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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Eligibility and benefit levels in the federal food stamp program are determined on a “household” rather than an individual basis. The statutory definition of the term “household,” as amended in 1981 and 1982, generally treats parents, children, and siblings who live together as a single household, but does not treat more distant relatives, or groups of unrelated persons who live together, as a single household unless they also customarily purchase food and prepare meals together. Although there are variations in the facts of the four cases that were consolidated in the District Court, they all raise the question whether the statutory distinction between parents, children, and siblings, and all other groups of individuals violates the guarantee of equal treatment in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
l-H
Appellees are families who generally buy their food and prepare their meals as separate economic units; each family will either lose its benefits or have its food stamp allotment decreased as a result of the 1981 and 1982 amendments. Moreover, as appellees’ counsel eloquently explained, in each case the loss or reduction of benefits will impose a severe hardship on a needy family, and may be especially harmful to the affected young children for whom an adequate diet is essential.
Appellees accordingly filed these lawsuits to invalidate the 1981 and 1982 amendments and to be treated as separate households for the purpose of determining eligibility and allotment of food stamps. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court considered the merits of appel-lees’ challenge to the constitutionality of the “household” definition.
The District Court was persuaded that the statutory definition had a rational basis. It observed that the amendment made it more difficult for individuals who live together to “manipulate” the rules “so as to obtain separate household status and receive greater benefits”; that the administrative burden of “attempting to make individual household determinations as to ‘household’ status” was time consuming; and that unrelated persons who live together for reasons of economy or health are more likely “ ‘to actually be separate households’ ” than related families who live together. App. to Juris. Statement 5a-6a. It held, however, that “a stricter standard of review than the ‘rational basis’ test” was required. Id., at 7a. Relying primarily on United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 534 (1973), a case which it construed as holding that a “congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group” could not justify the exclusion of household groups which contained unrelated persons, the District Court reasoned that “if the Supreme Court is willing to protect unpopular political groups it should even be more willing to protect the traditional family value of living together.” App. to Juris. Statement 8a.
We noted probable jurisdiction, 474 U. S. 994 (1985), and now reverse.
II
The District Court erred in judging the constitutionality of the statutory distinction under “heightened scrutiny.” The disadvantaged class is that comprised by parents, children, and siblings. Close relatives are not a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class. As a historical matter, they have not been subjected to discrimination; they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; and they are not a minority or politically powerless. See, e. g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 313-314 (1976) (-per curiam). In fact, quite the contrary is true.
Nor does the statutory classification “directly and substantially” interfere with family living arrangements and thereby burden a fundamental right. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 386-387, and n. 12 (1978). See id., at 403-404 (Stevens, J., concurring); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 58 (1977). The “household” definition does not order or prevent any group of persons from dining together. Indeed, in the overwhelming majority of cases it probably has no effect at all. It is exceedingly unlikely that close relatives would choose to live apart simply to increase their allotment of food stamps, for the cost of separate housing would almost certainly exceed the incremental value of the additional stamps. See 50 Fed. Reg. 36641, 36642 (1985). Thus, just as in United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno — the decision which the District Court read to require “heightened scrutiny” — the “legislative classification must be sustained if the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.” 413 U. S., at 533. See id., at 533-538.
Under the proper standard of review, we agree with the District Court that Congress had a rational basis both for treating parents, children, and siblings who live together as a single “household,” and for applying a different standard in determining whether groups of more distant relatives and unrelated persons living together constitute a “household.”
As a general matter, the economies of scale that may be realized in group purchase and preparation of food surely justified Congress in providing additional food stamp benefits to households that could not achieve such efficiencies. Moreover, the Legislature’s recognition of the potential for mistake and fraud and the cost-ineffectiveness of case-by-ease verification of claims that individuals ate as separate households unquestionably warrants the use of general definitions in this area.
The question that remains is whether Congress could accommodate the wishes of distant relatives and unrelated individuals to dine separately without invidiously discriminating against close relatives. The question, in other words, is whether Congress could “[l]imi[t] the availability of the ‘purchase and prepare food separately’ rule to those most likely to actually be separate households, although living together with others for reasons of economy or health (i. e., [distant relatives and] unrelated persons).” S. Rep. No. 97-504, p. 25 (1982).
So stated, the justification for the statutory classification is obvious. Congress could reasonably determine that close relatives sharing a home — almost by definition — tend to purchase and prepare meals together while distant relatives and unrelated individuals might not be so inclined. In that event, even though close relatives are undoubtedly as honest as other food stamp recipients, the potential for mistaken or misstated claims of separate dining would be greater in the case of close relatives than would be true for those with weaker communal ties, simply because a greater percentage of the former category in fact prepare meals jointly than the comparable percentage in the latter category. The additional fact that close relatives represent by far the largest proportion of food stamp recipients might well have convinced Congress that limited funds would not permit the accommodation given distant relatives and unrelated persons to be stretched to embrace close relatives as well. Finally, Congress might have reasoned that it would be somewhat easier for close relatives — again, almost by definition — to accommodate their living habits to a federal policy favoring common meal preparation than it would be for more distant relatives or unrelated persons to do so. Because of these differences, we are persuaded that Congress could rationally conclude that the two categories merited differential treatment. Neither the decision to take “one step” in 1981— when the rule was applied to parents and children — nor the' decision to take a second step in 1982, when the rule was extended to siblings as well — was irrational because Congress did not simultaneously take a third step that would apply to the entire food stamp program.
The judgment of the District Court is therefore
Reversed.
Section 3(i) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 703, as redesig-nated and amended, 7 U. S. C. § 2012(i), provides in part:
"‘Household' means (1) an individual who lives alone or who, while living with others, customarily purchases foods and prepares meals for home consumption separate and apart from the others, or (2) a group of individuals who live together and customarily purchase food and prepare meals together for home consumption; except that parents and children, or siblings, who live together shall be treated as a group of individuals who customarily purchase and prepare meals together for home consumption even if they do not do so, unless one of the parents, or siblings, is an elderly or disabled member.”
The italicized language was added to the definition by § 101(1) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 358. The clause extending the proviso to siblings, which appears in boldface, was added by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-253, 96 Stat. 772.
“The federal sovereign, like the States, must govern impartially. The concept of equal justice under law is served by the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, as well as by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 100 (1976). Accord, e. g., United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 533, n. 5 (1973); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 (1954).
In United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, we held that the definition of the term “household” in the Food Stamp Act as amended in 1971, 84 Stat. 2048, was unconstitutional. That definition drew a distinction between households composed entirely of persons who are related to one another and households containing one or more members who are unrelated to the rest. Unlike the present statute, the 1971 definition completely disqualified all households in the latter category. Not only were all groups of unrelated persons ineligible for benefits, but even groups of related persons would lose their benefits if they admitted one nonrelative to their household. We concluded that this definition did not further the interest in preventing fraud, or any other legitimate purpose of the Food Stamp Program.
“Thus, in practical operation, the 1971 amendment excludes from participation in the food stamp program, not those persons who are ‘likely to abuse the program’ but, rather, only those persons who are so desperately in need of aid that they cannot even afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their eligibility.” 413 U. S., at 538.
The House Committee Report on the Food Stamp Act of 1977 made this reference to the 1971 amendment invalidated in Moreno:
“This proviso was essentially an attempt to ban food stamp participation by communal households (so-called ‘hippie communes’). In 1973 the Supreme Court in Moreno v. U. S. Department of Agriculture, 413 U. S. 528, upheld an earlier ruling by a lower court to the effect that this provision was unconstitutional. It had been implemented for only a brief period in a few states.” H. R. Rep. No. 95-464, p. 140 (1977).
The 1971 definition was, therefore, “wholly without any rational basis” and “invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” 413 U. S., at 538.
See S. Rep. No. 97-504, p. 24 (1982) (“Because of economics of scale, small (one-, two-, and three-person) households are provided more food stamps per person than larger households. For example, current benefit levels are $70 for 1-, $128 for 2-, $183 for 3-person households”); S. Rep. No. 97-128, p. 31 (1981) (“It should be noted that because of economics of scale, small (one, two, or three persons) households are provided more food stamps per person than larger households — for example, $70 for one, $128 for two, $183 for three, and $233 for four”).
See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 97-504, p. 25 (1982) (“Thus, for larger households that are able to fragment into separate, smaller households simply by purchasing and preparing food separately, or claiming to do so, benefits can be significantly increased. In 1981, Congress took a first step toward limiting this potential manipulation of food stamp rules by requiring that parents and children living together apply together, except for elderly or disabled parents. This year’s Committee proposal would take the next logical step”); H. R. Rep. No. 97-106, pp. 118-119 (1981) (“Currently, the program definition of household states, in part, that a household may consist of an individual or group of individuals who, while living with others, customarily purchase food and prepare meals for home consumption separate and apart from others. This can result in some closely related individuals claiming separate household status for purposes of obtaining food stamp benefits to which they would not otherwise be entitled. For example, an individual over 18 years old, who is living with his parents and has no visible means of support, could be eligible to participate, even though his parents would not be eligible, if the individual were to claim separate household status and indicate that he has zero gross income. The individual could, under existing law, be certified as a separate household, although in fact he was being supported by his parents”); S. Rep. No. 97-128, p. 31 (1981) (“[Cjurrent law . . . enables large households to fragment into separate households, resulting] in increased food stamp benefits”); S. Rep. No. 97-139, pp. 52-53 (1981) (“Under present law, family units may apply as separate households and receive larger benefits if they claim to purchase food and prepare meals separately, even though the children are totally supported by the parents”).
“Limiting the availability of the ‘purchase and prepare food separately’ rule to those most likely to actually be separate households, although living together with others for reasons of economy or health (i. e., unrelated persons and the elderly or disabled), would place a reasonable control on a situation that State and local administrators have identified as one which r[e]quires congressional action. In fact, tightening of the household definition was the leading recommendation for change made in response to a recent survey by the Committee. Suggestions for revision were received from Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, and numerous local administrators, including several who testified before the Committee.
“A further problem with the existing household definition occurs when members of a household ‘claim’ to purchase and prepare food separately, but, in fact, do not. Verification of a household’s claim can be difficult and administratively burdensome as noted in the following examples from State administrators.” S. Rep. No. 97-604, pp. 24-25 (1982).
See, e. g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47, 53 (1977) (“General rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases”); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485 (1970) (“ ‘The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require rough accommodations — illogical, it may be, and unscientific’ ” (quoting Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70 (1913))). See also, e. g., Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U. S. 181, 189 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 785 (1975).
Although the origin of the distinction is not entirely clear, the Report of the House Agriculture Committee suggests that its decision not to “ex-pan[d] the single household concept to the entire ease load, requiring all individuals living in the same home to be treated as one household,” was based on its concern over “the impact of the amendment upon various types of living arrangements.” H. R. Rep. No. 97-106, p. 256 (1981).
Cf. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Economic Characteristics of Households in the United States: Fourth Quarter 1984, pp. 24, 34 (1986) (statistical table indicating that more than 87% of households receiving food stamps are families related by blood, marriage, or adoption who live and eat together); U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Economic Characteristics of Households in the United States: Third Quarter 1984, pp. 26, 36 (1985) (same); U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Economic Characteristics of Households in the United States: Second Quarter 1984, pp. 26, 36 (1985) (same); U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Economic Characteristics of Households in the United States: First Quarter 1984, pp. 26, 36 (1985) (same).
“[A]n open-ended rule that allows most or all households to fragment simply by changing food purchasing and eating habits is too subject to manipulation.” S. Rep. No. 97-504, p. 25 (1982). Even a small percentage of error — given the millions of families involved and the fact that Congress believed that almost all of them could purchase food jointly— could result in the improper expenditure of many millions of dollars. See Budget of the United States Government FY 1985, p. 8-43 (in 1983, approximately 21 million participants received food stamp assistance valued at nearly $12 billion); U. S. Dept, of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1985, pp. 122-123 (105th ed.) (same). Congress “expect[ed] that eligibility workers could effectively question claims” of “ ‘separateness’ ” submitted by distant relatives and unrelated individuals. S. Rep. No. 97-504, p. 26 (1982).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner James Zobrest, who has been deaf since birth, asked respondent school district to provide a sign-language interpreter to accompany him to classes at a Roman Catholic high school in Tucson, Arizona, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U. S. C. § 1400 et seq., and its Arizona counterpart, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-761 et seq. (1991 and Supp. 1992). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided, however, that provision of such a publicly employed interpreter would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. We hold that the Establishment Clause does not bar the school district from providing the requested interpreter.
James Zobrest attended grades one through five in a school for the deaf, and grades six through eight in a public school operated by respondent. While he attended public school, respondent furnished him with a sign-language interpreter. For religious reasons, James’ parents (also petitioners here) enrolled him for the ninth grade in Salpointe Catholic High School, a sectarian institution. When petitioners requested that respondent supply James with an interpreter at Salpointe, respondent referred the matter to the county attorney, who concluded that providing an interpreter on the school’s premises would violate the United States Constitution. App. 10-18. Pursuant to Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-253(B) (1991), the question next was referred to the Arizona attorney general, who concurred.in the county attorney’s opinion. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-137. Respondent accordingly declined to provide the requested interpreter.
Petitioners then instituted this action in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona under 20 U. S. C. § 1415(e)(4)(A), which grants the district courts jurisdiction over disputes regarding the services due disabled children under the IDEA. Petitioners asserted that the IDEA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment require respondent to provide James with an interpreter at Salpointe, and that the Establishment Clause does not bar such relief. The complaint sought a preliminary injunction and “such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.” App. 25. The District Court denied petitioners’ request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the provision of an interpreter at Salpointe would likely offend the Establishment Clause. Id., at 52-53. The court thereafter granted respondent summary judgment, on the ground that “[t]he interpreter would act as a conduit for the religious inculcation of James — thereby, promoting James’ religious development at government expense.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-35. “That kind of entanglement of church and state,” the District Court concluded, “is not allowed.” Ibid.
The Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote, 963 F. 2d 1190 (CA9 1992), applying the three-part test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 613 (1971). It first found that the IDEA has a clear secular purpose: “ ‘to assist States and Localities to provide for the education of all handicapped children.’” 963 F. 2d, at 1193 (quoting 20 U. S. C. § 1400(c)). Turning to the second prong of the Lemon inquiry, though, the Court of Appeals determined that the IDEA, if applied as petitioners proposed, would have the primary effect of advancing religion and thus would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. “By placing its employee in the sectarian school,” the Court of Appeals reasoned, “the government would create the appearance that it was a ‘joint sponsor’ of the school’s activities.” 963 F. 2d, at 1194-1195. This, the court held, would create the “symbolic union of government and religion” found impermissible in School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 392 (1985). In contrast, the dissenting judge argued that “[gjeneral welfare programs neutrally available to all children,” such as the IDEA, pass constitutional muster, “because their benefits diffuse over the entire population.” 963 F. 2d, at 1199 (opinion of Tang, J.). We granted certiorari, 506 U. S. 813 (1992), and now reverse.
Respondent has raised in its brief in opposition to certiorari and in isolated passages in its brief on the merits several issues unrelated to the Establishment Clause question. Respondent first argues that 34 CFR § 76.532(a)(1) (1992), a regulation promulgated under the IDEA, precludes it from using federal funds to provide an interpreter to James at Salpointe. Brief in Opposition 13. In the alternative, respondent claims that even if there is no affirmative bar to the relief, it is not required by statute or regulation to furnish interpreters to students at sectarian schools. Brief for Respondent 4, n. 4. And respondent adds that providing such a service would offend Art. II, § 12, of the Arizona Constitution. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28.
It is a familiar principle of our jurisprudence that federal courts will not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the Act is fairly possible by which the constitutional question can be avoided. See, e. g., United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 92 (1985), and cases cited therein. In Locke, a case coming here by appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 (1982 ed.), we said that such an appeal “brings before this Court not merely the constitutional question decided below, but the entire case.” 471 U. S., at 92. “The entire case,” we explained, “includes nonconstitutional questions actually decided by the lower court as well as nonconstitutional grounds presented to, but not passed on, by the lower court.” Ibid. Therefore, in that case, we turned “first to the nonconstitutional questions pressed below.” Ibid.
Here, in contrast to Locke and other cases applying the prudential rule of avoiding constitutional questions, only First Amendment questions were pressed in the Court of Appeals. In the opening paragraph of its opinion, the Court of Appeals noted that petitioners’ appeal raised only First Amendment issues:
“The Zobrests appeal the district court’s ruling that provision of a state-paid sign language interpreter to James Zobrest while he attends a sectarian high school would violate the Establishment Clause. The Zobrests also argue that denial of such assistance violates the Free Exercise Clause.” 963 F. 2d, at 1191.
Respondent did not urge any statutory grounds for affirmance upon the Court of Appeals, and thus the Court of Appeals decided only the federal constitutional claims raised by petitioners. In the District Court, too, the parties chose to litigate the case on the federal constitutional issues alone. “Both parties’ motions for summary judgment raised only federal constitutional issues.” Brief for Respondent 4, n. 4. Accordingly, the District Court’s order granting respondent summary judgment addressed only the Establishment Clause question. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-35.
Given this posture of the case, we think the prudential rule of avoiding constitutional questions has no application. The fact that there may be buried in the record a nonconstitutional ground for decision is not by itself enough to invoke this rule. See, e. g., Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U. S. 569, 572 (1987). “Where issues are neither raised before nor considered by the Court of Appeals, this Court will not ordinarily consider them.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 147, n. 2 (1970). We therefore turn to the merits of the constitutional claim.
We have never said that “religious institutions are disabled by the First Amendment from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare programs.” Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 609 (1988). For if the Establishment Clause did bar religious groups from receiving general government benefits, then “a church could not be protected by the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair.” Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274-275 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given that a contrary rule would lead to such absurd results, we have consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit. Nowhere have we stated this principle more clearly than in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388 (1983), and Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for Blind, 474 U. S. 481 (1986), two cases dealing specifically with government programs offering general educational assistance.
In Mueller, we rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a Minnesota law allowing taxpayers to deduct certain educational expenses in computing their state income tax, even though the vast majority of those deductions (perhaps over 90%) went to parents whose children attended sectarian schools. See 463 U. S., at 401; id., at 405 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Two factors, aside from States’ traditionally broad taxing authority, informed our decision. See Witters, supra, at 491 (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing Mueller). We noted that the law “permits all parents — whether their children attend public school or private — to deduct their children’s educational expenses.” 463 U. S., at 398 (emphasis in original). See also Widmar, supra, at 274 (“The provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of groups is an important index of secular effect”); Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226, 248 (1990) (plurality opinion) (same). We also pointed out that under Minnesota’s scheme, public funds become available to sectarian schools “only as a result of numerous private choices of individual parents of school-age children,” thus distinguishing Mueller from our other cases involving “the direct transmission of assistance from the State to the schools themselves.” 463 U. S., at 399.
Witters was premised on virtually identical reasoning. In that case, we upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge the State of Washington’s extension of vocational assistance, as part of a general state program, to a blind person studying at a private Christian college to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director. Looking at the statute as a whole, we observed that “[a]ny aid provided under Washington’s program that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.” 474 U. S., at 487. The program, we said, “creates no financial incentive for students to undertake sectarian education.” Id., at 488. We also remarked that, much like the law in Mueller, “Washington’s program is ‘made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited.’” Witters, supra, at 487 (quoting Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 782-783, n. 38 (1973)). In light of these factors, we held that Washington’s program — even as applied to a student who sought state assistance so that he could become a pastor — would not advance religion in a manner inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. Witters, supra, at 489.
That same reasoning applies with equal force here. The service at issue in this case is part of a general government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as “disabled” under the IDEA, without regard to the “sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature” of the school the child attends. By according parents freedom to select a school of their choice, the statute ensures that a government-paid interpreter will be present in a sectarian school only as a result of the private decision of individual parents. In other words, because the IDEA creates no financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school, an interpreter’s presence there cannot be attributed to state decisionmaking. Viewed against the backdrop of Mueller and Witters, then, the Court of Appeals erred in its decision. When the government offers a neutral service on the premises of a sectarian school as part of a general program that “is in no way skewed towards religion,” Witters, supra, at 488, it follows under our prior decisions that provision of that service does not offend the Establishment Clause. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 244 (1977). Indeed, this is an even easier case than Mueller and Witters in the sense that, under the IDEA, no funds traceable to the government ever find their way into sectarian schools’ coffers. The only indirect economic benefit a sectarian school might receive by dint of the IDEA is the disabled child’s tuition — and that is, of course, assuming that the school makes a profit on each student; that, without an IDEA interpreter, the child would have gone to school elsewhere; and that the school, then, would have been unable to fill that child’s spot.
Respondent contends, however, that this case differs from Mueller and Witters, in that petitioners seek to have a public employee physically present in a sectarian school to assist in James’ religious education. In light of this distinction, respondent argues that this case more closely resembles Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 (1975), and School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373 (1985). In Meek, we struck down a statute that, inter alia, provided “massive aid” to private schools — more than 75% of which were church related — through a direct loan of teaching material and equipment. 421 U. S., at 364-365. The material and equipment covered by the statute included maps, charts, and tape recorders. Id., at 355. According to respondent, if the government could not place a tape recorder in a sectarian school in Meek, then it surely cannot place an interpreter in Salpointe. The statute in Meek also authorized state-paid personnel to furnish “auxiliary services” — which included remedial and accelerated instruction and guidance counseling — on the premises of religious schools. We determined that this part of the statute offended the First Amendment as well. Id., at 372. Ball similarly involved two public programs that provided services on private school premises; there, public employees taught classes to students in private school classrooms. 473 U. S., at 375. We found that those programs likewise violated the Constitution, relying largely on Meek. 473 U. S., at 386-389. According to respondent, if the government could not provide educational services on the premises of sectarian schools in Meek and Ball, then it surely cannot provide James with an interpreter on the premises of Salpointe.
Respondent’s reliance on Meek and Ball is misplaced for two reasons. First, the programs in Meek and Ball— through direct grants of government aid — relieved sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in educating their students. See Witters, 474 U. S., at 487 (“[Tjhe State may not grant aid to a religious school, whether cash or in kind, where the effect of the aid is ‘that of a direct subsidy to the religious school’ from the State”) (quoting Ball, supra, at 394). For example, thé religious schools in Meek received teaching material and equipment from the State, relieving them of an otherwise necessary cost of performing their educational function. 421 U. S., at 365-366. “Substantial aid to the educational function of such schools,” we explained, “necessarily results in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole,” and therefore brings about “the direct and substantial advancement of religious activity.” Id., at 366. So, too, was the case in Ball: The programs challenged there, which provided teachers in addition to instructional equipment and material, “in effect subsidize[d] the religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a substantial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects.” 473 U. S., at 397. “This kind of direct aid,” we determined, “is indistinguishable from the provision of a direct cash subsidy to the religious school.” Id., at 395. The extension of aid to petitioners, however, does not amount to “an impermissible ‘direct subsidy’” of Salpointe, Witters, supra, at 487, for Salpointe is not relieved of an expense that it otherwise would have assumed in educating its students. And, as we noted above, any attenuated financial benefit that parochial schools do ultimately receive from the IDEA is attributable to “the private choices of individual parents.” Mueller, 463 U. S., at 400. Disabled children, not sectarian schools, are the primary beneficiaries of the IDEA; to the extent sectarian schools benefit at all from the IDEA, they are only incidental beneficiaries. Thus, the function of the IDEA is hardly “ ‘to provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions.’” Witters, supra, at 488 (quoting Nyquist, supra, at 783).
Second, the task of a sign-language interpreter seems to us quite different from that of a teacher or guidance counselor. Notwithstanding the Court of Appeals’ intimations to the contrary, see 963 F. 2d, at 1195, the Establishment Clause lays down no absolute bar to the placing of a public employee in a sectarian school. Such a flat rule, smacking of antiquated notions of “taint,” would indeed exalt form over substance. Nothing in this record suggests that a sign-language interpreter would do more than accurately interpret whatever material is presented to the class as a whole. In fact, ethical guidelines require interpreters to “transmit everything that is said in exactly the same way it was intended.” App. 73. James’ parents have chosen of their own free will to place him in a pervasively sectarian environment. The sign-language interpreter they have requested will neither add to nor subtract from that environment, and hence the provision of súch assistance is not barred by the Establishment Clause.
The IDEA creates a neutral government program dispensing aid not to schools but to individual handicapped children. If a handicapped child chooses to enroll in a sectarian school, we hold that the Establishment Clause does not prevent the school district from furnishing him with a sign-language interpreter there in order to facilitate his education. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
The parties have stipulated: “The two functions of secular education and advancement of religious values or beliefs are inextricably intertwined throughout the operations of Salpointe.” App. 92.
The parties agreed that exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile here. Id., at 94-95.
During the pendency of this litigation, James completed his high school studies and graduated from Salpointe on May 16, 1992. This case nonetheless presents a continuing controversy, since petitioners seek reimbursement for the cost they incurred in hiring their own interpreter, more than $7,000 per year. Id., at 65.
Respondent now concedes that “the IDEA has an appropriate ‘secular purpose.’” Brief for Respondent 16.
The Court of Appeals also rejected petitioners’ Free Exercise Clause claim. 963 F. 2d, at 1196-1197. Petitioners have not challenged that part of the decision below. Pet. for Cert. 10, n. 9.
Respondent may well have waived these other defenses. For in response to an interrogatory asking why it had refused to provide the requested service, respondent referred only to the putative Establishment Clause bar. App. 59-60.
That regulation prohibits the use of federal funds to pay for “[r]eligious worship, instruction, or proselytization.” 34 CFR § 76.532(a)(1) (1992). The United States asserts that the regulation merely implements the Secretary of Education’s understanding of (and thus is coextensive with) the requirements of the Establishment Clause. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Witters v. Dept. of Services for Blind, O. T. 1985, No. 84-1070, p. 21, n. 11 (“These regulations are based on the Department’s interpretation of constitutional requirements”). This interpretation seems persuasive to us. The only authority cited by the Secretary for issuance of the regulation is his general rulemaking power. See 34 CFR § 76.532 (1992) (citing 20 U. S. C. §§ 1221e-3(a)(1), 2831(a), and 2974(b)). Though the Fourth Circuit placed a different interpretation on §76.532 in Goodall v. Stafford County School Board, 930 F. 2d 363, 369 (holding that the regulation prohibits the provision of an interpreter to a student in a sectarian school), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 864 (1991), that court did not have the benefit of the United States’ views.
In our view, this belated contention is entitled to little, if any, weight here given respondent’s repeated concession that, but for the perceived federal constitutional bar, it would have willingly provided James with an interpreter at Salpointe as a matter of local policy. See, e. g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 31 (“We don’t deny that ... we would have voluntarily done that. The only concern that came up at the time was the Establishment Clause concern”).
Forty of the forty-one private schools involved in Ball were pervasively sectarian. 473 U. S., at 384-385.
For instance, in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 242 (1977), we made clear that “the provision of health services to all schoolchildren — public and nonpublic — does not have the primary effect of aiding religion,” even when those services are provided within sectarian schools. We accordingly rejected a First Amendment challenge to the State’s providing diagnostic speech and hearing services on sectarian school premises. Id., at 244; see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 371, n. 21 (1975).
Indeed, respondent readily admits, as it must, that there would be no problem under the Establishment Clause if the IDEA funds instead went directly to James’ parents, who, in turn, hired the interpreter themselves. Brief for Respondent 11 (“If such were the case, then the sign language interpreter would be the student’s employee, not the School District’s, and governmental involvement in the enterprise would end with the disbursement of hinds”).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellee Orito was charged in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin with a violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1462 in that he did “knowingly transport and carry in interstate commerce from San Francisco ... to Milwaukee ... by means of a common carrier, that is, Trans-World Airlines and North Central Airlines, copies of [specified] obscene, lewd, lascivious, and filthy materials . . . .” The materials specified included some 83 reels of film, with as many as eight to 10 copies of some of the films. Appellee moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the statute violated his First and Ninth Amendment rights. The District Court granted his motion, holding that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad since it failed to distinguish between “public” and “non-public” transportation of obscene material. The District Court interpreted this Court’s decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 (1967); and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), to establish the proposition that “non-public transportation” of obscene material was constitutionally protected.
Although the District Court held the statute void on its face- for overbreadth, it is not clear whether the statute was held to be overbroad because it covered transportation intended solely for the private use of the transporter, or because, regardless of the intended use of the material, the statute extended to “private carriage” or “nonpublic” transportation which in itself involved no risk of exposure to children or unwilling adults. The United States brought this direct appeal under former 18 U. S. C. § 3731 (1964 ed.) now amended, Pub. L. 91-644, § 14 (a), 84 Stat. 1890. See United States v. Spector, 343 U. S. 169, 171 (1952).
The District Court erred in striking down 18 U. S. C. § 1462 and dismissing appellee’s indictment on these “privacy” grounds. The essence of appellee’s contentions is that Stanley has firmly established the right to possess obscene material in the privacy of the home and that this creates a correlative right to receive it, transport it, or distribute it. We have rejected that reasoning. This case was decided by the District Court before our decisions in United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363 (1971), and United States v. Reidel, 402 U. S. 351 (1971). Those holdings negate the idea that some zone of constitutionally protected privacy follows such material when it is moved outside the home area protected by Stanley. United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, supra, at 376 (opinion of White, .J.). United States v. Reidel, supra, at 354-356. See United States v. Zacher, 332 F. Supp. 883, 885-886 (ED Wis. 1971). But cf. United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, supra, at 379 (Stewart, J., concurring).
The Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home, just as it protects other special privacy rights such as those of marriage, procreation, motherhood, child rearing, and education. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438, 453-454 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, at 486; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925). But viewing obscene films in a commercial theater open to the adult public, see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, ante, at 65-67, or transporting such films in common carriers in interstate commerce, has no claim to such special consideration. It is hardly necessary to catalog the myriad activities that may be lawfully conducted within the privacy and confines of the home, but may be prohibited in public. The Court has consistently rejected constitutional protection for obscene material outside the home. See United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, ante, at 126-129; Miller v. California, ante, at 23; United States v. Reidel, supra, at 354-356 (opinion of White, J.); id., at 357-360 (Harlan, J., concurring); Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 484 — 485 (1957).
Given (a) that obscene material is not protected under the First Amendment, Miller v. California, supra; Roth v. United States, supra, (b) that the Government has a legitimate interest in protecting the public commercial environment by preventing such material from entering the stream of commerce, see Paris Adult Theatre I, ante, at 57-64, and (c) that no constitutionally protected privacy is involved, United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, supra, at 376 (opinion of White, J.), we cannot say that the Constitution forbids comprehensive federal regulation of interstate transportation of obscene material-merely because such transport may be by private carriage, or because the material is intended for the private use of the transporter. That the transporter has an abstract proprietary power to shield the obscene material from all others and to guard the material with the same privacy as in the home is not controlling. Congress may regulate on the basis of the natural tendency of material in the home being kept private and the contrary tendency once material leaves that area, regardless of a transporter’s professed intent. Congress could reasonably determine such regulation to be necessary to effect permissible federal control of interstate commerce in obscene material, based as that regulation is on a legislatively determined risk of ultimate exposure to juveniles or to the public and the harm that exposure could cause. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, ante, at 57-63. See also United States v. Alpers, 338 U. S. 680, 681-685 (1950); Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432, 436-437 (1925); Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325, 329-330 (1915). "The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no control. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27; Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U. S. 506, 513 and cases cited.” United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 115 (1941). “It is sufficient to reiterate the well-settled principle that Congress may impose relevant conditions and requirements on those who use the channels of interstate commerce in order that those channels will not become the means of promoting or spreading evil, whether of a physical, moral or economic nature.” North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U. S. 686, 705 (1946).
As this case came to us on the District Court’s summary dismissal of the indictment, no determination of the obscenity of the material involved has been made. Today, for the first time since Roth v. United States, supra, we have arrived at standards accepted by a majority of this Court for distinguishing obscene material, unprotected by the First Amendment, from protected free speech. See Miller v. California, ante, at 23-25; United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, ante, at 130 n. 7. The decision of the District Court is therefore vacated and the case is remanded for reconsideration of the sufficiency of the indictment in light of Miller v. California, supra; United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels, supra; and this opinion.
Vacated and remanded.
Title 18 U. S. C. § 1462 provides in pertinent part:
“Whoever brings into the United States, or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or knowingly uses any express company or other common carrier, for carriage in interstate or foreign commerce—
“(a) any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character; . . .
“Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for the first such offense and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, for each such offense thereafter.”
Appellee also moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that 18 U. S. C. § 1462 does not require proof of scienter. That issue was not reached by the District Court and is not before us now.
The District Court stated:
“By analogy, it follows that with the right to read obscene matters comes the right to transport or to receive such material when done in a fashion that does not pander it or impose it upon unwilling adults or upon minors.
“I find no meaningful distinction between the private possession which was held to be protected in Stanley and the non-public transportation which the statute at bar proscribes.” 338 F. Supp. 308, 310 (1970).
“These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the case before us. He is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases — the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 565 (1969). (Emphasis added.)
The Solicitor General indicates that the tariffs of most, if not all, common carriers include a right of inspection. Resorting to common carriers, like entering a place of public accommodation, does not involve the privacies associated with the home. See United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 376 (1971) (opinion of White, J.); United States v. Reidel, 402 U. S. 351, 359-360 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Poe v. UUman, 367 U. S. 497, 551-552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Miller v. United States, 431 F. 2d 655, 657 (CA9 1970); United States v. Melvin, 419 F. 2d 136, 139 (CA4 1969).
“Congress can certainly regulate interstate commerce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of such commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty or the spread of any evil or harm to the people of other States from the State of origin. In doing this it is merely exercising the police power, for the benefit of the public, within the field of interstate commerce. ... In the Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, it was held that Congress might pass a law punishing the transmission of lottery tickets from one State to another, in order to prevent the carriage of those tickets to be sold in other States and thus demoralize, through a spread of the gambling habit, individuals who were likely to purchase. ... In Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308 and Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, the so-called White Slave Traffic Act, which was construed to punish any person engaged in enticing a woman from one State to another for immoral ends, whether for commercial purposes or otherwise, was valid because it was intended to prevent the use of interstate commerce to facilitate prostitution or concubinage, and other forms of immorality. ... In Weber v. Freed, 239 U. S. 325, it was held that Congress had power to prohibit the importation of pictorial representations of prize fights designed for public exhibition, because of the demoralizing effect of such exhibitions in the State of destination.” Brooks v. United, States, 267 U. S. 432, 436-437 (1925).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases represent the latest stage of the litigation arising from the merger of the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads, which we upheld two Terms ago in the Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U. S. 486. A condition of that merger was Penn Central’s promise to take in the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company as an operating entity — a promise that Penn Central fulfilled on December 31, 1968, 11 months after its own formation. The ultimate question presented by the cases now before us is the price Penn Central must pay for the assets of the New Haven.
I
1. The Penn Central. The proposed combination of the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads first came under consideration by the parties and the Interstate Commerce Commission more than 12 years ago, a decade prior to its eventual consummation. The two railroads formally sought permission to merge under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., on March 9, 1962. On April 6, 1966, the Commission authorized the merger of the two roads. The union of the two carriers was the largest railroad merger in the history of the Nation, bringing together the companies that “dominate rail transportation in the Northeast.” In 1965 the component roads enjoyed a total operating revenue in excess of $1,500,000,000 and a net annual income of over $75,000,000. The two companies held some $72,000,000 in working capital and $1,242,000,000 in combined investments. With, about 19,600 miles of road “sprawling between the Great Lakes on the north... and the Ohio and Potomac Rivers on the south,” Penn Central was at its inception nearly twice the size of the next largest railroad system in the East and three times that of the third largest.
The predicted economies effected by the merger were likewise enormous; it was thought that within about eight years of the combination they would exceed $80,000,000 annually. Those savings represented a value, capitalized at 8%, of $1,000,000,000.
On June 9, 1967, after considerable litigation involving protective conditions for various affected railroad competitors, the Commission issued a modified order authorizing the Penn-Central merger. On October 19, 1967, a court of three judges, convened in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to review the Commission’s order pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1336, 2284, and 2321-2325, upheld the Commission’s action. On January 15, 1968, this Court affirmed with minor modifications, and thereby sustained the validity of the merger. Two weeks later, on February 1, 1968, Pennsylvania and New York Central merged.
2. The New Haven. The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad is now an operating division of the Penn Central system. At the time of the merger, however, it was an independent Class I railroad operating some 1,500 miles of line in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the States of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York; as such, it was the sixth largest railroad in the northeast region and the largest in New England. With an operations area extending from Boston to New York and connecting with nine other Class I railroads, the New Haven served 12 cities of greater than 100,000 population, as well as a number of important defense establishments. In 1964 the railroad employed about 9,800 people and paid them annual wages amounting to $70,000,000. About 30,000 commuters used the line every day to reach work in New York City alone. As described by the Commission,
“The New Haven has both a large passenger and freight business. It is the fourth largest passenger carrying railroad in the United States, and has the second highest commuter revenue of all such roads.... The volume of its freight business... is substantially greater.... It is the largest freight railroad in New England and ranks tenth in freight traffic among all railroads in the eastern district.... Its freight service is considered to be of extreme importance to the industrial well-being of southern New England.”
The financial history of the New Haven was for decades a history of extreme vicissitudes. The company’s decline and fall, with passage into, out of, and back into railroad reorganization, have been chronicled elsewhere. It first went into reorganization under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 205, on October 23, 1935. Due in large measure to the difficulties of including formerly-leased lines in the reorganized road, nearly 12 years elapsed from the filing of the debtor’s petition in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut to that court’s eventual order approving consummation of the Commission’s plan of reorganization.
The railroad emerged from reorganization in 1947 with a vastly simplified debt structure in which only the most senior holders of secured interests survived. But in the following years the financial condition of the company again deteriorated, prompting it to seek at first partial and then total discontinuance of passenger service on the former Old Colony lines in Massachusetts. By 1959 the financial condition of the New Haven was such as to render the chance of surplus earnings “slight at best.” Through late 1960 and into early 1961 the company’s management expended great efforts to stave off bankruptcy by obtaining loans or grants from the Federal and State Governments. By the middle of 1961, current liabilities exceeded current assets by $36,310,000, and the company was losing cash at the annual rate of $18,000,000.
Finally, on July 7, 1961, the New Haven again petitioned for reorganization under § 77 in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, a step that the court was later to find had been far too long delayed:
“[I]n the interest of its creditors, its employees and the public [the railroad] should have petitioned... long before it did. The grave problems which... beset the reorganization would have been much less acute and infinitely more manageable if bankruptcy had not been put off until its cash was almost entirely depleted, credit was practically gone, maintenance was down and in all other respects the bottom was out of the barrel.”
Immediately upon their taking over the New Haven, the trustees appointed by the reorganization court were obliged to borrow $8,000,000 to meet the payroll. The situation did not improve with the passage of time. “[I]n spite of spartan economies and a sizeable reduction in numbers of employees, the costs of operation... offset savings and eroded away the accumulated cash.” On July 6, 1964, the New Haven trustees petitioned the Commission, pursuant to § 13a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 13a (2), for authority to discontinue suburban passenger train service in the Boston area. There followed a public hearing, an adjournment to afford Massachusetts authorities an opportunity — ultimately unavailing — to negotiate a contract with New' Haven for continuation of some service, and a motion by the New Haven for expedited disposition “by reason of the critical nature of New Haven’s finances, the irretrievable drain which the operations in question impose upon New Haven’s resources, and the increasing adverse effect which New Haven’s situation has upon the public interest and upon New Haven’s creditors... The Commission granted the trustees’ application, concluding that for a period beginning four years before the 1961 reorganization petition and continuing thereafter, New Haven’s financial condition had been “critical” and “drastically weak...
By 1965 it was evident that the New Haven was on the verge of collapse. Its year-end current assets amounted to $20,521,000, some $16,685,000 less than current liabilities plus long-term debt payments due within the coming year. The obligations payable after one year totaled $189,042,000. The retained income account showed a deficit of $81,672,000; the working capital account, a deficit of $16,700,000. For the year the net railway operating income showed a deficit of $16,000,000, with overall net income a deficit only $1,000,000 less. The company was in default in its payments of both principal and interest on its long-term debt. In the view of the trustees, New Haven was “absolutely faced with economic obsolescence if it continues as an independent, short-line, terminal railroad.”
On October 11, 1965, the New Haven notified the Commission, pursuant to § 13a (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U. S. C. § 13a (1), of its intention to discontinue all its interstate passenger trains effective March 1, 1966. If carried into effect, the proposed discontinuance would have drastically curtailed passenger train service in New York and Massachuetts, and ended it completely in Connecticut and Rhode Island. In the spring of 1966 the Commission, noting that over an 11-year period New Haven had experienced “an unending succession of reverses,” concluded that “[t]here now is totally lacking any hope or plan for future survival of this carrier, except that held out by its merger into a trunkline railroad.” The Commission acceded in part to the trustees’ notice of discontinuance, but invoked its statutory power to keep many of the trains in operation on the ground that “passenger as well as freight service by the N[ew] H[aven] is a national necessity and that termination of either would lead to distress in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, and would severely damage New York City and the Nation generally.”
As 1966 gave way to 1967, the New Haven’s situation deteriorated still further. As of April 1967 the reorganization court thought “the prospect for the continued operation of the Railroad was very dim.” The road lacked even a current expense fund from which to satisfy the “six months” creditors, and the court thought it “highly unlikely that there ever will be one.” In July 1967 the reorganization court found that the New Haven’s situation had become “desperately critical”; its cash depletion was “so serious that, if the present rate of loss continues, there will be insufficient left by late September to meet the payroll of approximately $1,400,000 per week.”
As 1967 came to an end, so did the New Haven’s cash reserve. By August 31 the cash balance fell to $4,500,000 — a precarious condition for a company requiring $1,750,000 a week simply to meet current operating expenses. The trustees estimated that as of December 31, 1967, the balance would decline to $3,100,000 and two months later would fall to $850,000. The New Haven’s financial position had thus eroded to the point where its shutdown was “imminent....”
3. The inclusion negotiations. From the outset of the § 77 proceeding in 1961, the trustees of the New Haven and the reorganization court charged with conservation of the debtor’s dwindling assets recognized that “a merger with a large trunk line railroad would be the most promising and feasible means of continuing the viability of the New Haven’s transportation system... In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 289 F. Supp. 451, 456; cf. 281 F. Supp. 65. After Pennsylvania and New York Central filed their merger application before the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1962, the New Haven trustees sought inclusion in the new company, both by private negotiations with the component roads and by a petition to the Commission filed June 26, 1962. See In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 378 F. 2d 635, 636; Merger Report, 327 I. C. C. 475, 480. As the reorganization court said, it was “apparent that the inclusion of the New Haven in the Penn-Central merger was the only salvation for the New Haven as an operating railroad....” In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 289 F. Supp., at 456; see also In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 304 F. Supp. 793, 800.
The Commission, as we have noted, authorized the merger of the two roads in 1966. But in so doing, it found that “[wjithout some radical change in circumstances, even if this merger application were denied, N[ew] H[aven] would face a nearly insuperable task in bringing itself out of bankruptcy.” Merger Report, 327 I. C. C., at 522. The Commission concluded that the proposed Penn-Central combination, “without complete inclusion of N[ew] H[aven], would not be consistent with the public interest....” Id., at 524. Accordingly, it required “all the New Haven railroad to be included in the applicants’ transaction,” and conditioned its approval of the merger upon that inclusion, id., at 524, 527. In so doing, the Commission spelled out Penn Central’s obligation toward New Haven in unequivocal language. Condition 8 of the Merger Report stipulated as follows:
“The Pennsylvania New York Central Transportation Company shall be required to include in the transaction all the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company... upon such fair and equitable terms as the parties may agree subject to the approval of the Bankruptcy Court and the Commission. Within 6 months after the date this report is served, the parties shall file with the Commission for its approval, a plan for such inclusion. In the event the parties are unable to reach an agreement (and subject to approval by the Bankruptcy Court) such inclusion shall be upon such fair and equitable terms and conditions as the Commission may impose.
“Jurisdiction is hereby reserved for such purposes. Consummation of the merger by applicants shall indicate their full and complete assent to these requirements.” 327 I. C. C., at 553.
Condition 16 of the Merger Report reiterated that
“Consummation of the transaction approved herein shall constitute on the part of The Pennsylvania Railroad Company and the New York Central Railroad Company, their successors and assigns, acquiescence in and assent to the conditions stated in this appendix and in the attached report.” Id., at 555.
Having determined to require the inclusion of New Haven in Penn Central as a condition of merger, the Commission remitted the parties to private negotiation of the terms of inclusion. Id., at 527. The New Haven trustees on the one side, and the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads on the other, had already been bargaining for some time, having drafted preliminary documents, dated December 22, 1964, and February 5, 1965, that provided for Penn Central’s assumption of New Haven’s freight operations. Oscar Gruss & Son v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 386, 393; Interstate Discontinuance Case, 327 I. C. C. 151, 175 n. 6. On April 21, 1966, two weeks after the Merger Report, they executed a Purchase Agreement for the transfer of substantially all the New Haven assets to Penn Central. Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U. S., at 508; see In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 378 F. 2d, at 636. The Purchase Agreement provided for the transfer of the New Haven properties to Penn Central, with the consideration in exchange to consist in part of cash and in part of stocks and bonds of Penn Central.
In September 1966 the trustees filed a petition with the reorganization court reciting the background of the negotiations with Penn Central, the New Haven’s large and growing deficits, and the insufficiency of internally generated cash to meet operating demands. In the trustees’ view, inclusion in Penn Central afforded “the only practicable means for reorganization of the Debtor that is consistent with the best interest of the public and of all parties interested in the Debtor’s estate,...” They submitted that operations should continue so long as inclusion was possible, and that the court should grant them leave to press for inclusion on the basis of the Purchase Agreement. In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 378 F. 2d, at 637. On October 24, 1966, the reorganization court authorized the trustees to present the Agreement to the Commission, noting that the goal of preserving the New Haven operations “has been the policy from the beginning of these proceedings....” Three days later the trustees and the Pennsylvania and New York Central railroads petitioned the Commission for approval of the New Haven’s inclusion on the terms of the Agreement.
On November 16, 1967, the Commission ratified the Purchase Agreement as the basis for the inclusion of New Haven in Penn Central. Pennsylvania R. Co.—Merger—New York Central R. Co., 331 I. C. C. 643 (“Second Supplemental Report”). It looked upon the fact that the parties had been able to reach agreement as an indication that even though the New Haven trustees were selling properties having no value as an operating entity, they nevertheless had enjoyed a degree of bargaining power by virtue of the requirement that Penn Central take in New Haven as a condition of the merger. 331 I. C. C., at 657. “[WJhere a transaction is bargained at arm’s length,” said the Commission, “each side is presumably capable of determining its own best interest, and our primary function is to discover whether the transaction will be in the public interest.” Id., at 656. The Commission then undertook its independent analysis of the value of the New Haven properties. Although the Purchase Agreement “carrie [d] some probative force as to the values of the properties involved, it [was] by no means controlling.” Id., at 657. The Commission must still determine the price “on the basis of all the evidence pertaining thereto, not merely the agreement and supporting evidence.” Id., at 660 n. 12.
Upon its independent review of the record, the Commission found that the asset value of the New Haven properties to be transferred to Penn Central and of the consideration to be given in exchange was $125,000,000. The Commission concluded that payment of that sum by Penn Central to the New Haven estate would be both “just and reasonable” as a condition of the merger under § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, and “fair and equitable” as part of a plan of reorganization under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. Unwilling to defer the, merger until inclusion could take place but recognizing that the danger of an end to all New Haven operations was “very real,” 331 I. C. C., at 654, the Commission authorized financial aid from Penn Central to prop up the debtor during the interim period between merger and inclusion to ensure New Haven’s continued functioning until its acquisition by Penn Central. See Penn-Central Merger Cases, 389 U. S., at 509.
4. The inclusion litigations. At this juncture the Commission’s determination of the terms of inclusion was subjected to simultaneous judicial review in two separate forums. On January 23, 1968, eight days after this Court’s approval of the merger and eight days before the merger itself, the New Haven bondholders commenced five actions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to set aside the Commission’s order. The three-judge District Court reconvened to hear the actions and shortly thereafter consolidated the five cases into one. On March 29, 1968, the Commission certified the first step of its plan for the reorganization of the New Haven — the sale of its assets to Penn Central — to the reorganization court. Pursuant to § 77(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. § 205(e), the New Haven bondholders filed their objections to the Commission’s plan following notice given by the reorganization court. Thus, the identical question of the price Penn Central would have to pay for the New Haven assets came at the same time before the three-judge District Court in New York and the single-judge District Court in Connecticut.
On July 10, 1968, the three-judge court, following extensive briefing and argument on the numerous issues underlying the price question, found itself unable to agree with the Commission in several major respects. It therefore vacated so much of the Commission’s order as found the terms of Penn Central’s acquisition of the New Haven’s assets to be just and reasonable and remanded the cause for further proceedings. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., First Mortgage 4% Bondholders’ Committee v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 418. On August 13, 1968, also after extensive briefing and argument, the reorganization court independently returned the Commission’s plan for further proceedings. In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 289 F. Supp. 451. On the overriding question of price, the two courts were in accord: by fixing the worth of the New Haven at $125,000,000, the Commission had substantially understated the value of the properties to be transferred. The three-judge court estimated the understatement to be on the order of $45,000,000 to $50,000,000; the reorganization court, $33,000,000 to $55,000,000. 289 F. Supp., at 440, 465.
Meanwhile, the continuing drain on the New Haven’s dwindling cash reserves called for — and received — drastic action. Upon remanding the Commission’s proposed plan under § 77, the reorganization court ruled that unless the Commission ordered inclusion by January 1, 1969, the court would entertain a motion to dismiss the reorganization proceedings, resulting in termination of all the New Haven’s train service. 289 F. Supp., at 459. The court recommended that the Commission direct the early inclusion of New Haven with a partial payment of the purchase price, deferring other issues to later resolution. Id., at 466.
On the remand, the Commission reopened the record for the reception of further evidence and briefing in accordance with the instructions of the two reviewing courts. Its revaluation of the New Haven properties, announced on November 25, 1968, resulted in an increase in total worth of some $37,700,000, yielding a new price of $162,700,000 for the properties to be transferred. Pennsylvania R. Co.—Merger—New York Central R. Co., 334 I. C. C. 25, 53 (“Fourth Supplemental Report”). But the Commission then invoked “other pricing considerations” not taken into account at the timé of its prior report. Application of the new considerations effected a reduction of $22,081,000 from the newly calculated asset value, leaving a net value of $140,600,000— $15,600,000 more than the Commission’s initial estimate, but $17,400,000 less than the lowest range of value suggested by either of the two District Courts. In addition, the Commission required Penn Central to pay $5,000,000 toward the New Haven’s interim operating expenses and, yielding to the directive of the reorganization court, ordered Penn Central to take over the New Haven properties by January 1, 1969. 334 I. C. C., at 74, 76.
The Commission certified its revised plan to the reorganization court on December 2, 1968. Within three weeks the bondholders filed their objections. On December 24, 1968, the reorganization court released the assets of the debtor’s estate to Penn Central without approving the price terms set by the Commission. The court reiterated that failure to include New Haven in Penn Central by January 1, 1969, would result in immediate termination of all New Haven train service. On December 31 the estate transferred its assets to Penn Central.
At once the bondholders pressed for judicial review of the Commission’s revised evaluation. With their objections to the plan of reorganization already pending before the reorganization court, representatives of holders of the debtor’s first and refunding mortgage 4% bonds commenced two separate actions against the United States and the Commission before the three-judge District Court in New York. The Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company and the Chase Manhattan Bank, trustees under other mortgage bonds, commenced two more actions against the same defendants. The three-judge court consolidated the four cases and granted intervention — to the New Haven trustees as parties plaintiff and to Penn Central, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the States of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York as parties defendant.
On May 28, 1969, the reorganization court again rejected the plan submitted by the Commission. Although it accepted the Commission’s determinations on some issues, the court overruled the Commission with respect to its valuation of the New Haven’s Harlem River and Oak Point freight yards and its added deductions introduced for the first time on the remand. The court also instituted its own “underwriting” plan to ensure equivalent value for the estate with respect to the Penn Central common stock given in partial consideration for the transferred New Haven properties. In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 304 F. Supp. 793. An order implementing decision and remanding to the Commission was entered on July 28, 1969. 304 F. Supp. 1136.
On June 18, 1969, the three-judge court filed its opinion in the bondholders’ action. With one judge in dissent, the court upheld the Commission’s valuation of the freight yards and its added deductions on the remand. The court also adopted the underwriting plan devised by the reorganization court. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., First Mortgage 4% Bondholders’ Committee v. United States, 305 F. Supp. 1049. A decree fixing the terms of judgment followed on September 11, 1969.
With the two District Courts thus in agreement, after two rounds of judicial review, on many of the substantial issues that had come before them, but in disagreement on matters amounting to more than $28,000,000 in value, the bondholders took direct appeals to this Court from the judgment of the three-judge court. They also appealed from the order of the reorganization court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The United States, the Commission, and Penn Central took no appeals from the decree of the three-judge court but cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals from the order of the reorganization court. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals from the reorganization court, and the parties then petitioned this Court to grant certiorari to the Court of Appeals in advance of its judgment, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 1254 (1) and-2101 (e), and Rule 20 of this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeals from the order of the three-judge court and, with respect to the judgment of the reorganization court, granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals before judgment, accelerating briefing and argument to permit disposition of these cases at the current Term. 396 U. S. 1056.
II
We first consider the dual review to which the District Courts in New York and Connecticut subjected the price determinations of the Interstate Commerce Commission. From the outset all the parties in the three-judge court recognized that the pricing questions presented in the litigation there were also destined to come before the reorganization court under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. Confronted with the prospect of duplicate litigation, the New Haven bondholders asked the three-judge court to enjoin the Commission’s certification of its plan of reorganization to the District Court in Connecticut. Counsel urged that “if such certification is not restrained, the questions presented by the complaint herein under Section 5 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act will also be before the Bankruptcy Court under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act... The three-judge court denied the bondholders’ application for injunctive relief. In its view, “the balance of convenience tilt [ed] heavily in favor of allowing the Connecticut court to proceed to such extent as it is advised,” since the grant of such an injunction could delay the reorganization proceedings for a substantial time.
In this ruling the three-judge court was correct. The jurisdiction of the reorganization court was not open to question. Upon its approval of the New Haven’s petition for reorganization in 1961, that court had acquired “exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property wherever located....” Bankruptcy Act, § 77 (a), 11 U. S. C. § 205 (a). Subject to the court’s control, the trustees whom it appointed were empowered “to operate the business of the debtor.” Id., §77 (c)(2), 11 U. S. C. § 205 (c) (2). They were thus charged with the dual responsibility of conserving the debtor’s estate for the benefit of creditors and preserving an ongoing railroad in the public interest. Massachusetts v. Bartlett, 384 F. 2d 819, 821, cert. denied, 390 U. S. 1003; 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶77.02, at 469-470 (14th ed. 1969). With these goals in view, the statute bestowed a “broad and general” authority upon both the court and the trustees. Cf. Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85. The provisions of § 77 “doubtless suffice[d] to confer upon the [reorganization court] power appropriate for adjusting property rights in the railroad debtor’s estate and, as to such rights, beyond that in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings.” Id., at 85-86; cf. 5 Collier, supra, ¶[ 77.11, at 498-499. Together, the court and the Commission “unquestionably” had “full and complete power not only over the debtor and its property, but also, as a corollary, over any rights that [might] be asserted against it.” Callaway v. Benton, 336 U. S. 132, 147. One such power was precisely that which the Commission was about to propose that the reorganization court exercise — the power to confirm a plan of reorganization providing for “the sale of all... of the property of the debtor....” Bankruptcy Act, §77 (b)(5), 11 U. S. C. §205 (b)(5). To that end the Commission was required to certify its proposal to the court as a prerequisite to judicial approval. § 77 (d), 11 U., S. C. § 205 (d). Injunctive intervention by the three-judge court would thus have disrupted an essential statutory phase of the New Haven reorganization.
The United States also sought to avoid duplicate litigation — but by bypassing the New York rather than the Connecticut federal court. In a motion filed shortly after the commencement of the New Haven bondholders’ suit in the three-judge court, the Government moved to dismiss the complaints for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In support of the motion it was argued that (1) until the Commission certified the terms of inclusion to the reorganization court, Condition 8 under which Penn Central had pledged to take in New Haven was not satisfied and the Commission’s order was not yet reviewable; (2) by virtue of the § 77 aspects of the case, the reorganization court had exclusive jurisdiction over the pricing questions sought to be presented to the three-judge court; and (3) even on the assumption that the three-judge court had jurisdiction, it should stay.its hand as a matter of equity to avoid an unnecessary interference with the proceedings before the reorganization court.
The Government’s motion to dismiss was opposed by Penn Central, the New Haven trustees, the State of New York, and the bondholders. Significantly, the Commission did not oppose the motion. Indeed, the Commission agreed with the United States that “most (and perhaps all) of the issues raised by the plaintiffs in this three-judge Court will be reviewable by the Reorganization Court,” conceded that “the resulting concurrent jurisdiction is awkward, at least in theory,” and concluded tentatively that “the scope of judicial review... in the Reorganization Court would, as a practical matter [,] be the same as in this three-judge Court.” The three-judge court denied the Government’s motion to dismiss. The bondholders’ actions, the court said, came within the letter of the statutes authorizing review of orders of the Commission. The court conceded there was “an area of overlap” between the work of the New York and Connecticut forums, but thought nothing in § 77 or decisional law superseded that dual arrangement. See 289 F. Supp., at 424 n. 3.
The three-judge court correctly observed that in ordering New Haven’s inclusion in Penn Central the Commission had properly exercised its authority under both § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act and § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. The fact that the New Haven was in reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act did not preclude the Commission from exercising its statutory power, in passing on the merger application of two railroads, to require the inclusion of a third. Interstate Commerce Act, § 5 (2)(d), 49 U. S. C. § 5 (2)(d). “The Commission can undoubtedly carry on § 5 proceedings simultaneously with § 77 reorganization proceedings....” Callaway v. Benton, 336 U. S., at 140. Here the transfer of the New Haven assets was as much a part of a merger under § 5 as it was a plan of reorganization under § 77.
Moreover, at the outset of the litigation, the jurisdiction of neither the New York nor the Connecticut court was “complete.” On the one hand, the reorganization court lacked coercive power over Penn Central: under § 77 it could neither approve nor disapprove the merger qua merger, and it could not compel Penn Central to purchase the New Haven assets. So far as § 77 was concerned, Penn Central stood in the position of a potential purchaser, willing but not obliged to buy the New Haven properties. Cf. Callaway v. Benton, 336 U. S., at 137; Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 318 U. S. 523, 550; Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 161 F. 2d 413, 434 n. 5 (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Protective Committee v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 331 U. S. 858; In re New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 54 F. Supp. 595, 619. On the other hand, the three-judge court could not by itself effect a conveyance of the New Haven properties to Penn Central, nor could it compel the debtor’s trustees to do so without the consent of the reorganization court.
Moved largely by the concern that neither court might have jurisdiction over the entire case, the three-judge court was of the opinion that matters should proceed simultaneously in both forums with a view to bringing the § 5 and § 77 aspects before this Court at the same time. Given the complexities of the jurisdictional question and the importance of an expedited determination of the merits, the three-judge court produced an understandable solution to the problem insofar
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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I
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal requires us to decide whether dismissal of a federal indictment was constitutionally required by reason of a period of three years between the occurrence of the alleged criminal acts and the filing of the indictment.
On April 21, 1970, the two appellees were indicted and charged in 19 counts with operating a business known as Allied Enterprises, Inc., which was engaged in the business of selling and installing home improvements such as intercom sets, fire control devices, and burglary detection systems. Allegedly, the business was fraudulently conducted and involved misrepresentations, alterations of documents, and deliberate nonperformance of contracts. The period covered by the indictment was March 15, 1965, to February 6, 1967; the earliest specific act alleged occurred on September 3, 1965, the latest on January 19, 1966.
On May 5, 1970, appellees filed a motion to dismiss the indictment “for failure to commence prosecution of the alleged offenses charged therein within such time as to afford [them their] rights to due process of law and to a speedy trial under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.” No evidence was submitted, but from the motion itself and the arguments of counsel at the hearing on the motion, it appears that Allied Enterprises had been subject to a Federal Trade Commission cease-and-desist order on February 6, 1967, and that a series of articles appeared in the Washington Post in October 1967, reporting the results of that newspaper’s investigation of practices employed by home improvement firms such as Allied. The articles also contained purported statements of the then United States Attorney for the District of Columbia describing his office’s investigation of these firms and predicting that indictments would soon be forthcoming. Although the statements attributed to the United States Attorney did not mention Allied specifically, that company was mentioned in the course of the newspaper stories. In the summer of 1968, at the request of the United States Attorney’s office, Allied delivered certain of its records to that office, and in an interview there appellee Marion discussed his conduct as an officer of Allied Enterprises. The grand jury that indicted appellees was not impaneled until September 1969, appellees were not informed of the grand jury’s concern with them until March 1970, and the indictment was finally handed down in April.
Appellees moved to dismiss because the indictment was returned "an unreasonably oppressive and unjustifiable time after the alleged offenses.” They argued that the indictment required memory of many specific acts and conversations occurring several years before, and they contended that the delay was due to the negligence or indifference of the United States Attorney in investigating the ease and presenting it to a grand jury. No specific prejudice was claimed or demonstrated. The District Court judge dismissed the indictment for “lack of speedy prosecution” at the conclusion of the hearing and remarked that since the Government must have become aware of the relevant facts in 1967, the defense of the case “is bound to have been seriously prejudiced by the delay of at least some three years in bringing the prosecution that should have been brought in 1967, or at the very latest early 1968.”
The United States appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 18 U. S. C. §3731 (1964 ed., Supp. V). We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction until the hearing on the merits of the case. We now hold that the Court has jurisdiction, and on the merits we reverse the judgment of the District Court.
I
Prior to its recent amendment, 18 U. S. C. § 3731 (1964 ed., Supp. V) authorized an appeal to this Court by the United States when in any criminal case a district court sustained “a motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy/’ It is plain to us that the appeal of the United States is within the purview of this section. Appellees had not been placed in jeopardy when the District Court rendered its judgment. The trial judge based his ruling on undue delay prior to indictment, a matter that was beyond the power of the Government to cure since re-indictment would not have been permissible under such a ruling. The motion to dismiss rested on grounds that had nothing to do with guilt or innocence or the truth of the allegations in the indictment but was, rather, a plea in the nature of confession and avoidance, that is, where the defendant does not deny that he has committed the acts alleged and that the acts were a crime but instead pleads that he cannot be prosecuted because of some extraneous factor, such as the running of the statute of limitations or the denial of a speedy trial. See United States v. Weller, 401 U. S. 264, 260 (1971). The motion rested on constitutional grounds exclusively, and neither the motion, the arguments of counsel, the Court’s oral opinion, nor its judgment mentioned Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48 (b), as a ground for dismissal. Our jurisdiction to hear this appeal has been satisfactorily established.
II
Appellees do not claim that the Sixth Amendment was violated by the two-month delay between the return of the indictment and its dismissal. Instead, they claim that their rights to a speedy trial were violated by the period of approximately three years between the end of the criminal scheme charged and the return of the indictment; it is argued that this delay is so substantial and inherently prejudicial that the Sixth Amendment required the dismissal of the indictment. In our view, however, the Sixth Amendment speedy trial provision has no application until the putative defendant in some way becomes an “accused,” an event that occurred in this case only when the appellees were indicted on April 21, 1970.
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial....” On its face, the protection of the Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been “accused” in the course of that prosecution. These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet accused, nor would they seem to require the Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time. The Amendment would appear to guarantee to a criminal defendant that the Government will move with the dispatch that is appropriate to assure him an early and proper disposition of the charges against him. “[T]he essential ingredient is orderly expedition and not mere speed.” Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1, 10 (1959).
Our attention is called to nothing in the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Amendment indicating that it does not mean what it appears to say, nor is there more than marginal support for the proposition that, at the time of the adoption of the Amendment, the prevailing rule was that prosecutions would not be permitted if there had been long delay in presenting a charge. The framers could hardly have selected less appropriate language if they had intended the speedy trial provision to protect against pre-accusation delay. No opinions of this Court intimate support for appellees’ thesis, and the courts of appeals that have considered the question in constitutional terms have never reversed a conviction or dismissed an indictment solely on the basis of the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial provision where only pre-indictment delay was involved.
Legislative efforts to implement federal and state speedy trial provisions also plainly reveal the view that these guarantees are applicable only after a person has been accused of a crime. The Court has pointed out that “[a]t the common law and in the absence of special statutes of limitations the mere failure to find an indictment will not operate to discharge the accused from the offense nor will a nolle prosequi entered by the Government or the failure of the grand jury to indict.” United States v. Cadarr, 197 U. S. 475, 478 (1905). Since it is “doubtless true that in some cases the power of the Government has been abused and charges have been kept hanging over the heads of citizens, and they have been committed for unreasonable periods, resulting in hardship,” the Court noted that many States “[w]ith a view to preventing such wrong to the citizen... [and] in aid of the constitutional provisions, National and state, intended to secure to the accused a speedy trial” had passed statutes limiting the time within which such trial must occur after charge or indictment. Characteristically, these statutes to which the Court referred are triggered only when a citizen is charged or accused. The statutes vary greatly in substance, structure, and interpretation, but a common denominator is that “[i]n no event... [does] the right to speedy trial arise before there is some charge or arrest, even though the prosecuting authorities had knowledge of the offense long before this.” Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 57 Col. L. Rev. 846, 848 (1957).
No federal statute of general applicability has been enacted by Congress to enforce the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment, but Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48 (b), which has the force of law, authorizes dismissal of an indictment, information, or complaint “[i]f there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing an information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial....” The rule clearly is limited to post-arrest situations.
Appellees’ position is, therefore, at odds with longstanding legislative and judicial constructions of the speedy trial provisions in both national and state constitutions.
III
It is apparent also that very little support for appel-lees’ position emerges from a consideration of the purposes of the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial provision, a guarantee that this Court has termed “an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.” United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 120 (1966); see also Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 Ü. S. 213, 221-226 (1967); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U. S. 30, 37-38 (1970). Inordinate delay between arrest, indictment, and trial may impair a defendant’s ability to present an effective defense. But the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accused’s defense. To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends. These considerations were substantial underpinnings for the decision in Klopfer v. North Carolina, supra; see also Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374, 377-378 (1969). So viewed, it is readily understandable that it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.
Invocation, of the speedy trial provision thus need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge. But we decline to extend the reach of the amendment to the period prior to arrest. Until this event occurs, a citizen suffers no restraints on his liberty and is not the subject of public accusation: his situation does not compare with that of a defendant who has been arrested and held to answer. Passage of time, whether before or after arrest, may impair memories, cause evidence to be lost, deprive the defendant of witnesses, and otherwise interfere with his ability to defend himself. But this possibility of prejudice at trial is not itself sufficient reason to wrench the Sixth Amendment from its proper context. Possible prejudice is inherent in any delay, however short; it may also weaken the Government’s case.
The law has provided other mechanisms to guard against possible as distinguished from actual prejudice resulting from the passage of time between crime and arrest or charge. As we said in United States v. Ewell, supra, at 122, “the applicable statute of limitations... is... the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges.” Such statutes represent legislative assessments of relative interests of the State and the defendant in administering and receiving justice; they “are made for the repose of society and the protection of those who may [during the limitation]... have lost their means of defence.” Public Schools v. Walker, 9 Wall. 282, 288 (1870). These statutes provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s right to a fair trial would be prejudiced. As this Court observed in Toussie v. United States, 397 U. S. 112, 114-115 (1970):
“The purpose of a statute of limitations is to limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a certain fixed period of time following the occurrence of those acts the legislature has decided to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limitation is designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also have the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.”
There is thus no need to press the Sixth Amendment into service to guard against the mere possibility that pre-accusation delays will prejudice the defense in a criminal case since statutes of limitation already perform that function.
Since appellees rely only on potential prejudice and the passage of time between the alleged crime and the indictment, see Part IV, infra, we perhaps need go no further to dispose of this case, for the indictment was the first official act designating appellees as accused individuals and that event occurred within the statute of limitations. Nevertheless, since a criminal trial is the likely consequence of our judgment and since appellees may claim actual prejudice to their defense, it is appropriate to note here that the statute of limitations does not fully define the appellees' rights with respect to the events occurring prior to indictment. Thus, the Government concedes that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment would require dismissal of the indictment if it were shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay in this case caused substantial prejudice to appellees' rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused. Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959). However, we need not, and could not now, determine when and in what circumstances actual prejudice resulting from pre-accusation delays requires the dismissal of the prosecution. Actual prejudice to the defense of a criminal case may result from the shortest and most necessary delay; and no one suggests that every delay-caused detriment to a defendant’s case should abort a criminal prosecution. To accommodate the sound administration of justice to the rights of the defendant to a fair trial will necessarily involve a delicate judgment based on the circumstances of each case. It would be unwise at this juncture to attempt to forecast our decision in such cases.
IV
In the case before us, neither appellee was arrested, charged, or otherwise subjected to formal restraint prior to indictment. It was this event, therefore, that transformed the appellees into “accused” defendants who are subject to the speedy trial protections of the Sixth Amendment.
The 38-month delay between the end of the scheme charged in the indictment and the date the defendants were indicted did not extend beyond the period of the applicable statute of limitations here. Appellees have not, of course, been able to claim undue delay pending trial, since the indictment was brought on April 21, 1970, and dismissed on June 8, 1970. Nor have appellees adequately demonstrated that the pre-indictment delay by the Government violated the Due Process Clause. No actual prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged or proved, and there is no showing that the Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass them. Appellees rely solely on the real possibility of prejudice inherent in any extended delay: that memories will dim, witnesses become inaccessible, and evidence be lost. In light of the applicable statute of limitations, however, these possibilities are not in themselves enough to demonstrate that appellees cannot receive a fair trial and to therefore justify the dismissal of the indictment. Events of the trial may demonstrate actual prejudice, but at the present time appellees’ due process claims are speculative and premature.
Reversed.
App. 39. The court’s oral decision consisted of the following statement: “It appears to the Court that the matters complained of occurred between March 1965 and January 1966. It further appears that these matters were known from early 1967 or a matter of common knowledge in late 1967. There appears no reason why a three-year delay from 1967 was justified by the necessity of research and examination delving into the various transactions, they could have been discovered and handled much, much sooner, certainly probably during the year 1967 or at the latest early 1968.
“The defendants have been indicted on 19 counts, each of which I believe carries a ten-year sentence, each of which is a separate, distinct transaction which would justify consecutive sentences, and by the very nature of this outrageous scheme if the allegations could be believed, the ability to remember, to build up in one’s recollection, to produce the necessary defense, is bound to have been seriously prejudiced by the delay of at least some three years in bringing the prosecution that should have been brought in 1967, or at the very latest early 1968.
“The Court, therefore, views that there has been a lack of speedy prosecution in this case, and will grant the motion to dismiss.” Ibid.
The Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U. S. C. §3731 (1964 ed., Supp. V), at the time of this appeal, provided in relevant part:
“An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the district courts direct to the Supreme Court of the United States in all criminal cases in the following instances:
“From the decision or judgment sustaining a motion in bar, when the defendant has not been put in jeopardy.”
The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, § 14 (a), 84 Stat. 1890, amended the Criminal Appeals Act to read in pertinent part as follows:
“In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.”
This amendment thus terminated the Court’s appellate jurisdiction of Government appeals from district court judgments in federal criminal cases. Pending cases were not affected by the amendment, however, since subsection (b) of § 14 provides:
“The amendments made by this section shall not apply with respect to any criminal case begun in any district court before the effective date of this section.”
The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 took effect on January 2, 1971; the appellees in this case were indicted on April 21, 1970.
401 U. S. 934 (1971).
Rule 48(b) provides that: “If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing an information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint.” In any event, it is doubtful that Rule 48 (b) applies in the circumstances of this case, where the indictment was the first formal act in the criminal prosecution of these appellees. See cases cited in n. 11, infra.
The history of the speedy trial provision is sparse and unillu-minating with respect to the issue before us. See F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 31-32, 34 (1951); R. Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776-1791, p. 202 (1955); I. Brant, The Bill of Rights 223 (1965); Dumbauld, State Precedents for the Bill of Rights, 7 J. Pub. L. 323, 335 n. 91 (1958); Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 476, 484 (1968).
A single case that antedates the Bill of Rights, Rex v. Robinson, 1 Black. W. 541, 96 Eng. Rep. 313 (K. B. 1765), and three 19th century British cases, Rex v. Marshall, 13 East 322, 104 Eng. Rep. 394 (K. B. 1811); Regina v. Hext, 4 Jurist 339 (Q. B. 1840); Regina v. Robins, 1 Cox’s C. C. 114 (Somerset Winter Assizes 1844), are cited for the proposition that the framers intended to protect against pre-indictment delay by enacting the Sixth Amendment. These cases fail to establish a definite rule that the Founders sought to constitutionalize, however, and the Government’s argument concerning the history of the Sixth Amendment, while not dispositive, is more persuasive. Brief for the United States 15-18. The Government points out that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2, provided for "more speedy Relief of all Persons imprisoned for any such criminal or supposed criminal Matters" and required that persons jailed for felonies or treason be brought to trial upon their own motion within two terms of court or be discharged on bail. The Act does not allude to delay before arrest. Most of the States that ratified the Bill of Rights had either adopted the British Act or passed a similar law, Petition of Provoo, 17 F. R. D. 183, 197 n. 6 (Md.), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Provoo, 350 U. S. 857 (1955), and many of them had speedy trial provisions in their own constitutions which were modeled on the British Act. Article 8 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which may have been the model Madison used for the Sixth Amendment, Rutland, supra, n. 5, at 202, secured the right to a speedy trial in "criminal prosecutions" where "a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation." See generally Heller, supra, n. 5, at 23. Insofar as this meager evidence is probative at all, it seems to imply that the Sixth Amendment was designed to assure that those accused of crimes would have their trial without undue delay.
This Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee in only a small number of cases. See, e. g., Dickey v. Florida, 398 U. S. 30 (1970); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U. S. 374 (1969); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (1967); United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116 (1966); Pollard v. United States, 352 U. S. 354 (1957); United States v. Provoo, supra, n. 6; Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U. S. 77 (1905). See also Smith v. United States, 360 U. S. 1, 10 (1959).
Most courts of appeals have recognized the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial only after a prosecution has been formally initiated or have held that the sole safeguard against pre-indictment delay is the relevant statute of limitations: United States v. Feinberg, 383 F. 2d 60, 65 (CA2 1967); Carlo v. United States, 286 F. 2d 841, 846 (CA2), cert. denied, 366 U. S. 944 (1961); Pitts v. North Carolina, 395 F. 2d 182, 185 n. 3 (CA4 1968); United States v. Durham, 413 F. 2d 1003, 1004 (CA5 1969); Kroll v. United States, 433 F. 2d 1282, 1286 (CA5 1970), cert. denied, 402 U. S. 944 (1971); United States v. Grayson, 416 F. 2d 1073, 1076-1077 (CA5 1969); United States v. Wilson, 342 F. 2d 782, 783 (CA5), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 860 (1965); Donnell v. United States, 229 F. 2d 560, 567 (CA5 1956); Harlow v. United States, 301 F. 2d 361, 366 (CA5), cert. denied, 371 U. S. 814 (1962); Bruce v. United States, 351 F. 2d 318, 320 (CA5 1965), cert. denied, 384 U. S. 921 (1966); Hoopengarner v. United States, 270 F. 2d 465, 469 (CA6 1959); United States v. Harris, 412 F. 2d 471, 473 (CA6 1969); Lothridge v. United States, 441 F. 2d 919, 922 (CA6 1971); Parker v. United States, 252 F. 2d 680, 681 (CA6), cert. denied, 356 U. S. 964 (1958); Edmaiston v. Neil, 452 F. 2d 494 (CA6 1971); United States v. Panczko, 367 F. 2d 737, 738-739 (CA7 1966); Terlikowski v. United States, 379 F. 2d 501, 504 (CA8), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 1008 (1967); Foley v. United States, 290 F. 2d 562, 565 (CA8 1961); Benson v. United States, 402 F. 2d 576, 579 (CA9 1968); Venus v. United States, 287 F. 2d 304, 307 (CA9 1960), rev’d per curiam on other grounds, 368 U. S. 345 (1961); D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F. 2d 338, 350 (CA9 1951), cert. denied, 343 U. S. 935 (1952); United States v. Reed, 413 F. 2d 338, 340 (CA10 1969), cert. denied sub nom. Sartain v. United States, 397 U. S. 954 (1970); Nickens v. United States, 116 U. S. App. D. C. 338, 340, 323 F. 2d 808, 810 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U. S. 905 (1964). Some courts of appeals have stated that pre-indictment delay may be cause for dismissal but they have seemed to treat the question primarily as one of due process (although the Sixth Amendment is occasionally mentioned) and have required a showing of actual prejudice: Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F. 2d 735, 737 (CA1 1967); Fleming v. United States, 378 F. 2d 502, 504 (CA1 1967); United States v. Capaldo, 402 F. 2d 821, 823 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 394 U. S. 989 (1969); United States v. Simmons, 338 F. 2d 804, 806 (CA2 1964), cert. denied, 380 U. S. 983 (1965); United States v. Holiday, 319 F. 2d 775, 776 (CA2 1963); United States v. Hammond, 360 F. 2d 688, 689 (CA2 1966); United States v. Dickerson, 347 F. 2d 783, 784 (CA2 1965); United States v. Rivera, 346 F. 2d 942, 943 (CA2 1965); United States v. Sanchez, 361 F. 2d 824, 825 (CA2 1966); United States v. Harbin, 377 F. 2d 78, 79, 80 n. 1 (CA4 1967); United States v. Lee, 413 F. 2d 910, 912-913 (CA7 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1022 (1970); United States v. Napue, 401 F. 2d 107, 114-115 (CA7 1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1024 (1969); Lucas v. United States, 363 F. 2d 500, 502 (CA9 1966); Sanchez v. United States, 341 F. 2d 225, 228 n. 3 (CA9), cert. denied, 382 U. S. 856 (1965); Acree v. United States, 418 F. 2d 427, 430 (CA10 1969). Although Petition of Provoo, 17 F. R. D. 183 (Md.), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Provoo, 350 U. S. 857 (1955), is sometimes cited for the proposition that pre-indictment delay will justify dismissal, the District Court explicitly stated that it considered this delay to be relevant only on the issue of whether the defendant had been denied a fair trial. 17 F. R. D., at 202. In Taylor v. United States, 99 U. S. App. D. C. 183, 238 F. 2d 259 (1956), a conviction was vacated where there had been a six-year delay between the crime (housebreaking) and trial, 3 1/2 years of which was a delay between crime and indictment; the defendant had been in prison on another charge during this time, and the defendant was substantially prejudiced in his ability to defend against the housebreaking charge. The Court of Appeals stated: "We do not rely on the mere lapse of time between the commission of the offenses and the date of indictment, considered by itself, for that is governed by the statute of limitations. It is the combination of the factors set forth above [post-indictment delay, prejudice] which motivates our decision." Id., at 186, 238 F. 2d, at 262. In three instances district courts have held, however, that "delay" for Sixth Amendment purposes must be computed from the time of the crime or from the time when the Government considers the defendants’ actions criminal, and have dismissed indictments for excessive delay. United States v. Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196 (DC 1965); United States v. Wahrer, 319 F. Supp. 585 (Alaska 1970); United States v. Burke, 224 F. Supp. 41 (DC 1963). There is a unique line of cases in the District of Columbia Circuit concerning pre-indictment delay in narcotics cases where the Government relies on secret informers and (frequently) on single transactions. These cases take a more rigid stance against such delays, but they are based on the Court of Appeals’ purported supervisory jurisdiction and not on the Sixth Amendment. See, e. g., Ross v. United States, 121 U. S. App. D. C. 233, 238, 349 F. 2d 210, 215 (1965); Bey v. United States, 121 U. S. App. D. C. 337, 350 F. 2d 467 (1965); Powell v. United States, 122 U. S. App. D. C. 229, 231, 352 F. 2d 705, 707 (1965); Tynan v. United States, 126 U. S. App. D. C. 206, 208, 376 F. 2d 761, 763 (1967) (explicitly limiting Ross).
The provision the Court dealt with in Cadarr was § 939 of the then District of Columbia Code adopted by Congress, 31 Stat. 1342. That section provided that if any person “charged with a criminal offense shall have been committed or held to bail,” the grand jury must act within a specified time or the accused would be set free. The provision remains in the present code as § 23-102, 84 Stat. 605, and then, as now, does not purport to reach behind the time of charge, commitment, or holding for bail.
See, e. g., Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, § 103-5 (a) (1969); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19, §781 (1964); Cal. Pen. Code § 1382 (1970); Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-191 (1960); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.556 (1967). A more comprehensive list of such state statutes appears in American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Speedy Trial 14-15 (Approved Draft 1968). The Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference of the State of New York recently promulgated rules on trial delay and detention which cover defendants who are “held in custody” and which begin computation of delay periods from the date of arrest. Rule 29.1, New York Law Journal, April 30, 1971, p. 1, col. 6. See generally Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 476 (1968); Note, Pre-Arrest Delay: Evolving Due Process Standards, 43 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 722 (1968); Note, Constitutional Limits on Pre-Arrest Delay, 51 Iowa L. Rev. 670 (1966); Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 Ya. L. Rev. 1587 (1965); Note, Justice Overdue — Speedy Trial for the Potential Defendant, 5 Stan. L. Rev. 95 (1952).
The rules that the Second Circuit en banc recently adopted in United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann, 437 F. 2d 1312 (CA2 1971), which appear in Appendix, 28 U. S. C. A. (May 1971 Supp.), require trial within a specified period but apply to “all persons held in jail prior to
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Secretary of the Interior is responsible for maintaining our national parks, and for providing facilities and services for their public enjoyment through concessionaires or otherwise. In meeting this responsibility, he has contracted for petitioner to conduct guided tours of the Mall, a grassy park located in the center of the City of Washington and studded with national monuments and museums. Visitors to the Mall may board petitioner’s open "minibuses” which travel among the various points of interest at speeds under 10 miles per hour. Guides on the buses and at certain stationary locations describe the sights. Visitors may debark to tour the museums, boarding a later bus to return to the point of departure.
Suit was brought by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission (hereafter WMATC) to enjoin petitioner from conducting tours of the Mall without a certificate of convenience and necessity from the WMATC. Carriers permitted by WMATC to provide mass transit and sightseeing services in the City of Washington intervened as plaintiffs, and the United States appeared as amicus curiae. The concessionaire and the United States contend that the Secretary’s authority over national park lands, and in particular his grant of “exclusive charge and control” over the Mall dating from 1898, permit him to contract for this service without interference. The carriers and WMATC argue that the interstate compact which created the WMATC implicitly limited the Secretary’s authority over the Mall, and gave rise to dual jurisdiction over these tours in the Secretary and the WMATC. One carrier, D. C. Transit System, Inc., also argues that its franchise limits the Secretary’s power. In a detailed opinion the District Court dismissed the suit. The Court of Appeals reversed without opinion. We granted certiorari and, having heard the case and examined the web of statutes on which it turns, we reverse, finding the Secretary’s exclusive authority to contract for services on the Mall undiminished by the compact creating WMATC or by the charter granted a private bus company.
I.
That the Secretary has substantial power over the Mall is undisputed. The parties agree that he is free to enter into the contract in question. They also agree that he is free to exclude traffic from the Mall altogether, or selectively to exclude from the Mall any carrier licensed by the WMATC or following WMATC instructions. Moreover, the parties agree that the Secretary could operate the tour service himself without need to obtain permission from anyone. Yet the WMATC argues that before the Secretary’s power may be exercised through a concessionaire, the consent of the WMATC must be obtained.
This interpretation of the statutes involved would result in a dual regulatory jurisdiction overlapping on the most fundamental matters. The Secretary is empowered by statute to "contract for services . . . provided in the national parks ... for the public ... as may be required in the administration of the National Park Service_” Act of May 26, 1930, c. 324, § 3, 46 Stat. 382, 16 U. S. C. § 17b. Moreover, he is “to encourage and enable private persons and corporations ... to provide and operate facilities and services which he deems desirable . . . .” Pub. L. 89-249, § 2, 79 Stat. 969, 16 U. S. C. § 20a (1964 ed., Supp. III). Congress was well aware that the services provided by these national park concessionaires include transportation. Hearings on H. R. 5796, 5872, 5873, 5886, and 5887 before the Subcommittee on National Parks of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 151-159 (1964). In this case the Secretary concluded that there was a public need for a motorized, guided tour of the grounds under his control, and that petitioner was most fit to provide it.
The WMATC, however, also asserts the power to decide whether this tour serves “public convenience and necessity,” and the power to require the concessionaire to “conform to the . . . requirements of the Commission” and the “terms and conditions” which it may impose. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, § 4 (b), 74 Stat. 1037. The Secretary’s contract leaves the tour’s route under his control, but the WMATC would in its certificate specify the “service to be rendered and the routes over which” the concessionaire might run within the Mall. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, §4 (d)(1), 74 Stat. 1037. Moreover, the WMATC might require the provision of additional service on or off the Mall and forbid the discontinuance of any existing service. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, §§4(e) and (i), 74 Stat. 1038, 1039. The contract with the Secretary provides fare schedules, pursuant to statutory authority in the Secretary to regulate the concessionaire’s charges. Pub. L. 89-249, § 3,79 Stat. 969, 16 U. S. C. § 20b (1964 ed., Supp. III). The WMATC would have the power to “suspend any fare, regulation, or practice” depending on the WMATC’s views of the financial condition, efficiency, and effectiveness of the concessionaire and the reasonableness of the rate. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, § 6, 74 Stat. 1040. And under the same section the WMATC could set whatever fare it found reasonable, although a profit of 6%% or less could not be prohibited. The Secretary is given statutory authority to require the keeping of records by the concessionaire and to inspect those records, and the Comptroller General is required to examine the concessionaire’s books every five years. Pub. L. 89-249, §9, 79 Stat. 971, 16 U. S. C. § 20g (1964 ed., Supp. III). The WMATC would also have the power to require reports and to prescribe and have access to the records to be kept. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, § 10, 74 Stat. 1042. Finally, the Secretary is given by statute the general power to specify by contract the duties of a concessionaire, 16 U. S. C. §§ 17b, 20-20g (1964 ed. and Supp. Ill); the WMATC would claim this power by regulation and rule. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, § 15, 74 Stat. 1045.
We cannot ascribe to Congress a purpose of subjecting the concessionaire to these two separate masters, who show at the outset their inability to agree by presence on the opposite sides of this lawsuit. There is no indication from statutory language or legislative history that Congress intended to divest the Secretary partly or wholly of his authority in establishing the WMATC. When the WMATC was formed there was in the statute books, as there is now, a provision that the “park system of the District of Columbia is placed under the exclusive charge and control of the Director of the National Park Service.” Act of July 1, 1898, c. 543, § 2, 30 Stat. 570, as amended, D. C. Code §8-108(1967). He was, and is, explicitly “authorized and empowered to make and enforce all regulations for the control of vehicles and traffic.” Act of June 5, 1920, c. 235, § 1, 41 Stat. 898, D. C. Code § 8-109 (1967). And this extends to sidewalks and streets which “lie between and separate the said public grounds.” Act of March 4, 1909, c. 299, § 1, 35 Stat. 994, D. C. Code § 8-144 (1967). The creation of the Public Utilities Commission — the predecessor of the WMATC — was not intended “to interfere with the exclusive charge and control . . . committed to” the predecessor of the National Park Service. Act of March 3, 1925, c. 443, § 16 (b), 43 Stat. 1126, as amended, D. C. Code §40-613 (1967).
In this context the WMATC was established. After World War II, metropolitan Washington had expanded rapidly into Maryland and Virginia. The logistics of moving vast numbers of people on their daily round became increasingly complicated, and increasingly in need of coordinated supervision. Congress therefore gave its consent and approval through a joint resolution to an interstate compact which “centralizes to a great degree in a single agency . . . the regulatory powers of private transit now shared by four regulatory agencies.” S. Rep. No. 1906, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1960). These four agencies were “the public utility regulatory agencies of the States of Virginia, Maryland, and the District of Columbia and the Interstate Commerce Commission.” Pub. L. 86-794, 74 Stat. 1031. The Secretary was not included in this listing. Moreover, Congress specifically provided that nothing in the Act or compact “shall affect the normal and ordinary police powers . . . of the Director of the National Park Service with respect to the regulation of vehicles, control of traffic and use of streets, highways, and other vehicular facilities . ...” Finally, the House Report on the compact lists the federal legislation which was suspended to give effect to the compact, and the laws giving exclusive control of the Mall to the Secretary are not on the list. H. R. Rep. No. 1621, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 29-30 (1960).
There is thus no reason to ignore the principle that repeals by implication are not favored or to suspect that the Congress, in creating the WMATC, disturbed the exclusivity of the Secretary’s control over the Mall either by extinguishing entirely his power to contract for transportation services or by burdening the concessionaire with two separate agencies engaged in regulating precisely the same aspects of its conduct. Congress was endeavoring to simplify the regulation of transportation by creating the WMATC, not to thrust it further into a bureaucratic morass. It therefore established the WMATC to regulate the mass transit of commuters and workers. A system of minibuses, proceeding in a circular route around the Mall at less than 10 miles per hour, and stopping from time to time to describe the sights before disgorging most passengers where it picked them up, serves quite a different function. The Mall is, and was intended to be, an expansive, open sanctuary in the midst of a metropolis; a spot suitable for Americans to visit to examine the historical artifacts of their country and to reflect on monuments to the men and events of its history. The Secretary has long had exclusive control of the Mall and ample power to develop it for these purposes. We hold that the WMATC has not been empowered to impose its own regulatory requirements on the same subject matter.
II.
If the WMATC is without jurisdiction to issue a certificate of convenience and necessity in this case, as we have found, then the D. C. Transit System’s interpretation of its franchise as protecting it from any uncerti-fied sightseeing service on the Mall would give it an absolute monopoly of service there: the WMATC, lacking jurisdiction over the Mall, would have no authority to certify another carrier. The Secretary, if D. C. Transit is right, would have to take D. C. Transit or no one. Nothing in the statute confers so rigid a monopoly.
Section 1 (a) of D. C. Transit’s franchise, Pub. L. 757, c. 669, Tit. I, pt. 1, 70 Stat. 598, confers the power to operate a “mass transportation system.” That this does not include sightseeing is clearly shown by the separate grant of power to operate “charter or sightseeing services” in § 6, 70 Stat. 599. The section giving D. C. Transit a measure of exclusivity is § 3, 70 Stat. 598, which protects it from any uncertified “competitive . . . bus line” for the “transportation of passengers of the character which runs over a given route on a fixed schedule . . . .” In determining what is “competitive” one must refer back to the sections which grant the franchise.
Even if §§ 1 and 3 together would protect “mass transportation” on the Mall from uncertified competition, and even if § 3 protects § 6 activity, it does not follow that D. C. Transit has a monopoly over sightseeing on the Mall. Section 6 explicitly saves the “laws ... of the District of Columbia,” including the “exclusive charge and control” of the Secretary over the Mall. D. C. Code §8-108 (1967). D. C. Transit admits the Secretary could exclude its sightseeing service from the Mall; if so, surely the franchise protection does not extend there. Moreover, § § 3 and 6 together cannot confer a monopoly of Mall sightseeing both because this would involve an impairment of the Secretary’s power under District law contrary to § 6, and because it would be unreasonable to construe the protection of § 3 against carriers uncerti-fied by the WMATC to apply where the WMATC has no powers of certification.
And even were § 3 so construed, its protection against “transportation of passengers of the character which runs over a given route on a fixed schedule” was evidently aimed at commuter service whose most important qualities are speed and predictability, not the service here whose most important qualities are interesting dialogue and leisurely exposure of the rider to new and perhaps unexpected experiences. The agenda of the tour will be varied by the Secretary according to the events of the day. The franchise does not protect D. C. Transit against competition in this sort of service on the Mall.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the District Court. If the Congress, which has the matter before it, wishes to clarify or alter the relationship of these statutes and agencies, it is entirely free to do so.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
16 U. S. C. §§ 1, 17b, 20 (1964 ed. and Supp. Ill). This responsibility is met principally through the National Park Service, which was created by the Act of August 25, 1916, c. 408, § 1, 39 Stat. 535, as an agency of the Department of the Interior. Since there is no conflict between them, we shall refer directly to the Secretary of the Interior rather than to the Director of the National Park Service.
In the Act of July 1, 1898, c. 543, § 2, 30 Stat. 570, Congress placed the District of Columbia parks under the “exclusive charge and control” of the United States Army Chief of Engineers. This authority was transferred in the Act of February 26, 1925, c. 339, 43 Stat. 983, to the Director of Public Buildings and Public Parks of the National Capital. And in Executive Order No. 6166, June 10, 1933, H. R. Doc. No. 69, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., § 2, this authority finally devolved upon the agency now called the National Park Service. Act of March 2, 1934, c. 38, § 1, 48 Stat. 389.
D. C. Transit System, Inc., an intervening carrier, contends otherwise. But that position is not directly at issue in our view of the case.
The Secretary’s power does not extend beyond these limits, however. In order to institute a transportation service from the Mall to a proposed Visitors’ Center in Union Station he sought specific authorization from Congress to add to and confirm his existing authority and provide a service embracing both the Mall and its surroundings. S. Rep. No. 959, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 8-10 (1968). Congress simply directed him to study the transportation needs of the entire area. Pub. L. 90-264, Tit. I, § 104, 82 Stat. 44 (1968); S. Rep. No. 959, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 810, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1967).
Pub. L. 86-794, § 3, 74 Stat. 1050. The term “police power” is a vague one which “embraces an almost infinite variety of subjects.” Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 145 (1877) (economic regulation of grain storage an aspect of police power). It is broad enough to embrace the full range of the Secretary's power over the Mall, which even prior to the compact was ordinarily directed to ends quite different from that of the surrounding municipalities in regulating their streets. The Secretary sought explicit recognition of these differences through use of more specific language in the compact, but his clarification was not adopted. H. R. Rep. No. 1621, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 20, 48-49 (1960).
E. g., Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 363 (1842); FTC v. A. P. W. Paper Co., 328 U. S. 193, 202 (1946).
This transportation is undertaken by contract with the Federal Government to serve a purpose of the Federal Government, and so might be thought to fall within the specific exemption from the compact for transportation by the Federal Government. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, § 1(a) (2), 74 Stat. 1036. Moreover, it is not primarily designed to transport people “between any points” but rather back to the same point of departure, and might therefore be excepted from the WMATC’s jurisdiction. Pub. L. 86-794, Tit. II, Art. XII, §1 (a), 74 Stat. 1035. But we find it unnecessary to reach these arguments, which would involve much more severe limits on the power of the WMATC throughout the city.
“There is hereby granted to D. C. Transit System, Inc. ... a franchise to operate a mass transportation system of passengers for hire within the District of Columbia . . . the cities of Alexandria and Falls Church, and the counties of Arlington and Fairfax in the Commonwealth of Virginia and the counties of Montgomery and Prince Georges in the State of Maryland . . . Provided, That nothing in this section shall be construed to exempt the Corporation from any law or ordinance of the Commonwealth of Virginia or the State of Maryland or any political subdivision of such Commonwealth or State, or of any rule, regulation, or order issued under the authority of any such law or ordinance, or from applicable provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act and rules and regulations prescribed thereunder.”
“The Corporation is hereby authorized and empowered to engage in special charter or sightseeing services subject to compliance with applicable laws, rules and regulations of the District of Columbia and of the municipalities or political subdivisions of the States in which such service is to be performed, and with applicable provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act and rules and regulations prescribed thereunder.”
“No competitive street railway or bus line, that is, bus or railway line for the transportation of passengers of the character which runs over a given route on a fixed schedule, shall be established to operate in the District of Columbia without the prior issuance of a certificate by the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia ... to the effect that the competitive line is necessary for the convenience of the public.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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I
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we are asked to set aside, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state conviction secured under somewhat unusual circumstances.
On June 26, 1951, a Bergen County, New Jersey, grand jury returned three indictments against the petitioner charging that on September 20, 1950, in concert with two others, he robbed three individuals, Cascio, Capezzuto and Galiardo, at Gay’s Tavern in Fairview, New Jersey. These indictments were joined for trial. The State called five witnesses: the three victims named in the indictment, and two other persons, Dottino and Yager. Dottino and Yager were also victims of the robbery, but they were not named in the indictment. All the witnesses, after stating that they were in Gay’s Tavern on September 20, testified to the elements of a robbery as defined in the New Jersey statute: that they were put in fear and that property was taken from their persons. The petitioner, who claimed that he was not at the tavern on the fateful day and testified to an alibi, was the sole witness for the defense. Although Galiardo and Dottino had both identified petitioner from a photograph during the police investigation, only one of the witnesses, Yager, identified him at the trial as one of the robbers. On May 27, 1952, the jury acquitted the petitioner on all three indictments.
Subsequently, on July 17,1952, another Bergen County grand jury returned a fourth indictment against petitioner, which was the same as the first three in all respects except that it named Yager as the victim of the robbery at Gay’s Tavern. At the trial upon this indictment the State called only Yager as a witness, and he repeated his earlier testimony identifying petitioner. The defense called Cascio, Capezzuto, Galiardo and Dottino, and they each once again testified either that petitioner was not one of the robbers or that a positive identification was not possible. Petitioner repeated his alibi. This time the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The conviction was sustained on appeal in both the Superior Court of New Jersey, 35 N. J. Super. 555, 114 A. 2d 573, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 21 N. J. 496, 122 A. 2d 628. We granted certiorari to consider petitioner’s claim, timely raised below, that he was deprived of due process. 352 U. S. 907.
Petitioner contends that the second prosecution growing out of the Gay’s Tavern robberies infringed safeguards of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment which are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and that these safeguards as such are carried over under the Fourteenth Amendment as restrictions on the States. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325. More particularly, it is said that petitioner’s trial for the robbery of Yager, following his previous acquittal on charges of robbing Cascio, Capezzuto, and Galiardo, amounted to trying him again on the same charges. However, in the circumstances shown by this record, we cannot say that petitioner’s later prosecution and conviction violated due process.
At the outset it should be made clear that petitioner has not been twice put in jeopardy for the same crime. The New Jersey courts, in rejecting his claim that conviction for robbing Yager violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the State Constitution, have construed the New Jersey statute as making each of the four robberies, though taking place on the same occasion, a separate offense. This construction was consistent with the usual New Jersey rule that double jeopardy does not apply unless the same evidence necessary to sustain a second indictment would have been sufficient to secure a conviction on the first. See State v. Di Giosia, 3 N. J. 413, 419, 70 A. 2d 756, 759; State v. Labato, 7 N. J. 137, 144, 80 A. 2d 617, 620. Certainly nothing in the Due Process Clause prevented the State from making that construction.
But even if it was constitutionally permissible for New Jersey to punish petitioner for each of the four robberies as separate offenses, it does not necessarily follow that the State was free to prosecute him for each robbery at a different trial. The question is whether this case involved an attempt “to wear the accused out by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials.” Palko v. Connecticut, supra, at 328.
We do not think that the Fourteenth Amendment always forbids States to prosecute different offenses at consecutive trials even though they arise out of the same occurrence. The question in any given case is whether such a course has led to fundamental unfairness. Of course, it may very well be preferable practice for a State in circumstances such as these normally to try the several offenses in a single prosecution, and recent studies of the American Law Institute have led to such a proposal. See Model Penal Code § 1.08 (2) (Tent. Draft. No. 5, 1956). But it would be an entirely different matter for us to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment always prevents a State from allowing different offenses arising out of the same act or transaction to be prosecuted separately, as New Jersey has done. For it has long been recognized as the very essence of our federalism that the States should have the widest latitude in the administration of their own systems of criminal justice. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581; West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78. In the last analysis, a determination whether an impermissible use of multiple trials has taken place cannot be based on any over-all formula. Here, as elsewhere, “The pattern of due process is picked out in the facts and circumstances of each case.” Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U. S. 424, 427-428. And thus, without speculating as to hypothetical situations in which the Fourteenth Amendment might prohibit consecutive prosecutions of multiple offenses, we reach the conclusion that the petitioner in this case was not deprived of due process.
“Rule 2:4-15 Joinder of Offenses [now Revised Rule 3:4-7]:
“Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or accusation in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether high misdemeanors or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.”
“Rule 2:5-4 Trial of Indictments or Accusations Together [now Revised Rule 3:5-6] :
“The court may order two or more indictments or accusations to be tried together if the offenses and the defendants, if there is more than one, could have been joined in a single indictment or accusation.”
In Brock v. North Carolina, su-pra, this Court upheld a state conviction against a somewhat similar claim of denial of due process. In Brock two of the State’s key witnesses had previously been tried and convicted of crimes arising out of the same transaction which formed the basis of the charge against the petitioner. Before judgments were entered on their convictions they were called by the State to testify at petitioner’s trial. Because of their intention to appeal their convictions and the likelihood of a new trial in the event of reversal, the two witnesses declined to testify at petitioner’s trial on the ground that their answers might be self-incriminatory. At this point the State was granted a mistrial upon its representation that the evidence of the two witnesses was necessary to its case and that it intended to procure their testimony at a new trial of the petitioner. This Court held that a second trial of the petitioner did not violate due process.
Remembering that the Yager robbery constituted a separate offense from the robberies of the other victims, we find no basis for a constitutional distinction between the circumstances which led to the retrial in Brock and those surrounding the subsequent indictment and trial in the present case. It is a fair inference from the record before us that the indictment and trial on the charge of robbing Yager resulted from the unexpected failure of four of the State’s witnesses at the earlier trial to identify petitioner, after two of these witnesses had previously identified him in the course of the police investigation. Indeed, after the second of the two witnesses failed to identify petitioner, the State pleaded surprise and attempted to impeach his testimony. We cannot say that, after such an unexpected turn of events, the State’s decision to try petitioner for the Yager robbery was so arbitrary or lacking in justification that it amounted to a denial of those concepts constituting “the very essence of a scheme of ordered justice, which is due process.” Brock v. North Carolina, supra, at 428. Thus, whatever limits may confine the right of a State to institute separate trials for concededly different criminal offenses, it is plain to us that these limits have not been transgressed in this case.
Petitioner further contends that his conviction was constitutionally barred by “collateral estoppel.” His position is that because the sole disputed issue in the earlier trial related to his identification as a participant in the Gay’s Tavern robberies, the verdict of acquittal there must necessarily be taken as having resolved that issue in his favor. The doctrine of collateral estoppel, so the argument runs, is grounded in considerations of basic fairness to litigants, and thus for a State to decline to apply the rule in favor of a criminal defendant deprives him of due process. Accordingly, it is claimed that New Jersey could not relitigate the issue of petitioner’s “identity,” and is thus precluded from convicting him of robbing Yager.
A common statement of the rule of collateral estoppel is that “where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action on a different cause of action.” Restatement, Judgments, § 68 (1). As an aspect of the broader doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel is designed to eliminate the expense, vexation, waste, and possible inconsistent results of duplicatory litigation. See Developments in the Law — Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 820. Although the rule was originally developed in connection with civil litigation, it has been widely employed in criminal cases in both state and federal courts. See, e. g., Harris v. State, 193 Ga. 109, 17 S. E. 2d 573; Commonwealth v. Evans, 101 Mass. 25; United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U. S. 85; Sealfon v. United States, 332 U. S. 575; cf. Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 335.
Despite its wide employment, we entertain grave doubts whether collateral estoppel can be regarded as a constitutional requirement. Certainly this Court has never so held. However, we need not decide that question, for in this case New Jersey both recognized the rule of collateral estoppel and considered its applicability to the facts of this case. The state court simply ruled that petitioner’s previous acquittal did not give rise to such an estoppel because “the trial of the first three indictments involved several questions, not just [petitioner’s] identity, and there is no way of knowing upon which question the jury’s verdict turned.” 21 N. J., at 505, 122 A. 2d, at 632. Possessing no such corrective power over state courts as we do over the federal courts, see Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 50, note 1, we would not be justified in substituting a different view as to the basis of the jury’s verdict.
It is of course true that when necessary to a proper determination of a claimed denial of constitutional rights this Court will examine the record in a state criminal trial and is not foreclosed by the conclusion of the state court. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 271; Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315, 316. But this practice has never been thought to permit us to overrule state courts on controverted or fairly debatable factual issues. “On review here of State convictions, all those matters which are usually termed issues of fact are for conclusive determination by the State courts and are not open for reconsideration by this Court. Observance of this restriction in our review of State courts calls for the utmost scruple.” Watts v. Indiana, supra, at 50-51.
In this case we are being asked to go even further than to overrule a state court’s findings on disputed factual issues. For we would have to embark on sheer speculation in order to decide that the jury’s verdict at the earlier trial necessarily embraced a determination favorable to the petitioner on the issue of “identity.” In numerous criminal cases both state and federal courts have declined to apply collateral estoppel because it was not possible to determine with certainty which issues were decided by the former general verdict of acquittal. See, e. g., People v. Rogers, 102 Misc. 437, 170 N. Y. Supp. 86; State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 422-424, 120 P. 2d 285, 312-313; United States v. Halbrook, 36 F. Supp. 345. Keeping in mind the fact that jury verdicts are sometimes inconsistent or irrational, see, e. g., Dunn v. United States, 284 U. S. 390; United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277, 279; Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, we cannot say that the New Jersey Supreme Court exceeded constitutionally permissible bounds in concluding that the jury might have acquitted petitioner at the earlier trial because it did not believe that the victims of the robbery had been put in fear, or that property had been taken from them, or for other reasons unrelated to the issue of “identity.” For us to try to outguess the state court on this score would be wholly out of keeping with the proper discharge of our difficult and delicate responsibilities under the Fourteenth Amendment in determining whether a State has violated the Federal Constitution.
Finally, in the circumstances shown by this record, we cannot hold that petitioner was denied a “speedy trial” on the Yager indictment, whatever may be the reach of the Sixth Amendment under the provisions of the Fourteenth. And we need hardly add that the sufficiency of the evidence to support the identification of the petitioner as one of the Gay’s Tavern robbers is a matter solely within the province of the state courts.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 2:166-1 of the Revised Statutes of New Jersey, under which petitioner was indicted, provided:
“Any person who shall forcibly take from the person of another, money or personal goods and chattels, of any value whatever, by violence or putting him in fear . . . shall be guilty . . . .”
This section was subsequently repealed and substantially re-enacted. N. J. Stat. Ann., 1953, § 2A: 141-1.
Article I, par. 11, of the New Jersey Constitution provides in part that “No person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same offense.”
Indeed, the New Jersey Superior Court recognized this problem under the double jeopardy clause of the State Constitution when it said in the present case: “Assuredly our prosecutors are aware that the concept of double jeopardy is designed to prevent the government from unduly harassing an accused, and we are confident that they will not resort unfairly to multiple indictments and successive trials in order to accomplish indirectly that which the constitutional interdiction precludes.” 35 N. J. Super., at 561-562, 114 A. 2d, at 577.
See also Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 805; Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 Yale L. J. 513; Gershenson, Res Judicata in Successive Criminal Prosecutions, 24 Brooklyn L. Rev. 12.
The New Jersey Rules in force during 1952 provided:
The robbery at Gay’s Tavern occurred on September 20, 1950. On September 23 or 24, 1950, petitioner absconded from parole in New York. He was arrested on November 20, 1950, and returned to prison in New York, where he remained until January 12, 1952, when he was transferred to the Bergen County jail in New Jersey. In the meantime, on June 26, 1951, the Bergen County grand jury returned indictments charging petitioner with the robberies of Cascio, Capezzuto and Galiardo. These were tried together, at petitioner’s first trial, on May 26 and 27, 1952. Following his acquittal petitioner was returned to New York to complete his- sentence, and he was in a New York prison on July 17, 1952, when the Bergen County grand jury returned the indictment charging him with the robbery of Yager. New Jersey reacquired petitioner by extradition on May 11, 1954. The second trial was held on October 18, 1954, at the next term of the Bergen County Court, which was not in session for criminal trials during the summer months. It thus appears that a substantial portion of the time elapsing prior to petitioner’s trial on the Yager indictment can be accounted for by his incarceration in New York.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mb. Justice Frankfuetee
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Does the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution bar a State from use of the injunction to prohibit picketing of a place of business solely in order to secure compliance with a demand that its employees be in proportion to the racial origin of its then customers? Such is the broad question of this case.
The petitioners, acting on behalf of a group calling themselves Progressive Citizens of America, demanded of Lucky Stores, Inc., that it hire Negroes at its grocery store near the Canal Housing Project in Richmond, California, as white clerks quit or were transferred, until the proportion of Negro clerks to white clerks approximated the proportion of Negro to white customers. At the time in controversy about 60% of the customers of the Canal store were Negroes. Upon refusal of this demand and in order to compel compliance, the Canal store was systematically patrolled by pickets carrying placards stating that Lucky refused to hire Negro clerks in proportion to Negro customers.
Suit was begun by Lucky to enjoin the picketing on appropriate allegations for equitable relief. The Superior Court of Contra Costa County issued a preliminary injunction restraining petitioners and others from picketing any of Lucky’s stores to compel “the selective hiring of negro clerks, such hiring to be based on the proportion of white and negro customers who patronize plaintiff’s stores.” In the face of this injunction, petitioners continued to picket the Canal store, carrying placards reading: “Lucky Won’t Hire Negro Clerks in Proportion to Negro Trade — Don’t Patronize.” In conformity with State procedure, petitioners were found guilty of contempt for “wilfully disregarding” the injunction and were sentenced to imprisonment for two days and fined $20 each. They defended their conduct by challenging the injunction as a deprivation of the liberty assured them by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The intermediate appellate court annulled the judgment of contempt, 186 P. 2d 756, but it was reinstated on review by the Supreme Court of California. That court held that the conceded purpose of the picketing in this case— to compel the hiring of Negroes in proportion to Negro customers — was unlawful even though pursued in a peaceful manner. Having violated a valid injunction petitioners were properly punishable for contempt. “The controlling points,” according to the decision of the Supreme Court of California, “are that the injunction is limited to prohibiting picketing for a specific unlawful purpose and that the evidence justified the trial court in finding that such narrow prohibition was deliberately violated.” 32 Cal. 2d 850, 856, 198 P. 2d 885, 888. We brought the case here to consider claims of infringement of the right of freedom of speech as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 336 U. S. 966.
First. Discrimination against Negroes in employment has brought a variety of legal issues before this Court in recent years. Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 338 U. S. 232; Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88; Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210; New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552. See also Myrdal, An American Dilemma cc. 13-14 (1944). Such discrimination raises sociological problems which in some aspects and within limits have received legal solutions. California has been sensitive to these problems and decisions of its Supreme Court have been hostile to discrimination on the basis of color. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329; Williams v. International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P. 2d 903. This background of California’s legal policy is relevant to the conviction of its court that it would encourage discriminatory hiring to give constitutional protection to petitioners’ efforts to subject the opportunity of getting a job to a quota system. The view of that court is best expressed in its own words:
“It was just such a situation — an arbitrary discrimination upon the basis of race and color alone, rather than a choice based solely upon individual qualification for the work to be done — which we condemned in the Marinship case, supra (25 Cal. 2d 721, 737, 745). The fact that those seeking such discrimination do not demand that it be practiced as to all employes of a particular employer diminishes in no respect the unlawfulness of their purpose; they would, to the extent of the fixed proportion, make the right to work for Lucky dependent not on fitness for the work nor on an equal right of all, regardless of race, to compete in an open market, but, rather, on membership in a particular race. If petitioners were upheld in their demand then other races, white, yellow, brown and red, would have equal rights to demand discriminatory hiring on a racial basis. Yet that is precisely the type of discrimination to which petitioners avowedly object.” 32 Cal. 2d at 856, 198 P. 2d at 889.
These considerations are most pertinent in regard to a population made up of so many diverse groups as ours. To deny to California the right to ban picketing in the circumstances of this case would mean that there could be no prohibition of the pressure of picketing to secure proportional employment on ancestral grounds of Hungarians in Cleveland, of Poles in Buffalo, of Germans in Milwaukee, of Portuguese in New Bedford, of Mexicans in San Antonio, of the numerous minority groups in New York, and so on through the whole gamut of racial and religious concentrations in various cities. States may well believe that such constitutional sheltering would inevitably encourage use of picketing to compel employment on the basis of racial discrimination. In disallowing such picketing States may act under the belief that otherwise community tensions and conflicts would be exacerbated. The differences in cultural traditions instead of adding flavor and variety to our common citizenry might well be hardened into hostilities by leave of law. The Constitution does not demand that the element of communication in picketing prevail over the mischief furthered by its use in these situations.
Second. “[T]he domain of liberty, withdrawn by the Fourteenth Amendment from encroachment by the states,” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 327, no doubt includes liberty of thought and appropriate means for expressing it. But while picketing is a mode of communication it is inseparably something more and different. Industrial picketing “is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.” Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Black and Murphy, JJ., concurring in Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 775, 776. Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may convey the same information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a picket line. But the very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces consequences, different from other modes of communication. The loyalties and responses evoked and exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by printed word. See Gregory, Labor and the Law 346-48 (rev. ed. 1949); Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 180, 200-02 (1942); Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A Dissent, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 513, 517 (1943); Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts, 10 N. C. L. Rev. 158, 186-87, n. 135 (1932).
Third. A State may constitutionally permit picketing despite the ingredients in it that differentiate it from speech in its ordinary context. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468. And we have found that because of its element of communication picketing under some circumstances finds sanction in the Fourteenth Amendment. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321; Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769; Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293. However general or loose the language of opinions, the specific situations have controlled decision. It has been amply recognized that picketing, not being the equivalent of speech as a matter of fact, is not its inevitable legal equivalent. Picketing is not beyond the control of a State if the manner in which picketing is conducted or the purpose which it seeks to effectuate gives ground for its disallowance. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306; Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287; Hotel and Restaurant Employees’ International Alliance v. Wisconsin E. R. B., 315 U. S. 437; Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter’s Cafe, 315 U. S. 722; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490. “A state is not required to tolerate in all places and all circumstances even peaceful picketing by an individual.” Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl, supra at 775.
The constitutional boundary line between the competing interests of society involved in the use of picketing cannot be established by general phrases. Picketing when not in numbers that of themselves carry a threat of violence may be a lawful means to a lawful end. See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 206-07. The California Supreme Court suggested a distinction between picketing to promote discrimination, as here, and picketing against discrimination : “It may be assumed for the purposes of this decision, without deciding, that if such discrimination exists, picketing to protest it would not be for an unlawful objective.” 32 Cal. 2d at 855, 198 P. 2d at 888. We cannot construe the Due Process Clause as precluding California from securing respect for its policy against involuntary employment on racial lines by prohibiting systematic picketing that would subvert such policy. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., supra.
Fourth. The fact that California’s policy is expressed by the judicial organ of the State rather than by the legislature we have repeatedly ruled to be immaterial. Castillo v. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674, 684; Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316; Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U. S. 362, 369; Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69, 79; Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, 11. For the Fourteenth Amendment leaves the States free to distribute the powers of government as they will between their legislative and judicial branches. Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U. S. 71, 83-84; Soliah v. Heskin, 222 U. S. 522, 524; Erie R. Co. v. Board of Public Util. Comm’rs, 254 U. S. 394, 413; Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 225; Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 443. “[R]ights under that amendment turn on the power of the State, no matter by what organ it acts.” Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U. S. 165, 170-71.
It is not for this Court to deny to a State the right, or even to question the desirability, of fitting its law “to a concrete situation through the authority given . . . to its courts.” Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadow-moor Dairies, Inc., supra at 297. It is particularly important to bear this in mind in regard to matters affecting industrial relations which, until recently, have “been left largely to judicial lawmaking and not to legislation.” Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter’s Cafe, supra at 724. In charging its courts with evolving law instead of formulating policy by statute, California has availed itself of the variety of law-making sources, and has recognized that in our day as in Coke’s “the law hath provided several weapons of remedy.” Coke, The Compleat Copyholder § 9 in Three Law Tracts (1764). California chose to strike at the discrimination inherent in the quota system by means of the equitable remedy of injunction to protect against unwilling submission to such a system. It is not for this Court to deny to California that choice from among all “the various weapons in the armory of the law.” Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 148.
The policy of a State may rely for the common good on the free play of conflicting interests and leave conduct unregulated. Contrariwise, a State may deem it wiser policy to regulate. Regulation may take the form of legislation, e. g., restraint of trade statutes, or be left to the ad hoc judicial process, e. g., common law mode of dealing with restraints of trade. Either method may outlaw an end not in the public interest or merely address itself to the obvious means toward such end. The form the regulation should take and its scope are surely matters of policy and, as such, within a State’s choice.
If because of the compulsive features inherent in picketing, beyond the aspect of mere communication as an appeal to reason, a State chooses to enjoin picketing to secure submission to a demand for employment proportional to the racial origin of the then customers of a business, it need not forbid the employer to adopt such a quota system of his own free will. A State is not required to exercise its intervention on the basis of abstract reasoning. The Constitution commands neither logical symmetry nor exhaustion of a principle. “The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations — illogical, it may be, and unscientific.” Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70. A State may “direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, and it may do so none the less that the forbidden act does not differ in kind from those that are allowed.” Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 160. See also Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 81; Keokee Consolidated Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 227; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 384; Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 661-62; James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U. S. 119, 125; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 396; Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 46. Lawmaking is essentially empirical and tentative, and in adjudication as in legislation the Constitution does not forbid “cautious advance, step by step, and the distrust of generalities.” Carroll v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 199 U. S. 401, 411.
The injunction here was drawn to meet what California deemed the evil of picketing to bring about proportional hiring. We do not go beyond the circumstances of the case. Generalizations are treacherous in the application of large constitutional concepts.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Minton are of the opinion that this case is controlled by the principles announced in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, and therefore concur in the Court’s judgment.
The range of policy in proscribing or permitting picketing for various ends is illustrated by a recent bill against picketing of courts passed by the New York State Legislature but vetoed by Governor Dewey. See N. Y. Times, Apr. 11,1950, p. 21, col. 1.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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C
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
MR. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The decision herein passes only on the integrity of a criminal trial in the federal courts. It does not determine the guilt or innocence of the petitioners, and we do not reach other issues propounded in the lengthy briefs or which may be present in the trial record of 5,147 pages. The Solicitor General of the United States moved to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings because of untruthful testimony given before other tribunals by Joseph D. Mazzei, a Government witness in this case. The counter-motion of petitioners asked for a new trial. The decision is based entirely upon the representations of the Government in its written motion and on the statements of the Solicitor General during the argument on the motions.
The petitioners were charged in a one-count indictment in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania with conspiracy to violate the Smith Act. They were convicted, and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed by a divided court. 223 F. 2d 449. This Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari, 350 U. S. 922, and the case was scheduled for argument on October 10,1956.
On September 27, 1956, the Solicitor General of the United States filed a motion calling the attention of the Court to the testimony given in other proceedings by Mazzei, who was one of the seven witnesses for the Government in this case. In his motion, he stated that the Government, on the information in its possession, now has serious reason to doubt the truthfulness of Mazzei’s testimony in those proceedings. While adhering to its position that “the testimony given by Mazzei at the trial [in this case] was entirely truthful and credible,” the motion stated that “these incidents, taken cumulatively, lead us to suggest that the issue of his truthfulness at the trial of these petitioners should now be determined by the District Court after a hearing.”
The material cited by the Government indicating the untruthfulness of Mazzei on occasions other than this trial can best be presented by setting forth verbatim the description of these incidents presented in the Motion of the Government to Remand:
“On June 18, 1953, Mazzei testified before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, in Washington, D. C., that, at a meeting of the Civil Rights Congress on December 4, 1952, one Louis Bortz told him that he, Bortz, had been ‘selected by the Communist Party to do a job in the liquidation of Senator Joseph McCarthy.’ Mazzei further testified that the said Bortz conducted Communist Party classes in Pittsburgh to familiarize Party members with the handling of firearms and to instruct them in the construction of bombs.
“On November 14, 1952, Mazzei pleaded guilty to charges of adultery and bastardy in a Pennsylvania state court. This fact was brought out during his cross-examination at the petitioners’ trial. On October 2, 1953 — after the completion of the trial— Mazzei filed a petition in the state court to have the guilty plea set aside. One of the grounds set forth in his petition was that he ‘was not guilty of the charge to which he was induced to plead * * * but did so only in his official capacity (as a Government informant) at the insistence of his superior in the FBI to avoid testifying.’ At a hearing on the above petition on October 6, 1953, a Special Agent of the FBI denied Mazzei’s allegations under oath. Maz-zei’s petition was dismissed by the court on October 6, 1953.
“In November 1953, Mazzei, at a secret proceeding, identified a certain Government official as a long-time active Communist Party member.
“On June 10 and 11, 1955, Mazzei testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security regarding possible Communist influences motivating attempts to discredit Justice Michael Musmanno of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In the course of his testimony, Mazzei identified John J. Mullen, National Director, Political Action Committee, Steel Workers of America, as a member of the Communist Party in Pittsburgh during the period that Mazzei was a Government informant. Mazzei also testified that since 1942 he met Mullen ten or fifteen times a year, as a fellow Communist Party member.
“On July 2, 1956, Mazzei testified in disbarment proceedings against one Leo Sheiner before the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, in Miami. On cross-examination, Mazzei reiterated his charge that he was induced to plead guilty to the adultery and bastardy charge in the Pennsylvania state court in November 1952 by an Agent of the FBI. Items of his testimony as to alleged Communist activity are as follows: — that he visited Dade County, Florida, on behalf of the Communist Party during each of the years from 1946 to 1952; that the Communist Party in Miami had attempted to lease a bus line which served the Opa-locka Air Base; that in 1948 the Communist Party made plans for the armed invasion of the United States on orders from the Soviet Union and that he, Mazzei, was selected to go to Miami in 1948 because it was a seaport; that he took courses in the Communist Party on sabotage, espionage, and handling arms and ammunition; that he was taught by officers of the Communist Party in Pittsburgh how to blow bridges, poison water in reservoirs, and to eliminate people; that he discussed with Sheiner in 1948 ‘knocking off’ a Judge Holt (a Florida judge) whom they (presumably the Communist Party) were having trouble with, and importing one Louis Bortz, the strong-arm man for the Communist Party, to do the job; that he and the Communist Party had made plans to assassinate Senators, Congressmen, and even went to Washington and beat up a Senator; and that, to his knowledge, Sheiner was extensively engaged in Communist Party activities in 1945, 1947, 1950, 1951, and 1952. None of this testimony at the Florida proceeding is supported or corroborated by information in the possession of the Government.
“Mazzei likewise testified that the FBI arranged to get him into the Army so that he could watch a certain Communist Party member; that he never wore a uniform and that he was discharged the day after the Communist Party member he was to watch was discharged. In actual fact, Mazzei’s career in the Army was the result of the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 and the FBI had nothing to do with his service in the armed forces. He also testified that sometimes the FBI paid him about $1,000 a month for expenses. From the period 1942 to 1952, according to the Bureau records, Mazzei was paid the total of $172.05 as expense money.
“Mazzei likewise testified that he had never been arrested in his life. In fact, he was arrested in connection with the paternity case brought against him in Pennsylvania by one Irene Corva. He has been arrested several times subsequent to this for his failure to make support payments to this woman.”
On the argument of the motion the Solicitor General, in response to questions by the Court, stated with commendable candor that he believed the testimony given by Mazzei on June 18, 1953, before the Senate Committee concerning “the liquidation of Senator Joseph McCarthy” was untrue. He likewise stated that he believed the testimony given by Mazzei on July 2, 1956, in the Circuit Court of Florida was untrue. And in addition to the Solicitor General’s personal opinion, the text of the motion itself shows that the Department of Justice is certain that some of Mazzei’s post-trial testimony was contrary to the facts. The Pennsylvania statement of October 2, 1953, concerning his conviction of adultery and bastardy was controverted under oath at that hearing by an agent of the FBI. Mazzei again asserted in the Florida proceeding that he was induced to plead guilty to the adultery charge by an agent of the FBI. In the Florida testimony, he said that the FBI sometimes paid him a thousand dollars a month for expenses, whereas the records of the Bureau showed he was paid a total of $172.05 as expense money. He also testified there that the FBI arranged to put him in the Army to spy on a Party member, whereas the FBI had nothing to do with his Army service; he had been inducted in accordance with the Selective Service Act. All these discrepancies are pointed out in the motion, as quoted above.
As to his bizarre testimony in the Florida proceeding-concerning sabotage, espionage, handling of arms and ammunition, and plots to assassinate Senators, Congressmen, and a state judge, the Government’s motion suggests that none of it is worthy of belief by stating therein: “None of this testimony at the Florida proceeding is supported or corroborated by information in the possession of the Government.”
At the oral argument, however, the Solicitor General stated that although he believed all of this testimony to be untrue, he was not prepared to say the witness Mazzei was guilty of perjury in giving the testimony; that his untrue statements might have been caused by a psychiatric condition, and that such condition might have arisen subsequent to the time of this trial. The Solicitor General, in the light of this position, asked to have the argument on the main case stricken from the calendar and the case remanded to the District Court for a full consideration of the credibility of the testimony of witness Mazzei. Commendable as the action of the Solicitor General was in promptly bringing the matter to our attention when it came to the attention of his office, we do not believe the disposition of the case suggested by him should be made.
Either this Court or the District Court should accept the statements of the Solicitor General as indicating the unreliability of this Government witness. The question of whether his untruthfulness in these other proceedings constituted perjury or was caused by a psychiatric condition can make no material difference here. Whichever explanation might be found to be correct in this regard, Mazzei’s credibility has been wholly discredited by the disclosures of the Solicitor General. No other conclusion is possible. The dignity of the United States Government will not permit the conviction of any person on tainted testimony. This conviction is tainted, and there can be no other just result than to accord petitioners a new trial.
It must be remembered that we are not dealing here with a motion for a new trial initiated by the defense, under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, presenting untruthful statements by a Government witness subsequent to the trial as newly discovered evidence affecting his credibility at the trial. Such an allegation by the defense ordinarily will not support a motion for a new trial, because new evidence which is “merely cumulative or impeaching” is not, according to the often-repeated statement of the courts, an adequate basis for the grant of a new trial.
Here we have an entirely different situation. The witness Mazzei was a paid informer of the Government — he had been in its employ from 1942 to 1953 for the purpose of infiltrating the Communist Party and reporting the facts found. He testified in this case in that capacity, as a Government witness. It is the Government which now questions the credibility of its own witness because in other proceedings in the same field of activity he gave certain testimony — some parts of it positively established as untrue and other parts of it believed by the Solicitor General to be untrue. The Solicitor General conceded that without Mazzei’s testimony in this case the conviction of two of the petitioners cannot stand, but he argued that as to the other three Mazzei’s evidence may not have had a substantial effect. But the trial judge believed Mazzei’s testimony was material against them for, over objection, he admitted it against all the defendants. There were only seven witnesses. The testimony of Mazzei, at least, gave flesh-and-blood reality to the mass of Communist literature read to the jury to show advocacy of violence by the Communist Party. This being so, it cannot be determined conclusively by any court that his testimony was insignificant in the general case against the defendants. Thus it has tainted the trial as to all petitioners. As we said last Term in Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board:
“When uncontested challenge is made that a finding of subversive design by petitioner was in part the product of three perjurious witnesses, it does not remove the taint for a reviewing court to find that there is ample innocent testimony to support the Board’s findings. If these witnesses in fact committed perjury in testifying in other cases on subject matter substantially like that of their testimony in the present proceedings, their testimony in this proceeding is inevitably discredited and the Board’s determination must duly take this fact into account.” 351 U. S. 115, 124.
There we remanded to the Subversive Activities Control Board for reconsideration of its original determination in the light of the record shorn of the tainted testimony. But there the Board, an administrative agency, was the original finder of fact. Here, on the other hand, in a criminal case, the original finder of fact was a jury. The district judge is not the proper agency to determine that there was sufficient evidence at the trial, other than that given by Mazzei, to sustain a conviction of any of the petitioners. Only the jury can determine what it would do on a different body of evidence, and the jury can no longer act in this case. For this reason, as well as that stated in the preceding paragraph, if on a remand the District Court should rule that the verdict against some of the petitioners could stand, we would be obliged, on a subsequent appeal, to reverse and, at that late date, direct that a new trial be granted. This case was instituted four and one-half years ago; petitioners have been proceeding in forma pauperis. The interests of justice could not be served by a remand that must prove futile.
It might be different if we could see in this case any factual issue upon which the District Court, on a remand, could make an unassailable finding that Mazzei’s other falsehoods were differentiated from his testimony herein. But it is not within the realm of reason to expect the district judge to determine, as the Government indicated it would ask him to do, that the witness Mazzei testified truthfully in this case in 1953 as an undercover informer concerning the activities of the Communist conspiracy, yet concurrently appeared in the same role in another tribunal and testified falsely — possibly because of a psychiatric condition — about a plan by different members of the Communist conspiracy to assassinate a United States Senator. That would be an unreasonable determination to make even though the judge might believe that Mazzei's bizarre testimony in 1956 concerning plans for the assassination of other officials, the destruction of bridges, training in sabotage and handling arms, and the poisoning of water in reservoirs, all to destroy the Government of the United States, was the product of a mental or emotional condition that had developed only after the time of this trial.
Mazzei, by his testimony, has poisoned the water in this reservoir, and the reservoir cannot be cleansed without first draining it of all impurity. This is a federal criminal case, and this Court has supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings of the federal courts. If it has any duty to perform in this regard, it is to see that the waters of justice are not polluted. Pollution having taken place here, the condition should be remedied at the earliest opportunity.
“The untainted administration of justice is certainly one of the most cherished aspects of our institutions. Its observance is one of our proudest boasts. This Court is charged with supervisory functions in relation to proceedings in the federal courts. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332. Therefore, fastidious regard for the honor of the administration of justice requires the Court to make certain that the doing of justice be made so manifest that only irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can be asserted.” Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U. S. 115, 124.
The government of a strong and free nation does not need convictions based upon such testimony. It cannot afford to abide with them. The interests of justice call for a reversal of the judgments below with direction to grant the petitioners a new trial.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The Court directed that oral argument on the motions be heard at the time previously scheduled for the argument .on the merits. 352 U. S. 808. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, believing the motion should be granted without argument, filed a dissent.
After hearing argument on the motions, October 10, 1956, the Court recessed to consider the matter, following which its decision to order a new trial was announced from the bench. 352 U. S. 862. Argument on the merits, therefore, was not heard. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Burton, and Mr. Justice Harlan dissented from the denial of the Government’s motion to remand.
This opinion has been written to amplify the decision announced October 10, 1956. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Minton participated in the consideration and decision of the motions, voting in favor of the order of the Court. On October 15, 1956, prior to the writing of this opinion, he retired from the Court. Therefore he did not participate in the consideration of this opinion.
It was alleged that between 1945 and the date of the indictment the petitioners had conspired to advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence and to organize a society or group, the Communist Party, devoted to that purpose. The trial judge ruled that the organization charge was barred by the statute of limitations, but that evidence concerning the 1945 organization of the Communist Party, as well as earlier events, was admissible in determining whether petitioners had conspired to advocate violence.
The Solicitor General’s motion stated that his office came into possession of “the history of Mazzei’s post-trial testimony” less than ten days before the motion was filed. With one exception, the motion does not indicate when other units of the Department of Justice acquired their information of Mazzei’s conduct.
See, e. g., United States v. Johnson, 142 F. 2d 588, 592, cert. dismissed, 323 U. S. 806; United States v. Rutkin, 208 F. 2d 647, 654; United States v. Frankfeld, 111 F. Supp. 919, 923, aff’d sub nom. Meyers v. United States, 207 F. 2d 413. But see United States v. On Lee, 201 F. 2d 722, 725-726 (dissenting opinion).
See also United States v. Johnson, 327 U. S. 106, 110-111, n. 4 and n. 5.
Although we have not examined the evidence in this case, in view of the disposition made, we deem it appropriate to consider herein the nature of Mazzei’s testimony, since petitioners’ counter-motion referred us to the appropriate pages of the transcript. The same pages had also been cited in the main briefs of both parties in summarizing the evidence.
Mazzei testified quite specifically about statements by defendants Careathers and Dolsen, made in classes each had taught at a Communist Party school he had attended in 1943 or in private conversations each had had with him at that time.
Careathers taught in his class, Mazzei testified, about the part the Negro people would play in bringing about a revolution. [Tr. 1940-1941.] Dolsen told his class, with Careathers present, that the only way a revolution could come about would be by violent overthrow of the government, with the Communist Party helping. [Tr. 1923.] Mazzei related other details of Dolsen’s teaching, and passages were read to the jury which he said Dolsen had read to the class from the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. [Tr. 1922-1923, 1936-1938.]
Mazzei told how Dolsen and Careathers had each given him private instruction after class, because each was unsatisfied with his understanding of a lesson in Dolsen’s class. Mazzei related that each had told him in these separate private sessions that a revolution in this country could only come by armed violence, and that it would be with the help of the Communist Party and the Soviet Union. [Tr. 1940, 1943.] Mazzei also testified that Dolsen had told him, on an auto trip, that if a revolution came about, he would not hesitate to kill, as he had done in China, where he had worked with the Communist Party. [Tr. 1945.]
Cf. Gordon v. United States, 344 U. S. 414, 422-423.
The present situation is different from that in United States v. Flynn, 130 F. Supp. 412, reargument denied, 131 F. Supp. 742. There the defense moved for a new trial on the basis of an affidavit in which a witness recanted his testimony after the trial. The Government charged that the recantation, rather than the testimony it contradicted, was the lie. Hence there was a factual issue to be determined at the outset, unlike the present case, where there is no conflict between the trial testimony and the subsequent matter brought forward by the Government as bearing on credibility. This difference has been recognized by the courts as calling for the application of different tests in passing on a motion for new trial, even without the added distinction of this case that it is the Government which questions the witness’s credibility. See, e. g., United States v. Johnson, 142 F. 2d 588, 591-592, cert. dismissed, 323 U. S. 806; United States v. Hiss, 107 F. Supp. 128, 136, aff’d, 201 F. 2d 372. Therefore, we express no opinion as to the procedure followed by Judge Dimock in the Flynn case.
Cf. Remmer v. United States, 347 U. S. 227, 348 U. S. 904, 350 U. S. 377.
Because the situation raised by the Solicitor General’s motion is quite distinct from that of the ordinary defense motion for new trial, see pp. 9-11, supra, we would not consider ourselves bound on a review of the District Court’s ruling in this situation by the limitations expressed with reference to the defense motion in United States v. Johnson, 327 U. S. 106.
See also note 6, supra.
The trial of petitioners started February 24, 1953. Mazzei testified against petitioners on March 26, 27, and 30. It was on June 18 that he testified before the Senate Committee. On July 9, a motion for a mistrial was made on the basis of the prejudice alleged to be caused petitioners by the publicity given the June 18 testimony of Mazzei concerning the assassination of Senator McCarthy. Mistrial was denied. The jury found petitioners guilty on August 20. They were sentenced on August 25, on which date motions for new trial were denied.
Cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 340-341; Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 225.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for further consideration in light of Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123.
Mr. Justice Black dissents.
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White dissent for reasons stated in Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, 138 (1968).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State of Kansas imposes a tax on the receipt of motor fuel by fuel distributors within its boundaries. Kansas applies that tax to motor fuel received by non-Indian fuel distributors who subsequently deliver that fuel to a gas station owned by, and located on, the Reservation of the Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation (Nation). The Nation maintains that this application of the Kansas motor fuel tax is an impermissible affront to its sovereignty. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the application of the Kansas tax to fuel received by a non-Indian distributor, but subsequently delivered to the Nation, was invalid under the interest-balancing test set forth in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136 (1980). But the Bracker interest-balancing test applies only where “a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation.” Id., at 144. It does not apply where, as here, a state tax is imposed on a non-Indian and arises as a result of a transaction that occurs off the reservation. Accordingly, we reverse.
I
The Nation is a federally recognized Indian Tribe whose reservation is on United States trust land in Jackson County, Kansas. The Nation owns and operates a casino on its reservation. In order to accommodate casino patrons and other reservation-related traffic, the Nation constructed, and now owns and operates, a gas station on its reservation next to the casino. Seventy-three percent of the station’s fuel sales are made to casino patrons, while 11 percent of the station’s fuel sales are made to persons who live or work on the reservation. The Nation purchases fuel for its gas station from non-Indian distributors located off its reservation. Those distributors pay a state fuel tax on their initial receipt of motor fuel, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3408 (2003 Cum. Supp.), and pass along the cost of that tax to their customers, including the Nation.
The Nation sells its fuel within 2 cents per gallon of the prevailing market price. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 379 F. 3d 979, 982 (CA10 2004). It does so notwithstanding the distributor’s decision to pass along the cost of the State’s fuel tax to the Nation, and the Nation’s decision to impose its own tax on the station’s fuel sales in the amount of 16 cents per gallon of gasoline and 18 cents per gallon of diesel (increased to 20 cents for gasoline and 22 cents for diesel in January 2003). Ibid. The Nation’s fuel tax generates approximately $300,000 annually, funds that the Nation uses for “‘constructing and maintaining roads, bridges and rights-of-way located on or near the Reservation,’ ” including the access road between the state-funded highway and the casino. Ibid.
The Nation brought an action in Federal District Court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief from the State’s collection of motor fuel tax from distributors who deliver fuel to the reservation. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the State. Applying the Bracker interest-balancing test, it determined that the balance of state, federal, and tribal interests tilted in favor of the State. The court reached this determination because “it is undisputed that the legal incidence of the tax is directed off-reservation at the fuel distributors,” Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation v. Richards, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1311 (Kan. 2003), and because the ultimate purchasers of the fuel, non-Indian casino patrons, receive the bulk of their governmental services from the State, id., at 1309. The court held that the State’s tax did not interfere with the Nation’s right of self-government, adding that “a tribe cannot oust a state from any power to tax on-reservation purchases by nonmembers of the tribe by simply imposing its own tax on the transactions or by otherwise earning its revenues from the tribal business.” Id., at 1311.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. 379 F. 3d 979 (2004). It determined that, under Bracket, the balance of state, federal, and tribal interests favored the Tribe. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the Nation’s fuel revenues were “derived from value generated primarily on its reservation,” 379 F. 3d, at 984 — namely, the creation of a new fuel market by virtue of the presence of the casino — and that the Nation’s interests in taxing this reservation-created value to raise revenue for reservation infrastructure outweighed the State’s “general interest in raising revenues,” id., at 986. We granted certiorari, 543 U. S. 1186 (2005), and now reverse.
II
Although we granted certiorari to determine whether Kansas may tax a non-Indian distributor’s off-reservation receipt of fuel without being subject to the Bracket interest-balancing test, Pet. for Cert, i, the Nation maintains that Kansas’ “tax is imposed not on the off-reservation receipt of fuel, but on its on-reservation sale and delivery,” Brief for Respondent 11 (emphasis in original). As the Nation recognizes, under our Indian tax immunity cases, the “who” and the “where” of the challenged tax have significant consequences. We have determined that “[t]he initial and frequently dispositive question in Indian tax cases... is who bears the legal incidence of [the] tax,” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S. 450, 458 (1995) (emphasis added), and that the States are categorically barred from placing the legal incidence of an excise tax “on a tribe or on tribal members for sales made inside Indian country” without congressional authorization, id., at 459 (emphasis added). We have further determined that, even when a State imposes the legal incidence of its tax on a non-Indian seller, the tax may nonetheless be pre-empted if. the transaction giving rise to tax liability occurs on the reservation and the imposition of the tax fails to satisfy the Bracker interest-balancing test. See 448 U. S. 136 (holding that state taxes imposed on on-reservation logging and hauling operations by non-Indian contractor are invalid under the interest-balancing test); cf. Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 448 U. S. 160 (1980) (holding that the Indian trader statutes pre-empted Arizona’s tax on a non-Indian seller’s on-reservation sales).
The Nation maintains that it is entitled to prevail under the categorical bar articulated in Chickasaw because “[t]he fairest reading of the statute is that the legal incidence of the tax actually falls on the Tribe [on the reservation].” Brief for Respondent 17, n. 5. The Nation alternatively maintains it is entitled to prevail even if the legal incidence of the tax is on the non-Indian distributor because, according to the Nation, the tax arises out of a distributor’s on-reservation transaction with the Tribe and is therefore subject to the Bracker balancing test. Brief for Respondent 15. We address the “who” and the “where” of Kansas’ motor fuel tax in turn.
A
Kansas law specifies that “the incidence of [the motor fuel] tax is imposed on the distributor of the first receipt of the motor fuel.” Kan. Stat. Ann. §79-3408(c) (2003 Cum. Supp.). We have suggested that such “dispositive language” from the state legislature is determinative of who bears the legal incidence of a state excise tax. Chickasaw, supra, at 461. But even if the state legislature had not employed such “dispositive language,” thereby requiring us instead to look to a “fair interpretation of the taxing statute as written and applied,” California Bd. of Equalization v. Chemehuevi Tribe, 474 U. S. 9,11 (1985) (per curiam), we would nonetheless conclude that the legal incidence of the tax is on the distributor.
Kansas law makes clear that it is the distributor, rather than the retailer, that is liable to pay the motor fuel tax. Section 79-3410(a) (1997) provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very distributor... shall compute and shall pay to the director... the amount of [motor fuel] taxes due to the state.” While the distributors are “entitled” to pass along the cost of the tax to downstream purchasers, see § 79-3409 (2003 Cum. Supp.), they are not required to do so. In sum, the legal incidence of the Kansas motor fuel tax is on the distributor. The lower courts reached the same conclusion. 379 F. 3d, at 982 (“The Kansas legislature structured the tax so that its legal incidence is placed on non-Indian distributors”); 241 F. Supp. 2d, at 1311 (“[I]t is undisputed that the legal incidence of the tax is directed off-reservation at the fuel distributors”); see also Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri v. Pierce, 213 F. 3d 566, 578 (CA10 2000) (“[T]he legal incidence of the [Kansas] tax law as presently written falls on the fuel distributors rather than on the Tribes”); Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Kline, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1294 (Kan. 2004) (“Under the Kansas statutory scheme, the legal incidence of the state’s fuel tax falls on the ‘distributor of first receipt’ of such fuel”); Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri v. LaFaver, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307 (Kan. 1998) (“[T]he statutes are extremely clear in providing that the tax in question is imposed upon the distributor”). And the Kansas Department of Revenue, the state agency charged with administering the motor fuel tax, has concluded likewise. See Letter from David J. Heinemann, Office of Administrative Appeals, to Mark A. Burghart, Written Final Determination in Request for Informal Conference for Reconsideration of Agency Action, Davies Oil Co., Inc., Docket No. 01-970 (Jan. 3,2002) (hereinafter Kansas Dept, of Revenue Letter) (“The legal incidence of the Kansas fuel tax rests with Davies, the distributor, who is up-stream from Nation, the retailer”).
The United States, as amicus, contends that this conclusion is foreclosed by the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in Kaul v. State Dept, of Revenue, 266 Kan. 464, 970 P. 2d 60 (1998). The United States reads Kaul as holding that the legal incidence of Kansas’ motor fuel tax rests on the Indian retailers, rather than on the non-Indian distributors. And, under the United States’ view, so long as the Kansas Supreme Court’s “ ‘definitive determination as to the operating incidence’ ” of its fuel tax is “ ‘consistent with the statute’s reasonable interpretation,’” it should be “‘deemed conclusive.’” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 10 (quoting Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U. S. 200, 208 (1975)).
We disagree with the United States’ interpretation of Kaul. In Kaul, two members of the Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Oklahoma sought to enjoin the enforcement of Kansas’ fuel tax on fuel delivered to their gas station located on the Prairie Band Potawatomi Tribe of Kansas’ Reservation. The Kansas Supreme Court determined that the station owners had standing to challenge the tax because the statute provided that the distributor was entitled to “ ‘charge and collect such tax... as a part of the selling price.’” Kaul, supra, at 474, 970 P. 2d, at 67 (quoting Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3409 (1995); emphasis deleted). The court determined that the station owners were not entitled to an injunction, however, because they were not members of a Kansas tribe and thus there had “been no showing by Retailers that payment of fuel tax to Kansas interferes with the self-government of a Kansas tribe or a Kansas tribal member.” 266 Kan., at 477, 970 P. 2d, at 69. The court then noted that “the legal incidence of the tax on motor fuel rests on non-tribal members and does not affect the Potawatomi Indian reservation within the state of Kansas.” Ibid.
Kaul does not foreclose our determination that the distributor bears the legal incidence of the Kansas motor fuel tax. As an initial matter, it is unclear whether the court’s reference to “nontribal members” is a reference to the non-tribal-member retailers or the non-tribal-member distributors. At the very least, Kaul's imprecise language cannot be characterized as a definitive determination. Moreover, the 1998 amendments to the Kansas fuel provisions, including the amendment to § 79-3408(c) that provides that “the incidence of this tax is imposed on the distributor,” were not applied in Kaul. Id., at 473, 970 P. 2d, at 66 (identifying provisions that were repealed in 1998 as being “in effect during the period relevant to this case”); id., at 474, 970 P. 2d, at 67 (noting that a “critical statute” to its holding was the 1995 version of § 79-3409, which was amended in 1998). Accordingly, Kaul did not speak authoritatively on the provisions before us today.
B
The Nation maintains that we must apply the Bracker interest-balancing test, irrespective of the identity of the taxpayer (i. e., the party bearing the legal incidence), because the Kansas fiiel tax arises as a result of the on-reservation sale and delivery of the motor fuel. See Brief for Respondent 15. Notably, however, the Nation presented a starkly different interpretation of the statute in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals, arguing that “[t]he balancing test is appropriate even though the legal incidence of the tax is imposed on the Nation’s non-Indian distributor and is triggered by the distributor’s receipt of fuel outside the reservation.” Appellant’s Reply Brief in No. 03-3218 (CA10), p. 3 (emphasis added); see also 241 F. Supp. 2d, at 1311 (District Court observing that “it is undisputed that the legal incidence of the tax is directed off-reservation at the fuel distributors”). A “fair interpretation of the taxing statute as written and applied,” Chemehuevi Tribe, 474 U. S., at 11, confirms that the Nation's interpretation of the statute before the Court of Appeals was correct.
As written, the Kansas fuel tax provisions state that “the incidence of this tax is imposed on the distributor of the first receipt of the motor fuel and such taxes shall be paid but once. Such tax shall be computed on all motor-vehicle fuels or special fuels received by each distributor, manufacturer or importer in this state and paid in the manner provided for herein....” Kan. Stat. Ann. §79-3408(c) (2003 Cum. Supp.). Under this provision, the distributor who initially receives the motor fuel is liable for payment of the fuel tax, and the distributor’s tax liability is determined by calculating the amount of fuel received by the distributor.
Section 79-3410(a) (1997) confirms that it is the distributor’s off-reservation receipt of the motor fuel, and not any subsequent event, that establishes tax liability. That section provides:
“[E]very distributor, manufacturer, importer, exporter or retailer of motor-vehicle fuels or special fuels, on or before the 25th day of each month, shall render to the director... a report certified to be true and correct showing the number of gallons of motor-vehicle fuels or special fuels received by such distributor, manufacturer, importer, exporter or retailer during the preceding calendar month.... Every distributor, manufacturer or importer within the time herein fixed for the rendering of such reports, shall compute and shall pay to the director at the director’s office the amount of taxes due to the state on all motor-vehicle fuels or special fuels received by such distributor, manufacturer or importer during the preceding calendar month.”
Thus, Kansas law expressly provides that a distributor’s monthly tax obligations are determined by the amount of fuel received by the distributor during the preceding month. See Kline, 297 F. Supp. 2d, at 1294 (“The distributor must compute and remit the tax each month for the fuel received by the distributor in the State of Kansas”).
The Nation disagrees. It contends that what is taxed is not the distributors’ (off-reservation) receipt of the fuel, but rather the distributors’ use, sale, or delivery of the motor fuel — in this case, the distributors’ (on-reservation) sale or delivery to the Nation. The Nation grounds support for this proposition in § 79-3408(a) (2003 Cum. Supp.). That section provides that “[a] tax... is hereby imposed on the use, sale or delivery of all motor vehicle fuels or special fuels which are used, sold or delivered in this state for any purpose whatsoever.” But this section cannot be read in isolation. If it were, it would permit Kansas to tax the same fuel multiple times — namely, every time fuel is sold, delivered, or used. Section 79-3408(a) must be read in conjunction with subsection (c), which specifies that “the incidence of this tax is imposed on the distributor of the first receipt of the motor fuel and such taxes shall be paid but once.” (Emphasis added.) The identity of the single, taxable event is revealed in the very next sentence of subsection (c), which provides that “[s]uch tax shall be computed on all... fuels received by each distributor.” (Emphasis added.) In short, the “use, sale or delivery” that triggers tax liability is the sale or delivery of the fiiel to the distributor. The Kansas Department of Revenue has issued a final determination reaching the same conclusion. See Kansas Dept, of Revenue Letter (“[Pjursuant to the Kansas Motor Fuel Tax Act... the state fuel tax was imposed on Davies, a distributor, when Davies first received the fuel at its business, a site located off of Nation’s reservation” (emphasis added)).
The Nation claims further support for its interpretation of the statute in §79-3408(d) (2003 Cum. Supp.). Section 79-3408(d) permits distributors to obtain deductions from the Kansas motor fuel tax for certain postreceipt transactions, such as sale or delivery of fuel for export from the State and sale or delivery of fuel to the United States. §§ 79-3408(d)(1)-(2). The Nation argues that these exemptions make it impossible for a distributor to calculate its “ultimate tax liability” without knowing “whether, where, and to whom the fuel is ultimately sold or delivered.” Brief for Respondent 15. The Nation infers from these provisions that the taxable event is actually the distributors’ postre-ceipt delivery of fuel to retailers such as the Nation, rather than the distributors’ initial receipt of the fuel.
The Nation’s theory suffers from a number of conceptual defects. First, under Kansas law, a distributor must pay the tax even for fuel that sits in its inventory — fuel that is not (or at least has not yet been) used, sold, or delivered by the distributor. But the Nation’s interpretation presumes that the tax is owed only on a distributor’s postreeeipt use, sale, or delivery of fuel. As this interpretation cannot be reconciled with the manner in which the Kansas motor fuel tax is actually applied, it must be rejected. Second, the availability of tax deductions does not change the nature of the taxable event, here the distributor’s receipt of the fuel. By analogy, an individual federal income taxpayer may reduce his tax liability by paying home mortgage interest. But that entitlement does not render the taxable event anything other than the receipt of income by the taxpayer. See 26 U.S.C. §1 (2000 ed. and Supp. II), § 163(h) (2000 ed.); cf. North American Oil Consol, v. Burnet, 286 U. S. 417, 424 (1982) (federal income tax liability arises when “a taxpayer... has received income”).
Finally, the Nation contends that its interpretation of the statute is supported by Kan. Stat. Ann. §79-3417 (1997), which permits a refund — in certain circumstances — for destroyed fuel. However, the Nation’s interpretation is actually foreclosed by that section. Section 79-3417 entitles a distributor to a “refund from the state of the amount of motor-vehicle fuels or special fuels tax paid on any... fuels of 100 gallons or more in quantity, which are lost or destroyed at any one time while such distributor is the owner thereof,” provided the distributor supplies the required notification and documentation to the State. This section illustrates that a distributor pays taxes for fuel in its possession that it has not delivered or sold, and is only entitled to the refund described in this section for tax it has already paid on fuel that is subsequently destroyed. While this section does not specify the event that gives rise to the distributor’s tax liability, it forecloses the Nation’s contention that such liability does not arise until fuel is sold or delivered to a nonexempt entity.
III
Although Kansas’ fuel tax is imposed on non-Indian distributors based upon those distributors’ off-reservation receipt of motor fuel, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the tax was nevertheless still subject to the interest-balancing test this Court set forth in Bracker, 448 U. S. 136. As Bracker itself explained, however, we formulated the balancing test to address the “difficult questio[n]” that arises when “a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation” Id., at 144-145 (emphasis added). The Bracker interest-balancing test has never been applied where, as here, the State asserts its taxing authority over non-Indians off the reservation. And although we have never addressed this precise issue, our Indian tax immunity cases counsel against such an application.
A
We have applied the balancing test articulated in Bracker only where “the legal incidence of the tax fell on a nontribal entity engaged in a transaction with tribes or tribal members,” Arizona Dept, of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U. S. 32, 37 (1999), on the reservation. See Bracker, supra (motor carrier license and use fuel taxes imposed on on-reservation logging and hauling operations by non-Indian contractor); Department of Taxation and Finance of N. Y. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U. S. 61 (1994) (various taxes imposed on non-Indian purchasers of goods retailed on-reservation); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U. S. 163 (1989) (state severance tax imposed on non-Indian lessee’s on-reservation production of oil and gas); Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N. M., 458 U. S. 832 (1982) (state gross receipts tax imposed on private contractor’s proceeds from the construction of a school on the reservation); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134 (1980) (cigarette and sales taxes imposed on on-reservation purchases by nonmembers); Central Machinery Co., 448 U. S. 160 (tax imposed on on-reservation sale of farm machinery to Tribe). Similarly, the cases identified in Bracker as supportive of the balancing test were exclusively concerned with the on-reservation conduct of non-Indians. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965) (gross proceeds tax imposed on non-Indian retailer on Navajo Indian Reservation); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264 (1898) (state property tax imposed on cattle owned by non-Indian lessees of tribal land); Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959) (holding the state courts lacked jurisdiction over dispute between non-Indian, on-reservation retailer and Indian debtors).
Limiting the interest-balancing test exclusively to on-reservation transactions between a nontribal entity and a tribe or tribal member is consistent with our unique Indian tax immunity jurisprudence. We have explained that this jurisprudence relies “heavily on the doctrine of tribal sovereignty... which historically gave state law ‘no role to play’ within a tribe’s territorial boundaries.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U. S. 114, 123-124 (1993) (quoting McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S. 164, 168 (1973)). We have further explained that the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, which has a “significant geographical component,” Bracker, supra, at 151, requires us to “revers[e]” the “‘general rule’” that ‘“exemptions from tax laws should... be clearly expressed.’ ” Sac and Fox, supra, at 124 (quoting McClanahan, supra, at 176). And we have determined that the geographical component of tribal sovereignty “ ‘provide[s] a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read.’” Sac and Fox, supra, at 124 (quoting McClanahan, supra, at 172). Indeed, the particularized inquiry we set forth in Bracker relied specifically on that backdrop. See 448 U. S., at 144-145 (noting that where “a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation... we have examined the language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms of both the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of tribal independence” (emphasis added)).
We have taken an altogether different course, by contrast, when a State asserts its taxing authority outside of Indian country. Without applying the interest-balancing test, we have permitted the taxation of the gross receipts of an off-reservation, Indian-owned ski resort, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973), and the taxation of income earned by Indians working on reservation but living off reservation, Chickasaw, 515 U. S. 450. In these cases, we have concluded that “[a]bsent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State.” Mescalero Apache, supra, at 148-149; Chickasaw, supra, at 465 (quoting Mescalero Apache, supra, at 148-149). If a State may apply a nondiscriminatory tax to Indians who have gone beyond the boundaries of the reservation, then it follows that it may apply a nondiscriminatory tax where, as here, the tax is imposed on non-Indians as a result of an off-reservation transaction. In these circumstances, the interest-balancing test set forth in Bracker is inapplicable. Cf. Blaze Constr., 526 U. S., at 37 (declining to apply the Bracker interest-balancing test “where a State seeks to tax a transaction [on reservation] between the Federal Government and its non-Indian private contractor”).
The application of the interest-balancing test to the Kansas motor fuel tax is not only inconsistent with the special geographic sovereignty concerns that gave rise to that test, but also with our efforts to establish “bright-line standard[s]” in the context of tax administration. 526 U. S., at 37 (“The need to avoid litigation and to ensure efficient tax administration counsels in favor of a bright-line standard for taxation of federal contracts, regardless of whether the contracted-for activity takes place on Indian reservations”); cf. Chickasaw, supra, at 460 (noting that the legal incidence test “ *provide[s] a reasonably bright-line standard’ ”); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U. S. 251, 267-268 (1992). Indeed, we have recognized that the Bracker interest-balancing test “only cloud[s]” our efforts to establish such standards. Blaze Constr., supra, at 37. Under the Nation’s view, however, any off-reservation tax imposed on the manufacture or sale of any good imported by the Nation or one of its members would be subject to interest balancing. Such an expansion of the application of the Bracker test is not supported by our cases.
Nor is the Nation entitled to interest balancing by virtue of its claim that the Kansas motor fuel tax interferes with its own motor fuel tax. As an initial matter, this is ultimately a complaint about the downstream economic consequences of the Kansas tax. As the owner of the station, the. Nation will keep every dollar it collects above its operating costs. Given that the Nation sells gas at prevailing market rates, its decision to impose a tax should have no effect on its net revenues from the operation of the station; it should not matter whether those revenues are labeled “profits” or “tax proceeds.” The Nation merely seeks to increase those revenues by purchasing untaxed fuel. But the Nation cannot invalidate the Kansas tax by complaining about a decrease in revenues. See Colville, 447 U. S., at 156 (“Washington does not infringe the right of reservation Indians to'make their own laws and be ruled by them,’ Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959), merely because the result of imposing its taxes will be to deprive the Tribes of revenues which they currently are receiving”). Nor would our analysis change if we accorded legal significance to the Nation’s decision to label a portion of the station’s revenues as tax proceeds. See id., at 184, n. 9 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, concur-ing in result in part, and dissenting in part) (“When two sovereigns have legitimate authority to tax the same transaction, exercise of that authority by one sovereign does not oust the jurisdiction of the other. If it were otherwise, we would not be obligated to pay federal as well as state taxes on our income or gasoline purchases. Economic burdens on the competing sovereign... do not alter the concurrent nature of the taxing authority”)-
B
Finally, the Nation contends that the Kansas motor fuel tax is invalid notwithstanding the inapplicability of the interest-balancing test, because it “exempts from taxation fuel sold or delivered to all other sovereigns,” and is therefore impermissibly discriminatory. Brief for Respondent 17-20 (emphasis deleted); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 79-3408(d)(1)-(2) (2003 Cum. Supp.). But the Nation is not similarly situated to the sovereigns exempted from the Kansas fuel tax. While Kansas uses the proceeds from its fuel tax to pay for a significant portion of the costs of maintaining the roads and bridges on the Nation’s reservation, including the main highway used by the Nation’s casino patrons, Kansas offers no such services to the several States or the Federal Government. Moreover, to the extent Kansas fuel retailers bear the cost of the fuel tax, that burden falls equally upon all retailers within the State regardless of whether those retailers are located on an Indian reservation. Accordingly, the Kansas motor fuel tax is not impermissibly discriminatory.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Kansas motor fuel tax is a nondiscriminatory tax imposed on an off-reservation transaction between non-Indians. Accordingly, the tax is valid and poses no affront to the Nation’s sovereignty. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
The Kansas Legislature recently amended the fuel tax statute. 2005 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 46. The text of the sections to which we refer remains the same, although the subsection numbers have changed. For consistency, our subsection references are to the 2003 version applied by the lower courts and cited by the parties.
The record does not clearly establish whether the distributor passed along the cost of the tax to the Nation’s gas station. At oral argument, petitioner acknowledged that the record was unclear, but represented that the distributor was in fact passing along the cost of the tax to the Nation.
This understanding of the application of the Kansas fuel tax is confirmed by the form that fuel distributors are required to fill out each month pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3410 (1997). See Kansas Form MF-52, available at http://www.ksrevenue.org/pdf/forms/mf52.pdf (as visited Nov. 21, 2005, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). The form instructs distributors to enter in line 1 “the total net gallons of gasoline, gasohol and special fuel received or imported” during the preceding month. Id., at 2. The distributors may then “[e]nter the deductions that apply to your business” in lines 2(a)-to-(e) for the preceding month. Those deductions include “[n]et gallons of fuel exported from Kansas,” “[n]et gallons of fuel sold to the U. S. Government,” “[n)et gallons of fuel sold for aviation purposes,” and “[n]et gallons of dyed diesel fuel received for the month,” the very deductions described in §79-3408(d), ibid, (emphasis in original). The distributor’s tax liability is then calculated by subtracting the total deductions from the total fuel received, and applying the 2.5 percent handling allowance to the difference. Thus, the event that generates a distributor’s tax liability is its receipt of fuel. And the distributor must pay tax on that fuel even if it is not subsequently delivered or sold. While a distributor may decrease its tax liability by engaging in transactions that entitle it to deductions, such as by selling or delivering fuel to an exempt entity like the United States, its tax liability is unaffected by sales or deliveries to nonexempt entities like the Nation.
Indeed, the dissent acknowledges that tax is owed on fuel a distributor receives and holds in inventory — and thus implicitly concedes that the distributors’ off-reservation receipt of motor fuel is the event that gives rise to tax liability. See post, at 120 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). While the dissent contends that such tax is ultimately “effectively offset” by a subsequent delivery of the inventoried fuel, ibid., the dissent does not explain the meaning of this opaque contention. A distributor’s subsequent delivery of fuel to the Nation or any other fuel retailer in Kansas has no effect on tax that it has already paid in a preceding month. Indeed, the distributor does not report delivery to retailers on its monthly tax return. See Kansas Form MF-52. And a distributor must pay the tax even if the fuel is never delivered.
Our recent discussion in Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U. S. 450 (1995), regarding the application of the interest-balancing test to motor fuel taxes is not to the contrary. In Chickasaw, we noted in dicta that, “if the legal incidence of the tax rests on non-Indians, no categorical bar prevents enforcement of the tax; if the balance of federal, state, and tribal interests favors the State, and federal law is not to the contrary, the State may impose its levy, and may place on a tribe or tribal members ‘minimal burdens’ in collecting the toll.” Id., at 459 (citation omitted). Chickasaw did not purport to expand the applicability of White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136 (1980), to an off-reservation tax on non-Indians. Indeed, the quoted sentence reveals that Chickasaw discussed the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On February 29, 1952, the United States filed the complaint in this case against Lindsay and the other respondents alleging that on February 26, 1945, Lindsay had delivered damaged wool to the Government in violation of an agreement with the Commodity Credit Corporation, a wholly owned corporate agency of the United States. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the Government’s seven year old claim was barred by the six year time limit in § 4 (c) of a 1948 Act as amended. That section provides that “No suit by or against the Corporation shall be allowed unless ... it shall have been brought within six years after the right accrued on which suit is brought . . . .” Holding that the 1952 suit was barred because the right to sue had “accrued” in 1945 when the damaged wool was delivered, the District Court dismissed the case. 105 F. Supp. 467. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed on the same ground. 202 F. 2d 239. However, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that a Government claim arising prior to the 1948 Act “accrued” not when the suit arose but when the Act became effective. Field Packing Co. v. United States, 197 F. 2d 329. This conflict among the circuits as to the statutory meaning of “accrued” led us to grant certiorari. 346 U. S. 810. The question here is whether Government claims growing out of the Corporation’s transactions prior to the Act “accrued” on the date a right to sue came into existence or on the date the Act became effective.
In common parlance a right accrues when it comes into existence as the Government’s claim against Lindsay did in 1945. Giving “accrued” its normal meaning would therefore bar all claims not sued on within six years from the date they arose whether they came into existence before or after passage of the Act. The Government admits that the normal meaning of “accrued” controls when the 1948 Act is applied prospectively, that is, to claims arising after the Act’s effective date. But construing the Act in a way that requires its six year limitation period to begin before 1948 gives the law a retroactive effect, shortening the time for suit on some prior claims and summarily cutting off others. To prevent retroactivity we are urged to depart from the normal meaning of “accrued” when § 4 (c) is applied to preexisting claims. This suggested departure is no minor one. We are asked to read the words “six years after the right accrued” as though Congress intended to say “six years after the effective date of the Act when it is applied to pre-existing causes of action.” Precedents are cited in which, to avoid retroactive barring of suits, courts have refused to give “accrued” its normal meaning and have instead given it a special meaning — the date a new statute of limitations becomes effective. In effect, it is argued that these court decisions have made “accrued” a word of art when used in such statutes. Therefore, we are asked to hold that Congress used “accrued” in § 4 (c) with this special meaning.
It is true that courts have sometimes given “accrued” the meaning the Government here suggests, but we are unable to agree that the word has thereby taken on an established technical meaning which Congress must have had in mind when it used “accrued” in this Act. The legislative history fails to show that such a meaning was suggested to Congress before the Act was passed. Moreover, many of the decisions that gave “accrued” this special meaning did so to avoid possible constitutional questions should the statutes be interpreted in a way that would destroy private rights. See, e. g., Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596. But no constitutional question is raised by applying this six year time limit to pre-existing claims of the Government. Congress has unquestioned power to bar recovery on Government claims if it sees fit. And we agree with the court below that we need not now decide whether § 4 (c) can be applied to preexisting claims brought by private persons against the Government. But see Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571, 581; Cummings v. Deutsche Bank, 300 U. S. 115, 119; Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 204 F. 2d 88, 91-92.
The Government also urges that quite apart from constitutional considerations there are strong reasons why courts should, whenever possible, construe statutes so as to avoid retroactivity. Cases are cited in which particular provisions have been deemed so inequitable and unfair when applied retrospectively that this Court has refused to impute to law-making bodies a purpose to bring about such results. But we cannot say that any consequences of retroactive application of the time limit here call on us to hold that Congress did not intend this statute to take effect according to the natural meaning of its words. The Government has used the Commodity Credit Corporation in business transactions since 1933. Probably many claims have accrued in the intervening years. Maybe others, like this one, are for comparatively small amounts. All, whether large or small, could have been sued on as they arose. We think that Congress might well have believed it wise to bar all stale claims by the Government against its agents and others who dealt with it in the past. For and against such a view arguments can be made that are based on common notions of fairness and justice. In this situation it seems better to leave this statutory problem with Congress rather than for us to stretch the word “accrued” beyond its ordinary meaning. Cf. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U. S. 304, 316.
Affirmed.
62 Stat. 1070, as amended, 63 Stat. 154, 156; 15 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 714b (c).
United States v. Heth, 3 Cranch 399; Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U. S. 141; Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303; Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327; United States v. Magnolia Co., 276 U. S. 160; United States v. St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co., 270 U. S. 1; Shwab v. Doyle, 258 U. S. 529; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U. S. 190; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U. S. 306; Lewis v. Lewis, 7 How. 776.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Whittaker
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The principal question presented is whether an Ohio statute that exempts from ad valorem taxation “merchandise or agricultural products belonging to a nonresident ... if held in a storage warehouse for storage only” denies to appellant, a resident of the State, the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
The facts are stipulated. So far as pertinent, they are that appellant, Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc., an Ohio corporation, owns and operates a department store in each of four Ohio cities. It also maintains in each of those cities a private warehouse where it stores stocks of merchandise of the kinds sold in its stores. As needed, merchandise is transferred from the warehouse to the store, and when merchandise is sold by sample in the store — usually a heavy or bulky article — it is delivered from the warehouse directly to the customer.
Title 57, Page’s Ohio Rev. Code Ann., 1953, § 5709.01, provides, inter alia, that “All personal property located and used in business in this state [shall be] subject to taxation, regardless of the residence of the owners thereof. . . .” (Emphasis added.) During the tax year involved another Ohio statute, Title 57, Page’s Ohio Rev. Code Ann., 1953, § 5701.08 (A), provided, in pertinent part, that:
“As used in Title LVII of the Revised Code:
“(A) Personal property is 'used’ within the meaning of 'used in business’ . . . when stored or kept on hand as material, parts, products, or merchandise; but merchandise or agricultural products belonging to a nonresident of this state is not used in business in this state if held in a storage warehouse for storage only. ...” (We have added the italics, and, as was done by the Supreme Court of Ohio, we will refer to the italicized portion as the “proviso.”)
Acting under those statutes, appellee, as Tax Commissioner of Ohio, proposed the assessment of an ad valorem tax against appellant based on the average value of the merchandise that it had stored in its four Ohio warehouses during the tax year ending January 31, 1954. Appellant petitioned the Board of Tax Appeals of Ohio for a redeter-mination, contending that the property stored in its four warehouses in the tax year involved was “merchandise . . . held in a storage warehouse for storage only/' within the meaning of § 5701.08 (A), and that because the section exempted nonresidents, but taxed residents, on stocks of merchandise so held, it denied to appellant, a resident of Ohio, the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The Board of Tax Appeals upheld the tax, and so did the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that appellant lacked standing to raise the constitutional question presented and affirmed the judgment. 166 Ohio St. 116, 140 N. E. 2d 411. The case comes here on Allied’s appeal.
The first and preliminary question thus is whether the Supreme Court of Ohio correctly held that appellant lacked standing to prosecute the constitutional question sought to be presented. It is settled that “[wjhether a pleading sets up a sufficient right of action or defense, grounded on the Constitution or a law of the United States, is necessarily a question of federal law; and where a case coming from a state court presents that question, this Court must determine for itself the sufficiency of the allegations displaying the right or defense, and is not concluded by the view taken of them by the state court.” First National Bank v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 341, 346; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U. S. 313, 318.
In reaching its conclusion, the Ohio court said “In our opinion, it is not necessary to consider the constitutional question raised by the taxpayer in the instant case because, if its contention with regard to that question is sound, it necessarily leads to the conclusion that the entire proviso in subdivision (A) of Section 5701.08, which read, ‘but merchandise or agricultural products belonging to a nonresident of this state is not used in business in this state if held in a storage warehouse for storage only,’ was void and should be stricken. That being so, it is apparent that any of taxpayer’s ‘merchandise . . . held in a storage warehouse for storage only’ would be taxable because described by the preceding words remaining in the statute and reading, ‘stored . . . as . . . merchandise.’ ” But the court did not hold that the proviso was invalid, nor did it strike it from the statute. Instead, it held that the proviso expressed the valid legislative purpose to exempt the merchandise and agricultural products of nonresidents when held in a storage warehouse for storage only and that the court was powerless to strike it. In this, the court was following its prior decisions on the question. General Cigar Co. v. Peck, 159 Ohio St. 152, 111 N. E. 2d 265 (1953), and B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 202, 118 N. E. 2d 525 (1954), had so held. In the latter case the court had answered a contention that the proviso was invalid for undue preference of nonresidents by saying “such an argument should be addressed to the General Assembly and not to this court.” 161 Ohio St., at 210, 118 N. E. 2d, at 530. Those interpretations, for present purposes, became a part of the proviso. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562, 566. The proviso is the basis of appellant’s claim of denial of the equal protection of the laws. With the proviso thus validly remaining in the statute it is quite immaterial that appellant’s claim necessarily would fall if it were out. It follows that appellant does have standing to prosecute its constitutional claim.
This brings us to the merits. Does the proviso exempting “merchandise or agricultural products belonging to a nonresident ... if held in a storage warehouse for storage only” deny to appellant, a resident of the State, the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment? The applicable principles have been often stated and are entirely familiar. The States have a very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes. When dealing with their proper domestic concerns, and not trenching upon the prerogatives of the National Government or violating the guaranties of the Federal Constitution, the States have the attribute of sovereign powers in devising their fiscal systems to ensure revenue and foster their local interests. Of course, the States, in the exercise of their taxing power, are subject to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But that clause imposes no iron rule of equality, prohibiting the flexibility and variety that are appropriate to reasonable schemes of state taxation. The State may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions and may vary the rate of excise upon various products. It is not required to resort to close distinctions or to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity with reference to composition, use or value. Bell’s Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 237; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 293; Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 121; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 573; Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U. S. 350, 353; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245, 255; Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 179; Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 142; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 159; State Board of Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 537. “To hold otherwise would be to subject the essential taxing power of the State to an intolerable supervision, hostile to the basic principles of our Government and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to assure.” Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, supra, 281 U. S., at 159.
But there is a point beyond which the State cannot go without violating the Equal Protection Clause. The State must proceed upon a rational basis and may not resort to a classification that is palpably arbitrary. The rule often has been stated to be that the classification “must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415; Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 37; Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U. S. 71, 85; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 240; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S. 146, 160. “If the selection or classification is neither capricious nor arbitrary, and rests upon some reasonable consideration of difference or policy, there is no denial of the equal protection of the law.” Brown- Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 573. State Board of Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 537. That a statute may discriminate in favor of a certain class does not render it arbitrary if the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy. American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89; Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 142.
Coming directly to the concrete problem now before us, it has repeatedly been held and appears to be entirely settled that a statute which encourages the location within the State of needed and useful industries by exempting them, though not also others, from its taxes is not arbitrary and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell’s Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra, 134 U. S., at 237; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S., at 159; Williams v. Baltimore, 289 U. S. 36; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 439 (dissenting opinion). Similarly, it has long been settled that a classification, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary nor viola-tive of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78; Quong Wing v. Kirken-dall, 223 U. S. 59; Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 357; State Board of Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S., at 537.
In the light of the law thus well settled, how stands appellant’s case? We cannot assume that state legislative enactments were adopted arbitrarily or without good reason to further some legitimate policy of the State. What were the special reasons, motives or policies of the Ohio Legislature for adopting the questioned proviso we do not know with certainty, nor is it important that we should, Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 126, for a state legislature need not explicitly declare its purpose. But it is obvious that it may reasonably have been the purpose and policy of the State Legislature, in adopting the proviso, to encourage the construction or leasing and operation of warehouses in Ohio by nonresidents with the attendant benefits to the State’s economy, or to stimulate the market for merchandise and agricultural products produced in Ohio by enabling nonresidents to purchase and hold them in the State for storage only, free from taxes, in anticipation of future needs. Other similar purposes reasonably may be conceived. Therefore, we cannot say that the discrimination of the proviso which exempted only the “merchandise or agricultural products belonging to a nonresident ... if held in a storage warehouse for storage only” was not founded upon a reasonable distinction, or difference in state policy, or that no state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sustain it. For those reasons, it cannot be said, in the light of the settled law as shown by the cases cited, that the questioned proviso was invidious or palpably arbitrary and denied appellant the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Appellant heavily relies on Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562. We think that case is not apposite. There Ohio statutes exempted from taxation certain accounts receivable owned by residents of the State but taxed those owned by nonresidents. The statutes, on their face admittedly discriminatory against nonresidents, themselves declared their purpose. That purpose was to proffer to other States a scheme of “reciprocity” for taxing accounts receivable. Ohio argued that the reciprocal character of its statutes eliminated the discriminatory effects against nonresidents, but this Court held that it did not. Having themselves specifically declared their purpose, the Ohio statutes left no room to conceive of any other purpose for their existence. And the declared purpose having been found arbitrarily discriminatory against nonresidents, the Court could hardly escape the conclusion that “the inequality [was] not because of the slightest difference in Ohio’s relation to the decisive transaction, but solely because of the different residence of the owner.” 337 U. S., at 572. As we have shown, that is not the situation here. Here the discrimination against residents is not invidious nor palpably arbitrary because, as shown, it rests not upon the “different residence of the owner,” but upon a state of facts that reasonably can be conceived to constitute a distinction, or difference in state policy, which the State is not prohibited from separately classifying for purposes of taxation by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. , „ ,
, „ , Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The unitalicized portion of the statute was enacted in 1931, 114 Ohio Laws 714, 716. The italicized clause was added by the Ohio Legislature at its next session in 1933, 115 Ohio Laws 548, 553. In September 1955 the section was amended by deleting the italicized clause and inserting the following: “and merchandise or agricultural products shipped from outside of this state and held in this state in a warehouse or a place of storage for storage only and for shipment outside of this state are not used in business in this state.” 126 Ohio Laws 78.
The Ohio taxing date is January 1, Title 57, Page’s Ohio Rev. Code Ann., 1953, § 5711.03. Why the assessment involved was for the year ended January 31, instead of January 1, 1954, is not explained in the record or the briefs. A merchant’s personal property is valued for tax purposes “by taking the amount in value on hand, as nearly as possible, in each month of the next preceding year in which he has been engaged in business, adding together such amounts, and dividing the aggregate amount by the number of months that he has been in business during such year.” Title 57, Page’s Ohio Rev. Code Ann., 1953, § 5711.15.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a foreign corporation, although authorized to do and doing a local business in Ohio, is a nonresident within the meaning of the proviso here in question. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Peck, 161 Ohio St. 202, 204, 118 N. E. 2d 525, 527.
The stated purpose was to proffer to other States a right to tax accounts receivable owned by residents of Ohio that derived from sales of Ohio goods negotiated and consummated in such other States in exchange for a claimed Ohio right to tax the accounts receivable owned by residents of other States that derived from sales of their goods negotiated and consummated in Ohio. “The effect,” this Court said, “[was] that intangibles of nonresident owners [were] assigned a situs within the taxing reach of Ohio while those of its residents [were] assigned a situs without. [Thus], [t]he exempted intangibles of residents [were] offered up to the taxing power of other states which may embrace this doctrine of a tax situs separate from residence, [but] no other state [ever] sought to take advantage of the ‘reciprocity’ proffer.” Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, supra, at 573-574.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners, coal mine operators in southeastern Tennessee, were plaintiffs in the trial court, where their complaint accused respondent United Mine Workers of America of violating the Sherman Act by conspiring with various coal producers to drive petitioners out of business. The major thrust of the claim was that the Union had expressly or impliedly agreed with the major producers to impose the provisions of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement (NBCWA), first executed by the Union and certain companies in 1950, on all coal mine operators, knowing that small and nonmechanized operators would be unable to meet the contract’s terms. The purpose of this alleged conspiracy was to eliminate the marginal operators, control production, and reserve the market for larger concerns. The claim of express agreement rested on the so-called Protective Wage Clause (PWC) added to the NBCWA by amendment in 1958. The PWC, after reciting that the parties agreed that coal mines “shall be so operated as not to debase or lower the standards of wages, hours, safety requirements and other conditions of work, established by this contract,” provided as follows:
“During the period of this Contract, the United Mine Workers of America will not enter into, be a party to, nor will it permit any agreement or understanding covering any wages, hours or other conditions of work applicable to employees covered by this Contract on any basis other than those specified in this Contract or any applicable District Contract. The United Mine Workers of America will diligently perform and enforce without discrimination or favor the conditions of this paragraph and all other terms and conditions of this Contract and will use and exercise its continuing best efforts to obtain full compliance therewith by each and all the parties signatory thereto.”
Petitioners in any event claimed that a conspiratorial arrangement between the Union and the major operators could be implied from the PWC, the course of negotiations between the Union and those operators from 1950 forward, and the ensuing organizational and strike activity against petitioners and other southeastern Tennessee operators aimed at securing agreement to and compliance with the National Agreement as amended from time to time, as well as from the Union’s purchase of a controlling interest in West Kentucky Coal Co. and the latter’s allegedly predatory pricing in the TVA coal market.
Following a trial to the court on a voluminous record, the trial judge wrote an extensive opinion containing his findings and conclusions leading to a dismissal of the case for failure of proof. Ramsey v. UMW, 265 F. Supp. 388 (ED Tenn. 1967). He interpreted the PWC as forbidding departure from the contract terms by the Union only where signatories were concerned; the court found nothing in the contract obligating the Union to insist on comparable terms when dealing with employers outside the bargaining unit. As for an implied conspiracy to standardize employment terms throughout the industry aimed at destroying marginal producers, the trial court said that “[w]ere this case being tried upon the usual preponderance of the evidence rule applicable to civil cases, the Court would conclude that the U. M. W. did so impliedly agree,” but that “the standard of proof where a labor union is involved is'clear proof/ as required by Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a standard different from the ordinary civil burden of persuasion.” 265 F. Supp., at 412. Judged by this stricter standard, proof of conspiracy was found wanting and the case against the Union failed.
A panel of the Court of Appeals ruled the trial court had erred in applying the clear-evidence standard but rehearing en banc was granted. The Court of Appeals then agreed with the District Court’s construction of the PWC but with respect to the clear-evidence standard, four judges agreed with the trial judge and four disagreed. The latter insisted that the ordinary preponderance-of-evidence standard was applicable in civil antitrust actions against labor unions except with respect to proving the authority of individual members, officers, and agents of the Union to perform the acts complained of on behalf of the Union. The District Court’s judgment was therefore affirmed by an equally divided court. Ramsey v. UMW, 416 F. 2d 655 (CA6 1969). We granted certiorari. 397 U. S. 1006 (1970).
I
In a section of his opinion entitled “Legal Guidelines,” the District Judge inquired as to “the standard of proof that must govern a proceeding involving a Sherman Act charge against a labor union.” His answer was: “The burden of proof borne by the plaintiff is not the usual preponderance of the evidence rule applicable in civil cases generally. The requirement imposed by Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is that of ‘clear proof’ where a labor organization is a party to an action such as this. . . . That the ‘clear proof’ standard applies to an action wherein a labor organization is sought to be charged with a Sherman Act violation appears settled.” 265 F. Supp., at 400. In this and other passages in the trial judge’s opinion, he apparently demanded clear proof rather than a preponderance of the evidence not only with respect to the authority of the individuals who were alleged to have performed certain illegal acts on behalf of unions, but also as to whether the acts themselves occurred, whether the acts proved amounted to a conspiracy and whether plaintiffs’ businesses had been injured. The eight judges of the Court of Appeals also seemed to read the trial court as having given unlimited application to the clear-proof standard in this action. Apparently they were also convinced that the standard applied by the trial court had made a critical difference in the case, for the issue that equally divided them was whether the clear-proof standard should be applied to any matters other than the Union’s authorization of the conduct alleged and proved.
The reasoning of the lower courts in departing from the usual preponderance-of-evidence rule generally applicable to civil actions in federal courts was rooted in § 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 71, 29 U. S. C. § 106. But the trial judge and four judges of the Court of Appeals read far too much into § 6, which provides as follows:
“No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.”
Judge O’Sullivan cogently observed in the Court of Appeals that: “This is plain language which . . . clearly exposes the Section’s limitation.” 416 F. 2d, at 667. On its face § 6 is not addressed to the quantum of evidence required to prove the occurrence of the alleged “unlawful acts.” It is concerned only with requiring “clear proof” that the person or organization charged actually participated in, authorized, or ratified “such acts.” Nothing in the words of the section suggests that a new and different standard of proof was being prescribed for all issues in actions against a union, its members or its officers involved in a labor dispute. The section neither expressly nor by implication requires satisfaction of the clear-proof standard in deciding factual issues concerning the commission vel non of acts by union officers or by members alleged to constitute a conspiracy, or the inferences to be drawn from such acts, or concerning overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, the impact on the relevant market or the injury to plaintiffs’ businesses.
The legislative history of § 6 was reviewed at length in United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U. S. 395 (1947). We have reviewed it again and we find nothing to suggest that the section means something different from what its language seems to say. Without laboring the matter- — since nothing to the contrary in the legislative history has been presented to us— the simple concern of Congress was that unions had been found liable for violence and other illegal acts occurring in labor disputes which they had never authorized or ratified and for which they should not be held responsible. Congress discerned a tendency in courts to blame unions for everything occurring during a strike. Nor was the problem necessarily limited to labor unions. The straightforward answer was § 6, with its requirement that when illegal acts of any individual are charged against one of the major antagonists in a labor dispute— whether employer or union — -the evidence must clearly prove that the individual’s acts were authorized or ratified. See id., at 403. We find no support in the legislative material for the notion that Congress intended broadly to modify the standard of proof where union and employer are sued separately or together in civil actions for damages incurred in the course of labor disputes.
Prior cases in this Court relied on by the courts below are not to the contrary. Carpenters’ major concern was § 6. The Court there said that “[t]he limitations of that section are upon all courts of the United States in all matters growing out of labor disputes, covered by the Act, which may come before them.” Id., at 401. The statement is unexceptionable — the federal courts, of course, must heed § 6 in all cases arising out of labor disputes in which the section is applicable. However, the limitations the section imposes are those that the section describes. It is clear from the remainder of the Carpenters opinion that § 6 deals only with proving the authority of individuals or organizations who act for another. Indeed, the Court there reversed a judgment against a union because the trial court had failed to instruct that illegal acts could not be proved against the union unless the evidence clearly showed the union had authorized, participated in, or ratified the commission of those acts.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), insofar as it dealt with § 6, was concerned only with the failure of the evidence clearly to show union responsibility for illegal acts of violence. There was no suggestion in that case that § 6 had broader scope. And § 6 was not even involved in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657 (1965), as it came to this Court. The section was neither cited nor discussed and there were no indications that our passing reference, 381 U. S., at 665, to forfeiture of union exemption from antitrust liability when union connivance with employers is clearly shown was intended to establish a stricter standard of proof in actions charging labor unions with violations of the Sherman Act.
In our view, § 6 requires clear and convincing evidence only as to the Union’s authorization, participation in, or ratification of the acts allegedly performed on its behalf. Nor do we discern any basis for our fashioning a new standard of proof applicable in antitrust actions against labor unions. Accordingly, the District Court erred in requiring petitioners’ compliance with the standard of § 6 in proving other elements of their treble-damage case against the Union.
II
Petitioners argue two other matters. We are urged to construe the PWC as itself being an illegal bargain for which the Union is not exempt under the antitrust laws. The thrust of the argument in this Court is that by 1958, when the PWC was first agreed to by the Union and the BCOA, the Union had executed the national contract with hundreds of different bargaining units in addition to those represented by the BCOA. Even if the PWC bound the Union only to insist on identical contract terms as against “signatories,” the effect of the clause, it is urged, was to bind the Union to the same contract, ad infinitum, with many and different bargaining units; the Union was no longer free to agree to different terms with any previous signatory to the NBCWA. We find no reference to this aspect of the case in the opinions in the District Court and the Court of Appeals. We are unsure whether it was presented below and whether, in any event, there is record support for it. Accordingly, we deem it inappropriate to consider it in the first instance.
Finally, petitioners in effect ask us to reconsider our holding in Pennington and other cases that under the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts the Union incurs no liability under the antitrust laws when it concludes “a wage agreement with the multi-employer bargaining unit . . . and ... as a matter of its own policy, and not by agreement with all or part of the employers of that unit, seek[s] the same wages from other employers.” 381 U. S., at 664. This we decline to do. The Court made it unmistakably clear in Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U. S. 797, 811 (1945), that unilateral conduct by a union of the type protected by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts does not violate the Sherman Act even though it may also restrain trade. “[T]hese congres-sionally permitted union activities may restrain trade in and of themselves. There is no denying the fact that many of them do so, both directly and indirectly.” But “the desirability of such an exemption of labor unions is a question for the determination of Congress.” 325 U. S., at 810. We adhere to this view. But neither do we retreat from the “one line which we can draw with assurance that we follow the congressional purpose. We know that Congress feared the concentrated power of business organizations to dominate markets and prices. ... A business monopoly is no less such because a union participates, and such participation is a violation of the Act.” Id., at 811. Hence we also adhere to the decision in Pennington: “[T]he relevant labor and antitrust policies compel us to conclude that the alleged agreement between UMW and the large operators to secure uniform labor standards throughout the industry, if proved, was not exempt from the antitrust laws.” 381 U. S., at 669. Where a union, by agreement with one set of employers, insists on maintaining in other bargaining units specified wage standards ruinous to the business of those employers, it is liable under the antitrust laws for the damages caused by its agreed-upon conduct.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
In return the operators agreed “that all bituminous coal mined, produced, or prepared by them, or any of them, or procured or acquired by them or any of them under a subcontract arrangement” should be produced under terms and conditions which are as favorable to the employees as those provided for in this contract.
In another case, Tennessee Consolidated Coal Co. v. UMW, 416 F. 2d 1192 (CA6 1969), the Court of Appeals stated that the Protective Wage Clause was a “quid pro quo” for the foregoing undertaking of the operators which was described by the court as an agreement “to boycott coal not produced in conformity with the national agreement.” 416 F. 2d, at 1198.
The Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA) was formed as a multi-employer collective-bargaining unit in 1950, just after signing of the 1950 NBCWA. Member employers ranged from the small to the large, though its members mined about 50% of U. S. bituminous coal. It formed a “negotiating committee” analogous to the UMW’s “policy committee,” to represent member employers at the bargaining table. Ramsey v. UMW, 265 F. Supp. 388, 407 (ED Tenn. 1967). Relations between union and management improved greatly during the 1950’s, leading petitioners to suggest that the absence of strife indicated the rise of the conspiracy. Id., at 407-408.
The court later said, “Did not the clear evidence rule apply, the Court might have reached a different conclusion upon certain issues.” 265 F. Supp., at 434.
See n. 3, supra, and accompanying text.
The Union urges not only that the trial court properly understood the limited scope of § 6 but also that on most if not all significant issues the proof failed even under the preponderance-of-evidence rule. For the first proposition the Union relies on the trial judge’s instructions to the jury in a later case, which are reported in Tennessee Consolidated Coal Co. v. UMW, 416 F. 2d, at 1200-1203, and which are said to construe § 6 more narrowly. But we must decide the case before us, not some other one in which the trial court may have evidenced different views. Here the Union’s claim is belied by the language of the trial court’s opinion and its interpretation by the eight judges of the Court of Appeals. The second proposition — that the trial court’s clear-evidence ruling was mere dictum — leaves unexplained the Court of Appeals’ affirmance by an equally divided court as well as the trial judge’s remarks that he would or might have reached different results on some issues, apparently including some aspects of the conspiracy issue, if preponderance of the evidence was the governing standard. To what extent the proof would fail under the standard we here hold applicable and what legal difference it might make are matters open to be dealt with on remand. We do note from the trial court’s opinion that except for violence and some picketing, issues of union responsibility for acts alleged and proved were nonexistent or played little part in the thinking of the trial judge.
“In civil cases [the fact finder’s] duty is to weigh the evidence carefully, and to find for the party in whose favor it preponderates . . . .” Lilienthal’s Tobacco v. United States, 97 U. S. 237, 266 (1878).
As we noted in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 736 n. 26 (1966), the fullest statement concerning the basis and impact of § 6 is found in S. Rep. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 19-21.
“Moreover, it will be observed that this section . . . applies both to organizations of labor and organizations of capital.” Id., at 19.
The “more stringent standards” of § 6 were modified by Congress for purposes of the Labor Management Relations Act. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 736 (1966). See National Labor Relations Act, as amended, § 2 (13), 61 Stat. 139, 29 U. S. C. §152(13); Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, §§301 (e), 303 (b), 61 Stat. 157, 159, 29 U. S. C. §§ 185 (e), 187 (b).
From the opinion of the District Court it appears that George Ramsey, one of the petitioners, “was a signatory to the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement from the time he began operations [in 1954] until 1960. In 1958 he was sued by the Welfare Fund for non-payment of royalties and the following two years his payments to the Welfare Fund exceeded his profits. In fact, he lost money in 1960. In that year his employees withdrew from the U. M. W. and joined the Southern Labor Union and he terminated his U. M. W. contract.” 265 F. Supp., at 428. Other companies refused to sign the National Contract and negotiated for modifications. “[0]n December 26, 1962, the miners in most of the Southeastern Tennessee coal field ceased working. . . . While it does not appear that the U. M. W. called the strike, it is clear that it sanctioned and approved the strike.” Ibid.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
G
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Trade Commission, after extensive proceedings, ruled that respondents, the corporate owner of a chain of supermarkets and two of its officers, had unlawfully induced certain suppliers to engage in discriminatory pricing and sales promotional activities prohibited by §§ 2 (a) and 2 (d) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. 63 F. T. C.-(1963). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Commission’s construction of § 2 (d) and reversed in part its ruling that the section had been violated. 359 F. 2d 351 (1966). We granted certiorari, 386 U. S. 907 (1967), because the case presents important questions concerning the scope of a key provision of the Robinson-Patman Act.
I.
Section 2 (d) makes it unlawful for a supplier'in interstate commerce to grant advertising or other sales promotional allowances to one “customer” who resells the supplier’s “products or commodities” unless the allowances are “available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities.” Although we have limited our review of this case to one aspect of the alleged § 2 (d) violations, full understanding of the issues requires a brief exposition of the facts from which the Commission concluded that respondents had induced violations of both §§ 2 (a) and 2 (d). The relevant facts found by the Commission were not disturbed by the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Fred Meyer, Inc., operates a chain of 13 supermarkets in the Portland, Oregon, area which engage in the retail sale of groceries, drugs, variety items, and a limited line of clothing. In 1957 Meyer’s sales exceeded $40,000,000. According to its 1960 prospectus, it made one-fourth of the retail food sales in the Portland area and was the second largest seller of all goods in that area. Since 1936 Meyer has conducted annually a four-week promotional campaign in its stores based on the distribution of coupon books to consumers. The books usually contain 72 pages, each page featuring a single product being sold by Meyer at a reduced price. The consumer buys the book for the nominal sum of 10$ and must surrender the appropriate coupon when making his purchase of goods. A coupon often represents a reduction of one-third or more from Meyer’s regular price for the featured item, and the cover of the 1957 book stated that the use of all 72 coupons would result in total savings of more than $54. The promotional campaign is highly successful. Meyer sold 138,700 books in 1957 and 121,270 in 1958. Aside from the nominal 100 paid by consumers for the coupon books, Meyer finances the promotion by charging the supplier of each featured product a fee of at least $350 for each coupon-page advertising his product. Some participating suppliers further underwrite the promotion by giving Meyer price reductions on its purchases of featured items, by replacing at no cost a percentage of the goods sold by Meyer during the campaign, or by redeeming coupons in cash at an agreed rate.
The Commission concluded that this promotional scheme, as conducted in the years 1956 through 1958, violated §§ 2 (d) and 2(a) in the following respects: First, the $350 paid to Meyer by each of four suppliers participating in the campaigns represented promotional allowances paid in violation of § 2 (d) because similar allowances were not made available on proportionally equal terms to competing customers. Second, the additional value given Meyer by these suppliers in the form of discounts, free replacements of goods sold and coupon redemptions amounted to price discrimination prohibited by § 2 (a). The Commission held that by inducing the suppliers to discriminate in price, respondents had violated § 2 (f) of the Act, and that by inducing them to grant discriminatory promotional allowances, respondents had engaged in an unfair method of competition in violation of § 5 (a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Both before the Commission and in the Court of Appeals, respondents argued that it was not established that two participating suppliers, Tri-Valley Packing Association and Idaho Canning Company, had violated § 2 (d). Meyer purchased directly from both of these suppliers. Tri-Valley participated in the 1957 promotion by paying Meyer $350 for a coupon-page featuring Tri-Valley’s brand of canned peaches and by replacing in merchandise every third can sold by Meyer on the coupon’s offer of three cans for the price of two. Idaho Canning participated in the 1957 promotion on substantially identical terms, except that the coupon-page it purchased offered three cans of corn for the price of two. The Commission found that two wholesalers, Hudson House and Wadhams & Co., both of which resold to Meyer’s retail competitors, had been disfavored in these transactions in that Hudson House had purchased canned peaches from Tri-Valley and both Hudson House and Wadhams had purchased canned corn from Idaho Can-rung, but neither of the two wholesalers had been accorded promotional allowances comparable to those received by Meyer. Respondents argued that, purely as a matter of statutory construction, Tri-Valley and Idaho Canning could not have violated the requirement of proportional equality among “customers competing in the distribution” of their products because (1) Meyer, a retailer, was not “competing” in the distribution of canned corn and peaches with the disfavored wholesalers, Hudson House and Wadhams, and (2) the retailers found by the Commission to be competing with Meyer in the resale of these products were not “customers” of TriValley and Idaho Canning but were customers of Hudson House and Wadhams.
The Commission rejected this reading of § 2 (d), noting that, if respondents’ view prevailed, a retailer buying from a wholesaler and having no direct dealings with his supplier would receive no protection against discriminatory promotional allowances given his competitor who purchased directly from the supplier. The Commission held that § 2 (d) prohibits a supplier from granting promotional allowances to a direct-buying retailer, such as Meyer, unless the allowances are also made available to wholesalers who purchase from the supplier and resell to the direct-buying retailer’s competitors. Accordingly, the Commission’s cease-and-desist order included a provision barring respondents from inducing suppliers to grant them promotional allowances not available to “customers who resell to purchasers who compete with respondents in the resale of such supplier’s products.” 63 F. T. C., at • — . One Commissioner, while agreeing with the majority that respondents had induced TriValley and Idaho Canning to violate § 2 (d), dissented in part on the ground that the order should have required the promotional allowances to be made available to the retailers competing with Meyer rather than to wholesalers who resold to them. Thus, in his view, the competing retailers were “customers” of Tri-Valley and Idaho Canning within the meaning of the statute. The Court of Appeals adopted the interpretation of § 2 (d) urged by respondents. Consequently, it set aside the portion of the Commission’s order set out above.
We agree with the Commission that the proscription of § 2 (d) reaches the kind of discriminatory promotional allowances granted Meyer by Tri-Valley and Idaho Canning. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this point. However, because we have concluded that Meyer’s retail competitors, rather than the two wholesalers, were competing customers under the statute, we also remand the case for appropriate modification of the Commission’s order. We deal first with respondents’ arguments, second with the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and third with the Commission’s order.
II.
Respondents press upon us a view of § 2 (d) which leaves retailers who buy from wholesalers for the most part unprotected from discriminatory promotional allowances granted their direct-buying competitors. We are told that § 2 (d) in specific terms requires this result. To benefit from the statute’s requirement of proportional equality, it is urged, a buyer must be a “competing customer” within the narrowest sense of that phrase. Thus, the wholesalers in this case are not competing customers because they do not compete with Meyer, and the retailers who do compete with Meyer in the resale of the suppliers’ products are outside the protection of § 2 (d) because they are not customers of the suppliers. For reasons stated below, we agree with respondents that, on the facts of this case, § 2 (d) reaches only discrimination between customers competing for resales at the same functional level and, therefore, does not mandate proportional equality between Meyer and the two wholesalers. But we cannot accept the second half of this argument, for it rests on a narrow definition of “customer” which becomes wholly untenable when viewed in light of the central purpose of § 2 (d) and the economic realities with which its framers were concerned.
Conceding that the Robinson-Patman amendments by no means represent an exemplar of legislative clarity, we cannot, in the absence of an unmistakable directive, construe the Act in a manner which runs counter to the broad goals which Congress intended it to effectuate. See, e. g., FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U. S. 505, 516-521 (1963); Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F. 2d 988, 991-993 (C. A. 8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 773 (1945). We start with the proposition that “[t]he Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in 1936 to curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing power.” FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U. S. 166, 168 (1960). The role within the statutory scheme which Congress intended for § 2 (d) is well documented in the legislative history. An investigation of chain store buying practices undertaken by the Federal Trade Commission, at Congress’ request, had indicated that § 2 of the Clayton Act was an inadequate deterrent against outright price discrimination. The investigation also revealed that certain practices by which large buyers induced concessions which their smaller competitors could not obtain were wholly beyond the reach of § 2. It is significant that congressional concern had focused on the buying practices of large retailers, particularly the chain stores, because it was felt that they were threatening the continued existence of the independent merchant. Indeed, before Congress acted, some States had attempted to limit the growth of retail chains through express prohibitions against further extensions and through taxation. One of the practices disclosed by the Commission’s investigation was that by which large retailers induced concessions from suppliers in the form of advertising and other sales promotional allowances. The draftsman of the provision which eventually emerged as § 2 (d) explained that, even when such payments were made for actual sales promotional services, they were a form of indirect price discrimination because the recipient of the allowances could shift part of his advertising costs to his supplier while his disfavored competitor could not. That Congress adopted this view of the practice it sought to eliminate by § 2 (d) is demonstrated by the words used by the Senate Judiciary Committee in recommending enactment of the section:
“Still another favored medium for the granting of oppressive discriminations is found in the practice of large buyer customers to demand, and of their sellers to grant, special allowances in purported payment of advertising and other sales promotional services, which the customer agrees to render with reference to the seller's products, or sometimes with reference to his business generally. Such an allowance becomes unjust when the service is not rendered as agreed and paid for, or when, if rendered, the payment is grossly in excess of its value, or when in any case the customer is deriving from it equal benefit to his own business and is thus enabled to shift to his vendor substantial portions of his own advertising cost, while his smaller competitor, unable to command such allowances, cannot do so.”
Congress chose to deter such indirect price discrimination by prohibiting the granting of sales promotional allowances to one customer unless accorded on proportionally equal terms to all competing customers.
Of course, neither the Committee Report nor other parts of the legislative history in so many words define “custome/^ to include retailers who purchase through wholesalers and compete with direct buyers in resales. But a narrower reading of § 2 (d) would lead to the following anomalous result. On the one hand, direct-buying retailers like Meyer, who resell large quantities of their suppliers’ products and therefore find it feasible to undertake the traditional wholesaling functions for themselves, would be protected by the provision from the granting of discriminatory promotional allowances to their direct-buying competitors. On the other hand, smaller retailers whose only access to suppliers is through independent wholesalers would not be entitled to this protection. Such a result would be diametrically opposed to Congress’ clearly stated intent to improve the competitive position of small retailers by eliminating what was regarded as an abusive form of discrimination. If we were to read “customer” as excluding retailers who buy through wholesalers and compete with direct buyers, we would frustrate the purpose of § 2 (d). We effectuate it by holding that the section includes such competing retailers within the protected class.
III.
The Commission did not press in the Court of Appeals the position of one Commissioner that retailers who purchased through Hudson House and Wadhams and competed with Meyer in resales were customers of Tri-Valley and Idaho Canning. Consequently, that court gave almost no consideration to the construction of § 2 (d) which we hold to be the proper one. Citing its prior ruling in Tri-Valley Packing Assn. v. FTC, 329 F. 2d 694, 709-710 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1964), the court merely stated that a § 2 (d) violation could not be made out unless (1) Tri-Valley and Idaho Canning had in some way dealt directly with retailers competing with Meyer, and (2) canned peaches and corn sold by the two suppliers could be traced through Hudson House and Wad-hams to the shelves of the competing retailers. 359 F. 2d, at 359-360, 362-363. In the view of the Court of Appeals, these two requirements compose the elements of the “indirect customer” doctrine under which the Commission and the courts impose § 2 (d) liability when a supplier in effect supplants his intermediate distributors in dealings with those to whom the distributors resell and favors some of the distributors’ accounts over others. See American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F. 2d 104, 109 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U. S. 824 (1962); K. S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 198 F. Supp. 310, 312-313 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1961); Kay Windsor Frocks, Inc., 51 F. T. C. 89, 95-96 (1954); F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 398-399 (1962), 90 (1964 Supp.). We need not and do not question the validity of this doctrine as applied to pierce a supplier’s unrealistic claim that a reseller favored by him is actually the customer of an intermediate distributor. Nor do we reach the question whether a retailer may succeed in a private action based on § 2 (d) without proving that he in fact resold the supplier’s product in competition with a favored buyer. In the case before us, it is conceded that Meyer was a customer of Tri-Valley and Idaho Canning. Moreover, as indicated by its approval of the Commission’s § 2 (a) ruling, the Court of Appeals did not question the Commission’s finding that Meyer competed in the resale of Tri-Valley and Idaho Canning products with retailers who purchased through Hudson House and Wadhams. Given these findings, it was unnecessary for the Commission to resort to the indirect customer doctrine. Whether suppliers deal directly with disfavored competitors or not, they can, and here did, afford a direct buyer the kind of competitive advantage which § 2 (d) was intended to eliminate. In light of our holding that “customers” in § 2 (d) includes retailers who buy through wholesalers and compete with a direct buyer in the resale of the supplier’s product, the requirement of direct dealing between the supplier and disfavored competitors imposed by the Court of Appeals rests on too narrow a reading of the statute. Further, in light of the Commission’s finding that Meyer competed in the resale of the Idaho Canning and Tri-Valley products with other retailers in the area who purchased through Hudson House and Wadhams and in light of the fact that the Court of Appeals did not disturb this finding, the court misapprehended the Commission’s burden in requiring it to trace those products to the shelves of the disfavored retailers.
IV.
The Commission’s view of the impact of respondents’ argument in no way conflicts with our own. In rejecting respondents’ construction of § 2 (d), the Commission observed:
“The net result of this argument is that the entire structure of ‘independent’ food merchants — including the traditional wholesaler and his numerous, small retailer-customers — are placed completely outside the pale of Section 2 (d) of the amended Clayton Act insofar as their competition with the direct-buying 'chains’ is concerned.
“We are not persuaded that Congress either intended or effected any such result when it passed Section 2 (d). In the first place, such a construction goes squarely against the well-known purposes of the Act itself, namely, to give the ‘independent’ food sellers an even break in their competition with the ‘chains.’ ”
But rather than concluding, as we have, that retailers who purchased through Hudson House and Wadhams and competed with Meyer in resales were 'disfavored customers of Tri-Valley and Idaho Canning, a majority of the Commission held that the wholesalers, Hudson House and Wadhams, were the customers entitled to promotional allowances on proportionally equal terms with Meyer. Although we approach the Commission’s ruling with the deference due the agency charged with day-today administration of the Act, we hold that, at least on the facts before us, § 2 (d) does not require proportional equality between Meyer and the two wholesalers.
The Commission believed it found support for its position in the language of § 2 (d) itself, which requires that promotional allowances be accorded on proportionally equal terms to “customers competing in the distribution” of a supplier’s product, rather than merely to customers competing in resales. The majority reasoned that Hudson House and Wadhams, when they resold to Meyer’s retail competitors, were competing with Meyer in the distribution of Tri-Valley and Idaho Canning products because the two wholesalers were “seeking exactly the same consumer dollars that respondents are after.” 63 F. T. C., at-. While it cannot be doubted that Congress reasonably could have employed such a broad concept of competition in § 2 (d), we do not believe that the use of the word “distribution” rather than “resale” is a clear indication that it did, and what discussion there was of the promotional allowance provision during the congressional hearings indicates that the section was meant to impose proportional equality only where buyers competed on the same functional level. Thus, in reporting the provision, both the Senate and House Judiciary Committees used the following example:
“To illustrate: Where, as was revealed in the hearings earlier referred to in this report, a manufacturer grants a particular chain distributor an advertising allowance of a stated amount per month per store in which the former’s goods are sold, a competing customer with a smaller number of stores, but equally able to furnish the same service per store, and under conditions of the same value to the seller, would be entitled to a similar allowance on that basis.”
This illustration and others which- could be cited are not conclusive, but they do strongly suggest that the competition with which Congress was concerned in § 2 (d) was that between buyers who competed in resales of the supplier’s products. And, as stated above, Congress’ objective was to assure that all sellers, regardless of size, competing directly for the same customers would receive even-handed treatment from their suppliers. We noted in FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U. S. 505 (1963), that when Congress wished to expand the meaning of competition to include more than resellers operating on the same functional level, it knew how to do so in unmistakable terms. It did so in § 2 (a) of the Act by prohibiting price discrimination which may “injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them.” Id., at 514 — 515; see FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 55 (1948). We stated in Sun Oil that:
“There is no reason appearing on the face of the statute to assume that Congress intended to invoke by omission in § 2 (b) the same broad meaning of competition or competitor which it explicitly provided by inclusion in § 2 (a); the reasonable inference is quite the contrary.”
In the present case, too, we think “the reasonable inference” is that Congress did not intend such a broad meaning of competition in§2(d). We recognize that it would be both inappropriate and unwise to attempt to formulate an all-embracing rule applying the elusive language of the section to every system of distribution a supplier might devise for getting his product to the consumer. But, on the concrete facts here presented, it is clear that the direct impact of Meyer’s receiving discriminatory promotional allowances is felt by the disfavored retailers with whom Meyer competes in resales. We cannot assume without a clear indication from Congress that § 2 (d) was intended to compel the supplier to pay the allowances to a reseller further up the distributive chain who might or might not pass them on to the level where the impact would be felt directly. We conclude that the most reasonable construction of § 2 (d) is one which places on the supplier the responsibility for making promotional allowances available to those resellers who compete directly with the favored buyer.
The Commission argues here that the view we take of § 2 (d) is impracticable because suppliers will not always find it feasible to bypass their wholesalers and grant promotional allowances directly to their numerous retail outlets. Our decision does not necessitate such bypassing. We hold only that, when a supplier gives allowances to a direct-buying retailer, he must also make them available on comparable terms to those who buy his products through wholesalers and compete with the direct buyer in resales. Nothing we have said bars a supplier, consistently with other provisions of the antitrust laws, from utilizing his wholesalers to distribute payments or administer a promotional program, so long as the supplier takes responsibility, under rules and guides promulgated by the Commission for the regulation of such practices, for seeing that the allowances are made available to all who compete in the resale of his product.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it held that the promotional allowances granted Meyer by Tri-Valley and Idaho Canning did not violate § 2 (d), is reversed. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to remand to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
38 Stat. 730, as amended, 49 Stat. 1526, 1527, 15 U. S. C. §§ 13 (a), 13 (d). Section 2 (a) provides in pertinent part:
“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be ... to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: . . .”
Section 2 (d) provides in full:
“[I]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities.”
See n. 1, supra.
The Commission and respondents filed separate petitions for certiorari to review different rulings of the Court of Appeals. Respondents contended (1) that the Commission had failed to show that respondents’ inducement of §§ 2 (a) and 2 (d) violations had been knowing and (2) that the Commission’s order prohibiting future inducement of § 2 (d) violations was too broad. The Commission’s petition raised the question “[w]hether a supplier’s granting to a retailer who buys directly from it promotional allowances that are not made available to a wholesaler who resells to retailers competing with the direct-buying retailer violates Section 2 (d) of the Robinson-Patman Act.” The Commission also presented an additional question which it sought to reserve only if respondents’ petition were granted. We denied respondents’ petition, 386 U. S. 908 (1967), and specifically limited our review on the Commission’s petition to the issue of statutory interpretation therein presented. 386 ü. S. 907 (1967).
The Commission found that the total of $25,200 received by-Meyer from 72 participating suppliers in each of the years 1956 and 1957 more than covered Meyer’s cost of publishing, distributing, and publicizing the coupon books in those years. The Commission characterized as “clear profit” the $13,870 paid Meyer by consumer purchasers of the books in 1957.
See n. 1, supra.
15 U. S. C. § 13 (f):
“It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section.”
38 Stat. 719, as amended, 66 Stat. 632, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (a):
“(1) Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.
“(6) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.”
63 F. T. C., at — (Commissioner Elman, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
This case, in its present posture, does not present the question whether the functional label used by a manufacturer or reseller reflects his actual position in the distributive chain. Compare FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U. S. 470, 475 (1952); cf. FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U. S. 55, 62-63 (1959).
Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U. S. 61, 65 (1953); see F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 20 (1962).
S. Res. No. 224, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 Cong. Rec. 7857 (1928).
Federal Trade Commission, Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 63-65, 90-91, 96-97 (1935).
Id., at 57-65. See also Hearings before the Special House Committee on Investigation of American Retail Federation, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
See C. Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems under the Robinson-Patman Act 6-11 (2d rev. ed. 1959). In presenting his bill to the House Judiciary Committee, Representative Patman stated:
“I believe it is the opinion of everyone who has studied this subject, that the day of the independent merchant is gone unless something is done and done quickly. He cannot possibly survive under that system. So we have reached the crossroads; we must either turn the food and grocery business of this . . . country over to a few corporate chains, or we have got to pass laws that will give the people, who built this country in time of peace and who saved it in time of war, an opportunity to exist — not to give them any special rights, special privileges, or special benefits, but just to deny their competitors the special benefits that they are getting, that they should not be permitted to have.” Hearings on H. R. 8442, 4995, and 5062 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6 (1935).
See Federal Trade Commission, Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, supra, n. 12, at 78-82.
Id., at 44-46, 61. See also Hearings before the Special House Committee on Investigation of American Retail Federation, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 3, No. 1, at 66-88 (1935).
Hearings on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 464 (1936) (Mr. Teegarden).
S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1936). The House Judiciary Committee reported the provision favorably in identical terms. H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 15-16 (1936).
The Commission’s § 2 (a) and § 2 (d) rulings were both based on findings that retailers in the Portland area who purchased through Hudson House and Wadhams competed with Meyer in the resale of Idaho Canning com and Tri-Valley peaches. The Court of Appeals could not have consistently set aside these findings with regard to the § 2 (d) violations while upholding them with respect to § 2 (a).
63 F. T. C., at —.
S. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1936); H. R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., 16 (1936).
See n. 14, supra.
371 U. S., at 515.
See 16 CFR §§ 1.55-1.66; of. “Guides for Allowances and Services,” 1 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 3980, at 6073-6079.
See, e. g., F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 534; Stedman, Twenty-four Years of the Robinson-Patman Act, 1960 Wis. L. Rev. 197, 218.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Petitioner and Carzell Moore were indicted together for the rape and murder of Teresa Carol Allen. Moore was tried separately, was convicted of both crimes, and has been sentenced to death. See Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 807, 243 S. E. 2d 1, cert. denied, 439 U. S. 903 (1978). Petitioner subsequently was convicted of murder, and also received a capital sentence. The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the conviction and sentence, 242 Ga. 261, 249 S. E. 2d 1 (1978), and petitioner has sought review of so much of the judgment as affirmed the capital sentence. We grant the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari and vacate the sentence.
The evidence at trial tended to show that petitioner and Moore abducted Allen from the store where she was working alone and, acting either in concert or separately, raped and murdered her. After the jury determined that petitioner was guilty of murder, a second trial was held to decide whether capital punishment would be imposed. See Ga. Code § 27-2503 (1978). At this second proceeding, petitioner sought to prove he was not present when Allen was killed and had not participated in her death. He attempted to introduce the testimony of Thomas Pasby, who had testified for the State at Moore’s trial. According to Pasby, Moore had confided to him that he had killed Allen, shooting her twice after ordering petitioner to run an errand. The trial court refused to allow introduction of this evidence, ruling that Pasby’s testimony constituted hearsay that was inadmissible under Ga. Code § 38-301 (1978). The State then argued to the jury that in the absence of direct evidence as to the circumstances of the crime, it could infer that petitioner participated directly in Allen’s murder from the fact that more than one bullet was fired into her body.
Regardless of whether the proffered testimony comes within Georgia’s hearsay rule, under the facts of this case its exclusion constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The excluded testimony was highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the trial, see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604-605 (1978) (plurality opinion); id., at 613-616 (opinion of Blackmun, J.), and substantial reasons existed to assume its reliability. Moore made his statement spontaneously to a close friend. The evidence corroborating the confession was ample, and indeed sufficient to procure a conviction of Moore and a capital sentence. The statement was' against interest, and there was no reason to believe that Moore had any ulterior motive in making it. Perhaps most important, the State considered the testimony sufficiently reliable to use it against Moore, and to base a sentence of death upon it. In these unique circumstances, “the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.” Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302 (1973). Because the exclusion of Pasby’s testimony denied petitioner a fair trial on the issue of punishment, the sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall, adhering to their view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), would vacate the death sentence without remanding for further proceedings.
Georgia recognizes an exception, to the hearsay rule for declarations against pecuniary interest, but not for declarations against penal interest. See 242 Ga. 261, 269-272, 249 S. E. 2d 1, 8-9 (1978), quoting Little v. Stynchcombe, 227 Ga. 311, 180 S. E. 2d 541 (1971).
The District Attorney stated to the jury:
“We couldn’t possibly bring any evidence other than the circumstantial evidence and the direct evidence that we had pointing to who did it, and I think it’s especially significant for you to remember what Dr. Dawson said in this case. When the first shot, in his medical opinion, he stated that Miss Allen had positive blood pressure when both shots were fired but I don’t know whether Carzell Moore fired the first shot and handed the gun to Roosevelt Green and he fired the second shot or whether it was vice versa or whether Roosevelt Green had the gun and fired the shot or Carzell Moore had the gun and fired the first shot or the second, but I think it can be reasonably stated that you Ladies and Gentlemen can believe that each one of them fired the shots so that they would be as equally involved and one did not exceed the other’s part in the commission of this crime.” Pet. for Cert. 10.
A confession to a crime is not considered hearsay under Georgia law when admitted against a declarant. Ga. Code §38-414 (1978); Green v. State, 115 Ga. App. 685, 155 S. E. 2d 655 (1967).
See Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 592-593 (1978).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner has been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death by an Arizona court for the killing of one Janie Miscovich. He asks this Court to reverse his conviction on the ground that a confession received in evidence at his trial was coerced by fear of lynching, in violation of his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The victim, proprietor of a grocery store in Kansas Settlement, Arizona, was killed while tending her store on the evening of March 16, 1953. No one witnessed the crime, but strong circumstantial evidence indicated that it occurred between 10 p. m. and 11 p. m., and that petitioner was responsible. He was arrested the next day under circumstances which lend credence to his assertion of a “putative lynching." The confession at issue, however, was not made until the day following the arrest, when he was taken before a Justice of the Peace for preliminary examination.
After an initial determination of voluntariness, the trial judge in the Superior Court of Cochise County, Arizona, submitted the issue of coercion to the jury under instructions to ignore the confession as evidence unless it was found entirely voluntary. A general verdict of guilty was returned by the jury and accepted by the trial court. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed, 78 Ariz. 52, 275 P. 2d 408, and we denied certiorari. 350 U. S. 950 (1956). Petitioner then made application for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. After reviewing the entire record, the District Court denied the writ without a hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 235 F. 2d 775, and we granted certiorari because of the seriousness of petitioner’s allegations under the Due Process Clause. 352 U. S. 1024. An exhaustive review of the record, however, impels us to conclude that petitioner’s confession was “the expression of free choice,” Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 53 (1949), and not the product of fear, duress, or coercion.
The prosecution’s use of a coerced confession first led to this Court’s reversal of a state conviction in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936). Our resolution of similar claims in subsequent cases makes clear that “the question whether there has been a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the introduction of an involuntary confession is one on which we must make an independent determination on the ■ undisputed facts.” Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 404 (1945). No encroachment of the traditional jury function results, for the issue of coercion, unlike the basic facts on which coercion is ascertained, involves the application of constitutional standards of fundamental fairness under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 507 (1953) (concurring opinion). In each instance our inquiry must weigh the “circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person confessing.” Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191, 197 (1957), quoting Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 185 (1953).
We turn then to the undisputed portions of the record to ascertain the facts against which petitioner’s claim of coercion must be measured.
I.
Petitioner is an itinerant Negro laborer who lived with his common-law wife and four other Negroes, including one Ross Lee Cooper, a 17-year-old boy, in an old barracks provided by his employer about a half mile from the victim’s store. Petitioner is a Navy veteran, 27 years old at the time of the murder, with a partial high school education. He had a criminal record of three different convictions, the most serious being a five-year larceny sentence, as well as two terms in the Navy brig for twice being absent without leave from his service post.
The body of Janie Miscovich was found Tuesday morning, March 17. A supplier noticed smoke coming from the store and summoned the help of three men constructing a building nearby, one of whom was petitioner. Petitioner did nothing to assist in putting out the fire, and left the scene before the victim's body was discovered, declaring that he “never could stand the stench of burning flesh.” Although the body was severely beaten and burned, death was attributed to knife wounds in the heart, inflicted with a large knife found later in the store.
Preliminary investigation by local police disclosed that petitioner and Cooper were at the store together Monday afternoon and evening. After they returned to the barracks at approximately 8:30 p. m., petitioner left again by himself, returning around midnight. A trail of blood and footprints was traced from the store to within 50 yards of the barracks, where a strip of freshly harrowed ground made further tracking impossible. Blood spots were found in the kitchen of the barracks, and two bloody gloves were found hidden near the barracks. Both gloves were for the right hand and one of them was slit across the middle, ring and little fingers. Matching gloves were found in the store, where nine pairs plus two gloves for the left hand remained out of 12 pairs of gloves stocked by Janie Miscovich on Monday. The only pair of shoes petitioner owned, found under his bed in the barracks, exactly matched the 13%-inch footprints trailed to the barracks. He had returned to the barracks after discovery of the fire and exchanged his shoes for a pair of old work boots he got “out of the trash pile.”
II.
A posse of 12 to 15 men headed by the Sheriff of Cochise County apprehended petitioner Tuesday at 3 p. m. lying under a pasture brush pile over 200 yards from the road and about iy2 miles from Kansas Settlement. Three fingers of his right hand had been severely cut, matching the slits in the bloody glove found outside the barracks.
Petitioner was placed under arrest by the Sheriff and handcuffed by a state highway patrolman with the posse. When asked by the Sheriff “why he had killed the woman,” petitioner asserted that he had not killed her, but that he could take the posse to the man who had done so, accusing Cooper of the murder. He also stated that he had cut his hand on a can. At this point a local rancher on horseback, who had no official connection with the Sheriff’s posse, lassoed petitioner around the neck and jerked him a few steps in the general direction of both the Sheriff’s car and the nearest trees, some 200 yards away. The Sheriff quickly intervened, removed the rope, and admonished, “Stop that. We will have none of that . . . .” There was no talk of lynching among the other members of the posse.
The Sheriff then put petitioner and two other men in his car and drove a few miles south where petitioner directed him in search of Cooper. They found Cooper working in a field about half a mile off the road. The Sheriff borrowed a horse from a member of the posse— which had followed the Sheriff’s car — and rode alone across the field to arrest Cooper. As he was bringing Cooper back to the car, a second rancher on horseback roped Cooper around the waist and led him along. When they reached the car, the Sheriff removed the rope. Petitioner, who had a full view of Cooper’s apprehension, got out of the car and identified Cooper as the Miscovich killer.
Cooper was handcuffed and standing beside petitioner when the rancher responsible for Cooper’s roping lassoed both men, catching them either by their shoulders or their necks and pulling them down to their knees. The Sheriff, looking “kind of mad,” reacted “immediately,” removing the rope and shouting, “Hey, stop that. We will have no more of that.” Two or three other men joined the Sheriff in protesting the third roping incident. No trees at all could be seen from the location of these last two ropings, and no mention or threat of lynching was heard.
By 4:30 p. m. both prisoners had been placed in the Sheriff’s car. They were taken directly to Willcox, the nearest town with a Justice Court, for preliminary examination in compliance with Arizona law. However, the judge, who was also a school bus driver, already had departed on the evening run. Before leaving Willcox, the Sheriff stopped briefly at the local mortuary, where the body of the murder victim was shown to both suspects. The prisoners then were taken to Bisbee, site of the county jail and courthouse. Arriving there after closing time of the nearest Justice Court, the Sheriff took them to nearby Warren for questioning by the County Attorney.
It was 6 p. m. when the Sheriff and his prisoners reached the home of the County Attorney, whom a prior injury had confined to a full body cast and stretcher. Petitioner and Cooper were placed together in a back bedroom under guard of an armed deputy, but each was separately quizzed for an hour in a front room. Petitioner was questioned solely by the County Attorney, though six other men, some of whom were armed, were present. Petitioner was barefoot; his shoes had been seized as evidence in the case, and there were no shoes at the jail large enough to fit him. He wore the same coveralls in which he was arrested. The County Attorney first identified each man in the room, assured petitioner that no threats and no promises would be made, “explained to him his rights,” and told him to tell the truth. No force was used or threatened against either prisoner. While petitioner’s statement was never tendered in evidence at the trial, it was filed with the United States District Court in the habeas proceeding as proof of his composure on the very day of his arrest. The statement included petitioner’s stout denial' of any responsibility for the murder, and a detailed story designed to incriminate Cooper, a young and backward boy called “Baby John.” Petitioner claimed to have returned to the store with Cooper a second time the night before, and to have waited outside while Cooper entered the store to buy beer. Upon hearing screams, petitioner said he rushed inside, found Cooper holding a knife over the woman, cut his hand trying to seize the knife from Cooper, and then ran back to the barracks, leaving Cooper with the woman. He illustrated the story in some detail by tracing his movements with crayons on a diagram of the Miscovich store.
At 9 p. m., the Cochise County Under-Sheriff took petitioner to a hospital where his hand was treated, and at 10 p. m. left him at the county jail. Later the Sheriff stopped by petitioner’s cell, but nothing was said aside from the Sheriff’s inquiry as to “how he was feeling.”
At 11:30 a. m. the next morning, Wednesday, March 18, the Sheriff brought petitioner before the Lowell Justice Court for preliminary examination. Petitioner was barefoot, and remained so until the Sheriff bought him a pair of shoes. Prior to leaving the jail for court, the Sheriff gave petitioner a pack of cigarettes. Upon further inquiry as to how he was feeling, petitioner complained of his hand injury, and the Sheriff said he would see that it was dressed again.
When petitioner arrived at the court, three other men were conducting business with the Justice of the Peace, delaying petitioner’s hearing for five minutes until they finished and departed. Then, in the presence of the Sheriff, a Deputy Sheriff, and a female secretary, Justice of the Peace Frazier read the complaint to petitioner, advised him of his rights to preliminary hearing and to counsel, told him the hearing could be waived, and instructed him that he could plead guilty or not guilty as he chose, but that a guilty plea would automatically waive the preliminary. Petitioner immediately replied with the oral confession in issue here: “I am guilty. I don’t need any lawyer. I killed the woman.” Judge Frazier asked if the murder was committed with an axe. Petitioner said, “No. I killed her with a knife.”
Immediately thereafter, the Sheriff again took petitioner to the home of the County Attorney, where a detailed confession was made in the presence of the County Attorney, his secretary, the Sheriff, and a Deputy Sheriff. Just as he had the night before, the County Attorney identified those present and told petitioner that no threats or promises would be made. He also warned petitioner that the secretary would record everything said, and concluded, “You don't have to talk to me if you don’t want to, but you can, if you will, tell me in your own words, in your own free will, just what took place out at Kansas Settlement.” Later in the afternoon, after his return to the jail, petitioner was taken downstairs to the County Attorney’s courthouse office,' where in the presence of five people he read through and signed the typed transcript of his confession at the County Attorney’s home.
Either the next day, Thursday, March 19, or else Friday, March 20 (the record being inconclusive), a newspaper reporter visited petitioner in jail. At the trial he testified petitioner seemed nervous and afraid. Petitioner indicated that he’d been “roughed up” and that the Sheriff had saved his life. At the reporter’s request, he posed for a picture with the Sheriff. Petitioner asked the Sheriff on Thursday to be moved to a part of the jail where he could be by himself, and the Sheriff said he would try to arrange it. On the same day, the Sheriff took petitioner to a doctor for additional treatment of his hand.
The third and last confession was taken down on Friday, March 20, in the County Attorney’s office in the presence of seven men, including a Deputy United States Marshal. After the same preliminary precautions as preceded petitioner’s statements Tuesday night and Wednesday afternoon, the County Attorney obtained a detailed confession. Several days later, on April 1, the Marshal met alone with petitioner and had him read the transcript of this last confession, telling him to initial the bottom of each page if, and only if, the material thereon was true. After an hour’s reading, petitioner initialed all the pages.
The written confessions, signed on the 18th and the 1st, were found “procured by threat of lynch” and declared involuntary by the trial judge after his preliminary inquiry. Although the oral confession before the Justice of the Peace was made between the time of the ropings and the written confessions, the trial judge made an initial determination that it was voluntary. He justified this seeming incongruity on the basis of the different circumstances under which the oral statement was made, namely, the judicial surroundings and the presence of the Sheriff with only one other deputy, the Sheriff being “the very man who had protected [petitioner].”
III.
Deplorable as these ropings are to the spirit of a civilized administration of justice, the undisputed facts before us do not show that petitioner’s oral statement was a product of fear engendered by them. Arizona’s determination that the written confessions were involuntary cannot control the separate constitutional inquiry posed by the character of the oral confession. And since ours is to be an independent resolution of the issue of coercion, the range of our inquiry is not limited to those factors which differentiate the oral from the written confessions. The inquiry to be made here, primary in both time and logic, is the voluntariness of the oral confession, which was admitted into evidence. Consequently we do not consider the subsequent confessions.
Coercion here is posited solely upon the roping incidents. There is no claim and no evidence of physical beating, as in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936) ; of continuous relay questioning, as in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949); of incommunicado detention, as in Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191 (1957); or of psychiatric inducement, as in Leyra v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556 (1954). Petitioner is neither of tender age, as was the accused in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948), nor of subnormal intelligence, as was the defendant in Fikes v. Alabama, supra. Nor, in view of his extensive criminal record, can he be thought an impressionable stranger to the processes of law.
The 20-hour interval between the time of the ropings and petitioner’s oral confession was devoid of all coercive influences other than the sight of the victim’s body. No threats were made, no promises offered, no force used, and no intimation of mob action existent. Petitioner’s own activity during the crucial 20 hours is eloquent rebuttal of the contention that he was a man dominated by fear. At the logical height of oppression, during the ropings themselves, petitioner stoutly denied the offense and attempted to put the police on the trail of Cooper. That very evening he reiterated his position in a detailed story of Cooper’s guilt and his own innocence, notwithstanding Cooper’s presence with him in the same house. Even though petitioner appeared apprehensive and worried to a newspaperman two or three days after the oral statement, his demeanor both at the County Attorney’s home the night of his arrest and before the Justice Court the next morning bespoke complete voluntariness to other witnesses, including Judge Frazier. Nothing in the undisputed record seriously substantiates the contention that a fear engendered by the ropings overbore petitioner’s free will at the time he appeared in the Justice Court. His statement appears to be the spontaneous exclamation of a guilty conscience.
Petitioner relies heavily on the testimony of the state patrolman who was present at the first roping. He testified that when petitioner was first roped, the Sheriff said, “Will you tell the truth, or I will let them go ahead and do this.” Petitioner argues that this testimony completely negates the Sheriff’s role as petitioner’s “protector,” eliminating one of the two factors by which the trial judge distinguished the oral from the other confessions. The Sheriff, however, expressly denied making any such statement, and all other witnesses of the first roping agreed that no such threat ever was uttered. Whatever the merits of this dispute, our inquiry clearly is limited to a study of the undisputed portions of the record. “[T]here has been complete agreement that any conflict in testimony as to what actually led to a contested confession is not this Court’s concern. Such conflict comes here authoritatively resolved [against petitioner] by the State’s adjudication.” Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 51-52 (1949). Time and again we have refused to consider disputed facts when determining the issue of coercion. See Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U. S. 55, 60-61 (1951); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596, 597-598 (1948); Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547 (1942). The rationale behind such exclusion, of course, lies in the superior opportunity of trial court and jury to observe the witnesses and weigh the fleeting intangibles which may indicate truth or falsehood. We abide by the wisdom of that reasoning.
IV.
Petitioner has an alternative prayer that his case be remanded to the District Court for a plenary hearing on the issue of coercion. There is no merit, however, to his contention that the District Court erred in denying the writ on the basis of the record without a full hearing. The granting of a hearing is within the discretion of the District Court, Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 463-465 (1953), and no abuse of that discretion appears here.
Petitioner also urges that the District Court erred in considering the transcript of his interrogation in the County Attorney’s home after his arrest. As stated above, that transcript never was made part of the record in the case. The State, however, filed it as an affidavit before the District Court. Petitioner asserts error because, in the absence of any hearing, he had no opportunity to rebut the affidavit. It does not appear, however, that petitioner made any objection in the District Court, nor did he file any counter-affidavit. Moreover, the substance of the transcript — petitioner’s denial of guilt and attempt to implicate Cooper just three hours after the ropings — appears at other places in the record. We fail to see how prejudice could have resulted.
Affirmed.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Brennan dissent.
The State contends preliminarily that petitioner failed to exhaust his state remedy before seeking habeas in the federal courts, because his application in this Court for certiorari to the state court was not timely. The normal rule that certiorari must be applied for here after a state conviction before habeas is sought in the District Court, Darr v. Burjord, 339 U. S. 200 (1950), is not inflexible, however, and in special circumstances need not be complied with. Darr v. Burjord, supra, at 210. “Whether such circumstances exist calls for a factual appraisal by the [District Court] in each special situation. Determination of this issue, like others, is largely left to the trial courts subject to appropriate review by the courts of appeals.” Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519, 521 (1952). Petitioner’s failure tp timely apply for certiorari was noted by the District Court in this case, but expressly was stated not to be the basis for its denial of habeas. Since that court and the Court of Appeals considered petitioner’s application on the merits, we are not inclined at this late date to consider the procedural defect a fatal error.
"An officer who has arrested a person without a warrant shall without unnecessary delay take the person arrested before the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the county in which the arrest occurs, and shall make before the magistrate a complaint, which shall set forth the facts showing the offense for which the person was arrested.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., 1956, § 13-1418.
The Sheriff, the Under-Sheriff, a court reporter, a police photographer, and two County Attorney’s deputies.
A young mother living in the barracks who sat up all Monday night with her sick child completely discredited petitioner’s story by her unshaken testimony that Cooper never left the barracks again after returning with petitioner about 8:30 p. m.
Out of the jury's presence during the initial inquiry of the trial court into the coercion issue, Judge Frazier testified that he told petitioner the Superior Court would appoint an attorney for him, but that he said nothing about appointing an attorney himself for the preliminary examination in the Justice Court. Subsequently, testifying before the jury, he stated that petitioner was told of a “right to counsel before his preliminary in Justice Court.”
The Sheriff, two Deputy Sheriffs, a County Attorney's deputy, and the County Attorney’s secretary.
Others present were the Under-Sheriff, a Deputy Sheriff, the County Attorney, two County Attorney’s deputies, and a court reporter.
Unlike many cases where this Court has found coercion, there apparently was no failure here to comply with the state statute requiring that a prisoner be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay after the arrest. Contrast, e. g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191 (1957); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949); Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1945); Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547 (1942). The Arizona statute, see note 2, supra, was construed in State v. Johnson, 69 Ariz. 203, 211 P. 2d 469, where the accused apparently was not taken before a magistrate until the morning following his 5 p. m. arrest.
The “[state] adjudication” upon which this rule turns is that of the trial judge in this case. While the general verdict of guilty is not instructive here as to the jury’s view on the issue of coercion, the judge made an initial determination of voluntariness before submitting the confession to the jury. That preliminary finding occurred prior to the highway patrolman’s testimony, but a motion for mistrial by defense counsel immediately after the conflict arose was denied before the case went to the jury. Therefore, we need not decide whether the mere fact of conviction, absent a more specific adjudication of voluntariness, would suffice to invoke the rule foreclosing assessment of the disputed facts.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Commonwealth of Kentucky permits policemen, firemen, and other “hazardous position” workers to retire and to receive “normal retirement” benefits after either (1) working for 20 years; or (2) working for 5 years and attaining the age of 55. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 16.576,16.577(2) (Lexis 2003), 61.592(4) (Lexis Supp. 2003). It permits those who become seriously disabled but have not otherwise become eligible for retirement to retire immediately and receive “disability retirement” benefits. See § 16.582(2)(b) (Lexis 2003). And it treats some of those disabled individuals more generously than it treats some of those who became disabled only after becoming eligible for retirement on the basis of age. The question before us is whether Kentucky’s system consequently discriminates against the latter workers “because of . . . age.” Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or Act), § 4(a)(1), 81 Stat. 603, 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1). We conclude that it does not.
I
A
Kentucky has put in place a special retirement plan (Plan) for state and county employees who occupy “[h]azardous position[sj,” e. g., active duty law enforcement officers, firefighters, paramedics, and workers in correctional systems. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 61.592(1)(a) (Lexis Supp. 2003). The Plan sets forth two routes through which such an employee can become eligible for what is called “normal retirement” benefits. The first makes an employee eligible for retirement after 20 years of service. The second makes an employee eligible after only 5 years of service provided that the employee has attained the age of 55. See §§ 16.576, 16.577(2), 61.592(4). An employee eligible under either route will receive a pension calculated in the same way: Kentucky multiplies years of service times 2.5% times final preretirement pay. See § 16.576(3).
Kentucky’s Plan has special provisions for hazardous position workers who become disabled but are not yet eligible for normal retirement. Where such an employee has worked for five years or became disabled in the line of duty, the employee can retire at once. See §§ 16.576(1), 16.582(2) (Lexis 2003). In calculating that employee’s benefits Kentucky will add a certain number of (“imputed”) years to the employee’s actual years of service. The number of imputed years equals the number of years that the disabled employee would have had to continue working in order to become eligible for normal retirement benefits, i. e., the years necessary to bring the employee up to 20 years of service or to at least 5 years of service when the employee would turn 55 (whichever number of years is lower). See § 16.582(5)(a) (Lexis 2003). Thus, if an employee with 17 years of service becomes disabled at age 48, the Plan adds 3 years and calculates the benefits as if the employee had completed 20 years of service. If an employee with 17 years of service becomes disabled at age 54, the Plan adds 1 year and calculates the benefits as if the employee had retired at age 55 with 18 years of service.
The Plan also imposes a ceiling on imputed years equal to the number of years the employee has previously worked (i. e., an employee who has worked eight years cannot receive more than eight additional imputed years), see § 16.582(5)(a); it provides for a certain minimum payment, see § 16.582(6) (Lexis 2003); and it contains various other details, none of which is challenged here.
B
Charles Lickteig, a hazardous position worker in the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department, became eligible for retirement at age 55, continued to work, became disabled, and then retired at age 61. The Plan calculated his annual pension on the basis of his actual years of service (18 years) times 2.5% times his final annual pay. Because Lickteig became disabled after he had already become eligible for normal retirement benefits, the Plan did not impute any additional years for purposes of the calculation.
Lickteig complained of age discrimination to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); and the EEOC then brought this age discrimination lawsuit against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Kentucky’s Plan administrator, and other state entities (to whom we shall refer collectively as “Kentucky”). The EEOC pointed out that, if Lickteig had become disabled before he reached the age of 55, the Plan, in calculating Lickteig’s benefits, would have imputed a number of additional years. And the EEOC argued that the Plan failed to impute years solely because Lickteig became disabled after he reached age 55.
The District Court, making all appropriate evidence-related assumptions in the EEOC’s favor, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56, held that the EEOC could not establish age discrimination; and it granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor. A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed that judgment. EEOC v. Jefferson Cty. Sheriff’s Dept. 424 F. 3d 467 (2005). The Sixth Circuit then granted rehearing en banc, held that Kentucky’s Plan did violate the ADEA, and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 467 F. 3d 571 (2006).
Kentucky sought certiorari. In light of the potentially serious impact of the Circuit’s decision upon pension benefits provided under plans in effect in many States, we granted the writ. See, e. g., Ind. Code §§ 36-8-8-13.3(b) and (c) (West 2004); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 38.23 and 38.556(2)(d) (West 2005); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 135-1 and 135-5 (Lexis 2007); 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5102 and 5704 (2001 and Supp. 2007); Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-36-501(c)(3) (Supp. 2007). See also Reply Brief for Petitioners 20-21 (predicting, inter alia, large increase in pension liabilities, potential reduction in benefits for all disabled persons, or both); Brief for National Association of State Retirement Administrators et al. as Amici Curiae 8-14 (same).
II
The ADEA forbids an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U. S. C. § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added). In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U. S. 604 (1993), the Court explained that where, as here, a plaintiff claims age-related “disparate treatment” (i. e., intentional discrimination “because of... age”) the plaintiff must prove that age “actually motivated the employer’s decision.” Id., at 610 (emphasis added); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U. S. 133, 141 (2000). The Court noted that “[t]he employer may have relied upon a formal, facially discriminatory policy requiring adverse treatment” because of age, or “the employer may have been motivated by [age] on an ad hoc, informal basis.” Hazen Paper, 507 U. S., at 610. But “[w]hatever the employer’s decisionmaking process,” a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment cannot succeed unless the employee’s age “actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Cf. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U. S. 228, 239-240 (2005) (plurality opinion) (describing “disparate-impact” theory, not here at issue, which focuses upon unjustified discriminatory results).
In Hazen Paper, the Court considered a disparate-treatment claim that an employer had unlawfully dismissed a 62-year-old employee with over 9Vz years of service in order to avoid paying pension benefits that would have vested after 10 years. The Court held that, without more evidence of intent, the ADEA would not forbid dismissal of the claim. A dismissal based on pension status was not a dismissal “because of . . . age.” 507 U. S., at 611-612. Of course, pension status depended upon years, of service, and years of service typically go hand in hand with age. Id., at 611. But the two concepts were nonetheless “analytically distinct.” Ibid. An employer could easily “take account of one while ignoring the other.” Ibid. And the dismissal in question, if based purely upon pension status (related to years of service), would not embody the evils that led Congress to enact the ADEA in the first place: The dismissal was not based on a “prohibited stereotype” of older workers, did not produce any “attendant stigma” to those workers, and was not “the result of an inaccurate and denigrating generalization about age.” Id., at 612.
At the same time, Hazen Paper indicated that discrimination on the basis of pension status could sometimes be unlawful under the ADEA, in particular where pension status served as a “proxy for age.” Id., at 613. Suppose, for example, an employer “targeted] employees with a particular pension status on the assumption that these employees are likely to be older.” Id., at 612-613. In such a case, Hazen Paper suggested, age, not pension status, would have “actually motivated” the employer’s decisionmaking. Hazen Paper also left open “the special case where an employee is about to vest in pension benefits as a result of his age, rather than years of service.” Id., at 613. We here consider a variation on this “special case” theme.
Ill
Kentucky’s Plan turns normal pension eligibility either upon the employee’s having attained 20 years of service alone or upon the employee’s having attained 5 years of service and reached the age of 55. The ADEA permits an employer to condition pension eligibility upon age. See 29 U. S. C. § 623(0(1)(A)(i) (2006 ed.). Thus we must decide whether a plan that (1) lawfully makes age in part a condition of pension eligibility, and (2) treats workers differently in light of their pension status, (3) automatically discriminates because of age. The Government argues “yes.” But, following Hazen Paper’s approach, we come to a different conclusion. In particular, the following circumstances, taken together, convince us that, in this particular instance, differences in treatment were not “actually motivated” by age.
First, as a matter of pure logic, age and pension status remain “analytically distinct” concepts. Hazen Paper, 507 U. S., at 611. That is to say, one can easily conceive of decisions that are actually made “because of” pension status and not age, even where pension status is itself based on age. Suppose, for example, that an employer pays all retired workers a pension, retirement eligibility turns on age, say, 65, and a 70-year-old worker retires. Nothing in language or in logic prevents one from concluding that the employer has begun to pay the worker a pension, not because the worker is over 65, but simply because the worker has retired.
Second, several background circumstances eliminate the possibility that pension status, though analytically distinct from age, nonetheless serves as a “proxy for age” in Kentucky’s Plan. Cf. id., at 613. We consider not an individual employment decision, but a set of complex systemwide rules. These systemic rules involve, not wages, but pensions— a benefit that the ADEA treats somewhat more flexibly and leniently in respect to age. See, e. g., 29 U. S. C. § 623(0(1)(A)(i) (explicitly allowing pension eligibility to turn on age); § 623(/)(2)(A) (allowing employer to consider (age-related) pension benefits in determining level of severance pay); § 623(0(3) (allowing employer to consider (age-related) pension benefits in determining level of long-term disability benefits). And the specific benefit at issue here is offered to all hazardous position workers on the same nondiscriminatory terms ex ante. That is to say, every such employee, when hired, is promised disability retirement benefits should he become disabled prior to the time that he is eligible for normal retirement benefits.
Furthermore, Congress has otherwise approved of programs that calculate permanent disability benefits using a formula that expressly takes account of age. For example, the Social Security Administration now uses such a formula in calculating Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. See, e.g., 42 U. S. C. § 415(b)(2)(B)(iii); 20 CFR § 404.211(e) (2007). And until (and in some cases after) 1984, federal employees received permanent disability benefits based on a formula that, in certain circumstances, did not just consider age, but effectively imputed years of service only to those disabled workers younger than 60. See 5 U. S. C. § 8339(g) (2006 ed.); see also Office of Personnel Management, Disability Retirement Under the Civil Service Retirement System, Retirement Facts 4, p. 3 (rev. Nov. 1997), online at http://www.opm.gov/forms/pdfimage/RI83-4.pdf (as visited June 16, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
Third, there is a clear non-age-related rationale for the disparity here at issue. The manner in which Kentucky calculates disability retirement benefits is in every important respect but one identical to the manner in which Kentucky calculates normal retirement benefits. The one significant difference consists of the fact that the Plan imputes additional years of service to disabled individuals. But the Plan imputes only those years needed to bring the disabled worker’s years of service to 20 or to the number of years that the individual would have worked had he worked to age 55. The disability rules clearly track Kentucky’s normal retirement rules.
It is obvious, then, that the whole purpose of the disability rules is, as Kentucky claims, to treat a disabled worker as though he had become disabled after, rather than before, he had become eligible for normal retirement benefits. Age factors into the disability calculation only because the normal retirement rules themselves permissibly include age as a consideration. No one seeking to help disabled workers in the way that Kentucky’s rules seek to help those workers would care whether Kentucky’s normal system turned eligibility in part upon age or upon other, different criteria.
That this is so is suggested by the fact that one can readily construct a plan that produces an identical disparity but is age neutral. Suppose that Kentucky’s Plan made eligible for a pension (1) day-shift workers who have 20 years of service, and (2) night-shift workers who have 15 years of service. Suppose further that the Plan calculates the amount of the pension the same way in either case, which method of calculation depends solely upon years of service (say, giving the worker a pension equal to $1,000 for each year of service). If the Plan were then to provide workers who become disabled prior to pension eligibility the same pension the workers would have received had they worked until they became pension eligible, the Plan would create a disparity between disabled day-shift and night-shift workers: A day-shift worker who becomes disabled before becoming pension eligible would, in many instances, end up receiving a bigger pension than a night-shift worker who becomes disabled after becoming pension eligible. For example, a day-shift worker who becomes disabled prior to becoming pension eligible would receive an annual pension of $20,000, while a night-shift worker who becomes disabled after becoming pension eligible, say, after 16 years of service, would receive an annual pension of $16,000.
The disparity in this example is not “actually motivated” by bias against night-shift workers. Rather, such a disparity, like the disparity in the case before us, is simply an artifact of Plan rules that treat one set of workers more generously in respect to the timing of their eligibility for normal retirement benefits but which do not treat them more generously in respect to the calculation of the amount of their normal retirement benefits. The example helps to show that the Plan at issue in this case simply seeks to treat disabled employees as if they had worked until the point at which they would be eligible for a normal pension. The disparity turns upon pension eligibility and nothing more.
Fourth, although Kentucky’s Plan placed an older worker at a disadvantage in this case, in other cases, it can work to the advantage of older workers. Consider, for example, two disabled workers, one of whom is aged 45 with 10 years of service, one of whom is aged 40 with 15 years of service. Under Kentucky’s scheme, the older worker would actually get a bigger boost of imputed years than the younger worker (10 years would be imputed to the former, while only 5 years would be imputed to the latter). And that fact helps to confirm that the underlying motive is not an effort to discriminate “because of. . . age.”
Fifth, Kentucky’s system does not rely on any of the sorts of stereotypical assumptions that the ADEA sought to eradicate. It does not rest on any stereotype about the work capacity of “older” workers relative to “younger” workers. See, e. g., General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U. S. 581, 590 (2004) (noting that except on one point, all the findings and statements of objectives in the ADEA are “either cast in terms of the effects of age as intensifying over time, or are couched in terms that refer to ‘older’ workers, explicitly or implicitly relative to ‘younger’ ones” (emphasis added)). The Plan does assume that all disabled workers would have worked to the point at which they would have become eligible for a pension. It also assumes that no disabled worker would have continued working beyond the point at which he was both (1) disabled and (2) pension eligible. But these “assumptions” do not involve age-related stereotypes, and they apply equally to all workers, regardless of age.
Sixth, the nature of the Plan’s eligibility requirements means that, unless Kentucky were severely to cut the benefits given to disabled workers who are not yet pension eligible (which Kentucky claims it will do if its present Plan is unlawful), Kentucky would have to increase the benefits available to disabled, pension-eligible workers, while lacking any clear criteria for determining how many extra years to impute for those pension-eligible workers who already are 55 or older. The difficulty of finding a remedy that can both correct the disparity and achieve the Plan’s legitimate objective — providing each disabled worker with a sufficient retirement benefit, namely, the normal retirement benefit that the worker would receive if he were pension eligible at the time of disability — further suggests that this objective and not age “actually motivated” the Plan.
The above factors all taken together convince us that the Plan does not, on its face, create treatment differences that are “actually motivated” by age. And, for present purposes, we accept the District Court’s finding that the Government has pointed to no additional evidence that might permit a factfinder to reach a contrary conclusion. See App. 28-30.
It bears emphasizing that our opinion in no way unsettles the rule that a statute or policy that facially discriminates based on age suffices to show disparate treatment under the ADEA. We are dealing today with the quite special case of differential treatment based on pension status, where pension status — with the explicit blessing of the ADEA — itself turns, in part, on age. Further, the rule we adopt today for dealing with this sort of case is clear: Where an employer adopts a pension plan that includes age as a factor, and that employer then treats employees differently based on pension status, a plaintiff, to state a disparate-treatment claim under the ADEA, must come forward with sufficient evidence to show that the differential treatment was “actually motivated” by age, not pension status. And our discussion of the factors that lead us to conclude that the Government has failed to make the requisite showing in this case provides an indication of what a plaintiff might show in other cases to meet his burden of proving that differential treatment based on pension status is in fact discrimination “because of” age.
IV
The Government makes two additional arguments. First, it looks for support to an amendment that Congress made to the ADEA after this Court’s decision in Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U. S. 158 (1989). In Betts, the employer denied a worker disability benefits on the ground that its bona fide benefit program provided disability benefits only to workers who became disabled prior to age 60, and the worker in that case became disabled at age 61. Id., at 163. The ADEA at that time exempted from its prohibitions employment decisions taken pursuant to the terms of “ ‘any bona fide employee benefit plan . . . which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act.” Id., at 161 (quoting 29 U. S. C. § 623(f)(2) (1982 ed.)). And the Court held that the employer’s decision fell within that exception. 492 U. S., at 182. Subsequently Congress amended the ADEA to make clear that it covered age-based discrimination in respect to all employee benefits. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, § 102, 104 Stat. 978, 29 U. S. C. § 630(0 (2000 ed.). Congress replaced the “not a subterfuge” exception with a provision stating that age-based disparities in the provision of benefits are lawful only when they are justified in respect to cost savings. Id., at 978-979, 29 U. S. C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i).
We agree with the Government that the amendment broadened the field of employer actions subject to antidiscrimination rules and it narrowed the statutorily available justifications for age-related differences. But these facts cannot help the Government here. We do not dispute that ADEA prohibitions apply to the Plan at issue, and our basis for finding the Plan lawful does not rest upon amendment-related justifications. Rather, we find that the discrimination is not “actually motivated” by age. Thus Hazen Paper, not Betts, provides relevant precedent. And the amendment cited by the Government is beside the point.
Second, the Government says that we must defer to a contrary EEOC interpretation contained in an EEOC regulation and compliance manual. The regulation, however, says only that providing “the same level of benefits to older workers as to younger workers” does not violate the Act. 29 CFR § 1625.10(a)(2) (2007). The Government’s interpretation of this language is not entitled to deference because, on its face, the regulation “does little more than restate the terms of the statute itself.” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 257 (2006) (denying deference to an agency interpretation of its own regulation in light of the “near equivalence” of the statute and regulation).
The compliance manual provides more explicitly that benefits are not “equal” insofar as a plan “reduces or eliminates benefits based on a criterion that is explicitly defined (in whole or in part) by age.” 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 3, p. 627:0004 (2001) (bold typeface deleted). And the compliance manual further provides that “[biasing disability retirement benefits on the number of years a disabled employee would have worked until normal retirement age by definition gives more constructive years of service to younger than to older employees” and thus violates the Act. See id., at 627:0010.
These statements, while important, cannot lead us to a different conclusion. See National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536 U. S. 101, 111, n. 6 (2002) (noting that compliance manuals are “‘“entitled to respect” under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944)’ ”); see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U. S. 576, 587 (2000). Following Hazen Paper, we interpret the Act as requiring a showing that the discrimination at issue “actually motivated” the employer’s decision. Given the reasons set forth in Part III, supra, we conclude that evidence of that motivation was lacking here. And the EEOC’s statement in the compliance manual that it automatically reaches a contrary conclusion—a statement that the manual itself makes little effort to justify—lacks the necessary “power to persuade” us. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944).
y
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and V, and an opinion with respect to Parts III and IV, in which The Chief Justice, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Kennedy joined.
At issue in this case is the validity of the death sentence imposed by an Arizona trial court after a jury found petitioner Jeffrey Walton guilty of committing first-degree murder.
The Arizona statutes provide that a person commits first-degree murder if “[ijntending or knowing that his conduct will cause death, such person causes the death of another with premeditation” or if in the course of committing certain specified offenses and without any mental state other than what is required for the commission of such offenses, he causes the death of any person. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1105 (1989). After a person has been found guilty of first-degree murder, the sentence for such crime is determined in accordance with the provisions of § 13-703(B). It is there directed that a “separate sentencing hearing . . . shall be conducted before the court alone” to determine whether the sentence shall be death or life imprisonment. In the course of such hearing, the judge is instructed to determine the existence or nonexistence of any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances defined in subsections (F) and (G) of §13-703. Subsection (F) defines 10 aggravating circumstances that may be considered. One of them is whether the offense was committed with the expectation of receiving anything of pecuniary value. § 13-703(F)(5). Another is whether the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner. § 13-703(F)(6). Subsection (G) defines mitigating circumstances as any factors “which are relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less than death, including any aspect of the defendant’s character, propensities or record and any of the circumstances of the offense, including but not limited to” five specified factors. The burden of establishing the existence of any of the aggravating circumstances is on the prosecution, while the burden of establishing mitigating circumstances is on the defendant. § 13-703(C). The court is directed to return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances and then “shall impose a sentence of death if the court finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (F) of this section and that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” § 13-703(E).
I
Petitioner Walton and his two codefendants, Robert Hoover and Sharold Ramsey, went to a bar in Tucson, Arizona, on the night of March 2, 1986, intending to find and rob someone at random, steal his car, tie him up, and leave him in the desert while they fled the State in the car. In the bar’s parking lot, the trio encountered Thomas Powell, a young, off-duty Marine. The three robbed Powell at gunpoint and forced him into his car which they then drove out into the desert. While driving out of Tucson, the three asked Powell questions about where he lived and whether he had any more money. When the car stopped, Ramsey told a frightened Powell that he would not be hurt. Walton and Hoover then forced Powell out of the car and had him lie face down on the ground near the car while they debated what to do with him. Eventually, Walton instructed Hoover and Ramsey to sit in the car and turn the radio up loud. Walton then took a .22 caliber derringer and marched Powell off into the desert. After walking a short distance, Walton forced Powell to lie down on the ground, placed his foot on Powell’s neck, and shot Powell once in the head. Walton later told Hoover and Ramsey that he had shot Powell and that he had “never seen a man pee in his pants before.” Powell’s body was found approximately a week later, after Walton was arrested and led police to the murder site. A medical examiner determined that Powell had been blinded and rendered unconscious by the shot but was not immediately killed. Instead, Powell regained consciousness, apparently floundered about in the desert, and ultimately died from dehydration, starvation, and pneumonia approximately a day before his body was found.
A jury convicted Walton of first-degree murder after being given instructions on both premeditated and felony murder. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1105 (1989). The trial judge then conducted the separate sentencing hearing required by §13-703(B). The State argued that two aggravating circumstances were present: (1) The murder was committed “in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner,” § 13-703(F)(6), and (2) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain. § 13-703(F)(5). In mitigation Walton presented testimony from a psychiatrist who opined that Walton had a long history of substance abuse which impaired his judgment, see § 13-703(G)(1), and that Walton may have been abused sexually as a child. Walton’s counsel also argued Walton’s age, 20 at the time of sentencing, as a mitigating circumstance. See § 13-703(G)(5). At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found “beyond any doubt” that Walton was the one who shot Powell. The court also found that the two aggravating circumstances pressed by the State were present. The court stated that it had considered Walton’s age and his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, as well as all of the mitigating factors urged by defendant’s counsel. The court then concluded that that there were “no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” App. 61. See §13-703. The court sentenced Walton to death.
The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Walton’s conviction and sentence. 159 Ariz. 571, 769 P. 2d 1017 (1989). Relying on its prior decisions, the court rejected various specific challenges to the constitutionality of the Arizona death penalty statute, some of which are pressed here, and then proceeded to conduct its independent review of Walton’s sentence in order to “ensure that aggravating factors were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and all appropriate mitigation was considered.” Id,., at 586, 769 P. 2d, at 1032. The court began by examining the “especially heinous, cruel or depraved” aggravating circumstance found by the. trial judge. The court pointed out that it previously had determined that a murder is committed in an especially cruel manner when “the perpetrator inflicts mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim’s death,” id., at 586, 769 P. 2d, at 1032, (citations omitted), and that “[mjental anguish includes a victim’s uncertainty as to his ultimate fate.” Ibid. In this case, the court concluded that there was ample evidence that Powell suffered mental anguish prior to his death. The Arizona Supreme Court also found the evidence sufficient to conclude that the crime was committed in an especially depraved manner, pointing out that it had defined a depraved murder as one where “the perpetrator relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion.” Id., at 587, 769 P. 2d, at 1033. Additionally, the court found that the pecuniary gain circumstance was present. Id., at 588, 769 P. 2d, at 1034. After examining Walton’s mitigating evidence regarding his substance abuse and his youth, the court concluded that there were “no mitigating circumstances sufficient to call for lenience.” Id., at 589, 769 P. 2d, at 1035. Finally, the court conducted its proportionality review and determined that Walton’s death sentence was “proportional to sentences imposed in similar cases.” Id., at 590, 769 P. 2d, at 1036.
Because the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held the Arizona death penalty statute to be unconstitutional for the reasons submitted by Walton in this case, see Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F. 2d 1011 (1988) (en banc), we granted certiorari, 493 U. S. 808 (1989), to resolve the conflict and to settle issues that are of importance generally in the administration of the death penalty. We now affirm the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court.
h-4 1 — 1
Walton’s first argument is that every finding of fact underlying the sentencing decision must be made by a jury, not by a judge, and that the Arizona scheme would be constitutional only if a jury decides what aggravating and mitigating circumstances are present in a given case and the trial judge then imposes sentence based on those findings. Contrary to Walton’s assertion, however: “Any argument that the Constitution requires that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence has been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court.” Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 745 (1990).
We repeatedly have rejected constitutional challenges to Florida’s death sentencing scheme, which provides for sentencing by the judge, not the jury. Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U. S. 638 (1989) (per curiam); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447 (1984); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976). In Hildwin, for example, we stated that “[t]his case presents us once again with the question whether the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to specify the aggravating factors that permit the imposition of capital punishment in Florida,” 490 U. S., at 638, and we ultimately concluded that “the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury.” Id., at 640-641.
The distinctions Walton attempts to draw between the Florida and Arizona statutory schemes are not persuasive. It is true that in Florida the jury recommends a sentence, but it does not make specific factual findings with regard to the existence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and its recommendation is not binding on the trial judge. A Florida trial court no more has the assistance of a jury’s findings of fact with respect to sentencing issues than does a trial judge in Arizona.
Walton also suggests that in Florida aggravating factors are only sentencing “considerations” while in Arizona they are “elements of the offense.” But as we observed in Poland v. Arizona, 476 U. S. 147 (1986), an Arizona capital punishment case: “Aggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or offenses, but are ‘standards to guide the making of [the] choice’ between the alternative verdicts of death and life imprisonment. Thus, under Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme, the judge’s finding of any particular aggravating circumstance does not of itself ‘convict’ a defendant (i. e., require the death penalty), and the failure to find any particular aggravating circumstance does not ‘acquit’ a defendant (i. e., preclude the death penalty).” Id., at 156 (citation omitted).
Our holding in Cabana v. Bidlock, 474 U. S. 376 (1986), provides further support for our conclusion. Cabana held that an appellate court could constitutionally make the Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782 (1982), finding — that the defendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill — in the first instance. We noted that “Enmund, ‘does not affect the state’s definition of any substantive offense, even a capital offense,”’ 474 U. S., at 385 (citations omitted), and that “while the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of such defendants, it does not supply a new element of the crime of capital murder that must be found by the jury.” Id., at 385, n. 3. Enmund only places “a substantive limitation on sentencing, and like other such limits it need not be enforced by the jury.” 474 U. S., at 386. If the Constitution does not require that the Enmund finding be proved as an element of the offense of capital murder, and does not require a jury to make that finding, we cannot conclude that a State is required to denominate aggravating circumstances “elements” of the offense or permit only a jury to determine the existence of such circumstances.
We thus conclude that the Arizona capital sentencing scheme does not violate the Sixth Amendment.
Ill
Also unpersuasive is Walton’s contention that the Arizona statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it imposes on defendants the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-703(0 and 13-703(E) (1989). It is true that the Court has refused to countenance state-imposed restrictions on what mitigating circumstances may be considered in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. See, e. g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). But Walton is not complaining that the Arizona statute or practice excludes from consideration any particular type of mitigating evidence; and it does not follow from Lockett and its progeny that a State is precluded from specifying how mitigating circumstances are to be proved. Indeed, in Lockett itself, we expressly reserved opinion on whether “it violates the Constitution to require defendants to bear the risk of nonpersuasion as to the existence of mitigating circumstances in capital cases.” Id., at 609, and n. 16 (plurality opinion).
In Martin v. Ohio, 480 U. S. 228 (1987), we upheld the Ohio practice of imposing on a capital defendant the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that, she was acting in self-defense when she allegedly committed the murder. In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 (1952), the Court upheld, in a capital case, a requirement that the defense of insanity be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the defendant, see also Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U. S. 877 (1976), and in Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977), we rejected the argument that a State violated due process by imposing a preponderance of the evidence standard on a defendant to prove the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance.
The basic principle of these cases controls the result in this case. So long as a State’s method of allocating the burdens of proof does not lessen the State’s burden to prove every element of the offense charged, or in this case to prove the existence of aggravating circumstances, a defendant’s constitutional rights are not violated by placing on him the burden of proving mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684 (1975), is not to the contrary. Mullaney struck down on due process grounds a state statute that required a convicted murder defendant to negate an element of the offense of murder in order to be entitled to a sentence for voluntary manslaughter. No such burden is placed on defendants by Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme. We therefore decline to adopt as a constitutional imperative a rule that would require the court to consider the mitigating circumstances claimed by a defendant unless the State negated them by a preponderance of the evidence.
Neither does Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367 (1988), lend support to Walton’s position. There this Court reversed a death sentence because it concluded that the jury instructions given at the sentencing phase likely led the jury to believe that any particular mitigating circumstance could not be considered unless the jurors unanimously agreed that such circumstance was present. The Court’s focus was on whether reasonable jurors would have read the instructions to require unanimity and, if so, the possible consequences of such an understanding. Here, of course, the judge alone is the sentencer, and Mills is therefore beside the point.
Furthermore, Mills did not suggest that it would be forbidden to require each individual juror, before weighing a claimed mitigating circumstance in the balance, to be convinced in his or her own mind that the mitigating circumstance has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. To the contrary, the jury in that case was instructed that it had to find that any mitigating circumstances had been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Id., at 387. Neither the petitioner in Mills nor the Court in its opinion hinted that there was any constitutional objection to that aspect of the instructions.
We therefore reject Walton’s argument that Arizona’s allocation of the burdens of proof in a capital sentencing proceeding violates the Constitution.
IV
Walton insists that because § 13 — 703(E) provides that the court “shall” impose the death penalty if one or more aggravating circumstances are found and mitigating circumstances are held insufficient to call for leniency, the statute creates an unconstitutional presumption that death is the proper sentence. Our recent decisions in Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U. S. 299 (1990), and Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990), foreclose this submission. Blystone rejected a challenge to a jury instruction based on a Pennsylvania statute requiring the imposition of the death penalty if aggravating circumstances were found to exist but no mitigating circumstances were present. We pointed out that “[t]he requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence,” 494 U. S., at 307 (footnote omitted), and concluded that because the Pennsylvania statute did not preclude the sentencer from considering any type of mitigating evidence, id., at 308, it was consonant with that principle. In addition, the Court concluded that the statute was not “impermissibly ‘mandatory’ as that term was understood” in Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976), because it did not automatically impose death upon conviction for certain types of murder. 494 U. S., at 305. The same is true of the Arizona statute.
Similarly, Boyde v. California, supra, upheld a pattern jury instruction which stated that “[i]f you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death.” See 494 U. S., at 374 (emphasis omitted). The Court specifically noted that “there is no . . . constitutional requirement of unfettered sentencing discretion in the jury, and States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence ‘in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty.’” Id., at 377 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U. S. 164, 181 (1988) (plurality opinion)). Walton’s arguments in this case are no more persuasive than those made in Blystone and Boyde.
V
Walton’s final contention is that the especially heinous, cruel, or depraved aggravating circumstance as interpreted by the Arizona courts fails to channel the sentencer’s discretion as required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Walton contends that the Arizona factor fails to pass constitutional muster for the same reasons this Court found Oklahoma’s “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance to be invalid in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356 (1988), and Georgia’s “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman” circumstance to be invalid in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980).
Maynard v. Cartwright and Godfrey v. Georgia, however, are distinguishable in two constitutionally significant respects. First, in both Maynard and Godfrey the defendant was sentenced by a jury and the jury either was instructed only in the bare terms of the relevant statute or in terms nearly as vague. See 486 U. S., at 358-359, 363-364; 446 U. S., at 426 (plurality opinion). Neither jury was given a constitutional limiting definition of the challenged aggravating factor. Second, in neither case did the state appellate court, in reviewing the propriety of the death sentence, purport to affirm the death sentence by applying a limiting definition of the aggravating circumstance to the facts presented. 486 U. S., at 364; 446 U. S., at 429 (plurality opinion). These points were crucial to the conclusion we reached in Maynard. See 486 U. S., at 363-364. They are equally crucial to our decision in this case.
When a jury is the final sentencer, it is essential that the jurors be properly instructed regarding all facets of the sentencing process. It is not enough to instruct the jury in the bare terms of an aggravating circumstance that is unconstitutionally vague on its face. That is the import of our holdings in Maynard and Godfrey. But the logic of those cases has no place in the context of sentencing by a trial judge. Trial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decisions. If the Arizona Supreme Court has narrowed the definition of the “especially heinous, cruel or depraved” aggravating circumstance, we presume that Arizona trial judges are applying the narrower definition. It is irrelevant that the statute itself may not narrow the construction of the factor. Moreover, even if a trial judge fails to apply the narrowing construction or applies an improper construction, the Constitution does not necessarily require that a state appellate court vacate a death sentence based on that factor. Rather, as we held in Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738 (1990), a state appellate court may itself determine whether the evidence supports the existence of the aggravating circumstance as properly defined or the court may eliminate consideration of the factor altogether and determine whether any remaining aggravating circumstances are sufficient to warrant the death penalty.
When a federal court is asked to review a state court’s application of an individual statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstance in a particular case, it must first determine whether the statutory language defining the circumstance is itself too vague to provide any guidance to the sentencer. If so, then the federal court must attempt to determine whether the state courts have further defined the vague terms and, if they have done so, whether those definitions are constitutionally sufficient, /. e., whether they provide some guidance to the sentencer. In this case there is no serious argument that Arizona’s “especially heinous, cruel or depraved” aggravating factor is not facially vague. But the Arizona Supreme Court has sought to give substance to the operative terms, and we find that its construction meets constitutional requirements.
The Arizona Supreme Court stated that “a crime is committed in an especially cruel manner when the perpetrator inflicts mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim’s death,” and that “[m]ental anguish includes a victim’s uncertainty as to his ultimate fate.” 159 Ariz., at 586, 769 P. 2d, at 1032. The court rejected the State’s argument that the six days Powell suffered after being shot constituted cruelty within the meaning of the statute. The court pointed out that it had limited the cruelty circumstance in prior cases to situations where the suffering of the victim was intended by or foreseeable to the killer. Id., at 587, 769 P. 2d, at 1033.
In Maynard v. Cartwright, we expressed approval of a definition that would limit Oklahoma’s “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance to murders involving “some kind of torture or physical abuse,” 486 U. S., at 364-365, but we also noted that such a construction was not the only one “that would be constitutionally acceptable.” Id., at 365. The construction given by the Arizona Supreme Court to the cruelty aspect of the Arizona aggravating circumstance is virtually identical to the- construction we approved in Maynard.
The Arizona Supreme Court’s construction also is similar to the construction of Florida’s “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance that we approved in Proffttt v. Florida, 428 U. S., at 255-256 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). Recognizing that the proper degree of definition of an aggravating factor of this nature is not susceptible of mathematical precision, we conclude that the definition given to the “especially cruel” provision by the Arizona Supreme Court is constitutionally sufficient because it gives meaningful guidance to the sentencer. Nor can we fault the state court’s statement that a crime is committed in an especially “depraved” manner when the perpetrator “relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion,” or “shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure” in the killing. See 159 Ariz., at 587, 769 P. 2d, at 1033.
Walton nevertheless contends that the heinous, cruel, or depraved factor has been applied in an arbitrary manner and, as applied, does not distinguish his case from cases in which the death sentence has not been imposed. In effect Walton challenges the proportionality review of the Arizona Supreme Court as erroneous and asks us to overturn it. This we decline to do, for we have just concluded that the challenged factor has been construed by the Arizona courts in a manner that furnishes sufficient guidance to the sentencer. This being so, proportionality review is not constitutionally required, and we “lawfully may presume that [Walton’s] death sentence was not ‘wantonly and freakishly’ imposed — and thus that the sentence is not disproportionate within any-recognized meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279, 306, 308 (1987); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U. S. 37, 43 (1984). Furthermore, the Arizona Supreme Court plainly undertook its proportionality review in good faith and found that Walton’s sentence was proportional to the sentences imposed in cases similar to his. The Constitution does not require us to look behind that conclusion.
The judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Those factors are as follows:
“1. The defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
“2. The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
“3. The defendant was legally accountable for the conduct of another under the provisions of § 13-303, but his participation was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
“4. The defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that his conduct in the course of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.
“5. The defendant’s age.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13 — 703(G) (1989).
In the course of its opinion, the court also rejected Walton’s challenge, not repeated in this Court, that Hoover and not Walton actually shot Powell. The court pointed out that because the jury was instructed on both felony and premeditated murder but entered only a general verdict, the trial court was required under Arizona law to independently make the determination mandated by Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U. S. 137 (1987), that Walton killed, intended to kill, attempted to kill, or as a participant in a felony was recklessly indifferent to the killing of Powell. 159 Ariz., at 585, 769 P. 2d, at 1031. The court then held that the trial court’s Enmund determination was based on substantial evidence. 159 Ariz., at 586, 769 P. 2d, at 1032.
The court argued that Powell must have realized as he was being driven out of Tucson into the desert that he might be harmed, and the court pointed out that Powell was obviously frightened enough that Ramsey tried to reassure him that he would not be harmed. Then, the court noted, Walton and Hoover forced Powell to lie on the ground while they argued over his fate, and eventually Walton marched Powell off into the desert with a gun but no rope, surely making Powell realize that he was not going to be tied up and left unharmed. The court further observed that Powell was so frightened that he urinated on himself. Id., at 586-587, 769 P. 2d, at 1032-1033.
The court concluded that Walton’s reference to having “ ‘never seen a man pee in his pants before’ ” constituted evidence of “callous fascination with the murder” and demonstrated “an indifference to the suffering of the victim and ... a sense of pleasure” taken “in the killing." Id., at 587, 769 P. 2d, at 1033.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether approximately 180 elderly residents of a nursing home operated by Town Court Nursing Center, Inc., have a constitutional right to a hearing before a state or federal agency may revoke the home’s authority to provide them with nursing care at government expense. Although we recognize that such a revocation may be harmful to some patients, we hold that they have no constitutional right to participate in the revocation proceedings.
Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. (Town Court), operates a 198-bed nursing home in Philadelphia, Pa. In April 1976 it was certified by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) as a “skilled nursing facility,” thereby becoming eligible to receive payments from HEW and from the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (DPW), for providing nursing care services to aged, disabled, and poor persons in need of medical care. After receiving its certification, Town Court entered into formal “provider agreements” with both HEW and DPW. In those agreements HEW and DPW agreed to reimburse Town Court for a period of one year for care provided to persons eligible for Medicare or Medicaid benefits under the Social Security Act, on the condition that Town Court continue to qualify as a skilled nursing facility.
On May 17, 1977, HEW notified Town Court that it no longer met the statutory and regulatory standards for skilled nursing facilities and that, consequently, its Medicare provider agreement would not be renewed. The HEW notice stated that no payments would be made for services rendered after July 17, 1977, explained how Town Court might request reconsideration of the decertification decision, and directed it to notify Medicare beneficiaries that payments were being discontinued. Three days later DPW notified Town Court that its Medicaid provider agreement would also not be renewed.
Town Court requested HEW to reconsider its termination decision. While the request was pending, Town Court and six of its Medicaid patients filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging that both the nursing home and the patients were entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the decer-tification decision before the Medicaid payments were discontinued. The complaint alleged that termination of the payments would require Town Court to close and would cause the individual plaintiffs to suffer both a loss of benefits and “immediate and irreparable psychological and physical harm.” App. 11a.
The District Court granted a preliminary injunction against DPW and HEW, requiring payments to be continued for new patients as well as for patients already in the home and prohibiting any patient transfers until HEW acted on Town Court’s petition for reconsideration. After HEW denied that petition, the District Court dissolved the injunction and denied the plaintiffs any further relief, except that it required HEW and DPW to pay for services actually provided to patients.
Town Court and the six patients filed separate appeals from the denial of the preliminary injunction, as well as a motion, which was subsequently granted, for reinstatement of the injunction pending appeal. The Secretary of HEW cross-appealed from the portion of the District Court’s order requiring payment for services rendered after the effective date of the termination. The Secretary of DPW took no appeal and, though named as an appellee, took no position on the merits.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, unanimously held that there was no constitutional defect in the HEW procedures that denied Town Court an evidentiary hearing until after the termination had become effective and the agency had ceased paying benefits. The Court of Appeals came to a different conclusion, however, with respect to the patients’ claim to a constitutional right to a pretermination hearing. Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal, 586 F. 2d 280 (1978).
Relying on the reasoning of Klein v. Califano, 586 F. 2d 250 (CA3 1978) (en banc), decided the same day, a majority of the court concluded that the patients had a constitutionally protected property interest in continued residence at Town Court that gave them a right to a pretermination hearing. In Klein the court identified three Medicaid provisions — a statute giving Medicaid recipients the right to obtain services from any qualified facility, a regulation prohibiting certified facilities from transferring or discharging a patient except for certain specified reasons, and a regulation prohibiting the reduction or termination of financial assistance without a hearing — which, in its view, created a “legitimate entitlement to continued residency at the home of one’s choice absent specific cause for transfer.” Id., at 258. It then cited the general due process maxim that, whenever a governmental benefit may be withdrawn only for cause, the recipient is entitled to a hearing as to the existence of such cause. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 11. Finally, it held that, since the inevitable consequence of decertifying a facility is the transfer of all its residents receiving Medicaid benefits, a decision to decertify should be treated as a decision to transfer, thus triggering the patients’ right to a hearing on the issue of whether there is adequate cause for the transfer.
Applying this reasoning in Town Court, six judges held that the patients were entitled to a pretermination hearing on the issue of whether Town Court’s Medicare and Medicaid provider agreements should be renewed. The court thus reinstated that portion of the preliminary injunction that prohibited patient transfers until after the patients had been granted a hearing and affirmed that portion that required HEW and DPW to continue paying benefits on behalf of Town Court residents. It then remanded, leaving the nature of the hearing to be accorded the patients to be determined, in the first instance, by the District Court. Three judges dissented, concluding that neither the statutes nor the regulations granted the patients any substantive interest in decertification proceedings and that they had no constitutionally protected property right in uninterrupted occupancy.
The Secretary of DPW filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted. 441 U. S. 904. We now reverse, essentially for the reasons stated by Chief Judge Seitz in his dissent.
At the outset, it is important to remember that this case does not involve the question whether HEW or DPW should, as a matter of administrative efficiency, consult the residents of a nursing home before making a final decision to decertify it. Rather, the question is whether the patients have an interest in receiving benefits for care in a particular facility that entitles them, as a matter of constitutional law, to a hearing before the Government can decertify that facility. The patients have identified two possible sources of such a right. First, they contend that the Medicaid provisions relied upon by the Court of Appeals give them a property right to remain in the home of their choice absent good cause for transfer and therefore entitle them to a hearing on whether such cause exists. Second, they argue that a transfer may have such severe physical or emotional side effects that it is tantamount to a deprivation of life or liberty, which must be preceded by a due process hearing. We find both arguments unpersuasive.
Whether viewed singly or in combination, the Medicaid provisions relied upon by the Court of Appeals do not confer a right to continued residence in the home of one’s choice. Title 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (23) (1976 ed., Supp. II) gives recipients the right to choose among a range of qualified providers, without government interference. By implication, it also confers an absolute right to be free from government interference with the choice to remain in a home that continues to be qualified. But it clearly does not confer a right on a recipient to enter an unqualified home and demand a hearing to certify it, nor does it confer a right on a recipient to continue to receive benefits for care in a home that has been decertified. Second, although the regulations do protect patients by limiting the circumstances under which a home may transfer or discharge a Medicaid recipient, they do not purport to limit the Government’s right to make a transfer necessary by decertifying a facility. Finally, since decerti-fication does not reduce or terminate a patient's financial assistance, but merely requires him to use it for care at a different facility, regulations granting recipients the right to a hearing prior to a reduction in financial benefits are irrelevant.
In holding that these provisions create a substantive right to remain in the home of one's choice absent specific cause for transfer, the Court of Appeals failed to give proper weight to the contours of the right conferred by the statutes and regulations. As indicated above, while a patient has a right to continued benefits to pay for care in the qualified institution of his choice, he has no enforceable expectation of continued benefits to pay for care in an institution that has been determined to be unqualified.
The Court of Appeals also erred in treating the Government’s decision to decertify Town Court as if it were equivalent in every respect to a decision to transfer an individual patient. Although decertification will inevitably necessitate the transfer of all those patients who remain dependent on Medicaid benefits, it is not the same for purposes of due process analysis as a decision to transfer a particular patient or to deny him financial benefits, based on his individual needs or financial situation.
In the Medicare and the Medicaid Programs the Government has provided needy patients with both direct benefits and indirect benefits. The direct benefits are essentially financial in character; the Government pays for certain medical services and provides procedures to determine whether and how much money should be paid for patient care. The net effect of these direct benefits is to give the patients an opportunity to obtain medical services from providers of their choice that is comparable, if not exactly equal, to the opportunity available to persons who are financially independent. The Government cannot withdraw these direct benefits without giving the patients notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the issue of their eligibility for benefits.
This case does not involve the withdrawal of direct benefits. Rather, it involves the Government’s attempt to confer an indirect benefit on Medicaid patients by imposing and enforcing minimum standards of care on facilities like Town Court. When enforcement of those standards requires decertification of a facility, there may be an immediate, adverse impact on some residents. But surely that impact, which is an indirect and incidental result of the Government’s enforcement action, does not amount to a deprivation of any interest in life, liberty, or property.
Medicaid patients who are forced to move because their nursing home has been decertified are in no different position for purposes of due process analysis than financially independent residents of a nursing home who are forced to move because the home’s state license has been revoked. Both groups of patients are indirect beneficiaries of government programs designed to guarantee a minimum standard of care for patients as a class. Both may be injured by the closing of a home due to revocation of its state license or its decertification as a Medicaid provider. Thus, whether they are private patients or Medicaid patients, some may have difficulty locating other homes they consider suitable or may suffer both emotional and physical harm as a result of the disruption associated with their move. Yet none of these patients would lose the ability to finance his or her continued care in a properly licensed or certified institution-. And, while they might have a claim against the nursing home for damages, none would have any claim against the responsible governmental authorities for the deprivation of an interest in life, liberty, or property. Their position under these circumstances would be comparable to that of members of a family who have been dependent on an errant father; they may suffer serious trauma if he is deprived of his liberty or property as a consequence of criminal proceedings, but surely they have no constitutional right to participate in his trial or sentencing procedures.
The simple distinction between government action that directly affects a citizen’s legal rights, or imposes a direct restraint on his liberty, and action that is directed against a third party and affects the citizen only indirectly or incidentally, provides a sufficient answer to all of the cases on which the patients rely in this Court. Thus, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, involved the direct relationship between a publicly owned utility and its customers; the utility had provided its customers with a legal right to receive continued service as long as they paid their bills. We held that under these circumstances the utility’s customers had a constitutional right to a hearing on a disputed bill before their service could be discontinued. But nothing in that case implies that if a public utility found it necessary to cut off service to a nursing home because of delinquent payments, it would be required to offer patients in thé home an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the credit dispute. This would be true even if the termination of utility service required the nursing home to close and caused serious inconvenience or harm to patients who would therefore have to move. As in this case, such patients might have rights against the home, and might also have direct relationships with the utility concerning their own domestic service, but they would have no constitutional right to interject themselves into the dispute between the public utility and the home.
Over a century ago this Court recognized the principle that the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the indirect adverse effects of governmental action. Thus, in the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 551, the Court stated:
“That provision has always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power. It has never been supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals.”
More recently, in Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277, we rejected the argument made by the parents of a girl murdered by a parolee that a California statute granting absolute immunity to the parole board for its release decisions deprived their daughter of her life without due process of law:
“A legislative decision that has an incremental impact on the probability that death will result in any given situation — such as setting the speed limit at 55-miles-per-hour instead of 45 — cannot be characterized as state action depriving a person of life just because it may set in motion a chain of events that ultimately leads to the random death of an innocent bystander.” Id., at 281.
Similarly, the fact that the decertification of a home may lead to severe hardship for some of its elderly residents does not turn the decertification into a governmental decision to impose that harm.
Whatever legal rights these patients may have against Town Court for failing to maintain its status as a qualified skilled nursing home — and we express no opinion on that subject — we hold that the enforcement by HEW and DPW of their valid regulations did not directly affect the patients’ legal rights or deprive them of any constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or property.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The certification in 1976 was Town Court’s second; it had first been certified in 1967. It was decertified in 1974 as a result of substantial noncompliance with both state and federal requirements.
The Medicare Program, see 42 U. S. C. § 1395 et seq., which is primarily for the benefit of the aged and the disabled, is financed and administered entirely by the Federal Government (HEW); the Medicaid Program, see 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq., which is primarily designed for the poor, is a cooperative federal-state program.
HEW based its determination on a survey conducted by DPW, which recommended that the home be decertified. In its notice to Town Court HEW stated in part:
“In order to participate in the Medicare Program, a skilled nursing facility must meet the statutory requirements contained in section 1861 (j) of the Act, 42 USC 1395 x (j), as well as all other health and safety requirements established by the Secretary in subpart J, part 405, title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations. A participating skilled nursing facility is required to be in compliance with all of the eighteen conditions of participation for such facilities contained in subpart J.
“On May 8-11, 1977, the Pennsylvania Department of Health performed a survey of your facility. That survey found that your facility does not comply with seven of the eighteen conditions of participation. The seven conditions not being complied with are:
“II. Governing Body and Management (405.1121)
“HI. Medical Direction (405.1122)
“IV. Physical Services (405.1123)
“V. Nursing Services (405.1124)
“VIII. Pharmaceutical Services (405.1127)
“XIII. Medical Records (405.1132)
“XV. Physical Environment (405.1134)
“Your facility’s failure to comply with these conditions of participation precludes renewal of your agreement. Renewal is also precluded by the fact that your facility has failed to maintain compliance with numerous standards which had previously been determined to be met. Please refer to 20 CFR 405.1908 (d).” App. 295a-296a.
The state agency’s letter read in part:
“Because the Medicare Program has terminated your participation, the Department of Public Welfare has no alternative but to likewise ter-mínate your participation under the Medical Assistance Program. The Federal regulations, 45 C. F. R. § 249.33 (a) (9), require that a State medical assistance plan must:
“ ‘Provide that in the case of skilled nursing facilities certified under the provisions of title XVIII of the Social Security Act, the term of a provider agreement shall be subject to the same terms and conditions and coterminous with the period of approval of eligibility specified by the Secretary pursuant to that title, and upon notification that an agreement with a facility under title XVIII of the Act has been terminated or cancelled, the single State agency will take appropriate action to terminate the facility’s participation under the plan. A facility whose agreement has been can-
celled or otherwise terminated may not be issued another agreement until the reasons which cause the cancellation or termination have been removed and reasonable assurance provided the survey agency that they will not recur.’ (emphasis supplied)
“Because of the requirements of HEW, your facility must be terminated from participation in the Medical Assistance Program effective June 18, 1977.” Id., at 291ar-292a.
At the time the suit was filed, no Town Court residents were Medicare recipients. However, Town Court did have a Medicare provider agreement with HEW, the nonrenewal of which automatically triggered the nonrenewal of its Medicaid agreement. See n. 4, supra.
Although the plaintiffs filed their action on behalf of a class of all Medicaid recipients in the home, the District Court never certified the class. Thus, the action has proceeded throughout the Court of Appeals and in this Court as an individual action on behalf of the six named plaintiffs.
Relying on this Court’s decision in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, the Court of Appeals held that Town Court’s property interests were sufficiently protected by informal pretermination procedures and by the opportunity for an administrative hearing and federal-court review after benefits had been terminated:
“As was true in Eldridge, the decision not to renew a provider agreement is an easily documented, sharply focused decision in which issues of credibility and veracity play little role. It is based in most cases upon routine, standard, unbiased reports by health care professionals. Those professionals evaluate the provider in light of well-defined criteria that were developed in the administrative rule-making process. Written submissions are adequate to allow the provider to present his case. Given the extensive documentation that the provider is able to submit in response to the findings of the survey teams, the provider is unlikely to need an eviden-tiary hearing in order to present his position more effectively. In any event, there is ample opportunity to expand orally upon written submissions during the exit interview or in discussions during the survey itself. There is opportunity to submit additional evidence after notice of deficiencies is given, and the evidence upon which the recommendation of the survey team is based is disclosed fully to the provider. Moreover, the criteria used to evaluate the provider are well known in advance to the provider, and compliance is readily proved or disproved by written submission. Finally, review by an administrative law judge, by the Appeals Council of HEW, and ultimately by the federal courts; insures that the decision of the Secretary will be thoroughly examined before becoming final.
“As stated in Eldridge, the public interest in preserving scarce financial and administrative resources is strong. Given the large number of providers participating in Medicare and the frequent surveys that are required, we believe that the costs of providing pre-termination hearings would be substantial. Further, the public has a strong interest in insuring that elderly and infirm nursing home patients are not required to stay in noncomplying homes longer than is necessary to assure that the provider had adequate notice and opportunity to respond to charges of deficiencies.” Town Court Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal, 586 F. 2d 266, 277-278 (1978). Town Court did not seek further review of this determination.
At the time the litigation began Frank S. Beal was the Pennsylvania Secretary of Public Welfare. He has since been replaced in that position by Helen B. O’Bannon, the petitioner in this Court.
Title 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (23) (1976 ed., Supp. II) provides, in relevant part:
“[A]ny individual eligible for medical assistance (including drugs) may obtain such assistance from any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or person, qualified to perform the service or services required (including an organization which provides such services, or arranges for their availability, on a prepayment basis), who undertakes to provide him such services. . . .”
The same “free choice of providers” is also guaranteed by 42 CFR § 431.51 (1979).
Title 42 CFR §405.1121 (k) (4) (1979) requires skilled nursing facilities that are licensed either as Medicaid or Medicare providers to establish written policies and procedures to ensure that each patient admitted to the facility “[i]s transferred or discharged only for medical reasons, or for his welfare or that of other patients, or for nonpayment of his stay (except as prohibited by titles XVIII or XIX of the Social Security Act), and is given reasonable advance notice to ensure orderly transfer or discharge. . . .”
Title 45 CFR § 205.10 (a)(5) (1979) provides, in relevant part, that an “opportunity for a hearing shall be granted to any applicant who requests a hearing because his or her claim for financial assistance . . . or medical assistance is denied, . . . and to any recipient who is aggrieved by any agency action resulting in suspension, reduction, discontinuance, or termination of assistance.”
“Because a decision to decertify a nursing home as an unqualified provider is tantamount to an order to transfer a patient for his welfare, Medicaid residents threatened with transfer are entitled to some form of hearing on the existence of the condition or cause for transfer — whether the home is a qualified provider and whether decertification is for the patients’ welfare.” 586 F. 2d, at 258.
Three judges joined a brief opinion announcing the judgment of the court authored by Judge Aldisert, which disposed of the case in a summary fashion based on the reasoning of Klein v. Calijano. Judge Adams wrote a concurring opinion, which was also joined by three judges (two of whom also joined Judge Aldisert), in which he attempted to explain more fully the reasoning in Klein. Referring to the three provisions relied upon in Klein, Judge Adams stated that they
“. . . paint three distinct points in the landscape of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ that Medicaid beneficiaries can assert. Taken alone, the interest created by each of these clauses might be dismissed as not rising to the level of a cognizable property interest. However, when viewed together, they compel the conclusion that they identify three aspects of an ‘underlying substantive interest’ that enjoys the stature of ‘property.’ ” (Footnote omitted.) 586 F. 2d, at 287.
Judge Adams also relied, to some extent, on the hardship that nursing home residents might suffer if forced to transfer to another home, stating that the “health” and “home” interests the residents possess in remaining in a particular nursing home are “among those that most persons would regard as being encompassed by the protections of the due process clause.” Id., at 289. Finally, unlike Judge Aldisert, Judge Adams went on to suggest what types of procedures would be necessary before Medicaid patients could be transferred.
Chief Judge Seitz summarized his response to the three parts of the majority’s analysis as follows:
“The majority finds that continued residency in the nursing home of one’s choice absent specific cause for transfer is an underlying substantive interest created by three Medicaid provisions. Under the first, 42 U. S. C. § 1396a (a) (23), a Medicaid recipient may obtain medical care ‘from any institution . . . qualified to perform the service or services required.’ Clearly, what the majority characterizes as a recipient’s right to obtain medical care from a ‘freely selected provider’ is limited to a choice among institutions which have been determined by the Secretary to be ‘qualified.’ Next, the majority’s reliance on 45 C. F. R. § 205.10 (a) (5), ensuring a notice and hearing to a recipient whose benefits are suspended, reduced, discontinued or terminated, is obviously misplaced. As ^he majority itself notes, the decertification of these facilities did not reduce or suspend the residents’ rights to continued benefits.
“Finally, the majority relies upon 45 C. F. R. §249.12 (a) (1) (ii) (B) (4), which establishes as one requirement for an institution's certification that each resident admitted to that institution be ‘transferred or discharged only for medical reasons or for his welfare or that of other patients, or for nonpayment for his stay.' The majority reads this provision as a limitation on the Secretary’s power to interrupt a recipient’s residence at a particular institution. Clearly, however, this provision is a standard of conduct imposed by the Secretary upon the provider. Violation of this standard is one of many grounds for decertifying the offending institution. See 45 C. F. R. §§249.33 (a)(2), 249.10 (b)(15). The provision creates no 'substantive interest' in the residents vis-a-vis the Secretary.
“Moving to its minor premise, the majority postulates that a decision to decertify is tantamount to a decision to transfer individual residents. Practically, of course, this may be a consequence in most cases, at least where an institution fails to remedy its insufficiencies. Analytically, however, the two decisions are different. Decertification focuses on the institution’s noncompliance with HEW's standards. The majority does not and cannot contend that recipients have a right to remain in an institution that the Secretary has found, by appropriate procedures, to be in substantial noncompliance with the standards. ‘Transfer trauma,’ although a legitimate concern for some residents, is necessarily subordinate to the threat posed to all residents by substandard conditions.” Id., at 295-296.
The patients urge us to dismiss the petition without reaching the merits on the ground that there is no one before the Court who may properly argue the petitioner’s position. Thus, they contend that DPW is foreclosed from arguing here because, although its Secretary was formally an appellee in the Court of Appeals, it deliberately took a neutral position on the merits in that court. And they argue that HEW, which did argue the merits below, is foreclosed from arguing them here because its Secretary did not petition for certiorari. While we accept the patients’ argument with respect to the portion of the injunction requiring continued payments for Medicaid patients, we reject it insofar as the main issue presented bv the petition — the right of the patients to a pretermination hearing — is concerned.
When the District Court ruled against the patients and Town Court on their right to a pretermination hearing, it nevertheless ordered HEW and DPW to continue making navments for services actually rendered, no doubt to ensure that there would be no break in care or benefits while the patients were being transferred. The patients appealed on the hearing issue, but the HEW Secretary alone cross-appealed on the issue of whether HEW should continue paying benefits assuming that there was no right to a pretermination hearing. The DPW Secretary did not file a cross-appeal, thus accepting the District Court’s order that DPW continue paying its share of benefits. Under these circumstances, the DPW Secretary’s petition for certiorari could not revive the issue of the propriety of that order. And, since the HEW Secretary did not file a petition for certiorari, we have no occasion to review it now.
However, the patients’ jurisdictional argument fails insofar as the hearing issue is concerned. Because it contributes funds to the Medicaid program and has joint supervisory responsibilities with the Federal Government over Medicaid providers, DPW clearly has a sufficient interest in this question to give it standing to argue the merits. And, since it was victorious in the District Court on this issue, there was no need for it to file an appeal in order to keep it alive. Finally, although we would not normally allow a party to make an argument it had not raised below, the fact that the same argument was vigorously asserted by HEW and fully addressed by the Court of Appeals removes any prudential barrier to review that might otherwise exist.
Because he was a party to the proceeding below, the HEW Secretary was automatically joined as a respondent when the DPW Secretary filed his petition in this Court. See this Court’s Rule 21 (4). In that capacity, he may seek reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals on any ground urged in that court.
As Judge Adams pointed out in his concurring opinion, HEW and DPW would no doubt benefit from patient input on the questions whether the facility meets the applicable standards and, if not, whether decertification should be postponed pending attempts to bring the home into compliance. 586 F. 2d, at 292-293. Indeed, HEW recognizes the value of patient input, requiring patient interviews to be conducted under some circumstances as a part of the periodic review of a facility’s qualifications. See 42 CFR §456.608 (1979). The fact that a person may be an important, or even critical, witness does not, however, give him a constitutional right to testify.
The patients cite a number of studies indicating that removal to another home may cause “transfer trauma,” increasing the possibility of death or serious illness for elderly, infirm patients. They also argue that associational interests, such as friendship among patients and staff and family ties, may be disrupted if the patients are scattered to other nursing homes, perhaps in other areas of the country. In denying the motion for a preliminary injunction, the District Court did not take evidence or make any findings on the harm that might result from a transfer. Nevertheless, we assume for purposes of this decision that there is a risk that some residents may encounter severe emotional and physical hardship as a result of a transfer.
The patients also argue that they are third-party beneficiaries of the provider agreement between DPW and Town Court and that this status somehow entitles them to more than Town Court itself is entitled to— namely, a pretermination hearing. They also argue that a legitimate entitlement to continued care in the home of their choice arises out of Pennsylvania’s long history of providing free medical care for those who are indigent. Nothing in the cited Pennsylvania statutes or court decisions, however, purports to create the kind of broad entitlement that the patients claim. In any event, neither of these state-law arguments was advanced in the courts below and therefore neither may provide the basis for an affirmance in this Court.
This regulation is clearly designed to prevent abuses by providers and not to define the Government’s obligations or limit its powers in any way. Although the regulation allows a home to transfer or discharge a patient for medical reasons, we may assume that the Government could not order a patient transferred out of a qualified facility simply because it believed such a transfer was medically indicated. In other words, we assume that the statute referred to above would prohibit any such interference with the patient’s free choice among qualified providers.
45 CFR § 205.10 (a) (5) (1979). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254.
This would, of course, depend on the contract between the patients and the nursing home, if any, and the provisions of the applicable state law.
Similarly, in Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, and Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134, the Court was concerned with the direct relationship between a public employer and its employees. The character of that relationship determined whether the employee possessed an expectancy of continued employment that was legally enforceable against his employer— or at least could not be terminated by the employer without observing certain minimal safeguards. But those eases raised no question concerning the right of an employee who loses his job as a result of government action directed against a third party.
We, of course, need not and do not hold that a person may never have a right to a hearing before his interests may be indirectly affected by government action. Conceivably, for example, if the Government were acting against one person for the purpose of punishing or restraining another, the indirectly affected individual might have a constitutional right to some sort of hearing. But in this case the Government is enforcing its regulations against the home for the benefit of the patients as a whole and the home itself has a strong financial incentive to contest its enforcement decision; under these circumstances the parties suffering an indirect adverse effect clearly have no constitutional right to participate in the enforcement proceedings.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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D
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are here concerned with the constitutionality of certain aspects of Indiana’s system for pretrial commitment of one accused of crime.
Petitioner, Theon Jackson, is a mentally defective deaf mute with a mental level of a pre-school child. He cannot read, write, or otherwise communicate except through limited sign language. In May 1968, at age 27, he was charged in the Criminal Court of Marion County, Indiana, with separate robberies of two women. The offenses were alleged to have occurred the preceding July. The first involved property (a purse and its contents) of the value of four dollars. The second concerned five dollars in money. The record sheds no light on these charges since, upon receipt of not-guilty pleas from Jackson, the trial court set in motion the Indiana procedures for determining his competency to stand trial. Ind. Ann..Stat. § 9-1706a (Supp. 1971), now Ind. Code 35-5-3-2 (1971).
As the statute requires, the court appointed two psychiatrists to examine Jackson. A competency hearing was subsequently held at which petitioner was represented by counsel. The court received the examining doctors’ joint written report and oral testimony from them and from a deaf-school interpreter through whom they had attempted to communicate with petitioner. The report concluded that Jackson’s almost nonexistent communication skill, together with his lack of hearing and his mental deficiency, left him unable to understand the nature of the charges against him or to participate in his defense. One doctor testified that it was extremely unlikely that petitioner could ever learn to read or write and questioned whether petitioner even had the ability to develop any proficiency in sign language. He believed that the interpreter had not been able to communicate with petitioner to any great extent and testified that petitioner’s “prognosis appears rather dim.” The other doctor testified that even if Jackson were not a deaf mute, he would be incompetent to stand trial, and doubted whether petitioner had sufficient intelligence ever to develop the necessary communication skills. The interpreter testified that Indiana had no facilities that could help someone as badly off as Jackson to learn minimal communication skills.
On this evidence, the trial court found that Jackson “lack[ed] comprehension sufficient to make his defense,” § 9-1706a, and ordered him committed to the Indiana Department of Mental Health until such time as that Department should certify to the court that “the defendant is sane.”
Petitioner’s counsel then filed a motion for a new trial, contending that there was no evidence that Jackson was “insane,” or that he would ever attain a status which the court might regard as “sane” in the sense of competency to stand trial. Counsel argued that Jackson’s commitment under these circumstances amounted to a “life sentence” without his ever having been convicted of a crime, and that the commitment therefore deprived Jackson of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection, and constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal the Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed, with one judge dissenting. 253 Ind. 487, 255 N. E. 2d 515 (1970). Rehearing was denied, with two judges dissenting. We granted certiorari, 401 U. S. 973 (1971).
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that, on the record before us, Indiana cannot constitutionally commit the petitioner for an indefinite period simply on account of his incompetency to stand trial on the charges filed against him. Accordingly, we reverse.
I
Indiana Commitment Procedures
Section 9-1706a contains both the procedural and substantive requirements for pretrial commitment of incompetent criminal defendants in Indiana. If at any time before submission of the case to the court or jury the trial judge has “reasonable ground” to believe the defendant “to be insane,” he must appoint two examining physicians and schedule a competency hearing. The hearing is to the court alone, without a jury. The examining physicians’ testimony and “other evidence” may be adduced on the issue of incompetency. If the court finds the defendant “has not comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense,” trial is delayed or continued and the defendant is remanded to the state department of mental health to be confined in an “appropriate psychiatric institution.” The section further provides that “[w] hen ever the defendant shall become sane” the superintendent of the institution shall certify that fact to the court, and the court shall order him brought on to trial. The court may also make such an order sua sponte. There is no statutory provision for periodic review of the defendant’s condition by either the court or mental health authorities. Section 9-1706a by its terms does not accord the defendant any right to counsel at the competency hearing or otherwise describe the nature of the hearing; but Jackson was represented by counsel who cross-examined the testifying doctors carefully and called witnesses on behalf of the petitioner-defendant.
Petitioner’s central contention is that the State, in seeking in effect to commit him to a mental institution indefinitely, should have been required to invoke the standards and procedures of Ind. Ann. Stat. § 22-1907, now Ind. Code 16-15-1-3 (1971), governing commitment of “feeble-minded” persons. That section provides that upon application of a “reputable citizen of the county” and accompanying certificate of a reputable physician that a person is “feeble-minded and is not insane or epileptic” (emphasis supplied), a circuit court judge shall appoint two physicians to examine such person. After notice, a hearing is held at which the patient is entitled to be represented by counsel. If the judge determines that the individual is indeed “feeble-minded,” he enters an order of commitment and directs the clerk of the court to apply for the person’s admission “to the superintendent of the institution for feeble-minded persons located in the district in which said county is situated.” A person committed under this section may be released “at any time,” provided that “in the judgment of the superintendent, the mental and physical condition of the patient justifies it.” § 22-1814, now Ind. Code 16-15-4-12 (1971). The statutes do not define either “feeble-mindedness” or “insanity” as used in § 22-1907. But a statute establishing a special institution for care of such persons, § 22-1801, refers to the duty of the State to provide care for its citizens who are “feeble-minded, and are therefore unable properly to care for themselves.” These provisions evidently afford the State a vehicle for commitment of persons in need of custodial care who are “not insane” and therefore do not qualify as “mentally ill” under the State's general involuntary civil commitment scheme. See §§ 22-1201 to 22-1256, now Ind. Code 16-14-9-1 to 16-14^0-31, 16-13-2-9 to 16-13-2-10, 35-5-3-4, 16-14-14-1 to 16-14-14-19, and 16-14415-5, 16-14-15-1, and 16-14-19-1 (1971).
Scant attention was paid this general civil commitment law by the Indiana courts in the present case. An understanding of it, however, is essential to a full airing of the equal protection claims raised by petitioner. Section 22-1201 (1) defines a “mentally ill person” as one who
“is afflicted with a psychiatric disorder which substantially impairs his mental health; and, because of such psychiatric disorder, requires care, treatment, training or detention in the interest of the welfare of such person or the welfare of others of the community in which such person resides.”
Section 22-1201 (2) defines a “psychiatric disorder” to be any mental illness or disease, including any mental deficiency, epilepsy, alcoholism, or drug addiction. Other sections specify procedures for involuntary commitment of “mentally ill” persons that are substantially similar to those for commitment of the feeble-minded. For example, a citizen’s sworn statement and the statement of a physician are required. § 22-1212. The circuit court judge, the applicant, and the physician then consult to formulate a treatment plan. § 22-1213. Notice to the individual is required, § 22-1216, and he is examined by two physicians, § 22-1215. There are provisions for temporary commitment. A hearing is held before a judge on the issue of mental illness. §§ 22-1209, 22-1216, 22-1217. The individual has a right of appeal. § 22-1210. An individual adjudged mentally ill under these sections is remanded to the department of mental health for assignment to an appropriate institution. § 22-1209. Discharge is in the discretion of the superintendent of the particular institution to which the person is assigned, §22-1223; Official Opinion No. 54, Opinions of the Attorney General of Indiana, Dec. 30, 1966. The individual, however, remains within the court's custody, and release can therefore be revoked upon a hearing. Ibid.
II
Equal Protection
Because the evidence established little likelihood of improvement in petitioner’s condition, he argues that commitment under § 9-1706a in his case amounted to a commitment for life. This deprived him of equal protection, he contends, because, absent the criminal charges pending against him, the State would have had to proceed under other statutes generally applicable to all other citizens: either the commitment procedures for feeble-minded persons, or those for mentally ill persons. He argues that under these other statutes (1) the decision whether to commit would have been made according to a different standard, (2) if commitment were warranted, applicable standards for release would have been more lenient, (3) if committed under § 22-1907, he could have been assigned to a special institution affording appropriate care, and (4) he would then have been entitled to certain privileges not now available to him.
In Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107 (1966), the Court held that a state prisoner civilly committed at the end of his prison sentence on the finding of a surrogate was denied equal protection when he was deprived of a jury trial that the State made generally available to all other persons civilly committed. Rejecting the State’s argument that Baxstrom’s conviction and sentence constituted adequate justification for the difference in procedures, the Court said that “there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments.” 383 U. S., at 111-112; see United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F. 2d 1071 (CA2), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 847 (1969). The Court also held that Baxstrom was denied equal protection by commitment to an institution maintained by the state corrections department for “dangerously mentally ill” persons, without a judicial determination of his “dangerous propensities” afforded all others so committed.
If criminal conviction and imposition of sentence are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all others, the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice. This was the precise holding of the Massachusetts Court in Commonwealth v. Druken, 356 Mass. 503, 507, 254 N. E. 2d 779, 781 (1969). The Baxstrom principle also has been extended to commitment following an insanity acquittal, Bolton v. Harris, 130 U. S. App. D. C. 1, 395 F. 2d 642 (1968); Cameron v. Mullen, 128 U. S. App. D. C. 235, 387 F. 2d 193 (1967); People v. Lolly, 19 N. Y. 2d 27, 224 N. E. 2d 87 (1966), and to commitment in lieu of sentence following conviction as a sex offender. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U. S. 504 (1972).
Respondent argues, however, that because the record fails to establish affirmatively that Jackson will never improve, his commitment “until sane” is not really an indeterminate one. It is only temporary, pending possible change in his condition. Thus, presumably, it cannot be judged against commitments under other state statutes that are truly indeterminate. The State relies on the lack of “exactitude” with which psychiatry can predict the future course of mental illness, and on the Court’s decision in what "is claimed to be “a fact situation similar to the case at hand” in Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S. 366 (1956).
Were the State’s factual premise that Jackson’s commitment is only temporary a valid one, this, might well be a different case. But the record does not support that premise. One of the doctors testified that in his view Jackson would be unable to acquire the substantially improved communication skills that would be necessary for him to participate in any defense. The prognosis for petitioner’s developing such skills, he testified, appeared “rather dim.” In answer to a question whether Jackson would ever be able to comprehend the charges or participate in his defense, even after commitment and treatment, the doctor said, “I doubt it, I don’t believe so.” The other psychiatrist testified that even if Jackson were able to develop such skills, he would still be unable to comprehend the proceedings or aid counsel due to his mental deficiency. The interpreter, a supervising teacher at the state school for the deaf, said that he would not be able to serve as an interpreter for Jackson or aid him in participating in a trial, and that the State had no facilities that could, “after a length of time,” aid Jackson in so participating. The court also heard petitioner’s mother testify that Jackson already had undergone rudimentary out-patient training in communications skills from the deaf and dumb school in Indianapolis over a period of three years without noticeable success. There is nothing in the record that even points to any possibility that Jackson’s present condition can be remedied at any future time.
Nor does Greenwood, which concerned the constitutional validity of 18 U. S. C. §§ 4244 to 4248, lend support to respondent’s position. That decision, addressing the “narrow constitutional issue raised by the order of commitment in the circumstances of this case,” 350 U. S., at 375, upheld the Federal Government’s constitutional authority to commit an individual found by the District Court to be “insane,” incompetent to stand trial on outstanding criminal charges, and probably dangerous to the safety of the officers, property, or other interests of the United States. The Greenwood Court construed the federal statutes to deal “comprehensively” with defendants “who are insane or mentally incompetent to stand trial,” and not merely with “the problem of temporary mental disorder.” 350 U. S., at 373. Though Greenwood’s prospects for improvement were slim, the Court held that “in the situation before us,” where the District Court had made an explicit finding of dangerousness, that fact alone “does not defeat federal power to make this initial commitment.” 350 U. S., at 375. No issue of equal protection was raised or decided. See Petitioner’s Brief, No. 460, O. T. 1955, pp. 2, 7-9. It is clear that the Government’s substantive power to commit on the particular findings made in that case was the sole question there decided. 350 U. S., at 376.
We note also that neither the Indiana statute nor state practice makes the likelihood of the defendant's improvement a relevant factor. The State did not seek to make any such showing, and the record clearly establishes that the chances of Jackson's ever meeting the competency standards of § 9-1706a are at best minimal, if not nonexistent. The record also rebuts any contention that the commitment could contribute to Jackson's improvement. Jackson’s § 9-1706a commitment is permanent in practical effect.
We therefore must turn to the question whether, because of the pendency of the criminal charges that triggered the State’s invocation of § 9-1706a, Jackson was deprived of substantial rights to which he would have been entitled under either of the other two state commitment statutes. Baxstrom held that the State cannot withhold from a few the procedural protections or the substantive requirements for commitment that are available to all others. In this case commitment procedures under all three statutes appear substantially similar: notice, examination by two doctors, and a full judicial hearing at which the individual is represented by counsel and can cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence. Under each of the three statutes, the commitment determination is made by the court alone, and appellate review is available.
In contrast, however, what the State must show to commit a defendant under § 9-1706a, and the circumstances under which an individual so committed may be released, are substantially different from the standards under the other two statutes.
Under § 9-1706a, the State needed to show only Jackson’s inability to stand trial. We are unable to say that, on the record before us, Indiana could have civilly committed him as mentally ill under § 22-1209 or committed him as feeble-minded under § 22-1907. The former requires at least (1) a showing of mental illness and (2) a showing that the individual is in need of “care, treatment, training or detention.” § 22-1201 (1). Whether Jackson’s mental deficiency would meet the first test is unclear; neither examining physician addressed himself to this. Furthermore, it is problematical whether commitment for “treatment” or “training” would be appropriate since the record establishes that none is available for Jackson’s condition at any state institution. The record also fails to establish that Jackson is in need of custodial care or “detention.” He has been employed at times, and there is no evidence that the care he long received at home has become inadequate. The statute appears to require an independent showing of dangerousness (“requires.. •. detention in the interest of the welfare of such person or... others...”). Insofar as it may require such a showing, the pending criminal charges are insufficient to establish it, and no other supporting evidence was introduced. For the same reasons, we cannot say that this record would support a feeble-mindedness commitment under § 22-1907 on the ground that Jackson is “unable properly to care for [himself].” §22-1801.
More important, an individual committed as feeble-minded is eligible for release when his condition “justifies it,” § 22-1814, and an individual civilly committed as mentally ill when the “superintendent or administrator shall discharge such person, or [when] cured of such illness” §22-1223 (emphasis supplied). Thus, in either case release is appropriate when the individual no longer requires the custodial care or treatment or detention that occasioned the commitment, or when the department of mental health believes release would be in his best interests. The evidence available concerning Jackson’s past employment and home care strongly suggests that under these standards he might be eligible for release at almost any time, even if he did not improve. On the other hand, by the terms of his present § 9-1706a commitment, he will not be entitled to release at all, absent an unlikely substantial change for the better in his condition.
Baxstrom did not deal with the standard for release, but its rationale is applicable here. The harm to the individual is just as great if the State, without reasonable justification, can apply standards making his commitment a permanent one when standards generally applicable to all others afford him a substantial opportunity for early release.
As we noted above, we cannot conclude that pending criminal charges provide a greater justification for different treatment than conviction and sentence. Consequently, we hold that by subjecting Jackson to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all others not charged with offenses, and by thus condemning him in effect to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release afforded by § 22-1209 or § 22-1907, Indiana deprived petitioner of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.
III
Due Process
For reasons closely related to those discussed in Part II above, we also hold that Indiana’s indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on account of his incompetency to stand trial does not square with the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.
A. The Federal System. In the federal criminal system, the constitutional issue posed here has not been encountered precisely because the federal statutes have been construed to require that a mentally incompetent defendant must also be found “dangerous” before he can be committed indefinitely. But the decisions have uniformly articulated the constitutional problems compelling this statutory interpretation.
The federal statute, 18 U. S. C. §§ 4244 to 4246, is not dissimilar to the Indiana law. It provides that a defendant found incompetent to stand trial may be committed “until the accused shall be mentally competent to stand trial or until the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law.” § 4246. Section 4247, applicable on its face only to convicted criminals whose federal sentences are about to expire, permits commitment if the prisoner is (1) “insane or mentally incompetent” and (2) “will probably endanger the safety of the officers, the property, or other interests of the United States, and... suitable arrangements for the custody and care of the prisoner are not otherwise available,” that is, in a state facility. See Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S., at 373-374. One committed under this section, however, is entitled to release when any of the three conditions no longer obtains, “whichever event shall first occur.” § 4248. Thus, a person committed under § 4247 must be released when he no longer is “dangerous.”
In Greenwood, the Court upheld the pretrial commitment of a defendant who met all three conditions of § 4247, even though there was little likelihood that he would ever become competent to stand trial. Since Greenwood had not yet stood trial, his commitment was ostensibly under § 4244. By the related release provision, § 4246, he could not have been released until he became competent. But the District Court had in fact applied § 4247, and found specifically that Greenwood would be dangerous if not committed. This Court approved that approach, holding § 4247 applicable before trial as well as to those about to be released from sentence. 350 U. S., at 374. Accordingly, Greenwood was entitled to release when no longer dangerous, § 4248, even if he did not become competent to stand trial and thus did not meet the requirement of § 4246. Under these circumstances, the Court found the commitment constitutional.
Since Greenwood, federal courts without exception have found improper any straightforward application of §§ 4244 and 4246 to a defendant whose chance of attaining competency to stand trial is slim, thus effecting an indefinite commitment on the ground of incompetency alone. United States v. Curry, 410 F. 2d 1372 (CA4 1969); United States v. Walker, 335 F. Supp. 705 (ND Cal. 1971); Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F. Supp. 822 (WD Mo. 1970); United States v. Jackson, 306 F. Supp. 4 (ND Cal. 1969); Maurietta v. Ciccone, 305 F. Supp. 775 (WD Mo. 1969). See In re Harmon, 425 F. 2d 916 (CA1 1970); United States v. Klein, 325 F. 2d 283 (CA2 1963); Martin v. Settle, 192 F. Supp. 156 (WD Mo. 1961); Royal v. Settle, 192 F. Supp. 176 (WD Mo. 1959). The holding in each of these cases was grounded in an expressed substantial doubt that §§ 4244 and 4246 could survive constitutional scrutiny if interpreted to authorize indefinite commitment.
These decisions have imposed a “rule of reasonableness” upon §§4244 and 4246. Without a finding of dangerousness, one committed thereunder can be held only for a “reasonable period of time” necessary to determine whether there is a substantial chance of his attaining the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable future. If the chances are slight, or if the defendant does not in fact improve, then he must be released or granted a §§4247-4248 hearing.
B. The States. Some States appear to commit indefinitely a defendant found incompetent to stand trial until he recovers competency. Other States require a finding of dangerousness to support such a commitment or provide forms of parole. New York has recently enacted legislation mandating release of incompetent defendants charged with misdemeanors after 90 days of commitment, and release and dismissal of charges against those accused of felonies after they have been committed for two-thirds of the maximum potential prison sentence. The practice of automatic commitment with release conditioned solely upon attainment of competence has been decried on both policy and constitutional grounds. Recommendations for changes made by commentators and study committees have included incorporation into pretrial commitment procedures of the equivalent of the federal “rule of reason,” a requirement of a finding of dangerousness or of full-scale civil commitment, periodic review by court or mental health administrative personnel of the defendant’s condition and progress, and provisions for ultimately dropping charges if the defendant does not improve. One source of this criticism is undoubtedly the empirical data available which tend to show that many defendants committed before trial are never tried, and that those defendants committed pursuant to ordinary civil proceedings are, on the average, released sooner than defendants automatically committed solely on account of their incapacity to stand trial. Related to these statistics are substantial doubts about whether the rationale for pretrial commitment — that care or treatment will aid the accused in attaining competency — is empirically valid given the state of most of our mental institutions. However, very few courts appear to have addressed the problem directly in the state context.
In United States ex rel. Wolfersdorf v. Johnston, 317 F. Supp. 66 (SDNY 1970), an 86-year-old defendant-committed for nearly 20 years as incompetent to stand trial on state murder and kidnaping charges applied for federal habeas corpus. He had been found “not dangerous,” and suitable for civil commitment. The District Court granted relief. It held that petitioner’s incarceration in an institution for the criminally insane constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and that the “shocking circumstances” of his commitment violated the Due Process Clause. The court quoted approvingly the language of Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F. Supp., at 824, concerning the “substantial injustice in keeping an un-convicted person in... custody to await trial where it is plainly evident his mental condition will not permit trial within a reasonable period of time.”
In a 1970 case virtually indistinguishable from the one before us, the Illinois Supreme Court granted relief to an illiterate deaf mute who had been indicted for murder four years previously but found incompetent to stand trial on account of his inability to communicate, and committed. People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 Ill. 2d 281, 263 N. E. 2d 109 (1970). The institution where petitioner was confined had determined, “[I]t now appears that [petitioner] will never acquire the necessary communication skills needed to participate and cooperate in his trial.” Petitioner, however, was found to be functioning at a “nearly normal level of performance in areas other than communication.” The State contended petitioner should not be released until his competency was restored. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. It held:
“This court is of the opinion that this defendant, handicapped as he is and facing an indefinite commitment because of the pending indictment against him, should be given an opportunity to obtain a trial to determine whether or not he is guilty as charged or should be released.” Id., at 288, 263 N. E. 2d, at 113.
C. This Case. Respondent relies heavily on Greenwood to support Jackson’s commitment. That decision is distinguishable. It upheld only the initial commitment without considering directly its duration or the standards for release. It justified the commitment by treating it as if accomplished under allied statutory provisions relating directly to the individual’s “insanity” and society’s interest in his indefinite commitment, factors not considered in Jackson’s case. And it sustained commitment only upon the finding of dangerousness. As Part A, supra, shows, all these elements subsequently have been held not simply sufficient, but necessary, to sustain a commitment like the one involved here.
The States have traditionally exercised broad power to commit persons found to be mentally ill. The substantive limitations on the exercise of this power and the procedures for invoking it vary drastically among the States. The particular fashion in which the power is exercised — for instance, through various forms of civil commitment, defective delinquency laws, sexual psychopath laws, commitment of persons acquitted by reason of insanity — reflects different combinations of distinct bases for commitment sought to be vindicated. The bases that have been articulated include dangerousness to self, dangerousness to others, and the need for care or treatment or training. Considering the number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the substantive constitutional limitations on this power have not been more frequently litigated.
We need not address these broad questions here. It is clear that Jackson’s commitment rests on proceedings that did not purport to bring into play, indeed did not even consider relevant, any of the articulated bases for exercise of Indiana’s power of indefinite commitment. The state statutes contain at least two alternative methods for invoking this power. But Jackson was not afforded any “formal commitment proceedings addressed to [his] ability to function in society,” or to society’s interest in his restraint, or to the State’s ability to aid him in attaining competency through custodial care or compulsory treatment, the ostensible purpose of the commitment. At the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.
We hold, consequently, that a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant. Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal. In light of differing state facilities and procedures and a lack of evidence in this record, we do not think it appropriate for us to attempt to prescribe arbitrary time limits. We note, however, that petitioner Jackson has now been confined for three and one-half years on a record that sufficiently establishes the lack of a substantial probability that he will ever be able to participate fully in a trial.
These conclusions make it unnecessary for us to reach petitioner’s Eighth-Fourteenth Amendment claim.
IV
Disposition of the Charges
Petitioner also urges that fundamental fairness requires that the charges against him now be dismissed. The thrust of his argument is that the record amply establishes his lack of criminal responsibility at the time the crimes are alleged to have been committed. The Indiana court did not discuss this question. Apparently it believed that by reason of Jackson’s incompetency commitment the State was entitled to hold the charges pending indefinitely. On this record, Jackson’s claim is a substantial one. For a number of reasons, however, we believe the issue is not sufficiently ripe for ultimate decision by us at this time.
A. Petitioner argues that he has already made out a complete insanity defense. Jackson’s criminal responsibility at the time of the alleged offenses, however, is a distinct issue from his competency to stand trial. The competency hearing below was not directed to criminal responsibility, and evidence relevant to it was presented only incidentally. Thus, in any event, we would have to remand for further consideration of Jackson’s condition in the light of Indiana’s law of criminal responsibility.
B. Dismissal of charges against an incompetent accused has usually been thought to be justified on grounds not squarely presented here: particularly, the Sixth-Fourteenth Amendment right to a speedy trial, or the denial of due process inherent in holding pending criminal charges indefinitely over the head of one who will never have a chance to prove his innocence. Jackson did not present the Sixth-Fourteenth Amendment issue to the state courts. Nor did the highest state court rule on the due process issue, if indeed it was presented to that court in precisely the above-described form. We think, in light of our holdings in Parts II and III, that the Indiana courts should have the first opportunity to determine these issues.
C. Both courts and commentators have noted the desirability of permitting some proceedings to go forward despite the defendant’s incompetency. For instance, § 4.06 (3) of the Model Penal Code would permit an incompetent accused’s attorney to contest any issue “susceptible of fair determination prior to trial and without the personal participation of the defendant.” An alternative draft of § 4.06 (4) of the Model Penal Code would also permit an evidentiary hearing at which certain defenses, not including lack of criminal responsibility, could be raised by defense counsel on the basis of which the court might quash the indictment. Some States have statutory provisions permitting pretrial motions to be made or even allowing the incompetent defendant a trial at which to establish his innocence, without permitting a conviction. We do not read this Court’s previous decisions to preclude the States from allowing, at a minimum, an incompetent defendant to raise certain defenses such as insufficiency of the indictment, or make certain pretrial motions through counsel. Of course, if the Indiana courts conclude that Jackson was almost certainly not capable of criminal responsibility when the offenses were committed, dismissal of the charges might be warranted. But even if this is not the case, Jackson may have other good defenses that could sustain dismissal or acquittal and that might now be asserted. We do not know if Indiana would approve procedures such as those mentioned here, but these possibilities will be open on remand.
Reversed and remanded.
Mb. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
“9-1706a. Commitment before trial — Subsequent actions. — When at any time before the trial of any criminal cause or during the progress thereof and before the final submission of the cause to the court or jury trying the same, the court, either from his own knowledge or upon the suggestion of any person, has reasonable ground for believing the defendant to be insane, he shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine the question of the defendant’s sanity and shall appoint two [2] competent disinterested physicians who shall examine the defendant upon the question of his sanity and testify concerning the same at the hearing. At the hearing, other evidence may be introduced to prove the defendant’s sanity or insanity. If the court shall find that the defendant has comprehension sufficient to understand the nature of the criminal action against him and the proceedings thereon and to make his defense, the trial shall not be delayed or continued on the ground of the alleged insanity of the defendant. If the court shall find that the defendant has not comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense, the trial shall be delayed or continued on the ground of the alleged insanity of the defendant. If the court shall find that the defendant has not comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense, the court shall order the defendant committed to the department of mental health, to be confined by the department in an appropriate psychiatric institution. Whenever the defendant shall become sane the superintendent of the state psychiatric hospital shall certify the fact to the proper court, who shall enter an order on his record
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
D
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A number of growers, handlers, and processors of California tree fruits (respondents) brought this proceeding to challenge the validity of various regulations contained in marketing orders promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture. The orders impose assessments on respondents that cover the expenses of administering the orders, including the cost of generic advertising of California nectarines, plums, and peaches. The question presented to us is whether the requirement that respondents finance such generic advertising is a law “abridging the freedom of speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment.
I
Congress enacted the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 601 et seq., in order to establish and maintain orderly marketing conditions and fair prices for agricultural commodities. § 602(1). Marketing orders promulgated pursuant to the AMAA are a species of economic regulation that has displaced competition in a number of discrete markets; they are expressly exempted from the antitrust laws. § 608b. Collective action, rather than the aggregate consequences of independent competitive choices, characterizes these regulated markets. In order “to avoid unreasonable fluctuations in supplies and prices,” § 602(4), these orders may include mechanisms that provide a uniform price to all producers in a particular market, that limit the quality and the quantity of the commodity that may be marketed, §§ 608c(6)(A), (7), that determine the grade and size of the commodity, § 608c(6)(A), and that make an orderly disposition of any surplus that might depress market prices, ibid. Pursuant to the policy of collective, rather than competitive, marketing, the orders also authorize joint research and development projects, inspection procedures that ensure uniform quality, and even certain standardized packaging requirements. §§ 608c(6)(D), (H), (I). The expenses of administering such orders, including specific projects undertaken to serve the economic interests of the cooperating producers, are “paid from funds collected pursuant to the marketing order.” §§ 608c(6)(I), 610(b)(2)(ii).
Marketing orders must be approved by either two-thirds of the affected producers or by producers who market at least two-thirds of the volume of the commodity. § 608c(9)(B). The AMA A restricts the marketing orders “to the smallest regional production areas . . . practicable.” § 608c(11)(b). The orders are implemented by committees composed of producers and handlers of the regulated commodity, appointed by the Secretary, who recommend rules to the Secretary governing marketing matters such as fruit size and maturity levels. 7 CFR §§ 916.23, 916.62, 917.25, 917.30 (1997). The committees also determine the annual rate of assessments to cover the expenses of administration, inspection services, research, and advertising and promotion. §§ 916.31(c), 917.35(f).
Among the collective activities that Congress authorized for certain specific commodities is “any form of marketing promotion including paid advertising.” 7 U. S. C. § 608c(6) (I). The authorized promotional activities, like the marketing orders themselves, are intended to serve the producers’ common interest in disposing of their output on favorable terms. The central message of the generic advertising at issue in this case is that “California Summer Fruits” are wholesome, delicious, and attractive to discerning shoppers. See App. 530. All of the relevant advertising, insofar as it is authorized by the statute and the Secretary’s regulations, is designed to serve the producers’ and handlers’ common interest in promoting the sale of a particular product.
II
The regulations at issue in this litigation are contained in Marketing Order 916, which regulates nectarines grown in California, and Marketing Order 917, which originally regulated peaches, pears, and plums grown in California. A 1966 amendment to the former expressly authorized generic advertising of nectarines, see 31 Fed. Reg. 8177, and a series of amendments, beginning in 1971, to the latter authorized advertising of each of the regulated commodities, see 36 Fed. Reg. 14381 (1971); 41 Fed. Reg. 14375, 17528 (1976). The advertising provisions relating to pears are not now being challenged, thus we limit our discussion to generic advertising of California nectarines, plums, and peaches.
Respondent Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., is a large producer of these fruits that packs and markets its own output as well as that grown by other farmers. In 1987, after encountering problems with some fruit varieties under the maturity and minimum size standards in the orders, it refused to pay its assessments and filed a petition with the Secretary challenging those standards. In 1988, it filed a second petition challenging amendments to the maturity standards as well as the generic advertising regulations. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), in two separate decisions that are explained in a total of 769 pages, ruled in favor of Wileman on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) issues, without resolving respondents’ First Amendment claims. App. to
Brief in Opposition 393a. In a comparably detailed decision, the Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture entirely reversed the ALJ. Wileman, along with 15 other handlers, then sought review of the Judicial Officer’s decision by filing this action in the District Court pursuant to 7 U. S. C. § 608c(15)(B). A number of enforcement actions brought by the Secretary to collect withheld assessments were consolidated with the review proceeding. Acting on cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court upheld both marketing orders and entered judgment of $3.1 million in past due assessments against the handlers.
In the Court of Appeals the handlers challenged the generic advertising provisions of the orders as violative of both the APA and the First Amendment. The court rejected the statutory challenge, concluding that the record contained substantial evidence justifying both the original decision to engage in generic advertising and the continuation of the program. It explained:
“The Nectarine Administrative Committee and the Peach Commodity Committee engage in a careful process each year prior to and during their annual spring meetings in approving the advertising program for the upcoming season. Prior to the full committee meeting, the Subcommittee on Advertising and Promotion meets to review in detail the program developed by its staff. The staff in turn uses monthly reports on price trends, consumer interests, and general market conditions in the formation of the proposed advertising program.
“[I]t is only because the handlers themselves, through the committees, recommend a budget with a generic advertising component that the program is renewed by the Secretary every year. In fact, in most years the recommendations have been unanimous. We cannot assume that the handlers — the parties with firsthand knowledge of the state of their industry — would make recommendations that have an adverse effect on their businesses. Of course, the interests of the voting committee members may not always coincide with those of every handler in the industry. However, this court has previously noted that the Supreme Court ‘upheld the constitutionality of the system despite the fact that it may produce results with which some growers or handlers will disagree.’ Saulsbury Orchards and Almond Processing, Inc. v. Yeutter, 917 F. 2d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U. S. 533 ... (1939)).” Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F. 3d 1367, 1375-1376 (CA9 1995) (footnote omitted).
The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that Government enforced contributions to pay for generic advertising violated the First Amendment rights of the handlers. Relying on an earlier Ninth Circuit decision that had cited our decision in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977), see Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 14 F. 3d 429 (CA9 1993), the court began by stating that the “First Amendment right of freedom of speech includes a right not to be compelled to render financial support for others’ speech.” 58 F. 3d, at 1377. It then reviewed the generic advertising regulations under “the test for restrictions on commercial speech set out in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 566 ... (1980).” Id., at 1378. Although it was satisfied that the Government interest in enhancing returns to peach and nectarine growers was substantial, it was not persuaded that the generic advertising passed either the second or third “prongs” of Central Hudson. With respect to the former, even though the generic advertising “undoubtedly” has increased peach and nectarine sales, the Government failed to prove that it did so more effectively than individualized advertising. The court also concluded that the program was not “narrowly tailored” because it did not give the handlers any credit for their own advertising and because California was the only State in which such programs were in place.
The Court of Appeals’ disposition of the First Amendment claim is in conflict with a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that rejected a challenge to generic advertising of beef authorized by the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985, 7 U. S. C. §§ 2901-2911. United States v. Frame, 885 F. 2d 1119, 1136, 1137 (1989). Characterizing that statute as “legislation in furtherance of an ideologically neutral compelling state interest,” id., at 1137, and noting that the “Cattlemen’s Board is authorized only to develop a campaign to promote the product that the defendant himself has chosen to market,” id., at 1136, despite the plaintiff’s objections to the content of the advertising, the court found no violation of his First Amendment rights.
We granted the Secretary’s petition for certiorari to resolve the conflict, 517 U. S. 1232 (1996), and now reverse.
III
In challenging the constitutionality of the generic advertising program in the Court of Appeals, respondents relied, in part, on their claimed disagreement with the content of some of the generic advertising. 58 F. 3d, at 1377, n. 6. The District Court had found no merit to this aspect of their claim, and the Court of Appeals did not rely on it for its conclusion that the program was unconstitutional. Rather, the Court of Appeals invalidated the entire program on the theory that the program could not survive Central Hudson because the Government had failed to prove that generic advertising was more effective than individual advertising in increasing consumer demand for California nectarines, plums, and peaches. That holding did not depend at all on either the content of the advertising, or on the respondents’ claimed disagreement with any particular message. Although respondents have continued in this Court to argue about their disagreement with particular messages, those arguments, while perhaps calling into question the administration of portions of the program, have no bearing on the validity of the entire program.
For purposes of our analysis, we neither accept nor reject the factual assumption underlying the Court of Appeals’ invalidation of the program — namely, that generic advertising may not be the most effective method of promoting the sale of these commodities. The legal question that we address is whether being compelled to fund this advertising raises a First Amendment issue for us to resolve, or rather is simply a question of economic policy for Congress and the Executive to resolve.
In answering that question we stress the importance of the statutory context in which it arises. California nectarines and peaches are marketed pursuant to detailed marketing orders that have displaced many aspects of independent business activity that characterize other portions of the economy in which competition is fully protected by the antitrust laws. The business entities that are compelled to fund the generic advertising at issue in this litigation do so as a part of a broader collective enterprise in which their freedom to act independently is already constrained by the regulatory scheme. It is in this context that we consider whether we should review the assessments used to fund collective advertising, together with other collective activities, under the standard appropriate for the review of economic regulation or under a heightened standard appropriate for the review of First Amendment issues.
IV
Three characteristics of the regulatory scheme at issue distinguish it from laws that we have found to abridge the freedom of Speech protected by the First Amendment. First, the marketing orders impose no restraint on the freedom of any producer to communicate any message to any audience. Second, they do not compel any person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech. Third, they do not compel the producers to endorse or to finance any political or ideological views. Indeed, since all of the respondents are engaged in the business of marketing California nectarines, plums, and peaches, it is fair to presume that they agree with the central message of the speech that is generated by the generic program. Thus, none of our First Amendment jurisprudence provides any support for the suggestion that the promotional regulations should be scrutinized under a different standard from that applicable to the other anticom-petitive features of the marketing orders.
Respondents advance several arguments in support of their claim that being required to fund the generic advertising program violates the First Amendment. Respondents argue that the assessments for generic advertising impinge on their First Amendment rights because they reduce the amount of money that producers have available to conduct their own advertising. This is equally true, however, of assessments to cover employee benefits, inspection fees, or any other activity that is authorized by a marketing order. The First Amendment has never been construed to require heightened scrutiny of any financial burden that has the incidental effect of constraining the size of a firm’s advertising budget. The fact that an economic regulation may indirectly lead to a reduction in a handler’s individual advertising budget does not itself amount to a restriction on speech.
The Court of Appeals, perhaps recognizing the expansive nature of respondents’ argument, did not rely on the claim that the assessments for generic advertising indirectly limit the extent of the handlers’ own advertising. Rather, the Court of Appeals apparently accepted respondents’ argument that the assessments infringe First Amendment rights because they constitute compelled speech. Our compelled speech case law, however, is clearly inapplicable to the regulatory scheme at issue here. The use of assessments to pay for advertising does not require respondents to repeat an objectionable message out of their own mouths, cf. West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 632 (1943), require them to use their own property to convey an antagonistic ideological message, cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 (1977); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U. S. 1, 18 (1986) (plurality opinion), force them to respond to a hostile message when they “would prefer to remain silent,” see ibid., or require them to be publicly identified or associated with another’s message, cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 88 (1980). Respondents are not required themselves to speak, but are merely required to make contributions for advertising. With trivial exceptions on which the court did not rely, none of the generic advertising conveys any message with which respondents disagree. Furthermore, the advertising is attributed not to them, but to the California Tree Fruit Agreement or “California Summer Fruits.” See, e. g., App. 530.
Although this regulatory scheme may not compel speech as recognized by our case law, it does compel financial contributions that are used to fund advertising. As the Court of Appeals read our decision in Abood, just as the First Amendment prohibits compelled speech, it prohibits — at least without sufficient justification by the government — compelling an individual to “render financial support for others’ speech.” 58 F. 3d, at 1377. However, Abood, and the cases that follow it, did not announce a broad First Amendment right not to be compelled to provide financial support for any organization that conducts expressive activities. Rather, Abood merely recognized a First Amendment interest in not being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict with one’s “freedom of belief.” 431 U. S., at 235. We considered, in Abood, whether it was constitutional for the State of Michigan to require government employees who objected to unions or union activities to contribute to an “agency shop” arrangement requiring all employees to pay union dues as a condition of employment. We held that compelled contributions to support activities related to collective bargaining were “constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop” to labor relations. Id., at 222. Relying on our compelled-speech cases, however, the Court found that compelled contributions for political purposes unrelated to collective bargaining implicated First Amendment interests because they interfere with the values lying at the “heart of the First Amendment — ]the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.” Id., at 234-235; see also id., at 235.
Here, however, requiring respondents to pay the assessments cannot be said to engender any crisis of conscience. None of the advertising in this record promotes any particular message other than encouraging consumers to buy California tree fruit. Neither the fact that respondents may prefer to foster that message independently in order to promote and distinguish their own products, nor the fact that they think more or less money should be spent fostering it, makes this case comparable to those in which an objection rested on political or ideological disagreement with the content of the message. The mere fact that objectors believe their money is not being well spent “does not mean [that] they have a First Amendment complaint.” Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U. S. 435, 456 (1984).
Moreover, rather than suggesting that mandatory funding of expressive activities always constitutes compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment, our cases provide affirmative support for the proposition that assessments to fund a lawful collective program may sometimes be used to pay for speech over the objection of some members of the group. Thus, in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S. 507 (1991), while we held that the cost of certain publications that were not germane to collective-bargaining activities could not be assessed against dissenting union members, id,., at 527-528, we squarely held that it was permissible to charge them for those portions of “the Teachers’ Voice that concern teaching and education generally, professional development, unemployment, job opportunities, award programs . . . , and other miscellaneous matters.” Id., at 529. That holding was an application of the rule announced in Abood and further refined in Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1 (1990), a case involving bar association activities.
As we pointed out in Keller, “Abood held that a union could not expend a dissenting individual’s dues for ideological activities not ‘germane’ to the purpose for which compelled association was justified: collective bargaining. Here the compelled association and integrated bar are justified by the State’s interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services. The State Bar may therefore constitutionally fund activities germane to those goals out of the mandatory dues of all members. It may not, however, in such manner fund activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of activity.” Id., at 13-14. This test is clearly satisfied in this case because (1) the generic advertising of California peaches and nectarines is unquestionably germane to the purposes of the marketing orders and, (2) in any event, the assessments are not used to fund ideological activities.
We are not persuaded that any greater weight should be given to the fact that some producers do not wish to foster generic advertising than to the fact that many of them may well object to the marketing orders themselves because they might earn more money in an unregulated market. Respondents’ criticisms of generic advertising provide no basis for concluding that factually accurate advertising constitutes an abridgment of anybody’s right to speak freely. Similar criticisms might be directed at other features of the regulatory orders that impose restraints on competition that arguably disadvantage particular producers for the benefit of the entire market. Although one may indeed question the wisdom of such a program, its debatable features are insufficient to warrant special First Amendment scrutiny. It was therefore error for the Court of Appeals to rely on Central Hudson for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of market order assessments for promotional advertising.
V
The Court of Appeals’ decision to apply the Central Hudson test is inconsistent with the very nature and purpose of the collective action program at issue here. The Court of Appeals concluded that the advertising program does not “directly advance” the purposes of the marketing orders because the Secretary had failed to prove that generic advertising is any more effective in stimulating consumer demand for the commodities than the advertising that might otherwise be undertaken by producers acting independently. We find this an odd burden of proof to assign to the administrator of marketing orders that reflect a policy of displacing unrestrained competition with Government supervised cooperative marketing programs. If there were no marketing orders at all to set maturity levels, size, quantity, and other features, competition might well generate greater production of nectarines, peaches, and plums. It may also be true that if there were no generic advertising, competition would generate even more advertising and an even larger consumer demand than does the cooperative program. But the potential benefits of individual advertising do not bear on the question whether generic advertising directly advances the statute’s collectivist goals. Independent advertising would be primarily motivated by the individual competitor’s interest in maximizing its own sales, rather than in increasing the overall consumption of a particular commodity. While the First Amendment unquestionably protects the individual producer’s right to advertise its own brands, the statute is designed to further the economic interests of the producers as a group. The basic policy decision that underlies the entire statute rests on an assumption that in the volatile markets for agricultural commodities the public will be best served by compelling cooperation among producers in making economic decisions that would be made independently in a free market. It is illogical, therefore, to criticize any cooperative program authorized by this statute on the ground that competition would provide greater benefits than joint action.
On occasion it is appropriate to emphasize the difference between policy judgments and constitutional adjudication. Judges who have endorsed the view that the Sherman Act is a charter of economic liberty naturally approach laws that command competitors to participate in joint ventures with a jaundiced eye. Doubts concerning the policy judgments that underlie many features of this legislation do not, however, justify reliance on the First Amendment as a basis for reviewing economic regulations. Appropriate respect for the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States provides abundant support for the constitutionality of these marketing orders on the following reasoning.
Generic advertising is intended to stimulate consumer demand for an agricultural product in a regulated market. That purpose is legitimate and consistent with the regulatory goals of the overall statutory scheme. See § 602(1). At least a majority of the producers in each of the markets in which such advertising is authorized must be persuaded that it is effective, or presumably the programs would be discontinued. Whether the benefits from the advertising justify its cost is a question that not only might be answered differently in different markets, but also involves the exercise of policy judgments that are better made by producers and administrators than by judges.
As with other features of the marketing orders, individual producers may not share the views or the interests of others in the same market. But decisions that are made by the majority, if acceptable for other regulatory programs, should be equally so for promotional advertising. Perhaps more money may be at stake when a generic advertising program is adopted than for other features of the cooperative endeavor, but that fact does not transform this question of business judgment into a constitutional issue. In sum, what we are reviewing is a species of economic regulation that should enjoy the same strong presumption of validity that we accord to other policy judgments made by Congress. The mere fact that one or more producers “do not wish to foster” generic advertising of their product is not a sufficient reason for overriding the judgment of the majority of market participants, bureaucrats, and legislators who have concluded that such programs are beneficial.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
See, e. g., United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U. S. 533 (1939); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 186, 188-189 (1994).
Congress amended the AMA A in 1954 to authorize the Secretary to establish “marketing ... development projects.” See Agricultural Act of 1954, § 401(c), 68 Stat. 906.
Those regulations include provisions minimizing the risk that the generic advertising might adversely affect the interests of any individual producer. See 7 U. S. C. § 608c(16)(A)(i) (providing for termination or suspension of an order that does not “effectuate the declared policy” of the AMAA); § 608e(16)(B) (providing for termination of an order if a majority of producers does not support a regulation); § 608c(15)(A) (allowing handlers subject to a marketing order to petition for modification or exemption from an order that is inconsistent with the statute). For the purpose of this case, we assume that those regulations accomplish their goals, and that the generic advertising programs therefore further the interests of those who pay for them. We do not, however, rule out the possibility that, despite the approval of generic advertising by at least two-thirds of the handlers, individual advertising might be even more effective.
The original marketing order for California peaches and plums was first issued in 1939. See 4 Fed. Reg. 2135 (1939). The marketing order for California nectarines was issued in 1958. See 7 CFR § 937.45 (1959).
The plum portion of Order 917 was terminated in 1991 after a majority of plum producers failed to vote for its continuation, see 56 Fed. Reg. 23772, but because some of the respondents are seeking a refund of 1991 assessments for plum advertising, the validity of that portion of the program is not moot.
The ALJ indicated that if respondents “were not to succeed in their nonconstitutional arguments” she would rule in their favor on the First Amendment claim. App. to Brief in Opposition 393a.
The Court of Appeals quoted the following as a “typical excerpt”: “ ‘The record shows a wide consensus among the peach and pear industries that promotional activities have been beneficial in increasing demand and should be continued.
“ ‘Media generally is expensive but some things can be done selectively in this field that are inexpensive and yet create an impact on the buying trade as well as the consuming public. Trade paper ads, particularly at the beginning of the season, together with the editorial support'which trade papers are willing to accord an advertiser are helpful in launching a program for seasonal ñ'uits such as peaches and pears. Spot radio or TV commercials in the principal markets during peak movement periods have proved to be successful. It has been found in many fresh promotional programs that spot announcements, particularly when developed with a “dealer tag” at the end of each spot, have considerable influence in triggering retail promotions. 41 Fed. Reg. 14,375, 14,376-77 (1976).’ ” Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F. 3d 1367, 1375 (CA9 1995).
Respondents also challenged other features of the collective program including the fruit maturity and minimum size requirements. Reviewing these aspects of the order pursuant to the deferential standard of review provided in the APA, the Court of Appeals found that they were not arbitrary and capricious. See 58 F. 3d, at 1382, 1384.
The plaintiff had claimed that he disagreed with the point of view expressed in advertising that the consumption of beef is “ ‘desirable, healthy, nutritious’”; the court concluded that his claim was not “a dispute over anything more than mere strategy.” Frame, 885 F. 2d, at 1137.
The District Court stated: “Scattered throughout plaintiffs’ briefs are additional objections which are difficult to characterize or quantify. They assert that the advertising condones ‘lying’ in that it promotes the ‘lie’ that red colored fruit is superior, that it rewards mediocrity by advertising all varieties of California fruit to be of equal quality, that it promotes sexually subliminal messages as evidenced by an ad depicting a young girl in a wet bathing suit, and that it promotes the ‘socialistic programs’ of the Secretary. It is impossible from these ‘vague claims’ to determine that plaintiffs’ first amendment rights have been significantly infringed.” Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Madigan, Civ. No. F-90-473-OWW (ED Cal. 1993), reprinted in App. to Pet. for Cert. 91a-92a.
Respondents argue that assessments were used to fund advertisements conveying the message that red nectarines are superior to other nectarines, Brief for Respondents Wileman Brothers et al. 33, and advertisements conveying the message that “all California fruit is the same,” ibid.; Brief for Respondents Gerawan Farming, Inc., et al. 46. They contend that they object to these messages because some of respondent companies grow varieties of nectarines that are not red, and because they seek to promote the fact that the commodities are highly varied. See Brief for Respondents Wileman Brothers et al. 33; Brief for Respondents Gerawan Farming, Inc., et al. 46. Respondents’ argument concerning promotion of red varieties appears to confuse complaints concerning maturity standards imposed on peach and nectarine growers with complaints concerning advertising. See, e. g., App. 233; id., at 692. The argument that the advertising promotes a view that all California fruit is the same is premised upon no particular advertisement, but rather upon testimony by respondents’ executives concerning their general opposition to paying for generic advertising. See, e. g., id., at 588; id., at 662-663.
Respondents also suggest that assessments were improperly used to fund materials promoting fruit varieties grown exclusively by their competitors. Brief for Respondents Wileman Brothers et al. 19-20. The claim, however, arises simply from a single reference to Red Jim nectarines, listed among 25 varieties, on a 1989 chart illustrating the availability of mid- to late-season summer tree fruits. App. 531.
These complaints, if they have any merit, are all essentially challenges to the administration of the program that are more properly addressed to the Secretary.
This fact distinguishes the limits on commercial speech at issue in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y, 447 U. S. 557 (1980), Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976), and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U. S. 484 (1996).
This fact distinguishes the compelled speech in West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 (1977), Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C, Inc., 487 U. S. 781 (1988), and the compelled association in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557 (1995).
This fact distinguishes cases like Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740 (1961), Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977), and Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1 (1990).
See n. 10, supra.
The generic advertising program at issue here is even less likely to pose a First Amendment burden than the programs upheld in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S. 507 (1991). Lehnert involved collective programs in the context of a union agency-shop agreement which arguably always poses some burden on First Amendment rights. See id,., at 518 (noting that agency-shop agreements inherently burden First Amendment rights); see also Abood, 431 U. S., at 222 (recognizing that all compelled contributions for collective bargaining affect First Amendment interests because an employee may have ideological, moral, or religious objections to the union’s activities). By contrast, the collective programs authorized by the marketing order do not, as a general matter, impinge on speech or association rights. Cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 634, 635 (1984) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (finding “only minimal constitutional protection of the freedom of commercial association” and that an association whose “activities are not predominantly of the type protected by the First Amendment” is subject to “rationally related state regulation of its membership”).
As we have already noted, n. 8, supra, respondents failed in their challenge to the other features of the programs before the District Court and the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals fails to explain why the Central Hudson test, which involved a restriction on commercial speech, should govern a case involving the compelled funding of speech. Given the fact that the Court of Appeals relied on Abood for the proposition that the program implicates the First Amendment, it is difficult to understand why the Court of Appeals did not apply Abood’s “germaneness” test.
See, e. g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 359-360 (1933); Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 4 (1958); Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U. S. 623, 647 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Secretary must terminate an order if he determines that it does not further the policies of the AMAA, see 7 U. S. C. § 608c(16)(A)(i), or that a majority of producers does not support it, see § 608e(16)(B). The committee voted unanimously for generic advertising assessments in each of the years at issue here. See 58 F. 3d, at 1376.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
After hearing oral argument, and further study of the record, we conclude that the record does not adequately present the questions tendered in the petition. Accordingly the writ is dismissed as improvidently granted.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
whom Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Harlan join.
Considering the volume of cases which invoke the Court's discretionary jurisdiction — as of today 1,091 such cases have been passed on during this Term — it would be indeed surprising if in each Term there were not two or three instances of petitions which, after passing through the preliminary sifting process, did not survive the scrutiny of oral argument. See the cases collected in Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U. S. 70, 77-78, and, more recently, Triplett v. Iowa, 357 U. S. 217, Joseph v. Indiana, 359 U. S. 117, and Phillips v. New York, ante, p. 456. But this is not one of them. The specific questions which were presented by the petition for certiorari are not now found to be frivolous nor do they raise disputed questions of fact, nor does the record otherwise appropriately preclude answers to them. In my view they call for answers against the claims of the petitioner and I would therefore affirm the judgment. In view of the disposition of the case elaboration is not called for.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), the Court held that a suspect's waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is valid only if it is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Id., at 444. This case presents the question whether the suspect’s awareness of all the crimes about which he may be questioned is relevant to determining the validity of his decision to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege.
I
In February 1979, respondent John Leroy Spring and a companion shot and killed Donald Walker during a hunting trip in Colorado. Shortly thereafter, an informant told agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) that Spring was engaged in the interstate transportation of stolen firearms. The informant also told the agents that Spring had discussed his participation in the Colorado killing. At the time the ATF agents received this information, Walker’s body had not been found and the police had received no report of his disappearance. Based on the information received from the informant relating to the firearms violations, the ATF agents set up an undercover operation to purchase firearms from Spring. On March 30, 1979, ATF agents arrested Spring in Kansas City, Missouri, during the undercover purchase.
An ATF agent on the scene of the arrest advised Spring of his Miranda rights. Spring was advised of his Miranda rights a second time after he was transported to the ATF office in Kansas City. At the ATF office, the agents also advised Spring that he had the right to stop the questioning at any time or to stop the questioning until the presence of an attorney could be secured. Spring then signed a written form stating that he understood and waived his rights, and that he was willing to make a statement and answer questions.
ATF agents first questioned Spring about the firearms transactions that led to his arrest. They then asked Spring if he had a criminal record. He admitted that he had a juvenile record for shooting his aunt when he was 10 years old. The agents asked if Spring had ever shot anyone else. Spring ducked his head and mumbled, “I shot another guy once.” The agents asked Spring if he had ever been to Colorado. Spring said no. The agents asked Spring whether he had shot a man named Walker in Colorado and thrown his body into a snowbank. Spring paused and then ducked his head again and said no. The interview ended at this point.
On May 26, 1979, Colorado law enforcement officials visited Spring while he was in jail in Kansas City pursuant to his arrest on the firearms offenses. The officers gave Spring the Miranda warnings, and Spring again signed a written form indicating that he understood his rights and was willing to waive them. The officers informed Spring that they wanted to question him about the Colorado homicide. Spring indicated that he “wanted to get it off his chest.” In an interview that lasted approximately IV2 hours, Spring confessed to the Colorado murder. During that time, Spring talked freely to the officers, did not indicate a desire to terminate the questioning, and never requested counsel. The officers prepared a written statement summarizing the interview. Spring read, edited, and signed the statement.
Spring was charged in Colorado state court with first-degree murder. Spring moved to suppress both statements on the ground that his waiver of Miranda rights was invalid. The trial court found that the ATF agents’ failure to inform Spring before the March 30 interview that they would question him about the Colorado murder did not affect his waiver of his Miranda rights:
“[T]he questions themselves suggested the topic of inquiry. The questions dealt with ‘shooting anyone’ and specifically killing a man named Walker and throwing his body in a snowbank in Colorado. The questions were not designed to gather information relating to a subject that was not readily evident or apparent to Spring. Spring had been advised of his right to remain silent, his right to stop answering questions, and to have an Attorney present during interrogation. He did not elect to exercise his right to remain silent or to refuse to answer questions relating to the homicide, nor did he request Counsel during interrogation.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 4-A.
Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the March 30 statement should not be suppressed on Fifth Amendment grounds. The trial court, however, subsequently ruled that Spring’s statement that he “shot another guy once” was irrelevant, and that the context of the discussion did not support the inference that the statement related to the Walker homicide. For that reason, the March 30 statement was not admitted at Spring’s trial. The court concluded that the May 26 statement “was made freely, voluntarily, and intelligently, after [Spring’s] being properly and fully advised of his rights, and that the statement should not be suppressed, but should be admitted in evidence.” Id., at 5-A. The May 26 statement was admitted into evidence at trial, and Spring was convicted of first-degree murder.
Spring argued on appeal that his waiver of Miranda rights before the March 30 statement was invalid because he was not informed that he would be questioned about the Colorado murder. Although this statement was not introduced at trial, he claimed that its validity was relevant because the May 26 statement that was admitted against him was the illegal “fruit” of the March 30 statement, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963), and therefore should have been suppressed. The Colorado Court of Appeals agreed with Spring, holding that the ATF agents “had a duty to inform Spring that he was a suspect, or to readvise him of his Miranda rights, before questioning him about the murder.” 671 P. 2d 965, 966 (1983). Because they failed to do so before the March 30 interview, “any waiver of rights in regard to questions designed to elicit information about Walker’s death was not given knowingly or intelligently.” Id., at 967. The court held that the March 30 statement was inadmissible and that the State had failed to meet its burden of proving that the May 26 statement was not the product of the prior illegal statement. The court reversed Spring’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, directing that if the State sought to introduce the May 26 statement into evidence, the trial court should determine whether the “taint” of the March 30 statement was sufficiently attenuated to allow introduction of the May 26 statement.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, although its reasoning differed in some respects. 713 P. 2d 865 (1985). The court found:
“[T]he validity of Spring’s waiver of constitutional rights must be determined upon an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement to determine if the waiver was voluntary, knowing and intelligent. No one factor is always determinative in that analysis. Whether, and to what extent, a suspect has been informed or is aware of the subject matter of the interrogation prior to its commencement is simply one factor in the court’s evaluation of the total circumstances, although it may be a major or even a determinative factor in some situations.” Id., at 872-873 (citations omitted).
The court concluded:
“Here, the absence of an advisement to Spring that he would be questioned about the Colorado homicide, and the lack of any basis to conclude that at the time of the execution of the waiver, he reasonably could have expected that the interrogation would extend to that subject, are determinative factors in undermining the validity of the waiver.” Id., at 874 (emphasis in original).
Justice Erickson, joined by Justice Rovira, dissented as to the resolution of this issue, stating:
“Law enforcement officers have no duty under Miranda to inform a person in custody of all charges being investigated prior to questioning him. All that Miranda requires is that the suspect be advised that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be used against him in court, that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer present during interrogation, and that if he cannot afford a lawyer one will be appointed to represent him.” Id., at 880 (citations omitted).
The dissenting justices found “ample evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Spring waived his Miranda rights” and rejected “the majority’s conclusion that Spring’s waiver of his Miranda rights on March 30, 1979 was invalid simply because he was not informed of all matters that would be reviewed when he was questioned by the police.” Id., at 881. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
We granted certiorari, 476 U. S. 1104 (1986), to resolve an arguable Circuit conflict and to review the Colorado Supreme Court’s determination that a suspect’s awareness of the possible subjects of questioning is a relevant and sometimes determinative consideration in assessing whether a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is valid. We now reverse.
II
There is no dispute that the police obtained the May 26 confession after complete Miranda warnings and after informing Spring that he would be questioned about the Colorado homicide. The Colorado Supreme Court nevertheless held that the confession should have been suppressed because it was the illegal “fruit” of the March 30 statement. A confession cannot be “fruit of the poisonous tree” if the tree itself is not poisonous. Our inquiry, therefore, centers on the validity of the March 30 statement.
A
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” This privilege “is fully applicable during a period of custodial interrogation.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 460-461. In Miranda, the Court concluded that “without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” Id., at 467. Accordingly, the Court formulated the now-familiar “procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Id., at 444. The Court’s fundamental aim in designing the Miranda warnings was “to assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.” Id., at 469.
Consistent with this purpose, a suspect may waive his Fifth Amendment privilege, “provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Id., at 444. In this case, the law enforcement officials twice informed Spring of his Fifth Amendment privilege in precisely the manner specified by Miranda. As we have noted, Spring indicated that he understood the enumerated rights and signed a written form expressing his intention to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial court specifically found that “there was no element of duress or coercion used to induce Spring’s statements [on March 30, 1978].” App. to Pet. for Cert. 3-A. Despite the explicit warnings and the finding by the trial court, Spring argues that his March 30 statement was in effect compelled in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege because he signed the waiver form without being aware that he would be questioned about the Colorado homicide. Spring’s argument strains the meaning of compulsion past the breaking point.
B
A statement is not “compelled” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment if an individual “voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently” waives his constitutional privilege. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 444. The inquiry whether a waiver is coerced “has two distinct dimensions.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412, 421 (1986):
“First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the ‘totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.” Ibid, (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 725 (1979)).
There is no doubt that Spring’s decision to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege was voluntary. He alleges no “coercion of a confession by physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to break [his] will,” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298, 312 (1985), and the trial court found none. His allegation that the police failed to supply him with certain information does not relate to any of the traditional indicia of coercion: “the duration and conditions of detention . . . , the manifest attitude of the police toward him, his physical and mental state, the diverse pressures which sap or sustain his powers of resistance and self-control.” Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 602 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Absent evidence that Spring’s “will [was] overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired” because of coercive police conduct, ibid.; see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U. S. 157, 163-164 (1986), his waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege was voluntary under this Court’s decision in Miranda.
There also is no doubt that Spring’s waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege was knowingly and intelligently made: that is, that Spring understood that he had the right to remain silent and that anything he said could be used as evidence against him. The Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Moran v. Burbine, supra, at 422; Oregon v. Elstad, supra, at 316-317. The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee is both simpler and more fundamental: A defendant may not be compelled to be a witness against himself in any respect. The Miranda warnings protect this privilege by ensuring that a suspect knows that he may choose not to talk to law enforcement officers, to talk only with counsel present, or to discontinue talking at any time. The Miranda warnings ensure that a waiver of these rights is knowing and intelligent by requiring that the suspect be fully advised of this constitutional privilege, including the critical advice that whatever he chooses to say may be used as evidence against him.
In this case there is no allegation that Spring failed to understand the basic privilege guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Nor is there any allegation that he misunderstood the consequences of speaking freely to the law enforcement officials. In sum, we think that the trial court was indisputably correct in finding that Spring’s waiver was made knowingly and intelligently within the meaning of Miranda.
hH b-1
A
Spring relies on this Court’s statement in Miranda that “any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will. . . show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege. ” 384 U. S., at 476. He contends that the failure to inform him of the potential subjects of interrogation constitutes the police trickery and deception condemned in Miranda, thus rendering his waiver of Miranda rights invalid. Spring, however, reads this statement in Miranda out of context and without due regard to the constitutional privilege the Miranda warnings were designed to protect.
We note first that the Colorado courts made no finding of official trickery. In fact, as noted above, the trial court expressly found that “there was no element of duress or coercion used to induce Spring’s statements.” Supra, at 573. Spring nevertheless insists that the failure of the ATF agents to inform him that he would be questioned about the murder constituted official “trickery” sufficient to invalidate his waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege, even if the official conduct did not amount to “coercion.” Even assuming that Spring’s proposed distinction has merit, we reject his conclusion. This Court has never held that mere silence by law enforcement officials as to the subject matter of an interrogation is “trickery” sufficient to invalidate a suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights, and we expressly decline so to hold today.
Once Miranda warnings are given, it is difficult to see how official silence could cause a suspect to misunderstand the nature of his constitutional right — “his right to refuse to answer any question which might incriminate him.” United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 188 (1977). “Indeed, it seems self-evident that one who is told he is free to refuse to answer questions is in a curious posture to later complain that his answers were compelled.” Ibid. We have held that a valid waiver does not require that an individual be informed of all information “useful” in making his decision or all information that “might . . . affec[t] his decision to confess.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S., at 422. “[W]e have never read the Constitution to require that the police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his rights.” Ibid. Here, the additional information could affect only the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing nature. Accordingly, the failure of the law enforcement officials to inform Spring of the subject matter of the interrogation could not affect Spring’s decision to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege in a constitutionally significant manner.
B
This Court’s holding in Miranda specifically required that the police inform a criminal suspect that he has the right to remain silent and that anything he says may be used against him. There is no qualification of this broad and explicit warning. The warning, as formulated in Miranda, conveys to a suspect the nature of his constitutional privilege and the consequences of.abandoning it. Accordingly, we hold that a suspect’s awareness of all the possible subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege.
f — I <1
The judgment of the Colorado Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Under this Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), prior to a custodial interrogation a criminal suspect must “be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Id., at 444.
Spring also moved to suppress a third statement made on July 13, 1979, after he had pleaded guilty to the federal firearms offenses and after an information charging him with murder had been issued in Colorado. The Colorado Supreme Court unanimously concluded that the statement should be suppressed because the questioning officials made no effort “to reaffirm Spring’s decision to waive his constitutional rights after he declined to answer particular questions.” 713 P. 2d 865, 878 (1985). We granted certiorari only on the question whether the second statement should have been admitted into evidence. 476 U. S. 1104 (1986). Accordingly, the admissibility of the third statement is not before us.
The Colorado Supreme Court followed the lead of several Federal Courts of Appeals in holding that a suspect’s awareness of the subject matter of the interrogation is one factor to be considered in determining whether a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is valid. United States v. Burger, 728 F. 2d 140, 141 (CA2 1984); Carter v. Garrison, 656 F. 2d 68, 70 (CA4 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 952 (1982); United States v. McCrary, 643 F. 2d 323, 328 (CA5 1981). Other Courts of Appeals have found that a suspect’s awareness of the subject matter of interrogation is not a relevant factor in determining the validity of a Miranda waiver. United States v. Anderson, 175 U. S. App. D. C. 75, 77, n. 3, 533 F. 2d 1210, 1212, n. 3 (1976); United States v. Campbell, 431 F. 2d 97, 99, n. 1 (CA9 1970).
The State argued for the first time in its petition for rehearing to the Colorado Supreme Court that this Court’s decision in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U. S. 298 (1985), renders the May 26 statement admissible without regard to the validity of the March 30 waiver. The Colorado Supreme Court noted that the State would be free to make this argument to the trial court on remand. 713 P. 2d, at 876. The question whether our decision in Oregon v. Elstad provides an independent basis for admitting the May 26 statement therefore is not before us in this case.
This privilege is applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964).
The State does not dispute that the statement at issue was obtained during a “custodial interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda.
The trial court found: “Though it is true that [the ATF agents] did not specifically advise Spring that a part of their interrogation would include questions about the Colorado homicide, the questions themselves suggested the topic of inquiry.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 4-A. According to the Colorado Supreme Court, “It is unclear whether Spring was told by the agents that they wanted to question him specifically about the firearms violations for which he was arrested or whether the agents simply began questioning Spring without making any statement concerning the subject matter of the interrogation. What is clear is that the agents did not tell Spring that they were going to ask him questions about the killing of Walker before Spring made his original decision to waive his Miranda rights.” 713 P. 2d, at 871.
In certain circumstances, the Court has found affirmative misrepresentations by the police sufficient to invalidate a suspect’s waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e. g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U. S. 528 (1963) (misrepresentation by police officers that a suspect would be deprived of state financial aid for her dependent child if she failed to cooperate with authorities rendered the subsequent confession involuntary); Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315 (1959) (misrepresentation by the suspect’s friend that the friend would lose his job as a police officer if the suspect failed to cooperate rendered his statement involuntary). In this case, we are not confronted with an affirmative misrepresentation by law enforcement officials as to the scope of the interrogation and do not reach the question whether a waiver of Miranda rights would be valid in such a circumstance.
Such an extension of Miranda would spawn numerous problems of interpretation because any number of factors could affect a suspect’s decision to waive his Miranda rights. The requirement would also vitiate to a great extent the Miranda rule’s important “virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity” as to how a pretrial questioning of a suspect must be conducted. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 718 (1979).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner and the respondent (which we shall call the union and the employer) were parties to a collective bargaining contract within the purview of the National Labor Relations Act. The contract contained the following provisions, among others:
“Article II
“The Employer reserves the right to discharge any man in his employ if his work is not satisfactory.
“Article XIV
“Should any difference as to the true interpretation of this agreement arise, same shall be submitted to a Board of Arbitration of two members, one representing the firm, and one representing the Union. If said members cannot agree, a third member, who must be a disinterested party shall be selected, and the decision of the said Board of Arbitration shall be binding. It is further agreed by both parties hereto that during such arbitration, there shall be no suspension of work.
“Should any difference arise between the employer and the employee, same shall be submitted to arbitration by both parties. Failing to agree, they shall mutually appoint a third person whose decision shall be final and binding.”
In May of 1958 an employee named Welsch was discharged by the employer after he had damaged a new fork-lift truck by running it off a loading platform and onto some railroad tracks. When a business agent of the union protested, he was told by a representative of the employer that Welsch had been discharged because of unsatisfactory work. The union thereupon called a strike to force the employer to rehire Welsch. The strike lasted eight days. After the strike was over, the issue of Welsch’s discharge was submitted to arbitration. Some five months later the Board of Arbitration rendered a decision, ruling that Welsch’s work had been unsatisfactory, that his unsatisfactory work had been the reason for his discharge, and that he was not entitled to reinstatement as an employee.
In the meantime, the employer had brought this suit against the union in the Superior Court of King County, Washington, asking damages for business losses caused by the strike. After a trial that court entered a judgment in favor of the employer in the amount of $6,501.60. On appeal the judgment was affirmed by Department One of the Supreme Court of Washington. 57 Wash. 2d 95, 356 P. 2d 1. The reviewing court held that the pre-emption doctrine of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, did not deprive it of jurisdiction over the controversy. The court further held that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U. S. C. § 185, could not “reasonably be interpreted as pre-empting state jurisdiction, or as affecting it by limiting the substantive law to be applied.” 57 Wash. 2d, at 102, 356 P. 2d, at 5. Expressly applying principles of state law, the court reasoned that the strike was a violation of the collective bargaining contract, because it was an attempt to coerce the employer to forego his contractual right to discharge an employee for unsatisfactory work. We granted certiorari to consider questions of federal labor law which this case presents. 365 U. S. 868.
We note at the outset a question as to our jurisdiction. Although the judgment before us has been certified as that of the Supreme Court of Washington, this case was actually heard and decided by Department One of that court, consisting of five of the nine members of the full court. Since the union could have filed a petition for rehearing en banc but did not do so, the argument is made that the judgment before us was not “rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had,” and that the judgment is one we therefore have no power to review. 28 U. S. C. § 1257. This argument primarily rests upon Gorman v. Washington University, 316 U. S. 98, which held that, in view of the structure of Missouri’s judicial system, a separate division of the Supreme Court of that State was not the highest state court in which a decision of a federal question could be had. It is evident, however, that the law governing rehearings in the Supreme Court of Washington is quite unlike the particularized provisions of Missouri law which led this Court to dismiss the writ in Gorman.
As the opinion in Gorman pointed out, the Constitution of the State of Missouri expressly conferred the right to an en banc rehearing by the Supreme Court of Missouri in any case originally decided by a division of the court in which a federal question was involved. It was this provision of the state constitution which was the basis for the conclusion in Gorman that the State of Missouri did not regard a decision by a division of the court as the final step in the state appellate process in a case involving a federal question. “[T]he constitution of Missouri,” it was said, “has thus provided in this class of cases for review of the judgment of a division . . . 316 U. S., at 100.
By contrast, a rehearing en banc before the Supreme Court of Washington is not granted as a matter of right. The Constitution and statutes of the State of Washington authorize its Supreme Court to sit in two Departments, each of which is empowered “to hear and determine causes, and all questions arising therein.” Cases coming before the court may be assigned to a Department or to the court en banc at the discretion of the Chief Justice and a specified number of other members of the court. The state law further provides that the decision of a Department becomes a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington, unless within 30 days a petition for rehearing has been filed, or a rehearing has been ordered on the court’s own initiative.
We can discern in Washington’s system no indication that the decision in the present case, rendered unanimously by a majority of the judges of the Supreme Court of Washington, was other than the final word of the State’s final court. This case is thus properly before us, and we turn to the issues which it presents.
One of those issues — whether § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 deprives state courts of jurisdiction over litigation such as this — we have decided this Term in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S. 502. For the reasons stated in our opinion in that case, we hold that the Washington Supreme Court was correct in ruling that it had jurisdiction over this controversy. There remain for consideration two other issues, one of them implicated but not specifically decided in Dowd Box. Was the Washington court free, as it thought, to decide this controversy within the limited horizon of its local law? If not, does applicable federal law require a result in this case different from that reached by the state court?
In Dowd Box we proceeded upon the hypothesis that state courts would apply federal law in exercising jurisdiction over litigation within the purview of § 301 (a), although in that case there was no claim of any variance in relevant legal principles as between the federal law and that of Massachusetts. In the present case, by contrast, the Washington court held that there was nothing in § 301 “limiting the substantive law to be applied,” and the court accordingly proceeded to dispose of this litigation exclusively in terms of local contract law. The union insists that the case was one to be decided by reference to federal law, and that under applicable principles of national labor law the strike was not a violation of the collective bargaining contract. We hold that in a case such as this, incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles of federal labor law. We further hold, however, that application of such principles to this case leads to affirmance of the judgment before us.
It was apparently the theory of the Washington court that, although Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, requires the federal courts to fashion, from the policy of our national labor laws, a body of federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, nonetheless, the courts of the States remain free to apply individualized local rules when called upon to enforce such agreements. This view cannot be accepted. The dimensions of § 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the statute. Comprehensiveness is inherent in the process by which the law is to be formulated under the mandate of Lincoln Mills, requiring issues raised in suits of a kind covered by § 301 to be decided according to the precepts of federal labor policy.
More important, the subject matter of § 301 (a) “is peculiarly one that calls for uniform law.” Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 250 U. S. 566, 569; see Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U. S. 148, 167-169. The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements. Because neither party could be certain of the rights which it had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating an agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by the necessity of trying to formulate contract provisions in such a way as to contain the same meaning under two or more systems of law which might someday be invoked in enforcing the contract. Once the collective bargain was made, the possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation under competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong disputes as to its interpretation. Indeed, the existence of possibly conflicting legal concepts might substantially impede the parties’ willingness to agree to contract terms providing for final arbitral or judicial resolution of disputes.
The importance of the area which would be affected by separate systems of substantive law makes the need for a single body of federal law particularly compelling. The ordering and adjusting of competing interests through a process of free and voluntary collective bargaining is the keystone of the federal scheme to promote industrial peace. State law which frustrates the effort of Congress to stimulate the smooth functioning of that process thus strikes at the very core of federal labor policy. With due regard to the many factors which bear upon competing state and federal interests in this area, California v. Zook, 336 U. S. 725, 730-731; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230-231, we cannot but conclude that in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules.
Whether, as a matter of federal law, the strike which the union called was a violation of the collective bargaining contract is thus the ultimate issue which this case presents. It is argued that there could be no violation in the absence of a no-strike clause in the contract explicitly covering the subject of the dispute over which the strike was called. We disagree.
The collective bargaining contract expressly imposed upon both parties the duty of submitting the dispute in question to final and binding arbitration. In a consistent course of decisions the Courts of Appeals of at least five Federal Circuits have held that a strike to settle a dispute which a collective bargaining agreement provides shall be settled exclusively and finally by compulsory arbitration constitutes a violation of the agreement. The National Labor Relations Board has reached the same conclusion. W. L. Mead, Inc., 113 N. L. R. B. 1040. We approve that doctrine. To hold otherwise would obviously do violence to accepted principles of traditional contract law. Even more in point, a contrary view would be completely at odds with the basic policy of national labor legislation to promote the arbitral process as a substitute for economic warfare. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574.
What has been said is not to suggest that a no-strike agreement is to be implied beyond the area which it has been agreed will be exclusively covered by compulsory terminal arbitration.. Nor is it to suggest that there may not arise problems in specific cases as to whether compulsory and binding arbitration has been agreed upon, and, if so, as to what disputes have been made arbitrable. But no such problems are present in this case. The grievance over which the union struck was, as it concedes, one which it had expressly agreed to settle by submission to final and binding arbitration proceedings. The strike which it called was a violation of that contractual obligation.
Affirmed.
The strike was terminated by a temporary injunction issued by the state court.
The amount of damages is not in issue here.
The court noted that the unreported memorandum opinion of the trial judge indicated a theory of liability based upon tort, rather than contract, liability. The appellate court said, however: “From the pleadings, the theory is established that the respondent was injured by the appellant’s breach of contract and this theory is clearly supported by the record. Therefore, the rule that the judgment of the trial court will be sustained on any theory established by the pleadings and supported by the proof is applicable.” 57 Wash. 2d, at 103, 356 P. 2d, at 6.
See also Osment v. Pitcairn, 317 U. S. 587.
Article IV, §2 of the state constitution provides, in pertinent part, “The legislature may increase the number of judges of the supreme court from time to time and may provide for separate departments of said court.”
Revised Code of Washington, §2.04.120, provides:
“Two departments — Quorum. There shall be two departments of the supreme court, denominated respectively department one and department two. The chief justice shall assign four of the associate judges to each department and such assignment may be changed by him from time to time: Provided, That the associate judges shall be competent to sit in either department and may interchange with one another by agreement among themselves, or if no such agreement be made, as ordered by the chief justice. The chief justice may sit in either department and shall preside when so sitting, but-the judges assigned to each department shall select one of their number as presiding judge. Each of the departments shall have the power to hear and determine causes, and all questions arising therein, subject to the provisions in relation to the court en banc. The presence of three judges shall be necessary to transact any business in either of the departments, except such as may be done at chambers, but one or more of the judges may from time to time adjourn to the same effect as if all were present, and a concurrence of three judges shall be necessary to pronounce a decision in each department: Provided, That if three do not concur, the cause shall be reheard in the same department or transmitted to the other department, or to the court en banc.”
Revised Code of Washington, §2.04.150, provides:
“Apportionment of business — En banc hearings. The chief justice shall from time to time apportion the business to the departments, and may, in his discretion, before a decision is pronounced, order any cause pending before the court to be heard and determined by the court en banc. When a cause has been allotted to one of the departments and a decision pronounced therein, the chief justice, together with any two associate judges, may order such cause to be heard and decided by the court en banc. Any four judges may, either before or after decision by a department, order a cause to be heard en banc.”
Revised Code of Washington, §2.04.160, provides:
“Finality of departmental decision — Rehearings. The decision of a department, except in cases otherwise ordered as hereinafter provided, shall not become final until thirty days after the filing thereof, during which period a petition for rehearing, or for a hearing en banc, may be filed, the filing of either of which, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, shall have the effect of suspending such decision until the same shall have been disposed of. If no such petition be filed the decision of a department shall become final thirty days from the date of its filing, unless during such thirty-day period an order for a hearing en banc shall have been made: .... Whenever a decision shall become final, as herein provided, a judgment shall issue thereon.”
See Market Street R. Co. v. Comm’n, 324 U. S. 548, 551-552. In recent years we have, without challenge, reviewed on their merits several cases decided by a Department of the Washington Supreme Court in which no petition for rehearing en banc had been filed. See, e. g., McGrath v. Rhay, 364 U. S. 279; Ross v. Schneckloth, 357 U. S. 575; United States v. Carroll Construction Co., 346 U. S. 802.
Since this was a suit for violation of a collective bargaining contract within the purview of § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, the pre-emptive doctrine of cases such as San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, based upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, is not relevant. See Local 4264, United Steelworkers v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F. 2d 352 (C. A. 10th Cir.); Independent Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 235 F. 2d 401 (C. A. 3d Cir.); see generally Lodge No. 12, District No. 37, Int’l Assn. of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257 F. 2d 467 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Local 598, Plumbers & Steamfitters Union v. Dillion, 255 F. 2d 820 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Local 181, Int’l Union of Operating Engineers v. Dahlem Constr. Co., 193 F. 2d 470 (C. A. 6th Cir.). As pointed out in Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U. S., at 513, Congress “deliberately chose to leave the enforcement of collective agreements to the usual processes of the law.’ ” See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 52. It is, of course, true that conduct which is a violation of a contractual obligation may also be conduct constituting an unfair labor practice, and what has been said is not to imply that enforcement by a court of a contract obligation affects the jurisdiction of the N. L. R. B. to remedy unfair labor practices, as such. See generally Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional Problems, 57 Col. L. Rev. 52.
Of the many state courts which have assumed jurisdiction over suits involving contracts subject to § 301, few have explicitly considered the problem of state versus federal law. McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 60, 315 P. 2d 322, 330, held that federal law must govern. Accord: Local Lodge No. 774, Int’l Assn. of Machinists v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 186 Kan. 569, 352 P. 2d 420; Harbison-Walker Refractories Co. v. Local 702, United Brick & Clay Workers, 339 S. W. 2d 933, 935-936 (Ky. Ct. App.). Other courts have found it unnecessary to decide the question, because they found no conflict between state and federal law on the issues presented. Karcz v. Luther Mfg. Co., 338 Mass. 313, 317, 155 N. E. 2d 441, 444; Springer v. Powder Power Tool Corp., 220 Ore. 102, 106-107, 348 P. 2d 1112, 1114; Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 277, 100 N. W. 2d 317, 318 (on motion for rehearing). It bears noting, however, that these courts and others, e. g., Con necticut Co. v. Division 425, Street & Electric Railway Employees, 147 Conn. 608, 622-623, 164 A. 2d 413, 420, have carefully considered applicable federal precedents in resolving the litigation before them.
As one commentator has said: “Words in any legal document are ambiguous, but the body of law which grows up in an area through decision helps to dispel this ambiguity. The existence of two bodies of law which cannot be accommodated by any conflict-of-laws rule, however, is calculated to aggravate rather than to alleviate the situation.” Wellington, Labor and the Federal System, 26 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 542, 557.
It appears that this would be true whether the dispute be considered as a “difference as to the true interpretation of this agreement” or as a difference “between the employer and the employee” under Article XIV of the contract. See p. 96, supra. The union not only now concedes that the dispute as to Welsch’s discharge was subject to final and binding arbitration, but, indeed, after the strike, the dispute was so arbitrated.
See Local 25, Teamsters Union v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F. 2d 576, 583-584 (C. A. 1st Cir.); United Construction Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F. 2d 872, 876-877 (C. A. 4th Cir.); Labor Board v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 179 F. 2d 589, 592 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F. 2d 346, 351 (C. A. 6th Cir.); Labor Board v. Sunset Minerals, 211 F. 2d 224, 226 (C. A. 9th Cir.).
Deciding the case as we do upon this explicit ground, we do not adopt the reasoning of the Washington court. Insofar as the language of that court’s opinion is susceptible to the construction that a strike during the term of a collective bargaining agreement is ipso facto a violation of the agreement, we expressly reject it.
With respect to such problems, compare United Mine Workers v. Labor Board, 103 U. S. App. D. C. 207, 257 F. 2d 211, with Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F. 2d 346 (affirmed on this question by an equally divided Court, 361 U. S. 459), for differing interpretations of an identical contract.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
G
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we review a determination by the Michigan Court of Appeals that any “investigatory pursuit” of a person undertaken by the police necessarily constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. We conclude that the police conduct in this case did not amount to a seizure, for it would not have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.
I
Early on the afternoon of December 19, 1984, four officers riding in a marked police cruiser were engaged in routine patrol duties in Metropolitan Detroit. As the cruiser came to an intersection, one of the officers observed a car pull over to the curb. A man got out of the car and approached respondent Michael Mose Chesternut, who was standing alone on the corner. When respondent saw the patrol car nearing the comer where he stood, he turned and began to run. As Officer Peltier, one of those in the car, later testified, the patrol car followed respondent around the corner “to see where he was going.” App. 25. The cruiser quickly caught up with respondent and drove alongside him for a short distance. As they drove beside him, the officers observed respondent discard a number of packets he pulled from his right-hand pocket. Officer Peltier got out of the cruiser to examine the packets. He discovered that they contained pills. While Peltier was engaged in this inspection, respondent, who had run only a few paces farther, stopped. Surmising on the basis of his experience as a paramedic that the pills contained codeine, Officer Peltier arrested respondent for the possession of narcotics and took him to the station house. During an ensuing search, the police discovered in respondent’s hatband another packet of pills, a packet containing heroin, and a hypodermic needle. Respondent was charged with knowingly and intentionally possessing heroin, tablets containing codeine, and tablets containing diazepam, all in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws §333.7403(2) (1980).
At a preliminary hearing, at. which Officer Peltier was the only witness, respondent moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that he had been unlawfully seized during the police pursuit preceding his disposal of the packets. The presiding Magistrate granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. Relying on People v. Terrell, 77 Mich. App. 676, 259 N. W. 2d 187 (1977), the Magistrate ruled from the bench that a police “chase” like the one involved in this case implicated Fourth Amendment protections and could not be justified by the mere fact that the suspect ran at the sight of the police. App. 31-35. Applying a clearly-erroneous standard to the Magistrate’s ruling, the trial court upheld the dismissal order. Id., at 2-10.
The Michigan Court of Appeals “reluctantly” affirmed, 157 Mich. App. 181, 184, 403 N. W. 2d 74, 76 (1986), noting that “although we find the result unfortunate, we cannot say that the lower court’s ruling was clearly erroneous under the present law or the facts presented.” Id., at 183, 403 N. W. 2d, at 75. Like the courts below it, the Court of Appeals rested its ruling on state precedents interpreting the Fourth Amendment. The court determined, first, that any “investigatory pursuit” amounts to a seizure under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968). “As soon as the officers began their pursuit,” the court explained, “defendant’s freedom was restricted.” 157 Mich. App., at 183, 403 N. W. 2d, at 75. The court went on to conclude that respondent’s flight from the police was insufficient, by itself, to give rise to the particularized suspicion necessary to justify this kind of seizure. Because “the police saw [respondent] do absolutely nothing illegal nor did they observe other suspicious activity,” the court determined that the investigatory pursuit had violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures. Id., at 184, 403 N. W. 2d, at 76.
After the Michigan Supreme Court denied petitioner leave to appeal, App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a, petitioner sought review here. We granted a 'writ of certiorari, 484 U. S. 895 (1987), to consider whether the officers’ pursuit of respondent constituted a seizure implicating Fourth Amendment protections, and, if so, whether the act of fleeing, by itself, was sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion justifying that seizure. Because we conclude that the officers’ conduct did not constitute a seizure, we need not reach the second question.
h — I i
A
Petitioner argues that the Fourth Amendment is never implicated until an individual stops in response to the police’s show of authority. Thus, petitioner would have us rule that a lack of objective and particularized suspicion would not poison police conduct, no matter how coercive, as long as the police did not succeed in actually apprehending the individual. Respondent contends, in sharp contrast, that any and all police “chases” are Fourth Amendment seizures. Respondent would have us rule that the police may never pursue an individual absent a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that he is engaged in criminal activity.
Both petitioner and respondent, it seems to us, in their attempts to fashion a bright-line rule applicable to all investigatory pursuits, have failed to heed this Court’s clear direction that any assessment as to whether police conduct amounts to a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment must take into account “ ‘all of the circumstances surrounding the incident’ ” in each individual case. INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 215 (1984), quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.). Rather than adopting either rule proposed by the parties and determining that an investigatory pursuit is or is not necessarily a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, we adhere to our traditional contextual approach, and determine only that, in this particular case, the police conduct in question did not amount to a seizure.
B
In Terry v. Ohio, the Court noted:
“Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” 392 U. S., at 19, n. 16.
A decade later in United States v. Mendenhall, Justice Stewart, writing for himself and then Justice Rehnquist, first transposed this analysis into a test to be applied in determining whether “a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” 446 U. S., at 554. The test provides that the police can be said to have seized an individual “only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Ibid. The Court has since embraced this test. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S., at 215. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 502 (1983) (plurality opinion); id., at 514 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The test is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation. Moreover, what constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to “leave” will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs. Compare United States v. Mendenhall, supra (considering whether police request to see identification and ticket of individual who stopped upon police’s approach constituted seizure), with INS v. Delgado, supra (considering whether INS “factory survey” conducted while employees continued to move about constituted seizure of entire work force).
While the test is flexible enough to be applied to the whole range of police conduct in an equally broad range of settings, it calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regardless of the particular individual’s response to the actions of the police. The test’s objective standard-looking to the reasonable man’s interpretation of the conduct in question — allows the police to determine in advance whether the conduct contemplated will implicate the Fourth Amendment. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2(h), pp. 407-408 (2d ed. 1987 and Supp. 1988). This “reasonable person” standard also ensures that the scope of Fourth Amendment protection does not vary with the state of mind of the particular individual being approached.
C
Applying the Court’s test to the facts of this case, we conclude that respondent was not seized by the police before he discarded the packets containing the controlled substance. Although Officer Peltier referred to the police conduct as a “chase,” and the Magistrate who originally dismissed the complaint was impressed by this description, the characterization is not enough, standing alone, to implicate Fourth Amendment protections. Contrary to respondent’s assertion that a chase necessarily communicates that detention is intended and imminent, Brief for Respondent 9, the police conduct involved here would not have communicated to the reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise intrude upon respondent’s freedom of movement. The record does not reflect that the police activated a siren or flashers; or that they commanded respondent to halt, or displayed any weapons; or that they operated the car in an aggressive manner to block respondent’s course or otherwise control the direction or speed of his movement. Tr. of Oral Arg. 2, 11, 20. While the very presence of a police car driving parallel to a running pedestrian could be somewhat intimidating, this kind of police presence does not, standing alone, constitute a seizure. Cf. United States v. Knotts, 460 U. S. 276 (1983) (holding that continuous surveillance on public thoroughfares by visual observation and electronic “beeper” does not constitute seizure); Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S., at 497 (plurality opinion) (noting that mere approach by law enforcement officers, identified as such, does not constitute seizure). Without more, the police conduct here — a brief acceleration to catch up with respondent, followed by a short drive alongside him — was not “so intimidating” that respondent could reasonably have believed that he was not free to disregard the police presence and go about his business. INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S., at 216. The police therefore were not required to have “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting [respondent] of criminal activity,” in order to pursue him. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417-418 (1981).
J-H HH
Because respondent was not unlawfully seized during the initial police pursuit, we conclude that charges against him were improperly dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals, and remand the case to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The Magistrate did not independently consider whether the codeine pills, if lawfully seized, established probable cause justifying respondent’s arrest. The Fourth Amendment issue before us is therefore limited to the police conduct preceding and including respondent’s disposal of the packets.
In Terrell, a police officer got out of his unmarked car and “gave chase” on foot after allegedly observing the defendant stick his hand in his pocket and run at the sight of the officer. 77 Mich. App., at 678, 259 N. W. 2d, at 188. According to the officer, the defendant ran into an apartment building where the officer observed him drop a clear envelope containing a brown powdery substance. Having determined that the package might contain heroin, the officer arrested the defendant. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the envelope and its contents. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the police “investigatory pursuit” constituted a seizure that was unjustified by any particularized suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Id., at 679-680, 259 N. W. 2d, at 188-189.
The Michigan Court of Appeals rested its holding on People v. Terrell, supra, and People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 378 N. W. 2d 451 (1985), cert. dism’d (in view of that respondent’s death), 478 U. S. 1017 (1986), both of which were to the effect that the defendant in question had been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In Shabaz, the Michigan Supreme Court quoted “Michigan’s analogous [constitutional] provision,” without elaboration, in a footnote following a recitation of the Fourth Amendment. 424 Mich., at 52, n. 4, 378 N. W. 2d, at 455, n. 4. The Supreme Court said nothing to suggest that the Michigan Constitution’s seizure provision provided an independent source of relief, and the court’s entire analysis rested expressly on the Fourth Amendment and federal cases. Similarly, in Terrell, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated that the suppression of evidence and dismissal of charges against the defendant “was soundly based on existing law, state and Federal,” but made clear that the scope of the right in question was defined “by the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 77 Mich. App., at 679, 259 N. W. 2d, at 188, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 20 (1968). In light of the bases for the courts’ decisions in Shabaz and Terrell, we readily conclude that the decision below likewise rests on the Michigan courts’ interpretation of the Federal Constitution and not on any adequate and independent state ground. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983). The defense in effect concedes this. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 38-39.
Two justices of the Michigan Supreme Court would have granted leave to appeal. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 10a.
Three other Justices, otherwise in the majority, chose not to reach the question whether the federal officers had seized respondent. 446 U. S., at 560 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
At the preliminary hearing, the Magistrate interrupted the State’s attorney, who was asserting that the police were simply performing routine patrolling duties, with the following:
“That would be fine until the Officer said we were chasing him in the car, otherwise I would agree with you. My ears picked up when the Officer said that, you know. He said we went around. I asked him why were you chasing him in the car, why were you chasing him and he said because he was running and we wanted to see where he was going.” App. 29-30.
As Officer Peltier explained, the goal of the “chase” was not to capture respondent, but “to see where he was going.” Id., at 25. Of course, the subjective intent of the officers is relevant to an assessment of the Fourth Amendment implications of police conduct only to the extent that that intent has been conveyed to the person confronted. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S., at 554, n. 6 (opinion of Stewart, J.). See also 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2(h), p. 407 (2d ed. 1987 and Supp. 1988) (uncommunicated intent of police irrelevant to determination of whether seizure occurred).
The facts of this case are not identical to the facts involved in both Terrell and Shabaz, upon which the Michigan courts relied in finding a seizure in this case. In both Terrell and Shabaz, a police officer got out of the car to chase the pedestrian suspect on foot, after which the defendant abandoned the inculpatory evidence. People v. Terrell, 77 Mich. App., at 678, 259 N. W. 2d, at 188; People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich., at 47-48, 378 N. W. 2d, at 453. In Shabaz, the State appears to have stipulated that the chase, whose clear object was to apprehend the defendant, constituted a seizure. Id., at 52, 378 N. W. 2d, at 455. While no similar stipulation was entered in Terrell, the goal of that chase appears to have been equally clear. We, of course, intimate no view as to the federal constitutional correctness of either of those Michigan state-court cases.
The United States, which has submitted a brief as amicus curiae, suggests that, in some circumstances, police pursuit “will amount to a stop from the outset or from an early point in the chase, if the police command the person to halt and indicate that he is not free to go.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13. Of course, such circumstances are not before us in this case. We therefore leave to another day the determination of the circumstances in which police pursuit could amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Souter
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Justice Stevens joins.
The question presented is whether our ruling in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. 263 (1984), should apply retroactively to claims arising on facts antedating that decision. We hold that application of the rule in that case requires its application retroactively in later cases.
I — H
Prior to its amendment in 1985, Georgia state law imposed an excise tax on imported alcohol and distilled spirits at a rate double that imposed on alcohol and distilled spirits manufactured from Georgia-grown products. See Ga. Code Ann. § 3-4-60 (1982). In 1984, a Hawaii statute that similarly distinguished between imported and local alcoholic products was held in Bacchus to violate the Commerce Clause. Bacchus, 468 U. S., at 273. It proved no bar to our finding of unconstitutionality that the discriminatory tax involved intoxicating liquors, with respect to which the States have heightened regulatory powers under the Twenty-first Amendment. Id., at 276.
In Bacchus’ wake, petitioner James B. Beam Distilling Co., a Delaware corporation and Kentucky bourbon manufacturer, claimed Georgia’s law likewise inconsistent with the Commerce Clause, and sought a refund of $2.4 million, representing not only the differential taxation but the full amount it had paid under § 3-4-60 for the years 1982, 1983, and 1984. Georgia’s Department of Revenue failed to respond to the request, and Beam thereafter brought a refund action against the State in the Superior Court of Fulton County. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court agreed that § 3-4-60 could not withstand a Bacchus attack for the years in question, and that the tax had therefore been unconstitutional. Using the analysis described in this Court’s decision in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97 (1971), the court nonetheless refused to apply its ruling retroactively. It therefore denied petitioner’s refund request.
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court in both respects. The court held the pre-1985 version of the statute to have violated the Commerce Clause as, in its words, an act of “simple economic protectionism.” See 259 Ga. 363, 364, 382 S. E. 2d 95, 96 (1989) (citing Bacchtis). But it, too, applied that finding on a prospective basis only, in the sense that it declined to declare the State’s application of the statute unconstitutional for the years in question. The court concluded that but for Bacchus its decision on the constitutional question would have established a new rule of law by overruling past precedent, see Scott v. State, 187 Ga. 702, 2 S. E. 2d 65 (1939) (upholding predecessor to §3-4-60 against Commerce Clause objection), upon which the litigants may justifiably have relied. See 259 Ga., at 365, 382 S. E. 2d, at 96. That reliance, together with the “unjust results” that would follow from retroactive application, was thought by the court to satisfy the Chevron Oil test for prospectivity. To the dissenting argument of two justices that a statute found unconstitutional is unconstitutional ab initio, the court observed that while it had “‘declared statutes to be void from their inception when they were contrary to the Constitution at the time of enactment, . . . those decisions are not applicable to the present controversy, as the original . . . statute, when adopted, was not violative of the Constitution under court interpretations of that period.’” 259 Ga., at 366, 382 S. E. 2d, at 97 (quoting Adams v. Adams, 249 Ga. 477, 478-479, 291 S. E. 2d 518, 520 (1982)).
Beam sought a writ of certiorari from the Court on the retroactivity question. We granted the petition, 496 U. S. 924 (1990), and now reverse.
r“H H-1
In the ordinary case, no question of retroactivity arises. Courts are as a general matter in the business of applying settled principles and precedents of law to the disputes that come to bar. See Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 60 (1965). Where those principles and precedents antedate the events on which the dispute turns, the court merely applies legal rules already decided, and the litigant has no basis on which to claim exemption from those rules.
It is only when the law changes in some respect that an assertion of nonretroactivity may be entertained, the paradigm case arising when a court expressly overrules a precedent upon which the contest would otherwise be decided differently and by which the parties may previously have regulated their conduct. Since the question is whether the court should apply the old rule or the new one, retroactivity is properly seen in the first instance as a matter of choice of law, “a choice . . . between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward.” Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358, 364 (1932). Once a rule is found to apply “backward,” there may then be a further issue of remedies, i. e., whether the party prevailing under a new rule should obtain the same relief that would have been awarded if the rule had been an old one. Subject to possible constitutional thresholds, see McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U. S. 18 (1990), the remedial inquiry is one governed by state law, at least where the case originates in state court. See American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167, 210 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But the antecedent choice-of-law question is a federal one where the rule at issue itself derives from federal law, constitutional or otherwise. See Smith, supra, at 177-178 (plurality opinion); cf. United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U. S. 286, 297, n. (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
As a matter purely of judicial mechanics, there are three ways in which the choice-of-law problem may be resolved. First, a decision may be made fully retroactive, applying both to the parties before the court and to all others by and against whom claims may be pressed, consistent with res judicata and procedural barriers such as statutes of limitations. This practice is overwhelmingly the norm, see Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting), and is in keeping with the traditional function of the courts to decide cases before them based upon their best current understanding of the law. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part). It also reflects the declaratory theory of law, see Smith, supra, at 201 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 622-623 (1965), according to which the courts are understood only to find the law, not to make it. But in some circumstances retroactive application may prompt difficulties of a practical sort. However much it comports with our received notions of the judicial role, the practice has been attacked for its failure to take account of reliance on cases subsequently abandoned, a fact of life if not always one of jurisprudential recognition. See, e. g., Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U. S. 267, 276 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
Second, there is the purely prospective method of overruling, under which a new rule is applied neither to the parties in the law-making decision nor to those others against or by whom it might be applied to conduct or events occurring before that decision. The case is decided under the old law but becomes a vehicle for announcing the new, effective with respect to all conduct occurring after the date of that decision. This Court has, albeit infrequently, resorted to pure prospectivity, see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97 (1971); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 88 (1982); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 142-143 (1976); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 422 (1964); see also Smith, supra, at 221, n. 11 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Linkletter, supra, at 628, although in so doing it has never been required to distinguish the remedial from the choice-of-law aspect of its decision. See Smith, supra, at 210 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This approach claims justification in its appreciation that “[t]he past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration,” Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371, 374 (1940); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U. S. 192, 199 (1973) (plurality opinion), and that to apply the new rule to parties who relied on the old would offend basic notions of justice and fairness. But this equitable method has its own drawback: it tends to relax the force of precedent, by minimizing the costs of overruling, and thereby allows the courts to act with a freedom comparable to that of legislatures. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537, 554-555 (1982); James v. United States, 366 U. S. 213, 225 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
Finally, a court may apply a new rule in the case in which it is pronounced, then return to the old one with respect to all others arising on facts predating the pronouncement. This method, which we may call modified, or selective, prospec-tivity, enjoyed its temporary ascendancy in the criminal law during a period in which the Court formulated new rules, prophylactic or otherwise, to insure protection of the rights of the accused. See, e. g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719 (1966); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 297 (1967); Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U. S. 31 (1975); see also Smith, supra, at 198 (“During the period in which much of our retroactivity doctrine evolved, most of the Court’s new rules of criminal procedure had expanded the protections available to criminal defendants”). On the one hand, full retroactive application of holdings such as those announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964); and Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), would have “seriously disrupted] the administration of our criminal laws [,]... requiring] the retrial or release of numerous prisoners found guilty by trustworthy evidence in conformity with previously announced constitutional standards.” Johnson, supra, at 731. On the other hand, retroactive application could hardly have been denied the litigant in the law-changing decision itself. A criminal defendant usually seeks one thing only on appeal, the reversal of his conviction; future application would provide little in the way of solace. In this context, without retroactivity at least to the first successful litigant, the incentive to seek review would be diluted if not lost altogether.
But selective prospectivity also breaches the principle that litigants in similar situations should be treated the same, a fundamental component of stare decisis and the rule of law generally. See R. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision 69-72 (1961). “We depart from this basic judicial tradition when we simply pick and choose from among similarly situated defendants those who alone will receive the benefit of a ‘new’ rule of constitutional law.” Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 258-259 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 409, 425 (1924). For this reason, we abandoned the possibility of selective prospectivity in the criminal context in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314, 328 (1987), even where the new rule constituted a “clear break” with previous law, in favor of completely retroactive application of all decisions to cases pending on direct review. Though Griffith was held not to dispose of the matter of civil retroactivity, see id., at 322, n. 8, selective prospectivity appears never to have been endorsed in the civil context. Smith, 496 U. S., at 200 (plurality opinion). This case presents the issue.
Ill
Both parties have assumed the applicability of the Chevron Oil test, under which the Court has accepted prospectivity (whether in the choice-of-law or remedial sense, it is not clear) where a decision displaces a principle of law on which reliance may reasonably have been placed, and where pros-pectivity is on balance warranted by its effect on the operation of the new rule and by the inequities that might otherwise result from retroactive application. See Chevron Oil, 404 U. S., at 106-107. But we have never employed Chevron Oil to the end of modified civil prospectivity.
The issue is posed by the scope of our disposition in Bacchus. In most decisions of this Court, retroactivity both as to choice of law and as to remedy goes without saying. Although the taxpaying appellants prevailed on the merits of their Commerce Clause claim, however, the Bacchus Court did not grant outright their request for a refund of taxes paid under the law found unconstitutional. Instead, we remanded the case for consideration of the State’s arguments that appellants were “not entitled to refunds since they did not bear the economic incidence of the tax but passed it on as a separate addition to the price that their customers were legally obligated to pay.” Bacchus, 468 U. S., at 276-277. “These refund issues, . . . essentially issues of remedy,” had not been adequately developed on the record nor passed upon by the state courts below, and their consideration may have been intertwined with, or obviated by, matters of state law. Id., at 277.
Questions of remedy aside, Bacchus is fairly read to hold as a choice of law that its rule should apply retroactively to the litigants then before the Court. Because the Bacchus opinion did not reserve the question whether its holding should be applied to the parties before it, cf. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266, 297-298 (1987) (remanding case to consider whether ruling “should be applied retroactively and to decide other remedial issues”), it is properly understood to have followed the normal rule of retroactive application in civil cases. If the Court were to have found prospectivity as a choice-of-law matter, there would have been no need to consider the pass-through defense; if the Court had reserved the issue, the terms of the remand to consider “remedial” issues would have been incomplete. Indeed, any consideration of remedial issues necessarily implies that the precedential question has been settled to the effect that the rule of law will apply to the parties before the Court. See McKesson, 496 U. S., at 46-49 (pass-through defense considered as remedial question). Because the Court in Bacchus remanded the case solely for consideration of the pass-through defense, it thus should be read as having retroactively applied the rule there decided. See also Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S. 14, 28 (1985); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U. S. 176, 196-197 (1983); cf. Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 817 (1989).
Bacchus thus applied its own rule, just as if it had reversed and remanded without further ado, and yet of course the Georgia courts refused to apply that rule with respect to the litigants in this case. Thus, the question is whether it is error to refuse to apply a rule of federal law retroactively after the case announcing the rule has already done so. We hold that it is, principles of equality and stare decisis here prevailing over any claim based on a Chevron Oil analysis.
Griffith cannot be confined to the criminal law. Its equality principle, that similarly situated litigants should be treated the same, carries comparable force in the civil context. See Estate of Donnelly, 397 U. S., at 296 (Harlan, J., concurring). Its strength is in fact greater in the latter sphere. With respect to retroactivity in criminal cases, there remains even now the disparate treatment of those cases that come to the Court directly and those that come here in collateral proceedings. See Griffith, supra, at 331-332 (White, J., dissenting). Whereas Griffith held that new rules must apply retroactively to all criminal cases pending on direct review, we have since concluded that new rules will not relate back to convictions challenged on habeas corpus. Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). No such difficulty exists in the civil arena, in which there is little opportunity for collateral attack of final judgments.
Nor is selective prospectivity necessary to maintain incentives to litigate in the civil context as it may have been in the criminal before Griffith’s, rule of absolute retroactivity. In the civil context, “even a party who is deprived of the full retroactive benefit of a new decision may receive some relief.” Smith, 496 U. S., at 198-199. Had the appellants in Bacchus lost their bid for retroactivity, for example, they would nonetheless have won protection from the future imposition of discriminatory taxes, and the same goes for the petitioner here. Assuming that pure prospectivity may be had at all, moreover, its scope must necessarily be limited to a small number of cases; its possibility is therefore unlikely to deter the broad class of prospective challengers of civil precedent. See generally Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 Va. L. Rev. 201, 215 (1965).
Of course, retroactivity in civil cases must be limited by the need for finality, see Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940); once suit is barred by res judicata or by statutes of limitation or repose, a new rule cannot reopen the door already closed. It is true that one might deem the distinction arbitrary, just as some have done in the criminal context with respect to the distinction between direct review and habeas: why should someone whose failure has otherwise become final not enjoy the next day’s new rule, from which victory would otherwise spring? It is also objected that in civil cases unlike criminal there is more potential for litigants to freeload on those without whose labor the new rule would never have come into being. (Criminal defendants are already potential litigants by virtue of their offense, and invoke retroactivity only by way of defense; civil beneficiaries of new rules may become litigants as a result of the law change alone, and use it as a weapon.) That is true of the petitioner now before us, which did not challenge the Georgia law until after its fellow liquor distributors had won their battle in Bacchus. To apply the rule of Bacchus to the parties in that case but not in this one would not, therefore, provoke Justice Harlan’s attack on modified prospectivity as “[s]imply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases to flow by unaffected by ±hat new rule.” Mackey, 401 U. S., at 679 (opinion concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part); see also Smith, supra, at 214-215 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Beam had yet to enter the waters at the time of our decision in Bacchus, and yet we give it Bacchus’ benefit. Insofar as equality drives us, it might be argued that the new rule should be applied to those who had toiled and failed, but whose claims are now precluded by res judicata; and that it should not be applied to those who only exploit others’ efforts by litigating in the new rule’s wake.
As to the former, independent interests are at stake; and with respect to the latter, the distinction would be too readily and unnecessarily overcome. While those whose claims have been adjudicated may seek equality, a second chance for them could only be purchased at the expense of another principle. “ ‘Public policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of that contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties.’ ” Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U. S. 394, 401 (1981) (quoting Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Assn., 283 U. S. 522, 525 (1931)). Finality must thus delimit equality in a temporal sense, and we must accept as a fact that the argument for uniformity loses force over time. As for the putative hangers-on, they are merely asserting a right that the Court has told them is theirs in law, that the Court has not deemed necessary to apply on a prospective basis only, and that is not otherwise barred by state procedural requirements. They cannot be characterized as freeloaders any more than those who seek vindication under a new rule on facts arising after the rule’s announcement. Those in each class rely on the labors of the first successful litigant. We might, of course, limit retroactive application to those who at least tried to fight their own battles by litigating before victory was certain. To this possibility, it is enough to say that distinguishing between those with cases pending and those without would only serve to encourage the filing of replicative suits when this or any other appellate court created the possibility of a new rule by taking a case for review.
Nor, finally, are litigants to be distinguished for choice-of-law purposes on the particular equities of their claims to prospectivity: whether they actually relied on the old rule and how they would suffer from retroactive application of the new. It is simply in the nature of precedent, as a necessary component of any system that aspires to fairness and equality, that the substantive law will not shift and spring on such a basis. To this extent, our decision here does limit the possible applications of the Chevron Oil analysis, however irrelevant Chevron Oil may otherwise be to this case. Because the rejection of modified prospectivity precludes retroactive application of a new rule to some litigants when it is not applied to others, the Chevron Oil test cannot determine the choice of law by relying on the equities of the particular case. See Simpson v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Dept. of Labor, 681 F. 2d 81, 85-86 (CA1 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Dept. of Labor, 459 U. S. 1127 (1983); see also Note, 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 117, 131-132. Once retroactive application is chosen for any assertedly new rule, it is chosen for all others who might seek its prospective application. The applicability of rules of law is not to be switched on and off according to individual hardship; allowing relitigation of choice-of-law issues would only compound the challenge to the stabilizing purpose of precedent posed in the first instance by the very development of “new” rules. Of course, the generalized enquiry permits litigants to assert, and the courts to consider, the equitable and reliance interests of parties absent but similarly situated. Conversely, nothing we say here precludes consideration of individual equities when deciding remedial issues in particular cases.
<1
The grounds for our decision today are narrow. They are confined entirely to an issue of choice of law: when the Court has applied a rule of law to the litigants in one case it must do so with respect to all others not barred by procedural requirements or res judicata. We do not speculate as to the bounds or propriety of pure prospectivity.
Nor do we speculate about the remedy that may be appropriate in this case; remedial issues were neither considered below nor argued to this Court, save for an effort by petitioner to buttress its claim by reference to our decision last Term in McKesson. As we have observed repeatedly, federal “issues of remedy . . . may well be intertwined with, or their consideration obviated by, issues of state law.” Bacchus, 468 U. S., at 277. Nothing we say here deprives respondents of their opportunity to raise procedural bars to recovery under state law or demonstrate reliance interests entitled to consideration in determining the nature of the remedy that must be provided, a matter with which McKes-son did not deal. See Estate of Donnelly, 397 U. S., at 296 (Harlan, J., concurring); cf. Lemon, 411 U. S., at 203.
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
Although petitioner expends some effort, see Brief for Petitioner 5-8, in asserting the uneonstitutionality under Bacchus of the Georgia law as amended, see Ga. Code Ann. § 3-4-60 (1990), an argument rejected by the Georgia Supreme Court in Heublein, Inc. v. State, 256 Ga. 578, 351 S. E. 2d 190 (1987), that issue is neither before us nor relevant to the issue that is.
In fact, the state defendant in Bacchus argued for pure prospectivity under the criteria set forth in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97 (1971). See Brief for Appellee in Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, O. T. 1983, No. 82-1565, p. 19. It went on to argue that “even if” the challenged tax were held invalid and the decision were not limited to prospective application, the challengers should not be entitled to refunds because any taxes paid would have been passed through to consumers. Id,., at 46. Though unnecessary to our ruling here, the prospectivity issue can thus be said actually to have been litigated and by implication actually to have been decided by the Court by the fact of its consideration of the pass-through defense. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 747-748, n. 3 (1990).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
J
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case tests by habeas corpus the validity of Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U. S. C. § 802, as applied to á civilian tried by court-martial for a capital offense while employed overseas by the United States Army. It is a companion case to No. 22, Kinsella v. Singleton, ante, p. 234, which involves the application of the same Article to noncapital offenses committed by dependents accompanying soldiers stationed outside the United States, and to No. 21, McElroy v. Guagliardo, and No. 37, Wilson v. Bohlender, post, p. 281, involving noncapital offenses committed by armed-services employees while stationed overseas — all of which cases are decided today.
Petitioner, a civilian employee of the United States Army attached to an Army installation in France, was tried by a general court-martial for the capital offense of premeditated murder as defined in Article 118 (1) of thé Uniform Code of Military Justice. He was 'found guilty of the lesser and included offense of unpremeditated, murder, and sentenced to confinement at hard labor for the term of-his natural life. The'sentence was subsequently reduced to 35 years. While serving this sentence at the United States Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, he filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that Article 2 (11) was unconstitutional as applied to him, for the reason that Congress lacked the power to deprive him of a civil trial affording all of the protections of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution. • The writ was dismissed, 161 F. Supp. 112, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 261 F. 2d 204. In the light of the opinion of this Court on the rehearing in Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1 (1957), as well as that of the Court of Appeals on the issue of the severability, of Article 2 (11) in Guagliardo v. McElroy, 259 F. 2d 927, we granted certiorari. 359 U. S. 978 (1959).
We are of the opinion that this case is controlled by Reid v. Covert, supra. It decided that the application of the Article to civilian dependents charged with capital offenses while accompanying servicemen outside the United States was unconstitutional as violative of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.- We have carefully considered the Government’s position as to the distinctions between civilian dependents and civilian employees, especially its voluminous historical materials relating to court-martial jurisdiction. However, the considerations pointed out in Covert have equal applicability here. Those who controlled the majority there held that the death penalty is so irreversible that a dependent charged with a capital crime' must have the benefit of a jury. The awesomeness of the death penalty has no-less impact when applied to civilian employees. Continued adherence to Covert requires civilian employees to be afforded the same right of trial by jury. Furthermore, the number of civilian employees is much smaller than the number of dependents, and the alternative procedures available for controlling discipline as to the former more' effective. See McElroy v. Guagliardo, post, p. 281. For the purposes of this decision, we cannot say that there are any valid distinctions between the two classes of persons. The judgment is therefore reversed.
It is so ordered.
[For opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, see ante, p. 249.]
[For opinion of Mr. Justice Whittaker, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, see ante, p. 259.]
Art. 2. “The following persons are subject to this chapter:
“(11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the following: that part of Alaska east of longitude 172 degrees west, the Canal Zone, the main group of the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.”
In the light of our opinion in No. 21, McElroy v. Guagliardo, handed down today, post, p. 281, we deny the contention that the article is honseverable.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Heights Medical Center, Inc. (hereafter appellee), sued appellant Peralta in February 1982 to recover some $5,600 allegedly due under appellant’s guarantee of a hospital debt incurred by one of his employees. Citation issued, the return showing personal, but untimely, service. Appellant did not appear or answer, and on July 20, 1982, default judgment was entered for the amount claimed, plus attorney’s fees and costs.
In June 1984, appellant began a bill of review proceeding in the Texas courts to set aside the default judgment and obtain other relief. In the second amended petition, it was alleged that the return of service itself showed a defective service and that appellant in fact had not been personally served at all. The judgment was therefore void under Texas law. It was also alleged that the judgment was abstracted and recorded in the county real property records, thereby creating a cloud on appellant’s title, that a writ of attachment was issued, and that, unbeknownst to him, his real property was sold to satisfy the judgment and for much less than its true value. Appellant prayed that the default judgment be vacated, the abstract of judgment be expunged from the county real property records, the constable’s sale be voided, and that judgment for damages be entered against the Medical Center and Mr. and Mrs. Paul-Seng-Ngan Chen, the purchasers at the constable’s sale and appellees here.
Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that in a bill of review proceeding such as appellant filed, it must be shown that petitioner had a meritorious defense to the action in which judgment had been entered, that petitioner was prevented from proving his defense by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party, and that there had been no fault or negligence on petitioner’s part. Although it was assumed for the purposes of summary judgment that there had been defective service and that this lapse excused proof of the second and third requirement for obtaining a bill of review, it was assertedly necessary, nevertheless, to show a meritorious defense, which appellant had conceded he did not have. In response to the motion, appellant repeated the allegations in his petition and filed an affidavit denying that he had ever been personally served or had ever been notified of the entry of default judgment or of the sale of his property. Appellee’s motion for summary judgment was granted. Record 54.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing for the first time asserted federal constitutional claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellee answered that under Texas law there were three avenues by which to attack a judgment on the grounds that it was void for want of service: an appeal within 30 days of the judgment; by writ of error within 6 months; and by bill of review. It being too late to seek either of the first two courses, appellee urged that the bill of review was the only route then open to appellant, and that route was not available to him — even assuming he did not receive notice of the action filed against him — since he had no meritorious defense. Appellee denied that the meritorious-defense requirement threatened any federal constitutional rights. Rehearing was denied.
On appeal to the Texas Court of Appeals, appellant repeated his claims that in the absence of valid service of process and notice of the judgment, showing a meritorious defense was not necessary under Texas law and requiring it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellee argued that despite the allegation of no service and no notice of judgment, the meritorious-defense requirement prevented relief and that even though the bill of review was the only avenue of relief, the State could constitutionally insist on the showing of a meritorious defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reciting the three elements essential for granting a bill of review and holding that a meritorious defense must be shown whether there had been proper service and notice or not. 715 S. W. 2d 721 (1986). The court rejected the due process challenge because it viewed the meritorious-defense requirement as “not onerous.” Id., at 722. Rehearing was denied, as was the application for a writ of error filed with the Texas Supreme Court, that court noting, “No Reversible Error.” App. to Juris. Statement 2a.
Because the holding below appeared problematic in light of our precedents, we noted probable jurisdiction. 481 U. S. 1067 (1987). The case was briefed and argued, and we now reverse.
In opposition to summary judgment, appellant denied that he had been personally served and that he had notice of the judgment. The case proceeded through the Texas courts on that basis, and it is not denied by appellee that under our cases, a judgment entered without notice or service is constitutionally infirm. “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 314 (1950). Failure to give notice violates “the most rudimentary demands of due process of law.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 550 (1965). See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 291 (1980); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 333 (1976); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U. S. 100, 110 (1969); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 733 (1878).
The Texas courts nevertheless held, as appellee urged them to do, that to have the judgment set aside, appellant was required to show that he had a meritorious defense, apparently on the ground that without a defense, the same judgment would again be entered on retrial and hence appellant had suffered no harm from the judgment entered without notice. But this reasoning is untenable. As appellant asserts, had he had notice of the suit, he might have impleaded the employee whose debt had been guaranteed, worked out a settlement, or paid the debt. He would also have preferred to sell his property himself in order to raise funds rather than to suffer it sold at a constable’s auction.
Nor is there any doubt that the entry of the judgment itself had serious consequences. It is not denied that the judgment was entered on the county records, became a lien on appellant’s property, and was the basis for issuance of a writ of execution under which appellant’s property was promptly sold without notice. Even if no execution sale had yet occurred, the lien encumbered the property and impaired appellant’s ability to mortgage or alienate it; and state procedures for creating and enforcing such liens are subject to the strictures of due process. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 604 (1974); Hodge v. Muscatine County, 196 U. S. 276, 281 (1905). Here, we assume that the judgment against him and the ensuing consequences occurred without notice to appellant, notice at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner that would have given him an opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, supra, at 552.
In this Court, appellee insists that appellant has other remedies to escape the consequences of an invalid judgment and should be left to pursue those avenues. This argument, which is made for the first time in this litigation and which appellant disputes, is apparently offered as an alternative ground for affirming the judgment below. We are not required, however, to entertain such submissions, particularly when there is no indication that they were raised below, and we are especially disinclined to become involved in resolving disputes about Texas law that should have been presented to the state courts. We shall deal with the case as it came here and affirm or reverse based on the ground relied on below.
Appellee’s position below was that appellant either had a remedy by bill of review or not at all, and that that remedy was unavailable since no meritorious defense had been shown. It appears to us that the Texas courts decided the case on this basis. There was no mention of other remedies, no suggestion that appellant had sought the wrong remedy; and it seems obvious that had a meritorious defense been shown, and the allegations on service and notice found to be true, the offending judgment would have been vacated. The Texas court held that the default judgment must stand absent a showing of a meritorious defense to the action in which judgment was entered without proper notice to appellant, a judgment that had substantial adverse consequences to appellant. By reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that holding is plainly infirm.
Where a person has been deprived of property in a manner contrary to the most basic tenets of due process, “it is no answer to say that in his particular case due process of law would have led to the same result because he had no adequate defense upon the merits.” Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413, 424 (1915). As we observed in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S., at 552, only “wip[ing] the slate clean . . . would have restored the petitioner to the position he would have occupied had due process of law been accorded to him in the first place.” The Due Process Clause demands no less in this case.
The judgment below is
Reversed.
Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(f) provides:
“On expiration of the time within which the trial court has plenary power, a judgment cannot be set aside by the trial court except by bill of review for sufficient cause, filed within the time allowed by law; provided that the court may at any time correct a clerical error in the record of a judgment and render judgment nunc pro tunc under Rule 316, and may also sign an order declaring a previous judgment or order to be void because signed after the court’s plenary power had expired.”
The petition alleged that the record contained a return of service of process, showing that service was effected more than 90 days after its issuance, contrary to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 101 (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1988). Record 41. The parties agree that under Texas law at the time of this suit, the citation lost its official status after 90 days. Texas courts have held that service after the 90th day is a nullity, depriving the court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Lewis v. Lewis, 667 S. W. 2d 910, 911 (Tex. App. 1984); Kem v. Krueger, 626 S. W. 2d 143, 144 (Tex. App. 1981); Lemothe v. Cimbalista, 236 S. W. 2d 681, 682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 239(a) requires that notice of default judgment be mailed to the defendant at the address which the party taking the judgment is required to file with the clerk. Appellant argued in the Court of Appeals that neither of these requirements had been fulfilled.
Further examination of the record indicates that appellee was correct in challenging our appellate jurisdiction, Motion to Dismiss 3-4, because there was no explicit challenge to the constitutionality of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(f) and because the Texas courts did not pass on any such issue. Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U. S. 182, 185 (1945); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S. 555, 562, n. 4 (1980). Treating the filed papers as a petition for certiorari, however, we grant the petition. We nevertheless continue to refer to Peralta and Heights Medical Center as appellant and appellee.
Appellee conceded at oral argument that for purposes of this decision, we must assume the truth of appellant’s claims that he was never served with process. Tr. of Oral Arg. 39.
Under Texas law a judgment entitles the judgment creditor to a lien on the debtor’s property. As a matter of right and without notice and hearing, a judgment creditor can have the judgment abstracted and recorded. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 52.002, 52.004(a) (1984 and Supp. 1988). Such a recorded abstract “constitutes a lien on the real property of the defendant located in the county in which the abstract is recorded and indexed, including real property acquired after such recording and indexing,” § 52.001, and the holder of a judgment lien will have a superior interest to a later purchaser. Masterson v. Adams, 197 S. W. 2d 154, 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
D
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals approved certification of a class of more than 2 million current and former Comcast subscribers who seek damages for alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws. We consider whether certification was appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).
I
Comcast Corporation and its subsidiaries, petitioners here, provide cable-television services to residential and commercial customers. From 1998 to 2007, petitioners engaged in a series of transactions that the parties have described as "clustering," a strategy of concentrating operations within a particular region. The region at issue here, which the parties have referred to as the Philadelphia "cluster" or the Philadelphia "Designated Market Area" (DMA), includes 16 counties located in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey. Petitioners pursued their clustering strategy by acquiring competitor cable providers in the region and swapping their own systems outside the region for competitor systems located in the region. For instance, in 2001, petitioners obtained Adelphia Communications' cable systems in the Philadelphia DMA, along with its 464,000 subscribers; in exchange, petitioners sold to Adelphia their systems in Palm Beach, Florida, and Los Angeles, California. As a result of nine clustering transactions, petitioners' share of subscribers in the region allegedly increased from 23.9 percent in 1998 to 69.5 percent in 2007. See 264 F.R.D. 150, 156, n. 8, 160 (E.D.Pa.2010).
The named plaintiffs, respondents here, are subscribers to Comcast's cable-television services. They filed a class-action antitrust suit against petitioners, claiming that petitioners entered into unlawful swap agreements, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, and monopolized or attempted to monopolize services in the cluster, in violation of § 2. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. Petitioners' clustering scheme, respondents contended, harmed subscribers in the Philadelphia cluster by eliminating competition and holding prices for cable services above competitive levels.
Respondents sought to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). That provision permits certification only if "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members." The District Court held, and it is uncontested here, that to meet the predominance requirement respondents had to show (1) that the existence of individual injury resulting from the alleged antitrust violation (referred to as "antitrust impact") was "capable of proof at trial through evidence that [was] common to the class rather than individual to its members"; and (2) that the damages resulting from that injury were measurable "on a class-wide basis" through use of a "common methodology." 264 F.R.D., at 154.
Respondents proposed four theories of antitrust impact: First, Comcast's clustering made it profitable for Comcast to withhold local sports programming from its competitors, resulting in decreased market penetration by direct broadcast satellite providers. Second, Comcast's activities reduced the level of competition from "overbuilders,"
companies that build competing cable networks in areas where an incumbent cable company already operates. Third, Comcast reduced the level of "benchmark" competition on which cable customers rely to compare prices. Fourth, clustering increased Comcast's bargaining power relative to content providers. Each of these forms of impact, respondents alleged, increased cable subscription rates throughout the Philadelphia DMA.
The District Court accepted the overbuilder theory of antitrust impact as capable of classwide proof and rejected the rest. Id., at 165, 174, 178, 181. Accordingly, in its certification order, the District Court limited respondents' "proof of antitrust impact" to "the theory that Comcast engaged in anticompetitive clustering conduct, the effect of which was to deter the entry of overbuilders in the Philadelphia DMA." App. to Pet. for Cert. 192a-193a.
The District Court further found that the damages resulting from overbuilder-deterrence impact could be calculated on a classwide basis. To establish such damages, respondents had relied solely on the testimony of Dr. James McClave.
Dr. McClave designed a regression model comparing actual cable prices in the Philadelphia DMA with hypothetical prices that would have prevailed but for petitioners' allegedly anticompetitive activities. The model calculated damages of $875,576,662 for the entire class. App. 1388a (sealed). As Dr. McClave acknowledged, however, the model did not isolate damages resulting from any one theory of antitrust impact. Id., at 189a-190a. The District Court nevertheless certified the class.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, petitioners contended the class was improperly certified because the model, among other shortcomings, failed to attribute damages resulting from overbuilder deterrence, the only theory of injury remaining in the case. The court refused to consider the argument because, in its view, such an "attac[k] on the merits of the methodology [had] no place in the class certification inquiry." 655 F.3d 182, 207 (C.A.3 2011). The court emphasized that, "[a]t the class certification stage," respondents were not required to "tie each theory of antitrust impact to an exact calculation of damages." Id., at 206. According to the court, it had "not reached the stage of determining on the merits whether the methodology is a just and reasonable inference or speculative." Ibid. Rather, the court said, respondents must "assure us that if they can prove antitrust impact, the resulting damages are capable of measurement and will not require labyrinthine individual calculations." Ibid. In the court's view, that burden was met because respondents' model calculated "supra-competitive prices regardless of the type of anticompetitive conduct." Id., at 205.
We granted certiorari. 567 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 24, 183 L.Ed.2d 673 (2012).
II
The class action is "an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only." Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-701, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979). To come within the exception, a party seeking to maintain a class action "must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance" with Rule 23. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551-2552, 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011). The Rule "does not set forth a mere pleading standard." Ibid. Rather, a party must not only "be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact," typicality of claims or defenses, and adequacy of representation, as required by Rule 23(a). Ibid. The party must also satisfy through evidentiary proof at least one of the provisions of Rule 23(b). The provision at issue here is Rule 23(b)(3), which requires a court to find that "the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members."
Repeatedly, we have emphasized that it "'may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question,' and that certification is proper only if 'the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.' " Ibid. (quoting General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982) ). Such an analysis will frequently entail "overlap with the merits of the plaintiff's underlying claim." 564 U.S., at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 2551. That is so because the " 'class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action.' " Ibid. (quoting Falcon, supra, at 160, 102 S.Ct. 2364 ).
The same analytical principles govern Rule 23(b). If anything, Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule 23(a). Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623-624, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). Rule 23(b)(3), as an " 'adventuresome innovation,' " is designed for situations " 'in which "class-action treatment is not as clearly called for."'" Wal-Mart, supra, at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 2558 (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S., at 614-615, 117 S.Ct. 2231 ). That explains Congress's addition of procedural safeguards for (b)(3) class members beyond those provided for (b)(1) or (b)(2) class members (e.g., an opportunity to opt out), and the court's duty to take a " 'close look' " at whether common questions predominate over individual ones. Id., at 615, 117 S.Ct. 2231.
III
Respondents' class action was improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(3). By refusing to entertain arguments against respondents' damages model that bore on the propriety of class certification, simply because those arguments would also be pertinent to the merits determination, the Court of Appeals ran afoul of our precedents requiring precisely that inquiry. And it is clear that, under the proper standard for evaluating certification, respondents' model falls far short of establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a classwide basis. Without presenting another methodology, respondents cannot show Rule 23(b)(3) predominance: Questions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class. This case thus turns on the straightforward application of class-certification principles; it provides no occasion for the dissent's extended discussion, post, at 1437 - 1441 (GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., dissenting), of substantive antitrust law.
A
We start with an unremarkable premise. If respondents prevail on their claims, they would be entitled only to damages resulting from reduced overbuilder competition, since that is the only theory of antitrust impact accepted for class-action treatment by the District Court. It follows that a model purporting to serve as evidence of damages in this class action must measure only those damages attributable to that theory. If the model does not even attempt to do that, it cannot possibly establish that damages are susceptible of measurement across the entire class for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3). Calculations need not be exact, see Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563, 51 S.Ct. 248, 75 L.Ed. 544 (1931), but at the class-certification stage (as at trial), any model supporting a "plaintiff's damages case must be consistent with its liability case, particularly with respect to the alleged anticompetitive effect of the violation." ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Proving Antitrust Damages: Legal and Economic Issues 57, 62 (2d ed. 2010); see, e.g., Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1224 (C.A.9 1997). And for purposes of Rule 23, courts must conduct a " 'rigorous analysis' " to determine whether that is so. Wal-Mart, supra, at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 2551-2552.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals saw no need for respondents to "tie each theory of antitrust impact" to a calculation of damages. 655 F.3d, at 206. That, they said, would involve consideration of the "merits" having "no place in the class certification inquiry." Id., at 206-207. That reasoning flatly contradicts our cases requiring a determination that Rule 23 is satisfied, even when that requires inquiry into the merits of the claim. Wal-Mart, supra, at ----, and n. 6, 131 S.Ct., at 2551-2552, and n. 6. The Court of Appeals simply concluded that respondents "provided a method to measure and quantify damages on a classwide basis," finding it unnecessary to decide "whether the methodology [was] a just and reasonable inference or speculative." 655 F.3d, at 206. Under that logic, at the class-certification stage any method of measurement is acceptable so long as it can be applied classwide, no matter how arbitrary the measurements may be. Such a proposition would reduce Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement to a nullity.
B
There is no question that the model failed to measure damages resulting from the particular antitrust injury on which petitioners' liability in this action is premised. The scheme devised by respondents'
expert, Dr. McClave, sought to establish a "but for" baseline-a figure that would show what the competitive prices would have been if there had been no antitrust violations. Damages would then be determined by comparing to that baseline what the actual prices were during the charged period. The "but for" figure was calculated, however, by assuming a market that contained none of the four distortions that respondents attributed to petitioners' actions. In other words, the model assumed the validity of all four theories of antitrust impact initially advanced by respondents: decreased penetration by satellite providers, overbuilder deterrence, lack of benchmark competition, and increased bargaining power. At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. McClave expressly admitted that the model calculated damages resulting from "the alleged anticompetitive conduct as a whole" and did not attribute damages to any one particular theory of anticompetitive impact. App. 189a-190a, 208a.
This methodology might have been sound, and might have produced commonality of damages, if all four of those alleged distortions remained in the case. But as Judge Jordan's partial dissent pointed out:
"[B]ecause the only surviving theory of antitrust impact is that clustering reduced overbuilding, for Dr. McClave's comparison to be relevant, his benchmark counties must reflect the conditions that would have prevailed in the Philadelphia DMA but for the alleged reduction in overbuilding. In all respects unrelated to reduced overbuilding, the benchmark counties should reflect the actual conditions in the Philadelphia DMA, or else the model will identify 'damages' that are not the result of reduced overbuilding, or, in other words, that are not the certain result of the wrong." 655 F.3d, at 216 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The majority's only response to this was that "[a]t the class certification stage we do not require that Plaintiffs tie each theory of antitrust impact to an exact calculation of damages, but instead that they assure us that if they can prove antitrust impact, the resulting damages are capable of measurement and will not require labyrinthine individual calculations." Id., at 206. But such assurance is not provided by a methodology that identifies damages that are not the result of the wrong. For all we know, cable subscribers in Gloucester County may have been overcharged because of petitioners' alleged elimination of satellite competition (a theory of liability that is not capable of classwide proof); while subscribers in Camden County may have paid elevated prices because of petitioners' increased bargaining power vis-à-vis content providers (another theory that is not capable of classwide proof); while yet other subscribers in Montgomery County may have paid rates produced by the combined effects of multiple forms of alleged antitrust harm; and so on. The permutations involving four theories of liability and 2 million subscribers located in 16 counties are nearly endless.
In light of the model's inability to bridge the differences between supra-competitive prices in general and supra-competitive prices attributable to the deterrence of overbuilding, Rule 23(b)(3) cannot authorize treating subscribers within the Philadelphia cluster as members of a single class. Prices whose level above what an expert deems "competitive" has been caused by factors unrelated to an accepted theory of antitrust harm are not "anticompetitive" in any sense relevant here. "The first step in a damages study is the translation of the legal theory of the harmful event into an analysis of the economic impact of that event." Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 432 (3d ed. 2011) (emphasis added). The District Court and the Court of Appeals ignored that first step entirely.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice GINSBURG and Justice BREYER, with whom Justice SOTOMAYOR and Justice KAGAN join, dissenting.
Today the Court reaches out to decide a case hardly fit for our consideration. On both procedural and substantive grounds, we dissent.
I
This case comes to the Court infected by our misguided reformulation of the question presented. For that reason alone, we would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
Comcast sought review of the following question: "[W]hether a district court may certify a class action without resolving'merits arguments' that bear on [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23's prerequisites for certification, including whether purportedly common issues predominate over individual ones under Rule 23(b)(3)." Pet. for Cert. i. We granted review of a different question: "Whether a district court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis." 567 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 24, 183 L.Ed.2d 673 (2012) (emphasis added).
Our rephrasing shifted the focus of the dispute from the District Court's Rule 23(b)(3) analysis to its attention (or lack thereof) to the admissibility of expert testimony. The parties, responsively, devoted much of their briefing to the question whether the standards for admissibility of expert evidence set out in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), apply in class certification proceedings. See Brief for Petitioners 35-49; Brief for Respondents 24-37. Indeed, respondents confirmed at oral argument that they understood our rewritten question to center on admissibility, not Rule 23(b)(3). See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 25.
As it turns out, our reformulated question was inapt. To preserve a claim of error in the admission of evidence, a party must timely object to or move to strike the evidence. Fed. Rule Evid. 103(a)(1). In the months preceding the District Court's class certification order, Comcast did not object to the admission of Dr. McClave's damages model under Rule 702 or Daubert. Nor did Comcast move to strike his testimony and expert report. Consequently, Comcast forfeited any objection to the admission of Dr. McClave's model at the certification stage. At this late date, Comcast may no longer argue that respondents' damages evidence was inadmissible.
Comcast's forfeiture of the question on which we granted review is reason enough to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. See Rogers v. United States, 522 U.S. 252, 259, 118 S.Ct. 673, 139 L.Ed.2d 686 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring in result) ("[W]e ought not to decide the question if it has not been cleanly presented."); The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc., 359 U.S. 180, 183, 79 S.Ct. 710, 3 L.Ed.2d 723 (1959) (dismissal appropriate in light of "circumstances... not fully apprehended at the time certiorari was granted" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court, however, elects to evaluate whether respondents "failed to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis." Ante, at 1431, n. 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). To justify this second revision of the question presented, the Court observes that Comcast "argued below, and continue[s] to argue here, that certification was improper because respondents had failed to establish that damages could be measured on a classwide basis." Ibid. And so Comcast did, in addition to endeavoring to address the question on which we granted review. By treating the first part of our reformulated question as though it did not exist, the Court is hardly fair to respondents.
Abandoning the question we instructed the parties to brief does "not reflect well on the processes of the Court." Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 772, 87 S.Ct. 1414, 18 L.Ed.2d 515 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Taking their cue from our order, respondents did not train their energies on defending the District Court's finding of predominance in their briefing or at oral argument. The Court's newly revised question, focused on predominance, phrased only after briefing was done, left respondents without an unclouded opportunity to air the issue the Court today decides against them. And by resolving a complex and fact-intensive question without the benefit of full briefing, the Court invites the error into which it has fallen. See infra, at 1437 - 1441.
II
While the Court's decision to review the merits of the District Court's certification order is both unwise and unfair to respondents, the opinion breaks no new ground on the standard for certifying a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). In particular, the decision should not be read to require, as a prerequisite to certification, that damages attributable to a classwide injury be measurable " 'on a class-wide basis.' " See ante, at 1431 - 1432 (acknowledging Court's dependence on the absence of contest on the matter in this case); Tr. of Oral Arg. 41.
To gain class-action certification under Rule 23(b)(3), the named plaintiff must demonstrate, and the District Court must find, "that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members." This predominance requirement is meant to "tes[t] whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation," Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997), but it scarcely demands commonality as to all questions. See 7AA C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1778, p. 121 (3d ed. 2005) (hereinafter Wright, Miller, & Kane). In particular, when adjudication of questions of liability common to the class will achieve economies of time and expense, the predominance standard is generally satisfied even if damages are not provable in the aggregate. See Advisory Committee's 1966 Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U.S.C.App., p. 141 ("[A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action, and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the class."); 7AA Wright, Miller, & Kane § 1781, at 235-237. Recognition that individual damages calculations do not preclude class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is well nigh universal. See 2 W. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 4:54, p. 205 (5th ed. 2012) (ordinarily, "individual damage[s] calculations should not scuttle class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)"). Legions of appellate decisions across a range of substantive claims are illustrative. See, e.g., Tardiff v. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1, 6 (C.A.1 2004) (Fourth Amendment); Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 273 (C.A.3 2004) (Equal Credit Opportunity Act); Bertulli v. Independent Assn. of Continental Pilots, 242 F.3d 290, 298 (C.A.5 2001) (Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and Railway Labor Act); Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 564-566 (C.A.6 2007) (Federal Communications Act); Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 801 (C.A.7 2008) (Eighth Amendment). Antitrust cases, which typically involve common allegations of antitrust violation, antitrust impact, and the fact of damages, are classic examples. See In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d 124, 139-140 (C.A.2 2001). See also 2A P. Areeda, H. Hovenkamp, R. Blair, & C. Durrance, Antitrust Law ¶ 331, p. 56 (3d ed. 2007) (hereinafter Areeda & Hovenkamp); 6 A. Conte & H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 18:27, p. 91 (4th ed. 2002). As this Court has rightly observed, "[p]redominance is a test readily met" in actions alleging "violations of the antitrust laws." Amchem, 521 U.S., at 625, 117 S.Ct. 2231.
The oddity of this case, in which the need to prove damages on a classwide basis through a common methodology was never challenged by respondents, see Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees in No. 10-2865(CA3), pp. 39-40, is a further reason to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. The Court's ruling is good for this day and case only. In the mine run of cases, it remains the "black letter rule" that a class may obtain certification under Rule 23(b)(3) when liability questions common to the class predominate over damages questions unique to class members. 2 Rubenstein, supra, § 4:54, at 208.
III
Incautiously entering the fray at this interlocutory stage, the Court sets forth a profoundly mistaken view of antitrust law. And in doing so, it relies on its own version of the facts, a version inconsistent with factual findings made by the District Court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
A
To understand the antitrust problem, some (simplified) background discussion is necessary. Plaintiffs below, respondents here, alleged that Comcast violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. For present purposes, the § 2 claim provides the better illustration. A firm is guilty of monopolization under § 2 if the plaintiff proves (1) "the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market" and (2) "the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power[,] as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-571, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966). A private plaintiff seeking damages must also show that (3) the monopolization caused "injur[y]." 15 U.S.C. § 15. We have said that antitrust injuries must be "of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flo[w] from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334, 110 S.Ct. 1884, 109 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990) (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977) ). See 2A Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 391a, at 320 (To prove antitrust injury, "[a] private plaintiff must identify the economic rationale for a business practice's illegality under the antitrust laws and show that its harm flows from whatever it is that makes the practice unlawful."). As plaintiffs below, respondents attempted to meet these requirements by showing that (1) Comcast obtained a 60% or greater share of the Philadelphia market, and that its share provides it with monopoly power; (2) Comcast acquired its share through exclusionary conduct consisting of a series of mergers with competitors and "swaps" of customers and locations; and (3) Comcast consequently injured respondents by charging them supra-competitive prices.
If, as respondents contend, Philadelphia is a separate well-defined market, and the alleged exclusionary conduct permitted Comcast to obtain a market share of at least 60%, then proving the § 2 violation may not be arduous. As a point of comparison, the government considers a market shared by four firms, each of which has 25% market share, to be "highly concentrated." Dept. of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 5.3, p. 19 (2010). A market, such as the one alleged by respondents, where one firm controls 60% is far worse. See id., § 5.3, at 18-19, and n. 9 (using a concentration index that determines a market's concentration level by summing the squares of each firm's market share, one firm with 100% yielding 10,000, five firms with 20% each yielding 2000, while a market where one firm accounts for 60% yields an index number of at least 3,600). The Guidelines, and any standard antitrust treatise, explain why firms in highly concentrated markets normally have the power to raise prices significantly above competitive levels. See, e.g., 2B Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 503, at 115.
B
So far there is agreement. But consider the last matter respondents must prove: Can they show that Comcast injured them by charging higher prices? After all, a firm with monopoly power will not necessarily exercise that power by charging higher prices. It could instead act less competitively in other ways, such as by leading the quiet life. See J. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3 Econometrica 1, 8 (1935) ("The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.").
It is at this point that Dr. McClave's model enters the scene. His model first selects a group of comparable outside -Philadelphia "benchmark" counties, where Comcast enjoyed a lower market share (and where satellite broadcasting accounted for more of the local business). Using multiple regression analysis, McClave's model measures the effect of the anticompetitive conduct by comparing the class counties to the benchmark counties. The model concludes that the prices Philadelphia area consumers would have paid had the Philadelphia counties shared the properties of the benchmark counties (including a diminished Comcast market share), would have been 13.1% lower than those they actually paid. Thus, the model provides evidence that Comcast's anticompetitive conduct, which led to a 60% market share, caused the class to suffer injuriously higher prices.
C
1
The special antitrust-related difficulty present here stems from the manner in which respondents attempted to prove their antitrust injuries. They proffered four "non-exclusive mechanisms" that allegedly "cause[d] the high prices" in the Philadelphia area. App. 403a. Those four theories posit that (1) due to Comcast's acquisitions of competitors, customers found it more difficult to compare prices; (2) one set of potential competitors, namely Direct Broadcast Satellite companies, found it more difficult to obtain access to local sports broadcasts and consequently decided not to enter the Philadelphia market; (3) Comcast's ability to obtain programming material at lower prices permitted it to raise prices; and (4) a number of potential competitors (called "overbuilders"), whose presence in the market would have limited Comcast's power to raise prices, were ready to enter some parts of the market but decided not to do so in light of Comcast's anticompetitive conduct. 264 F.R.D. 150, 161-162 (E.D.Pa.2010).
For reasons not here relevant, the District Court found the first three theories inapplicable and limited the liability-phase proof to the "overbuilder" theory. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 192a-193a. It then asked the parties to brief whether doing so had any impact on the viability of McClave's model as a measure of classwide damages. See 264 F.R.D., at 190. After considering the parties' arguments, the District Court found that striking the three theories "does not impeach Dr. McClave's damages model" because "[a]ny anticompetitive conduct is reflected in the [higher Philadelphia] price [which Dr. McClave's model determines], not in the [the model's] selection of the comparison counties, [i.e., the lower-price 'benchmark counties' with which the Philadelphia area prices were compared]." Id., at 190-191. The court explained that "whether or not we accepted all [four]... theories... is inapposite to Dr. McClave's methods of choosing benchmarks." Ibid. On appeal, the Third Circuit held that this finding was not an abuse of discretion. 655 F.3d 182, 207 (2011).
2
The Court, however, concludes that "the model failed to measure damages resulting from the particular antitrust injury on which petitioners' liability in this action is premised." Ante, at 1433. To reach this conclusion the Court must consider fact-based matters, namely what this econometric multiple-regression model is about, what it proves, and how it does so. And it must overturn two lower courts' related factual findings to the contrary.
We are normally "reluctant to disturb findings of fact in which two courts below have concurred."
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 614, 104 S.Ct. 1237, 79 L.Ed.2d 552 (1984). See also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 589, n. 5, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (noting "our well-settled rule that we will not 'undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by two courts below in the absence of a very obvious and exceptional showing of error' " (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275, 69 S.Ct. 535, 93 L.Ed. 672 (1949) )). Here, the District Court found McClave's econ
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The National Government and, beyond it, the separate States are bound by the proscriptive mandates of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and all persons within those respective jurisdictions may invoke its protection. See Amdts. 8 and 14, § 1; Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 660 (1962). Patrick Kennedy, the petitioner here, seeks to set aside his death sentence under the Eighth Amendment. He was charged by the respondent, the State of Louisiana, with the aggravated rape of his then-8-year-old stepdaughter. After a jury trial petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death under a state statute authorizing capital punishment for the rape of a child under 12 years of age. See La. Stat. Ann. § 14:42 (West 1997 and Supp. 1998). This case presents the question whether the Constitution bars respondent from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in death of the victim. We hold the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for this offense. The Louisiana statute is unconstitutional.
I
Petitioner’s crime was one that cannot be recounted in these pages in a way sufficient to capture in full the hurt and horror inflicted on his victim or to convey the revulsion society, and the jury that represents it, sought to express by sentencing petitioner to death. At 9:18 a.m. on March 2, 1998, petitioner called 911 to report that his stepdaughter, referred to here as L. H., had been raped. He told the 911 operator that L. H. had been in the garage while he readied his son for school. Upon hearing loud screaming, petitioner said, he ran outside and found L. H. in the side yard. Two neighborhood boys, petitioner told the operator, had dragged L. H. from the garage to the yard, pushed her down, and raped her. Petitioner claimed he saw one of the boys riding away on a blue 10-speed bicycle.
When police arrived at petitioner’s home between 9:20 and 9:30 a.m., they found L. H. on her bed, wearing a T-shirt and wrapped in a bloody blanket. She was bleeding profusely from the vaginal area. Petitioner told police he had carried her from the yard to the bathtub and then to the bed. Consistent with this explanation, police found a thin line of blood drops in the garage on the way to the house and then up the stairs. Once in the bedroom, petitioner had used a basin of water and a cloth to wipe blood from the victim. This later prevented medical personnel from collecting a reliable DNA sample.
L. H. was transported to the Children’s Hospital. An expert in pediatric forensic medicine testified that L. H.’s injuries were the most severe he had seen from a sexual assault in his four years of practice. A laceration to the left wall of the vagina had separated her cervix from the back of her vagina, causing her rectum to protrude into the vaginal structure. Her entire perineum was torn from the posterior fourchette to the anus. The injuries required emergency surgery.
At the scene of the crime, at the hospital, and in the first weeks that followed, both L. H. and petitioner maintained in their accounts to investigators that L. H. had been raped by two neighborhood boys. One of L. H.’s doctors testified at trial that L. H. told all hospital personnel the same version of the rape, although she reportedly told one family member that petitioner raped her. L. H. was interviewed several days after the rape by a psychologist. The interview was videotaped, lasted three hours over two days, and was introduced into evidence at trial. On the tape one can see that L. H. had difficulty discussing the subject of the rape. She spoke haltingly and with long pauses and frequent movement. Early in the interview, L. H. expressed reservations about the questions being asked:
“I’m going to tell the same story. They just want me to change it.... They want me to say my Dad did it.... I don’t want to say it.... I tell them the same, same story.” Def. Exh. D-7, 01:29:07-:36.
She told the psychologist that she had been playing in the garage when a boy came over and asked her about Girl Scout cookies she was selling; and that the boy “pulled [her by the legs to] the backyard,” id., at 01:47:41-:52, where he placed his hand over her mouth, “pulled down [her] shorts,” Def. Exh. D-8, 00:03:11-:12, and raped her, id., at 00:14:39-:40.
Eight days after the crime, and despite L. H.’s insistence that petitioner was not the offender, petitioner was arrested for the rape. The State’s investigation had drawn the accuracy of petitioner and L. H.’s story into question. Though the defense at trial proffered alternative explanations, the case for the prosecution, credited by the jury, was based upon the following evidence: An inspection of the side yard immediately after the assault was inconsistent with a rape having occurred there, the grass having been found mostly undisturbed but for a small patch of coagulated blood. Petitioner said that one of the perpetrators fled the crime scene on a blue 10-speed bicycle but gave inconsistent descriptions of the bicycle’s features, such as its handlebars. Investigators found a bicycle matching petitioner and L. H.’s description in tall grass behind a nearby apartment, and petitioner identified it as the bicycle one of the perpetrators was riding. Yet its tires were flat, it did not have gears, and it was covered in spider webs. In addition police found blood on the underside of L. H.’s mattress. This convinced them the rape took place in her bedroom, not outside the house.
Police also found that petitioner made four telephone calls on the morning of the rape. Sometime before 6:15 a.m., petitioner called his employer and left a message that he was unavailable to work that day. Petitioner called back between 6:30 and 7:30 a.m. to ask a colleague how to get blood out of a white carpet because his daughter had “ ‘just become a young lady.’” Brief for Respondent 12. At 7:37 a.m., petitioner called B & B Carpet Cleaning and requested urgent assistance in removing bloodstains from a carpet. Petitioner did not call 911 until about an hour and a half later.
About a month after petitioner’s arrest L. H. was removed from the custody of her mother, who had maintained until that point that petitioner was not involved in the rape. On June 22, 1998, L. H. was returned home and told her mother for the first time that petitioner had raped her. And on December 16, 1999, about 21 months after the rape, L. H. recorded her accusation in a videotaped interview with the Child Advocacy Center.
The State charged petitioner with aggravated rape of a child under La. Stat. Ann. § 14:42 (West 1997 and Supp. 1998) and sought the death penalty. At all times relevant to petitioner’s case, the statute provided:
“A. Aggravated rape is a rape committed... where the anal or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without lawful consent of the victim because it is committed under any one or more of the following circumstances:
“(4) When the victim is under the age of twelve years. Lack of knowledge of the victim’s age shall not be a defense.
“D. Whoever commits the crime of aggravated rape shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
“(1) However, if the victim was under the age of twelve years, as provided by Paragraph A(4) of this Section:
“(a) And if the district attorney seeks a capital verdict, the offender shall be punished by death or life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, in accordance with the determination of the jury.”
(Since petitioner was convicted and sentenced, the statute has been amended to include oral intercourse within the definition of aggravated rape and to increase the age of the victim from 12 to 18. See La. Stat. Ann. § 14:42 (West Supp. 2007).)
Aggravating circumstances are set forth in La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 905.4 (West 1997 Supp.). In pertinent part and at all times relevant to petitioner’s case, the provision stated:
“A. The following shall be considered aggravating circumstances:
“(1) The offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson, aggravated escape, assault by drive-by shooting, armed robbery, first degree robbery, or simple robbery.
“(10) The victim was under the age of twelve years or sixty-five years of age or older.”
The trial began in August 2003. L. H. was then 13 years old. She testified that she “ ‘woke up one morning and Patrick was on top of [her].’” She remembered petitioner bringing her “ ‘[a] cup of orange juice and pills chopped up in it’” after the rape and overhearing him on the telephone saying she had become a “‘young lady.’” 05-1981, pp. 12, 15, 16 (La. 5/22/07), 957 So. 2d 757, 767, 769, 770. L. H. acknowledged that she had accused two neighborhood boys but testified petitioner told her to say this and that it was untrue. Id., at 769.
The jury having found petitioner guilty of aggravated rape, the penalty phase ensued. The State presented the testimony of S. L., who is the cousin and goddaughter of petitioner’s ex-wife. S. L. testified that petitioner sexually abused her three times when she was eight years old and that the last time involved sexual intercourse. Id., at 772. She did not tell anyone until two years later and did not pursue legal action.
The jury unanimously determined that petitioner should be sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed. See id., at 779-789, 793; see also State v. Wilson, 96-1392, 96-2076 (La. 12/13/96), 685 So. 2d 1063 (upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty for child rape). The court rejected petitioner’s reliance on Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (1977), noting that, while Coker bars the use of the death penalty as punishment for the rape of an adult woman, it left open the question which, if any, other nonhomicide crimes can be punished by death consistent with the Eighth Amendment. Because “‘children are a class that need special protection/ ” the state court reasoned, the rape of a child is unique in terms of the harm it inflicts upon the victim and our society. 957 So. 2d, at 781.
The court acknowledged that petitioner would be the first person executed for committing child rape since La. Stat. Ann. § 14:42 was amended in 1995 and that Louisiana is in the minority of jurisdictions that authorize the death penalty for the crime of child rape. But following the approach of Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551 (2005), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 (2002), it found significant not the “numerical counting of which [S]tates... stand for or against a particular capital prosecution," but “the direction of change.” 957 So. 2d, at 783 (emphasis deleted). Since 1993, the court explained, four more States—Oklahoma, South Carolina, Montana, and Georgia—had capitalized the crime of child rape, and at least eight States had authorized capital punishment for other nonhomicide crimes. By its count, 14 of the then-38 States permitting capital punishment, plus the Federal Government, allowed the death penalty for nonhomicide crimes and 5 allowed the death penalty for the crime of child rape. See id., at 785-786.
The state court next asked whether “child rapists rank among the worst offenders.” Id., at 788. It noted the severity of the crime; that the execution of child rapists would serve the goals of deterrence and retribution; and that, unlike in Atkins and Roper, there were no characteristics of petitioner that tended to mitigate his moral culpability. 957 So. 2d, at 788-789. It concluded: “[S]hort of first-degree murder, we can think of no other non-homicide crime more deserving [of capital punishment].” Id., at 789.
On this reasoning the Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected petitioner’s argument that the death penalty for the rape of a child under 12 years is disproportionate and upheld the constitutionality of the statute. Chief Justice Calogero dissented. Coker, supra, and Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 917 (1977), in his view, “set out a bright-line and easily administered rule” that the Eighth Amendment precludes capital punishment for any offense that does not involve the death of the victim. 957 So. 2d, at 794.
We granted certiorari. 552 U. S. 1087 (2008).
II
The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” The Amendment proscribes “all excessive punishments, as well as cruel and unusual punishments that may or may not be excessive.” Atkins, 536 U. S., at 311, n. 7. The Court explained in Atkins, id., at 311, and Roper, supra, at 560, that the Eighth Amendment’s protection against excessive or cruel and unusual punishments flows from the basic “precept of justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.” Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 367 (1910). Whether this requirement has been fulfilled is determined not by the standards that prevailed when the Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791 but by the norms that “currently prevail.” Atkins, supra, at 311. The Amendment “draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). This is because “[t]he standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society change.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C. J., dissenting).
Evolving standards of decency must embrace and express respect for the dignity of the person, and the punishment of criminals must conform to that rule. See Trop, supra, at 100 (plurality opinion). As we shall discuss, punishment is justified under one or more of three principal rationales: rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see also Part IV-B, infra. It is the last of these, retribution, that most often can contradict the law’s own ends. This is of particular concern when the Court interprets the meaning of the Eighth Amendment in capital cases. When the law punishes by death, it risks its own sudden descent into brutality, transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency and restraint.
For these reasons we have explained that capital punishment must “be limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’” Roper, supra, at 568 (quoting Atkins, supra, at 319). Though the death penalty is not invariably unconstitutional, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), the Court insists upon confining the instances in which the punishment can be imposed.
Applying this principle, we held in Roper and Atkins that the execution of juveniles and mentally retarded persons are punishments violative of the Eighth Amendment because the offender had a diminished personal responsibility for the crime. See Roper, supra, at 571-573; Atkins, supra, at 318, 320. The Court further has held that the death penalty can be disproportionate to the crime itself where the crime did not result, or was not intended to result, in death of the victim. In Coker, 433 U. S. 584, for instance, the Court held it would be unconstitutional to execute an offender who had raped an adult woman. See also Eberheart, supra (holding unconstitutional in light of Coker a sentence of death for the kidnaping and rape of an adult woman). And in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782 (1982), the Court overturned the capital sentence of a defendant who aided and abetted a robbery during which a murder was committed but did not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing would take place. On the other hand, in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U. S. 137 (1987), the Court allowed the defendants’ death sentences to stand where they did not themselves kill the victims but their involvement in the events leading up to the murders was active, recklessly indifferent, and substantial.
In these cases the Court has been guided by “objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice with respect to executions.” Roper, 543 U. S., at 563; see also Coker, supra, at 593-597 (plurality opinion) (finding that both legislatures and juries had firmly rejected the penalty of death for the rape of an adult woman); Enmund, 458 U. S., at 788 (looking to “historical development of the punishment at issue, legislative judgments, international opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have made”). The inquiry does not end there, however. Consensus is not dispositive. Whether the death penalty is disproportionate to the crime committed depends as well upon the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history, meaning, and purpose. See id., at 797-801; Gregg, supra, at 182-183 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Coker, supra, at 597-600 (plurality opinion).
Based both on consensus and our own independent judgment, our holding is that a death sentence for one who raped but did not kill a child, and who did not intend to assist another in killing the child, is unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
III
A
The existence of objective indicia of consensus against making a crime punishable by death was a relevant concern in Roper, Atkins, Coker, and Enmund, and we follow the approach of those cases here. The history of the death penalty for the crime of rape is an instructive beginning point.
In 1925, 18 States, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Government had statutes that authorized the death penalty for the rape of a child or an adult. See Coker, supra, at 593 (plurality opinion). Between 1930 and 1964, 455 people were executed for those crimes. See 5 Historical Statistics of the United States: Earliest Times to the Present, pp. 5-262 to 5-263 (S. Carter et al. eds. 2006) (Table Ec343357). To our knowledge the last individual executed for the rape of a child was Ronald Wolfe in 1964. See H. Frazier, Death Sentences in Missouri, 1803-2005: A History and Comprehensive Registry of Legal Executions, Pardons, and Commutations 143 (2006).
In 1972, Furman invalidated most of the state statutes authorizing the death penalty for the crime of rape; and in Furman’s aftermath only six States reenacted their capital rape provisions. Three States—Georgia, North Carolina, and Louisiana—did so with respect to all rape offenses. Three States—Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee—did so with respect only to child rape. See Coker, supra, at 594-595 (plurality opinion). All six statutes were later invalidated under state or federal law. See Coker, supra (striking down Georgia’s capital rape statute); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 287, n. 6, 301-305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (striking down North Carolina’s mandatory death penalty statute); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U. S. 325 (1976) (striking down Louisiana’s mandatory death penalty statute); Collins v. State, 550 S. W. 2d 643, 646 (Tenn. 1977) (striking down Tennessee’s mandatory death penalty statute); Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943, 951 (Fla. 1981) (holding unconstitutional the imposition of death for child rape); Leatherwood v. State, 548 So. 2d 389, 402-403 (Miss. 1989) (striking down the death penalty for child rape on state-law grounds).
Louisiana reintroduced the death penalty for rape of a child in 1995. See La. Stat. Ann. § 14:42 (West Supp. 1996). Under the current statute, any anal, vaginal, or oral intercourse with a child under the age of 13 constitutes aggravated rape and is punishable by death. See § 14:42 (West Supp. 2007). Mistake of age is not a defense, so the statute imposes strict liability in this regard. Five States have since followed Louisiana’s lead: Georgia, see Ga. Code Ann. 16-6-1 (2007) (enacted 1999); Montana, see Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-503 (2007) (enacted 1997); Oklahoma, see Okla. Stat., Tit. 10, § 7115(E) (West 2007 Supp.) (enacted 2006); South Carolina, see S. C. Code Ann. § 16-3-655(C)(1) (Supp. 2007) (enacted 2006); and Texas, see Tex. Penal Code Aim. § 12.42(c)(3) (West Supp. 2007) (enacted 2007); see also § 22.021(a). Four of these States’ statutes are more narrow
than Louisiana’s in that only offenders with a previous rape conviction are death eligible. See Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-503(3)(c); Okla. Stat., Tit. 10, § 7115(E); S. C. Code Ann. § 16-3-655(C)(1); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(c)(3). Georgia’s statute makes child rape a capital offense only when aggravating circumstances are present, including but not limited to a prior conviction. See Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-30 (Supp. 2007).
By contrast, 44 States have not made child rape a capital offense. As for federal law, Congress in the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 expanded the number of federal crimes for which the death penalty is a permissible sentence, including certain nonhomicide offenses; but it did not do the same for child rape or abuse. See 108 Stat. 1972 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U. S. C.). Under 18 U. S. C. § 2245, an offender is death eligible only when the sexual abuse or exploitation results in the victim’s death.
Petitioner claims the death penalty for child rape is not authorized in Georgia, pointing to a 1979 decision in which the Supreme Court of Georgia stated that “[statutory rape is not a capital crime in Georgia.” Presnell v. State, 243 Ga. 131, 132-133, 252 S. E. 2d 625, 626. But it appears Presnell was referring to the separate crime of statutory rape, which is not a capital offense in Georgia, see Ga. Code Ann. § 26-2018 (1969); cf. § 16-6-3 (2007). The State’s current capital rape statute, by contrast, is explicit that the rape of “[a] female who is less than ten years of age” is punishable “by death.” §§ 16-6-1(a)(2), (b). Based on a recent statement by the Supreme Court of Georgia it must be assumed that this law is still in force: “Neither the United States Supreme Court, nor this Court, has yet addressed whether the death penalty is unconstitutionally disproportionate for the crime of raping a child.” State v. Velazquez, 283 Ga. 206, 208, 657 S. E. 2d 838, 840 (2008).
Respondent would include Florida among those States that permit the death penalty for child rape. The state statute does authorize, by its terms, the death penalty for “sexual battery upon... a person less than 12 years of age.” Fla. Stat. § 794.011(2) (2007); see also § 921.141(5) (2007). In 1981, however, the Supreme Court of Florida held the death penalty for child sexual assault to be unconstitutional. See Buford, supra. It acknowledged that Coker addressed only the constitutionality of the death penalty for rape of an adult woman, 403 So. 2d, at 950, but held that “[t]he reasoning of the justices in Coker... compels [the conclusion] that a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of sexual assault and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment,” id., at 951. Respondent points out that the state statute has not since been amended. Pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 775.082(2) (2007), however, Florida state courts have understood Buford to bind their sentencing discretion in child rape cases. See, e. g., Gibson v. State, 721 So. 2d 363, 367, and n. 2 (Fla. App. 1998) (deeming it irrelevant that “the Florida Legislature never changed the wording of the sexual battery statute”); Cooper v. State, 453 So. 2d 67 (Fla. App. 1984) (“After Buford, death was no longer a possible penalty in Florida for sexual battery”); see also Fla. Stat. § 775.082(2) (“In the event the death penalty in a capital felony is held to be unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court... the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death for a capital felony... shall sentence such person to life imprisonment”).
Definitive resolution of state-law issues is for the States’ own courts, and there may be disagreement over the statistics. It is further true that some States, including States that have addressed the issue in just the last few years, have made child rape a capital offense. The summary recited here, however, does allow us to make certain comparisons with the data cited in the Atkins, Roper, and Enmund cases.
When Atkins was decided in 2002, 30 States, including 12 noncapital jurisdictions, prohibited the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders; 20 permitted it. See 536 U. S., at 313-315. When Roper was decided in 2005, the numbers disclosed a similar division among the States: 30 States prohibited the death penalty for juveniles, 18 of which permitted the death penalty for other offenders; and 20 States authorized it. See 543 U. S., at 564. Both in Atkins and in Roper, we noted that the practice of executing mentally retarded and juvenile offenders was infrequent. Only five States had executed an offender known to have an IQ below 70 between 1989 and 2002, see Atkins, supra, at 316; and only three States had executed a juvenile offender between 1995 and 2005, see Roper, supra, at 564-565.
The statistics in Enmund bear an even greater similarity to the instant case. There eight jurisdictions had authorized imposition of the death penalty solely for participation in a robbery during which an accomplice committed murder, see 458 U. S., at 789, and six defendants between 1954 and 1982 had been sentenced to death for felony murder where the defendant did not personally commit the homicidal assault, id., at 794. These facts, the Court concluded, “weighted] on the side of rejecting capital punishment for the crime.” Id., at 793.
The evidence of a national consensus with respect to the death penalty for child rapists, as with respect to juveniles, mentally retarded offenders, and vicarious felony murderers, shows divided opinion but, on balance, an opinion against it. Thirty-seven jurisdictions—36 States plus the Federal Government—have the death penalty. As mentioned above, only six of those jurisdictions authorize the death penalty for rape of a child. Though our review of national consensus is not confined to tallying the number of States with applicable death penalty legislation, it is of significance that, in 45 jurisdictions, petitioner could not be executed for child rape of any kind. That number surpasses the 30 States in Atkins and Roper and the 42 States in Enmund that prohibited the death penalty under the circumstances those cases considered.
B
At least one difference between this case and our Eighth Amendment proportionality precedents must be addressed. Respondent and its amici suggest that some States have an “erroneous understanding of this Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.” Brief for Missouri Governor Matt Blunt et al. as Amici Curiae 10. They submit that the general propositions set out in Coker, contrasting murder and rape, have been interpreted in too expansive a way, leading some state legislatures to conclude that Coker applies to child rape when in fact its reasoning does not, or ought not, apply to that specific crime.
This argument seems logical at first, but in the end it is unsound. In Coker, a four-Member plurality of the Court, plus Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall in concurrence, held that a sentence of death for the rape of a 16-year-old woman, who was a minor under Georgia law, see Ga. Code Ann. § 74-104 (1973), yet was characterized by the Court as an adult, was disproportionate and excessive under the Eighth Amendment. See 433 U. S., at 593-600; see also id., at 600 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); ibid. (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment). (The Court did not explain why the 16-year-old victim qualified as an adult, but it may be of some significance that she was married, had a home of her own, and had given birth to a son three weeks prior to the rape. See Brief for Petitioner in Coker v. Georgia, O. T. 1976, No. 75-5444, pp. 14-15.)
The plurality noted that only one State had a valid statute authorizing the death penalty for adult rape and that “in the vast majority of cases, at least 9 out of 10, juries ha[d] not imposed the death sentence.” Coker, 433 U. S., at 597; see also id., at 594 (“Of the 16 States in which rape had been a capital offense, only three provided the death penalty for rape of an adult woman in their revised statutes — Georgia, North Carolina, and Louisiana. In the latter two States, the death penalty was mandatory for those found guilty, and those laws were invalidated by Woodson and Roberts”). This “history and... objective evidence of the country’s present judgment concerning the acceptability of death as a penalty for rape of an adult woman,” id., at 593, confirmed the Court’s independent judgment that punishing adult rape by death was not proportional:
“Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of... another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not.... We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which ‘is unique in its severity and irrevocability,' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 187, is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life.” Id., at 598 (footnote omitted).
Confined to this passage, Coker’s analysis of the Eighth Amendment is susceptible of a reading that would prohibit making child rape a capital offense. In context, however, Coker’s holding was narrower than some of its language read in isolation. The Coker plurality framed the question as whether, “with respect to rape of an adult woman,” the death penalty is disproportionate punishment. Id., at 592. And it repeated the phrase “an adult woman” or “an adult female” in discussing the act of rape or the victim of rape eight times in its opinion. See Coker, supra. The distinction between adult and child rape was not merely rhetorical; it was central to the Court’s reasoning. The opinion does not speak to the constitutionality of the death penalty for child rape, an issue not then before the Court. In discussing the legislative background, for example, the Court noted:
“Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also authorized the death penalty in some rape cases, but only where the victim was a child and the rapist an adult. The Tennessee statute has since been invalidated because the death sentence was mandatory. The upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United States at the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman, and only two other jurisdictions provide capital punishment when the victim is a child.... [This] obviously weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.” Id., at 595-596 (citation and footnote omitted).
Still, respondent contends, it is possible that state legislatures have understood Coker to state a broad rule that covers the situation of the minor victim as well. We see little evidence of this. Respondent cites no reliable data to indicate that state legislatures have read Coker to bar capital punishment for child rape and, for this reason, have been deterred from passing applicable death penalty legislation. In the absence of evidence from those States where legislation has been proposed but not enacted we refuse to speculate about the motivations and concerns of particular state legislators.
The position of the state courts, furthermore, to which state legislators look for guidance on these matters, indicates that Coker has not blocked the emergence of legislative consensus. The state courts that have confronted the precise question before us have
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Delma Banks, Jr., was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Prior to trial, the State advised Banks’s attorney there would be no need to litigate discovery issues, representing: “[W]e will, without the necessity of motions[,] provide you with all discovery to which you are entitled.” App. 361, n. 1; App. to Pet. for Cert. A4 (both sources’ internal quotation marks omitted). Despite that undertaking, the State withheld evidence that would have allowed Banks to discredit two essential prosecution witnesses. The State did not disclose that one of those witnesses was a paid police informant, nor did it disclose a pretrial transcript revealing that the other witness’ trial testimony had been intensively coached by prosecutors and law enforcement officers.
Furthermore, the prosecution raised no red flag when the informant testified, untruthfully, that he never gave the police any statement and, indeed, had not talked to any police officer about the case until a few days before the trial. Instead of correcting the informant’s false statements, the prosecutor told the jury that the witness “ha[d] been open and honest with you in every way,” App. 140, and that his testimony was of the “utmost significance,” id., at 146. Similarly, the prosecution allowed the other key witness to convey, untruthfully, that his testimony' was entirely unrehearsed. Through direct appeal and state collateral review proceedings, the State continued to hold secret the key witnesses’ links to the police and allowed their false statements to stand uncorrected.
Ultimately, through discovery and an evidentiary hearing authorized in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the long-suppressed evidence came to light. The District Court granted Banks relief from the death penalty, but the Court of Appeals reversed. In the latter court’s judgment, Banks had documented his claims of prosecutorial misconduct too late and in the wrong forum; therefore he did not qualify for federal-court relief. We reverse that judgment. When police or prosecutors conceal significant exculpatory or impeaching material in the State’s possession, it is ordinarily incumbent on the State to set the record straight.
I
On April 14, 1980, police found the corpse of 16-year-old Richard Whitehead in Pocket Park, east of Nash, Texas, a town in the vicinity of Texarkana. Id., at 8,141. A preliminary autopsy revealed that Whitehead had been shot three times. Id., at 10. Bowie County Deputy Sheriff Willie Huff, lead investigator of the death, learned from two witnesses that Whitehead had been in the company of petitioner, 21-year-old Delma Banks, Jr., late on the evening of April 11. Id., at 11-15,144; Banks v. State, 643 S. W. 2d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 904 (1983). On April 23, Huff received a call from a con-fidentiál informant reporting that “Banks was coming to Dallas to meet an individual and get a weapon.” App. 15. That evening, Huff and other officers followed Banks to South Dallas, where Banks visited a residence. Ibid.; Brief for Petitioner 3. Police stopped Banks’s vehicle en route from Dallas, found a handgun in the car, and arrested the car’s occupants. App. 16. Returning to the Dallas residence Banks had visited, Huff encountered and interviewed Charles Cook and recovered a second gun, a weapon Cook said Banks had left with him several days earlier. Ibid. Tests later identified the second gun as the Whitehead murder weapon. Id., at 17.
In a May 21,1980, pretrial hearing, Banks’s counsel sought information from Huff concerning the confidential informant who told Huff that Banks would be driving to Dallas. Id., at 21. Huff was unresponsive. Ibid. Any information that might reveal the identity of the informant, the prosecution urged, was privileged. Id., at 23. The trial court sustained the State’s objection. Id., at 24. Several weeks later, in a July 7, 1980, letter, the prosecution advised Banks’s counsel that “[the State] will, without necessity of motions provide you with all discovery to which you are entitled.” Id., at 361, n. 1; App. to Pet. for Cert. A4 (both sources’ internal quotation marks omitted).
The guilt phase of Banks’s trial spanned two days in September 1980. See Brief for Petitioner 2; App. to Pet. for Cert. C3. Witnesses testified to seeing Banks and Whitehead together on April 11 in Whitehead’s green Mustang, and to hearing gunshots in Pocket Park at 4 a.m. on April 12. Banks v. State, 643 S. W. 2d, at 131. Charles Cook testified that Banks arrived in Dallas in a green Mustang at about 8:15 a.m. on April 12, and stayed with Cook until April 14. App. 42-43,47-53. Cook gave the following account of Banks’s visit. On the morning of his arrival, Banks had blood on his leg and told Cook “he [had] got into it on the highway with a white boy.” Id., at 44. That night, Banks confessed to having “kill[ed] the white boy for the hell of it and take[n] his car and come to Dallas.”. Id., at 48. During their ensuing conversation, Cook first noticed that “[Banks] had a pistol.” Id., at 49. Two days later, Banks left Dallas by bus. Id., at 52-53. The next day, Cook abandoned the Mustang in West Dallas and sold Banks’s gun to a neighbor. Id., at 54. Cook further testified that, shortly before the police arrived at his residence to question him, Banks had revisited him and requested the gun. Id., at 57.
On cross-examination, Cook three times represented that he had not talked to anyone about his testimony. Id., at 59. In fact, however, Cook had at least one “pretrial practice sessio[n]” at which Huff and prosecutors intensively coached Cook for his appearance on the stand at Banks’s trial. Id., at 325, ¶ 10, 381-390; Joint Lodging Material 1-36 (transcript of pretrial preparatory session). The prosecution allowed Cook’s misstatements to stand uncorrected. In its guilt-phase summation, the prosecution told the jury “Cook brought you absolute truth.” App. 84.
In addition to Cook, Robert Farr was a key witness for the prosecution. Corroborating parts of Cook’s account, Farr testified to traveling to Dallas with Banks to retrieve Banks’s gun. Id., at 34-35. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Farr whether he had “ever taken any money from some police officers,” or “give[n] any police officers a statement.” Id., at 37-38. Farr answered no to both questions; he asserted emphatically that police officers had not promised him anything and that he had “talked to no one about this [case]” until a few days before trial. Ibid. These answers were untrue, but the State did not correct them. Farr was the paid informant who told Deputy Sheriff Huff that Banks would travel to Dallas in search óf a gun. Id., at 329; App. to Pet. for Cert. A4, A9. In a 1999 affidavit, Farr explained:
“I assumed that if I did not help [Huff] with his investigation of Delma that he would have me arrested for drug charges. That’s why I agreed to help [Huff]. I was afraid that if I didn’t help him, I would be arrested.... “Willie Huff asked me to help him find Delma’s gun. I told [Huff] that he would have to pay me money right away for my help on the case. I think altogether he gave me about $200.00 for helping him. He paid me some of the money before I set Delma up. He paid me the rest after Delma was arrested and charged with murder....
“In order to help Willie Huff, I had to set Delma up. I told Delma that I wanted to rob a pharmacy to get drugs and that I needed his gun to do it. I did not really plan to commit a robbery but I told Delma this so that he would give me his gun.... I convinced Delma to drive to Dallas with me to get the gun.” App. 442-443, ¶ ¶ 6-8.
The defense presented no evidence. App. to Pet. for Cert. A6. Banks was convicted of murder committed in the course of a robbery, in violation of Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (1974). See App. to Pet. for Cert. C3.
The penalty phase ran its course the next day. Ibid. Governed by the Texas statutory capital murder scheme applicable in 1980, the jury decided Banks’s sentence by answering three “special issues.” App. 142-143. “If the jury unanimously answer[ed] ‘yes’ to each issue submitted, the trial court [would be obliged to] sentence the defendant to death.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 310 (1989) (construing Texas’ sentencing scheme); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Arts. 37.071(c)-(e) (Vernon Supp. 1980). The critical question at the penalty phase in Banks’s case was: “Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability that the defendant, Delma Banks, Jr., would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society?” App. 143 (internal quotation marks omitted).
On this question, the State offered two witnesses, Vetrano Jefferson and Robert Farr. Id., at 104-113. Jefferson testified that, in early April 1980, Banks had struck him across the face with a gun and threatened to kill him. Id., at 104-106. Farr’s testimony focused once more on the trip to Dallas to fetch Banks’s gun. The gun was needed, Farr asserted, because “[w]e [Farr and Banks] were going to pull some robberies.” Id., at 108. According to Farr, Banks “said he would take care of it” if “there was any trouble during these burglaries.” Id., at 109. When the prosecution asked: “How did [Banks] say he would take care of it?” Farr responded: “[Banks] didn’t go into any specifics, but he said it would be taken care of.” Ibid.
On cross-examination, defense counsel twice asked whether Farr had told Deputy Sheriff Huff of the Dallas trip. Ibid. The State remained silent as Farr twice perjuriously testified: “No, I did not.” Ibid. Banks’s counsel also inquired whether Farr had previously attempted to obtain prescription drugs by fraud, and, “up tight over that,” would “testify to anything anybody want[ed] to hear.” Id., at 110. Farr first responded: “Can you prove it?” Ibid. Instructed by the court to answer defense counsel’s questions, Farr again said: “No, I did not....” Ibid.
Two defense witnesses impeached Farr, but were, in turn, impeached themselves. James Kelley testified to Farr’s attempts to obtain drugs by fraud; the prosecution impeached Kelley by eliciting his close relationship to Banks’s girlfriend. Id., at 124-129. Later,. Kelley admitted to being drunk while on the stand. App. to Pet. for Cert. A13. Former Arkansas police officer Gary Owen testified that Farr, as a police informant in Arkansas, had given false information; the prosecution impeached Owen by bringing out his pending application for employment by defense counsel’s private investigator. App. 129-131.
Banks’s parents and acquaintances testified that Banks was a “respectful, churchgoing young man.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A7; App. 137-139. Thereafter, Banks took the stand. He affirmed that he had “never before been convicted of a felony.” Id., at 134. Banks admitted striking Vetrano Jefferson in April 1980, and traveling to Dallas to obtain a gun in late April 1980. Id., at 134-136. He denied, however, any intent to participate in robberies, asserting that Farr alone had planned to commit them. Id., at 136-137. The prosecution suggested on cross-examination that Banks had been willing “to supply [Farr] the means and possible death weapon in an armed robbery case.” Id., at 137. Banks conceded as much. Ibid.
During summation, the prosecution intimated that Banks had not been wholly truthful in this regard, suggesting that “a man doesn’t travel two hundred miles, or whatever the distance is from here [Texarkana] to Dallas, Texas, to supply a person with a weapon.” Id., at 143. The State homed in on Farr’s testimony that Banks said he would “take care” of any trouble arising during the robbery:
“[Farr] said, ‘Man, you know, what i[f] there’s trouble?’ And [Banks] says, ‘Don’t worry about it. I’ll take care of it.’ I*think that speaks for itself, and I think you know what that means.... I submit to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has again met its burden of proof, and that the answer to question number two [propensity to commit violent criminal acts] should also be yes.” Id., at 140,144. See also id., at 146-147.
Urging Farr’s credibility, the prosecution called the jury’s attention to Farr’s admission, at. trial, that he used narcotics. Id., at 36, 140. Just as Farr had been truthful about his drug use, the prosecution suggested, he was also “open and honest with [the jury] in every way” in his penalty-phase testimony. Id., at 140. Farr’s testimony, the prosecution emphasized, was “of the utmost significance” because it showed “[Banks] is a danger to friends and strangers, alike.” Id., at 146. Banks’s effort to impeach Farr was ineffective, the prosecution further urged, because defense witness “Kelley kn[ew] nothing about the murder,” and defense witness Owen “wish[ed] to please his future employers.” Id., at 148.
The jury answered yes to the three special issues, and the judge sentenced Banks to death. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Banks’s direct appeal. 643 S. W. 2d, at 135. Banks’s first two state postconviction motions raised issues not implicated here; both were denied. Ex parte Banks, No. 13568-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Ex parte Banks, 769 S. W. 2d 539, 540 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
Banks’s third state postconviction motion, filed January 13, 1992, presented questions later advanced in federal court and reiterated in the petition now before us. App. 150. Banks alleged “upon information and belief” that “the prosecution knowingly failed to turn over exculpatory evidence as required by [Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 “(1963)]”; the withheld evidence, Banks asserted, “would have revealed Robert Farr as a police informant and Mr. Banks’ arrest as a set-up.” App. 180, ¶ 114 (internal quotation marks omitted). In support of this third state-court postconviction plea, Banks attached an unsigned affidavit from his girlfriend, Farr’s sister-in-law Demetra Jefferson, which stated that Farr “was well-connected to law enforcement people,” and consequently managed to stay out of “trouble” for illegally obtaining prescription drugs. Id., at 195, ¶7. Banks alleged as well that during the guilt phase of his trial, the State deliberately withheld information “critical to the jury’s assessment of Cook’s credibility,” including the “generous ‘deal’ [Cook had] cut with the prosecutors.” Id., at 152, ¶ 2, 180, ¶ 114.
The State’s reply to Banks’s pleading, filed October 6,1992, “denie[d] each and every allegation of fact made by [Banks], except those supported by official court records and those specifically admitted.” Id., at 234; Tr. of Oral Arg, 32. “[N]othing was kept secret from the defense,” the State represented. App. 234. While the reply specifically asserted that the State had made “no deal with Cook,” ibid., the State said nothing specific about Farr. Affidavits from Deputy Sheriff Huff and prosecutors accompanied the reply. Id., at 241-243. The affiants denied any “deal, secret or otherwise, with Charles Cook,” but they, too, like the State’s pleading they supported, remained silent about Farr. Ibid.
In February and July 1993 orders, the state postconviction court rejected Banks’s claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. E1-E9, G1-G7. The court found that “there was no agreement between the State and the witness Charles Cook,” but made no findings concerning Farr. Id., at G2. In a January 10, 1996, one-page per curiam order, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the lower court’s disposition of Banks’s motion. Id., at Dl.
On March 7, 1996, Banks filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. App. 248. He alleged multiple violations of his federal constitutional rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. C5-C7. Relevant here, Banks reasserted that the State had withheld material exculpatory evidence “reveal[ing] Robert Farr as a police informant and Mr. Banks’ arrest as a set-up.” App. 260, ¶ 152 (internal quotation marks omitted). Banks also asserted that the State had. concealed “Cook’s enormous incentive to testify in a manner favorable to the [prosecution].” Id., at 260, ¶ 153; App. to Pet. for Cert. C6-C7. In June 1998, Banks moved for discovery and an evidentiary hearing to gain information from the State on the roles played and trial testimony provided by Farr and Cook. App. 262-266, 282-283, 286. The superintending Magistrate Judge allowed limited discovery regarding Cook, but found insufficient justification for inquiries concerning Farr. Id., at 294-295.
Banks renewed his discovery and evidentiary requests in February 1999. Id., at 2, 300-331. This time, he proffered affidavits from both Farr and Cook to back up his claims that, as to each of these two key witnesses, the prosecution had wrongly withheld crucial exculpatory and impeaching evidence. Id., at 322-331. Farr’s affidavit affirmed that Farr had “set Delma up” by proposing the drive to Dallas and informing Deputy Sheriff Huff of the trip. Id., at 329, ¶ 8, 442-443, ¶ 8; supra, at 678. Accounting for his unavailability earlier, Farr stated that less than a year after the Banks trial, he had left Texarkana, first for Oklahoma, then for California, because his police-informant work endangered his life. App. 330-331, 444; Pet. for Cert. 27, n. 12. Cook recalled that in preparation for his Banks trial testimony, he had participated in “three or four... practice sessions” at which prosecutors told him to testify “as they wanted [him] to, and that [he] would spend the rest of [his] life in prison if [he] did not.” App. 325, ¶¶ 10-11.
On March 4, 1999, the Magistrate Judge an establishing issues for an evidentiary hearing, id., at 340, 346, at which she would consider Banks’s claims that the State had withheld “crucial exculpatory and impeaching evidence” concerning “two of the [S]tate’s essential witnesses, Charles Cook and Robert Farr,” id., at 340, 345 (internal quotation marks omitted). In anticipation of the hearing, the Magistrate Judge ordered disclosure of the Bowie County District Attorney’s files. Brief for Petitioner 37-38; Tr. of June 7-8, 1999, Federal Evidentiary Hearing (ED Tex.), p. 30 (hereinafter Federal Evidentiary Hearing).
One item lodged in the District Attorney’s files, turned over to Banks pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s disclosure order, was a 74-page transcript of a Cook interrogation. App. to Pet. for Cert. A10. The interrogation, conducted by Bowie County law enforcement officials and prosecutors, occurred in September 1980, shortly before the Banks trial. Ibid. The transcript revealed that the State’s representatives had closely rehearsed Cook’s testimony. In particular, the officials told Cook how to reconcile his testimony with affidavits to which he had earlier subscribed recounting Banks’s visits to Dallas. See, e. g., Joint Lodging Material 24 (“Your [April 1980] statement is obviously screwed up.”); id., at 26 (“[T]he way this statement should read is that....”); id., at 32 (“[Ljet me tell you how this is going to work.”); id., at 36 (“That’s not in your [earlier] statement.”). Although the transcript did not bear on Banks’s claim that the prosecution had a deal with Cook, it provided compelling evidence that Cook’s testimony had been tutored by Banks’s prosecutors. Without objection at the hearing, the Magistrate Judge admitted the September 1980 transcript into evidence. Brief for Petitioner 39; Federal Evidentiary Hearing 75-76.
Testifying at the evidentiary hearing, Deputy Sheriff Huff acknowledged, for the first time, that Farr was an informant and that he had been paid $200 for his involvement in the case. App. to Pet. for Cert. C43. As to Cook, a Banks trial prosecutor testified, in line with the State’s consistent position, that no deal had been offered to gain Cook’s trial testimony. Id., at C45; Federal Evidentiary Hearing 52-53. Defense counsel questioned the prosecutor about the September 1980 transcript, calling attention to discrepancies between the transcript and Cook’s statements at trial. Id., at 65-68. In a posthearing brief and again in proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, Banks emphasized the suppression of the September 1980 transcript, noting the prosecution’s obligation to disclose material, exculpatory evi-. dence, and the assurance in this case that Banks would receive “all [the] discovery to which [Banks was] entitled.” App. 360-361, and n. 1, 378-379 (internal quotation marks omitted); supra, at 677.
In a May 11,2000, report and recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommended a writ of habeas corpus with respect to Banks’s death sentence, but not his conviction. App. to Pet. for Cert. C54. “[T]he State’s failure to disclose Farr’s informant status, coupled with trial counsel’s dismal performance during the punishment phase,” the Magistrate Judge concluded, “undermined the reliability of the jury’s verdict regarding punishment.” Id., at C44. Finding no convincing evidence of a deal between the State and Cook, however, she recommended that the guilt-phase verdict remain undisturbed. Id., at C46.
Banks moved to alter or amend the Magistrate Judge’s report on the ground that it left unresolved a fully aired question, i e., whether Banks’s rights were violated by the State’s failure to disclose to the defense the prosecution’s eve-of-trial interrogation of Cook. App. 398. That interrogation, Banks observed, could not be reconciled with Cook’s insistence at trial that he had talked to no one about his testimony. Id., at 400, n. 17; see supra, at 677.
The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and denied Banks’s motion to amend the report. App. to Pet. for Cert. B6; App. 421-424. Concerning the Cook Brady transcript-suppression claim, the District Court recognized that Banks had filed his federal petition in 1996, three years before he became aware of the September 1980 transcript. App. 422-423. When the transcript surfaced in response to the Magistrate Judge’s 1999 disclosure order, Banks raised that newly discovered, long withheld document in his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and, again, in his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report. Id., at 423. The District Court concluded, however, that Banks had not properly pleaded a Brady claim predicated on the withheld Cook rehearsal transcript. App. 422. When that Brady claim came to light, the District Court reasoned, Banks should have moved to amend or supplement his 1996 federal habeas petition specifically to include the 1999 discovery as a basis for relief. App. 423. Banks urged that a Brady claim based on the September 1980 transcript had been aired by implied consent; under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b), he contended, the claim should have been treated as if raised in the pleadings. App. 433. Banks sought, and the District Court denied, a certificate of appeal-ability on this question. Id., at 433, 436.
In an August 20, 2003, unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court to the extent that it granted relief on the Farr Brady claim and denied a certificate of appeal-ability on the Cook Brady claim. App. to Pet. for Cert. A2, judgt. order reported at 48 Fed. Appx. 104 (2002). The Court of Appeals observed that in his 1992 state-court post-conviction application, Banks had not endeavored to develop the facts underpinning the Farr Brady claim. App. to Pet. for Cert. A19-A20. For that reason, the court held, the evi-dentiary proceeding ordered by the Magistrate Judge was unwarranted. Ibid. The Court of Appeals expressed no doubt that the prosecution had suppressed, prior to the federal habeas proceeding, Farr’s informant status and his part in the fateful trip to Dallas. But Banks was not appropriately diligent in pursuing his state-court application, the Court of Appeals maintained. In the Fifth Circuit’s view, Banks should have at that time attempted to locate Farr and question him; similarly, he should have asked to interview Deputy Sheriff Huff and other officers involved in investigating the crime. Id., at A19, A22. If such efforts had proved unavailing, the Court of Appeals suggested, Banks might have applied to the state court for assistance. Id., at A19. Banks’s lack of diligence in pursuing his 1992 state-court plea, the Court of Appeals concluded, rendered the evidence uncovered in the federal habeas proceeding procedurally barred. Id., at A22-A23.
In any event, the Fifth Circuit further concluded, Farr’s status as an informant was not “materia[l]” for Brady purposes. App. to Pet. for Cert. A32-A33. Banks had impeached Farr at trial by bringing out that he had been a police informant in Arkansas, and an unreliable one at that. Id., at A28, A32-A33; supra, at 680. Moreover, the Court of Appeals said, other witnesses had corroborated much of Farr’s testimony against Banks. App. to Pet. for Cert. A32. Notably, Banks himself had acknowledged his willingness to get a gun for Farr’s use in robberies. Ibid. In addition, the Fifth Circuit observed, the Magistrate Judge had relied on the cumulative effect of Brady error and the ineffectiveness of Banks’s counsel at the penalty phase. App. to Pet. for Cert. A44. Banks himself, however, had not urged that position; he had argued Brady and ineffective assistance of counsel discretely, not cumulatively. App. to Pet. for Cert. A46-A47. Finally, in accord with the District Court, the Court of Appeals apparently regarded Rule 15(b) as inapplicable in habeas proceedings. App. to Pet. for Cert. A51-A52. The Fifth Circuit accordingly denied a certificate of appealability on the Cook Brady transcript-suppression claim. App. to Pet. for Cert. A52, A78.
With an execution date set for March 12, 2003, Banks applied to this Court for a writ of certiorari, presenting four issues: the tenability of his Farr Brady claim; a penalty-phase ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim; the question whether, as to the Cook Brady transcript-suppression claim, a certificate of appealability was wrongly denied; and a claim of improper exclusion of minority jurors in violation of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965). Pet. for Cert. 23-24. We stayed Banks’s execution on March 12, 2003, 538 U. S. 917, and, on April 21, 2003, granted his petition on all questions other than his Swain claim. 538 U. S. 977. We now reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment dismissing Banks’s Farr Brady claim and that Court’s denial of a certificate of appealability on his Cook Brady claim.
II
We note, initially, that Banks s Brady claims arose under the regime in place prior to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214. Turning to the tenability of those claims, we consider first Banks’s Farr Brady claim as it trains on his death sentence, see App. to Pet. for Cert. B6 (District Court granted habeas solely with respect to the capital sentence), and next, Banks’s Cook Brady claim.
A
To pursue habeas corpus relief in federal court, Banks first had to exhaust “the remedies available in the courts of the State;” 28 U. S. C. §2254(b) (1994 ed.); see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 520 (1982). Banks alleged in his January 1992 state-court application for a writ of habeas corpus that the prosecution knowingly failed to turn over exculpatory evidence involving Farr in violation of Banks’s due process rights. App. 180. Banks thus satisfied the exhaustion requirement as to the legal ground for his Farr Brady claim.
In state postconviction court, however, Banks failed to produce evidence establishing that Farr had served as a police informant in this case. As support for his Farr Brady claim, Banks appended to his state-court application only De-metra Jefferson’s hardly probative statement that Farr “was well-connected to law enforcement people.” App. 195, ¶ 7; see supra, at 682. In the federal habeas forum, therefore, it was incumbent on Banks to show that he was not barred, by reason of the anterior state proceedings, from producing evidence to substantiate his Farr Brady claim. Banks “[would be] entitled to an evidentiary hearing [in federal court] if he [could] show cause for his failure to develop the facts in state-court proceedings and actual prejudice resulting from that failure.” Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U. S. 1, 11 (1992).
Brady, we reiterate, held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U. S., at 87. We set out in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 281-282 (1999), the three components or essential elements of a Brady prosecutorial misconduct claim: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” 527 U. S., at 281-282. “[Clause and prejudice” in this case “parallel two of the three components of the alleged Brady violation itself.” Id., at 282. Corresponding to the second Brady component (evidence suppressed by the State), a petitioner shows “cause” when the reason for his failure to develop facts in state-court proceedings was the State’s suppression of the relevant evidence; coincident with the third Brady component (prejudice), prejudice within the compass of the “cause and prejudice” requirement exists when the suppressed evidence is “material” for Brady purposes. 527 U. S., at 282. As to the first Brady component (evidence favorable to the accused), beyond genuine debate, the suppressed evidence relevant here, Farr’s paid informant status, qualifies as evidence advantageous to Banks. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A26 (Court of Appeals’ recognition that “Farr’s being a paid informant would certainly be favorable to Banks in attacking Farr’s testimony”). Thus, if Banks succeeds in demonstrating “cause and prejudice,” he will at the same time succeed in establishing the elements of his Farr Brady death penalty due process claim.
B
Our determination as to “cause” for Banks’s failure to develop the facts in state-court proceedings is informed by Strickler: In that case, Virginia prosecutors told the petitioner, prior to trial, that “the prosecutor’s files were open to the petitioner’s counsel,” thus “there was no need for a formal [Brkdy] motion.” 527 U. S., at 276, n. 14 (quoting App. in Strickler v. Greene, O. T. 1998, No. 98-5864, pp. 212-213 (brackets in original)). The prosecution file given to the Strickler petitioner, however, did not include several documents prepared by an “importan[t]” prosecution witness, recounting the witness’ initial difficulty recalling the events to which she testified at the petitioner’s trial. 527 U. S., at 273-275, 290. Those absent-from-the-file documents could have been used to impeach the witness. Id., at 273. In state-court postconviction proceedings, the Strickler petitioner had unsuccessfully urged ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel’s failure to move, pretrial, for Brady material. Answering that plea, the State asserted that a Brady motion would have been superfluous, for the prosecution had maintained an open file policy pursuant to which it had disclosed all Brady material. 527 U. S., at 276, n. 14, 278.
This Court determined that in the federal habeas proceedings, the Strickler petitioner had shown cause for his failure to raise a Brady claim in state court. 527 U. S., at 289. Three factors accounted for that determination:
“(a) the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence; (b) petitioner reasonably relied on the prosecution’s open file policy as fulfilling the prosecution’s duty to disclose such evidence; and (c) the [State] confirmed petitioner’s reliance on the open file policy by asserting during state habeas proceedings that petitioner had already received everything known to the government.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted).
This case is congruent with Strickler in all three respects. First, the State knew of, but kept
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is well established that federal, state, and regional legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for their legislative activities. In this case, petitioners argue that they, as local officials performing legislative functions, are entitled to the same protection. They further argue that their acts of introducing, voting for, and signing an ordinance eliminating the government office held by respondent constituted legislative activities. We agree on both counts and therefore reverse the judgment below.
I — !
Respondent Janet Seott-Harris was administrator of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) for the city of Fall River, Massachusetts, from 1987 to 1991. In 1990, respondent received a complaint that Dorothy Bilt-cliffe, an employee serving temporarily under her supervision, had made repeated racial and ethnic slurs about her colleagues. After respondent prepared termination charges against Biltcliffe, Biltcliffe used her political connections to press her case with several state and local officials, including petitioner Marilyn Roderick, the vice president of the Fall River City Council. The city council held a hearing on the charges against Biltcliffe and ultimately accepted a settlement proposal under which Biltcliffe would be suspended without pay for 60 days. Petitioner Daniel Bogan, the mayor of Fall River, thereafter substantially reduced the punishment.
While the charges against Biltcliffe were pending, Mayor Bogan prepared his budget proposal for the 1992 fiscal year. Anticipating a 5 to 10 percent reduction in state aid, Bogan proposed freezing the salaries of all municipal employees and eliminating 135 city positions. As part of this package, Bogan called for the elimination of DHHS, of which respondent was the sole employee. The city council ordinance committee, which was chaired by Roderick, approved an ordinance eliminating DHHS. The city council thereafter adopted the ordinance by a vote of 6 to 2, with petitioner Roderick among those voting in favor. Bogan signed the ordinance into law.
Respondent then filed suit under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, against the city, Bogan, Roderick, and several other city officials. She alleged that the elimination of her position was motivated by racial animus and a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights in filing the complaint against Biltcliffe. The District Court denied Bogan’s and Roderick’s motions to dismiss on the ground of legislative immunity, and the case proceeded to trial. Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River, et al., Civ. 91-12057-PBS (Mass., Jan. 27, 1995), App. to Pet. for Cert. 1.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants on the racial discrimination charge, but found the city, Bogan, and Roderick liable on respondent’s First Amendment claim, concluding that respondent’s constitutionally protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the elimination of her position. On a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the District Court again denied Bogan’s and Roderick’s claims of absolute legislative immunity, reasoning that “the ordinance amendment passed by the city council was an individually-targeted administrative act, rather than a neutral, legislative elimination of a position which incidentally resulted in the termination of plaintiff.” Id., at 20.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit set aside the verdict against the city but affirmed the judgments against Roderick and Bogan. Scott-Harris v. Fall River, 134 F. 3d 427 (1997). Although the court concluded that petitioners have “absolute immunity from civil liability for damages arising out of their performance of legitimate legislative activities,” id., at 440, it held that their challenged conduct was not “legislative,” id., at 441. Relying on the jury’s finding that “constitutionally sheltered speech was a substantial or motivating factor” underlying petitioners’ conduct, the court reasoned that the conduct was administrative, rather than legislative, because Roderick and Bogan “relied on facts relating to a particular individual [respondent] in the decisionmaking calculus.” Ibid. We granted certiorari. 520 U. S. 1263 (1997).
II
The principle that legislators are absolutely immune from liability for their legislative activities has long been recognized in Anglo-American law. This privilege “has taproots in the Parliamentary struggles of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries” and was “taken as a matter of course by those who severed the Colonies from the Crown and founded our Nation.” Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 372 (1951). The Federal Constitution, the Constitutions of many of the newly independent States, and the common law thus protected legislators from liability for their legislative activities. See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 6; Tenney, supra, at 372-375.
Recognizing this venerable tradition, we have held that state and regional legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for their legislative activities. See Tenney, supra (state legislators); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391 (1979) (regional legislators); see also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 202-204 (1881) (interpreting the federal Speech and Debate Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 6, to provide similar immunity to Members of Congress). We explained that legislators were entitled to absolute immunity from suit at common law and that Congress did not intend the general language of § 1983 to “impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason.” Tenney, supra, at 376. Because the common law accorded local legislators the same absolute immunity it accorded legislators at other levels of government, and because the rationales for such immunity are fully applicable to local legislators, we now hold that local legislators are likewise absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 for their legislative activities.
The common law at the time § 1983 was enacted deemed local legislators to be absolutely immune from suit for their legislative activities. New York’s highest court, for example, held that municipal aldermen were immune from suit for their discretionary decisions. Wilson v. New York, 1 Denio 595 (1845). The court explained that when a local legislator exercises discretionary powers, he “is exempt from all responsibility by action for the motives which influence him, and the manner in which such duties are performed. If corrupt, he may be impeached or indicted, but the law will not tolerate an action to redress the individual wrong which may have been done.” Id., at 599. These principles, according to the court, were “too familiar and well settled to require illustration or authority.” Id., at 599-600.
Shortly after § 1988 was enacted, the Mississippi Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion, holding that town aider-men could not be held liable under state law for their role in the adoption of an allegedly unlawful ordinance. Jones v. Loving, 55 Miss. 109, 30 Am. Rep. 508 (1877). The court explained that “[i]t certainly cannot be argued that the motives of the individual members of a legislative assembly, in voting for. a particular law, can be inquired into, and its supporters be made personally liable, upon an allegation that they acted maliciously towards the person aggrieved by the passage of the law.” Id., at 111, 30 Am. Rep., at 509. The court thus concluded that “[w]henever the officers of a municipal corporation are vested with legislative powers, they hold and exercise them for the public good, and are clothed with all the immunities of government, and are exempt from all liability for their mistaken use.” Ibid.
Treatises of that era confirm that this was the pervasive view. A leading treatise on municipal corporations explained that “[w]here the officers of a municipal corporation are invested with legislative powers, they are exempt from individual liability for the passage of any ordinance within their authority, and their motives in reference thereto will not be inquired into.” 1 J. Dillon, Law of Municipal Corporations §313, pp. 326-327 (3d ed. 1881) (emphasis in original). Thomas Cooley likewise noted in his influential treatise on the law of torts that the “rightful exemption” of legislators from liability was “very plain” and applied to members of “inferior legislative bodies, such as boards of supervisors, county commissioners, city councils, and the like.” Cooley 376; see also J. Bishop, Commentaries on the Non-Contract Law § 744 (1889) (noting that municipal legislators were immune for their legislative functions); Mechem §§644-646 (same); Throop, supra n. 4, § 709, at 671 (same).
Even the authorities cited by respondent are consistent with the view that local legislators were absolutely immune for their legislative, as distinct from ministerial, duties. In the few eases in which liability did attach, the courts emphasized that the defendant officials lacked discretion, and the duties were thus ministerial. See, e. g., Morris v. The People, 3 Denio 381, 395 (N. Y. 1846) (noting that the duty was “of a ministerial character only”); Caswell v. Allen, 7 Johns. 63, 68 (N. Y. 1810) (holding supervisors liable because the act was “mandatory55 and “[n]o discretion appeared] to [have been] given to the supervisors”). Respondent’s heavy reliance on our decision in Amy v. Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136 (1871), is misguided for this very reason. In that case, we held that local legislators could be held liable for violating a court order to levy a tax sufficient to pay a judgment, but only because the court order had created a ministerial duty. Id., at 138 (“The rule is well settled, that where the law requires absolutely a ministerial act to be done by a public officer, and he neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be compelled to respond in damages to the extent of the injury arising from his conduct”). The treatises cited by respondent confirm that this distinction between legislative and ministerial duties was dispositive of the right to absolute immunity. See, e. g., Cooley 377 (stating that local legislators may be held liable only for their “ministerial” duties); Meehem §647 (same).
Absolute immunity for local legislators under § 1983 finds support not only in history, but also in reason. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S., at 376 (stating that Congress did not intend for § 1983 to “impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason”). The rationales for according absolute immunity to federal, state, and regional legislators apply with equal force to local legislators. Regardless of the level of government, the exercise of legislative discretion should not be inhibited by judicial interference or distorted by the fear of personal liability. See Spallone v. United States, 493 U. S. 265, 279 (1990) (noting, in the context of addressing local legislative action, that “any restriction on a legislator’s freedom undermines the ‘public good’ by interfering with the rights of the people to representation in the democratic process”); see also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., at 201-204 (federal legislators); Tenney, supra, at 377 (state legislators); Lake Country Estates, 440 U. S., at 405 (regional legislators). Furthermore, the time and energy required to defend against a lawsuit are of particular concern at the local level, where the part-time citizen-legislator remains commonplace. See Tenney, supra, at 377 (citing “the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial”). And the threat of liability may significantly deter service in local government, where prestige and pecuniary rewards may pale in comparison to the threat of civil liability. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 816 (1982).
Moreover, certain deterrents to legislative abuse may be greater at the local level than at other levels of government. Municipalities themselves can be held liable for constitutional violations, whereas States and the Federal Government are often protected by sovereign immunity. Lake Country Estates, supra, at 405, n. 29 (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U. S. 658 (1978)). And, of course, the ultimate cheek on legislative abuse — the electoral process — applies with equal force at the loeal level, where legislators are often more closely responsible to the electorate. Cf. Tenney, supra, at 378 (stating that “[s]elf-diseipline and the voters must be the ultimate reliance for discouraging or correcting such abuses”).
Any argument that the rationale for absolute immunity does not extend to local legislators is implicitly foreclosed by our opinion in Lake Country Estates. There, we held that members of an interstate regional planning agency were entitled to absolute legislative immunity. Bereft of any historical antecedent to the regional agency, we relied almost exclusively on Tenney’s description of the purposes of legislative immunity and the importance of such immunity in advancing the “public good.” Although we expressly noted that local legislators were not at issue in that ease, see Lake Country Estates, 440 U. S., at 404, n. 26, we considered the regional legislators at issue to be the functional equivalents of loeal legislators, noting that the regional agency was “comparable to a county or municipality” and that the function of the regional agency, regulation of land use, was “traditionally a function performed by loeal governments.” Id., at 401-402. Thus, we now make explicit what was implicit in our precedents: Local legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for their legislative activities.
! — I HH
Absolute legislative immunity attaches to all actions taken “in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” Tenney, supra, at 376, The Court of Appeals held that petitioners’ conduct in this case was not legislative because them actions were specifically targeted at respondent. Relying on the jury’s finding that respondent’s constitutionally protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor behind petitioners’ conduct, the court concluded that petitioners necessarily “relied on facts relating to a particular individual” and “devised an ordinance that targeted [respondent] and treated her differently from other managers employed by the City.” 134 F. 3d, at 441. Although the Court of Appeals did not suggest that intent or motive can overcome an immunity defense for activities that are, in fact, legislative, the court erroneously relied on petitioners’ subjective intent in resolving the logically prior question of whether their acts were legislative.
Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it. The privilege of absolute immunity “would be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury’s speculation as to motives.” Ten- ney, 341 U. S., at 377 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, it simply is “not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators.” Ibid. We therefore held that the defendant in Ten-ney had acted in a legislative capacity even though he allegedly singled out the plaintiff for investigation in order “to intimidate and silence plaintiff and deter and prevent him from effectively exercising his constitutional rights.” Id., at 871 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This leaves us with the question whether, stripped of all considerations of intent and motive, petitioners’ actions were legislative. We have little trouble concluding that they were. Most evidently, petitioner Roderick’s acts of voting for an ordinance were, in form, quintessentially legislative. Petitioner Bogan’s introduction of a budget and signing into law an ordinance also were formally legislative, even though he was an executive official. We have recognized that officials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when they perform legislative functions, see Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U. S. 719, 731-734 (1980); Bogan’s actions were legislative because they were integral steps in the legislative process. Cf. Edwards v. United States, 286 U. S. 482, 490 (1932) (noting “the legislative character of the President’s function in approving or disapproving bills”); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, 372-373 (1932) (recognizing that a Governor’s signing or vetoing of a bill constitutes part of the legislative process).
Respondent, however, asks us to look beyond petitioners’ formal actions to consider whether the ordinance was legislative in substance. We need not determine whether the formally legislative character of petitioners’ actions is alone sufficient to entitle petitioners to legislative immunity, because here the ordinance, in substance, bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation. The ordinance reflected a discretionary, policymaking decision implicating the budgetary priorities of the city and the services the city provides to its constituents. Moreover, it involved the termination of a position, which, unlike the hiring or firing of a particular employee, may have prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office. And the city council, in eliminating DHHS, certainly governed “in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act.” Tenney, supra, at 379. Thus, petitioners’ activities were undoubtedly legislative.
*i* *i*
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Respondent dropped several other defendants from the suit, and the District Court directed a verdict in favor of defendant Robert Connors, the Fall River City Administrator. Only the city, Bogan, and Roderick were appellants in the Court of Appeals, and only the latter two are petitioners in this Court.
The court held that the city was not liable because the jury could reasonably infer unlawful intent only as to two of the dty council members, and municipal liability could not rest “on so frail a foundation.” 134 F. 3d, at 440.
The “regional” legislature in Lake Country Estates was the governing body of an agency created by a compact between two States to coordinate and regulate development in a region encompassing portions of both States. Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S., at 394.
The court distinguished “discretionary” duties, which were protected absolutely, and “ministerial” duties, which were not. Although the court described the former as “judicial” in nature, it was merely using the term broadly to encompass the “discretionary3’ acts of officials. See 1 Denio, at 599 (“[I]f his powers are discretionary, to be exerted or withheld, according to his own view of what is necessary and proper, they are in their nature judicial”). The legislators' actions in Wilson were unquestionably legislative in both form and substance. Thus, Wilson was widely, and correctly, cited as a leading case regarding legislative immunity. See, e. g., T. Cooley, Law of Torts 377, n. 1 (1880) (hereinafter Cooley); F. Meehem, Law of Public Offices and Officers § 644, p. 431, n. 1 (1890) (hereinafter Mechem); M. Throop, Law Relating to Public Officers § 709, p. 671, n. 1 (1892).
It is thus not surprising that several Members of this Court have recognized that the rationale of Lake Country Estates essentially settled the question of immunity for local legislators. See Owen v. Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 664, n. 6 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 407-408 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part); see also Spallone v. United States, 493 U. S. 265, 278 (1990) (explaining that the same considerations underlying Tenney and Lake Country Estates applied to contempt sanctions against local legislators). In fact, the argument for absolute immunity for local legislators may be stronger than for the regional legislators in Lake Country Estates, because immunity was historically granted to local legislators and because the legislators in Lake Country Estates were unelected and thus less directly accountable to the public. See Lake Country Estates, supra, at 407 (Marshall, X, dissenting in part).
Because of our conclusion that petitioners are entitled to absolute legislative immunity, we need not address the third question on which we granted certiorari: whether petitioners proximately caused an injury cognizable under § 1983.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was convicted of murder in a Georgia state court. His sentence was death by electrocution. Subsequently he asked the Governor to postpone execution on the ground that after conviction and sentence he had become insane. Acting under authority granted by § 27-2602 of the Georgia Code the Governor appointed three physicians who examined petitioner and declared him sane. Petitioner then filed this habeas corpus proceeding again alleging his insanity. He contended that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that his claim of insanity after sentence be originally determined by a judicial or administrative tribunal after notice and hearings in which he could be represented by counsel, cross-examine witnesses and offer evidence. He further contended that if the tribunal was administrative its findings must be subject to judicial review. The trial court sustained the constitutional validity of § 27-2602, holding that determination of petitioner’s sanity by the Governor supported by the report of physicians had met the standards of due process. The State Supreme Court affirmed, 205 Ga. 122, 52 S. E. 2d 433. The constitutional questions being substantial, see Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U. S. 431, 439, the case is here on appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2).
In affirming, the State Supreme Court held that a person legally convicted and sentenced to death had no statutory or constitutional right to a judicially conducted or supervised “inquisition or trial” on the question of insanity subsequent to sentence. It viewed the Georgia statutory procedure for determination of this question as motivated solely by a sense of “public propriety and decency” — an “act of grace” which could be “bestowed or withheld by the State at will” and therefore not subject to due process requirements of notice and hearing. The court cited as authority, among others, our holding in Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U. S. 398. Compare Burns v. United States, 287 U. S. 216, 223.
In accordance with established policy we shall not go beyond the constitutional issues necessarily raised by this record. At the outset we lay aside the contention that execution of an insane person is a type of “cruel and unusual punishment” forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 469. For the controlling Georgia statutes neither approve the practice of executing insane persons, nor is this petitioner about to be executed on such a premise. It is suggested that the reasoning of the Georgia Supreme Court in this case requires us to pass upon the state statute as though it had established a state practice designed to execute persons while insane. But we shall not measure the statute by some possible future application. Our holding is limited to the question of whether the method applied by Georgia here to determine the sanity of an already convicted defendant offends due process.
Postponement of execution because of insanity bears a close affinity not to trial for a crime but rather to reprieves of sentences in general. The power to reprieve has usually sprung from the same source as the power to pardon. Power of executive clemency in this country undoubtedly derived from the practice as it had existed in England. Such power has traditionally rested in governors or the President, although some of that power is often delegated to agencies such as pardon or parole boards. Seldom, if ever, has this power of executive clemency been subjected to review by the courts. See Ex parte United States, 242 U. S. 27, 42, and cases collected in Note, 38 L. R. A. 577, 587.
We are unable to say that it offends due process for a state to deem its Governor an “apt and special tribunal” to pass upon a question so closely related to powers that from the beginning have been entrusted to governors. And here the governor had the aid of physicians specially trained in appraising the elusive and often deceptive symptoms of insanity. It is true that gov'ernors and physicians might make errors of judgment. But the search for truth in this field is always beset by difficulties that may beget error. Even judicial determination of sanity might be wrong.
Recently we have pointed out the necessary and inherent differences between trial procedures and post-conviction procedures such as sentencing. Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241. In that case we emphasized that certain trial procedure safeguards are not applicable to the process of sentencing. This principle applies even more forcefully to an effort to transplant every trial safeguard to a determination of sanity after conviction. As was pointed out in the Nobles case, supra, to require judicial review every time a convicted defendant suggested insanity would make the possibility of carrying out a sentence depend upon “fecundity in making suggestion after suggestion of insanity.” Nobles v. Georgia, supra, at 405-406. See also Phyle v. Duffy, supra. To protect itself society must have power to try, convict, and execute sentences. Our legal system demands that this governmental duty be performed with scrupulous fairness to an accused. We cannot say that it offends due process to leave the question of a convicted person’s sanity to the solemn responsibility of a state’s highest executive with authority to invoke the aid of the most skillful class of experts on the crucial questions involved.
This leaves the contention that the Georgia statutes do not make provisions for an adversary hearing in which a convicted defendant can be present by friends, attorneys, or in person, with the privilege of cross-examining witnesses and offering evidence. Whether this Governor declined to hear, any statements on petitioner’s behalf, this record does not show. We would suppose that most if not all governors, like most if not all judges, would welcome any information which might be suggested in cases where human lives depend upon their decision.
Both the Nobles and the Phyle cases stand for the universal common-law principle that upon a suggestion of insanity after sentence, the tribunal charged with responsibility must be vested with broad discretion in deciding whether evidence shall be heard. This discretion has usually been held nonreviewable by appellate courts. The heart of the common-law doctrine has been that a suggestion of insanity after sentence is an appeal to the conscience and sound wisdom of the particular tribunal which is asked to postpone sentence. We cannot say that the trust thus reposed in judges should be denied governors, traditionally charged with saying the last word that spells life or death. There is no indication that either the Governor or the physicians who acted on petitioner’s application violated the humanitarian policy of Georgia against execution of the insane. We hold that the Georgia statute as applied is not a denial of due process of law.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
“Disposition of insane convicts. . . . Upon satisfactory evidence being offered to the Governor that the person convicted of a capital offense has become insane subsequent to his conviction, the Governor may, within his discretion, have said person examined by such expert physicians as the Governor may choose; and said physicians shall report to the Governor the result of their investigation; and the Governor may, if he shall determine that the person convicted has become insane, have the power of committing him to the Milledgeville State Hospital until his sanity shall have been restored, as determined by laws now in force. . . .” Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2602 (1074 P. C.); Acts 1903, p. 77.
“No person who has been convicted of a capital offense shall be entitled to any inquisition or trial to determine his sanity.” Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2601 (1073 P. C.); Acts 1903, p. 77.
Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U. S. 398,409.
See eases collected in Notes, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 424 et seq.; 49 A. L. R. 801 et seq.; 38 L. R. A. 577 et seq.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
D
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Alito
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are asked in this case to decide whether an association-in-fact enterprise under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. § 1961 et seq., must have “an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages.” Pet. for Cert. i. We hold that such an enterprise must have a “structure” but that an instruction framed in this precise language is not necessary. The District Court properly instructed the jury in this case. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
A
The evidence at petitioner’s trial was sufficient to prove the following: Petitioner and others participated in a series of bank thefts in New York, New Jersey, Ohio, and Wisconsin during the 1990’s. The participants in these crimes included a core group, along with others who were recruited from time to time. Although the participants sometimes attempted bank-vault burglaries and bank robberies, the group usually targeted cash-laden night-deposit boxes, which are often found in banks in retail areas.
Each theft was typically carried out by a group of participants who met beforehand to plan the crime, gather tools (such as crowbars, fishing gaffs, and walkie-talkies), and assign the roles that each participant would play (such as lookout and driver). The participants generally split the proceeds from the thefts. The group was loosely and informally organized. It does not appear to have had a leader or hierarchy; nor does it appear that the participants ever formulated any long-term master plan or agreement.
From 1991 to 1994, the core group was responsible for more than 30 night-deposit-box thefts. By 1994, petitioner had joined the group, and over the next five years, he participated in numerous attempted night-deposit-box thefts and at least two attempted bank-vault burglaries.
In 2003, petitioner was indicted for participation in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1962(c); conspiracy to commit that offense, in violation of § 1962(d); conspiracy to commit bank burglary, in violation of § 371; and nine counts of bank burglary and attempted bank burglary, in violation of §2113(a).
B
In instructing the jury on the meaning of a RICO “enterprise,” the District Court relied largely on language in United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576 (1981). The court told the jurors that, in order to establish the existence of such an enterprise, the Government had to prove that: “(1) There [was] an ongoing organization with some sort of framework, formal or informal, for carrying out its objectives; and (2) the various members and associates of the association function[ed] as a continuing unit to achieve a common purpose.” App. 112. Over petitioner’s objection, the court also told the jury that it could “find an enterprise where an association of individuals, without structural hierarchy, form[ed] solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern of racketeering acts” and that “[e]ommon sense suggests that the existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes more readily proven by what is [sic] does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure.” Id., at 111-112.
Petitioner requested an instruction that the Government was required to prove that the enterprise “had an ongoing organization, a core membership that functioned as a continuing unit, and an ascertainable structural hierarchy distinct from the charged predicate acts.” Id., at 95. The District Court refused to give that instruction.
Petitioner was convicted on 11 of the 12 counts against him, including the RICO counts, and was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment. In a summary order, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed his conviction but vacated the sentence on a ground not relevant to the issues before us. 283 Fed. Appx. 825 (2007). The Court of Appeals did not specifically address the RICO jury instructions, stating only that the arguments not discussed in the order were “without merit.” Id., at 826. Petitioner was then re-sentenced, and we granted certiorari, 554 U. S. 944 (2008), to resolve conflicts among the Courts of Appeals concerning the meaning of a RICO enterprise.
II
A
RICO makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” 18 U. S. C. § 1962(c) (emphasis added).
The statute does not specifically define the outer boundaries of the “enterprise” concept but states that the term “includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” § 1961(4). This enumeration of included enterprises is obviously broad, encompassing “any... group of individuals associated in fact.” Ibid, (emphasis added). The term “any” ensures that the definition has a wide reach, see, e. g., Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 218-219 (2008), and the very concept of an association in fact is expansive. In addition, the RICO statute provides that its terms are to be “liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.” § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947, note following 18 U. S. C. § 1961; see also, e. g., National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 257 (1994) (“RICO broadly defines ‘enterprise' ”); Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 497 (1985) (“RICO is to be read broadly”); Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 21 (1983) (noting “the pattern of the RICO statute in utilizing terms and concepts of breadth”).
In light of these statutory features, we explained in Turkette that “an enterprise includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact” and that RICO reaches “a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.” 452 U. S., at 580, 583. Such an enterprise, we said, “is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.” Id., at 583.
Notwithstanding these precedents, the dissent asserts that the definition of a RICO enterprise is limited to “businesslike entities.” See post, at 952 (opinion of Stevens, J.). We see no basis to impose such an extratextual requirement.
B
As noted, the specific question on which we granted certiorari is whether an association-in-fact enterprise must have “an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages.” Pet. for Cert. i. We will break this question into three parts. First, must an association-in-fact enterprise have a “structure”? Second, must the structure be “ascertainable”? Third, must the “structure” go “beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity” in which its members engage?
“Structure.” We agree with petitioner that an association-in-fact enterprise must have a structure. In the sense relevant here, the term “structure” means “[t]he way in which parts are arranged or put together to form a whole” and “[t]he interrelation or arrangement of parts in a complex entity.” American Heritage Dictionary 1718 (4th ed. 2000); see also Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1410 (1967) (defining structure to mean, among other things, “the pattern of relationships, as of status or friendship, existing among the members of a group or society”).
From the terms of RICO, it is apparent that an association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose. As we succinctly put it in Turkette, an association-in-fact enterprise is “a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.” 452 U. S., at 583.
That an “enterprise” must have a purpose is apparent from the meaning of the term in ordinary usage, i. e., a “venture,” “undertaking,” or “project.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 757 (1976). The concept of “association]” requires both interpersonal relationships and a common interest. See id., at 132 (defining “association” as “an organization of persons having a common interest”); Black’s Law Dictionary 156 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (defining “association” as a “collection of persons who have joined together for a certain object”). Section 1962(c) reinforces this conclusion and also shows that an “enterprise” must have some longevity, since the offense proscribed by that provision demands proof that the enterprise had “affairs” of sufficient duration to permit an associate to “participate” in those affairs through “a pattern of racketeering activity.”
Although an association-in-fact enterprise must have these structural features, it does not follow that a district court must use the term “structure” in its jury instructions. A trial judge has considerable discretion in choosing the language of an instruction so long as the substance of the relevant point is adequately expressed.
“Ascertainable. ” Whenever a jury is told that it must find the existence of an element beyond a reasonable doubt, that element must be “ascertainable” or else the jury could not find that it was proved. Therefore, telling the members of the jury that they had to ascertain the existence of an “ascertainable structure” would have been redundant and potentially misleading.
“Beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity.” This phrase may be interpreted in at least two different ways, and its correctness depends on the particular sense in which the phrase is used. If the phrase is interpreted to mean that the existence of an enterprise is a separate element that must be proved, it is of course correct. As we explained in Turkette, the existence of an enterprise is an element distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity and “proof of one does not necessarily establish the other.” 452 U. S., at 583.
On the other hand, if the phrase is used to mean that the existence of an enterprise may never be inferred from the evidence showing that persons associated with the enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, it is incorrect. We recognized in Turkette that the evidence used to prove the pattern of racketeering activity and the evidence establishing an enterprise “may in particular cases coalesce.” Ibid.
C
The crux of petitioner’s argument is that a RICO enterprise must have structural features in addition to those that we think can be fairly inferred from the language of the statute. Although petitioner concedes that an association-in-fact enterprise may be an “ ‘informal’ ” group and that “not ‘much’” structure is needed, Reply Brief for Petitioner 24, he contends that such an enterprise must have at least some additional structural attributes, such as a structural “hierarchy,” “role differentiation,” a “unique modus operandi," a “chain of command,” “professionalism and sophistication of organization,” “diversity and complexity of crimes,” “membership dues, rules and regulations,” “uncharged or additional crimes aside from predicate acts,” an “internal discipline mechanism,” “regular meetings regarding enterprise affairs,” an “enterprise ‘name,’ ” and “induction or initiation ceremonies and rituals,” id., at 31-35; see also Brief for Petitioner 26-28, 33; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 8, 17.
We see no basis in the language of RICO for the structural requirements that petitioner asks us to recognize. As we said in Turkette, an association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit that functions with a common purpose. Such a group need not have a hierarchical structure or a “chain of command”; decisions may be made on an ad hoc basis and by any number of methods — by majority vote, consensus, a show of strength, etc. Members of the group need not have fixed roles; different members may perform different roles at different times. The group need not have a name, regular meetings, dues, established rules and regulations, disciplinary procedures, or induction or initiation ceremonies. While the group must function as a continuing unit and remain in existence long enough to pursue a course of conduct, nothing in RICO exempts an enterprise whose associates engage in spurts of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence. Nor is the statute limited to groups whose crimes are sophisticated, diverse, complex, or unique; for example, a group that does nothing but engage in extortion through old-fashioned, unsophisticated, and brutal means may fall squarely within the statute’s reach.
The breadth of the “enterprise” concept in RICO is highlighted by comparing the statute with other federal statutes that target organized criminal groups. For example, 18 U. S. C. § 1955(b), which was enacted together with RICO as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452,84 Stat. 922, defines an “illegal gambling business” as one that “involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business.” A “continuing criminal enterprise,” as defined in 21 U. S. C. § 848(c), must involve more than five persons who act in concert and must have an “organizer,” supervisor, or other manager. Congress included no such requirements in RICO.
Ill
A
Contrary to petitioner’s claims, rejection of his argument regarding these structural characteristics does not lead to a merger of the crime proscribed by 18 U. S. C. § 1962(c) (participating in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity) and any of the following offenses: operating a gambling business, §1955; conspiring to commit one or more crimes that are listed as RICO predicate offenses, §371; or conspiring to violate the RICO statute, § 1962(d).
Proof that a defendant violated § 1955 does not necessarily establish that the defendant conspired to participate in the affairs of a gambling enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. In order to prove the latter offense, the prosecution must prove either that the defendant committed a pattern of § 1955 violations or a pattern of state-law gambling crimes. See § 1961(1). No such proof is needed to establish a simple violation of § 1955.
Likewise, proof that a defendant conspired to commit a RICO predicate offense — for example, arson — does not necessarily establish that the defendant participated in the affairs of an arson enterprise through a pattern of arson crimes. Under § 371, a conspiracy is an inchoate crime that may be completed in the brief period needed for the formation of the agreement and the commission of a single overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Feola, 420 U. S. 671, 694 (1975). Section 1962(c) demands much more: the creation of an “enterprise” — a group with a common purpose and course of conduct — and the actual commission of a pattern of predicate offenses.
Finally, while in practice the elements of a violation of §§ 1962(c) and (d) are similar, this overlap would persist even if petitioner’s conception of an association-in-fact enterprise were accepted.
B
Because the statutory language is clear, there is no need to reach petitioner’s remaining arguments based on statutory purpose, legislative history, or the rule of lenity. In prior cases, we have rejected similar arguments in favor of the clear but expansive text of the statute. See National Organization for Women, 510 U. S., at 262 (“The fact that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth” (quoting Sedima, 473 U. S., at 499; brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Turkette, 452 U. S., at 589-591. “We have repeatedly refused to adopt narrowing constructions of RICO in order to make it conform to a preconceived notion of what Congress intended to proscribe.” Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co., 553 U. S. 639, 660 (2008); see also, e. g., National Organization for Women, supra, at 252 (rejecting the argument that “RICO requires proof that either the racketeering enterprise or the predicate acts of racketeering were motivated by an economic purpose”); H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 244 (1989) (declining to read “an organized crime limitation into RICO’s pattern concept”); Sedima, supra, at 481 (rejecting the view that RICO provides a private right of action “only against defendants who had been convicted on criminal charges, and only where there had occurred a ‘racketeering injury’ ”).
IV
The instructions the District Court Judge gave to the jury in this case were correct and adequate. These instructions explicitly told the jurors that they could not convict on the RICO charges unless they found that the Government had proved the existence of an enterprise. See App. 111. The instructions made clear that this was a separate element from the pattern of racketeering activity. Ibid.
The instructions also adequately told the jury that the enterprise needed to have the structural attributes that may be inferred from the statutory language. As noted, the trial judge told the jury that the Government was required to prove that there was “an ongoing organization with some sort of framework, formal or informal, for carrying out its objectives” and that “the various members and associates of the association function[ed] as a continuing unit to achieve a common purpose.” Id., at 112.
Finally, the trial judge did not err in instructing the jury that “the existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes more readily proven by what is [sic] does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure.” Id., at 111-112. This instruction properly conveyed the point we made in Turkette that proof of a pattern of racketeering activity may be sufficient in a particular case to permit a jury to infer the existence of an assoeiation-in-fact enterprise.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Breyer joins, dissenting.
In my view, Congress intended the term “enterprise” as it is used in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U. S. C. § 1961 et seq., to refer only to businesslike entities that have an existence apart from the predicate acts committed by their employees or associates. The trial judge in this case committed two significant errors relating to the meaning of that term. First, he instructed the jury that “an association of individuals, without structural hierarchy, form[ed] solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern of racketeering acts” can constitute an enterprise. App. 112. And he allowed the jury to find that element satisfied by evidence showing a group of criminals with no existence beyond its intermittent commission of racketeering acts and related offenses. Because the Court’s decision affirming petitioner’s conviction is inconsistent with the statutory meaning of the term enterprise and serves to expand RICO liability far beyond the bounds Congress intended, I respectfully dissent.
I
RICO makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” § 1962(c). The statute defines “enterprise” to include “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” § 1961(4).
It is clear from the statute and our earlier decisions construing the term that Congress used “enterprise” in these provisions in the sense of “a business organization,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 757 (1976), rather than “a ‘venture,’ ‘undertaking,’ or ‘project,’” ante, at 946 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, at 757). First, the terms “individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity” describe entities with formal legal structures most commonly established for business purposes. § 1961(4). In context, the subsequent reference to any “union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity” reflects an intended commonality between the legal and nonlegal entities included in the provision. Ibid, (emphasis added). “The juxtaposition of the two phrases suggests that ‘associated in fact’ just means structured without the aid of legally defined structural forms such as the business corporation.” Limestone Development Corp. v. Lemont, 520 F. 3d 797, 804-805 (CA7 2008).
That an enterprise must have businesslike characteristics is confirmed by the text of § 1962(c) and our decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170 (1993). Section 1962(c) creates liability for “conducting] or participating]... in the conduct of [an] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” In Reves, we examined that provision’s meaning and held that, “[i]n order to ‘participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs,’ one must have some part in directing those affairs.” Id., at 179 (quoting § 1962(c)). It is not enough for a defendant to “carry on” or “participate in” an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity; instead, evidence that he operated, managed, or directed those affairs is required. See id., at 177-179. This requirement confirms that the enterprise element demands evidence of a certain quantum of businesslike organization — i. e., a system of processes, dealings, or other affairs that can be “directed.”
Our cases also make clear that an enterprise “is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages.” United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S. 576, 583 (1981). As with the requirement that an enterprise have businesslike characteristics, that an enterprise must have a separate existence is confirmed by § 1962(e) and Reves. If an entity's existence consisted solely of its members’ performance of a pattern of racketeering acts, the “enterprise’s affairs” would be synonymous with the “pattern of racketeering activity.” Section 1962(c) would then prohibit an individual from conducting or participating in “the conduct of [a pattern of racketeering activity] through a pattern of racketeering activity” — a reading that is unbearably redundant, particularly in a case like this one in which a single pattern of activity is alleged. The only way to avoid that result is to require that an “enterprise’s affairs” be something other than the pattern of racketeering activity undertaken by its members.
Recognizing an enterprise’s businesslike nature and its distinctness from the pattern of predicate acts, however, does not answer the question of what proof each element requires. In cases involving a legal entity, the matter of proving the enterprise element is straightforward, as the entity’s legal existence will always be something apart from the pattern of activity performed by the defendant or his associates. Cf. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U. S. 158, 163 (2001). But in the case of an assoeiationin-fact enterprise, the Government must adduce other evidence of the entity’s “separate” existence and “ongoing organization.” Turkette, 452 U. S., at 583. There may be cases in which a jury can infer that existence and continuity from the evidence used to establish the pattern of racketeering activity. Ibid. But that will be true only when the pattern of activity is so complex that it could not be performed in the absence of structures or processes for planning or concealing the illegal conduct beyond those inherent in performing the predicate acts. More often, proof of an enterprise’s separate existence will require different evidence from that used to establish the pattern of predicate acts.
Precisely what proof is required in each case is a more difficult question, largely due to the abundant variety of RICO predicates and enterprises. Because covered enterprises are necessarily businesslike in nature, however, proof of an association-in-fact enterprise’s separate existence will generally require evidence of rules, routines, or processes through which the entity maintains its continuing operations and seeks to conceal its illegal acts. As petitioner suggests, this requirement will usually be satisfied by evidence that the association has an “ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages.” Pet. for Cert. i. Examples of such structure include an organizational hierarchy, a “framework for making decisions,” an “internal discipline mechanism,” “regular meetings,” or a practice of “reinvestfing]... proceeds to promote and expand the enterprise.” Reply Brief for Petitioner 31-34. In other cases, the enterprise’s existence might be established through evidence that it provides goods or services to third parties, as such an undertaking will require organizational elements more comprehensive than those necessary to perform a pattern of predicate acts. Thus, the evidence needed to establish an enterprise will vary from case to case, but in every case the Government must carry its burden of proving that an alleged enterprise has an existence separate from the pattern of racketeering activity undertaken by its constituents.
II
In some respects, my reading of the statute is not very different from that adopted by the Court. We agree that “an association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.” Ante, at 946. But the Court stops short of giving content to that requirement. It states only that RICO “demands proof that the enterprise had ‘affairs’ of sufficient duration to permit an associate to ‘participate’ in those affairs through ‘a pattern of racketeering activity,’ ” before concluding that “[a] trial judge has considerable discretion in choosing the language of an instruction” and need not use the term “structure.” Ibid. While I agree the word “structure” is not talismanic, I would hold that the instructions must convey the requirement that the alleged enterprise have an existence apart from the alleged pattern of predicate acts. The Court’s decision, by contrast, will allow juries to infer the existence of an enterprise in every case involving a pattern of racketeering activity undertaken by two or more associates.
By permitting the Government to prove both elements with the same evidence, the Court renders the enterprise requirement essentially meaningless in association-in-fact cases. It also threatens to make that category of § 1962(c) offenses indistinguishable from conspiracies to commit predicate acts, see §371, as the only remaining difference is § 1962(c)’s pattern requirement. The Court resists this criticism, arguing that § 1962(c) “demands much more” than the inchoate offense defined in §371. Ante, at 950. It states that the latter “may be completed in the brief period needed for the formation of the agreement and the commission of a single overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,” whereas the former requires the creation of “a group with a common purpose and course of conduct — and the actual commission of a pattern of predicate offenses.” Ibid. Given that it is also unlawful to conspire to violate § 1962(c), see § 1962(d), this comment provides no assurance that RICO and §371 offenses remain distinct. Only if proof of the enterprise element — the “group with a common purpose and course of conduct” — requires evidence of activity or organization beyond that inherent in the pattern of predicate acts will RICO offenses retain an identity distinct from § 371 offenses.
This case illustrates these concerns. The trial judge instructed the jury that an enterprise need have only the degree of organization necessary “for carrying out its objectives” and that it could “find an enterprise where an association of individuals, without structural hierarchy, forms solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern of racketeering acts.” App. 112. These instructions were plainly deficient, as they did not require the Government to prove that the alleged enterprise had an existence apart from the pattern of predicate acts. Instead, they permitted the Government’s proof of the enterprise’s structure and continuing nature — requirements on which all agree — to consist only of evidence that petitioner and his associates performed a pattern of racketeering activity.
Petitioner’s requested instruction would have required the jury to find that the alleged enterprise “had an ongoing organization, a core membership that functioned as a continuing unit, and an ascertainable structural hierarchy distinct from the charged predicate acts.” Id., at 95. That instruction does not precisely track my understanding of the statute; although evidence of “structural hierarchy” can evidence an enterprise, it is not necessary to establish that element. Nevertheless, the proposed instruction would have better directed the jury to consider whether the alleged enterprise possessed the separate existence necessary to expose petitioner to liability under § 1962(c), and the trial judge should have considered an instruction along those lines.
The trial judge also erred in finding the Government’s evidence in this case sufficient to support petitioner’s RICO convictions. Petitioner was alleged to have participated and conspired to participate in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of one act of bank robbery and three acts of interstate transportation of stolen funds. Id., at 15-19. The “primary goals” of the alleged enterprise “included generating money for its members and associates through the commission of criminal activity, including bank robberies, bank burglaries and interstate transportation of stolen money.” Id., at 14. And its modus operandi was to congregate periodically when an associate had a lead on a night-deposit box that the group could break into. Whoever among the associates was available would bring screwdrivers, crowbars, and walkie-talkies to the location. Some acted as lookouts, while others retrieved the money. When the endeavor was successful, the participants would split the proceeds. Thus, the group’s purpose and activities, and petitioner’s participation therein, were limited to sporadic acts of taking money from bank deposit boxes. There is no evidence in RICO’s text or history that Congress intended it to reach such ad hoc associations of thieves.
Ill
Because the instructions and evidence in this case did not satisfy the requirement that an alleged enterprise have an existence separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages, I respectfully dissent.
The relevant portion of the instructions was as follows:
“The term ‘enterprise’ as used in these instructions may also include a group of people associated in fact, even though this association is not recognized as a legal entity. Indeed, an enterprise need not have a name. Thus, an enterprise need not be a form[al] business entity such as a corporation, but may be merely an informal association of individuals. A group or association of people can be an ‘enterprise’ if, among other requirements, these individuals ‘associate’ together for a purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. Common sense suggests that the existence of an association-in-fact is oftentimes more readily proven by what is [sic] does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure.
“Moreover, you may find an enterprise where an association of individuals, without structural hierarchy, forms solely for the purpose of carrying out a pattern of racketeering acts. Such an association of persons may be established by evidence showing an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and... by evidence that the people making up the association functioned as a continuing unit. Therefore, in order to establish the existence of such an enterprise, the government must prove that: (1) There is an ongoing organization with some sort of framework, formal or informal, for carrying out its objectives; and (2) the various members and associates of the association function as a continuing unit to achieve a common purpose.
“Regarding ‘organization,’ it is not necessary that the enterprise have any particular or formal structure, but it must have sufficient organization that its members functioned and operated in a coordinated manner in order to carry out the alleged common purpose or purposes of the enterprise.” App. 111-113 (emphasis added).
This provision does not purport to set out an exhaustive definition of the term “enterprise.” Compare §§ 1961(1) — (2) (defining what the terms “racketeering activity” and “State” mean) with §§ 1961(3M4) (defining what the terms “person” and “enterprise” include). Accordingly, this provision does not foreclose the possibility that the term might include, in addition to the specifically enumerated entities, others that fall within the ordinary meaning of the term “enterprise.” See H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U. S. 229, 238 (1989) (explaining that the term “pattern” also retains its ordinary meaning notwithstanding the statutory definition in § 1961(5)).
The dissent claims that the “businesslike” limitation “is confirmed by the text of § 1962(c) and our decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170 (1993).” Post, at 953. Section 1962(c), however, states only that one may not “conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [an] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Whatever businesslike characteristics the dissent has in mind, we do not see them in § 1962(c). Furthermore, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U. S. 170 (1993), is inapposite because that case turned on our interpretation of the participation requirement of § 1962, not the definition of “enterprise.” See id., at 184-185. In any case, it would be an interpretive stretch to deduce from the requirement that an enterprise must be “directed” to impose the much broader, amorphous requirement that it be “businesslike.”
It is easy to envision situations in which proof that individuals engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity would not establish the existence of an enterprise. For example, suppose that several individuals, independently and without coordination, engaged in a pattern of crimes listed as RICO predicates — for example, bribery or extortion. Proof of these patterns would not be enough to show that the individuals were members of an enterprise.
The dissent states that “[o]nly if proof of the enterprise element... requires evidence of activity or organization beyond that inherent in the pattern of predicate acts will RICO offenses retain an identity distinct from §371 offenses.” Post, at 957. This is incorrect: Even if the same evidence may prove two separate elements, this does not mean that the two elements collapse into one.
To be sure, we have read RICO’s enterprise term broadly to include entities with exclusively noneconomic motives or wholly unlawful purposes. See National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U. S. 249, 252 (1994) (NOW); United States v. Turkette, 452 U. S.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Officers executing a warrant to search for cocaine in respondent Banks’s apartment knocked and announced their authority. The question is whether their 15-to-20-second wait before a forcible entry satisfied the Fourth Amendment and 18 U. S. C. §3109. We hold that it did.
I
With information that Banks was selling cocaine at home, North Las Vegas Police Department officers and Federal Bureau of Investigation agents got a warrant to search his two-bedroom apartment. As soon as they arrived there, about 2 o’clock on a Wednesday afternoon, officers posted in front called out “police search warrant” and rapped hard enough on the door to be heard by officers at the back door. Brief for United States 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). There was no indication whether anyone was home, and after waiting for 15 to 20 seconds with no answer, the officers broke open the front door with a battering ram. Banks was in the shower and testified that he heard nothing until the crash of the door, which brought him out dripping to confront the police. The search produced weapons, crack cocaine, and other evidence of drug dealing.
In response to drug and firearms charges, Banks moved to suppress evidence, arguing that the officers executing the search warrant waited an unreasonably short time before forcing entry, and so violated both the Fourth Amendment and 18 U. S. C. § 3109. The District Court denied the motion, and Banks pleaded guilty, reserving his right to challenge the search on appeal.
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed and ordered suppression of the evidence found. 282 F. 3d 699 (2002). In assessing the reasonableness of the execution of the warrant, the panel majority set out a nonexhaustive list of “factors that an officer reasonably should consider” in deciding when to enter premises identified in a warrant, after knocking and announcing their presence but receiving no express acknowledgment:
“(a) size of the residence; (b) location of the residence; (c) location of the officers in relation to the main living or sleeping areas of the residence; (d) time of day; (e) nature of the suspected offense; (f) evidence demonstrating the suspect's guilt; (g) suspect’s prior convictions and, if any, the type of offense for which he was convicted; and (h) any other observations triggering the senses of the officers that reasonably would lead one to believe that immediate entry was necessary.” Id., at 704.
The majority also defined four categories of intrusion after knock and announcement, saying that the classification “aids in the resolution of the essential question whether the entry made herein was reasonable under the circumstances”:
“(1) entries in which exigent circumstances exist and non-forcible entry is possible, permitting entry to be made simultaneously with or shortly after announcement; (2) entries in which exigent circumstances exist and forced entry by destruction of property is required, necessitating more specific inferences of exigency; (3) entries in which no exigent circumstances exist and non-forcible entry is possible, requiring an explicit refusal of admittance or a lapse of a significant amount of time; and (4) entries in which no exigent circumstances exist and forced entry by destruction of property is required, mandating an explicit refusal of admittance or a lapse of an even more substantial amount of time.” Ibid.
The panel majority put the action of the officers here in the last category, on the understanding that they destroyed the door without hearing anything to suggest a refusal to admit even though sound traveled easily through the small apartment. The majority held the 15-to-20-second delay after knocking and announcing to be “[insufficient ... to satisfy the constitutional safeguards.” Id., at 705.
Judge Fisher dissented, saying that the majority ought to come out the other way based on the very grounds it stressed: Banks’s small apartment, the loud knock and announcement, the suspected offense of dealing in cocaine, and the time of the day. Judge Fisher thought the lapse of 15 to 20 seconds was enough to support a reasonable inference that admittance had been constructively denied. Id., at 710.
We granted certiorari to consider how to go about applying the standard of reasonableness to the length of time police with a warrant must wait before entering without permission after knocking and announcing their intent in a felony case. 537 U. S. 1187 (2003). We now reverse.
II.
There has never been a dispute that these officers were obliged to knock and announce their intentions when executing the search warrant, an obligation they concededly honored. Despite this agreement, we start with a word about standards for requiring or dispensing with a knock and announcement, since the same criteria bear on when the officers could legitimately enter after knocking.
The Fourth Amendment says nothing specific about formalities in exercising a warrant’s authorization, speaking to the manner of searching as well as to the legitimacy of searching at all simply in terms of the right to be “secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Although the notion of reasonable execution must therefore be fleshed out, we have done that case by case, largely avoiding categories and protocols for searches. Instead, we have treated reasonableness as a function of the facts of cases so various that no template is likely to produce sounder results than examining the totality of circumstances in a given case; it is too hard to invent categories without giving short shrift to details that turn out to be important in a given instance, and without inflating marginal ones. See, e. g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33, 39 (1996) (“[W]e have consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry”); Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 33 (1963) (reasonableness not susceptible to Procrustean application); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 357 (1931) (no formula for determining reasonableness; each case on its own facts and circumstances). We have, however, pointed out factual considerations of unusual, albeit not dispositive, significance.
In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U. S. 927 (1995), we held that the common law knock-and-announce principle is one focus of the reasonableness enquiry; and we subsequently decided that although the standard generally requires the police to announce their intent to search before entering closed premises, the obligation gives way when officers “have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or . . . would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence,” Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, 394 (1997). When a warrant applicant gives reasonable grounds to expect futility or to suspect that one or another such exigency already exists or will arise instantly upon knocking, a magistrate judge is acting within the Constitution to authorize a “no-knock” entry. And even when executing a warrant silent about that, if circumstances support a reasonable suspicion of exigency when the officers arrive at the door, they may go straight in. Id,., at 394, 396, n. 7.
Since most people keep their doors locked, entering without knocking will normally do some damage, a circumstance too common to require a heightened justification when a reasonable suspicion of exigency already justifies an unwarned entry. We have accordingly held that police in exigent circumstances may damage premises so far as necessary for a no-knock entrance without demonstrating the. suspected risk in any more detail than the law demands for an unannounced intrusion simply by lifting the latch. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U. S. 65, 70-71 (1998). Either way, it is enough that the officers had a reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances.
Ill
Like Ramirez, this case turns on the significance of exigency revealed by circumstances known to the officers, for the only substantive difference between the two situations goes to the time at which the officers reasonably anticipated some danger calling for action without delay. Whereas the Ramirez Magistrate Judge found in advance that the customary warning would raise an immediate risk that a wanted felon would elude capture or pose a threat to the officers, see id., at 68, here the Government claims that a risk of losing. . evidence arose shortly after knocking and announcing. Although the police concededly arrived at Banks’s door without reasonable suspicion of facts justifying a no-knock entry, they argue that announcing their presence started the clock running toward the moment of apprehension that Banks would flush away the easily disposable cocaine, prompted by knowing the police would soon be coming in. While it was held reasonable for the police in Ramirez tó enter forcibly upon arrival, the Government argues it was equally reasonable for the officers to go in with force here as soon as the danger of disposal had ripened.
Banks does not, of course, deny that exigency may develop in the period beginning when officers with a warrant knock to be admitted, and the issue comes down to whether it was reasonable to suspect imminent loss of evidence after the 15 to 20 seconds the officers waited prior to forcing their way. Though we agree with Judge Fisher’s dissenting opinion that this call is a close one, 282 F. 3d, at 707, we think that after 15 or 20 seconds without a response, police could fairly suspect that cocaine would be gone if they were reticent any longer. Courts of Appeals have, indeed, routinely held similar wait times to be reasonable in drug cases with similar facts including easily disposable evidence (and some courts have found even shorter ones to be reasonable enough).
A look at Banks’s counterarguments shows why these courts reached sensible results, for each of his reasons for saying that 15 to 20 seconds was too brief rests on a mistake about the relevant enquiry: the fact that he was actually in the shower and did not hear the officers is not to the point, and the same is true of the claim that it might have taken him longer than 20 seconds if he had heard the knock and headed straight for the door. As for the shower, it is enough to say that the facts known to the police are what count in judging reasonable waiting time, cf., e. g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989) (“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight”), and there is no indication that the police knew that Banks was in the shower and thus unaware of an impending search that he would otherwise have tried to frustrate.
And the argument that 15 to 20 seconds was too short for Banks to have come to the door ignores the very risk that justified prompt entry. True, if the officers were to justify their timing here by claiming that Banks’s failure to admit them fairly suggested a refusal to let them in, Banks could at least argue that no such suspicion can arise until an occupant has had time to get to the door, a time that will vary with the size of the establishment, perhaps five seconds to open a motel room door, or several minutes to move through a townhouse. In this case, however, the police claim exigent need to enter, and the crucial fact in examining their actions is not time to reach the door but the particular exigency claimed. On the record here, what matters is the opportunity to get rid of cocaine, which a prudent dealer will keep near a commode or kitchen sink. The significant circumstances include the arrival of the police during the day, when anyone inside would probably have been up and around, and the sufficiency of 15 to 20 seconds for getting to the bathroom or the kitchen to start flushing cocaine down the drain. That is, when circumstances are exigent because a pusher may be near the point of putting his drugs beyond reach, it is imminent disposal, not travel time to the entrance, that governs when the police may reasonably enter; since the bathroom and kitchen are usually in the interior of a dwelling, not the front hall, there is no reason generally to peg the travel time to the location of the door, and no reliable basis for giving the proprietor of a mansion a longer wait than the resident of a bungalow, or an apartment like Banks’s. And 15 to 20 seconds does not seem an unrealistic guess about the time someone would need to get in a position to rid his quarters of cocaine.
Once thé exigency had matured, of course, the officers were not bound to learn anything more or wait any longer before going in, even though their entry entailed some harm to the building. Ramirez held that the exigent need of law enforcement trumps a resident’s interest in avoiding all property damage, see 523 U. S., at 70-71, and there is no reason to treat a post-knock exigency differently from the no-knock counterpart in Ramirez itself.
IV
Our emphasis on totality analysis necessarily rejects positions taken on each side of this case. Ramirez, for example, cannot be read with the breadth the Government espouses, as “reflectfing] a general principle that the need to damage property in order to effectuate an entry to execute a search warrant should not be part of the analysis of whether the entry itself was reasonable.” Brief for United States 18; Reply Brief for United States 4. At common law, the knock-and-announce rule was traditionally “justified in part by the belief that announcement generally would avoid ‘the destruction or breaking of any house ... by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue.’” Wilson, 514 U. S., at 935-936 (quoting Semayne’s Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 196 (K. B. 1603)). One point in making an officer knock and announce, then, is to give a person inside the chance to save his door. That is why, in the case with no reason to suspect an immediate risk of frustration or futility in waiting at all, the reasonable wait time may well be longer when police make a forced entry, since they ought to be more certain the occupant has had time to answer the door. It is hard to be more definite than that, without turning the notion of a reasonable time under all the . circumstances into a set of sub-rules as the Ninth Circuit has been inclined to do. Suffice it to say that the need to damage property in the course of getting in is a good reason to require more patience than it would be reasonable to expect if the door were open. Police seeking a stolen piano may be able to spend more time to make sure they really need the battering ram.
On the other side, we disapprove of the Court of Appeals’s four-part scheme for vetting knock-and-announce entries. To begin with, the demand for enhanced evidence of exigency before a door can reasonably be damaged by a warranted no-knock intrusion was already bad law before the Court of Appeals decided this case. In Ramirez (a case from the Ninth Circuit), we rejected an attempt to subdivide felony-cases by accepting “mild exigency” for entry without property damage, but requiring “more specific inferences of exigency” before damage would be reasonable. 523 U. S., at 69-71 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals did not cite Ramirez.
Nor did the appeals court cite United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266 (2002) (again, from the Ninth Circuit). There, we recently disapproved a framework for making reasonable suspicion determinations that attempted to reduce what the Circuit described as “troubling . . . uncertainty” in reasonableness analysis, by “describing] and clearly delimiting]” an officer’s consideration of certain factors. Id., at 272, 275 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, as in Arvizu, the Court of Appeals’s overlay of a categorical scheme on the general reasonableness analysis threatens to distort the “totality of the circumstances” principle, by replacing a stress on revealing facts with resort to pigeonholes. Id., at 274 (internal quotation marks omitted). Attention to cocaine rocks and pianos tells a lot about the chances of their respective disposal and its bearing on reasonable time. Instructions couched in terms like “significant amount of time,” and “an even more substantial amount of time,” 282 F. 3d, at 704, tell very little.
V
Last, there is Banks’s claim that the entry violated 18 U. S. C. § 3109. Ramirez held that the result should be the same under the Fourth Amendment and §3109, permitting an officer to enter by force “if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance.” We explained the statute’s “‘requirement of prior notice . . . before forcing entry . . . [as] codiffying] a tradition embedded in Anglo-American law,’ ” 523 U. S., at 72 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U. S. 301, 313 (1958)); see also Sabbath v. United States, 391 U. S. 585, 591, n. 8 (1968), and we held that § 3109 implicates the exceptions to the common law knock-and-announce requirement that inform the Fourth Amendment itself, 523 U. S., at 73. The upshot is that § 3109 is subject to an exigent circumstances exception, ibid., which qualifies the requirement of refusal after notice, just as it qualifies the obligation to announce in the first place. Absent exigency, the police must knock and receive an actual refusal or wait out the time necessary to infer one. But in a case like this, where the officers knocked and announced their presence, and forcibly entered after a reasonable suspicion of exigency had ripened, their entry satisfied § 3109 as well as the Fourth Amendment, even without refusal of admittance.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
So ordered.
The statute provides: “The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.”
Some States give magistrate judges the authority to issue “no-knock” warrants, and some do not. See, e. g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U. S. 385, 396, n. 7 (1997) (collecting state statutes and cases).
The standard for a no-knock entry stated in Richards applies on reasonable suspicion of exigency or futility. Because the facts here go to exigency, not futility, we speak of that alone.
Ramirez and Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997), our cases addressing the role of exigency in assessing the reasonableness' of a no-knock entry, involved searches by warrant for evidence of a felony, as does this case. In a different context governed by the Fourth Amendment, we have held that the risk of losing evidence of a minor offense is insufficient to make it reasonable to enter a dwelling to make a warrantless arrest. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U. S. 740 (1984). Courts of Appeals have applied Welsh to warrantless entries simply to search for evidence, considering the gravity of the offense in determining whether exigent circumstances exist. See, e. g., United States v. Aquino, 836 F. 2d 1268, 1271-1273 (CA10 1988); United States v. Clement, 854 F. 2d 1116, 1120 (CA8 1988) (per curiam). We intimate nothing here about such warrantless entry cases. Nor do we express a view on the significance of the existence of a warrant in evaluating whether exigency justifies action in knock-and-armounce cases when the reason for the search is a minor offense.
Several Courts of Appeals have explicitly taken into account the risk of disposal of drug evidence as a factor in evaluating the reasonableness of waiting time. See, e. g., United States v. Goodson, 165 F. 3d 610, 612, 614 (CA8 1999) (holding a 20-second wait after a loud announcement at a one-story ranch reasonable); United States v. Spikes, 158 F. 3d 913, 925-927 (CA6 1998) (holding a 15-to-30-second wait in midmorning after a loud announcement reasonable); United States v. Spriggs, 996 F. 2d 320, 322-323 (CADC 1993) (holding a 15-second wait after a reasonably audible announcement at 7:45 a.m. on a weekday reasonable); United States v. Garcia, 983 F. 2d 1160, 1168 (CA1 1993) (holding a 10-second wait after a loud announcement reasonable); United States v. Jones, 133 F. 3d 358, 361-362 (CA5 1998) (per curiam,) (relying specifically on the concept of exigency, holding a 15-to-20-second wait reasonable). See also United States v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F. 3d 973, 981-982, n. 7 (CA9 2002) (“Banks appears to be a departure from our prior decisions. . . . [W]e have found a 10 to 20 second wait to be reasonable in similar circumstances, albeit when the police heard sounds after the knock and announcement”); United States v. Jenkins, 175 F 3d 1208, 1215 (CA10 1999) (holding a 14-to-20-second wait at 10 am. reasonable); United States v. Markling, 7 F. 3d 1309, 1318-1319 (CA7 1993) (holding a 7-second wait at a small motel room reasonable when officers acted on a specific tip that the suspect was likely to dispose of the drugs).
It is probably unrealistic even on its own terms. The apartment was “small,” 282 F. 3d 699, 704 (CA9 2002), and a man may walk the length of today’s small apartment in 15 seconds.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, we must decide whether appellees were entitled to summary judgment on their claim that North Carolina’s Twelfth Congressional District, as established by the State’s 1997 congressional redistricting plan, constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This is the third time in six years that litigation over North Carolina’s Twelfth Congressional District has come before this Court. The first time around, we held that plaintiffs whose complaint alleged that the State had deliberately segregated voters into districts on the basis of race without compelling justification stated a claim for relief under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 658 (1993) (Shaw I). After remand, we affirmed the District Court’s finding that North Carolina’s District 12 classified voters by race and further held that the State’s reapportionment scheme was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899 (1996) (Shaw II).
response our in Shaw II, the State enacted a new districting plan. See 1997 N. C. Sess. Laws, ch. 11. A map of the unconstitutional District 12 was set forth in the Appendix to the opinion of the Court in Shaw I, supra, and we described it as follows:
“The second majority-black district, District 12, is ... unusually shaped. It is approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the [Interstate]~85 corridor. It winds in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas ‘until it gobbles in enough enclaves of black neighborhoods.’ Northbound and southbound drivers on [Interstate]-85 sometimes find themselves in separate districts in one county, only to ‘trade’ districts when they enter the next county. Of the 10 counties through which District 12 passes, 5 are cut into 8 different districts; even towns are divided. At one point the district remains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two other districts before crossing over them.” 509 U. S., at 635-636 (citations omitted).
The State’s 1997 plan altered District 12 in several respects. By any measure, blacks no longer constitute a majority of District 12: Blacks now account for approximately 47% of the district’s total population, 43% of its voting age population, and 46% of registered voters. App. to Juris. Statement 67a, 99a. The new District 12 splits 6 counties as opposed to 10; beginning with Guilford County, the district runs in a southwestern direction through parts of Forsyth, Davidson, Rowan, Iredell, and Mecklenburg Counties, picking up concentrations of urban populations in Greensboro and High Point (both in Guilford), Winston-Salem (Forsyth), and Charlotte (Mecklenburg). (The old District 12 went through the same six counties but also included portions of Durham, Orange, and Alamance Counties east of Guilford, and parts of Gaston County west of Mecklenburg.) With these changes, the district retains only 41.6% of its previous area, id., at 153a, and the distance between its farthest points has been reduced to approximately 95 miles, id., at 105a. But while District 12 is wider and shorter than it was before, it retains its basic “snakelike” shape and continues to track Interstate 85. See generally Appendix, infra.
Appellees believed the new to be the product of an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.
They filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina against several state officials in their official capacities seeking to enjoin elections under the State’s 1997 plan. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment and supporting materials, and the three-judge District Court heard argument on the pending motions, but before either party had conducted discovery and without an evidentiary hearing. Over one judge’s dissent, the District Court granted appellees’ motion and entered the injunction they sought. 34 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (EDNC 1998). The majority of the court explained that “the uncontroverted material facts” showed that “District 12 was drawn to collect precincts with high racial identification rather than political identification,” that “more heavily Democratic precincts . . . were bypassed in the drawing of District 12 and included in the surrounding congressional districts,” and that “[tjhe legislature disregarded traditional districting criteria.” No. 4:96-CV-104-BO(3) (EDNC, Apr. 14, 1998), App. to Juris. Statement 21a. From these “un-controverted material facts,” the District Court concluded “the General Assembly, in redistrieting, used criteria with respect to District 12 that are facially race driven,” ibid., and thereby violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, id., at 22a. (Apparently because the issue was not litigated, the District Court did not consider whether District 12 was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.)
The state officials filed a notice of appeal. We noted probable jurisdiction, 524 U. S. 980 (1998), and now reverse.
II
Our decisions have established that all laws that classify citizens on the basis of race, including racially gerrymandered districting schemes, are constitutionally suspect and must be strictly scrutinized. Shaw II, 517 U. S., at 904; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 904-905 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 227 (1995). When racial classifications are explicit, no inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary. See Shaw I, 509 U. S., at 642. A facially neutral law, on the other hand, warrants strict scrutiny only if it can be proved that the law was “motivated by a racial purpose or object,” Miller, sufra, at 913, or if it is “ ‘unexplainable on grounds other than race,’ ” Shaw I, supra, at 644 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977)); see also Miller, supra, at 905, 918. The task of assessing a jurisdiction’s motivation, however, is not a simple matter; on the contrary, it is an inherently complex endeavor, one requiring the trial court to perform a “sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” Arlington Heights, supra, at 266; see also Miller, supra, at 905, 914 (citing Arlington Heights); Shaw I, supra, at 644 (same).
Districting legislation ordinarily, if not always, classifies tracts of land, precincts, or census blocks, and is race neutral on its face. North Carolina’s 1997 plan was not atypical; appellees, therefore, were required to prove that District 12 was drawn with an impermissible racial motive — in this context, strict scrutiny applies if race was the “predominant factor” motivating the legislature’s districting decision. To carry their burden, appellees were obliged to show — using direct or circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both, see Shaw II, supra, at 905; Miller, 515 U. S., at 916 — that “the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral dis-tricting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations,” ibid.
Appellees offered only circumstantial evidence in support of their claim. Their evidence included maps of District 12, showing its size, shape, and alleged lack of continuity. See Appendix, infra. They also submitted evidence of the district’s low scores with respect to traditional measures of compactness and expert affidavit testimony explaining that this statistical evidence proved the State had ignored traditional districting criteria in crafting the new Twelfth Congressional District. See App. 221-251. Appellees further claimed that the State had disrespected political subdivisions and communities of interest. In support, they pointed out that under the 1997 plan, District 12 was the only one statewide to contain no undivided county and offered figures showing that District 12 gathered almost 75% of its population from Mecklenburg County, at the southern tip of the district, and from Forsyth and Guilford Counties at the northernmost part of the district. Id, at 176, 208-209.
Appellees also presented statistical and demographic evidence with respect to the precincts that were included within District 12 and those that were placed in neighboring districts. For the six subdivided counties included within District 12, the proportion of black residents was higher in the portion of the county within District 12 than the portion of the county in a neighboring district. Other maps and supporting data submitted by appellees compared the demographics of several so-called “boundary segments.” This evidence tended to show that, in several instances, the State had excluded precincts that had a lower percentage of black population but were as Democratic (in terms of registered voters) as the precinct inside District 12. Id., at 253-290; 3 Record, Doc. No. 61.
■Viewed in toto, appellees’ evidence tends to support an inference that the State drew its district lines with an impermissible racial motive — even though they presented no direct evidence of intent. Summary judgment, however, is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U. S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242 (1986). To be sure, appellants did not contest the evidence of District 12’s shape (which hardly could be contested), nor did they claim that appellees’ statistical and demographic evidence, most if not all of which appears to have been obtained from the State’s own data banks, was untrue.
The District Court nevertheless was only partially correct in stating that the material facts before it were un-controverted. The legislature’s motivation is itself a factual question. See Shaw II, 511 U. S., at 905; Miller, supra, at 910. Appellants asserted that the General Assembly drew its district lines with the intent to make District 12 a strong Democratic district. In support, they presented the after-the-fact affidavit testimony of the two members of the General Assembly responsible for developing the State’s 1997 plan. See App. to Juris. Statement 69a-84a. Those legislators further stated that, in crafting their districting law, they attempted to protect incumbents, to adhere to traditional districting criteria, and to preserve the existing partisan balance in the State’s congressional delegation, which in 1997 was composed of six Republicans and six Democrats. Ibid.
More important, we think, was the affidavit of an expert, Dr. David W. Peterson. Id., at 85a-100a. He reviewed racial demographics, party registration, and election result data (the number of people voting for Democratic candidates) gleaned from the State’s 1998 Court of Appeals election, 1998 Lieutenant Governor election, and 1990 United States Senate election for the precincts included within District 12 and those surrounding it. Unlike appellees’ evidence, which highlighted select boundary segments, appellants’ expert examined the district’s entire border — all 234 boundary segments. See id., at 92a. He recognized “a strong correlation between racial composition and party preference” so that “in precincts with high black representation, there is a correspondingly high tendency for voters to favor the Democratic Party” but that “[i]n precincts with low black representation, there is much more variation in party preference, and the fraction of registered voters favoring Democrats is substantially lower.” Id., at 91a. Because of this significant correlation, the data tended to support both a political and racial hypothesis. Therefore, Peterson focused on “divergent boundary segments,” those where blacks were greater inside District 12 but Democrats were greater outside and those where blaeks were greater outside the district but Democrats were greater inside. He concluded that the State included the more heavily Democratic precinct much more often than the more heavily black precinct, and therefore, that the data as a whole supported a political explanation at least as well as, and somewhat better than, a racial explanation. Id., at 98a; see also id., at 87a (“[T]here is at least one other explanation that fits the data as well as or better than race, and that explanation is political identification”).
Peterson’s analysis of District 12’s divergent boundary segments and his affidavit testimony that District 12 displays a high correlation between race and partisanship support an inference that the General Assembly did no more than create a district of strong partisan Democrats. His affidavit is also significant in that it weakens the probative value of appellees’ boundary segment evidence, which the District Court appeared to give significant weight. See id., at 20a-21a. Appellees’ evidence was limited to a few select precincts, see App. 253-276, whereas Peterson analyzed all 234 boundary segments. Moreover, appellees’ maps reported only party registration figures. Peterson again was more thorough, looking also at actual voting re-suits. Peterson’s more complete analysis was significant because it showed that in North Carolina, party registration and party preference do not always correspond.
political motivation explanation as true, as the District Court was required to do in ruling on appellees’ motion for summary judgment, see Anderson, 477 U. S., at 255, appellees were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Our prior decisions have made clear that a jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so happens that the most loyal Democrats happen to be black Democrats and even if the State were conscious of that fact. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 968 (1996); id., at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); Shaw II, supra, at 905; Miller, 515 U. S., at 916; Shaw I, 509 U. S., at 646. Evidence that blacks constitute even a supermajority in one congressional district while amounting to less than a plurality in a neighboring district will not, by itself, suffice to prove that a jurisdiction was motivated by race in drawing its district lines when the evidence also shows a high correlation between race and party preference.
Of course, exclusively on appellees’ boundary segment evidence, and appellees submitted other evidence tending to show that the General Assembly was motivated by racial considerations in drawing District 12 — most notably, District 12's shape and its lack of compactness. But in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party’s evidence “is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party’s] favor.” Anderson, 477 U. S., at 255. While appellees’ evidence might allow the District Court to find that the State acted with an impermissible racial motivation, despite the State’s explanation as supported by the Peterson affidavit, it does not require that the court do so. All that can be said on the record before us is that motivation was in dispute. Reasonable inferences from the undisputed facts can be drawn in favor of a racial motivation finding or in favor of a political motivation finding. The District Court nevertheless concluded that race was the “predominant factor” in the drawing of the district. In doing so, it either credited appellees’ asserted inferences over those advanced and supported by appellants or did not give appellants the inference they were due. In any event, it was error in this ease for the District Court to resolve the disputed fact of motivation at the summary judgment stage. Cf. ibid. (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions”).
Outright admissions of impermissible racial motivation are infrequent and plaintiffs often must rely upon other evidence. Summary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion, however, is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact. That is not to say that summary judgment in a plaintiff’s favor will never be appropriate in a racial gerrymandering case sought to be proved exclusively by circumstantial evidence. We can imagine an instance where the uncontroverted evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn in the nonmoving party’s favor would not be "significantly probative” so as to create a genuine issue of fact for trial. Id., at 249-250. But this is not that case. And even if the question whether appellants had created a material dispute of fact were a close one, we think that “the sensitive nature of redistricting and the presumption of good faith that must be accorded legislative enactments,” Miller, 515 U. S., at 916, would tip the balance in favor of the District Court making findings of fact. See also id., at 916-917 (“[Cjourts must also recognize . . . the intrusive potential of judicial intervention into the legislative realm, when assessing ... the adequacy of a plaintiff’s showing at the various stages of litigation and determining whether to permit discovery or trial to proceed”).
our decision, we are fully aware that the District Court is more familiar with the evidence than this Court, and is likewise better suited to assess the General Assembly’s motivations. Perhaps, after trial, the evidence will support a finding that race was the State’s predominant motive, but we express no position as to that question. We decide only that this case was not suited for summary disposition. The judgment of the District Court is reversed.
It is so ordered.
[Appendix containing North Carolina Congressional District map follows this page.]
In response to the District Court’s decision and order, the State enacted yet another districting plan, 1998 N. C. Sess. Laws, eh. 2 (codified at N. C. Gen. Stat. § 163-201(a) (Supp. 1998)), which revised Districts 5,6,9, 10, and 12. Under the State’s 1998 plan, no part of Guilford County is located within District 12 and all of Rowan County falls within the district’s borders. The 1998 plan also modified District 12’s boundaries in For-syth, Davidson, and Iredell Counties. See ibid,.; see also Cromartie v. Hunt, No. 4:96-CV-104-BO(3) (EDNC, June 22,1998), App. to Juris. Statement 178a-179a. The State’s 1998 congressional elections were conducted pursuant to the 1998 plan with the District Court’s approval. Brief for Appellees 6, n. 13; App. to Juris. Statement 179a. Because the State’s 1998 law provides that the State will revert to the 1997 districting plan upon a favorable decision of this Court, see 1998 N. C. Sess. Laws, ch. 2, § 1.1, this case is not moot, see City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U. S. 283, 288-289, and n. 11 (1982); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, 382, n. 9 (1978); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 141-142, n. 17 (1972).
Cf. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U. S. 471, 488 that, in cases brought under §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Arlington Heights framework should guide a court’s inquiry into whether a jurisdiction had a discriminatory purpose in enacting a voting change); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 618 (1982) (same framework is to be used in evaluating vote dilution claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause).
Justice Stevens asserts that proof of a district’s “bizarre configuration” gives rise equally to an inference that its architects were motivated by politics or race. Post, at 555. We do not necessarily quarrel with the proposition that a district’s unusual shape can give rise to'an inference of political motivation. But we doubt that a bizarre shape equally supports a political inference and a racial one. Some districts, we have said, are “so highly irregular that [they] rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to ‘segregate]... voters’ on the basis of race.” Shaw 1,509 U. S. 630, 646-647 (1993) (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 341 (I960)).
In the portion of Guilford Comity in District 12, black residents constituted 51.5% of the population, while in the District 6 portion, only 10.2% cf the population was black. App. 179. Appellees’ evidence as to the other counties showed: Forsyth District 12 was 72.9% black while Forsyth District 5 was 11.1% black; Davidson District 12 was 14.8% black while Davidson District 6 was 4.1% black; Rowan District 12 was 35.6% black and Rowan District 6 was 7.7% black; Iredell District 12 was 24.3% black while Iredell District 10 was 10.1% black; Mecklenburg District 12 was 51.9% black but Mecklenburg District 9 was only 7.2% black. Id, at 179-181.
Boundary segments, we are told, are those sections along the district’s perimeter that separate outside precincts from inside precincts. In other words, the boundary segment is the district borderline itself; for each segment, the relevant comparison is between the inside precinct that touches the segment and the corresponding outside precinct. See App. to Juris. Statement 92a; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20, n. 7.
In addition to the evidence that appellants presented to the District Court, they have submitted with their reply brief maps showing that in almost all of the majority-Democrat registered precincts surrounding those portions of District 12 in Guilford, Forsyth, and Mecklenburg Counties, Republican candidates were elected in at least one of the three elections considered by the state defendants’ expert. Reply Brief for State Appellants 4-8; App. to Reply Brief for State Appellants la-10a. Appellants apparently did not put this additional evidence before the District Court prior to the court’s decision on the competing motions for summary judgment. They claim excuse in that appellees filed their maps showing partisan registration at the “eleventh hour.” Brief for State Appellants 10, n. 13. We are not sure why appellants believe the timing of appellees’ filing to be an excuse. The District Court set an advance deadline for filings in support of the competing motions for summary judgment, so appellants could not have been caught by surprise. And given that appellants not only had to respond to appellees’ evidence, but also had their own motion for summary judgment to support, one would think that the District Court would not have needed to afford them “an adequate opportunity to respond.” Ibid.
This Court has recognized, however, that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause although we were not in agreement as to the standards that would govern such a claim. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109, 127 (1986).
We note that Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996), Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899 (1996), and Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), each came to us on a developed record and after the respective District Courts had made findings of fact. Bush v. Vera, supra, at 959; Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1311-1331, 1336-1344 (SD Tex. 1994); Shaw II, supra, at 903; Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 456-473 (EDNC 1994); Miller v. Johnson, supra, at 910; Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1360-1369 (SD Ga. 1994).
Just as summary judgment is rarely granted in a plaintiff’s favor in cases where the issue is a defendant’s racial motivation, such as disparate treatment suits under Title VII or racial discrimination claims under 42 U. S. C. § 1981, the same holds true for racial gerrymandering claims of the sort brought here. See generally 10B C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §§2730,2732.2 (1998).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether Rule 609(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a judge to let a civil litigant impeach an adversary’s credibility with evidence of the adversary’s prior felony convictions. Because the Courts of Appeals have answered that question in different ways, we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 487 U. S. 1203 (1988).
While in custody at a county prison, petitioner Paul Green obtained work-release employment at a car wash. On his sixth day at work, Green reached inside a large dryer to try to stop it. A heavy rotating drum caught and tore off his right arm. Green brought this product liability action against respondent Bock Laundry Co. (Bock), manufacturer of the machine. At trial Green testified that he had been instructed inadequately concerning the machine’s operation and dangerous character. Bock impeached Green’s testimony by eliciting admissions that he had been convicted of conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary, both felonies. The jury returned a verdict for Bock. On appeal Green argued that the District Court had erred by denying his pretrial motion to exclude the impeaching evidence. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the District Court’s ruling. 845 F. 2d 1011 (1988).
The Court of Appeals’ disposition followed Circuit precedent established in Diggs v. Lyons, 741 F. 2d 577 (CA3 1984), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1078 (1985). Writing for the panel majority, Judge Maris, who had headed the Advisory Committee that proposed a federal code of evidence'to this Court, concluded in Diggs that Rule 609 mandated admission for impeachment purposes of a civil plaintiff’s prior felony convictions. He relied on the legislative history of Rule 609 as establishing that Congress intended Rule 609 to govern both criminal and civil proceedings. 741 F. 2d, at 581. He also concluded that a judge may not balance prejudice and probativeness pursuant to Rule 403 in order to circumvent Rule 609(a)(2)’s requirement that all convictions pertaining to dishonesty — often called crimen falsi evidence — be admitted. Ibid. Rule 609’s specific command, he wrote, forecloses judicial exercise of Rule 403 discretion to exclude evidence of felony convictions. Id., at 582. The only situation in which Rule 609(a) allows the trial judge discretion to bar impeachment by prior felony convictions is when admission would unduly prejudice the defendant in a criminal case. Ibid. Judge Maris concluded with this comment:
“[T]he scope of Rule 609 has been and is the subject of widespread controversy and strongly held divergent views. We have felt compelled to give the rule the effect which the plain meaning of its language and the legislative history require. We recognize that the mandatory admission of all felony convictions on the issue of credibility may in some cases produce unjust and even bizarre results. Evidence that a witness has in the past been convicted of manslaughter by automobile, for example, can have but little relevance to his credibility as a witness in a totally different matter. But if the rule is to be amended to eliminate these possibilities of injustice, it must be done by those who have the authority to amend the rules, the Supreme Court and the Congress.... It is not for us as enforcers of the rule to amend it under the guise of construing it.” Ibid.
Dissenting, Judge Gibbons acknowledged that “snippets of legislative history” show that four Members of Congress anticipated that a court might interpret Rule 609(a) to require impeachment of a witness by prior felony convictions irrelevant to the civil context. Id., at 583. Yet he remained unpersuaded that Congress as a whole intended “so ridiculous a result.” Ibid. Instead, he attributed the Rules’ silence regarding impeachment of civil plaintiffs to “legislative oversight.” Ibid. And he noted that other Circuits had concluded, contrary to the panel majority, “that the mandatory admission feature of prior crimen falsi convictions does not apply to the admissibility of prior felony convictions in civil cases.” Ibid. Placing the use of prior felony conviction evidence outside the reach of the judge’s discretion, he declared, “makes no sense whatever.” Ibid.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Diggs convey dissatisfaction with automatic admissibility of prior felony convictions to impeach civil witnesses, especially civil plaintiffs. Indeed, criticism of this result is longstanding and widespread. Our task in deciding this case, however, is not to fashion the rule we deem desirable but to identify the rule that Congress fashioned. We begin by considering the extent to which the text of Rule 609 answers the question before us. Concluding that the text is ambiguous with respect to civil cases, we then seek guidance from legislative history and from the Rules’ overall structure.
I
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) provides:
“General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.”
By its terms the Rule requires a judge to allow impeachment of any witness with prior convictions for felonies not involving dishonesty “only if” the probativeness of the evidence is greater than its prejudice “to the defendant. Ibid. It follows that impeaching evidence detrimental to the prosecution in a criminal case “shall be admitted” without any such balancing. Ibid.
The Rule’s plain language commands weighing of prejudice to a defendant in a civil trial as well as in a criminal trial. But that literal reading would compel an odd result in a case like this. Assuming that all impeaching evidence has at least minimal probative value, and given that the evidence of plaintiff Green’s convictions had some prejudicial effect on his case — but surely none on defendant Bock’s — balancing according to the strict language of Rule 609(a)(1) inevitably leads to the conclusion that the evidence was admissible. In fact, under this construction of the Rule, impeachment detrimental to a civil plaintiff always would have to be admitted.
No matter how plain the text of the Rule may be, we cannot accept an interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an adversary’s testimony that it grants to a civil defendant. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant certain fair trial rights not enjoyed by the prosecution, while the Fifth Amendment lets the accused choose not to testify at trial. In contrast, civil litigants in federal court share equally the protections of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Given liberal federal discovery rules, the inapplicability of the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination, and the need to prove their case, civil litigants almost always must testify in depositions or at trial. Denomination as a civil defendant or plaintiff, moreover, is often happenstance based on which party filed first or on the nature of the suit. Evidence that a litigant or his witness is a convicted felon tends to shift a jury’s focus from the worthiness of the litigant’s position to the moral worth of the litigant himself. It is unfathomable why a civil plaintiff — but not a civil defendant — should be subjected to this risk. Thus we agree with the Seventh Circuit that as far as civil trials are concerned, Rule 609(a)(1) “can’t mean what it says.” Campbell v. Greer, 831 F. 2d 700, 703 (1987).
Out of this agreement flow divergent courses, each turning on the meaning of “defendant.” The word might be interpreted to encompass all witnesses, civil and criminal, parties or not. See Green v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 382, 383 (ED Pa. 1985) (dictum). It might be read to connote any party offering a witness, in which event Rule 609(a)(l)’s balance would apply to civil, as well as criminal, cases. E. g., Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F. 2d 352 (CA5 1981). Finally, “defendant” may refer only to the defendant in a criminal case. See, e. g., Campbell, 831 F. 2d, at 703. These choices spawn a corollary question: must a judge allow prior felony impeachment of all civil witnesses as well as all criminal prosecution witnesses, or is Rule 609(a)(1) inapplicable to civil cases, in which event Rule 403 would authorize a judge to balance in such cases? Because the plain text does not resolve these issues, we must examine the history leading to enactment of Rule 609 as law.
II
At common law a person who had been convicted of a felony was not competent to testify as a witness. “[T]he disqualification arose as part of the punishment for the crime, only later being rationalized on the basis that such a person was unworthy of belief.” 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 609[02], p. 609-58 (1988) (citing 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence §519 (3d ed. 1940)). As the law evolved, this absolute bar gradually was replaced by a rule that allowed such witnesses to testify in both civil and criminal cases, but also to be impeached by evidence of a prior felony conviction or a crimen falsi misdemeanor conviction. In the face of scholarly criticism of automatic admission of such impeaching evidence, some courts moved toward a more flexible approach.
In 1942, the American Law Institute proposed a rule that would have given the trial judge discretion in all cases to exclude evidence of prior convictions of any witness if “its probative value is outweighed by the risk that its admission will... create substantial danger of undue prejudice....” Model Code of Evidence, Rule 303 (1942); see Rule 106. No such evidence could be admitted against a witness-accused unless he first introduced “evidence for the sole purpose of supporting his credibility.” Rule 106(3).
A decade later the American Bar Association endorsed a rule that further limited impairment of any witness’ credibility to convictions for crimes “involving dishonesty or false statement.” National Conference of Commissioners, Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 21 (1953). As with Model Rule 106, this evidence would not be admitted against a witness-accused unless he adduced evidence supporting his credibility. Ibid. This code too afforded the judge discretion to exclude impeaching evidence in both criminal and civil trials if on balance he deemed it too prejudicial. See Rules 2, 45.
The only contemporaneous congressional enactment governing impeachment by prior convictions stated:
“No person shall be incompetent to testify, in either civil or criminal proceedings, by reason of his having been convicted of crime, but such fact may be given in evidence to affect his credit as a witness, either upon the cross-examination of the witness or evidence aliunde....” D. C. Code Ann. § 14-305 (1961).
This provision of the District of Columbia Code traditionally had been interpreted to require the admission of prior conviction evidence. McGowan, 1970 Law & Social Order 1. But in reviewing a defendant’s challenge to admission of a grand larceny conviction to impeach his testimony at his trial on housebreaking and larceny charges, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted that the Rule said conviction evidence “may,” not “shall,” be admitted; therefore, a judge was not required to allow such impeachment. Luck v. United States, 121 U. S. App. D. C. 151, 156, 348 F. 2d 763, 768 (1965). In effect, the court conditioned admissibility on the kind of judicial balancing expressly provided in the Uniform Rules and Model Code. Id., at 156, n. 8, 348 F. 2d, at 768, n. 8. Far from welcoming this innovation, the Federal Department of Justice in 1969 proposed changing the code to overrule Luck, and in 1970 Congress amended the District of Columbia Code to provide that both prior felony and crimen falsi impeaching evidence “shall be admitted.”
Amid controversy over Luck, a distinguished Advisory Committee appointed at the recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the United States submitted in March 1969 the first draft of evidence rules to be used in all federal civil and criminal proceedings. Rule 6-09, forerunner of Federal Rule of Evidence 609, allowed all crimen falsi and felony convictions evidence without mention of judicial discretion. The Committee reasoned that “[d]angers of.unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, waste of time, and surprise” inherent in the admission of evidence of witness misconduct “tend to disappear or diminish” when the evidence is based on a conviction. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, Advisory Committee’s Note, 46 F. R. D. 161, 297 (1969). Having considered five options — including the Luck doctrine — for further reducing risks to a witness-accused, the Committee found none acceptable, and so proposed a rule that “adheres to the traditional practice of allowing the witness-accused to be impeached by evidence of conviction of crime, like other witnesses.” Id., at 299.
Nonetheless, the Advisory Committee embraced the Luck doctrine in its second draft. Issued in March 1971, this version of Rule 609(a) authorized the judge to exclude either felony or crimen falsi evidence upon determination that its probative value was “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, 51 F. R. D. 315, 391 (1971). The Committee specified that its primary concern was prejudice to the witness-accused; the “risk of unfair prejudice to a party in the use of [convictions] to impeach the ordinary witness is so minimal as scarcely to be a subject of comment.” Advisory Committee’s Note, id., at 392. Yet the text of the proposal was broad enough to allow a judge to protect not only criminal defendants, but also civil litigants and nonparty witnesses, from unfair prejudice. Cf. ibid, (safeguards in Rule 609(b), (c), (d) apply to all witnesses).
As had Luck’s interpretation of the District of Columbia Code, the Advisory Committee’s revision of Rule 609(a) met resistance. The Department of Justice urged that the Committee supplant its proposal with the strict, amended version of the District Code. Moore §609.01[1. — 7], p. VI-111. Senator McClellan objected to the adoption of the Luck doctrine and urged reinstatement of the earlier draft.
The Advisory Committee backed off. As Senator McClellan had requested, it submitted as its third and final draft the same strict version it had proposed in March 1969. Rules of Evidence, 56 F. R. D. 183, 269-270 (1973). The Committee’s Note explained:
“The weight of traditional authority has been to allow use of felonies generally, without regard to the nature of the particular offense, and of crimen falsi without regard to the grade of the offense. This is the view accepted by Congress in the 1970 amendment of § 14-305 of the District of Columbia Code.... Whatever may be the merits of [other] views, this rule is drafted to accord with the Congressional policy manifested in the 1970 legislation.” Id., at 270.
This Court forwarded the Advisory Committee’s final draft to Congress on November 20, 1972.
The House of Representatives did not accept the Advisory Committee’s final proposal. A Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee recommended an amended version similar to the text of the present Rule 609(a), except that it avoided the current Rule’s ambiguous reference to prejudice to “the defendant.” Rather, in prescribing weighing of admissibility of prior felony convictions, it used the same open-ended reference to “unfair prejudice” found in the Advisory Committee’s second draft.
The House Judiciary Committee departed even further from the Advisory Committee’s final recommendation, preparing a draft that did not allow impeachment by evidence of prior conviction unless the crime involved dishonesty or false statement. Motivating the change were concerns about the deterrent effect upon an accused who might wish to testify and the danger of unfair prejudice, “even upon a witness who was not the accused,” from allowing impeachment by prior felony convictions regardless of their relation to the witness’ veracity. H. R. Rep. No. 93-650, p. 11 (1973). Although the Committee Report focused on criminal defendants and did not mention civil litigants, its express concerns encompassed all nonaccused witnesses.
Representatives who advocated the automatic admissibility approach of the Advisory Committee’s draft and those who favored the intermediate approach proposed by the Subcommittee both opposed the Committee’s bill on the House floor. Four Members pointed out that the Rule applied in civil, as well as criminal, cases. The House voted to adopt the Rule as proposed by its Judiciary Committee.
The Senate Judiciary Committee proposed an intermediate path. For criminal defendants, it would have allowed impeachment only by crimen falsi evidence; for other witnesses, it also would have permitted prior felony evidence only if the trial judge found that probative value outweighed “prejudicial effect against the party offering that witness.” This language thus required the exercise of discretion before prior felony convictions could be admitted in civil litigation. But the full Senate, prodded by Senator McClellan, reverted to the version that the Advisory Committee had submitted. See 120 Cong. Rec. 37076, 37083 (1974).
Conflict between the House bill, allowing impeachment only by crimen falsi evidence, and the Senate bill, embodying the Advisory Committee’s automatic admissibility approach, was resolved by a Conference Committee. The conferees’ compromise — enacted as Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) — authorizes impeachment by felony convictions, “but only if” the court determines that probative value outweighs “prejudicial effect to the defendant.” The Conference Committee’s Report makes it perfectly clear that the balance set forth in this draft, unlike the second Advisory Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee versions, does not protect all nonparty witnesses:
“The danger of prejudice to a witness other than the defendant (such as injury to the witness’ reputation in his community) was considered and rejected by the Conference as an element to be weighed in determining admissibility. It was the judgment of the Conference that the danger of prejudice to a nondefendant witness is outweighed by the need for the trier of fact to have as much relevant evidence on the issue of credibility as possible.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, pp. 9-10 (1974).
Accord, Linskey v. Hecker, 753 F. 2d 199, 201 (CA1 1985). Equally clear is the conferees’ intention that the rule shield the accused, but not the prosecution, in a criminal case. Impeachment by convictions, the Committee Report stated, “should only be excluded where it presents a danger of improperly influencing the outcome of the trial by persuading the trier of fact to convict the defendant on the basis of his prior criminal record.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1597, supra, at 10.
But this emphasis on the criminal context, in the Report’s use of terms such as “defendant” and “to convict” and in individual conferees’ explanations of the compromise, raises some doubt over the Rule’s pertinence to civil litigants. The discussions suggest that only two kinds of witnesses risk prejudice — the defendant who elects to testify in a criminal case and witnesses other than the defendant in the same kind of case. Nowhere is it acknowledged that undue prejudice to a civil litigant also may improperly influence a trial’s outcome. Although this omission lends support to Judge Gibbons’ opinion that “legislative oversight” caused exclusion of civil parties from Rule 609(a)(1)’s balance, see Diggs, 741 F. 2d, at 583, a number of considerations persuade us that the Rule was meant to authorize a judge to weigh prejudice against no one other than a criminal defendant.
A party contending that legislative action changed settled law has the burden of showing that the legislature intended such a change. Cf. Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474 U. S. 494, 502 (1986). The weight of authority before Rule 609’s adoption accorded with the Advisory Committee’s final draft, admitting all felonies without exercise of judicial discretion in either civil or criminal cases. Departures from this general rule had occurred overtly by judicial interpretation, as in Luck v. United States, 121 U. S. App. D. C. 151, 348 F. 2d 763 (1965), or in evidence codes, such as the Model Code and the Uniform Rules. Rule 609 itself explicitly adds safeguards circumscribing the common-law rule. See Advisory Committee’s Note, 56 F. R. D., at 270-271. The unsubstantiated assumption that legislative oversight produced Rule 609(a)(l)’s ambiguity respecting civil trials hardly demonstrates that Congress intended silently to overhaul the law of impeachment in the civil context. Cf. NLRB v. Plasterers, 404 U. S. 116, 129-130 (1971).
To the extent various drafts of Rule 609 distinguished civil and criminal cases, moreover, they did so only to mitigate prejudice to criminal defendants. Any prejudice that convictions impeachment might cause witnesses other than the accused was deemed “so minimal as scarcely to be a subject of comment.” Advisory Committee’s Note, 51 F. R. D., at 392. Far from voicing concern lest such impeachment unjustly diminish a civil witness in the eyes of the jury, Representative Hogan declared that this evidence ought to be used to measure a witness’ moral value. Furthermore, Representative Dennis — who in advocating a Rule limiting impeachment to crimen falsi convictions had recognized the impeachment Rule’s applicability to civil trials — not only debated the issue on the House floor, but also took part in the conference out of which Rule 609 emerged. See 120 Cong. Rec. 2377-2380, 39942, 40894-40895 (1974). These factors, indicate that Rule 609(a)(l)’s textual limitation of the prejudice balance to criminal defendants resulted from deliberation, not oversight.
Had the conferees desired to protect other parties or witnesses, they could have done so easily. Presumably they had access to all of Rule 609’s precursors, particularly the drafts prepared by the House Subcommittee and the Senate Judiciary Committee, both of which protected the civil litigant as well as the criminal defendant. Alternatively, the conferees could have amended their own draft to include other parties. They did not for the simple reason that they intended that only the accused in a criminal case should be protected from unfair prejudice by the balance set out in Rule 609(a)(1).
Ill
That conclusion does not end our inquiry. We next must decide whether Rule 609(a)(1) governs all prior felonies impeachment, so that no discretion may be exercised to benefit civil parties, or whether Rule 609(a)(l)’s specific reference to the criminal defendant leaves Rule 403 balancing available in the civil context.
Several courts, often with scant analysis of the interrelation between Rule 403 and Rule 609(a)(1), have turned to Rule 403 to weigh prejudice and probativeness of impeaching testimony in civil cases. Judge Gibbons, dissenting in Diggs, 741 F. 2d, at 583, labeled this a “sensible approach.” Indeed it may be. Prodigious scholarship highlighting the irrationality and unfairness of impeaching credibility with evidence of felonies unrelated to veracity indicates that judicial exercise of discretion is in order. If Congress intended otherwise, however, judges must adhere to its decision.
A general statutory rule usually does not govern unless there is no more specific rule. See D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U. S. 204, 208 (1932). Rule 403, the more general provision, thus comes into play only if Rule 609, though specific regarding criminal defendants, does not pertain to civil witnesses. See Advisory Committee’s Note to Proposed Rule 403, 56 F. R. D., at 218. The legislative history evinces some confusion about Rule 403’s applicability to a version of Rule 609 that included no balancing language. That confusion is not an obstacle because the structure of the Rules as enacted resolves the question.
Rule 609(a) states that impeaching convictions evidence “shall be admitted. ” With regard to subpart (2), which governs impeachment by crimen falsi convictions, it is widely agreed that this imperative, coupled with the absence of any-balancing language, bars exercise of judicial discretion pursuant to Rule 403. Subpart (1), concerning felonies, is subject to the same mandatory language; accordingly, Rule 403 balancing should not pertain to this subsection either.
Any argument that Rule 403 overrides Rule 609 loses force when one considers that the Rule contains its own weighing language, not only in subsection (a)(1), but also in sections (b), pertaining to older convictions, and (d), to juvenile adjudications. These latter balances, like Rule 609 in general, apply to both civil and criminal witnesses. See Fed. Rule Evid. 1101(b). Earlier drafts of subsection (a)(1) also contained balancing provisions that comprehended both types of witnesses; these, as we have shown, deliberately were eliminated by advocates of an automatic admissibility rule. The absence of balances within only two aspects of the Rule— crimen falsi convictions and felony convictions of witnesses other than those whose impeachment would prejudice a criminal defendant — must be given its proper effect. Thus Rule 609(a)(l)’s exclusion of civil witnesses from its weighing language is a specific command that impeachment of such witnesses be admitted, which overrides a judge’s general discretionary authority under Rule 403. Courts relying on Rule 403 to balance probative value against prejudice to civil witnesses depart from the mandatory language of Rule 609.
In summary, we hold that Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) requires a judge to permit impeachment of a civil witness with evidence of prior felony convictions regardless of ensuant unfair prejudice to the witness or the party offering the testimony. Thus no error occurred when the jury in this product liability suit learned through impeaching cross-examination that plaintiff Green was a convicted felon. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F. R. D. 161, 162 (1969).
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
“Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time
“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
Although Rule 609(b) confers discretion upon the judge regarding the admission of convictions more than 10 years old, that factor was not present in Diggx or in this case.
More than a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., then a Justice on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, wrote in a civil case: “[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime, the only ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is the general readiness to do evil which the conviction may be supposed to show. It is from that general disposition alone that the jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular case, and thence that he, has lied in fact. The evidence has no tendency to prove that he was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself, and it reaches that conclusion solely through the general proposition that he is of bad character and unworthy of credit.” Gertz v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
Questions about the relevancy and fairness of such evidence did not abate, see n. 11, infra, and persisted even after enactment in 1975 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. E. g., Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F. 2d 114, 118 (CA5 1983); 10 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore’s Federal Practice § 609.02, pp. VI-134 to VI-135 (2d ed. 1988) (hereinafter Moore); 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 315, pp. 316-319 (1979) (hereinafter Louisell); Foster, Rule 609(a) in the Civil Context: A Recommendation for Reform, 57 Ford. L. Rev. 1 (1988); Note, Prior Convictions Offered for Impeachment in Civil Trials: The Interaction of Federal Rules of Evidence 609(a) and 403, 54 Ford. L. Rev. 1063 (1986).
Thus the text of the Rule limits impeachment of not only a criminal defendant, but also any witness offered on the defendant’s behalf. Cf. S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 364-365 (3d ed. 1982) (hereinafter Saltzburg) (suggesting Congress may not have intended this result).
Courts considering admissibility of impeachment harmful to a civil defendant occasionally have allowed balancing without questioning Rule 609(a)’s asymmetry when applied to the civil context. E. g., Murr v. Stinson, 752 F. 2d 233 (CA6 1985) (per curiam); Calhoun v. Baylor, 646 F. 2d 1158 (CA6 1981).
Cf. Campbell v. Greer, 831 F. 2d 700, 703 (CA7 1987). Declaratory judgment and interpleader actions, for instance, may invert expected designations of plaintiff and defendant. See 28 U. S. C. §2201 (1982 ed., Supp. V); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 22.
See Shows, 695 F. 2d, at 118 (prior felony impeachment of plaintiff alleging injuries because of employer's negligence “presented the risk that a jury would not be fair to Shows’ claim, not because it did not believe him, but because as a convict he was not deserving of their justice”). See also Foster, 57 Ford. L. Rev., at 5, 21-22; Note, 54 Ford. L. Rev., at 1067.
Accord, Moore §609.14[4], at VI-148 (“[SJubsection (a)(1) is deficient, in that it cannot be sensibly applied in civil cases”); Louisell S 316, at 324, n. 26 (“It would be incongruous to read the provision as allowing exclusion of convictions of defendants in civil cases, since no reason appears to distinguish among the parties in civil litigation").
See, e. g., Moore §609.02, at VI-134; E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence §43, p. 93 (3d ed. 1984) (hereinafter Cleary).
While a Court of Appeals Judge, William Howard Taft, having determined that both common law and an Ohio statute permitted prior felonies impeachment in criminal cases, stated: “It is difficult to see any reason why the legislature should permit the credibility of a witness in a criminal case to be attacked by proof of former conviction, but should withhold such permission in civil cases.” Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Rambo, 59 F. 75, 79 (CA6 1893). He concluded that evidence that a civil defendant’s witness had been convicted of burglary could be admitted as impeachment, though not in the plaintiff’s case in chief. See also Wounick v. Hysmith, 423 F. 2d 873 (CA3 1970) (Circuit precedent permitted admission of all crimen falsi convictions); Oklahoma ex rel. Nesbitt v. Allied Materials Corp., 312 F. Supp. 130, 133 (WD Okla. 1968); Taylor v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 33 F. R. D. 283, 285 (WD Mo. 1962).
In a seminal article, Dean Ladd questioned the traditional rule’s “premise, that the doing of an act designated by organized society as a crime is itself an indication of testimonial unreliability,” and advocated barring impeachment by evidence of convictions bearing no relation to a witness’ truthfulness. Ladd, Credibility Tests — Current Trends, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 166, 176, 191 (1940). See also McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior Conviction, 1970 Law & Social Order 1 (hereafter McGowan); Comments following A. L. I., Model Code of Evidence, Rule 106, pp. 128-129 (1942).
Among those who seemed to strain against the conventional rule was Judge Learned Hand, who, in allowing impeachment of a civil antitrust defendant by evidence of a nolo contendere plea, wrote:
“[S]o far as we can see, the greater number of jurisdictions allow the conviction as evidence to impeach a witness. Where there is a doubt as to the competency of evidence, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 43(a)... admonishes us to admit it rather than to exclude it; and for that reason we think it should have been here admitted. In all such cases there is of course the danger that the jury will use the plea as an admission of the ‘operative’ facts; but that is equally true of a conviction on a plea of guilty or on a verdict. Whether the attempt is ever practicable to limit its use to the witness’s credibility, and whether, if not, its use is an injustice, are not open questions for us.” Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems, Inc., 162 F. 2d 779, 785 (CA2 1947).
See also Pasternak v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 417 F. 2d 1292 (CA10 1969) (exercising discretion despite contrary state rule); Ruffalo’s Trucking Service, Inc. v. National Ben-Franklin Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, 243 F. 2d 949 (CA2 1957) (holding state law permits discretion).
Model Code of Evidence, Rule 2 (1942).
This blending of Rules 106 and 303 is justified by the latter Rule’s provision that “[a]ll Rules stating evidence to be admissible are subject to this Rule unless the contrary is expressly stated.” See Rule 303(2).
Writing for the Court of Appeals’ panel, Judge McGowan explained: “The trial court is not required to allow impeachment by prior conviction every time a defendant takes the stand in his own defense. The statute, in our view, leaves room for the operation of a sound judicial discretion to play upon the circumstances as they unfold in a particular case. There may well be cases where the trial judge might think that the cause of truth would be helped more by letting the jury hear the defendant’s story than by the defendant’s foregoing laic] that
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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I
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to decide when a contractor providing military equipment to the Federal Government can be held liable under state tort law for injury caused by a design defect.
I
On April 27, 1983, David A. Boyle, a United States Marine helicopter copilot, was killed when the CH-53D helicopter in which he was flying crashed off the coast of Virginia Beach, Virginia, during a training exercise. Although Boyle survived the impact of the crash, he was unable to escape from the helicopter and drowned. Boyle’s father, petitioner here, brought this diversity action in Federal District Court against the Sikorsky Division of United Technologies Corporation (Sikorsky), which built the helicopter for the United States.
At trial, petitioner presented two theories of liability under Virginia tort law that were submitted to the jury. First, petitioner alleged that Sikorsky had defectively repaired a device called the servo in the helicopter’s automatic flight control system, which allegedly malfunctioned and caused the crash. Second, petitioner alleged that Sikorsky had defectively designed the copilot’s emergency escape system: the escape hatch opened out instead of in (and was therefore ineffective in a submerged craft because of water pressure), and access to the escape hatch handle was obstructed by other equipment. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of petitioner and awarded him $725,000. The District Court denied Sikorsky’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions that judgment be entered for Sikorsky. 792 F. 2d 413 (CA4 1986). It found, as a matter of Virginia law, that Boyle had failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the repair work performed by Sikorsky, as opposed to work that had been done by the Navy, was responsible for the alleged malfunction of the flight control system. Id., at 415-416. It also found, as a matter of federal law, that Sikorsky could not be held liable for the allegedly defective design of the escape hatch because, on the evidence presented, it satisfied the requirements of the “military contractor defense,” which the court had recognized the same day in Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F. 2d 403 (CA4 1986). 792 F. 2d, at 414-415.
Petitioner sought review' here, challenging the Court of Appeals’ decision on three levels: First, petitioner contends that there is no justification in federal law for shielding Government contractors from liability for design defects in military equipment. Second, he argues in the alternative that even if such a defense should exist, the Court of Appeals’ formulation of the conditions for its application is inappropriate. Finally, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not remanding for a jury determination of whether the elements of the defense were met in this case. We granted cer-tiorari, 479 U. S. 1029 (1986).
HH
Petitioner s broadest contention is that, in the absence of legislation specifically immunizing Government contractors from liability for design defects, there is no basis for judicial recognition of such a defense. We disagree. In most fields of activity, to be sure, this Court has refused to find federal pre-emption of state law in the absence of either a clear statutory prescription, see, e. g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947), or a direct conflict between federal and state law, see, e. g., Florida Lime & Avogado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). But we have held that a few areas, involving “uniquely federal interests,” Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 640 (1981), are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts — so-called “federal common law.” See, e. g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U. S. 715, 726-729 (1979); Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 426-427 (1964); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U. S. 593, 597 (1959); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363, 366-367 (1943); D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U. S. 447, 457-458 (1942).
The dispute in the present case borders upon two areas that we have found to involve such “uniquely federal interests.” We have held that obligations to and rights of the United States under its contracts are governed exclusively by federal law. See, e. g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U. S. 580, 592-594 (1973); Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U. S. 407, 411 (1947); National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U. S. 454, 456 (1945); Clearfield Trust, supra. The present case does not involve an obligation to the United States under its contract, but rather liability to third persons. That liability may be styled one in tort, but it arises out of performance of the contract — and traditionally has been regarded as sufficiently related to the contract that until 1962 Virginia would generally allow design defect suits only by the purchaser and those in privity with the seller. See General Bronze Corp. v. Kostopulos, 203 Va. 66, 69-70, 122 S. E. 2d 548, 551 (1961); see also Va. Code § 8.2-318 (1965) (eliminating privity requirement).
Another area that we have found to be of peculiarly federal concern, warranting the displacement of state law, is the civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in the course of their duty. We have held in many contexts that the scope of that liability is controlled by federal law. See, e. g., Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U. S. 292, 295 (1988); Howard v. Lyons, supra, at 597; Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 569-574 (1959) (plurality opinion); id.',, at 577 (Black, J., concurring); see also Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F. 2d 396 (CA2 1926), aff’d, 275 U. S. 503 (1927) (per curiam); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The present case involves an independent contractor performing its obligation under a procurement contract, rather than an official performing his duty as a federal employee, but there is obviously implicated the same interest in getting the Government’s work done.
We think the reasons for considering these closely related areas to be of “uniquely federal” interest apply as well to the civil liabilities arising out of the performance of federal procurement contracts. We have come close to holding as much. In Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U. S. 18 (1940), we rejected an attempt by a landowner to hold a construction contractor liable under state law for the erosion of 95 acres caused by the contractor’s work in constructing dikes for the Government. We said that “if [the] authority to carry out the project was validly conferred, that is, if what was done was within the constitutional power of Congress, there is no liability on the part of the contractor for executing its will.” Id., at 20-21. The federal interest justifying this holding surely exists as much in procurement contracts as in performance contracts; we see no basis for a distinction.
Moreover, it is plain that the Federal Government’s interest in the procurement of equipment is implicated by suits such as the present one — even though the dispute is one between private parties. It is true that where “litigation is purely between private parties and does not touch the rights and duties of the United States,” Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Assn. v. Parnell, 352 U. S. 29, 33 (1956), federal law does not govern. Thus, for example, in Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U. S. 25, 30 (1977), which involved the question whether certain private parties could sue as third-party beneficiaries to an agreement between a municipality and the Federal Aviation Administration, we found that state law was not displaced because “the operations of the United States in connection with FAA grants such as these . . . would [not] be burdened” by allowing state law to determine whether third-party beneficiaries could sue, id., at 30, and because “any federal interest in the outcome of the [dispute] before us ‘[was] far too speculative, far too remote a possibility to justify the application of federal law to transactions essentially of local concern.’” Id., at 32-33, quoting Parnell, supra, at 33-34; see also Wallis v. Pan American Petro leum Corp., 384 U. S. 63, 69 (1966). But the same is not true here. The imposition of liability on Government contractors will directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either the contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified by the Government, or it will raise its price. Either way, the interests of the United States will be directly affected.
That the procurement of equipment by the United States is an area of uniquely federal interest does not, however, end the inquiry. That merely establishes a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for the displacement of state law. Displacement will occur only where, as we have variously described, a “significant conflict” exists between an identifiable “federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law,” Wallis, supra, at 68, or the application of state law would “frustrate specific objectives” of federal legislation, Kimbell Foods, 440 U. S., at 728. The conflict with federal policy need not be as sharp as that which must exist for ordinary preemption when Congress legislates “in a field which the States have traditionally occupied.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S., at 230. Or to put the point differently, the fact that the area in question is one of unique federal concern changes what would otherwise be a conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one that can. But conflict there must be. In some cases, for example where the federal interest requires a uniform rule, the entire body of state law applicable to the area conflicts and is replaced by federal rules. See, e. g., Clearfield Trust, 318 U. S., at 366-367 (rights and obligations of United States with respect to commercial paper must be governed by uniform federal rule). In others, the conflict is more narrow, and only particular elements of state law are superseded. See, e. g., Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U. S., at 595 (even assuming state law should generally govern federal land acquisitions, particular state law at issue may not); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U. S., at 597 (state defamation law generally applicable to federal official, but federal privilege governs for statements made in the course of federal official’s duties).
In Miree, supra, the suit was not seeking to impose upon the person contracting with the Government a duty contrary to the duty imposed by the Government contract. Rather, it was the contractual duty itself that the private plaintiff (as third-party beneficiary) sought to enforce. Between Miree and the present case, it is easy to conceive of an intermediate situation, in which the duty sought to be imposed on the contractor is not identical to one assumed under the contract, but is also not contrary to any assumed. If, for example, the United States contracts for the purchase and installation of an air-conditioning unit, specifying the cooling capacity but not the precise manner of construction, a state law imposing upon the manufacturer of such units a duty of care to include a certain safety feature would not be a duty identical to anything promised the Government, but neither would it be contrary. The contractor could comply with both its contractual obligations and the state-prescribed duty of care. No one suggests that state law would generally be pre-empted in this context.
The present case, however, is at the opposite extreme from Miree. Here the state-imposed duty of care that is the asserted basis of the contractor’s liability (specifically, the duty to equip helicopters with the sort of escape-hatch mechanism petitioner claims was necessary) is precisely contrary to the duty imposed by the Government contract (the duty to manufacture and deliver helicopters with the sort of escape-hatch mechanism shown by the specifications). Even in this sort of situation, it would be unreasonable to say that there is always a “significant conflict” between the state law and a federal policy or interest. If, for example, a federal procurement officer orders, by model number, a quantity of stock helicopters that happen to be equipped with escape hatches opening outward, it is impossible to say that the Government has a significant interest in that particular feature. That would be scarcely more reasonable than saying that a private individual who orders such a craft by model number cannot sue for the manufacturer’s negligence because he got precisely what he ordered.
In its search for the limiting principle to identify those situations in which a “significant conflict” with federal policy or interests does arise, the Court of Appeals, in the lead case upon which its opinion here relied, identified as the source of the conflict the Feres doctrine, under which the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not cover injuries to Armed Services personnel in the course of military service. See Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950). Military contractor liability would conflict with this doctrine, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, since the increased cost of the contractor’s tort liability would be added to the price of the contract, and “[s]uch pass-through costs would . . . defeat the purpose of the immunity for military accidents conferred upon the government itself.” Tozer, 792 F. 2d, at 408. Other courts upholding the defense have embraced similar reasoning. See, e. g., Bynum v. FMC Cory., 770 F. 2d 556, 565-566 (CA5 1985); Tillett v. J. I. Case Co., 756 F. 2d 591, 596-597 (CA7 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F. 2d 444, 449 (CA9 1983), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 1043 (1984). We do not adopt this analysis because it seems to us that the Feres doctrine, in its application to the present problem, logically produces results that are in some respects too broad and in some respects too narrow. Too broad, because if the Government contractor defense is to prohibit suit against the manufacturer whenever Feres would prevent suit against the Government, then even injuries caused to military personnel by a helicopter purchased from stock (in our example above), or by any standard equipment purchased by the Government, would be covered. Since Feres prohibits all service-related tort claims against the Government, a contractor defense that rests upon it should prohibit all service-related tort claims against the manufacturer — making inexplicable the three limiting criteria for contractor immunity (which we will discuss presently) that the Court of Appeals adopted. On the other hand, reliance on Feres produces (or logically should produce) results that are in another respect too narrow. Since that doctrine covers only service-related injuries, and not injuries caused by the military to civilians, it could not be invoked to prevent, for example, a civilian’s suit against the manufacturer of fighter planes, based on a state tort theory, claiming harm from what is alleged to be needlessly high levels of noise produced by the jet engines. Yet we think that the character of the jet engines the Government orders for its fighter planes cannot be regulated by state tort law, no more in suits by civilians than in suits by members of the Armed Services.
There is, however, a statutory provision that demonstrates the potential for, and suggests the outlines of, “significant conflict” between federal interests and state law in the context of Government procurement. In the FTCA, Congress authorized damages to be recovered against the United States for harm caused by the negligent or wrongful conduct of Government employees, to the extent that a private person would be liable under the law of the place where the conduct occurred. 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b). It excepted from this consent to suit, however, \
“[a]ny claim . . . based Upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U. S. C, §2680(a).
We think that the selection of the appropriate design for military equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function within the meaning of this provision. It often involves not merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the balancing of many technical, military, and even social considerations, including specifically the trade-off between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness. And we are further of the view that permitting “second-guessing” of these judgments, see United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U. S. 797, 814 (1984), through state tort suits against contractors would produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA exemption. The financial burden of judgments against the contractors would ultimately be passed through, substantially if not totally, to the United States itself, since defense contractors will predictably raise their prices to cover, or to insure against, contingent liability for the Government-ordered designs. To put the point differently: It makes little sense to insulate the Government against financial liability for the judgment that a particular feature of military equipment is necessary when the Government produces the equipment itself, but not when it contracts for the production. In sum, we are of the view that state law which holds Government contractors liable for design defects in military equipment does in some circumstances present a “significant conflict” with federal policy and must be displaced.
We agree with the scope of displacement adopted by the Fourth Circuit here, which is also that adopted by the Ninth Circuit, see McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., supra, at 451. Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States. The first two of these conditions assure that the suit is within the area where the policy of the “discretionary function” would be frustrated — i. e., they assure that the design feature in question was considered by a Government officer, and not merely by the contractor itself. The third condition is necessary because, in its absence, the displacement of state tort law would create some incentive for the. manufacturer to withhold knowledge of risks, since conveying that knowledge might disrupt the contract but withholding it would produce no liability. We adopt this provision lest our effort to protect discretionary functions perversely impede them by cutting off information highly relevant to the discretionary decision.
We have considered the alternative formulation of the Government contractor defense, urged upon us by petitioner, which was adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F. 2d 736, 746 (1985), cert. pending, No. 85-1529. That would preclude suit only if (1) the contractor did not participate, or participated only minimally, in the design of the defective equipment; or (2) the contractor timely warned the Government of the risks of the design and notified it of alternative designs reasonably known by it, and the Government, although forewarned, clearly authorized the contractor to proceed with the dangerous design. While this formulation may represent a perfectly reasonable tort rule, it is not a rule designed to protect the federal interest embodied in the “discretionary function” exemption. The design ultimately selected may well reflect a significant policy judgment by Government officials whether or not the contractor rather than those officials developed the design. In addition, it does not seem to us sound policy to penalize, and thus deter, active contractor participation in the design process, placing the contractor at risk unless it identifies all design defects.
Ill
Petitioner raises two arguments regarding the Court of Appeals’ application of the Government contractor defense to the facts of this case. First, he argues that since the formulation of the defense adopted by the Court of Appeals differed from the instructions given by the District Court to the jury, the Seventh Amendment guarantee of jury trial required a remand for trial on the new theory. We disagree. If the evidence presented in the first trial would not suffice, as a matter of law, to support a jury verdict under the properly formulated defense, judgment could properly be entered for the respondent at once, without a new trial. And that is so even though (as petitioner claims) respondent failed to object to jury instructions that expressed the defense differently, and in a fashion that would support a verdict. See St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U. S. 112, 118-120 (1988) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J.., White, and Scalia, JJ.); Ebker v. Tan Jay Int’l, Ltd., 739 F. 2d 812, 825-826, n. 17 (CA2 1984) (Friendly, J.); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2537, pp. 599-600 (1971).
It is somewhat unclear from the Court of Appeals’ opinion, however, whether it was in fact deciding that no reasonable jury could, under the properly formulated defense, have found for the petitioner on the facts presented, or rather was assessing on its own whether the defense had been established. The latter, which is what petitioner asserts occurred, would be error, since whether the facts establish the conditions for the defense is a question for the jury. The critical language in the Court of Appeals’ opinion was that “[b]ecause "Sikorsky has satisfied the requirements of the military contractor defense, it can incur no liability for . . . the allegedly defective design of the escape hatch.” 792 F. 2d, at 415. Although it seems to us doubtful that the Court of Appeals was conducting the factual evaluation that petitioner suggests, we cannot be certain from this language, and so we remand for clarification of this point.' If the Court of Appeals was saying that no reasonable jury could find, under the principles it had announced and on the basis of the evidence presented, that the Government contractor defense was inapplicable, its judgment shall stand, since petitioner did not seek from us, nor did we grant, review of the sufficiency-of-the-evidence determination. If the Court of Appeals was not saying that, it should now undertake the proper sufficiency inquiry.
Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded.
So ordered.
Justice Brennan’s dissent misreads our discussion here to “inti-mat[e] that the immunity [of federal officials] . . . might extend . . . [to] nongovernment employees” such as a Government contractor. Post, at 523. But we do not address this issue, as it is not before us. We cite these cases merely to demonstrate that the liability of independent contractors performing work for the Federal Government, like the liability of federal officials, is an area of uniquely federal interest.
As this language shows, Justice Brennan’s dissent is simply incorrect to describe Miree and other cáses as declining to apply federal law despite the assertion of interests “comparable” to those before us here. Post, at 521-522.
We refer here to the displacement of state law, although it is possible to analyze it as the displacement of federal-law reference to state law for the rule of decision. Some of our cases appear to regard the area in which a uniquely federal interest exists as being entirely governed by federal law, with federal law deigning to “borro[w],” United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U. S. 580, 594 (1973), or “incorporate]” or “adopt” United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U. S. 715, 728, 729, 730 (1979), state law except where a significant conflict with federal policy exists. We see nothing to be gained by expanding the theoretical scope of the federal pre-emption beyond its practical effect, and so adopt the more modest terminology. If the distinction between displacement of state law and displacement of federal law’s incorporation of state law ever makes a practical difference, it at least does not do so in the present case.
Even before our landmark decision in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363 (1943), the distinctive federal interest in a particular field was used as a significant factor giving broad pre-emptive effect to federal legislation in that field:
“It cannot be doubted that both the state and the federal [alien] registration laws belong ‘to that class of laws which concern the exterior relation of this whole nation with other nations and governments.’ Consequently the regulation of aliens is . . . intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities of the national government.... And where the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 66-67 (1941) (citation omitted).
Justice Brennan’s assumption that the outcome of this case would be different if it were brought under the Death on the High Seas Act, Act of Mar. 30, 1920, ch. Ill, § 1 etseq. (1982 ed., Supp. IV), 41 Stat. 537, codified at 46 U. S. C. App. §761 et seq., is not necessarily correct. That issue is not before us, and we think it inappropriate to decide it in order to refute (or, for that matter, to construct) an alleged inconsistency.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Four members of the Court would reverse. Four members of the Court would dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. Consequently, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit remains in effect.
Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Alito
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases concern the interplay between two federal environmental statutes. Section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act requires that the Environmental Protection Agency transfer certain permitting powers to state authorities upon an application and a showing that nine specified criteria have been met. Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 provides that a federal agency must consult with agencies designated by the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior in order to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species.” The question presented is whether §7(a)(2) effectively operates as a tenth criterion on which the transfer of permitting power under the first statute must be conditioned. We conclude that it does not. The transfer of permitting authority to state authorities — who will exercise that authority under continuing federal oversight to ensure compliance with relevant mandates of the Endangered Species Act and other federal environmental protection statutes — was proper. We therefore reverse the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
I
A
1
The Clean Water Act (CWA), 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., established a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) that is designed to prevent harmful discharges into the Nation’s waters. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or Agency) initially administers the NPDES permitting system for each State, but a State may apply for a transfer of permitting authority to state officials. See 33 U. S. C. § 1342; see also § 1251(b) (“It is the policy of Congress that the Stat[e]... implement the permit progra[m] under sectio[n] 1342... of this title”). If authority is transferred, then state officials — not the federal EPA — have the primary responsibility for reviewing and approving NPDES discharge permits, albeit with continuing EPA oversight.
Under § 402(b) of the CWA, “the Governor of each State desiring to administer its own permit program for discharges into navigable waters within its jurisdiction may submit to [the EPA] a foil and complete description of the program it proposes to establish and administer under State law or under an interstate compact,” as well as a certification “that the laws of such State... provide adequate authority to carry out the described program.” 33 U. S. C. § 1342(b). The same section provides that the EPA “shall approve each submitted program” for transfer of permitting authority to a State “unless [it] determines that adequate authority does not exist” to ensure that nine specified criteria are satisfied. Ibid. These criteria all relate to whether the state agency that will be responsible for permitting has the requisite authority under state law to administer the NPDES program. 2 If the criteria are met, the transfer must be approved.
2
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 87 Stat. 884, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq., is intended to protect and conserve endangered and threatened species and their habitats. Section 4 of the ESA directs the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior to list threatened and endangered species and to designate their critical habitats. §1533. The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) administers the ESA with respect to species under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior, while the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) administers the ESA with respect to species under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Commerce. See 50 CFR §§17.11, 222.101(a), 223.102, 402.01(b) (2006).
Section 7 of the ESA prescribes the steps that federal agencies must take to ensure that their actions do not jeopardize endangered wildlife and flora. Section 7(a)(2) provides that “[e]ach Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary [of Commerce or the Interior], insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as an ‘agency action’) is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species.” 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2).
Once the consultation process contemplated by § 7(a)(2) has been completed, the Secretary is required to give the agency a written biological opinion “setting forth the Secretary’s opinion, and a summary of the information on which the opinion is based, detailing how the agency action affects the species or its critical habitat.” § 1536(b)(3)(A); see also 50 CFR §402.14(h). If the Secretary concludes that the agency action would place the listed species in jeopardy or adversely modify its critical habitat, “the Secretary shall suggest those reasonable and prudent alternatives which he believes would not violate [§ 7(a)(2)] and can be taken by the Federal agency... in implementing the agency action.” 16 U. S. C. § 1536(b)(3)(A); see also 50 CFR § 402.14(h)(3). Regulations promulgated jointly by the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior provide that, in order to qualify as a “reasonable and prudent alternative,” an alternative course of action must be able to be implemented in a way “consistent with the scope of the Federal agency’s legal authority and jurisdiction.” §402.02. Following the issuance of a “jeopardy” opinion, the agency must either terminate the action, implement the proposed alternative, or seek an exemption from the Cabinet-level Endangered Species Committee pursuant to 16 U. S. C. § 1536(e). The regulations also provide that “Section 7 and the requirements of this part apply to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.” 50 CFR § 402.03.
B
1
In February 2002, Arizona officials applied for EPA authorization to administer that State’s NPDES program. The EPA initiated consultation with the FWS to determine whether the transfer of permitting authority would adversely affect any listed species.
The FWS regional office concluded that the transfer of authority would not cause any direct impact on water quality that would adversely affect listed species. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 06-340, p. 564. However, the FWS office was concerned that the transfer could result in the issuance of more discharge permits, which would lead to more development, which in turn could have an indirect adverse effect on the habitat of certain upland species, such as the cactus ferruginous pygmy-owl and the Pima pineapple cactus. Specifically, the FWS feared that, because § 7(a)(2)’s consultation requirement does not apply to permitting decisions by state authorities, the transfer of authority would empower Arizona officials to issue individual permits without considering and mitigating their indirect impact on these upland species. Id., at 565-566. The FWS regional office therefore urged that, in considering the proposed transfer of permitting authority, those involved in the consultation process should take these potential indirect impacts into account.
The EPA disagreed, maintaining that “its approval action, which is an administrative transfer of authority, [would not be] the cause of future non-discharge-related impacts on endangered species from projects requiring State NPDES permits.” Id., at 564. As a factual matter, the EPA believed that the link between the transfer of permitting authority and the potential harm that could result from increased development was too attenuated. Ibid. And as a legal matter, the EPA concluded that the mandatory nature of CWA § 402(b) — which directs that the EPA “shall approve” a transfer request if that section’s nine statutory criteria are met — stripped it of authority to disapprove a transfer based on any other considerations. Id., at 564-565.
Pursuant to procedures set forth in a memorandum of understanding between the agencies, the dispute was referred to the agencies’ national offices for resolution. In December 2002, the FWS issued its biological opinion, which concluded that the requested transfer would not cause jeopardy to listed species. The opinion reasoned that “the loss of section 7-related conservation benefits... is not an indirect effect of the authorization action,” id., at 117, because
“loss of any conservation benefit is not caused by EPA’s decision to approve the State of Arizona’s program. Rather, the absence of the section 7 process that exists with respect to Federal NPDES permits reflects Congress’ decision to grant States the right to administer these programs under state law provided the State’s program meets the requirements of [section] 402(b) of the Clean Water Act.” Id., at 114.
In addition, the FWS opined that the EPA’s continuing oversight of Arizona’s permitting program, along with other statutory protections, would adequately protect listed species and their habitats following the transfer. Id., at 101-107.
The EPA concluded that Arizona had met each of the nine statutory criteria listed in § 402(b) and approved the transfer of permitting authority. In the notice announcing the approval of the transfer, the EPA noted that the issuance of the FWS’ biological opinion had “conclude[d] the consultation process required by ESA section 7(a)(2) and reflects the [FWS’] agreement with EPA that the approval of the State program meets the substantive requirements of the ESA.” Id., at 78.
2
On April 2,2003, respondents filed a petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seeking review of the transfer pursuant to 33 U. S. C. § 1369(b)(1)(D), which allows private parties to seek direct review of the EPA’s determinations regarding state permitting programs in the federal courts of appeals. The court granted petitioner National Association of Home Builders leave to intervene as a respondent in that case. Respondent Defenders of Wildlife also filed a separate action in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging, among other things, that the biological opinion issued by the FWS in support of the proposed transfer did not comply with the ESA’s standards. The District Court severed that claim and transferred it to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which consolidated the case with the suit challenging the EPA transfer. See 420 F. 3d 946 (2005).
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit held that the EPA’s approval of the transfer was arbitrary and capricious because the EPA “relied during the administrative proceedings on legally contradictory positions regarding its section 7 obligations.” Id., at 959. The court concluded that the EPA “fail[ed] to understand its own authority under section 7(a)(2) to act on behalf of listed species and their habitat,” id., at 977, because “the two propositions that underlie the EPA’s action — that (1) it must, under the [ESA], consult concerning transfers of CWA permitting authority, but (2) it is not permitted, as a matter of law, to take into account the impact on listed species in making the transfer decision — cannot both be true,” id., at 961. The court therefore concluded that it was required to “remand to the agency for a plausible explanation of its decision, based on a single, coherent interpretation of the statute.” Id., at 962.
The panel majority, however, did not follow this course of action. Rather, the panel went on to review the EPA's substantive construction of the statutes at issue and held that the ESA granted the EPA both the power and the duty to determine whether its transfer decision would jeopardize threatened or endangered species. The panel did not dispute that Arizona had met the nine criteria set forth in § 402(b) of the CWA, but the panel nevertheless concluded that § 7(a)(2) of the ESA provided an “affirmative grant of authority to attend to [the] protection of listed species,” id., at 965, in effect adding a tenth criterion to those specified in § 402(b). The panel dismissed the argument that the EPA’s approval of the transfer application was not subject to § 7(a)(2) because it was not a “discretionary action” within the meaning of 50 CFR §402.03 (interpreting § 7(a)(2) to apply only to agency actions “in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control”). 420 F. 3d, at 967-969. It viewed the FWS’ regulation as merely “coterminous” with the express statutory language encompassing all agency actions that are “ ‘authorized, funded, or carried out’ ” by the agency. Id., at 969 (quoting 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2)). On these grounds, the court granted the petition and vacated the EPA’s transfer decision.
In dissent, Judge Thompson explained that the transfer decision was not a “discretionary action” under 50 CFR §402.03 because “[t]he Clean Water Act, by its very terms, permits the EPA to consider only the nine specified factors. If a state’s proposed permitting program meets the enumerated requirements,” he reasoned, “the EPA administrator ‘shall approve’ the program. 33 U. S. C. § 1342(b). This [congressional directive does not permit the EPA to impose additional conditions.” 420 F. 3d, at 980.
The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en banc. 450 F. 3d 394 (2006). Writing for the six judges who dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Kozinski disagreed with the panel’s conclusion that the EPA’s analysis was so internally inconsistent as to be arbitrary and capricious. He further noted that, if the panel was correct on this point, the proper resolution would have been to remand to the EPA for further explanation. Id., at 396-398. On the statutory question, Judge Kozinski echoed Judge Thompson’s conclusion that once the nine criteria set forth in § 402(b) of the CWA are satisfied, a transfer is mandatory and nondiscretionary. Id., at 397-399. He rejected the panel majority’s broad construction of ESA § 7(a)(2), concluding that “[i]f the ESA were as powerful as the majority contends, it would modify not only the EPA’s obligation under the CWA, but every categorical mandate applicable to every federal agency.” Id., at 399, n. 4.
The Ninth Circuit’s construction of § 7(a)(2) is at odds with that of other Courts of Appeals. Compare 420 F. 3d 946 (case below) with Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust v. FERC, 962 F. 2d 27, 33-34 (CADC 1992), and American Forest & Paper Assn. v. EPA, 137 F. 3d 291, 298-299 (CA5 1998). We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict, 549 U. S. 1105 (2007), and we now reverse.
II
Before addressing this question of statutory interpretation, however, we first consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the EPA’s transfer decision was arbitrary and capricious because, in that court’s words, the agencies involved in the decision “relied... on legally contradictory positions regarding [their] section 7 obligations.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 06-340, at 23.
As an initial matter, we note that if the EPA’s action was arbitrary and capricious, as the Ninth Circuit held, the proper course would have been to remand to the Agency for clarification of its reasons. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U. S. 183 (2006) (per curiam). Indeed, the court below expressly recognized that this finding required it to “remand to the Agency for a plausible explanation of its decision, based on a single, coherent interpretation of the statute.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 06-340, at 28. But the Ninth Circuit did not take this course; instead, it jumped ahead to resolve the merits of the dispute. In so doing, it erroneously deprived the Agency of its usual administrative avenue for explaining and reconciling the arguably contradictory rationales that sometimes appear in the course of lengthy and complex administrative decisions. We need not examine this question further, however, because we conclude that the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the EPA’s action was arbitrary and capricious is not fairly supported by the record.
Review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is deferential; we will not vacate an agency’s decision unless it
“has relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43 (1983).
‘We will, however, ‘uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’” Ibid. (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419 U. S. 281, 286 (1974)).
The Court of Appeals concluded that the EPA’s decision was “internally inconsistent” because, in its view, the Agency stated — both during preliminary review of Arizona’s transfer application and in the Federal Register notice memorializing its final action — “that section 7 requires consultation regarding the effect of a permitting transfer on listed species.” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 06-340, at 23.
With regard to the various statements made by the involved agencies’ regional offices during the early stages of consideration, the only “inconsistency” respondents can point to is the fact that the agencies changed their minds — something that, as long as the proper procedures were followed, they were fully entitled to do. The federal courts ordinarily are empowered to review only an agency’s final action, see 5 U. S. C. § 704, and the fact that a preliminary determination by a local agency representative is later overruled at a higher level within the agency does not render the decision-making process arbitrary and capricious.
Respondents also point to the final Federal Register notice memorializing the EPA’s approval of Arizona’s transfer application. This notice stated that the FWS’ issuance of its biological opinion had “concludefd] the consultation process required by ESA section 7(a)(2).” App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 06-340, at 73. Respondents contend that this statement is inconsistent with the EPA’s previously expressed position — and their position throughout this litigation — that §7(a)(2)’s consultation requirement is not triggered by a transfer application under § 402 of the CWA.
We are not persuaded that this statement constitutes the type of error that requires a remand. By the time the Federal Register statement was issued, the EPA had already consulted with the FWS about the Arizona application, and the question whether that consultation had been required, as opposed to voluntarily undertaken by the Agency, was simply not germane to the final agency transfer decision. The Federal Register statement, in short, was dictum, and it had no bearing on the final agency action that respondents challenge. Mindful of Congress’ admonition that in reviewing agency action, “due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error,” 5 U. S. C. § 706, we do not believe that this stray statement, which could have had no effect on the underlying agency action being challenged, requires that we further delay the transfer of permitting authority to Arizona by remanding to the Agency for clarification. See also PDK Labs. Inc. v. United States Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F. 3d 786, 799 (CADC 2004) (“In administrative law, as in federal civil and criminal litigation, there is a harmless error rule”).
We further disagree with respondents’ suggestion that, by allegedly altering its legal position while the Arizona transfer decision and its associated litigation was pending, the “EPA is effectively nullifying respondents’ rights to participate in administrative proceedings concerning Arizona’s application, and particularly respondents’ rights under EPA’s own regulations to comment on NPDES transfer applications.” Brief for Respondents 28 (citing 40 CFR § 123.61(b); emphasis deleted). Consistent with EPA regulations, the Agency made available “a comment period of not less than 45 days during which interested members of the public [could] express their views on the State program.” § 123.61(a)(1). Respondents do not suggest that they were deprived of their right to comment during this period.
Respondents also contend that if the case were remanded to the EPA, they would raise additional challenges — including, for example, a challenge to the EPA’s provision of financial assistance to Arizona for the administration of its NPDES program. However, as explained below, any such agency action is separate and independent of the agency’s decision to authorize the transfer of permitting authority pursuant to § 402(b). See n. 11, infra. We express no opinion as to the viability of a separate administrative or legal challenge to such actions.
III
A
We turn now to the substantive statutory question raised by the petitions, a question that requires us to mediate a clash of seemingly categorical — and, at first glance, irreconcilable — legislative commands. Section 402(b) of the CWA provides, without qualification, that the EPA “shall approve” a transfer application unless it determines that the State lacks adequate authority to perform the nine functions specified in the section. 33 U. S. C. § 1342(b). By its terms, the statutory language is mandatory and the list exclusive; if the nine specified criteria are satisfied, the EPA does not have the discretion to deny a transfer application. Cf. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U. S. 230, 241 (2001) (noting Congress’ “use of a mandatory ‘shall’... to impose discretionless obligations”); Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U. S. 26, 35 (1998) (“[T]he mandatory ‘shall’... normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion”); Association of Civil Technicians v. FLRA, 22 F. 3d 1150, 1153 (CADC 1994) (“The word ‘shall’ generally indicates a command that admits of no discretion on the part of the person instructed to carry out the directive”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1375 (6th ed. 1990) (“As used in statutes... this word is generally imperative or mandatory”). Neither respondents nor the Ninth Circuit has ever disputed that Arizona satisfied each of these nine criteria. See 420 F. 3d, at 963, n. 11; Brief for Respondents 19, n. 8.
The language of § 7(a)(2) of the ESA is similarly imperative: It provides that “[e]ach Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any aetion authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency... is not likely to jeopardize” endangered or threatened species or their habitats. 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2). This mandate is to be carried out through consultation and may require the agency to adopt an alternative course of action. As the author of the panel opinion below recognized, applying this language literally would “ad[dJ one [additional] requirement to the list of considerations under the Clean Water Act permitting transfer provision.” 450 F. 3d, at 404, n. 2 (Berzon, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis in original). That is, it would effectively repeal the mandatory and exclusive list of criteria set forth in § 402(b), and replace it with a new, expanded list that includes §7(a)(2)’s no-jeopardy requirement.
B
While a later enacted statute (such as the ESA),can sometimes operate to amend or even repeal an earlier statutory provision (such as the CWA), “repeals by implication are not favored” and will not be presumed unless the “intention of the legislature to repeal [is] clear and manifest.” Watt v. Alaska, 451 U. S. 259, 267 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will not infer a statutory repeal “unless the later statute ‘“expressly contradices] the original act”’ or unless such a construction ‘“is absolutely necessary... in order that [the] words [of the later statute] shall have any meaning at all.” ’ ” Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U. S. 535, 548 (1988) (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 158 (1976), in turn quoting T. Sedgwick, The Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law 98 (2d ed. 1874)); see also Branch v. Smith, 538 U. S. 254, 273 (2003) (“An implied repeal will only be found where provisions in two statutes are in ‘irreconcilable conflict/ or where the latter Act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and ‘is clearly intended as a substitute’”); Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U. S. 497, 503 (1936) (“[T]he intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest”). Outside these limited circumstances, “a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.” Radzanower, supra, at 153.
Here, reading § 7(a)(2) as the Court of Appeals did would effectively repeal §402(b)’s statutory mandate by engrafting. a tenth criterion onto the CWA. Section 402(b) of the CWA commands that the EPA “shall” issue a permit whenever all nine exclusive statutory prerequisites are met. Thus, § 402(b) does not just set forth minimum requirements for the transfer of permitting authority; it affirmatively mandates that the transfer “shall” be approved if the specified criteria are met. The provision operates as a ceiling as well as a floor. By adding an additional criterion, the Ninth Circuit’s construction of § 7(a)(2) raises that floor and alters §402(b)’s statutory command.
The Ninth Circuit’s reading of § 7(a)(2) would not only abrogate §402(b)’s statutory mandate, but also result in the implicit repeal of many additional otherwise categorical statutory commands. Section 7(a)(2) by its terms applies to “any action authorized, funded, or carried out by” a federal agency — covering, in effect, almost anything that an agency might do. Reading the provision broadly would thus partially override every federal statute mandating agency action by subjecting such action to the further condition that it pose no jeopardy to endangered species. See, e. g., Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust v. FERC, 962 F. 2d, at 33-34 (considering whether § 7(a)(2) overrides the Federal Power Act’s prohibition on amending annual power licenses). While the language of § 7(a)(2) does not explicitly repeal any provision of the CWA (or any other statute), reading it for all that it might be worth runs foursquare into our presumption against implied repeals.
C
1
The agencies charged with implementing the ESA have attempted to resolve this tension through regulations implemeriting § 7(a)(2). The NMFS and the FWS, acting jointly on behalf of the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior and following notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, have promulgated a regulation stating that “Section 7 and the requirements of this part apply to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.” 50 CFR §402.03 (emphasis added). Pursuant to this regulation, § 7(a)(2) would not be read as impliedly repealing non-discretionary statutory mandates, even when they might result in some agency action. Rather, the ESA’s requirements would come into play only when an action results from the exercise of agency discretion. This interpretation harmonizes the statutes by giving effect to the ESA’s no-jeopardy mandate whenever an agency has discretion to do so, but not when the agency is prohibited from considering such extra-statutory factors.
We have recognized that “[t]he latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing the statute, together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement, establishes that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation” of the statutory scheme. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 703 (1995). But such deference is appropriate only where “Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue” through the statutory text. Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984).
“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.... [However,] if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id., at 842-843.
In making the threshold determination under Chevron, “a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 132 (2000). Rather, “[t]he meaning — or ambiguity — of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.... It is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’ ” Id., at 182-133 (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989)).
We must therefore read § 7(a)(2) of the ESA against the statutory backdrop of the many mandatory agency directives whose operation it would implicitly abrogate or repeal if it were construed as broadly as the Ninth Circuit did below. When § 7(a)(2) is read this way, we are left with a fundamental ambiguity that is not resolved by the statutory text. An agency cannot simultaneously obey the differing mandates set forth in § 7(a)(2) of the ESA and § 402(b) of the CWA, and consequently the statutory language — read in light of the canon against implied repeals — does not itself provide clear guidance as to which command must give way.
In this situation, it is appropriate to look to the implementing agency’s expert interpretation, which cabins §7(a)(2)’s application to “actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or control.” 50 CFR §402.03. This reading harmonizes the statutes by applying § 7(a)(2) to guide agencies’ existing discretionary authority, but not reading it to override express statutory mandates.
2
We conclude that this interpretation is reasonable in light of the statute’s text and the overall statutory scheme, and that it is therefore entitled to deference under Chevron. Section 7(a)(2) requires that an agency “insure” that the actions it authorizes, funds, or carries out are not likely to jeopardize listed species or their habitats. To “insure” something — as the court below recognized — means “ '[t]o make certain, to secure, to guarantee (some thing, event, etc.).’” 420 F. 3d, at 963 (quoting 7 Oxford English Dictionary 1059 (2d ed. 1989)). The regulation’s focus on “discretionary” actions accords with the commonsense conclusion that, when an agency is required to do something by statute, it simply lacks the power to “insure” that such action will not jeopardize endangered species.
This reasoning is supported by our decision in Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U. S. 752 (2004). That case concerned safety regulations that were promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and had the effect of triggering a Presidential directive allowing Mexican trucks to ply their trade on United States roads. The Court held that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) did not require the agency to assess the environmental effects of allowing the trucks entry because “the legally relevant cause of the entry of the Mexican trucks is not FMCSA’s action, but instead the actions of the President in lifting the moratorium and those of Congress in granting the President this authority while simultaneously limiting FMCSA’s discretion.” Id., at 769 (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that “where an agency has no ability to prevent a certain effect due to its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions, the agency cannot be considered a legally relevant ‘cause’ of the effect.” Id., at 770.
We do not suggest that Public Citizen controls the outcome here; § 7(a)(2), unlike NEPA, imposes a substantive (and not just a procedural) statutory requirement, and these cases involve agency action more directly related to environmental concerns than the FMCSA’s truck safety regulations. But the basic principle announced in Public Citizen — that an agency cannot be considered the legal “cause” of an action that it has no statutory discretion not to take — supports the reasonableness of the FWS’ interpretation of § 7(a)(2) as reaching only discretionary agency actions. See also California v. United States, 438 U. S. 645, 668, n. 21 (1978) (holding that a statutory requirement that federal operating agencies conform to state water usage rules applied only to the extent that it was not “inconsistent with other congressional directives”).
3
The court below simply disregarded §402.03’s interpretation of the ESA’s reach, dismissing “the regulation’s reference to ‘discretionary... involvement’ ” as merely “congruent with the statutory reference to actions ‘authorized, funded, or carried out’ by the agency.” 420 F. 3d, at 968. But this reading cannot be right. Agency discretion presumes that an agency can exercise “judgment” in connection with a particular action. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 415-416 (1971); see also Random House Dictionary of the English Language 411 (unabridged ed. 1967) (“discretion” defined as “the power or right to decide or act according to one’s own judgment; freedom of judgment or choice”). As the mandatory language of § 402(b) itself illustrates, not every action authorized, funded, or carried out by a federal agency is a product of that agency’s exercise of discretion.
The dissent’s interpretation of §402.03 is similarly implausible. The dissent would read the regulation as simply clarifying that discretionary agency actions are included within the scope of § 7(a)(2), but not confining the statute’s reach to such actions. See post, at 679-682. But this reading would render the regulation entirely superfluous. Nothing in either § 7(a)(2) or the other agency regulations interpreting that section, see § 402.02, suggests that discretionary actions are excluded from the scope of the ESA, and there is thus no need for a separate regulation to bring them within the statute’s scope. On the dissent’s reading, §402.03’s reference to “discretionary”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mb. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are members of a Mormon sect, known as Fundamentalists. They not only believe in polygamy; unlike other Mormons, they practice it. Each of petitioners, except Stubbs, has, in addition to his lawful wife, one or more plural wives. Each transported at least one plural wife across state lines, either for the purpose of cohabiting with her, or for the purpose of aiding another member of the cult in such a project. They were convicted of violating the Mann Act (36 Stat. 825, 18 U. S. C. § 398) on a trial to the court, a jury having been waived. 56 F. Supp. 890. The judgments of conviction were affirmed on appeal. 146 F. 2d 730. The cases are here on petitions for certiorari which we granted in view of the asserted conflict between the decision below and Mortensen v. United States, 322 U. S. 369.
The Act makes an offense the transportation in interstate commerce of “any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.” The decision turns on the meaning of the latter phrase, “for any other immoral purpose.”
United States v. Bitty, 208 U. S. 393, involved a prosecution under a federal statute making it a crime to import an alien woman “for the purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral purpose.” The act was construed to cover a case where a man imported an alien woman so that she should live with him as his concubine. Two years later the Mann Act was passed. Because of the similarity of the language used in the two acts, the Bitty case became a forceful precedent for the construction of the Mann Act. Thus one who transported a woman in interstate commerce so that she should become his mistress or concubine was held to have transported her for an “immoral purpose” within the meaning of the Mann Act. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470.
It is argued that the Caminetti decision gave too wide a sweep to the Act; that the Act was designed to cover only the white slave business and related vices; that it was not designed to cover voluntary actions bereft of sex commercialism; and that in any event it should not be construed to embrace polygamy which is a form of marriage and, unlike prostitution or debauchery or the concubinage involved in the Caminetti case, has as its object parenthood and the creation and maintenance of family life. In support of that interpretation an exhaustive legislative history is submitted which, it is said, gives no indication that the Act was aimed at polygamous practices.
While Mortensen v. United States, supra, p. 377, rightly indicated that the Act was aimed “primarily” at the use of interstate commerce for the conduct of the white slave business, we find no indication that a profit motive is a sine qua non to its application. Prostitution, to be sure, normally suggests sexual relations for hire. But debauchery has no such implied limitation. In common understanding the indulgence which that term suggests may be motivated solely by lust. And so we start with words which by their natural import embrace more than commercialized sex. What follows is “any other immoral purpose.” Under the ejusdem generis rule of construction the general words are confined to the class and may not be used to enlarge it. But we could not give the words a faithful interpretation if we confined them more narrowly than the class of which they are a part.
That was the view taken by the Court in the Bitty and Caminetti cases. We do not stop to reexamine the Cam-inetti case to determine whether the Act was properly applied to the facts there presented. But we adhere to its holding, which has been in force for almost thirty years, that the Act, while primarily aimed at the use of interstate commerce for the purposes of commercialized sex, is not restricted to that end.
We conclude, moreover, that polygamous practices are not excluded from the Act. They have long been outlawed in our society. As stated in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164:
“Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people. At common law, the second marriage was always void (2 Kent, Com. 79), and from the earliest history of England polygamy has been treated as an offence against society.”
As subsequently stated in Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1, 49, “The organization of a community for the spread and practice of polygamy is, in a measure, a return to barbarism. It is contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in the Western world.” And see Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333. Polygamy is a practice with far more pervasive influences in society than the casual, isolated transgressions involved in the-Caminetti case. The establishment or maintenance of polygamous households is a notorious example of promiscuity. The permanent advertisement of their existence is an example of the sharp repercussions which they have in the community. We could conclude that Congress excluded these practices from the Act only if it were clear that the Act is confined to commercialized sexual vice. Since we cannot say it is, we see no way by which the present transgressions can be excluded. These polygamous practices have long been branded as immoral in the law. Though they have different ramifications, they are in the same genus as the other immoral practices covered by the Act.
The fact that the regulation of marriage is a state matter does not, of course, make the Mann Act an unconstitutional interference by Congress with the police powers of the States. The power of Congress over the instrumen-talities of interstate commerce is plenary; it may be used to defeat what are deemed to be immoral practices; and the fact that the means used may have “the quality of police regulations” is not consequential. Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 323; see Athanasaw v. United States, 227 U. S. 326; Wilson v. United States, 232 U. S. 563.
Petitioners' second line of defense is that the requisite purpose was lacking. It is said that those petitioners who already had plural wives did not transport them in interstate commerce for an immoral purpose. The test laid down in the Mortensen case was whether the transportation was in fact “the use of interstate commerce as a calculated means for effectuating sexual immorality.” 322 U. S. p. 375. There was evidence that this group of petitioners in order to cohabit with their plural wives found it necessary or convenient to transport them in interstate commerce and that the unlawful purpose was the dominant motive. In one case the woman was transported for the purpose of entering into a plural marriage. After a night with this petitioner she refused to continue the plural marriage relationship. But guilt under the Mann Act turns on the purpose which motivates the transportation, not on its accomplishment. Wilson v. United States, supra, pp. 570-71.
It is also urged that the requisite criminal intent was lacking since petitioners were motivated by a religious belief. That defense claims too much. If upheld, it would place beyond the law any act done under claim of religious sanction. But it has long been held that the fact that polygamy is supported by a religious creed affords no defense in a prosecution for bigamy. Reynolds v. United States, supra. Whether an act is immoral within the meaning of the statute is not to be determined by the accused’s concepts of morality. Congress has provided the standard. The offense is complete if the accused intended to perform, and did in fact perform, the act which the statute condemns, viz., the transportation of a woman for the purpose of making her his plural wife or cohabiting with her as such.
We have considered the remaining objections raised and find them without merit.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Jackson think that the cases should be reversed. They are of opinion that affirmance requires extension of the rule announced in the Caminetti case and that the correctness of that rule is so dubious that it should at least be restricted to its particular facts.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints has forbidden plural marriages since 1890. See Toncray v. Budge, 14 Ida. 621, 654-55, 95 P. 26.
Petitioners’ activities extended into Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Utah and Wyoming.
“Of women: The offering of the body to indiscriminate lewdness for hire (esp. as a practice or institution); whoredom, harlotry.” 8 Oxford English Dictionary 1497.
“Vicious indulgence in sensual pleasures.” 3 Oxford English Dictionary 79; “Excessive indulgence in sensual pleasures of any kind; gluttony; intemperance; sexual immorality; unlawful indulgence of lust.” 3 Century Diet. Rev. Ed. 1477.
Blackstock v. United States, 261 F. 150; Carey v. United States, 265 F. 515; Elrod v. United States, 266 F. 55; Burgess v. United States, 54 App. D. C. 71, 294 F. 1002; Corbett v. United States, 299 F. 27; Hart v. United States, 11 F. 2d 499; Ghadiali v. United States, 17 F. 2d 236; United States v. Reginelli, 133 F. 2d 595; Poindexter v. United States, 139 F. 2d 158; Simon v. United States, 145 F. 2d 345; Qualls v. United States, 149 F. 2d 891; Sipe v. United States, 80 U. S. App. D. C. 194, 150 F. 2d 984; United States v. Chaplin, 54 F. Supp. 682.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
On January 29, 1953, the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to § 11 (b)(1) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 820, 15 U. S. C. § 79k (b)(1), issued a notice and order for hearing directed to Middle South Utilities, Inc., and its subsidiary, Louisiana Power & Light Company, upon the matter of “[w]hether Middle South and Louisiana [Power] should be required to take action to dispose of the gas utility assets and non-utility assets of Louisiana [Power] and, if so, what terms and conditions should be imposed in connection therewith.” A copy of that notice and order for hearing was served upon those companies and also upon the Louisiana Public Service Commission by registered mail.
A full hearing was conducted by the S. E. C. at which Middle South and Louisiana Power appeared, adduced evidence, and presented arguments in support of their position that they should be permitted to retain Louisiana Power’s gas properties as an additional integrated public utility system under the proviso to § 11 (b)(1) of the Act. The Louisiana Public Service Commission did not appear in that proceeding. On March 20, 1953, the S. E. C. issued its opinion, findings and order directing Middle South and Louisiana Power to divest themselves of all the non-electric assets of Louisiana Power “in any appropriate manner not in contravention of the applicable provisions of the Act,” which gave them one year for compliance under the provisions of § 11 (c) of the Act, 49 Stat. 821, 15 U. S. C. § 79k (c). No petition to review that order was ever filed, and it ceased to be subject to judicial review with the expiration of the 60 days allowed to petition for that purpose by § 24 (a) of the Act, 49 Stat. 834, 15 U. S. C. § 79x (a), on May 19, 1953.
Thereafter, pursuant to § 11 (c) of the Act, the S. E. C. extended the time for compliance with its order to March 20, 1955. On November 10, 1954, Louisiana Power and its newly organized wholly owned subsidiary, Louisiana Gas Service Corp., filed a joint “application-declaration” with the S. E. C., proposing the transfer by Louisiana Power of all its non-electric properties to Louisiana Gas as a step in compliance with the divestment order of March 20, 1953, and expressing the intention of Louisiana Power to effect divestment of the common stock of Louisiana Gas within 18 months from the date the latter might begin operations. Thereupon, the S. E. C. issued a notice advising interested persons, including the Louisiana Public Service Commission, of the filing of the “application-declaration” mentioned, and that they might request a hearing on that proposal. By telegram of December 22, 1954, the Louisiana Commission requested the S. E. C. to grant a hearing upon that “application-declaration” and to reopen the §11 (b)(1) proceeding which had resulted in the divestment order of March 20, 1953. On December 27, 1954, it filed with the S. E. C. a formal petition accordingly, which it supplemented on January 3, 1955. Also, at the suggestion of the S. E. C., the Louisiana Commission submitted an offer of proof and a brief in support of its petition to reopen the divestment proceeding. The offer of proof did not indicate any change in conditions since the divestment order of March 20, 1953, but, rather, complained that the evidence in that proceeding had been incomplete and that the S. E. C. had acted, in part, upon an erroneous conception of the law. The S. E. C. heard oral argument upon the Louisiana Commission’s petition to reopen. Thereafter, on September 13; 1955, it found that there were “no grounds for questioning . . . [its] earlier conclusion and no changed circumstances justifying a modification” of its divestment order of March 20, 1953, and it denied the petition to reopen that proceeding.
The Louisiana Commission then filed a petition in the Court of Appeals to review the order of September 13, 1955, denying its petition to reopen, and also therein stated that it sought review of the divestment order of March 20,1953. The S. E. C. moved the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition for review upon the ground that the order of September 13, 1955, was not judicially reviewable and that the petition for review was in essence an attempt to appeal from the divestment order of March 20, 1953, long after the time allowed by law to do so had expired. The Court of Appeals held that the order of September 13, 1955, was reviewable, and it set aside that order. It also held that legal determinations made by the S. E. C. in its divestment order of March 20, 1953, were erroneous, and it, in effect, set aside that order too. 235 F. 2d 167. We granted certiorari. 352 U. S. 924.
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the order of September 13, 1955, was subject to judicial review was rested upon the last two sentences of § 11 (b) of the Act, 49 Stat. 820, 15 U. S. C. § 79k (b), reading: “The Commission may by order revoke or modify any order previously made under this subsection, if, after notice and opportunity for hearing, it finds that the conditions upon which the order was predicated do not exist. Any order made under this subsection shall be subject to judicial review as provided in section 79x of this title.” It held that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s order of September 13, 1955, denying the Louisiana Commission’s petition to reopen the divestment proceeding was an “order” specifically made subject to judicial review by the quoted language.
We take a different view. We hold that the orders made judicially reviewable by the quoted language are the directory orders mentioned in, and authorized by, subsection (b) of § 11 of the Act, and orders which may “revoke or modify” any such order previously made under that subsection, and that the quoted language does not include an order merely denying a petition to reopen §11 (b) proceedings. It follows that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s order of September 13, 1955, denying the Louisiana Commission’s petition to reopen the divestment proceeding was not an order which was subject to judicial review, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals must accordingly be reversed.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court. Two Terms ago in Free v. Bland, 369 U. S. 663, where federal savings bonds purchased with community funds were registered in a co-ownership form and the registered co-owners were husband and wife, the survivor was held entitled to the proceeds of the bonds without liability to account in any amount to the beneficiaries of the deceased co-owner, despite conflicting state law purporting to forbid a married couple to make survivorship arrangements with respect to community property and requiring süch property to pass as part of the estate of the deceased in accordance with his will or the state intestacy laws. The success of the management of the national debt was deemed to depend upon the successful sale of the savings bonds, one of the inducements to purchasers being sur-vivorship provisions which afforded “a convenient method of avoiding complicated probate proceedings.” 369 U. S., at 669. State law interfered with a legitimate exercise of federal power and was required to give way under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
The Court nevertheless recognized that the federal law was not to be used as a shield for fraud or to prevent relief “where the circumstances manifest fraud or a breach of trust tantamount thereto on the part of a husband while acting in his capacity as manager of the general community property.” 369 U. S., at 670. The scope and application of the exception to the regulatory imperative — “the doctrine of fraud applicable under federal law in such a case,” 369 U. S., at 670-671 — were left to decision in other cases.
This is one of those cases. Petitioner is the brother of Angel Yiatchos who died in 1958 and who in 1950-1951 purchased with community funds belonging to himself and his wife United States Savings Bonds in the face amount of $15,075. The deceased was the registered owner of the bonds and they were made payable on his death to his brother, the petitioner. The deceased left a will made in 1954, naming his wife as executrix and bequeathing all cash and bonds owned by him at the time of his death to his brother, four sisters and a nephew. Petitioner brought suit in the appropriate court in the State of Washington to establish his ownership of the bonds, relying upon the federal regulations providing for registration of the savings bonds in the beneficiary form and providing that in the case of the death of the registered owner “the beneficiary will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner, and payment or reissue will be made as though the bond were registered in his name alone.” 31 CFR § 315.66. The trial court, on stipulated facts, sustained the claims of the wife and the other beneficiaries under the will who insisted that since the bonds were purchased with community funds and were community property at the death of the deceased they must be divided into two equal parts, one-half to go to the wife and the other half to be distributed in accordance with the will. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed, holding that the deceased’s “purchase with community funds of bonds payable to him alone or, after his death, payable exclusively to his brother was in fraud of the rights of the respondent wife” and “a void endeavor to divest the wife of any interest in her own property.” The deceased having been under a fiduciary duty to manage the community funds for the benefit of the community, “[a] breach of this duty [was] a constructive fraud.” Petitioner’s claim to any part of the bonds as beneficiary named therein was rejected since “[respondent widow had a vested one-half interest in the bond proceeds” and since “[t]he descent of decedent’s interest is controlled by RCW 11.04.050 and, therefore, must be distributed according to the terms of the will.” In re Yiatchos’ Estate, 60 Wash. 2d 179, 182, 373 P. 2d 125, 127. We granted certiorari to consider an asserted conflict with Free v. Bland, supra, which was decided while this case was on appeal in the Washington Supreme Court and which that court considered in rendering its own judgment.
Under the federal regulations petitioner is entitled to the bonds unless his deceased brother committed fraud or breach of trust tantamount to fraud. Since the construction and application of a federal regulation having the force of law, California Comm’n v. United States, 355 U. S. 534, 542-545; Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U. S. 481, 484, are involved, whether or not there is fraud which will bar the named beneficiary in a particular case must be determined as a matter of federal law, Free v. Bland, supra; Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363. But in applying the federal standard we shall be guided by state law insofar as the property interests of the widow created by state law are concerned. It would seem obvious that the bonds may not be used as a device to deprive the widow of property rights which she enjoys under Washington law and which would not be transferable by her husband but for the survivorship provisions of the federal bonds.
Proceeding on these premises, we note that under Washington law spouses may agree to change the status of community property either by an agreement to become effective on the death of either spouse, Rev. Code Wash. § 26.16.120; In re Yiatchos’ Estate, 60 Wash. 2d 179, 182, 373 P. 2d 125, 127, or by gift during lifetime; Hanley v. Most, 9 Wash. 2d 429, 458, 115 P. 2d 933, 944. Thus the widow in this case could have consented to a gift of community property to her husband’s brother or to the inclusion of the bonds in that portion of the estate which belonged to her husband and which he could dispose of at the time of his death. If she gave such consent, or if she ratified the purchase and registration of the bonds, the conduct of the husband was not, for federal purposes, fraud or breach of trust sufficient to avoid the command of the regulations, and petitioner would be entitled to all of the bonds.
So far petitioner apparently agrees, but he denies the need for further inquiry, claiming all of the bonds because the record is silent about the knowledge or consent of the wife, she having made no claim of fraud and produced no facts negativing her consent or knowledge. But we think the course suggested by the United States in its amicus curiae brief is preferable. The factual record was made by the stipulation of the parties prior to decision of Free v. Bland, supra. Before precluding the widow because of her own conduct, she should have an opportunity upon remand to prove the actual facts concerning her knowledge or participation in the purchase and registration of the bonds.
Petitioner, however, also objects to a remand because further inquiry into consent or acquiescence rests upon the erroneous assumption that the wife could object to the husband’s transfer of the bonds after his death. Since the present value of the bonds, or even their face value, is less than one-half the community property, the deceased, says petitioner, was not attempting to give away property belonging to his wife but was only making use of a simple device provided by federal law to dispose of what he could give by will under the Washington law. The validity of this contention turns on a question of state law about which we are not entirely clear and which may be resolved upon remand. According to the court below, the widow had a “vested one-half interest” in the bonds, which may mean that under Washington law the wife before and after death has a half interest in each item of the community estate, including the particular bonds involved in this case, and cannot be forced to take cash or something else of equal value upon a division of the community property between herself and those entitled to take her husband’s half. Under such circumstances, since we cannot say that this property right, if it exists, is insubstantial, to allow all of the bonds to pass to the designated beneficiary would effect an involuntary and impermissible conversion of the widow’s assets.
On the other hand, Rev. Code Wash. § 26.16.030 provides that “The husband shall have the management and control of community personal property, with a like power of disposition as he has of his separate personal property, except he shall not devise by will more than one-half thereof.” If under Washington law, the widow, after her husband’s death, has no interest in specific assets owned by the community and her half of the community estate may be satisfied from property or money other than the bonds, petitioner is entitled to all of the bonds for then there is no fraud or breach of trust in derogation of the widow’s property rights under state law. Upon dissolution of the community one-half of the community property belonged to Angel Yiatchos, who was free, as of the time of dissolution, to dispose of this half as he pleased. He might have left it to his brother by will. Instead he elected to effect the same result by utilizing federal savings bonds with their convenient feature of permitting ownership spanning two lives. On the assumption, then, that the wife is entitled to half of the estate, but not half of each particular item of property, the bonds have not been used as an instrument of fraud ; and the survivorship provisions of the federal regulations must control, preempting, if necessary, inconsistent state law which interferes with the legitimate exercise of the Federal Government’s power to borrow money. Free v. Bland, supra.
Petitioner is therefore entitled to all of the bonds if the widow consented to making him the beneficiary or if under Washington law the surviving spouse does not have a one-half interest in each community asset. But even if the wife is not barred by her own consent or by the nature of her interest from claiming a half interest in the bonds, petitioner is entitled to the other half, the half which belonged to the deceased and could be disposed of by him to the beneficiaries of his choice. The Washington court deemed the transaction void ab initio and required the deceased’s half to pass by his will rather than by virtue of the bonds and the force of the regulation. But the petitioner was entitled to the proceeds only on the death of the husband, and then only if the bonds had not matured or been cashed. During the husband’s life he was the registered owner of the bonds, and was therefore entitled at any time to convert them into cash upon presentation and surrender “as though no beneficiary had been named in the registration.” 31 CFR § 315.65. Aside from possible consequences of the wife’s consent or ratification, as long as Angel Yiatchos was alive the bonds were community property, and could be used by him— the manager of the community and the registered owner of the bonds — for community purposes just as the assets used to purchase them could have been so used. Thus, the holding of the court below, which requires that the bonds be disposed of by will or by state intestacy provisions, is nothing more than a state prohibition against utilizing savings bonds to transmit property at death, and is, for reasons stated above, forbidden by Free v. Bland, supra.
We add but one caveat to our holding that petitioner is entitled to at least one-half the bonds. The bonds, it would appear, are less than one-half the gross estate, but the record does not compare the value of the bonds with one-half the net estate after payment of debts. It is our understanding that the deceased’s interest in the community property is chargeable with his separate debts and with one-half the community debts. Ryan v. Ferguson, 3 Wash. 356, 28 P. 910. It would not contravene federal law as expressed in the applicable regulations to require the bonds to bear the same share of the debts that they would have borne if they had been passed to petitioner as a specific legacy under the will rather than by the survivorship provisions of the bonds.
The judgment of the Washington court is reversed insofar as it relates to one-half of the bonds, subject to the above remarks concerning the portion of the debts which may be allocable thereto. As to the other half the judgment is vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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J
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Alito
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider in this case what a mutual fund shareholder must prove in order to show that a mutual fond investment adviser breached the “fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services” that is imposed by § 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-35(b) (hereinafter § 36(b)).
I
A
The Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 789, 15 U. S. C. §80a-l et seq., regulates investment companies, including mutual funds. “A mutual fond is a pool of assets, consisting primarily of [a] portfolio [of] securities, and belonging to the individual investors holding shares in the fund.” Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 480 (1979). The following arrangements are typical. A separate entity called an investment adviser creates the mutual fond, which may have no employees of its own. See Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U. S. 90, 93 (1991); Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U. S. 523, 536 (1984); Burks, 441 U. S., at 480-481. The adviser selects the fond’s directors, manages the fund’s investments, and provides other services. See id., at 481. Because of the relationship between a mutual fund and its investment adviser, the fund often “ ‘cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser. Therefore, the forces of arm’s-length bargaining do not work in the mutual fond industry in the same manner as they do in other sectors of the American economy.’” Ibid, (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 5 (1969) (hereinafter S. Rep.)).
“Congress adopted the [Investment Company Act of 1940] because of its concern with the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment companies.” Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 536 (internal quotation marks omitted). Recognizing that the relationship between a fund and its investment adviser was “fraught with potential conflicts of interest,” the Act created protections for mutual fund shareholders. Id., at 536-538 (internal quotation marks omitted); Burks, supra, at 482-483. Among other things, the Act required that no more than 60 percent of a fund’s directors could be affiliated with the adviser and that fees for investment advisers be approved by the directors and the shareholders of the fund. See §§ 10, 15(c), 54 Stat. 806, 813.
The growth of mutual funds in the 1950’s and 1960’s prompted studies of the 1940 Act’s effectiveness in protecting investors. See Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 537-538. Studies commissioned or authored by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) identified problems relating to the independence of investment company boards and the compensation received by investment advisers. See ibid. In response to such concerns, Congress amended the Act in 1970 and bolstered shareholder protection in two primary ways.
First, the amendments strengthened the “cornerstone” of the Act’s efforts to check conflicts of interest, the independence of mutual fund boards of directors, which negotiate and scrutinize adviser compensation. Burks, supra, at 482. The amendments required that no more than 60 percent of a fund’s directors be “persons who are interested persons,” e. g., that they have no interest in or affiliation with the investment adviser. 15 U. S. C. §80a-10(a); §80a-2(a)(19); see also Daily Income Fund, supra, at 538. These board members are given “a host of special responsibilities.” Burks, 441 U. S., at 482-483. In particular, they must “review and approve the contracts of the investment adviser” annually, id., at 483, and a majority of these directors must approve an adviser’s compensation, 15 U. S. C. §80a-15(c). Second, § 36(b), 84 Stat. 1429, of the Act imposed upon investment advisers a “fiduciary duty” with respect to compensation received from a mutual fund, 15 U. S. C. §80a-35(b), and granted individual investors a private right of action for breach of that duty, ibid.
The “fiduciary duty” standard contained in § 36(b) represented a delicate compromise. Prior to the adoption of the 1970 amendments, shareholders challenging investment adviser fees under state law were required to meet “common-law standards of corporate waste, under which an unreasonable or unfair fee might be approved unless the court deemed it ‘unconscionable’ or ‘shocking,’ ” and “security holders challenging adviser fees under the [Investment Company Act] itself had been required to prove gross abuse of trust.” Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 540, n. 12. Aiming to give shareholders a stronger remedy, the SEC proposed a provision that would have empowered the Commission to bring actions to challenge a fee that was not “reasonable” and to intervene in any similar action brought by or on behalf of an investment company. Id., at 538. This approach was included in a bill that passed the House. H. R. 9510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(d) (1967); see also S. 1659, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(d) (as introduced May 1,1967). Industry representatives, however, objected to this proposal, fearing that it “might in essence provide the Commission with ratemaking authority.” Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 538.
The provision that was ultimately enacted adopted “a different method of testing management compensation,” id., at 539 (quoting S. Rep., at 5; internal quotation marks omitted), that was more favorable to shareholders than the previously available remedies but that did not permit a compensation agreement to be reviewed in court for “reasonableness.” This is the fiduciary duty standard in § 36(b).
B
Petitioners are shareholders in three different mutual funds managed by respondent Harris Associates L. P., an investment adviser. Petitioners filed this action in the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to § 36(b) seeking damages, an injunction, and rescission of advisory agreements between Harris Associates and the mutual funds. The complaint alleged that Harris Associates had violated § 36(b) by charging fees that were “disproportionate to the services rendered” and “not within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm’s length in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” App. 52.
The District Court granted summary judgment for Harris Associates. Applying the standard adopted in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F. 2d 923 (CA2 1982), the court concluded that petitioners had failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to “whether the fees charged ... were so disproportionately large that they could not have been the result of arm’s-length bargaining.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 29a. The District Court assumed that it was relevant to compare the challenged' fees with those that Harris Associates charged its other clients. Id., at 30a. But in light of those comparisons as well as comparisons with fees charged by other investment advisers to similar mutual funds, the court held that it could not reasonably be found that the challenged fees were outside the range that could have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining. Id., at 29a-32a.
A panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed based on different reasoning, explicitly “disapprov[ing] the Gartenberg approach.” 527 F. 3d 627, 632 (2008). Looking to trust law, the panel noted that, while a trustee “owes an obligation of candor in negotiation,” a trustee, at the time of the creation of a trust, “may negotiate in his own interest and accept what the settlor or governance institution agrees to pay.” Ibid, (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts §242, and Comment /). The panel thus reasoned that “[a] fiduciary duty differs from rate regulation. A fiduciary must make foil disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on compensation.” 527 F. 3d, at 632. In the panel’s view, the amount of an adviser’s compensation would be relevant only if the compensation were “so unusual” as to give rise to an inference “that deceit must have occurred, or that the persons responsible for decision have abdicated.” Ibid.
The panel argued that this understanding of § 36(b) is consistent with the forces operating in the contemporary mutual fond market. Noting that “[tjoday thousands of mutual funds compete,” the panel concluded that “sophisticated investors” shop for the funds that produce the best overall results, “mov[e] their money elsewhere” when fees are “excessive in relation to the results,” and thus “create a competitive pressure” that generally keeps fees low. Id., at 633-634. The panel faulted Gartenberg on the ground that it “relies too little on markets.” 527 F. 3d, at 632. And the panel firmly rejected a comparison between the fees that Harris Associates charged to the funds and the fees that Harris Associates charged other types of clients, observing that “[djifferent clients call for different commitments of time” and that costs, such as research, that may benefit several categories of clients “make it hard to draw inferences from fee levels.” Id., at 634.
The Seventh Circuit denied rehearing en banc by an equally divided vote. 537 F. 3d 728 (2008) (per curiam). The dissent from the denial of rehearing argued that the panel’s rejection of Gartenberg was based “mainly on an economic analysis that is ripe for reexamination.” 537 F. 3d, at 730 (opinion of Posner, J.). Among other things, the dissent expressed concern that Harris Associates charged “its captive funds more than twice what it charges independent funds,” and the dissent questioned whether high adviser fees actually drive investors away. Id., at 731.
We granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals over the proper standard under § 36(b). 556 U. S. 1104 (2009).
II
A
Since Congress amended the Investment Company Act in 1970, the mutual fund industry has experienced exponential growth. Assets under management increased from $38.2 billion in 1966 to over $9.6 trillion in 2008. The number of mutual fund investors grew from 3.5 million in 1965 to 92 million in 2008, and there are now more than 9,000 open- and closed-end funds.
During this time, the standard for an investment adviser’s fiduciary duty has remained an open question in our Court, but, until the Seventh Circuit’s decision below, something of a consensus had developed regarding the standard set forth over 25 years ago in Gartenberg, 694 F. 2d 923. The Gartenberg standard has been adopted by other federal courts, and “[t]he SEC’s regulations have recognized, and formalized, GartenbergASke factors.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23. See 17 CFR §240.14a-101, Sched. 14A, Item 22, par. (c)(ll)(i) (2009); 69 Fed. Reg. 39801, n. 31, 39807-39809 (2004), In the present case, both petitioners and respondent generally endorse the Gartenberg approach, although they disagree in some respects about its meaning.
In Gartenberg, the Second Circuit noted that Congress had not defined what it meant by a “fiduciary duty” with respect to compensation but concluded that “the test is essentially whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range of what would have been negotiated at arm's-length in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances.” 694 F. 2d, at 928. The Second Circuit elaborated that, “[t]o be guilty of a violation of § 36(b),... the adviser-manager must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm's-length bargaining” Ibid. “To make this determination,” the court stated, “all pertinent facts must be weighed,” id., at 929, and the court specifically mentioned “the adviser-manager's cost in providing the service,... the extent to which the adviser-manager realizes economies of scale as the fund grows larger, and the volume of orders which must be processed by the manager,” id., at 930. Observing that competition among advisers for the business of managing a fund may be “virtually nonexistent,” the court rejected the suggestion that “the principal factor to be considered in evaluating a fee's fairness is the price charged by other similar advisers to funds managed by them,” although the court did not suggest that this factor could not be “taken into account.” Id., at 929. The court likewise rejected the “argument that the lower fees charged by investment advisers to large pension funds should be used as a criterion for determining fair advisory fees for money market funds,” since a “pension fund does not faee the myriad of daily purchases and redemptions throughout the nation which must be handled by [a money market fund].” Id., at 930, n. 3.
B
The meaning of § 36(b)'s reference to “a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services” is hardly pellucid, but based on the terms of that provision and the role that a shareholder action for breach of that duty plays in the overall structure of the Act, we conclude that Gartenberg was correct in its basic formulation of what § 36(b) requires: To face liability under § 36(b), an investment adviser must charge a fee that is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.
1
We begin with the language of § 36(b). As noted, the Seventh Circuit panel thought that the phrase “fiduciary duty” incorporates a standard taken from the law of trusts. Petitioners agree but maintain that the panel identified the wrong trust-law standard. Instead of the standard that applies when a trustee and a settlor negotiate the trustee’s fee at the time of the creation of a trust, petitioners invoke the standard that applies when a trustee seeks compensation after the trust is created. Brief for Petitioners 20-23, 35-37. A compensation agreement reached at that time, they point out, “‘will not bind the beneficiary’ if either ‘the trustee failed to make a full disclosure of all circumstances affecting the agreement’” which he knew or should have known or if the agreement is unfair to the beneficiary. Id., at 23 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts §242, Comment i). Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the term “fiduciary” is not exclusive to the law of trusts, that the phrase means different things in different contexts, and that there is no reason to believe that § 36(b) incorporates the specific meaning of the term in the law of trusts. Brief for Respondent 34-36.
We find it unnecessary to take sides in this dispute. In Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295 (1939), we discussed the meaning of the concept of fiduciary duty in a context that is analogous to that presented here, and we also looked to trust law. At issue in Pepper was whether a bankruptcy court could disallow a dominant or controlling shareholder’s claim for compensation against a bankrupt corporation. Dominant or controlling shareholders, we held, are “fiduciaries]” whose “powers are powers [held] in trust.” Id., at 306. We then explained:
“Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein... . The essence of the test is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain. If it does not, equity will set it aside.” Id., at 306-307 (emphasis added; footnote omitted); see also Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590, 599 (1921) (standard of fiduciary duty for interested directors).
We believe that this formulation expresses the meaning of the phrase “fiduciary duty” in § 36(b), 84 Stat. 1429. The Investment Company Act modifies this duty in a significant way: It shifts the burden of proof from the fiduciary to the party claiming breach, 15 U. S. C. §80a-35(b)(l), to show that the fee is outside the range that arm’s-length bargaining would produce.
The Gartenberg approach fully incorporates this understanding of the fiduciary duty as set out in Pepper and reflects §36(b)(l)’s imposition of the burden on the plaintiff. As noted, Gartenberg insists that all relevant circumstances be taken into account, see 694 F. 2d, at 929, as does § 36(b)(2), 84 Stat. 1429 (“[A]pproval by the board of directors ... shall be given such consideration by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances” (emphasis added)). And Gartenberg uses the range of fees that might result from arm’s-length bargaining as the benchmark for reviewing challenged fees.
2
Gartenberg’s approach also reflects §36(b)’s place in the statutory scheme and, in particular, its relationship to the other protections that the Act affords investors.
Under the Act, scrutiny of investment-adviser compensation by a fully informed mutual fund board is the “cornerstone of the . . . effort to control conflicts of interest within mutual funds.” Burks, 441 U. S., at 482. The Act interposes disinterested directors as “independent watchdogs” of the relationship between a mutual fund and its adviser. Id., at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted). To provide these directors with the information needed to judge whether an adviser’s compensation is excessive, the Act requires advisers to furnish all information “reasonably . . . necessary to evaluate the terms” of the adviser’s contract, 15 U. S. C. §80a-15(c), and gives the SEC the authority to enforce that requirement. See §80a-41. Board scrutiny of adviser compensation and shareholder suits under § 36(b), 84 Stat. 1429, are mutually reinforcing but independent mechanisms for controlling conflicts. See Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 541 (Congress intended for § 36(b) suits and directorial approval of adviser contracts to act as “independent checks on excessive fees”); Kamen, 500 U. S., at 108 (“Congress added § 36(b) to the [Act] in 1970 because it concluded that the shareholders should not have to rely solely on the fund’s directors to assure reasonable adviser fees, notwithstanding the increased disinterestedness of the board” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In recognition of the role of the disinterested directors, the Act instructs courts to give board approval of an adviser’s compensation “such consideration ... as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances.” § 80a-35(b)(2). Cf. Burks, supra, at 485 (“[X]t would have been paradoxical for Congress to have been willing to rely largely upon [boards of directors as] ‘watchdogs' to protect shareholder interests and yet, where the ‘watchdogs’ have done precisely that, require that they be totally muzzled”).
From this formulation, two inferences may be drawn. First, a measure of deference to a board’s judgment may be appropriate in some instances. Second, the appropriate measure of deference varies depending on the circumstances.
Gartenberg heeds these precepts. Gartenberg advises that “the expertise of the independent trustees of a fund, whether they are fully informed about all facts bearing on the [investment adviser’s] service and fee, and the extent of care and conscientiousness with which they perform their duties are important factors to be considered in deciding whether they and the [investment adviser] are guilty of a breach of fiduciary duty in violation of § 36(b).” 694 F. 2d, at 930.
III
While both parties in this case endorse the basic Gartenberg approach, they disagree on several important questions that warrant discussion.
The first concerns comparisons between the fees that an adviser charges a captive mutual fund and the fees that it charges its independent clients. As noted, the Gartenberg court rejected a comparison between the fees that the adviser in that case charged a money market fund and the fees that it charged a pension fund. 694 F. 2d, at 930, n. 3 (noting that “[t]he nature and extent of the services required by each type of fund differ sharply”). Petitioners contend that such a comparison is appropriate, Brief for Petitioners 30-31, but respondent disagrees, Brief for Respondent 38-44. Since the Act requires consideration of all relevant factors, 15 U. S. C. §80a-35(b)(2); see also §80a-15(c), we do not think that there can be any categorical rule regarding the comparisons of the fees charged different types of clients. See Daily Income Fund, supra, at 537 (discussing concern with investment advisers’ practice of charging higher fees to mutual funds than to their other clients). Instead, courts may give such comparisons the weight that they merit in light of the similarities and differences between the services that the clients in question require, but courts must be wary of inapt comparisons. As the panel below noted, there may be significant differences between the services provided by an investment adviser to a mutual fund and those it provides to a pension fund which are attributable to the greater frequency of shareholder redemptions in a mutual fund, the higher turnover of mutual fond assets, the more burdensome regulatory and legal obligations, and higher marketing costs. 527 F. 3d, at 634 (“Different clients call for different commitments of time”). If the services rendered are sufficiently different that a comparison is not probative, then courts must reject such a comparison. Even if the services provided and fees charged to an independent fund are relevant, courts should be mindful that the Act does not necessarily ensure fee parity between mutual funds and institutional clients, contrary to petitioners’ contentions. See id., at 631 (“Plaintiffs maintain that a fiduciary may charge its controlled clients no more than its independent clients”).
By the same token, courts should not rely too heavily on comparisons with fees charged to mutual funds by other advisers. These comparisons are problematic because these fees, like those challenged, may not be the product of negotiations conducted at arm’s length. See 537 F. 3d, at 731-732 (opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Gartenberg, supra, at 929 (“Competition between money market funds for shareholder business does not support an inference that competition must therefore also exist between [investment advisers] for fund business. The former may be vigorous even though the latter is virtually non-existent”).
Finally, a court’s evaluation of an investment adviser’s fiduciary duty must take into account both procedure and substance. See 15 U. S. C. § 80a-35(b)(2) (requiring deference to board’s consideration “as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances”); cf. Daily Income Fund, 464 U. S., at 541 (“Congress intended security holder and SEC actions under § 36(b), on the one hand, and directorial approval of adviser contracts, on the other, to act as independent cheeks on excessive fees”). Where a board’s process for negotiating and reviewing investment-adviser compensation is robust, a reviewing court should afford commensurate deference to the outcome of the bargaining process. See Burks, 441 U. S., at 484 (unaffiliated directors serve as “independent watchdogs” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, if the disinterested directors considered the relevant factors, their decision to approve a particular fee agreement is entitled to considerable weight, even if a court might weigh the factors differently. Cf. id., at 485. This is not to deny that a fee may be excessive even if it was negotiated by a board in possession of all relevant information, but such a determination must be based on evidence that the fee “is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.” Gartenberg, 694 F. 2d, at 928.
In contrast, where the board’s process was deficient or the adviser withheld important information, the court must take a more rigorous look at the outcome. When an investment adviser fails to disclose material information to the board, greater scrutiny is justified because the withheld information might have hampered the board’s ability to function as “an independent check on management.” Burks, supra, at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Section 86(b) is sharply focused on the question of whether the fees themselves were excessive.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., 248 F. 3d. 321, 328 (CA4 2001); see also 15 U. S. C. § 80a-35(b) (imposing a “fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature” (emphasis added)). But an adviser's compliance or noncompliance with its disclosure obligations is a factor that must be considered in calibrating the degree of deference that is due a board’s decision to approve an adviser’s fees.
It is also important to note that the standard for fiduciary breach under § 36(b) does not call for judicial second-guessing of informed board decisions. See Daily Income Fund, supra, at 538; see also Burks, 441 U. S., at 483 (“Congress consciously chose to address the conflict-of-interest problem through the Act’s independent-directors section, rather than through more drastic remedies”). “[Potential conflicts [of interests] may justify some restraints upon the unfettered discretion of even disinterested mutual fund directors, particularly in their transactions with the investment adviser,” but they do not suggest that a court may supplant the judgment of disinterested directors apprised of all relevant information, without additional evidence that the fee exceeds the arm’s-length range. Id., at 481. In reviewing compensation under § 36(b), the Act does not require courts to engage in a precise calculation of fees representative of arm’s-length bargaining. See 527 F. 3d, at 633 (“Judicial price-setting does not accompany fiduciary duties”). As recounted above, Congress rejected a “reasonableness” requirement that was criticized as charging the courts with rate-setting responsibilities. See Daily Income Fund, supra, at 538-540. Congress’ approach recognizes that courts are not well suited to make such precise calculations. Cf. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U. S. 278, 308 (1997) (“[T]he Court is institutionally unsuited to gather the facts upon which economic predictions can be made, and professionally untrained to make them”); Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U. S. 467, 539 (2002); see also Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F. 2d 17, 25 (CA1 1990) (opinion for the court by Breyer, C. J.) (“[H]ow is a judge or jury to determine a ‘fair price’ ”). Gartenberg’s “so disproportionately large” standard, 694 F. 2d, at 928, reflects this congressional choice to “rely largely upon [independent director] ‘watchdogs’ to protect shareholder interests.” Burks, supra, at 485.
By focusing almost entirely on the element of disclosure, the Seventh Circuit panel erred. See 527 F. 3d, at 632 (An investment adviser “must make full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on compensation”). The Gartenberg standard, which the panel rejected, may lack sharp analytical clarity, but we believe that it accurately reflects the compromise that is embodied in § 36(b), and it has provided a workable standard for nearly three decades. The debate between the Seventh Circuit panel and the dissent from the denial of rehearing regarding today’s mutual fund market is a matter for Congress, not the courts.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
An “affiliated person” indudes (1) a person who owns, controls, or holds the power to vote 5 percent or more of the securities of the investment adviser; (2) an entity which the investment adviser owns, controls, or in which it holds the power to vote more than 5 percent of the securities; (3) any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the investment adviser; (4) an officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of the investment adviser; (5) an investment adviser or a member of the investment adviser’s board of directors; or (6) the depositor of an unincorporated investment adviser. See §80a-2(a)(3). The Act defines “interested person” to include not only all affiliated persons but also a wider swath of people such as the immediate family of affiliated persons, interested persons of an underwriter or investment adviser, legal counsel for the company, and interested broker-dealers. § 80a-2(a)(19).
See 527 F. 3d 627 (CA7 2008) (case below); Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., 248 F. 3d 321 (CA4 2001); Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Management LLC, 305 F. 3d 140 (CA3 2002) (per curiam). After we granted certiorari in this case, another Court of Appeals adopted the standard of Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F. 2d 923 (CA2 1982). See Gallus v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc., 561 F. 3d 816 (CA8 2009).
Compare H. R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., p. vii (1966), with Investment Company Institute, 2009 Fact Book 15,20,72 (49th ed.), online at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2009_faetbook.pdf (as visited Mar. 9, 2010, and available in Clerk of Court’s ease file).
See, e. g., Gallus, supra, at 822-823; Krantz, supra; In re Franklin Mut. Funds Fee Litigation, 478 F. Supp. 2d 677, 683, 686 (NJ 2007); Yameen v. Eaton Vance Distributors, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 350, 355 (Mass. 2005); Hunt v. Invesco Funds Group, Inc., No. H-04-2555, 2006 WL 1581846, *2 (SD Tex., June 5, 2006); Siemers v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-4518 WHA, 2006 WL 2355411, *15-*16 (ND Cal., Aug. 14, 2006); see also Amron v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisors Inc., 464 F. 3d 338, 340-341 (CA2 2006).
Other factors cited by the Gartenberg court include (1) the nature and quality of the services provided to the fund and shareholders; (2) the profitability of the fund to the adviser; (3) any “fall-out financial benefits,” those collateral benefits that accrue to the adviser because of its relationship with the mutual fund; (4) comparative fee structure (meaning a comparison of the fees with those paid by similar funds); and (5) the independence, expertise, care, and conscientiousness of the board in evaluating adviser compensation. 694 F. 2d, at 929-932 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A money market fund differs from a mutual fund in both the types of investments and the frequency of redemptions. A money market fund often invests in short-term money market securities, such as short-term securities of the United States Government or its agencies, bank certificates of deposit, and commercial paper. Investors can invest in such a fund for as little as a day, so, from the investor’s perspective, the fund resembles an investment “more like a bank account than [a] traditional investment in securities.” Id., at 925.
Section 36(b) provides as follows:
“[T]he investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment company, or by the security holders thereof, to such investment adviser.” 84 Stat. 1429 (codified at 15 U. S. C. §80a-35(b)).
Comparisons with fees charged to institutional clients, therefore, will not “doo[m] [a]ny [f]und to [t]rial.” Brief for Respondent 49; see also Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 188 F. Supp. 2d 373, 384 (SDNY 2002) (suggesting that fee comparisons, where permitted, might produce a triable issue). First, plaintiffs bear the burden in showing that fees are beyond the range of arm’s-length bargaining. §80a-35(b)(l). Second, a showing of relevance requires courts to assess any disparity in fees in light of the different markets for advisory services. Only where plaintiffs have shown a large disparity in fees that cannot be explained by the different services in addition to other evidence that the fee is outside the arm’s-length range will trial be appropriate. C£ App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a; see also In re AllianceBernstein Mut. Fund Excessive Fee Litigation, No. 04 Civ. 4885 (SWK), 2006 WL 1520222, *2 (SDNY, May 31, 2006) (citing report finding that fee differential resulted from different services and different liabilities assumed).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II-B.
Various Federal Courts of Appeals are divided over the evidence question presented by this case. At issue is the interpretation of a provision in the Federal Rules of Evidence bearing upon the admissibility of statements, made by a declarant who testifies as a witness, that are consistent with the testimony and are offered to rebut a charge of a “recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.” Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). The question is whether out-of-court consistent statements made after the alleged fabrication, or after the alleged improper influence or motive arose, are admissible under the Rule.
I
Petitioner Tome was charged in a one-count indictment with the felony of sexual abuse of a child, his own daughter, aged four at the time of the alleged crime. The case having arisen on the Navajo Indian Reservation, Tome was tried by a jury in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, where he was found guilty of violating 18 U. S. C. §§ 1153, 2241(c), and 2245(2)(A) and (B).
Tome and the child’s mother had been divorced in 1988. A tribal court awarded joint custody of the daughter, A. T., to both parents, but Tome had primary physical custody. In 1989 the mother was unsuccessful in petitioning the tribal court for primary custody of A. T., but was awarded custody for the summer of 1990. Neither parent attended a further custody hearing in August 1990. On August 27, 1990, the mother contacted Colorado authorities with allegations that Tome had committed sexual abuse against A. T.
The prosecution’s theory was that Tome committed sexual assaults upon the child while she was in his custody and that the crime was disclosed when the child was spending vacation time with her mother. The defense argued that the allegations were concocted so the child would not be returned to her father. At trial A. T., then 6V2 years old, was the Government’s first witness. For the most part, her direct testimony consisted of one- and two-word answers to a series of leading questions. Cross-examination took place over two trial days. The defense asked A. T. 348 questions. On the first day A. T. answered all the questions posed to her on general, background subjects.
The next day there was no testimony, and the prosecutor met with A. T. When cross-examination of A. T. resumed, she was questioned about those conversations but was reluctant to discuss them. Defense counsel then began questioning her about the allegations of abuse, and it appears she was reluctant at many points to answer. As the trial judge noted, however, some of the defense questions were imprecise or unclear. The judge expressed his concerns with the examination of A. T., observing there were lapses of as much as 40-55 seconds between some questions and the answers and that on the second day of examination the witness seemed to be losing concentration. The trial judge stated, “We have a very difficult situation here.”
After A. T. testified, the Government produced six witnesses who testified about a total of seven statements made by A. T. describing the alleged sexual assaults: A. T.’s babysitter recited A. T.’s statement to her on August 22, 1990, that she did not want to return to her father because he “gets drunk and he thinks I’m his wife”; the babysitter related further details given by A. T. on August 27,1990, while A. T.’s mother stood outside the room and listened after the mother had been unsuccessful in questioning A. T. herself; the mother recounted what she had heard A. T. tell the babysitter; a social worker recounted details A. T. told her on August 29, 1990, about the assaults; and three pediatricians, Drs. Kuper, Reich, and Spiegel, related A. T.’s statements to them describing how and where she had been touched by Tome. All but A. T.’s statement to Dr. Spiegel implicated Tome. (The physicians also testified that their clinical examinations of the child indicated that she had been subjected to vaginal penetrations. That part of the testimony is not at issue here.)
A. T.’s out-of-court statements, recounted by the six witnesses, were offered by the Government under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). The trial court admitted all of the statements over defense counsel’s objection, accepting the Government’s argument that they rebutted the implicit charge that A. T.’s testimony was motivated by a desire to live with her mother. The court also admitted A. T.’s August 22d statement to her babysitter under Rule 803(24), and the statements to Dr. Kuper (and apparently also to Dr. Reich) under Rule 803(4) (statements for purposes of medical diagnosis). The Government offered the testimony of the social worker under both Rules 801(d)(1)(B) and 803(24), but the record does not indicate whether the court ruled on the latter ground. No objection was made to Dr. Spiegel’s testimony. Following trial, Tome was convicted and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, adopting the Government’s argument that all of A. T.’s out-of-court statements were admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) even though they had been made after A. T.’s alleged motive to fabricate arose. The court reasoned that “the pre-motive requirement is a function of the relevancy rules, not the hearsay rules” and that as a “function of relevance, the pre-motive rule is clearly too broad ... because it is simply not true that an individual with a motive to lie always will do so.” 3 F. 3d 342, 350 (1993). “Rather, the relevance of the prior consistent statement is more accurately determined by evaluating the strength of the motive to lie, the circumstances in which the statement is made, and the declarant’s demonstrated propensity to lie.” Ibid. The court recognized that some Circuits require that the consistent statements, to be admissible under the Rule, must be made before the motive or influence arose, see, e. g., United States v. Guevara, 598 F. 2d 1094, 1100 (CA7 1979); United States v. Quinto, 582 F. 2d 224, 234 (CA2 1978), but cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Miller, 874 F. 2d 1255, 1272 (1989), in support of its balancing approach. Applying this balancing test to A. T.’s first statement to her babysitter, the Court of Appeals determined that although A. T. might have had “some motive to lie, we do not believe that it is a particularly strong one.” 3 F. 3d, at 351. The court held that the District Judge had not abused his discretion in admitting A. T.’s out-of-court statements. It did not analyze the probative quality of A. T.’s six other out-of-court statements, nor did it reach the admissibility of the statements under any other rule of evidence.
We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 1109 (1994), and now reverse.
II
The prevailing common-law rule for more than a century before adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence was that a prior consistent statement introduced to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive was admissible if the statement had been made before the alleged fabrication, influence, or motive came into being, but it was inadmissible if made afterwards. As Justice Story explained: “[W]here the testimony is assailed as a fabrication of a recent date,... in order to repel such imputation, proof of the antecedent declaration of the party may be admitted.” Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412, 439 (1836) (emphasis added). See also People v. Singer, 300 N. Y. 120, 124-125, 89 N. E. 2d 710, 712 (1949).
McCormick and Wigmore stated the rule in a more categorical manner: “[T]he applicable principle is that the prior consistent statement has no relevancy to refute the charge unless the consistent statement was made before the source of the bias, interest, influence or incapacity originated.” E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence §49, p. 105 (2d ed. 1972) (hereafter McCormick). See also 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence §1128, p. 268 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1972) (hereafter Wigmore) (“A consistent statement, at a time prior to the existence of a fact said to indicate bias . . . will effectively explain away the force of the impeaching evidence” (emphasis in original)). The question is whether Rule 801(d)(1)(B) embodies this temporal requirement. We hold that it does.
A
Rule 801 provides:
“(d) Statements which are not hearsay. — A statement is not hearsay if—
“(1) Prior statement by witness. — The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is .. .
“(B) consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.”
Rule 801 defines prior consistent statements as nonhear-say only if they are offered to rebut a charge of “recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.” Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). Noting the “troublesome” logic of treating a witness’ prior consistent statements as hearsay at all (because the declarant is present in court and subject to cross-examination), the Advisory Committee decided to treat those consistent statements, once the preconditions of the Rule were satisfied, as nonhearsay and admissible as substantive evidence, not just to rebut an attack on the witness’ credibility. See Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 801(d)(1), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 773. A consistent statement meeting the requirements of the Rule is thus placed in the same category as a declarant’s inconsistent statement made under oath in another proceeding, or prior identification testimony, or admissions by a party opponent. See Fed. Rule Evid. 801.
The Rules do not accord this weighty, nonhearsay status to all prior consistent statements. To the contrary, admissibility under the Rules is confined to those statements offered to rebut a charge of “recent fabrication or improper influence or motive,” the same phrase used by the Advisory Committee in its description of the “traditiona[lj” common law of evidence, which was the background against which the Rules were drafted. See Advisory Committee’s Notes, supra, at 773. Prior consistent statements may not be admitted to counter all forms of impeachment or to bolster the witness merely because she has been discredited. In the present context, the question is whether A. T.’s out-of-court statements rebutted the alleged link between her desire to be with her mother and her testimony, not whether they suggested that A. T.’s in-court testimony was true. The Rule speaks of a party rebutting an alleged motive, not bolstering the veracity of the story told.
This limitation is instructive, not only to establish the preconditions of admissibility but also to reinforce the significance of the requirement that the consistent statements must have been made before the alleged influence, or motive to fabricate, arose. That is to say, the forms of impeachment within the Rule’s coverage are the ones in which the temporal requirement makes the most sense. Impeachment by charging that the testimony is a recent fabrication or results from an improper influence or motive is, as a general matter, capable of direct and forceful refutation through introduction of out-of-court consistent statements that predate the alleged fabrication, influence, or motive. A consistent statement that predates the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that the testimony was contrived as a consequence of that motive. By contrast, prior consistent statements carry little rebuttal force when most other types of impeachment are involved. McCormick §49, p. 105 (“When the attack takes the form of impeachment of character, by showing misconduct, convictions or bad reputation, it is generally agreed that there is no color for sustaining by consistent statements. The defense does not meet the assault” (footnote omitted)); see also 4 Wigmore §1131, p. 293 (“The broad rule obtains in a few courts that consistent statements may be admitted after impeachment of any sort — in particular after any impeachment by cross-examination. But there is no reason for such a loose rule” (footnote omitted)).
There may arise instances when out-of-court statements that postdate the alleged fabrication have some probative force in rebutting a charge of fabrication or improper influence or motive, but those statements refute the charged fabrication in a less direct and forceful way. Evidence that a witness made consistent statements after the alleged motive to fabricate arose may suggest in some degree that the in-court testimony is truthful, and thus suggest in some degree that that testimony did not result from some improper influence; but if the drafters of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) intended to countenance rebuttal along that indirect inferential chain, the purpose of confining the types of impeachment that open the door to rebuttal by introducing consistent statements becomes unclear. If consistent statements are admissible without reference to the timeframe we find imbedded in the Rule, there appears no sound reason not to admit consistent statements to rebut other forms of impeachment as well. Whatever objections can be leveled against limiting the Rule to this designated form of impeachment and confining the rebuttal to those statements made before the fabrication or improper influence or motive arose, it is clear to us that the drafters of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) were relying upon the common-law temporal requirement.
The underlying theory of the Government’s position is that an out-of-court consistent statement, whenever it was made, tends to bolster the testimony of a witness and so tends also to rebut an express or implied charge that the testimony has been the product of an improper influence. Congress could have adopted that rule with ease, providing, for instance, that “a witness’ prior consistent statements are admissible whenever relevant to assess the witness’ truthfulness or accuracy.” The theory would be that, in a broad sense, any prior statement by a witness concerning the disputed issues at trial would have some relevance in assessing the accuracy or truthfulness of the witness’ in-court testimony on the same subject. The narrow Rule enacted by Congress, however, cannot be understood to incorporate the Government’s theory.
Our analysis is strengthened by the observation that the somewhat peculiar language of the Rule bears close similarity to the language used in many of the common-law cases that describe the premotive requirement. “Rule 801(d)(1) (B) employs the precise language — ‘rebut[ting]. .. charge[s] ... of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive’— consistently used in the panoply of pre-1975 decisions.” Ohl-baum, The Hobgoblin of the Federal Rules of Evidence: An Analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent Statements and a New Proposal, 1987 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 231, 245. See, e.g., Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet., at 439; Hanger v. United States, 398 F. 2d 91, 104 (CA8 1968); People v. Singer, 300 N. Y. 120, 89 N. E. 2d 710 (1949).
The language of the Rule, in its concentration on rebutting charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive to the exclusion of other forms of impeachment, as well as in its use of wording that follows the language of the common-law cases, suggests that it was intended to carry over the common-law premotive rule.
B
Our conclusion that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) embodies the common-law premotive requirement is confirmed by an examination of the Advisory Committee’s Notes to the Federal Rules of Evidence. We have relied on those well-considered Notes as a useful guide in ascertaining the meaning of the Rules. See, e. g., Huddleston v. United States, 485 U. S. 681, 688 (1988); United States v. Owens, 484 U. S. 554, 562 (1988). Where, as with Rule 801(d)(1)(B), “Congress did not amend the Advisory Committee’s draft in any way . . . the Committee’s commentary is particularly relevant in determining the meaning of the document Congress enacted,” Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U. S. 153, 165-166, n. 9 (1988). The Notes are also a respected source of scholarly commentary. Professor Cleary was a distinguished commentator on the law of evidence, and he and members of the Committee consulted and considered the views, criticisms, and suggestions of the academic community in preparing the Notes.
The Notes disclose a purpose to adhere to the common law in the application of evidentiary principles, absent express provisions to the contrary. Where the Rules did depart from their common-law antecedents, in general the Committee said so. See, e. g., Notes on Rule 804(b)(4), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 790 (“The general common law requirement that a declaration in this area must have been made ante litem motam has been dropped, as bearing more appropriately on weight than admissibility”); Rule 804(b)(2), id., at 789 (“The exception is the familiar dying declaration of the common law, expanded somewhat beyond its traditionally narrow limits”); Rule 804(b)(3), ibid. (“The exception discards the common law limitation and expands to the full logical limit”). The Notes give no indication, however, that Rule 801(d)(1)(B) abandoned the premotive requirement. The entire discussion of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is limited to the following comment:
“Prior consistent statements traditionally have been admissible to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive but not as substantive evidence. Under the rule they are substantive evidence. The prior statement is consistent with the testimony given on the stand, and, if the opposite party wishes to open the door for its admission in evidence, no sound reason is apparent why it should not be received generally.” Notes on Rule 801(d)(1)(B), id., at 773.
Throughout their discussion of the Rules, the Advisory Committee’s Notes rely on Wigmore and McCormick as authority for the common-law approach. In light of the categorical manner in which those authors state the premotive requirement, see supra, at 156, it is difficult to imagine that the drafters, who noted the new substantive use of prior consistent statements, would have remained silent if they intended to modify the premotive requirement. As we observed with respect to another provision of the Rules, “[w]ith this state of unanimity confronting the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we think it unlikely that they intended to scuttle entirely [the common-law requirement].” United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 45, 50 (1984). Here, we do not think the drafters of the Rule intended to scuttle the whole premotive requirement and rationale without so much as a whisper of explanation.
Observing that Edward Cleary was the Reporter of the Advisory Committee that drafted the Rules, the Court has relied upon his writings as persuasive authority on the meaning of the Rules. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993); Abel, supra, at 51-52. Cleary also was responsible for the 1972 revision of McCormick’s treatise, which included an examination of the changes introduced by the proposed federal rules to the common-law practice of impeachment and rehabilitation. The discussion, which occurs only three paragraphs after the treatise’s categorical description of the common-law premotive rule, also lacks any indication that the proposed rules were abandoning that temporal limitation. See McCormick § 50, p. 107.
Our conclusion is bolstered by the Advisory Committee’s stated “unwillingness to countenance the general use of prior prepared statements as substantive evidence.” See Notes on Rule 801(d)(1), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 773. Rule 801(d), which “enumerates three situations in which the statement is excepted from the category of hearsay,” ibid., was expressly contrasted by the Committee with Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(1) (1953), “which allows any out-of-court statement of a declarant who is present at the trial and available for cross-examination.” Notes on Rule 801(d)(1), supra, at 773 (emphasis added). When a witness presents important testimony damaging to a party, the party will often counter with at least an implicit charge that the witness has been under some influence or motive to fabricate. If Rule 801 were read so that the charge opened the floodgates to any prior consistent statement that satisfied Rule 403, as the Tenth Circuit concluded, the distinction between rejected Uniform Rule 63(1) and Rule 801(d)(1)(B) would all but disappear.
That Rule 801(d)(1)(B) permits prior consistent statements to be used for substantive purposes after the statements are admitted to rebut the existence of an improper influence or motive makes it all the more important to observe the preconditions for admitting the evidence in the first place. The position taken by the Rules reflects a compromise between the views expressed by the “bulk of the case law ... against allowing prior statements of witnesses to be used generally as substantive evidence” and the views of the majority of “writers . . . [who] ha[d] taken the opposite position.” Ibid. That compromise was one that the Committee candidly admitted was a “judgment . . . more of experience than of logic.” Ibid.
“A party contending that legislative action changed settled law has the burden of showing that the legislature intended such a change.” Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 521 (1989) (applying that presumption in interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 609). Nothing in the Advisory Committee’s Notes suggests that it intended to alter the common-law premotive requirement.
C
The Government’s final argument in favor of affirmance is that the common-law premotive rule advocated by petitioner is inconsistent with the Federal Rules’ liberal approach to relevancy and with strong academic criticism, beginning in the 1940’s, directed at the exclusion of out-of-court statements made by a declarant who is present in court and subject to cross-examination. This argument misconceives the design of the Rules’ hearsay provisions.
Hearsay evidence is often relevant. “The only way in which the probative force of hearsay differs from the probative force of other testimony is in the absence of oath, demeanor, and cross-examination as aids in determining credibility.” Advisory Committee’s Introduction to Article VIII, 28 II S. C. App., p. 771. That does not resolve the matter, however. Relevance is not the sole criterion of admissibility. Otherwise, it would be difficult to account for the Rules’ general proscription of hearsay testimony (absent a specific exception), see Fed. Rule Evid. 802, let alone the traditional analysis of hearsay that the Rules, for the most part, reflect. Ibid. (“The approach to hearsay in these rules is that of the common law. . . . The traditional hearsay exceptions are drawn upon for the exceptions . . .”). That certain out-of-court statements may be relevant does not dispose of the question whether they are admissible.
The Government’s reliance on academic commentators critical of excluding out-of-court statements by a witness, see Brief for United States 40, is subject to like criticism. To be sure, certain commentators in the years preceding the adoption of the Rules had been critical of the common-law approach to hearsay, particularly its categorical exclusion of out-of-court statements offered for substantive purposes. See, e.g., Weinstein, The Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 331, 344-345 (1961) (gathering sources). General criticism was directed to the exclusion of a declarant’s out-of-court statements where the declarant testified at trial. See, e. g., id., at 333 (“[Treating the out of court statement of the witness himself as hearsay” is a “practical absurdity in many instances”); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 192-196 (1948). As an alternative, they suggested moving away from the categorical exclusion of hearsay and toward a case-by-case balancing of the probative value of particular statements against their likely prejudicial effect. See Weinstein, supra, at 338; Ladd, The Relationship of the Principles of Exclusionary Rules of Evidence to the Problem of Proof, 18 Minn. L. Rev. 506 (1934). The Advisory Committee^ however, was explicit in rejecting this balancing approach to hearsay: Given the Advisory Committee’s rejection of both the general balancing approach to hearsay and of Uniform Rule 63(1), see supra, at 162, the Government’s reliance on the views of those who advocated these positions is misplaced.
“The Advisory Committee has rejected this approach to hearsay as involving too great a measure of judicial discretion, minimizing the predictability of rulings, [and] enhancing the difficulties of preparation for trial.” Advisory Committee’s Introduction, supra, at 771.
The statement-by-statement balancing approach advocated by the Government and adopted by the Tenth Circuit creates the precise dangers the Advisory Committee noted and sought to avoid: It involves considerable judicial discretion; it reduces predictability; and it enhances the difficulties of trial preparation because parties will have difficulty knowing in advance whether or not particular out-of-court statements will be admitted. See Advisory Committee’s Introduction, supra, at 771.
D
The case before us illustrates some of the important considerations supporting the Rule as we interpret it, especially in criminal cases. If the Rule were to permit the introduction of prior statements as substantive evidence to rebut every implicit charge that a witness’ in-court testimony results from recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, the whole emphasis of the trial could shift to the out-of-court statements, not the in-court ones. The present case illustrates the point. In response to a rather weak charge that A. T.’s testimony was a fabrication created so the child could remain with her mother, the Government was permitted to present a parade of sympathetic and credible witnesses who did no more than recount A. T.’s detailed out-of-court statements to them. Although those statements might have been probative on the question whether the alleged conduct had occurred, they shed but minimal light on whether A. T. had the charged motive to fabricate. At closing argument before the jury, the Government placed great reliance on the prior statements for substantive purposes but did not once seek to use them to rebut the impact of the alleged motive.
We are aware that in some cases it may be difficult to ascertain when a particular fabrication, influence, or motive arose. Yet, as the Government concedes, a majority of common-law courts were performing this task for well over a century, see Brief for United States 39, and the Government has presented us with no evidence that those courts, or the judicial circuits that adhere to the rule today, have been unable to make the determination. Even under the Government’s hypothesis, moreover, the thing to be rebutted must be identified, so the date of its origin cannot be that much more difficult to ascertain. By contrast, as the Advisory Committee commented, see supra, at 164, the Government’s approach, which would require the trial court to weigh all of the circumstances surrounding a statement that suggest its probativeness against the court’s assessment of the strength of the alleged motive, would entail more of a burden, with no guidance to attorneys in preparing a case or to appellate courts in reviewing a judgment.
Ill
Courts must be sensitive to the difficulties attendant upon the prosecution of alleged child abusers. In almost all cases a youth is the prosecution’s only eyewitness. But “[t]his Court cannot alter evidentiary rules merely because litigants might prefer different rules in a particular class of cases.” United States v. Salerno, 505 U. S. 317, 322 (1992). When a party seeks to introduce out-of-court statements that contain strong circumstantial indicia of reliability, that are highly probative on the material questions at trial, and that are better than other evidence otherwise available, there is no need to distort the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). If its requirements are met, Rule 803(24) exists for that eventuality. We intimate no view, however, concerning the admissibility of any of A. T.’s out-of-court statements under that section, or any other evidentiary principle. These matters, and others, are for the Court of Appeals to decide in the first instance.
Our holding is confined to the requirements for admission under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). The Rule permits the introduction of a declarant’s consistent out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive only when those statements were made before the charged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. These conditions of admissibility were not established here.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed and the case is remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion. We hold that the proofs justified with reason the jury’s conclusion, embodied in answers to Interrogatories to Jury numbers I and II, that employer negligence played a part in producing the petitioner’s injury. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500. See also Moore v. Terminal Railroad Assn., 358 U. S. 31, and cases cited therein. We therefore find it unnecessary to consider the petitioner’s challenge to the Qhio procedure governing interrogatories to the jury.
For the reasons set forth in his opinion in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500, 524, Mr. Justice Frankfurter is of the view that the writ of certiorari is improvidently granted.
Mr. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. ~
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7 U. S. C. §2321 et seq., protects owners of novel seed varieties against unauthorized sales of their seed for replanting purposes. An exemption, however, allows farmers to make some sales of protected variety seed to other farmers. This case raises the question whether there is a limit to the quantity of protected seed that a farmer can sell under this exemption.
I
In 1970, Congress passed the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA), 84 Stat. 1542, 7 U. S. C. § 2321 et seq., in order to provide developers of novel plant varieties with “adequate encouragement for research, and for marketing when appropriate, to yield for the public the benefits of new varieties,” §2581. The PVPA extends patent-like protection to novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants (that is, plants grown from seed) which parallels the protection afforded asexually reproduced plant varieties (that is, varieties reproduced by propagation or grafting) under Chapter 15 of the Patent Act. See 35 U. S. C. §§ 161-164.
The developer of a novel variety obtains PVPA coverage by acquiring a certificate of protection from the Plant Variety Protection Office. See 7 U. S. C. §§2421, 2422, 2481-2483. This confers on the owner the exclusive right for 18 years to “exclude others from selling the variety, or offering it for sale, or reproducing it, or importing it, or exporting it, or using it in producing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom.” §2483.
Petitioner, Asgrow Seed Company, is the holder of PVPA certificates protecting two novel varieties of soybean seed, which it calls A1937 and A2234. Respondents, Dennis and Becky Winterboer, are Iowa farmers whose farm spans 800 acres of Clay County, in the northwest corner of the State. The Winterboers have incorporated under the name “D-Double-U Corporation” and do business under the name “DeeBee’s Feed and Seed.” In addition to growing crops, for sale as food and livestock feed, since 1987 the Winter-boers have derived a sizable portion of their income from “brown-bag” sales of their crops to other farmers to use as seed. A brown-bag sale occurs when a farmer purchases seed from a seed company, such as Asgrow, plants the seed in his own fields, harvests the crop, cleans it, and then sells the reproduced seed to other farmers (usually in nondescript brown bags) for them to plant as crop seed on their own farms. During 1990, the Winterboers planted 265 acres of A1937 and A2234, and sold the entire salable crop, 10,529 bushels, to others for use as seed — enough to plant 10,000 acres. The average sale price was $8.70 per bushel, compared with a then-current price of $16.20 to $16.80 per bushel to obtain varieties A1937 and A2234 directly from Asgrow.
Concerned that the Winterboers were making a business out of selling its protected seed, Asgrow sent a local farmer, Robert Ness, to the Winterboer farm to make a purchase. Mr. Winterboer informed Ness that he could sell him soybean seed that was “just like” Asgrow varieties A1937 and A2234. Ness purchased 20 bags of each; a plant biologist for Asgrow tested the seeds and determined that they were indeed A1937 and A2234.
Asgrow brought suit against the Winterboers in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, seeking damages and a permanent injunction against sale of seed harvested from crops grown from A1937 and A2234. The complaint alleged infringement under 7 U. S. C. §2541(1), for selling or offering to sell Asgrow’s protected soybean varieties; under § 2541(3), for sexually multiplying Asgrow’s novel varieties as a step in marketing those varieties for growing purposes; and under § 2541(6), for dispensing the novel variéties to others in a form that could be propagated without providing notice that the seeds were of a protected variety.
The Winterboers did not deny that Asgrow held valid certificates of protection covering A1937 and A2234, and that they had sold seed produced from those varieties for others to use as seed. Their defense, at least to the §§2541(1) and (3) charges, rested upon the contention that their sales fell within the statutory exemption from infringement liability found in 7 U. S. C. § 2543. That section, entitled “Right to save seed; crop exemption,” reads in relevant part as follows:
“Except to the extent that such action may constitute an infringement under subsections (3) and (4) of section 2541 of this title, it shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by him from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on his farm, or for sale as provided in this section: Provided, That without regard to the provisions of section 2541(3) of this title it shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person, whose primary farming occupation is the growing of crops for sale for other than reproductive purposes, to sell such saved seed to other persons so engaged, for reproductive purposes, provided such sale is in compliance with such State laws governing the sale of seed as may be applicable. A bona fide sale for other than reproductive purposes, made in channels usual for such other purposes, of seed produced on a farm either from seed obtained by authority of the owner for seeding purposes or from seed produced by descent on such farm from seed obtained by authority of the owner for seeding purposes shall not constitute an infringement.. . .”
The Winterboers argued that this language gave them the right to sell an unlimited amount of seed produced from a protected variety, subject only to the conditions that both buyer and seller be farmers “whose primary farming occupation is the growing of crops for sale for other than reproductive purposes,” and that all sales comply with state law. As-grow maintained that the exemption allows a farmer to save and resell to other farmers only the amount of seed the seller would need to replant his own fields — a limitation that the Winterboers’ sales greatly exceeded. The District Court agreed with Asgrow and granted summary judgment in its favor. 795 F. Supp. 915 (1991).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. 982 F. 2d 486 (1992). Although “recognizing] that, without meaningful limitations, the crop exemption [of § 2543] could undercut much of the PVPA’s incentives,” id., at 491, the Court of Appeals saw nothing in §2543 that would limit the sale of protected seed (for reproductive purposes) to the amount necessary to plant the seller’s own acreage. Rather, as the Court of Appeals read the statute, §2543 permits a farmer to sell up to half of every crop he produces from PVPA-protected seed to another farmer for use as seed, so long as he sells the other 50 percent of the crop grown from that specific variety for nonreproductive purposes, e. g., for food or feed. The Federal Circuit denied Asgrow’s petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc by a vote of six judges to five. 989 F. 2d 478 (1993). We granted certiorari. 511 U. S. 1029 (1994).
II
It may be well to acknowledge at the outset that it is quite impossible to make complete sense of the provision at issue here. One need go no further than the very first words of its title to establish that. Section 2543 does not, as that title claims and the ensuing text says, reserve any “[r]ight to save seed” — since nothing elsewhere in the Act remotely prohibits the saving of seed. Nor, under any possible analysis, is the proviso in the first sentence of § 2543 (“Provided, That”) really a proviso.
With this advance warning that not all mysteries will be solved, we enter the verbal maze of §2543. The entrance, we discover, is actually an exit, since the provision begins by excepting certain activities from its operation: “Except to the extent that such action may constitute an infringement under subsections (3) and ()) of section 25)1 of this title, it shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by him . . . and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on his farm, or for sale as provided in this section . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Thus, a farmer does not qualify for the exemption from infringement liability if he has
“(3) sexually multiplied] the novel variety as a step in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety; or
(4) use[d] the novel variety in producing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom.” 7 U. S. C. §§2541(3)-(4).
In 1990, the Winterboers planted 265 acres of Asgrow protected variety seed and collected a harvest of 12,037 bushels of soybeans. The parties do not dispute that this act of planting and harvesting constituted “sexual multiplication” of the novel varieties. See 7 U. S. C. § 2401(f) (defining “sexually reproduced” seed to include “any production of a variety by seed”). The Winterboers sold almost all of these beans for use as seed (i. e., “for growing purposes”), without Asgrow’s consent. The central question in this ease, then, is whether the Winterboers’ planting and harvesting were conducted “as a step in marketing” Asgrow’s protected seed varieties for growing purposes. If they were, the Winter-boers were not eligible for the §2543 exemption, and the District Court was right to grant summary judgment to Asgrow.
The PVPA does not define “marketing.” When terms used in a statute are undefined, we give them their ordinary meaning. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 476 (1994). The Federal Circuit believed that the word “marketing” requires “extensive or coordinated selling activities, such as advertising, using an intervening sales representative, or similar extended merchandising or retail activities.” 982 F. 2d, at 492. We disagree. Marketing ordinarily refers to the act of holding forth property for sale, together with the activities preparatory thereto (in the present case, cleaning, drying, bagging, and pricing the seeds). The word does not require that the promotional or merchandising activities connected with the selling be extensive. One can market apples by simply displaying them on a cart with a price tag; or market a stock by simply listing it on a stock exchange; or market a house (we would normally say “place it on the market”) by simply setting a “for sale” sign on the front lawn. Indeed, some dictionaries give as one meaning of “market” simply “to sell.” See, e.g., Oxford Universal Dictionary 1208 (3d ed. 1955); Webster’s New International Dictionary 1504 (2d ed. 1950). Of course, effective selling often involves extensive promotional activities, and when they occur they are all part of the “marketing.” But even when the holding forth for sale relies upon no more than word-of-mouth advertising, a marketing of goods is in process. Moreover, even if the word “marketing” could, in one of its meanings, demand extensive promotion, we see no reason why the law at issue here would intend that meaning. That would have the effect of preserving PVPA protection for less valuable plant varieties, but eliminating it for varieties so desirable that they can be marketed by word of mouth; as well as the effect of requiring courts to ponder the difficult question of how much promotion is necessary to constitute marketing. We think that when the statute refers to sexually multiplying a variety “as a step in marketing,” it means growing seed of the variety for the purpose of putting the crop up for sale. Under the exception set out in the first clause of § 2543, then, a farmer is not eligible for the § 2543 exemption if he plants and saves seeds for the purpose of selling the seeds that they produce for replanting.
Section 2543 next provides that, so long as a person is not violating either §§ 2541(3) or (4),
“it shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced by him from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained, by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on his farm, or for sale as provided in this section . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Farmers generally grow crops to sell. A harvested soybean crop is typically removed from the farmer’s premises in short order and taken to a grain elevator or processor. Sometimes, however, in the case of a plant such as the soybean, in which the crop is the seed, the farmer will have a portion of his crop cleaned and stored as seed for replanting his fields next season. We think it clear that this seed saved for replanting is what the provision under discussion means by “saved seed” — not merely regular uncleaned crop that is stored for later market sale or use as fodder.
There are two ways to read the provision, depending upon which words the phrase “for sale as provided in this section” is taken to modify. It can be read “production of a crop ... for sale as provided in this section”; or alternatively “use such saved seed ... for sale as provided in this section.” The parallelism created by the phrase “for use on his farm” followed immediately by “or for sale as provided in this section” suggests the former reading. But the placement of the comma, separating “use [of] such saved seed in the production of a crop for use on his farm,” from “or for sale,” favors the latter reading. So does the fact that the alternative reading requires the reader to skip the lengthy “Provided, That” clause in order to find out what sales are “provided [for] in this section” — despite the parallelism between “provided” and “Provided,” and despite the presence of a colon, which ordinarily indicates specification of what has preceded. It is surely easier to think that at least some of the sales “provided for” are those that are “Provided” after the colon. (It is, of course, not unusual, however deplorable it may be, for “Provided, That” to be used as prologue to an addition rather than an exception. See Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 206 (1928); 1A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 20.22 (5th ed. 1992).)
We think the latter reading is also to be preferred because it lends greater meaning to all the provisions. Under the former reading (“production of a crop... for sale as provided in this section”), the only later text that could be referred to is the provision for “bona fide sale[s] for other than reproductive purposes” set out in the second sentence of § 2543 — the so-called “crop exemption.” (The proviso could not be referred to, since it does not provide for sale of crops grown from saved seed, but only for sale of saved seed itself.) But if the “or for sale” provision has such a limited referent, the opening clause’s (“Except to the extent that...”) reservation of § 2541(3) infringement liability (i. e., liability for growing as a step in marketing for reproductive purposes) would be devoid of content, since the provision to which it is attached would permit no sales for reproductive purposes. Under the latter reading, by contrast, the farmer may not “use [his] saved seed ... for sale” as the proviso allows if the seed was intentionally grown for the purpose of such sale — i. e., “sexually multiplied]... as a step in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety.” A second respect in which our favored reading gives greater meaning to the provision is this: The other reading (“crop ... for sale as provided in this section”) causes the “permission” given in the opening sentence to extend only to sales for nonreproductive purposes of the crops grown from saved seed, as opposed to sales of the saved seed itself. But no separate permission would have been required for this, since it is already contained within the crop exemption itself; it serves only as a reminder that crop from saved seed can be sold under that exemption — a peculiarly incomplete reminder, since the saved seed itself can also be sold under that exemption.
To summarize: By reason of its proviso the first sentence of § 2543 allows seed that has been preserved for reproductive purposes (“saved seed”) to be sold for such purposes. The structure of the sentence is such, however, that this authorization does not extend to saved seed that was grown for the very purpose of sale (“marketing”) for replanting — because in that case, §2541(3) would be violated, and the above-discussed exception to the exemption would apply. As a practical matter, since §2541(1) prohibits all unauthorized transfer of title to, or possession of, the protected variety, this means that the only seed that can be sold under the proviso is seed that has been saved by the farmer to replant his own acreage. (We think that limitation is also apparent from the text of the crop exemption, which permits a farm crop from saved seeds to be sold — for nonreproductive purposes — only if those saved seeds were “produced by descent on such farm” (Emphasis added.) It is in our view the proviso in § 2543, and not the crop exemption, that authorizes the permitted buyers of saved seeds to sell the crops they produce.) Thus, if a farmer saves seeds to replant his acreage, but for some reason changes his plans, he may instead sell those seeds for replanting under the terms set forth in the proviso (or of course sell them for nonreproductive purposes under the crop exemption).
It remains to discuss one final feature of the proviso authorizing limited sales for reproductive purposes. The proviso allows sales of saved seed for replanting purposes only between persons “whose primary farming occupation is the growing of crops for sale for other than reproductive purposes.” The Federal Circuit, which rejected the-proposition that the only seed sellable under the exemption is seed saved for the farmer’s own replanting, sought to achieve some limitation upon the quantity of seed that can be sold for reproductive purposes by adopting a “crop-by-crop” approach to the “primary farming occupation” requirement of the proviso. “[B]uyers or sellers of brown bag seed qualify for the crop exemption,” it concluded, “only if they produce a larger crop from a protected seed for consumption (or other nonre-productive purposes) than for sale as seed.” 982 F. 2d, at 490. That is to say, the brown-bag seller can sell no more than half of his protected crop for seed. The words of the statute, however, stand in the way of this creative (if somewhat insubstantial) limitation. To ask what is a farmer’s “primary farming occupation” is to ask what constitutes the bulk of his total farming business. Selling crops for other than reproductive purposes must constitute the preponderance of the farmer’s business, not just the preponderance of his business in the protected seed. There is simply no way to derive from this text the narrower focus that the Federal Circuit applied. Thus, if the quantity of seed that can be sold is not limited as we have described — by reference to the original purpose for which the seed is saved — then it is barely limited at all (i. e., limited only by the volume or worth of the selling farmer’s total crop sales for other than reproductive purposes). This seems to us a most unlikely result.
* * *
We hold that a farmer who meets the requirements set forth in the proviso to § 2543 may sell for reproductive purposes only such seed as he has saved for the purpose of replanting his own acreage. While the meaning of the text is by no means clear, this is in our view the only reading that comports with the statutory purpose of affording “adequate encouragement for research, and for marketing when appropriate, to yield for the public the benefits of new varieties.” 7 U. S. C. §2581. Because we find the sales here were unlawful, we do not reach the second question on which we granted certiorari — whether sales authorized under §2543 remain subject to the notice requirement of §2541(6).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is
Reversed.
At the time the infringement action was filed, §2541 provided in full:
“Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, it shall be an infringement of the rights of the owner of a novel variety to perform , without authority, any of the following acts in the United States, or in commerce which can be regulated by Congress or affecting such commerce, prior to expiration of the right to plant variety protection but after either the issue of the certificate or the distribution of a novel plant variety with the notice under section 2567 of this title:
“(1) sell the novel variety, or offer it or expose it for sale, deliver it, ship it, consign it, exchange it, or solicit an offer to buy it, or any other transfer of title or possession of it;
“(2) import the novel variety into, or export it from, the United States;
“(3) sexually multiply the novel variety as a step in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety; or
“(4) use the novel variety in producing (as distinguished from developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom; or
“(5) use seed which had been marked “Unauthorized Propagation Prohibited” or “Unauthorized Seed Multiplication Prohibited” or progeny thereof to propagate the novel variety; or
“(6) dispense the novel variety to another, in a form which can be propagated, without notice as to being a protected variety under which it was received; or
“(7) perform any of the foregoing acts even in instances in which the novel variety is multiplied other than sexually, except in pursuance of a valid United States plant patent; or
“(8) instigate or actively induce performance of any of the foregoing acts.”
In October 1992, Congress amended §2541, designating the prior text as subsection (a) and adding a subsection (b), the provisions of which are not relevant here. Curiously, however, the references in §2543 to the infringement provisions of § 2541 were not amended to reflect this change. For clarity’s sake, therefore, we will continue to refer to the infringement provisions under their prior designations, e. g., §§ 2541(l)-(8), rather than their current designations, e. g., §§2541(a)(l)-(8).
Congress has recently amended this section by striking from the first sentence the words “ ‘section: Provided, That’ and all that follows through the period and inserting ‘section.’ ” Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. 103-349, 108 Stat. 3136, 3142. That amendment has the effect of eliminating the exemption from infringement liability for farmers who sell PVPA-protected seed to other farmers for reproductive purposes. That action, however, has no bearing on the resolution of the present case, since the amendments affect only those certificates issued after April 4,1995, that were not pending on or before that date. See id., §§ 14(a), 15,108 Stat. 3144, 3145.
The dissent asserts that the Federal Circuit’s more demanding interpretation of “marketing” is supported by the ancient doctrine disfavoring restraints on alienation of property, see post, at 194-195. The wellspring of that doctrine, of course, is concern for property rights, and in the context of the PVPA it is the dissent’s interpretation, rather than ours, which belittles that concern. The whole purpose of the statute is to create a valuable property in the product of botanical research by giving the developer the right to “exclude others from selling the variety, or offering it for sale, or reproducing it, or importing it, or exporting it,” etc. 7 U. S. C. § 2488. Applying the rule disfavoring restraints on alienation to interpretation of the PVPA is rather like applying the rule disfavoring restraints upon freedom of contract to interpretation of the Sherman Act.
This reading also gives meaning to the proviso’s statement that “without regard to the provisions of section 2541(3)... it shall not infringe any right hereunder” for a person to engage in certain sales of saved seed for reproductive purposes (emphasis added). This serves to eliminate the technical argument that a production of seed that was originally in compliance with §2541(3) (because it was not done as a step in marketing for reproductive purposes) could retroactively be rendered unlawful by the later sale permitted in the proviso, because such sale causes the earlier production to have been “a step in the marketing” for reproductive purposes.
For crops such as soybeans, in which the-, seed: and: the harvest are one and the same, this will mean enough seeds- for one year’s crop on that acreage. Since the germination rate of a batch of-seed declines over time, the soybean farmer will get the year-after-next’s seeds from next year’s harvest. That is not so for some vegetable crops, in which the seed is not the harvest, and a portion of the crop must be permitted to overripen (“go to seed”) in order to obtain seeds. One of the amici in the Court of Appeals asserted (and the parties before us did not dispute) that it is the practice of vegetable farmers to “grow” seeds only every four or five years, and to “brown bag” enough seed for four or five future crops. A vegetable farmer who sets aside protected seed with subsequent replantings in mind, but who later abandons his plan (because he has sold his farm, for example), would under our analysis be able to sell all his saved seed, even though it would plant (in a single year) four or five times his current acreage.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants are citizens and qualified voters of Fulton County, Georgia, and as such are entitled to vote in congressional elections in Georgia’s Fifth Congressional District. That district, one of ten created by a 1931 Georgia statute, includes Fulton, DeKalb, and Rockdale Counties and has a population according to the 1960 census of 823,680. The average population of the ten districts is 394,312, less than half that of the Fifth. One district, the Ninth, has only 272,154 people, less than one-third as many as the Fifth. Since there is only one Congressman for each district, this inequality of population means that the Fifth District’s Congressman has to represent from two to three times as many people as do Congressmen from some of the other Georgia districts.
Claiming that these population disparities deprived them and voters similarly situated of a right under the Federal Constitution to have their votes for Congressmen given the same weight as the votes of other Georgians, the appellants brought this action under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1988 and 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) asking that the Georgia statute be declared invalid and that the appellees, the Governor and Secretary of State of Georgia, be enjoined from conducting elections under it. The complaint alleged that appellants were deprived of the full benefit of their right to vote, in violation of (1) Art. I, § 2, of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that “The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . .”; (2) the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) that part of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment which provides that “Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers ....” The ease was heard by a three-judge District Court, which found unanimously, from facts not disputed, that:
“It is clear by any standard . . . that the population of the Fifth District is grossly out of balance with that of the other nine congressional districts of Georgia and in fact, so much so that the removal of DeKalb and Rockdale Counties from the District, leaving only Fulton with a population of 556,326, would leave it exceeding the average by slightly more than forty per cent.”
Notwithstanding these findings, a majority of the court dismissed the complaint, citing as their guide Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s minority opinion in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, an opinion stating that challenges to apportionment of congressional districts raised only “political” questions, which were not justiciable. Although the majority below said that the dismissal here was based on “want of equity” and not on nonjusticiability, they relied on no circumstances which were peculiar to the present case; instead, they adopted the language and reasoning of Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s Colegrove opinion in concluding that the appellants had presented a wholly “political” question. Judge Tuttle, disagreeing with the court’s reliance on that opinion, dissented from the dismissal, though he would have denied an injunction at that time in order to give the Georgia Legislature ample opportunity to correct the “abuses” in the apportionment. He relied on Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, which, after full discussion of Colegrove and all the opinions in it, held that allegations of disparities of population in state legislative districts raise justiciable claims on which courts may grant relief. We noted probable jurisdiction. 374 U. S. 802. We agree with Judge Tuttle that in debasing the weight of appellants’ votes the State has abridged the right to vote for members of Congress guaranteed them by the United States Constitution, that the District Court should have entered a declaratory judgment to that effect, and that it was therefore error to dismiss this suit. The question of what relief should be given we leave for further consideration and decision by the District Court in light of existing circumstances.
I.
Baker v. Carr, supra, considered a challenge to a 1901 Tennessee statute providing for apportionment of State Representatives and Senators under the State’s constitution, which called for apportionment among counties or districts “according to the number of qualified voters in each.” The complaint there charged that the State’s constitutional command to apportion on the basis of the number of qualified voters had not been followed in the 1901 statute and that the districts were so discrimina-torily disparate in number of qualified voters that the plaintiffs and persons similarly situated were, “by virtue of the debasement of their votes,” denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amendment. The cause there of the alleged “debasement” of votes for state legislators — districts containing widely varying numbers of people — was precisely that which was alleged to debase votes for Congressmen in Colegrove v. Green, supra, and in the present case. The Court in Baker pointed out that the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove, upon the reasoning of which the majority below leaned heavily in dismissing “for want of equity,” was approved by only three of the seven Justices sitting. After full consideration of Cole-grove, the Court in Baker held (1) that the District Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter; (2) that the qualified Tennessee voters there had standing to sue; and (3) that the plaintiffs had stated a justiciable cause of action on which relief could be granted.
The reasons which led to these conclusions in Baker are equally persuasive here. Indeed, as one of the grounds there relied on to support our holding that state apportionment controversies are justiciable we said:
. . Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355, Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U. S. 375, and Carroll v. Becker, 285 U. S. 380, concerned the choice of Representatives in the Federal Congress. Smiley, Koenig and Carroll settled the issue in favor of justiciability of questions of congressional redistricting. The Court followed these precedents in Colegrove although over the dissent of three of the seven Justices who participated in that decision.”
This statement in Baker, which referred to our past decisions holding congressional apportionment cases to be justiciable, we believe was wholly correct and we adhere to it. Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s Colegrove opinion contended that Art. I, § 4, of the Constitution had given Congress “exclusive authority” to protect the right of citizens to vote for Congressmen, but we made it clear in Baker that nothing in the language of that article gives support to a construction that would immunize state congressional apportionment laws which debase a citizen’s right to vote from the power of courts to protect the constitutional rights of individuals from legislative destruction, a power recognized at least since our decision in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, in 1803. Cf. Gib bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. The right to vote is too important in our free society to be stripped of judicial protection by such an interpretation of Article I. This dismissal can no more be justified on the ground of “want of equity” than on the ground of “nonjusticiability.” We therefore hold that the District Court erred in dismissing the complaint.
II.
This brings us to the merits. We agree with the District Court that the 1931 Georgia apportionment grossly discriminates against voters in the Fifth Congressional District. A single Congressman represents from two to three times as many Fifth District voters as are represented by each of the Congressmen from the other Georgia congressional districts. The apportionment statute thus contracts the value of some votes and expands that of others. If the Federal Constitution intends that when qualified voters elect members of Congress each vote be given as much weight as any other vote, then this statute cannot stand.
We hold that, construed in its historical context, the command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives be chosen “by the People of the several States” means that as nearly as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another’s. This rule is followed automatically, of course, when Representatives are chosen as a group on a statewide basis, as was a widespread practice in the first 50 years of our Nation’s history. It would be extraordinary to suggest that in such statewide elections the votes of inhabitants of some parts of a State, for example, Georgia’s thinly populated Ninth District, could be weighted at two or three times the value of the votes of people living in more populous parts of the State, for example, the Fifth District around Atlanta. Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368. We do not believe that the Framers of the Constitution intended to permit the same vote-diluting discrimination to be accomplished through the device of districts containing widely varied numbers of inhabitants. To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of Representatives elected “by the People,” a principle tenaciously fought for and established at the Constitutional Convention. The history of the Constitution, particularly that part of it relating to the adoption of Art. I, § 2, reveals that those who framed the Constitution meant that, no matter what the mechanics of an election, whether statewide or by districts, it was population which was to be the basis of the House of Representatives.
During the Revolutionary War the rebelling colonies were loosely allied in the Continental Congress, a body with authority to do little more than pass resolutions and issue requests for men and supplies. Before the war ended the Congress had proposed and secured the ratification by the States of a somewhat closer association under the Articles of Confederation. Though the Articles established a central government for the United States, as the former colonies were even then called, the States retained most of their sovereignty, like independent nations bound together only by treaties. There were no separate judicial or executive branches: only a Congress consisting of a single house. Like the members of an ancient Greek league, each State, without regard to size or population, was given only one vote in that house. It soon became clear that the Confederation was without adequate power to collect needed revenues or to enforce the rules its Congress adopted. Farsighted men felt that a closer union was necessary if the States were to be saved from foreign and domestic dangers.
The result was the Constitutional Convention of 1787, called for “the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation . . . .” When the Convention met in May, this modest purpose was soon abandoned for the greater challenge of creating a new and closer form of government than was possible under the Confederation. Soon after the Convention assembled, Edmund Randolph of Virginia presented a plan not merely to amend the Articles of Confederation but to create an entirely new National Government with a National Executive, National Judiciary, and a National Legislature of two Houses, one house to be elected by “the people,” the second house to be elected by the first.
The question of how the legislature should be constituted precipitated the most bitter controversy of the Convention. One principle was uppermost in the minds of many delegates: that, no matter where he lived, each voter should have a voice equal to that of every other in electing members of Congress. In support of this principle, George Mason of Virginia
“argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the Govt.”
James Madison agreed, saying “If the power is not immediately derived from the people, in proportion to their numbers, we may make a paper confederacy, but that will be all.” Repeatedly, delegates rose to make the same point: that it would be unfair, unjust, and contrary to common sense to give a small number of people as many Senators or Representatives as were allowed to much larger groups — in short, as James Wilson of Pennsylvania put it, “equal numbers of people ought to have an equal no. of representatives . . .” and representatives “of different districts ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their respective constituents hold to each other.”
Some delegates opposed election by the people. The sharpest objection arose out of the fear on the part of small States like Delaware that if population were to be the only basis of representation the populous States like Virginia would elect a large enough number of representatives to wield overwhelming power in the National Government. Arguing that the Convention had no authority to depart from the plan of the Articles of Confederation which gave each State an equal vote in the National Congress, William Paterson of New Jersey said, “If the sovereignty of the States is to be maintained, the Representatives must be drawn immediately from the States, not from the people: and we have no power to vary the idea of equal sovereignty.” To this end he proposed a single legislative chamber in which each State, as in the Confederation, was to have an equal vote. A number of delegates supported this plan.
The delegates who wanted every man’s vote to count alike were sharp in their criticism of giving each State, regardless of population, the same voice in the National Legislature. Madison entreated the Convention “to renounce a principle wch. was confessedly unjust,” and Rufus King of Massachusetts “was prepared for every event, rather than sit down under a Govt, founded in a vicious principle of representation and which must be as shortlived as it would be unjust.”
The dispute came near ending the Convention without a Constitution. Both sides seemed for a time to be hopelessly obstinate. Some delegations threatened to withdraw from the Convention if they did not get their way. Seeing the controversy growing sharper and emotions rising, the wise and highly respected Benjamin Franklin arose and pleaded with the delegates on both sides to “part with some of their demands, in order that they may join in some accomodating proposition.” At last those who supported representation of the people in both houses and those who supported it in neither were brought together, some expressing the fear that if they did not reconcile their differences, “some foreign sword will probably do the work for us.” The deadlock was finally broken when a majority of the States agreed to what has been called the Great Compromise, based on a proposal which had been repeatedly advanced by Roger Sherman and other delegates from Connecticut. It provided on the one hand that each State, including little Delaware and Rhode Island, was to have two Senators. As a further guarantee that these Senators would be considered state emissaries, they were to be elected by the state legislatures, Art. I, § 3, and it was specially provided in Article V that no State should ever be deprived of its equal representation in the Senate. The other side of the compromise was that, as provided in Art. I, § 2, members of the House of Representatives should be chosen “by the People of the several States” and should be “apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers.” While those who wanted both houses to represent the people had yielded on the Senate, they had not yielded on the House of Representatives. William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut had summed it up well: “in one branch the people, ought to be represented; in the other, the States.”
The debates at the Convention make at least one fact abundantly clear: that when the delegates agreed that the House should represent “people” they intended that in allocating Congressmen the number assigned to each State should be determined solely by the number of the State’s inhabitants. The Constitution embodied Edmund Randolph’s proposal for a periodic census to ensure “fair representation of the people,” an idea endorsed by Mason as assuring that “numbers of inhabitants” should always be the measure of representation in the House of Representatives. The Convention also overwhelmingly agreed to a resolution offered by Randolph to base future apportionment squarely on numbers and to delete any reference to wealth. And the delegates defeated a motion made by Elbridge Gerry to limit the number of Representatives from newer Western States so that it would never exceed the number from the original States.
It would defeat the principle solemnly embodied in the Great Compromise — equal representation in the House for equal numbers of people — for us to hold that, within the States, legislatures may draw the lines of congressional districts in such a way as to give some voters a greater voice in choosing a Congressman than others. The House of Representatives, the Convention agreed, was to represent the people as individuals, and on a basis of complete equality for each voter. The delegates were quite aware of what Madison called the “vicious representation” in Great Britain whereby “rotten boroughs” with few inhabitants were represented in Parliament on or almost on a par with cities of greater population. Wilson urged that people must be represented as individuals, so that America would escape-the evils of the English system under which one man could send two members to Parliament to represent the borough of Old Sarum while London’s million people sent but four. The delegates referred to rotten borough apportionments in some of the state legislatures as the kind of objectionable governmental action that the Constitution should not tolerate in the election of congressional representatives.
Madison in The Federalist described the system of division of States into congressional districts, the method which he and others assumed States probably would adopt: “The city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain between fifty and sixty thousand souls. It will therefore form nearly two districts for the choice of Foederal Representatives.” “[N] umbers,” he said, not only are a suitable way to represent wealth but in any event “are the only proper scale of representation.” In the state conventions, speakers urging ratification of the Constitution emphasized the theme of equal representation in the House which had permeated the debates in Philadelphia. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney told the South Carolina Convention, “the House of Representatives will be elected immediately by the people, and represent them and their personal rights individually . . . .” Speakers at the ratifying conventions emphasized that the House of Representatives was meant to be free of the malapportionment then existing in some of the state legislatures — such as those of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and South Carolina — and argued that the power given Congress in Art. I, § 4, was meant to be used to vindicate the people’s right to equality of representation in the House. Congress’ power, said John Steele at the North Carolina convention, was not to be used to allow Congress to create rotten boroughs; in answer to another delegate’s suggestion that Congress might use its power to favor people living near the seacoast, Steele said that Congress “most probably” would “lay the state off into districts,” and if it made laws “inconsistent with the Constitution, independent judges will not uphold them, nor will the people obey them.”
Soon after the Constitution was adopted, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, by then an Associate Justice of this Court, gave a series of lectures at Philadelphia in which, drawing on his experience as one of the most active members of the Constitutional Convention, he said:
“[A] 11 elections ought to be equal. Elections are equal, when a given number of citizens, in one part of the state, choose as many representatives, as are chosen by the same number of citizens, in any other part of the state. In this manner, the proportion of the representatives and of the constituents will remain invariably the same.”
It is in the light of such history that we must construe Art. I, § 2, of the Constitution, which, carrying out the ideas of Madison and those of like views, provides that Representatives shall be chosen “by the People of the several States” and shall be “apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective Numbers.” It is not surprising that our Court has held that this Article gives persons qualified to vote a constitutional right to vote and to have their votes counted. United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383; Ex Parte Yar-brough, 110 U. S. 651. Not only can this right to vote not be denied outright, it cannot, consistently with Article I, be destroyed by alteration of ballots, see United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299, or diluted by stuffing of the ballot box, see United States v. Saylor, 322 U. S. 385. No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this right. In urging the people to adopt the Constitution, Madison said in No. 57 of The Federalist:
“Who are to be the electors of the Fcederal Representatives? Not the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of the United States. . .
Readers surely could have fairly taken this to mean, “one person, one vote.” Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368, 381. While it may not be possible to draw congressional districts with mathematical precision, that is no excuse for ignoring our Constitution’s plain objective of making equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives. That is the high standard of justice and common sense which the Founders set for us.
Reversed and remanded.
Ga. Code, §34-2301.
Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276, 279-280.
“We do not deem [Colegrove v. Green] ... to be a precedent for dismissal based on the nonjusticiability of a political question involving the Congress as here, but we do deem it to be strong authority for dismissal for want of equity when the following factors here involved are considered on balance: a political question involving a coordinate branch of the federal government; a political question posing a delicate problem difficult of solution without depriving others of the right to vote by district, unless we are to redistrict for the state; relief may be forthcoming from a properly apportioned state legislature; and relief may be afforded by the Congress.” 206 F. Supp., at 285 (footnote omitted).
369 U. S., at 188.
Mr. Justice Rutledge in Colegrove believed that the Court should exercise its equitable discretion to refuse relief because “The shortness of the time remaining [before the next election] makes it doubtful whether action could, or would, be taken in time to secure for petitioners the effective relief they seek.” 328 U. S., at 565. In a later separate opinion he emphasized that his vote in Colegrove had been based on the “particular circumstances” of that case. Cook v. Fortson, 329 U. S. 675, 678.
369 U. S., at 232. Cf. also Wood v. Broom, 287 U. S. 1.
“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators. . . IT. S. Const., Art. I, § 4.
328 U. S., at 554.
“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative . . . .” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 2.
The provisions for apportioning Representatives and direct taxes have been amended by the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Amendments, respectively.
We do not reach the arguments that the Georgia statute violates the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As late as 1842, seven States still conducted congressional elections at large. See Paschal, “The House of Representatives: ‘Grand Depository of the Democratic Principle’?” 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 276, 281 (1952).
3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Farrand ed. 1911) 14 (hereafter cited as “Farrand”).
James Madison, who took careful and complete notes during the Convention, believed that in interpreting the Constitution later generations should consider the history of its adoption:
“Such were the defects, the deformities, the diseases and the ominous prospects, for which the Convention were to provide a remedy, and which ought never to be overlooked in expounding & appreciating the Constitutional Charter the remedy that was provided.” Id., at 549.
1 id., at 20.
Id., at 48.
Id., at 472.
See, e. g., id., at 197-198 (Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania); id., at 467 (Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts); id., at 286, 465-466 (Alexander Hamilton of New York); id., at 489-490 (Rufus King of Massachusetts); id., at 322, 446-449, 486, 527-528 (James Madison of Virginia); id., at 180, 456 (Hugh Williamson of North Carolina); id., at 253-254, 406, 449-450, 482-484 (James Wilson of Pennsylvania).
Id., at 180.
Luther Martin of Maryland declared “that the States being equal cannot treat or confederate so as to give up an equality of votes without giving up their liberty: that the propositions on the table were a system of slavery for 10 States: that as Va. Masts. & Pa. have 42/90 of the votes they can do as they please without a miraculous Union of the other ten: that they will have nothing to do, but to gain over one of the ten to make them compleat masters of the rest ...” Id., at 438.
Id., at 251.
3 id., at 613.
E. g., 1 id., at 324 (Alexander Martin of North Carolina); id., at 437-438, 439-441, 444-445, 453-455 (Luther Martin of Maryland); id., at 490-492 (Gunning Bedford of Delaware).
Id., at 464.
Id., at 490.
Gunning Bedford of Delaware said:
“We have been told (with a dictatorial air) that this is the last moment for a fair trial in favor of a good Governmt. . . . The Large States dare not dissolve the confederation. If they do the small ones will find some foreign ally of more honor and good faith, who will take them by the hand and do them justice.” Id., at 492.
Id., at 488.
Id., at 532 (Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts). George Mason of Virginia urged an “accomodation” as “preferable to an appeal to the world by the different sides, as had been talked of by some Gentlemen.” Id., at 533.
See id., at 551.
See id., at 193, 342-343 (Roger Sherman); id., at 461-462 (William Samuel Johnson).
Id., at 462. (Emphasis in original.)
While “free Persons” and those “bound to Service for a Term of Years” were counted in determining representation, Indians not taxed were not counted, and “three fifths of all other Persons” (slaves) were included in computing the States’ populations. Art. I, § 2. Also, every State was to have “at Least one Representative.” Ibid.
1 Farrand, at 580.
Id., at 579.
Id., at 606. Those who thought that one branch should represent wealth were told by Roger Sherman of Connecticut that the “number of people alone [was] the best rule for measuring wealth as well as representation; and that if the Legislature were to be governed by wealth, they would be obliged to estimate it by numbers.” Id., at 582.
2 id., at 3. The rejected thinking of those who supported the proposal to limit western representation is suggested by the statement of Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania that “The Busy haunts of men not the remote wilderness, was the proper School of political Talents.” 1 id., at 583.
Id., at 464.
Id., at 457. “Rotten boroughs” have long since disappeared in Great Britain. Today permanent parliamentary Boundary Commissions recommend periodic changes in the size of constituencies, as population shifts. For the statutory standards under which these commissions operate, see House of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Acts of 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 66, Second Schedule, and of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 26, Schedule.
2 id., at 241.
See, e. g., 2 Works of Alexander Hamilton (Lodge ed. 1904) 25 (statement to New York ratifying convention).
The Federalist, No. 57 (Cooke ed. 1961), at 389.
Id., No. 54, at 368. There has been some question about the authorship of Numbers 54 and 57, see The Federalist (Lodge ed. 1908) xxiii-xxxv, but it is now generally believed that Madison was the author, see, e. g., The Federalist (Cooke ed. 1961) xxvii; The Federalist (Van Doren ed. 1945) vi-vii; Brant, “Settling the Authorship of The Federalist,” 67 Am. Hist. Rev. 71 (1961).
See, e. g., 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (2d Elliot ed. 1836) 11 (Fisher Ames, in the Massachusetts Convention) (hereafter cited as “Elliot”); id., at 202 (Oliver Wolcott, Connecticut); 4 id., at 21 (William Richardson Davie, North Carolina); id., at 257 (Charles Pinckney, South Carolina).
Id., at 304.
“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators. . . .” U. S. Const., Art. I, §4.
See 2 Elliot, at 49 (Francis Dana, in the Massachusetts Convention) ; id., at 50-51 (Rufus King, Massachusetts); 3 id., at 367 (James Madison, Virginia).
4 id., at 71.
2 The Works of James Wilson (Andrews ed. 1896) 15.
The Federalist, No. 57 (Cooke ed. 1961), at 385.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Powell joined.
Under the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits (OASDI) program, 42 U. S. C. §§ 401-431 (1970 ed. and Supp. V), survivors’ benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband covered by the Act are payable to his widow. Such benefits on the basis of the earnings of a deceased wife covered by the Act are payable to the widower, however, only if he “was receiving at least one-half of his support” from his deceased wife. The question in this case is whether this gender-based distinction violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A three-judge District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the different treatment of men and women mandated by § 402 (f)(1)(D) constituted invidious discrimination against female wage earners by affording them less protection for their surviving spouses than is provided to male employees, 396 F. Supp. 308 (1975). We noted probable jurisdiction. 424 U. S. 906 (1976). We affirm.
I
Mrs. Hannah Goldfarb worked as a secretary in the New York City public school system for almost 25 years until her death in 1968. During that entire time she paid in full all social security taxes required by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U. S. C. §§ 3101-3126. She was survived by her husband, Leon Goldfarb, now aged 72, a retired federal employee. Leon duly applied for widower’s benefits. The application was denied with the explanation:
“You do not qualify for a widower’s benefit because you do not meet one of the requirements for such entitlement. This requirement is that you must have been receiving at least one half support from your wife when she died.”
The District Court declared § 402 (f)(1)(D) unconstitutional primarily on the authority of Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975), stating:
“[Section 402 (f)(1)(D)] and its application to this plaintiff, ‘deprive women of protection for their families which men receive as a result of their employment.’ Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645... (1975). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677... (1973)
“Whatever may have been the ratio of contribution to family expenses of the Goldfarbs while they both worked, Mrs. Goldfarb was entitled to the dignity of knowing that her social security tax would contribute to their joint welfare when the couple or one of them retired and to her husband's welfare should she predecease him. She paid taxes at the same rate as men and there is not the slightest scintilla of support for the proposition that working women are less concerned about their spouses’ welfare in old age than are men.” 396 F. Supp., at 308-309.
II
The gender-based distinction drawn by § 402 (f)(1)(D)—burdening a widower but not a widow with the task of proving dependency upon the deceased spouse—presents an equal protection question indistinguishable from that decided in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra. That decision and the decision in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973), plainly require affirmance of the judgment of the District Court.
The statutes held unconstitutional in Frontiero provided increased quarters allowance and medical and dental benefits to a married male member of the uniformed Armed Services whether or not his wife in fact depended on him, while a married female service member could only receive the increased benefits if she in fact provided over one-half of her husband’s support. To justify the classification, the Secretary of Defense argued: “[A]s an empirical matter, wives in our society frequently are dependent upon their husbands, while husbands rarely are dependent upon their wives. Thus,... Congress might reasonably have concluded that it would be both cheaper and easier simply conclusively to presume that wives of male members are financially dependent upon their husbands, while burdening female members with the task of establishing dependency in fact.” 411 U. S., at 688-689. But Frontiero concluded that, by according such differential treatment to male and female members of the uniformed services for the sole purpose of achieving administrative convenience, the challenged statute violated the Fifth Amendment. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76 (1971); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 656-657 (1972); cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 506-507 (1975).
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, like the instant case, presented the question in the context of the OASDI program. There the Court held unconstitutional a provision that denied father’s insurance benefits to surviving widowers with children in their care, while authorizing similar mother’s benefits to similarly situated widows. Paula Wiesenfeld, the principal source of her family’s support, and covered by the Act, died in childbirth, survived by the baby and her husband Stephen. Stephen applied for survivors’ benefits for himself and his infant son. Benefits were allowed the baby under 42 U. S. C. § 402 (d) (1970 ed., Supp. III), but denied the father on the ground that “mother’s benefits” under § 402 (g) were available only to women. The Court reversed, holding that the gender-based distinction made by § 402 (g) was “indistinguishable from that invalidated in Frontiero,” 420 U. S., at 642, and therefore:
“[While] the notion that men are more likely than women to be the primary supporters of their spouses and children is not entirely without empirical support,... such a gender-based generalization cannot suffice to justify the denigration of the efforts of women who do work and whose earnings contribute significantly to their families’ support.
“Section 402 (g) clearly operates, as did the statutes invalidated by our judgment in Frontiero, to deprive women of protection for their families which men receive as a result of their employment. Indeed, the classification here is in some ways more pernicious.... [I]n this case social security taxes were deducted from Paula’s salary during the years in which she worked. Thus, she not only failed to receive for her family the same protection which a similarly situated male worker would have received, but she also was deprived of a portion of her own earnings in order to contribute to the fund out of which benefits would be paid to others.” Id., at 645.
Precisely the same reasoning condemns the gender-based distinction made by § 402 (f)(1)(D) in this case. For that distinction, too, operates “to deprive women of protection for their families which men receive as a result of their employment” : social security taxes were deducted from Hannah Goldfarb’s salary during the quarter century she worked as a secretary, yet, in consequence of § 402 (f)(1)(D), she also “not only failed to receive for her [spouse] the same protection which a similarly situated male worker would have received [for his spouse] but she also was deprived of a portion of her own earnings in order to contribute to the fund out of which benefits would be paid to others.” Wiesenfeld thus inescapably compels the conclusion reached by the District Court that the gender-based differentiation created by § 402 (f)(1)(D)—that results in the efforts of female workers required to pay social security taxes producing less protection for their spouses than is produced by the efforts of men—is forbidden by the Constitution, at least when supported by no more substantial justification than “archaic and overbroad” generalizations, Schlesinger v. Ballard, supra, at 508, or “ ‘old notions' ” Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U. S. 7, 14 (1975), such as “assumptions as to dependency,” Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, at 645, that are more consistent with “the role-typing society has long imposed,” Stanton v. Stanton, supra, at 15, than with contemporary reality. Thus § 402 (f)(1)(D) “‘[b]y providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are... similarly situated... violates the [Fifth Amendment].’ Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 77....” Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, at 653.
III
Appellant, however, would focus equal protection analysis, not upon the discrimination against the covered wage earning female, but rather upon whether her surviving widower was unconstitutionally discriminated against by burdening him but not a surviving widow with proof of dependency. The gist of the argument is that, analyzed from the perspective of the widower, “the denial of benefits reflected the congressional judgment that aged widowers as a class were sufficiently likely not to be dependent upon their wives that it was appropriate to deny them benefits unless they were in fact dependent.” Brief for Appellant 12.
But Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld rejected the virtually identical argument when appellant’s predecessor argued that the statutory classification there attacked should be regarded from the perspective of the prospective beneficiary and not from that of the covered wage earner. The Secretary in that case argued that the “pattern of legislation reflects the considered judgment of Congress that the ‘probable need’ for financial assistance is greater in the case of a widow, with young children to maintain, than in the case of similarly situated males.” Brief for Appellant in No. 73-1892, O. T. 1974, p. 14. The Court, however, analyzed the classification from the perspective of the wage earner and concluded that the classification was unconstitutional because “benefits must be distributed according to classifications which do not without sufficient justification differentiate among covered employees solely on the basis of sex.” 420 U. S., at 647. Thus, contrary to appellant’s insistence, Brief for Appellant 12, Wiesenfeld is “dispositive here.”
From its inception, the social security system has been a program of social insurance. Covered employees and their employers pay taxes into a fund administered distinct from the general federal revenues to purchase protection against the economic consequences of old age, disability, and death. But under § 402 (f)(1)(D) female insureds received less protection for their spouses solely because of their sex. Mrs. Goldfarb worked and paid social security taxes for 25 years at the same rate as her male colleagues, but because of § 402 (f)(1)(D) the insurance protection received by the males was broader than hers. Plainly then § 402 (f)(1)(D) disadvantages women contributors to the social security system as compared to similarly situated men. The section then “impermissibly discriminates against a female wage earner because it provides her family less protection than it provides that of a male wage earner, even though the family needs may be identical.” Wiesenfeld, supra, at 654-655 (Powell, J., concurring). In a sense, of course, both the female wage earner and her surviving spouse are disadvantaged by operation of the statute, but this is because “Social Security is designed... for the protection of the family,” 420 U. S., at 654 (Powell, J., concurring), and the section discriminates against one particular category of family—that in which the female spouse is a wage earner covered by social security. Therefore decision of the equal protection challenge in this case cannot focus solely on the distinction drawn between widowers and widows but, as Wiesenfeld held, upon the gender-based discrimination against covered female wage earners as well.
IV
Appellant’s emphasis upon the sex-based distinction between widow and widower as recipients of benefits rather than that between covered female and covered male employees also emerges in his other arguments. These arguments have no merit.
A
We accept as settled the proposition argued by appellant that Congress has wide latitude to create classifications that allocate noncontractual benefits under a social welfare program. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 776-777 (1975); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 609-610 (1960). It is generally the case, as said, id., at 611:
“Particularly when we deal with a withholding of a noncontractual benefit under a social welfare program such as [Social Security], we must recognize that the Due Process Clause can be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification.”
See also Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 768-770; Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 81, 84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485-486 (1970).
But this “does not, of course, immunize [social welfare legislation] from scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment.” Richardson v. Belcher, supra, at 81. The Social Security Act is permeated with provisions that draw lines in classifying those who are to receive benefits. Congressional decisions in this regard are entitled to deference as those of the institution charged under our scheme of government with the primary responsibility for making such judgments in light of competing policies and interests. But “[t]o withstand constitutional challenge,... classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197 (1976). Such classifications, however, have frequently been revealed on analysis to rest only upon “old notions” and “archaic and overbroad" generalizations, Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U. S., at 14; Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S., at 508; cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 512-513 (1976), and so have been found to offend the prohibitions against denial of equal protection of the law. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, supra; Craig v. Boren, supra. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645 (1972); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 522 (1975).
Therefore, Wiesenfeld, supra, at 646-647, expressly rejected the argument of appellant’s predecessor, relying on Flemming v. Nestor, that the “noncontractual” interest of a covered employee in future social security benefits precluded any claim of denial of equal protection. Rather, Wiesenfeld held that the fact that the interest is “non-contractual" does not mean that “a covered employee has no right whatever to be treated equally with other employees as regards the benefits which flow from his or her employment," nor does it “sanction differential protection for covered employees which is solely gender based.” 420 U. S., at 646. On the contrary, benefits “directly related to years worked and amount earned by a covered employee, and not to the need of the beneficiaries directly,” like the employment-related benefits in Frontiero, “must be distributed according to classifications which do not without sufficient justification differentiate among covered employees solely on the basis of sex.” 420 U. S., at 647.
B
Appellant next argues that Frontiero and Wiesenfeld should be distinguished as involving statutes with different objectives from § 402 (f)(1)(D). Rather than merely enacting presumptions designed to save the expense and trouble of determining which spouses are really dependent, providing benefits to all widows, but only to such widowers as prove dependency, § 402 (f)(1)(D), it is argued, rationally defines different standards of eligibility because of the differing social welfare needs of widowers and widows. That is, the argument runs, Congress may reasonably have presumed that nondependent widows, who receive benefits, are needier than nondependent widowers, who do not, because of job discrimination against women (particularly older women), see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351, 353-354 (1974), and because they are more likely to have been more dependent on their spouses. See Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 645; Kahn v. Shevin, supra, at 354 n. 7.
But “inquiry into the actual purposes” of the discrimination, Wiesenfeld, supra, at 648, proves the contrary. First, § 402 (f)(1)(D) itself is phrased in terms of dependency, not need. Congress chose to award benefits, not to widowers who could prove that they are needy, but to those who could prove that they had been dependent on their wives for more than one-half of their support. On the face of the statute, dependency, not need, is the criterion for inclusion.
Moreover, the general scheme of OASDI shows that dependence on the covered wage earner is the critical factor in determining beneficiary categories. OASDI is intended to insure covered wage earners and their families against the economic and social impact on the family normally entailed by loss of the wage earner's income due to retirement, disability, or death, by providing benefits to replace the lost wages. Cf. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 633-634 (1974). Thus, benefits are not paid, as under other welfare programs, simply to categories of the population at large who need economic assistance, but only to members of the family of the insured wage earner. Moreover, every family member other than a wife or widow is eligible for benefits only if a dependent of the covered wage earner. This accords with the system’s general purpose; one who was not dependent to some degree on the covered wage earner suffers no economic loss when the wage earner leaves the work force. Thus the overall statutory scheme makes actual dependency the general basis of eligibility for OASDI benefits, and the statute, in omitting that requirement for wives and widows, reflects only a presumption that they are ordinarily dependent. At all events, nothing whatever suggests a reasoned congressional judgment that nondependent widows should receive benefits because they are more likely to be needy than nondependent widowers.
Finally, the legislative history of § 402 (f)(1)(D) refutes appellant’s contention. The old-age provisions of the original Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 622, provided pension benefits only to the wage earner himself, with a lump-sum payment to his estate under certain circumstances. Wives’ and widows’ benefits were first provided when coverage was extended to other family members in 1939. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, 53 Stat. 1360, 1364—1366. The general purpose of the amendments was “to afford more adequate protection to the family as a unit.” H. R. Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1939). (Emphasis supplied.) The House Ways and Means Committee criticized the old lump-sum payment because it “make[s] payments to the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether or not he leaves dependents.” Ibid. The Social Security Board, which had initiated the amendments in a report transmitted by the President to Congress, recommended the adoption of survivors’ benefits because “[t]he payment of monthly benefits to widows and orphans, who are the two chief classes of dependent survivors, would furnish more significant protection than does the payment of lump-sum benefits.” H. R. Doc. No. 110, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1939). In addition to recommending survivors’ benefits, the Board suggested the extension of old-age pension benefits “for the aged dependent wife of the retired worker.” Id., at 6. On the Senate floor, Senator Harrison, the principal proponent of the amendments, criticized the then-existing system of benefits because under it “no regard is had as to whether [the covered wage earner] has a dependent wife, or whether he dies leaving a child, widow, or parents.” 84 Cong. Rec. 8827 (1939). There is no indication whatever in any of the legislative history that Congress gave any attention to the specific case of nondependent widows, and found that they were in need of benefits despite their lack of dependency, in order to compensate them for disadvantages caused by sex discrimination. There is every indication that, as Wiesenfeld recognized, 420 U. S., at 644, “the framers of the Act legislated on the ‘then generally accepted presumption that a man is responsible for the support of his wife and children.’ D. Hoskins & L. Bixby, Women and Social Security: Law and Policy in Five Countries, Social Security Administration Research Report No. 42, p. 77 (1973).”
Survivors’ and old-age benefits were not extended to husbands and widowers until 1950. 64 Stat. 483, 485. The legislative history of this provision also demonstrates that Congress did not create the disparity between nondependent widows and widowers with a compensatory purpose. The impetus for change came from the Advisory Council on Social Security, which recommended benefits for “the aged, dependent husband... [and] widower.” The purpose of this recommendation was “[t]o equalize the protection given to the dependents of women and men” because “[u]nder the present program, insured women lack some of the rights which insured men can acquire.” Advisory Council on Social Security, Recommendations for Social Security Legislation, S. Doc. No. 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 38 (1949). (Emphasis supplied in part.) It is clear from the report that the Advisory Council assumed that the provision of benefits to dependent husbands and widowers was the equivalent of the provision of benefits to wives and widows under the previous statute, and not a lesser protection deliberately made because of lesser need. Although the original bill, H. R. 6000, that became the Social Security Act Amendments of 1950 did not contain a provision for husbands’ and widowers’ benefits, the Senate Finance Committee added it, because “the committee believes that protection given to dependents of women and men should be made more comparable.” S. Rep. No. 1669, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 28 (1950). In 1950, as in 1939, there was simply no indication of an intention to create a differential treatment for the benefit of nondependent wives.
We conclude, therefore, that the differential treatment of nondependent widows and widowers results not, as appellant asserts, from a deliberate congressional intention to remedy the arguably greater needs of the former, but rather from an intention to aid the dependent spouses of deceased wage earners, coupled with a presumption that wives are usually dependent. This presents precisely the situation faced in Frontiero and Wiesenfeld. The only conceivable justification for writing the presumption of wives’ dependency into the statute is the assumption, not verified by the Government in Frontiero, 411 U. S., at 689, or here, but based simply on “archaic and overbroad” generalizations, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S., at 508, that it would save the Government time, money, and effort simply to pay benefits to all widows, rather than to require proof of dependency of both sexes. We held in Frontiero, and again in Wiesenfeld, and therefore hold again here, that such assumptions do not suffice to justify a gender-based discrimination in the distribution of employment-related benefits.
Affirmed.
Title 42 U. S. C. §402 (f)(1) (1970 ed. and Supp. V), in pertinent part, provides:
“The widower... of an individual who died a fully insured individual, if such widower—
“(A) has not remarried,
“(B)(i) has attained age 60, or (ii) has attained age 50... and is under a disability...,
“ (C) has filed application for widower’s insurance benefits...,
“(D)(i) was receiving at least one-half of his support... from such individual at the time of her death, or if such individual had a period of disability which did not end prior to the month in which she died, at the time such period began or at the time of her death, and filed proof of such support within two years after the date of such death..., or (ii) was receiving at least one-half of his support... from such individual at the time she became entitled to old-age... insurance benefits..., and filed proof of such support within two years after the month in which she became entitled to such benefits... and,
“(E) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits or is entitled to old-age insurance benefits each of which is less than the primary insurance amount of his deceased wife,
“shall be entitled to a widower’s insurance benefit....”
Compare 42 U. S. C. § 402 (e)(1) (1970 ed. and Supp. V), which provides, in pertinent part:
“The widow... of an individual who died a fully insured individual, if such widow...
“(A) is not married,
“ (B)(i) has attained age 60, or (ii) has attained age 50... and is under a disability...,
“(C)(i) has filed application for widow’s insurance benefits... and
“(D) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits or is entitled to old-age insurance benefits each of which is less than the primary insurance amount of such deceased individual,
“shall be entitled to a widow’s insurance benefit....”
The decision also applied to § 402 (c)(1)(C), which imposes a dependency requirement on husbands of covered female wage earners applying for old-age benefits; wives applying for such benefits are not required to prove dependency, § 402 (b). These gender-based classifications have been uniformly held to be unconstitutional. See Abbott v. Weinberger, Civ. No. C74-194 (ND Ohio, Feb. 12, 1976), appeal docketed sub nom. Califano v. Abbott, No. 75-1643 (husband’s old-age benefits); Coffin v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 400 F. Supp. 953 (DC 1975) (three-judge court), appeal docketed sub nom. Califano v. Coffin, No. 75-791 (both husband’s and widower’s benefits); Jablon v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 399 F. Supp. 118 (Md. 1975) (three-judge court), appeal docketed sub nom. Califano v. Jablon, No. 75-739 (husband’s benefits); Silbowitz v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 397 F. Supp. 862 (SD Fla. 1975) (three-judge court), appeal docketed sub nom. Califano v. Silbowitz, No. 75-712 (husband’s benefits). See also Kalina v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 541 F. 2d 1204 (CA6 1976) (spouse’s annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U. S. C. § 231a (c)(3)(ii) (1970 ed., Supp. V)).
Although Mr. Goldfarb did not pursue an administrative appeal of the denial of his application, appellant concedes that because the denial was based on his failure to meet a clear statutory requirement, further administrative review would have been futile and the initial denial was therefore “final” for purposes of the District Court's jurisdiction to review it under 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g). See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 764-767 (1975).
In order for Mr. Goldfarb to have satisfied §402 (f)(1)(D), his wife would have to have been earning three times what he earned. According to Brief for Appellant 25: “As a practical matter, only husbands whose wives contribute 75 percent of the family income meet [the dependency] test.” That is because in order to meet the test, the wife must have provided for all of her own half of the family budget, plus half of her husband's share. For more elaborate descriptions of the dependency calculation, see 20 CFR § 404.350 (1976); Social Security Claims Manual, §§ 2625, 2628. See also Brief for Appellant 25-26, and n. 14; Brief for Appellee 5 n. 7.
The dissent maintains that this sentence “overstates [the] relevance” of Wiesenfeld and Frontiero. It is sufficient to answer that the principal propositions argued by appellant and in the dissent—namely, the focus on discrimination between surviving, rather than insured, spouses; the reliance on Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351 (1974); the argument that the presumption of female dependence is empirically supportable; and the emphasis on the special deference due to classifications in the Social Security Act—were all asserted and rejected in one or both of those cases as justifications for statutes substantially similar in effect to § 402 (f)(1)(D).
The disadvantage to the woman wage earner is even more pronounced in the case of old-age benefits, to which a similarly unequal dependency requirement applies. 42 U. S. C. §§ 402 (b), (c)(1)(C) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). See n. 2, supra. In that situation, where the insured herself is still living, she is denied not only “the dignity of knowing [during her working career] that her social security tax would contribute to their joint welfare when the couple or one of them retired and to her husband’s welfare should she predecease him,” 396 F. Supp. 308, 309 (EDNY 1975) (opinion below), but also the more tangible benefit of an increase in the income of the family unit of which she remains a part.
See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1939), accompanying the bill that extended social security benefits for the first time beyond the covered wage earner himself. The Report emphasizes that the purpose of the amendments was “to afford more adequate protection to the family as a unit.” (Emphasis supplied.)
This is accepted by appellant and appellee. See, e. g., Brief for Appellant 13 n. 2; Brief for Appellee 23; Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.
In any event, gender-based discriminations against men have been invalidated when they do not “serve important governmental objectives and [are not] substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197 (1976). Neither Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 351 (1974), nor Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498 (1975), relied on by appellant, supports a contrary conclusion. The gender-based distinctions in the statutes involved in Kahn and Ballard were justified because the only discernible purpose of each was the permissible one of redressing our society’s longstanding disparate treatment of women. Craig v. Boren, supra, at 198 n. 6.
But “the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.” Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 648 (1975). That inquiry in this case demonstrates that § 402(f)(1)(D) has no such remedial purpose. See Part IV-B, infra. Moreover, the classifications challenged in Wiesenfeld and in this case rather than advantaging women to compensate for past wrongs compounds those wrongs by penalizing women “who do work and whose earnings contribute significantly to their families’ support.” Wiesenfeld, supra, at 645.
Thus, justifications that suffice for non-gender-based classifications in the social welfare area do not necessarily justify gender discriminations. For example, Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), sustained a discrimination designed to weed out collusive marriages without making case-by-case determinations between marriages of less than nine months’ duration and longer ones on the ground:
“While such a limitation doubtless proves in particular cases to be 'under-inclusive’ or ‘over-inclusive’ in light of its presumed purpose, it is nonetheless a widely accepted response to legitimate interests in administrative economy and certainty of coverage for those who meet its terms.” Id., at 776.
Yet administrative convenience and certainty of result have been found inadequate justifications for gender-based classifications. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71, 76 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 690 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 656-657 (1972) Cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 509-510 (1976).
This argument is made for the first time in appellant’s brief. The Jurisdictional Statement, p. 11, argued only the rationality of “extending to women... the presumption of dependency.”
Although presumed need has been a factor in determining the amounts of social security benefits, in addition to the extent of contributions made to the system, the primary determinants of the benefits received are the years worked and amount earned by the covered worker. 42 U. S. C. §§ 414, 415 (1970 ed. and Supp. V). See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 647, and nn. 14, 15. In any event, need is not a requirement for inclusion in any beneficiary category, 42 U. S. C. § 402 (1970 ed. and Supp. V), and from the beginning was intended to be irrelevant to the right to receive benefits. See H. R. Rep. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1935).
Old-age or survivors’ benefits may be paid to the insured wage earner himself, 42 U. S. C. § 402 (a) (1970 ed. and Supp. V); his spouse, while he is still alive, §§ 402 (b), (c), or after his death, §§ 402 (e), (f), (g); his children, § 402 (d); and his parents, § 402 (h).
Dependency is a prerequisite to qualification for parents’ benefits, §402 (h)(1)(B); children’s benefits, §402 (d)(1)(C); husbands’ benefits, §402 (c)(1)(C); and widowers’ benefits, §402 (f)(1)(D). (Certain children are “de
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was brought in a Utah state court under the Federal Safety Appliance and Federal Employers’ Liability Acts to recover damages for the death of Frank Lucus, an employee of the respondent railroad. The decedent’s death occurred when a one-man flat-top motor-driven track car crashed into the back end of an eighty-two-car freight train on a main-line track at a point near Lemay, Utah. Both train and motorcar were being operated in an eastward direction on railroad business. The train unexpectedly stopped just before the crash occurred because the air in its brake lines escaped, thereby locking the brakes. The air had escaped because of a violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act in that the threads on a valve were so badly worn that a nut became disconnected. When the brakes locked, the motorcar was several hundred feet behind the freight train moving at about the same rate as the train, not an excessive rate under ordinary circumstances. The motorcar was equipped with brakes which had they been applied could have stopped the car within a distance of about one hundred feet. But the decedent who was in control of the car did not apply the brakes. Apparently he and another employee with him were looking backward toward a block signal and therefore did not know the train had stopped.
Despite the proof that the train had stopped because of the railroad’s violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, the state trial judge directed the jury to return a verdict in the railroad’s favor. This resulted from the court’s holding that the Act didn’t apply to Mr. Lucus, that the Act’s protection against defective brakes did not extend to employees following and crashing into a train which stopped suddenly because of defective brake appliances.
On appeal the State Supreme Court affirmed. — Utah —•, 185 P. 2d 963. That court agreed with the trial court’s interpretation of the Safety Appliance Act and also held that the evidence failed to show that the defective appliance was the “legal” cause of the crash and of the death of decedent. The obvious importance of the restrictive interpretation given to the two federal Acts prompted us to grant certiorari.
First We cannot agree with the State Supreme Court’s holding that although the railroad ran its train with defective brakes it thereby “violated no duty owing” to the decedent. That court said that the object of the Safety Appliance Act “insofar as brakes might be concerned, is not to protect employees from standing, but from moving trains.”
We do not view the Act’s purpose so narrowly. It commands railroads not to run trains with defective brakes. An abrupt or unexpected stop due to bad brakes might be equally dangerous to employees and others as a failure to stop a train because of bad brakes. And this Act, fairly interpreted, must be held to protect all who need protection from dangerous results due to maintenance or operation of congressionally prohibited defective appliances. Fairport, P. & E. R. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U. S. 589, 597. Liability of a railroad under the Safety Appliance Act for injuries inflicted as a result of the Act’s violation follows from the unlawful use of prohibited defective equipment “not from the position the employee may be in or the work which he may be doing at the moment when he is injured.” Brady v. Terminal R. Assn., 303 U. S. 10, 16; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U. S. 617, 621. In this case where undisputed evidence established that the train suddenly stopped because of defective air-brake appliances, petitioner was entitled to recover if this defective equipment was the sole or a contributory proximate cause of the decedent employee’s death. Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U. S. 239, 243; Spokane & I. E. R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U. S. 497, 509-510.
Second. The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the evidence here and held as a matter of law that the defective equipment did not proximately cause or contribute to the decedent’s death. That court discussed distinctions between “proximate cause” in the legal sense, deemed a sufficient cause to impose liability, and “cause” in the “philosophic sense,” deemed insufficient to impose liability. It considered the stopping of this train to have been a cause of decedent’s death in the “philosophic sense” in that the stopping created “a condition upon which the negligence of plaintiffs’ intestate operated,” one perhaps of many causes “so insignificant that no ordinary mind would think of them as causes.” The court added, however, that the stopping “was not the legal cause of the result,” thereby classifying it as not “a substantial factor as well as actual factor in bringing about” the decedent’s death. This conclusion was reached in part upon the reasoning that “The leak in the triple valve caused the train to stop, because as a safety device, it was designed to do just that.”
The language selected by Congress to fix liability in cases of this kind is simple and direct. Consideration of its meaning by the introduction of dialectical subtleties can serve no useful interpretative purpose. The statute declares that railroads shall be responsible for their employees’ deaths “resulting in whole or in part” from defective appliances such as were here maintained. 45 U. S. C. § 51. And to make its purpose crystal clear, Congress has also provided that “no such employee . . . shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case” where a violation of the Safety Appliance Act, such as the one here, “contributed to the . . . death of such employee.” 45 U. S. C. § 53. Congress has thus for its own reasons imposed extraordinary safety obligations upon railroads and has commanded that if a breach of these obligations contributes in part to an employee’s death, the railroad must pay damages. These air-brakes were defective; for this reason alone the train suddenly and unexpectedly stopped; a motor track car following at about the same rate of speed and operated by an employee looking in another direction crashed into the train; all of these circumstances were inseparably related to one another in time and space. The jury could have found that decedent’s death resulted from any or all of the foregoing circumstances.
It was error to direct a verdict for the railroad. The judgment of the State Supreme Court is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
27 Stat. 531, 45 U. S. C. §§ 1, 8, 9; 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 36 Stat. 291, and 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U. S. C. §§ 51, 53.
Petitioner was employed by the railroad as a signal maintainer. The other occupant of the motorcar had just been employed to work in the same capacity. This was the new employee’s first trip and he took the trip to familiarize himself with the signals. Both occupants of the car were seated and looking back in the direction of a block signal. Contributory negligence is not a defense to this action.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case focuses upon a criminal defendant whom a state court found mentally competent to stand trial if represented by counsel but not mentally competent to conduct that trial himself. We must decide whether in these circumstances the Constitution prohibits a State from insisting that the defendant proceed to trial with counsel, the State thereby denying the defendant the right to represent himself. See U. S. Const., Amdt. 6; Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975). We conclude that the Constitution does not forbid a State so to insist.
I
In July 1999, Ahmad Edwards, the respondent, tried to steal a pair of shoes from an Indiana department store. After he was discovered, he drew a gun, fired at a store security officer, and wounded a bystander. He was caught and then charged with attempted murder, battery with a deadly weapon, criminal recklessness, and theft. His mental condition subsequently became the subject of three competency proceedings and two self-representation requests, mostly before the same trial judge:
1. First Competency Hearing: August 2000. Five months after Edwards’ arrest, his court-appointed counsel asked for a psychiatric evaluation. After hearing psychiatrist and neuropsychologist witnesses (in February 2000 and again in August 2000), the court found Edwards incompetent to stand trial, App. 365a, and committed him to Logansport State Hospital for evaluation and treatment, see id., at 48a-53a.
2. Second Competency Hearing: March 2002. Seven months after his commitment, doctors found that Edwards’ condition had improved to the point where he could stand trial. Id., at 63a-64a. Several months later, however, but still before trial, Edwards’ counsel asked for another psychiatric evaluation. In March 2002, the judge held a competency hearing, considered additional psychiatric evidence, and (in April) found that Edwards, while “suffering] from mental illness,” was “competent to assist his attorneys in his defense and stand trial for the charged crimes.” Id., at 114a.
3. Third Competency Hearing: April 2003. Seven months later but still before trial, Edwards’ counsel sought yet another psychiatric evaluation of his client. And, in April 2003, the court held yet another competency hearing. Edwards’ counsel presented further psychiatric and neuropsychological evidence showing that Edwards was suffering from serious thinking difficulties and delusions. A testifying psychiatrist reported that Edwards could understand the charges against him, but he was “unable to cooperate with his attorney in his defense because of his schizophrenic illness”; “[h]is delusions and his marked difficulties in thinking make it impossible for him to cooperate with his attorney.” Id., at 164a. In November 2003, the court concluded that Edwards was not then competent to stand trial and ordered his recommitment to the state hospital. Id., at 206a-211a.
4. First Self-Representation Request and First Trial: June 2005. About eight months after his commitment, the hospital reported that Edwards’ condition had again improved to the point that he had again become competent to stand trial. Id., at 228a-236a. And almost one year after that, Edwards’ trial began. Just before trial, Edwards asked to represent himself. Id., at 509a, 520a. He also asked for a continuance, which, he said, he needed in order to proceed pro se. Id., at 519a-520a. The court refused the continuance. Id., at 520a. Edwards then proceeded to trial represented by counsel. The jury convicted him of criminal recklessness and theft but failed to reach a verdict on the charges of attempted murder and battery.
5. Second Self-Representation Request and Second Trial: December 2005. The State decided to retry Edwards on the attempted murder and battery charges. Just before the retrial, Edwards again asked the court to permit him to represent himself. Id., at 279a-282a. Referring to the lengthy record of psychiatric reports, the trial court noted that Edwards still suffered from schizophrenia and concluded that “[w]ith these findings, he’s competent to stand trial but I’m not going to find he’s competent to defend himself.” Id., at 527a. The court denied Edwards’ self-representation request. Edwards was represented by appointed counsel at his retrial. The jury convicted Edwards on both of the remaining counts.
Edwards subsequently appealed to Indiana’s intermediate appellate court. He argued that the trial court’s refusal to permit him to represent himself at his retrial deprived him of his constitutional right of self-representation. U. S. Const., Amdt. 6; Faretta, supra. The court agreed and ordered a new trial. The matter then went to the Indiana Supreme Court. That court found that “[t]he record in this case presents a substantial basis to agree with the trial court,” 866 N. E. 2d 252, 260 (2007), but it nonetheless affirmed the intermediate appellate court on the belief that this Court’s precedents, namely, Faretta, supra, and Godinez v. Moran, 509 U. S. 389 (1993), required the State to allow Edwards to represent himself. At Indiana’s request, we agreed to consider whether the Constitution required the trial court to allow Edwards to represent himself at trial.
II
Our examination of this Court’s precedents convinces us that those precedents frame the question presented, but they do not answer it. The two cases that set forth the Constitution’s “mental competence” standard, Dusky v. United States, 362 U. S. 402 (1960) (per curiam), and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U. S. 162 (1975), specify that the Constitution does not permit trial of an individual who lacks “mental competency.” Dusky defines the competency standard as including both (1) “whether” the defendant has “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him” and (2) whether the defendant “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” 362 U. S., at 402 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). Drope repeats that standard, stating that it “has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.” 420 U. S., at 171 (emphasis added). Neither case considered the mental competency issue presented here, namely, the relation of the mental competence standard to the right of self-representation.
The Court’s foundational “self-representation” case, Faretta, held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments include a “constitutional right to proceed without counsel when” a criminal defendant “voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.” 422 U. S., at 807 (emphasis in original). The Court implied that right from: (1) a “nearly universal conviction,” made manifest in state law, that “forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so,” id., at 817-818; (2) Sixth Amendment language granting rights to the “accused”; (3) Sixth Amendment structure indicating that the rights it sets forth, related to the “fair administration of American justice,” are “personal!]” to the accused, id., at 818-821; (4) the absence of historical examples of forced representation, id., at 821-832; and (5) “ ‘respect for the individual,’ ” id., at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 350-351 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel “must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law’ ”)).
Faretta does not answer the question before us both because it did not consider the problem of mental competency (cf. 422 U. S., at 835 (Faretta was “literate, competent, and understanding”)), and because Faretta itself and later cases have made clear that the right of self-representation is not absolute, see Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U. S. 152, 163 (2000) (no right of self-representation on direct appeal in a criminal case); Mc-Kaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U. S. 168, 178-179 (1984) (appointment of standby counsel over self-represented defendant’s objection is permissible); Faretta, 422 U. S., at 835, n. 46 (no right “to abuse the dignity of the courtroom”); ibid, (no right to avoid compliance with “relevant rules of procedural and substantive law”); id., at 834, n. 46 (no right to “en-gag[e] in serious and obstructionist misconduct,” referring to Illinois v. Allen, supra). The question here concerns a mental-illness-related limitation on the scope of the self-representation right.w
The sole case in which this Court considered mental competence and self-representation together, Godinez, supra, presents a question closer to that at issue here. The case focused upon a borderline-competent criminal defendant who had asked a state trial court to permit him to represent himself and to change his pleas from not guilty to guilty. The state trial court had found that the defendant met Dusky’s mental competence standard, that he “knowingly and intelligently” waived his right to assistance of counsel, and that he “freely and voluntarily” chose to plead guilty. 509 U. S., at 393 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the state trial court had consequently granted the defendant’s self-representation and change-of-plea requests. See id., at 392-393. A federal appeals court, however, had vacated the defendant’s guilty pleas on the ground that the Constitution required the trial court to ask a further question, namely, whether the defendant was competent to waive his constitutional right to counsel. See id., at 393-394. Competence to make that latter decision, the appeals court said, required the defendant to satisfy a higher mental competency standard than the standard set forth in Dusky. See 509 U. S., at 393-394. Dusky’s more general standard sought only to determine whether a defendant represented by counsel was competent to stand trial, not whether he was competent to waive his right to counsel. 509 U. S., at 394-395.
This Court, reversing the Court of Appeals, “rejected] the notion that competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel must be measured by a standard that is higher than (or even different from) the Dusky standard.” Id., at 398. The decision to plead guilty, we said, “is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a [represented] defendant may be called upon to make during the course of a trial.” Ibid. Hence “there is no reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights.” Id., at 399. And even assuming that self-representation might pose special trial-related difficulties, “the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself.” Ibid, (emphasis in original). For this reason, we concluded, “the defendant’s ‘technical legal knowledge’ is ‘not relevant’ to the determination.” Id., at 400 (quoting Faretta, supra, at 836).
We concede that Godinez bears certain similarities with the present case. Both involve mental competence and self-representation. Both involve a defendant who wants to represent himself. Both involve a mental condition that falls in a gray area between Dusky’s minimal constitutional requirement that measures a defendant’s ability to stand trial and a somewhat higher standard that measures mental fitness for another legal purpose.
We nonetheless conclude that Godinez does not answer the question before us now. In part that is because the Court of Appeals’ higher standard at issue in Godinez differs in a critical way from the higher standard at issue here. In Godinez, the higher standard sought to measure the defendant’s ability to proceed on his own to enter a guilty plea; here the higher standard seeks to measure the defendant’s ability to conduct trial proceedings. To put the matter more specifically, the Godinez defendant sought only to change his pleas to guilty, he did not seek to conduct trial proceedings, and his ability to conduct a defense at trial was expressly not at issue. Thus we emphasized in Godinez that we needed to consider only the defendant’s “competence to waive the right.” 509 U. S., at 399 (emphasis in original). And we further emphasized that we need not consider the defendant’s “technical legal knowledge” about how to proceed at trial. Id., at 400 (internal quotation marks omitted). We found our holding consistent with this Court’s earlier statement in Massey v. Moore, 348 U. S. 105, 108 (1954), that “[o]ne might not be insane in the sense of being incapable of standing trial and yet lack the capacity to stand trial without benefit of counsel.” See Godinez, supra, at 399-400, n. 10 (quoting Massey and noting that it dealt with “a question that is quite different from the question presented” in Godinez). In this case, the very matters that we did not consider in Godinez are directly before us.
For another thing, Godinez involved a State that sought to permit a gray-area defendant to represent himself. Godinez’s constitutional holding is that a State may do so. But that holding simply does not tell a State whether it may deny a gray-area defendant the right to represent himself — the matter at issue here. One might argue that Godinez’s grant (to a State) of permission to allow a gray-area defendant self-representation must implicitly include permission to deny self-representation. Cf. 509 U. S., at 402 (“States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation”). Yet one could more forcefully argue that Godinez simply did not consider whether the Constitution requires self-representation by gray-area defendants even in circumstances where the State seeks to disallow it (the question here). The upshot is that, in our view, the question before us is an open one.
Ill
We now turn to the question presented. We assume that a criminal defendant has sufficient mental competence to stand trial (i. e., the defendant meets Dusky’s standard) and that the defendant insists on representing himself during that trial. We ask whether the Constitution permits a State to limit that defendant’s self-representation right by insisting upon representation by counsel at trial — on the ground that the defendant lacks the mental capacity to conduct his trial defense unless represented.
Several considerations taken together lead us to conclude that the answer to this question is yes. First, the Court’s precedent, while not answering the question, points slightly in the direction of our affirmative answer. Godinez, as we have just said, simply leaves the question open. But the Court’s “mental competency” cases set forth a standard that focuses directly upon a defendant’s “present ability to consult with his lawyer,” Dusky, 862 U. S., at 402 (internal quotation marks omitted); a “capacity ... to consult with counsel,” and an ability “to assist [counsel] in preparing his defense,” Drope, 420 U. S., at 171. See ibid. (“It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial” (emphasis added)). These standards assume representation by counsel and emphasize the importance of counsel. They thus suggest (though do not hold) that an instance in which a defendant who would choose to forgo counsel at trial presents a very different set of circumstances, which in our view, calls for a different standard.
At the same time Faretta, the foundational self-representation case, rested its conclusion in part upon preexisting state law set forth in cases all of which are consistent with, and at least two of which expressly adopt, a competency limitation on the self-representation right. See 422 U. S., at 813, and n. 9 (citing 16 state-court decisions and two secondary sources). See, e.g., Cappetta v. State, 204 So. 2d 913, 917-918 (Fla. App. 1967), rev’d on other grounds, 216 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1968), cited in Faretta, supra, at 813, n. 9 (assuring a “mentally competent” defendant the right “to conduct his own defense” provided that “no unusual circumstances exist” such as, e. g., “mental derangement” that “would ... depriv[e]” the defendant “of a fair trial if allowed to conduct his own defense,” 204 So. 2d, at 917-918); id., at 918 (noting that “whether unusual circumstances are evident is a matter resting in the sound discretion granted to the trial judge”); Allen v. Commonwealth, 324 Mass. 558, 562-563, 87 N. E. 2d 192, 195 (1949) (noting “the assignment of counsel” was “necessary” where there was some “special circumstance” such as when the criminal defendant was “mentally defective”).
Second, the nature of the problem before us cautions against the use of a single mental competency standard for deciding both (1) whether a defendant who is represented by counsel can proceed to trial and (2) whether a defendant who goes to trial must be permitted to represent himself. Mental illness itself is not a unitary concept. It varies in degree. It can vary over time. It interferes with an individual’s functioning at different times in different ways. The history of this case (set forth in Part I, supra) illustrates the complexity of the problem. In certain instances an individual may well be able to satisfy Dusky’s mental competence standard, for he will be able to work with counsel at trial, yet at the same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel. See, e. g., N. Poythress, R. Bonnie, J. Monahan, R. Otto, & S. Hoge, Adjudicative Competence: The MacArthur Studies 103 (2002) (“Within each domain of adjudicative competence (competence to assist counsel; decisional competence) the data indicate that understanding, reasoning, and appreciation [of the charges against a defendant] are separable and somewhat independent aspects of functional legal ability”). See also McKaskle, 465 U. S., at 174 (describing trial tasks as including organization of defense, making motions, arguing points of law, participating in voir dire, questioning witnesses, and addressing the court and jury).
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) tells us (without dispute) in its amicus brief filed in support of neither party that “[disorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and other common symptoms of severe mental illnesses can impair the defendant’s ability to play the significantly expanded role required for self-representation even if he can play the lesser role of represented defendant.” Brief for APA et al. as Amici Curiae 26. Motions and other documents that the defendant prepared in this case (one of which we include in the Appendix, infra) suggest to a layperson the common sense of this general conclusion.
Third, in our view, a right of self-representation at trial will not “affirm the dignity” of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel. McKaskle, supra, at 176-177 (“Dignity” and “autonomy” of individual underlie self-representation right). To the contrary, given that defendant’s uncertain mental state, the spectacle that could well result from his self-representation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling. Moreover, insofar as a defendant’s lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence, self-representation in that exceptional context undercuts the most basic of the Constitution’s criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial. As* Justice Brennan put it, “[t]he Constitution would protect none of us if it prevented the courts from acting to preserve the very processes that the Constitution itself prescribes.” Allen, 397 U. S., at 350 (concurring opinion). See Martinez, 528 U. S., at 162 (“Even at the trial level ... the government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer”). See also Sell v. United States, 539 U. S. 166, 180 (2003) (“[T]he Government has a concomitant, constitutionally essential interest in assuring that the defendant’s trial is a fair one”).
Further, proceedings must not only be fair, they must “appear fair to all who observe them.” Wheat v. United States, 486 U. S. 153, 160 (1988). An amicus brief reports one psychiatrist’s reaction to having observed a patient (a patient who had satisfied Dusky) try to conduct his own defense: “[H]ow in the world can our legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?” Brief for State of Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). See Massey, 348 U. S., at 108 (“No trial can be fair that leaves the defense to a man who is insane, unaided by counsel, and who by reason of his mental condition stands helpless and alone before the court”). The application of Dusky’s basic mental competence standard can help in part to avoid this result. But given the different capacities needed to proceed to trial without counsel, there is little reason to believe that Dusky alone is sufficient. At the same time, the trial judge, particularly one such as the trial judge in this case, who presided over one of Edwards’ competency hearings and his two trials, will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant.
We consequently conclude that the Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so. That is to say, the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.
IV
Indiana has also asked us to adopt, as a measure of a defendant’s ability to conduct a trial, a more specific standard that would “deny a criminal defendant the right to represent himself at trial where the defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury.” Brief for Petitioner 20 (emphasis deleted). We are sufficiently uncertain, however, as to how that particular standard would work in practice to refrain from endorsing it as a federal constitutional standard here. We need not now, and we do not, adopt it.
Indiana has also asked us to overrule Faretta. We decline to do so. We recognize that judges have sometimes expressed concern that Faretta, contrary to its intent, has led to trials that are unfair. See Martinez, supra, at 164 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting practical concerns of trial judges). But recent empirical research suggests that such instances are not common. See, e. g., Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N. C. L. Rev. 423, 427, 447, 428 (2007) (noting that of the small number of defendants who chose to proceed pro se—“roughly 0.3% to 0.5%” of the total, state felony defendants in particular “appear to have achieved higher felony acquittal rates than their represented counterparts in that they were less likely to have been convicted of felonies”). At the same time, instances in which the trial’s fairness is in doubt may well be concentrated in the 20 percent or so of self-representation cases where the mental competence of the defendant is also at issue. See id., at 428 (about 20 percent of federal pro se felony defendants ordered to undergo competency evaluations). If so, today’s opinion, assuring trial judges the authority to deal appropriately with cases in the latter category, may well alleviate those fair trial concerns.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Indiana is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
APPENDIX
Excerpt from respondent’s filing entitled ‘“Defendant’s Version of the Instant Offense,’ ” which he had attached to his presentence investigation report:
“ ‘The appointed motion of permissive intervention filed therein the court superior on, 6-26-01 caused a stay of action and apon it’s expiration or thereafter three years the plan to establish a youth program to and for the coordination of aspects of law enforcement to prevent and reduce crime amoung young people in Indiana became a diplomatic act as under the Safe Streets Act of 1967, “A omnibuc considerate agent: I membered clients within the public and others that at/production of the courts actions showcased causes. The costs of the stay (Trial Rule 60) has a derivative property that is: my knowledged events as not unnexpended to contract the membered clients is the commission of finding a facilitie for this plan or project to become organization of administrative recommendations conditioned by governors.’” 866 N. E. 2d, at 258, n. 4 (alterations omitted).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice White, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join.
This case presents the issue of the legality, under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, of a warrantless seizure of an automobile and the examination of its exterior at a police impoundment area after the car had been removed from a public parking lot.
Evidence obtained upon this examination was introduced at the respondent’s state court trial for first-degree murder. He was convicted. The Federal District Court, on a habeas corpus application, ruled that the examination was a search violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 354 F. Supp. 26 (SD Ohio 1972). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 476 F. 2d 467 (1973). We granted certiorari, 414 U. S. 1062 (1973), and now conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, there was no violation of the protection afforded by the Amendments.
I
In 1968 respondent Arthur Ben Lewis, Jr., was tried and convicted by a jury in an Ohio state court for the first-degree murder of Paul Radcliffe. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of conviction. State v. Lewis, 22 Ohio St. 2d 125, 258 N. E. 2d 445 (1970). This Court denied review. Lewis v. Ohio, 400 U. S. 959 (1970).
On respondent’s federal habeas application, the District Court, from the record and after an evidentiary-hearing, adduced the following facts:
On the afternoon of July 19, 1967, Radcliffe’s body was found near his car on the banks of the Olentangy River in Delaware County, Ohio. The car had gone over the embankment and had come to rest in brush. Radcliffe had died from shotgun wounds. Casts were made of tire tracks at the scene, and foreign paint scrapings were removed from the right rear fender of Radcliffe’s automobile.
Within five days of Radcliffe’s death, the investigation began to focus upon respondent Lewis. It was learned that Lewis knew Radcliffe. Lewis had been negotiating the sale of a business and had executed a contract of sale. The purchaser, Jack Smith, employed Radcliffe,. an accountant, to examine Lewis’ books. Police went to Lewis’ place of business to question him and there observed the model and color of his car in the thought that it might have been used to push the Radcliffe vehicle over the embankment. Not until several months later, however, in late September, was Lewis again questioned. On October 9, he was asked to appear the next morning at the Office of the Division of Criminal Activities in Columbus for further interrogation.
On October 10, at 8 a. m., a warrant for respondent’s arrest was obtained. The District Court found that at this time, in addition to probable cause for the arrest, the police also had probable cause to believe that Lewis’ ear was used in the commission of the crime. An automobile similar to his had been observed leaving the scene; the color of his vehicle was similar to the color of the paint scrapings from the victim’s car; in a telephone call to Mrs. Smith, made by a person who said he was Radcliffe, but proved not to be, the caller made statements that, if true, would benefit only Lewis; he had had body repair work done on the grille, hood, right front fender, and other parts of his car on the day following the crime; and the victim’s desk calendar for the day of his death showed the notation, “Call Ben Lewis.”
Respondent Lewis complied with the request to appear. He drove his car to the Activities Office, placed it in a public commercial parking lot a half block away, and arrived shortly after 10 a. m. Although the police were in possession of the arrest warrant for the entire period that Lewis was present, he was not served with that warrant or arrested until late that afternoon, at approximately 5 p. m. Two hours earlier, Lewis had been permitted to call his lawyer, and two attorneys were present on his behalf in the office at the time of the formal arrest. Upon the arrest, Lewis’ car keys and the parking lot claim check were released to the police. A tow truck was dispatched to remove the car from the parking lot to the police impoundment lot.
The impounded car was examined the next day by a technician from the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation. The tread of its right rear tire was found to match the cast of a tire impression made at the scene of the crime. The technician testified that, in his opinion, the foreign paint on the fender of Radcliffe’s car was not different from the paint samples taken from respondent’s vehicle, that is, there was no difference in color, texture, or order of layering of the paint.
The District Court concluded that the seizure and examination of Lewis’ car were violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the evidence obtained therefrom should have been excluded at the state court trial. The court, accordingly, issued a writ of habeas corpus requiring the State to “initiate action for a new trial of” respondent within 90 days or, in the alternative, to release him. 354 F. Supp., at 44. The Court of Appeals, in affirming, held that the scraping of paint from the exterior of Lewis’ car was in fact a search, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; that there was no consent to that search; that it was not incident to Lewis’ arrest; and that the seizure of the car could not be justified on the ground that the vehicle was an instrumentality of the crime in plain view.
II
This case is factually different from prior car search cases decided by this Court. The evidence with which we are concerned is not the product of a “search” that implicates traditional considerations of the owner’s privacy-interest. It consisted of paint scrapings from the exterior and an observation of the tread of a tire on an operative wheel. The issue, therefore, is whether the examination of an automobile’s exterior upon probable cause invades a right to privacy which the interposition of a warrant requirement is meant to protect. This is an issue this Court has not previously addressed.
The common-law notion that a warrant to search and seize is dependent upon the assertion of a superior government interest in property, see, e. g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765), and the proposition that a warrant is valid “only when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the possession of it,” Couled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 309 (1921), were explicitly rejected as controlling Fourth Amendment considerations in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 302-306 (1967). Rather than property rights, the primary object of the Fourth Amendment was determined to be the protection of privacy. Id., at 305-306. And it had been said earlier: “The decisions of this Court have time and again underscored the essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment to shield the citizen from unwarranted intrusions into his privacy.” Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 498 (1958). See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 769-770 (1966); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 350 (1967); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1973).
At least since Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925), the Court has recognized a distinction between the warrantless search and seizure of automobiles or other movable vehicles, on the one hand, and the search of a home or office, on the other. Generally, less stringent warrant requirements have been applied to vehicles. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 49 (1970), the Court chronicled the development of car searches and seizures. An underlying factor in the Carroll-Chambers line of decisions has been the exigent circumstances that exist in connection with movable vehicles. “[Tjhe circumstances that furnish probable cause to search a particular auto for particular articles are most often unforeseeable; moreover, the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S., at 50-51. This is strikingly true where the automobile's owner is alerted to police intentions and, as a consequence, the motivation to remove evidence from official grasp is heightened.
There is still another distinguishing factor. “The search of an automobile is far less intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one’s person or of a building.” Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view. See People v. Case, 220 Mich. 379, 388-389, 190 N. W. 289, 292 (1922). “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S., at 351; United States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S., at 14. This is not to say that no part of the interior of an automobile has Fourth Amendment protection; the exercise of a desire to be mobile does not, of course, waive one’s right to be free of unreasonable government intrusion. But insofar as Fourth Amendment protection extends to a motor vehicle, it is the right to privacy that is the touchstone of our inquiry.
In the present case, nothing from the interior of the car and no personal effects, which the Fourth Amendment traditionally has been deemed to protect, were searched or seized and introduced in evidence. With the “search” limited to the examination of the tire on the wheel and the taking of paint scrapings from the exterior of the vehicle left in the public parking lot, we fail to comprehend what expectation of privacy was infringed. Stated simply, the invasion of privacy, “if it can be said to exist, is abstract and theoretical.” Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U. S. 861, 865 (1974). Under circumstances such as these, where probable cause exists, a warrantless examination of the exterior of a car is not unreasonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Here, it has been established and is conceded that the police had probable cause to search Lewis’ car. An automobile similar in color and model to his car had been seen leaving the scene of the crime. This similarity was corroborated by comparison of the paint scrapings taken from the victim’s car with the color and paint of Lewis’ automobile. Lewis had had repair work done on his car immediately following the death of the victim. And he had a nexus with Radcliffe on the day of death. All this provided reason to believe that the car was used in the commission of the crime for which Lewis was arrested. Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58, 61 (1967).
Ill
Concluding, as we have, that the examination of the exterior of the vehicle upon probable cause was reasonable, we have yet to determine whether the prior impoundment of the automobile rendered that examination a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We do not think that, because the police impounded the car prior to the examination, which they could have made on the spot, there is a constitutional barrier to the use of the evidence obtained thereby. Under the circumstances of this case, the seizure itself was not unreasonable.
Respondent asserts that this case is indistinguishable from Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971). We do not agree. The present case differs from Coolidge both in the scope of the search and in the circumstances of the seizure. Since the Coolidge car was parked on the defendant's driveway, the seizure of that automobile required an entry upon private property. Here, as in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42 (1970), the automobile was seized from a public place where access was not meaningfully restricted. This is, in fact, the ground upon which the Coolidge plurality opinion distinguished Chambers, 403 U. S., at 463 n. 20. See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 446-447 (1973).
In considering whether the lack of a warrant to seize a vehicle invalidates the otherwise legal examination of the car, Chambers is highly pertinent. In Chambers, four men in an automobile were arrested shortly after an armed robbery. The Court concluded that there was probable cause to arrest and probable cause to search the vehicle. The car was taken from the highway to the police station where, some time later, a search producing incriminating evidence, was conducted. We stated:
“For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
“. . . The probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured. In that event there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate search without a warrant and the car’s immobilization until a warrant is obtained.” 399 U. S., at 52.
The fact that the car in Chambers was seized after being stopped on a highway, whereas Lewis’ car was seized from a public parking lot, has little, if any, legal significance. The same arguments and considerations of exigency, immobilization on the spot, and posting a guard obtain. In fact, because the interrogation session ended with awareness that Lewis had been arrested and that his car constituted incriminating evidence, the incentive and potential for the car’s removal substantially-increased. There was testimony at the federal hearing that Lewis asked one of his attorneys to see that his wife and family got the car, and that the attorney relinquished the keys to the police in order to avoid a physical confrontation. 354 F. Supp., at 33. In Chambers, all occupants of the car were in custody and there were no means of relating this fact or the location of the car (if it had not been impounded) to a friend or confederate. Chambers also stated that a search of the car on the spot was impractical because it was dark and the search could not be carefully executed. 399 U. S., at 52 n. 10. Here too, the seizure facilitated the type of close examination necessary.
Respondent contends that here, unlike Chambers, probable cause to search the car existed for some time prior to arrest and that, therefore, there were no exigent circumstances. Assuming that probable cause previously existed, we know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment. Exigent circumstances with regard to vehicles are not limited to situations where probable cause is unforeseeable and arises only at the time of arrest. Cf. Chambers, id., at 50-51. The exigency may arise at any time, and the fact that the police might have obtained a warrant earlier does not negate the possibility of a current situation’s necessitating prompt police action.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
The arrest warrant was obtained in Delaware County, where the crime was committed. The Activities Office is in adjacent Franklin County. In Ohio, an arrest warrant may be served in any county of the State. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2941.36 (1953). In contrast, a search warrant in Ohio may be issued by a judge or magistrate only “within his jurisdiction.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2933.21 (Supp. 1972). Thus, a search warrant obtained in Delaware County is not valid in Franklin County.
The call was made at about 9:30 a. m. on July 19 by a man who identified himself to Mrs. Smith as Radcliffe and who stated that the books were in “A-l condition.” Mrs. Smith, who knew the victim, did not identify the caller as Radcliffe. Gunshots were heard between 8 a. m. and 8:30 a. m. that day by two women who lived near the site of the crime. It thus became clear that someone had impersonated Radcliffe in making the telephone call.
The calendar’s page for July 19 was missing. Investigation disclosed a writing indentation, on the next and underlying page for July 20, which indicated what had been written on the page for July 19.
Apparently, the car’s trunk was also opened and a tire in the trunk was observed. 354 F. Supp. 26, 33; 476 F. 2d 467, 468. No evidence obtained from any part of the interior of the vehicle, however, was introduced.
The Court there discussed the following post -Carroll cases: Busty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 (1931); Scher v. United States, 305 U. S. 251 (1938); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1949); Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364 (1964); Cooper v. California, 386 U. S. 58 (1967); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U. S. 216 (1968). Cases decided since Chambers and that now might be added to the list include Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266 (1973); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973). See also Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234 (1968); Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 835 (1974).
Petitioner contends that Lewis’ car keys and the parking lot claim check were seized in plain view as an incident to his arrest, and that this seizure served to transfer constructive possession of the vehicle which could then be searched and seized as an instrumentality of the crime. We feel that the District Court and the Court of Appeals were correct in rejecting this argument. Irrespective of the plain-view or instrumentality analyses, the concept of constructive possession has not been found to justify the search or seizure of an item not in actual possession.
As has been noted, the arrest was made at the Office of the Division of Criminal Activities; but the examination of the vehicle took place some time later at the police impoundment lot. This difference in time and place eliminates any search-incident-to-an-arrest contention.
“The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction. of evidence of the crime — things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused's person or under his immediate control. But these justifica^ tions are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest.” Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 367 (1964). See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 47 (1970).
Again, we are not confronted with any issue as to the propriety of a search of a car’s interior. “Neither Carroll, supra, nor other cases in this Court require or suggest that in every conceivable circumstance the search of an auto even with probable cause may be made without the extra protection for privacy that a warrant affords.” Id., at 50.
Coolidge concerned a thorough and extensive search of the entire automobile including the interior from which, by vacuum sweepings, incriminating evidence was obtained. A search of that kind raises different and additional considerations not present in the examination of a tire on an operative wheel and in the taking of exterior paint samples from the vehicle in the present case for which there was no reasonable expectation of privacy.
Before the District Court, the State argued that Lewis had consented to the seizure of his car by requesting that the police impound it for safekeeping. The District Court stated:
“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, petitioner [Lewis] did not clearly and unequivocally consent to the seizure and search of the automobile. The testimony . . . established, at most, that petitioner consented to their taking custody of the car for safekeeping. There is no evidence that petitioner consented, expressly or impliedly, to a seizure of the automobile for purposes of a search. .. .” 354 F. Supp., at 37-38.
Inasmuch as we hold the seizure to be justified under Chambers, we do not reach the issue of Lewis’ consent.
To make a comparison with a paint scraping required that a section of the painted exterior that had not been recently repaired be sampled. This conceivably could necessitate several scrapings if the first sample was not conclusive after laboratory analysis. Similarly, to make a cast of the tire tread on the operative wheel would require laboratory equipment.
We do not address the question found to be determinative in Mr. Justice Powell’s opinion concurring in the result. This question was not raised or briefed by the parties.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA or Act), defendants in civil suits may remove "mass actions" from state to federal court. CAFA defines a "mass action" as "any civil action ... in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). The question presented is whether a suit filed by a State as the sole plaintiff constitutes a "mass action" under CAFA where it includes a claim for restitution based on injuries suffered by the State's citizens. We hold that it does not. According to CAFA's plain text, a "mass action" must involve monetary claims brought by 100 or more persons who propose to try those claims jointly as named plaintiffs. Because the State of Mississippi is the only named plaintiff in the instant action, the case must be remanded to state court.
I
A
Congress enacted CAFA in order to "amend the procedures that apply to consideration of interstate class actions." 119 Stat. 4. In doing so, Congress recognized that "[c]lass action lawsuits are an important and valuable part of the legal system." CAFA § 2. It was concerned, however, that certain requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, had functioned to "kee[p] cases of national importance" in state courts rather than federal courts. CAFA § 2.
CAFA accordingly loosened the requirements for diversity jurisdiction for two types of cases-"class actions" and "mass actions." The Act defines "class action" to mean "any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B). And it defines "mass action" to mean "any civil action ... in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact." § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
For class and mass actions, CAFA expanded diversity jurisdiction in two key ways. First, it replaced the ordinary requirement of complete diversity of citizenship among all plaintiffs and defendants, see State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-531, 87 S.Ct. 1199, 18 L.Ed.2d 270 (1967), with a requirement of minimal diversity. Under that requirement, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a class action if "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant." § 1332(d)(2)(A). The same rule applies to mass actions. See § 1332(d)(11)(A) ("[A] mass action shall be deemed ... removable under [§§ 1332(d)(2) through (d)(10) ]"). Second, whereas § 1332(a) ordinarily requires each plaintiff's claim to exceed the sum or value of $75,000, see Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 554-555, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005), CAFA grants federal jurisdiction over class and mass actions in which the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. §§ 1332(d)(2), (d)(6), (d)(11)(A). Class and mass actions filed in state court that satisfy CAFA's requirements may be removed to federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1453, but federal jurisdiction in a mass action, unlike a class action, "shall exist only over those plaintiffs" whose claims individually satisfy the $75,000 amount in controversy requirement, § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).1
B
Respondents manufacture liquid crystal displays, or LCDs. In March 2011, the State of Mississippi sued them in state court, alleging that they had formed an international cartel to restrict competition and raise prices in the LCD market. The State claimed that these actions violated two Mississippi statutes: the Mississippi Antitrust Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 75-21-1 et seq. (2009), and the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act, § 75-24-1 et seq. (2009 and Cum. Supp. 2013). The State sought injunctive relief and civil penalties under both statutes, along with punitive damages, costs, and attorney's fees. It also sought restitution for its own purchases "of LCD products and the purchases of its citizens." App. to Brief in Opposition 65a; § 75-24-11.
Respondents filed a notice to remove the case from state to federal court, arguing that the case was removable under CAFA as either a "class action" or a "mass action." The District Court ruled that the suit did not qualify as a "class action" because it was "not brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or a 'similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure.' " 876 F.Supp.2d 758, 769 (S.D.Miss.2012). But it held that the suit did qualify as a "mass action," because "[i]t is a civil action 'in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact.' " Id., at 771. The District Court reached that conclusion on the basis of Fifth Circuit precedent in Louisiana ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418 (C.A.5 2008), which it understood to "stan[d] for the proposition that the words 'persons' and 'plaintiffs' in [the mass action definition] are to be defined as 'real parties in interest.' " 876 F.Supp.2d, at 771. Applying that rule, the court found that 100 or more unidentified Mississippi consumers had purchased LCD screens and were therefore real parties in interest to the State's restitution claim. Ibid. The court noted the "possibility that a 'mass action' should be thought of as a 'mass joinder,' "-that is, as a suit involving 100 or more "named plaintiffs." Ibid., n. 9. But it deemed that interpretation to be foreclosed by Caldwell.
The District Court nonetheless remanded the case to state court on the basis of CAFA's "general public exception," which excludes from the "mass action" definition "any civil action in which ... all of the claims in the action are asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of individual claimants or members of a purported class) pursuant to a State statute specifically authorizing such action." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III).
The Court of Appeals reversed. 701 F.3d 796 (C.A.5 2012). It agreed with the District Court's determination that Mississippi's suit is not a "class action" under CAFA.2Id., at 799. It also agreed that, under Caldwell, the suit qualifies as a "mass action" because "[t]he real parties in interest in Mississippi's suit are those more than 100 ... individual citizens who purchased the [LCD] products within Mississippi." 701 F.3d, at 800. It disagreed, however, with the District Court's ruling that the suit falls within the general public exception. Id., at 802-803.3 Judge Elrod concurred in the judgment, noting that after the Fifth Circuit's decision in Caldwell, three Courts of Appeals had deemed similar lawsuits not to be mass actions removable under CAFA.4 We granted certiorari to resolve this split of authority, 569 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 2736, 186 L.Ed.2d 191 (2013), and now reverse.
II
A
Our analysis begins with the statutory text. Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1886, 1892-1893, 185 L.Ed.2d 1003 (2013). The statute provides:
"[T]he term mass action means any civil action (except a [class action] ) in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact, except that jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements under subsection (a)." § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
The parties do not dispute that this provision encompasses suits that are brought jointly by 100 or more named plaintiffs who propose to try their claims together. The question is whether the provision also includes suits brought by fewer than 100 named plaintiffs on the theory that there may be 100 or more unnamed persons who are real parties in interest as beneficiaries to any of the plaintiffs' claims. Respondents argue that the provision covers such suits because "claims of 100 or more persons" refers to "the persons to whom the claim belongs, i.e., the real parties in interest to the claims," regardless of whether those persons are named or unnamed. Brief for Respondents 19 (emphasis in original). We disagree.
To start, the statute says "100 or more persons," not "100 or more named or unnamed real parties in interest." Had Congress intended the latter, it easily could have drafted language to that effect. Indeed, when Congress wanted a numerosity requirement in CAFA to be satisfied by counting unnamed parties in interest in addition to named plaintiffs, it explicitly said so: CAFA provides that in order for a class action to be removable, "the number of members of all proposed plaintiff classes" must be 100 or greater, § 1332(d)(5)(B), and it defines "class members" to mean "the persons (named or unnamed) who fall within the definition of the proposed or certified class," § 1332(d)(1)(D). Congress chose not to use the phrase "named or unnamed" in CAFA's mass action provision, a decision we understand to be intentional. See Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 573, 129 S.Ct. 1849, 173 L.Ed.2d 785 (2009) (" '[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion' ").
More fundamentally, respondents' interpretation cannot be reconciled with the fact that the "100 or more persons" referred to in the statute are not unspecified individuals who have no actual participation in the suit, but instead the very "plaintiffs" referred to later in the sentence-the parties who are proposing to join their claims in a single trial. Congress made this understanding evident in two key ways.
First, we presume that " 'Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.' " Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 1882, 1889, 182 L.Ed.2d 840 (2012). Here, Congress used the terms "persons" and "plaintiffs" just as they are used in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20, governing party joinder. Where § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) requires that the "claims of 100 or more persons [must be] proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact," Rule 20 provides that "[p]ersons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly ... and any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in the action." Thus, just as it is used in Rule 20, the term "persons" in § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i) refers to the individuals who are proposing to join as plaintiffs in a single action.
Second, respondents' interpretation of "persons" cannot square with the statute's requirement that the claims of the "100 or more persons" must be proposed for joint trial "on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of law or fact." § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). It is difficult to imagine how the claims of one set of unnamed individuals could be proposed for joint trial on the ground that the claims of some completely different group of named plaintiffs share common questions. The better understanding is that Congress meant for the "100 or more persons" and the proposed "plaintiffs" to be one and the same.
Recognizing that the statute's use of the term "persons" could be a reference to proposed plaintiffs, respondents assert that "plaintiffs," like "persons," should be construed to "includ[e] both named and unnamed real parties in interest." Brief for Respondents 24. But that stretches the meaning of "plaintiff" beyond recognition. The term "plaintiff" is among the most commonly understood of legal terms of art: It means a "party who brings a civil suit in a court of law." Black's Law Dictionary 1267 (9th ed. 2009); see also Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1729 (1961) (defining "plaintiff" to mean "one who commences a personal action or lawsuit," or "the complaining party in any litigation"). It certainly does not mean "anyone, named or unnamed, whom a suit may benefit," as respondents suggest.5
Moreover, Congress used the term "plaintiffs" twice in the mass action provision. The provision encompasses actions in which monetary "claims of 100 or more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs' claims involve common questions," and it then provides that "jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount requiremen[t]" of $75,000. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i). If respondents are correct that "plaintiffs" means unnamed parties in interest where it is used the first time, then so too the second. After all, the "presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing throughout a statute" is "at its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given sentence." Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994).
Yet if the term "plaintiffs" is stretched to include all unnamed individuals with an interest in the suit, then § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i)'s requirement that "jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose claims [exceed $75,000]" becomes an administrative nightmare that Congress could not possibly have intended, see Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982). How is a district court to identify the unnamed parties whose claims in a given case are for less than $75,000? Would the court in this case, for instance, have to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the identity of each of the hundreds of thousands of unnamed Mississippi citizens who purchased one of respondents' LCD products between 1996 and 2006 (the period alleged in the complaint)? Even if it could identify every such person, how would it ascertain the amount in controversy for each individual claim? Respondents suggest that "[i]n some circumstances, defendants may be able to identify from their payment records any persons who may have claims for overpayments," but they stop notably short of claiming to possess such decades-old records themselves. Brief for Respondents 25.
Furthermore, what would happen with individuals whose claims were valued at less than $75,000? The District Court in this case suggested that if the suit were deemed a mass action, it would sever the claim for "restitution for losses incurred by individuals claiming less than or equal to $75,000 each" and remand that claim back to state court, while allowing the other claims (including the restitution claims exceeding $75,000) to proceed in federal court. 876 F.Supp.2d, at 775. Even respondents do not defend that outcome, presumably because it would mean that much of the State's lawsuit could proceed in state court after all, simultaneously with the newly severed parallel federal action.6
We think it unlikely that Congress intended that federal district courts engage in these unwieldy inquiries. By contrast, interpreting "plaintiffs" in accordance with its usual meaning-to refer to the actual named parties who bring an action-leads to a straightforward, easy to administer rule under which a court would examine whether the plaintiffs have pleaded in good faith the requisite amount. See Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353, 81 S.Ct. 1570, 6 L.Ed.2d 890 (1961). Our decision thus comports with the commonsense observation that "when judges must decide jurisdictional matters, simplicity is a virtue." See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1345, 1350, 185 L.Ed.2d 439 (2013).
B
Our reading of the mass action provision's text is reinforced by the statutory context. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U.S. ----, ----, 132 S.Ct. 1702, 1707-1708, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012).
First, the provision of CAFA governing transfer motions confirms our view that the term "plaintiffs" refers to actual named parties as opposed to unnamed real parties in interest. That provision, § 1332(d)(11)(C)(i), provides that once a mass action has been removed to federal court, it "shall not thereafter be transferred to any other court ... unless a majority of the plaintiffs in the action request transfer." If respondents are correct that "plaintiffs" means "unnamed parties in interest," it will be surpassingly difficult for a court to decide in a case like this one whether an action may be transferred. The District Court itself acknowledged this problem, noting that it would have to identify and communicate with "hundreds of thousands if not millions of real parties in interest" to "pol[l] [them] about their preferred forum" if respondents' interpretation were correct. 876 F.Supp.2d, at 777.
The context in which the mass action provision was enacted lends further support to our conclusion. Congress' overriding concern in enacting CAFA was with class actions. See Preamble, 119 Stat. 4 (describing CAFA as an "[a]ct to amend the procedures that apply to consideration of interstate class actions"); CAFA § 2 (Congress' findings with respect to class actions). The mass action provision thus functions largely as a backstop to ensure that CAFA's relaxed jurisdictional rules for class actions cannot be evaded by a suit that names a host of plaintiffs rather than using the class device. Respondents' argument fails to recognize this key distinction. Their position is ultimately that "[t]his action is similar to a class action," such that it should be removed. Brief for Respondents 27. But if Congress had wanted representative actions brought by States as sole plaintiffs to be removable under CAFA on the theory that they are in substance no different from class actions, it would have done so through the class action provision, not the one governing mass actions.7
III
Rather than relying on the text of CAFA as the source of its real party in interest inquiry, the Court of Appeals appeared to find such an inquiry necessary on the basis of what it understood to be a background principle: that "federal courts look to the substance of the action and not only at the labels that the parties may attach." Caldwell, 536 F.3d, at 424. This was error.
We have interpreted the diversity jurisdiction statute to require courts in certain contexts to look behind the pleadings to ensure that parties are not improperly creating or destroying diversity jurisdiction. We have held, for example, that a plaintiff may not keep a case out of federal court by fraudulently naming a nondiverse defendant. Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 185-186, 27 S.Ct. 184, 51 L.Ed. 430 (1907). Nor may a plaintiff create diversity by collusively assigning his interest in an action. Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823, 825-830, 89 S.Ct. 1487, 23 L.Ed.2d 9 (1969); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1359. And in cases involving a State or state official, we have inquired into the real party in interest because a State's presence as a party will destroy complete diversity. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Missouri Railroad and Warehouse Comm'rs, 183 U.S. 53, 58-59, 22 S.Ct. 18, 46 L.Ed. 78 (1901).
But the question in this case is not simply whether there exists some background principle of analyzing the real parties in interest to a suit; the question is whether Congress intended that courts engage in that analysis when deciding whether a suit is a mass action. Recognizing this fact, respondents do not argue that the real party in interest inquiry employed in the above cases somehow supersedes the text of CAFA; they instead argue that we should read CAFA in light of those cases because " 'Congress expects its statutes to be read in conformity with this Court's precedents.' " Brief for Respondents 19 (quoting United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 495, 117 S.Ct. 921, 137 L.Ed.2d 107 (1997)). For two reasons, however, we conclude that Congress did not intend the background inquiry to apply to the mass action provision.
First, it makes sense to infer Congress' intent to incorporate a background principle into a new statute where the principle has previously been applied in a similar manner. But that is not the case here. The background real party in interest inquiry identifies what party's (or parties') citizenship should be considered in determining diversity. The inquiry that respondents urge is quite different: It is an attempt to count up additional unnamed parties in order to satisfy the mass action provision's numerosity requirement. Respondents offer no reason to believe that Congress intended to extend the real party inquiry to this new circumstance, and so any presumption that Congress wanted to incorporate the inquiry, if it exists in this case at all, would be comparatively weak. Cf. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 286, 123 S.Ct. 824, 154 L.Ed.2d 753 (2003) ("Congress' silence, while permitting an inference that Congress intended to apply ordinary background tort principles, cannot show that it intended to apply an unusual modification of those rules"). 8
Second, even if the background principle had previously been applied in the manner sought by respondents, Congress provided express indications that it did not want the principle to apply to the mass action provision. It specified that "the term 'mass action' shall not include any civil action in which ... the claims are joined upon motion of a defendant." § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(II). By prohibiting defendants from joining unnamed individuals to a lawsuit in order to turn it into a mass action, Congress demonstrated its focus on the persons who are actually proposing to join together as named plaintiffs in the suit. Requiring district courts to pierce the pleadings to identify unnamed persons interested in the suit would run afoul of that intent. Moreover, as already discussed, Congress repeatedly used the word "plaintiffs" to describe the 100 or more persons whose claims must be proposed for a joint trial. That word refers to actual, named parties-a concept inherently at odds with the background inquiry into unnamed real parties in interest, who by definition are never plaintiffs. Congress thus clearly displaced a background real party in interest inquiry, even assuming one might otherwise apply. Cf. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 459, n. 16, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002).
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499.
CAFA provides certain exceptions for class actions that involve matters of principally local or state concern. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(3)-(5). None of them are at issue in this case.
Respondents do not challenge this ruling before this Court.
The Court of Appeals did so on the rationale that because individual Mississippi consumers are real parties in interest to the State's restitution claim, the general public exception's requirement that "all of the claims" must be "asserted on behalf of the general public (and not on behalf of individual claimants)" was not satisfied. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III).
See AU Optronics Corp. v. South Carolina, 699 F.3d 385 (C.A.4 2012); Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661 (C.A.9 2012); LG Display Co. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768 (C.A.7 2011).
Congress could of course require a real party in interest inquiry in a statute that uses the term "plaintiff" simply by saying so. But it has not done that here.
Respondents suggest that a district court might be able to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims that fall beneath $75,000, thereby avoiding the problem of identifying and remanding such claims to the state court. We need not decide the issue here, but we note that at least one Court of Appeals has rejected that view. See Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1206, n. 51 (C.A.11 2007) (holding that because supplemental jurisdiction does not apply where a federal statute " 'expressly provide[s] otherwise,' " 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the mass action provision's explicit exclusion of jurisdiction over claims beneath $75,000 negates supplemental jurisdiction over such claims).
The parties both point to the "general public exception," § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(III), in support of their respective positions. But because the foregoing arguments resolve this case, we need not construe that provision here.
We have also applied a real party in interest inquiry in contexts other than that of determining citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374-376, 44 S.Ct. 138, 68 L.Ed. 342 (1923) (state sovereign immunity); Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 392-393, 58 S.Ct. 954, 82 L.Ed. 1416 (1938) (original jurisdiction). But even if we were to indulge in a presumption that Congress somehow intended to import the inquiry applied in those particular contexts into the mass action provision's distinct numerosity requirement, we would find any such presumption overridden by CAFA's text.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 9, New Hyde Park, New York, acting in its official capacity under state law, directed the School District’s principal to cause the following prayer to be said aloud by each class in the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each school day:
“Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.”
This daily procedure was adopted on the recommendation of the State Board of Regents, a governmental agency created by the State Constitution to which the New York Legislature has granted broad supervisory, executive, and legislative powers over the State’s public school system. These state officials composed the prayer which they recommended and published as a part of their “Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the Schools,” saying: “We believe that this Statement will be subscribed to by all men and women of good will, and we call upon all of them to aid in giving life to our program.”
Shortly after the practice of reciting the Regents’ prayer was adopted by the School District, the parents of ten pupils brought this action in a New York State Court insisting that use of this official prayer in the public schools was contrary to the beliefs, religions, or religious practices of both themselves and their children. Among other things, these parents challenged the constitutionality of both the state law authorizing the School District to direct the use of prayer in public schools and the School District’s regulation ordering the recitation of this particular prayer on the ground that these actions of official governmental agencies violate that part of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution which commands that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion” — a command which was “made applicable to the State of New York by the Fourteenth Amendment of the said Constitution.” The New York Court of Appeals, over the dissents of Judges Dye and Fuld, sustained an order of the lower state courts which had upheld the power of New York to use the Regents’ prayer as a part of the daily procedures of its public schools so long as the schools did not compel any pupil to join in the prayer over his or his parents’ objection. We granted certiorari to review this important decision involving rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
We think that by using its public school system to encourage recitation of the Regents’ prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Claüse. There can, of course, be no doubt that New York’s program of daily classroom invocation of God’s blessings as prescribed in the Regents’ prayer is a religious activity. It is a solemn avowal of divine faith and supplication for the blessings of the Almighty. The nature of such a prayer has always been religious, none of the respondents has denied this and the trial court expressly so found:
“The religious nature of prayer was recognized by Jefferson and has been concurred in by theological writers, the United States Supreme Court and State courts and administrative officials, including New York’s Commissioner of Education. A committee of the New York Legislature has agreed.
“The Board of Regents as amicus curiae, the respondents and intervenors all concede the religious nature of prayer, but seek to distinguish this prayer because it is based on our spiritual heritage. . . .”
The petitioners contend among other things that the state laws requiring or permitting use of the Regents’ prayer must be struck down as a violation of the Establishment Clause because that prayer was composed by governmental officials as a part of a governmental program to further religious beliefs. For this reason, petitioners argue, the State’s use of the Regents’ prayer in its public school system breaches the constitutional wall of separation between Church and State. We agree with that contention since we think that the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government.
It is a matter of history that this very practice of establishing governmentally composed prayers for religious services was one of the reasons which caused many of our early colonists to leave England and seek religious freedom in America. The Book of Common Prayer, which was created under governmental direction and which was approved by Acts of Parliament in 1548 and 1549, set out in minute detail the accepted form and content of prayer and other religious ceremonies to be used in the established, tax-supported Church of England. The controversies over the Book and what should be its content repeatedly threatened to disrupt the peace of that country as the accepted forms of prayer in the established church changed with the views of the particular ruler that happened to be in control at the time. Powerful groups representing some of the varying religious views of the people struggled among themselves to impress their particular views upon the Government and obtain amendments of the Book more suitable to their respective notions of how religious services should be conducted in order that the official religious establishment would advance their particular religious beliefs. Other groups, lacking the necessary political power to influence the Government on the matter, decided to leave England and its established church and seek freedom in America from England’s governmentally ordained and supported religion.
It is an unfortunate fact of history that when some of the very groups which had most strenuously opposed the established Church of England found themselves sufficiently in control of colonial governments in this country to write their own prayers into law, they passed laws making their own religion the official religion of their respective colonies. Indeed, as late as the time of the Revolutionary War, there were established churches in at least eight of the thirteen former colonies and established religions in at least four of the other five. But the successful Revolution against English political domination was shortly followed by intense opposition to the practice of establishing religion by law. This opposition crystallized rapidly into an effective political force in Virginia where the minority religious groups such as Presbyterians, Lutherans, Quakers and Baptists had gained such strength that the adherents to the established Episcopal Church were actually a minority themselves. In 1785-1786, those opposed to the established Church, led by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, who, though themselves not members of any of these dissenting religious groups, opposed all religious establishments by law on grounds of principle, obtained the enactment of the famous' “Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty” by which all religious groups were placed on an equal footing so far as the State wTas concerned. Similar though less far-reaching legislation was being considered and passed in other States.
By the time of the adoption of the Constitution, our history shows that there was a widespread awareness among many Americans of the dangers of a union of Church and State. These people knew, some of them from bitter personal experience, that one of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in his owrn way lay in the Government’s placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or one particular form of religious services. They knew the anguish, hardship and bitter strife that could come when zealous religious groups struggled with one another to obtain the Government’s stamp of approval from each King, Queen, or Protector that came to temporary power. The Constitution was intended to avert a part of this danger by leaving the government of this country in the hands of the people rather than in the hands of any monarch. But this safeguard was not enough. Our Founders were no more willing to let the content of their prayers and their privilege of praying whenever they pleased be influenced by the ballot box than they were to let these vital matters of personal conscience depend upon the succession of monarchs. The First Amendment was added to the Constitution to stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal Government would be used to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people can say— that the people’s religions must not be subjected to the pressures of government for change each time a new political administration is elected to office. Under that Amendment’s prohibition against governmental establishment of religion, as reinforced by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, government in this country, be it state or federal, is without power to prescribe by law any particular form of prayer which is to be used as an official prayer in carrying on any program of govern-mentally sponsored religious activity.
There can be no doubt that New York’s state prayer program officially establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents’ prayer. The respondents’ argument to the contrary, which is largely based upon the contention that the Regents’ prayer is “non-denominational” and the fact that the program, as modified and approved by state courts, does not require all pupils to recite the prayer but permits those who wish to do so to remain silent or be excused from the room, ignores the essential nature of the program’s constitutional defects. Neither the fact that the prayer may be denomina-tionally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the students is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause, of the First Amendment, both of which are operative against the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom. The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserv-ing individuals or not. This is not to say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a particular form of religious worship do not involve coercion of such individuals. When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain. But the purposes underlying the Establishment Clause go much further than that. Its first and most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion. The history of governmentally established religion, both in England and in this country, showed that whenever government had allied itself with one particular form of religion, the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. That same history showed that many people had lost their respect for any religion that had relied upon the support of government to spread its faith. The Establishment Clause thus stands as an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal,' too sacred, too holy, to permit its “unhallowed perversion” by a civil magistrate. Another purpose of the Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious persecutions go hand in hand. The Founders knew that only a few years after the Book of Common Prayer became the only accepted form of religious services in the established Church of England, an Act of Uniformity was passed to compel all Englishmen to attend those services and to make it a criminal offense to conduct or attend religious gatherings of any other kind — a law which was consistently flouted by dissenting religious groups in England and which contributed to widespread persecutions of people like John Bunyan who persisted in holding “unlawful [religious] meetings ... to the great disturbance and distraction of the good subjects of this kingdom . . . And they knew that similar persecutions had received the sanction of law in several of the colonies in this country soon after the establishment of official religions in those colonies. It was in large part to get completely away from this sort of systematic religious persecution that the Founders brought into being our Nation, our Constitution, and our Bill of Rights with its prohibition against any governmental establishment of religion. The New York laws officially prescribing the Regents’ prayer are inconsistent both with the purposes of the Establishment Clause and with the Establishment Clause itself.
It has been argued that to apply the Constitution in such a way as to prohibit state laws respecting an establishment of religious services in public schools is to indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayer. Nothing, of course, could be more wrong. The history of man is inseparable from the history of religion. And perhaps it is not too much to say that since the beginning of that history many people have devoutly believed that “More things are wrought by prayer than this world dreams of.” It was doubtless largely due to men who believed this that there grew up a sentiment that caused men to leave the cross-currents of officially established state religions and religious persecution in Europe and come to this country filled with the hope that they could find a place in which they could pray when they pleased to the God of their faith in the language they chose. And there were men of this same faith in the power of prayer who led the fight for adoption of our Constitution and also for our Bill of Rights with the very guarantees of religious freedom that forbid the sort of governmental activity which New York has attempted here. These men knew that the First Amendment, which tried to put an end to governmental control of religion and of prayer, was not written to destroy either. They knew rather that it was written to quiet well-justified fears which nearly all of them felt arising out of an awareness that governments of the past had shackled men’s tongues to make them speak only the religious thoughts that government wanted them to speak and to pray only to the God that government wanted them to pray to. It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to for religious guidance.
It is true that New York’s establishment of its Regents’ prayer as an officially approved religious doctrine of that State does not amount to a total establishment of one particular religious sect to the exclusion of all others— that, indeed, the governmental endorsement of that prayer seems relatively insignificant when compared to the governmental encroachments upon religion which were commonplace 200 years ago. To those who may subscribe to the view that because the Regents’ official prayer is so brief and general there can be no danger to religious freedom in its governmental establishment, however, it may be appropriate to say in the words of James Madison, the author of the First Amendment:
“[I]t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. . . . Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects ? That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?”
The judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the decision of this case.
Mr. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
See New York Constitution, Art. V, §4; New York Education Law, §§ 101, 120 et seq., 202, 214-219, 224, 245 et seq., 704, and 801 et seq.
10 N. Y. 2d 174, 176 N. E. 2d 579. The trial court’s opinion, which is reported at 18 Misc. 2d 659, 191 N. Y. S. 2d 453, had made it clear that the Board of Education must set up some sort of procedures to protect those who objected to reciting the prayer: “This is not to say that the rights accorded petitioners and their children under the ‘free exercise’ clause do not mandate safeguards against such embarrassments and pressures. It is enough on this score, however, that regulations, such as were adopted by New York City’s Board of Education in connection with its released time program, be adopted, making clear that neither teachers nor any other school authority may comment on participation or nonpartici-pation in the exercise nor suggest or require that any posture or language be used or dress be worn or be not used or not worn. Non-participation may take the form either of remaining silent during the exercise, or if the parent or child so desires, of being excused entirely from the exercise. Such regulations must also make provision for those nonparticipants who are to be excused from the prayer exercise. The exact provision to be made is a matter for decision by the board, rather than the court, within the framework of constitutional requirements. Within that framework would fall a provision that prayer participants proceed to a common assembly while nonparticipants attend other rooms, or that nonparticipants be permitted to arrive at school a few minutes late or to attend separate opening exercises, or any other method which treats with equality both participants and nonparticipants.” 18 Misc. 2d, at 696, 191 N. Y. S. 2d, at 492-493. See also the opinion of the Appellate Division affirming that of the trial court, reported at 11 App. Div. 2d 340, 206 N. Y. S. 2d 183.
368 U. S. 924.
18 Misc. 2d, at 671-672, 191 N. Y. S. 2d, at 468-469.
2 & 3 Edward VI, c. 1, entitled “An Act for Uniformity of Service and Administration of the Sacraments throughout the Realm”; 3 &: 4 Edward VI, c. 10, entitled “An Act for the abolishing and putting away of divers Bopks and Images.”
The provisions pf the various versions of the Book of Common Prayer are set out jn broad outline in the Encj'clopaedia Britannica, Vol. 18 (1957 ed.), pp. 420-423. For a more complete description, see Pulían, The History of the Book of Common Prayer (1900).
The first major revision of the Book of Common Prayer was made in 1552 during the reign of Edward VI. 5 & 6 Edward VI, c. 1. In 1553, Edward VI died and was succeeded by Alary who abolished the Book of Common Prayer entirely. 1 Mary, c. 2. But upon the accession of Elizabeth in 1558, the Book was restored with important alterations from the form it had been given by Edward VI. 1 Elizabeth, c. 2. The resentment to this amended form of the Book was kept firmly under control during the reign of Elizabeth but, upon her death in 1603, a petition signed'by more than 1,000 Puritan ministers was presented to King James I asking for further alterations in the Book. Some alterations were made and the Book retained substantially this form until it was completely suppressed again in 1645 as a result of the successful Puritan Revolution. Shortly after the restoration in 1660 of Charles II, the Book was again reintroduced, 13 & 14 Charles II, c. 4, and again with alterations. Rather than accept this form of the Book some 2,000 Puritan ministers vacated their benefices. See generally Pulían, The History of the Book of Common Prayer (1900), pp. vii-xvi; Encyclopaedia Britannica (1957 ed.), Vol. 18, pp. 421-422.
For example, the Puritans twice attempted to modify the Book of Common Prayer and once attempted to destroy it. The story of their struggle to modify the Book in the reign of Charles I is vividly summarized in Pulían, History of the Book of Common Prayer, at p. xiii: “The King actively supported those members of the Church of England who were anxious to vindicate its Catholic character and maintain the ceremonial which Elizabeth had approved. Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, was the leader of this school. Equally resolute in his opposition to the distinctive tenets of Rome and of Geneva, he enjoyed the hatred of both Jesuit and Calvinist. He helped the Scottish bishops, who had made large concessions to the uncouth habits of Presbyterian worship, to draw up a Book of Common Prayer for Scotland. It contained a Communion Office resembling that of the book of 1549. It came into use in 1637, and met with a bitter and barbarous opposition. The vigour of the Scottish Protestants strengthened the hands of their English sympathisers. Laud and Charles were executed, Episcopacy was abolished, the use of the Book of Common Prayer was prohibited.”
For a description of some of the laws enacted by early theocratic governments in New England, see Farrington, Main Currents in American Thought (1930), Vol. 1, pp. 5-50; Whipple, Our Ancient Liberties (1927), pp. 63-78; Wertenbaker, The Puritan Oligarchv (1947).
The Church of England was the established church of at least five colonies: Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. There seems to be some controversy as to whether that church was officially established in New York and New Jersey but there is no doubt that it received substantial support from those States. See Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America (1902), pp. 338, 408. In Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Connecticut, the Congregationalist Church was officially established. In Pennsylvania and Delaware, all Christian sects were treated equally in most situations but Catholics were discriminated against in some respects. See generally Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America (1902). In Rhode Island all Protestants enjoyed equal privileges but it is not clear whether Catholics were allowed to vote. Compare Fiske, The Critical Period in American History (1899), p. 76 with Cobb, The. Rise of Religious Liberty in America (1902), pp. 437-438.
12 Hening, Statutes of Virginia (1823), 84, entitled "An act for establishing religious freedom.” The story of the events surrounding the enactment of this law was reviewed in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, both by the Court, at pp. 11-13, and in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge, at pp. 33-42. See also Fiske, The Critical Period in American History (1899), pp. 78-82; James, The Struggle for Religious Liberty in Virginia (1900); Thom, The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Virginia: The Baptists (1900); Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America (1902), pp. 74-115, 482-499.
See Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America (1902), pp. 482-509.
“ [A] ttempts to enforce by legal sanctions, acts obnoxious to so great a proportion of Citizens, tend to enervate the laws in general, and to slacken the bands of Society. If it be difficult to execute any law which is not generally deemed necessary or salutary, what must be the case where it is deemed invalid and dangerous? and what may be the effect of so striking an example of impotency in the Government, on its general authority.” Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, II Writings of Madison 183, 190.
“It is moreover to weaken in those who profess this Religion a pious confidence in its innate excellence, and the patronage of its Author; and to foster in those who still reject it, a suspicion that its friends are too conscious of its fallacies, to trust it to its own merits. . . . [Experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation. During almost fifteen centuries, has the legal establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity; in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution. Enquire of the Teachers of Christianity for the ages in which it appeared in its greatest lustre; those of every sect, point to the ages prior to its incorporation with Civil policy.” Id., at 187.
Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, II Writings of Madison, at 187.
“[T]he proposed establishment is a departure from that generous policy, which, offering an asylum to the persecuted and oppressed of every Nation and Religion, promised a lustre to our country, and an accession to the number of its citizens. What a melancholy mark is the Bill of sudden degeneracy? Instead of holding forth an asjdum to the persecuted, it is itself a signal of persecution. . . . Distant as it may be, in its present form, from the Inquisition it differs from it only in degree. The one is the first step, the other the last in the career of intolerance. The magnanimous sufferer under this cruel scourge in foreign Regions, must view the Bill as a Beacon on our Coast, warning him to seek some other haven, where liberty and philanthropy in their due extent may offer a more certain repose from his troubles.” Id., at 188.
5 & 6 Edward VI, c. 1, entitled “An Act for the Uniformity of Service and Administration of Sacraments throughout the Realm.” This Act was repealed during the reign of Mary but revived upon the accession of Elizabeth. See note 7, supra. The reasons which led to the enactment of this statute were set out in its preamble: “Where there hath been a very godly Order set forth by the Authority of Parliament, for Common Prayer and Administration of the Sacra-merits to be used in the Mother Tongue within the Church of England, agreeable to the Word of God and the Primitive Church, very comfortable to all good People desiring to live in Christian Conversation, and most profitable to the Estate of this Realm, upon the which the Mercy, Favour and Blessing of Almighty God is in no wise so readily and plenteously poured as by Common Prayers, due using of the Sacraments, and often preaching of the Gospel; with the Devotion of the Hearers: (1) And yet this notwithstanding, a great Number of People in divers Parts of this Realm, following their own Sensuality, and living either without Knowledge or due Fear of God, do wilfully and damnably before Almighty God abstain and refuse to come to their Parish Churches and other Places where Common Prayer, Administration of the Sacraments, and Preaching of the Word of God, is used upon Sundays and other Days ordained to be Holydays.”
Bunyan’s own account of his trial is set forth in A Relation of the Imprisonment of Mr. John Bunyan, reprinted in Grace Abounding and The Pilgrim’s Progress (Brown ed. 1907), at 103-132.
For a vivid account of some of these persecutions, see Werten-baker, The Puritan Oligarchy (1947).
Perhaps the best example of the sort of men who came to this country for precisely that reason is Roger Williams, the founder of Rhode Island, who has been described as “the truest Christian amongst many who sincerely desired to be Christian.” Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought (1930), Vol. 1, at p. 74. Williams, who was one of the earliest exponents of the doctrine of separation of church and state, believed that separation was necessary in order to protect the church from the danger of destruction which he thought inevitably flowed from control by even the best-in ten tioned civil authorities: “The unknowing zeale of Constantine and other Emperours, did more hurt to Christ Jesus his Crowne and Kingdome, then the raging fury of the most bloody Neroes. In the persecutions of the later, Christians were sweet and fragrant, like spice pounded and beaten in morters: But those good Emperours, persecuting some erroneous persons, Arrius, &c. and advancing the professours of some Truths of Christ (for there was no small number of Truths lost in those times) and maintaining their Religion by the materiall Sword, I say by this meanes Christianity was ecclipsed, and the Professors of it fell asleep Williams, The Bloudy Tenent, of Persecution, for cause, of Conscience, discussed in A Conference betweene Truth and Peace (London, 1644), reprinted in Narragansett Club Publications, Vol. Ill, p. 184. To Williams, it was no part of the business or competence of a civil magistrate to interfere in religious matters: “[W]hat imprudence and indiscretion is it in the most common affaires of Life, to conceive that Emperours, Kings and Rulers of the earth must not only be qualified with politic all and state abilities to make and execute such Civill Lawes which may concerne the common rights, peace and safety (which is worke and businesse, load and burthen enough for the ablest shoulders in the Commonweal) but also furnished with such Spirituall and heavenly abilities to governe the Spirituall and Chiistian Commonweale ...” Id., at 366. See also id., at 136-137.
There is of course nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent with the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express love for our country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration of Independence which contain references to the Deity or by singing officially espoused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme Being, or with the fact that there are many manifestations in our public life of belief in God. Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to the unquestioned religious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored in this instance.
Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, II Writings of Madison 183, at 185-186.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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C
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have held that in capital cases, “‘the sentenced” may not refuse to consider or “ ‘be precluded from considering’ ” any relevant mitigating evidence. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 4 (1986) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 114 (1982)). See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). Certiorari was granted in the present case to consider petitioner’s contention that he was sentenced to death under a Florida statute that operated in a manner inconsistent with this requirement. 476 U. S. 1168 (1986).
H
On July 31, 1976, 13-year-old Cynthia Driggers was strangled to death. At the time of the murder, both Cynthia and petitioner resided with Richard Hitchcock, who was Cynthia’s stepfather and petitioner’s brother. Petitioner initially confessed to the murder, stating that he had killed Cynthia after she threatened to tell her parents that she and petitioner had engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. At his trial for first-degree murder, however, petitioner recanted and testified that it was his brother Richard who murdered Cynthia, after finding out about the intercourse. The State contended that petitioner had sexually assaulted Cynthia and then murdered her to avoid discovery.
Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. After unsuccessful appeals and state and federal collateral proceedings, he filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. He argued, among other things, that the advisory jury and sentencing judge had been precluded by law from considering certain evidence of mitigating circumstances that had been introduced, and that additional evidence of mitigating circumstances had been withheld by his counsel in the reasonable belief that it could not be considered under the Florida death penalty statute. The District Court denied petitioner’s application, without granting an evidentiary hearing. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, 745 F. 2d 1332 (1984), and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed en banc, 770 F. 2d 1514 (1985). This petition followed.
II
Petitioner claims that the advisory jury and the sentencing judge were precluded by law from considering some of the evidence of mitigating circumstances before them. The Florida death penalty statute in effect at the time (which has since been amended in various respects) provided for separate postconviction proceedings to determine whether those convicted of capital felonies should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. Those proceedings were typically held before the trial jury, which heard evidence “as to any matter that the court deem[ed] relevant to sentence.” Fla. Stat. §921.141(1) (1975). After hearing that evidence, the jury was to render an advisory verdict by determining “(a) [wjhether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in [§921.141(5)]; (b) [w]hether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist as enumerated in [§921.141(6)], which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and (c) [biased on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life [imprisonment] or death.” §921.141(2). The trial court then was to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances itself and enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death. If it imposed a sentence of death, it was required to set forth in writing its findings “(a) [t]hat sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in [§921.141(5)], and (b) [t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances, as enumerated in [§921.141(6)], to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.” §921.141(3).
Petitioner argues that, at the time he was sentenced, these provisions had been authoritatively interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court to prohibit the sentencing jury and judge from considering mitigating circumstances not specifically enumerated in the statute. See, e. g., Cooper v. State, 336 So. 2d 1133, 1139 (1976) (“The sole issue in a sentencing hearing under Section 921.141, Florida Statutes (1975), is to examine in each case the itemized aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Evidence concerning other matters have [sic] no place in that proceeding . . .”), cert. denied, 431 U. S. 925 (1977). Respondent contends that petitioner has misconstrued Cooper, pointing to the Florida Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Songer v. State, 365 So. 2d 696 (1978) (per curiam), which expressed the view that Cooper had not prohibited sentencers from considering mitigating circumstances not enumerated in the statute. Because our examination of the sentencing proceedings actually conducted in this case convinces us that the sentencing judge assumed such a prohibition and instructed the jury accordingly, we need not reach the question whether that was in fact the requirement of Florida law. We do note, however, that other Florida judges conducting sentencing proceedings during roughly the same period believed that Florida law precluded consideration of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. At least three death sentences have been overturned for this reason. See Songer v. Wainwright, 769 F. 2d 1488 (CA11 1985) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. pending, No. 85-567; Lucas v. State, 490 So. 2d 943, 946 (Fla. 1986); Harvard v. State, 486 So. 2d 537 (Fla.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 863 (1986). We also note that the Florida Legislature has since removed the phrase “as enumerated [in the statutory list]” from the provisions requiring the advisory jury and the sentencing judge to consider mitigating circumstances. See Fla. Stat. §§921.141(2)(b), (3)(b) (1985).
In the sentencing phase of this case, petitioner's counsel introduced before the advisory jury evidence that as a child petitioner had the habit of inhaling gasoline fumes from automobile gas tanks; that he had once passed out after doing so; that thereafter his mind tended to wander; that petitioner had been one of seven children in a poor family that earned its living by picking cotton; that his father had died of cancer; and that petitioner had been a fond and affectionate uncle to the children of one of his brothers. Tr. of Advisory Sentence 7-10. In argument to the advisory jury, petitioner’s counsel referred to various considerations, some of which were the subject of factual dispute, making a sentence of death inappropriate: petitioner’s youth (he was 20 at the time of the murder), his innocence of significant prior criminal activity or violent behavior, the difficult circumstances of his upbringing, his potential for rehabilitation, and his voluntary surrender to authorities. Id., at 13-17, 21-26. Although petitioner’s counsel stressed the first two considerations, which related to mitigating circumstances specifically enumerated in the statute, he told the jury that in reaching its sentencing decision it was to “look at the overall picture . . . consider everything together . . . consider the whole picture, the whole ball of wax. ” Id., at 50-52. In contrast, the prosecutor told the jury that it was “to consider the mitigating circumstances and consider those by number,” id., at 28, and then went down the statutory list item by item, arguing that only one (petitioner’s youth) was applicable. Before proceeding to their deliberations, the members of the jury were told by the trial judge that he would instruct them “on the factors in aggravation and mitigation that you may consider under our law.” Id., at 5. He then instructed them that “[t]he mitigating circumstances which you may consider shall be the following ...” (listing the statutory mitigating circumstances). Id., at 56.
After receiving the advisory jury’s recommendation (by majority vote) of death, and despite the argument of petitioner’s counsel that the court should take into account the testimony concerning petitioner’s family background and his capacity for rehabilitation, the sentencing judge found that “there [were] insufficient mitigating circumstances as enumerated in Florida Statute 921.14-1(6) to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.” Tr. of Sentencing Proceedings 7 (emphasis added). He described the process by which he reached his sentencing judgment as follows: “In determining whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment, this Court is mandated to apply the facts to certain enumerated ‘aggravating’ and ‘mitigating’ circumstances.” 10 Record 195 (emphasis added). The only mitigating circumstance he found was petitioner’s youth. Id., at 197.
We think it could not be clearer that the advisory jury was instructed not to consider, and the sentencing judge refused to consider, evidence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, and that the proceedings therefore did not comport with the requirements of Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1 (1986), Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion). Respondent has made no attempt to argue that this error was harmless, or that it had no effect on the jury or the sentencing judge. In the absence of such a showing our cases hold that the exclusion of mitigating evidence of the sort at issue here renders the death sentence invalid. See Skipper, supra (evidence that defendant had adapted well to prison life); Eddings, supra (evidence of 16-year-old defendant’s troubled family history and emotional disturbance). As in those cases, however, the State is not precluded from seeking to impose a death sentence upon petitioner, “provided that it does so through a new sentencing hearing at which petitioner is permitted to present any and all relevant mitigating evidence that is available.” Skipper, supra, at 8.
We reverse the judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeals. That court is instructed to remand to the District Court with instructions to enter an order granting the application for a writ of habeas corpus, unless the State within a reasonable period of time either resentences petitioner in a proceeding that comports with the requirements of Lockett or vacates the death sentence and imposes a lesser sentence consistent with law.
It is so ordered.
Certiorari was also granted on petitioner’s claim that the Florida death penalty statute discriminates against capital defendants who murder whites and against black capital defendants, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because we hold petitioner’s death sentence invalid on other grounds, we decline to reach this claim. We today decide a similar challenge to the Georgia death penalty statute. See McCleskey v. Kemp, ante, p. 279.
Section 921.141(5) provided that the aggravating circumstances “shall be limited to the following”: that the crime was committed while the defendant was under sentence of imprisonment; that the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; that the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons; that the crime was committed while the defendant was involved in the commission of specified other felonies; that the crime was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest or escaping from custody; that the crime was committed for pecuniary gain; that the crime was intended to disrupt the government or the enforcement of the laws; and that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
Section 921.141(6) provided that the mitigating circumstances “shall be the following”: that the defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity; that the crime was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; that the victim participated in or consented to the crime; that defendant was merely an accomplice whose participation in the crime was relatively minor; that the defendant acted under duress or domination; that the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; and the age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
announced by Mr. Justice Brennan.
Petitioner, Elmer Davis, Jr., was tried before a jury in the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, on a charge of rape-murder. At trial, a written confession and testimony as to an oral confession were offered in evidence. Defense counsel objected on the ground that the confessions were involuntarily given. The trial judge heard testimony on this issue, ruled that the confessions were made voluntarily, and permitted them to be introduced in evidence. The jury returned a verdict of guilty without, a recommendation for life imprisonment, and Davis was sentenced to death.
The conviction was affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 253 N. C. 86, 116 S. E. 2d 365, and this Court denied certiorari. 365 U. S. 855. Davis then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The writ was denied without an evidentiary hearing on the basis of the state court record. 196 F. Supp. 488. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the. District Court for an evidentiary hearing oh the issue of the voluntariness of Davis’ confessions. 310 F. 2d 904. A hearing was held in the District Court, following which the District Judge again held that the confessions were voluntary. 221 F. Supp. 494. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, after argument and then resubmission en banc, affirmed with two judges dissenting. 339 F. 2d 770. We granted certiorari. 382 U. S. 953.
We are not called upon in this proceeding to pass on the guilt or innocence of the petitioner of the atrocious crime that was committed. Nor are we called upon to determine whether the confessions obtained are true or false. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534 (1961). The sole issue presented for review is whether the confessions were voluntarily given or were the result of overbearing by police authorities. Upon thorough review of the record, we have concluded that the confessions were not made freely and voluntarily but rather that Davis’ will was overborne by the sustained pressures upon him. Therefore, the confessions are constitutionally inadmissible and the judgment of the court below must be reversed.
Had the trial in this case before us come after our decision in Miranda v. Arizona, ante, p. 436, we would reverse summarily. Davis was taken into custody by Charlotte police and interrogated repeatedly over a period of 16 days. There is no indication in the record that police advised him of any of his rights until after he had confessed orally on the 16th day. This would be clearly improper under Miranda. Id., at 478-479, 492. Similarly, no waiver of rights could be inferred from this record since it shows only that Davis was repeatedly interrogated and that he denied the alleged offense prior to the time he finally confessed. Id., at 476, 499.
We have also held today, in Johnson v. New Jersey, ante, p. 719, that our decision in Miranda, delineating procedures to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during in-custody interrogation is to be applied prospectively only. Thus the present case may not be reversed solely on the ground that warnings were not given and waiver not shown. As we pointed out in Johnson, however, the nonretroactivity of the decision in Miranda does not affect the duty of courts to consider claims that a statement was taken under circumstances which violate the standards of voluntariness which had begun to evolve long prior to our decisions in Miranda and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964). This Court has undertaken to review the voluntariness of statements obtained by police in state cases since Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936). The standard of voluntariness which has evolved in state cases under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the same general standard which applied in federal prosecutions — a standard grounded in the policies of the privilege against self-incrimination. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 6-8 (1964).
The review of voluntariness in cases in which the trial was held prior to our decisions in Escobedo and Miranda is not limited in any manner by these decisions. On the contrary, that a defendant was not advised of his right to remain silent or of his right respecting counsel at the outset of interrogation, as is now required by Miranda, is a significant factor in considering the voluntariness of statements later made. This factor has been recognized in several of our prior decisions dealing with standards of voluntariness. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 510-511 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 610 (1961); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U. S. 62, 64 (1949). See also Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U. S. 49, 54, 55 (1962). Thus, the fact that Davis was never effectively advised of his rights gives added weight to the other circumstances described below which made his confessions involuntary.
As is almost invariably so in cases involving confessions obtained through unobserved police interrogation, there is a conflict in the testimony as to the events surrounding the interrogations. Davis alleged that he was beaten, threatened, and cursed by police and that he was told he would get a hot bath and something to eat as soon as he signed a statement. This was flatly denied by each officer who testified. Davis further stated that he had repeatedly asked for a lawyer and that police refused to allow him to obtain one. This was also denied. Davis’ sister testified at the habeas corpus hearing that she twice came to the police station and asked to see him, but that each time police officers told her Davis was not having visitors. Police officers testified that, on the contrary, upon learning of Davis’ desire to see his sister, they went to her home to tell her Davis wanted to see her, but she informed them she was busy with her children. These factual allegations were resolved against Davis by the District Court and we need not review these specific findings here.
It is our duty in this case, however, as in all of our prior cases dealing with the question whether a confession was involuntarily given, to examine the entire record and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness. E. g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 515-516 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199, 205 (1960); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143, 147-148 (1944). Wholly apart from the disputed facts, a statement of the case from facts established in the record, in our view, leads plainly to the conclusion that the confessions were the product of a will overborne.
Elmer Davis is an impoverished Negro with a third or fourth grade education. His level of intelligence is such that it prompted the comment by the court below, even while deciding against him on his claim of involuntariness, that there is a moral question whether a person of Davis’ mentality should be executed. Police first came in contact with Davis while he was a child when his mother, murdered his father, and thereafter knew him through his long criminal record, beginning with a prison term he served at the age of 15 or 16.
In September 1959, Davis escaped from a state prison camp near Asheville, North Carolina, where he was serving sentences of 17 to 25 years. On September 20, 1959, Mrs. Foy Belle Cooper was raped and murdered in the Elmwood Cemetery in the City of Charlotte, North Carolina. On September 21, police in a neighboring county arrested Davis in Belmont, 12 miles from Charlotte. He was wearing civilian clothes and had in his possession women’s undergarments and a billfold with identification papers of one Bishel Burén Hayes. Hayes testified at trial that his billfold and shoes had been taken from him while he lay in a drunken sleep near the Elmwood Cemetery on September 20.
Charlotte police learned of Davis’ arrest and contacted the warden of the state prison to get permission to take Davis into their custody in connection with the Cooper murder and other felonies. Having obtained permission, they took Davis from Belmont authorities and brought him to the detective headquarters in Charlotte. From the testimony of the officers, it is beyond dispute that the reason for securing Davis was their suspicion that he had committed the murder.
The second and third floors of the detective headquarters building contain lockup cells used for detention overnight and occasionally for slightly longer periods. It has no kitchen facilities for preparing meals. The cell in which Davis was placed measures 6 by 10 feet and contains a solid steel bunk with mattress, a drinking fountain, and a commode. It is located on the inside of the building with no view of daylight. It is ventilated by two exhaust fans located in the ceiling of the top floor of the building. Despite the fact that a county jail equipped and used for lengthy detention is located directly across the street from detective headquarters, Davis was incarcerated in this cell on an upper floor of the building for the entire period until he confessed. Police Chief Jesse James testified: “I don’t know anybody who has stayed in the city jail as long as this boy.”
When Davis arrived at the detective headquarters, an arrest sheet was prepared giving various statistics concerning him. On this arrest sheet was typed the following illuminating directive: “HOLD FOR HUCKS & FES-PERMAN RE-MRS. COOPER. ESCAPEE FROM HAYWOOD COUNTY STILL HAS 15 YEARS TO PULL. DO NOT ALLOW ANYONE TO SEE DAVIS. OR ALLOW HIM TO USE TELEPHONE.” Both at trial and at the habeas corpus hearing the testimony of police officers on this notation was nearly uniform. Each officer testified that he did not put that directive on the arrest sheet, that he did not know who did, and that he never knew of it. The police captain first testified at trial that there had never been an order issued in the police department that Davis was not to see or talk to anybody. He cited as an example the fact that Davis’ sister came to see him (after Davis had confessed). He testified later in the trial, however:
“I don’t know, it is possible I could have ordered this boy to be held without privilege of communicating with his friends, relatives and held without the privilege of using the telephone or without the privilege of talking to anybody. . . . No, I did not want him to talk to anybody. For the simple reason he was an escaped convict and it is the rules and regulations of the penal system that if he is a C grade prisoner he is not permitted to see anyone alone or write anyone letters and I was trying to conform to the state regulations.”
The District Court found as a fact that from September 21 until after he confessed on October 6, neither friend nor relative saw Davis. It concluded, however, that Davis was not held incommunicado because he would have been permitted visitors had anyone requested to see him. In so finding, the District Court noted specifically the testimony that police officers contacted Davis’ sister for him. But the court made no mention whatever of the notation on the arrest sheet or the testimony of the police captain.
The stark wording of the arrest sheet directive remains, as does Captain McCall’s testimony. The denials and evasive testimony of the other officers cannot wipe this evidence from the record. Even accepting that police would have allowed a person to see Davis had anyone actually come, the directive stands unassailably as an indicium of the purpose of the police in holding Davis. As the dissenting judges below stated: “The instruction not to permit anyone access to Davis and not to allow him to communicate with the outside world can mean only that it was the determination of his custodians to keep him under absolute control where they could subject him to questioning at will in the manner and to the extent they saw fit, until he would confess.” 339 F. 2d, at 780. Moreover, the uncontested fact that no one other than the police spoke to Davis during the 16 days of detention and interrogation that preceded his confessions is significant in the determination of voluntariness.
During the time Davis was held by Charlotte police, he was fed two sandwiches, described by one officer as “thin” and “dry,” twice a day. This fare was occasionally supplemented with peanuts and other “stuff” such as cigarettes brought to him by a police officer. The District Court found that the food was the same served prisoners held overnight in the detention jail and that there was no attempt by police to weaken Davis by inadequate feeding. The State contends that “two sandwiches twice a day supplemented by peanuts ‘and other stuff’ was not such a poor diet, for an idle person doing no work, as to constitute a violation of due process of law.” Brief for Respondent, p. 7.
We may readily agree that the record does not show any deliberate attempt to starve Davis, compare Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560 (1958), arid that his diet was not below a minimum necessary to sustain him. Nonetheless, the diet was extremely limited and may well have had a significant effect on Davis’ physical strength and therefore his ability to resist. There is evidence in the record, not rebutted by the State, that Davis lost 15 pounds during the period of detention.
From the time Davis was first brought to the overnight lockup in Charlotte on September 21, 1959, until he confessed on the 16th day of detention, police officers conducted daily interrogation sessions with him in a special interrogation room in the building. These sessions each lasted “forty-five minutes or an hour or maybe a little more,” according to one of the interrogating officers. Captain McCall testified that he had assigned his entire force of 26 to 29 men to investigate the case. From this group, Detectives Hucks and Fesperman had primary responsibility for interrogating Davis. These officers testified to interrogating him once or twice each day throughout the 16 days. Three other officers testified that they conducted several interrogation sessions at the request of Hucks and Fesperman. Although the officers denied that Davis was interrogated at night, one testified that the interrogation periods he directed were held some time prior to 11 p. m. Captain McCall also interrogated Davis once.
According to each of the officers, no mention of the Cooper murder was made in any of the interrogations between September 21 and October 3. Between these dates they interrogated Davis extensively with respect to the stolen goods in his possession. It is clear from the record, however, that these interrogations were directly related to the murder and were not simply questioning as to unrelated felonies. The express purpose of this line of questioning was to break down Davis' alibis as to where he had obtained the articles. By destroying Davis’ contention that he had taken the items from homes some distance from Charlotte, Davis could be placed at the scene of the crime.
In order to put pressure on Davis with respect to these alibis, police took him from the lockup on October 1 to have him point out where he had stolen the goods. Davis had told the officers that he took the items from houses along the railroad line between Canton and Asheville. To disprove this story, Davis was aroused at 5 a. m. and driven to Canton. There his leg shackles were removed and he walked on the railroad tracks, handcuffed to an officer, 14 miles to Asheville. When Davis was unable to recognize any landmark along the way or any house that he had burglarized, an officer confronted him with the accusation that his story was a lie. The State points out that Davis was well fed on this day, that he agreed to make the hike, and contends that it was not so physically exhausting as to be coercive. The coercive influence was not, however, simply the physical exertion of the march, but also the avowed purpose of that trek— to break down his alibis to the crime of murder.
On the afternoon of October 3, two officers planned and carried out a ruse to attempt to get Davis to incriminate himself in some manner. They engaged Davis in idle conversation for 10 to 20 minutes and then inquired whether he would like to go out for “some fresh air.” They then took Davis from the jail and drove him into the cemetery to the scene of the crime in order to observe his reaction.
The purpose of these excursions and of all of the interrogation sessions was known to Davis. On the day of the drive to the cemetery, the interrogators shifted tactics and began questioning Davis specifically about the murder. They asked him if he knew why he was being held. He stated that he believed it was with respect to the Cooper murder. Police then pressed him, asking, “Well, did you do it?" He denied it. The interrogation sessions continued through the next two days. Davis consistently denied any knowledge of the crime.
On October 6, Detectives Hucks and Fesperman interrogated Davis for the final time. Lieutenant Sykes, who had known Davis’ family, but who had not taken part in any of the prior interrogation sessions because he had been away on vacation, asked to sit in. During this interrogation, after repeated earlier denials of guilt, Davis refused to answer questions concerning the crime. At about 12:45 p. m., Lieutenant Sykes inquired of Davis if he would like to talk to any of the officers alone about Mrs. Cooper. Davis said he would like to talk to Sykes. The others left the room. Lieutenant Sykes then asked Davis if he had been reading a testament which he was holding. Davis replied that he had. Sykes asked Davis if he had been praying. Davis replied that he did not know how to pray and agreed he would like Sykes to pray for him. The lieutenant offered a short prayer. At that point, as the dissent below aptly put it, the prayers of the police officer were answered — Davis confessed. He was driven to the cemetery and asked to re-enact the crime. Police then brought him back to the station where he repeated the confession to several of the officers. In the presence of six officers, a two-page statement of the confession Davis had made was transcribed. Although based on the information Davis had given earlier, Captain McCall dictated this statement employing his own choice of format, wording, and content. He paused periodically to ask Davis if he agreed with the statement so far. Each time Davis acquiesced. Davis signed the statement. Captain McCall then contacted the press and stated, “He finally broke down today.”
The concluding paragraphs of this confession, dictated by the police, contain, along with the standard disclaimer that the confession was free and voluntary, a statement that unwittingly summarizes the coercive effect on Davis of the prolonged period of detention and interrogation. They read:
“In closing, I want to say this. I have known in my own mind that [sic] you people were holding me for, and all the time I have been lying in jail, it has been worrying me, and I knew that sooner or later, I would have to tell you about it.
“I have made this statement freely and voluntarily. Captain McCall has dictated this statement in the presence of Detectives W. F. Hucks, E. F. Fesperman, H. C. Gardner, C. E. Davis, and Detective Lieutenant C. L. Sykes. I am glad it is over, because I have been going thru a big strain.”
The facts established on the record demonstrate that Davis went through a prolonged period in which substantial coercive influences were brought to bear upon him to extort the confessions that marked the culmination of police efforts. Evidence of extended interrogation in such a coercive atmosphere has often resulted in a finding of involuntariness by this Court. E. g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568 (1961); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U. S. 191 (1957); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U. S. 62 (1949). We have never sustained the use of a confession obtained after such a lengthy period of detention and interrogation as was involved in this case.
The fact that each individual interrogation session was of relatively short duration does not mitigate the substantial coercive effect create'd by repeated interrogation in these surroundings over 16 days. So far as Davis could have known, the interrogation in the overnight lockup might still be going on today had he not confessed. Moreover, as we have noted above, the fact that police did not directly accuse him of the crime until after a substantial period of eroding his will to resist by a tangential line of interrogation did not reduce the coercive influence brought to bear upon him. Similarly, it is irrelevant to the consideration of voluntariness that Davis was an escapee from a prison camp. Of course Davis was not entitled to be released. But this does not alleviate the coercive effect of his extended detention and repeated interrogation while isolated from everyone but the police in the police jail.
In light of all of the factors discussed above, the conclusion is inevitable — Davis’ confessions were the involuntary end product of coercive influences and are thus constitutionally inadmissible in evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit must be reversed and the case remanded to the District Court. On remand, the District Court should enter such orders as are appropriate and consistent with this opinion, allowing the State a reasonable time in which to retry petitioner.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result.
The written confession which Davis subsequently signed contained a notation that he was advised he did not have to make a statement and that any statement made could be used for or against him in court. A police officer testified at trial that he told Davis if the statement was not the truth he did not have to sign it.
The State adds in its brief: “Surely, Davis was not such a sensitive person, after all his years in prison, that ‘cussing’ and being called ‘Nigger’ constituted any degree of fear or coercion.” Brief for Respondent, p. 8.
Some of the officers testified that they had no idea why Davis was being brought to Charlotte except as an escapee or in relation to the stolen goods in his possession. Captain McCall, who was in charge of the entire detective division of the Charlotte Police, stated at trial, however: “He was brought over here for the purpose of being an escaped convict and as a likely suspect in the murder case .... We were not holding him for the State when he was in Gaston County jail, but were making an investigation in reference to our murder case.” At the habeas corpus hearing, he testified: “[H]e was in our custody primarily because he was a suspect in Mrs. Cooper’s case . . . .” Davis’ prior offenses included an assault in the vicinity of the cemetery, and his home had been nearby. See also note 9, infra.
The only exception to this incarceration was a day spent near Asheville, described infra, and a night in the Asheville jail.
Transcript of Evidence on Appeal. His testimony at the habeas corpus hearing was very similar. He first stated somewhat confusingly:
“Inasmuch as he was an escaped convict, I would have asked them what was the purpose of placing this do not allow anyone to see Davis or allow him to use the telephone. To be perfectly honest with you, why put it in writing when you can do the same thing verbally. I mean there is no question about it. The question is that each individual is allowed due process of law. And if they had been asked in any way or if I had been asked for anyone to see Elmer, they would have been given permission. Nobody asked to my knowledge.”
He later testified:
“I didn’t want anybody to talk to him without me knowing it as he was a prisoner of the State of North Carolina, and he was a C grade prisoner and not entitled to visitors without the permission of the warden.”
During the 16-day period, this diet varied only for two meals on the day he was taken to Asheville and on one other occasion when an officer brought him two hamburgers.
As the Police Chief explained: “An interrogation room should be void of all materials so that you can talk to a man in complete quiet and keep his attention.”
After the officer admitted that the sessions might have been up to 11 p. m., the following question was posed and answered:
“Q. Well, he could have been interrogated by you at night, couldn’t he?
“A. I’ll say no and I’ll say yes.”
Another officer testified as follows:
“Q. At the time you interrogated him up in the Police Department, was it daylight or dark?
“A. Well, it could have been both, if I remember correctly. I’ll just leave it that way: it could have been both, because that’s the way it is.”
Further graphic evidence of the obvious purpose of the police in detaining and repeatedly interrogating Davis is found in statements made to the press during this period:
“Detective Capt. W. A. McCall said Davis had not implicated himself in the Sunday slaying.
“ ‘We’re still talking to him,’ he said.” Charlotte Observer, Sept. 23, 1959, B-l.
“A Negro man was seen crouching in the bushes at Elmwood Cemetery shortly before the rape-slaying of an elderly widow there Sunday afternoon, Charlotte detectives said Wednesday.
“Charlotte detectives . . . continued interrogating E. J. Davis, the escapee who was arrested in Belmont Monday night.
“ ‘We questioned him twice today,’ Capt. McCall said Wednesday night. ‘He has given us some conflicting information, and we’re checking all his alibis.’
“ ‘We’ll give him a lie detector test if necessary. But so far we have had no positive results from our interrogation.’” Charlotte Observer, Sept. 24, 1959, B-l.
“ ‘Everybody . . . everybody is a suspect in this case until we sign a murder warrant.’
“Detective Capt. W. A. McCall spoke these words Thursday as police continued their search for the man who killed and raped a 78-year-old widow in a local graveyard Sunday afternoon.
“But the main emphasis Thursday continued to be on E. J. Davis, a 32ryear-old Negro prison escapee who was convicted of raping an elderly woman here in 1949.
“Davis was questioned at length Thursday for the third straight day.
“ ‘We know he’s telling us some lies,’ Capt. McCall said. ‘We’re checking every alibi and every story he gives us, and some of them just aren’t true.
“ ‘We don’t have enough facts yet to give him a lie detector test, though.’ ” Charlotte Observer, Sept. 25, 1959, B-l.
“Being questioned presently in connection with the slaying of 78-year-old Mrs. Foy Belle Cooper is E. J. Davis, a 32-year-old Negro escapee who was arrested Monday in Belmont. Davis has a prior record for rape in 1949.” Charlotte Observer, Sept. 26, 1959, B-l.
“Charlotte detectives concentrated Monday on a 32-year-old escaped convict in an effort to find who raped and murdered a 78-year-old widow here a week ago.
“Davis has been questioned closely several times in connection with the rape-slaying of Mrs. Foy Belle Cooper, 78.” Charlotte Observer, Sept. 29, 1959, 14-A.
“City detectives were still probing a man’s alibis for loopholes Friday in an investigation into the rape-slaying of a 78-year-old white woman in Charlotte Sept. 20.
“The suspect is an escaped convict, E. J. Davis. . . .” Charlotte Observer, Oct. 3, 1959, B-l.
Although the District Court found that police did not interrogate Davis directly about the Cooper case until October 3, the testimony was not uniform on this point. There is testimony in the record by police officers that the first interrogation about the murder was on the Friday before he confessed — October 2, 1959. See 253 N. C. 86, 90, 116 S. E. 2d 365, 367. See also Charlotte Observer, Oct. 7, 1959, A-1, Oct. 8, 1959, B-1.
Although the record does not show the tenor of the interrogation on October 4, it is established that Davis was interrogated every day and that he denied any connection with the crime until October 6.
After Davis signed the written confession, Police Chief Jesse James appeared to question Davis about his treatment. In response to this questioning, Davis stated that he had been treated all right. The following morning, a minister who knew Davis’ family and had read of his arrest 16 days earlier in the newspaper, appeared to talk to Davis. He testified that Davis told him his treatment had been very fine and that everyone had been courteous and kind to him. The minister indicated further that he often cooperated with police in such matters.
Charlotte Observer, Oct. 7, 1959, A-l-2.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 (Act) allows a federal court to detain an arrestee pending trial if the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that no release conditions “will reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the community.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck down this provision of the Act as facially unconstitutional, because, in that court’s words, this type of pretrial detention violates “substantive due process.” We granted certiorari because of a conflict among the Courts of Appeals regarding the validity of the Act. 479 U. S. 929 (1986). We hold that, as against the facial attack mounted by these respondents, the Act fully comports with constitutional requirements. We therefore reverse.
r — 4
Responding to “the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons on release,” S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 3 (1983), Congress formulated the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U. S. C. §3141 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. III), as the solution to a bail crisis in the federal courts. The Act represents the National Legislature’s considered response to numerous perceived deficiencies in the federal bail process. By providing for sweeping changes in both the way federal courts consider bail applications and the circumstances under which bail is granted, Congress hoped to “give the courts adequate authority to make release decisions that give appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if released.” S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 3.
To this end, § 3141(a) of the Act requires a judicial officer to determine whether an arrestee shall be detained. Section 3142(e) provides that “[i]f, after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f), the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, he shall order the detention of the person prior to trial.” Section 3142(f) provides the arrestee with a number of procedural safeguards. He may request the presence of counsel at the detention hearing, he may testify and present witnesses in his behalf, as well as proffer evidence, and he may cross-examine other witnesses appearing at the hearing. If the judicial officer finds that no conditions of pretrial release can reasonably assure the safety of other persons and the community, he must state his findings of fact in writing, § 3142(i), and support his conclusion with “clear and convincing evidence,” § 3142(f).
The judicial officer is not given unbridled discretion in making the detention determination. Congress has specified the considerations relevant to that decision. These factors include the nature and seriousness of the charges, the substan-tiality of the Government’s evidence against the arrestee, the arrestee’s background and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by the suspect’s release. § 3142(g). Should a judicial officer order detention, the detainee is entitled to expedited appellate review of the detention order. §§ 3145(b), (c).
Respondents Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were arrested on March 21,1986, after being charged in a 29-count indictment alleging various Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, mail and wire fraud offenses, extortion, and various criminal gambling violations. The RICO counts alleged 35 acts of racketeering activity, including fraud, extortion, gambling, and conspiracy to commit murder. At respondents’ arraignment, the Government moved to have Salerno and Cafaro detained pursuant to § 3142(e), on the ground that no condition of release would assure the safety of the community or any person. The District Court held a hearing at which the Government made a detailed proffer of evidence. The Government’s case showed that Salerno was the “boss” of the Genovese crime family of La Cosa Nostra and that Cafaro was a “captain” in the Genovese family. According to the Government’s proffer, based in large part on conversations intercepted by a court-ordered wiretap, the two respondents had participated in wide-ranging conspiracies to aid their illegitimate enterprises through violent means. The Government also offered the testimony of two of its trial witnesses, who would assert that Salerno personally participated in two murder conspiracies. Salerno opposed the motion for detention, challenging the credibility of the Government’s witnesses. He offered the testimony of several character witnesses as well as a letter from his doctor stating that he was suffering from a serious medical condition. Cafaro presented no evidence at the hearing, but instead characterized the wiretap conversations as merely “tough talk.”
The District Court granted the Government’s detention motion, concluding that the Government had established by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of release would ensure the safety of the community or any person:
“The activities of a criminal organization such as the Genovese Family do not cease with the arrest of its principals and their release on even the most stringent of bail conditions. The illegal businesses, in place for many years, require constant attention and protection, or they will fail. Under these circumstances, this court recognizes a strong incentive on the part of its leadership to continue business as usual. When business as usual involves threats, beatings, and murder, the present danger such people pose in the community is self-evident.” 631 F. Supp. 1364, 1375 (SDNY 1986).
Respondents appealed, contending that to the extent that the Bail Reform Act permits pretrial detention on the ground that the arrestee is likely to commit future crimes, it is unconstitutional on its face. Over a dissent, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed. 794 F. 2d 64 (1986). Although the court agreed that pretrial detention could be imposed if the defendants were likely to intimidate witnesses or otherwise jeopardize the trial process, it found “§ 3142(e)’s authorization of pretrial detention [on the ground of future dangerousness] repugnant to the concept of substantive due process, which we believe prohibits the total deprivation of liberty simply as a means of preventing future crimes.” Id., at 71-72. The court concluded that the Government could not, consistent with due process, detain persons who had not been accused of any crime merely because they were thought to present a danger to the community. Id., at 72, quoting United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F. 2d 984, 1000-1001 (CA2 1986) (opinion of Newman, J.). It reasoned that our criminal law system holds persons accountable for past actions, not anticipated future actions. Although a court could detain an arrestee who threatened to flee before trial, such detention would be permissible because it would serve the basic objective of a criminal system— bringing the accused to trial. The court distinguished our decision in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), in which we upheld police detention pursuant to arrest. The court construed Gerstein as limiting such detention to the “ ‘administrative steps incident to arrest.’ ” 794 F. 2d, at 74, quoting Gerstein, supra, at 114. The Court of Appeals also found our decision in Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S. 253 (1984), upholding postarrest, pretrial detention of juveniles, inapposite because juveniles have a lesser interest in liberty than do adults. The dissenting judge concluded that on its face, the Bail Reform Act adequately balanced the Federal Government’s compelling interests in public safety against the detainee’s liberty interests.
II
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that the Bail Reform Act might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, since we have not recognized an “overbreadth” doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment. Schall v. Martin, supra, at 269, n. 18. We think respondents have failed to shoulder their heavy burden to demonstrate that the Act is “facially” unconstitutional.
Respondents present two grounds for invalidating the Bail Reform Act’s provisions permitting pretrial detention on the basis of future dangerousness. First, they rely upon the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the Act exceeds the limitations placed upon the Federal Government by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Second, they contend that the Act contravenes the Eighth Amendment’s proscription, against excessive bail. We treat these contentions in turn.
A
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” This Court has held that the Due Process Clause protects individuals against two types of government action. So-called “substantive due process” prevents the government from engaging in conduct that “shocks the conscience,” Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 172 (1952), or interferes with rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325-326 (1937). When government action depriving a person of life, liberty, or property survives substantive due process scrutiny, it must still be implemented in a fair manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). This requirement has traditionally been referred to as “procedural” due process.
Respondents first argue that the Act violates substantive due process because the pretrial detention it authorizes constitutes impermissible punishment before trial. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 535, and n. 16 (1979). The Government, however, has never argued that pretrial detention could be upheld if it were “punishment.” The Court of Appeals assumed that pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act is regulatory, not penal, and we agree that it is.
As an initial matter, the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, supra, at 537. To determine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, we first look to legislative intent. Schall v. Martin, 467 U. S., at 269. Unless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive restrictions, the punitive/regulatory distinction turns on “‘whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].’” Ibid., quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963).
We conclude that the detention imposed by the Act falls on the regulatory side of the dichotomy. The legislative history of the Bail Reform Act clearly indicates that Congress did not formulate the pretrial detention provisions as punishment for dangerous individuals. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 8. Congress instead perceived pretrial detention as a potential solution to a pressing societal problem. Id., at 4-7. There is no doubt that preventing danger to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal. Schall v. Martin, supra.
Nor are the incidents of pretrial detention excessive in relation to the regulatory goal Congress sought to achieve. The Bail Reform Act carefully limits the circumstances under which detention may be sought to the most serious of crimes. See 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f) (detention hearings available if case involves crimes of violence, offenses for which the sentence is life imprisonment or death, serious drug offenses, or certain repeat offenders). The arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention hearing, ibid., and the maximum length of pretrial detention is limited by the stringent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III). Moreover, as in Schall v. Martin, the conditions of confinement envisioned by the Act “appear to reflect the regulatory purposes relied upon by the” Government. 467 U. S., at 270. As in Schall, the statute at issue here requires that detainees be housed in a “facility separate, to the extent practicable, from persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody pending appeal.” 18 U. S. C. § 3142(i)(2). We conclude, therefore, that the pretrial detention contemplated by the Bail Reform Act is regulatory in nature, and does not constitute punishment before trial in violation of the Due Process Clause.
The Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that “the Due Process Clause prohibits pretrial detention on the ground of danger to the community as a regulatory measure, without regard to the duration of the detention.” 794 F. 2d, at 71. Respondents characterize the Due Process Clause as erecting an impenetrable “wall” in this area that “no governmental interest — rational, important, compelling or otherwise — may surmount.” Brief for Respondents 16.
We do not think the Clause lays down any such categorical imperative. We have repeatedly held that the Government’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest. For example, in times of war or insurrection, when society’s interest is at its peak, the Government may detain individuals whom the Government believes to be dangerous. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160 (1948) (approving un-reviewable executive power to detain enemy aliens in time of war); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78, 84-85 (1909) (rejecting due process claim of individual jailed without probable cause by Governor in time of insurrection). Even outside the exigencies of war, we have found that sufficiently compelling governmental interests can justify detention of dangerous persons. Thus, we have found no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially dangerous resident aliens pending deportation proceedings. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524, 537-542 (1952); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228 (1896). We have also held that the government may detain mentally unstable individuals who present a danger to the public, Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979), and dangerous defendants who become incompetent to stand trial, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 731-739 (1972); Greenwood v. United States, 350 U. S. 366 (1956). We have approved of postarrest regulatory detention of juveniles when they present a continuing danger to the community. Schall v. Martin, supra. Even competent adults may face substantial liberty restrictions as a result of the operation of our criminal justice system. If the police suspect an individual of a crime, they may arrest and hold him until a neutral magistrate determines whether probable cause exists. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975). Finally, respondents concede and the Court of Appeals noted that an arrestee may be incarcerated until trial if he presents a risk of flight, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 534, or a danger to witnesses.
Respondents characterize all of these cases as exceptions to the “general rule” of substantive due process that the government may not detain a person prior to a judgment of guilt in a criminal trial. Such a “general rule” may freely be conceded, but we think that these cases show a sufficient number of exceptions to the rule that the congressional action challenged here can hardly be characterized as totally novel. Given the well-established authority of the government, in special circumstances, to restrain individuals’ liberty prior to or even without criminal trial and conviction, we think that the present statute providing for pretrial detention on the basis of dangerousness must be evaluated in precisely the same manner that we evaluated the laws in the cases discussed above.
The government’s interest in preventing crime by arrest-ees is both legitimate and compelling. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U. S. 144, 155 (1960). In Schall, supra, we recognized the strength of the State’s interest in preventing juvenile crime. This general concern with crime prevention is no less compelling when the suspects are adults. Indeed, “[t]he harm suffered by the victim of a crime is not dependent upon the age of the perpetrator.” Schall v. Martin, supra, at 264-265. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 responds to an even more particularized governmental interest than the interest we sustained in Schall. The statute we upheld in Schall permitted pretrial detention of any juvenile arrested on any charge after a showing that the individual might commit some undefined further crimes. The Bail Reform Act, in contrast, narrowly focuses on a particularly acute problem in which the Government interests are overwhelming. The Act operates only on individuals who have been arrested for a specific category of extremely serious offenses. 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f). Congress specifically found that these individuals are far more likely to be responsible for dangerous acts in the community after arrest. See S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 6-7. Nor is the Act by any means a scattershot attempt to incapacitate those who are merely suspected of these serious crimes. The Government must first of all demonstrate probable cause to believe that the charged crime has been committed by the arrestee, but that is not enough. In a full-blown adversary hearing, the Government must convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person. 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f). While the Government’s general interest in preventing crime is compelling, even this interest is heightened when the Government musters convincing proof that the arrestee, already indicted or held to answer for a serious crime, presents a demonstrable danger to the community. Under these narrow circumstances, society’s interest in crime prevention is at its greatest.
On the other side of the scale, of course, is the individual’s strong interest in liberty. We do not minimize the importance and fundamental nature of this right. But, as our cases hold, this right may, in circumstances where the government’s interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the greater needs of society. We think that Congress’ careful delineation of the circumstances under which detention will be permitted satisfies this standard. When the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from executing that threat. Under these circumstances, we cannot categorically state that pretrial detention “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934).
Finally, we may dispose briefly of respondents’ facial challenge to the procedures of the Bail Reform Act. To sustain them against such a challenge, we need only find them “adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some [persons] charged with crimes,” Schall, supra, at 264, whether or not they might be insufficient in some particular circumstances. We think they pass that test. As we stated in Schall, “there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct.” 467 U. S., at 278; see Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 274 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); id., at 279 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
Under the Bail Reform Act, the procedures by which a judicial officer evaluates the likelihood of future dangerousness are specifically designed to further the accuracy of that determination. Detainees have a right to counsel at the detention hearing. 18 U. S. C. § 3142(f). They may testify in their own behalf, present information by proffer or otherwise, and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. Ibid. The judicial officer charged with the responsibility of determining the appropriateness of detention is guided by statutorily enumerated factors, which include the nature and the circumstances of the charges, the weight of the evidence, the history and characteristics of the putative offender, and the danger to the community. § 3142(g). The Government must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. § 3142(f). Finally, the judicial officer must include written findings of fact and a written statement of reasons for a decision to detain. § 3142(i). The Act’s review provisions, § 3145(c), provide for immediate appellate review of the detention decision.
We think these extensive safeguards suffice to repel a facial challenge. The protections are more exacting than those we found sufficient in the juvenile context, see Schall, supra, at 275-281, and they far exceed what we found necessary to effect limited postarrest detention in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975). Given the legitimate and compelling regulatory purpose of the Act and the procedural protections it offers, we conclude that the Act is not facially invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
B
Respondents also contend that the Bail Reform Act violates the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Court of Appeals did not address this issue because it found that the Act violates the Due Process Clause. We think that the Act survives a challenge founded upon the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment addresses pretrial release by providing merely that “[ejxcessive bail shall not be required.” This Clause, of course, says nothing about whether bail shall be available at all. Respondents nevertheless contend that this Clause grants them a right to bail calculated solely upon considerations of flight. They rely on Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, 5 (1951), in which the Court stated that “[bjail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated [to ensure the defendant’s presence at trial] is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.” In respondents’ view, since the Bail Reform Act allows a court essentially to set bail at an infinite amount for reasons not related to the risk of flight, it violates the Excessive Bail Clause. Respondents concede that the right to bail they have discovered in the Eighth Amendment is not absolute. A court may, for example, refuse bail in capital cases. And, as the Court of Appeals noted and respondents admit, a court may refuse bail when the defendant presents a threat to the judicial process by intimidating witnesses. Brief for Respondents 21-22. Respondents characterize these exceptions as consistent with what they claim to be the sole purpose of bail — to ensure the integrity of the judicial process.
While we agree that a primary function of bail is to safeguard the courts’ role in adjudicating the guilt or innocence of defendants, we reject the proposition that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the government from pursuing other admittedly compelling interests through regulation of pretrial release. The above-quoted dictum in Stack v. Boyle is far too slender a reed on which to rest this argument. The Court in Stack had no occasion to consider whether the Excessive Bail Clause requires courts to admit all defendants to bail, because the statute before the Court in that case in fact allowed the defendants to be bailed. Thus, the Court had to determine only whether bail, admittedly available in that case, was excessive if set at a sum greater than that necessary to ensure the arrestees’ presence at trial.
The holding of Stack is illuminated by the Court’s holding just four months later in Carlson v. Landon, 342 U. S. 524 (1952). In that case, remarkably similar to the present action, the detainees had been arrested and held without bail pending a determination of deportability. The Attorney General refused to release the individuals, “on the ground that there was reasonable cause to believe that [their] release would be prejudicial to the public interest and would endanger the welfare and safety of the United States.” Id., at 529 (emphasis added). The detainees brought the same challenge that respondents bring to us today: the Eighth Amendment required them to be admitted to bail. The Court squarely rejected this proposition:
“The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act. In England that clause has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail. When this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said that indicated any different concept. The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus, in criminal cases bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be death. Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable.” Id., at 545-546 (footnotes omitted).
Carlson v. Landon was a civil case, and we need not decide today whether the Excessive Bail Clause speaks at all to Congress’ power to define the classes of criminal arrestees who shall be admitted to bail. For even if we were to conclude that the Eighth Amendment imposes some substantive limitations on the National Legislature’s powers in this area, we would still hold that the Bail Reform Act is valid. Nothing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible Government considerations solely to questions of flight. The only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not be “excessive” in light of the perceived evil. Of course, to determine whether the Government’s response is excessive, we must compare that response against the interest the Government seeks to protect by means of that response. Thus, when the Government has admitted that its only interest is in preventing flight, bail must be set by a court at a sum designed to ensure that goal, and no more. Stack v. Boyle, supra. We believe that when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a compelling interest other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does not require release on bail.
I — I I — I HH
In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception. We hold that the provisions for pretrial detention in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 fall within that carefully limited exception. The Act authorizes the detention prior to trial of arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community which no condition of release can dispel. The numerous procedural safeguards detailed above must attend this adversary hearing. We are unwilling to say that this congressional determination, based as it is upon that primary concern of every government — a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens — on its face violates either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
Reversed.
Every other Court of Appeals to have considered the validity of the Bail Reform Act of 1984 has rejected the facial constitutional challenge. United States v. Walker, 805 F. 2d 1042 (CA11 1986); United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F. 2d 1102 (CA11 1986); United States v. Simpkins, 255 U. S. App. D. C. 306, 801 F. 2d 520 (1986); United States v. Zannino, 798 F. 2d 544 (CA1 1983); United States v. Perry, 788 F. 2d 100 (CA3), cert. denied, 479 U. S. 864 (1986); United States v. Portes, 786 F. 2d 758 (CA7 1985).
Salerno was subsequently sentenced in unrelated proceedings before a different judge. To this date, however, Salerno has not been confined pursuant to that sentence. The authority for Salerno’s present incarceration remains the District Court’s pretrial detention order. The case is therefore very much alive and is properly presented for our resolution.
We intimate no view on the validity of any aspects of the Act that are not relevant to respondents’ case. Nor have respondents claimed that the Act is unconstitutional because of the way it was applied to the particular facts of their case.
We intimate no view as to the point at which detention in a particular case might become excessively prolonged, and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress’ regulatory goal.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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D
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, under the applicable principles hereinafter discussed, properly held that it was error to submit to a jury’s determination whether an insured died as a result of suicide or accident.
Petitioned is the beneficiary of two policies issued by respondent in 1944 and 1949 insuring the life of her now-deceased husband, William Dick. Each policy contained a clause which provided that double indemnity would be payable upon receipt of proof that the death of the insured “resulted directly, and independently of all other causes, from bodily injury effected solely through external violent and accidental means,” but that the double indemnity would not be payable if the insured’s death resulted from “self-destrúction, whether sane or insane.”
Mr. Dick met his death while alone in the silage shed of his farm. The death resulted from two wounds caused by the discharge of his shotgun. Petitioner filed proofs of death but respondent rejected her claim for double •indemnity payments on the ground that Mr. Dick had committed suicide. Petitioner then filed suit in the North Dakota courts. Her complaint set forth the policies in issue, the facts surrounding her husband’s death, an allegation that the death was accidental, and a demand for payment. Respondent removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota on the grounds of diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount. It then filed an answer to the complaint in which it set up suicide as an affirmative defense to the demand for double indemnity payments. Respondent admitted liability for the face amounts of the policies ($7,500) and no issue is presented concerning those amounts.
Trial proceeded before the district judge and jury. The evidence showed that the Dicks, who had been happily married since 1926, lived on a farm near Lisbon, North Dakota, where they raised sheep, cattle and field crops. Five of the six quarter sections of the farm were unmort-gaged and Mr. Dick, who was not known to have any financial problems, had nearly $1,000 in the bank. He was known as a “husky,” “strong,” “jolly” man who was seldom moody. “If he had anything on his chest, he would get it off and forget about it.” Dick got along well with his neighbors and was well liked in the community. He was 47 at the time of his death. He was five feet seven inches tall, weighed approximately 165 pounds, and was generally healthy. The coroner, who was also Dick’s personal doctor, testified that Dick was a mature, muscular, physically able workman who, three weeks before his death, was bright and cheerful. About a year and a half before his death, Mr. Dick visited the doctor and complained that he felt tired and pepless. His condition was diagnosed as mild to moderate non-specific prostatitis for which he received sulfa treatments and hormone shots. But the record is devoid of evidence that the condition was serious or particularly painful or that Mr. Dick was especially concerned with it. The Dicks reared five children. One daughter still lived with them and attended high school in nearby Elliott. Dick got along well with his whole family.
The evening before he died, the family returned from Elliott and ate ice cream and watched television together. Mr. Dick helped his daughter with a school problem in general science explaining to her the intricacies of a transformer. He slept soundly that night. He intended to help his cousin — a neighbor — make sausage the following day. He arose the next morning, milked the cows, ate a hearty breakfast, and spoke with his wife about their plans for the day. He said nothing to indicate that he contemplated doing anything out of the ordinary. About 8:30 a. m., Mrs. Dick drove their daughter to school. Mr. Dick backed the car out of the garage for his wife and said goodbye in a normal way.. He was then in the process of feeding milk to the pigs and silage-to the'cattle.'
Mrs. Dick returned in about a half hour and proceeded' to work, in the house. Later, when she thought it was time to leave .-for the cousin’s house, she went to .locate Mr. Dick.' She walked to the barn and called for fiim but there was no answer. She then went to the little 8 foot by 12 foot silage shed adjacent to the barn and saw Mr. Dick lying on the floor. He was fiflly clothed for the zero weather Lisbon was then experiencing and he wore bulky gloves and a heavy janket which was fully zipped up. Near him lay his shotgun. A good part of his head appeared blown off and she knew from his appearance that he was dead, ’^he hurriedly returned to the house and called Mr. Dick’s brother who lived nearby. He came immediately and at Mrs. Dick’s direction went to the silage shed. There he saw Mr. Dick lying with his head to the northwest and his feet to the Southeast of the shed. The body was along the south wall with the feet near, the corner. Later, when he examined the shed more closely, he found a concentration of- shotgun pellets high 'in the northwest corner of the shed and other pellets four to five feet from the floor in the southeast corner. He also noticed a sprinkle of frozen silage on the floor of the shed and on the stepsTeading to the door from the shed.
James Dick, the deceased’s nephew, also Responded to Mrs. Dick’s calí. He stated that upon arriving at the' Dicks’ house, he saw a tub newly filled with ground corn in the silage yard and that normally his uncle fed silage with a topping of ground corn to the cattle. He also stated that the cattle were just then finishing the silage presumably laid out by Mr. Dick before his death.
At about 11 a. m., the sheriff arrived. .Mr. Dick was still lying where he had died. The sheriff examined Mr. Dick’s shotgun and found two discharged shells in its chamber. The gun was dry and clean and there were no bloodstains on it or on the gloves which Dick was still wearing. The sheriff also noticed some of the shot patterns found by Dick’s brother and saw some brain tissue splattered on the southeast corner. He found a screwdriver lying on the floor about a foot from the gun. The Dicks used the screwdriver to open and close the door to the silage shed because the doorknob was missing.
Soon thereafter the coroner arrived. He testified that Mr. Dick’s body contained a shotgun- wound on the left side and one bn the head. The body wound was mortal, but not immediately fatal. It consisted of a gouged out wound on the left lateral chest wall which removed skin, fat, rib muscles and portions of rib from the body.' In addition, other ribs were fractured and Dick’s left lung was collapsed.' In the coroner’s opinion, it was the type of wound which would have had to result in immense pain, although it probably would not have made it impossible for Dick again to discharge the gun. The wound to. the head caused immediate death. According to the testimony of the sheriff and a member of the Fargo police department, both wounds were received from the front. In the sheriff’s opinion, the chest wound was received from an upward shot into Dick’s body, but this testimony conflicted with another statement of the sheriff indicating-that the wound was received from a downward shot.
It was clear from the testimony that Mr. Dick was an experienced hunter. Petitioner testified that he kept the shotgun in the barn because of attacks on his sheep by vicious dogs during the preceding year. A number of the sheep had been killed in this manner. In addition, Dick had mentioned seeing foxes near the barn. Mrs. Dick testified that when, her husband went hunting, he sometimes borrowed his father’s gun because he didn’t trust his own. She was with him once when the gun wouldn’t fire and.had been told that occasionally it fired accidentally. .In addition, Dick’s brother testified that while hunting with Dick he heard a shot at an unexpected time which Dick explained as hn accidental discharge that occurred “once in a while.” The gun was over 26 years old.
The sheriff testified that after the death'he tested Dick’s gun by cocking and dropping it a number of times. The triggers did not release on any of these occasions. The sheriff also explained that the gun had a safety and could not discharge with the safety on. The safety was off during each of his tests. Finally, the sheriff stated that each trigger had approximately a seven-pound trigger pull.
No suicide notes were found. Mr. Dick had said nothing to his relatives or friends concerning suicide. He left no will.
At the conclusion of the evidence, respondent unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict. The court charged the jury that under state law accidental death should be presumed and that respondent had the burden to show by a fair preponderance of the evidence that Dick committed suicide. The jury returned a verdict of $7,500 for petitioner. Respondent’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial were denied.
In this Court and before the Court of Appeals, both parties assumed that the propriety of the District Court’s refusal to grant respondent’s motions was a matter of North Dakota law. Under that law, it is dear that under the circumstances present in this case a presumption arises, which has the weight of affirmative evidence, that death was accidental. Svihovec v. Woodmen Accident Co., 69 N. D. 259, 285 N. W. 447. See Paulsen v. Modern Woodmen of America, 21 N. D. 235, 130 N. W. 231; Clemens v. Royal Neighbors of America, 14 N. D. 116, 103 N. W. 402; Stevens v. Continental Casualty Co., 12 N. D. 463, 97 N. W. 862. Proof of coverage and of-death by gunshot wound shifts the burden to the insurer to establish that the death of the insured was due to his suicide. Svihovec v. Woodmen Accident Co., supra. Under North Dakota law, this presumption does not disappear once the insurer presents any evidence of suicide. Ibid. Rather, the presumed fact (accidental death) continues and a plaintiff is entitled to affirmative instructions to the jury concerning its existence and weight.- This is not to say that under North Dakota law the presumption of acci-. dental death may not be overcome by so much evidence that the insurer is entitled to a directed verdict. For it is clear that where “there is no evidence in the record that can be said to be inconsistent with the conclusion of death by suicide,” or “the facts and circumstances surrounding the death [can] not be reconciled with any reasonable theory of accidental or nonin ten tional injury,” the state court may direct a verdict for the insurer even though the insurer is charged with the burden of proving that death was caused by suicide. These state rules determine when the evidence in a “suicide” case is sufficient to go to a jury. They are not directed at determining when the presumption of accidental death is rebutted, and thus excised from the case, because, as stated above, the presumed fact of accidental death continues throughout the trial and has the weight of affirmative evidence.
The Court of Appeals, in its opinion, reviewed the evidence in detail and resolved at least one disputed, point in respondent’s favor. It found, as “definitely established by the evidence,” that “neither barrel [of the shotgun] could have been fired unless someone or something either pulled or pushed one of the triggers.” It stated that “[o]ne can believe that even an experienced hunter might accidentally shoot himself once, but the asserted theory that he could accidentally shoot himself first with one barrel and then with the other stretches credulity beyond the breaking point.” And it concluded that the facts and circumstances could not “be reconciled with any reasonable theory of accident, and that, under the evidence, the question whether the death was accidental was not a question of fact for the jury.” Judgment was reversed with directions to dismiss the complaint. 252 F. 2d 43. We granted certiorari, 357 U. S. 925.
Lurking in this case is the' question whether it is proper tó apply a state or federal test of sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict where federal jurisdiction is'rested on. diversity of citizenship. On this question, the lower courts are not in agreement. Compare Rowe v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 231 F. 2d 922; Cooper v. Brown, 126 F. 2d 874; Lovas v. General Motors Corp., 212 F. 2d 805, with Davis Frozen Foods v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 204 F. 2d 839; Reuter v. Eastern Air Lines, 226 F. 2d 443; Diederich v. American News Co., 128 F. 2d 144. And see Morgan, Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 174, and 5 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d ed. 1951) § 38.10. But the question is not properly here for decision because, in the briefs and arguments in this Court, both parties assumed that the North Dakota standard applied. Moreover, although the Court of Appeals appears to have applied., the state standard, that court did not discuss the issue. Under these circumstances, we will not reach out to decide this important question particularly where, in the context of this case, the two standards are substantially the same. A decision 'as to which standard should be applied can well be left to another case where the question is briefed and argued. This case can be decided on the simple issue stated at the outset of the opinion.
In our view, the Court of Appeals improperly reversed the judgment of the District Court. It committed its basic error in resolving a factual dispute in favor of respondent that the shotgun would not fire unless someone or something pulled the triggers. Petitioner’s. evidence on this score, despite the “tests” performed by the sheriff, could support a jury conclusion that the gun might have fired accidentally from other causes. Once an accidental discharge is possible, a jury could rationally conceive of a number of explanations of accidental death which were consistent with evidence which the .jury might well have believed showed the overwhelming improbability of suicide. The record indisputably shows lack, of motive — in fact there is' affirmative evidence from which the jury could infer that Dick was a most unlikely suicide prospect. He was relatively healthy, financially secure, happily married, well liked, and apparently emotionally stable. He left nothing behind to indicate that he had committed suicide and nothing in his conduct before death indicated an intention to destroy himself. The timing of the death, while in the midst of normal chores and immediately preceding a planned appointment with neighbors, militates against such a conclusion. Dick’s presence in the shed and the accessibility of. the gun are explicable in view of the fact that dogs had previously attacked his sheep and the fact that the door in the shed provided a convenient exit to the adjoining fields. And a jury could well.believe it improbable that a man would not even bother to remove his bulky gloves, of thick jacket, when he intended to commit suicide even though those articles of clothing made it difficult to turn the gun on himself.
In a case like this one, North Dakota presumes that death was accidental and places on the insurer the burden of proving that death resulted from suicide. Stevens v. Continental Casualty Co., supra; Paulsen v. Modern Woodmen of America, supra. Under the Erie rule; presumptions (and their effects) and burden of proof are “substantive” and hence respondent was required to shoulder the burden during the instant trial. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109; Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208. And see Balchunas v. Palmer, 151 F. 2d 842; Sylvania Electric Products v. Barker, 228 F. 2d 842; Matsumoto v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 168 F. 2d 496. After all the evidence was’ in, the district judge, who was intimately concerned with the trial and who has a firsthand knowledge of the applicable state principles, believed that the ^case should go to the jury. Under all the circumstances, we believe that he was correct and that reasonable men cCuld conclude that the respondent failed to satisfy 'its burden of showing" that death resulted from suicide.
Reversed.
Mb. Justice Harlan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The gun was a Stevens, 12 gauge, double barreled shotgun with two triggers placed one behind the other. It weighed approximately seven pounds. It had an over-all length of 46 inches and measured 32 inches from muzzle to triggers. '
The sheriff stated that he did not “pretend to be an expert as far as shotguns are concerned.” His tests consisted of dropping the gun with the muzzle down ten times from a height of ten inches and holding the guij with the butt down, about ten inches from the floor and 'dropping it on a board eight or ten times. He also placed the gun, in a normal shooting position against his shoulder and swung the barrel against an obstacle three or four times.
This statement of the presumption and its weight accords with the requirements of N. D. Rev. Code, 1943, § 31-1101, which provides:
“A presumption, unless declared by law to be conclusive, may be. controverted by other direct or indirect evidence but unless so controverted, the jurors are bound to find according to the presumption.”
Respondent’s argument below that the court should adopt the “modern” rule on the effect of presumptions, see, e..g.,9 Wigmore On. Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 2491, wp,s rejected. The “modern” rule was applied by this Court in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U. S. 161, a decision predating Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64. For the subsequent history of the Gamer case, see 106 F. 2d 375.
Svihovec v. Woodmen Accident Co., supra; Clemens v. Royal Neighbors of America, supra.
The Court of Appeals admitted the improbability of Dick’s being able to pull the triggers with bulky gloves on but believed that this was offset by the probability that he used the screwdriver to push the triggers. This resolution of the facts seems strained indeed. The presence of the screwdriver was accounted for by testimony indicating that, it- was used to open the silage shed door. And the jury could reject as improbable the court’s implicit theory that a man mortally wounded in the chest and bulkily clothed could hold a heavy shotgun at arm’s length and shoot off his head particularly when he was wearing heavy gloves that could only be inserted in the trigger guard with difficulty.
Respondent argued that the North Dakota rule on presumptions should be abandoned in favor of the “modern” rule, see note 4, supra, but the record does not show that it argued' for the application of the federal standard of sufficiency of the evidence.
Compare Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 U. S. 476, 479-480,- and Bailey v. Central Vermont R. Co., 319 U. S. 350, 353, with Svihovec v. Woodmen Accident Co., supra.
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In California, to sentence a defendant to death for first-degree murder the trier of fact must find the defendant guilty , and also find one or more of 19 special circumstances listed in Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 190.2 (West 1988 and Supp. 1994). The case then proceeds to the penalty phase, where the trier of fact must consider a number of specified factors in deciding whether to sentence the defendant to death. §190.3. These two cases present the question whether three of the §190.3 penalty-phase factors are unconstitutionally vague under decisions of this Court construing the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
I
Petitioner Tuilaepa’s case arises out of a murder he committed in Long Beach, California, in October 1986. Tuilaepa and an accomplice walked into the Wander Inn Bar in Long Beach, where a small crowd had gathered to watch Monday Night Football. Tuilaepa, who was carrying a .22-caliber rifle, approached the bartender, pointed the rifle at him, and demanded money from the cash register. After the bartender turned over the money, Tuilaepa and his accomplice began robbing the bar’s patrons. When the accomplice demanded money from a man named Melvin Whiddon, Whiddon refused and knocked the accomplice to the floor. Tuilaepa shot Whiddon in the neck and next shot Whiddon’s brother, Kelvin, who was standing nearby. Tuilaepa turned to another man, Bruce Monroe, and shot him in the stomach. As Tuilaepa and his accomplice ran toward the back door, they confronted Kenneth Boone. Tuilaepa shot Boone in the neck. Melvin Whiddon died at the scene from the gunshot wounds; the others suffered serious and in some cases permanent injuries.
The State sought the death penalty against Tuilaepa, charging him with the murder of Melvin Whiddon and one special circumstance under § 190.2: murder during the commission of a robbery. The jury found Tuilaepa guilty of first-degree murder and also found the special circumstance true. At the penalty phase, the trial judge instructed the jury to consider the relevant sentencing factors specified in § 190.3. The jury was unanimous in sentencing Tuilaepa to death.
Petitioner Proctor murdered Bonnie Stendal, a 55-year-old schoolteacher who lived in Burney, a small community in Shasta County, California. On a night in April 1982, Proctor entered Mrs. Stendal’s home and beat her, causing numerous cuts and bruises on her face. Proctor stabbed Mrs. Stendal in the neck several times and inflicted seven stab wounds in the area of the right breast. Proctor raped Mrs. Stendal and committed further sexual assaults with a foreign object. After beating, torturing, and raping Mrs. Stendal, Proctor strangled her to death and dumped her body on the side of the road near Lake Britton, 12 miles from Burney. The body was found late the next afternoon, clad in a nightgown with hands tied behind the back.
The State sought the death penalty against Proctor, charging him with murder and a number of special circumstances under § 190.2 including murder during the commission of a rape, murder during the commission of a burglary, and infliction of torture during a murder. The jury found Proctor guilty of murder and found the three special circumstances true. After a mistrial at the penalty phase, Proctor’s motion for change of venue was granted, and a new sentencing jury was empaneled in Sacramento County. The trial judge instructed the jury to consider the sentencing factors specified in § 190.3. The jury was unanimous in sentencing Proctor to death.
Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court of California, which affirmed their convictions and death sentences. No. 93-5131, 4 Cal. 4th 569, 842 P. 2d 1142 (1992), and No. 93-5161, 4 Cal. 4th 499, 842 P. 2d 1100 (1992). We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 1010 (1993), and now affirm.
II
A
Our capital punishment cases under the Eighth Amendment address two different aspects of the capital decision-making process: the eligibility decision and the selection decision. To be eligible for the death penalty, the defendant must be convicted of a crime for which the death penalty is a proportionate punishment. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (1977). To render a defendant eligible for the death penalty in a homicide case, we have indicated that the trier of fact must convict the defendant of murder and find one “aggravating circumstance” (or its equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase. See, e. g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U. S. 231, 244-246 (1988); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U. S. 862, 878 (1983). The aggravating circumstance may be contained in the definition of the crime or in a separate sentencing factor (or in both). Lowenfield, supra, at 244-246. As we have explained, the aggravating circumstance must meet two requirements. First, the circumstance may not apply to every defendant convicted of a murder; it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder. See Arave v. Creech, 507 U. S. 463, 474 (1993) (“If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm”). Second, the aggravating circumstance may not be unconstitutionally vague. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420, 428 (1980); see Arave, supra, at 471 (court “‘must first determine whether the statutory language defining the circumstance is itself too vague to provide any guidance to the sentencer’”) (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 654 (1990)).
We have imposed a separate requirement for the selection decision, where the sentencer determines whether a defendant eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive that sentence. “What is important at the selection stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.” Zant, supra, at 879; see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 303-304 (1976) (plurality opinion). That requirement is met when the jury can consider relevant mitigating evidence of the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U. S. 299, 307 (1990) (“requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence”); see Johnson v. Texas, 509 U. S. 350, 361 (1993).
The eligibility decision fits the crime within a defined classification. Eligibility factors almost of necessity require an answer to a question with a factual nexus to the crime or the defendant so as to “make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.” Arave, supra, at 471 (internal quotation marks omitted). The selection decision, on the other hand, requires individualized sentencing and must be expansive enough to accommodate relevant mitigating evidence so as to assure an assessment of the defendant’s culpability. The objectives of these two inquiries can be in some tension, at least when the inquiries occur at the same time. See Romano v. Oklahoma, ante, at 6 (referring to “two somewhat contradictory tasks”). There is one principle common to both decisions, however: The State must ensure that the process is neutral and principled so as to guard against bias or caprice in the sentencing decision. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 189 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (procedures must “minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action”). That is the controlling objective when we examine eligibility and selection factors for vagueness. Indeed, it is the reason that eligibility and selection factors (at least in some sentencing schemes) may not be “too vague.” Walton, supra, at 654; see Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356, 361-364 (1988).
Because “the proper degree of definition” of eligibility and selection factors often “is not susceptible of mathematical precision,” our vagueness review is quite deferential. Walton, supra, at 655; see Gregg, supra, at 193-194 (factors “are by necessity somewhat general”). Relying on the basic principle that a factor is not unconstitutional if it has some “common-sense core of meaning . . . that criminal juries should be capable of understanding,” Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 279 (1976) (White, J., concurring in judgment), we have found only a few factors vague, and those in fact are quite similar to one another. See Maynard, supra, at 363-364 (question whether murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel”); Godfrey, supra, at 427-429 (question whether murder was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman”); cf. Arave, 507 U. S., at 472 (“We are not faced with pejorative adjectives ... that describe a crime as a whole”). In providing for individualized sentencing, it must be recognized that the States may adopt capital sentencing processes that rely upon the jury, in its sound judgment, to exercise wide discretion. That is evident from the numerous factors we have upheld against vagueness challenges. See, e.g., id., at 472-473 (question whether the defendant was a “cold-blooded, pitiless slayer” is not unconstitutionally vague); Walton, supra, at 654 (question whether “perpetrator inflict[ed] mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim’s death” with “[mjental anguish including] a victim’s uncertainty as to his ultimate fate” is not unconstitutionally vague) (internal quotation marks omitted); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S. 242, 255-258 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (various “mitigating” questions not unconstitutionally vague, nor is the question whether the crime was a “conscienceless or pitiless crime which [wa]s unnecessarily torturous to the victim”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Jurek, supra, at 274-276 (question “whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society” is not unconstitutionally vague).
In our decisions holding a death sentence unconstitutional because of a vague sentencing factor, the State had presented a specific proposition that the sentencer had to find true or false (e.g., whether the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel). We have held, under certain sentencing schemes, that a vague propositional factor used in the sentencing decision creates an unacceptable risk of randomness, the mark of the arbitrary and capricious sentencing process prohibited by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972). See Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S. 222 (1992). Those concerns are mitigated when a factor does not require a yes or a no answer to a specific question, but instead only points the sentencer to a subject matter. See Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 190.3(a), (k) (West 1988). Both types of factors (and the distinction between the two is not always clear) have their utility. For purposes of vagueness analysis, however, in examining the propositional content of a factor, our concern is that the factor have some “common-sense core of meaning ... that criminal juries should be capable of understanding.” Jurek, swpra, at 279 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
B
With those principles in mind, we consider petitioners’ vagueness challenge to the California scheme. A defendant in California is eligible for the death penalty when the jury finds him guilty of first-degree murder and finds one of the §190.2 special circumstances true. See California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, 1008 (1983) (jury found that “the defendant [fell] within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty [by] determining the truth of the alleged special circumstance,” commission of murder during the course of a robbery). (Petitioners do not argue that the special circumstances found in their cases were insufficient, so we do not address that part of California’s scheme save to describe its relation to the selection phase.) At the penalty phase, the jury is instructed to consider numerous other factors listed in § 190.3 in deciding whether to impose the death penalty on a particular defendant. Petitioners contend that three of those § 190.3 sentencing factors are unconstitutional and that, as a consequence, it was error to instruct their juries to consider them. Both Proctor and Tuilaepa challenge factor (a), which requires the sentencer to consider the “circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true.” Tuilaepa challenges two other factors as well: factor (b), which requires the sentencer to consider “[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence”; and factor (i), which requires the sentencer to consider “[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime.” We conclude that none of the three factors is defined in terms that violate the Constitution.
Petitioners’ challenge to factor (a) is at some odds with settled principles, for our capital jurisprudence has established that the sentencer should consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U. S., at 304 (“[Consideration of... the circumstances of the particular offense [is] a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death”). We would be hard pressed to invalidate a jury instruction that implements what we have said the law requires. In any event, this California factor instructs the jury to consider a relevant subject matter and does so in understandable terms. The circumstances of the crime are a traditional subject for consideration by the sentencer, and an instruction to consider the circumstances is neither vague nor otherwise improper under our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Tuilaepa also challenges factor (b), which requires the sentencer to consider the defendant’s prior criminal activity. The objection fails for many of the same reasons. Factor (b) is phrased in conventional and understandable terms and rests in large part on a determination whether certain events occurred, thus asking the jury to consider matters of historical fact. Under other sentencing schemes, in Texas for example, jurors may be asked to make a predictive judgment, such as “whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” See Jurek, 428 U. S., at 269. Both a backward-looking and a forward-looking inquiry are a permissible part of the sentencing process, however, and the States have considerable latitude in determining how to guide the sentencer’s decision in this respect. Here, factor (b) is not vague.
Tuilaepa’s third challenge is to factor (i), which requires the sentencer to consider “[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime.” This again is an unusual challenge in light of our precedents. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 115-117 (1982) (age may be relevant factor in sentencing decision). The factual inquiry is of the most rudimentary sort, and there is no suggestion that the term “age” is vague. Petitioner contends, however, that the age factor is equivocal and that in the typical case the prosecution argues in favor of the death penalty based on the defendant’s age, no matter how old or young he was at the time of the crime. It is neither surprising nor remarkable that the relevance of the defendant’s age can pose a dilemma for the sentencer. But difficulty in application is not equivalent to vagueness. Both the prosecution and the defense may present valid arguments as to the significance of the defendant’s age in a particular case. Competing arguments by adversary parties bring perspective to a problem, and thus serve to promote a more reasoned decision, providing guidance as to a factor jurors most likely would discuss in any event. We find no constitutional deficiency in factor (i).
C
Petitioners could not and do not take great issue with the conclusion that factors (a), (b), and (i) provide common and understandable terms to the sentencer. Cf. Godfrey, 446 U. S., at 429 (“jury’s interpretation of [outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman factor] can only be the subject of sheer speculation”). Petitioners argue, however, that selection factors must meet the requirements for eligibility factors, Brief for Petitioner in No. 93-5161, pp. 10-25, and therefore must require an answer to a factual question, as eligibility factors do. According to petitioners, a capital jury may not be instructed simply to consider an open-ended subject matter, such as “the circumstances of the crime” or “the background of the defendant.” Apart from the fact that petitioners’ argument ignores the obvious utility of these open-ended factors as part of a neutral sentencing process, it contravenes our precedents. Our decisions in Zant and Gregg reveal that, at the selection stage, the States are not confined to submitting to the jury specific propositional questions. In Zant, we found no constitutional difficulty where the jury had been told to consider “‘all facts and circumstances presented in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment as well as such arguments as have been presented for the State and for the Defense.’” 462 U. S., at 878-880,889, n. 25. We also stated that “[n]othing in the United States Constitution prohibits a trial judge from instructing a jury that it would be appropriate to take account of a defendant’s prior criminal record in making its sentencing determination.” Id., at 888. And in Gregg, we rejected a vagueness challenge to that same Georgia sentencing scheme in a case in which the “judge ... charged the jury that in determining what sentence was appropriate the jury was free to consider the facts and circumstances, if any, presented by the parties in mitigation or aggravation.” 428 U. S., at 161, 203-204. In both cases, therefore, the Court found no constitutional problem with a death sentence where the jury instructions directed consideration of the “facts and circumstances” of the case. In these cases as well, we must reject petitioners’ suggestion that the Constitution prohibits sentencing instructions that require the trier of fact to consider a relevant subject matter such as the “circumstances of the crime.”
Petitioners also suggest that the § 190.3 sentencing factors are flawed because they do not instruct the sentencer how to weigh any of the facts it finds in deciding upon the ultimate sentence. In this regard, petitioners claim that a single list of factors is unconstitutional because it does not guide the jury in evaluating and weighing the evidence and allows the prosecution (as well as the defense) to make wide-ranging arguments about whether the defendant deserves the death penalty. This argument, too, is foreclosed by our cases. A capital sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision. In California v. Ramos, for example, we upheld an instruction informing the jury that the Governor had the power to commute life sentences and stated that “the fact that the jury is given no specific guidance on how the commutation factor is to figure into its determination presents no constitutional problem.” 463 U. S., at 1008-1009, n. 22. Likewise, in Proffitt v. Florida, we upheld the Florida capital sentencing scheme even though “the various factors to be considered by the sentencing authorities [did] not have numerical weights assigned to them.” 428 U. S., at 258. In Gregg, moreover, we “approved Georgia’s capital sentencing statute even though it clearly did not channel the jury’s discretion by enunciating specific standards to guide the jury’s consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Zant, 462 U. S., at 875. We also rejected an objection “to the wide scope of evidence and argument” allowed at sentencing hearings. 428 U. S., at 203-204. In sum, “discretion to evaluate and weigh the circumstances relevant to the particular defendant and the crime he committed” is not impermissible in the capital sentencing process. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279, 315, n. 37 (1987). “Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, . . . the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment.” Ramos, supra, at 1008. Indeed, the sentencer may be given “unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty.” Zant, supra, at 875; see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 948-951 (1983) (plurality opinion). In contravention of those cases, petitioners’ argument would force the States to adopt a kind of mandatory sentencing scheme requiring a jury to sentence a defendant to death if it found, for example, a certain kind or number of facts, or found more statutory aggravating factors than statutory mitigating factors. The States are not required to conduct the capital sentencing process in that fashion. See Gregg, supra, at 199-200, n. 50.
The instructions to the juries in petitioners’ cases directing consideration of factor (a), factor (b), and factor (i) did not violate the Constitution. The judgments of the Supreme Court of California are
Affirmed.
Section 190.3 provides in part:
“In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the following factors if relevant:
“(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1.
“(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.
“(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.
“(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
“(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant’s homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
“(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct.
“(g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.
“(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the [ejffects of intoxication.
“(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
“(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor.
“(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Marshall joined.
This case presents the question whether public employees who allege that they were discharged or threatened with discharge solely because of their partisan political affiliation or nonaffiliation state a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
I
Respondents brought this- suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against petitioners, Richard J. Elrod, Richard J. Daley, the Democratic Organization of Cook County, and the Democratic County Central Committee of Cook County. Their complaint alleged that they were discharged or threatened with discharge solely for the reason that they were not affiliated with or sponsored by the Democratic Party. They sought declaratory, injunctive, and other relief for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988. Finding that the respondents failed to make an adequate showing of irreparable injury, the District Court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction and ultimately dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, relying on Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F. 2d 561 (CA7 1972), reversed and remanded, holding that respondents’ complaint stated a legally cognizable claim. The Court of Appeals instructed the District Court to enter appropriate preliminary injunctive relief. 509 F. 2d 1133 (1975). We granted certiorari. 423 U. S. 821. We affirm.
II
In December 1970, the Sheriff of Cook County, a Republican, was replaced by Richard Elrod, a Democrat. At that time, respondents, all Republicans, were employees of the Cook County Sheriff’s Office. They were non-civil-service employees and, therefore, not covered by any statute, ordinance, or regulation protecting them from arbitrary discharge. One respondent, John Bums, was Chief Deputy of the Process Division and supervised all departments of the Sheriff’s Office working on the seventh floor of the building housing that office. Frank Yargas was a bailiff and security guard at the Juvenile Court of Cook County. Fred L. Buckley was employed as a process server in the office. Joseph Dennard was an employee in the office.
It has been the practice of the Sheriff of Cook County, when he assumes office from a Sheriff of a different political party, to replace non-civil-service employees of the Sheriff’s Office with members of his own party when the existing employees lack or fail to obtain requisite support from, or fail to affiliate with, that party. Consequently, subsequent to Sheriff Elrod’s assumption of office, respondents, with the exception of Buckley, were discharged from their employment solely because they did not support and were not members of the Democratic Party and had failed to obtain the sponsorship of one of its leaders. Buckley is in imminent danger of being discharged solely for the same reasons. Respondents allege that the discharges were ordered by Sheriff Elrod under the direction of the codefendants in this suit.
Ill
At the outset, we are met with objections to our consideration of this case based on the political-question doctrine and the principle of separation of powers. These objections need not long detain us.
A question presented to this Court for decision is properly deemed political when its resolution is committed by the Constitution to a branch of the Federal Government other than this Court. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 (1962). Thus, “it is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary’s relationship to the States, which gives rise to the 'political question.’ ” Id., at 210. That matters related to a State’s, or even the Federal Government’s, elective process are implicated by this Court's resolution of a question is not sufficient to ¡ justify our withholding decision of the question. In particular, in this case., we are asked only to determine whether the politically motivated discharge of employees of the Cook County Sheriff’s Office comports with the limitations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. j.This involves solely a question of constitutional interpretation, a function ultimately the responsibility of this Court. Id., at 211. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 618-549 (1969). Petitioners do not, and could not, argue that a' decision as to the constitutionality of the Sheriff’s practices should be left to Congress or the President. The political-question doctrine, therefore, is no obstacle to judicial review in this case. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 28 (1968).
Petitioners also object that our review of this case will offend the principle of separation. of powers, for the executive’s responsibility to insure that the laws be faithfully executed requires the power of appointment or removal at will, unimpaired by any judicial oversight. They cite Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), in support of their argument. The short answer to this (argument is that the separation-of-powers principle, like the political-question doctrine, has no applicability to the federal judiciary’s relationship to the States. The matter in Myers itself was limited to the permissibility of restraints imposed by Congress on the President concerning the removal of the executive officers. More fundamentally, however, the answer to petitioners’ ob-Ejection is that there can be no impairment of executive power, whether on the state or federal level, where actions pursuant to that power are impermissible under the Con-|_stitution. Where there is no power, there can be no impairment of power. And our determination of the limits on state executive power contained in the Constitution is in proper keeping with our primary responsibility of interpreting that document. It is to such a determination that we now turn.
IV
The Cook County Sheriff’s practice of dismissing employees on a partisan basis is but one form of the general practice of political patronage. The practice also includes placing loyal supporters in government jobs that may or may not have been made available by political discharges. Nonofficeholders may be the beneficiaries of lucrative government contracts for highway construction, buildings, and supplies. Favored wards may receive improved public services. Members of the judiciary may even engage in the practice through the appointment of receiverships, trusteeships, and refereeships. Although political patronage comprises a broad range of activities, we are here concerned only with the constitutionality of dismissing public employees for partisan reasons.
Patronage practice is not new to American politics. It has existed at the federal level at least since the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, although its popularization and legitimation primarily occurred later, in the Presidency of Andrew Jackson. The practice is not unique to American politics. It has been used in many European countries, and in darker times, it played a significant role in the Nazi rise to power in Germany and other totalitarian states. More recent times have witnessed a strong decline in its use, particularly with respect to public employment. Indeed, only a few decades after Andrew Jackson's administration, strong discontent with the corruption and inefficiency of the patronage system of public employment eventuated in the Pendleton Act, the foundation of modern civil service. And on the state and local levels, merit systems have increasingly displaced the practice. This trend led the Court to observe in CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 564 (1973), that “the judgment of Congress, the Executive, and the country appears to have been that partisan political activities by federal employees must be limited if the Government is to operate effectively and fairly, elections are to play their proper part in representative government, and employees themselves are to be sufficiently free from improper influences.”
The decline of patronage employment is not, of course, relevant to the question of its constitutionality. It is the practice itself, not the magnitude of its occurrence, the constitutionality of which must be determined. Nor for that matter does any unacceptability of the practice signified by its decline indicate its unconstitutionality. Our inquiry does not begin with the judgment of history, though the actual operation of a practice viewed in retrospect may help to assess its workings with respect to constitutional limitations. Compare Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 637 (1896). Rather, inquiry must commence with identification of the constitutional limitations implicated by a challenged governmental practice.
Y
The cost of the practice of patronage is the restraint it places on freedoms of belief and association. In order to maintain their jobs, respondents were required to pledge their political allegiance to the Democratic Party, work for the election of other candidates of the Democratic Party, contribute a portion of their wages to the Party, or obtain the sponsorship of a member of the Party, usually at the price of one of the first three alternatives. Regardless of the incumbent party's identity, Democratic or otherwise, the consequences for association and belief are the same. An individual who is a member of the out-party maintains affiliation with his own party at the risk of losing his job. He works for the election of his party's candidates and espouses its policies at the same risk. The financial and campaign assistance that he is induced to provide to another party furthers the advancement of that party’s policies to the detriment of his party's views and ultimately his own beliefs, and any assessment of his salary is tantamount to coerced belief. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 19 (1976). Even a pledge of allegiance to another party, however ostensible, only serves to compromise the individual’s true beliefs. Since the average public employee is hardly in the financial position to support his party and another, or to lend his time to two parties, the individual’s ability to act according to his beliefs and to associate with others of his political persuasion is constrained, and support for his party is diminished.
It is not only belief and association which are restricted where political patronage is the practice. The free functioning of the electoral process also suffers. Conditioning public employment on partisan support prevents support of competing political interests. Existing employees are deterred from such support, as well as the multitude seeking jobs. As government employment, state or federal, becomes more pervasive, the greater the dependence on it becomes, and therefore the greater becomes the power to starve political opposition by commanding partisan support, financial and otherwise. Patronage thus tips the electoral process in favor of the incumbent party, and where the practice’s scope is substantial relative to the size of the electorate, the impact on the process can be significant.
Our concern with the impact of patronage on political belief and association does not occur in the abstract, for political belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment. Regardless of the nature of the inducement, whether it be by the denial of public employment or, as in Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943), by the influence of a teacher over students, “[ijf there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” Id., at 642. And, though freedom of belief is central, “[t]he First Amendment protects political association as well as political expression.” Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 15. “There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form of 'orderly group activity’ protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 430; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 522-523; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460-461. The right to associate with the political party of one’s choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom.” Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51, 56-57 (1973).
These protections reflect our “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964), a principle itself reflective of the fundamental understanding that “[ competition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process... Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., at 32. Patronage, therefore, to the extent it compels or restrains belief and association, is inimical to the process which undergirds our system of government and is “at war with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment.” Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F. 2d, at 576. As such, the practice unavoidably confronts decisions by this Court either invalidating or recognizing as invalid government action that inhibits belief and association through the conditioning of public employment on political faith.
The Court recognized in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 100 (1947), that “Congress may not 'enact a regulation providing that no Republican, Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office....’” This principle was reaffirmed in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952), which held that a State could not require its employees to establish their loyalty by extracting an oath denying past affiliation with Communists. And in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 898 (1961), the Court recognized again that the government could not deny employment because of previous membership in a particular party.
Particularly pertinent to the constitutionality of the practice of patronage dismissals are Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589 (1967), and Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593 (1972). In Keyishian, the Court invalidated New York statutes barring employment merely on the basis of membership in “subversive” organizations. Keyishian squarely held that political association alone could not, consistently with the First Amendment, constitute an adequate ground for denying public employment. In Perry, the Court broadly rejected the validity of limitations on First Amendment rights as a condition to the receipt of a governmental benefit, stating that the government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to ‘produce a result which [it] could not command directly.’ Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 526. Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.” 408 U. S., at 597.
Patronage practice falls squarely within the prohibitions of Keyishian and Perry. Under that practice, public employees hold their jobs on the condition that they provide, in some acceptable manner, support for the favored political party. The threat of dismissal for failure to provide that support unquestionably inhibits protected belief and association, and dismissal for failure to provide support only penalizes its exercise. The belief and association which government may not ordain directly are achieved by indirection. And regardless of how evenhandedly these restraints may operate in the long run, after political office has changed hands several times, protected interests are still infringed and thus the violation remains.
VI
Although the practice of patronage dismissals clearly infringes First Amendment interests, our inquiry is not at an end, for the prohibition on encroachment of First Amendment protections is not an absolute. Restraints are permitted for appropriate reasons. Keyishian and Perry, however, not only serve to establish a presumptive prohibition on infringement, but also serve to dispose of one suggested by petitioners’ reference to this Court’s af-firmance by an equally divided court in Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U. S. 918 (1951), aff’g 86 U. S. App. D. C. 248, 182 F. 2d 46 (1950). That is the notion that because there is no right to a government benefit, such as public employment, the benefit may be denied for any reason. Perry, however, emphasized that “[f]or at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no Tight’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely.” 408 U. S., at 597. Perry and Keyishian properly recognize one such impermissible reason: The denial of a public benefit may not be used by the government for the purpose of creating an incentive enabling it to achieve what it may not command directly. “ ‘[T]he theory that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected/ ” Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S., at 605-606. “It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.” Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 404 (1963). “ '[T]his Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a “right” or as a “privilege.” ’ ” Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U. S. 634, 644 (1973) (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 374 (1971)).
While the right-privilege distinction furnishes no ground on which to justify patronage, petitioners raise several other justifications requiring consideration. Before examining those justifications, however, it is necessary to have in mind the standards according to which their sufficiency is to be measured. It is firmly established that a significant impairment of First Amendment rights must survive exacting scrutiny. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 64-65; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460-461 (1958). “This type of scrutiny is necessary even if any deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights arises, not through direct government action, but indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of the government’s conduct....” Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 65. Thus encroachment “cannot be justified upon a mere showing of a legitimate state interest.” Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U. S., at 58. The interest advanced must be paramount, one of vital importance, and the burden is on the government to show the existence of such an interest. Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 94; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S., at 31-33; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438, 444 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 464-466; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 530 (1945). In the instant case, care must be taken not to confuse the interest of partisan organizations with governmental interests. Only the latter will suffice. Moreover, it is not enough that the means chosen in furtherance of the interest be rationally related to that end. Sherbert v. Verner, supra, at 406. The gain to the subordinating interest provided by the means must outweigh the incurred loss of protected rights, see United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S., at 96, and the government must “emplo[y] means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment... Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 25. “[A] State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty. 'Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms/ If the State has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal liberties.” Kusper v. Pontikes, supra, at 59 (citations omitted). See United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960). In short, if conditioning the retention of public employment on the employee’s support of the in-party is to survive constitutional challenge, it must further some vital government end by a means that is least restrictive of freedom of belief and association in achieving that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the loss of constitutionally protected rights.
One interest which has been offered in justification of patronage is the need to insure effective government and the efficiency of public employees. It is argued that employees of political persuasions not the same as that of the party in control of public office will not have the incentive to work effectively and may even be motivated to subvert the incumbent administration’s efforts to govern effectively. We are not persuaded. The inefficiency resulting from the wholesale replacement of large numbers of public employees every time political office changes hands belies this justification. And the prospect of dismissal after an election in which the incumbent party has lost is only a disincentive to good work. Further, it is not clear that dismissal in order to make room for a patronage appointment will result in replacement by a person more qualified to do the job since appointment often occurs in exchange for the delivery of votes, or other party service, not job capability. More fundamentally, however, the argument does not succeed because it is doubtful that the mere difference of political persuasion motivates poor performance; nor do we think it legitimately may be used as a basis for imputing such behavior. The Court has consistently recognized that mere political association is an inadequate basis for imputing disposition to ill-willed conduct. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S., at 606-608; Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11, 19 (1966); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S., at 190-191. Though those cases involved affiliation with the Communist Party, we do not “consider these [respondents’] interest in freely associating with members of the [Republican] Party less worthy of protection than [other] employees’ interest in associating with Communists or former Communists.” Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F. 2d, at 570. At all events, less drastic means for insuring government effectiveness and employee efficiency are available to the State. Specifically, employees may always be discharged for good cause, such as insubordination or poor job performance, when those bases in fact exist.
Even if the first argument that patronage serves effectiveness and efficiency be rejected, it still may be argued that patronage serves those interests by giving the employees of an incumbent party the incentive to perform well in order to insure their party’s incumbency and thereby their jobs. Patronage, according to the argument, thus makes employees highly accountable to the public. But the ability of officials more directly accountable to the electorate to discharge employees for cause and the availability of merit systems, growth in the use of which has been quite significant, convince us that means less intrusive than patronage still exist for achieving accountability in the public work force and, thereby, effective and efficient government. The greater effectiveness of patronage over these less drastic means, if any, is at best marginal, a gain outweighed by the absence of intrusion on protected interests under the alternatives.
The lack of any justification for patronage dismissals as a means of furthering government effectiveness and efficiency distinguishes this case from CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548 (1973), and United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1949). In both of those cases, legislative restraints on political management and campaigning by public employees were upheld despite their encroachment on First Amendment rights because, inter alia, they did serve in a necessary manner to foster and protect efficient and effective government. Interestingly, the activities that were restrained by the legislation involved in those cases are characteristic of patronage practices. As the Court observed in Mitchell: “The conviction that an actively partisan governmental personnel threatens good administration has deepened since [1882]. Congress recognizes danger to the service in that political rather than official effort may earn advancement and to the public in that governmental favor may be channeled through political connections.” 330 U. S., at 97-98.
A second interest advanced in support of patronage is the need for political loyalty of employees, not to the end that effectiveness and efficiency be insured, but to the end that representative government not be undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation of policies of the new administration, policies presumably sanctioned by the electorate. The justification is not without force, but is nevertheless inadequate to validate patronage wholesale. Limiting patronage dismissals to policymak-ing positions is sufficient to achieve this governmental end. Nonpolicymaking individuals usually have only limited responsibility and are therefore not in a position to thwart the goals of the in-party.
No clear line can be drawn between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions. While nonpolicymaking individuals usually have limited responsibility, that is not to say that one with a number of responsibilities is necessarily in a policymaking position. The nature of the responsibilities is critical. Employee supervisors, for example, may have many responsibilities, but those responsibilities may have only limited and well-defined objectives. An employee with responsibilities that are not well defined or are of broad scope more likely functions in a policymaking position. In determining whether an employee occupies a policymaking position, consideration should also be given to whether the employee acts as an adviser or formulates plans for the implementation of broad goals. Thus, the political loyalty “justification is a matter of proof, or at least argument, directed at particular kinds of jobs.” Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F. 2d, at 574. Since, as we have noted, it is the government's burden to demonstrate an overriding interest in order to validate an encroachment on protected interests, the burden of establishing this justification as to any particular respondent will rest on the petitioners on remand, cases of doubt being resolved in favor of the particular respondent.
It is argued that a third interest supporting patronage dismissals is the preservation of the democratic process. According to petitioners, “ ‘we have contrived no system for the support of party that does not place considerable reliance on patronage. The party organization makes a democratic government work and charges a price for its services.' ” The argument is thus premised on the centrality of partisan politics to the democratic process.
Preservation of the democratic process is certainly an interest protection of which may in some instances justify limitations on First Amendment freedoms. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976); CSC v. Letter Carriers, supra; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23 (1968); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra. But however important preservation of the two-party system or any system involving a fixed number of parties may or may not be, Williams v. Rhodes, supra, at 32, we are not persuaded that the elimination of patronage practice or, as is specifically involved here, the interdiction of patronage dismissals, will bring about the demise of party politics. Political parties existed in the absence of active patronage practice prior to the administration of Andrew Jackson, and they have survived substantial reduction in their patronage power through the establishment of merit systems.
Patronage dismissals thus are not the least restrictive alternative to achieving the contribution they may make to the democratic process. The process functions as well without the practice, perhaps even better, for patronage dismissals clearly also retard that process. Patronage can result in the entrenchment of one or a few parties to the exclusion of others. And most indisputably, as we recognized at the outset, patronage is a very effective impediment to the associational and speech freedoms which are essential to a meaningful system of democratic government. Thus, if patronage contributes at all to the elective process, that contribution is diminished by the practice’s impairment of the same. Indeed, unlike the gain to representative government provided by the Hatch Act in CSC v. Letter Carriers, supra, and United Public Workers v. Mitchell, supra, the gain to representative government provided by the practice of patronage, if any, would be insufficient to justify its sacrifice of First Amendment rights.
To be sure, Letter Carriers and Mitchell upheld Hatch Act restraints sacrificing political campaigning and management, activities themselves protected by the First Amendment. But in those cases it was the Court’s judgment that congressional subordination of those activities was permissible to safeguard the core interests of individual belief and association. Subordination of some First Amendment activity was permissible to protect other such activity. Today, we hold that subordination of other First Amendment activity, that is, patronage dismissals, not only is permissible, but also is mandated by the First Amendment. And since patronage dismissals fall within the category of political campaigning and management, this conclusion irresistibly flows from Mitchell and Letter Carriers. For if the First Amendment did not place individual belief and association above political campaigning and management, at least in the setting of public employment, the restraints on those latter activities could not have been judged permissible in Mitchell and Letter Carriers
It is apparent that at bottom we are required to engage in the resolution of conflicting interests under the First Amendment. The constitutional adjudication called for by this task is well within our province. The illuminating source to which we turn in performing the task is the system of government the First Amendment was intended to protect, a democratic system whose proper functioning is indispensably dependent on the unfettered judgment of each citizen on matters of political concern. Our decision in obedience to the guidance of that source does not outlaw political parties or political campaigning and management. Parties are free to exist and their concomitant activities are free to continue. We require only that the rights of every citizen to believe as he will and to act and associate according to his beliefs be free to continue as well.
In summary, patronage dismissals severely restrict political belief and association. Though there is a vital need for government efficiency and effectiveness, such dismissals are on balance not the least restrictive means for fostering that end. There is also a need to insure that policies which the electorate has sanctioned are effectively implemented. That interest can be fully satisfied by limiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions. Finally, patronage dismissals cannot be justified by their contribution to the proper functioning of our democratic process through their assistance to partisan politics since political parties are nurtured by other, less intrusive and equally effective methods. More fundamentally, however, any contribution of patronage dismissals to the democratic process does not suffice to override their severe encroachment on First Amendment freedoms. We hold, therefore, that the practice of patronage dismissals is unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that respondents thus stated a valid claim for relief.
VII
There remains the question whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction was properly directed by the Court of Appeals. The District Court predicated its denial of respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction on its finding that the allegations in their complaints and affidavits did not constitute a sufficient showing of irreparable injury and that respondents had an adequate remedy at law. The Court of Appeals held, however: “Inasmuch as this case involves First Amendment rights of association which must be carefully guarded against infringement by public office holders, we judge that injunctive relief is clearly appropriate in these cases.” 509 F. 2d, at 1136. We agree.
At the time a preliminary injunction was sought in the District Court, one of the respondents was only threatened with discharge. In addition, many of the members of the class respondents were seeking to have certified prior to the dismissal of their complaint were threatened with discharge or had agreed to provide support for the Democratic Party in order to avoid discharge. It is clear therefore that First Amendment interests were either threatened or in fact being impaired at the time relief was sought. The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971). Since such injury was both threatened and occurring at the time of respondents’ motion and since respondents sufficiently demonstrated a probability of success on the merits, the Court of Appeals might properly have held that the District Court abused its discretion in denying preliminary injunctive relief. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 67 (1963).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Stevens did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
For purposes of our review, all of the well-pleaded allegations of respondents’ complaint and uncontroverted affidavits filed in support of the motion for a preliminary injunction are taken as true.
M. Tolchin. & S. Tolchin, To the Victor 5-6 (1971).
Id., at 323.
Id., at 323-326.
See C. Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage 87, 209-210 (1904); D. Rosenbloom, Federal Service and the Constitution 238-240 (1971).
C. Friedrich & Z. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy 183-188 (rev. ed. 1965).
Act of Jan. 16, 1883, c. 27, § 2 (2) Fifth, Sixth, 22 Stat. 404.
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 604-605, n. 2 (1973). Factors contributing to the declining use of patronage have not been limited to the proliferation of merit systems. New methods of political financing, the greater necessity of job expertise in public employment, growing issue orientation in the elective process, and new incentives for political campaigners have also contributed. Sorauf, The Silent Revolution In Patronage, 20 Pub. Admin. Rev. 28, 34 (1960).
For comprehensive commentary on the constitutionality of the practice of patronage dismissals, see Sehoen, Politics, Patronage, and the Constitution, 3 Ind. Legal Forum 35 (1969); Comment, Patronage Dismissals: Constitutional Limits and Political Justification, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 297 (1974).
“It is important to note that while it is the Fourteenth Amendment which bears directly upon the State it is the more specific limiting principles of the First Amendment that finally govern this case.” Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 639 (1943).
Protection of First Amendment interests has not been limited to invalidation of conditions on government employment requiring allegiance to a particular political party. This Court’s decisions have prohibited' conditions on public benefits, in the form of jobs or otherwise, which dampen the exercise generally of First Amendment rights, however slight the inducement to the individual to forsake those rights.
In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488 (1961), decided the same day as Cafeteria Workers, the Court squarely held that a citizen could not be refused a public office for failure to declare his belief in God. More broadly, the Court has held impermissible under the First Amendment the dismissal of a high school teacher for openly criticizing the Board of Education on its allocation of school funds. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U. S. 563 (1968). And in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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C
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the .Court.
This case is before us for the second time. The present litigation began with a dispute between the petitioning unions and respondents, co-partners in the business of selling lumber and other materials in California. Respondents' began an action , in the Superior Court for the County of San Diego, asking for an injunction and damages. Upon hearing, the trial court found the following facts. In March of 1953 the unions sought from respondents an agreement to retain in their employ only those workers who were already members of the unions, or who applied for membership within thirty days. Respondents refused, claiming that none of their employees had shown a desire to join a union, and that, in any event, they could not accept such an arrangement until one of the unions had been designated by the employees as a collective bargaining agent., The unions began at once peacefully to picket the respondents’ place of business, and to exert pressure on customers and suppliers in order to persuade them to stop dealing with respondents. The sole purpose of these pressures was to compel execution of the proposed contract. The unions contested this finding, claiming that the only purpose of their activities was to. educate the workers and persuade them to become members. On the basis of . its findings, the court enjoined the unions from picketing and from the use of other pressures to force an agreement, until one of them had been properly designated as a collective bargaining agent. The court also awarded $1,000 damages for losses found to have been sustained.
At the time the suit in the state court was started, respondents had begun a representation proceeding before the National Lafcor Relations Board. The Regional Director declined jurisdiction, presumably because the amount of interstate commerce involved did not meet the Board’s monetary standards in taking jurisdiction.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court sustained the judgment of the Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P. 2d 1, holding that, since the National Labor Relations Board had declined to exercise its jurisdiction, the California courts had power over the dispute. They further decided that the conduct of thé union constituted an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, and hence was not privileged under California law. As the California court itself later pointed out this decision did not specify what law, staté or federal, was the basis of the relief granted. Both state and federal law played a part but, “[a]ny distinction as between those laws was not thoroughly explored.” Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 602, 320 P. 2d 473, 477.
We granted certiorari, 351 U. S. 923, and decided the case together with Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U. S. 1, and Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U. S. 20. In those cases, we held that the refusal of the National Labor Relations Board to assert jurisdiction did not leave with the States power over activities they otherwise would be pre-empted from regulating. Both Guss and Fairlawn involved relief of an equitable nature. In vacating and remanding the-judgment of the California court in this case, we pointed out that those cases controlled this-one, “in its major aspects.” 353 U. S., at 28. However, since it was not clear whether the judgment for damages would be sustained under California law, we remanded to the state court for consideration of that local law issue. The federal question, namely, whether the National Labor Relations Act precluded California from granting an award for damages arising out of the conduct in question, could not be appropriately decided until the antecedent state law question was decided by the state court.
On remand, the California court, in accordance with our decision in Guss, set aside the injunction, but sustained the award of damages. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P. 2d 473 (three judges dissenting). After deciding- that California had jurisdiction to award damages for injuries caused by the union’s activities, the California court held that those activities constituted a tort based on an unfair labor practice under state law. In so holding the court relied on general tort provisions of the California Civil Code, §§ 1677, 1708, as well as state enactments dealing specifically with labor relations, Calif. Labor Code, § 923 (1937); ibid., §§ 1115-1118 (1947).
We again granted certiorari, 357 U. S. 925, . to determine whether the California court had jurisdiction to award damages arising out of peaceful union activity which it could not enjoin.
The issue is a variant of a familiar theme. It began with Allen-Bradley v. Wisconsin Board, 315 U. S. 740, was greatly intensified by litigation flowing from the Taft-Hartley Act, and has recurred here in almost a score of. cases during the last decade. The comprehensive regulation of industrial relations by Congress, novel federal legislation twenty-five years ago but now an integral part of our economic life, inevitably gave rise to difficult problems of federal-state relations. To be sure, in the abstract these problems came to us as ordinary questions of statutory construction. But they involved a more complicated and perceptive process than is conveyed'by the delusive phrase, “ascertaining the - intent of the legislature.” Many of these problems probably coíild not have been, at all events were not, foreseen by the Congress. Others were only dimly perceived and their precise scope only vaguely defined. This Court was called upon to apply a new and complicated legislative scheme, the aims and social policy of which were drawn with broad strokes while the details had to be filled in, to no small extent, by the judicial process. Recently we indicated the task that was thus cast upon this Court in carrying out with fidelity the purposes of Congress, but doing so by giving application to congressional incompletion. What we said in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468, deserves repetition, because the considerations there outlined guide this day’s decision:
“By the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress did not exhaust the full sweep of legislative power over industrial relations given by the Commerce Clause. Congress formulated a code whereby it outlawed some aspects of labor activities and left others free for the operation of economic forces. As to both categories, the areas that have been pre-empted by federal authority and thereby withdrawn from state power are not susceptible of delimitation by fixed metes and bounds. Obvious conflict, actual or potential, leads to easy judicial exclusion of state action. Such was the situation in Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra. But as the opinion in that case recalled, the Labor Management Relations Act ‘leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much.’ 346 U. S., at 488. This penumbral area can be rendered progressively clear only by the course of litigation.” 348 U. S., at 480-481. -
The case before us concerns one of the most teasing and frequently litigated areas of indhstrial relations, the multitude of activities regulated by §§ 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act. 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. §§ 157, 158. These broad provisions govern both protected “concerted activities” and unfair labor practices. They regulate the vital, economic instruments of the strike, and the picket line, and impinge on the clash of the still unsettled claims between employers and labor unions. The extent to which the variegated laws of the several States are displaced by a single, uniform, national rule has been a matter of frequent and recurring concern. As we pointed out the other day, “the statutory implications concerning what has been taken fropi the States ¿nd what has been left to them are of a Delphic nature, to be translated into concreteness by the process of litigating elucidation.” International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617, 619.
In the area of regulation with which we are here concerned, the process thus described has contracted initial ambiguity and doubt and established guides for judgment by interested parties and certainly guides for decision. We state these principles in full realization that, in the course of a process of tentative, fragmentary illumination carried on over more than a decade during which the writers of opinions ’ almost^inevitably, because unconsciously, focus their primary attention on the facts of particular situations, language may have been used or views implied which'do not completely harmonize with the clear pattern which the decisions have evolved. But it may safely be claimed that the basis and purport of a long series of adjudications have “translated into concreteness” the consistently applied principles which decide this case.
In determining the extent to which state regulation must yield to subordinating federal authority, we have been concerned with delimiting areas of potential conflict; potential conflict of rules of law, of remedy, and of administration. The nature .of the judicial process precludes an ad hoc inquiry into the special problems of labor-management relations involved in a particular set of occurrences in order to ascertain the precise nature and degree of federal-state conflict there involved, and more particularly what exact mischief such a conflict would cause. Nor is. it our business to attempt this. Such determinations inevitably depend upon judgments on the impact of these particular conflicts on the entire scheme of federal labor policy and administration. Our task is confined to dealing with classes of situations. To the National Labor Relations Board and to Congress must be left those precise and closely limited demarcations that can be adequately fashioned only by legislation and administration. We have necessarily been concerned with the potential conflict of two law-enforcing authorities, with the disharmonies inherent in two systems, one federal the other state, of inconsistent standards Qf substantive law and differing remedial schemes. But the unifying consideration of our decisions has been regard to the fact that Congress has entrusted administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative experience:
“Congress did not .merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties.. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes towards labor controversies. ... A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law. . . Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 486, 490-491.
Administration is more than a means of regulation; administration is regulation. We have been concerned with conflict in its broadest sense; conflict with a complex and interrelated federal scheme of law, remedy, and administration. Thus, judicial concern has necessarily focused on the nature of the activities which the States have sought to regulate, rather than on the method of regulation adopted. When the exercise of state power over a particular area of activity threatened interference with the clearly indicated policy of industrial relations, it has been judicially necessary to preclude the States from acting. However, due regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system, including the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter of doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of democracy, has required us not to find withdrawal from the States of power to regulate where the activity regulated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act. See Interna tional Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617. Or where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence ,of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law. Nor has it mattered, whether the States have acted through laws of broad general application rather than laws specifically directed towards the governance of industrial relations. Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow the States to control conduct which is the subject of national regulation would create potential frustration of national purposes.
At times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the States was governed by § 7 or § 8 Or was, perhaps, outside both these sections. But courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board. What is outside the scope of this Court’s authority cannot remain within a State’s power and state jurisdiction too must yield to the exclusive primary competence of the Board. See, e. g., Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, especially at 489-491; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468.
The case before us is such a case. The adjudication in California has throughout been based on the assumption that the behavior of the petitioning unions constituted an unfair labor practice. This conclusion was derived by the California courts from the facts as well as from their view of the Act. It is not for us to decide whether the National Labor Relations Board would have, or should have, decided these questions in the same manner. When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.
To require the States to yield to the primary jurisdiction of the National Board does not ensure Board adjudication of the status of a disputed activity. If the Board decides, subject to appropriate federal judicial review, that conduct is protected by § 7, or prohibited by § 8, then the matter is at an end, and the States are ousted of all jurisdiction. Or, the Board may decide that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited, and thereby raise the question whether such activity may be regulated by the States. However, the Board may also fail to determine the status of the disputed conduct by declining to assert jurisdiction, or by refusal of the General Counsel to file a charge; or by adopting some other disposition which does not define the nature of the activity with unclouded legal significance. This was the basic problem underlying our decision in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U. S. 1. In that case we held that the failure of the National Labor Relations Board to assume jurisdiction did not leave the States free to regulate activities they would otherwise be precluded from regulating. It follows that the failure of the Board to define the legal Significance under the Act of a particular activity does not give the States the power to act. ’In the absence of the Board’s clear determination that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited or of compelling precedent applied to essentially undisputed facts, it is not for this Court to decide whether such activities are subject to state jurisdiction. The withdrawal of this narrow area from possible state activity follows from our decisions in Weber and Guss. The governing consideration is that to allow the States to control activities that are potentially subject to federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict with national labor policy.
In the light of these principles the case before us is clear. Since the National Labor Relations Board has not adjudicated the status of the conduct for which the State of California seeks to give a remedy in damages, and since such activity is arguably within the compass of § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the State’s jurisdiction is displaced.
Nor is it significant that California asserted its power to givfe damages rather than to enjoin what the Board may restrain though it could not compensate. Our concern is with delimiting areas of conduct which must be free from state regulation if national policy is to be left unhampered. Such regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy. Even the States’ salutary effort to redress private wrongs or grant compensation for past harm cannot be exerted to regulate activities that are potentially subject to the exclusivé federal regulatory scheme. See Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, 492-497. It may be that an award of damages in a particular situation will not, in fact, conflict with the active assertion of federal authority. The same may be true of the incidence of a particular state injunction. To sanction either involves a conflict with federal policy in that it involves allowing two law-making sources to govern. In fact, since remedies form an ingredient of any integrated scheme of regulation, to allow the State to grant a remedy here which has been withheld from the National Labor Relations Board only accentuates the danger of conflict.
It is true that we have allowed the States to grant compensation for the consequences, as defined by the traditional law of torts, of conduct marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order. United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S. 634; United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656. We have also allowed the States to enjoin such conduct. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U. S. 131; Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 351 U. S. 266. State jurisdiction has prevailed in these situations because the compelling state interest, in the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overridden in the absence of clearly expressed congressional direction. ■ We recognize that the opinion in United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656, found support in the fact that the state remedy had no federal counterpart. But that decision was determined, as is demonstrated by the question to which review was restricted, by the “type of conduct” involved, i. e., “intimidation and threats of violence.” In the present case there is no such compelling state interest.
The judgment below is
Reversed.
E. g., Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U. S. 1; Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U. S. 131; Teamsters Union v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 350 U. S. 155; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468; Garner v. Teamsters Union, 348 U. S. 485; Automobile Workers v. O’Brien, 339 U. S. 454; Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Electric R. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U. S, 383; Hill v. Florida, 325 U. S. 538. See Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283. The cases up to that time are summarized in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468.
United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S. 634; Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U. S. 131; Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 351 U. S. 266; United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656.
See Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468, in which it was pointed out that the state court had relied on a general restraint of trade statute. Cf. Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Boards 351 U. S. 266. The case before us involves both tort law of general application and specialized labor relations statutes. See p. 239, supra.
See Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 245. The approach taken in that case, in which the Court undertook for itself to determine the status of the disputed activity, has not been followed in later decisions, and is no longer of general application.
“When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition . . . Charleston & West. Carolina R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U. S. 597, 604.
The conduct involved in Laburnum was so characterized in United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U. S. 634, 640, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Burton; who also wrote thé opinion of the Court in Laburnum. When this very case was before us for the first time we noted that “Laburnum sustained an award of damages under state tort law for violent conduct. We cannot know that the California court would have interpreted its own state law to allow an award of damages in this situation.” 353 U. S., at 29. ■
In Laburnum this Court itself expressly phrased its grant of cer-tiorari to include only the limited question of the State’s jurisdiction to award damages “[i]n view of, the type of conduct found by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia to have been carried out by Petitioners . . . ,” 346 U. S. 936, despite the fact that petitioners had urged upon us a question not limited to the particular conduct involved. Petition for certiorari, p. 6.
Throughout,' the opinion of the Court makes it clear that the holding in favor of state jurisdiction was limited to a situation involving violence and threats of violence. Thus the findings of the Virginia court as to the flagrant and violent activities of petitioners were set out at length. 347 U. S., at 660-662, n. 4. The Court relies on statements by Senator Taft, the Aci’s sponsor, and from a Senate Report which point out that “mass-picketing,” “violence,” “threat [s] of violence,” may be a violation of state law, as well as unfair labor practices under the Act. 347 U. S., at 668.'
The Court in Laburnum points out that it would be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act which allow recovery for damages caused by secondary boycotts, not to allow an injured party “to recover damages caused more directly and flagrantly through- such conduct as is before us.” 347 U. S. 666. The Court also placed reliance on a quotation from International Union v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 245, 253, which points out that the “[p] dicing of . . . conduct .. .,” which consists of “actual or threatened violence to persons or destruction of property,” is left to the States. In its concluding paragraph the Court again stresses that Virginia has jurisdiction over “coercion of the type found here . . . .”
The damages awarded were extensive, consisting primarily of loss of profits caused by the disruption of respondents’, business resulting from the violence. These damages were restricted to the “damages directly and proximately caused by wrongful conduct chargeable to the defendants . . .” as defined by the traditional. law of torts. United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 194 Va. 872, 887, 75 S. E. 2d 694,704. Thus there is nothing in the measure of damages to indicate that state power was exerted to compensate for anything more than the direct consequences of the violent conduct.
All these factors make it plain that our decision in Laburnum rested on the nature of the activities there involved, and the interest of the State in regulating them. The case has been so interpreted in later decisions of this Court. See Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U. S. 468, 477; and the phrases qu.oted from Russell, supra. In Russell we again allowed the State to award damages for injuries caused by “mass picketing and threats of violence . . . ,” 356 U. S., at 638. That opinion also continually stresses the violent nature of the conduct and limits its decision to the “kind of tortious conduct” there involved. 356 U. S., at 646. See also 356 U. S., at 642; and 356 U. S., at 640, where the Court points out that Alabama could have enjoined the activities of the union. •
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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J
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Rutledge
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On the merits this appeal presents substantial questions concerning the constitutional validity of ordinances of the City of Los Angeles governing the solicitation of contributions for charity. First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds are urged as nullifying them chiefly in the view that they impose prior restraints upon and unduly abridge appellants’ rights in the free exercise of their religion. Those rights, as claimed, are to engage in soliciting donations for charity as a part of their religion free from the ordinances’ restrictions.
Similar, but also distinct, questions were involved in Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, dismissed today for jurisdictional reasons. 331 U. S. 543. This case, however, arose procedurally in a different fashion, so that it is not subject to the same jurisdictional defect. And the procedural difference is important, not merely for our jurisdiction but also for determining the propriety of exercising it in the special circumstances presented by this appeal.
The California Supreme Court heard and determined the Gospel Army case several months in advance of this one. It sustained the regulations in both instances, filing separate opinions in each case. 27 Cal. 2d 232; 28 Cal. 2d 460. But the attack upon the city ordinances in the Gospel Army case covered a much wider range than here, and the court’s principal opinion was rendered in that cause. Hence in this case it disposed of overlapping issues merely by reference a fortiori to its “approval” of the challenged provisions in the Gospel Army opinion.
As will more fully appear, this mode of treatment, together with interlacing relationships between provisions involved here and others in the Gospel Army case, has combined with the necessitated dismissal of that appeal to create for us difficult problems in determining exactly how much of the regulatory scheme approved in the Gospel Army opinion, and hence also how much of that decision, must be taken as having been incorporated in the disposition of this cause. By virtue of the California court’s method of decision, we are largely without benefit of its judgment upon these matters, including possible questions of severability. Consequently, this fact, together with the different jurisdictional postures in which the cases reach this Court, would force us to determine those questions independently before undertaking any decision on the merits.
That necessity and the difficulties tendered by the extricating problem raise substantial questions concerning the disposition appropriate, in the unusual situation, to be made of this appeal. In order to present the problem with a fair degree of precision, it is necessary to state in some detail the nature of the two proceedings, their relationships to each other, and their procedural as well as jurisdictional differences.
I.
This suit is one for a writ of prohibition. The appeal is from the California Supreme Court’s judgment denying appellants’ application for such a writ. 28 Cal. 2d 460. They instituted the suit in the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, of California. Its object was to test the jurisdiction of the respondent Municipal Court of Los Angeles to proceed with a pending criminal prosecution against Murdock, who is an officer of the Rescue Army. In that court he had been charged with violating three provisions of the city ordinances, had been twice convicted, and twice the convictions had been reversed by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
While the case was pending in. the Municipal Court after the second reversal, appellants filed their petition in this cause in the District Court of Appeal. Alleging that the Municipal Court was threatening to proceed with a third trial on the same charges, they set forth grounds held sufficient under the state procedure to present for adjudication the question of the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction. 28 Cal. 2d at 462-467.
The District Court of Appeal denied the writ. Thereupon the state Supreme Court transferred the cause to its own docket and issued an alternative writ of prohibition pending determination there. As in the Gospel Army case, the Supreme Court, with three of the seven justices dissenting, decided the issues on the merits against the appellants. It therefore denied the writ, at the same time discharging the alternative writ. In short effect the ordinances, insofar as they were involved, were sustained as against the constitutional and other objections raised concerning them. Probable jurisdiction was duly noted here, and the cause was assigned for argument immediately following the Gospel Army case.
Apparently Murdock was charged in the Municipal Court with violating three sections of the Municipal Code. These were §§ 44.09 (a), 44.09 (b), and 44.12 of Article 4, Chapter IV. Sections 44.09 (a) and (b) formed the basis for the first count against Murdock. Colloquially speaking, § 44.09 is a “tin-cup” ordinance. In summary, its two subdivisions, (a) and (b), prohibit solicitations in the specified public places or adjacent areas “by means of any box or receptacle” except, under (a), “by the express written permission of the Board [of Social Service Commissioners]”; under (b), “without first filing with the Department [of Social Service] a 'notice of intention’ as required by Sec. 44.05” and, literally, obeying the further command that “every person so soliciting must in all other respects comply with the provisions of this Article.” The full text of the section is set forth in the margin.
The second count charged violation of § 44.12 by soliciting without exhibiting or reading to the persons solicited an information card issued by the Los Angeles Board of Social Service Commissioners. Section 44.12 is more general than § 44.09 as to place and manner of solicitation. It is in the following words:
“No person shall solicit any contributions unless he exhibits an Information Card provided for in Sec. 44.03 of this Article and reads it to the person solicited or presents it to said person for his perusal, allowing him sufficient opportunity to read same, before accepting any contribution so solicited.”
Obviously neither § 44.09 (b) nor § 44.12 is self-contained. Each incorporates by reference other sections of the code. Thus, it is necessary to take into account, under § 44.09 (b), the provisions of § 44.05 requiring the filing of the “notice of intention” as well as the omnibus requirement of compliance “in all other respects... with the provisions of this Article”; under §44.12, the requirements of § 44.03 concerning issuance of the information card. Enforcement of § 44.09 (a), which does not refer specifically to other sections, necessarily involves consideration of whatever requirements may relate to securing the board’s written permission.
The issue of the Municipal Court’s jurisdiction therefore, insofar as it concerns us, turns upon the validity of §§ 44.09 (a), 44.09 (b) and 44.12, together with the other provisions necessarily incorporated in them by reference; and, upon this appeal, their validity not only is relative solely to the effect of the federal constitutional prohibitions, but must be determined in light of the California Supreme Court’s interpretation, including the extent to which other provisions have been incorporated. Moreover the jurisdictional question arises substantially as upon demurrer to the charges, since trial has not been had and the issue concerns only the Municipal Court’s power to proceed with the criminal cause. Hence only the validity of the provisions on their face, not as applied to proven circumstances, is called in question.
The Gospel Army case, on the other hand, was an injunction suit, in which attack was projected on a broad front against the ordinances and the scheme of regulation they embody as a whole. For some reason § 44.09 (a) was not attacked in that suit. But § 44.09 (b) was involved indirectly through its relation to § 44.05 and § 44.12 directly, as well as numerous other provisions both of Article 4, Chapter IV, and outside it. That article, as we have noted above, consists of Code §§ 44.01-44.19, entitled “Charities and Relief,” and thus includes all of the sections involved here as well as many others which were in issue in the Gospel Army case.
It is this setting of dovetailed legislative enactments and judicial decisions which creates the primary problem for our disposition. Those interrelations, of the cases and of the ordinances they involve, will be better understood in the setting of a summary of the general scheme.
II.
The Municipal Code regulates both charitable and other solicitations, as well as pawnbrokers, secondhand dealers, junk dealers, etc. The regulations affecting those dealers lie outside Article 4 and became pertinent in the Gospel Army case because of that organization’s activities in collecting, repairing, selling and giving away used articles. None of those regulations, however, appears to be involved here. The Municipal Court charges, so far as we can now ascertain, relate exclusively to charitable solicitations and consequently are comprehended within Article 4. We therefore are relieved of the necessity for taking account of any of the code provisions outside that article.
Article 4, however, comprehends numerous interrelated sections and subdivisions. They provide a broad and general, though also highly detailed and integrated, plan for regulating solicitations in Los Angeles. The sections here in question are integral parts of that plan.
It is designed primarily, though not exclusively, to secure a maximum of information and publicity for the public. It seeks to make available to all persons solicited detailed information concerning the persons soliciting, the causes or organizations on behalf of which they act, and the uses to which the donations will be put. The plan also undertakes, in other ways, to assure responsibility, both moral and financial, on the part of soliciting individuals and agencies; and to see to it that the funds collected are applied to their appropriate purposes.
Machinery for executing the scheme is created through the establishment of a Department of Social Service and a Board of Social Service Commissioners, each with specified administrative powers. Comprehensive and detailed definitions of activities affected and correlative prohibitions are prescribed, together with various provisions for exemption. Violation of the prohibitions, which generally require compliance with one or more other regulations, is made punishable by criminal sanctions.
More narrowly, insofar as the plan is relevant here, any person or association desiring to solicit contributions for a charitable purpose must file with the department, at least ten days before beginning to solicit, a written “Notice of Intention.” § 44.05. This is, in substance, an application for the “Information Card” provided for in § 44.03 (d). It will be recalled that § 44.09’(b), in issue here, expressly requires the filing of this notice. And § 44.12, also directly in issue, requires exhibition of the card before solicitation may lawfully take place.
The notice must be filed on a form furnished by the department and must contain the “complete information” specified in the margin. § 44.05. The department is authorized, among other things, to investigate the statements contained in the notice and to issue information cards “to all solicitors.” § 44.03. Those cards must show the detailed matters specified below. Ibid. The board is empowered to publish the results of the investigations provided for in § 44.03 and to exercise other powers, such as endorsing a soliciting association, waiving specified requirements, and recalling the information cards for correction. §§44.02,44.03. A fee of four cents per card is charged, when issued, unless more than twenty-five are issued at one time for the same solicitation. In that event the fee becomes one cent per card.
The foregoing regulations apply, on the face of the ordinance, to charitable solicitations as requirements in the nature of conditions precedent, compliance with which is necessary before solicitation may be lawfully made. There are also other requirements which become applicable during and after the act of solicitation. One is that of § 44.15, which commands persons soliciting for charity to tender to each contributor a written receipt containing specified detailed information. And by § 44.14 every such solicitor must file with the department, within thirty days after “the close of any such solicitation” or demand, a report showing the contributions secured and “exactly for what uses and in what manner” they “were or are to be disbursed.”
Article 4, moreover, classifies persons soliciting into three groups, two of which are primary, namely, “promoters” and “solicitors.” “Solicitors,” as will appear, are subdivided into two classes. The regulations bearing upon promoters are more onerous than those touching solicitors and are contained in § 44.19, which itself includes numerous subdivisions.
The exact definitive distinction between solicitors and promoters, who may be either institutions or individuals, is not clear from the definitions given in the ordinance, or indeed from the opinions filed in the state court. But, so far as we can gather, the promoter differs from the solicitor, generally at any rate, as being one who engages in solicitation as a business or by exercising a managerial or supervisory capacity over other persons acting as paid solicitors under his direction or pursuant to a program in his charge.
Section 44.19 also regulates the relations between promoters and paid solicitors associated with them. A promoter is forbidden by § 44.19 (9) (a) to cause or permit any person for compensation “to solicit or receive on his behalf or at his instigation, under his direction or control or in his employment, any contribution unless such person shall be registered as a solicitor by the Board.” And the next subsection requires the registered solicitor to prove his good moral character and reputation for honesty, to file a $500 bond, and to pay a $1.00 registration fee. §44.19 (9) (b), (d).
Section 44.19 thus apparently is effective to create two classes of solicitors, namely, registered and unregistered, as well as the distinction between promoters and solicitors; and establishes special and more burdensome conditions for lawful solicitation by registered solicitors, as well as by promoters, than are created for solicitors not required to be registered.
Finally, without detailed elaboration, numerous regulations in addition to or interwoven with those relating to solicitors of both types and to promoters govern the organizations or charities on whose behalf the solicitations are made.
The foregoing summary is perhaps more than sufficient to show the comprehensive nature of the plan and the intricately interlacing relationships of the numerous provisions of Article 4 making up the general scheme in which §§ 44.09 (a), (b) and 44.12 find their context and setting. Some no doubt could be applied independently, perhaps for example § 44.09 (a). But others are interwoven with one or more distinct provisions to specify essential constituent elements. And in many instances the provisions so imported require or suggest still further reference to additional ones. The article is in fact a web of intricately dovetailing references and cross-references.
Thus, with respect to the sections involved here, § 44.12 requires exhibition of the information card provided for in § 44.03. This in turn forces reference to § 44.05, which specifies the conditions for securing the card. And fulfillment of those conditions may compel resort to still other provisions. The same process must be gone through with respect to § 44.09 (b). For while that section differs verbally from § 44.12 in that it specifically requires only the filing of the notice of intention, not issuance or exhibition of the information card, not only is the procedure for filing the notice highly detailed and largely set forth in other sections. It is also highly doubtful, in view of the California Supreme Court’s decision, whether persons so complying and filing the notice would be authorized by that act alone to proceed with lawful solicitation under § 44.09 (b), without waiting the specified ten-day period (§ 44.05) and undergoing the investigations prescribed by § 44.03 or perhaps actually procuring the card.
It is necessary, in order to complete the environment of the problem presented by the appeal, to set forth somewhat more fully the manner in which the California Supreme Court dealt with §§ 44.09 (a), 44.09 (b) and 44.12, and related provisions. This, however, may best be deferred at this point, in order to state the legal principles which we think are controlling of our disposition.
III.
The Gospel Army case we have dismissed for the technical, nevertheless important, reason that under California law the state Supreme Court’s reversal, without more, contemplates further proceedings in the trial court. Consequently that judgment is not final for the purposes of our jurisdiction on appeal, within the meaning of § 237 (a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 344 (a). 331 U. S. 543.
On the other hand, this appeal is not subject to that particular infirmity. The effect of the California Supreme Court’s judgment, of course, will be to permit further proceedings by the Municipal Court. But under the rule of Bandini Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U. S. 8, this prohibition proceeding would be an independent suit, in relation to that criminal prosecution, “and the judgment finally disposing of it,” as did the state Supreme Court’s judgment, “is a final judgment within the meaning of § 237 (a) of the Judicial Code.” 284 U. S. at 14.
The Bandini case, like this one, was a prohibition proceeding brought in a California District Court of Appeal. Its object was to determine the jurisdiction of a state Superior Court in an equity cause. That suit had been brought by the state Director of Natural Resources to enjoin alleged unreasonable waste of natural gas, pursuant to the Oil and Gas Conservation Act of California. A preliminary injunction issued in the Superior Court. Thereupon the writ of prohibition was sought to restrain the enforcement of the order, and of the Act, which was attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment on due process and equal protection grounds. The writ was denied, as was hearing by the California Supreme Court. Upon appeal here this Court sustained its jurisdiction and determined the constitutional issues presented upon the face of the statute, affecting the Superior Court’s jurisdiction, adversely to the appellants’ contentions.
The Bandini ruling is well settled. Apparently, however, it has been applied to a proceeding in prohibition relating to a criminal prosecution in but a single case, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, without discussion. On the other hand, a close, indeed it would seem a complete, analogy is to be found in Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63. In that case Bryant had been charged criminally in the courts of New York with violating that state's so-called anti-secret organization statute, and was held in custody for trial pursuant to that charge. He instituted habeas corpus proceedings in the state courts, on the ground that “the warrant under which he was arrested and detained was issued without any jurisdiction, in that the statute which he was charged with violating was unconstitutional.” 278 U. S. at 65. Upon appeal from the state court’s denial of the writ, this Court with one justice dissenting entertained the appeal and held the statute valid.
Although the jurisdictional inquiry, in the state courts and here, was conducted in the separate proceeding on habeas corpus, unlike the Bandini case it related to a criminal cause, as does this case. And for the purposes of our jurisdiction under § 237 (a) of the Judicial Code, a distinction would seem to be wholly verbal between such an inquiry and its disposition made under the state procedure of habeas corpus and a similar one made in a state proceeding for a writ of prohibition. Those procedures, of course, have their historic differences, both in availability and in specific function, at the common law. But when they are utilized, under state authorization, substantially for the identical purpose of questioning the validity of state statutes under the federal constitution, as determinative of the jurisdiction of state courts to proceed with criminal prosecutions based on those acts, it would seem difficult to find any substantial difference between them relative to this Court’s jurisdiction to review their determinations. This assumes, of course, that the judgment reviewed under one name or the other would be such as finally disposes of the proceeding.
While therefore we are unable to conclude that there is no jurisdiction in this cause, nevertheless compelling reasons exist for not exercising it.
From Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409, to Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co. and the Hatch Act case decided this term, this Court has followed a policy of strict necessity in disposing of constitutional issues. The earliest exemplifications, too well known for repeating the history here, arose in the Court’s refusal to render advisory opinions and in applications of the related jurisdictional policy drawn from the case and controversy limitation. U. S. Const., Art. III. The same policy has been reflected continuously not only in decisions but also in rules of court and in statutes made applicable to jurisdictional matters, including the necessity for reasonable clarity and definiteness, as well as for timeliness, in raising and presenting constitutional questions. Indeed perhaps the most effective implement for making the policy effective has been the certiorari jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Congress. E. g., Judicial Code, §§ 237, 240.
The policy, however, has not been limited to jurisdictional determinations. For, in addition, “the Court [has] developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.” Thus, as those rules were listed in support of the statement quoted, constitutional issues affecting legislation will not be determined in friendly, nonadversary proceedings; in advance of the necessity of deciding them; in broader terms than are required by the precise facts to which the ruling is to be applied; if the record presents some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of; at the instance of one who fails to show that he is injured by the statute’s operation, or who has availed himself of its benefits; or if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.
Some, if not indeed all, of these rules have found “most varied applications.” And every application has been an instance of reluctance, indeed of refusal, to undertake the most important and the most delicate of the Court’s functions, notwithstanding conceded jurisdiction, until necessity compels it in the performance of constitutional duty.
Moreover the policy is neither merely procedural nor in its essence dependent for applicability upon the diversities of jurisdiction and procedure, whether of the state courts, the inferior federal courts, or this Court. Rather it is one of substance, grounded in considerations which transcend all such particular limitations. Like the case and controversy limitation itself and the policy against entertaining political questions, it is one of the rules basic to the federal system and this Court’s appropriate place within that structure.
Indeed in origin and in practical effects, though not in technical function, it is a corollary offshoot of the case and controversy rule. And often the line between applying the policy or the rule is very thin. They work, within their respective and technically distinct areas, to achieve the same practical purposes for the process of constitutional adjudication, and upon closely related considerations.
The policy’s ultimate foundations, some if not all of which also sustain the jurisdictional limitation, lie in all that goes to make up the unique place and character, in our scheme, of judicial review of governmental action for constitutionality. They are found in the delicacy of that function, particularly in view of possible consequences for others stemming also from constitutional roots; the comparative finality of those consequences; the consideration due to the judgment of other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of their authority; the necessity, if government is to function constitutionally, for each to keep within its power, including the courts; the inherent limitations of the judicial process, arising especially from its largely negative character and limited resources of enforcement; withal in the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our system.
All these considerations and perhaps others, transcending specific procedures, have united to form and sustain the policy. Its execution has involved a continuous choice between the obvious advantages it produces for the functioning of government in all its coordinate parts and the very real disadvantages, for the assurance of rights, which deferring decision very often entails. On the other hand it is not altogether speculative that a contrary policy, of accelerated decision, might do equal or greater harm for the security of private rights, without attaining any of the benefits of tolerance and harmony for the functioning of the various authorities in our scheme. For premature and relatively abstract decision, which such a policy would be most likely to promote, have their part too in rendering rights uncertain and insecure.
As with the case and controversy limitation, however, the choice has been made long since. Time and experience have given it sanction. They also have verified for both that the choice was wisely made. Any other indeed might have put an end to or seriously impaired the distinctively American institution of judicial review. And on the whole, in spite of inevitable exceptions, the policy has worked not only for finding the appropriate place and function of the judicial institution in our governmental system, but also for the preservation of individual rights.
Most recently both phases of its operation have been exemplified in declaratory judgment proceedings. Despite some seemingly widespread misconceptions, the general introduction of that procedure in both state and federal spheres has not reversed or modified the policy’s general direction or effects.
One aspect of the policy’s application, it has been noted, has been by virtue of the presence of other grounds for decision. But when such alternatives are absent, as in this case, application must rest upon considerations relative to the manner in which the constitutional issue itself is shaped and presented.
These cannot be reduced to any precise formula or complete catalogue. But in general, as we have said, they are of the same nature as those which make the case and controversy limitation applicable, differing only in degree. To the more usual considerations of timeliness and maturity, of concreteness, definiteness, certainty, and of adversity of interests affected, are to be added in cases coming from state courts involving state legislation those arising when questions of construction, essentially matters of state law, remain unresolved or highly ambiguous. They include, of course, questions of incorporation by reference and severability, such as this case involves. Necessarily whether decision of the constitutional issue will be made must depend upon the degree to which uncertainty exists in these respects. And this inevitably will vary with particular causes and their varying presentations.
Accordingly the policy’s applicability can be determined only by an exercise of judgment relative to the particular presentation, though relative also to the policy generally and to the degree in which the specific factors rendering it applicable are exemplified in the particular case. It is largely a question of enough or not enough, the sort of thing precisionists abhor but constitutional adjudication nevertheless constantly requires. And it is this kind of question that the declaratory judgments procedure has facilitated in presentation, a consequence which dictates the greatest care in seeing that it be not utilized so as to become a means for nullifying the policy.
Much the same thing may be said for the state procedure in prohibition as it has been followed in this case. Indeed, in all but name the two procedures are substantially identical, for the purposes of our jurisdiction and function in review. Here relief is neither sought nor needed beyond adjudication of the jurisdictional issue. The suit seeks only, in substance, a judicial declaration that jurisdiction does not exist in the Municipal Court. But for a variety of reasons the shape in which the underlying constitutional issues have reached this Court presents, we think, insuperable obstacles to any exercise of jurisdiction to determine them.
Those reasons comprise not only obstacles of prematurity and comparative abstractness arising from the nature of the proceeding in prohibition and the manner in which the parties have utilized it for presenting the constitutional questions. They also include related considerations growing out of uncertainties resulting from the volume of legislative provisions possibly involved, their intricate interlacing not only with each other on their face but also in the California Supreme Court’s disposition of them, and especially from its treatment of this case by reference in considerable part to the Gospel Army case, difficulties all accentuated for us of course by the necessity for dismissal of that cause here. Because the application of the policy must be relative to the factors specifically dictating such action, a statement of our particular reasons follows.
IV.
In the first place, the constitutional issues come to us in highly abstract form. Although raised technically in the separate proceeding in prohibition, they arise substantially as upon demurrer to the charges against Murdock in the criminal proceeding. The record presents only bare allegations that he was charged criminally with violating §§ 44.09 (a), 44.09 (b) and 44.12, and that those sections are unconstitutional, on various assignments, as applied to his alleged solicitations. We are therefore without benefit of the precision which would be afforded by proof of conduct made upon trial. Moreover, we do not have the benefit on this record of even the literal text of the charges. Indeed, the summarized statement of the pleadings leaves us in doubt whether there were only two or, on the other hand, three distinct offenses charged.
The pleadings seem to allege that Murdock was charged with violation of three different provisions of Article 4, namely, §§ 44.09 (a), 44.09 (b) and 44.12. Yet they allege equally clearly that there were only two counts. The second rested, as we have said, on § 44.12. But from the state of the pleadings we cannot be sure whether the first was grounded on § 44.09 (a), on § 44.09 (b), or on both and, if the latter, whether conjunctively or alternatively.
The California Supreme Court’s decision purported to deal with both. But the opinion did not discuss the anomaly of including two distinct charges in a single count. Nor did it decide whether that count was intended to charge two such offenses independently, one under each subdivision, or only commission of those offenses alternatively, that is, either an offense under § 44.09 (a) or one under § 44.09 (b) in order, possibly, to anticipate contingencies of proof.
We might assume either one construction or the other, of course, and make our disposition accordingly. Perhaps the more tenable assumption would be that Murdock was charged conjunctively under both subdivisions, rather than that he was confronted with an alternative allegation. But the doubt raised concerning this, by conjunction of the charges in a single count, is substantial; the matter is, for present purposes, entirely one of state procedure and state law; and therefore is one for the state court of last resort to resolve. In these circumstances we are unwilling to undertake clarifying the ambiguity. To do so would be directly contrary to the policy of avoiding constitutional decisions until the issues are presented with clarity, precision and certainty.
The two subdivisions, while complementary in regulating solicitation by receptacles, are entirely distinct not only in the places where the regulations apply, but also in the conditions prescribed to be fulfilled before lawful solicitation may take place. Those differences are substantial, not merely nominal or technical. With the possibility presented by the record that only one or the other provision may be involved in the final disposition of the criminal proceeding, as a matter of pleading and proof and not simply of the jury’s action, it is entirely too speculative whether one sort of regulation or the other actually will be utilized to secure Murdock’s conviction for us to express opinion at this stage on the constitutionality of either. For the same reason we are unwilling to determine the validity of both, notwithstanding the California court has held each valid. That decision on our part, consistently with the policy, should await the determination which necessarily will be made in the further proceedings in the Municipal Court, whether Mur-dock has been charged independently or alternatively under the two subsections in the first count.
Other reasons relating particularly to § 44.09 (b) sustain this conclusion. In the first place, the California court’s opinions give us no guide concerning the effect of that section’s concluding omnibus clause, requiring compliance “in all other respects... with the provisions of this Article.” Whether or not that court, treating the section independently as we must do, would regard it as effective to incorporate all or only some of the many provisions of Article 4, and in the latter event how many, are matters upon which we are altogether without light. And those questions, being matters of state law, are essentially for the state court’s determination, not ours.
Moreover they are substantial. As we have shown, the requirements of Article 4 concerning lawful solicitation are many and varied. Presumably, though by no means certainly, the special ones of § 44.19, relating to promoters and registered solicitors, would not become applicable under a general charge made pursuant to § 44.09 (b). But a literal application of the concluding language of § 44.09 (b) would make them so, upon proof of violation. And, in that event, Murdock conceivably could be convicted upon proof of his failure to pay the substantial license fees, give the bonds, or otherwise comply with the more burdensome provisions of § 44.19, even though he had fulfilled the explicit command of § 44.09 (b) for filing the notice of intention as required by § 44.05 and, indeed, all other requirements of Article 4 outside § 44.19.
Whether the charge under § 44.09 (b) comprehends failure to comply with all of the conditions of Article 4 or only some of them, and if the latter which ones, depends on whether the omnibus clause is to be literally applied, disregarded entirely, or possibly construed in some modified way involving neither of these extremes. This Court certainly has no proper function to undertake such a task of interpretation. Apart from invading the state court’s function, the problem of extricating the applicable provisions from such a mass, together with matters of sever-ability likely to arise, would be formidable. And when discharged the result might be merely that we had performed it and determined the constitutional issues so presented, only to find that in the further proceedings to be had in the Municipal Court our interpretation had been put aside in favor of another.
Moreover that cause hardly can proceed to final decision without clarification of the charge, or making clarification unnecessary. Murdock’s rights thus can be assured of protection, even though at the trouble and expense of undergoing another trial. Those inconveniences, concededly substantial, do not outweigh the strong considerations relative to this Court’s functions dictating that it should not undertake a task at once so speculative and so foreign to them.
Somewhat less obviously, similar difficulties are presented for dealing with the more specific requirement of § 44.09 (b) for filing the notice of intention and the related one of § 44.12 for procuring and exhibiting the information card. Simply upon the face of the ordinance (Article 4), we would construe these provisions as excluding all reference to the licensing requirements of § 44.19, as well as the regulations relating to dealers in used articles, junk, etc., as indeed the California Supreme Court’s opinion seems to exclude them. In such a view the charges under § 44.09 (b) (without reference to the omnibus concluding clause) and § 44.12 would be restricted to failure to comply with whatever provisions of §§ 44.01-44.18 may be incorporated by reference in those two sections. Presumably also, within that range, would be excluded all requirements applicable only after the act of solicitation, such as those for keeping records and making reports of the receipt and disposition of contributions received, §§ 44.09, 44.14, cf. also § 44.08, and perhaps though not at all certainly (as to the charge under § 44.12) the tendering at the time of solicitation of the receipt required by § 44.15. Possibly therefore a fair construction of the charges under § § 44.09 (b) and 44.12 would be that they are limited, so far as concerns incorporation of other provisions, to including the licensing requirements of §§ 44.05 and 44.03, themselves extensive and highly detailed, which so far as we can gather from the California court’s treatment of them, was the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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I
|
sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises some complex questions about the Securities and Exchange Commission’s power to regulate the activities of insurance companies and of persons engaged in the insurance business. The Commission originally brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, pursuant to § 21 (e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 900, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78u (e). It alleged violations of § 10 (b) of the Act, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), and of the Commission’s Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1968). According to the amended complaint, National Securities and various persons associated with it had contrived a fraudulent scheme centering on a contemplated merger between National Life & Casualty Insurance Co. (National Life), a firm controlled by National Securities, and Producers Life Insurance Co. (Producers). The details of the alleged scheme are not important here. The Commission contended that National Securities purchased a controlling interest in Producers, partly from Producers’ directors and partly in the form of treasury stock held by Producers. After taking control of Producers’ board, respondents sought to obtain shareholder approval of the merger by sending communications to Producers’ 14,000 stockholders. These communications, according to the Commission, contained misrepresentations of material facts and omitted to state material facts necessary to make the statements which were made not misleading. Among other things, respondents allegedly failed to disclose their plan for the surviving company to assume certain obligations which National Securities had undertaken as part of the consideration for its purchases of Producers’ stock. In plain language, Producers’ shareholders were not told that they were going to pay part of the cost of National Securities’ acquisition of control in their company.
The Commission was denied temporary relief, and shortly thereafter Producers’ shareholders and the Arizona Director of Insurance approved the merger. The two companies were formally consolidated into National Producers Life Insurance Co. on July 9, 1965. Thereafter, the Commission amended its complaint to seek additional relief; the previously sought injunction forbidding further violations of Rule 10b-5 was to be supplemented by court orders unwinding the merger and returning the situation to the status quo ante, requiring respondents to make an accounting of their unlawful gains, and readjusting the equities of the various respondents in whatever companies survived the decree. The Commission also requested whatever further relief the court might deem just, equitable, and necessary. Respondents moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court ruled that the relief requested was either barred by §2 (b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 34 (1945), as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1012 (b), or was beyond the scope of § 21 (e) of the Securities Exchange Act. 252 F. Supp. 623 (1966). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying on the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 387 F. 2d 25 (1967). Upon application by the Commission, we granted certi-orari because of the importance of the questions raised to the administration of the securities laws. 390 U. S. 1023 (1968).
I.
Insofar as it is relevant to this ease, § 2 (b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance . . ..” Respondents contend that this Act bars the present suit since the Arizona Director of Insurance found that the merger was not “[Unequitable to the stockholders of any domestic insurer” and not otherwise “contrary to law,” as he was required to do under the state insurance laws. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-731 (Supp. 1969). If the Securities Exchange Act were applied, respondents argue, these laws would be “superseded.” The SEC sees no conflict between state and federal law; it contends that the applicable Arizona statutes did not give the State Insurance Director the power to determine whether respondents had made full disclosure in connection with the solicitation of proxies. Although respondents disagree, we do not find it necessary to inquire into this state-law dispute. The first question posed by this case is whether the relevant Arizona statute is a “law enacted ... for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance” within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Even accepting respondents’ view of Arizona law, we do not believe that a state statute aimed at protecting the interests of those who own stock in insurance companies comes within the sweep of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Such a statute is not a state attempt to regulate “the business of insurance,” as that phrase was used in the Act.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed in reaction to this Court’s decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944). Prior to that decision, it had been assumed, in the language of the leading case, that “[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce.” Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 183 (1869). Consequently, regulation of insurance transactions was thought to rest exclusively with the States. In South-Eastern Underwriters, this Court held that insurance transactions were subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause, and that the antitrust laws, in particular, were applicable to them. Congress reacted quickly. Even before the opinion was announced, the House had passed a bill exempting the insurance industry from the antitrust laws. 90 Cong. Rec. 6565 (1944). Objection in the Senate killed the bill, 90 Cong. Rec. 8054 (1944), but Congress clearly remained concerned about the inroads the Court’s decision might make on the tradition of state regulation of insurance. The McCarran-Ferguson Act was the product of this concern. Its purpose was stated quite clearly in its first section; Congress declared that “the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest.” 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U. S. C. § 1011. As this Court said shortly afterward, “[ojbviously Congress’ purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and future state systems for regulating and taxing the business of insurance.” Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408, 429 (1946).
The question here is whether state laws aimed at protecting the interests of those who own securities in insurance companies are the type of laws referred to in the 1945 enactment. The legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act offers no real assistance. Congress was mainly concerned with • the relationship between insurance ratemaking and the antitrust laws, and with the power of the States to tax insurance companies. See, e. g., 91 Cong. Rec. 1087-1088 (remarks of Congressmen Hancock and Celler). The debates centered on these issues, and the Committee reports shed little light on the meaning of the words “business of insurance.” See S. Rep. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) ; H. R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). In context, however, it is relatively clear what problems Congress was dealing with. Under the regime of Paul v. Virginia, supra, States had a free hand in regulating the dealings between insurers and their policyholders. Their negotiations, and the contract which resulted, were not considered commerce and were, therefore, left to state regulation. The South-Eastern Underwriters decision threatened the continued supremacy of the States in this area. The McCarran-Ferguson Act was an attempt to turn back the clock, to assure that the activities of insurance companies in dealing with their policyholders would remain subject to state regulation. As the House Report makes clear, “[i]t [was] not the intention of Congress in the enactment of this legislation to clothe the States with any power to regulate or tax the business of insurance beyond that which they had been held to possess prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Southeastern Underwriters Association case.” H. R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1945).
Given this history, the language of the statute takes on a different coloration. The statute did not purport to make the States supreme in regulating all the activities of insurance companies; its language refers not to the persons or companies who are subject to state regulation, but to laws “regulating the business of insurance.” Insurance companies may do many things which are subject to paramount federal regulation; only when they are engaged in the “business of insurance” does the statute apply. Certainly the fixing of rates is part of this business; that is what South-Eastern Underwriters was all about. The selling and advertising of policies, FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U. S. 560 (1958), and the licensing of companies and their agents, cf. Robertson v. California, 328 U. S. 440 (1946), are also within the scope of the statute. Congress was concerned with the type of state regulation that centers around the contract of insurance, the transaction which Paul v. Virginia held was not “commerce.” The relationship between insurer and insured, the type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement — these were the core of the “business of insurance.” Undoubtedly, other activities of insurance companies relate so closely to their status as reliable insurers that they too must be placed in the same class. But whatever the exact scope of the statutory term, it is clear where the focus was — it was on the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder. Statutes aimed at protecting or regulating this relationship, directly or indirectly, are laws regulating the “business of insurance.”
In this case, Arizona is concerning itself with a markedly different set of problems. It is attempting to regulate not the “insurance” relationship, but the relationship between a stockholder and the company in which he owns stock. This is not insurance regulation, but securities regulation. It is true that the state statute applies only to insurance companies. But mere matters of form need not detain us. The crucial point is that here the State has focused its attention on stockholder protection; it is not attempting to secure the interests of those purchasing insurance policies. Such regulation is not within the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
This reading of the Act is implicit in this Court’s past decisions. Less than two years ago the Court approved the application of the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 48 Stat. 77, 16 U. S. C. § 77e, to certain annuity contracts issued by insurance companies. SEC v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co., 387 U. S. 202 (1967). The Court explicitly rejected arguments based on the McCarran-Eerguson Act in a similar case of slightly earlier vintage. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 359 U. S. 65, 67-68 (1959). Although the securities laws contain a number of exemptions relating to insurance and insurance companies, the Commission has traditionally regulated a number of activities related to insurance securities. Of course, under the securities laws state regulation may co-exist with that offered under the federal securities laws. See, e. g., Securities Act of 1933, § 18, 48 Stat. 85, 15 U. S. C. § 77r; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28 (a), 48 Stat. 903, 15 U. S. C. § 78bb (a). But it has never been held that state regulation of insurance securities pre-empts federal regulation, on the theory that the federal securities laws would be “superseding” state laws regulating the “business of insurance.” The fact that Arizona purports to protect the interests of insurance company stockholders does not, therefore, by itself render the federal securities laws inapplicable.
II.
The fact remains, however, that the State of Arizona has approved a merger between two insurance companies which, as a matter of remedies, the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks to unwind. Moreover, Arizona has approved the merger not only under its laws relating to insurance securities but also in its capacity as licensor of insurers within the State. The applicable statute requires the State Director of Insurance to find that the proposed merger would not “substantially reduce the security of and service to be rendered to policyholders” before he gives his approval. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-731B 3 (Supp. 1969). This section of the statute clearly relates to the “business of insurance.” The question is, then, whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act bars a federal remedy which affects a matter subject to state insurance regulation. In the circumstances of this particular case, we do not think it does; without intimating any opinion about what remedies would be appropriate should a violation be found after a trial on the merits, we hold that the McCarran-Ferguson Act furnishes no reason for refusing the remedies the Commission is seeking.
The Commission alleged that approval of the merger was obtained through the use of various fraudulent misrepresentations. It did not ask the trial court to pass directly upon a merger which the State Director of Insurance had approved. No question of the legality or illegality of the merger, standing alone, was raised. The gravamen of the complaint was the misrepresentation, not the merger. The merger became relevant only insofar as it was necessary to attack it in order to undo the harm caused by the alleged deception. Presumably, full disclosure would have avoided the particular Rule 10b-5 violations alleged in the complaint. Nevertheless, respondents contend that any attempt to interfere with a merger approved by state insurance officials would “invalidate, impair, or supersede” the state insurance laws made paramount by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. We cannot accept this overly broad restriction on federal power.
It is clear that any “impairment” in this case is a most indirect one. The Federal Government is attempting to protect security holders from fraudulent misrepresentations; Arizona, insofar as its activities are protected by the McCarran-Ferguson Act from the normal operations of the Supremacy Clause, is attempting to protect the interests of the policyholders. Arizona has not commanded something which the Federal Government seeks to prohibit. It has permitted respondents to consummate the merger; it did not order them to do so. In this context, all the Securities and Exchange Commission is asking is that insurance companies speak the truth when talking to their shareholders. The paramount federal interest in protecting shareholders is in this situation perfectly compatible with the paramount state interest in protecting policyholders. And the remedy the Commission seeks does not affect a matter predominantly of concern to policyholders alone; the merger is at least as important to those owning the companies’ stock as it is to those holding their policies. In these circumstances, we simply cannot see the conflict. Different questions would, of course, arise if the Federal Government were attempting to regulate in the sphere reserved primarily to the States by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. But that is not this case. In these circumstances, there is no reason to emasculate the securities laws by forbidding remedies which might prove to be essential. Cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 (1964). On remand, the trial court may order a return to the status quo ante if it finds that course of action desirable, necessary, and otherwise lawful.
III.
Respondents argue that there are alternative grounds on which the lower courts’ action in granting judgment on the pleadings can be sustained. They contend that the complaint fails to allege a “purchase or sale” of securities within the meaning of § 10 (b) and the Commission’s Rule 10b-5, and that in any case Rule 10b-5 does not apply to misrepresentations in connection with the solicitation of proxies. Since this case is here in the context of an appeal from the pretrial dismissal of a complaint, a simple remand would leave the lower courts with nothing more on which to base a decision than the record presently before this Court. In addition, further delays in resolving this controversy might increase the difficulty of fashioning effective relief. Accordingly, we think it desirable to dispose of these two issues before remanding the case so that the trial court may go forward with further proceedings without undue delay.
Although § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 may well be the most litigated provisions in the federal securities laws, this is the first time this Court has found it necessary to interpret them. We enter this virgin territory cautiously. The questions presented are narrow ones. They arise in an area where glib generalizations and unthinking abstractions are major occupational hazards. Accordingly, in deciding this particular case, remembering what is not involved is as important as determining what is. With this in mind, we turn to respondents’ particular contentions.
Respondents argue that the complaint fails to allege any misstatements “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,” as is required by both the statute and the rule. They rely upon the so-called “no-sale doctrine” presently set forth in the Commission’s Rule 133 under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 CFR § 230.133 (1968). That rule, promulgated under the Commission’s authority to define “accounting, technical, and trade terms” used in the 1933 Act, § 19 (a), 48 Stat. 85, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77s, sets forth various situations involving statutory mergers and other types of corporate reorganizations, and declares that no “sale” or “offer” shall be deemed to be involved. But whatever may be the validity or effect of this rule — and we intimate absolutely no opinion on these questions — it certainly does not determine the result here. The rule is specifically made applicable only to cases involving § 5 of the 1933 Act; this case arises under § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act. Although the interdependence of the various sections of the securities laws is certainly a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language Congress has chosen, ordinary rules of statutory construction still apply. The meaning of particular phrases must be determined in context, SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 350-351 (1943). Congress itself has cautioned that the same words may take on a different coloration in different sections of the securities laws; both the 1933 and the 1934 Acts preface their lists of general definitions with the phrase “unless the context otherwise requires.” 1933 Act, § 2, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U. S. C. § 77b; 1934 Act, § 3, 48 Stat. 882, 15 U. S. C. § 78c. We must therefore address ourselves to the meaning of the words “purchase or sale” in the context of § 10 (b). Whatever these or similar words may mean in the numerous other contexts in which they appear in the securities laws, only this one narrow question is presented here.
Section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 together constitute one of the several broad antifraud provisions contained in the securities laws. In the context of this case, the Commission seeks to apply them to prevent the shareholders of Producers from being defrauded as a result of misstatements made by respondents. For the statute and the rule to apply, the allegedly proscribed conduct must have been “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” The relevant definitional sections of the 1934 Act are for the most part unhelpful; they only declare generally that the terms “purchase” and “sale” shall include contracts to purchase or sell. §§3(a)(13), (14), 48 Stat. 884, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78c (a)(13), (14). Consequently, we must ask whether respondents’ alleged conduct is the type of fraudulent behavior which was meant to be forbidden by the statute and the rule.
According to the amended complaint, Producers’ shareholders were misled in various material respects prior to their approval of a merger. The deception furthered a scheme which resulted in their losing their status as shareholders in Producers and becoming shareholders in a new company. Moreover, by voting in favor of the merger, each approving shareholder individually lost any right under Arizona law to obtain an appraisal of his stock and payment for it in cash. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-347 (1956). Whatever the terms “purchase” and “sale” may mean in other contexts, here an alleged deception has affected individual shareholders’ decisions in a way not at all unlike that involved in a typical cash sale or share exchange. The broad anti-fraud purposes of the statute and the rule would clearly be furthered by their application to this type of situation. Therefore we conclude that Producers’ shareholders “purchased” shares in the new company by exchanging them for their old stock. As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has said, “This view does no violence to the statutory language, and is the present interpretation of the body which is responsible for the administration of the acts.” Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F. 2d 262, 269 (opinion of Fairchild and Cummings, JJ.), cert. denied, sub nom. Bard v. Dasho, 389 U. S. 977 (1967); see Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F. 2d 627 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 970 (1967); cf. Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F. 2d 24 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1964).
Respondents’ alternative argument that Rule 10b-5 does not cover misrepresentations which occur in connection with proxy solicitations can be dismissed rather quickly. Section 14 of the 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 895, 15 U. S. C. § 78n, and the rules adopted pursuant to that section, 17 CFR §§ 240.14a-l to 240.14a-103 (1968), set up a complex regulatory scheme covering proxy solicitations. At the time of the conduct charged in the complaint, these provisions did not apply to respondents; the 1964 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act would have made them applicable later if certain conditions relating to state regulation had not been met. 78 Stat. 567, 15 U. S. C. § 781 (g)(2)(G). But the existence or nonexistence of regulation under § 14 would not affect the scope of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. The two sections of the Act apply to different sets of situations. Section 10 (b) applies to all proscribed conduct in connection with a purchase or sale of any security; § 14 applies to all proxy solicitations, whether or not in connection with a purchase or sale. The fact that there may well be some overlap is neither unusual nor unfortunate. Nor does it help respondents that insurance companies may often be exempt from federal proxy regulation under the 1964 amendments. The securities laws’ exemptions for insurance companies and insurance activities are carefully limited. None is applicable to the Rule 10b-5 situation with which we are confronted, and we do not have the power to create one. Congress may well have concluded that the Commission’s general antifraud powers over purchases and sales of securities should continue to apply to insurance securities, even though the more detailed regulation of proxy solicitations — which may often be conducted in connection with the managerial activities of insurance companies— was left to the States. Accordingly, we find no bar to the application of Rule 10b-5 to respondents’ misstatements in their proxy materials.
Since the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not prohibit the relief sought, and since neither of the alternative grounds for dismissal which have been raised here is meritorious, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Black,
believing that the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit correctly analyzed the issues in this case and that its judgment is right, dissents from this Court’s reversal of the judgment.
Mr. Justice Harlan, whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur entirely in Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion construing the McCarran-Ferguson Act. But I am at a loss to understand why the Court finds it necessary to go further and construe Rule 10b-5 promulgated under § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Court of Appeals did not reach this question since it believed that the McCarran-Ferguson Act entirely exempted the transaction involved here from the commands of the federal securities laws. The Government’s petition for certiorari is similarly limited. The only issue it raises is “[wjhether the McCarran-Ferguson Act . . . precludes the application of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. . . .” See Petition for Certiorari 2. When the respondents’ brief on the merits argued that Rule 10b-5 did not apply to the present case, the Solicitor General did not even attempt to present the Government’s position on that score because he quite properly believed that “the question is not appropriately before this Court for decision.” Government’s Reply Brief 2.
Despite the fact that we have not heard the views of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Court chooses this case as a vehicle to construe for the first time one of the most important and elusive provisions of the securities laws. Moreover, the decision has far-reaching radiations, despite the fact that the precise issue presented is a narrow one. Courts and commentators have long debated whether Rule 10b-5 should be read as a sweeping prohibition against fraud in the securities industry when this results in rendering nullities of the other antifraud provisions of more limited scope which can be found in the statute books. See, e. g., §§ 11(a), 12 (2), and 13 of the Securities Act of 1933; § 18 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. The late Judge Jerome Frank, Professor Louis Loss, and Milton Cohen, — to mention only three of those particularly eminent in this field — have warned that Rule 10b-5 should not be construed to supersede the special statutory schemes which Congress has devised to assure fair dealing in various aspects of the securities business. But see A. Bromberg, Securities Law § 2.5 (1967); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F. 2d 270 (1961). Even those who take an extremely broad view of the scope of the Rule have recognized that it could well be argued that the courts should not rush in to apply § 10 (b) to regulate proxy solicitations where Congress has refused to permit the Commission to intervene under § 14. See Bromberg, supra, § 6.5 (2), n. 93.1. Indeed, at one time the SEC itself was of the opinion that the Rule did not apply in cases of this sort. National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford University, 134 F. 2d 689, 694 (1943). Nevertheless, the majority believes it can answer this question “rather quickly,” ante, at 468, without any real recognition of the basic principles which hang in the balance.
In addition, the Court has chosen to adopt a very loose construction of the requirement, first enunciated by Judge Augustus Hand in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F. 2d 461 (1951), cert. denied 343 U. S. 956 (1952), that a transaction must involve a “purchase” or “sale” of securities before it may be found to violate Rule 10b-5. While some commentators have welcomed the erosion of this doctrine, see Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 1 Ob-5, 54 Ya. L. Rev. 268 (1968), especially in injunction actions initiated by the SEC, Note, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to SEC Rule 10b-5, 53 Cornell L. Rev. 684, 694-697 (1968), others believe that “Birnbaum seems basically correct.” 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1469. As recently as 1964, the Second Circuit rendered a decision which has been commonly understood to have reaffirmed the vitality of the Birnbaum doctrine, with my Brother Marshall casting the deciding vote. O’Neill v. Maytag, 339 F. 2d 764, 768 (1964); see Lowenfels, supra, at 270.
I am unwilling to decide these fundamental matters without full-dress argument. Indeed, if the courts of appeals are not to be permitted to develop the law in this area on a case-by-case basis, I think it much wiser for us to consider the basic issues in a case which squarely raises them rather than in one which is of marginal importance.
“No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.”
In 1966 Arizona law was amended to give him this power. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §20-143 (Supp. 1969). This statute was passed in response to the 1964 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act. Pub. L. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565.
E. g., Securities Act of 1933, § 3 (a) (8), 48 Stat. 76, 15 U. S. C. § 77c (a) (8); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12 (g) (2) (G), added by Pub. L. 88-467, 78 Stat. 567 (1964), 15 U. S. C. § 781 (g) (2)(G).
The Commision lists a large number of examples of its activities in its brief. Brief for Petitioner 16-17.
Although the District Court held that some of the relief requested was beyond that properly allowable under § 21 (e) of the 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 900, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78u (e), no such question has been argued by either party here. Accordingly, we express no opinion about the proper construction of that section. See Note, Ancillary Relief in SEC Injunction Suits for Violation of Rule 10b-5, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 656 (1966).
Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. §78j (b), provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange—
“(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.”
Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1968), provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
“(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
“(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
“(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”
For the history of this doctrine, see 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 518-542 (1961).
These sections do indicate the breadth of the statutory terms by using the definitional word “include” and by including within the definitions contracts “to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire” and “to sell or otherwise dispose of” securities.
This case presents none of the complications which may arise in determining who, if anyone, may bring private actions under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. Cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426 (1964). This is a suit brought by the Commission; the terms “purchase” and “sale” are relevant only to the question of statutory coverage. Therefore there are no “standing” problems lurking in the case. Cf. Lowenfels, The Demise of the Bimbaum Doctriné: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 Va. L. Rev. 268 (1968).
Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 188 F. 2d 783 (1951).
3 Securities Regulation 1787-1791 (1961).
“Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1340, 1370 n. 89 (1966).
Both O’Neill and Birnbaum were of course private actions, and I do not mean to suggest that my Brother Marshall is flatly inconsistent in now ruling that the “purchase” and “sale” requirement has been met in this case involving the SEC’s request for an injunction. Nevertheless, both private and public actions arise under the same Rule, and the legal problems involved in the two situations, while not identical, are closely related.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was charged in a three-count indictment under § 145 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 with the felony of wilfully attempting to evade federal income taxes by filing a false return. Upon conviction, he was sentenced to concurrent two-year prison terms and was fined $2,000 on each count. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction on count one, but affirmed the convictions on counts two and three. 234 F. 2d 797. We granted certiorari limited to a question of general importance in the enforcement of the income tax, namely, whether petitioner could be prosecuted and sentenced under § 145 (b) for an offense claimed by him to be punishable also under § 3616 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 352 U. S. 1023.
The threshold question is whether the conduct for which petitioner was convicted was an offense under § 3616 (a). That section made it a misdemeanor for any person to deliver to the Collector “any false or fraudulent list, return, account, or statement, with intent to defeat or evade the valuation, enumeration, or assessment intended to be made . . and provided maximum penalties of one year in prison and a $1,000 fine, together with the costs of prosecution. 53 Stat. 440. If the wilful filing of a false income tax return was not embraced by § 3616 (a), petitioner’s case falls, and discussion of other issues becomes unnecessary.
Unlike § 145 (b), which appeared in the income tax chapter of the 1939 Code and was specifically and restrictively designed to punish evasion of that tax, § 3616 (a) was placed among the Code’s “General Administrative Provisions” and was general in scope. Failure explicitly to exclude evasion of the income tax from the scope of § 3616 (a) is urged as ground for its inclusion, thereby making it a misdemeanor to file a false return with intent to evade the income tax, despite the specific felony provision of § 145 (b).
As long ago as 1926 it was the Government’s position that the predecessor of § 145 (b) effectively repealed §3616 (a)’s applicability to income tax evasion. See brief for the United States in United States v. Noveck, 273 U. S. 202, pp. 16-19. To be sure, during the last five years, the Government prosecuted a small number of minor offenses, we are told less than seven per cent of the criminal income tax evasion cases involving the filing of false returns, as misdemeanors under § 3616 (a). More recently, a series of cases brought the relation of § 145 (b) to § 3616 (a) into focus and called for an interpretative analysis of the history of these sections in order to ascertain their respective functions. And so now, for the first time, has the Government made a detailed survey of the problem of alleged overlapping between § 3616 (a) and § 145 (b).
Section 3616 (a) goes back to the Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 580, 586, when excise taxes and customs duties were the main sources of federal revenue. Being general in scope, this section, as successively re-enacted, was applicable to the first federal taxes on income, from 1861 to 1871, and again in 1894; there were no separate provisions for punishing income tax evasions. See, e. g., the Act of 1861, 12 Stat. 292, 309; the Act of 1894, 28 Stat. 509, 553.
A different story begins with the income tax legislation that followed the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment. Section II of the Revenue Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 114, 166, contained its own criminal sanction. Section II (F) proscribed the making of a false return with intent to evade the income tax, an act that would otherwise have been punishable under what was then § 3179 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, the immediate predecessor of § 3616 (a). The offense would have been a misdemeanor under either statute. But § II (F) provided a maximum fine of $2,000 while § 3179 only permitted a fine of up to $1,000. It seems clear that § II (F) displaced § 3179. Such implied repeal, pro tanto, is further demonstrated by the fact that §§ 3167, 3172, 3173 and 3176 of the Revised Statutes, related provisions in the enforcement of the revenue laws, were specifically incorporated, as modified, into § II, but § 3179 was not. Nor was it incorporated by reference; § II (L) made applicable only those administrative and general tax provisions “not inconsistent with the provisions of this section,” and § 3179 was obviously inconsistent with § II (F).
The Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756, 775, and the Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 300, 325, offer further evidence that Congress withdrew the income tax from the reach of the general provisions of § 3179. Both of those Acts imposed income taxes, proscribed the making of false returns as a misdemeanor, and punished that offense more severely than did § 3179. In addition to its specific prohibition of false returns, the 1917 Act made it an offense to evade or attempt to evade taxes imposed by it, thereby using for the first time language similar to that subsequently found in § 145 (b).
In an effort to escape the effect of the scheme for punishing income tax evaders set forth in the 1913, 1916, and 1917 statutes, petitioner claims that the Revenue Act of 1918 made § 3179 again applicable to the income tax. Section 253 of Title II, the income tax title, provided in pertinent part:
“Any individual . . . who willfully refuses to pay or collect such [required] tax, to make such return, or to supply such information at the time or times required under this title, or who willfully attempts in any manner to defeat or evade the tax imposed by this title, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both 40 Stat. 1057, 1085.
Despite § 253’s addition of the words “in any manner” to the “attempts” clause of the 1917 Act, petitioner contends that the failure of § 253 to single out the making of false returns with intent to evade must be attributed to a congressional determination that this particular mode of income tax evasion should be punished under § 3179. Plainly enough, such a reading of the Act is untenable. We cannot hold that the classic method of evading the income tax, the filing of a false return, did not constitute an attempt “in any manner to defeat or evade” that tax. This would empty those words of their most obvious content and would produce glaring incongruities. It would mean that Congress, having manifested its desire in the previous revenue laws to punish this offense more harshly than did § 3179, inexplicably reversed itself in an Act that heavily increased the punishment for all other forms of obstruction to the income tax. And it would mean that Congress provided a lesser penalty for the making of false returns with intent to evade than for either wilful refusal to file, which is usually considered to be a lesser offense, or refusal to file when combined with affirmative acts of evasion such as keeping a double set of books. An explanation of the omission more in harmony with the rational system of tax administration that was the congressional design is that Congress merely tried to speak economically in 1918 and, having prohibited “attempts in any manner” to evade the income tax, found it unnecessary also to proscribe the major kind of attempt.
This interpretation gains further support from the Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253, 343, which made the last significant alteration of the statutory scheme prior to the 1939 codification. Section 1017 (a), subsequently § 145 (a) of the Code, continued the wilful failure to make returns, supply information or pay taxes as a misdemeanor carrying a penalty of up to one year in prison and a $10,000 fine. Section 1017 (b), the future § 145 (b), made it a felony, with a maximum penalty of five years in prison and a $10,000 fine, to attempt “in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this Act.” And § 1017 (c), later § 3793 (b)(1) of the Code, created a new offense, which made it a felony, with a maximum penalty of five years in prison and $10,000 fine, for any person wilfully to assist in the preparation of a false return. Thus the 1924 Act, by increasing the punishment for affirmative acts of evasion, made even more pronounced one of the indicated anomalies that petitioner’s view would impose. In addition, § 1017 (c) requires petitioner to impute to Congress a desire to punish one who assisted in preparing a false return much more severely than one who actually made the return with intent to evade.
Our duty is to give coherence to what Congress has done within the bounds imposed by a fair reading of legislation. In Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, the dominant consideration in the Court’s unanimous decision relating § 145 (b) to § 145 (a) was the avoidance of incongruities analogous to those that would result from petitioner’s reading of the sections before us. The evolution of those sections makes clear that by the time the unconfined language of § 3179 became § 3616 (a) of the 1939 Code, its scope had been shrunk by a series of specific enactments that had the potency of implied repeals. Due regard for appropriate statutory construction calls for such a conclusion in order to harmonize an earlier, generalized statute with later ad hoc enactments expressly directed to the collection of income taxes.
In view of our conclusion that § 3616 (a) did not apply to evasion of the income tax, it becomes unnecessary to consider other contentions advanced by petitioner.
Affirmed.
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Clark concur in the result.
"SEC. 145. PENALTIES.
“(a) Failure to File Returns, Submit Information, or Pay Tax. — Any person required under this chapter to pay any tax, or required by law or regulations made under authority thereof to make a return, keep any records, or supply any information, for the purposes of the computation, assessment, or collection of any tax imposed by this chapter, who willfully fails to pay such tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
“(b) Failure to Collect and Pay Over Tax, or Attempt to Defeat or Evade Tax. — Any person required under this chapter to collect, account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this chapter, who willfully fails to collect or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, and any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this chapter or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.” 53 Stat. 62-63.
By the time certiorari was granted, petitioner's sentence had been reduced by the District Court to concurrent one-year prison terms and to a fine of $1,000 on each of the two affirmed counts. For further details of the history of the case, see 352 U. S. 916 and 353 U. S. 909.
The 1916 Act provided the same punishment as the Act of 1913. The 1917 Act provided, in addition to the maximum penalties set forth in § 3179, a penalty of double the tax evaded.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
We believe that dismissal of the representation petition on the sole ground of the Board’s "long standing policy not to exercise jurisdiction over the hotel industry” as a class, is contrary to the principles expressed in Office Employes v. Labor Board, 353 U. S. 313, 318-320 (1957). The judgment is therefore reversed and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
This is an application for a writ of habeas corpus brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas alleging unlawful detention under a sentence of imprisonment following a trial in the state court in which petitioner was, according to his claim, denied due process of law as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. After hearing, the District Court dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the order of dismissal, 258 F. 2d 937, to which opinion reference is made for the facts. A petition for certiorari to review this judgment presented so impressive a showing for the exercise of this Court’s discretionary jurisdiction that the case was brought here with leave to the petitioner to proceed in forma pauperis, 359 U. S. 924, and his motion for the assignment of counsel was'duly granted. 359 U. S. 951.
Before the case could come to be heard here, the petitioner was released from the state prison after having served his sentence with time off for good behavior. The case has thus become moot, and the Court is without jurisdiction to deal with the merits of petitioner’s claim. “The purpose of the proceeding defined by the statute [authorizing the writ of habeas corpus to be issued] was to inquire into the legality of the detention, and the only judicial relief authorized was the discharge of the prisoner or his admission to bail.” McNally v. Hill, 293 U. S. 131, 136. “Without restraint of liberty, the writ will not issue.” Id., 138. See also Johnson v. Hoy, 227 U. S. 245. “It is well settled that this court will not proceed to adjudication where there is no subject-matter on which the judgment of the court can operate.” Ex parte Baez, 177 U. S. 378, 390. We have applied these principles to deny the writ of certiorari for mootness on the express ground that petitioner was no longer in respondent’s custody in at least three cases not relevantly different from the present one. Weber v. Squier, 315 U. S. 810; Tornello v. Hudspeth, 318 U. S. 792; Zimmerman v. Walker, 319 U. S. 744. In all these cases there was custody as the basis for habeas corpus jurisdiction until the cases reached here. In Weber, the respondent’s custody ceased because the petitioner had received the benefits of the United States Parole Act. In Tornello the petitioner had been pardoned, and was no longer in the custody of anyone. In Zimmerman petitioner had been unconditionally released and was also no longer in the custody of anyone. These cases demonstrate that it is a condition upon this Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate an application for habeas corpus that the petitioner be in custody when that jurisdiction can become effective. It is precisely because a denial of a petition for certiorari without more has no significance as a ruling that an explicit statement of the reason for a denial means what it says. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Since the case has become moot before the error complained of in the judgment below could be adjudicated, the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals to vacate its judgment and to direct the District Court to vacate its order and dismiss the application.
It is likewise true that “a motion for relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 [relevant only to federal sentences] is available only to attack a sentence under which a prisoner is in custody.” 358 U. S., at 420. Contrary to the unconsidered assumption in Pollard v. United States, 352 U. S. 354, this was decided after full deliberation only a year ago. See the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, 358 U. S., at 418, and the opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart for the Court on this point, 358 U. S., at 420, in Heflin v. United States, 358 U. S. 415. Of course Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is not available for state sentences.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States brought this civil antitrust action under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 18, to challenge a proposed merger between two commercial banks. The acquiring bank is a large, nationally chartered bank based in Seattle, Washington, and the acquired bank is a medium-size, state-chartered bank located at the opposite end of the State in Spokane. The banks are not direct competitors to any significant degree in Spokane or any other part of the State. They have no banking offices in each other’s home cities. The merger agreement would substitute the acquiring bank for the acquired bank in Spokane and would permit the former for the first time to operate as a direct participant in the Spokane market.
The proposed merger would have no effect on the number of banks in Spokane. The United States bases its case exclusively on the potential-competition doctrine under § 7 of the Clayton Act. It contends that if the merger is prohibited, the acquiring bank would find an alternative and more competitive means for entering the Spokane area and that the acquired bank would ultimately develop by internal expansion or mergers with smaller banks into an actual competitor of the acquiring bank and other large banks in sections of the State outside Spokane. The Government further submits that the merger would terminate the alleged procompetitive influence that the acquiring bank presently exerts over Spokane banks due to the potential for its entry into that market.
After a full trial, the District Court held against the Government on all aspects of the case. We affirm that court’s judgment. We hold that in applying the potential-competition doctrine to commercial banking, courts must take into account the extensive federal and state regulation of banks, particularly the legal restraints on entry unique to this line of commerce. The legal barriers to entry in the instant case, notably state-law prohibitions against de novo branching, against branching from a branch office, and against multibank holding companies, compel us to conclude that the challenged merger is not in violation of § 7.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Facts.
The acquiring bank, National Bank of Commerce (NBC), is a national banking association with its principal office in Seattle, Washington. Located in the northwest corner of the State, Seattle is the largest city in Washington. NBC is a wholly owned subsidiary of a registered bank holding company, Marine Bancorporation, Inc. (Marine), and in terms of assets, deposits, and loans is the second largest banking organization with headquarters in the State of Washington. At the end of 1971, NBC had total assets of $1.8 billion, total deposits of $1.6 billion, and total loans of $881.3 million. It operates 107 branch banking offices within the State, 59 of which are located in the Seattle metropolitan area and 31 of which are in lesser developed sections of eastern Washington. In order of population, the four major metropolitan areas in Washington are Seattle, Tacoma, Spokane, and Everett. NBC has no branch offices in the latter three areas.
The target bank, Washington Trust Bank (WTB), founded in 1902, is a state bank with headquarters in Spokane. Spokane is located in the extreme eastern part of the State, approximately 280 road miles from Seattle. It is the largest city in eastern Washington, with a population of 170,000 within the corporate limits and of approximately 200,000 in the overall metropolitan area. The city has a substantial commercial and industrial base. The surrounding region is sparsely populated and is devoted largely to agriculture, mining, and timber. Spokane serves as a trade center for this region. NBC, the acquiring bank, has had a longstanding interest in securing entry into Spokane.
WTB has seven branch offices, six in the city of Spokane and one in Opportunity, a Spokane suburb. WTB is the eighth largest banking organization with headquarters in Washington and the ninth largest banking organization in the State. At the end of 1971, it had assets of $112 million, total deposits of $96.6 million, and loans of $57.6 million. It controls 17.4% of the 46 commercial banking offices in the Spokane metropolitan area. It is one of 12 middle-size banks in Washington (i. e., banks with assets in the $30 million to $250 million range).
WTB is well managed and profitable. From December 31, 1966, to June 30, 1972, it increased its percentage of total deposits held by banking organizations in the Spokane metropolitan area from 16.6% to 18.6%. The amount of its total deposits grew by approximately 50% during that period, a somewhat higher rate of increase than exhibited by all banking organizations operating in Spokane at the same time. Although WTB has exhibited a pattern of moderate growth, at no time during its 70-year history has it expanded outside the Spokane metropolitan area.
As of June 30, 1972, there were 91 national and state banking organizations in Washington. The five largest in the State held 74.3% of the State’s total commercial bank deposits and operated 61.3% of its banking offices. At that time, the two largest in the State, Seattle-First National Bank and NBC, held 51.3% of total deposits and operated 36.5% of the banking offices in Washington. There are six banking organizations operating in the Spokane metropolitan area. One organization, Washington Bancshares, Inc., controls two separate banks and their respective branch offices. As of midyear 1972, this organization in the aggregate held 42.1% of total deposits in the area. Seattle-First National Bank, by comparison, held 31.6%. The target bank held 18.6% of total deposits at that time, placing it third in the Spokane area behind Washington Bancshares, Inc., and Seattle-First National Bank. Thus, taken together, Washington Bancshares, Seattle-First National Bank, and WTB hold approximately 92% of total deposits in the Spokane area. None of the remaining three commercial banks in Spokane holds a market share larger than 3.1%. One of these banks, Farmers & Merchants Bank, has offices only in a Spokane suburb.
The degree of concentration of the commercial banking business in Spokane may well reflect the severity of Washington’s statutory restraints on de novo geographic expansion by banks. Although Washington permits branching, the restrictions placed on that method of internal growth are stringent. Subject to the approval of the state supervisor of banking, Washington banks with sufficient paid-in capital may open branches in the city or town in which their headquarters are located, the unincorporated areas of the county in which their headquarters are located, and incorporated communities which have no banking office. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 30.40.-020 (Supp. 1973). But under state law, no state-chartered bank “shall establish or operate any branch... in any city or town outside the city or town in which its principal place of business is located in which any bank, trust company or national banking association regularly transacts a banking or trust business, except by taking over or acquiring an existing bank, trust company or national banking association... Ibid. Since federal law subjects nationally chartered banks to the branching limitations imposed on their state counterparts, national and state banks in Washington are restricted to mergers or acquisitions in order to expand into cities and towns with preexisting banking organizations.
The ability to acquire existing banks is also limited by a provision of state law requiring that banks incorporating in Washington include in their articles of incorporation a clause forbidding a new bank from merging with or permitting its assets to be acquired by another bank for a period of at least 10 years, without the consent of the state supervisor of banking. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §30.08.020 (7) (1961 and Supp. 1973). In addition, once a bank acquires or takes over one of the banks operating in a city or town other than the acquiring bank’s principal place of business, it cannot branch from the acquired bank. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 30.40.020 (Supp. 1973). Thus, an acquiring bank that enters a new city or town containing banks other than the acquired bank is restricted to the number of bank offices obtained at the time of the acquisition. Moreover, multibank holding companies are prohibited in Washington. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §30.04.230 (Supp. 1973). Under state law, no corporation in Washington may own, hold, or control more than 25% of the capital stock of more than one bank. Ibid. Violations of the one-bank holding company statute are gross misdemeanors carrying a possible penalty of forfeiture of a corporate charter. Ibid. Accordingly, it is not possible in Washington to achieve the rough equivalent of free branching by aggregating a number of unit banks under a bank holding company.
B. The Proceedings.
In February 1971, Marine, NBC, and WTB agreed to merge the latter into NBC. NBC, as the surviving bank, would operate all eight banking offices of WTB as branches of NBC. In March 1971, NBC and WTB applied to the Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to the Bank Merger Act of 1966 for approval of the merger. As required by that Act, see 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c) (4), the Comptroller requested “reports on the competitive factors involved” from the Attorney General, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Each of these agencies submitted a negative report on the competitive effects of the merger. The Attorney General relied on the reasons advanced in the instant case. The latter two agencies based their conclusions primarily on the degree of concentration in commercial banking in Washington as a whole.
The Comptroller approved the merger in a report issued September 24, 1971. He concluded that state law precluded NBC from branching in Spokane and “effectively prevented” NBC from causing a new Spokane bank to be formed which could later be treated as a merger partner. He noted that state law prevented the only independent small bank with offices located within the city boundaries of Spokane from merging with NBC, since that bank was state chartered, had been founded in 1965, and was subject to the minimum 10-year restriction against sale of a new bank set out in Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 30.08.020 (7) (1961 and Supp. 1973). The Comptroller relied heavily on the view that the merger would contribute to the convenience and needs of bank customers in Spokane by bringing to them services not previously provided by WTB.
Acting within the 30-day limitation period set out in the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c) (7), the United States then commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging the legality of the merger under § 7 of the Clayton Act. As a result, the merger was automatically stayed. 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c) (7) (A). Pursuant to 12 U. S. C. § 1828 (c) (7) (D), the Comptroller intervened in support of the merger as a party defendant.
Prior to trial the United States dropped all allegations concerning actual competition between the merger partners. The remainder of the complaint addressed the subject of potential competition. The United States sought to establish that the merger “may... substantially... lessen competition” within the meaning of § 7 in three ways: by eliminating the prospect that NBC, absent acquisition of the market share represented by WTB, would enter Spokane de novo or through acquisition of a smaller bank and thus would assist in deconcentrating that market over the long run; by ending present pro-competitive effects allegedly produced in Spokane by NBC’s perceived presence on the fringe of the Spokane market; and by terminating the alleged probability that WTB as an independent entity would develop through internal growth or through mergers with other medium-size banks into a regional or ultimately statewide counterweight to the market power of the State’s largest banks. The Government’s first theory — alleged likelihood of de novo or foothold entry by NBC if the challenged merger were blocked — was the primary basis upon which this case was presented to the District Court.
At the close of final oral argument following a week-long trial, the District Judge ruled for the defendants from the bench. Two weeks later he adopted without change the defendants’ proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law, the latter consisting of seven sentences. 1973-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 74,496, p. 94,244 (1973). The court found that the merger would “substantially” increase competition in commercial banking in the Spokane metropolitan area and would have “no inherent anti-competitive effect... Ibid. In light of the legal and economic barriers to any other method of entry, the court further found “no reasonable probability” that, absent the challenged merger, NBC would enter the Spokane market in the “reasonably foreseeable future.” Id., at 94,245.
According to the District Court, Washington law forbade NBC from establishing de novo branches in Spokane, and the Government had failed to establish that there was any existing bank in Spokane other than WTB “available for acquisition by NBC on any reasonably acceptable basis at any time in the foreseeable future, or at all.” Ibid. Moreover, any attempt by NBC to enter de novo by assisting in the formation of and then acquiring a newly chartered bank in Spokane “even if it could be legally accomplished,” or to undertake a foothold acquisition, would not be economically feasible. Ibid. In addition to noting the past and projected slow growth of the Spokane area, the court found that the ability to branch in a metropolitan area was essential to effective competition in the banking business. Ibid. Under state law, NBC would be unable to open new branch offices in Spokane if it made a foothold acquisition or helped form and then acquired a new bank. These and other factors rendered “negative” the prospects for growth of a foothold acquisition or of a sponsored bank started from scratch. Ibid. This was confirmed by the experience of another large banking organization not based in Spokane that had entered the city through a foothold acquisition in 1964 and subsequently had been unable to expand the market share of the acquired bank. Id., at 94,245-94,246.
The court found no perceptible procompetitive effect deriving from NBC’s premerger presence on the fringe of the Spokane market. Id., at 94,246. It also held that the Government had failed to carry its burden of proving a reasonable probability that WTB, absent the merger, would expand beyond the Spokane market by de novo growth or through combination with another medium-size bank. Ibid. It found no probability that NBC would be “entrenched as a dominant bank in the Spokane metropolitan area” as a result of the merger, and it could find no likelihood that the merger would trigger a series of defensive mergers by other banks in the State. Id., at 94,246-94,247.
On the basis of its findings, the District Court dismissed the Government’s complaint. The Government thereupon brought this direct appeal under the Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 29. We noted probable jurisdiction. 414 U. S. 907 (1973).
II
THE RELEVANT MARKETS
Determination of the relevant product and geographic markets is "a necessary predicate” to deciding whether a merger contravenes the Clayton Act. United States v. Du Pont & Co., 353 U. S. 586, 593 (1957); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 324 (1962). The District Court found that the relevant product market “within which the competitive effect of the merger is to be judged” is the “business of commercial banking (and the cluster of products and services denoted thereby)....” 1973-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 74,496, p. 94,243. The parties do not dispute- this finding, and in any event it is in full accord with our precedents.
The District Court found that the relevant geographic market is the Spokane metropolitan area, "consisting of the City of Spokane and the populated areas immediately adjacent thereto, including the area extending easterly through the suburb of Opportunity toward the Idaho border... Id., at 94,244. This area extends approximately five miles to the west and south and 10 miles to the north and east of the center of the city. It is wholly within and considerably smaller than Spokane County and is surrounded by a sparsely populated region, with no nearby major metropolitan centers. It contains all eight of the target bank’s offices. On the basis of the record, we have no reason to doubt that it constitutes a reasonable approximation of the “localized” banking market in which Spokane banks offer the major part of their services and to which local consumers can practicably turn for alternatives. E. g., United States v. Phillipsburg National Bank, 399 U. S. 350, 362-365 (1970). It is also the area where “the effect of the merger on competition will be direct and immediate...,” which as this Court has held is the appropriate “section of the country” for purposes of § 7. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 357 (1963). Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s holding that the Spokane metropolitan area is the appropriate geographic market for determining the legality of the merger.
Prior to trial the Government stipulated that the Spokane area is a relevant geographic market in the instant case, and there is no dispute that it is the only banking market in which WTB is a significant participant. Nevertheless, the Government contends that the entire State is also an appropriate “section of the country” in this case. It is conceded that the State is not a banking market. But the Government asserts that the State is an economically differentiated region, because its boundaries delineate an area within which Washington banks are insulated from most forms of competition by out-of-state banking organizations. The Government further argues that this merger, and others it allegedly will trigger, may lead eventually to the domination of all banking in the State by a few large banks, facing each other in a network of local, oligopolistic banking markets. This assumed eventual statewide linkage of local markets, it is argued, will enhance statewide the possibility of parallel, standardized, anticompetitive behavior. This concern for the possible statewide consequences of geographic market extension mergers by commercial banks appears to be an important reason for the Government’s recent efforts to block such mergers through an application of the potential-competition doctrine under § 7.
The Government’s proposed reading of the “any section of the country” phrase of § 7 is at variance with this Court’s § 7 cases, and we reject it. Without exception the Court has treated “section of the country” and “relevant geographic market” as identical, and it has defined the latter concept as the area in which the goods or services at issue are marketed to a significant degree by the acquired firm. E. g., Philadelphia National Bank, supra, at 357-362. In cases in which the acquired firm markets its products or services on a local, regional, and national basis, the Court has acknowledged the existence of more than one relevant geographic market. But in no previous § 7 case has the Court determined the legality of a merger by measuring its effects on areas where the acquired firm is not a direct competitor. In urging that the legality of this merger be gauged on a statewide basis, the Government is suggesting that we take precisely that step, because, as it concedes, the section of the country in which WTB markets by far the greatest portion of its services, due to the predominantly localized character of commercial banking, is the Spokane metropolitan area. Under the precedents, we decline the Government’s invitation. We hold that in a potential-competition case like this one, the relevant geographic market or appropriate section of the country is the area in which the acquired firm is an actual, direct competitor.
Apart from the fact that the Government’s statewide approach is not supported by the precedents, it is simply too speculative on this record. There has been no persuasive showing that the effect of the merger on a statewide basis “may be substantially to lessen competition” within the meaning of § 7. To be sure, § 7 was designed to arrest mergers “at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce [is] still in its incipiency.” Brown Shoe Co., 370 U. S., at 317. See, e. g., United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U. S. 270, 277 (1966). Moreover, the proscription expressed in § 7 against mergers “when a Tendency’ toward monopoly nr [a]'reasonable likelihood’ of a substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market is shown,” United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U. S. 158, 171 (1964), applies alike to actual- and potential-competition cases. Ibid. But it is to be remembered that § 7 deals in “probabilities,” not “ephemeral possibilities.” Brown Shoe Go., supra, at 323. The Government’s underlying concern for a linkage or network of statewide oligopolistic banking markets is, on this record at least, considerably closer to “ephemeral possibilities” than to “probabilities.” To assume, on the basis of essentially no evidence, that the challenged merger will tend to produce a statewide linkage of oligopolies is to espouse a per se rule against geographic market extension mergers like the one at issue here. No § 7 case from this Court has gone that far, and we do not do so today. For the purpose of this case, the appropriate “section of the country” and the “relevant geographic market” are the same — the Spokane metropolitan area.
Ill
POTENTIAL-COMPETITION DOCTRINE
The term “potential competitor” appeared for the first time in a § 7 opinion of this Court in United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U. S. 651, 659 (1964). El Paso was in reality, however, an actual-competition rather than a potential-competition case. The potential-competition doctrine has been defined in major part by subsequent cases, particularly United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U. S. 526 (1973). Unequivocal proof that an acquiring firm actually would have entered de novo but for a merger is rarely available. Thus, as Falstaff indicates, the principal focus of the doctrine is on the likely effects of the premerger position of the acquiring firm on the fringe of the target market. In developing and applying the doctrine, the Court has recognized that a market extension merger may be unlawful if the target market is substantially concentrated, if the acquiring firm has the characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive to render it a perceived potential de novo entrant, and if the acquiring firm’s premerger presence on the fringe of the target market in fact tempered oligopolistic behavior on the part of existing participants in that market. In other words, the Court has interpreted § 7 as encompassing what is commonly known as the “wings effect” — the probability that the acquiring firm prompted premerger procompetitive effects within the target market by being perceived by the existing firms in that market as likely to enter de novo. Falstaff, supra, at 531-537. The elimination of such present procom-petitive effects may render a merger unlawful under § 7.
Although the concept of perceived potential entry has been accepted in the Court’s prior § 7 cases, the potential-competition theory upon which the Government places principal reliance in the instant case has not. The Court has not previously resolved whether the potential-competition doctrine proscribes a market extension merger solely on the ground that such a merger eliminates the prospect for long-term deconcentration of an oligopolistic market that in theory might result if the acquiring firm were forbidden to enter except through a de novo undertaking or through the acquisition of a small existing entrant (a so-called foothold or toehold acquisition). Falstaff expressly reserved this issue.
The Government’s potential-competition argument in the instant case proceeds in five steps. First, it argues that the potential-competition doctrine applies with full force to commercial banks. Second, it submits that the Spokane commercial banking market is sufficiently concentrated to invoke that doctrine. Third, it urges us to resolve in its favor the question left open in Falstaff. Fourth, it contends that, without regard to the possibility of future deconcentration of the Spokane market, the challenged merger is illegal under established doctrine because it eliminates NBC as a perceived potential entrant. Finally, it asserts that the merger will eliminate WTB’s potential for growth outside Spokane. We shall address those points in the order presented.
A. Application of the Doctrine to Commercial Banks.
Since United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321 (1963), the Court has taken the view that, as a general rule, standard § 7 principles applicable to unregulated industries apply as well to mergers between commercial banks. See also United States v. First National Bank, 376 U. S. 665 (1964). Congress reacted to Philadelphia National Bank by including in the Bank Merger Act of 1966 a “convenience and needs” defense uniquely applicable to commercial banks. 12 U. S. C. §§ 1828 (c) (5) (B) and (c) (7) (B). Subsequent cases have revealed, however, that that defense comes into play only after a district court has made a de novo determination of the status of a bank merger under the Clayton Act. See United States v. Third National Bank, 390 U. S. 171 (1968); United States v. First City National Bank, 386 U. S. 361 (1967). As the Court noted in Phillipsburg National Bank, supra, “the antitrust standards of... Philadelphia National Bank... were preserved in the Bank Merger Act of 1966.” 399 U. S., at 358.
Although the Court's prior bank merger cases have involved combinations between actual competitors operating in the same geographic markets, an element that distinguishes them factually from this case, they nevertheless are strong precedents for the view that § 7 doctrines are applicable to commercial banking. In accord with the general principles of those cases, we hold that geographic market extension mergers by commercial banks must pass muster under the potential-competition doctrine. We further hold, however, that the application of the doctrine to commercial banking must take into account the unique federal and state regulatory restraints on entry into that line of commerce. Failure to do so would produce misconceptions that go to the heart of the doctrine itself.
The Government’s present position has evolved over a series of eight District Court cases, all of them decided unfavorably to its views. The conceptual difficulty with the Government’s approach, and an important reason why it has been uniformly unsuccessful in the district courts, is that it fails to accord full weight to the extensive federal and state regulatory barriers to entry into commercial banking. This omission is of great importance, because ease of entry on the part of the acquiring firm is a central premise of the potential-competition doctrine.
Unlike, for example, the beer industry, see Falstaff Brewing Corp., supra, entry of new competitors into the commercial banking field is “wholly a matter of governmental grace...” and “far from easy.” Philadelphia National Bank, supra, at 367, and n. 44. Beer manufacturers are free to base their decisions regarding entry and the scale of entry into a new geographic market on nonregulatory considerations, including their own financial capabilities, their long-range goals as to markets, the cost of creating new production and distribution facilities, and above all the profit prospects in the target market. They need give no thought to public needs and convenience. No comparable freedom exists for commercial banks. Ease of entry into a market presumes ease of exit — i. e., the withdrawal or financial collapse of a certain number of participants in that market. Reflecting this country’s bitter experience of four decades ago that “[a] bank failure is a community disaster...,” entry into and exit from the commercial banking business have been extensively regulated by the Federal and State Governments. The regulatory barriers to entry include federal and state supervisory controls over the number of bank charters to be granted, designed to limit the number of banks operating in any particular market and thus to prevent bank failures. See id., at 328. In addition, no branch, no matter how small, may be opened without prior approval of the appropriate bank regulatory agency. Moreover, there are state-law restrictions, such as those in force in Washington, on de novo geographic expansion through branching and multi-bank holding companies. As noted earlier, Washington statutes forbid branching into cities and towns where the expanding bank does not maintain its headquarters and other banks operate, and they forbid branching from a branch in such areas. See supra, at 609-611. Similarly, Washington permits only one-bank holding companies. Supra, at 611-612.
In Philadelphia National Bank, supra, the Court relied on regulatory barriers to entry to support its conclusion that mergers between banks in direct competition in the same market must be scrutinized with particular care under §7. 374 U. S., at 352, 367-370, 372. But the same restrictions on new entry render it difficult to hold that a geographic market extension merger by a commercial bank is unlawful under the potential-competition doctrine. Such limitations often significantly reduce, if they do not eliminate, the likelihood that the acquiring bank is either a perceived potential de novo entrant or a source of future competitive benefits through de novo or foothold entry. Similarly, the Court noted in Philadelphia Nar tional Bank that under applicable state law de novo branching in the relevant market was permissible and presented an “alternative to the merger route... Id., at 370. In this case, by contrast, there are serious questions whether an “alternative to the merger route” through branching or a functional equivalent is a legal or feasible method of entry by NBC into the Spokane market.
B. Structure of the Spokane Market.
Since the legality of the challenged merger must be judged by its effects on the relevant product and geographic markets, commercial banking in the Spokane metropolitan area, it is imperative to determine the competitive characteristics of commercial banking in that section of the country. The potential-competition doctrine has meaning only as applied to concentrated markets. That is, the doctrine comes into play only where there are dominant participants in the target market engaging in interdependent or parallel behavior and with the capacity effectively to determine price and total output of goods or services. If the target market performs as a competitive market in traditional antitrust terms, the participants in the market will have no occasion to fashion their behavior to take into account the presence of a potential entrant. The present procompetitive effects that a perceived potential entrant may produce in an oligopolistic market will already have been accomplished if the target market is performing competitively. Likewise, there would be no need for concern about the prospects of long-term deconcentration of a market which is in fact genuinely competitive.
In an effort to establish that the Spokane commercial banking market is oligopolistic, the Government relied primarily on concentration ratios indicating that three banking organizations (including WTB) control approximately 92% of total deposits in Spokane. The District Court held against the Government on this point, finding that "a highly competitive market” existed which “does not suffer from parallel or other anticompetitive practices attributable to undue market power.” 1973-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 74,496, p. 94,246. The court apparently gave great weight to the testimony of the banks’ expert witnesses concerning the number of bank organizations and banking offices operating in the Spokane metropolitan area. The record indicates that neither the Government nor the appellees undertook any significant study of the performance, as compared to the structure, of the commercial banking market in Spokane.
We conclude that by introducing evidence of concentration ratios of the magnitude of those present here the Government established a prima facie case that the Spokane market was a candidate for the potential-competition doctrine. On this aspect of the case, the burden was then upon appellees to show that the concentration ratios, which can be unreliable indicators of actual market behavior, see United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U. S. 486 (1974), did not accurately depict the economic characteristics of the Spokane market. In our view, appellees did not carry this burden, and the District-Court erred in holding to the contrary. Appellees introduced no significant evidence of the absence of paral-lei behavior in the pricing or providing of commercial bank services in Spokane.
We note that it is hardly surprising that the Spokane commercial banking market is structurally concentrated. As the Government’s expert witness conceded, all banking markets in the country are likely to be concentrated. This is so because as a country we have made the policy judgment to restrict entry into commercial banking in order to promote bank safety. Thus, most banking markets in theory will be subject to the potential-competition doctrine. But the same factor that usually renders such markets concentrated and theoretical prospects for potential-competition § 7 cases — regulatory barriers to new entry — will also make it difficult to establish that the doctrine invalidates a particular geographic market extension merger.
C. Potential De Novo or Foothold Entry.
The third step in the Government’s argument, resolution of the question reserved in Falstaff, was the primary basis on which the case was presented to the District Court and to us. The Government contends that the challenged merger violates § 7 because it eliminates the alleged likelihood that, but for the merger, NBC would enter Spokane de novo or through a foothold acquisition. Utilization of one of these methods of entry, it is argued, would be likely to produce deconcentration of the Spokane market over the long run or other procompetitive effects, because NBC would be required to compete vigorously to expand its initially insignificant market share.
Two essential preconditions must exist before it is possible to resolve whether the Government’s theory, if proved, establishes a violation of § 7. It must be determined: (i) that in fact NBC has available feasible means for entering the Spokane market other than by acquiring WTB; and (ii) that those means offer a substantial likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration of that market or other significant procompetitive effects. The parties are in sharp disagreement over the existence of each of these preconditions in this case. There is no dispute that NBC possesses the financial capability and incentive to enter. The controversy turns on what methods of entry are realistically possible and on the likely effect of various methods on the characteristics of the Spokane commercial banking market.
It is undisputed that under state law NBC cannot establish de novo branches in Spokane and that its parent holding company cannot hold more than 25% of the stock of any other bank. Entry for NBC into Spokane therefore must be by acquisition of an existing bank. The Government contends that NBC has two distinct alternatives for acquisition of banks smaller than WTB and that either alternative would be likely to benefit the Spokane commercial banking market.
First, the Government contends that NBC could arrange for the formation of a new bank (a concept known as “sponsorship”), insure that the stock for such a new bank is placed in friendly hands,. and then ultimately acquire that bank. Appellees respond that this approach would violate the spirit if not the letter of state-law restrictions on bank branching. They note that this method would require the issuance of either a state or a national charter, and they assert that neither state nor federal banking authorities would be likely to grant a charter for a new bank in a static, “well-banked” market like Spokane. Moreover, it is argued that such officials would be certain to refuse to do so where the purpose of the scheme was to avoid the requirements of the state branching law. Appellees further note that the stock and assets of any new state bank in Washington are inalienable for at least 10 years without approval of state banking officials, see Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §30.08.020 (7), and they argue that such officials would refuse to grant approval for sale as
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Since 1945, a decree of this Court has rationed the North Platte River among users in Wyoming, Nebraska, and Colorado. By petition in 1986, Nebraska again brought the matter before us, and we appointed a Special Master to conduct the appropriate proceedings. In his Third Interim Report on Motions to Amend Pleadings (Sept. 9, 1994) (hereinafter Third Interim Report), the Master has made recommendations for rulings on requests for leave to amend filed by Nebraska and Wyoming. We now have before us the parties’ exceptions to the Master’s report, each of which we overrule.
HH
The North Platte River is a nonnavigable stream rising m northern Colorado and flowing through Wyoming into Nebraska, where it joins with the South Platte to form the Platte River. In 1934, Nebraska invoked our original jurisdiction under the Constitution, Art. Ill, §2, cl. 2, by suing Wyoming for an equitable apportionment of the North Platte. The United States had leave to intervene, Colorado was impleaded as a defendant, and the ensuing litigation culminated in the decision and decree in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589 (1945) (Nebraska I).
We concluded that the doctrine of prior appropriation should serve as the general “guiding principle” in our allocation of the North Platte’s flows, id., at 618, but resisted an inflexible application of that doctrine in rendering four principal rulings. Ibid. First, we enjoined Colorado and Wyoming from diverting or storing water above prescribed amounts, meant to reflect existing uses, on the river’s upper reaches. Id., at 621-625, 665-666. Second, we set priorities among Wyoming canals that divert water for the use of Nebraska irrigators and federal reservoirs, also in Wyoming, that store water for Wyoming and Nebraska irrigation districts. Id., at 625-637, 666-667. Third, we apportioned the natural irrigation-season flows in a stretch of river that proved to be the principal focus of the litigation (the “pivotal reach” of 41 miles between the Guernsey Dam in Wyoming and the Tri-State Dam in Nebraska), allocating 75 percent of those flows to Nebraska and 25 percent to Wyoming. Id., at 637-654, 667-669. Finally, we held that any party could apply for amendment of the decree or for further relief. Id., at 671 (Decree Paragraph XIII). With the parties’ stipulation, the decree has since been modified once, to account for the construction of the Glendo Dam and Reservoir. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 345 U. S. 981 (1953).
Nebraska returned to this Court in 1986 seeking additional relief under the decree, alleging that Wyoming was threatening its equitable apportionment, primarily by planning water projects on tributaries that have historically added significant flows to the pivotal reach. We granted Nebraska leave to file its petition, 479 U. S. 1051 (1987), and allowed Wyoming to file a counterclaim, 481 U. S. 1011 (1987).
Soon thereafter, Wyoming made a global motion for summary judgment, which the Master in his First Interim Report recommended be denied. See First Interim Report of Special Master, O. T. 1988, No. 108 Orig. After engaging in discovery, Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado, and the United States all filed further summary judgment motions. In his Second Interim Report, the Master recommended that we grant the motions of the United States and Nebraska in part, but that we otherwise deny summary relief. See Second Interim Report of Special Master on Motions for Summary Judgment and Renewed Motions for Intervention, O. T. 1991, No. 108 Orig. We overruled the parties’ exceptions. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U. S. 584 (1993) (Nebraska II).
Nebraska and Wyoming then sought leave to amend their pleadings, and we referred those requests to the Master. The Amended Petition that Nebraska seeks to file contains four counts. Count I alleges that Wyoming is depleting the natural flows of the North Platte and asks for an injunction against constructing storage capacity on the river’s tributaries and “permitting unlimited depletion of groundwater that is hydrologically connected to the North Platte River and its tributaries.” App. to Third Interim Report D-2 to D-7. Count II alleges that the United States is operating the Glendo Reservoir in violation of the decree and seeks an order holding the United States to the decree. Id., at D-7 to D-8. Count III alleges that Wyoming water projects and groundwater development threaten to deplete the Laramie River’s contributions to the North Platte, and asks the Court to “specify that the inflows of the Laramie River below Wheatland are a component of the equitable apportionment of the natural flows in the [pivotal] reach, 75% to Nebraska and 25% to Wyoming, and [to] enjoin the State of Wyoming from depleting Nebraska’s equitable share of the Laramie River’s contribution to the North Platte River_” Id., at D-8 to D-12. Count IV seeks an equitable apportionment of the North Platte’s nonirrigation season flows. Id., at D-12 to D-16. The Master recommended that we allow Nebraska to substitute the first three counts of its Amended Petition for its current petition, but that we deny leave to file Count IV. Neither Nebraska nor the United States has excepted to the Master’s recommendation, whereas Wyoming has filed three exceptions, set out in detail below.
Wyoming proposes to amend its pleading with four counterclaims and five cross-claims. The First Counterclaim and Cross-Claim allege that Nebraska and the United States have failed to recognize beneficial use limitations on diversions by Nebraska canals, and that Nebraska (with the acquiescence of the United States) has violated the equitable apportionment by demanding natural flow and storage water from sources above Tri-State Dam and diverting them for use below Tri-State Dam. App. to Third Interim Report E-3 to E-6, E-8 to E-10. Wyoming’s Second and Third Counterclaims and Cross-Claims seek enforcement or modification of Paragraph XVII of the decree, which deals with the operation of the Glendo Reservoir and is also the subject of Count II of Nebraska’s Amended Petition. Id., at E-6 to E-7, E-10 to E-ll. By its Fourth Counterclaim and Fifth Cross-Claim, Wyoming asks the Court to modify the decree to leave the determination of carriage (or transportation) losses to state officials under state law. Id., at E-7 to E-8, E-12. Finally, Wyoming’s Fourth Cross-Claim alleges that the United States has failed to operate its storage reservoirs in accordance with federal and state law and its own storage water contracts, thus upsetting the very basis of the decree’s equitable apportionment. Id., at E-ll to E-12.
The Master recommended that we allow Wyoming to substitute its Second through Fourth Counterclaims and its Second through Fifth Cross-Claims for its current pleadings, but that we deny leave to file Wyoming’s First Counterclaim and Cross-Claim insofar as they seek to impose a beneficial use limitation on Nebraska’s diversions of natural flow. The United States and Nebraska except to the recommendation to allow Wyoming to file its Fourth Cross-Claim. Wyoming excepts to the Master’s recommended disposition of its First Counterclaim and Cross-Claim. In all, then, Wyoming has filed four exceptions to the Master’s recommendations and the United States and Nebraska a single (and largely overlapping) exception each.
II
We have found that the solicitude for liberal amendment of pleadings animating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(a); Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 182 (1962), does not suit cases within this Court’s original jurisdiction. Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U. S. 641, 644 (1973); cf. this Court’s Rule 17.2. The need for a less complaisant standard follows from our traditional reluctance to exercise original jurisdiction in any but the most serious of circumstances, even where, as in cases between two or more States, our jurisdiction is exclusive. Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U. S. 73, 77 (1992) (“ ‘The model case for invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction is a dispute between States of such seriousness that it would amount to casus belli if the States were fully sovereign,’ ” quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U. S. 554, 571, n. 18 (1983)); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, 309 (1921) (“Before this court can be moved to exercise its extraordinary power under the Constitution to control the conduct of one State at the suit of another, the threatened invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing evidence”). Our requirement that leave be obtained before a complaint may be filed in an original action, see this Court’s Rule 17.3, serves an important gatekeeping function, and proposed pleading amendments must be scrutinized closely in the first instance to see whether they would take the litigation beyond what we reasonably anticipated when we granted leave to file the initial pleadings. See Ohio v. Kentucky, supra, at 644.
Accordingly, an understanding of the scope of this litigation as envisioned under the initial pleadings is the critical first step in our consideration of the motions to amend. We have, in fact, already discussed the breadth of the current litigation at some length in reviewing the Special Master’s First and Second Interim Reports, Nebraska II, 507 U. S., at 590-593, where we concluded that this litigation is not restricted “solely to enforcement of rights determined in the prior proceedings,” id., at 592. To the contrary, we observed that in Paragraph XIII of the decree, we had retained jurisdiction “to modify the decree to answer unresolved questions and to accommodate ‘change[s] in conditions’ — a phrase sufficiently broad to encompass not only changes in water supply,... but also new development that threatens a party’s interests.” Id., at 591, citing Nebraska I, 325 U. S., at 620. The parties may therefore not only seek to enforce rights established by the decree, but may also ask for “a reweighing of equities and an injunction declaring new rights and responsibilities....” 507 U. S., at 593. We made it clear, however, that while “Paragraph XIII perhaps eases a [party’s] burden of establishing, as an initial matter, that a claim [for modification] is ‘of that character and dignity which makes the controversy a justiciable one under our original jurisdiction,’” ibid., quoting Nebraska I, supra, at 610, the “[party] still must make a showing of substantial injury to be entitled to relief,” 507 U. S., at 593.
We think the Master appreciated these conclusions about the scope of this litigation when he assessed the proposed amendments to pleadings to see whether they sought enforcement of the decree or plausibly alleged a change in conditions sufficient to justify its modification. See Third Interim Report 33-36. The parties, of course, do not wholly agree with us, as they indicate by their exceptions, to which we turn.
Ill
A
Wyoming’s First Amended Counterclaim alleges that “Nebraska has circumvented and violated the equitable apportionment by demanding natural flow water for diversion by irrigation canals at and above Tri-State Dam in excess of the beneficial use requirements of the Nebraska lands entitled to water from those canals under the Decree... App. to Third Interim Report E-4. Wyoming’s First Amended Cross-Claim alleges that the United States “has circumvented and violated the equitable apportionment, and continues to do so, by operating the federal reservoirs to deliver natural flow water for diversion by Nebraska irrigation canals at and above Tri-State Dam in excess of the beneficial use requirements of the lands entitled to water from those canals under the Decree... Id., at E-8. The Master recommended that we deny leave to inject these claims into the litigation, concluding that Wyoming’s object is to transform the 1945 apportionment from a proportionate sharing of the natural flows in the pivotal reach to a scheme based on the beneficial use requirements of the pivotal reach irriga-tors. Third Interim Report 55-64. Wyoming excepts to the recommendation, claiming that its amendments do no more than elaborate on the suggestion made in the counterclaim that we allowed it to file in 1987, that Nebraska irriga-tors are wasting water diverted in the pivotal reach. But there is more to the amendments than that, and we agree with the Master that Wyoming in reality is calling for a fundamental modification of the settled apportionment scheme established in 1945, without alleging a change in conditions that would arguably justify so bold a step.
In Nebraska II we rejected any notion that our 1945 decision and decree “impose absolute ceilings on diversions by canals taking in the pivotal reach.” 507 U. S., at 602. We found that although the irrigation requirements of the lands served by the canals were calculated in the prior proceedings, those calculations were used to “determin[e] the appropriate apportionment of the pivotal reach, not to impose a cap on the canals’ total diversions, either individually or cumulatively.” Ibid. This was clearly indicated, we observed, by the fact that “Paragraph V of the decree, which sets forth the apportionment, makes no mention of diversion ceilings and expressly states that Nebraska is free to allocate its share among its canals as it sees fit.” Id., at 603, citing Nebraska I, supra, at 667.
These conclusions about our 1945 decision and decree expose the true nature of Wyoming’s amended claims. Simply put, Wyoming seeks to replace a simple apportionment scheme with one in which Nebraska’s share would be capped at the volume of probable beneficial use, presumably to Wyoming’s advantage. Wyoming thus seeks nothing less than relitigation of the “main controversy” of the 1945 litigation, the equitable apportionment of irrigation-season flows in the North Platte’s pivotal reach. See 325 U. S., at 637-638. Under any circumstance, we would be profoundly reluctant to revisit such a central question supposedly resolved 50 years ago, and there can be no temptation to do so here, in the absence of any allegation of a change in conditions that might warrant reexamining the decree’s apportionment scheme. Wyoming’s first exception is overruled.
B
Counts I and III of Nebraska’s Amended Petition would have us modify the decree to enjoin proposed developments by Wyoming on the North Platte’s tributaries, see App. to Third Interim Report D-4 to D-6, D-9 to D-ll, on the theory that these will deplete the tributaries’ contributions to the mainstem, and hence upset “the equitable balance of the North Platte River established in the Decree,” id., at D-5, D-10. Wyoming’s second exception takes issue with the Master’s stated intention to consider a broad array of downstream interests in passing on Nebraska’s claims, and to hear evidence of injury not only to downstream irrigators, but also to wildlife and wildlife habitat. Third Interim Report 14, 17, 19, 26.
Consideration of this evidence, Wyoming.argues, would run counter to our denial of two earlier motions to amend filed by Nebraska: its 1988 motion, 485 U. S. 931, by which it expressly sought modification of the decree to make Wyoming and Colorado share the burden of providing instream flows necessary to preserve critical wildlife habitat, and its 1991 motion, see 507 U. S. 1049 (1993), in which it sought an apportionment of nonirrigation-season flows. Wyoming also suggests that allegations of injury to wildlife are as yet purely speculative and would be best left to other forums.
Wyoming’s arguments are not persuasive. To assign an affirmative obligation to protect wildlife is one thing; to consider all downstream effects of upstream development when assessing threats to equitable apportionment is quite another. As we have discussed above, Nebraska II makes it clear that modification of the decree (as by enjoining developments on tributaries) will follow only upon a “balancing of equities,” 507 U. S., at 592, and that Nebraska will have to make a showing of “substantial injury” before we will grant it such relief, id., at 593. There is no warrant for placing entire categories of evidence beyond Nebraska’s reach when it attempts to satisfy this burden, which is far from insignificant.
Nor does our resistance to Nebraska’s efforts to bring about broad new apportionments (as of nonirrigation-season flows) alter this conclusion. Here, Nebraska seeks only to have us enjoin discrete Wyoming developments. If Nebraska is to have a fair opportunity to present its case for our doing so, we do not understand how we can preclude it from setting forth that evidence of environmental injury, or consign it to producing that evidence in some other forum, since this is the only Court in which Nebraska can challenge the Wyoming projects. And as for Wyoming’s argument that any proof of environmental injury that Nebraska will present will be highly speculative, the point is urged prematurely. Purely speculative harms will not, of course, carry Nebraska’s burden of showing substantial injury, but at this stage we certainly have no basis for judging Nebraska’s proof, and no justification for denying Nebraska the chance to prove what it can.
C
Wyoming’s third exception is to the Master’s recommendation to allow Nebraska to proceed with its challenge to Wyoming’s actions on Horse Creek, a tributary that flows into the North Platte below the Tri-State Dam. In Count I of its Amended Petition, Nebraska alleges that Wyoming is “presently violating and threatens to violate” Nebraska’s equitable apportionment “by depleting the natural flows of the North Platte River by such projects as... reregulating reservoirs and canal linings in the... Horse Creek Conservancy District.” App. to Third Interim Report D-5. Nebraska asks for an injunction against Wyoming’s depletions of the creek.
Wyoming argues that the claim is simply not germane to this case, since Horse Creek feeds into the North Platte below the apportioned reach, the downstream boundary of which is the Tri-State Dam. It is clear, however, that the territorial scope of the case extends downstream of the pivotal reach. In the 1945 decision and decree, we held against apportioning that stretch of river between the Tri-State Dam and Bridgeport, Nebraska, not because it fell outside the geographic confines of the case, but because its needed water was “adequately supplied from return flows and other local sources.” Nebraska I, 325 U. S., at 654-655. In so concluding, we had evidence that return flows from Horse Creek provided an average annual contribution of 21,900 acre-feet of water to the North Platte during the irrigation season. Third Interim Report 42.
Now Nebraska alleges that Wyoming’s actions threaten serious depletion of these return flows, with consequent injury to its interests in the region below the Tri-State Dam. These allegations describe a change in conditions sufficient, if proven, to warrant the injunctive relief sought, and Nebraska is accordingly entitled to proceed with its claim. Wyoming’s third exception is overruled.
D
In Counts I and III of its Amended Petition, Nebraska alleges that increased groundwater pumping within Wyoming threatens substantial depletion of the natural flow of the river. This allegation is obviously one of a change in conditions posing a threat of significant injury, and Wyoming concedes that “groundwater pumping in Wyoming can and does in fact deplete surface water flows in the North Platte River,” Third Interim Report 38. In excepting nevertheless to the Master’s recommendation that we allow the claim to go forward, Wyoming raises Nebraska’s failure to regulate groundwater pumping within its own borders, which is said to preclude Nebraska as a matter of equity from seeking limitations on pumping within Wyoming.
We fail to see how the mere fact of unregulated pumping within Nebraska can serve to bar Nebraska’s claim. Nebraska is the downstream State and claims that Wyoming’s pumping hurts it; Wyoming is upstream and has yet to make a showing that Nebraska’s pumping hurts it or anyone else. If Wyoming ultimately makes such a showing, it could well affect the relief to which Nebraska is entitled, but that is a. question for trial, and does not stop Nebraska from amending its claims at this stage.
Wyoming’s reliance on two of this Court’s prior original cases is, at best, premature. Both cases were decided after trial, see Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 49, 105 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 518 (1906), and while both recognize that relief on the merits may turn on the equities, 206 U. S., at 104-105, 113-114; 200 U. S., at 522, the application of that principle to Nebraska’s claim is not, as we have just stated, obvious at this point. We accordingly accept the Master’s recommendation, Third Interim Report 41, and overrule Wyoming’s fourth exception.
>
Wyoming s Fourth Amended Cross-Claim seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and is aimed against the United States alone, alleging that federal management of reservoirs has contravened state and federal law as well as contracts governing water supply to individual users. Wyoming claims that “the United States has allocated storage water in a manner which (a) upsets the equitable balance on which the apportionment of natural flow was based, (b) results in the allocation of natural flow contrary to the provisions of the Decree..., (c) promotes inefficiency and waste of water contrary to federal and state law, (d) violates the contract rights of the North Platte Project Irrigation Districts and violates the provisions of the Warren Act, 43 U. S. C. § 523,... and (e) exceeds the limitations in the contracts under the Warren Act.” App. to Third Interim Report E-ll to E-12. Wyoming alleges that this mismanagement has made “water shortages... more frequen[t] and... more severe, thereby causing injury to Wyoming and its water users.” Id., at E-12.
The United States and Nebraska except to allowing Wyoming’s cross-claim to proceed, for two reasons. They argue, first, that the decree expressly refrained from apportioning storage water, as distinct from natural flow, with the consequence that the violations alleged are not cognizable in an action brought under the decree. Second, they maintain that any claim turning on the United States’s failure to comply with individual contracts for the release of storage water ought to be relegated to an action brought by individual contract holders in a federal district court and that, indeed, just such an action is currently pending in Goshen Irrigation District v. United States, No. C89-0161-J (D. Wyo., filed June 23, 1989).
The Master addressed both objections. As to the first, he said that “even though the decree did not apportion storage water, it was framed based in part on assumptions about storage water rights and deliveries,” and that therefore “Wyoming should have the opportunity to go forward with her claims that the United States has violated the law and contracts rights and that such violations have the effect of undermining Wyoming’s apportionment.” Third Interim Report 70. The Master found the second point “unpersuasive” because “neither Wyoming nor Nebraska [is a party] to the [Goshen] case [brought by the individual contractors], and the federal district court, therefore, does not have jurisdiction to consider whether any violations that may be proven on the part of the United States will have the effect of undermining the 1945 apportionment decree.” Id., at 71. We agree with the Master on both counts.
The availability of storage water and its distribution under storage contracts was a predicate to the original apportionment-decree. Our 1945 opinion expressly recognized the significance of storage water to the lands irrigated by the pivotal reach, noting that over the prior decade storage water was on average over half of the total supply and that over 90 percent of the irrigated lands had storage rights as well as rights to natural flow. Nebraska I, 325 U. S., at 605. We pointed out that Nebraska appropriators in the pivotal reach had “greater storage water rights” than Wyoming appropriators, id., at 645, a fact that helped “tip the scales in favor of the flat percentage system,” as against a scheme even more favorable to Nebraska, ibid.
In rejecting Wyoming’s original proposal, which was to combine water from storage and natural flow and apportion both by volume among the different users, id., at 621, we anticipated that the storage supply would “be left for distribution in accordance with the contracts which govern it,” id., at 631. In doing so, we were clearly aware of the beneficial use limitations that govern federal contracts for storage water. Contracts between the United States and individual water users on the North Platte, we pointed out, had been made and were maintained in compliance with § 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 388, 43 U. S. C. §§ 372, 383, which provided that “ ‘the right to the use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right.’ ” 325 U. S., at 613. In addition, contracts had been made under the Warren Act, 36 Stat. 925, 43 U. S. C. §§523-525, which granted the Secretary of the Interior the further power to contract for the storage and delivery of water available in excess of the requirements of any given project managed under the Reclamation Act. See Nebraska I, supra, at 631, 639-640.
Under this system, access to water from storage facilities was only possible by a contract for its use, Nebraska I, 325 U. S., at 640, and apportionment of storage water would have disrupted that system. “If storage water is not segregated, storage water contractors in times of shortage of the total supply will be deprived of the use of a part of the storage supply for which they pay... [and] those who have not contracted for the storage supply will receive at the expense of those who have contracted for it a substantial increment to the natural flow supply which, as we have seen, has been insufficient to go around.” Ibid. Hence, we refrained from apportioning stored water and went no further than capping the total amount of storage in certain dams to protect senior, downstream rights to natural flow. Id., at 630. But although our refusal in 1945 to apportion storage water was driven by a respect for the statutory and contractual regime in place at the time, we surely did not dismiss storage water as immaterial to the proper allocation of the natural flow in the pivotal reach. And while our decree expressly protected those with rights to storage water, it did so on the condition that storage water would continue to be distributed “in accordance with... lawful contracts....” Id., at 669. This is the very condition that Wyoming now seeks to vindicate.
Wyoming argues that the United States no longer abides by the governing law in administering the storage water contracts. First, it contends that the Government pays no heed to federal law’s beneficial use limitations on the disposition of storage water but rather “releases] storage water on demand to the canals in the pivotal reach without regard to how the water is used.” Brief for Wyoming in Response to Exceptions of Nebraska and United States to Third Interim Report 6 (emphasis deleted) (hereinafter Response Brief). This liberality allegedly harms Wyoming contractees whose storage supply is wasted, as well as junior Wyoming appropriated who are subject to the senior call of the United States to refill the reservoirs and are consequently deprived of the natural flow they would otherwise receive.
Second, Wyoming claims that federal policy in drought years encourages contract users to exploit this failure of the Government to police consumption. It points out that in years of insufficient supply, the United States has calculated each water district’s average use of storage water in prior years, and then allocated to each district a certain percentage of that average, according to what the overall supply will bear. The United States has then further reduced the allotment of each individual canal within a district by the amount of natural flow delivered to the canal, with the result that in dry years water is distributed under “purely a mass [i. e., fixed volume] allocation that sets a cap on the total diversion of each individual canal.” Id., at 8. Wyoming thus contends not only that under this system “in a dry year like 1989 the [United States’s] allocation effectively replaces the Court decreed 75/25 apportionment,” id., at 9, but that the departure from the norm is needlessly great because the system “encourages individual canals to divert as much water as possible during ‘non-allocation’ years in order to maximize their average diversions which will be the measure of their entitlement in a subsequent dry year allocation,” id., at 8, n. 6.
If Wyoming were arguing merely that any administration of storage water that takes account of fluctuations in the natural flow received by a contractee violates the decree, we would reject its claim, for we recognized in 1945 that the outstanding Warren Act contracts contained “agree[ments] to deliver water which will, with all the water to which the land is entitled by appropriation or otherwise, aggregate a stated amount.” 325 U. S., at 631. Indeed, we set forth an example of just such a contract in our opinion. Id., at 631, n. 17. In asserting, however, that a predicate to the 1945 decree was that the United States adhered to beneficial use limitations in administering storage water contracts, that it no longer does so, and that this change has caused or permitted significant injury to Wyoming interests, Wyoming has said enough to state a serious claim that ought to be allowed to go forward.
Although the claim may well require consideration of individual contracts and compliance with the Reclamation and Warren Acts, it does not follow (as Nebraska and the United States argue) that Wyoming is asserting the private contractors’ rights proper, or (as the United States contends) that Wyoming brings suit “ ‘in reality for the benefit of particular individuals,’ ” Brief for United States in Support of Exception 25, quoting Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U. S. 387, 393-394 (1938). Wyoming argues only that the cumulative effect of the United States’s failure to adhere to the law governing the contracts undermines the operation of the decree, see Response Brief 14-21, and thereby states a claim arising under the decree itself, one by which it seeks to vindicate its “ ‘quasi-sovereign’ interests which are ‘independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain,’” Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, supra, at 393, quoting Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 237 (1907).
It is of no moment that some of the contracts could be made (or are) the subject of litigation between individual contract holders and the United States in federal district court. Wyoming is not a party to any such litigation and, as counsel for the United States acknowledged at oral argument, it is uncertain whether the State would qualify for intervention in the ongoing Goshen litigation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 46. While the uncertainty of intervention is beside the point on the dissent’s view, which “see[s] no reason... why Wyoming could not institute its own action against the United States in [district court],” post, at 27, the dissent nowhere explains how Wyoming would have standing to bring an action under storage water contracts to which it is not a party. As we have just said, Wyoming’s claim derives not from rights under individual contracts but from the decree, and the decree can be modified only by this Court. Putting aside, then, whether another forum might offer relief that, as a practical matter, would mitigate the alleged ill effects of the National Government’s contract administration, this is the proper forum for. the State’s claim, and it makes sense to entertain the claim in the course of adjudicating the broader controversy among Wyoming, Nebraska, and the United States. Cf. United States v. Nevada, 412 U. S. 534, 537 (1973) (per curiam) (denying motion for leave to file bill of complaint in part because “ftjhere is now no controversy between the two States with respect to the... [r]iver [in question]”).
Nor do we fear the specter, raised by the United States, of intervention by many individual storage contractors in this proceeding. Ordinarily, in a suit by one State against another subject to the original jurisdiction of this Court, each.State “must be deemed to represent all its citizens.” Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U. S. 163, 173 (1930). A State is presumed to speak in the best interests of those citizens, and requests to intervene by individual contractees may be treated under the general rule that an individual’s motion for leave to intervene in this Court will be denied absent a “showing [of] some compelling interest in his own right, apart from his interest in a class with all other citizens and creatures of the state, which interest is not properly represented by the state.” New Jersey v. New York, 345 U. S. 369, 373 (1953); cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2). We have said on many occasions that water disputes among States may be resolved by compact or decree without the participation of individual claimants, who nonetheless are bound by the result reached through representation by their respective States. Nebraska I, 325 U. S., at 627, citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U. S. 92, 106-108 (1938); see also Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U. S. 494, 508-509 (1932). As we view the litigation at the current time, it is unlikely to present occasion for individual storage contract holders to show that their proprietary interests are not adequately represented by their State.
Two caveats are nonetheless in order, despite our allowance of Wyoming’s cross-claim. Nebraska argues that Wyoming is using its cross-claim as a back door to achieving the mass allocation of natural flows sought in its First Counterclaim and Cross-Claim. This argument will be difficult to assess without further development of the merits, and we can only emphasize at this point that in allowing Wyoming’s Fourth Cross-Claim to go forward, we are not, of course, in any way sanctioning the very modification of the decree that we have just ruled out in this proceeding. Second, the parties should not take our allowance of the Fourth Cross-Claim as an opportunity to enquire into every detail of the United States’s administration of storage water contracts. The United States’s contractual compliance is not, of itself, an appropriate subject of the Special Master’s attention, which is properly confined to the effects of contract administration on the operation of the decree. Contractual compliance, as such, is the subject of the Goshen litigation, which we presume will move forward independently of this original action.
V
For these reasons, the exceptions to the Special Master’s Third Interim Report are overruled.
It is
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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K
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U. S. C. § 7101 et seq., protects the right of federal employees “to form, join, or assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any such activity,” § 7102, and requires that federal agencies and labor organizations bargain in good faith concerning the terms and conditions of employment, §§ 7102, 7114, 7116(a)(5), and (b)(5). Recognizing “the special requirements and needs of the Government,” § 7101(b), Title VII exempts certain matters from the duty to negotiate. One such exemption provides that an agency’s duty to bargain extends “to matters which are the subject of any agency rule or regulation . . . only if the [Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority)] has determined under subsection (b) of this section that no compelling need . . . exists for the rule or regulation.” § 7117(a)(2). Subsection (b) specifies detailed procedures for determining whether there is a “compelling need” for the agency regulation. We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict between Circuits as to whether § 7117(b) provides the exclusive procedure for determining whether there is a compelling need for an agency regulation or whether the Authority alternatively may make a compelling need determination in connection with an unfair labor practice (ULP) proceeding. 484 U. S. 813 (1987).
In September 1981, the respondent, Aberdeen Proving Ground, notified its employees’ union representatives that Aberdeen intended to curtail operations for the three days after Thanksgiving, November 27-29, 1981, and that, as a result, Aberdeen employees would be placed on forced annual leave for Friday, November 27. Thereafter, Aberdeen met with union representatives to discuss leave procedures. Union representatives requested that the employees instead be granted administrative leave; management replied that administrative leave was not permitted by the relevant rules and regulations and that the issue “verges on nonnegotiability.” 21 F. L. R. A. 826, 829 (1982).
The union then filed an ULP charge with the Authority, and the Authority’s General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that Aberdeen’s refusal to negotiate concerning the union’s administrative leave proposal was a failure to negotiate in good faith. The Administrative Law Judge held in Aberdeen’s favor, concluding that the union’s proposal was inconsistent with agency regulations and thus not subject to negotiations because the Authority had not previously determined under § 7117(b) that there was no compelling need for the regulations. Id., at 834. The Authority reversed, holding that an ULP charge is properly filed where the Government employer undertakes a unilateral change in conditions of employment, even though the union’s proposal may conflict with an agency regulation and there has been no compelling need determination. In the Authority’s view, in such cases the compelling need determination may be properly unified with the ULP proceeding. 21 F. L. R. A. 814, 816-820 (1986). Finding that the regulation was not justified by a compelling need, the Authority held that Aberdeen had violated its duty to negotiate in good faith. See §§ 7116(a)(1) and (a)(5).
The Court of Appeals summarily reversed on the authority of its prior decision in U. S. Army Engineer Center v. FLRA, 762 F. 2d 409 (CA4 1985). In U. S. Army Engineer Center the Court of Appeals wrote that “an examination of the history, policies, and, above all, the language of the Federal Labor-Management Relations Act persuades us that Congress meant the § 7117(b) negotiability appeal to be the sole means of determining a compelling need question under the statute.” 762 F. 2d, at 417. We agree with both the analysis and conclusion of the Court of Appeals.
The plain language of Title VII unambiguously provides that where a matter is covered by regulation, no duty to bargain arises until the Authority has first determined that no compelling need justifies adherence to the regulation. Section 7117(a)(2) states unequivocally that “[t]he duty to bargain in good faith shall . . . extend to matters which are the subject of any agency rule or regulation . . . only if the Authority has determined under subsection (b) of this section that no compelling need . . . exists for the rule or regulation.” (Emphasis supplied.) As the Court of Appeals noted, the language of the statute is that of a condition precedent. 762 F. 2d, at 413. The phrase “only if” denotes exclusivity; it does not suggest one of multiple options. Moreover, the words “has determined under subsection (b) of this section” .clearly refer to an event that has come to pass. Thus, the duty to bargain does not arise until the § 7117(b) determination has occurred. Section 7117(b) further confirms this reading of the statute. Here, the statute again speaks in exclusive and mandatory terms: “In any case of collective bargaining in which an exclusive representative alleges that no compelling need exists for any rule or regulation . . . which is then in effect and which governs any matter at issue in such collective bargaining, the Authority shall determine under paragraph (2) of this subsection . . . whether such a compelling need exists.” (Emphasis supplied.)
This plain reading of Title VII is fully consistent with — if not compelled by — the legislative history and asserted purpose of the statute. Title VII strives to achieve a balance between the rights of federal employees to bargain collectively and “the paramount public interest in the effective conduct of the public’s business.” Message from the President Transmitting A Draft of Proposed Legislation to Reform the Civil Service Laws 4 (1978), Legislative History of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Committee Print compiled for the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service) Print No. 96-7, p. 626 (1979) (Leg. Hist.); see also 124 Cong. Rec. 25600-25601, 25613-25614 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Clay), Leg. Hist. 842-845.
Section 7117(b) is carefully constructed to strike such a balance. Under § 7117(b) employees are provided with a means to clarify the scope of the agency’s duty to bargain; if the agency then refuses to bargain, the union may seek relief through an ULP proceeding. At the same time, § 7117(b) provides special procedures designed to promote effective government. For instance, under a § 7117(b) negotiability appeal, but not in the ULP forum, the agency that issued the relevant regulation is a necessary party, § 7117(b)(4); the Authority’s General Counsel is not a party, § 7117(b)(3); and the negotiability appeal is presented directly to the Authority, rather than first to an administrative law judge, 5 CFR pt. 2424 (1987). Moreover, a § 7117(b) hearing is an expedited proceeding, § 7117(b)(3), thus resolving doubt as to whether a regulation is controlling as promptly as practicable. Most importantly, requiring that compelling need be resolved exclusively through a § 7117(b) appeal allows agencies to act in accordance with their regulations without an overriding apprehension that their adherence to the regulations might result in sanctions under an ULP proceeding. See § 7118(a)(7). To allow compelling need to be adjudicated in the context of an ULP proceeding, without any prior § 7117(b) negotiability appeal, would frustrate this careful balance and would disregard Congress’ direction that Title VII “be interpreted in a manner consistent with the requirement of an effective and efficient Government.” § 7101(b).
Although “reviewing courts should uphold reasonable and defensible constructions of an agency’s enabling Act,... they must not ‘rubber-stamp . . . administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute.’” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U. S. 89, 97 (1983), quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380 U. S. 278, 291-292 (1965). The Court of Appeals properly concluded that the Authority acted inconsistently with the language and purpose of Title VII in permitting resolution of the compelling need issue in the ULP forum.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly
Affirmed.
Compare Defense Logistics Agency v. FLRA, 244 U. S. App. D. C. 22, 754 F. 2d 1003 (1985) (permissible for Authority to resolve compelling need in either § 7117(b) negotiability appeal or ULP forum in unilateral change eases), with U. S. Army Engineer Center v. FLRA, 762 F. 2d 409 (CA4 1985) (§ 7117(b) negotiability appeal exclusive procedure to resolve compelling need).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
G
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Commodities Trading Corporation brought this suit in the Court of Claims to recover “just compensation” for about 760,000 pounds of whole black pepper requisitioned by the War Department in 1944 from Commodities’ stock of 17,000,000 pounds. The United States contended that the OPA ceiling price of 6.63 cents per pound was just compensation. Commodities denied this, claiming 22 cents per pound. It argued that Congress did not and could not constitutionally fix the ceiling price as a measure for determining what is just compensation under the Constitution. Commodities also contended that, for reasons peculiar to its own situation, application of the ceiling price in this instance would be particularly unjust. The Court of Claims fixed “just compensation” at 15 cents per pound. In so doing, that court took into consideration what it terms “retention value,” explained as an allowance for the price Commodities “undoubtedly could have secured for its pepper had it been permitted to hold it until after restrictions had been removed . . . .” The court also considered how much the precise pepper requisitioned cost Commodities, the prices at which that company sold pepper after the government requisition, subsequent OPA ceiling prices, and the average price of pepper for the past 75 years. 113 Ct. Cl. 244, 83 F. Supp. 356. We granted the petitions of both parties for certiorari. 338 U. S. 857.
First. The questions presented are controlled by the clause of the Fifth Amendment providing that private property shall not be “taken for public use, without just compensation.” This Court has never attempted to prescribe a rigid rule for determining what is “just compensation” under all circumstances and in all cases. Fair market value has normally been accepted as a just standard. But when market value has been too difficult to find, or when its application would result in manifest injustice to owner or public, courts have fashioned and applied other standards. Since the market value standard was developed in the context of a market largely free from government controls, prices rigidly fixed by law raise questions concerning whether a “market value” so fixed can be a measure of “just compensation.” United States v. Felin & Co., 334 U. S. 624. Whatever the circumstances under which such constitutional questions arise, the dominant consideration always remains the same: What compensation is “just” both to an owner whose property is taken and to the public that must pay the bill?
The word “just” in the Fifth Amendment evokes ideas of “fairness” and “equity,” and these were the primary standards prescribed for ceiling prices under the Emergency Price Control Act. As assurance that prices fixed under its authority by the administrative agency would be “generally fair and equitable,” Congress provided that price regulations could be subjected to judicial review. All legitimate purchases and sales had to be made at or below ceiling prices. And most businessmen were compelled to sell because, for example, their goods were perishable or their businesses depended on continuous sales. Thus ceiling prices of commodities held for sale represented not only market value but in fact the only value that could be realized by most owners. Under these circumstances they cannot properly be ignored in deciding what is just compensation.
The extent to which ceiling prices should govern courts in such a decision is another matter. Congress did not expressly provide that prices fixed under the Price Control Act should constitute the measure of just compensation for property taken under the Fifth Amendment. And § 4 (d) provides that the Act shall not be construed as requiring any person to sell. But § 1 (a) declared the Act’s purposes “to assure that defense appropriations are not dissipated by excessive prices” and to “prevent hardships ... to the Federal, State, and local governments, which would result from abnormal increases in prices . . . .” Congress thus plainly contemplated that these governments should be able to buy goods fulfilling their wartime needs at the prices fixed for other purchasers. The crucial importance of this in the congressional plan for a stabilized war economy to limit inflation and prevent profiteering is shown by the fact that during the war approximately one-half of the nation’s output of goods and services went to federal, state and local governments. And should judicial awards of just compensation be uniformly greater in amount than ceiling prices, expectations of pecuniary gains from condemnations might prompt many owners to withhold essential materials until the Government requisitioned them. We think the congressional purpose and the necessities of a wartime economy require that ceiling prices be accepted as the measure of just compensation, so far as that can be done consistently with the objectives of the Fifth Amendment.
Second. It is contended that acceptance of ceiling prices as just compensation would be inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment because such prices fail to take into account a factor designated by the Court of Claims as “retention value.” This concept stems largely from the Emergency Price Control Act’s provision that the Act shall not be construed as compelling an owner to sell his property against his will. Translating the provision as conferring on an owner the “right to hold his property until he can get for it whatever anyone is willing to pay,” the Court of Claims held that it gave rise to a “retention value” which must be added to the ceiling price in order to meet the constitutional requirement of “just compensation.”
In enacting that provision Congress merely refused to take from owners their long-existing “right to hold” until they wanted to sell. It did not create a new “right to hold” as against a constitutional Government taking, or engraft added values of any kind on property which happens to be requisitioned at a time when prices are fixed by law. We cannot justifiably stretch this provision into a command that the Government pay owners a “retention value” for property taken.
Nor can we construe the Fifth Amendment as supporting the Court of Claims “retention value” rule. In peacetime when prices are not fixed, the normal measure of just compensation has been current market value; retention value has never been treated as a separate and essential factor. True, current market value may sometimes be higher because a buyer anticipates future rises in prices. And exceptional circumstances can be conceived which would justify resort to evidential forecasts of potential future values in order to determine present market value. But the general constitutional rule declared and applied by the Court of Claims did not rest on exceptional circumstances.
A persuasive reason against the general rule declared by the Court of Claims is the highly speculative nature of proof to show possible future prices on which “retention value” must depend. In this case, for instance, no one knew how long the war would last nor how long economic conditions due to war might lead Congress to continue price-fixing legislation. Predictions on these subjects were guesses, not informed forecasts. And even if such predictions were reasonably certain, there remained other unknowns. How much more than the ceiling price would a speculative purchaser have paid for property at the time of seizure? To what extent, if at all, would the lifting of war controls raise prices above the controlled ceilings? And as of what date should future value be estimated? The Court of Claims opinion indicates how haphazard such calculations must be: its figure of 15 cents per pound appears to be a rough judicial compromise between the ceiling price and the 22 cents claimed, not a weighted average drawn from the varied assortment of doubtful factors considered by the court. Moreover, that figure seems completely divorced from the conjectured postwar price, a factor crucially significant in the court’s “retention value” concept.
An equally forceful objection to the “retention value” rule is the discrimination it would breed. Only a limited group of owners could take advantage of the rule: those who have nonperishable products so essential for war purposes that refusal to sell would result in governmental requisition. And many of these would be financially unable to withhold their goods on such a gamble. Thus owners able to hold essential nonperishable goods until requisition would become a favored class at the expense of other owners not so fortunate. Moreover, even within that favored class the “retention value” rule would create discrimination against owners impelled by a sense of duty to sell their goods to the Government at ceiling prices without waiting for requisition. A premium would be placed on recalcitrance in time of war.
A rule so difficult to apply and leading to such discriminatory and unjust results cannot be required by the Fifth Amendment’s command for payment of “just compensation.”
Third. While there is no constitutional obstacle to treating “generally fair and equitable” ceiling prices as the normal measure of just compensation for commodities held for sale, there must be room for special exceptions to such a general rule. For unfair hardship may be inflicted on a particular dealer by valid ceiling prices which are “generally” fair. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 516-518. But the ceiling price of pepper, fair and just to the trade generally, should be accepted as the maximum measure of compensation unless Commodities has sustained the burden of proving special conditions and hardships peculiarly applicable to it. Cf. Marion & Rye Valley R. Co. v. United States, 270 U. S. 280, 285.
Commodities contends that it proved the existence of such conditions. It points to the statement of the Court of Claims that the “so-called ‘retention value’ is particularly applicable in this case” because Commodities was an “investor” in pepper rather than a “trader.” The company accumulated its large supply at intervals during the 1933-1941 period, expecting to hold it to sell when the price went up. The court found that Commodities could reasonably expect this rise: the nature of production was such that periods of abundance and scarcity were bound to alternate, and during the preceding 75 years the price of pepper had shown marked fluctuations in fairly regular cycles. Most of Commodities’ pepper was bought when prices were low. It is argued that as an “investor” Commodities should not be deprived of the pecuniary benefits which future high prices would have afforded but for the Government’s taking.
Under this state of facts the situation of Commodities differed only in degree, if at all, from that of myriad other commodity owners who quite naturally wished to hold their goods for higher prices. Postwar inflationary influences are common and generally expected. Price cycles, seasonal and otherwise, are also well-recognized economic phenomena. Doubtless owners of steel, textiles, foodstuffs, and other goods could produce evidence similar to that offered in regard to pepper to show cyclical fluctuations in their prices. Nor would there be much difficulty in showing that a great many owners had bought, produced, or manufactured their various merchandise with the idea of withholding from markets to await expected higher prices. Many lost anticipated profits due to price control or requisition. Sacrifices of this kind and others far greater are the lot of a people engaged in war. That a war calls for sacrifices is of course no reason why an unfair and disproportionate burden should be borne by Commodities. But the facts here show no such burden on Commodities. Commodities, just like other traders in pepper and other products, bought pepper with the intention of ultimately selling on the market. No more than any other owner is Commodities entitled to “retention value,” a value based on speculation concerning the price it might have obtained for pepper after the war and after price controls were removed.
Another contention is that the particular pepper turned over to the Government cost Commodities more than the ceiling price, and that this is a special circumstance sufficient to preclude use of the ceiling price here. The Court of Claims did find that the average cost to Commodities of the precise pepper taken, including labor costs, storage, interest, insurance, taxes and other expenses, was 12.7 cents per pound. The Government challenges these findings and also claims that Commodities selected its high-cost pepper for delivery under the requisition. Pointing out that pepper is fungible and that the only relevant cost figure is the average cost to Commodities of all its pepper, the Government asserts that this average cost was less than the ceiling price.
We do not consider these contentions of the Government because we think that the cost of the pepper delivered provides no sufficient basis for specially excluding Commodities from application of the ceiling price. The general rule has been that the Government pays current market value for property taken, the price which could be obtained in a negotiated sale, whether the property had cost the owner more or less than that price. Vogelstein & Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 337, 340. The reasons underlying the rule in cases where no government-controlled prices are involved also support its application where value is measured by a ceiling price. In neither instance should the Government be required to make good any losses caused by the fact that the owner purchased goods at a price higher than market value on the date of taking. Especially is this true where the resulting loophole in wartime regulation would be available only to dealers in essential nonperishable commodities who have enough funds and storage space to withhold goods until the Government is forced to requisition them.
We have considered all other contentions of Commodities and find that none of them present reasons sufficient to justify awarding Commodities an amount in excess of ceiling prices. In the final analysis all its arguments rest on the principle that the Government must pay Commodities for potential profits lost because of war and the consequent price controls. We cannot hold that the Fifth Amendment requires the Government to give owners of requisitioned goods such a special benefit.
The judgment of the Court of Claims is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter an appropriate judgment based on the maximum ceiling price of the pepper at the time it was taken.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
See, e. g., United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369; Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246.
56 Stat. 23, 50 U. S. C. App. § 901.
Had Congress prescribed a rule that prices fixed under the Act should constitute the measure of constitutional “just compensation,” courts upon proper challenges would have been faced with responsibility of determining whether that rule satisfied the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137. Compare Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 327.
Eighth Report of the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, October 1, 1946, H. R. Doc. No. 45, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 7.
Pertinent parts of the Court of Claims discussion of “retention value” were:
“We have several times held that, in determining just compensation, we must take into account the plaintiff’s right to hold its property until restrictions on its disposition are removed. Seven-Up Bottling Co. v. United States, 107 C. Cls. 402; Kaiser v. United States, 108 C. Cls. 47; Adler Metal Products Co. v. United States, 108 C. Cls. 102; Pantex Pressing Machine Co. v. United States, 108 C. Cls. 735.
“The Government in time of war has the undoubted right to say to the citizen, if you want to sell your property you must not sell it for more than a certain price; but the Government has no right to take the property and pay for it no more than this fixed price, unless that price justly compensates the owner, taking into consideration his right to hold his property until he can get for it whatever anyone is willing to pay.” 113 Ct. Cl. 259-260, 83 F. Supp. 357.
Commodities had petitioned the Price Administrator in 1943 to amend the applicable regulation so as to permit higher prices for pepper by allowances for storage expenses. This petition was denied. Nothing in the record indicates that the Emergency Court of Appeals was ever asked to consider ceiling prices for pepper.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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D
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Because of conflicting constructions by the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits of § 235 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 198, we brought these cases here. 349 U. S. 904; 349 U. S. 927. They were heard in sequence, and, since minor differences in their facts are irrelevant to the problems now before us, they may be disposed of in one opinion.
Section 235 (a) provides that any immigration officer “shall have power to require by subpena the attendance and testimony of witnesses before immigration officers . . . relating to the privilege of any person to enter, reenter, reside in, or pass through the United States or concerning any matter which is material and relevant to the enforcement of this Act and the. administration of the Service, and to that end may invoke the aid of any court of the United States.” The controlling issue presented by these cases is whether this section empowers an immigration officer to subpoena a naturalized citizen who is the subject of an investigation by the Service, where the purpose of the investigation is to determine if good cause exists for the institution of denaturalization proceedings under § 340 (a) of the Act.
In No. 35, the District Director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service at Philadelphia, in accordance with § 340.11 of the Service’s regulations, instituted an investigation of respondent for the aforementioned purpose. In furtherance of this inquiry into the legality of Minker’s naturalization the Director subpoenaed him to give testimony at the offices of the Service. Prior to the required date of his appearance, he moved to quash the subpoena in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania upon the ground, inter alia, that it was unauthorized by the Act. This motion was denied, In re Minker, 118 P. Supp. 264, and no appeal was taken. When respondent thereafter failed to obey the subpoena, the District Court, on application of the District Director, ordered respondent to appear before the Service and testify. He disregarded this order. After a hearing he was adjudged in contempt for so doing and fined $500. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that while the power to subpoena under § 235 (a) was available for investigations directed toward denaturalization proceedings, respondent as a putative defendant in such a proceeding was not a “witness” within the meaning of the section, and the Service was, therefore, without power to subpoena him. 217 F. 2d 350.
In No. 47, each petitioner was served with a subpoena issued by the officer in charge of the Immigration and Naturalization Service at Syracuse, New York. The subpoenas commanded petitioners’ appearance and testimony, and required them to produce specified documents. They appeared with documents as ordered, but refused to be sworn or to testify. Thereupon an application for an order of compliance was made by the Service in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York; but the court, denying the Service’s authority, refused to compel petitioners to appear and give testimony. 116 F. Supp. 464. On appeal, to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, this judgment was reversed. 219 F. 2d 137. The court held that § 235 (a) of the Act permitted the immigration officer to subpoena the petitioners in furtherance of the Service’s investigation of them under § 340.11 of the regulations. The decision assumed, although the court did not discuss the question, that each petitioner, even though a subject of investigation, was a “witness” within the meaning of § 235 (a).
This brings us to an examination of the scope of § 235 (a). It had its genesis in § 16 of the Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874, 885, which dealt with the examination of entering aliens by the Immigration Service. With respect to subpoenas the section provided: “Any commissioner of immigration or inspector in charge shall also have power to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses before said inspectors and the production of books, papers, and documents touching the right of any alien to enter, reenter, reside in, or pass through the United States, and to that end may invoke the aid of any court of the United States . . . .” Obviously, this provision strictly defined the purposes for which officers of the Service could subpoena witnesses. It did not give them power to issue subpoenas as aids in investigating potential naturalization offenses.
The 1952 Act in § 235 (a) retained the substance of this language in § 16. But the word “alien” was changed to “person,” and additional language extended the subpoena power to “any matter which is material and relevant to the enforcement of this Act and the administration of the Service.” If the additional clause, following the portion “relating to the privilege of any person to enter, reenter, reside in, or pass through the United States,” had merely read “and any other matter which is material and relevant,” the doctrine of ejusdem generis would appropriately be invoked to limit the subpoena power to an investigation pertaining to questions of admission and deportation. The comprehensive addition of the clause “or concerning any matter which is material and relevant to the enforcement of this Act and the administration of the Service,” precludes such narrowing reading. “Act” encompasses the full range of subjects covered by the statute. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 brought together in one statute the previously atomized subjects of immigration, nationality and naturalization. The unqualified use of the word “Act” in § 235 (a), if read as ordinary English, embraces all of these subjects even though § 235 (a) is itself in the immigration title of the statute. But “the title of a statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning . . . .” Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528-529. Throughout this statute the word “Act” is given its full significance. . The word embraces the entire statute. On the other hand, when only a particular title is referred to, it is designated as such, and when the reference is to a section, that word is employed. No justification appears for treating “Act” in § 235 (a) as meaning “section.” Thus far the Second and Third Circuits are in agreement.
We come then to the question upon which the two Courts of Appeals part ways in their construction of § 235 (a), namely, whether Salvatore and Joseph Falcone in the one case and Abraham Minker in the other, although each the subject of a denaturalization investigation under § 340.11 of the regulations, were “witnesses” within the meaning of the power given to “any immigration officer” to require “by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses” before immigration officers.
If the answer to the question merely depended upon whether, as a matter of allowable English usage, the word “witness” may fairly describe a person in the position of Minker and the Falcones, it could not be denied that the word could as readily be deemed to cover persons in their position as not. In short, the word is patently ambiguous: it can fairly be applied to anyone who gives testimony in a proceeding, although the proceeding immediately or potentially involves him as a party, or it may be restricted to the person who gives testimony in another’s case.
It is pertinent to note the breadth of § 235 (a) not only with respect to the type of investigation in which a subpoena may be issued (“any matter which is material and relevant to the enforcement of this Act”), but also with respect to the member of the Service empowered to issue it. The power is granted “any immigration officer,” who in turn is defined in § 101 (a) (18) of the Act as “any employee or class of employees of the Service or of the United States designated by the Attorney General, individually or by regulation, to perform the functions of an immigration officer specified by this Act or any section thereof.” This extensive delegated authority reinforces the considerations inherent in the nature of the power sought to be exercised that make for a restrictive reading of the Janus-faced word “witness.” The subpoena power “is a power capable of oppressive use, especially when it may be indiscriminately delegated and the subpoena is not returnable before a judicial officer. . . . True, there can be no penalty incurred for contempt before there is a judicial order of enforcement. But the subpoena is in form an official command, and even though improvidently issued it has some coercive tendency, either because of ignorance of their rights on the part of those whom it purports to command or their natural respect for what appears to be an official command, or because of their reluctance to test the subpoena’s validity by litigation.” Cudahy Packing Co., Ltd. v. Holland, 315 U. S. 357, 363-364.
These concerns, relevant to the construction of this ambiguously worded power, are emphatically pertinent to investigations that constitute the first step in proceedings calculated to bring about the denaturalization of citizens. See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U. S. 118; Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665. This may result in “loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living.” Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284. In such a situation where there is doubt it must be resolved in the citizen’s favor. Especially must we be sensitive to the citizen’s rights where the proceeding is nonjudicial because of “[t]he difference in security of judicial over administrative action . . . .” Ng Fung Ho v. White, supra, at 285.
These considerations of policy, which determined the Court’s decisions in requiring judicial as against administrative adjudication of the issue of citizenship in a deportation proceeding and those defining the heavy criterion of proof to be exacted by the lower courts from the Government before decreeing denaturalization, are important guides in reaching decision here. They give coherence to law and are fairly to be assumed as congressional presuppositions, unless by appropriate explicitness the lawmakers make them inapplicable. Cf. Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81, 83. It does not bespeak deprecation of official zeal, nor does it bring into question disinterestedness, to conclude that compulsory ex parte administrative examinations, untrammelled by the safeguards of a public adversary judicial proceeding, afford too ready opportunities for unhappy consequences to prospective defendants in denaturalization suits.
These general considerations find specific reinforcement in the language of other provisions of the Act, wherein the person who is the subject of an investigation is referred to with particularity. The most striking example of this is to be found in § 335 and its legislative history which pertains to the investigation of an alien who petitions for naturalization. Section 335 (b) provides: “The Attorney General shall designate employees of the Service to conduct preliminary examinations upon petitions for naturalization .... For such purposes any such employee so designated is hereby authorized to take testimony concerning any matter touching or in any way affecting the admissibility of any petitioner for naturalization, to administer oaths, including the oath of the petitioner for naturalization and the oaths of petitioner’s witnesses to the petition for naturalization, and to require by subpena the attendance and testimony of witnesses, including petitioner . . . Contrast this with § 335 (b)’s predecessor, § 333 (a) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, 1156: . . any such designated examiner is hereby authorized to take testimony concerning any matter touching or in any way affecting the admissibility of any petitioner for naturalization, to subpena witnesses, and to administer oaths, including the oath of the petitioner to the petition for naturalization and the oath of petitioner’s witnesses.” Other examples of Congress’ careful differentiation between a witness who is not the subject of an investigation and the person who is, may be found in §§ 236 (a), 242 (b) and 336 (d) of the 1952 Act.
All these considerations converge to the conclusion that Congress has not provided with sufficient clarity that the subpoena power granted by § 235 (a) extends over persons who are the subject of denaturalization investigations; therefore Congress is not to be deemed to have done so impliedly. Since this is so, we are not called upon to consider whether Congress may empower an immigration officer to secure evidence, under the authority of a subpoena, from a citizen who is himself the subject of an investigation directed toward his denaturalization. The judgment in No. 35 is affirmed; in No. 47, the judgment is reversed.
Affirmed and reversed respectively.
Section 235 (a) in full provides: “The inspection, other than the physical and mental examination, of aliens (including alien crewmen) seeking admission or readmission to, or the privilege of passing through the United States shall be conducted by immigration officers, except as otherwise provided in regard to special inquiry officers. All aliens arriving at ports of the United States shall be examined by one or more immigration officers at the discretion of the Attorney General and under such regulations as he may prescribe. Immigration officers are hereby authorized and empowered to board and search any vessel, aircraft, railway car, or other conveyance, or vehicle in which they believe aliens are being brought into the United States. The Attorney General and any immigration officer, including special inquiry officers, shall have power to administer oaths and to take and consider evidence of or from any person touching the privilege of any alien or person he believes or suspects to be an alien to enter, reenter, pass through, or reside in the United States or concerning any matter which is material and relevant to the enforcement of this Act and the administration of the Service, and, where such action may be necessary, to make a written record of such evidence. Any person coming into the United States may be required to state under oath the purpose or purposes for which he comes, the length of time he intends to remain in the United States, whether or not he intends to remain in the United States permanently and, if an alien, whether he intends to become a citizen thereof, and such other items of information as will aid the immigration officer in determining whether he is a national of the United States or an alien and, if the latter, whether he belongs to any of the excluded classes enumerated in section 212. The Attorney General and any immigration officer, including special inquiry officers, shall have power to require by subpena the attendance and testimony of witnesses before immigration officers and special inquiry officers and the production of books, papers, and documents relating to the privilege of any person to enter, reenter, reside in, or pass through the United States or concerning any matter which is material and relevant to the enforcement of this Act and the administration of the Service, and to that end may invoke the aid of any court of the United States. Any United States district court within the jurisdiction of which investigations or inquiries are being conducted by an immigration officer or special inquiry officer may, in the event of neglect or refusal to respond to a subpena issued under this subsection or refusal to testify before an immigration officer or special inquiry officer, issue an order requiring such persons to appear before an immigration officer or special inquiry officer, produce books, papers, and documents if demanded, and testify, and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt thereof.”
Section 340 (a) provides: “It shall be the duty of the United States district attorneys for the respective districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute proceedings in any court specified in subsection (a) of section 310 of this title in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing suit, for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of naturalization on the ground that such order and certificate of naturalization were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation, and such revocation and setting aside of the order admitting such person to citizenship and such canceling of certificate of naturalization shall be effective as of the original date of the order and certificate, respectively: Provided, That refusal on the part of a naturalized citizen within a period of ten years following his naturalization to testify as a witness in any proceeding before a congressional committee concerning his subversive activities, in a case where such person has been convicted of contempt for such refusal, shall be held to constitute a ground for revocation of such person's naturalization under this subsection as having been procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation. If the naturalized citizen does not reside in any judicial district in the United States at the time of bringing such suit, the proceedings may be instituted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the United States district court in the judicial district in which such person last had his residence.”
8 CFR § 340.11 provides: “Investigation and report. Whenever it appears that any grant of naturalization may have been procured by concealment of a material fact or by wilful misrepresentation, the facts shall be reported to the district director having jurisdiction over the naturalized person’s last known place of residence. If the district director is satisfied that a prima facie showing has been made that grounds for revocation exist, he shall cause an investigation to be made and report the facts in writing to the Commissioner with a recommendation as to whether revocation proceedings should be instituted. If it appears that naturalization was procured in violation of section 1425 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the facts in regard thereto may be presented by the district director to the appropriate United States Attorney for possible criminal prosecution.”
The question whether respondent was required to obey the order of the District Court irrespective of that court’s power under § 235 (a) has not been raised. See United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U. S. 258.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has taken the same view. Lansky et al. v. Savoretti, 220 F. 2d 906.
E. g., § 215 (g): “Passports, visas, reentry permits, and other documents required for entry under this Act may be considered as permits to enter for the purposes of this section.” § 241 (a) (2): “Any alien in the United States . . . shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported who — entered the United States without inspection or at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General or is in the United States in violation of this Act or in violation of any other law of the United States.” § 290 (a): “There shall be established in the office of the Commissioner for the use of the security and enforcement agencies of the Government of the United States, a central index, which shall contain the names of all aliens heretofore admitted to the United States, or excluded therefrom, insofar as such information is available from the existing records of the Service, and the names of all aliens hereafter admitted to the United States, or excluded therefrom, the names of their sponsors of record, if any, and such other relevant information as the Attorney General shall require as an aid to the proper enforcement of this Act.”
E. g., §284: “Nothing contained in this title shall be construed so as to limit, restrict, deny, or affect the coming into or departure from the United States of an alien member of the Armed Forces of the United States who is in the uniform of, or who bears documents identifying him as a member of, such Armed Forces, and who is coming to or departing from the United States under official orders or permit of such Armed Forces: Provided, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed to give to or confer upon any such alien any other privileges, rights, benefits, exemptions, or immunities under this Act, which are not otherwise specifically granted by this Act.”
“While the Nationality Act [§ 333 (a) of the 1940 Act] provides for subpena of witnesses at a preliminary [naturalization] hearing and for calling of witnesses in any naturalization proceedings in court, specific provision is not made for subpenaing the petitioner. The subcommittee feels that the proposed bill should contain the requirement that the petitioner be required to attend hearings and is so recommending.” S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 739.
Section 236 (a) provides: “A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this section, administer oaths, present and receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien or witnesses.”
Section 242 (b) provides: “A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this section to determine the deportability of any alien, and shall administer oaths, present and receive evidence, interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien or witnesses, and, as authorized by the Attorney General, shall make determinations, including orders of deportation.”
Section 336 (d) provides: “The Attorney General shall have the right to appear before any court in any naturalization proceedings for the purpose of cross-examining the petitioner and the witnesses produced in support of the petition concerning any matter touching or in any way affecting the petitioner’s right to admission to citizenship, and shall have the right to call witnesses, including the petitioner, produce evidence, and be heard in opposition to, or in favor of, the granting of any petition in naturalization proceedings.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
On October 26, 1973, law enforcement officers raided respondent’s home and seized approximately nine ounces of marihuana and assorted drug paraphernalia. Several days before the raid, officers had tape-recorded a transaction in which respondent had sold marihuana and other controlled substances to a police informant. With the aid of the seized evidence and the tape recording, respondent was convicted in Virginia state court of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of marihuana. The jury imposed a fine of $10,000 and a prison term of 20 years on each of the two counts, the prison terms to run consecutively. At the time of respondent’s conviction, Virginia law authorized fines of up to $25,000 and prison terms of not less than 5 nor more than 40 years for each of respondent’s offenses. Davis v. Davis, 585 F. 2d 1226, 1229 (CA4 1978).
After exhausting direct appeal, respondent brought a ha-beas action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, asserting that a 40-year sentence was so grossly disproportionate to the crime of possessing less than nine ounces of marihuana that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court, relying primarily upon the four factors set forth in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F. 2d 136 (CA4 1973), cert. denied, 415 U. S. 938 (1974), agreed:
“After examining the nature of the offense, the legislative purpose behind the punishment, the punishment in the Commonwealth of Virginia for other offenses, and the punishment actually imposed for the same or similar offenses in Virginia, this court must necessarily conclude that a sentence of forty years and twenty thousand dollars in fines is so grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crimes as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 453 (1977).
Accordingly, the District Court issued a writ of habeas corpus.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. Davis v. Davis, supra. The panel correctly noted that this Court “has never found a sentence for a term of years within the limits authorized by statute to be, by itself, a cruel and unusual punishment,” 585 F. 2d, at 1229, and held that respondent had failed to show that his sentence, in light of the factors known to the jury and the punishment authorized by Virginia, was sufficiently extraordinary to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id., at 1233. The decision was short-lived. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals reheard the case and, “for reasons sufficiently stated by the district judge in his opinion,” affirmed the award of habeas relief. Davis v. Davis, 601 F. 2d 153, 154 (1979). We granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of our decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263 (1980). Sub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 445 U. S. 947 (1980). The Court of Appeals again affirmed the District Court, this time by an equally divided vote. Davis v. Davis, 646 F. 2d 123 (1981). Because the Court of Appeals failed to heed our decision in Rummel, we now reverse.
The petitioner in Rummel was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Texas recidivist statute upon being convicted of his third felony: obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. He had previously been convicted of passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36, and of fraudulently using a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods or services. 445 U. S., at 265-266. Like the respondent in this case, Rummel argued that the length of his imprisonment was so “grossly disproportionate” to the crime for which he was sentenced that it violated the ban on cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In rejecting that argument, we distinguished between punishments — such as the death penalty — which by their very nature differ from all other forms of conventionally accepted punishment, and punishments which differ from others only in duration. This distinction was based upon two factors. First, this “Court’s Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be nor appear to be merely the subjective views of individual Justices.” Id., at 275. And second, the excessiveness of one prison term as compared to another is invariably a subjective determination, there being no clear way to make “any constitutional distinction between one term of years and a shorter or longer term of years.” Ibid. Thus, we concluded that “one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, . . . the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative.” Id., at 274. Accordingly, we held that Rummel’s life sentence did not violate the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
As mentioned above, the District Court found respondent’s sentence to be unconstitutional by applying the four-part test of Hart v. Coiner, supra. Hart also was relied upon by the lower-court dissenters in Rummel, and was implicitly disapproved by our rejection of the dissenters’ view. Not only did we expressly recognize Hart as the primary opposing authority, 445 U. S., at 267, 269, but our opinion also disapproved each of its four “objective” factors. Because the District Court’s grant of habeas relief was clearly guided by these factors, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming.
In short, Rummel stands for the proposition that federal courts should be “reluctan[t] to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment,” id. at 274, and that “successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences” should be “exceedingly rare,” id. at 272. By affirming the District Court decision after our decision in Rummel, the Court of Appeals sanctioned an intrusion into the basic line-drawing process that is “properly within the province of legislatures, not courts.” Id., at 275-276. More importantly, however, the Court of Appeals could be viewed as having ignored, consciously or unconsciously, the hierarchy of the federal court system created by the Constitution and Congress. Admittedly, the Members of this Court decide cases “by virtue of their commissions, not their competence.” And arguments may be made one way or the other whether the present case is distinguishable, except as to its facts, from Rummel. But unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.
Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss respondent’s habeas petition.
It is so ordered.
In addition to the evidence seized during the raid and the tape recording of the drug transaction, all of which demonstrated that respondent was an active drug dealer, the jury knew from evidence presented at trial that respondent had knowingly sold drugs to be smuggled into prison, had sold drugs to an inmate’s wife who was alone with an infant child, and had himself been imprisoned in the past. Davis v. Davis, 585 F. 2d, at 1227-1228.
Applying the first Hart factor to this case, the District Court found “no element of violence and minimal, debatable danger to the person.” Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444, 452 (WD Va. 1977). In Rummel, however, we noted that “the presence or absence of violence does not always affeet the strength of society’s interest in deterring a particular crime or in punishing a particular criminal.” 445 U. S., at 275. Hart’s second factor calls for an examination of the purposes behind the criminal statute and the existence of less restrictive means of effectuating those purposes. On this factor the District Court was inconclusive, but noted that the amount of marihuana involved was less than nine ounces, implying that such minimal possession could adequately be deterred with shorter prison sentences. 432 F. Supp., at 452. Such analysis was implicitly rejected by our conclusion in Rummel that the “ ‘small’ amount of money taken” was inapposite, because to acknowledge that the State could have given Rummel a life sentence for stealing some amount of money “is virtually to concede that the lines to be drawn are indeed ‘subjective,’ and therefore properly within the province of legislatures, not courts.” 445 U. S., at 275-276. Applying the third Hart factor, the District Court found that respondent’s sentence for possession with intent to distribute exceeded the maximum penalty available for that offense in all but four States, and that his sentence for distribution exceeded the maximum penalty available for that offense in all but eight States. 432 F. Supp., at 452-453. We rejected such comparison in Rummel, stating that “[ajbsent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the distinction of treating particular offenders more severely than any other State.” 445 U. S., at 282. Finally, the fourth Hart factor led the District Court to conclude that respondent’s sentence was disproportionate when compared to punishments applicable to other offenses under Virginia law. 432 F. Supp., at 453. This comparison was rejected in Rummel because “[ojther crimes . . . implicate other societal interests, making any such comparison inherently speculative.” 445 U. S., at 282, n. 27.
We noted in Rummel that there could be situations in which the proportionality principle would come into play, such as “if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.” Id., at 274, n. 11.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Louisiana statutes provide in general that all seagoing vessels moving between New Orleans and foreign ports must be navigated through the Mississippi River approaches to the port of New Orleans and within it exclusively by pilots who are State officers. New State pilots are appointed by the governor only upon certification of a State Board of River Pilot Commissioners, themselves pilots. Only those who have served a six-month apprenticeship under incumbent pilots and who possess other specific qualifications may be certified to the governor by the board. Appellants here have had at least fifteen years experience in the river, the port, and elsewhere, as pilots of vessels whose pilotage was not governed by the State law in question. Although they possess all the statutory qualifications except that they have not served the requisite six months apprenticeship under Louisiana officer pilots, they have been denied appointment as State pilots. Seeking relief in a Louisiana state court, they alleged that the incumbent pilots, having unfettered discretion under the law in the selection of apprentices, had selected, with occasional exception, only the relatives and friends of incumbents; that the selections were made by electing prospective apprentices into the pilots’ association, which the pilots have formed by authority of State law; that since “membership . . . has been closed ... to all except those having the favor of the pilots” the result is that only their relatives and friends have and can become State pilots. The Supreme Court of Louisiana has held that the pilotage law so administered does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 209 La. 737, 25 So. 2d 527. The case is here on appeal from that decision under 28 U. S. C. § 344 (a).
The constitutional command for a state to afford “equal protection of the laws” sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula. This Court has never attempted that impossible task. A law which affects the activities of some groups differently from the way in which it affects the activities of other groups is not necessarily banned by the Fourteenth Amendment. See e. g., Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147. Otherwise, effective regulation in the public interest could not be provided, however essential that regulation might be. For it is axiomatic that the consequence of regulating by setting apart a classified group is that those in it will be subject to some restrictions or receive certain advantages that do not apply to other groups or to all the public. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 106. This selective application of a regulation is discrimination in the broad sense, but it may or may not deny equal protection of the laws. Clearly, it might offend that constitutional safeguard if it rested on grounds wholly irrelevant to achievement of the regulation’s objectives. An example would be a law applied to deny a person a right to earn a living or hold any job because of hostility to his particular race, religion, beliefs, or because of any other reason having no rational relation to the regulated activities. See American Sugar Rfg. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 92.
The case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, relied on by appellants, is an illustration of a type of discrimination which is incompatible with any fair conception of equal protection of the laws. Yick Wo was denied the right to engage in an occupation supposedly open to all who could conduct their business in accordance with the law’s requirements. He could meet these requirements, but was denied the right to do so solely because he was Chinese. And it made no difference that under the law as written Yick Wo would have enjoyed the same protection as all others. Its unequal application to Yick Wo was enough to condemn it. But Yick Wo’s case, as other cases have demonstrated, was tested by the language of the law there considered and the administration there shown. Cf. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 93, 94; Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183; New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van de Carr, 199 U. S. 552; Engel v. O’Malley, 219 U. S. 128, 137. So here, we must consider the relationship of the method of appointing pilots to the broad objectives of the entire Louisiana pilotage law. See Grainger v. Douglas Park Jockey Club, 148 F. 513, and cases there cited. In so doing we must view the appointment system in the context of the historical evolution of the laws and institution of pilotage in Louisiana and elsewhere. Cf. Otis Co. v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 201 U. S. 140, 154; Jackman v. Rosenbaum, 260 U. S. 22, 31; Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422, 428-430. And an important factor in our consideration is that this case tests the right and power of a state to select its own agents and officers. Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U. S. 548; Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U. S. 1, 11-13.
Studies of the long history of pilotage reveal that it is a unique institution and must be judged as such. In order to avoid invisible hazards, vessels approaching and leaving ports must be conducted from and to open waters by persons intimately familiar with the local waters. The pilot’s job generally requires that he go outside the harbor’s entrance in a small boat to meet incoming ships, board them and direct their course from open water to the port. The same service is performed for vessels leaving the port. Pilots are thus indispensable cogs in the transportation system of every maritime economy. Their work prevents traffic congestion and accidents which would impair navigation in and to the ports. It affects the safety of lives and cargo, the cost and time expended in port calls, and, in some measure, the competitive attractiveness of particular ports. Thus, for the same reasons that governments of most maritime communities have subsidized, regulated, or have themselves operated docks and other harbor facilities and sought to improve the approaches to their ports, they have closely regulated and often operated their ports’ pilotage systems.
The history and practice of pilotage demonstrate that, although inextricably geared to a complex commercial economy, it is also a highly personalized calling. A pilot does not require a formalized technical education so much as a detailed and extremely intimate, almost intuitive, knowledge of the weather, waterways and conformation of the harbor or river which he serves. This seems to be particularly true of the approaches to New Orleans through the treacherous and shifting channel of the Mississippi River. Moreover, harbor entrances where pilots can most conveniently make their homes and still be close to places where they board incoming and leave outgoing ships are usually some distance from the port cities they serve. These “pilot towns” have begun, and generally exist today, as small communities of pilots, perhaps near but usually distinct from the port cities. In these communities young men have an opportunity to acquire special knowledge of the weather and water hazards of the locality and seem to grow up with ambitions to become pilots in the traditions of their fathers, relatives, and neighbors. We are asked, in effect, to say that Louisiana is without constitutional authority to conclude that apprenticeship under persons specially interested in a pilot’s future is the best way to fit him for duty as a pilot officer in the service of the State.
The States have had full power to regulate pilotage of certain kinds of vessels since 1789 when the first Congress decided that then existing state pilot laws were satisfactory and made federal regulation unnecessary. 1 Stat. 53, 54 (1789), 46 U. S. C. § 211; Olseny. Smith, 195 U. S. 332, 341; Anderson v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 225 U. S. 187. Louisiana legislation has controlled the activities and appointment of pilots since 1805—even before the Territory was admitted as a State. The State pilotage system, as it has evolved since 1805, is typical of that which grew up in most seaboard states and in foreign countries. Since 1805 Louisiana pilots have been State officers whose work has been controlled by the State. That Act forbade all but a limited number of pilots appointed by the governor to serve in that capacity. The pilots so appointed were authorized to select their own deputies. But pilots, and through them, their deputies, were literally under the command of the master and the wardens of the port of New Orleans, appointed by the governor. The master and wardens were authorized to make rules governing the practices of pilots, specifically empowered to order pilots to their stations, and to fine them for disobedience to orders or rules. And the pilots were required to make official bond for faithful performance of their duty. Pilots’ fees were fixed; ships coming to the Mississippi were required to pay pilotage whether they took on pilots or not. The pilots were authorized to organize an association whose membership they controlled in order “to enforce the legal regulations, and add to the efficiency of the service required thereby.” Moreover, efficient and adequate service was sought to be insured by requiring the Board of Pilot Commissioners to report to the governor and authorizing him summarily to remove any pilot guilty of “neglect of duty, habitual intemperance, carelessness, incompetency, or any act or conduct . . . showing” that he “ought to be removed.” La. Act No. 113, § 20 (1857). These provisions have been carried over with some revision into the present comprehensive Louisiana pilotage law. 6 La. Gen. Stat., tit. 59, cc. 6, 8 (1939). Thus in Louisiana, as elsewhere, it seems to have been accepted at an early date that in pilotage, unlike other occupations, competition for appointment, for the opportunity to serve particular ships and for fees, adversely affects the public interest in pilotage.
It is within the framework of this long-standing pilotage regulation system that the practice has apparently existed of permitting pilots, if they choose, to select their relatives and friends as the only ones ultimately eligible for appointment as pilots by the governor. Many other states have established pilotage systems which make the selection of pilots on this basis possible. Thus it was noted thirty years ago in a Department of Commerce study of pilotage that membership of pilot associations “is limited to persons agreeable to those already members, generally relatives and friends of the pilots. Probably in pilotage more than in any other occupation in the United States the male members of a family follow the same work from generation to generation.”
The practice of nepotism in appointing public servants has been a subject of controversy in this country throughout our history. Some states have adopted constitutional amendments or statutes to prohibit it. These have reflected state policies to wipe out the practice. But Louisiana and most other states have adopted no such general policy. We can only assume that the Louisiana legislature weighed the obvious possibility of evil against whatever useful function a closely knit pilotage system may serve. Thus the advantages of early experience under friendly supervision in the locality of the pilot’s training, the benefits to morale and esprit de corps which family and neighborly tradition might contribute, the close association in which pilots must work and live in their pilot communities and on the water, and the discipline and regulation which is imposed to assure the State competent pilot service after appointment, might have prompted the legislature to permit Louisiana pilot officers to select those with whom they would serve.
The number of people, as a practical matter, who can be pilots is very limited. No matter what system of selection is adopted, all but the few occasionally selected must of necessity be excluded. Cf. Olsen v. Smith, supra, 344, 345. We are aware of no decision of this Court holding that the Constitution requires a state governor, or subordinates responsible to him and removable by him for cause, to select state public servants by competitive tests or by any other particular method of selection. The object of the entire pilotage law, as we have pointed out, is to secure for the State and others interested the safest and most efficiently operated pilotage system practicable. We cannot say that the method adopted in Louisiana for the selection of pilots is unrelated to this objective. See Olsen v. Smith, supra; cf. Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495, 509-510. We do not need to consider hypothetical questions concerning any similar system of selection which might conceivably be practiced in other professions or businesses regulated or operated by state governments. It is enough here that considering the entirely unique institution of pilotage in the light of its history in Louisiana, we cannot say that the practice appellants attack is the kind of discrimination which violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Affirmed.
A ship entering the Mississippi River from the Gulf of Mexico is piloted the twenty mile distance from the mouth of the river to “Pilot Town” by one of a group of pilots specially familiar with the “entrance” to the Mississippi through the so-called “passes.” La. Acts 1880, No. 99, § 2, La. Acts 1908, No. 55, § 1, La. Acts 1910, No. 26, § 1, 6 La. Gen. Stat. §§ 9141, 9163 (1939). Between Pilot Town and New Orleans, a distance of approximately ninety miles, ships are piloted exclusively by so-called river port pilots. La. Acts 1908, No. 54, § 1, 6 La. Gen. Stat., tit. 59, c. 8 (1939). By an amendment in 1942 the exclusive jurisdiction of the river port pilots was extended to the piloting of seagoing vessels within the port of New Orleans. La. Acts 1942, No. 134, 6 La. Gen. Stat. § 9155 (Supp. 1946). Appellants here sought appointment as river port pilots.
Sections 2 and 3 of the Act of 1908 provided for the appointment and commissioning of twenty-eight pilots by the governor and prescribed that thereafter there should not be less than twenty. 6 La. Gen. Stat. §§ 9155, 9156 (1939).
The statement of the Louisiana court in this case that pilots so appointed are considered State officers has long been the established State rule. Williams v. Payson, 14 La. Ann. Rep. 7, 8 (1859); Louisiana v. Follett, 33 La. Ann. Rep. 228, 230 (1881); Levine v. Michel, 35 La. Ann. Rep. 1121, 1124 (1883).
From among the pilots the governor was required to appoint three River Port Pilot Commissioners. La. Acts 1908, No. 54, § 1, 6 La. Gen. Stat. § 9154 (1939).
“Whenever there exists a necessity for more pilots . . . the . . . board of river port pilot commissioners shall hold examinations, under such rules and regulations, and with such requirements as they shall have provided, with the governor’s approval, provided that no applicant shall be considered by said board, unless he submits proper evidence of moral character and is a voter of this state, and shall have served six months’ apprenticeship in his proposed calling, and upon the certificate of the board to the governor that the applicant has complied with the provisions of this act, the governor may, in his discretion, appoint to existing vacancies.” La. Acts 1908, No. 54, § 4. 6 La. Gen. Stat. § 9157 (1939).
Appellants were licensed to pilot coastwise vessels to and through the port under federal law which excludes states from controlling pilotage of coastal shipping. Rev. Stat. §§ 4401, 4444, 46 U. S. C. §§ 215, 364. Also prior to the passage of La. Acts 1942, No. 134, they had piloted all classes of vessels within the port of New Orleans. That Act deprived appellants of authority to pilot within the port and conferred it exclusively upon State river port pilots. Thus appellants allege they have been deprived of an opportunity to make a living unless they can obtain appointment as river port pilots under the pilotage law.
While the Act does not specifically require that the apprenticeships be performed under incumbent officer pilots, the State Supreme Court has so construed it.
La. Rev. Stat. § 2707 (1869), reenacted in § 4 of La. Acts 1928, No. 198, 6 La. Gen. Stat. § 9149 (1939).
Appellants’ complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Therefore we consider their allegations as facts for the purpose of this decision.
Appellants’ prayer had sought an injunction against interference with their serving as pilots, and, in the alternative, sought mandamus to compel the Board to examine appellants as required by law and to certify them to the Governor. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to compel the board to examine appellants because they did not possess the qualifications required to take examinations—specifically, they had not served apprenticeships.
See generally, Report of Departmental Committee on Pilotage (London, 1911); Pilotage in the United States, Special Agents Series, Department of Commerce (1917).
See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 308, 312, 316, 326; Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236, 238, 239.
For an excellent description of a pilot’s life and duty, see Kane, Deep Delta Country, c. 10 (1944).
See Kane, op. cit. supra, note 10. See also Hearings before House Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H. R. 9678, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 106, 214, 229, 279 (1916) (compulsory barge pilotage).
See Giesecke, American Commercial Legislation before 1789 (1910) 118; Kane, op. cit. supra, note 10.
See Kane, op. cit. supra, note 10. A Louisiana statute provides that “no license shall be granted any person to keep a tavern . . . at the Balize, South West Pass or any other station for pilots, nor within three miles of such station, unless the person applying for such license shall be recommended in writing by a majority of the branch pilots.” La. Rev. Stat. § 2704 (1869), 6 La. Gen. Stat. § 9166 (1939).
See Kane op. cit. supra, note 10, 128; see also Pilotage in the United States, op. cit. supra, note 8, 8, 16.
La. Acts (Territory of New Orleans) 1805, c. 24; see also Surrey, Commerce of Louisiana, 1699-1763, a. III (1916).
Almost all the maritime states, some as colonies before the Revolution, adopted comprehensive pilotage laws which included unrestricted apprenticeship provisions. Mass. Laws, c. 13 (1783); Mass. Rev. Stat. c. 32, §§ 5-42 (1836); New York Laws, c. XVIII, §§ I, VII, X, XII (1819); Pa. Stats, at Large, c. 536, § VI (1767); N. J. Rev. Laws, tit. 37, c. 7, § 18 (1847); 1 Laws of Md. (Dorsey) c. 63, §§ 2, 20, 23 (1803); Code of Virginia, c. 92, §§ 4, 9 (1849); N. C. Rev. Stat. c. 88, §§ 1, 5, 14 (1837). See also Report of Departmental Committee on Pilotage, op. cit. supra, note 8, Part I.
See note 2 supra.
The 1805 Act required deputies to obtain a certificate from the master and wardens as a condition precedent to their appointment. But § 1 of La. Acts 1806, c. 26, gave pilots blanket authority to appoint their own deputies. Pilots were, however, made responsible for the neglect or misconduct of their deputies.
La. Acts 1805, c. 24, § 20; La. Acts 1837, No. 106, § 9.
La. Acts 1805, c. 24, § 17.
Levine v. Michel, supra, at 1125; see also note 6 supra.
See Kane, op. cit. supra, n. 10, at 126-128; all of the State and colonial statutes set out in note 10, supra, provided for limitation on the number of pilots and fixed the fees they might charge. This is generally true today. See n. 23 infra.
The Department of Commerce Report, supra, n. 8, at 28 observed that: “The formation of pilots' associations was largely a result of the intense competition that formerly prevailed among the pilots, .... Little effort was made to maintain definite pilot stations. Instead, the desire to be the first to speak a ship frequently led the pilots to cruise great distances from the port.
“One of the unfortunate results of the intense competition of pilots was the fact that frequently pilots could not be had when wanted, although they might be far out to sea in quest of business. Another drawback was that pilots unnecessarily exposed themselves to danger. And a third important disadvantage was that it made the earnings precarious; a pilot might earn a great deal this month and very little the next. . . .
“The pilots themselves were the first to see the disadvantages of the free or competitive system and to take steps toward the organization of associations. These associations soon developed into strong working combinations that eliminated competition and placed on an amicable basis matters that formerly produced much sharp rivalry.
“From the evidence at hand it would appear that the shipping interests as well as the insurance and commercial interests of the ports encouraged the pilots in the formation of these associations. The advantages of a well-organized pilotage system were as apparent to these interests as to the pilots themselves, for the commerce of the port was not only facilitated and expedited but made much safer by reason of the better organization of the pilotage system, which came with the elimination of competition.
“Since associations have been formed along the present lines pilot-age grounds have been established . . . These grounds are well known to mariners, who may safely count on finding there at practically all times and in all conditions of weather a pilot boat with a sufficient number of pilots aboard to accommodate any reasonable number of vessels that may come. There is little chance nowadays that a vessel will fail to find a pilot when needed. . . .
“Still another advantage of the present organization of pilotage systems is that it permits the maintenance of a central office which is in constant touch with the pilot boat and arranges for the rotation of pilots. The association generally employs an agent to look after the routine business of the office.”
See N. J. Laws 1898, c. 31, N. J. Stat. Ann. Title 12, c. 8 (1939); Pa. P. L. 542 of 1803, Pa. Stats. Ann. (Purdon) Title 55, c. 2 (1930); Md. Ann. Code (Flack), Art. 74 (1939); Del. Rev. Code, c. 35 (1935); Va. Code, c. 142 (1942); Ala. Laws, 1931, p. 154, Ala. Code, Title 38, c. 2 (1940); Ore. Comp. Laws Ann., Title 105, c. 2 (1940). See also note 16, supra.
Pilotage in the United States, supra, note 8, p. 8.
See e. g., Mo. Const., Art. 14, § 13 (1924).
See e. g., Idaho Sess. Laws, 1915, c. 10, Idaho Code Ann., § 57-701 (1932); Fla. Laws, 1933, c. 16088, Fla. Stats. Ann. §§ 116.10, 116.11 (1943); Neb. Laws 1919, c. 190, § 6, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-108 (1943); Tex. Acts 1909, p. 85, Tex. Penal Code (Vernon) Arts. 432-438 (1938).
In Olsen v. Smith, the constitutionality of a Texas statute forbidding all but pilots appointed by the governor to serve was challenged by one who had not been appointed and had been enjoined from serving as a pilot. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra, was relied on as authority for a contention that he had been denied rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment including equal protection of the laws. Id. 334. But this Court in sustaining the constitutionality of the statute, did not specifically discuss the question here raised. Therefore we do not depend upon Olsen v. Smith as a necessarily controlling authority for our decision here.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondents, 18 owners of independent pharmacies in San Antonio, Tex., brought an antitrust action in a Federal District Court against the petitioners, Group Life and Health Insurance Co., known as Blue Shield of Texas (Blue Shield), and three pharmacies also doing business in San Antonio. The complaint alleged that the petitioners had violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1, by entering agreements to fix the retail prices of drugs and pharmaceuticals, and that the activities of the petitioners had caused Blue Shield’s policyholders not to deal with certain of the respondents, thereby constituting an unlawful group boycott. The trial court granted summary judgment to the petitioners on the ground that the challenged agreements are exempt from the antitrust laws under § 2 (b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 34, as amended, 61 Stat. 448, 15 U. S. C. § 1012 (b), because the agreements are the “business of insurance,” are “regulated by [Texas] law,” and are not “boycotts” within the meaning of § 3 (b) of the Act, 59 Stat. 34, 15 U. S. C. § 1013(b). 415 F. Supp. 343 (WD Tex.). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment. Holding that the agreements in question are not the “business of insurance” within the meaning of §2 (b), the appellate court did not reach the other questions decided by the trial court. 556 F. 2d 1375. We granted certiorari because of intercircuit conflicts as to the meaning of the phrase “business of insurance” in § 2 (b) of the Act. 435 U. S. 903.
I
Blue Shield offers insurance policies which entitle the policyholders to obtain prescription drugs. If the pharmacy selected by the insured has entered into a “Pharmacy Agreement” with Blue Shield, and is therefore a participating pharmacy, the insured is required to pay only $2 for every prescription drug. The remainder of the cost is paid directly by Blue Shield to the participating pharmacy. If, on the other hand, the insured selects a pharmacy which has not entered into a Pharmacy Agreement, and is therefore a nonparticipating pharmacy, he is required to pay the full price charged by the pharmacy. The insured may then obtain reimbursement from Blue Shield for 75% of the difference between that price and $2.
Blue Shield offered to enter into a Pharmacy Agreement with each licensed pharmacy in Texas. Under the Agreement, a participating pharmacy agrees to furnish prescription drugs to Blue Shield’s policyholders at $2 for each prescription, and Blue Shield agrees to reimburse the pharmacy for the pharmacy’s cost of acquiring the amount of the drug prescribed. Thus, only pharmacies that can afford to distribute prescription drugs for less than this $2 markup can profitably participate in the plan.
The only issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that these Pharmacy Agreements are not the “business of insurance” within the meaning of § 2 (b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. If that conclusion is correct, then the Agreements are not exempt from examination under the antitrust laws. Whether the Agreements are illegal under the antitrust laws is an entirely separate question, not now before us.
II
A
As the Court stated last Term in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U. S. 531, 541, the starting point in a case involving construction of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, like the starting point in any case involving the meaning of a statute, is the language of the statute itself. See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (Powell, J., concurring). It is important, therefore, to observe at the outset that the statutory language in question here does not exempt the business of insurance companies from the scope of the antitrust laws. The exemption is for the “business of insurance,” not the “business of insurers”:
“The statute did not purport to make the States supreme in regulating all the activities of insurance companies; its language refers not to the persons or companies who are subject to state regulation, but to laws'regulating the business of insurance.’ Insurance companies may do many things which are subject to paramount federal regulation; only when they are engaged in the ‘business of insurance’ does the statute apply.” SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U. S. 453, 459-460. (Emphasis in original.)
Since the law does not define the “business of insurance,” the question for decision is whether the Pharmacy Agreements fall within the ordinary understanding of that phrase, illumined by any light to be found in the structure of the Act and its legislative history. Cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,199, and n. 19.
B
The primary elements of an insurance contract are the spreading and underwriting of a policyholder’s risk. “It is characteristic of insurance that a number of risks are accepted, some of which involve losses, and that such losses are spread over all the risks so as to enable the insurer to accept each risk at a slight fraction of the possible liability upon it.” 1 G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 1:3 (2d ed. 1959). See also R. Keeton, Insurance Law § 1.2 (a) (1971) (“Insurance is an arrangement for transferring and distributing risk”); 1 G. Richards, The Law of Insurance § 2 (W. Freedman 5th ed. 1952).
The significance of underwriting or spreading of risk as an indispensable characteristic of insurance was recognized by this Court in SEC v. Variable Annuity Lije Ins, Co., 359 U. S. 65. That case involved several corporations, representing themselves as “life insurance” companies, that offered variable annuity contracts for sale in interstate commerce. The companies were regulated by the insurance commissioners of several States. Purchasers of the contracts were not entitled to any fixed return, but only to a pro rata participation in the investment portfolios of the companies. Thus a policyholder could receive substantial sums if investment decisions were successful, but very little if they were not. One of the questions presented was whether these variable annuity contracts were the “business of insurance” under § 2 (b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The Court held that the annuity contracts were not insurance, even though they were regulated as such under state law and involved actuarial prognostications of mortality. Central to the Court's holding was the premise that “the concept of 'insurance' involves some investment risk-taking on the part of the company.” 359 U. S., at 71. Since the variable annuity contracts offered no guarantee of fixed income, they placed all the investment risk on the annuitant and none on the company. Ibid. The Court concluded, therefore, that the annuities involved “no true underwriting of risks, the one earmark of insurance as it has commonly been conceived of in popular understanding and usage.” Id., at 73 (footnote omitted). Cf. German Alliance Ins, Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 412 (“The effect of insurance — indeed it has been said to be its fundamental object — is to distribute the loss over as wide an area as possible”).
The petitioners do not really dispute that the underwriting or spreading of risk is a critical determinant in identifying insurance. Rather they argue that the Pharmacy Agreements do involve the underwriting of risks. As they state in their brief:
“In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Variable Annuity Lije Insurance Co., 359 U. S. 65, 73 (1959), the 'earmark’ of insurance was described as the 'underwriting of risks’ in exchange for a premium. Here the risk insured against is the possibility that, during the term of the policy, the insured may suffer a financial loss arising from the purchase of prescription drugs, or that he may be financially unable to purchase such drugs. In consideration of the premium, Blue Shield assumes this risk by agreeing with its insureds to contract with Participating Pharmacies to furnish the needed drugs and to reimburse the Pharmacies for each prescription filled for the insured. In short, each of the fundamental elements of insurance is present here — the payment of a premium in exchange for a promise to indemnify the insured against losses upon the happening of a specified contingency.”
The fallacy of the petitioners’ position is that they confuse the obligations of Blue Shield under its insurance policies, which insure against the risk that policyholders will be unable to pay for prescription drugs during the period of coverage, and the agreements between Blue Shield and the participating pharmacies, which serve only to minimize the costs Blue Shield incurs in fulfilling its underwriting obligations. The benefit promised to Blue Shield policyholders is that their premiums will cover the cost of prescription drugs except for a $2 charge for each prescription. So long as that promise is kept, policyholders are basically unconcerned with arrangements made between Blue Shield and participating pharmacies.
The Pharmacy Agreements thus do not involve any underwriting or spreading of risk, but are merely arrangements for the purchase of goods and services by Blue Shield. By agreeing with pharmacies on the maximum prices it will pay for drugs, Blue Shield effectively reduces the total amount it must pay to its policyholders. The Agreements thus enable Blue Shield to minimize costs and maximize profits. Such cost-savings arrangements may well be sound business practice, and may well inure ultimately to the benefit of policyholders in the form of lower premiums, but they are not the “business of insurance.”
The Pharmacy Agreements are thus legally indistinguishable from countless other business arrangements that may be made by insurance companies to keep their costs low and thereby also keep low the level of premiums charged to their policyholders. Suppose, for example, that an insurance company entered into a contract with a large retail drug chain whereby its policyholders could obtain drugs under their policies only from stores operated by this chain. The justification for such an agreement would be administrative and bulk-purchase savings resulting from obtaining all of the company's drug needs from a single dealer. Even though these cost savings might ultimately be reflected in lower premiums to policyholders, would such a contract be the “business of insurance”? Or suppose that the insurance company should decide to acquire the chain of drug stores in order to lower still further its costs of meeting its obligations to its policyholders. Such an acquisition would surely not be the “business of insurance.” SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U. S. 453.
C
Another commonly understood aspect of the business of insurance relates to the contract between the insurer and the insured. In enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act Congress was concerned with:
“The relationship between insurer and insured, the type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement — these were the core of the ‘business of insurance.’ Undoubtedly, other activities of insurance companies relate so closely to their status as reliable insurers that they too must be placed in the same class. But whatever the exact scope of the statutory term, it is clear where the focus was — it was on the relationship between the insurance company and the policyholder.” SEC v. National Securities, Inc., supra, at 460.
The Pharmacy Agreements are not “between insurer and insured.” They are separate contractual arrangements between Blue Shield and pharmacies engaged in the sale and distribution of goods and services other than insurance.
The petitioners argue that nonetheless the Pharmacy Agreements so closely affect the “reliability, interpretation, and enforcement” of the insurance contract and “relate so closely to their status as reliable insurers” as to fall within the exempted area. This argument, however, proves too much.
At the most, the petitioners have demonstrated that the Pharmacy Agreements result in cost savings to Blue Shield which may be reflected in lower premiums if the cost savings are passed on to policyholders. But, in that sense, every business decision made by an insurance company has some impact on its reliability, its ratemaking, and its status as a reliable insurer. The manager of an insurance company is no different from the manager of any enterprise with the responsibility to minimize costs and maximize profits. If terms such as “reliability” and “status as a reliable insurer” were to be interpreted in the broad sense urged by the petitioners, almost every business decision of an insurance company could be included in the “business of insurance.” Such a result would be plainly contrary to the statutory language, which exempts the “business of insurance” and not the “business of insurance companies.”
Ill
A
The conclusion that the Pharmacy Agreements are not the “business of insurance” is fully confirmed by the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The law was enacted in 1945 in response to this Court’s decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533. The indictment in that case charged that the defendants had conspired to fix insurance rates and commissions, and had conspired to boycott and coerce noncooperating insurers, agents, and insureds. In the District Court the defendants had successfully demurred to the indictment on the ground that the insurance industry was not a part of interstate commerce subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause. On direct appeal, this Court reversed the judgment, holding that the business of insurance is interstate commerce, and that the Congress which enacted the Sherman Act had not intended to exempt the insurance industry from its coverage.
B
The primary concern of Congress in the wake of that decision was in enacting legislation that would ensure that the States would continue to have the ability to tax and regulate the business of insurance. This concern is reflected in §§ 1 and 2 (a) of the Act, neither of which is involved in this case. A secondary concern was the applicability of the antitrust laws to the insurance industry. Months before this Court’s decision in South-Eastern Underwriters was announced, proposed legislation to totally exempt the insurance industry from the Sherman and Clayton Acts had been introduced in Congress. Less than three weeks after the actual decision, the House of Representatives passed a bill which would also have provided the insurance industry with a blanket exemption from the antitrust laws, thus restoring the state of law that had existed before the decision in SouthEastern Underwriters.
Congress, however, rejected this approach. Instead of a total exemption, Congress provided in § 2 (b) that the antitrust laws “shall be applicable” unless the activities of insurance companies are the business of insurance and regulated by state law. Moreover, under § 3 (b) the Sherman Act was made applicable in any event to acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation. To allow the States time to adjust to the applicability of the antitrust laws to the insurance industry, Congress imposed a 3-year moratorium. After the expiration of the moratorium on July 1, 1948, however, Congress clearly provided that the antitrust laws would be applicable to the business of insurance “to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.”
By making the antitrust laws applicable to the insurance industry except as to conduct that is the business of insurance, regulated by state law, and not a boycott, Congress did not intend to and did not overrule the South-Eastern Underwriters case. While the power of the States to tax and regulate insurance companies was reaffirmed, the McCarran-Ferguson Act also established that the insurance industry would no longer have a blanket exemption from the antitrust laws. It is true that § 2 (b) of the Act does create a partial exemption from those laws. Perhaps more significantly, however, that section, and the Act as a whole, embody a legislative rejection of the concept that the insurance industry is outside the scope of the antitrust laws — a concept that had prevailed before the South-Eastern Underwriters decision.
C
References to the meaning of the “business of insurance” in the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act strongly suggest that Congress understood the business of insurance to be the underwriting and spreading of risk. Thus, one of the early House Reports stated: “The theory of insurance is the distribution of risk according to hazard, experience, and the laws of averages. These factors are not within the control of insuring companies in the sense that the producer or manufacturer may control cost factors.” H. R. Rep. No. 873, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 8-9 (1943). See also S. Rep. No. 1112, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1944); 90 Cong. Rec. 6526 (1944) (remarks of Rep. Hancock).
Because of the widespread view that it is very difficult to underwrite risks in an informed and responsible way without intra-industry cooperation, the primary concern of both representatives of the insurance industry and the Congress was that cooperative ratemaking efforts be exempt from the antitrust laws. The passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act was preceded by the introduction in the Senate Committee of a report and a bill submitted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners on November 16, 1944. The views of the NAIC are particularly significant, because the Act ultimately passed was based in large part on the NAIC bill. The report emphasized that the concern of the insurance commissioners was that smaller enterprises and insurers other than life insurance companies were unable to underwrite risks accurately, and it therefore concluded:
“For these and other reasons this subcommittee believes it would be a mistake to permit or require the unrestricted competition contemplated by the antitrust laws to apply to the insurance business. To prohibit oom- bined efforts for statistical and rate-making purposes would be a backward step in the development of a progressive business. We do not regard it as necessary to labor this point any further because Congress itself recently recognized the necessity for concert of action in the collection of statistical data and rate making when it enacted the District of Columbia Fire Insurance Rating Act.” Id., at A4405 (emphasis added).
The bill proposed by the NAIC enumerated seven specific practices to which the Sherman Act was not to apply. Each of the specific practices involved intra-industry cooperative or concerted activities. None involved contractual arrangements that insurance companies might make with providers of goods or services to reduce the costs to the companies of meeting their underwriting obligations to their policyholders.
The floor debates also focused simply on whether cooperative ratemaking should be exempt. Thus, Senator Ferguson, in explaining the purpose of the bill, stated:
“This bill would permit — and I think it is fair to say that it is intended to permit — rating bureaus, because in the last session we passed a bill for the District of Columbia allowing rating. What we saw as wrong was the fixing of rates without statutory authority in the States; but we believe that State rights should permit a State to say that it believes in a rating bureau. I think the insurance companies have convinced many members of the legislature that we cannot have open competition in fixing rates on insurance. If we do, we shall have chaos. There will be failures, and failures always follow losses.” 91 Cong. Rec. 1481 (1945).
The consistent theme of the remarks of other Senators also indicated a primary concern that cooperative ratemaking would be protected from the antitrust laws. Id., at 1444 and 1485 (remarks of Sen. O’Mahoney); 485 (remarks of Sen. Taft). President Roosevelt, in signing the bill, also emphasized that the bill would allow cooperative rate regulation. He stated that “Congress did not intend to permit private rate fixing, which the Antitrust Act forbids, but was willing to permit actual regulation of rates by affirmative action of the States.” S. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944-1945 Vol., p. 587 (1950). There is not the slightest suggestion in the legislative history that Congress in any way contemplated that arrangements such as the Pharmacy Agreements in this case, which involve the mass purchase of goods and services from entities outside the insurance industry, are the “business of insurance.”
D
At the time of the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, corporations organized for the purpose of providing their members with medical services and hospitalization were not considered to be engaged in the insurance business at all, and thus were not subject to state insurance laws. E. g., Jordan v. Group Health Assn., 71 App. D. C. 38, 107 F. 2d 239 (1939); California Physicians’ Service v. Garrison, 155 P. 2d 885 (Cal. App. 1945). affd, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 172 P. 2d 4 (1946); Commissioner of Banking & Insurance v. Community Health Service, 129 N. J. L. 427, 30 A. 2d 44 (1943); State ex rel. Fishback v. Universal Service Agency, 87 Wash. 413, 151 P. 768 (1915). Similarly, States which regulated prepaid health-service plans at the time the Act was enacted either exempted them from the requirements of the state insurance code or provided that they “shall not be construed as being engaged in the business of insurance” under state law. Rorem, Enabling Legislation for Non-Profit Hospital Service Plans, 6 Law & Contemp. Prob. 528, 534 (1939). Since the legislative history makes clear that Congress certainly did not intend the definition of the “business of insurance” to be broader than its commonly understood meaning, the contemporary perception that health-care organizations were not engaged in providing insurance is highly significant in ascertaining congressional intent.
The Jordan v. Group Health hLssn. case, supra, is illustrative of the contemporary view of health-care plans. Group Health was organized as a nonprofit corporation to provide various medical services and supplies to members who paid a fixed annual premium. To implement the plan, Group Health contracted with physicians, hospitals, and others, to provide medical services. These groups were compensated exclusively by Group Health. By contracting with the various medical groups directly, Group Health was able to obtain services at a lower cost than if each member contracted separately. The plan, therefore, was somewhat similar to the Pharmacy Agreements in this case. The court in Group Health held that this type of arrangement was not insurance:
“Whether the contract is one of insurance or of indemnity there must be a risk of loss to which one party may be subjected by contingent or future events and an assumption of it by legally binding arrangement by another. Even the most loosely stated conceptions of insurance... require these elements. Hazard is essential and equally so a shifting of its incidence.
“Although Group Health’s activities may be considered in one aspect as creating security against loss from illness or accident, more truly they constitute the quantity purchase of well-rounded, continuous medical service by its members. Group Health is in fact and in function a consumer cooperative. The functions of such an organization are not identical with those of insurance or indemnity companies. The latter are concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with risk.... On the other hand, the cooperative is concerned principally with getting service rendered to its members and doing so at lower prices made possible by quantity purchasing and economies in operation.” 71 App. D. C., at 44, 46, 107 F. 2d, at 245, 247. (Emphasis supplied in part; footnotes omitted.)
Indeed, Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations themselves have historically taken the position that they are not insurance companies in seeking to avoid state regulation and taxation. It is thus difficult to assume that contrary to this historical position and a majority of court decisions, Congress in 1945 understood that advance-payment medical-benefits plans are the “business of insurance.” It is next to impossible to assume that Congress could have thought that agreements (even by insurance companies) which provide for the purchase of goods and services from third parties at a set price are within the meaning of that phrase.
IV
It is well settled that exemptions from the antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed. E. g., Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., 425 U. S. 1; Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Steamfitters, 421 U. S. 616; FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U. S. 726; United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U. S. 305. This doctrine is not limited to implicit exemptions from the antitrust laws, but applies with equal force to express statutory exemptions. E. g., Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Assn., Inc., supra, at 11-12 (the Nonprofit Institutions Act); FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., supra, at 733 (§15 of the Shipping Act); United States v. McKesson Robbins, supra,'at 316 (the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts).
Application of this principle is particularly appropriate in this case because the Pharmacy Agreements involve parties wholly outside the insurance industry. In analogous contexts, the Court has held that an exempt entity forfeits antitrust exemption by acting in concert with nonexempt parties. The Court has held, for example, that an exempt agricultural cooperative under the Capper-Yolstead Act loses its exemption if it conspires with nonexempt parties. Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U. S. 384; United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188. Similarly, the Court has consistently stated that a union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws if it agrees with one set of employers to impose a wage scale on other bargaining units. Ramsey v. Mine Workers, 401 U. S. 302, 313; Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U. S. 657, 665-666.
If agreements between an insurer and retail pharmacists are the “business of insurance” because they reduce the insurer’s costs, then so are all other agreements insurers may make to keep their costs under control — whether with automobile body repair shops or landlords. Such agreements would be exempt from the antitrust laws if Congress had extended the coverage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to the "business of insurance companies.” But that is precisely what Congress did not do.
For all these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
The Act provides in relevant part:
“Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
“Sec. 2. (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
“(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.
“Sec. 3. (a) Until June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act,... and the Act of June 19, 1936, known as the Robinson-Patman Anti-discrimination Act, shall not apply to the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof.
“(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall ^render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.” 59 Stat. 33-34, as amended, 61 Stat. 448.
The position of the Fifth Circuit is in conflict with that of the Third, Fourth, and District of Columbia Circuits. See Frankford Hospital v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 554 F. 2d 1253 (CA3 1977); Anderson v. Medical Service of District of Columbia, 551 F. 2d 304 (CA4 1977); Proctor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 182 U. S. App. D. C. 264, 561 F. 2d 262 (1977).
The amicus curiae brief of the United States provides a useful illustration of the operation of the Pharmacy Agreement:
“Suppose the usual and customary retail price for a quantity of Drug X charged both by 'participating’ Pharmacy A and ‘non-participating’ Pharmacy B is $10.00, and the wholesale price (or acquisition cost) to both is $8.00. If an insured buys Drug X from Pharmacy A, the insured pays $2.00. Pharmacy A receives $2.00 from the insured and $8.00 from Blue Shield, or $10.00 total. If an insured buys Drug X from Pharmacy B, the insured pays Pharmacy B $10.00, and receives $6.00 (75 percent of the difference between the retail price and $2.00) from Blue Shield. While Pharmacy B receives the same as Pharmacy A, the insured must pay $4.00 for the drug and also must take steps to obtain reimbursement.
“If the pharmacy’s acquisition cost for the drug is $5.00 rather than $8.00, the situations of Pharmacy B and the insured are unchanged. But now Pharmacy A will receive only $5.00 from Blue Shield, for a total of $7.00.”
Even if they are the “business of insurance,” the Agreements are exempt from the antitrust laws only if they are also “regulated by State law” within the meaning of § 2 (b) and not “boycotts” or other conduct described by § 3 (b). See n. 1, supra. See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U. S. 531.
It is axiomatic that conduct which is not exempt from the antitrust laws may nevertheless be perfectly legal. The United States in its amicus brief urging affirmance has taken the position that the Pharmacy Agreements probably do not violate the antitrust laws, though recognizing that that issue is not presented here.
The issue in that case was the meaning of the "boycott” exception in § 3 (b) of the Act. The issue here, the meaning of the “business of insurance” exemption in § 2 (b) of the Act, was not before the Court.
Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language 1289 (unabr. 2d ed. 1958) defines insurance as:
“Act of insuring, or assuring, against loss or damage by a contingent event; a contract whereby, for a stipulated consideration, called a 'premium, one party undertakes to indemnify or guarantee another against loss by a certain specified contingency or peril, called a risk, the contract being set forth in a document called the policy....''
The issue in SEC v. Variable Annuity Lije Ins. Co. was whether the variable annuity contracts were subject to regulation under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Investment Company Act of 1940. The Court held that the contracts were subject to such regulation as securities since they were not “insurance” or “annuity” policies specifically exempt from the Securities Act, and because they were not the “business of insurance” within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
It is true that some type of provider agreement is necessary for a service benefit plan to exist. But it does not follow that because an agreement is necessary to provide insurance, it is also the “business of insurance.” Assume, for example, that an indemnity insurer must have a line of credit or other commercial arrangement with a bank in order to pay off monetary claims. Despite the fact that the line of credit is “necessary” for the insurer to fulfill its obligations, it is nevertheless not the “business of insurance.”
Thus, the benefit promised to Blue Shield policyholders under the policy is that they “shall be required to pay no more than the drug deductible for each of such covered drugs.”
As the Court of Appeals stated:
“Blue Shield’s policyholders are basically unconcerned with the contract between the insurer and the Participating Pharmacy. They are obligated to pay a Participating Pharmacy two dollars ($2.00) for a prescription regardless of the presence or absence of a price fixing arrangement. Thus, by minimizing costs and maximizing profits, the Participating Pharmacy Agreements inure principally to the benefit of Blue Shield.” 556 F. 2d 1375, 1381.
As the United States points out in its amicus brief, there is an important distinction between risk underwriting and risk reduction. By reducing the total amount it must pay to policyholders, an insurer reduces os liability and therefore its risk. But unless there is some element of spreading risk more widely, there is no underwriting of risk.
In National Securities, the Arizona Director of Insurance approved, pursuant to statute, a merger between two insurance companies. This Court held, however, that the Arizona statute was not enacted for the purpose of regulating the “business of insurance.” 393 U. S., at 460. If a merger between two insurance companies is not the “business of insurance,” then an acquisition by an insurer of a manufacturer or a retail chain, although conceptually indistinguishable from the Pharmacy Agreements in this case, is also not the “business of insurance.”
The petitioners argue that the absence of the Pharmacy Agreements "which permit the insured to obtain drugs on the terms and for the amounts stated in the policies would constitute a breach of the contract of insurance.” But the benefit Blue Shield provides its policyholders is the assurance that they can obtain drugs in return for a direct maximum payment of $2 for each prescription. The Pharmacy Agreements are separate contractual arrangements between Blue Shield and certain pharmacists fixing the cost Blue Shield will pay for drugs. The wholly separate nature of the two categories of agreements is in no way affected by the fact that the Pharmacy Agreements are indirectly referred to in the insurance policies.
Since the leading case of Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 183, it had been understood that “[ijssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce.”
S. Rep. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1945); H. R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1945). The problem was that if insurance was interstate commerce, then the constitutionality of state regulation and taxation would be questionable. As the House Report stated:
“Inevitable uncertainties... followed the handing down of the decision in the Southeastern Underwriters Association case....
“[Y]our committee believes there is urgent need for an immediate expression of policy by the Congress with respect to the continued regulation of the business of insurance by the respective States. Already many insurance companies have refused, while others have threatened refusal to comply with State tax laws, as well as with other State regulations, on the ground that to do so, when such laws may subsequently be held unconstitutional in keeping with the precedent-smashing decision in the Southeastern Underwriters case, will subject insurance executives to both civil and criminal actions for misappropriation of company funds.” Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
See text of
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners are two public defenders working in the State of Oregon. Petitioner Bruce Tower, the Douglas County Public Defender, represented respondent Billy Irl Glover at one of Glover’s state trials on robbery charges, at which Glover was convicted. Petitioner Gary Babcock, the Oregon State Public Defender, represented Glover in Glover’s unsuccessful state-court appeal from this and at least one other conviction.
In an action brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, Glover alleges that petitioners conspired with various state officials, including the trial and appellate court judges and the former Attorney General of Oregon, to secure Glover’s conviction. Glover seeks neither reversal of his conviction nor compensatory damages, but asks instead for $5 million in punitive damages to be awarded against each petitioner. App. 5, 9. We conclude that public defenders are not immune from liability in actions brought by a criminal defendant against state public defenders who are alleged to have conspired with state officials to deprive the § 1983 plaintiff of federal constitutional rights.
I
Glover was arrested on February 1, 1976, in Del Norte County, Cal. Pet. for Cert, in Glover v. Dolan, O. T. 1978, No. 78-5457, p. 3. The State of California extradited Glover to Benton County, Ore., on December 6, 1976. Upon arriving in Oregon Glover immediately filed for habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court, seeking, apparently, a stay of his pending state-court trial. A hearing on this petition was held in January 1977, and immediate relief was denied.
Before any final disposition of his federal habeas action, Glover was tried and convicted on different robbery charges in at least two Oregon state courts. One trial — the trial to which this § 1983 action is directly linked — was held in Douglas County Circuit Court, case No. 76-0386. Glover was represented by petitioner Tower, and was convicted. Petitioner Babcock represented Glover in the appeal from that conviction. The conviction was summarily affirmed by the Oregon Court of Appeals on January 18, 1978. Oregon v. Glover, 32 Ore. App. 177, 573 P. 2d 780. A second robbery trial — the trial in connection with which Glover had filed his federal habeas action — was held in the Benton County Circuit Court, case No. 31159. Pet. for Cert. in No. 78-5457, supra, at 6, 9. On April 6, 1977, Glover was convicted; five days later he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. This conviction was affirmed on April 17, 1978. Oregon v. Glover, 33 Ore. App. 553, 577 P. 2d 91. Petitioner Babcock represented Glover in this state-court appeal as well.
Meanwhile, on December 6, 1977, the Federal Magistrate to whom Glover’s habeas petition had been referred recommended that it be dismissed. On March 6, 1978, the District Court dismissed the habeas petition on the ground that Glover had failed to exhaust state remedies. Glover v. Dolan, No. 77-276 (Dist. Ct. Ore.). Glover gave notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but the District Court refused to issue a certificate of probable cause. The Court of Appeals dismissed Glover’s application for a certificate of probable cause on July 12, 1978, agreeing with the District Court that Glover had failed to exhaust state remedies. Glover v. Dolan, No. 78-8077 (CA9). In a petitition for a writ of certiorari filed with this Court, Glover contended that the Ninth Circuit and the District Court had erred in requiring him to exhaust state-court remedies before bringing his federal habeas petition. This Court denied the petition for certiorari. 439 U. S. 1075 (1979).
While incarcerated in the Oregon State Penitentiary, Glover then initiated new lawsuits, again attacking his conviction simultaneously in both state and federal courts, and these suits, again, proceeded in parallel for almost three years. First, on December 11, 1980, Glover filed a petition for postconviction relief in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for Marion County, seeking to have his conviction set aside on the basis of the alleged conspiracy between his lawyers and various state officials. This state-court petition was later consolidated with a petition for postconviction relief filed in connection with Glover’s Benton County conviction. On the following day, December 12, 1980, Glover filed this § 1983 action against petitioners in Federal District Court. His factual allegations were identical to those made in the state-court petition — indeed, Glover simply appended copies of papers filed in state court to his federal-court complaint.
On April 1, 1981, the Federal District Court granted petitioners’ motion to dismiss Glover’s § 1983 action, relying on a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that had held public defenders absolutely immune from §1983 liability, Miller v. Barilla, 549 F. 2d 648 (1977). App. B to Pet. for Cert.
On February 23, 1983, the consolidated state-court petitions came to trial before the Marion County Circuit Court. The state court found that there had been no conspiracy to convict Glover and therefore denied Glover’s request for relief. Two weeks later, on March 1, 1983, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the Federal District Court’s decision and remanded for trial in light of this Court’s decisions in Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193 (1979), and Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U. S. 312 (1981). 700 F. 2d 556. On May 31, 1983, petitioners filed in this Court a petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On June 29, 1983, Glover filed a notice of appeal in the State Court of Oregon Court of Appeals on the consolidated judgment from the Marion County court. The Oregon Court of Appeals dismissed Glover’s appeal for failure to prosecute on August 22,1983. We issued a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on October 3, 1983. 464 U. S. 813.
II
Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides that “[e]very person” who acts “under color of” state law to deprive another of constitutional rights shall be liable in a suit for damages. Petitioners concede, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that Glover’s conspiracy allegations “cast the color of state law over [petitioners’] actions.” Brief for Petitioners 14; see 700 F. 2d., at 558, n. 1.
In Polk County v. Dodson, supra, we held that appointed counsel in a state criminal prosecution, though paid and ultimately supervised by the State, does not act “under color of” state law in the normal course of conducting the defense. See also Ferri v. Ackerman, supra. In Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U. S. 24, 27-28 (1980), however, the Court held that an otherwise private person acts “under color of” state law when engaged in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive another of federal rights. Glover alleges that petitioners conspired with state officials, and his complaint, therefore, includes an adequate allegation of conduct “under color of” state law.
Ill
On its face § 1983 admits no immunities. But since 1951 this Court has consistently recognized that substantive doctrines of privilege and immunity may limit the relief available in § 1983 litigation. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 417-419 (1976); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U. S. 522 (1984). The Court has recognized absolute §1983 immunity for legislators acting within their legislative roles, Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951), for judges acting within their judicial roles, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554-555 (1967), for prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, and for witnesses, Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U. S. 325 (1983), and has recognized qualified immunity for state executive officers and school officials, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975).
Section 1983 immunities are “predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it.” Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 421; Pulliam v. Allen, supra, at 529. If an official was accorded immunity from tort actions at common law when the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1871, the Court next considers whether § 1983’s history or purposes nonetheless counsel against recognizing the same immunity in §1983 actions. See Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 424-429; Briscoe v. LaHue, supra, at 335-337. Using this framework we conclude that public defenders have no immunity from § 1983 liability for intentional misconduct of the type alleged here.
No immunity for public defenders, as such, existed at common law in 1871 because there was, of course, no such office or position in existence at that time. The first public defender program in the United States was reportedly established in 1914. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 Wis. L. Rev. 473, 476. Our inquiry, however, cannot stop there. Immunities in this country have regularly been borrowed from the English precedents, and the public defender has a reasonably close “cousin” in the English barrister. Like public defenders, barristers are not free to pick and choose their clients. They are thought to have no formal contractual relationship with their clients, and they are incapable of suing their clients for a fee. See Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] 1 A. C. 191; Kaus & Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel — Reflections on “Criminal Malpractice,” 21 UCLA L. Rev. 1191, 1193-1195, nn. 7-9 (1974). It is therefore noteworthy that English barristers enjoyed in the 19th century, as they still do today, a broad immunity from liability for negligent misconduct. Rondel v. Worsley, supra, a recent decision from the House of Lords, traces this immunity from its origins in 1435 until the present. Nevertheless, it appears that even barristers have never enjoyed immunity from liability for intentional misconduct, id., at 287 (opinion of Lord Pearson), and it is only intentional misconduct that concerns us here.
In this country the public defender’s only 19th-century counterpart was a privately retained lawyer, and petitioners do not suggest that such a lawyer would have enjoyed immunity from tort liability for intentional misconduct. Cf. Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U. S. 494 (1880); Von Wallhoffen v. Newcombe, 10 Hun. 236 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1877); Hoopes v. Burnett, 26 Miss. 428 (1853). This pattern has continued. Petitioners concede that Oregon, the State in which they practice, has given no indication, by statute or appellate decision, that public defenders are immune under state tort law from liability for intentional misconduct. Indeed, few state appellate courts have addressed the question of public defender immunity; none to our knowledge has concluded that public defenders should enjoy immunity for intentional misconduct. It is true that at common law defense counsel would have benefited from immunity for defamatory statements made in the course of judicial proceedings, see Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, at 426, n. 23, and 439 (White, J., concurring in judgment), but this immunity would not have covered a conspiracy by defense counsel and other state officials to secure the defendant’s conviction.
Finally, petitioners contend that public defenders have responsibilities similar to those of a judge or prosecutor, and therefore should enjoy similar immunities. The threat of § 1983 actions based on alleged conspiracies among defense counsel and other state officials may deter counsel from engaging in activities that require some degree of cooperation with prosecutors — negotiating pleas, expediting trials and appeals, and so on. Ultimately, petitioners argue, the State’s attempt to meet its constitutional obligation to furnish criminal defendants with effective counsel will be impaired. At the same time, the federal courts may be inundated with frivolous lawsuits.
Petitioners’ concerns may be well founded, but the remedy petitioners urge is not for us to adopt. We do not have a license to establish immunities from §1983 actions in the interests of what we judge to be sound public policy. It is for Congress to determine whether § 1983 litigation has become too burdensome to state or federal institutions and, if so, what remedial action is appropriate. We conclude that state public defenders are not immune from liability under § 1983 for intentional misconduct, “under color of” state law, by virtue of alleged conspiratorial action with state officials that deprives their clients of federal rights.
> H-l
As we have already described swpra, at 916-919, Glover has already had more than one day in court. Indeed, those not familiar with the delicate intricacies of § 1983 jurisdiction might characterize Glover’s successful initiation and prosecution of entirely parallel and duplicative state and federal actions as a great waste of judicial resources. But it appears that by now, at least, Glover has exhausted or defaulted on state-court opportunities to have his conviction set aside on the basis of the alleged conspiracy among his lawyers and state officials. We therefore have no occasion to decide if a Federal District Court should abstain from deciding a § 1983 suit for damages stemming from an unlawful conviction pending the collateral exhaustion of state-court attacks on the conviction itself. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971) (federal court may not enjoin ongoing criminal proceeding); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973) (§1983 action for injunctive relief may not be used to bypass exhaustion requirements of federal habeas corpus action); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327, 339, n. 16 (1977) (this Court has had no occasion to determine whether a §1983 damages action may engage Younger principles); Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U. S. 496, 518-519 (1982) (White, J., concurring in part) (“[A] defendant in a civil or administrative enforcement proceeding may not enjoin and sidetrack that proceeding by resorting to a § 1983 action in federal court”).
It is open to the District Court on remand to consider whether Glover is now collaterally estopped in this action by the state court’s finding that the conspiracy alleged in Glover’s §1983 complaint never occurred. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U. S. 90 (1980); see n. 4, supra. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is affirmed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis filed in connection with Pet. for Cert. in Glover v. Dolan, O. T. 1978, No. 78-5457, p. 4; Glover v. Dolan, No. 77-276 (Dist. Ct. Ore.) (Magistrate’s Findings and Recommendation, Dec. 6,1977), reprinted in App. to Response to Pet. for Cert. in Glover v. Dolan, O. T. 1978, No. 78-5457, p. A-1.
Id., at A-2; Pet. for Cert, in Glover v. Dolan, O. T. 1978, No. 78-5457, p. 10; Glover v. Dolan, supra, at A-2.
We note that Glover’s § 1983 complaint, filed December 12, 1980, asserts that Glover has not “begun other lawsuits in state or federal court dealing with the same facts involved in this [§ 1983] action or otherwise relating to [his] imprisonment.” App. 2. This statement was apparently accurate when Glover signed the complaint, but had ceased to be so when the complaint was actually filed in Federal District Court. There is no reference in the decisions of the Federal District Court or Court of Appeals to the parallel proceedings that were then in progress in the state courts.
In its “Findings of Fact” the Marion County Court stated:
“1. The trial judge did not act to the prejudice of the petitioner in that:
“b) Trial judge did not arbitrarily exclude evidence and witnesses.
“c) Trial judge did not participate in a conspiracy against petitioner with the trial counsel.
“2. Petitioner was afforded effective assistance of trial counsel as trial counsel was adequately prepared for trial in securing the necessary evidence and witnesses.
“4. Petitioner was afforded effective assistance of appellate counsel. . . .” Marion County Circuit Court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in No. 125,747, pp. 2-3, (June 2, 1983).
Windsor v. Gibson, 424 So. 2d 888 (Fla. App. 1982); Donigan v. Finn, 95 Mich. App. 28, 290 N. W. 2d 80 (1980); Reese v. Danforth, 486 Pa. 479, 406 A. 2d 735 (1979); Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 362 A. 2d 871 (1975). But see Scott v. City of Niagara Falls, 95 Misc. 2d 353, 407 N. Y. S. 2d 103 (Sup. 1978) (public defenders enjoy immunity for discretionary decisions taken in pursuance of their duties as public defenders).
See, e. g., Meadows v. Evans, 529 F. 2d 385, 386 (CA5 1976), aff’d en banc, 550 F. 2d 345, cert. denied, 434 U. S. 969 (1977); Martin v. Merola, 532 F. 2d 191, 194-195 (CA2 1976); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F. 2d 1249, 1251-1255 (CA1 1974); Alexander v. Emerson, 489 F. 2d 285 (CA5 1973).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. § 2254, “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U. S. 594, 598 (2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the Court of Appeals departed from this standard, and we therefore grant certiorari and reverse.
Irving Cross was tried for kidnaping and sexually assaulting A. S. at knifepoint. Cross claimed that A. S. had consented to sex in exchange for money and drugs. Despite her avowed fear of taking the stand, A. S. testified as the State’s primary witness at Cross’ trial in November 1999 and was cross-examined by Cross’ attorney. According to the trial judge, A. S.’s testimony was halting. The jury found Cross not guilty of kidnaping but was unable to reach a verdict on the sexual assault charges, and the trial judge declared a mistrial. The State decided to retry Cross on those counts, and the retrial was scheduled for March 29, 2000.
On March 20, 2000, the prosecutor informed the trial judge that A. S. could not be located. A week later, on March 28, the State moved to have A. S. declared unavailable and to introduce her prior testimony at the second trial.
The State represented that A. S. had said after the first trial that she was willing to testify at the retrial. The State said that it had remained in “constant contact” with A. S. and her mother and that “[ejvery indication” had been that A. S., “though extremely frightened, would be willing to again come to court and testify.” Record, Exh. J, p. Ill (hereinafter Exh. J). On March 3, however, A. S.’s mother and brother told the State’s investigator that they did not know where she was, and A. S.’s mother reported that A. S. was “very fearful and very concerned” about testifying again. Record, Exh. K, p. E-9 (hereinafter Exh. K); id., at E-14. On March 9 or 10, the investigator interviewed A. S.’s father, who also had “no idea where [A. S.] was.” Id., at E-12. The father’s only suggestion was to refer the investigator back to the mother.
On March 10, the State learned from A. S.’s mother that A. S. had run away from home the day before and had not returned. Exh. J, at 111. Thereafter, “efforts began by members of the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office and by law enforcement personnel to locate” A. S. Id., at 112. The State averred that its efforts included the following:
“Constant personal visits to the home of [A. S.] and her mother, at all hours of the day and night. This is where the victim has lived since the sexual assault occurred.
“Personal visits to the home of [A. S.’s] father. This is where the victim lived when the sexual assault occurred.
“Personal conversations, in English and in Spanish, with the victim’s mother, father, and other family members.
“Telephone calls, in English and in Spanish, to the victim’s mother, father, and other family members.
“Checks at the Office of the Medical Examiner of Cook County.
“Checks at local hospitals.
“Checks at the Cook County Department of Corrections.
“Check at the victim’s school.
“Check with the family of an old boyfriend of the victim.
“Check with the Illinois Secretary of State’s Office.
“[Department of] Public [A]id check.” Id., at 112-113.
The State also inquired at the Department of Public Health, the morgue, the Cook County Jail, the Illinois Department of Corrections, the Immigration Department, and the post office. See Exh. K, at E-14 to E-17, E-21; App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a. The State’s investigator was assisted in the search by a police detective and a victim’s advocate. The detective visited A. S.’s father’s home once and went to A. S.’s mother’s home — A. S.’s last-known residence — on numerous occasions, approximately once every three days, at different hours of the day and night. Exh. K, at E-27 to E-29, E-35. On one visit, A. S.’s mother told the victim’s advocate that A. S. could be staying with an ex-boyfriend in Waukegan, Illinois, 40 miles away. Id., at E-42 to E-43. The police detective visited the Waukegan address but was informed by the ex-boyfriend’s mother that she had not seen A. S. in several months and that A. S. was not staying with her or her son. Id., at E-33 to E-34. The efforts to find A. S. continued until March 28, the day of the hearing on the State’s motion. Id., at E-30.
On a final visit to A. S.’s mother on the morning of March 28, the mother informed the police detective that A. S. had called approximately two weeks earlier and had said that she did not want to testify and would not return to Chicago. See id., at E-30; 632 F. 3d 356, 359 (CA7 2011). A. S.’s mother told the detective that she still did not know where A. S. was or how to contact her. Exh. K, at E-30.
The trial court granted the State’s motion and admitted A. S.’s earlier testimony. The trial court concluded that the State had “expended efforts that go way beyond due diligence,” id., at E-65, and that A. S. “ha[d] made it impossible for anybody to find where she is ... in spite of what I think are superhuman efforts to locate [her],” id., at E-67. At Cross’ retrial, a legal intern from the State’s attorney’s office read A. S.’s prior, cross-examined testimony to the jury. According to the opinion below, the clerk’s reading of the prior testimony did not include the long pauses that occurred at the first trial, and the clerk read the transcript with a slight inflection. See 632 F. 3d, at 359. The jury acquitted Cross of aggravated sexual assault but found him guilty of two counts of criminal sexual assault.
On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court agreed that A. S. was unavailable because “[i]t is clear from her telephone conversation with her mother that she was not in the city” and “also evident that she was in hiding and did not want to be located.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a. The court found that the State had conducted a good-faith, diligent search to locate A. S., and that the trial court had properly allowed the introduction of A. S.’s cross-examined testimony from the first trial. The court, therefore, affirmed Cross’ convictions and sentence. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied Cross’ petition for leave to appeal, and we denied Cross’ petition for a writ of certiorari.
Cross then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Cross argued, among other things, that the state court had unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedents holding that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment precludes the admission of the prior testimony of an allegedly unavailable witness unless the prosecution made a good-faith effort to obtain the declarant’s presence at trial. The District Court denied Cross’ petition, but the Seventh Circuit reversed. According to the Seventh Circuit, the Illinois Appellate Court was unreasonable in holding that the State had made a sufficient effort to secure A. S.’s presence at the retrial. The Seventh Circuit stressed the importance of A. S.’s testimony and the manner of her testimony at the first trial.
In Barber v. Page, 390 U. S. 719 (1968), we held that “a witness is not ‘unavailable’ for purposes of the ... confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.” Id., at 724-725. In Barber, we held that a witness had not been unavailable for Confrontation Clause purposes because the State, which could have brought the witness to court by seeking a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, had “made absolutely no effort to obtain [his] presence ... at trial” apart from determining that he was serving a sentence in a federal prison. Id., at 723; see also id., at 725.
We again addressed the question of witness unavailability in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980). In that case, we held, the State had discharged its “duty of good-faith effort.” Id., at 75. We noted that the prosecutor had spoken to the witness’ mother, who reported that she had no knowledge of her daughter’s whereabouts and “knew of no way to reach [her] even in an emergency.” Ibid. We also noted that the State had served five subpoenas in the witness’ name to her parents’ residence over a 4-month period prior to the trial. “ ‘The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness,’” the Court made clear, “‘is a question of reasonableness.’ ” Id., at 74 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U. S. 149, 189, n. 22 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). We acknowledged that there were some additional steps that the prosecutor might have taken in an effort to find the witness, but we observed that “[o]ne, in hindsight, may always think of other things.” 448 U. S., at 75. But “the great improbability that such efforts would have resulted in locating the witness, and would have led to her production at trial, neutralizes any intimation that a concept of reasonableness required their execution.” Id., at 76.
In the present case, the holding of the Illinois Appellate Court that the State conducted the requisite good-faith search for A. S. did not represent an unreasonable application of our Confrontation Clause precedents. Whether or not the state court went too far in characterizing the prosecution’s efforts as “superhuman,” the state court identified the correct Sixth Amendment standard and applied it in a reasonable manner.
The Seventh Circuit found that the State’s efforts were inadequate for three main reasons. First, the Seventh Circuit faulted the State for failing to contact “A. S.’s current boyfriend — whom she was with just moments before the alleged assault — or any of her other friends in the Chicago area.” 632 F. 3d, at 362. But the record does not show that any of A. S.’s family members or any other persons interviewed by the State provided any reason to believe that any of these individuals had information about A. S.’s whereabouts.
Second, the Seventh Circuit criticized the State because it did not make inquiries at the cosmetology school where A. S. had once been enrolled, ibid., but the court’s own opinion observed that the information about A. S.’s enrollment at the cosmetology school after the mistrial was not “noteworthy” or “particularly helpful,” ibid. Since A. S. had not attended the school for some time, Exh. K, at E-42, there is no reason to believe that anyone at the school had better information about A. S.’s location than did the members of her family.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit found that the State’s efforts were insufficient because it had neglected to serve her with a subpoena after she expressed fear about testifying at the retrial. A. S., however, had expressed fear about testifying at the first trial but had nevertheless appeared in court and had taken the stand. The State represented that A. S., although fearful, had agreed to testify at the retrial as well. 632 F. 3d, at 362. We have never held that the prosecution must have issued a subpoena if it wishes to prove that a witness who goes into hiding is unavailable for Confrontation Clause purposes, and the issuance of a subpoena may do little good if a sexual assault witness is so fearful of an assailant that she is willing to risk his acquittal by failing to testify at trial.
As we observed in Roberts, when a witness disappears before trial, it is always possible to think of additional steps that the prosecution might have taken to secure the witness’ presence, see 448 U. S., at 75, but the Sixth Amendment does not require the prosecution to exhaust every avenue of inquiry, no matter how unpromising. And, more to the point, the deferential standard of review set out in 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) does not permit a federal court to overturn a state court’s decision on the question of unavailability merely because the federal court identifies additional steps that might have been taken. Under AEDPA, if the state-court decision was reasonable, it cannot be disturbed.
The petition for a writ of certiorari and Cross’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is
Reversed.
The State’s motion does not mention the investigator’s March 3 visit with A. S.’s mother and brother, and the record in this case does not make entirely clear when A. S. disappeared and when the State’s attorney actually became aware of this fact. In any event, the parties do not dispute the facts in this case regarding the State’s efforts to locate A. S. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether respondent’s death penalty must be vacated because one of the three statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury was subsequently held to be invalid by the Supreme Court of Georgia, although the other two aggravating circumstances were specifically upheld. The answer depends on the function of the jury’s finding of an aggravating circumstance under Georgia’s capital sentencing statute, and on the reasons that the aggravating circumstance at issue in this particular case was found to be invalid.
In January 1975 a jury in Bleckley County, Georgia, convicted respondent of the murder of Roy Asbell and sentenced him to death. The evidence received at the guilt phase of his trial, which included his confessions and the testimony of a number of witnesses, described these events: On August 19, 1974, while respondent was serving sentences for several burglary convictions and was also awaiting trial for escape, he again escaped from the Houston County Jail. In the next two days he committed two auto thefts, an armed robbery, and several burglaries. On August 21st, Roy Asbell interrupted respondent and an accomplice in the course of burglarizing the home of Asbell’s son in Twiggs County. Respondent beat Asbell, robbed him, and, with the aid of the accomplice, drove him in his own vehicle a short distance into Bleckley County. There they killed Asbell by shooting him twice through the ear at point blank range.
At the sentencing phase of the trial the State relied on the evidence adduced at the guilt phase and also established that respondent’s prior criminal record included convictions on two counts of armed robbery, five counts of burglary, and one count of murder. Respondent testified that he was “sorry” and knew he deserved to be punished, that his accomplice actually shot Asbell, and that they had both been “pretty high” on drugs. The State requested the jury to impose the death penalty and argued that the evidence established the aggravating circumstances identified in subparagraphs (b)(1), (b)(7), and (b)(9) of the Georgia capital sentencing statute.
The trial judge instructed the jury that under the law of Georgia “every person [found] guilty of Murder shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life, the sentence to be fixed by the jury trying the case.” App. 18. He explained that the jury was authorized to consider all of the evidence received during the trial as well as all facts and circumstances presented in extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation during the sentencing proceeding. He then stated:
“You may consider any of the following statutory aggravating circumstances which you find are supported by the evidence. One, the offense of Murder was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a Capital felony, or the offense of Murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious as-saultive criminal convictions. Two, the offense of Murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim. Three, the offense of Murder was committed by a person who has escaped from the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement. These possible statutory circumstances are stated in writing and will be out with you during your deliberations on the sentencing phase of this case. They are in writing here, and I shall send this out with you. If the jury verdict on sentencing fixes punishment at death by electrocution you shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman, the aggravating circumstances or circumstance which you found to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Unless one or more of these statutory aggravating circumstances are proven beyond a reasonable doubt you will not be authorized to fix punishment at death.”
The jury followed the court’s instruction and imposed the death penalty. It designated in writing that it had found the aggravating circumstances described as “One” and “Three” in the judge’s instruction. It made no such finding with respect to “Two.” It should be noted that the jury’s finding under “One” encompassed both alternatives identified in the judge’s instructions and in subsection (b)(1) of the statute— that respondent had a prior conviction of a capital felony and that he had a substantial history of serious assaultive convictions. These two alternatives and the finding that the murder was committed by an escapee are described by the parties as the three aggravating circumstances found by the jury, but they may also be viewed as two statutory aggravating circumstances, one of which rested on two grounds.
In his direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia respondent did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the aggravating circumstances found by the jury. Nor did he argue that there was any infirmity in the statutory definition of those circumstances. While his appeal was pending, however, the Georgia Supreme Court held in Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 584, 539-542, 224 S. E. 2d 386, 391-392 (1976), that the aggravating circumstance described in the second clause of (b)(1) — “a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions” — was unconstitutionally vague. Because such a finding had been made by the jury in this case, the Georgia Supreme Court, on its own motion, considered whether it impaired respondent’s death sentence. It concluded that the two other aggravating circumstances adequately supported the sentence. Stephens v. State, 287 Ga. 259, 261-262, 227 S. E. 2d 261, 263, cert. denied, 429 U. S. 986 (1976). The state court reaffirmed this conclusion in a subsequent appeal from the denial of state habeas corpus relief. Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 603-604, 247 S. E. 2d 92, 97-98, cert. denied, 439 U. S. 991 (1978).
After the Federal District Court had denied a petition for habeas corpus, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered two constitutional challenges to respondent’s death sentence. 631 F. 2d 397 (1980). That court first rejected his contention that the jury was not adequately instructed that it was permitted to impose life imprisonment rather than the death penalty even if it found an aggravating circumstance. The court then held, however, that the death penalty was invalid because one of the aggravating circumstances found by the jury was later held unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeals gave two reasons for that conclusion. First, it read Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), as requiring that a jury verdict based on multiple grounds be set aside if the reviewing court cannot ascertain whether the jury relied on an unconstitutional ground. The court concluded:
“It is impossible for a reviewing court to determine satisfactorily that the verdict in this case was not decisively affected by an unconstitutional statutory aggravating circumstance. The jury had the authority to return a life sentence even if it found statutory aggravating circumstances. It is possible that even if the jurors believed that the other aggravating circumstances were established, they would not have recommended the death penalty but for the decision that the offense was committed by one having a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions, an invalid ground.” 631 F. 2d, at 406.
Second, it believed that the presence of the invalid circumstance “made it possible for the jury to consider several prior convictions of [respondent] which otherwise would not have been before it.” Ibid.
In a petition for rehearing, the State pointed out that the evidence of respondent’s prior convictions would have been admissible at the sentencing hearing even if it had not relied on the invalid circumstance. The Court of Appeals then modified its opinion by deleting its reference to the possibility that the jury had relied on inadmissible evidence. 648 F. 2d 446 (1981). It maintained, however, that the reference in the instructions to the invalid circumstance “may have unduly directed the jury’s attention to his prior convictions.” Ibid. The court concluded: “It cannot be determined with the degree of certainty required in capital cases that the instruction did not make a critical difference in the jury’s decision to impose the death penalty.” Ibid.
We granted Warden Zant’s petition for certiorari, 454 U. S. 814 (1981). The briefs on the merits revealed that different state appellate courts have reached varying conclusions concerning the significance of the invalidation of one of multiple aggravating circumstances considered by a jury in a capital case. Although the Georgia Supreme Court had consistently stated that the failure of one aggravating circumstance does not invalidate a death sentence that is otherwise adequately supported, we concluded that an exposition of the state-law premises for that view would assist in framing the precise federal constitutional issues presented by the Court of Appeals' holding. We therefore sought guidance from the Georgia Supreme Court pursuant to Georgia’s statutory certification procedure. Ga. Code §24-4536 (Supp. 1980). Zant v. Stephens, 456 U. S. 410 (1982).
In its response to our certified question, the Georgia Supreme Court first distinguished Stromberg as a case in which the jury might have relied exclusively on a single invalid ground, noting that the jury in this case had expressly relied on valid and sufficient grounds for its verdict. The court then explained the state-law premises for its treatment of aggravating circumstances by analogizing the entire body of Georgia law governing homicides to a pyramid. It explained:
“All cases of homicide of every category are contained within the pyramid. The consequences flowing to the perpetrator increase in severity as the cases proceed from the base to the apex, with the death penalty applying only to those few cases which are contained in the space just beneath the apex. To reach that category a case must pass through three planes of division between the base and the apex.
“The first plane of division above the base separates from all homicide cases those which fall into the category of murder. This plane is established by the legislature in statutes defining terms such as murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and justifiable homicide. In deciding whether a given case falls above or below this plane, the function of the trier of facts is limited to finding facts. The plane remains fixed unless moved by legislative act.
“The second plane separates from all murder cases those in which the penalty of death is a possible punishment. This plane is established by statutory definitions of aggravating circumstances. The function of the factfinder is again limited to making a determination of whether certain facts have been established. Except where there is treason or aircraft hijacking, a given case may not move above this second plane unless at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists. Code Ann. §27-2534.1(c).
“The third plane separates, from all cases in which a penalty of death may be imposed, those cases in which it shall be imposed. There is an absolute discretion in the factfinder to place any given case below the plane and not impose death. The plane itself is established by the factfinder. In establishing the plane, the factfinder considers all evidence in extenuation, mitigation and aggravation of punishment. Code Ann. §27-2503 and § 27-2534.1. There is a final limitation on the imposition of the death penalty resting in the automatic appeal procedure: This court determines whether the penalty of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; whether the statutory aggravating circumstances are supported by the evidence; and whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. Code Ann. § 27-2587. Performance of this function may cause this court to remove a case from the death penalty category but can never have the opposite result.
“The purpose of the statutory aggravating circumstances is to limit to a large degree, but not completely, the factfinder’s discretion. Unless at least one of the ten statutory aggravating circumstances exists, the death penalty may not be imposed in any event. If there exists at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, the death penalty may be imposed but the factfinder has a discretion to decline to do so without giving any reason. Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 369, 283 S. E. 2d 238 (1981); Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 334, 240 S. E. 2d 833 (1977); Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 240 S. E. 2d 37 1977). In making the decision as to the penalty, the factfinder takes into consideration all circumstances before it from both the guilt-innocence and the sentence phases of the trial. These circumstances relate both to the offense and the defendant.
“A case may not pass the second plane into that area in which the death penalty is authorized unless at least one statutory aggravating circumstance is found. However, this plane is passed regardless of the number of statutory aggravating circumstances found, so long as there is at least one. Once beyond this plane, the case enters the area of the factfinder’s discretion, in which all the facts and circumstances of the case determine, in terms of our metaphor, whether or not the case passes the third plane and into the area in which the death penalty is imposed.” 250 Ga. 97, 99-100, 297 S. E. 2d 1, 3-4 (1982).
The Georgia Supreme Court then explained why the failure of the second ground of the (b)(1) statutory aggravating circumstance did not invalidate respondent’s death sentence. It first noted that the evidence of respondent’s prior convictions had been properly received and could properly have been considered by the jury. The court expressed the opinion that the mere fact that such evidence was improperly designated “statutory” had an “inconsequential impact” on the jury’s death penalty decision. Finally, the court noted that a different result might be reached if the failed circumstance had been supported by evidence not otherwise admissible or if there was reason to believe that, because of the failure, the sentence was imposed under the influence of an arbitrary factor. Id., at 100, 297 S. E. 2d, at 4.
We are indebted to the Georgia Supreme Court for its helpful response to our certified question. That response makes it clear that we must confront three separate issues in order to decide this case. First, does the limited purpose served by the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance in Georgia allow the jury a measure of discretion that is forbidden by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), and subsequent cases? Second, has the rule of Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), been violated? Third, in this case, even though respondent’s prior criminal record was properly admitted, does the possibility that the reference to the invalid statutory aggravating circumstance in the judge’s instruction affected the jury’s deliberations require that the death sentence be set aside? We discuss these issues in turn.
I
In Georgia, unlike some other States, the jury is not instructed to give any special weight to any aggravating circumstance, to consider multiple aggravating circumstances any more significant than a single such circumstance, or to balance aggravating against mitigating circumstances pursuant to any special standard. Thus, in Georgia, the finding of an aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its function of narrowing the class of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty. For this reason, respondent argues that Georgia’s statutory scheme is invalid under the holding in Furman v. Georgia.
A fair statement of the consensus expressed by the Court in Furman is that "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 189 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). After thus summarizing the central mandate of Furman, the joint opinion in Gregg set forth a general exposition of sentencing procedures that would satisfy the concerns of Furman. 428 U. S., at 189-195. But it expressly stated: “We do not intend to suggest that only the above-described procedures would be permissible under Fur-man or that any sentencing system constructed along these general lines would inevitably satisfy the concerns of Fur-man, for each distinct system must be examined on an individual basis.” Id., at 195. The opinion then turned to specific consideration of the constitutionality of Georgia’s capital sentencing procedures. Id., at 196-207.
Georgia’s scheme includes two important features which the joint opinion described in its general discussion of sentencing procedures that would guide and channel the exercise of discretion. Georgia has a bifurcated procedure, see id., at 190-191, and its statute also mandates meaningful appellate review of every death sentence, see id., at 195. The statute does not, however, follow the Model Penal Code’s recommendation that the jury’s discretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances against each other should be governed by specific standards. See id., at 193. Instead, as the Georgia Supreme Court has unambiguously advised us, the aggravating circumstance merely performs the function of narrowing the category of persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty.
Respondent argues that the mandate of Furman is violated by a scheme that permits the jury to exercise unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty by statute. But that argument could not be accepted without overruling our specific holding in Gregg. For the Court approved Georgia’s capital sentencing statute even though it clearly did not channel the jury’s discretion by enunciating specific standards to guide the jury’s consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
The approval of Georgia’s capital sentencing procedure rested primarily on two features of the scheme: that the jury was required to find at least one valid statutory aggravating circumstance and to identify it in writing, and that the State Supreme Court reviewed the record of every death penalty proceeding to determine whether the sentence was arbitrary or disproportionate. These elements, the opinion concluded, adequately protected against the wanton and freakish imposition of the death penalty. This conclusion rested, of course, on the fundamental requirement that each statutory aggravating circumstance must satisfy a constitutional standard derived from the principles of Furman itself. For a system “could have standards so vague that they would fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman could occur.” 428 U. S., at 195, n. 46. To avoid this constitutional flaw, an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.
Thus in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980), the Court struck down an aggravating circumstance that failed to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. Justice Stewart’s opinion for the plurality concluded that the aggravating circumstance described in subsection (b)(7) of the Georgia statute, as construed by the Georgia Supreme Court, failed to create any “inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence,” because a person of ordinary sensibility could find that almost every murder fit the stated criteria. Id., at 428-429. Moreover, the facts of the case itself did not distinguish the murder from any other murder. The plurality concluded that there was “no principled way to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many in which it was not.” Id., at 433.
Our cases indicate, then, that statutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. But the Constitution does not require the jury to ignore other possible aggravating factors in the process of selecting, from among that class, those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death. What is important at the selection stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 110-112 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 601-605 (1978) (plurality opinion); Roberts (Harry) v. Louisiana, 431 U. S. 633, 636-637 (1977); Gregg, 428 U. S., at 197 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S., at 251-252 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 303-304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
The Georgia scheme provides for categorical narrowing at the definition stage, and for individualized determination and appellate review at the selection stage. We therefore remain convinced, as we were in 1976, that the structure of the statute is constitutional. Moreover, the narrowing function has been properly achieved in this case by the two valid aggravating circumstances upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court — that respondent had escaped from lawful confinement, and that he had a prior record of conviction for a capital felony. These two findings adequately differentiate this case in an objective, evenhanded, and substantively rational way from the many Georgia murder cases in which the death penalty may not be imposed. Moreover, the Georgia Supreme Court in this case reviewed the death sentence to determine whether it was arbitrary, excessive, or disproportionate. Thus the absence of legislative or court-imposed standards to govern the jury in weighing the significance of either or both of those aggravating circumstances does not render the Georgia capital sentencing statute invalid as applied in this case.
II
Respondent contends that under the rule of Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931), and subsequent cases, the invalidity of one of the statutory aggravating circumstances underlying the jury’s sentencing verdict requires that its entire death sentence be set aside. In order to evaluate this contention, it is necessary to identify two related but different rules that have their source in the Stromberg case.
In Stromberg, a member of the Communist Party was convicted of displaying a red flag in violation of the California Penal Code. The California statute prohibited such a display (1) as a “sign, symbol or emblem” of opposition to organized government; (2) as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action; or (3) as an aid to seditious propaganda. This Court held that the first clause of the statute was repugnant to the Federal Constitution and found it unnecessary to pass on the validity of the other two clauses because the jury’s guilty verdict might have rested exclusively on a conclusion that Stromberg had violated the first. The Court explained:
“The verdict against the appellant was a general one. It did not specify the ground upon which it rested. As there were three purposes set forth in the statute, and the jury were instructed that their verdict might be given with respect to any one of them, independently considered, it is impossible to say under which clause of the statute the conviction was obtained. If any one of these clauses, which the state court has held to be separable, was invalid, it cannot be determined upon this record that the appellant was not convicted under that clause.” Id., at 367-368.
“The first clause of the statute being invalid upon its face, the conviction of the appellant, which so far as the record discloses may have rested upon that clause exclusively, must be set aside.” Id., at 369-370.
One rule derived from the Stromberg case is that a general verdict must be set aside if the jury was instructed that it could rely on any of two or more independent grounds, and one of those grounds is insufficient, because the verdict may have rested exclusively on the insufficient ground. The cases in which this rule has been applied all involved general verdicts based on a record that left the reviewing court uncertain as to the actual ground on which the jury’s decision rested. See, e. g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 292 (1942); Cramer v. United States, 325 U. S. 1, 36, n. 45 (1945); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 5-6 (1949); Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, 311-312 (1957). This rule does not require that respondent’s death sentence be vacated, because the jury did not merely return a general verdict stating that it had found at least one aggravating circumstance. The jury expressly found aggravating circumstances that were valid and legally sufficient to support the death penalty.
The second rule derived from the Stromberg case is illustrated by Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 528-529 (1945), and Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 586-590 (1969). In those cases we made clear that the reasoning of Stromberg encompasses a situation in which the general verdict on a single-count indictment or information rested on both a constitutional and an unconstitutional ground. In Thomas v. Collins, a labor organizer’s contempt citation was predicated both upon a speech expressing a general invitation to a group of nonunion workers, which the Court held to be constitutionally protected speech, and upon solicitation of a single individual. The Court declined to consider the State’s contention that the judgment could be sustained on the basis of the individual solicitation alone, for the record showed that the penalty had been imposed on account of both solicitations. “The judgment therefore must be affirmed as to both or as to neither.” 323 U. S., at 529. Similarly, in Street, the record indicated that petitioner’s conviction on a single-count indictment could have been based on his protected words as well as on his arguably unprotected conduct, flag burning. We stated that, “unless the record negates the possibility that the conviction was based on both alleged violations,” the judgment could not be affirmed unless both were valid. 394 U. S., at 588.
The Court’s opinion in Street explained:
“We take the rationale of Thomas to be that when a single-count indictment or information charges the commission of a crime by virtue of the defendant’s having done both a constitutionally protected act and one which may be unprotected, and a guilty verdict ensues without elucidation, there is an unacceptable danger that the trier of fact will have regarded the two acts as ‘intertwined’ and have rested the conviction on both together. See 323 U. S., at 528-529, 540-541. There is no comparable hazard when the indictment or information is in several counts and the conviction is explicitly declared to rest on findings of guilt on certain of these counts, for in such instances there is positive evidence that the trier of fact considered each count on its own merits and separately from the others.” Ibid, (footnote omitted).
The rationale of Thomas and Street applies to cases in which there is no uncertainty about the multiple grounds on which a general verdict rests. If, under the instructions to the jury, one way of committing the offense charged is to perform an act protected by the Constitution, the rule of these cases requires that a general verdict of guilt be set aside even if the defendant’s unprotected conduct, considered separately, would support the verdict. It is a difficult theoretical question whether the rule of Thomas and Street applies to the Georgia death penalty scheme. The jury’s imposition of the death sentence after finding more than one aggravating circumstance is not precisely the same as the jury’s verdict of guilty on a single-count indictment after finding that the defendant has engaged in more than one type of conduct encompassed by the same criminal charge, because a wider range of considerations enters into the former determination. On the other hand, it is also not precisely the same as the imposition of a single sentence of imprisonment after guilty verdicts on each of several separate counts in a multiple-count indictment, because the qualitatively different seritence of death is imposed only after a channeled sentencing procedure. We need not answer this question here. The second rule derived from Stromberg, embodied in Thomas and Street, applies only in cases in which the State has based its prosecution, at least in part, on a charge that constitutionally protected activity is unlawful. No such charge was made in respondent’s sentencing proceeding.
In Stromberg, Thomas, and Street, the trial courts’ judgments rested, in part, on the fact that the defendant had been found guilty of expressive activity protected by the First Amendment. In contrast, in this case there is no suggestion that any of the aggravating circumstances involved any conduct protected by the First Amendment or by any other provision of the Constitution. Accordingly, even if the Strom-berg rules may sometimes apply in the sentencing context, a death sentence supported by at least one valid aggravating circumstance need not be set aside under the second Strom-berg rule simply because another aggravating circumstance is “invalid” in the sense that it is insufficient by itself to support the death penalty. In this case, the jury’s finding that respondent was a person who has a “substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions” did not provide a sufficient basis for imposing the death sentence. But it raised none of the concerns underlying the holdings in Stromberg, Thomas, and Street, for it did not treat constitutionally protected conduct as an aggravating circumstance.
HH h-( f — <
Two themes have been reiterated in our opimons discussing the procedures required by the Constitution in capital sentencing determinations. On the one hand, as the general comments in the Gregg joint opinion indicated, 428 U. S., at 192-195, and as The Chief Justice explicitly noted in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S., at 605 (plurality opinion), there can be “no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose death.” See also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 638, n. 13 (1980). On the other hand, because there is a qualitative difference between death and any other permissible form of punishment, “there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S., at 305. “It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.” Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 358 (1977). Thus, although not every imperfection in the deliberative process is sufficient, even in a capital case, to set aside a state-court judgment, the severity of the sentence mandates careful scrutiny in the review of any colorable claim of error.
Respondent contends that the death sentence was impaired because the judge instructed the jury with regard to an invalid statutory aggravating circumstance, a “substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions,” for these instructions may have affected the jury’s deliberations. In analyzing this contention it is essential to keep in mind the sense in which that aggravating circumstance is “invalid.” It is not invalid because it authorizes a jury to draw adverse inferences from conduct that is constitutionally protected. Georgia has not, for example, sought to characterize the display of a red flag, cf. Stromberg v. California, the expression of unpopular political views, cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949), or the request for trial by jury, cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570 (1968), as an aggravating circumstance. Nor has Georgia attached the “aggravating” label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for example the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant, cf. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937), or to conduct that actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty, such as perhaps the defendant’s mental illness. Cf. Miller v. Florida, 373 So. 2d 882, 885-886 (Fla. 1979). If the aggravating circumstance at issue in this case had been invalid for reasons such as these, due process of law would require that the jury’s decision to impose death be set aside.
But the invalid aggravating circumstance found by the jury in this case was struck down in Arnold because the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that it fails to provide an adequate basis for distinguishing a murder case in which the death penalty may be imposed from those cases in which such a penalty may not be imposed. See nn. 5 and 16, supra. The underlying evidence is nevertheless fully admissible at the sentencing phase. As we noted in Gregg, 428 U. S., at 163, the Georgia statute provides that, at the sentencing hearing, the judge or jury
“‘shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any prior conviction and pleas: Provided, however, that only such evidence in aggravation as the State has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible.’” Ga. Code §27-2503 (1975) (emphasis supplied).
We expressly rejected petitioner’s objection to the wide scope of evidence and argument allowed at presentence hearings.
“We think that the Georgia court wisely has chosen not to impose unnecessary restrictions on the evidence that can be offered at such a hearing and to approve open and far-ranging argument.... So long as the evidence introduced and the arguments made at the presentence hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions. We think it desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision.” 428 U. S., at 203-204.
See id., at 206-207; see also n. 17, supra.
Thus, any evidence on which the jury might have relied in this case to find that respondent had previously been convicted of a substantial number of serious assaultive offenses, as he concedes he had been, was properly adduced at the sentencing hearing and was fully subject to explanation by the defendant. Cf. Gardner v. Florida, supra (requiring that the defendant have the opportunity to rebut evidence and State’s theory in sentencing proceeding); Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U. S. 14, 16, n. 3 (1978) (same). This case involves a statutory aggravating circumstance, invalidated by the State Supreme Court on grounds of vagueness, whose terms plausibly described aspects of the defendant’s background that were properly before the jury and whose accuracy was unchallenged. Hence the erroneous instruction does not implicate our repeated recognition that the “qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed.” Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S., at 604 (opinion of Burger, C. J.).
Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged on rehearing that the evidence was admissible, it expressed the concern that the trial court’s instructions “may have unduly directed the jury’s attention to his prior conviction.” 648 F. 2d, at 446. But, assuming that the instruction did induce the jury to place greater emphasis upon the respondent’s prior criminal record than it would otherwise have done, the question remains whether that emphasis violated any constitutional right. In answering this question, it is appropriate to compare the instruction that was actually given, see supra, at 866, with an instruction on the same subject that would have been unobjectionable. Cf. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U. S. 145, 154-157 (1977). Nothing in the United States Constitution prohibits a trial judge from instructing a jury that it would be appropriate to take account
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court of New York, First Judicial Department, is reversed. Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767.
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Clark would affirm. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502.
Mr. Justice Harlan adheres to the views expressed in his separate opinions in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 496, and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413, 455, and on the basis of the reasoning set forth therein would affirm.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
New constitutional rules announced by this Court that place certain kinds of primary individual conduct beyond the power of the States to proscribe, as well as “watershed” rules of criminal procedure, must be applied in all future trials, all cases pending on direct review, and all federal habeas corpus proceedings. All other new rules of criminal procedure must be applied in future trials and in cases pending on direct review, but may not provide the basis for a federal collateral attack on a state-court conviction. This is the substance of the “Teague rule” described by Justice O’Connor in her plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). The question in this case is whether Teague constrains the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion. We have never suggested that it does, and now hold that it does not.
I
In 1996, a Minnesota jury found petitioner Stephen Dan-forth guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. See Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (1994). The 6-year-old victim did not testify at trial, but the jury saw and heard a videotaped interview of the child. On appeal from his conviction, Danforth argued that the tape’s admission violated the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Applying the rule of admissibility set forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the tape “was sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence,” and affirmed the conviction. State v. Danforth, 573 N. W. 2d 369, 375 (1997). The conviction became final in 1998 when the Minnesota Supreme Court denied review and petitioner’s time for filing a writ of certiorari elapsed. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 390 (1994).
After petitioner’s conviction had become final, we announced a “new rule” for evaluating the reliability of testimonial statements in criminal cases. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 68-69 (2004), we held that where testimonial statements are at issue, “the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”
Shortly thereafter, petitioner filed a state postconviction petition, in which he argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the admission of the taped interview violated the rule announced in Crawford. Applying the standards set forth in Teague, the Minnesota trial court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that Crawford did not apply to petitioner’s case. The State Supreme Court granted review to consider two arguments: (1) that the lower courts erred in holding that Crawford did not apply retroactively under Teague; and (2) that the state court was “free to apply a broader retroactivity standard than that of Teague,” and should apply the Crawford rule to petitioner’s case even if federal law did not require it to do so. 718 N. W. 2d 451, 455 (2006). The court rejected both arguments. Ibid.
With respect to the second, the Minnesota court held that our decisions in Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47 (1973), American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167 (1990), and Teague itself establish that state courts are not free to give a Supreme Court decision announcing a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure broader retroactive application than that given by this Court. The Minnesota court acknowledged that other state courts had held that Teague does not apply to state postconviction proceedings, but concluded that “we are not free to fashion our own standard of retroactivity for Crawford.” 718 N. W. 2d, at 455-457.
Our recent decision in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U. S. 406 (2007), makes clear that the Minnesota court correctly concluded that federal law does not require state courts to apply the holding in Crawford to cases that were final when that case was decided. Nevertheless, we granted certiorari, 550 U. S. 956 (2007), to consider whether Teague or any other federal rule of law prohibits them from doing so.
II
We begin with a comment on the source of the “new rule” announced in Crawford. For much of our Nation’s history, federal constitutional rights — such as the Sixth Amendment confrontation right at issue in Crawford — were not binding on the States. Federal law, in fact, imposed no constraints on the procedures that state courts could or should follow in imposing criminal sanctions on their citizens. Neither the Federal Constitution as originally ratified nor any of the Amendments added by the Bill of Rights in 1791 gave this Court or any other federal court power to review the fairness of state criminal procedures. Moreover, before 1867 the statutory authority of federal district courts to issue writs of habeas corpus did not extend to convicted criminals in state custody. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment radically changed the federal courts’ relationship with state courts. That Amendment, one of the post-Civil War Reconstruction Amendments ratified in 1868, is the source of this Court’s power to decide whether a defendant in a state proceeding received a fair trial — i. e., whether his deprivation of liberty was “without due process of law.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”). In construing that Amendment, we have held that it imposes minimum standards of fairness on the States, and requires state criminal trials to provide defendants with protections “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937).
Slowly at first, and then at an accelerating pace in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the Court held that safeguards afforded by the Bill of Rights — including a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him” — are incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and are therefore binding upon the States. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963) (applying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the States); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 403 (1965) (holding that “the Sixth Amendment’s right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is likewise a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment”). Our interpretation of that basic Sixth Amendment right of confrontation has evolved over the years.
In Crawford we accepted the petitioner’s argument that the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation that we had previously endorsed in Roberts, 448 U. S. 56, needed reconsideration because it “strayfed] from the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause.” 541 U. S., at 42. We “turn[edj to the historical background of the Clause to understand its meaning,” id., at 43, and relied primarily on legal developments that had occurred prior to the adoption of the Sixth Amendment to derive the correct interpretation, id., at 43-50. We held that the “Constitution prescribes a procedure for determining the reliability of testimony in criminal trials, and we, no less than the state courts, lack authority to replace it with one of our own devising.” Id., at 67.
Thus, our opinion in Crawford announced a “new rule”— as that term is defined in Teague — because the result in that case “was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final,” Teague, 489 U. S., at 301 (plurality opinion). It was not, however, a rule “of our own devising” or the product of our own views about sound policy.
Ill
Our decision today must also be understood against the backdrop of our somewhat confused and confusing “retroactivity” cases decided in the years between 1965 and 1987. Indeed, we note at the outset that the very word “retroactivity” is misleading because it speaks in temporal terms. “Retroactivity” suggests that when we declare that a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure is “nonretroactive,” we are implying that the right at issue was not in existence prior to the date the “new rule” was announced. But this is incorrect. As we have already explained, the source of a “new rule” is the Constitution itself, not any judicial power to create new rules of law. Accordingly, the underlying right necessarily pre-exists our articulation of the new rule. What we are actually determining when we assess the “retroactivity” of a new rule is not the temporal scope of a newly announced right, but whether a violation of the right that occurred prior to the announcement of the new rule will entitle a criminal defendant to the relief sought.
Originally, criminal defendants whose convictions were final were entitled to federal habeas relief only if the court that rendered the judgment under which they were in custody lacked jurisdiction to do so. Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193 (1830); Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 176 (1874); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 376-377 (1880). In 1915, the realm of violations for which federal habeas relief would be available to state prisoners was expanded to include state proceedings that “deprive[d] the accused of his life or liberty without due process of law.” Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 335. In the early 1900’s, however, such relief was only granted when the constitutional violation was so serious that it effectively rendered the conviction void for lack of jurisdiction. See, e. g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923) (mob domination of a trial); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935) (per curiam) (knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942) (per curiam) (coerced guilty plea).
The serial incorporation of the Amendments in the Bill of Rights during the 1950’s and 1960’s imposed more constitutional obligations on the States and created more opportunity for claims that individuals were being convicted without due process and held in violation of the Constitution. Nevertheless, until 1965 the Court continued to construe every constitutional error, including newly announced ones, as entitling state prisoners to relief on federal habeas. “New” constitutional rules of criminal procedure were, without discussion or analysis, routinely applied to cases on habeas review.
See, e. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964); Gideon, 372 U. S. 335; Eskridge v. Washington Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U. S. 214 (1958) (per curiam).
In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965), the Court expressly considered the issue of “retroactivity” for the first time. Adopting a practical approach, we held that the retroactive effect of each new rule should be determined on a case-by-case basis by examining the purpose of the rule, the reliance of the States on the prior law, and the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the rule. Id., at 629. Applying those considerations to the exclusionary rule announced in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), we held that the Mapp rule would not be given retroactive effect; it would not, in other words, be applied to convictions that were final before the date of the Mapp decision. Linkletter, 381 U. S., at 636-640.
During the next four years, application of the Linkletter standard produced strikingly divergent results. As Justice Harlan pointed out in his classic dissent in Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 257 (1969), one new rule was applied to all cases subject to direct review, Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U. S. 406 (1966); another to all cases in which trials had not yet commenced, Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719 (1966); another to all cases in which tainted evidence had not yet been introduced at trial, Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80 (1968) (per curiam); and still others only to the party involved in the case in which the new rule was announced and to all future cases in which the proscribed official conduct had not yet occurred, Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293 (1967); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 (1968) (per curiam). He reasonably questioned whether such decisions “may properly be considered the legitimate products of a court of law, rather than the commands of a super-legislature.” 394 U. S., at 259.
Justice Harlan’s dissent in Desist, buttressed by his even more searching separate opinion in Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 675 (1971) (opinion concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part), and scholarly criticism, laid the groundwork for the eventual demise of the Linkletter standard. In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987), the Court rejected as “unprincipled and inequitable” the application of the Linkletter standard to cases pending on direct review. In Teague, Justice O’Connor reaffirmed Griffith’s rejection of the Linkletter standard for determining the “retroactive” applicability of new rules to state convictions that were not yet final and rejected the Linkletter standard for cases pending on federal habeas review. She adopted (with a significant modification) the approach advocated by Justice Harlan for federal collateral review of final state judgments.
Justice O’Connor endorsed a general rule of nonretroactivity for cases on collateral review, stating that “[ujnless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.” 489 U. S., at 310 (plurality opinion). The opinion defined two exceptions: rules that render types of primary conduct “‘beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe,’ ” id., at 311, and “watershed” rules that “implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial,” id., at 311, 312, 313.
It is clear that Linkletter and then Teague considered what constitutional violations may be remedied on federal habeas. They did not define the scope of the “new” constitutional rights themselves. Nor, as we shall explain, did Link-letter or Teague (or any of the other cases relied upon by respondent and the Minnesota Supreme Court) speak to the entirely separate question whether States can provide remedies for violations of these rights in their own postconviction proceedings.
IV
Neither Linkletter nor Teague explicitly or implicitly constrained the authority of the States to provide remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redress-able on federal habeas. Linkletter spoke in broad terms about the retroactive applicability of new rules to state convictions that had become final prior to our announcement of the rules. Although Linkletter arose on federal habeas, the opinion did not rely on that procedural posture as a factor in its holding or analysis. Arguably, therefore, the approach it established might have been applied with equal force to both federal and state courts reviewing final state convictions. But we did not state — and the state courts did not conclude — that Linkletter imposed such a limitation on the States.
The Term after deciding Linkletter, we granted certiorari in Johnson to address the retroactivity of the rules announced in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). Applying the standard announced in Linkletter, we held that those rules should be applied only to trials that began after the respective dates of those decisions; they were given no retroactive effect beyond the parties in Miranda and Escobedo themselves.
Notably, the Oregon Supreme Court decided to give retroactive effect to Escobedo despite our holding in Johnson. In State v. Fair, 263 Ore. 383, 502 P. 2d 1150 (1972), the Oregon court noted that it was continuing to apply Escobedo retroactively and correctly stated that “we are free to choose the degree of retroactivity or prospectivity which we believe appropriate to the particular rule under consideration, so long as we give federal constitutional rights at least as broad a scope as the United States Supreme Court requires.” 263 Ore., at 387-388, 502 P. 2d, at 1152. In so holding, the Oregon court cited our language in Johnson that “‘States are still entirely free to effectuate under their own law stricter standards than those we have laid down and to apply those standards in a broader range of cases than is required by this decision.’” 263 Ore., at 386, 502 P. 2d, at 1151 (quoting Johnson, 384 U. S., at 733).
Like Linkletter, Teague arose on federal habeas. Unlike in Linkletter, however, this procedural posture was not merely a background fact in Teague. A close reading of the Teague opinion makes clear that the rule it established was tailored to the unique context of federal habeas and therefore had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in their own postconviction proceedings than required by that opinion. Because the case before us now does not involve either of the “Teague exceptions,” it is Justice O’Con-nor’s discussion of the general rule of nonretroactivity that merits the following three comments.
First, not a word in Justice O’Connor’s discussion — or in either of the opinions of Justice Harlan that provided the blueprint for her entire analysis — asserts or even intimates that her definition of the class eligible for relief under a new rule should inhibit the authority of any state agency or state court to extend the benefit of a new rule to a broader class than she defined.
Second, Justice O’Connor’s opinion clearly indicates that Teague’s general rule of nonretroactivity was an exercise of this Court’s power to interpret the federal habeas statute. Chapter 153 of Title 28 of the U. S. Code gives federal courts the authority to grant “writs of habeas corpus,” but leaves unresolved many important questions about the scope of available relief. This Court has interpreted that congressional silence — along with the statute’s command to dispose of habeas petitions “as law and justice require,” 28 U. S. C. § 2243 — as an authorization to adjust the scope of the writ in accordance with equitable and prudential considerations. See, e. g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619 (1993) (harmless-error standard); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467 (1991) (abuse-of-the-writ bar to relief); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72 (1977) (procedural default); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976) (cognizability of Fourth Amendment claims). Teague is plainly grounded in this authority, as the opinion expressly situated the rule it announced in this line of cases adjusting the scope of federal habeas relief in accordance with equitable and prudential considerations. 489 U. S., at 308 (plurality opinion) (citing, inter alia, Wainwright and Stone). Since Teague is based on statutory authority that extends only to federal courts applying a federal statute, it cannot be read as imposing a binding obligation on state courts.
Third, the text and reasoning of Justice O’Connor’s opinion also illustrate that the rule was meant to apply only to federal courts considering habeas corpus petitions challenging state-court criminal convictions. Justice O’Connor made numerous references to the “Great Writ” and the “writ,” and expressly stated that “[t]he relevant frame of reference” for determining the appropriate retroactivity rule is defined by “the purposes for which the writ of habeas corpus is made available.” 489 U. S., at 306 (plurality opinion). Moreover, she justified the general rule of nonretroactivity in part by reference to comity and respect for the finality of state convictions. Federalism and comity considerations are unique to federal habeas review of state convictions. See, e. g., State v. Preciose, 129 N. J. 451, 475, 609 A. 2d 1280, 1292 (1992) (explaining that comity and federalism concerns “simply do not apply when this Court reviews procedural rulings by our lower courts”). If anything, considerations of comity militate in favor of allowing state courts to grant habeas relief to a broader class of individuals than is required by Teague. And while finality is, of course, implicated in the context of state as well as federal habeas, finality of state convictions is a state interest, not a federal one. It is a matter that States should be free to evaluate, and weigh the importance of, when prisoners held in state custody are seeking a remedy for a violation of federal rights by their lower courts.
The dissent correctly points out that Teague was also grounded in concerns over uniformity and the inequity inherent in the Linkletter approach. There is, of course, a federal interest in “reducing the inequity of haphazard retroactivity standards and disuniformity in the application of federal law.” Post, at 301. This interest in uniformity, however, does not outweigh the general principle that States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees. The fundamental interest in federalism that allows individual States to define crimes, punishments, rules of evidence, and rules of criminal and civil procedure in a variety of different ways — so long as they do not violate the Federal Constitution — is not otherwise limited by any general, undefined federal interest in uniformity. Nonuniformity is, in fact, an unavoidable reality in a federalist system of government. Any State could surely have adopted the rule of evidence defined in Crawford under state law even if that case had never been decided. It should be equally free to give its citizens the benefit of our rule in any fashion that does not offend federal law.
It is thus abundantly clear that the Teague rule of nonretroactivity was fashioned to achieve the goals of federal habeas while minimizing federal intrusion into state criminal proceedings. It was intended to limit the authority of federal courts to overturn state convictions — not to limit a state court’s authority to grant relief for violations of new rules of constitutional law when reviewing its own State’s convictions.
Our subsequent cases, which characterize the Teague rule as a standard limiting only the scope oí federal habeas relief, confirm that Teague speaks only to the context of federal habeas. See, e. g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406, 412 (2004) (“Teague’s nonretroactivity principle acts as a limitation on the power of federal courts to grant habeas corpus relief to state prisoners” (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted)); Caspari, 510 U. S., at 389 (“The [Teague] nonretroactivity principle prevents a federal court from granting habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner based on a rule announced after his conviction and sentence became final”).
It is also noteworthy that for many years following Teague, state courts almost universally understood the Teague rule as binding only federal habeas courts, not state courts. See, e. g., Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N. W. 2d 514 (S. D. 1990); Preciose, 129 N. J. 451, 609 A. 2d 1280; State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 256-257, 548 N. W. 2d 45, 49 (1996) (choosing of its own volition to adopt the Teague rule); but see State v. Egelhoff, 272 Mont. 114, 900 P. 2d 260 (1995). Commentators were similarly confident that Teague’s “restrictions applied] only to federal habeas cases,” leaving States free to “determine whether to follow the federal courts’ rulings on retroactivity or to fashion rules which respond to the unique concerns of that state.” Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on State Postconviction Remedies, 44 Ala. L. Rev. 421, 423-424, 422-423 (1993).
In sum, the Teague decision limits the kinds of constitutional violations that will entitle an individual to relief on federal habeas, but does not in any way limit the authority of a state court, when reviewing its own state criminal convictions, to provide a remedy for a violation that is deemed “nonretroactive” under Teague.
V
The State contends that two of our prior decisions — Michigan v. Payne and American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith — cast doubt on state courts’ authority to provide broader remedies for federal constitutional violations than mandated by Teague. We disagree.
A
In Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47, we considered the retroactivity of the rule prohibiting “vindictive” resentencing that had been announced in our opinion in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711, 723-726 (1969). Relying on the approach set forth in Linkletter and Stovall, we held that the Pearce rule did not apply because Payne’s resentencing had occurred prior to Pearce’s date of decision. We therefore reversed the judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court, which had applied Pearce retroactively, and remanded for further proceedings.
At first blush the fact that we reversed the judgment,of the Michigan court appears to lend support to the view that state courts may not give greater retroactive effect to new rules announced by this Court than we expressly authorize. But, as our opinion in Payne noted, the Michigan Supreme Court had applied the Pearce rule retroactively “‘pending clarification’ ” by this Court. 412 U. S., at 49. As the Michigan court explained, it had applied the new rule in the case before it in order to give guidance to Michigan trial courts concerning what it regarded as an ambiguity in Pearce’s new rule. The Michigan court did not purport to make a definitive ruling on the retroactivity of Pearce; nor did it purport to apply a broader state rule of retroactivity than required by federal law. Our opinion in Payne did not require the Michigan Supreme Court to modify its disposition of the case; it simply remanded for further proceedings after providing the clarification that the Michigan court sought. Most significantly, other than the fact that the case was remanded for further proceedings, not a word in our Payne opinion suggests that the Court intended to prohibit state courts from applying new constitutional standards in a broader range of cases than we require.
Notably, at least some state courts continued, after Payne, to adopt and apply broader standards of retroactivity than required by our decisions. In Commonwealth v. McCormick, 359 Pa. Super. 461, 470, 519 A. 2d 442, 447 (1986), for example, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania chose not to follow this Court’s nonretroactivity holding in Allen v. Hardy, 478 U. S. 255 (1986) (per curiam). The Pennsylvania court correctly explained that our decision was “not binding authority [in part] because neither the federal, nor the state constitution dictate which decisions must be given retroactive effect.” 359 Pa. Super., at 470, 519 A. 2d, at 447.
B
In American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167, petitioners challenged the constitutionality of an Arkansas statute enacted in 1983 that imposed a discriminatory burden on interstate truckers. While their suit was pending, this Court declared a virtually identical Pennsylvania tax unconstitutional. See American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U. S. 266 (1987). Shortly thereafter, the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down the Arkansas tax at issue. The primary issue in Smith was whether petitioners were entitled to a refund of taxes that were assessed before the date of our decision in Scheiner.
The Arkansas court held that petitioners were not entitled to a refund because our decision in Scheiner did not apply retroactively. Four Members of this Court agreed. The plurality opinion concluded that federal law did not provide petitioners with a right to a refund of pre-Scheiner tax payments because Scheiner did not apply retroactively to invalidate the Arkansas tax prior to its date of decision. Four Members of this Court dissented. The dissenting opinion argued that the case actually raised both the substantive question whether the tax violated the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution and the remedial question whether, if so, petitioners were entitled to a refund. The dissent concluded as a matter of federal law that the tax was invalid during the years before Scheiner, and that petitioners were entitled to a decision to that effect. Whether petitioners should get a refund, however, the dissent deemed a mixed question of state and federal law that should be decided by the state court in the first instance.
Although Teague was a plurality opinion that drew support from only four Members of the Court, the Teague rule was affirmed and applied by a majority of the Court shortly thereafter. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 313 (1989) (“Because Penry is before us on collateral review, we must determine, as a threshold matter, whether granting him the relief he seeks would create a new rule. Under Teague, new rules will not be applied or announced in eases on collateral review unless they fall into one of two exceptions” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The relevant passage in the Minnesota Supreme Court opinion states: “Danforth argues that Teague dictates the limits of retroactive application of new rules only in federal habeas corpus proceedings and does not limit the retroactive application of new rules in state postconviction proceedings. Danforth is incorrect when he asserts that state courts are free to give a Supreme Court decision of federal constitutional criminal procedure broader retroactive application than that given by the Supreme Court.... In light of Payne and American Trucking Associations, we cannot apply state retroactivity principles when determining the retroactivity of a new rule of federal constitutional criminal procedure if the Supreme Court has already provided relevant federal principles.” 718 N. W. 2d 451, 456 (2006).
See, e. g., Daniels v. State, 561 N. E. 2d 487, 489 (Ind. 1990); State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292, 1296-1297 (La. 1992); State v. Whitfield, 107 S. W. 3d 253, 266-268 (Mo. 2003); Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 816-819, 59 P. 3d 463, 470-471 (2002) (per curiam); Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N. W. 2d 514, 517-518 (S. D. 1990).
We note at the outset that this ease does not present the questions whether States are required to apply “watershed” rules in state post-conviction proceedings, whether the Teague rule applies to cases brought under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 (2000 ed. and Supp. Y), or whether Congress can alter the rules of retroactivity by statute. Accordingly, we express no opinion on these issues.
It may, therefore, make more sense to speak in terms of the “redress-ability” of violations of new rules, rather than the “retroactivity” of such rules. Cf. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“The very framing of the issue that we purport to decide today - whether our decision in [American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Schemer, 483 U. S. 266 (1987),] shall ‘apply’ retroactively - presupposes [an incorrect] view of our decisions as creating the law, as opposed to declaring what the law already is”). Unfortunately, it would likely create, rather than alleviate, confusion to change our terminology at this point. Accordingly, we will continue to utilize the existing vocabulary, despite its shortcomings.
Although our post-1867 cases reflected a “softening” of the concept of jurisdiction to embrace claims that the statute under which the petitioner had been convicted was unconstitutional or that the detention was based on an illegally imposed sentence, the Court adhered to the basic rule that habeas was unavailable to review claims of constitutional error that did not go to the trial court’s jurisdiction. See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 471, 488-484 (1963); Hart, The Supreme Court 1958 Term, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 103-104 (1959).
“[I]n Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101 (1942), the Court openly discarded the concept of jurisdiction — by then more [of] a fiction than anything else — as a touchstone of the availability of federal habeas review, and acknowledged that such review is available for claims of disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused....” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 79 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Linkletter arose in the context of a denial of federal habeas relief, so its holding was “necessarily limited to convictions which had become final by the time Mapp... [was] rendered.” Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 732 (1966). We noted in Linkletter that Mapp was being applied to cases that were still pending on direct review at the time it was decided, so the issue before us was expressly limited to “whether the exclusionary principle enunciated in Mapp applies to state court convictions which had become final before rendition of our opinion.” 381 U. S., at 622 (footnote omitted). Shortly thereafter, however, we held that the three-pronged Linkletter analysis should be applied both to convictions that were final before rendition of our opinions and to cases that were still pending on direct review. See Johnson, 384 U. S., at 732
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Alito
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to consider the application of the doctrines of waiver, judicial estoppel, and harmless error to a violation of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Speedy Trial Act or Act), 18 U. S. C. §§ 3161-3174. The Act generally requires a federal criminal trial to begin within 70 days after a defendant is charged or makes an initial appearance, § 3161(c)(1), but the Act contains a detailed scheme under which certain specified periods of delay are not counted. In this case, petitioner’s trial did not begin within 70 days of indictment. Indeed, his trial did not commence until more than seven years after the filing of the indictment, but petitioner, at the suggestion of the trial judge, signed a blanket, prospective waiver of his rights under the Act. We address the following questions: whether this waiver was effective; whether petitioner is judicially estopped from challenging the validity of the waiver; and whether the trial judge’s failure to make the findings required to exclude a period of delay under a particular provision of the Act, § 3161(h)(8), was harmless error.
I
In March 1996, petitioner attempted to open accounts at seven financial institutions using counterfeit $10 million United States bonds. The quality of the counterfeiting was, to put it mildly, not expert. One bond purported to be issued by the “Ministry of Finance of U. S. A.” 401 F. 3d 36, 39 (CA2 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Others contained misspelled words such as “Thunted States” and the “Onited States” (United States), “Dhtladelphla” (Philadelphia), “Cgicago” (Chicago), and “forevev” (forever). Id., at 39, n. 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). After petitioner presented these bonds, the Secret Service was contacted, and petitioner was arrested. Following arraignment on a criminal complaint, he was released on bond.
On April 4, 1996, a grand jury in the Eastern District of New York indicted petitioner on seven counts of attempting to defraud a financial institution, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1344, and one count of knowingly possessing counterfeit obligations of the United States, in violation of § 472. On June 26, the District Court, citing the complexity of the case, granted what is termed an “ends-of-justice” continuance, see § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii), until September 6. On September 6, the District Court granted another continuance, this time until November 8.
At the November 8 status conference, petitioner requested, without opposition from the Government, a further adjournment to January 1997. Concerned about the difficulty of fitting petitioner’s trial into its heavily scheduled calendar and the prospect that petitioner might “only waive [the Act] for so long as it is convenient for [him] to waive,” the District Court instructed petitioner as follows: “I think if I’m going to give you that long an adjournment, I will have to take a waiver for all time.” App. 71. Petitioner’s counsel responded that the defense would “waive for all time. That will not be a problem. That will not be an issue in this case.” Id., at 72.
The District Court then addressed petitioner directly and appears to have attempted to explain the operation of a provision of the Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3162(a)(2), under which a defendant whose trial does not begin on time is deemed to have waived the right to move for dismissal of the information or indictment if he or she does not file that motion prior to trial or entry of a guilty plea. The District Court reasoned: “[I]f you can waive [the Act] by inaction, i. e., not raising the motion to dismiss, you can waive affirmatively, knowledgeably, intelligently your right to do so, your right to a speedy trial and your right to make a motion to dismiss for the speedy trial.” App. 73. The court told petitioner that it was “prepared to start... trial right away,” ibid., but that if a continuance was granted, petitioner might have to wait some time for trial because the court had a “fairly big cas[e] . . . which [wa]s set to take eight months for trial.” “[I]f that [trial] starts before you start,” the court warned, “you may have to wait until that is done.” Id., at 74.
The District Court then produced a preprinted form — apparently of its own devising — captioned “Waiver of Speedy Trial Rights.” Id., at 79. The court led petitioner and his counsel through the form, and both signed it. Among other things, the form stated: “I wish to waive my rights to a speedy trial . . . under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (18 U. S. C. §3161 et seq.), under the Rules of this Circuit and under the Speedy Trial Plan adopted by this Court.” Ibid. The form also stated: “I have been advised and fully understand that ... I also waive any and all rights to make a motion to dismiss the indictment . . . against me for failure of the Court to give me a speedy trial and that I waive all of such rights to a speedy trial and to make such a motion or motions for all time.” Ibid. After the form was signed, petitioner’s counsel requested that a further status conference be scheduled for January 31,1997, and the court agreed. Id., at 77.
At the January 31 status conference, petitioner sought yet another continuance “to tap . . . the proper channels to authenticate [the] bonds.” Id., at 81. Petitioner and the Government emphasized that this request raised no issue under the Act because petitioner had “waived for all time,” though the Government suggested that it “would like to try the case sometime in 1997.” Ibid. After a brief discussion between the court and petitioner’s counsel about the need to investigate the authenticity of what seemed such obviously fake bonds, the court offered to set trial for May 5, 1997. Id., at 86. The court admonished petitioner’s counsel to “[g]et to work” and noted: “This [case] is a year old. That’s enough for a criminal case.” Id., at 86, 85. Nevertheless, apparently satisfied with petitioner’s waiver “for all time,” the District Court made no mention of the Act and did not make any findings to support exclusion of the 91 days between January 31 and petitioner’s next court appearance on May 2, 1997 (1997 continuance).
The four years that followed saw a variety of proceedings in petitioner’s case, but no trial. See 401 F. 3d, at 40-41. Counsel sought to be relieved because petitioner insisted that he argue that the bonds were genuine, and the court ultimately granted counsel’s request to withdraw. At the court’s suggestion, petitioner was examined by a psychiatrist, who determined that petitioner was competent to stand trial. Petitioner then asked to proceed pro se and sought to serve subpoenas on, among others, the President, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the late Chinese leader Chiang Kaishek, and “ ‘The Treasury Department of Treasury International Corporation.’” Id., at 40; App. 129. After a year of quashed subpoenas, the District Court set the case for trial, only to conclude on the morning of jury selection that it had to inquire once again into petitioner’s competency. The court dismissed the jury panel, found petitioner incompetent, and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment. On interlocutory appeal, however, the Court of Appeals vacated that order and remanded for further hearings. In July and August 2000, the District Court held those hearings and received further briefing on the competency issue.
On March 7, 2001, while the competency issue remained under submission, petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to comply with the Act. The District Court denied the motion on the ground that petitioner had waived his Speedy Trial Act rights “for all time,” mentioning in passing that the case was complex. Id., at 128-129. In the same order, the court found petitioner incompetent. Id., at 135. That latter determination was upheld on interlocutory appeal, and petitioner was committed for evaluation. After several months of hospitalization, petitioner was found to be delusional but competent to stand trial, and he was released.
Finally, on April 7, 2003, more than seven years after petitioner was indicted, his trial began. The jury found petitioner guilty on six counts of attempting to defraud a financial institution, and the court sentenced him to 63 months of imprisonment.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. Acknowledging that “a defendant’s waiver of rights under the Speedy Trial Act may be ineffective” because of the public interest served by compliance with the Act, the Court of Appeals found an exception for situations “ ‘when defendant’s conduct causes or contributes to a period of delay.’ ” 401 F. 3d, at 43-44 (quoting United States v. Gambino, 59 F. 3d 353, 360 (CA2 1995)). “[D]oubt[ing] that the public interest in expeditious prosecution would be served by a rule that allows defendants to request a delay and then protest the grant of their request,” the Court of Appeals held that petitioner would not be heard to complain of the 91-day delay in early 1997. 401 F. 3d, at 45. The Court of Appeals went on to suggest that there “can be no doubt that the district court could have properly excluded this period of time based on the ends of justice” in light of the complexity of the case and defense counsel’s request for additional time to prepare. Ibid.
We granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals on the standard for analyzing whether a defendant has made an effective waiver of rights under the Act. 546 U. S. 1085 (2006).
II
As noted above, the Speedy Trial Act generally requires a trial to begin within 70 days of the filing of an information or indictment or the defendant’s .initial appearance, 18 U. S. C. § 3161(c)(1), but the Act recognizes that criminal cases vary widely and that there are valid reasons for greater delay in particular cases. To provide the necessary flexibility, the Act includes a long and detailed list of periods of delay that are excluded in computing the time within which trial must start. See § 3161(h). For example, the Act excludes “delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant,” § 3161(h)(1), “delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness,” § 3161(h)(3)(A), “delay resulting from the fact that the defendant is mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial,” § 3161(h)(4), and “[a] reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has been granted,” § 3161(h)(7).
Much of the Act’s flexibility is furnished by § 3161(h)(8), which governs ends-of-justice continuances, and which we set out in relevant part in the margin. This provision permits a district court to grant a continuance and to exclude the resulting delay if the court, after considering certain factors, makes on-the-record findings that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the public’s and defendant’s interests in a speedy trial. This provision gives the district court discretion — within limits and subject to specific procedures — to accommodate limited delays for case-specific needs.
To promote compliance with its requirements, the Act contains enforcement and sanctions provisions. If a trial does not begin on time, the defendant may move, before the start of trial or the entry of a guilty plea, to dismiss the charges, and if a meritorious and timely motion to dismiss is filed, the district court must dismiss the charges, though it may choose whether to dismiss with or without prejudice. In making that choice, the court must take into account, among other things, “the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of [the Act] and on the administration of justice.” § 3162(a)(2).
This scheme is designed to promote compliance with the Act without needlessly subverting important criminal prosecutions. The more severe sanction (dismissal with prejudice) is available for use where appropriate, and the knowledge that a violation could potentially result in the imposition of this sanction gives the prosecution a powerful incentive to be careful about compliance. The less severe sanction (dismissal without prejudice) lets the court avoid unduly impairing the enforcement of federal criminal laws— though even this sanction imposes some costs on the prosecution and the court, which further encourages compliance. When an indictment is dismissed without prejudice, the prosecutor may of course seek — and in the great majority of cases will be able to obtain — a new indictment, for even if “the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations has expired, a new indictment may be returned . . . within six calendar months of the date of the dismissal.” §3288.
With this background in mind, we turn to the questions presented by the unusual procedures followed in this case.
Ill
Petitioner contends, and the Government does not seriously dispute, that a defendant may not prospectively waive the application of the Act. We agree.
A
1
As our discussion above suggests, the Speedy Trial Act comprehensively regulates the time within which a trial must begin. Section 3161(h) specifies in detail numerous categories of delay that are not counted in applying the Act’s deadlines. Conspicuously, § 3161(h) has no provision excluding periods of delay during which a defendant waives the application of the Act, and it is apparent from the terms of the Act that this omission was a considered one. Instead of simply allowing defendants to opt out of the Act, the Act demands that defense continuance requests fit within one of the specific exclusions set out in subsection (h). Subsection (h)(8), which permits ends-of-justice continuances, was plainly meant to cover many of these requests. Among the factors that a district court must consider in deciding whether to grant an ends-of-justice continuance are a defendant’s need for “reasonable time to obtain counsel,” “continuity of counsel,” and “effective preparation” of counsel. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv). If a defendant could simply waive the application of the Act whenever he or she wanted more time, no defendant would ever need to put such considerations before the court under the rubric of an ends-of-justice exclusion.
The purposes of the Act also cut against exclusion on the grounds of mere consent or waiver. If the Act were designed solely to protect a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, it would make sense to allow a defendant to waive the application of the Act. But the Act was designed with the public interest firmly in mind. See, e. g., § 3161(h)(8)(A) (to exclude delay resulting from a continuance — even one “granted . . . at the request of the defendant” — the district court must find “that the ends of justice served... outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial” (emphasis added)). That public interest cannot be served, the Act recognizes, if defendants may opt out of the Act entirely.
2
This interpretation is entirely in accord with the Act’s legislative history. As both the 1974 House and Senate Reports illustrate, the Act was designed not just to benefit defendants but also to serve the public interest by, among other things, reducing defendants’ opportunity to commit crimes while on pretrial release and preventing extended pretrial delay from impairing the deterrent effect of punishment. See S. Rep. No. 93-1021, pp. 6-8 (citing “bail problems,” offenses committed during pretrial release, and the “seriously undermined . . . deterrent value of the criminal process” as “the debilitating effect[s] of court delay upon our criminal justice system”); H. R. Rep. No. 93-1508, p. 8 (“The purpose of this bill is to assist in reducing crime and the danger of recidivism by requiring speedy trials ...”). The Senate Report accompanying the 1979 amendments to the Act put an even finer point on it: “[T]he Act seeks to protect and promote speedy trial interests that go beyond the rights of the defendant; although the Sixth Amendment recognizes a societal interest in prompt dispositions, it primarily safeguards the defendant’s speedy trial right — which may or may not be in accord with society’s.” S. Rep. No. 96-212, p. 29; see also id., at 6; H. R. Rep. No. 96-390, p. 3 (1979). Because defendants may be content to remain on pretrial release, and indeed may welcome delay, it is unsurprising that Congress refrained from empowering defendants to make prospective waivers of the Act’s application. See S. Rep. No. 96-212, at 29 (“Because of the Act’s emphasis on that societal right, a defendant ought not be permitted to waive rights that are not his or hers alone to relinquish”).
B
The District Court reasoned that 18 U. S. C. § 3162(a)(2) supports the conclusion that a defendant may prospectively waive the strictures of the Act. This provision states that “[f]ailure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.” Because this provision in effect allows a defendant to waive a completed violation of the Act (by declining to move to dismiss before the start of trial or the entry of a guilty plea), it follows, so the District Court’s reasoning went, that a defendant should be allowed to make a prospective waiver. We disagree.
It is significant that § 3162(a)(2) makes no mention of prospective waivers, and there is no reason to think that Congress wanted to treat prospective and retrospective waivers similarly. Allowing prospective waivers would seriously undermine the Act because there are many cases — like the case at hand — in which the prosecution, the defense, and the court would all be happy to opt out of the Act, to the detriment of the public interest. The sort of retrospective waiver allowed by § 3162(a)(2) does not pose a comparable danger because the prosecution and the court cannot know until the trial actually starts or the guilty plea is actually entered whether the defendant will forgo moving to dismiss. As a consequence, the prosecution and the court retain a strong incentive to make sure that the trial begins on time.
Instead of granting broad opt-out rights, § 3162(a)(2) serves two unrelated purposes. First, § 3162(a)(2) assigns the role of spotting violations of the Act to defendants — for the obvious reason that they have the greatest incentive to perform this task. Second, by requiring that a defendant move before the trial starts or a guilty plea is entered, § 3162(a)(2) both limits the effects of a dismissal without prejudice (by ensuring that an expensive and time-consuming trial will not be mooted by a late-filed motion under the Act) and prevents undue defense gamesmanship.
For these reasons, we reject the District Court’s reliance on § 3162(a)(2) and conclude a defendant may not prospectively waive the application of the Act. It follows that petitioner’s waiver “for all time” was ineffective. We therefore turn to the Government’s alternative grounds in support of the result below.
IV
A
The Government contends that because “petitioner’s express waiver induced the district court to grant a continuance without making an express ends-of-justice finding . . . , basic principles of judicial estoppel preclude petitioner from enjoying the benefit of the continuance, but then challenging the lack of a finding.” Brief for United States 10. In this case, however, we see no basis for applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
As this Court has explained:
“ ‘[Wjhere a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.’ Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U. S. 680, 689 (1895). This rule, known as judicial estoppel, ‘generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.’ Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U. S. 211, 227, n. 8 (2000).” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U. S. 742, 749 (2001).
Although this estoppel doctrine is equitable and thus cannot be reduced to a precise formula or test,
“several factors typically inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case: First, a party’s later position must be clearly inconsistent with its earlier position. Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier position .... A third consideration is whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.” Id., at 750-751 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In applying this doctrine to the present case, we must first identify the “position” of petitioner’s that the Government seeks to enforce. There are three possibilities: (1) petitioner’s promise not to move for dismissal under § 3162(a)(2), (2) petitioner’s (implied) position that waivers of the Act are enforceable, and (3) petitioner’s claim that counsel needed additional time to research the authenticity of the bonds. None of these gives rise to an estoppel.
First, we are unwilling to recognize an estoppel based on petitioner’s promise not to move for dismissal because doing so would entirely swallow the Act’s no-waiver policy. We see little difference between granting a defendant’s request for a continuance in exchange for a promise not to move for dismissal and permitting a prospective waiver, and as we hold above, prospective waivers are inconsistent with the Act.
Second, petitioner’s (mistaken) agreement that Speedy Trial Act waivers are valid also does not provide a ground for estoppel. Petitioner did not “succee[d] in persuading” the District Court to accept the proposition that prospective waivers of Speedy Trial Act rights are valid. On the contrary, it was the District Court that requested the waiver and produced the form for petitioner to sign. And while the other relevant factors (clear inconsistency and unfair advantage or detriment) might in isolation support the Government, we think they do not predominate where, as here, the Government itself accepted the District Court’s interpretation without objection.
Finally, petitioner’s representation to the District Court at the January 31 status conference that a continuance was needed to gather evidence of the bonds’ authenticity does not support the Government’s estoppel argument because the position that petitioner took then was not “clearly inconsistent” with the position that he now takes in seeking dismissal of the indictment. This would be a different case if petitioner had succeeded in persuading the District Court at the January 31 status conference that the factual predicate for a statutorily authorized exclusion of delay could be established — for example, if defense counsel had obtained a continuance only by falsely representing that he was in the midst of working with an expert who might authenticate the bonds. In fact, however, the discussion at the January 31 status conference did not focus on the requirements of the Act. Rather, the court and the parties proceeded on the assumption that the court’s waiver form was valid and that the Act could simply be disregarded. Nothing in the discussion at the conference suggests that the question presented by the defense continuance request was viewed as anything other than a case-management question that lay entirely within the scope of the District Court’s discretion. Under these circumstances, the best understanding of the position taken by petitioner’s attorney at the January 31 status conference is that granting the requested continuance would represent a sound exercise of the trial judge’s discretion in managing its calendar. This position was not “clearly inconsistent” with petitioner’s later position that the continuance was not permissible under the terms of the Act. Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is not estopped from challenging the ex-cludability under the Act of the 1997 continuance.
B
While conceding that the District Court “never made an express finding on the record” about the ends-of-justice balance, Brief for United States 30, the Government argues that such an express finding did not need to be entered contemporaneously — and could be supplied on remand — because, given the circumstances in 1997, the ends-of-justice balance in fact supported the 1997 continuance. We reject this argument. In the first place, the Act requires express findings, and in the second place, it does not permit those findings to be made on remand as the Government proposes.
The Act requires that when a district court grants an ends-of-justice continuance, it must “se[t] forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons” for finding that the ends of justice are served and they outweigh other interests. 18 U. S. C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). Although the Act is clear that the findings must be made, if only in the judge’s mind, before granting the continuance (the continuance can only be “granted ... on the basis of [the court’s] findings”), the Act is ambiguous on precisely when those findings must be “se[t] forth, in the record of the case.” However this ambiguity is resolved, at the very least the Act implies that those findings must be put on the record by the time a district court rules on a defendant’s motion to dismiss under § 3162(a)(2). In ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court must tally the unexcluded days. This, in turn, requires identifying the excluded days. But § 3161(h)(8)(A) is explicit that “[n]o ... period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable . .. unless the court sets forth . . . its reasons for [its] finding[s].” Thus, without on-the-record findings, there can be no exclusion under § 3161(h)(8). Here, the District Court set forth no such findings at the January 31 status conference, and § 3161(h)(8)(A) is not satisfied by the District Court’s passing reference to the case’s complexity in its ruling on petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, the 1997 continuance is not excluded from the speedy trial clock.
The Government suggests that this error, stemming as it does from the District Court’s technical failure to make an express finding, may be regarded as harmless. Brief for United States 31, n. 8. Harmless-error review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) presumptively applies to “all errors where a proper objection is made,” Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1, 7 (1999), and we have required “strong support” to find an implied repeal of Rule 52, United States v. Vonn, 535 U. S. 55, 65 (2002). We conclude, however, that the provisions of the Act provide such support here.
The relevant provisions of the Act are unequivocal. If a defendant pleads not guilty, the trial “shall commence” within 70 days “from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment” or from the defendant’s initial appearance, whichever is later. § 3161(c)(1) (emphasis added). Delay resulting from an ends-of-justice continuance is excluded from this time period, but “[n]o such period of delay . . . shall be excludable under this subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” § 3161(h)(8)(A) (emphasis added). When a trial is not commenced within the prescribed period of time, “the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant.” § 3162(a)(2) (emphasis added). A straightforward reading of these provisions leads to the conclusion that if a judge fails to make the requisite findings regarding the need for an ends-of-justice continuance, the delay resulting from the continuance must be counted, and if as a result the trial does not begin on time, the indictment or information must be dismissed. The argument that the District Court’s failure to make the prescribed findings may be excused as harmless error is hard to square with the Act’s categorical terms. See Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U. S. 146, 153-154, 155 (2001) (no “ ‘harmless’ ” or “ ‘technical’ ” violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers’ “antishuttling” provision in light of its “absolute language”).
Applying the harmless-error rule would also tend to undermine the detailed requirements of the provisions regulating ends-of-justice continuances. The exclusion of delay resulting from an ends-of-justice continuance is the most open-ended type of exclusion recognized under the Act and, in allowing district courts to grant such continuances, Congress clearly meant to give district judges a measure of flexibility in accommodating unusual, complex, and difficult cases. But it is equally clear that Congress, knowing that the many sound grounds for granting ends-of-justice continuances could not be rigidly structured, saw a danger that such continuances could get out of hand and subvert the Act’s detailed scheme. The strategy of § 3161(h)(8), then, is to counteract substantive open-endedness with procedural strictness. This provision demands on-the-record findings and specifies in some detail certain factors that a judge must consider in making those findings. Excusing the failure to make these findings as harmless error would be inconsistent with the strategy embodied in § 3161(h). Such an approach would almost always lead to a finding of harmless error because the simple failure to make a record of this sort is unlikely to affect the defendant’s rights. We thus conclude that when a district court makes no findings on the record in support of a § 3161(h)(8) continuance, harmless-error review is not appropriate.
V
We hold that the 91-day continuance granted on January 31 was not excluded from petitioner’s speedy trial clock. Because this continuance by itself exceeded the maximum 70-day delay provided in § 3161(c)(1), the Act was violated, and we need not address whether any other periods of delay during petitioner’s case were not excludable. The sanction for a violation of the Act is dismissal, but we leave it to the District Court to determine in the first instance whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice. See § 3162(a)(2). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The Government dismissed the other counts before trial.
The Court of Appeals ultimately remanded the case for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220 (2005). That issue is not before us, though we note that the District Court has indicated it would impose the same 63-month sentence if the defendant is produced for resentencing. No. 96-CR-285 (TCP) (EDNY, Oct. 27, 2005).
Title 18 U. S. C. § 3161(h)(8) provides:
“(A) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable under this subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
“(B) The factors, among others, which a judge shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph in any case are as follows:
“(i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.
“(ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established by this section.
“(iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a ease which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant or the Government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
“(C) No continuance under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph shall be granted because of general congestion of the court’s calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the attorney for the Government.”
We left this question open in New York v. Hill, 528 U. S. 110, 117, n. 2 (2000).
The possibility of obtaining a dismissal with prejudice plainly gives a defendant a strong incentive to police compliance, and even if a ease is dismissed without prejudice, a defendant may derive some benefit. For example, the time and energy that the prosecution must expend in connection with obtaining a new indictment may be time and energy that the prosecution cannot devote to the preparation of its ease.
As noted, in order to promote compliance with the Act, Congress set the minimum permissible penalty at a level that would impose some costs on the prosecution and the court without unduly interfering with the enforcement of the criminal laws. By specifying that a defendant may not move for dismissal once the trial has commenced or a plea has been entered, the amount of inconvenience resulting from a dismissal without prejudice is limited, and defendants are restricted in their ability to use such a motion for strategic purposes. For example, defendants cannot wait to see how a trial is going (or how it comes out) before moving to dismiss.
The best practice, of course, is for a district court to put its findings on the record at or near the time when it grants the continuance.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
|
sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellee, John Harris, Jr., was indicted in a California state court, charged with violation of the California Penal Code §§ 11400 and 11401, known as the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, set out below. He then filed a complaint in the Federal District Court, asking that court to enjoin the appellant, Younger, the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, from prosecuting him, and alleging that the prosecution and even the presence of the Act inhibited him in the exercise of his rights of free speech and press, rights guaranteed him by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Appellees Jim Dan and Diane Hirsch intervened as plaintiffs in the suit, claiming that the prosecution of Harris would inhibit them as members of the Progressive Labor Party from peacefully advocating the program of their party, which was to replace capitalism with socialism and to abolish the profit system of production in this country. Appellee Farrell Broslawsky, an instructor in history at Los Angeles Valley College, also intervened claiming that the prosecution of Harris made him uncertain as to whether he could teach about the doctrines of Karl Marx or read from the Communist Manifesto as part of his classwork. All claimed that unless the United States court restrained the state prosecution of Harris each would suffer immediate and irreparable injury. A three-judge Federal District Court, convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2284, held that it had jurisdiction and power to restrain the District Attorney from prosecuting, held that the State’s Criminal Syndicalism Act was void for vagueness and overbreadth in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and accordingly restrained the District Attorney from “further prosecution of the currently pending action against plaintiff Harris for alleged violation of the Act.” 281 F. Supp. 507, 517 (1968).
The case is before us on appeal by the State’s District Attorney Younger, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253. In his notice of appeal and his jurisdictional statement appellant presented two questions: (1) whether the decision of this Court in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, holding California’s law constitutional in 1927 was binding on the District Court and (2) whether the State’s law is constitutional on its face. In this Court the brief for the State of California, filed at our request, also argues that only Harris, who was indicted, has standing to challenge the State’s law, and that issuance of the injunction was a violation of a longstanding judicial policy and of 28 U. S. C. § 2283, which provides:
“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.”
See, e. g., Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Engineers, 398 U. S. 281, 285-286 (1970). Without regard to the questions raised about Whitney v. California, supra, since overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444 (1969), or the constitutionality of the state law, we have concluded that the judgment of the District Court, enjoining appellant Younger from prosecuting under these California statutes, must be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances. We express no view about the circumstances under which federal courts may act when there is no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun.
I
Appellee Harris has been indicted, and was actually being prosecuted by California for a violation of its Criminal Syndicalism Act at the time this suit was filed. He thus has an acute, live controversy with the State and its prosecutor. But none of the other parties plaintiff in the District Court, Dan, Hirsch, or Broslawsky, has such a controversy. None has been indicted, arrested, or even threatened by the prosecutor. About these three the three-judge court said:
“Plaintiffs Dan and Hirsch allege that they are members of the Progressive Labor Party, which advocates change in industrial ownership and political change, and that' they feel inhibited in advo-eating the program of their political party through peaceful, non-violent means, because of the presence of the Act 'on the books/ and because of the pending criminal prosecution against Harris. Plaintiff Bros-lawsky is a history instructor, and he alleges that he is uncertain as to whether his normal practice of teaching his students about the doctrines of Karl Marx and reading from the Communist Manifesto and other revolutionary works may subject him to prosecution for violation of the Act.” 281 F. Supp., at 509.
Whatever right Harris, who is being prosecuted under the state syndicalism law may have, Dan, Hirsch, and Bros-lawsky cannot share it with him. If these three had alleged that they would be prosecuted for the conduct they planned to engage in, and if the District Court had found this allegation to be true — either on the admission of the State’s district attorney or on any other evidence— then a genuine controversy might be said to exist. But here appellees Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky do not claim that they have ever been threatened with prosecution, that a prosecution is likely, or even that a prosecution is remotely possible. They claim the right to bring this suit solely because, in the language of their complaint, they “feel inhibited.” We do not think this allegation, even if true, is sufficient to bring the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts into play to enjoin a pending state prosecution. A federal lawsuit to stop a prosecution in a state court is a serious matter. And persons having no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative, are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs in such cases. See Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103 (1969). Since Harris is actually being prosecuted under the challenged laws, however, we proceed with him as a proper party.
II
Since the beginning of this country’s history Congress has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts. In 1793 an Act unconditionally provided: “[N]or shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state . . . 1 Stat. 335, c. 22, § 5. A comparison of the 1793 Act with 28 U. S. C. § 2283, its present-day successor, graphically illustrates how few and minor have been the exceptions granted from the flat, prohibitory language of the old Act. During all this lapse of years from 1793 to 1970 the statutory exceptions to the 1793 congressional enactment have been only three: (1) “except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress”; (2) “where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction”; and (3) “to protect or effectuate its judgments.” In addition, a judicial exception to the longstanding policy evidenced by the statute has been made where a person about to be prosecuted in a state court can show that he will, if the proceeding in the state court is not enjoined, suffer irreparable damages. See Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908).
The precise reasons for this longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings have never been specifically identified but the primary sources of the policy are plain. One is the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. The doctrine may originally have grown out of circumstances peculiar to the English judicial system and not applicable in this country, but its fundamental purpose of restraining equity jurisdiction within narrow limits is equally important under our Constitution, in order to prevent erosion of the role of the jury and avoid a duplication of legal proceedings and legal sanctions where a single suit would be adequate to protect the rights asserted. This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by' an even more vital consideration, the notion of “comity,” that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as “Our Federalism,” and one familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence is bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of “Our Federalism.” The concept does not mean blind deference to “States’ Rights” any more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses. What the concept does represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. It should never be forgotten that this slogan, “Our Federalism,” born in the early struggling days of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation’s history and its future.
This brief discussion should be enough to suggest some of the reasons why it has been perfectly natural for our cases to repeat time and time again that the normal thing to do when, federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions. In Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240 (1926), suit had been brought in the Federal District Court seeking to enjoin state prosecutions under a recently enacted state law that allegedly interfered with the free flow of interstate commerce. The Court, in a unanimous opinion made clear that such a suit, even with respect to state criminal proceedings not yet formally instituted, could be proper only under very special circumstances:
“Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, and following cases have established the doctrine that when absolutely necessary for protection of constitutional rights courts of the United States have power to enjoin state officers from instituting criminal actions. But this may not be done except under extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate. Ordinarily, there should be no interference with such officers; primarily, they are charged with the duty of prosecuting offenders against the laws of the State and must decide when and how this is to be done. The accused should first set up and rely upon his defense in the state courts, even though this involves a challenge of the validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate protection.” Id., at 243-244.
These principles, made clear in the Fenner case, have been repeatedly followed and reaffirmed in other cases involving threatened prosecutions. See, e. g., Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89 (1935); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 312 U. S. 45 (1941); Watson v. Buck, 313 U. S. 387 (1941); Williams v. Miller, 317 U. S. 599 (1942); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943).
In all of these cases the Court stressed the importance of showing irreparable injury, the traditional prerequisite to obtaining an injunction. In addition, however, the Court also made clear that in view of the fundamental policy against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions, even irreparable injury is insufficient unless it is “both great and immediate.” Fenner, supra. Certain types of injury, in particular, the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single criminal prosecution, could not by themselves be considered “irreparable” in the special legal sense of that term. Instead, the threat to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights must be one that cannot be eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution. See, e. g., Ex parte Young, supra, at 145-147. Thus, in the Buck case, supra, at 400, we stressed:
“Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. ‘No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and hence unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid.’ Beal v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Corp., 312 U. S. 45, 49.”
And similarly, in Douglas, supra, we made clear, after reaffirming this rule, that:
“It does not appear from the record that petitioners have been threatened with any injury other than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith . . . 319 U. S., at 164.
This is where the law stood when the Court decided Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479 (1965), and held that an injunction against the enforcement of certain state criminal statutes could properly issue under the circumstances presented in that case. In Dombrowski, unlike many of the earlier cases denying injunctions, the complaint made substantial allegations that:
“the threats to enforce the statutes against appellants are not made with any expectation of securing valid convictions, but rather are part of a plan to employ arrests, seizures, and threats of prosecution under color of the statutes to harass appellants and discourage them and their supporters from asserting and attempting to vindicate the constitutional rights of Negro citizens of Louisiana.” 380 U. S., at 482.
The appellants in Dombrowski had offered to prove that their offices had been raided and all their files and records seized pursuant to search and arrest warrants that were later summarily vacated by a state judge for lack of probable cause. They also offered to prove that despite the state court order quashing the warrants and suppressing the evidence seized, the prosecutor was continuing to threaten to initiate new prosecutions of appellants under the same statutes, was holding public hearings at which photostatic copies of the illegally seized documents were being used, and was threatening to use other copies of the illegally seized documents to obtain grand jury indictments against the appellants on charges of violating the same statutes. These circumstances, as viewed by the Court sufficiently establish the kind of irreparable injury, above and beyond that associated with the defense of a single prosecution brought in good faith, that had always been considered sufficient to justify federal intervention. See, e. g., Beal, supra, at 50. Indeed, after quoting the Court’s statement in Douglas concerning the very restricted circumstances under which an injunction could be justified, the Court in Dombrowski went on to say:
“But the allegations in this complaint depict a situation in which defense of the State’s criminal prosecution will not assure adequate vindication of constitutional rights. They suggest that a substantial loss of or impairment of freedoms of expression will occur if appellants must await the state court’s disposition and ultimate review in this Court of any adverse determination. These allegations, if true, clearly show irreparable injury.” 380 U. S., at 485-486.
And the Court made clear that even under these circumstances the District Court issuing the injunction would have continuing power to lift it at any time and remit the plaintiffs tp the state courts if circumstances warranted. 380 U. S., at 491, 492. Similarly, in Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U. S. 611 (1968), a divided Court denied an injunction after finding that the record did not establish the necessary bad faith and harassment; the dissenting Justices themselves stressed the very limited role to be allowed for federal injunctions against state criminal prosecutions and differed with the Court only on the question whether the particular facts of that case were sufficient to show that the prosecution was brought in bad faith.
It is against the background of these principles that we must judge the propriety of an injunction under the circumstances of the present case. Here a proceeding was already pending in the state court, affording Harris an opportunity to raise his constitutional claims. There is no suggestion that this single prosecution against Harris is brought in bad faith or is only one of a series of repeated prosecutions to which he will be subjected. In other words, the injury that Harris faces is solely “that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith,” Douglas, supra, and therefore under the settled doctrine we have already described he is not entitled to equitable relief “even if such statutes are unconstitutional,” Buck, supra.
The District Court, however, thought that the Dom-browski decision substantially broadened the availability of injunctions against state criminal prosecutions and that under that decision the federal courts may give equitable relief, without regard to any showing of bad faith or harassment, whenever a state statute is found “on its face” to be vague or overly broad, in violation of the First Amendment. We recognize that there are some statements in the Dombrowski opinion that would seem to support this argument. But, as we have already seen, such statements were unnecessary to the decision of that case, because the Court found that the plaintiffs had alleged a basis for equitable relief under the long-established standards. In addition, we do not regard the reasons adduced to support this position as sufficient to justify such a substantial departure from the established doctrines regarding the availability of injunctive relief. It is undoubtedly true, as the Court stated in Dombrow-ski, that “[a] criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression usually involves imponderables and contingencies that themselves may inhibit the full exercise of First Amendment freedoms.” 380 U. S., at 486. But this sort of “chilling effect,” as the Court called it, should not by itself justify federal intervention. In the first place, the chilling effect cannot be satisfactorily eliminated by federal injunctive relief. In Dombrowski itself the Court stated that the injunction to be issued there could be lifted if the State obtained an “acceptable limiting construction” from the state courts. The Court then made clear that once this was done, prosecutions could then be brought for conduct occurring before the narrowing construction was made, and proper convictions could stand so long as the defendants were not deprived of fair warning. 380 U. S., at 491 n. 7. The kind of relief granted in Dombrowski thus does not effectively eliminate uncertainty as to the coverage of the state statute and leaves most citizens with virtually the same doubts as before regarding the danger that their conduct might eventually be subjected to criminal sanctions. The chilling effect can, of course, be eliminated by an injunction that would prohibit any prosecution whatever for conduct occurring prior to a satisfactory rewriting of the statute. But the States would then be stripped of all power to prosecute even the socially dangerous and constitutionally unprotected conduct that had been covered by the statute, until a new statute could be passed by the state legislature and approved by the federal courts in potentially lengthy trial and appellate proceedings. Thus, in Dombrowski itself the Court carefully reaffirmed the principle that even in the direct prosecution in the State’s own courts, a valid narrowing construction can be applied to conduct occurring prior to the date when the narrowing construction was made, in the absence of fair warning problems.
Moreover, the existence of a “chilling effect,” even in the area of First Amendment rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for prohibiting state action. Where a statute does not directly abridge free speech, but — while regulating a subject within the State’s power — tends to have the incidental effect of inhibiting First Amendment rights, it is well settled that the statute can be upheld if the effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct and the lack of alternative means for doing so. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389 U. S. 217 (1967). Just as the incidental “chilling effect” of such statutes does not automatically render them unconstitutional, so the chilling effect that admittedly can result from the very existence of certain laws on the statute books does not in itself justify prohibiting the State from carrying out the important and necessary task of enforcing these laws against socially harmful conduct that the State believes in good faith to be punishable under its laws and the Constitution.
Beyond all this is another, more basic consideration. Procedures for testing the constitutionality of a statute “on its face” in the manner apparently contemplated by Dombrowski, and for then enjoining all action to enforce the statute until the State can obtain court approval for a modified version, are fundamentally at odds with the function of the federal courts in our constitutional plan. The power and duty of the judiciary to declare laws unconstitutional is in the final analysis derived from its responsibility for resolving concrete disputes brought before the courts for decision; a statute apparently governing a dispute cannot be applied by judges, consistently with their obligations under the Supremacy Clause, when such an application of the statute would conflict with the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). But this vital responsibility, broad as it is, does not amount to an unlimited power to survey the statute books and pass judgment on laws before the courts are called upon to enforce them. Ever since the Constitutional Convention rejected a proposal for having members of the Supreme Court render advice concerning pending legislation it has been clear that, even when suits of this kind involve a “case or controversy” sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III of the Constitution, the task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, see, e. g., Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (ND Ill. 1968), rev’d sub nom. Boyle v. Landry, post, p. 77, ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided. In light of this fundamental conception of the Framers as to the proper place of the federal courts in the governmental processes of passing and enforcing laws, it can seldom be appropriate for these courts to exercise any such power of prior approval or veto over the legislative process.
For these reasons, fundamental not only to our federal system but also to the basic functions of the Judicial Branch of the National Government under our Constitution, we hold that the Dombrowski decision should not be regarded as having upset the settled doctrines that have always confined very narrowly the availability of injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions. We do not think that opinion stands for the proposition that a federal court can properly enjoin enforcement of a statute solely on the basis of a showing that the statute “on its face” abridges First Amendment rights. There may, of course, be extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment. For example, as long ago as the Buck case, supra, we indicated:
“It is of course conceivable that a statute might be flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.” 313 U. S., at 402.
Other unusual situations calling for federal intervention might also arise, but there is no point in our attempting now to specify what they might be. It is sufficient for purposes of the present case to hold, as we do, that the possible unconstitutionality of a statute "on its face” does not in itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it, and that appellee Harris has failed to make any showing of bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief. Because our holding rests on the absence of the factors necessary under equitable principles to justify federal intervention, we have no occasion to consider whether 28 U. S. C. § 2283, which prohibits an injunction against state court proceedings “except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress” would in and of itself be controlling under the circumstances of this case.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
Ҥ 11400. Definition
“ ‘Criminal syndicalism’ as used in this article means any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the commission of crime, sabotage (which word is hereby defined as meaning wilful and malicious physical damage or injury to physical property), or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change.”
Ҥ 11401. Offense; punishment
“Any person who:
“1. By spoken or written words or personal conduct advocates, teaches or aids and abets criminal syndicalism or the duty, necessity or propriety of committing crime, sabotage, violence or any unlawful method of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change; or
“2. Wilfully and deliberately by spoken or written words justifies or attempts to justify criminal syndicalism or the commission or attempt to commit crime, sabotage, violence or unlawful methods of terrorism with intent to approve, advocate or further the doctrine of criminal syndicalism; or
“3. Prints, publishes, edits, issues or circulates or publicly displays any book, paper, pamphlet, document, poster or written or printed matter in any other form, containing or carrying written or printed advocacy, teaching, or aid and abetment of,, or advising, criminal syndicalism; or
“4. Organizes or assists in organizing, or is or knowingly becomes a member of, any organization, society, group or assemblage of persons organized or assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism; or
“5. Wilfully by personal act or conduct, practices or commits any act advised, advocated, taught or aided and abetted by the doctrine or precept of criminal syndicalism, with intent to accomplish a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change;
“Is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less than one nor more than 14 years.”
Appellees did not explicitly ask for a declaratory judgment in their complaint. They did, however, ask the District Court to grant “such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper,” and the District Court in fact granted a declaratory judgment. For the reasons stated in our opinion today in Samuels v. Mackell, post, p. 66, we hold that declaratory relief is also improper when a prosecution involving the challenged statute is pending in state court at the time the federal suit is initiated.
For an interesting discussion of the history of this congressional policy up to 1941, see Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118 (1941).
Neither the cases dealing with standing to raise claims of vagueness or overbreadth, e. g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940), nor the loyalty oath cases, e. g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360 (1964), changed the basic principles governing the propriety of injunctions against state criminal prosecutions. In the standing cases we allowed attacks on overly broad or vague statutes in the absence of any showing that the defendant’s conduct could not be regulated by some properly drawn statute. But in each of these cases the statute was not merely vague or overly broad “on its face”; the statute was held to be vague or overly broad as construed and applied to a particular defendant in a particular case. If the statute had been too vague as written but sufficiently narrow as applied, prosecutions and convictions under it would ordinarily have been permissible. See Dombrowski, supra, at 491 n. 7.
In Baggett and similar cases we enjoined state officials from discharging employees who failed to take certain loyalty oaths. We held that the States were without power to exact the promises involved, with their vague and uncertain content concerning advocacy and political association, as a condition of employment. Apart from the fact that any plaintiff discharged for exercising his constitutional right to refuse to take the oath would have had no adequate remedy at law, the relief sought was of course the kind that raises no special problem — an injunction against allegedly unconstitutional state action (discharging the employees) that is not part of a criminal prosecution.
See 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 21 (Far-rand ed. 1911).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing trial. We hold that it is not.
I
On August 2, 1984, in the early hours of the morning, respondent entered the Red Pearl Saloon in Las Vegas, Nevada, and shot the bartender and a patron four times each with an automatic pistol. He then walked behind the bar and removed the cash register. Nine days later, respondent arrived at the apartment of his former wife and opened fire on her; five of his seven shots hit their target. Respondent then shot himself in the abdomen and attempted, without success, to slit his wrists. Of the four victims of respondent’s gunshots, only respondent himself survived. On August 13, respondent summoned police to his hospital bed and confessed to the killings.
After respondent pleaded not guilty to three counts of first-degree murder, the trial court ordered that he be examined by a pair of psychiatrists, both of whom concluded that he was competent to stand trial. The State thereafter announced its intention to seek the death penalty. On November 28, 1984, 2lk months after the psychiatric evaluations, respondent again appeared before the trial court. At this time respondent informed the court that he wished to discharge his attorneys and change his pleas to guilty. The reason for the request, according to respondent, was to prevent the presentation of mitigating evidence at his sentencing.
On the basis of the psychiatric reports, the trial court found that respondent
“is competent in that he knew the nature and quality of his acts, had the capacity to determine right from wrong; that he understands the nature of the criminal charges against him and is able to assist in his defense of such charges, or against the pronouncement of the judgment thereafter; that he knows the consequences of entering a plea of guilty to the charges; and that he can intelligently and knowingly waive his constitutional right to assistance of an attorney.” App. 21.
The court advised respondent that he had a right both to the assistance of counsel and to self-representation, warned him of the “dangers and disadvantages” of self-representation, id., at 22, inquired into his understanding of the proceedings and his awareness of his rights, and asked why he had chosen to represent himself. It then accepted respondent’s waiver of counsel. The court also accepted respondent’s guilty pleas, but not before it had determined that respondent was not pleading guilty in response to threats or promises, that he understood the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of pleading guilty, that he was aware of the rights he was giving up, and that there was a factual basis for the pleas. The trial court explicitly found that respondent was “knowingly and intelligently” waiving his right to the assistance of counsel, ibid,., and that his guilty pleas were “freely and voluntarily” given, id., at 64.
On January 21, 1985, a three-judge court sentenced respondent to death for each of the murders. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed respondent’s sentences for the Red Pearl Saloon murders, but reversed his sentence for the murder of his ex-wife and remanded for imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Moran v. State, 103 Nev. 138, 734 P. 2d 712 (1987).
On July 30, 1987, respondent filed a petition for post-conviction relief in state court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court rejected respondent’s claim that he was “mentally incompetent to represent himself,” concluding that “the record clearly shows that he was examined by two psychiatrists both of whom declared [him] competent.” App. to Pet. for Cert. D-8. The Supreme Court of Nevada dismissed respondent’s appeal, Moran v. Warden, 105 Nev. 1041, 810 P. 2d 335, and we denied certiorari, 493 U. S. 874 (1989).
Respondent then filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The District Court denied the petition, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. 972 F. 2d 263 (1992). The Court of Appeals concluded that the “record in this case” should have led the trial court to “entertai[n] a good faith doubt about [respondent’s] competency to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights,” id., at 265, and that the Due Process Clause therefore “required the court to hold a hearing to evaluate and determine [respondent’s] competency ... before it accepted his decision to discharge counsel and change his pleas,” ibid. Rejecting petitioner’s argument that the trial court’s error was “cured by the postconviction hearing,” ibid., and that the competency determination that followed the hearing was entitled to deference under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d), the Court of Appeals held that “the state court’s postconviction ruling was premised on the wrong legal standard of competency,” 972 F. 2d, at 266. “Competency to waive constitutional rights,” according to the Court of Appeals, “requires a higher level of mental functioning than that required to stand trial”; while a defendant is competent to stand trial if he has “a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and is capable of assisting his counsel,” a defendant is competent to waive counsel or plead guilty only if he has “the capacity for ‘reasoned choice’ among the alternatives available to him.” Ibid. The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court had “erroneously applied the standard for evaluating competency to stand trial, instead of the correct ‘reasoned choice’ standard,” id., at 266-267, and further concluded that when examined “in light of the correct legal standard,” the record did not support a finding that respondent was “mentally capable of the reasoned choice required for a valid waiver of constitutional rights,” id., at 267. The Court of Appeals accordingly instructed the District Court to issue the writ of habeas corpus within 60 days, “unless the state court allows [respondent] to withdraw his guilty pleas, enter new pleas, and proceed to trial with the assistance of counsel.” Id., at 268.
Whether the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing trial is a question that has divided the Federal Courts of Appeals and state courts of last resort. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 506 U. S. 1033 (1992).
II
A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he is competent, Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 378 (1966), and he may not waive his right to counsel or plead guilty unless he does so “competently and intelligently,” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 468 (1938); accord, Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 758 (1970). In Dusky v. United States, 362 U. S. 402 (1960) (per curiam), we held that the standard for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and has “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Ibid, (internal quotation marks omitted). Accord, Drope v. Missouri, 420 U. S. 162, 171 (1975) (“[A] person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial”). While we have described the standard for competence to stand trial, however, we have never expressly articulated a standard for competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to the assistance of counsel.
Relying in large part upon our decision in Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 150 (1966) (per curiam), the Ninth Circuit adheres to the view that the competency standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel is higher than the competency standard for standing trial. See Sieling v. Eyman, 478 F. 2d 211, 214-215 (1973) (first Ninth Circuit decision applying heightened standard). In Westbrook, a two-paragraph per curiam opinion, we vacated the lower court’s judgment affirming the petitioner’s conviction, because there had been “a hearing on the issue of [the petitioner’s] competence to stand trial,” but “no hearing or inquiry into the issue of his competence to waive his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.” 384 U. S., at 150. The Ninth Circuit has reasoned that the “clear implication” of Westbrook is that the Dusky formulation is not “a high enough standard” for determining whether a defendant is competent to waive a constitutional right. Sieling, supra, at 214. We think the Ninth Circuit has read too much into Westbrook, and we think it errs in applying two different competency standards.
A
The standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit is whether a defendant who seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel has the capacity for “reasoned choice” among the alternatives available to him. How this standard is different from (much less higher than) the Dusky standard — whether the defendant has a “ratioial understanding” of the proceedings — is not readily apparent to us. In fact, respondent himself opposed certiorari on the ground that the difference between the two standards is merely one of “terminology,” Brief in Opposition 4, and he devotes little space in his brief on the merits to a defense of the Ninth Circuit’s standard, see, e. g., Brief for Respondent 17-18, 27, 32; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 33 (“Due process does not require [a] higher standard, [it] requires a separate inquiry”). But even assuming that there is some meaningful distinction between the capacity for “reasoned choice” and a “rational understanding” of the proceedings, we reject the notion that competence to plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel must be measured by a standard that is higher than (or even different from) the Dusky standard.
We begin with the guilty plea. A defendant who stands trial is likely to be presented with choices that entail relinquishment of the same rights that are relinquished by a defendant who pleads guilty: He will ordinarily have to decide whether to waive his “privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243 (1969), by taking the witness stand; if the option is available, he may have to decide whether to waive his “right to trial by jury,” ibid,.; and, in consultation with counsel, he may have to decide whether to waive his “right to confront [his] accusers,” ibid., by declining to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution. A defendant who pleads not guilty, moreover, faces still other strategic choices: In consultation with his attorney, he may be called upon to decide, among other things, whether (and how) to put on a defense and whether to raise one or more affirmative defenses. In sum, all criminal defendants — not merely those who plead guilty — may be required to make important decisions once criminal proceedings have been initiated. And while the decision to plead guilty is undeniably a profound one, it is no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may be called upon to make during the course of a trial. (The decision to plead guilty is also made over a shorter period of time, without the distraction and burden of a trial.) This being so, we can conceive of no basis for demanding a higher level of competence for those defendants who choose to plead guilty. If the Dusky standard is adequate for defendants who plead not guilty, it is necessarily adequate for those who plead guilty.
Nor do we think that a defendant who waives his right to the assistance of counsel must be more competent than a defendant who does not, since there is no reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights. Respondent suggests that a higher competency standard is necessary because a defendant who represents himself “ ‘must have greater powers of comprehension, judgment, and reason than would be necessary to stand trial with the aid of an attorney.’ ” Brief for Respondent 26 (quoting Silten & Tullís, Mental Competency in Criminal Proceedings, 28 Hastings L. J. 1053, 1068 (1977)). Accord, Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae 10-12. But this argument has a flawed premise; the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself. In Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975), we held that a defendant choosing self-representation must do so “competently and intelligently/’ id., at 835, but we made it clear that the defendant’s “technical legal knowledge” is “not relevant” to the determination whether he is competent to waive his right to counsel, id., at 836, and we emphasized that although the defendant “may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored,” id., at 834. Thus, while “[i]t is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel’s guidance than by their own unskilled efforts,” ibid., a criminal defendant’s ability to represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to choose self-representation.
B
A finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial, however, is not all that is necessary before he may be permitted to plead guilty or waive his right to counsel. In addition to determining that a defendant who seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel is competent, a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary. Parke v. Raley, 506 U. S. 20, 28-29 (1992) (guilty plea); Faretta, supra, at 835 (waiver of counsel). In this sense there is a “heightened” standard for pleading guilty and for waiving the right to counsel, but it is not a heightened standard of competence.
This two-part inquiry is what we had in mind in West-brook. When we distinguished between “competence to stand trial” and “competence to waive [the] constitutional right to the assistance of counsel,” 384 U. S., at 150, we were using “competence to waive” as a shorthand for the “intelligent and competent waiver” requirement of Johnson v. Zerbst. This much is clear from the fact that we quoted that very language from Zerbst immediately after noting that the trial court had not determined whether the petitioner was competent to waive his right to counsel. See 384 U. S., at 150 (“ ‘This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused’ ”) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S., at 465). Thus, Westbrook stands only for the unremarkable proposition that when a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel, a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not enough; the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary-before it can be accepted.
Ill
Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel. While psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to classify the various kinds and degrees of competence, and while States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose these additional requirements. Cf. Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, 446-453 (1992). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
One of the psychiatrists stated that there was “not the slightest doubt” that respondent was “in full control of his faculties” insofar as he had the “ability to aid counsel, assist in his own defense, recall evidence and . . . give testimony if called upon to do so.” App. 8. The other psychiatrist believed that respondent was “knowledgeable of the charges being made against him”; that he had the ability to “assist his attorney, in his own defense, if he so desirefd]”; and that he was “fully cognizant of the penalties if convicted.” Id., at 17.
During the course of this lengthy exchange, the trial court asked respondent whether he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and respondent answered as follows: “Just what they give me in, you know, medications.” Id., at 33. The court made no further inquiry. The “medications” to which respondent referred had been prescribed to control his seizures, which were a byproduct of his cocaine use. See App. to Pet. for Cert. D-4.
The specific features of the record upon which the Court of Appeals relied were respondent’s suicide attempt; his desire to discharge his attorneys so as to prevent the presentation of mitigating evidence at sentencing; his “monosyllabic” responses to the trial court’s questions; and the fact that he was on medication at the time he sought to waive his right to counsel and plead guilty. 972 F. 2d, at 265.
In holding that respondent was not competent to waive his constitutional rights, the court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that respondent was on medication at the time he sought to discharge his attorneys and plead guilty. See id., at 268.
While the Ninth Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit, see United States v. Masthers, 176 U. S. App. D. C. 242, 247, 539 F. 2d 721, 726 (1976), have employed the “reasoned choice” standard for guilty pleas, every other Circuit that has considered the issue has determined that the competency standard for pleading guilty is identical to the competency standard for standing trial. See Allard v. Helgemoe, 572 F. 2d 1, 3-6 (CA1), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 858 (1978); United States v. Valentino, 283 F. 2d 634, 635 (CA2 1960) (per curiam); United States ex rel. McGough v. Hewitt, 528 F. 2d 339, 342, n. 2 (CA3 1975); Shaw v. Martin, 733 F. 2d 304, 314 (CA4), cert. denied, 469 U. S. 873 (1984); Malinauskas v. United States, 505 F. 2d 649, 654 (CA5 1974); United States v. Harlan, 480 F. 2d 515, 517 (CA6), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1006 (1973); United States ex rel. Heral v. Franzen, 667 F. 2d 633, 638 (CA7 1981); White Hawk v. Solem, 693 F. 2d 825, 829-830, n. 7 (CA8 1982), cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1054 (1983); Wolf v. United States, 430 F. 2d 443, 444 (CA10 1970); United States v. Simmons, 961 F. 2d 183, 187 (CA11 1992), cert. denied, 507 U. S. 989 (1993). Three of those same Circuits, however, have indicated that the competency standard for waiving the right to counsel is “vaguely higher” than the competency standard for standing trial, see United States ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent, 526 F. 2d 131, 133 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 937 (1976); United States v. McDowell, 814 F. 2d 245, 250 (CA6), cert. denied, 484 U. S. 980 (1987); Blackmon v. Armontrout, 875 F. 2d 164, 166 (CA8), cert. denied, 493 U. S. 939 (1989), and one of them has stated that the two standards “may not always be coterminous,” United States v. Campbell, 874 F. 2d 838, 846 (CA1 1989). Only the Ninth Circuit applies the “reasoned choice” standard to waivers of counsel, and only the Seventh Circuit, see United States v. Clark, 943 F. 2d 775, 782 (1991), cert. pending, No. 92-6439, has held that the competency standard for waiving counsel is identical to the competency standard for standing trial. The Fourth Circuit has expressed the view that the two standards are “closely linked.” United States v. McGinnis, 384 F. 2d 875, 877 (1967) (per curiam), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 990 (1968).
Compare, e.g., State v. Sims, 118 Ariz. 210, 215, 575 P. 2d 1236, 1241 (1978) (heightened standard for guilty plea); and Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 567-568, 292 N. W. 2d 601, 610-611 (1980) (heightened standard for waiver of counsel), with People v. Herat, 62 Ill. 2d 329, 334, 342 N. E. 2d 34, 37 (1976) (identical standard for pleading guilty and standing trial); and People v. Reason, 37 N. Y. 2d 351, 353-354, 334 N. E. 2d 572, 574 (1975) (identical standard for waiving counsel and standing trial).
A criminal defendant waives three constitutional rights when he pleads guilty: the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront one’s accusers. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243 (1969).
Although this case comes to us by way of federal habeas corpus, we do not dispose of it on the ground that the heightened competency standard is a “new rule” for purposes of Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), because petitioner did not raise a Teague defense in the lower courts or in his petition for certiorari. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U. S. 20, 26 (1992); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 41 (1990).
We have used the phrase “rational choice” in describing the competence necessary to withdraw a certiorari petition, Rees v. Peyton, 384 U. S. 312, 314 (1966) (per curiam), but there is no indication in that opinion that the phrase means something different from “rational understanding.”
It is for this reason that the dissent’s reliance on Massey v. Moore, 348 U. S. 105 (1954), is misplaced. When we said in Massey that “[o]ne might not be insane in the sense of being incapable of standing trial and yet lack the capacity to stand trial without benefit of counsel,” id., at 108, we were answering a question that is quite different from the question presented in this case. Prior to our decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), the appointment of counsel was required only in those state prosecutions in which “special circumstances” were present, see id., at 350-351 (Harlan, J., concurring), and the question in Massey was whether a finding that a defendant is competent to stand trial compels a conclusion that there are no “special circumstances” justifying the appointment of counsel. The question here is not whether a defendant who is competent to stand trial has no right to have counsel appointed; it is whether such a defendant is competent to waive the right to counsel that (after Gideon) he under all circumstances has.
We note also that the prohibition against the trial of incompetent defendants dates back at least to the time of Blackstone, see Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, 446 (1992); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U. S. 162, 171-172 (1976); Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940 (CA6 1899) (collecting “common law authorities”), and that “[b]y the common law of that time, it was not representation by counsel but self-representation that was the practice in prosecutions for serious crime,” Faretta v. California, 422 U. S., at 823; accord, id., at 850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“self-representation was common, if not required, in 18th century English and American prosecutions”). It would therefore be “difficult to say that a standard which was designed to determine whether a defendant was capable of defending himself” is “inadequate when he chooses to conduct his own defense.” People v. Reason, 37 N. Y. 2d, at 354, 334 N. E. 2d, at 574.
The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings. See Drope v. Missouri, supra, at 171 (defendant is incompetent if he “lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him”) (emphasis added). The purpose of the “knowing and voluntary” inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced. See Faretta v. California, supra, at 835 (defendant waiving counsel must be “made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open’ ”) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 279 (1942)); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S., at 244 (defendant pleading guilty must have “a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence”).
We do not mean to suggest, of course, that a court is required to make a competency determination in every case in which a defendant seeks to plead guilty or to waive his right to counsel. As in any criminal case, a competency determination is necessary only when a court has reason to doubt the defendant’s competence. See Drope v. Missouri, supra, at 180-181; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U. S. 375, 385 (1966).
In this case the trial court explicitly found both that respondent was competent and that his waivers were knowing and voluntary. See supra, at 392-393.
Whether this same evidence implies that Moran’s waiver of counsel and guilty pleas were also involuntary remains to be seen. Cf. Miller v. Fen-ton, 474 U. S. 104 (1985) (voluntariness is a mixed question of law and fact entitled to independent federal review).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
The Final Report of the Special Master is received and ordered filed.
DECREE
This cause, having come to be heard on the Final Report of the Special Master appointed by the Court, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The Final Settlement Stipulation executed by all of the parties to this ease and presented to the Special Master on March 15, 2001, is approved;
2. The proposed Modified Decree submitted as the Appendix to the Final Settlement Stipulation is entered, replacing the decree originally entered in this case on October 8,1945, as modified on June 15, 1953;
3. All claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims brought in this case are hereby dismissed with prejudice; and
4. The parties shall share in the cost of this litigation in the manner that this Court shall order following the entry of the Modified Decree.
APPENDIX
Modified North Platte Decree
[Entered on October 8, 1945, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 665, modified and supplemented on June 15, 1953, Nebraska v. Wyoming, 345 U. S. 981, and further modified November 13, 2001, Nebraska v. Wyoming, supra, p. 40.]
This Court equitably apportioned the North Platte River among the States of Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska in 1945. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 665 (1945). The Decree was amended pursuant to a stipulation and joint motion of the parties in 1953. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 345 U. S. 981. In 1986, the State of Nebraska filed suit against the State of Wyoming. In 1987, Wyoming filed counterclaims against Nebraska. This Court resolved certain issues on cross-motions for summary judgment in 1993. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U. S. 584. In 1995, this Court granted in part and denied in part Nebraska’s motion to amend its petition, and granted in part and denied in part Wyoming’s motion to amend its counterclaims and to file cross-claims against the United States. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U. S. 1. The parties have agreed upon this Court’s entry of this Modified Decree to a dismissal with prejudice of all claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims for which leave to file was or could have been sought in this case.
The parties to this cause having filed a Final Settlement Stipulation dated March 13, 2001, which includes the parties’ agreement to create the North Platte Decree Committee to assist them in monitoring, administering, and implementing this Modified Decree, and a Joint Motion for Approval of Stipulation, Modification of Decree, and Dismissal with Prejudice, and the Court being fully advised:
IT IS ORDERED:
That the Final Settlement Stipulation dated March 13, 2001, is hereby approved and adopted;
That all claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims for which leave to file was or could have been sought in this case are hereby dismissed with prejudice; and
That the Decree of October 8, 1945, as amended on June 15,1953, is hereby modified as follows:
I. The State of Colorado, its officers, attorneys, agents, and employees, be and they are hereby severally enjoined:
(a) From diverting or permitting the diversion of water from the North Platte River and its tributaries for the irrigation of more than a total of 145,000 acres of land in Jackson County, Colorado, during any one irrigation season;
(b) From storing or permitting the storage of more than a total amount of 17,000 acre-feet of water for irrigation purposes from the North Platte River and its tributaries in Jackson County, Colorado, between October 1 of any year and September 30 of the following year;
(c) From exporting out of the basin of the North Platte River and its tributaries in Jackson County, Colorado, to any other stream basin or basins more than 60,000 acre-feet of water in any period of ten consecutive years reckoned in continuing progressive series beginning with October 1, 1945.
II. The State of Wyoming, its officers, attorneys, agents, and employees, be and they are hereby severally enjoined:
(a) From diverting or permitting the diversion of water for irrigation from the North Platte River and its tributaries, including water from hydrologically connected groundwater wells, upstream of Pathfinder Dam for the consumption in any period of ten consecutive years reckoned in continuing progressive series, of more than the largest amount of water consumed for irrigation from such sources in any ten consecutive year period between 1952 and 1999, inclusive. This injunction becomes effective the first full calendar year after the date of entry of this Modified Decree. The consumptive use of irrigation water in this area to be counted under this injunction shall include the following:
(1) Water consumed for irrigation purposes on lands irrigated with surface water diversions of natural flow;
(2) Water consumed for irrigation purposes on lands irrigated with water stored pursuant to paragraph 11(e);
(3) Water consumed for irrigation purposes on lands irrigated by water from hydrologically connected groundwater wells;
(4) Water consumed for purposes other than irrigation under water rights transferred since October 8, 1945, from an irrigation use to another use;
The largest amount of water consumed for irrigation from such sources in any ten consecutive year period between 1952 and 1999, inclusive, has been determined by the parties pursuant to a methodology and procedures approved and adopted in the Final Settlement Stipulation to be 1,280,000 acre-feet. For the purpose of determining compliance with this injunction, the amount of water consumed for irrigation from such sources shall be determined by the same methodology and procedures. After ten years of administration, accounting, and reporting under this injunction, the methodology and the ten consecutive year limit will be reviewed by the North Platte Decree Committee pursuant to procedures approved and adopted in the Final Settlement Stipulation to determine if there is a better methodology for calculating the largest amount of water consumed for irrigation in such ten consecutive year period and for determining compliance. In making such calculation, any acreage historically reported by the Wyoming State Engineer as irrigated by direct flow surface water or stored water or as transfers, between 1952 and 1999, inclusive, and used in the existing methodology, shall not be changed. In addition, the other acreage used in the existing methodology shall not be changed unless the North Platte Decree Committee agrees that such change results in a more accurate determination of acres actually irrigated between 1952 and 1999, inclusive. In any new methodology, to determine compliance with the consumptive use limit, the acreage above Pathfinder Dam, when combined with the acreage between Pathfinder Dam and Guernsey Reservoir, cannot exceed the 226,000 acreage limitation pursuant to paragraph 11(c). If Nebraska, Wyoming, and the United States agree on a new methodology and a new limit, they shall notify the Court and this paragraph will be modified accordingly. As provided in paragraph XIII, absent agreement on a new methodology and a new limit, Nebraska, Wyoming, or the United States may seek recourse to the Court to resolve these issues.
(b) From diverting or permitting the diversion of water for irrigation from the North Platte River and its tributaries, including water from hydrologically connected groundwater wells, between Pathfinder Dam and Guernsey Reservoir for the consumption in any period of ten consecutive years reckoned in continuing progressive series, exclusive of the Kendrick Project, of more than the largest amount of water consumed for irrigation from such sources in any ten consecutive year period between 1952 and 1999, inclusive. This injunction becomes effective the first full calendar year after the entry of this Modified Decree. The consumptive use of irrigation water in this area to be counted under this injunction shall include the following:
(1) Water consumed for irrigation purposes on lands irrigated with surface water diversions of natural flow;
(2) Water consumed for irrigation purposes on lands irrigated with water stored in reservoirs that store water from the tributaries between Pathfinder Dam and Guernsey Reservoir;
(3) Water consumed for irrigation purposes on lands irrigated by water from hydrologically connected groundwater wells;
(4) Water consumed for purposes other than irrigation with water rights transferred since October 8,1945, from an irrigation use to another use;
The largest amount of water consumed for irrigation from such sources in any ten consecutive year period between 1952 and 1999, inclusive, has been determined by the parties pursuant to a methodology and procedures approved and adopted in the Final Settlement Stipulation to be 890,000 acre-feet. For the purpose of determining compliance with this injunction, the amount of water consumed for irrigation from such sources shall be determined by the same methodology and procedures. After ten years of administration, accounting, and reporting under this injunction, the methodology and the ten consecutivé year limit will be reviewed by the North Platte Decree Committee pursuant to procedures approved and adopted in the Final Settlement Stipulation to determine if there is a better methodology for calculating the largest amount of water consumed for irrigation in such ten consecutive year period and for determining compliance. In making such calculation, any acreage historically reported by the Wyoming State Engineer as irrigated by direct flow surface water or stored water or as transfers, between 1952 and 1999, inclusive, and used in the existing methodology, shall not be changed. In addition, the other acreage used in the existing methodology shall not be changed unless the North Platte Decree Committee agrees that such change results in a more accurate determination of acres actually irrigated between 1952 and 1999, inclusive. In any new methodology, to determine compliance with the consumptive use limit, the acreage above Pathfinder Dam, when combined with the acreage between Pathfinder Dam and Guernsey Reservoir, cannot exceed the 226,000 acreage limitation pursuant to paragraph 11(c). If Nebraska, Wyoming, and the United States agree on a new methodology and a new limit, they shall notify the Court and this paragraph will be modified accordingly. As provided in paragraph XIII, absent agreement on a new methodology and a new limit, Nebraska, Wyoming, or the United States may seek recourse to the'Court to resolve these issues.
(c) From diverting or permitting the diversion of water from the North Platte River and its tributaries, including water from hydrologically connected groundwater wells, upstream of Guernsey Reservoir for the intentional irrigation of more than a total of 226,000 acres of land in Wyoming during any one irrigation season, exclusive of the Kendrick Project. The acres in this area to be counted under this injunction shall include the following, provided that an intentionally irrigated acre that receives water from more than one source shall be counted only once:
(1) Acres irrigated by surface water diversions of natural flow;
(2) Acres irrigated by water stored pursuant to paragraph 11(e);
(3) Acres irrigated by water stored in reservoirs that store water from the tributaries between Pathfinder Dam and Guernsey Reservoir;
(4) Acres irrigated with water from hydrologically connected groundwater wells;
(5) The equivalent of the acres found by order of the Wyoming State Board of Control to have been historically irrigated and that formed the basis for the transfer of water rights where water rights on the North Platte River upstream of Guernsey Reservoir or the tributaries upstream of Pathfinder Dam are transferred after October 8, 1945, from an irrigation use to another use; provided, however, that the amount of acres counted for a given year may be reduced proportionately to the extent that the actual diversion and use of water under the transferred water right during that year are less than the total diversion and use allowed by the order approving such transfer;
(6) The equivalent of the acres found by order of the Wyoming State Board of Control to have been historically irrigated and that formed the basis for the transfer of water rights where water rights on the tributaries entering the North Platte River between Pathfinder Dam and Guernsey Reservoir are transferred after January 1,2001, from an irrigation use to another use; provided, however, that the amount of acres counted for a given year may be reduced proportionately to the extent that the actual diversion and use of water under the transferred water right during that year are less than the total diversion and use allowed by the order approving such transfer;
Ten years after the entry of this Modified Decree, the provision that enjoins Wyoming from intentionally irrigating more than 226,000 acres upstream of Guernsey Reservoir will be replaced with two injunctions, one that limits the number of acres that can be irrigated above Pathfinder Dam and one that limits the number of acres that can be irrigated between Pathfinder Dam and Guernsey Reservoir. Wyoming has the discretion to designate the irrigated acreage limitation above Pathfinder Dam and the irrigated acreage limitation between Pathfinder Dam and Guernsey Reservoir, so long as the total irrigated acreage limitation does not exceed 226,000 acres. After Wyoming makes such designation, Nebraska, Wyoming, and the United States will so notify the Court and the Modified Decree will be modified accordingly.
(d) From diverting or permitting the diversion of water from the Laramie River and its tributaries, including water from hydrologieally connected groundwater wells, downstream of the Wheatland Irrigation District’s Tunnel No. 2, exclusive of the area within the Wheatland Irrigation District, for the intentional irrigation of more than a total of 39,000 acres of land in Wyoming during any one irrigation season. The acres in this area to be counted under this injunction shall include the following, provided that an intentionally irrigated acre that re( eives water from more than one source shall be counted onl y once:
(1) Acres irrigated by surfac 3 water diversions of natural flow;
(2) Acres irrigated by stored irrigation water released from a reservoir;
(3) Acres irrigated with wa ;er from hydrologieally connected groundwater wells;
(4) The equivalent of the acre s found by order of the Wyoming State Board of Control t > have been historically irrigated and that formed the basis for the transfer of water rights where water rights are transferred after January 1, 2001, from an irrigation use that is subject to the limitations of this paragraph 11(d) to another use; provided, however, that the amount of acres counted for a given year may be reduced proportionately to the extent that the actual diversion and use of water under the transferred water right during that year are less than the total diversion and use allowed by the order approving such transfer;
(e) From storing or permitting the storage of more than a total amount of 18,000 acre-feet of water for irrigation purposes from the North Platte River and its tributaries above Pathfinder Reservoir between October 1 of any year and September 30 of the following year, exclusive of Seminoe Reservoir.
III. The State of Wyoming, its officers, attorneys, agents, and employees, be and they are hereby severally enjoined from storing or permitting the storage of water in Pathfinder, Guernsey, Seminoe, Alcova, and Glendo Reservoirs and the Inland Lakes otherwise than in accordance with the relative storage rights, as among themselves, of such reservoirs, which are hereby defined and fixed as follows:
First, Pathfinder Reservoir;
Second, Inland Lakes with the same priority date as Pathfinder Reservoir;
Third, Guernsey Reservoir;
Fourth, Seminoe Reservoir;
Fifth, Alcova Reservoir; and
Sixth, Glendo Reservoir;
Provided, however, that water accruing in priority to the storage right of a reservoir listed above, and water accruing to the Glendo Reservoir reregulating space pursuant to paragraph XVII(g), may be physically stored in, released from, or exchanged with another reservoir so long as the water is accounted in accordance with the foregoing rule of priority and only when such storage, release, or exchange will not materially interfere with the administration of water for irrigation purposes according to the priority decreed for the French Canal and the State Line Canals. Further, in accordance with the opinion of this Court dated April 20, 1993 (507 U. S. 584),. the United States has the right to divert 46,000 acre-feet of water during the^nonirrigation season months of October, November, and'April for storage in the Inland Lakes. Historically, pursuant to annual agreements entered in the discretion of the parties, such diversions have occurred at a rate not exceeding 910 cubic feet per second from gains accruing to the river downstream of Alcova Reservoir. This right shall be administered in accordance with procedures to be reviewed and adopted annually by the North Platte Decree Committee.
IV. The State of Wyoming, its officers, attorneys, agents, and employees, be and they are hereby severally enjoined from storing-or permitting the storage of water in Pathfinder, Guernsey, Seminoe, Alcova, and Glendo Reservoirs, and from the diversion of natural flow water through the Casper Canal for the Kendrick Project between and including May 1 and September 30 of each year otherwise than in accordance with the rule of priority in relation to the appropriations of the Nebraska lands supplied by the French Canal and by the State Line Canals, which said Nebraska appropriations are hereby adjudged to be senior to said five reservoirs and said Casper Canal, and which said Nebraska appropriations are hereby identified and defined, and their diversion limitations in second feet and seasonal limitations in acre-feet fixed as follows:
Lands Canal Limitation in Sec. Feet Seasonal Limitation in Acre-Feet
Tract of 1,025 acres French 15 2,227
Mitchell Irrigation District Mitchell 195 35,000
Gering Irrigation District Gering 193 36,000
Farmers Irrigation District Tri-State 748 183,050
Ramshom Irrigation District Ramshom_14_3,000
This paragraph limits the extent to which these canals may stop the federal reservoirs from storing water and the Casper Canal from diverting natural flow water. It does not place any absolute ceilings or other restrictions on the quantities of water that these canals may actually divert. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U. S., at 603; see also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U. S., at 10.
V. The natural flow in the Guernsey Dam to Tri-State Dam section between and including May 1 and September 30 of each year, including the contribution of Spring Creek, be and the same hereby is apportioned between Wyoming and Nebraska on the basis of twenty-five per cent to Wyoming and seventy-five per cent to Nebraska, with the right granted Nebraska to designate from time to time the portion of its share which shall be delivered into the Interstate, Fort Laramie, French, and Mitchell Canals for use on the Nebraska lands served by these canals. The natural flow in a portion of certain tributaries and drains as defined in paragraph V(a) shall also be included in the natural flow apportioned by this paragraph. The State of Nebraska, its officers, attorneys, agents, and employees, and the State of Wyoming, its officers, attorneys, agents, and employees, are hereby enjoined and restrained from diversion or use contrary to this apportionment, provided that in the apportionment of water in this section the flow for each day, until ascertainable, shall be assumed to be the same as that of the preceding day, as shown by the measurements and computations for that day. Provided further that:
(a) Diversions under surface water rights for irrigation purposes from those parts of the tributaries and drains to the North Platte River that lie within the area bounded by Whalen Diversion Dam on the west, the Ft. Laramie Canal on the south, the Interstate Canal on the north, and the Wyoming-Nebraska state line on the east, excluding the drainage basins of the Laramie River and Horse Creek, shall be administered and accounted as diversions of natural flow for the purposes of the foregoing percentage apportionment, unless the depletions to the North Platte River resulting from such diversions are replaced. The amount of such depletions, and the method for their replacement in the ordinary course of administration, shall be determined and implemented pursuant to procedures that have been approved and adopted in the Final Settlement Stipulation.
(b) Diversions for irrigation purposes from wells with water right priorities between October 8,1945, and including December 31, 2000, located within the area bounded by Whalen Diversion Dam on the west, 300 feet south of the Ft. Laramie Canal on the south, one mile north of the Interstate Canal on the north, and the Wyoming-Nebraska state line on the east, shall be regulated as follows: To the extent the pumping of such wells results in depletions to the North Platte River between Whalen Diversion Dam and the state line or to the portions of tributaries described in paragraph V(a) between May 1 and September 30, such depletions shall be replaced or the pumping shall be regulated to prevent such depletions, unless such depletions occur when the natural flow in the Guernsey Dam to Tri-State Diversion Dam reach exceeds irrigation demands in that reach. The amount of such depletions, and the method for their replacement in the ordinary course of administration, shall be determined and implemented pursuant to procedures that have been approved and adopted in the Final Settlement Stipulation.
(c) Diversions for irrigation purposes from wells with water right priorities after December 31, 2000, located within the area bounded by Whalen Diversion Dam on the west, 300 feet south of the Ft. Laramie Canal on the south, one mile north of the Interstate Canal on the north, and the Wyoming-Nebraska state line on the east, shall be regulated or subject to depletion replacement pursuant to procedures that have been approved and adopted in the Final Settlement Stipulation.
(d) The river carriage and reservoir loss calculations established in the Decree of October 8, 1945, have been replaced with administrative procedures attached to the North Platte Decree Committee Charter. These procedures may be modified from time to time by the North Platte Decree Committee.
VI. This Modified Decree is intended to and does deal with and apportion only the natural flow of the North Platte River. Storage water shall not be affected by this Modified Decree, and the owners of rights therein shall be permitted to distribute the same in accordance with any lawful contracts which they may have entered into or may in the future enter into without interference because of this Modified Decree.
VII. Such additional gauging stations and measuring devices at or near the Wyoming-Nebraska state line, if any, as may be necessary for making any apportionment herein decreed, shall be constructed and maintained at the joint and equal expense of Wyoming and Nebraska to the extent that the costs thereof are not paid by others.
VIII. The State of Wyoming, its officers, attorneys, agents, and employees be and they are hereby severally enjoined from diverting or permitting the diversion of water from the North Platte River or its tributaries at or above Alcova Reservoir in lieu of or in exchange for return flow water from the Kendrick Project reaching the North Platte River below Alcova Resérvoir.
IX. The State of Wyoming and the State of Colorado be and they are hereby each required to prepare and maintain complete and accurate records of the total area of land irrigated and the storage and exportation of the water of the North Platte River and its tributaries within those portions of their respective jurisdictions covered by the provisions of paragraphs I, 11(c), 11(d), and 11(e). The State of Wyoming is also required to prepare and maintain complete and accurate records of the total consumption of irrigation water in the portion of its jurisdiction covered by paragraphs 11(a) and 11(b). The record keeping and reporting required of the State of Wyoming by this paragraph shall be implemented in accordance with procedures that have been approved and adopted in the Final Settlement Stipulation. The records required by this paragraph shall be available for inspection at all reasonable times; provided, however, that such records shall not be required in reference to the water uses permitted by paragraphs X and XII(f).
X. This Modified Decree shall not affect or restrict the use or diversion of water from the North Platte River and its tributaries in Colorado or Wyoming for ordinary and usual domestic, municipal, and stock watering purposes and consumption.
XI. For the purposes of this Modified Decree:
(a) “Season” or “seasonal” refers to the irrigation season, May 1 to September 30, inclusive;
(b) The term “storage water” as applied to releases from reservoirs owned and operated by the United States is defined as any water which is released from reservoirs for use on lands under canals having storage contracts in addition to the water which is discharged through those reservoirs to meet natural flow uses permitted by this Modified Decree;
(c) “Natural flow water” shall be taken as referring to all water in the stream except storage water;
(d) Return flows from the Kendrick Project shall be deemed to be “natural flow water” when they have reached the North Platte River, subject to the same diversion and use as any other natural flow in the stream;
(e) “Hydrologically connected groundwater wells” are defined in procedures attached to the North Platte Decree Committee Charter as Exhibits 4, 6, and 12 approved and adopted in the Final Settlement Stipulation. The North Platte Decree Committee may modify such definition in accordance with the Final Settlement Stipulation.
XII. This Modified Decree shall not affect:
(a) The relative rights of water users within any one of the States who are parties to this suit except as may be otherwise specifically provided herein;
(b) Such claims as the United States has to storage water under Wyoming law nor will the Modified Decree in any way interfere with the ownership and operation by the United States of the various federal storage and power plants, works, and facilities;
(c) The use or disposition of any additional supply or supplies of water that may be imported into the basin of the North Platte River from the watershed of an entirely separate stream or the return flow from any such supply or supplies;
(d) The apportionment heretofore made by this Court between the States of Wyoming and Colorado of the waters of the Laramie River, a tributary of the North Platte River, down, to and including the Wheatland Project. The waters of the Laramie River below the Wheatland Project are not apportioned by this Modified Decree. The only existing limitation in this Modified Decree on Wyoming’s use of the Laramie River is provided in paragraph 11(d);
(e) The apportionment made by the compact between the States of Nebraska and Colorado, apportioning the water of the South Platte River;
(f) Water diverted for de minimis uses, defined as:
(1) Ponds with capacities of twenty acre-feet or less for purposes other than irrigated agriculture;
(2) Wells with capacities less than or equal to twenty-five gallons per minute for a single project for purposes other than irrigated agriculture; and
(3) Miscellaneous uses that withdraw or divert less than fifty acre-feet per year for a single project other than stock watering, domestic or irrigated agriculture.
XIII. Any of the parties may apply at the foot of this Modified Decree for its amendment or for further relief. Any dispute related to compliance or administration shall be submitted to and addressed by the North Platte Decree Committee before a party may seek leave of the Court to bring such dispute before the Court. The Court retains jurisdiction of this suit for the purpose of any order, direction, or modification of the decree, or any supplementary decree, that may at any time be deemed proper in relation to the subject matter in controversy. Further, the Court retains jurisdiction, upon proper showing, to adjudicate all matters for which authority or responsibility is granted to the North Platte Decree Committee by this Modified Decree or the Final Settlement Stipulation. Matters with reference to which further relief may hereafter be sought shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:
(a) The question of the applicability and effect of the Act of August 9,1937 (50 Stat. 564, 595-596), upon the rights of Colorado and its water users;
(b) The question of the effect upon the rights of upstream areas of the construction or threatened construction in downstream areas of any projects not now existing or recognized in this Modified Decree;
(c) The question of the effect of the construction or threatened construction of storage capacity not now existing on tributaries entering the North Platte River between Pathfinder Reservoir and Guernsey Reservoir;
(d) The question of the right to divert at or above the headgate of the Casper Canal any water in lieu of, or in exchange for, any water developed by artificial drainage to the river of sump areas on the Kendrick Project;
(e) Any question relating to the joint operation of Pathfinder, Guernsey, Seminoe, Alcova, and Glendo Reservoirs whenever changed conditions make such joint operation possible;
(f) Any change in conditions making modification of the Modified Decree or the granting of further relief necessary or appropriate;
(g) Failure of the North Platte Decree Committee, or the parties to the North Platte Decree Committee, to act upon, resolve or agree on a matter that has been submitted to the North Platte Decree Committee.
XIV. The costs in the original cause were apportioned and paid pursuant to previous order of this Court. The costs in the present cause and the payment of the fees and expenses of the Special Master have been apportioned and paid according to previous orders of this Court with which the parties agree and the Court hereby confirms.
XV. The clerk of this Court shall transmit to the Governors and Attorneys General of the States of Colorado, Wyoming, and Nebraska, the Solicitor General of the United States of America, and Basin Electric Power Cooperative, copies of this Modified Decree duly authenticated under the seal of this Court.
XVI. Whatever claims or defenses the parties or any of them may have in respect to the application, interpretation, or construction of the Act of August 9, 1937 (50 Stat. 564, 595-596), shall be determined without prejudice to any party arising because of any development of the Kendrick Project occurring subsequent to October 1, 1951.
XVII. The following provisions are effective for the operation of Glendo Dam and Reservoir:
(a) The operation of the Glendo Project shall not impose any demand on areas at or above Seminoe Reservoir which will prejudice any rights that the States of Colorado or Wyoming might have to secure a modification of the Modified Decree permitting an expansion of water uses in the natural basin of the North Platte River in Colorado or above Seminoe Reservoir in Wyoming.
(b) The operation of Glendo Reservoir shall not affect the regime of the natural flow of the North Platte River except that not more than 40,000 acre-feet of the natural flow of the North Platte River and its tributaries which cannot be stored in upstream reservoirs under the provisions of this Modified Decree may be stored in Glendo Reservoir during any water year for disposition by the United States under contracts, in addition to evaporation losses on such storage, and further, the amount of water that may be held in storage at any one time for disposition by the United States under contracts, including carryover storage, shall never exceed 100,000 acre-feet. Such storage water shall be disposed of in accordance with contracts executed or to be hereafter executed, in compliance with federal law, and may be used for any beneficial purpose in Nebraska within the Platte River basin to the extent of 25,000 acre-feet annually and for any beneficial purpose in Wyoming within the Platte River basin to the extent of 15,000 acre-feet annually. The above limitation on the amount of storage of natural flow does not apply: (1) to flood water which may be temporarily stored in any capacity allocated for flood control in Glendo Reservoir; (2) to water originally stored in Pathfinder Reservoir which may be temporarily re-stored in Glendo Reservoir after its release from Pathfinder and before its delivery pursuant to contract; (3) to Inland Lakes account water temporarily stored in accordance with this Court’s Order of April 20, 1993; (4) to water which may be impounded behind Glendo Dam, as provided in the Bureau of Reclamation Definite Plan Report for the Glendo Unit, Wyoming, dated December 1952, as revised through December 1959 (Glendo Definite Plan Report) for the purpose of creating a head for the development of water power; or (5) to water in Glendo Reservoir used for the purposes described in paragraph XVII(g).
(c) Each State may substitute or supplement quantities of storage water obtained under other contractual arrangements with Glendo Reservoir storage supplies. Subject to contractual arrangements with the United States Bureau of Reclamation, including any required compliance with the Endangered Species Act, 16 U. S. C. § 1531 et seq., and the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U. S. C. §4321 et seq., each State shall also enjoy unrestricted use of its respective storage allocation in Glendo Reservoir, so long as the use is below Glendo Reservoir and within the Platte River basin.
(d) Glendo Reservoir storage water may be consumptively used in Wyoming by exchange or other means, upstream of Glendo Reservoir under the terms of this paragraph. For every two acre-feet of Glendo storage water diverted upstream of Glendo Reservoir pursuant to such an exchange, all of which may be fully consumed, an additional acre-foot of Wyoming’s Glendo storage allocation shall be contracted at the same time for storage and release from Glendo Reservoir and passed through Guernsey Reservoir to the North Platte River. Except as may be modified in accordance with paragraph XVII(e), or by agreement of the parties, such additional water shall be released from the reservoir at the same time and at a rate proportionate to the diversion of the water contracted for use upstream from Glendo Reservoir during the irrigation season. During the nonirrigation season, due to operational constraints of the outlets at Guernsey Reservoir, such additional water will be held in the Glendo account and released prior to the first of May as may be operationally practical. Except as provided in paragraph XVII(e), once released, such additional water shall be considered natural flow water for purposes of the 75/25 apportionment specified in paragraph V.
(e) If the valid exercise or enforcement of federal law or authority requires Wyoming or a water user within Wyoming to cause the release of a portion of Wyoming’s Glendo allocation for environmental purposes downstream of Glendo Reservoir, the additional water contracted and released under paragraph XVII(d) may be dedicated to and used for that purpose. Any water released pursuant to such requirement shall not be considered natural flow but shall be administered and protected as storage water in accordance with state law within both Wyoming and Nebraska until used for its intended purposes.
(f) Storage water in Glendo Reservoir from either State’s allocation may be used for fish and wildlife purposes downstream of Glendo Reservoir under contractual arrangements with the United States Bureau of Reclamation, subject to approval of Wyoming for contracts for water from Wyoming’s storage allocation and subject to approval of Nebraska for contracts for water from Nebraska’s storage allocation. Any water released pursuant to such agreement shall not be considered natural flow but shall be administered and protected as storage water in accordance with state law within both Wyoming and Nebraska until used for its intended purposes.
(g) The United States Bureau of Reclamation has the discretion to hold water in Glendo Reservoir in excess of the limitations stated in paragraph XVII(b) in accordance with the operation of the reregulation space in Glendo Reservoir under Permit No. 5998 Res. and Certificate of Construction of Reservoir, as clarified by Order of
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
K
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is affirmed by an equally divided Court.
Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to footnote 6.
Section 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA), 48 Stat. 1219, 12 U. S. C. § 1759, provides that “[fjederal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district.” Since 1982, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the agency charged with administering the FCUA, has interpreted § 109 to permit federal credit unions to be composed of multiple unrelated employer groups, each having its own common bond of occupation. In this action, respondents, five banks and the American Bankers Association, have challenged this interpretation on the ground that § 109 unambiguously requires that the same common bond of occupation unite every member of an occupationally defined federal credit union. We granted certiorari to answer two questions. First, do respondents have standing under the Administrative Procedure Act to seek federal-court review of the NCUA’s interpretation? Second, under the analysis set forth in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), is the NCUA’s interpretation permissible? We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative. We therefore affirm.
I
A
In 1934, during the Great Depression, Congress enacted the FCUA, which authorizes the chartering of credit unions at the national level and provides that federal credit unions may, as a general matter, offer banking services only to their members. Section 109 of the FCUA, which has remained virtually unaltered since the FCUA’s enactment, expressly restricts membership in federal credit unions. In relevant part, it provides:
“Federal credit union, membership shall consist of the incorporators and such other persons and incorporated and unincorporated organizations, to the extent permitted by rules and regulations prescribed by the Board, as may be elected to membership and as such shall each, subscribe to at least one share of its stock and pay the initial installment thereon and a uniform entrance fee if required by the board of directors; except that Federal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district.” 12 U. S. C. § 1759 (emphasis added).
Until 1982, the NCUA and its predecessors consistently interpreted § 109 to require that the same common bond of occupation unite every member of an occupationally defined federal credit union. In 1982, however, the NCUA reversed its longstanding policy in order to permit credit unions to be composed of multiple unrelated employer groups. See IRPS 82-1, 47 Fed. Reg. 16775 (1982). It thus interpreted § 109’s common bond requirement to apply only to each employer group in a multiple-group credit union, rather than to every member of that credit union. See IRPS 82-3,47 Fed. Reg. 26808 (1982). Under the NCUA’s new interpretation, all of the employer groups in a multiple-group credit union had to be located “within a well-defined area,” ibid., but the NCUA later revised this requirement to provide that each employer group could be located within “an area surrounding the [credit union’s] home or a branch office that can be reasonably served by the [credit union] as determined by NCUA.” IRPS 89-1, 54 Fed. Reg. 31170 (1989). Since 1982, therefore, the NCUA has permitted federal credit unions to be composed of wholly unrelated employer groups, each having its own distinct common bond.
B
After the NCUA revised its interpretation of § 109, petitioner AT&T Family Federal Credit Union (ATTF) expanded its operations considerably by adding unrelated employer groups to its membership. As a result, ATTF now has approximately 110,000 members nationwide, only 35% of whom are employees of AT&T and its affiliates. See Brief for Petitioner NCUA 9. The remaining members are employees of such diverse companies as the Lee Apparel Company, the Coca-Cola Bottling Company, the Ciba-Geigy Corporation, the Duke Power Company, and the American Tobacco Company. See App. 54-79.
In 1990, after the NCUA approved a series of amendments to ATTP’s charter that added several such unrelated employer groups to ATTP’s membership, respondents brought this action. Invoking the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §702, respondents claimed that the NCUA’s approval of the charter amendments was contrary to law because the members of the new groups did not share a common bond of occupation with ATTP’s existing members, as respondents alleged § 109 required. ATTP and petitioner Credit Union National Association were permitted to intervene in the action as defendants.
The District Court dismissed the complaint. It held that respondents lacked prudential standing to challenge the NCUA’s chartering decision because their interests were not within the “zone of interests” to be protected by § 109, as required by this Court’s cases interpreting the APA. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Admin., 772 F. Supp. 609 (DC 1991). The District Court rejected as irrelevant respondents’ claims that the NCUA’s interpretation had caused them competitive injury, stating that the legislative history of the FCUA demonstrated that it was passed “to establish a place for credit unions within the country’s financial market, and specifically not to protect the competitive interest of banks.” Id., at 612. The District Court also determined that respondents were not “suitable challengers” to the NCUA’s interpretation, as that term had been used in prior prudential standing cases from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. National Credit Union Admin., 988 F. 2d 1272, cert. denied, 510 U. S. 907 (1993). The Court of Appeals agreed that “Congress did not, in 1934, intend to shield banks from competition from credit unions,” 988 F. 2d, at 1275, and hence respondents could not be said to be “intended beneficiaries” of § 109. Relying on two of our prudential standing cases involving the financial services industry, Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617 (1971), and Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388 (1987), the Court of Appeals nonetheless concluded that respondents’ interests were sufficiently congruent with the interests of §109’s intended beneficiaries that respondents were “suitable challengers” to the NCUA’s chartering decision; therefore, their suit could proceed. See 988 F. 2d, at 1276-1278.
On remand, the District sis that we announced in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), and held that the NCUA had permissibly interpreted § 109. 863 F. Supp. 9 (DC 1994). It first asked whether, in enacting § 109, Congress had spoken directly to the precise question at issue — whether the same common bond of occupation must unite members of a federal credit union composed of multiple employer groups. See id., at 12. It determined that because § 109 could plausibly be understood to permit an occupationally defined federal credit union to consist of several employer “groups,” each having its own distinct common bond of occupation, Congress had not unambiguously addressed this question. See ibid. The District Court then stated that it was unnecessary to decide, under the second step of Chevron, whether the NCUA’s interpretation was reasonable, because respondents had not “seriously argued” that the interpretation was unreasonable. See 863 F. Supp., at 13-14. Accordingly, the District Court entered summary judgment against respondents. See ibid.
The Court of Appeals again reversed. 90 F. 3d 525 (CADC 1996). It held that the District Court had incorrectly applied the first step of Chevron: Congress had indeed spoken directly to the precise question at issue and had unambiguously indicated that the same common bond of occupation must unite members of a federal credit union composed of multiple employer groups. See 90 F. 3d, at 527. The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the concept of a “common bond” is implicit in the term “group,” the term “common bond” would be surplusage if it applied only to the members of each constituent “group” in a multiple-group federal credit union. See id., at 528. It further noted that the NCUA had not interpreted §109’s geographical limitation to allow federal credit unions to comprise groups from multiple unrelated “neighborhood^], communities], or rural dis-triet[s]” and stated that the occupational limitation should not be interpreted differently. See id., at 528-529. The NCUA’s revised interpretation of § 109 was therefore impermissible. See id., at 529. Because of the importance of the issues presented, we granted certiorari. 519 U. S. 1148 (1997).
Respondents claim a right to judicial review of the NCUA’s chartering decision under § 10(a) of the APA, which provides:
“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U. S. C. § 702.
We have interpreted § 10(a) of the APA to impose a prudential standing requirement in addition to the requirement, imposed by Article III of the Constitution, that a plaintiff have suffered a sufficient injury in fact. See, e. g., Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 152 (1970) (Data Processing). For a plaintiff to have prudential standing under the APA, “the interest sought to be protected by the complainant [must be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute... in question.” Id., at 153.
Based on four of our prior cases finding that competitors of financial institutions have standing to challenge agency action relaxing statutory restrictions on the activities of those institutions, we hold that respondents’ interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by § 109. Therefore, respondents have prudential standing under the APA to challenge the NCUA’s interpretation.
A
Although our prior cases have not stated a clear rule for determining when a plaintiff’s interest is “arguably within the zone of interests” to be protected by a statute, they nonetheless establish that we should not inquire whether there has been a congressional intent to benefit the would-be plaintiff. In Data Processing, supra, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller) had interpreted the National Bank Act’s incidental powers clause, Rev. Stat. § 5136, 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh, to permit national banks to perform data processing services for other banks and bank customers. See Data Processing, supra, at 151. The plaintiffs, a data processing corporation and its trade association, alleged that this interpretation was impermissible because providing data processing services was not, as was required by the statute, “[an] incidental powe[r]... necessary to carry on the business of banking.” See 397 U. S., at 157, n. 2.
In holding that the plaintiffs had standing, we stated that § 10(a) of the APA required only that “the interest sought to be protected by the complainant [be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute... in question.” Id., at 153. In determining that the plaintiffs’ interest met this requirement, we noted that although the relevant federal statutes—the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh, and the Bank Service Corporation Act, 76 Stat. 1132, 12 U. S. C. § 1864—did not “in terms protect a specified group[,]... their general policy is apparent; and those whose interests are directly affected by a broad or narrow interpretation of the Acts are easily identifiable.” Data Processing, 397 U. S., at 157. “[A]s competitors of national banks which are engaging in data processing services,” the plaintiffs were within that class of “aggrieved persons” entitled to judicial review of the Comptroller’s interpretation. Ibid.
Less than a year later, we applied the “zone of interests” test in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U. S. 45 (1970) (per curiam) (Arnold Tours). There, certain travel agencies challenged a ruling by the Comptroller, similar to the one contested in Data Processing, that permitted national banks to operate travel agencies. See 400 U. S., at 45. In holding that the plaintiffs had prudential standing under the APA, we noted that it was incorrect to view our decision in Data Processing as resting on the peculiar legislative history of §4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act, which had been passed in part at the behest of the data processing industry. See 400 U. S., at 46. We stated explicitly that “we did not rely on any legislative history showing that Congress desired to protect data processors alone from competition.” Ibid. We further explained:
“In Data Processing... [w]e held that §4 arguably brings a competitor within the zone of interests protected by it. Nothing in the opinion limited §4 to protecting only competitors in the data-proeessing field. When national banks begin to provide travel services for their customers, they compete with travel agents no less than they compete with data processors when they provide data-processing services to their customers.” Ibid, (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
A year later, we decided Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617 (1971) (ICI). In that ease, an investment company trade association and several individual investment companies alleged that the Comptroller had violated, inter alia, §21 of the Glass-Steagall Act, 1932, by permitting national banks to establish and operate what in essence were early versions of mutual funds. We held that the plaintiffs, who alleged that they would be injured by the competition resulting from the Comptroller’s action, had standing under the APA and stated that the case was controlled by Data Processing. See 401 U. S., at 621. Significantly, we fonnd unpersuasive Justice Harlan’s argument in dissent that the suit should be dismissed because “neither the language of the pertinent provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act nor the legislative history evineefd] any congressional concern for the interests of petitioners and others like them in freedom from competition.” Id., at 640.
Our fourth case in this vein was Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., 479 U. S. 388 (1987) (Clarke). There, a securities dealers trade association sued the Comptroller, this time for authorizing two national banks to offer discount brokerage services both at their branch offices and at other locations inside and outside their home States. See id., at 391. The plaintiff contended that the Comptroller’s action violated the McFadden Act, which permits national banks to carry on the business of banking only at authorized branches, and to open new branches only in their home States and only to the extent that state-chartered banks in that State can do so under state law. See id., at 891-392.
We again held that the plaintiff had standing under the APA. Summarizing our prior holdings, we stated that although the “zone of interests” test “denies a right of review if the plaintiff’s interests are... marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute,” id., at 399, “there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff,” id., at 399-400 (citing ICI). We then determined that by limiting the ability of national banks to do business outside their home States, “Congress ha[d] shown a concern to keep national banks from gaining a monopoly control over credit and money.” 479 U. S., at 403. The interest of the securities dealers in preventing national banks from expanding into the securities markets directly implicated this concern because offering discount brokerage services would allow national banks “access to more money, in the form of credit balances, and enhanced opportunities to lend money, viz., for margin purchases.” Ibid. The case was thus analogous to Data Processing and ICI: “In those cases the question was what activities hanks could engage in at all; here, the question is what activities banks can engage in without regard to the limitations imposed by state branching law.” 479 U. S., at 403.
B
Our prior eases, therefore, have consistently held that for a plaintiff’s interests to be arguably within the “zone of interests” to be protected by a statute, there does not have to be an “indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.” Id., at 399-400 (citing ICI); see also Arnold Tours, 400 U. S., at 46 (citing Data Processing). The proper inquiry is simply “whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected... by the statute.” Data Processing, 397 U. S., at 153 (emphasis added). Hence in applying the “zone of interests” test, we do not ask whether, in enacting the statutory provision at issue, Congress specifically intended to benefit the plaintiff. Instead, we first discern the interests “arguably... to be protected” by the statutory provision at issue; we then inquire whether the plaintiff’s interests affected by the agency action in question are among them.
Section 109 provides that “[fjederal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district.” 12 U. S. C. § 1759. By its express terms, §109 limits membership in every federal credit union to members of definable “groups.” Because federal credit unions may, as a general matter, offer banking services only to members, see, e. g., 12 U. S. C. §§ 1757(5)-(6), § 109 also restricts the markets that every federal credit union can serve. Although these markets need not be small, they unquestionably are limited. The link between § 109’s regulation of federal credit union membership and its limitation on the markets that federal credit unions can serve is unmistakable. Thus, even if it cannot be said that Congress had the specific purpose of benefiting commercial banks, one of the interests “arguably... to be protected” by § 109 is an interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve. This interest is precisely the interest of respondents affected by the NCUA’s interpretation of § 109. As competitors of federal credit unions, respondents certainly have an interest in limiting the markets that federal credit unions can serve, and the NCUA’s interpretation has affected that interest by allowing federal credit unions to increase their customer base.
Section 109 cannot be distinguished from the statutory provisions at issue in Clarke, ICI, Arnold Tours, and Data Processing. Although in Clarke the McFadden Act appeared to be designed to protect only the interest of state banks in parity of treatment with national banks, we nonetheless determined that the statute also limited “the extent to which [national] banks [could] engage in the discount brokerage business and hence Iimit[ed] the competitive impact on nonbank discount brokerage houses.” Clarke, 479 U. S., at 408. Accordingly, although Congress did not intend specifically to protect securities dealers, one of the interests “arguably... to be protected” by the statute was an interest in restricting national bank market power. The plaintiff securities dealers, as competitors of national banks, had that interest, and that interest had been affected by the interpretation of the McFadden Act they sought to challenge, because that interpretation had allowed national banks to expand their activities and serve new customers. See ibid.
Similarly, in ICI, even though in enacting the Glass-Steagall Act, Congress did not intend specifically to benefit investment companies and may have sought only to protect national banks and their depositors, one of the interests “arguably... to be protected” by the statute was an interest in restricting the ability of national banks to enter the securities business. The investment company plaintiffs, as competitors of national banks, had that interest^ and that interest had been affected by the Comptroller’s interpretation allowing national banks to establish mutual funds.
So too, in Arnold Tours and Data Processing, although in enacting the National Bank Act and the Bank Service Corporation Act, Congress did not intend specifically to benefit travel agents and data processors and may have been concerned only with the safety and soundness of national banks, one of the interests “arguably... to be protected” by the statutes was an interest in preventing national banks from entering other businesses’ product markets. As competitors of national banks, travel agents and data processors had that interest, and that interest had been affected by the Comptroller’s interpretations opening their markets to national banks. See also NationsBank of N C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U. S. 251 (1995) (deciding that the Comptroller had permissibly interpreted 12 U. S. C. § 24 Seventh to allow national banks to act as agents in the sale of annuities; insurance agents’ standing to challenge.the interpretation not questioned).
C
Petitioners attempt to distinguish this action principally on the ground that there is no evidence that Congress, when it enacted the FCUA, was at all concerned with the competitive interests of commercial banks, or indeed at all concerned with competition. See Brief for Petitioner ATTF 21-22. Indeed, petitioners contend that the very reason Congress passed the FCUA was that “[blanks were simply not in the picture” as far as small borrowers were concerned, and thus Congress believed it necessary to create a new source of credit for people of modest means. See id., at 25.
The difficulty with this argument is that similar arguments were made unsuccessfully in each of Data Processing, Arnold Tours, ICI, and Clarke. In Data Processing, the Comptroller argued against standing for the following reasons:
“[P]etitioners do not contend that Section 24 Seventh had any purpose... to protect the interest of potential competitors of national banks. The reason is clear: the legislative history of the Section dispels all possible doubt that its enactment in 1864 (18 Stat. 101) was for the express and sole purpose of creating a strong national banking system.... To the extent that the protection of a competitive interest was at the bottom of the enactment of Section 24 Seventh, it was the interest of national banks and not of their competitors.” Brief for Comptroller of the Currency in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, O. T. 1969, No. 85, pp. 19-20.
Similarly, in Arnold Tours, the Comptroller contended that the position of the travel agents was “markedly different from that of the data processors,” who could find in the legislative history “some manifestation of legislative concern for their competitive position.” Memorandum for Comptroller of the Currency in Opposition in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, O. T. 1970, No. 602, pp. 8-4. And in ICI, the Comptroller again urged us not to find standing, because—
“[t]he thrust of the legislation, and the concern of the drafters, was to protect the banking public through the maintenance of a sound national banking system....
“There was no Congressional objective to protect mutual funds or their investment advisers or underwriters.” Brief for Comptroller of Currency in Investment Company Institute v. Camp, O. T. 1970, No. 61, pp. 27-29 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Indeed, the. Congressional attitude toward the investment bankers can only be characterized as one of distaste. For example, in discussing the private investment bankers, Senator Glass pointed out that many of them had ‘unloaded millions of dollars of worthless investment securities upon the banks of this country.’” Id., at 30, n. 22 (citation omitted).
Finally, in Clarke, the Comptroller contended that “[tjhere is no doubt that Congress had only one type of competitive injury in mind when it passed the [McFadden] Act — the type that national and state banks might inflict upon each other.” Brief for Federal Petitioner in Clarke v. Securities Industry Assn., O. T. 1985, No. 85-971, p. 24.
In each case, we declined to accept the Comptroller’s argument. In Data Processing, we considered it irrelevant that the statutes in question “d[id] not in terms protect a specified group,” because “their general policy [was] apparent[,] and those whose interests [were] directly affected by a broad or narrow interpretation of [the statutes] [were] easily identifiable.” 397 U. S., at 157. In Arnold Tours, we similarly believed it irrelevant that Congress had shown no concern for the competitive position of travel agents in enacting the statutes in question. See 400 U. S., at 46. In ICI, we were unmoved by Justice Harlan’s comment in dissent that the Glass-Steagall Act was passed in spite of its positive effects on the competitive position of investment banks. See 401 U. S., at 640. And in Clarke, we did not debate whether the Congress that enacted the McFadden Act was concerned about the competitive position of securities dealers. See 479 U. S., at 403. The provisions at issue in each of these cases, moreover, could be said merely to be safety-and-soundness provisions, enacted only to protect national banks and their depositors and without a concern for competitive effects. We nonetheless did not hesitate to find standing.
We therefore cannot accept petitioners’ argument that respondents do not have standing because there is no evidence that the Congress that enacted § 109 was concerned with the competitive interests of commercial banks. To accept that argument, we would have to reformulate the “zone of interests” test to require that Congress have specifically intended to benefit a particular class of plaintiffs before a plaintiff from that class could have standing under the APA to sue. We have refused to do this in our prior eases, and we refuse to do so today.
Petitioners also mistakenly rely on our decision in Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers, 498 U. S. 517 (1991). In Air Courier, we held that the interest of Postal Service employees in maximizing employment opportunities was not within the “zone of interests” to be protected by the postal monopoly statutes, and hence those employees did not have standing under the APA to challenge a Postal Service regulation suspending its monopoly over certain international operations. See id., at 519. We stated that the purposes of the statute were solely to increase the revenues of the Post Office and to ensure that postal services were provided in a manner consistent with the public interest, see id., at 526-527. Only those interests, therefore, and not the interests of Postal Service employees in their employment, were “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected” by the statute. Cf. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871, 883 (1990) (stating that an agency reporting company would not have prudential standing to challenge the agency’s failure to comply with a statutory mandate to eon-duet hearings on the record). We further noted that although the statute in question regulated competition, the interests of the plaintiff employees had nothing to do with competition. See Air Courier, supra, at 528, n. 5 (stating that “[ejmployees have generally been denied standing to enforce competition laws because they lack competitive and direct injury”)- In this action, not only do respondents have “competitive and direct injury,” but, as the foregoing discussion makes clear, they possess an interest that is “arguably... to be protected” by § 109.
Respondents’ interest in limiting the markets that credit unions can serve is “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected” by § 109. Under our precedents, it is irrelevant that in enacting the FCUA, Congress did not specifically intend to protect commercial banks. Although it is clear that respondents’ objectives in this action are not eleemosynary in nature, under our prior cases that, too, is beside the point.
Ill
Turning to the merits, we must judge the permissibility of the NCUA’s current interpretation of § 109 by employing the analysis set forth in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). Under that analysis, we first ask whether Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id., at 842-848. If we determine that Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question at issue, we then inquire whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. See id., at 843-844. Because we conclude that Congress has made it clear that the same common bond of occupation must unite each member of an occupationally defined federal credit union, we hold that the NCUA’s contrary interpretation is impermissible under the first step of Chevron.
As noted, § 109 requires that “[fjederal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district.” Respondents contend that because § 109 uses the article “a” — “i. e., one”— in conjunction with the noun “common bond,” the “natural reading” of §109 is that all members in an occupationally defined federal credit union must be united by one common bond. See Brief for Respondents 33. Petitioners reply that because § 109 uses the plural noun “groups,” it permits multiple groups, each with its own common bond, to constitute a federal credit union. See Brief for Petitioner NCUA 29-30.
Like the Court of Appeals, we do not think that either of these contentions, standing alone, is conclusive. The article “a” could be thought to convey merely that one bond must unite only the members of each group in a multiple-group credit unión, and not all of the members in the credit union taken together. See 90 F. 3d, at 528. Similarly, the plural word “groups” could be thought to refer not merely to multiple groups in a particular credit union, but rather to every single “group” that forms a distinct credit union under the FCUA. See ibid. Nonetheless, as the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, additional considerations compel the conclusion that the same common bond of occupation must unite all of the members of an occupationally defined federal credit union.
First, the NCUA’s current interpretation makes the phrase "common bond” surplusage when applied to a federal credit union made up of multiple unrelated employer groups, because each "group” in such a credit union already has its own "common bond.” See ibid. To use the facts of this action, the employees of AT&T and the employees of the American Tobacco Company each already had a “common bond” before being joined together as members of ATTF. The former were bonded because they worked for AT&T, and the latter were bonded because they worked for the American Tobacco Company. If the phrase “common bond” is to be given any meaning when these employees are joined together, a different "common bond” — one extending to each and every employee considered together — must be found to unite them. Such a "common bond” exists when employees of different subsidiaries of the same company are joined together in a federal credit union; it does not exist, however, when employees of unrelated companies are so joined. See ibid. Put another way, in the multiple employer group context, the NCUA has read the statute as though it merely stated that “[fjederal credit union membership shall be limited to occupational groups,” but that is simply not what the statute provides.
Second, the NCUA’s interpretation violates the established canon of construction that similar language contained within the same section of a statute must be accorded a consistent meaning. See Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U. S. 214, 225 (1992). Section 109 consists of two parallel clauses: Federal credit union membership is limited “to groups having a common bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district.” 12 U. S. C. § 1759 (emphasis added). The NCUA concedes that even though the second limitation permits geographically defined credit unions to have as members more than one "group,” all of the groups must come from the same “neighborhood, community, or rural district.” See Brief for Petitioner NCUA 37. The reason that the NCUA has never interpreted, and does not contend that it could interpret, the geographical limitation to allow a credit union to be composed of members from an unlimited number of unrelated geographic units, is that to do so would render the geographical limitation meaningless. Under established principles of statutory interpretation, we must interpret the occupational limitation in the same way.
Petitioners have advanced one reason why we should interpret the occupational limitation differently. They contend that whereas the geographical limitation uses the word "within” and is thus "prepositional,” the occupational limitation uses the word “having” and is thus “participial” (and therefore less limiting). See Brief for Petitioner NCUA 31. There is, however, no reason why a participial phrase is inherently more open-ended than a prepositional one; indeed, certain participial phrases can narrow the relevant universe in an exceedingly effective manner — for example, “persons having February 29th as a wedding anniversary.” Reading the two parallel clauses in the same way, we must conclude that, just as all members of a geographically defined federal credit union must be drawn from the same “neighborhood, community, or rural district,” members of an occupationally defined federal credit union must be united by the same “common bond of occupation.”
Finally, by its terms, § 109 requires that membership in federal credit unions “shall be limited.” The NCUA’s interpretation — under which a common bond of occupation must unite only the members of each unrelated employer group— has the potential to read these words out of the statute entirely. The NCUA has not contested that, under its current interpretation, it would be permissible to grant a charter to a conglomerate credit union whose members would include the employees of every company in the United States. Nor can it: Each company’s employees would be a “group,” and each such “group” would have its own “common bond of occupation.” Section 109, however, cannot be considered a limitation on credit union membership if at the same time it permits such a limitless result.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the NCUA’s current interpretation of § 109 is contrary to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress and is thus impermissible under the first step of Chevron. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia joins this opinion, except as to footnote 6.
The Court of Appeals
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether Oklahoma may require cable television operators in that State to delete all advertisements for alcoholic beverages contained in the out-of-state signals that they retransmit by cable to their subscribers. Petitioners contend that Oklahoma’s requirement abridges their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and is pre-empted by federal law. Because we conclude that this state regulation is pre-empted, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and do not reach the First Amendment question.
Since 1959, it has been lawful to sell and consume alcoholic beverages in Oklahoma. The State Constitution, however, as well as implementing statutes, prohibits the advertising of such beverages, except by means of strictly regulated on-premises signs. For several years, pursuant to this authority, Oklahoma has prohibited television broadcasting stations in the State from broadcasting alcoholic beverage commercials as part of their locally produced programming and has required these stations to block out all such advertising carried on national network programming. See Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. Heublein Wines, Int’l, 566 P. 2d 1158, 1160 (Okla. 1977). At the same time, the Oklahoma Attorney General has ruled — principally because of the practical difficulties of enforcement — that the ban does not apply to alcoholic beverage advertisements appearing in newspapers, magazines, and other publications printed outside Oklahoma but sold and distributed in the State. Consequently, out-of-state publications may be delivered to Oklahoma subscribers and sold at retail outlets within the State, even though they contain advertisements for alcoholic beverages. Until 1980, Oklahoma applied a similar policy to cable television operators who were permitted to retransmit out-of-state signals containing alcoholic beverage commercials to their subscribers. In March of that year, however, the Oklahoma Attorney General issued an opinion in which he concluded that the retransmission of out-of-state alcoholic beverage commercials by cable television systems operating in the State would be considered a violation of the advertising ban. 11 Op. Okla. Atty. Gen. No. 79-334, p. 550 (Mar. 19, 1980). Respondent Crisp, Director of the Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, thereafter warned Oklahoma cable operators, including petitioners, that they would be criminally prosecuted if they continued to carry such out-of-state advertisements over their systems. App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a; App. 11.
Petitioners, operators of several cable television systems in Oklahoma, filed this suit in March 1981 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They alleged that the Oklahoma policy violated the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted petitioners a preliminary injunction and subsequently entered summary judgment and a permanent injunction in December 1981. In granting that relief, the District Court found that petitioners regularly carried out-of-state signals containing wine advertisements, that they were prohibited by federal law from altering or modifying these signals, and that “no feasible way” existed for petitioners to delete the wine advertisements. App. to Pet. for Cert. 40a-41a. Addressing petitioners’ First Amendment claim, the District Court applied the test set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557 (1980), and concluded that Oklahoma’s advertising ban was an unconstitutional restriction on the cable operators’ right to engage in protected commercial speech. App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a-50a. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that, while the wine commercials at issue were protected by the First Amendment, the state ban was a valid restriction on commercial speech. Oklahoma Telecasters Assn. v. Crisp., 699 F. 2d 490 (1983). Although the Court of Appeals noted that “Federal Communication[s] Commission regulations and federal copyright law prohibit cable operators from altering or modifying the television signals, including advertisements, they relay to subscribers,” the court did not discuss the question whether application of the Oklahoma law to these cable operators was pre-empted by the federal regulations. Id., at 492.
While petitioners’ petition for certiorari was pending, a brief was filed for the Federal Communications Commission as amicus curiae in which it was contended that the Oklahoma ban on the retransmission of out-of-state signals by cable operators significantly interfered with the existing federal regulatory framework established to promote cable broadcasting. In granting certiorari, therefore, we ordered the parties, in addition to the questions presented by the petitioners concerning commercial speech, to brief and argue the question whether the State’s regulation of liquor advertising, as applied to out-of-state broadcast signals, is valid in light of existing federal regulation of cable broadcasting. 464 U. S. 813 (1983).
Although we do not ordinarily consider questions not specifically passed upon by the lower court, see California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553, 557, n. 2 (1957), this rule is not inflexible, particularly in cases coming, as this one does, from the federal courts. See, e. g., Youakim v. Miller, 425 U. S. 231, 234 (1976) (per curiam); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 320, n. 6 (1971). Here, the conflict between Oklahoma and federal law was plainly raised in petitioners’ complaint, it was acknowledged by both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, the District Court made findings on all factual issues necessary to resolve this question, and the parties have briefed and argued the question pursuant to our order. Under these circumstances, we see no reason to refrain from addressing the question whether the Oklahoma ban as applied here so conflicts with the federal regulatory framework that it is pre-empted.
II
Petitioners and the FCC contend that the federal regulatory scheme for cable television systems administered by the Commission is intended to pre-empt any state regulation of the signals carried by cable system operators. Respondent apparently concedes that enforcement of the Oklahoma statute in this case conflicts with federal law, but argues that because the State’s advertising ban was adopted pursuant to the broad powers to regulate the transportation and importation of intoxicating liquor reserved to the States by the Twenty-first Amendment, the statute should prevail notwithstanding the conflict with federal law. As in California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U. S. 97 (1980), where we held that a California wine-pricing program violated the Sherman Act notwithstanding the State’s reliance upon the Twenty-first Amendment in establishing that system, we turn first before assessing the impact of the Twenty-first Amendment to consider whether the Oklahoma statute does in fact conflict with federal law. See id., at 106-114.
Our consideration of that question is guided by familiar and well-established principles. Under the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, the enforcement of a state regulation may be pre-empted by federal law in several circumstances: first, when Congress, in enacting a federal statute, has expressed a clear intent to pre-empt state law, Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977); second, when it is clear, despite the absence of explicit pre-emptive language, that Congress has intended, by legislating comprehensively, to occupy an entire field of regulation and has thereby “left no room for the States to supplement” federal law, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947); and, finally, when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or when the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). See also Michigan Canners & Freezers Assn. v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Board, ante, at 469.
And, as we made clear in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 (1982):
“Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes. Where Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his discretion, his judgments are subject to judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily. When the administrator promulgates regulations intended to pre-empt state law, the court’s inquiry is similarly limited: ‘If [h]is choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.’” Id., at 153-154, quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U. S. 374, 383 (1961).
The power delegated to the FCC plainly comprises authority to regulate the signals carried by cable television systems. In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U. S. 157 (1968), the Court found that the Commission had been given “broad responsibilities” to regulate all aspects of interstate communication by wire or radio by virtue of §2(a) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U. S. C. § 152(a), and that this comprehensive authority included power to regulate cable communications systems. 392 U. S., at 177-178. We have since explained that the Commission’s authority extends to all regulatory actions “necessary to ensure the achievement of the Commission’s statutory responsibilities.” FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U. S. 689, 706 (1979). Accord, United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U. S. 649, 665-667 (1972) (plurality opinion); id., at 675 (Burger, C. J., concurring in result). Therefore, if the FCC has resolved to pre-empt an area of cable television regulation and if this determination “represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies” that are within the agency’s domain, United States v. Shimer, supra, at 383, we must conclude that all conflicting state regulations have been precluded.
A
In contrast to commercial television broadcasters, which transmit video signals to their audience free of charge and derive their income principally from advertising revenues, cable television systems generally operate on the basis of a wholly different entrepreneurial principle. In return for service fees paid by subscribers, cable operators provide their customers with a variety of broadcast and nonbroadcast signals obtained from several sources. Typically, these sources include over-the-air broadcast signals picked up by a master antenna from local and nearby television broadcasting stations, broadcast signals from distant television stations imported by means of communications satellites, and non-broadcast signals that are not originated by television broadcasting stations, but are instead transmitted specifically for cable systems by satellite or microwave relay. Over the past 20 years, pursuant to its delegated authority under the Communications Act, the FCC has unambiguously expressed its intent to pre-empt any state or local regulation of this entire array of signals carried by cable television systems.
The Commission began its regulation of cable communication in the 1960’s. At that time, it was chiefly concerned that unlimited importation of distant broadcast signals into the service areas of local television broadcasting stations might, through competition, “destroy or seriously degrade the service offered by a television broadcaster,” and thereby cause a significant reduction in service to households not served by cable systems. Rules re Microwave-Served CATV, 38 F. C. C. 683, 700 (1965). In order to contain this potential effect, the Commission promulgated rules requiring cable systems to carry the signals of all local stations in their areas, to avoid duplication of the programs of local television stations carried on the system during the same day that such programs were broadcast by the local stations, and to limit their importation of distant broadcast signals into the service areas of the local television broadcasting stations. CATV, 2 F. C. C. 2d 725, 745-746, 781-782 (1966). It was with respect to that initial assertion of jurisdiction over cable signal carriage that we confirmed the FCC’s general authority under the Communications Act to regulate cable television systems. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., supra, at 172-178.
The Commission further refined and modified these rules governing the carriage of broadcast signals by cable systems in 1972. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F. C. C. 2d 143, on reconsideration, 36 F. C. C. 2d 326 (1972), aff’d sub nom. American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 523 F. 2d 1344 (CA9 1975). In marking the boundaries of its jurisdiction, the FCC determined that, in contrast to its regulatory scheme for television broadcasting stations, it would not adopt a system of direct federal licensing for cable systems. Instead, the Commission announced a program of “deliberately structured dualism” in which state and local authorities were given responsibility for granting franchises to cable operators within their communities and for overseeing such local incidents of cable operations as delineating franchise areas, regulating the construction of cable facilities, and maintaining rights of way. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F. C. C. 2d, at 207. At the same time, the Commission retained exclusive jurisdiction over all operational aspects of cable communication, including signal carriage and technical standards. See id., at 170-176. As the FCC explained in a subsequent order clarifying the scope of its 1972 cable television rules:
“The fact that this Commission has pre-empted jurisdiction of any and all signal carriage regulation is unquestioned. Nonetheless, occasionally we receive applications for certificates of compliance which enclose franchises that attempt to delineate the signals to be carried by the franchisee cable operator. Franchising authorities do not have any jurisdiction or authority relating to signal carriage. While the franchisor might want to include a provision requiring the operator to carry all signals allowable under our rules, that is as far as the franchisor can or should go.” Cable Television, 46 F. C. C. 2d 175, 178 (1974) (emphasis added).
The Commission has also made clear that its exclusive jurisdiction extends to cable systems’ carriage of specialized, nonbroadcast signals — a service commonly described as “pay cable.” See id., at 199-200.
Although the FCC has recently relaxed its regulation of importation of distant broadcast signals to permit greater access to this source of programming for cable subscribers, it has by no means forsaken its regulatory power in this area. See CATV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F. C. C. 2d 663 (1980), aff’d sub nom. Malrite T. V. of New York v. FCC, 652 F. 2d 1140 (CA2 1981), cert. denied sub nom. National Football League v. FCC, 454 U. S. 1143 (1982). Indeed, the Commission’s decision to allow unfettered importation of distant broadcast signals rested on its conclusion that “the benefits to existing and potential cable households from permitting the carriage of additional signals are substantial. Millions of households may be afforded not only increased viewing options, but also access to a diversity of services from cable television that presently is unavailable in their communities.” 79 F. C. C. 2d, at 746. See also Besen & Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 Law & Contemp. Prob. 77 (Winter 1981). As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in upholding this decision, “[by] shifting its policy toward a more favorable regulatory climate for the cable industry, the FCC has chosen a balance of television services that should increase program diversity....” Malrite T. V. of New York v. FCC, supra, at 1151. Clearly, the full accomplishment of such objectives would be jeopardized if state and local authorities were now permitted to restrict substantially the ability of cable operators to provide these diverse services to their subscribers.
Accordingly, to the extent it has been invoked to control the distant broadcast and nonbroadcast signals imported by cable operators, the Oklahoma advertising ban plainly reaches beyond the regulatory authority reserved to local authorities by the Commission’s rules, and trespasses into the exclusive domain of the FCC. To be sure, Oklahoma may, under current Commission rules, regulate such local aspects of cable systems as franchisee selection and construction oversight, see, e. g., Duplicative and Excessive Over- Regulation — CATV, 54 F. C. C. 2d 855, 863 (1975), but, by requiring cable television operators to delete commercial advertising contained in signals carried pursuant to federal authority, the State has clearly exceeded that limited jurisdiction and interfered with a regulatory area that the Commission has explicitly pre-empted.
B
Quite apart from this generalized federal pre-emption of state regulation of cable signal carriage, the Oklahoma advertising ban plainly conflicts with specific federal regulations. These conflicts arise in three principal ways. First, the FCC’s so-called “must-carry” rules require certain cable television operators to transmit the broadcast signals of any local television broadcasting station that is located within a specified 35-mile zone of the cable operator or that is “significantly viewed” in the community served by the operator. 47 CFR §§ 76.59(a)(1) and (6) (1983). These “must-carry” rules require many Oklahoma cable operators, including petitioners, to carry signals from broadcast stations located in nearby States such as Missouri and Kansas. See App. 22, 35. In addition, under Commission regulations, the local broadcast signals that cable operators are required to carry must be carried “in full, without deletion or alteration of any portion.” 47 CFR § 76.55(b) (1983). Because, in the Commission’s view, enforcement of these nondeletion rules serves to “prevent a loss of revenues to local broadcasters sufficient to result in reduced service to the public,” they have been applied to commercial advertisements as well as to regular programming. In re Pugh, 68 F. C. C. 2d 997, 999 (1978); WAPA-TV Broadcasting Corp., 59 F. C. C. 2d 263, 272 (1976); CATV, 15 F. C. C. 2d 417, 444 (1968); CATV, 2 F. C. C. 2d, at 753, 756. Consequently, those Oklahoma cable operators required by federal law to carry out-of-state broadcast signals in full, including any wine commercials, are subject to criminal prosecution under Oklahoma law as a result of their compliance with federal regulations.
Second, current FCC rulings permit, and indeed encourage, cable television operators to import out-of-state television broadcast signals and retransmit those signals to their subscribers. See CATV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F. C. C. 2d, at 745-746. For Oklahoma cable operators, this source of cable programming includes signals from television broadcasting stations located in Kansas, Missouri, and Texas, as well as the signals from so-called “superstations” in Atlanta and Chicago. App. 21, 35-36. It is undisputed that many of these distant broadcast signals retransmitted by petitioners contain wine commercials that are lawful under federal law and in the States where the programming originates. Nor is it disputed that cable operators who carry such signals are barred by Commission regulations from deleting or altering any portion of those signals, including commercial advertising. 47 CFR § 76.55(b) (1983). Under Oklahoma’s advertising ban, however, these cable operators must either delete the wine commercials or face criminal prosecution. Since the Oklahoma law, by requiring deletion of a portion of these out-of-state signals, compels conduct that federal law forbids, the state ban clearly “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the federal regulatory scheme. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S., at 67; Farmers Union v. IN DAY, Inc., 360 U. S. 525, 535 (1959).
Finally, enforcement of the state advertising ban against Oklahoma cable operators will affect a third source of cable programming over which the Commission has asserted exclusive jurisdiction. Aside from relaying local television broadcasting in accordance with the “must-carry” rules, and distant broadcast signals, cable operators also transmit specialized nonbroadcast cable services to their subscribers. This source of programming, often referred to as “pay cable,” includes such advertiser-supported national cable programming as the Cable News Network (CNN) and the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN). Although the Commission’s “must-carry” and nondeletion rules do not apply to such nonbroadcast cable services, the FCC, as noted earlier, see supra, at 703, has explicitly stated that state regulation of these services is completely precluded by federal law.
Petitioners generally receive such signals by antenna, microwave receiver, or satellite dish and restransmit them by wire to their subscribers. But, unlike local television broadcasting stations that transmit only one signal and receive notification from their networks concerning advertisements, cable operators simultaneously receive and channel to their subscribers a variety of signals from many sources without any advance notice about the timing or content of commercial advertisements carried on those signals. Cf. n. 2, supra. As the record of this case indicates, developing the capacity to monitor each signal and delete every wine commercial before it is retransmitted would be a prohibitively burdensome task. App. 25-26, 36-38. Indeed, the District Court specifically found that, in view of these considerations, “[tjhere exists no feasible way for [cable operators] to block out the [wine] advertisements.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a. Accordingly, if the state advertising ban is enforced, Oklahoma cable operators will be compelled either to abandon altogether their carriage of both distant broadcast signals and specialized nonbroadcast cable services or run the risk of criminal prosecution. As a consequence, the public may well be deprived of the wide variety of programming options that cable systems make possible.
Such a result is wholly at odds with the regulatory goals contemplated by the FCC. Consistent with its congressionally defined charter to “make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nationwide and world-wide wire and radio communication service...,” 47 U. S. C. § 151, the FCC has sought to ensure that “the benefits of cable communications become a reality on a nationwide basis.” Duplicative and Excessive Over-Regulation — CATV, 54 F. C. C. 2d, at 865. With that end in mind, the Commission has determined that only federal preemption of state and local regulation can assure cable systems the breathing space necessary to expand vigorously and provide a diverse range of program offerings to potential cable subscribers in all parts of the country. While that judgment may not enjoy universal support, it plainly represents a reasonable accommodation of the competing policies committed to the FCC’s care, and we see no reason to disturb the agency’s judgment. And, as we have repeatedly explained, when federal officials determine, as the FCC has here, that restrictive regulation of a particular area is not in the public interest, “States are not permitted to use their police power to enact such a regulation.” Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 178 (1978); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 767, 774 (1947). Cf. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S., at 155 (Federal Home Loan Bank Board explicitly pre-empted state due-on-sale clauses in order to afford flexibility and discretion to federal savings and loan institutions).
C
Although the FCC has taken the lead in formulating communications policy with respect to cable television, Congress has considered the impact of this new technology, and has, through the Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541,17 U. S. C. § 101 et seq., acted to facilitate the cable industry’s ability to distribute broadcast programming on a national basis. Prior to the 1976 revision, the Court had determined that the retransmission of distant broadcast signals by cable systems did not subject cable operators to copyright infringement liability because such retransmissions were not “performances” within the meaning of the 1909 Copyright Act. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U. S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U. S. 390 (1968). In revising the Copyright Act, however, Congress concluded that cable operators should be required to pay royalties to the owners of copyrighted programs retransmitted by their systems on pain of liability for copyright infringement. At the same time, Congress recognized that “it would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate [appropriate royalty payments] with every copyright owner” in order to secure consent for such retransmissions. Copyright Law Revision, H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 89 (1976). Section 111 of the 1976 Act codifies the solution devised by Congress. It establishes a program of compulsory copyright licensing that permits cable systems to retransmit distant broadcast signals without securing permission from the copyright owner and, in turn, requires each system to pay royalty fees to a central royalty fund based on a percentage of its gross revenues. To take advantage of this compulsory licensing scheme, a cable operator must satisfy certain reporting requirements, §§ 111(d)(1) and (2)(A), pay specified royalty fees to a central fund administered by the Register of Copyrights, §§ lll(d)(2)(B)-(D) and (3), and refrain from deleting or altering commercial advertising on the broadcast signals it transmits, § 111(c)(3). Failure to comply with these conditions results in forfeiture of the protections of the compulsory licensing system.
In devising this system, Congress has clearly sought to further the important public purposes framed in the Copyright Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8, of rewarding the creators of copyrighted works and of “promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.” Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U. S. 151, 156 (1975) (footnote omitted); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 428-429 (1984). Compulsory licensing not only protects the commercial value of copyrighted works but also enhances the ability of cable systems to retransmit such programs carried on distant broadcast signals, thereby allowing the public to benefit by the wider dissemination of works carried on television broadcast signals. By requiring cable operators to delete commercial advertisements for wine, however, the Oklahoma ban forces these operators to lose the protections of compulsory licensing. Of course, it is possible for cable systems to comply with the Oklahoma ban by simply abandoning their importation of the distant broadcast signals covered by the Copyright Act. But such a loss of viewing options would plainly thwart the policy identified by both Congress and the FCC of facilitating and encouraging the importation of distant broadcast signals.
I — I HH hH
Respondent contends that even if the Oklahoma advertising ban is invalid under normal pre-emption analysis, the fact that the ban was adopted pursuant to the Twenty-first Amendment rescues the statute from pre-emption. A similar claim was advanced in California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc, 445 U. S. 97 (1980). In that case, after finding that a California wine-pricing program violated the Sherman Act, we considered whether § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which reserves to the States certain power to regulate traffic in liquor, “permits California to countermand the congressional policy — adopted under the commerce power — in favor of competition.” 445 U. S., at 106. Here, we must likewise consider whether § 2 permits Oklahoma to override the federal policy, as expressed in FCC rulings and regulations, in favor of promoting the widespread development of cable communication.
The States enjoy broad power under § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate the importation and use of intoxicating liquor within their borders. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132 (1939). At the same time, our prior cases have made clear that the Amendment does not license the States to ignore their obligations under other provisions of the Constitution. See, e. g., Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116, 122, n. 5 (1982); California v. LaRue, 409 U. S. 109, 115 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433, 436 (1971); Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U. S. 341, 345-346 (1964). Indeed, “[t]his Court’s decisions... have confirmed that the Amendment primarily created an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 206 (1976). Thus, as the Court explained in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324 (1964), §2 reserves to the States power to impose burdens on interstate commerce in intoxicating liquor that, absent the Amendment, would clearly be invalid under the Commerce Clause. Id., at 330; State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U. S. 59, 62-63 (1936). We have cautioned, however, that “[t]o draw a conclusion... that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to ‘repeal’ the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors is concerned would... be an absurd oversimplification.” Hostetter, supra, at 331-332. Notwithstanding the Amendment’s broad grant of power to the States, therefore, the Federal Government plainly retains authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate even interstate commerce in liquor. Ibid. See also California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., supra, at 109-110; Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 425, n. 15 (1946); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945).
In rejecting the claim that the Twenty-first Amendment ousted the Federal Government of all jurisdiction over interstate traffic in liquor, we have held that when a State has not attempted directly to regulate the sale or use of liquor within its borders — the core § 2 power — a conflicting exercise of federal authority may prevail. In Hostetter, for example, the Court found that in-state sales of intoxicating liquor intended to be used only in foreign countries could be made under the supervision of the Federal Bureau of Customs, despite contrary state law, because the state regulation was not aimed at preventing unlawful use of alcoholic beverages within the State, but rather was designed “totally to prevent transactions carried on under the aegis of a law passed by Congress in the exercise of its explicit power under the Constitution to regulate commerce with foreign nations.” 377 U. S., at 333-334. Similarly, in Midcal Aluminum, supra, we found that “the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shelter for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State’s wine pricing program,” because the State’s interest in promoting temperance through the program was not substantial and was therefore clearly outweighed by the important federal objectives of the Sherman Act. 445 U. S., at 113-114.
Of course, our decisions in Hostetter and Midcal Aluminum were concerned only with conflicting state and federal efforts to regulate transactions involving liquor. In this case, by contrast, we must resolve a clash between an express federal decision to pre-empt all state regulation of cable signal carriage and a state effort to apply its ban on alcoholic beverage advertisements to wine commercials contained in out-of-state signals carried by cable systems. Nonetheless, the central question presented in those cases is essentially the same as the one before us here: whether the interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict with express federal policies. As in Hostetter and Midcal Aluminum, resolution of this question requires a “pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers” within the context of the issues and interests at stake in each case. 445 U. S., at 109.
There can be little doubt that the comprehensive regulations developed over the past 20 years by the FCC to govern signal carriage by cable television systems reflect an important and substantial federal interest. In crafting this regulatory scheme, the Commission has attempted to strike a balance between protecting noncable households from loss of regular television broadcasting service due to competition from cable systems and ensuring that the substantial benefits provided by cable of increased and diversified programming are secured for the maximum number of viewers. See, e. g., CATV Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F. C. C. 2d, at 744-746. To accomplish this regulatory goal, the Commission has deemed it necessary to assert exclusive jurisdiction over signal carriage by cable systems. In the Commission’s view, uniform national communications policy with respect to cable systems would be undermined if state and local governments were permitted to regulate in piecemeal fashion the signals carried by cable operators pursuant to federal authority. See Community Cable TV, Inc., FCC 83-525, pp. 12-13 (released Nov. 15, 1983); Cable Television, 46 F. C. C. 2d, at 178.
On the other hand, application of Oklahoma’s advertising ban to out-of-state signals carried by cable operators in that State is designed principally to further the State’s interest in discouraging consumption of intoxicating liquor. See 11 Op. Okla. Atty. Gen. No. 79-334, p. 550 (Mar. 19, 1980). Although the District Court found that “[consumption of alcoholic beverages in Oklahoma has increased substantially in the last 20 years despite the ban on advertising of such beverages,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 42a, we may nevertheless accept Oklahoma’s judgment that restrictions on liquor advertising represent at least a reasonable, albeit limited, means of furthering the goal of promoting temperance in the State. The modest nature of Oklahoma’s interests may be further illustrated by noting that Oklahoma has chosen not to press its campaign against alcoholic beverage advertising on all fronts. For example, the State permits both print and broadcast commercials for beer, as well as advertisements for all alcoholic beverages contained in newspapers, magazines, and other publications printed outside of the State. The ban at issue in this case is directed only at wine commercials that occasionally appear on out-of-state signals carried by cable operators. By their own terms, therefore, the State’s regulatory aims in this area are narrow. Although a state regulatory scheme obviously need not amount to a comprehensive attack on the problems of alcohol consumption in order to constitute a valid exercise of state power under the Twenty-first Amendment, the selective approach Oklahoma has taken toward liquor advertising suggests limits on the substantiality of the interests it asserts here. In contrast to state regulations governing the conditions under which liquor may be imported or sold within the State, therefore,
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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J
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Chief Justice BuRGer
delivered the opinion of of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a judicial officer authorized to issue warrants, who has viewed a film and finds it to be obscene, can issue a constitutionally valid warrant for the film’s seizure as evidence in a prosecution against the exhibitor, without first conducting an adversary hearing on the issue of probable obscenity.
Petitioner was manager of a commercial movie theater in the Greenwich Village area of New York City. On July 29, 1969, a film called “Blue Movie” was exhibited there. The film depicts a nude couple engaged in ultimate sexual acts. Three police officers saw part of the film. Apparently on the basis of their observations, an assistant district attorney of New York County requested a judge of the New York Criminal Court to see a performance. On July 31, 1969, the judge, accompanied by a police inspector, purchased a ticket and saw the entire film. There were about 100 other persons in the audience. Neither the judge nor the police inspector recalled any signs restricting admission to adults.
At the end of the film, the judge, without any discussions with the police inspector, signed a search warrant for the seizure of the film and three “John Doe” warrants for the arrest of the theater manager, the projectionist, and the ticket taker, respectively. No one at the theater was notified or consulted prior to the issuance of the warrants. The judge signed the warrants because “it was, and is my opinion that that film is obscene, and was obscene as I saw it then under the definition of obscene, that is [in] . . . section 235.00 of the Penal Law.” Exhibition of an obscene film violates New York Penal Law § 235.05.
The warrants were immediately executed by police officers. Three reels, composing a single copy of the film, were seized. Petitioner, the theater manager, was arrested, as were the projectionist and the ticket taker. No pretrial motion was made for the return of the film or for its suppression as evidence. Nor did petitioner make a pretrial claim that seizure of the film prevented its exhibition by use of another copy, and the record does not conclusively indicate whether such a copy was available. On September 16, 1969, 47 days after his arrest and the seizure of the movie, petitioner came to trial, a jury having been waived, before three judges of the New York City Criminal Court.
At trial, the prosecution’s case rested almost solely on testimony concerning the arrests and the seizure of the film, together with the introduction into evidence of the seized film itself. The film was exhibited to the trial judges. The defense offered three “expert” witnesses: an author, a professor of sociology, and a newspaper writer. These witnesses testified that the film had social, literary, and artistic importance in illustrating “a growing and important point of view about sexual behavior” as well as providing observations “about the political and social situation in this country today. . . .” Petitioner testified that the theater’s employees were instructed not to admit persons who appeared to be under 18 years of age, unless they “had identification” that they were 18. Petitioner also testified that there was a sign at the box office stating that “no one under 17 [would be] admitted.” Both at the end of the prosecution’s case and his own case, petitioner moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the seizure of the film, without a prior adversary hearing, violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the close of trial on September 17, 1969, petitioner was found guilty by all three judges of violating New York Penal Law § 235.05. On appeal, both the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Term, and the Court of Appeals of the State of New York viewed the film and affirmed petitioner’s conviction. The Court of Appeals, relying on this Court’s opinion in Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U. S. 636, 637 (1968), held that an adversary hearing was not required prior to seizure of the film, and that the judicial determination which occurred prior to seizure in this case was constitutionally sufficient. In so holding, the Court of Appeals explicitly disapproved, as going “beyond any requirement imposed on State courts by the Supreme Court,” Astro Cinema Corp. v. Mackell, 422 F. 2d 293 (CA2 1970), and Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F. 2d 410 (CA2 1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 920 (1970), cases requiring an adversary hearing prior to any seizure of movie film. 29 N. Y. 2d 319, 323, 277 N. E. 2d 651, 653 (1971).
We affirm this holding of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York. This Court has never held, or even implied, that there is an absolute First or Fourteenth Amendment right to a prior adversary hearing applicable to all cases where allegedly obscene material is seized. See Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43 (1961); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436, 440-442-(1957). In particular, there is no such absolute right where allegedly obscene material is seized, pursuant to a warrant, to preserve the material as evidence in a criminal prosecution. In Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, supra, the Court went so far as to suggest that it was an open question whether a judge need “have viewed the motion picture before issuing the warrant.” Here the judge viewed the entire film and, indeed, witnessed the alleged criminal act. It is not contested that the judge was a “neutral, detached magistrate,” that he had a full opportunity for independent judicial determination of probable cause prior to issuing the warrant, and that he was able to “focus searchingly on the question of obscenity.” See Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 731-733 (1961). Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 449-453 (1971); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480, 485-486 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
In United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363 (1971), and Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51 (1965), we held that “ ‘because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint.’ ” 402 U. S., at 367, quoting 380 U. S., at 58 (emphasis added). Those cases involved, respectively, seizure of imported materials by federal customs agents and state administrative licensing of motion pictures, both civil procedures directed at absolute suppression of the materials themselves. Even in those cases, we did not require that the adversary proceeding must take place prior to initial seizure. Rather, it was held that a judicial determination must occur “promptly so that administrative delay does not in itself become a form of censorship.” United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, supra, at 367; Freedman v. Maryland, supra, at 57—59. See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U. S. 410, 419-421 (1971); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U. S. 139, 141-142 (1968); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70-71 (1963).
In this case, of course, the film was not subjected to any form of “final restraint,” in the sense of being enjoined from exhibition or threatened with destruction. A copy of the film was temporarily detained in order to preserve it as evidence. There has been no showing that the seizure of a copy of the film precluded its continued exhibition. Nor, in this case, did temporary restraint in itself “become a form of censorship,” even making the doubtful assumption that no other copies of the film existed. Cf. United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, supra, at 367; Freedman v. Maryland, supra, at 57-59. A judicial determination of obscenity, following a fully adversary trial, occurred within 48 days of the temporary seizure. Petitioner made no pretrial motions seeking return of the film or challenging its seizure, nor did he request expedited judicial consideration of the obscenity issue, so it is entirely possible that a prompt judicial determination of the obscenity issue in an adversary proceeding could have been obtained if petitioner had desired. Although we have refrained from establishing rigid, specific time deadlines in proceedings involving seizure of allegedly obscene material, we have definitely excluded from any consideration of “promptness” those delays caused by the choice of the defendant. See United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, supra, at 373-374. In this case, the barrier to a prompt judicial determination of the obscenity issue in an adversary proceeding was not the State, but petitioner’s decision to waive pretrial motions and reserve the obscenity issue for trial. Cf. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S., at 439.
Petitioner’s reliance on the Court’s decisions in A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205 (1964), and Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717 (1961), is misplaced. Those cases concerned the seizure of large quantities of books for the sole purpose of their destruction, and this Court held that, in those circumstances, a prior judicial determination of obscenity in an adversary proceeding was required to avoid “danger of abridgment of the right of the public in a free society to unobstructed circulation of nonobscene books.” A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, supra, at 213. We do not disturb this holding. Courts will scrutinize any large-scale seizure of books, films, or other materials presumptively protected under the First Amendment to be certain that the requirements of A Quantity of Books and Marcus are fully met. “ ‘Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’ ” New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 714 (1971), quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S., at 70; Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 419 (1971); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175, 181 (1968). See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
But seizing films to destroy them or to block their distribution or exhibition is a very different matter from seizing a single copy of a film for the bona fide purpose of preserving it as evidence in a criminal proceeding, particularly where, as here, there is no showing or pretrial claim that the seizure of the copy prevented continuing exhibition of the film. If such a seizure is pursuant to a warrant, issued after a determination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate, and, following the seizure, a prompt judicial determination of the obscenity issue in an adversary proceeding is available at the request of any interested party, the seizure is constitutionally permissible. In addition, on a showing to the trial court that other copies of the film are not available to the exhibitor, the court should permit the seized film to be copied so that showing can be continued pending a judicial determination of the obscenity issue in an adversary proceeding. Otherwise, the film must be returned.
With such safeguards, we do not perceive that an adversary hearing prior to a seizure by lawful warrant would materially increase First Amendment protection. Cf. Carroll v. Princess Anne, supra, at 183-184. The necessity for a prior judicial determination of probable cause will protect against gross abuses, while the availability of a prompt judicial determination in an adversary proceeding following the seizure assures that difficult marginal cases will be fully considered in light of First Amendment guarantees, with only a minimal interference with public circulation pending litigation. The procedure used by New York in this case provides such First Amendment safeguards, while also serving the public interests in full and fair prosecution for obscenity offenses. Counsel for New York has argued that movie films t^nd to “disappear” if adversary hearings are afforded prior to seizure. We take judicial notice that such films may be compact, readily transported for exhibition in other jurisdictions, easily destructible, and particularly susceptible to alteration by cutting and splicing critical parts of film.
Petitioner also challenged his conviction on substantive, as opposed to procedural, ground arguing that he was convicted under standards of obscenity both over-broad and unconstitutionally vague. In addition, petitioner argues that films shown only to consenting adults in private have a particular claim to constitutional protection. In Miller v. California, ante, p. 15, and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, ante, p. 49, decided June 21, 1973, we dealt with these substantive issues. A majority of this Court has now approved guidelines for the lawful state regulation of obscene material. The judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York is therefore vacated and this case remanded for the sole purpose of affording the New York courts an opportunity to reconsider these substantive issues in light of Miller and Paris Adult Theatre I. See United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, ante, at 130 n. 7.
Vacated and remanded.
The prosecution presented no evidence that juveniles were actually present in the theater.
New York Penal Law §235.05 reads in relevant part:
“A person is guilty of obscenity when, knowing its content and character, he:
“1. Promotes, or possesses with intent to promote, any obscene material; or
"2. Produces, presents or directs an obscene performance or participates in a portion thereof which is obscene or which contributes to its obscenity.
“Obscenity is a class A misdemeanor.”
The terms used in § 235.05 are defined by New York Penal Law §235.00, which reads in relevant part:
“The following definitions are applicable to sections 235.05, 235.10 and 235.15:
“1. 'Obscene.' Any material or performance is ‘obscene’ if (a) considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient, shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, excretion, sadism or masochism, and (b) it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or representing such matters, and (c) it is utterly without redeeming social value. Predominant appeal shall be judged with reference to ordinary adults unless it appears from the character of the material or the circumstances of its dissemination to be designed for children or other specially susceptible audience.
“2. ‘Material’ means anything tangible which is capable of being used or adapted to arouse interest, whether through the medium of reading, observation, sound or in any other manner.
“3. ‘Performance’ means any play, motion picture, dance or other exhibition performed before an audience.
“4. ‘Promote’ means to manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the same.”
The cases against the ticket taker and projectionist were dismissed on the motion of the prosecutor.
“It is true that a judge may read a copy of a book in courtroom or chambers but not as easily arrange to see a motion picture there. However, we need not decide in this case whether the justice of the peace should have viewed the motion picture before issuing the warrant. The procedure under which the warrant issued solely upon the conclusory assertions of the police officer without any inquiry by the justice of the peace into the factual basis for the officer’s conclusions was not a procedure ‘designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity,’ [Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717], at 732, and therefore fell short of constitutional requirements demanding necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 58-59.” 392 U. S., at 637.
We further held “(1) there must be assurance, ‘by statute or authoritative judicial construction, that the censor will, within a specified brief period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film'; (2) ‘[a]ny restraint imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must similarly be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution’; and (3) ‘the procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision’ to minimize the impact of possibly erroneous administrative action. [Freedman v Maryland, 380 U. S.], at 58-59.” United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S., at 367.
The State of New York has represented that it stands ready to grant “immediate” adversary hearings on pretrial motions challenging seizures of material arguably protected by the First Amendment. No such motion was made by petitioner.
In particular, Marcus involved seizure by police officers acting pursuant to a general warrant of 11,000 copies of 280 publications. 367 U. S., at 723. Unlike this case, there was no independent judicial determination of obscenity by a neutral, detached magistrate, nor were the seizures made to preserve evidence for a criminal prosecution. Id., at 732. The sole purpose was to seize the articles as contraband and to cause them “to be publicly destroyed, by burning or otherwise.” Id., at 721 n. 6. In A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205 (1964), 1,715 copies of 31 publications were seized by a county sheriff, also without any prior judicial determination of obscenity and, again, for the sole purpose of destroying the publications as contraband. Id., at 206-209.
In Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502 (1966), this Court refused to review the legality of a seizure of books challenged under A Quantity of Books, supra, primarily because the record did not reveal the number of books seized as evidence under the warrant or “whether the books seized . . . were on the threshold of dissemination.” Id., at 613. If A Quantity of Books applied to all seizures of obscene material, there would have been no need for the Court to abstain from review in Mishkin, since the parties had conceded that there was no prior adversary hearing. This is not to say that multiple copies of a single film may be seized as purely cumulative evidence, or that a State may circumvent Marcus or A Quantity of Books by incorporating, as an element of a criminal offense, the number of copies of the obscene materials involved.
By “prompt,” we mean the shortest period “compatible with sound judicial resolution.” See United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S., at 367; Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U. S. 410, 417 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 61, at 68-69 (1965).
At oral argument, counsel for petitioner agreed that a prompt opportunity to obtain a copy from the seized film at “an independent lab under circumstances that would assure that there was no tampering with the film” with the original returned within “24 hours” would “satisfy” his “First Amendment position.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. Petitioner never requested such a copy below.
Failure to permit copying of seized material adversely affects First Amendment interests; prompt copying of seized material should be permitted. If copying is denied, return of the seized material should be required. On the other hand, violations of Fourth Amendment standards would require that the seized material be excluded from evidence. See Roaden v. Kentucky, post, p. 496; Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U. S., at 637. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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C
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether Congress has authorized the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or Commission) to regulate “off-exchange” trading in options to buy or sell foreign currency.
I
The CFTC brought this action in 1994, alleging that, beginning in 1992, petitioners solicited investments in and operated a fraudulent scheme in violation of the Commodity-Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U. S. C. § 1 et seq., and CFTC regulations. App. 10. See 7 U. S. C. §6c(b); 17 CFR §32.9 (1996). The CFTC’s complaint, affidavits, and declarations submitted to the District Court indicate that customers were told their funds would be invested using complex strategies involving options to purchase or sell various foreign currencies. App. 8. Petitioners apparently did in fact engage in many such transactions. Ibid.; 58 F. 3d 50, 51 (CA2 1995). To do so, they contracted directly with international banks and others without making use of any regulated exchange or board of trade. In the parlance of the business, petitioners traded in the “off-exchange” or “over-the-counter” (OTC) market. Ibid. No options were ever sold directly to petitioners' customers. However, their positions were tracked through internal accounts, and investors were provided weekly reports showing the putative status of their holdings. Petitioners and their customers suffered heavy losses. Id., at 51-52. Subsequently, the CFTC commenced these proceedings.
Rejecting petitioners’ defense that off-exchange transactions in foreign currency options are exempt from the CEA, the District Court appointed a temporary receiver to take control of their property for the benefit of their customers. App. to Pet. for Cert. 5b-6b. Relying on Circuit precedent, and acknowledging a conflict with another Circuit, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 58 F. 3d, at 54. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 517 U. S. 1219 (1996). For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
II
The outcome of this case is dictated by the so-called “Treasury Amendment” to the CEA. 88 Stat. 1395, 7 U. S. C. §2(ii). We have previously reviewed the history of the CEA and generally described how it authorizes the CFTC to regulate the “volatile and esoteric” market in futures contracts in fungible commodities. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 356, 357-367 (1982). As a part of the 1974 amendments that created the CFTC and dramatically expanded the coverage of the statute to include nonagricultural commodities “in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in,” see 88 Stat. 1395, 7 U. S. C. §2 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), Congress enacted the following exemption, which has come to be known as the “Treasury Amendment”:
“Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applicable to transactions in foreign currency, security warrants, security rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repurchase options, government securities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments, unless such transactions involve the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade.” 7 U. S. C. §2(ii) (emphasis added).
The narrow issue that we must decide is whether the italicized phrase (“transactions in foreign currency”) includes transactions in options to buy or sell foreign currency. An option, as the term is understood in the trade, is a transaction in which the buyer purchases from the seller for consideration the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell an agreed amount of a commodity at a set rate at any time prior to the option’s expiration. We think it plain that foreign currency options are “transactions in foreign currency” within the meaning of the statute. We are not persuaded by any of the arguments advanced by the CFTC in support of a narrower reading that would exempt futures contracts (agreements to buy or sell a specified quantity of a commodity at a particular price for delivery at a set future date) without exempting options.
III
“[A]bsent any ‘indication that doing so would frustrate Congress’s clear intention or yield patent absurdity, our obligation is to apply the statute as Congress wrote it.’ ” Hubbard v. United States, 514 U. S. 695, 703 (1995) (quoting BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 511 U. S. 531, 570 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting)). The CFTC argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that an option is not itself a transaction “in” foreign currency, but rather is just a contract right to engage in such a transaction at a future date. Brief for CFTC 30-31; 58 F. 3d, at 53. Hence, the Commission submits that the term “transactions in foreign currency” includes only the “actual exercise of an option (i. e., the actual purchase or sale of foreign currency)” but not the purchase or sale of an option itself. Brief for CFTC 31. That reading of the text seems quite unnatural to us, and we decline to adopt it.
The more normal reading of the key phrase encompasses all transactions in which foreign currency is the fungible good whose fluctuating market price provides the motive for trading. The CFTC’s interpretation violates the ordinary meaning of the key word “in,” which is usually thought to be “synonymous with [the] expressions ‘in regard to,’ ‘respecting,’ [and] ‘with respect to.’” Black’s Law Dictionary 758 (6th ed. 1990); see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 697-698 (1995). There can be no question that the purchase or sale of a foreign currency option is a transaction “respecting” foreign currency. We think it equally plain as a matter of ordinary meaning that such an option is a transaction “in” foreign currency for purposes of the Treasury Amendment.
Indeed, adopting the Commission’s reading would deprive the exemption of the principal effect Congress intended. The CFTC acknowledges that futures contracts fall squarely within the Treasury Amendment’s exemption, Brief for CFTC 30, and there is no question that the exemption of off-exchange foreign currency futures from CFTC regulation was one of Congress’ primary goals. Yet on the CFTC’s reasoning the exemption’s application to futures contracts could not be sustained.
A futures contract is no more a transaction “in” foreign currency as the Commission understands the term than an option. The Commission argues that because a futures contract creates a legal obligation to purchase or sell currency on a particular date, it is somehow more clearly a transaction “in” the underlying currencies than an option, which generates only the right to engage in a transaction. Id., at 30-32. This reasoning is wholly unpersuasive. No currency changes hands at the time a futures contract is made. And, the existence of a futures contract does not guarantee that currency will actually be exchanged. Indeed, the Commission concedes that, in most cases, futures contracts are “extinguished before delivery by entry into an offsetting futures contract.” Id., at 30 (citing 1 T. Snider, Regulation of the Commodities Futures and Options Markets §2.05 (2d ed. 1995) (hereinafter Snider)); see also Munn & Garcia 414. Adopting the CFTC’s reading would therefore place both futures and options outside the exemption, in clear contravention of Congress' intent. the Treas-
Furthermore, this interpretation would leave the Treasury Amendment’s exemption for “transactions in foreign currency” without any significant effect at all, because it would limit the scope of the exemption to “forward contracts” (agreements that anticipate the actual delivery of a commodity on a specified future date) and “spot transactions” (agreements for purchase and sale of commodities that anticipate near-term delivery). Both are transactions “in” a commodity as the CFTC would have us understand the term. But neither type of transaction for any commodity was subject to intensive regulation under the CEA at the time of the Treasury Amendment’s passage. See 7 U. S. C. § 2 (1970 ed., Supp. IV) (“term ‘future delivery,’ as used in this chapter, shall not include any sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery”); Snider § 9.01; J. Markham, The History of Commodity Futures Trading and Its Regulation 201-203 (1987). Our reading of the exemption is therefore also consonant with the doctrine that legislative enactments should not be construed to render their provisions mere sur-plusage. See Babbitt, 515 U. S., at 698 (noting “reluctance to treat statutory terms as surplusage”); Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U. S. 237, 249 (1985).
Finally, including options in the exemption is consistent with Congress’ purpose in enacting the Treasury Amendment. Although at the time the Treasury Amendment was drafted a thriving off-exchange market in foreign currency futures was in place, the closely related options market at issue here had not yet developed. See City of New York Bar Association Committee on Futures Regulation, The Evolving Regulatory Framework for Foreign Currency Trading 18, 23 (1986). The CFTC therefore suggests that Congress could not have intended to exempt foreign currency options from the CE A’s coverage. Brief for CFTC 41-42. The legislative history strongly suggests to the contrary that Congress’ broad purpose in enacting the Treasury Amendment was to provide a general exemption from CFTC regulation for sophisticated off-exchange foreign currency trading, which had previously developed entirely free from supervision under the commodities laws.
In explaining the Treasury Amendment, the Senate Committee Report notes in broad terms that the amendment “provides that inter-bank trading of foreign currencies and specified financial instruments is not subject to Commission regulation.” S. Rep. No. 93-1131, p. 6 (1974). Elsewhere, the Report again explains in general terms — without making reference to any distinction between options and futures— that the legislation
“included an amendment to clarify that the provisions of the bill are not applicable to trading in foreign currencies and certain enumerated financial instruments unless such trading is conducted on a formally organized futures exchange. A great deal of the trading in foreign currency in the United States is carried out through an informal network of banks and tellers. The Committee believes that this market is more properly supervised by the bank regulatory agencies and that, therefore, regulation under this legislation is unnecessary.” Id., at 23.
Similarly, the Treasury Department submitted to the Chairman of the relevant Senate Committee a letter that was the original source of the Treasury Amendment. While focusing on the need to exempt the foreign currency futures market from CFTC regulation, the letter points out that the “participants in this market are sophisticated and informed institutions,” and “the [CFTC] would clearly not have the expertise to regulate a complex banking function and would confuse an already highly regulated business sector.” Id., at 50 (letter of Donald Ritger, Acting General Counsel). The Department further explained that “new regulatory limitations and restrictions could have an adverse impact on the usefulness and efficiency of foreign exchange markets for traders and investors.” Ibid.
Although the OTC market for foreign currency options had not yet developed in 1974, the reasons underlying the Treasury Department’s express desire at that time to exempt off-exchange commodity futures trading from CFTC regulation apply with equal force to options today. Foreign currency options and futures are now traded in the same off-exchange markets, by the same entities, for quite similar purposes. See Brief for Foreign Exchange Committee et al. as Amici Curiae 19. Contrary to the Commission’s suggestion, we therefore think the purposes underlying the Treasury Amendment are most properly fulfilled by giving effect to the plain meaning of the language as Congress enacted it. should
The CFTC rejoins that the Treasury Amendment should be construed in the light of Congress’ history of regulating options more strictly than futures. See Snider §§7.03-7.04; Brief for CFTC 38-39. The Commission submits that this distinction was motivated by the view that options lend themselves more readily to fraudulent schemes than futures contracts. Hence, the CFTC argues that Congress would have acted reasonably and consistently with prior practice had it regulated commodities differently from options. While that may be true, we give only slight credence to these general historical considerations, which are unsupported by statutory language, or any evidence evocative of the particular concerns focused on by the legislators who enacted the Treasury Amendment. We think the history of the Treasury Amendment suggests — contrary to the CFTC’s view— that it was intended to take all transactions relating to foreign currency not conducted on a board of trade outside of the CEA’s ambit. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that, prior to the enactment of the CEA in 1974, foreign currency trading had been entirely unregulated under the commodities laws.
Our interpretation is also consonant with the history of evolving congressional regulation in this area. That history has been one of successively broadening the coverage of regulation by the addition of more and more commodities to the applicable legislation. It seems quite natural in this context to read the Treasury Amendment’s exemption of transactions in foreign currencies as a complete exclusion of that commodity from the regulatory scheme, except, of course, to the extent that the proviso for transactions “conducted on a board of trade” qualifies that exclusion. See 7 U. S. C. § 2(ii).
IV
To buttress its reading of the statute, the CFTC argues that elsewhere in the CEA Congress referred to transactions “involving” a particular commodity to describe options or used other “more encompassing terminology,” rather than what we are told is the narrower term transactions “in” the commodity, which was reserved for futures, spot transactions, and forward contracts. Brief for CFTC 30-33. Not only do we think it unlikely that Congress would adopt such a subtle method of drawing important distinctions, there is little to suggest that it did so. consistent.
Congress’ use of these terms has been far from consistent. Most strikingly, the use of the word “involving” in the Treasury Amendment itself completely eviscerates the force of the Commission’s argument. After setting forth exemptions for, inter alia, “transactions in foreign currency,” the amendment contains a proviso sweeping back into the statute’s coverage “such transactions involvfing] the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade.” 7 U. S. C. §2(ii) (emphasis added). As we have already noted, the CFTC agrees that futures contracts are a subset of “transactions in foreign currency.” The Commission further submits that the proviso uses the word “involve” to make the exemption inapplicable to those futures contracts that are conducted on a board of trade. This contradicts the “in” versus “involving” distinction. We would expect on the Commission’s reasoning that this provision would refer to “transactions in futures.” The use of the term “involving” instead, within the very amendment that the CFTC claims embraces this distinction, weighs heavily against the view that any such distinction was intended by Congress.
The CFTC argues further that the proviso properly understood aids its cause. The proviso sweeps back into the CFTC’s jurisdiction otherwise exempt “transactions in foreign currency” that “involve the sale thereof for future delivery” and are “conducted on a board of trade.” Since the proviso refers to futures without mentioning options, the Commission submits that the exemption itself should be read only to cover futures because Congress cannot reasonably have intended to regulate exchange trading in foreign currency futures without also regulating exchange trading in such options. We agree that Congress intended no such anomaly. But we are satisfied that the anomaly is best avoided by reading the proviso broadly rather than reading the exemption narrowly.
The proviso’s language fairly accommodates inclusion of both options and futures. To fall within the proviso, a transaction must “involve the sale [of foreign currency] for future delivery.” §2(ii) (emphasis added). Because options convey the right to buy or sell foreign currency at some future time prior to their expiration, they are transactions “involv[ing]” or related to the sale of foreign currency for future delivery. Thus, both futures and options are covered by both the exemption and the proviso. While that may not be the only possible reading of the literal text, and we do not intend to suggest that a similar construction would be required with respect to other provisions of the CEA, our interpretation is faithful to the “contemporary legal context” in which the Treasury Amendment was drafted. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 699 (1979); see also Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U. S. 107, 115 (1989) (noting that “ fin expounding a statute, we [are] not. .. guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy’ ”) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U. S. 41, 51 (1987)).
Finally, the CFTC calls our attention to statements in the 'legislative history of a 1982 amendment to the CEA, indicating that the drafters of that amendment believed that the CFTC had the authority to regulate foreign currency options “when they are traded other than on a national securities exchange.” See S. Rep. No. 97-384, p. 22 (1982). Those statements, at best, might be described as “legislative dicta” because the 1982 amendment itself merely resolved a conflict between the Securities Exchange Commission and the CFTC concerning their respective authority to regulate transactions on an exchange. See Snider § 10.24. The amendment made no change in the law applicable to off-exchange trading. Although these “dicta” are consistent with the position that the CFTC advocates, they shed no light on the intent of the authors of the Treasury Amendment that had been adopted eight years earlier. See, e. g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 839-840 (1988).
V
Underlying the statutory construction question before us, we recognize that there is an important public policy dispute — with substantial' arguments favoring each side. Petitioners, their amici, and the Treasury Department argue that if off-exchange foreign currency options are not treated as exempt from CEA regulation, the increased costs associated with unnecessary regulation of the highly sophisticated OTC foreign currency markets might well drive this business out of the United States. The Commission responds that to the extent limited exemptions from regulation are necessary, it will provide them, but argues that options are particularly susceptible to fraud and abuse if not carefully policed. Brief for CFTC 26, 49. As the Commission properly acknowledges, however, these are arguments best addressed to the Congress, not the courts. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 544, 555 (1979). Lacking the expertise or authority to assess these important competing claims, we note only that “a literal construction of a statute” does not “yiel[dj results so manifestly unreasonable that they could not fairly be attributed to congressional design.” Ibid.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The complaint names as defendants William C. Dunn, Delta Consultants, Inc., Delta Options, Ltd., and Nopkine Co., Ltd. App. 6-7. Only Dunn and Delta Consultants are petitioners here.
The statute provides: “No person shall offer to enter into, enter into or confirm the execution of, any transaction involving any commodity regulated under this chapter which is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an ‘option’... contrary to any rule, regulation, or order of the Commission prohibiting any such transaction or allowing any such transaction under such terms and conditions as the Commission shall prescribe.” 7 U. S. C. § 6e(b). The regulations at issue here further make it unlawful “for any person directly or indirectly ... [t]o cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud any other person;... [t]o make or cause to be made to any other person any false report or statement thereof or cause to be entered for any person any false record thereof;. . . [or] [t]o deceive or attempt to deceive any other person by any means whatsoever . . . in or in connection with an offer to enter into, the entry into, or the confirmation of the execution of, any commodity option transaction.” 17 CFR §32.9 (1996).
We are informed by amici that participants in the “highly evolved, sophisticated” OTC foreign currency markets include “commercial and investment banks, . . . foreign exchange dealers and brokerage companies, corporations, money managers (including pension, mutual fund and commodity pool managers), commodity trading advisors, insurance companies, governments and central banks.” Brief for Foreign Exchange Committee et al. as Amici Curiae 8. These markets serve a variety of functions, including providing ready access to foreign currency for international transactions, and allowing businesses to hedge against the risk of exchange rate movements. Id., at 8-9.
58 F. 3d 50, 53 (CA2 1995) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. American Bd. of Trade, 803 F. 2d 1242 (CA2 1986)).
58 F. 3d, at 54 (citing Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F. 3d 966 (CA4 1993), cert. denied, 511 U. S. 1031 (1994)).
See G. Munn & F. Garcia, Encyclopedia of Banking and Finance 736 (8th ed. 1983) (hereinafter Munn & Garcia); C. Luca, Trading in the Global Currency Markets 243 (1995) (hereinafter Luca). Participants in these markets refer to an option that provides the right to sell currency as a “put,” and one that provides the right to buy as a “call.” Munn & Garcia 737; Luca 270,272. Options can themselves be traded, at values that vary depending upon the exchange rate of the underlying currencies prior to the option’s expiration. Brief for Foreign Exchange Committee et al. as Amici Curiae 5, n. 5.
See Munn & Garcia 414; City of New York Bar Association Committee on Futures Regulation, The Evolving Regulatory Framework for Foreign Currency Trading 9 (1986).
The amendment was enacted on the suggestion of the Treasury Department at the time of a dramatic expansion in the scope of federal commodities regulation. The Department expressed concerns in a letter to the relevant congressional committee that this development might lead, inter alia, to the unintended regulation of the off-exchange market in foreign currency futures. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131, pp. 49-50 (1974) (“The Department feels strongly that foreign currency futures trading, other than on organized exchanges, should not be regulated by the new agency”) (letter of Donald Ritger, Acting General Counsel). The Treasury Amendment, which tracks almost verbatim the language proposed by the Department, cf. id., at 51, was included in the legislation to respond to these concerns. Id., at 23. The CFTC is therefore plainly correct to reject the suggestion of its amici that the Treasury Amendment’s exemption be construed not to include futures contracts within its coverage. See Brief for Chicago Mercantile Exchange as Amicus Curiae 17-18; Brief for Board of Trade of City of Chicago as Amicus Curiae 10.
See Snider §9.01 (defining “spot transactions” and “forward contracts”).
Similarly, the Conference Committee Report points out that the Treasury Amendment “provides that interbank trading of foreign currencies and specified financial instruments is not subject to Commission regulation.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1383, p. 35 (1974).
The Grain Futures Act, enacted by Congress in 1922 to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to supervise trading in grain futures on “contract markets,” defined the regulated commodities to include “wheat, corn, oats, barley, rye, flax, and sorghum.” 42 Stat. 998. In 1936 Congress expanded the coverage of the legislation to add further agricultural commodities, including cotton, rice, butter, eggs, and Irish potatoes. Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491. (The contrast between the title of the 1936 Act — “Commodity Exchange Act” — and the title of its predecessor — “Grain Futures Act”— suggests that an easy way to describe the coverage of the legislation is to identify the commodities that it regulates.) In 1968 the coverage of the legislation was again expanded, this time to include livestock and livestock products. 82 Stat. 26. The 1974 amendment expanded the coverage of the statute to include nonagrieultural commodities and, appropriately, replaced regulation by the Secretary of Agriculture with regulation by a new commission whose title included the word “Commodity.”
Similarly, the statute refers at one point to “[transactions in commodities involving the sale thereof for future delivery . . . and known as ‘futures.’ ” 7 U. S. C. § 5 (emphasis added). Had Congress meant to maintain the Commission’s distinction, we would not have expected the Legislature to use the words “in” and “involving” loosely in the same sentence to refer to futures, which the CFTC informs us are transactions “in” (but not “involving”) foreign currency. Similarly, the statute refers elsewhere to “transaction[s] in an option on foreign currency.” §6c(f) (emphasis added). If Congress had spoken in the manner the CFTC suggests, that provision would instead use the phrase “transactions involving an option.”
The statute’s general jurisdictional provision also fails to maintain the distinction the Commission presses. The CEA provides that the CFTC “shall have exclusive jurisdiction... with respect to accounts, agreements (including any transaction which is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, an ‘option’ . . .), and transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery.” § 2(i) (emphasis added). The Commission submits that this language gives the CFTC regulatory authority over options on futures contracts, see Snider § 10.11, and argues that the use of the word “involving” is therefore in keeping with its interpretation of the statutory scheme. See Brief for CFTC 32. But §2(i) provides the CFTC with exclusive jurisdiction over far more. Among other things, it explicitly grants jurisdiction over any “transactio[n] involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery,” plainly meaning at a minimum ordinary futures contracts, which the Commission otherwise insists are transactions “in” commodities.
Futures Trading Act of 1982, Tit. I, §102, 96 Stat. 2296, 7 U.S.C. §6c(f).
Though the CFTC’s brief disclaims any need for it, Brief for CFTC 48, at oral argument the Commission requested for the first time that we give deference to its interpretation of the Treasury Amendment as the agency, “charged with administering” it. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 785, 739 (1996); Tr. of Oral Arg. 54; see Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). If Chevron principles were applicable, we are unsure that the CFTC’s position would be the one owed deference. As the Commission concedes, Brief for CFTC 25, the Treasury Department has taken a quite different view of the statute — one consonant with the interpretation set forth here — to which petitioners argue deference is owed if Chevron is invoked. A reasonable argument could be made that Congress intended to charge Treasury, rather than the Commission, with administering the dimensions of the aptly named Treasury Amendment, which was specifically enacted at the behest of Treasury to confine the CFTC’s activities. Cf. Smiley, 517 U. S., at 740-741 (explaining that Chevron deference arises out of background presumptions of congressional intent); Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U. S. 144,157-158 (1991) (allocating power “authoritatively to interpret . . . regulations” after assessing “available indicia of legislative intent”). We need not “resolve the difficult issues regarding deference which would be lurking in other circumstances.” Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 477 (1992). Because “the statute, as a whole, clearly expresses Congress’ intention” to include foreign currency options within the Treasury Amendment’s exemption, administrative deference is improper. Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U. S. 26, 42 (1990).
Brief for Petitioners 23-25; Brief for Credit Lyonnais et al. as Amici Curiae 3; Brief for Foreign Exchange Committee et al. as Amici Curiae 6; Brief for CFTC 25.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
[Petitioner brought this habeas corpus proceeding to test the validity of the denial of his application under §§244 (a)(5) and 244 (c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 215, 216, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1254 (a)(5) and 1254 (c), for discretionary suspension of deportation. He contends that the denial of his application was unlawful because based on confidential, undisclosed information. The District Court denied the writ, holding, so far as pertinent here, that, “after complying with all the. essentials of due process of law in the deportation hearing and in the hearing to determine eligibility for suspension of deportation, [the Attorney General may] consider confidential information outside the record in formulating his discretionary decision.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding, inter alia, that petitioner was not “denied due process of law in the consideration of his application for suspension of deportation because of the use of this confidential information.” 222 F. 2d 820, 820-821; rehearing denied, 224 F. 2d 957. We granted certiorari, 350 U. S. 931, to consider the validity of 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 244.3, the Attorney General's regulation which provides:
“§ 244.3 Use of confidential information. In the case of an alien qualified for . . . suspension of deportation under section . . . 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act the determination as to whether the application for . . . suspension of deportation shall be granted or denied (whether such determination is made initially or on appeal) may be predicated upon confidential information without the disclosure thereof to the applicant, if in the opinion of the officer or the Board making the determination the disclosure of such information would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security.”
Following a hearing, the fairness of which is unchallenged, petitioner was ordered deported in 1952 pursuant to 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. V) § 137-3. That section provided for the deportation of any alien “who was at the time of entering the United States, or has been at any time thereafter,” a member of the Communist Party of the United States. Petitioner, a citizen of Great Britain, last entered the United States in 1921. .-At the deportation hearing he admitted having been a voluntary member of the Communist Party from 1935 through 1940. He attacked the validity of the deportation order in the courts below on the ground that there is “no lawful power . . . under the Constitution or laws of the United States” to deport one who has “at no time violated any condition imposed at the time of his entry.” But that point has been abandoned, and in this Court petitioner in effect concedes that he is deportable. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580.
In 1953, upon motion of petitioner, the deportation order was withdrawn for the purpose of allowing petitioner to seek discretionary relief from the Attorney General under § 244 (a) (5) of the Act. The application for suspension of deportation was filed and a hearing thereon was held before a special inquiry officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The special inquiry officer found petitioner to be qualified for suspension of deportation — that is, found that petitioner met the statutory prerequisites to the favorable exercise of the discretionary relief. But the special inquiry officer decided the case for suspension did not “warrant favorable action” in view of certain “confidential information.” The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed an appeal, basing its decision “Upon a full consideration of the evidence of record and in light of the confidential information available.” Thus, the Board in considering the appeal reviewed the undisclosed information as well as the evidence on the open record. Petitioner then commenced the present habeas corpus action.
As previously noted, § 244 (a)(5) of the Act provides that the Attorney General “may, in his discretion” suspend deportation of any deportable alien who meets certain statutory requirements relating to moral character, hardship and period of residence within the United States. If the Attorney General does suspend deportation under that provision, he must file, pursuant to § 244 (c), “a complete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case” with Congress, giving “the reasons for such suspension.” So far as pertinent here, deportation finally cancels only if Congress affirmatively approves the suspension by a favorable concurrent resolution within a specified period of time. There is no express statutory grant of any right to a hearing on an application to the Attorney General for discretionary suspension of deportation. For purposes of effectuating these statutory provisions, the Attorney General adopted regulations delegating his authority under § 244 of the Act to special inquiry officers; giving the alien the right to apply for suspension during a deportation hearing; putting the burden on the applicant to establish the statutory requirements for eligibility for suspension; allowing the alien-applicant to submit any evidence in support of his application; requiring the special inquiry officer to present evidence bearing on the applicant’s eligibility for relief; and requiring a “written decision” with “a discussion of the evidence relating to the alien’s eligibility for such relief and the reasons for granting or denying such application.” The Attorney General also promulgated the regulation under attack here, 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 244.3, see pp. 347-348, supra, providing for the use by special inquiry officers and the Board of Immigration Appeals of confidential information in ruling upon suspension applications if disclosure of the information would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety or security.
We note that petitioner does not suggest that he did not receive a full and fair hearing on evidence of record with respect to his statutory eligibility for suspension of deportation. In fact, petitioner recognizes that the special inquiry officer found in his favor on all issues relating to eligibility for the discretionary relief and that those findings were adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals. This favorably disposed of petitioner’s eligibility for consideration for suspension of deportation — the first step in the suspension procedure. Thus, we have here the case of an admittedly deportable alien who has been ordered deported following an unchallenged hearing, and who has been accorded another full and fair hearing on the issues respecting his statutory qualifications for discretionary suspension of deportation./!
It is urged upon the Court that the confidential information regulation is invalid because inconsistent with § 244 of the Act. In support of this claim, petitioner argues that § 244 implicitly requires the Attorney General to give a hearing on applications for suspension of deportation. It is then said that this statutory right is nullified and rendered illusory by the challenged regulation, and that therefore the regulation is invalid. But there is nothing in the language of § 244 of the Act upon which to base a belief that the Attorney General is required to give a hearing with all the evidence spread upon an open record with respect to the considerations which may bear upon his grant or denial of an application for suspension to an alien eligible for that relief. Assuming that the statute implicitly requires a hearing on an open record as to the specified statutory prerequisites to favorable action, there is no claim here of a denial of such a hearing on those issues. Moreover, though we assume a statutory right to a full hearing on those issues, it does not follow that such a right exists on the ultimate decision — the exercise of discretion to suspend deportation.
Eligibility for the relief here involved is governed by specific statutory standards which provide a right to a ruling on an applicant’s eligibility. However, Congress did not provide statutory standards for determining who, among qualified applicants for suspension, should receive the ultimate relief. That determination is left to the sound discretion of the Attorney General. The statute says that, as to qualified deportable aliens, the Attorney General “may, in his discretion” suspend deportation. It does not restrict the considerations which may be relied upon or the procedure by which the discretion should be exercised. Although such aliens have been given a right to a discretionary determination on an application for suspension, cf. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260, a grant thereof is manifestly not a matter of right under any circumstances, but rather is in all cases a matter of grace. Like probation or suspension of criminal sentence, it “comes as an act of grace,” Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 492, and “cannot be demanded as a right,” Berman v. United States, 302 U. S. 211, 213. And this unfettered discretion of the Attorney General with respect to suspension of deportation is analogous to the Board of Parole’s powers to release federal prisoners on parole. Even if we assume that Congress has given to qualified applicants for suspension of deportation a right to offer evidence to the Attorney General in support of their applications, the similarity between the discretionary powers vested in the Attorney General by § 244 (a) of the Act on the one hand, and judicial probation power and executive parole power on the other hand, leads to a conclusion that § 244 gives no right to the kind of a hearing on a suspension application which contemplates full disclosure of the considerations entering into a decision. Clearly there is no statutory right to that kind of a hearing on a request for a grant of probation after criminal conviction in the federal courts. Nor is there such a right with respect to an application for parole. Since, as we hold, the Attorney General’s discretion is not limited by the suggested hearing requirement, the challenged regulation cannot be said to be inconsistent with § 244 (a) of the Act.
Petitioner says that a hearing requirement, with a consequent disclosure of all considerations going into a decision, is made implicit by § 244 (c) if not by § 244 (a). Section 244 (c), it will be recalled, requires the Attorney General to file with Congress “a complete and detailed statement of the facts” as to cases in which suspension is granted, “with reasons for such suspension.” This statutory mandate does not, however, order such a report on cases in which suspension is denied. Section 244 (c) actually emphasizes the fact that suspension is not a matter of right. Congress was interested in limiting grants of this relief to the minimum. It evidenced an interest only in the reasons relied upon by the Attorney General for granting an application so that it could have an opportunity to accept or reject favorable administrative decisions. This in no way suggests that the applicant is to be apprised of the reasons for a denial of his request for suspension.
Petitioner also points to § 235 (c) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1225 (c), which specifically authorizes the Attorney General to determine under some circumstances that an alien is excludable “on the basis of information of a confidential nature.” It is argued from this that had Congress intended to permit the use of confidential information in rulings upon applications for suspension of deportation, it would have expressly so provided in language as specific as that used in § 235 (c). The difficulty with this argument is that § 235 (c) is an exception to an express statutory mandate under § 236 (a) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1226 (a), that determinations of admissibility be “based only on the evidence produced at the inquiry.” No such express mandate exists with respect to suspension of deportation, and, therefore, no specific provision for the use of confidential information was needed if normally contemplated by the broad grant of discretionary power to the Attorney General.
It is next argued that, even if the confidential information regulation is not inconsistent with § 244 (a), it nevertheless should be held invalid. Emphasizing that Congress did not in terms authorize such a procedure, petitioner contends that the Act should be construed to provide a right to a hearing because only such a construction would be consistent with the “tradition and principles of free government.” On its face this is an attractive argument. Petitioner urges that, in view of the severity of the result flowing from a denial of suspension of deportation, we should interpret the statute by resolving all doubts in the applicant’s favor. Cf. United States v. Minker, 350 U. S. 179, 187-188. But we must adopt the plain meaning of a statute, however severe the consequences. Cf. Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 528. As we have already stated, suspension of deportation is not given to deportable aliens as a right, but, by congressional direction, it is dispensed according to the unfettered discretion of the Attorney General. In the face of such a combination of factors we are constrained to construe the statute as permitting decisions based upon matters outside the administrative record, at least when such action would be reasonable.
It may be that § 244 (a) cannot be interpreted as allowing a decision based on undisclosed information in every case involving a deportable alien qualified for suspension. Thus, it could be argued that, where there is no compelling reason to refuse to disclose the basis of a denial of an application, the statute does not contemplate arbitrary secrecy. However, the regulation under attack here limits the use of confidential information to instances where, in the opinion of the special inquiry officer or the Board of Immigration Appeals, “the disclosure . . . would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security.” If the statute permits any withholding of information from the alien, manifestly this is a reasonable class of cases in which to exercise that power.
Our conclusion in this case is strongly supported by prior decisions of this Court. In both Knauff v. Shaugh-nessy, 338 U. S. 537, and Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, we upheld a regulation of the Attorney General calling for the denial of a hearing in exclusion cases where the Attorney General determined that an alien was ex-dudable on the basis of confidential information, and where, as here, the disclosure of that information would be prejudicial to the public interest. And again, as here, the statutes involved in those cases did not expressly authorize the use of such information in making the administrative ruling. It is true that a resident alien in a deportation proceeding has constitutional protections unavailable to a nonresident alien seeking entry into the United States, and that those protections may militate against construing an ambiguous statute as authorizing the use of confidential information in a deportation proceeding. Cf. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590. But the issue involved here under § 244 (a) is not whether an alien is deportable, but whether, as a deportable alien who is qualified for suspension of deportation, he should be granted such suspension. In view of the gratuitous nature of the relief, the use of confidential information in a suspension proceeding is more clearly within statutory authority than were the regulations involved in the Knauff and Mezei cases.
Concluding that the challenged regulation is not inconsistent with the Act, we must look to petitioner’s claim that the use of undiscloséd confidential information is unlawful because inconsistent with related regulations governing suspension of deportation procedures. As previously noted, an application for suspension is considered as part of the “hearing” to determine deporta-bility. 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, §§ 242.53 (c) and 242.54 (d) ; and see 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.5. The alien is entitled to “submit any evidence in support of his application which he believes should be considered by the special inquiry officer.” 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.54 (d). The hearing to determine deportability, during which the suspension application is considered, is to be a “fair and impartial hearing.” 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.53 (b). And a decision of the special inquiry officer on the request for suspension must contain “the reasons for granting or denying such application.” 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.61 (a).
We conclude that, although undisclosed information was used as a basis for denying suspension of deportation, none of the above-mentioned regulations was transgressed. While an applicant for suspension is, by regulation, entitled to “submit any evidence in support of his application,” that is merely a provision permitting an evidentiary plea to the discretion of those who are to make the decision. In this respect it is not unlike the “statement” and the opportunity to present “information in mitigation of punishment” to which a convicted defendant is entitled under Rule 32 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure before criminal sentence is imposed. And the situation is not different because the matter of suspension of deportation is taken up in the “fair and impartial” deportation “hearing.” Assuming that such a “hearing” normally precludes the use of undisclosed information, the “hearing” here involved necessarily contemplates the use of confidential matter in some circumstances. We must read the body of regulations governing suspension procedures so as to give effect, if possible, to all of its provisions. Cf. Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S. S. Co., 336 U. S. 198.
This same rationale leads us to conclude that the requirement of a decision containing “reasons” is fully complied with by a statement to the effect that the application has been denied on the basis of confidential information, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety or security. Section 244.3 says that such information may be used “without the disclosure thereof to the applicant.” Reading the provision for a statement of the “reasons” for a decision in the light of § 244.3, it follows that express reliance on confidential information constitutes a statement of the “reasons” for a denial of suspension within the meaning of § 242.61 (a). If “reasons” must be disclosed but confidential information need not be, the former mandate, which certainly comprehends the latter provision, must be satisfied by an express invocation of the latter provision.
Congress has provided a general plan dealing with the deportation of those aliens who have not obtained citizenship although admitted to residence. Since it could not readily make exception for cases of unusual hardship or extenuating circumstances, those matters were left to the consideration and discretion of the Attorney General. We hold that in this case the Attorney General has properly exercised his powers under the suspension statute and we affirm the judgment below.
It is so ordered.
The District Judge wrote no opinion. The quote is taken from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Record 15, 17-18.
A similar provision is now contained in 8 U. S. C. § 1251 (a)(6)(C).
“In determining cases submitted for hearing, special inquiry-officers shall exercise . . . the authority contained in section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to suspend deportation.” 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.6.
The finding was:
“As the respondent has not been found to have been a Communist Party member later than 1940, it follows that more than ten years has elapsed since the assumption of the status which constitutes the ground for his deportation. Evidence of record, consisting of affidavits of persons well acquainted with the respondent, together with employment records, as well as a report of an investigation by this Service, satisfactorily establishes that he has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than ten years last past. A check of the local and Federal records reveals no criminal record. An independent character investigation, as well as the above related affidavits tend to establish that for the ten years immediately preceding his application for relief, he has been a person of good moral character.
"... He has stated that if he were deported he would suffer extreme and unusual hardship in that he would be separated from relatives and friends, and in effect that he would find it almost impossible to maintain himself because of lack of funds. On the record, respondent appears to be qualified for suspension of deportation.”
Section 244 (a) (5) of the Act provides in pertinent part that “the Attorney General may, in his discretion, suspend deportation” in the case of a deportable alien who (1) has been present in the United States for at least ten years since the ground for his deportation arose; (2) “proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral character”; and (3) is one “whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus petitioner alleged, “Upon information and belief," that the "confidential information” considered by the special inquiry officer, and later by the Board of Immigration Appeals, was nothing more than the fact that petitioner’s name had appeared on a list circulated by the American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born, an organization which had been designated subversive by the Attorney General, ex parte. Petitioner claimed that “Solely by reason of [his] name appearing on said list, his case for discretionary relief was prejudged and no fair or impartial consideration of his case was given . . . .” In its Return to the Order to Show Cause, the Government denied that the confidential information relied upon was as alleged by petitioner, and denied that the case had been prejudged. The District Court made no specific finding with respect to the character or substance of the confidential information, but it did determine that the special inquiry officer and the Board of Immigration Appeals “exercised their independent judgment in denying discretionary relief.” See Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U. S. 260, 349 U. S. 280; Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302.
Petitioner apparently abandoned this allegation and argument in the Court of Appeals. In his petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court, he indirectly raises the point again by claiming to be “entitled to a judicial hearing upon ... his allegation of fact in habeas corpus proceedings that the undisclosed and so-called confidential matter . . . was of such a character that its consideration was not authorized by applicable regulations established by the Attorney .General.” However, petitioner made no direct assertion in this Court with respect to prejudgment. In this state of the record we conclude that there is no claim of prejudgment before this Court. See n. 22, infra.
No further administrative appeal was then available to petitioner. See 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, §§ 242.61 (e), 6.1 (b) (2), 6.1 (h) (1).
8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.6 quoted in part at note 3, supra. Petitioner does not suggest, nor can we conclude, that Congress expected the Attorney General to exercise his discretion in suspension cases personally. There is no doubt but that the discretion was conferred upon him as an administrator in his capacity as such, and that under his rulemaking authority, as a matter of administrative convenience, he could delegate his authority to special inquiry officers with review by the Board of Immigration Appeals. 66 Stat. 173, 8 U. S. C. § 1103.
8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.54 (d).
Ibid.
Ibid.
CFR, Rev. 1952, §242.53 (c).
8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 242.61 (a).
See notes 4 and 5, supra, and accompanying text.
Congress first provided for suspension of deportation in 1940 by adding a new provision to the Immigration Act of 1917. 54 Stat. 672, as amended, 62 Stat. 1206, 8 U. S. C. (1946 ed., Supp. V) § 155 (c). That new provision provided that “the Attorney General may . . . suspend deportation” under certain circumstances. In enacting the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Congress added the phrase “in his discretion” after the words “the Attorney General may.” In an analysis of draft legislation leading up to the 1952 Act, prepared by the Immigration and Naturalization Service for the assistance of the congressional committees, it was stated that the new words were suggested “in order to indicate clearly that the grant of suspension is entirely discretionary . . . .” That analysis was considered by the congressional committees. See S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3; H. R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 28.
As stated by Judge Learned Hand, “The power of the Attorney General to suspend deportation is a dispensing power, like a judge’s power to suspend the execution of a sentence, or the President’s to pardon a convict.” United States ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F. 2d 489, 491. See also S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 25, for an indication that suspension of deportation is a matter of grace to cover cases of unusual hardship. And see 81 Cong. Rec. 5546, 5553, 5554, 5561, 5569-5570, and 5572, where early proposed legislation for administrative suspension of deportation was variously described as a procedure for “clemency” and “amnesty,” and was compared with presidential discretion. And see S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 600, emphasizing that suspension of deportation is an entirely discretionary action which does not follow automatically from compliance with the formal eligibility requirements.
“. . . if in the opinion of the Board [of Parole] such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society, the Board may in its discretion authorize the release of such prisoner on parole.” (Emphasis supplied.) 18 IT. S. C. §4203. See United States v. Anderson, 76 F. 2d 375, 376; Losieau v. Hunter, 90 U. S. App. D. C. 85, 193 F. 2d 41.
A sentencing court “may suspend . . . sentence and place the defendant on probation” if it is “satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby.” 18 U. S. C. § 3651.
“The probation service of the court shall make a presentenee investigation and report to the court before the imposition of sentence or the granting of probation . . . .” Rule 32(c)(1), Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. “The report of the presentenee investigation shall contain any prior criminal record of the defendant and such information about his characteristics, his financial condition and the circumstances affecting his behavior as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in granting probation or in the correctional treatment of the defendant, and such other information as may be required by the Court.” Rule 32 (c)(2), Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. “Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.” Rule 32 (a), Fed. Rules Crim. Proc.
Cf. Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, where this Court held that there is no constitutional bar to setting a state criminal sentence on the basis of “out-of-court information.”
“If it appears to the Board of Parole from a report by the proper institutional officers or upon application by a prisoner eligible for release on parole, that there is a reasonable probability that such prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws, and if in the opinion of the Board such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society, the Board may in its discretion authorize the release of such prisoner on parole.” 18 U. S. C. § 4203 (a).
Note also that only certain prisoners are eligible for this discretionary relief. 18 U. S. C. § 4202.
See Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537, and Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, upholding a regulation of the Attorney General to a similar effect which had been promulgated prior to the existence of § 235 (c) or any other such specific statutory authority.
It is not claimed that a contrary construction would render the statute and regulation unconstitutional, or even that a substantial constitutional question would thereby arise. The thrust of the argument is rather that the statute should be construed liberally in favor of the alien as a matter of statutory interpretation. In any event, in this case we have not violated our normal rule of statutory interpretation that, where possible, constructions giving rise to doubtful constitutional validity should be avoided. That rule does not authorize a departure from clear meaning. E. g., United States v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689, 693; Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Cleary, 296 U. S. 315, 334-335. Moreover, the constitutionality of § 244 as herein interpreted gives us no difficulty. Cf. Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241.
Petitioner presents the claim that the decision of the special inquiry officer was void in that the “so-called confidential matter . . . was of such a character that its consideration was not authorized by applicable regulations established by the Attorney General.” See note 6, supra. To the extent that this is an allegation that the undisclosed information, if revealed, would not have been prejudicial to the public interest, petitioner is arguing that the decision violated 8 CFR, Rev. 1952, § 244.3. The Board of Immigration Appeals, the District Court, and the Court of Appeals concluded, in effect, that the special inquiry officer found that the disclosure of the information would have been contrary to public interest, safety or security. We accept that finding. Nothing more is required by the regulation.
The substance of this regulation is now incorporated in § 235 (c) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1225 (c). See pp. 356-357, supra.
See note 18, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a prosecution under an indictment containing six counts for narcotics offenses. Four counts were based on provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and two counts on the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, as amended. The first three counts derive from a sale on February 26, 1955, of twenty capsules of heroin and three capsules of cocaine; the last three counts derive from a sale of thirty-five capsules of heroin on February 28, 1955. Counts One and Four charged the sale of the drugs, on the respective dates, not “in pursuance of a written order” of the person to whom the drugs were sold on the requisite Treasury form, in violation of § 4705 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Counts Two and Five charged the sale and distribution of the drugs on the respective dates not “in the original stamped package or from the original stamped package,” in violation of § 4704 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Counts Three and Six charged facilitating concealment and sale of the drugs on the respective dates, with knowledge that the drugs had been unlawfully imported, in violation of § 2 (c) of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, as amended by the Act of November 2, 1951, 65 Stat. 767. In short, Congress had made three distinct offenses in connection with the vending of illicit drugs, and the petitioner, having violated these three independent provisions, was prosecuted for all three as separate wrongdoings, despite the fact that these violations of what Congress had proscribed were compendiously committed in single transactions of vending. Duly tried before a jury, petitioner was convicted, and no question touching the conviction is before us. In controversy is the legality of the sentences imposed by the trial court. These were imprisonment for a term of one to five years, imposed on each count, the sentences on the first three counts to run consecutively, the sentences on the remaining three counts to run concurrently with those on the first three counts. Thus the total sentence was three to fifteen years. Petitioner moved, under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, to vacate the sentence, claiming that for all three counts a sentence as for only one count could be imposed. The motion was denied and the Court of Appeals affirmed, 100 U. S. App. D. C. 315, 244 F. 2d 763, with expressions of doubt by two of the judges, who felt themselves bound by Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299. We brought the case here, 355 U. S. 903, in order to consider whether some of our more recent decisions, while not questioning Blockburger but moving in related areas, may not have impaired its authority.
We adhere to the decision in Blockburger v. United States, supra. The considerations advanced in support of the vigorous attack against it have left its justification undisturbed, nor have our later decisions generated counter currents.
That the Blockburger opinion did not lay out with particularity the course of anti-narcotics legislation is scant basis for suggesting that the Court was unaware of it or did not duly heed the relevant criteria for statutory construction in dealing with the specific legislation before it. The Court was not an innocent in the history of narcotics legislation. Blockburger was not the first case that brought prosecutions under successive enactments dealing with the control of narcotics before the Court. At the time of Blockburger, it was not customary to make the whole legislative history connected with particular statutes in adjudication 'part of the conventional apparatus of an opinion. What is more to the point about the Blockburger decision is that the unanimous Court that rendered it then included three Justices conspicuous for their alertness in safeguarding the interests of defendants in criminal cases and in their insistence on the compassionate regard for such interests. Invidiousness is not implied in saying that Mr. Justice Brandéis, Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Roberts would not have joined in finding that Congress established independent curbs as tactical details in the strategy against illicit narcotics trade, if it could be reasonably maintained that what in fact Congress was doing was merely giving different labels to the same thing. The fact that an offender violates by a single transaction several regulatory controls devised by Congress as means for dealing with a social evil as deleterious as it is difficult to combat does not make the several different regulatory controls single and identic. In Blockburger, the offender was indicted, convicted, and cumulatively sentenced for two separate offenses: selling forbidden drugs not “in the original stamped package” (now § 4704 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code), and of selling such drugs not “in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom such article is sold” (now §4705 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code). The petitioner here was likewise indicted, tried, convicted and cumulatively sentenced for the two foregoing offenses and, in addition, for violating the amended § 2 (c) of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act. And so while Blockburger was sentenced to ten years for the two offenses, petitioner was sentenced to a maximum of fifteen years. The Court of Appeals inevitably found the Block-burger case controlling.
We are strongly urged to reconsider Blockburger by reading the various specific enactments of Congress as reflecting a unitary congressional purpose to outlaw non-medicinal sales of narcotics. From this the conclusion is sought to be drawn that since Congress had only a single purpose, no matter how numerous the violations by an offender, of the specific means for dealing with this unitary purpose, the desire should be attributed to Congress to punish only as for a single offense when these multiple infractions are committed through a single sale. We agree with the starting point, but it leads us to the opposite conclusion. Of course the various enactments by Congress extending over nearly half a- century constitute a network of provisions, steadily tightened and enlarged, for grappling with a powerful, subtle and elusive enemy. If the legislation reveals anything, it reveals the determination of Congress to turn the screw of the criminal machinery — detection, prosecution and punishment— tighter and tighter. The three penal laws for which petitioner was convicted have different origins both in time and in design. The present § 2 (c) of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act derives from an enactment of February 9, 1909, § 2, 35 Stat. 614. The present § 4705 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 derives from the Act of December 17, 1914, § 2, 38 Stat. 785, 786. The present § 4704 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 derives from the Revenue Act of 1918, § 1006, 40 Stat. 1057, 1130 (1919). It seems more daring than convincing to suggest that three different enactments, each relating to a separate way of closing in on illicit distribution of narcotics, passed at three different periods, for each of which a separate punishment was declared by Congress, somehow or other ought to have carried with them an implied indication by Congress that if all these three different restrictions were disregarded but, forsooth, in the course of one transaction, the defendant should be treated as though he committed only one of these offenses.
This situation is toto coelo different from the one that led to our decision in Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81. That case involved application of the Mann Act — a single provision making it a crime to transport a woman in interstate commerce for purposes of prostitution. We held that the transportation of more than one woman as a single transaction is to be dealt with as a single offense, for the reason that when Congress has not explicitly stated what the unit of offense is, the doubt will be judicially resolved in favor of lenity. It is one thing for a single transaction to include several units relating to proscribed conduct under a single provision of a statute. It is a wholly different thing to evolve a rule of lenity for three violations of three separate offenses created by Congress at three different times, all to the end of dealing more and more strictly with, and seeking to throttle more and more by different legal devices, the traffic in narcotics. Both in the unfolding of the substantive provisions of law and in the scale of punishments, Congress has manifested an attitude not of lenity but of severity toward violation of the narcotics laws. Nor need we be detained by two other cases relied on, United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, and Prince v. United States, 352 U. S. 322. In the former we construed the record-keeping provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act as punishing “a course of conduct.” Of the Prince case, it suffices to say that the Court was dealing there “with a unique statute of limited purpose.” 352 U. S., at 325.
Finally, we have had pressed upon us that the Block-burger doctrine offends the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. If there is anything to this claim it surely has long been disregarded in decisions of this Court, participated in by judges especially sensitive to the application of the historic safeguard of double jeopardy. In applying a provision like that of double jeopardy, which is rooted in history and is not an evolving concept like that of due process, a long course of adjudication in this Court carries impressive authority. Certainly if punishment for each of separate offenses as those for which the petitioner here has been sentenced, and not merely different descriptions of the same offense, is constitutionally beyond the power of Congress to impose, not only Blockburger but at least the following cases would also have to be overruled: Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365; Morgan v. Devine, 237 U. S. 632; Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1; Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781; United States v. Michener, 331 U. S. 789; Pereira v. United States, 347 U. S. 1.
Suppose Congress, instead of enacting the three provisions before us, had passed an enactment substantially in this form: “Anyone who sells drugs except from the original stamped package and who sells such drugs not in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom the drug is sold, and who does so by way of facilitating the concealment and sale of drugs knowing the same to have been unlawfully imported, shall be sentenced to not less than fifteen years’ imprisonment: Provided, however, That if he makes such sale in pursuance of a written order of the person to whom the drug is sold he shall be sentenced to only ten years’ imprisonment: Provided further, That if he sells such drugs in the original stamped package he shall also be sentenced to only ten years’ imprisonment: And provided further, That if he sells such drugs in pursuance of a written order and from a stamped package, he shall be sentenced to only five years’ imprisonment.” Is it conceivable that such a statute would not be within the power of Congress? And is it rational to find such a statute constitutional but to strike down the Blockburger doctrine as violative of the double jeopardy clause?
In effect, we are asked to enter the domain of penology, and more particularly that tantalizing aspect of it, the proper apportionment of punishment. Whatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment, whether one believes in its efficacy or its futility, see Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law: The Movement for Reform, 1750-1833, passim, these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy. Equally so are the much mooted problems relating to the power of the judiciary to review sentences. First the English and then the Scottish Courts of Criminal Appeal were given power to revise sentences, the power to increase as well as the power to reduce them. See 7 Edw. VII, c. 23, § 4 (3); 16 & 17 Geo. V, c. 15, § 2 (4). This Court has no such power.
Affirmed.
35 Stat. 614, as amended. This provision was subsequently amended, 70 Stat. 570, 21 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 174.
For typical expressions of the attitudes of these members of the Court, see, e. g., Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U. S. 135, 139 (dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J.); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 476 (same); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 471, 485 (dissenting opinions of Brandeis and Butler, JJ.); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U. S. 435, 453 (separate opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Brandeis, J.); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 123 (dissenting opinion of Roberts, J., joined by Brandeis and Butler, JJ.); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 329 (dissent of Butler, J.).
This statute, amendatory of the 1914 Act, supra, introduced the “original stamped package” concept.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under § 7-43 (d) of the Illinois Election Code, a person is prohibited from voting in the primary election of a political party if he has voted in the primary of any other party within the preceding 23 months. Appellee, Harriet G. Pontikes, is a qualified Chicago voter who voted in a Republican primary in February 1971; she wanted to vote in a March 1972 Democratic primary, but was barred from doing so by this 23-month rule. She filed a complaint for declaratory and in-junctive relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that § 7-43 (d) unconstitutionally abridged her freedom to associate with the political party of her choice by depriving her of the opportunity to vote in the Democratic primary. A statutory three-judge court was convened, and held, one judge dissenting, that the 23-month rule is unconstitutional. 345 F. Supp. 1104. We noted probable jurisdiction of this appeal from that judgment. 411 U. S. 915.
I
At the outset, we are met by the appellants’ argument that the District Court should have abstained from adjudicating the constitutionality of the 23-month rule. They base this argument upon that portion of § 7-43 (d) which provides that:
“ [Participation by a primary elector in a primary of a political party which, under the provisions of Section 7-2 of this Article, is a political party within a city, village or incorporated town or town only and entitled hereunder to make nominations of candidates for city, village or incorporated town or town offices only, and for no other office or offices, shall not disqualify such primary elector from participating in other primaries of his party . . . Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 46, § 7-43 (d).
The appellants note that the February 1971 Republican primary election in which Mrs. Pontikes voted involved only nominations for the offices of mayor, city clerk, and city treasurer of the city of Chicago. They claim that the state courts might interpret this 1971 primary to have been one of a “political party within a city . . . only,” and thus outside the purview of the 23-month rule.
As we stated in Lake Carriers’ Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U. S. 498, 509:
“Abstention is a ‘judge-made doctrine . . . , first fashioned in 1941 in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, [that] sanctions . . . escape [from immediate decision] only in narrowly limited “special circumstances,” Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 492,' Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 248 (1967), justifying ‘the delay and expense to which application of the abstention doctrine inevitably gives rise.' England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411, 418 (1964).”
The paradigm of the “special circumstances” that make abstention appropriate is a case where the challenged state statute is susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary that would avoid or modify the necessity of reaching a federal constitutional question. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 249; Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167, 176-177. Abstention in such circumstances not only serves to minimize federal-state friction, but also avoids premature and perhaps unnecessary constitutional adjudication. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U. S. 528, 534. But the doctrine of abstention “contemplates that deference to state court adjudication only be made where the issue of state law is uncertain.” Ibid. Where, on the other hand, it cannot be fairly concluded that the underlying state statute is susceptible of an interpretation that might avoid the necessity for constitutional adjudication, abstention would amount to shirking the solemn responsibility of the federal courts to “guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States,” Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 637.
We think that the Illinois statute involved in this case is not fairly susceptible of a reading that would avoid the necessity of constitutional adjudication. The appellants’ argument — that the February 1971 Chicago Republican primary might be considered that of a “political party within a city . . . only” — is foreclosed by the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Faherty v. Board of Election Comm’rs, 5 Ill. 2d 519, 126 N. E. 2d 235. That decision made it clear that the kind of “local” primaries that are outside the scope of § 7-43 (d) are simply those of “ 'purely city . . . political part[ies]’ ”— those parties entitled, under § 7-2 of the Illinois Election Code, to make nominations for city offices only. Id., at 524, 126 N. E. 2d, at 238.
Since both the Democratic and Republican parties are, of course, entitled in Illinois to make nominations not only for city offices, but for congressional, state, and county offices as well, the Faherty court held that they were not within the statutory definition of “city” parties. It follows then, that despite the fact that the February 1971 Republican primary in which the appellee voted involved only nominations for offices within the city of Chicago, Mrs. Pontikes was still clearly barred by the 23-month rule from voting in the March 1972 Democratic primary. The District Court was thus wholly justified in declining to abstain from deciding the constitutional validity of the 23-month rule, and it is to that issue that we now turn.
II
There can no longer be any doubt that freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form of “orderly group activity” protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 430; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 522-523; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460-461. The right to associate with the political party of one’s choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 30. Cf. United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258.
To be sure, administration of the electoral process is a matter that the Constitution largely entrusts to the States. But, in exercising their powers of supervision over elections and in setting qualifications for voters, the States may not infringe upon basic constitutional protections. See, e. g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330; Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U. S. 621; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U. S. 89. As the Court made clear in Williams v. Rhodes, supra, unduly restrictive state election laws may so impinge upon freedom of association as to run afoul of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 393 U. S., at 30. And see id., at 35—41 (Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 41-48 (Harlan, J., concurring).
There can be little doubt that § 7-43 (d) substantially restricts an Illinois voter’s freedom to change his political party affiliation. One who wishes to change his party registration must wait almost two years before his choice will be given effect. Moreover, he is forced to forgo participation in any primary elections occurring within the statutory 23-month hiatus. The effect of the Illinois statute is thus to “lock” the voter into his pre-existing party affiliation for a substantial period of time following participation in any primary election, and each succeeding primary vote extends this period of confinement.
The 23-month rule does not, of course, deprive those in the appellee’s position of all opportunities to associate with the political party of their choice. But neither did the state attempts to compel disclosure of NAACP membership lists in Bates v. Little Rock and NAACP v. Alabama work a total restriction upon the freedom of the organization’s members to associate with each other. Rather, the Court found in those cases that the statutes under attack constituted a “substantial restraint” and a “significant interference” with the exercise of the constitutionally protected right of free association.
The same is true of §7-43(d). While the Illinois statute did not absolutely preclude Mrs. Pontikes from associating with the Democratic party, it did absolutely preclude her from voting in that party’s 1972 primary election. Under our political system, a basic function of a political party is to select the candidates for public office to be offered to the voters at general elections. A prime objective of most voters in associating themselves with a particular party must surely be to gain a voice in that selection process. By preventing the appellee-from participating at all in Democratic primary elections during the statutory period, the Illinois statute deprived her of any voice in choosing the party’s candidates, and thus substantially abridged her ability to associate effectively with the party of her choice.
HH f-H J — H
As our past decisions have made clear, a significant encroachment upon associational freedom cannot be justified upon a mere showing of a legitimate state interest. Bates v. Little Rock, supra, at 524; NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 463. For even when pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S., at 343. “Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S., at 438. If the State has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme' that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal liberties. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488.
The appellants here urge that the 23-month rule serves, the purpose of preventing “raiding” — the practice whereby voters in sympathy with one party vote in another’s primary in order to distort that primary’s results. It is said that our decision in Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, recognized the state interest in inhibiting “raiding,” and upheld the constitutional validity of legislation restricting a voter’s freedom to change parties, enacted as a means of serving that interest.
It is true, of course, that the Court found no constitutional infirmity in the New York delayed-enrollment statute under review in Rosario. That law required a voter to enroll in the party of his choice at least 30 days before a general election in order to be eligible to vote in the next party primary, and thus prevented a change in party affiliation during the approximately 11 months between the deadline and the primary election. It is also true that the Court recognized in Rosario that a State may have a legitimate interest in seeking to curtail “raiding,” since that practice may affect the integrity of the electoral process. Id., at 761. But it does not follow from Rosario that the Illinois statutory procedures also pass muster under the Fourteenth Amendment, for the Illinois Election Code differs from the New York delayed-enrollment law in a number of important respects.
The New York statute at issue in Rosario did not prevent voters from participating in the party primary of their choice; it merely imposed a time limit on enrollment. Under the New York law, a person who wanted to vote in a different party primary every year was not precluded from doing so; he had only to meet the requirement of declaring his party allegiance 30 days before the preceding general election. The New York law did not have the consequence of “locking” a voter into an unwanted party affiliation from one election to the next; any such confinement was merely the result of the elector's voluntary failure to take timely measures to enroll. Id., at 757-759. The Court therefore concluded that the New York delayed-enrollment law did not prevent voters “from associating with the political party of their choice.” Id., at 762. And see id., at 758 and n. 8.
The basic difference in the Illinois law is obvious. Since the appellee here voted in the 1971 Republican primary, the state law absolutely precluded her from participating in the 1972 Democratic primary. Unlike the petitioners in Rosario, whose disenfranchisement was caused by their own failure to take timely measures to enroll, there was no action that Mrs. Pontikes could have taken to make herself eligible to vote in the 1972 Democratic primary. The Illinois law, unlike that of New York, thus “locks” voters into a pre-existing party affiliation from one primary to the next, and the only way to break the “lock” is to forgo voting in any primary for a period of almost two years.
In other words, while the Court held in Rosario that the New York delayed-enrollment scheme did not. prevent voters from exercising their constitutional freedom to associate with the political party of their choice, the Illinois 23-month rule clearly does just that. It follows that the legitimate interest of Illinois in preventing “raiding” cannot justify the device it has chosen to effect its goal. For that device conspicuously infringes upon basic constitutional liberty. Far from supporting the validity of the Illinois legislation, the Court’s decision in Rosario suggests that the asserted state interest can be attained by “less drastic means,” which do not unnecessarily burden the exercise of constitutionally protected activity.
We conclude, therefore, that § 7-43 (d) of the Illinois Election Code unconstitutionally infringes upon the right of free political association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment of the District Court is accordingly
Affirmed.
The Chief Justice concurs in the result.
Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 46, § 7-43 provides, in pertinent part:
“No person shall be entitled to vote at a primary:
“(d) If he has voted at a primary held under this Article 7 of another political party within a period of 23 calendar months next preceding the calendar month in which such primary is held: Provided, participation by a primary elector in a primary of a political party which, under the provisions of Section 7-2 of this Article, is a political party within a city, village or incorporated town or town only and entitled hereunder to make nominations of candidates for city, village or incorporated town or town offices only, and for no other office or offices, shall not disqualify such primary elector from participating in other primaries of his party: And, provided, that no qualified voter shall be precluded from participating in the primary of any purely city, village or incorporated town or town political party under the provisions of Section 7-2 of this Article by reason of such voter having voted at the primary of another political party within a period of 23 calendar months next preceding the calendar month in which he seeks to participate is held.”
The Republican primary in which the appellee voted involved nominations for the offices of mayor, city clerk, and city treasurer of Chicago.
The March 1972 Democratic primary involved, inter alia, nominations for Governor, United States Senator, United States Representative, state legislators, county officers, and delegates to the National Convention of the Democratic Party.
28 U. S. C. §§2281, 2284.
The District Court upheld the constitutional validity of Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 46, §§ 7-43 (a) and 7-44, which require a declaration of party affiliation as a prerequisite to voting in a primary election. This holding, which was unanimous, has not been appealed.
This case was consolidated in the District Court with a similar action brought by two other voters against the county clerk of Lake County, Illinois. The defendant in that case has not appealed from the District Court’s judgment.
The appellants in this case are members of the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, who are responsible for administering the provisions of the Illinois Election Code within the city. See Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 46, § 6-21 et seq.
Bracketed material in original.
Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 46, § 7-2 defines the term “political party” under Illinois law, and states the offices for which various types of political parties are entitled to make nominations. Under § 7-2, a party that garners more than 5% of the entire vote cast at a statewide general election is defined as a “political party within the State,” and is entitled to make nominations for all state and county offices in the next succeeding primary. Similarly, a party that polls more than 5% of the entire vote cast at a municipal general election is defined as a “political party within . . . [a] city,” and is entitled to make nominations for city elective positions at the next succeeding primary.
Under § 7-43 (d), a “political party within a city . . . only” is one that has qualified under §7-2 to make only city nominations; in other words, a party that has polled more than 5% of the vote at the preceding municipal general election, but less than 5% of the vote at the preceding statewide general election. Obviously, the Republican party, in whose 1971 Chicago primary the appellee voted, does not fit within this description.
It is true, as the appellants argue, that the plaintiff in Faherty v. Board of Election Comm’rs, 5 Ill. 2d 519, 126 N. E. 2d 235, wished to vote in a Chicago Democratic primary after having voted, within the past year, in a statewide Republican primary; thus, the factual setting in Faherty was precisely the converse of that here. This, however, is a distinction without a difference. The holding of Faherty was that Republican and Democratic primaries, even those involving only citywide offices, were not primaries of political parties “within a city . . . only.” See n. 9, supra. Thus, these primaries are fully within the purview of the § 7-43 (d) 23-month rule.
See Art. I, §2; Art. II, §1. With respect to elections to federal office, however, the Court has held that Congress has power to establish voter qualifications. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 462.
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523.
N. Y. Election Law § 186.
New York presidential primaries are held in June; thus, in presidential election years, the cutoff date prescribed by § 186 occurs about eight months before the primary. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752, 760.
She could, of course, have made herself eligible to vote in the 1972 Democratic primary by forgoing participation in the 1971 Republican primary. But such a course would have prevented her from associating with the party of her choice in 1971, and thus in no way would have obviated the constitutional deficiencies inherent in the Illinois law.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the tolling rule first stated in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974). The Court held in American Pipe that the timely filing of a class action tolls the applicable statute of limitations for all persons encompassed by the class complaint. Where class-action status has been denied, the Court further ruled, members of the failed class could timely intervene as individual plaintiffs in the still-pending action, shorn of its class character. See id., at 544, 552-553, 94 S.Ct. 756. Later, in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983), the Court clarified American Pipe's tolling rule: The rule is not dependent on intervening in or joining an existing suit; it applies as well to putative class members who, after denial of class certification, "prefer to bring an individual suit rather than intervene... once the economies of a class action [are] no longer available." 462 U.S., at 350, 353-354, 103 S.Ct. 2392 ; see California Public Employees' Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc., 582 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 2042, 2053, 198 L.Ed.2d 584 (2017) (American Pipe "permitt[ed] a class action to splinter into individual suits"); Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 313-314, n. 10, 131 S.Ct. 2368, 180 L.Ed.2d 341 (2011) (under American Pipe tolling rule, "a putative member of an uncertified class may wait until after the court rules on the certification motion to file an individual claim or move to intervene in the [existing] suit").
The question presented in the case now before us: Upon denial of class certification, may a putative class member, in lieu of promptly joining an existing suit or promptly filing an individual action, commence a class action anew beyond the time allowed by the applicable statute of limitations? Our answer is no. American Pipe tolls the statute of limitations during the pendency of a putative class action, allowing unnamed class members to join the action individually or file individual claims if the class fails. But American Pipe does not permit the maintenance of a follow-on class action past expiration of the statute of limitations.
I
The instant suit is the third class action brought on behalf of purchasers of petitioner China Agritech's common stock, alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. In short, the successive complaints each make materially identical allegations that China Agritech engaged in fraud and misleading business practices, causing the company's stock price to plummet when several reports brought the misconduct to light. See App. 60-100 (Resh complaint), 205-235 (Smyth complaint), 133-156 (Dean complaint). The Exchange Act has a two-year statute of limitations that begins to run upon discovery of the facts constituting the violation. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b). The Act also has a five-year statute of repose. Ibid. The parties agree that the accrual date for purposes of the two-year limitation period is February 3, 2011, and for the five-year repose period, November 12, 2009. Brief for Respondents 8, n. 3.
Theodore Dean, a China Agritech shareholder, filed the first class-action complaint on February 11, 2011, at the start of the two-year limitation period. As required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 109 Stat. 737, Dean's counsel posted notice of the action in two "widely circulated national business-oriented publication[s]," 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i), and invited any member of the purported class to move to serve as lead plaintiff. App. 274-280. Six shareholders responded to the notice, seeking to be named lead plaintiffs; other shareholders who had filed their own class complaints dismissed them in view of the Dean action. On May 3, 2012, after several months of discovery and deferral of a lead-plaintiff ruling, the District Court denied class certification. The plaintiffs, the District Court determined, had failed to establish that China Agritech stock traded on an efficient market-a necessity for proving reliance on a classwide basis. App. 192. Dean's counsel then published a notice informing shareholders of the certification denial and advising: "You must act yourself to protect your rights. You may protect your rights by joining in the current Action as a plaintiff or by filing your own action against China Agritech." Id., at 281-282. The Dean action settled in September 2012, occasioning dismissal of the suit. See 857 F.3d 994, 998 (C.A.9 2017).
On October 4, 2012-within the two-year statute of limitations-Dean's counsel filed a new complaint (Smyth ) with a new set of plaintiffs and new efficient-market evidence. Eight shareholders responded to the PSLRA notice, seeking lead-plaintiff appointment. The District Court again denied class certification, this time on typicality and adequacy grounds. See App. 254. Thereafter, the Smyth plaintiffs settled their individual claims with the defendants and voluntarily dismissed their suit. Because the Smyth litigation was timely commenced, putative class members who promptly initiated individual suits in the wake of the class-action denial would have encountered no statute of limitations bar.
Respondent Michael Resh, who had not sought lead-plaintiff status in either the Dean or Smyth proceedings and was represented by counsel who had not appeared in the earlier actions, filed the present suit on June 30, 2014, styling it a class action-a year and a half after the statute of limitations expired. The other respondents moved to intervene, seeking designation as lead plaintiffs; together with Resh, they filed an amended complaint. The District Court dismissed the class complaint as untimely, holding that the Dean and Smyth actions did not toll the time to initiate class claims. App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed: "[P]ermitting future class action named plaintiffs, who were unnamed class members in previously uncertified classes, to avail themselves of American Pipe tolling," the court reasoned, "would advance the policy objectives that led the Supreme Court to permit tolling in the first place." 857 F.3d, at 1004. Applying American Pipe tolling to successive class actions, the Ninth Circuit added, would cause no unfair surprise to defendants and would promote economy of litigation by reducing incentives for filing protective class suits during the pendency of an initial certification motion. 857 F.3d, at 1004.
We granted certiorari, 583 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 543, 199 L.Ed.2d 423 (2017), in view of a division of authority among the Courts of Appeals over whether otherwise-untimely successive class claims may be salvaged by American Pipe tolling. Compare the instant case and Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 637, 652-653 (C.A.6 2015) (applying American Pipe tolling to successive class action), with, e.g., Basch v. Ground Round, Inc., 139 F.3d 6, 11 (C.A.1 1998) ("Plaintiffs may not stack one class action on top of another and continue to toll the statute of limitations indefinitely."); Griffin v. Singletary, 17 F.3d 356, 359 (C.A.11 1994) (similar); Korwek v. Hunt, 827 F.2d 874, 879 (C.A.2 1987) (American Pipe does not apply to successive class suits); Salazar-Calderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers Assn., 765 F.2d 1334, 1351 (C.A.5 1985) ("Plaintiffs have no authority for their contention that putative class members may piggyback one class action onto another and thus toll the statute of limitations indefinitely, nor have we found any."). See also Yang v. Odom, 392 F.3d 97, 112 (C.A.3 2004) (American Pipe tolling does not apply to successive class actions where certification was previously denied due to a class defect, but does apply when certification was denied based on the putative representative's deficiencies).
II
A
American Pipe established that "the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the statute [of limitations] for all purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action status." 414 U.S., at 553, 94 S.Ct. 756. "A contrary rule," the Court reasoned in American Pipe, "would deprive [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 23 class actions of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose of the procedure." Ibid. This is so, the Court explained, because without tolling, "[p]otential class members would be induced to file protective motions to intervene or to join in the event that a class was later found unsuitable." Ibid. In Crown, Cork, the Court further elaborated: Failure to extend the American Pipe rule "to class members filing separate actions," in addition to those who move to intervene, would result in "a needless multiplicity of actions" filed by class members preserving their individual claims-"precisely the situation that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the tolling rule of American Pipe were designed to avoid." 462 U.S., at 351, 103 S.Ct. 2392.
American Pipe and Crown, Cork addressed only putative class members who wish to sue individually after a class-certification denial. See, e.g., American Pipe, 414 U.S., at 552, 94 S.Ct. 756 (addressing "privilege of intervening in an individual suit"); Crown, Cork, 462 U.S., at 349, 103 S.Ct. 2392 (applying American Pipe to those who "file individual actions"); 462 U.S., at 352, 103 S.Ct. 2392 (tolling benefits "class members who choose to file separate suits").
What about a putative class representative, like Resh, who brings his claims as a new class action after the statute of limitations has expired? Neither decision so much as hints that tolling extends to otherwise time-barred class claims. We hold that American Pipe does not permit a plaintiff who waits out the statute of limitations to piggyback on an earlier, timely filed class action. The "efficiency and economy of litigation" that support tolling of individual claims, American Pipe, 414 U.S., at 553, 94 S.Ct. 756 do not support maintenance of untimely successive class actions; any additional class filings should be made early on, soon after the commencement of the first action seeking class certification.
American Pipe tolls the limitation period for individual claims because economy of litigation favors delaying those claims until after a class-certification denial. If certification is granted, the claims will proceed as a class and there would be no need for the assertion of any claim individually.
If certification is denied, only then would it be necessary to pursue claims individually.
With class claims, on the other hand, efficiency favors early assertion of competing class representative claims. If class treatment is appropriate, and all would-be representatives have come forward, the district court can select the best plaintiff with knowledge of the full array of potential class representatives and class counsel. And if the class mechanism is not a viable option for the claims, the decision denying certification will be made at the outset of the case, litigated once for all would-be class representatives.
Rule 23 evinces a preference for preclusion of untimely successive class actions by instructing that class certification should be resolved early on. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(c)(1)(A). Indeed, Rule 23(c) was amended in 2003 to permit district courts to take account of multiple class-representative filings. Before the amendment, Rule 23(c) encouraged district courts to issue certification rulings "as soon as practicable." The amendment changed the recommended timing target to "an early practicable time." The alteration was made to allow greater leeway, more time for class discovery, and additional time to "explore designation of class counsel" and consider "additional [class counsel] applications rather than deny class certification," thus "afford[ing] the best possible representation for the class." Advisory Committee's 2003 Note on subds. (c)(1)(A) and (g)(2)(A) of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U.S.C. App., pp. 815, 818; see Willging & Lee, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation after Ortiz, 58 U. Kan. L. Rev. 775, 785 (2010) (2003 amendments "raised the standard for certifying a class from an early, conditional ruling to a later, relatively final decision" and "expand[ed] the opportunity for parties to engage in discovery prior to moving for class certification").
The PSLRA, which governs this litigation, evinces a similar preference, this time embodied in legislation, for grouping class-representative filings at the outset of litigation. See supra, at 1804 - 1805. When the Dean and Smyth timely commenced actions were first filed, counsel put any shareholder who might wish to serve as lead plaintiff on notice of the action. Several heeded the call-six in Dean and eight in Smyth. See 857 F.3d, at 997-998. The PSLRA, by requiring notice of the commencement of a class action, aims to draw all potential lead plaintiffs into the suit so that the district court will have the full roster of contenders before deciding which contender to appoint. See Brief for Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association as Amicus Curiae 12-13 (PSLRA "seeks to achieve Congress['] goal of curbing duplicative... litigation by encouraging all interested parties to apply to serve as lead plaintiff at the early stages of the case [and] providing for the consolidation of similar class actions"). With notice and the opportunity to participate in the first (and second) round of class litigation, there is little reason to allow plaintiffs who passed up those opportunities to enter the fray several years after class proceedings first commenced.
Ordinarily, to benefit from equitable tolling, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have been diligent in pursuit of their claims. See, e.g., McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 391, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 185 L.Ed.2d 1019 (2013) ; Menominee Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 750, 755-756, 193 L.Ed.2d 652 (2016). Even American Pipe, which did not analyze "criteria of the formal doctrine of equitable tolling in any direct manner," ANZ, 582 U.S., at ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct., at 2052, observed that tolling was permissible in the circumstances because plaintiffs who later intervened to pursue individual claims had not slept on their rights, American Pipe, 414 U.S., at 554-555, 94 S.Ct. 756. Those plaintiffs reasonably relied on the class representative, who sued timely, to protect their interests in their individual claims. See Crown, Cork, 462 U.S., at 350, 103 S.Ct. 2392. A would-be class representative who commences suit after expiration of the limitation period, however, can hardly qualify as diligent in asserting claims and pursuing relief. Her interest in representing the class as lead plaintiff, therefore, would not be preserved by the prior plaintiff's timely filed class suit.
Respondents' proposed reading would allow the statute of limitations to be extended time and again; as each class is denied certification, a new named plaintiff could file a class complaint that resuscitates the litigation. See Yang, 392 F.3d, at 113 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (tolling for successive class actions could allow "lawyers seeking to represent a plaintiff class [to] extend the statute of limitations almost indefinitely until they find a district court judge who is willing to certify the class"); Ewing Industries Corp. v. Bob Wines Nursery, Inc., 795 F.3d 1324, 1326 (C.A.11 2015) (tolling for successive class actions allows plaintiffs "limitless bites at the apple"). This prospect points up a further distinction between the individual-claim tolling established by American Pipe and tolling for successive class actions. The time to file individual actions once a class action ends is finite, extended only by the time the class suit was pending; the time for filing successive class suits, if tolling were allowed, could be limitless. Respondents' claims happen to be governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2)'s five-year statute of repose, so the time to file complaints has a finite end. Statutes of repose, however, are not ubiquitous. See Dekalb County Pension Fund v. Transocean Ltd., 817 F.3d 393, 397 (C.A.2 2016). Most statutory schemes provide for a single limitation period without any outer limit to safeguard against serial relitigation. Endless tolling of a statute of limitations is not a result envisioned by American Pipe.
B
Respondents emphasize that in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 130 S.Ct. 1431, 176 L.Ed.2d 311 (2010), we said that "a class action may be maintained," id., at 398, 130 S.Ct. 1431 (internal quotation marks omitted), if the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) are satisfied, and " Rule 23automatically applies in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts," id., at 400, 130 S.Ct. 1431 (internal quotation marks omitted). See Brief for Respondents 21-23. If Resh's suit meets the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), respondents assert, there is no reason why Resh's suit cannot proceed as a class action. Shady Grove does not call for that outcome. In Shady Grove, the Court held that a federal diversity action could proceed under Rule 23 despite a state law prohibiting class treatment of suits seeking damages of the kind asserted in the Shady Grove complaint. 559 U.S., at 396, 416, 130 S.Ct. 1431. Our opinion in Shady Grove addressed a case in which a Rule 23 class action could have been maintained absent a contrary state-law command. Id., at 396, 130 S.Ct. 1431. Resh's case presents the reverse situation: The class action would be untimely unless saved by American Pipe's equitable-tolling exception to statutes of limitations. Rule 23 itself does not address timeliness of claims or tolling and nothing in the Rule calls for the revival of class claims if individual claims are tolled. In fact, as already explained, Rule 23 prescribes the opposite result. See supra, at 1806 - 1807.
Today's clarification of American Pipe's reach does not run afoul of the Rules Enabling Act by causing a plaintiff's attempted recourse to Rule 23 to abridge or modify a substantive right. See Brief for Respondents 23-26 (citing Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1036, 194 L.Ed.2d 124 (2016) ). Plaintiffs have no substantive right to bring their claims outside the statute of limitations. That they may do so, in limited circumstances, is due to a judicially crafted tolling rule that itself does not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. American Pipe, 414 U.S., at 558, 94 S.Ct. 756. Without American Pipe, respondents would have no peg to seek tolling here; as we have explained, however, American Pipe does not provide for the extension of the statute of limitations sought by Resh for institution of an untimely third class suit.
Respondents urge that American Pipe's logic in fact supports their position because declining to toll the limitation period for successive class suits will lead to a "needless multiplicity" of protective class-action filings. Brief for Respondents 32-34. See also post, at 1814 - 1815 (expressing concern about duplicative and dueling class actions). But there is little reason to think that protective class filings will substantially increase. Several Courts of Appeals have already declined to read American Pipe to permit a successive class action filed outside the limitation period. See supra, at 1805 - 1806; 3 W. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 9:64, n. 5 (5th ed. 2012). These courts include the Second and Fifth Circuits (no strangers to class-action practice); both courts declined to entertain out-of-time class actions in the 1980's. See Korwek, 827 F.2d 874 (C.A.2 1987) ; Salazar-Calderon, 765 F.2d 1334 (C.A.5 1985). Respondents and their amici make no showing that these Circuits have experienced a disproportionate number of duplicative, protective class-action filings.
Amicus National Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems cites examples of protective filings responding to courts' disallowance of American Pipe tolling for statutes of repose, but those examples in fact suggest that protective class filings are uncommon. See Brief of the National Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems as Amicus Curiae 7-8. Between dozens and hundreds of class plaintiffs filed protective individual claims while class-certification motions were pending in securities cases and the statute of repose was about to run out, placing a permanent bar against their claims. Ibid. But none of the plaintiffs appears to have filed a protective class action-even though, if the statute of repose expired and the pending class-certification motions were denied, there would be no further opportunity to assert class claims.
Nor do the incentives of class-action practice suggest that many more plaintiffs will file protective class claims as a result of our holding. Any plaintiff whose individual claim is worth litigating on its own rests secure in the knowledge that she can avail herself of American Pipe tolling if certification is denied to a first putative class. The plaintiff who seeks to preserve the ability to lead the class-whether because her claim is too small to make an individual suit worthwhile or because of an attendant financial benefit -has every reason to file a class action early, and little reason to wait in the wings, giving another plaintiff first shot at representation.
In any event, as previously explained, see supra, at 1806 - 1807, a multiplicity of class-action filings is not necessarily "needless." Indeed, multiple filings may aid a district court in determining, early on, whether class treatment is warranted, and if so, which of the contenders would be the best representative. And sooner rather than later filings are just what Rule 23 encourages. See ibid. Multiple timely filings might not line up neatly; they could be filed in different districts, at different times-perhaps when briefing on class certification has already begun-or on behalf of only partially overlapping classes. See Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 461, 464-465 (2000) (describing variety of "dueling" class filings). But district courts have ample tools at their disposal to manage the suits, including the ability to stay, consolidate, or transfer proceedings. District courts are increasingly familiar with overseeing such complex cases, given the surge in multidistrict litigation. See Cabraser & Issacharoff, The Participatory Class Action, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 846, 850-851 (2017) (multidistrict litigation frequently combines individual suits and multiple putative class actions). The Federal Rules provide a range of mechanisms to aid courts in this endeavor. What the Rules do not offer is a reason to permit plaintiffs to exhume failed class actions by filing new, untimely class claims.
* * *
The watchwords of American Pipe are efficiency and economy of litigation, a principal purpose of Rule 23 as well. Extending American Pipe tolling to successive class actions does not serve that purpose. The contrary rule, allowing no tolling for out-of-time class actions, will propel putative class representatives to file suit well within the limitation period and seek certification promptly. For all the above-stated reasons, it is the rule we adopt today: Time to file a class action falls outside the bounds of American Pipe.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice SOTOMAYOR, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that in cases governed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4, like this one, a plaintiff who seeks to bring a successive class action may not rely on the tolling rule established by American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974). I cannot, however, join the majority in going further by holding that the same is true for class actions not subject to the PSLRA.
I
A
To understand why the PSLRA is essential to the conclusion the Court reaches here, recall that this case involves a putative class-action lawsuit brought by a plaintiff with a timely individual claim, joined by coplaintiffs with timely individual claims, on behalf of a putative class of absent class members with timely individual claims. See ante, at 1805. One might naturally think, then, that the class claims in the lawsuit are timely. The majority, however, concludes that the named plaintiffs' and putative class members' class claims are time barred.
At first blush, this result might seem surprising, for the Court has rejected the idea that class claims are categorically different from individual claims. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398, 130 S.Ct. 1431, 176 L.Ed.2d 311 (2010). Although it did not hold that class claims may never be treated differently from individual claims, Shady Grove indicates that there must be a special reason for doing so.
Here, the PSLRA supplies that special reason. The PSLRA imposes significant procedural requirements on securities class actions that do not apply to individual or traditionally joined securities claims. See § 78u-4(a)(1).
Foremost among these requirements is a process for the "[a]ppointment of lead plaintiff." § 78u-4(a)(3). Under the PSLRA, the named plaintiff in a putative class action must publish within 20 days of filing the complaint a nationwide notice alerting putative class members to the filing of the suit and informing them that, "not later than 60 days after the date on which the notice is published, any member of the purported class may move the court to serve as lead plaintiff." § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i). The district court then must evaluate all prospective lead plaintiffs and choose the "most adequate" one based on a set of enumerated considerations. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B). The PSLRA thus contemplates a process by which all prospective class representatives come forward in the first-filed class action and make their arguments to the court for lead-plaintiff status. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, p. 32 (1995).
Respondents here bypassed that statutory process. They do not dispute that notice was published in the two earlier-filed putative class actions concerning the same securities claims as here, as required by the PSLRA. Yet they did not seek to be chosen lead plaintiffs in either of those actions. See ante, at 1804 - 1805, 1807. For that reason alone, I agree with the majority that respondents "can hardly qualify as diligent in asserting [class] claims and pursuing relief." Ante, at 1807 - 1808. Respondents' failure to utilize the PSLRA's lead-plaintiff selection procedure distinguishes them from the American Pipe absent class members, who were subject only to the traditional Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class procedure, which is "designed to avoid, rather than encourage, unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions." 414 U.S., at 550, 94 S.Ct. 756.
Unlike the PSLRA, Rule 23 contains no requirement of precertification notice to absent putative class members; it provides only for postcertification notice. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(c)(2). There thus is no mechanism for absent putative class members to learn that a putative class action is pending, much less that they are entitled to seek to displace the named plaintiff in that lawsuit as class representative. Also unlike the PSLRA, Rule 23 contains no process for a district court to choose from among the various candidates for lead plaintiff, nor does it specify what would make a person the most adequate representative of the class. See 7A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1765, p. 321 (3d ed. 2005). In class actions not subject to the PSLRA, the class representative is generally the first person who files the suit, and so is self-selected (subject to an adequacy determination), rather than selected by the court. See Rule 23(a)(4) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if... the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class"); Rule 23(c)(1)(A) ("At an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action"); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 33-35.
The majority points to Rule 23(c)'s requirement that the determination whether to certify a class be made at " 'an early practicable time,' " ante, at 1807, but there is no significance to that requirement with respect to the diligence of would-be class representatives. The Advisory Committee notes accompanying the 2003 amendment to Rule 23(c), which changed the recommended timing for a certification determination from "as soon as practicable" to "at an early practicable time," explained that the change would permit time for "controlled discovery into the'merits,' " efforts by defendants "to win dismissal or summary judgment as to the individual plaintiffs without certification," and the considered "designation of class counsel." Advisory Committee's 2003 Notes on subd. (c)(1)(A) of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U.S.C.App., p. 815. The notes say nothing about lead-plaintiff selection, and Rule 23(c) in no way ensures that potential lead plaintiffs know about the putative class action or about their opportunity to represent the class.
Given these important differences between Rule 23's general class procedures and the specific procedures imposed by the PSLRA, the majority's conclusion that absent class members were not diligent because they failed to ask to be the class representative in a prior suit makes sense only in the PSLRA context. The same conclusion simply does not follow in the generic Rule 23 context, where absent class members are most likely unaware of the existence of a putative class action. Cf. American Pipe, 414 U.S., at 551-552, 94 S.Ct. 756 (explaining that even absent class members who are unaware of the putative class action are entitled to tolling).
B
In addition to its focus on plaintiff diligence, the majority offers a separate line of reasoning to support its broad holding. It explains that its limitation on American Pipe tolling is necessary to prevent a "limitless" series of class actions, each rendered timely by the tolling effect of the previous ones. Ante, at 1808 - 1809. As the majority acknowledges, however, there is no such risk in this case, see ibid., because the applicable statute of repose puts a 5-year "outer limit on the right to bring a civil action." CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2175, 2182, 189 L.Ed.2d 62 (2014). The majority is right, of course, that in many other types of cases, no statute of repose will apply. See ante, at 1808 - 1809. But the Court has elsewhere pointed to the power of "comity among courts to mitigate the sometimes substantial costs of similar litigation brought by different plaintiffs."
Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 317, 131 S.Ct. 2368, 180 L.Ed.2d 341 (2011). There is no reason to assume that this existing safeguard will prove inadequate if the Court holds that American Pipe tolling is available for successive class actions outside the PSLRA context.
Even if principles of comity prove insufficient such that some modification to the American Pipe rule is necessary to prevent indefinite tolling, a narrower form of redress is available. Instead of adopting a blanket no-tolling-of-class-claims-ever rule outside the PSLRA context, the Court might hold, as a matter of equity, that tolling only becomes unavailable for future class claims where class certification is denied for a reason that bears on the suitability of the claims for class treatment. Where, by contrast, class certification is denied because of the deficiencies of the lead plaintiff as class representative, or because of some other nonsubstantive defect, tolling would remain available. See Yang v. Odom, 392 F.3d 97, 112 (C.A.3 2004). This approach would, for instance, ensure that in cases where the only problem with the first suit was the identity of the named plaintiff, a new and more adequate representative could file another suit to represent the class. Preserving the opportunity for such a fix may seem unimportant in a PSLRA case like this one, where the court in the first-filed case will usually have a choice among possible lead plaintiffs. See ante, at 1807 - 1808, n. 3. But, as just explained, in class actions not subject to the PSLRA, the certifying court often will have no choice as to the class representative.
Whether this or another rule ultimately is the right one, there is no need for the Court today to reach beyond the facts of this
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari, 421 U. S. 909 (1975), in this case to consider whether respondent’s charge that petitioners’ defamation of him, standing alone and apart from any other governmental action with respect to him, stated a claim for relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we conclude that it does not.
Petitioner Paul is the Chief of Police of the Louisville, Ky., Division of Police, while petitioner McDaniel occupies the same position in the Jefferson County, Ky., Division of Police. In late 1972 they agreed to combine their efforts for the purpose of alerting local area merchants to possible shoplifters who might be operating during the Christmas season. In early December petitioners distributed to approximately 800 merchants in the Louisville metropolitan area a “flyer,” which began as follows:
“TO: BUSINESS MEN IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA
“The Chiefs of The Jefferson County and City of Louisville Police Departments, in an effort to keep their officers advised on shoplifting activity, have approved the attached alphabetically arranged flyer of subjects known to be active in this criminal field.
“This flyer is being distributed to you, the business man, so that you may inform your security personnel to watch for these subjects. These persons have been arrested during 1971 and 1972 or have been active in various criminal fields in high density shopping areas.
“Only the photograph and name of the subject is shown on this flyer, if additional information is desired, please forward a request in writing . . . .”
The flyer consisted of five pages of “mug shot” photos, arranged alphabetically. Each page was headed: .
“NOVEMBER 1972 CITY OF LOUISVILLE JEFFERSON COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENTS ACTIVE SHOPLIFTERS”
In approximately the center of page 2 there appeared photos and the name of the respondent, Edward Charles Davis III.
Respondent appeared on the flyer because on June 14, 1971, he had been arrested in Louisville on a charge of shoplifting. He had been arraigned on this charge in September 1971, and, upon his plea of not guilty, the charge had been “filed away with leave [to reinstate]/' a disposition which left the charge outstanding. Thus, at the time petitioners caused the flyer to be prepared and circulated respondent had been charged with shoplifting but his guilt or innocence of that offense had never been resolved. Shortly after circulation of the flyer the charge against respondent was finally dismissed by a judge of the Louisville Police Court.
At the time the flyer was circulated respondent was employed as a photographer by the Louisville Courier-Journal and Times. The flyer, and respondent’s inclusion therein, soon came to the attention of respondent’s supervisor, the executive director of photography for the two newspapers. This individual called respondent in to hear his version of the events leading to his appearing in the flyer. Following this discussion, the supervisor informed respondent that although he would not be fired, he “had best not find himself in a similar situation” in the future.
Respondent thereupon brought this § 1983 action in the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, seeking redress for the alleged violation of rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution of the United States. Claiming jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3), respondent sought damages as well as declaratory and in-junctive relief. Petitioners moved to dismiss this complaint. The District Court granted this motion, ruling that “[t]he facts alleged in this case do not establish that plaintiff has been deprived of any right secured to him by the Constitution of the United States.”
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which recognized that, under our decisions, for respondent to establish a claim cognizable under § 1983 he had to show that petitioners had deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States, and that any such deprivation was achieved under color of law. Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 150 (1970). The Court of Appeals concluded that respondent had set forth a § 1983 claim “in that he has alleged facts that constitute a denial of due process of law.” 505 F. 2d 1180, 1182 (1974). In its view our decision in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433 (1971), mandated reversal of the District Court.
I
Respondent’s due process claim is grounded upon his assertion that the flyer, and in particular the phrase “Active Shoplifters” appearing at the head of the page upon which his name and photograph appear, imper-missibly deprived him of some “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. His complaint asserted that the “active shoplifter” designation would inhibit him from entering business establishments for fear of being suspected of shoplifting and possibly apprehended, and would seriously impair his future employment opportunities. Accepting that such consequences may flow from the flyer in question, respondent’s complaint would appear to state a classical claim for defamation actionable in the courts of virtually every State. Imputing criminal behavior to an individual is generally considered defamatory per se, and actionable without proof of special damages.
Respondent brought his action, however, not in the state courts of Kentucky, but in a United States District Court for that State. He asserted not a claim for defamation under the laws of Kentucky, but a claim that he had been deprived of rights secured to him by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Concededly if the same allegations had been made about respondent by a private individual, he would have nothing more than a claim for defamation under state law. But, he contends, since petitioners are respectively an official of city and of county government, his action is thereby transmuted into one for deprivation by the State of rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Greenwood v, Peacock, 384 U. S. 808 (1966), in the course of considering an important and not wholly dissimilar question of the relationship between the National and the State Governments, the Court said that “[i]t is worth contemplating what the result would be if the strained interpretation of § 1443 (1) urged by the individual petitioners were to prevail.” Id., at 832. We, too, pause to consider the result should respondent’s interpretation of § 1983 and of the Fourteenth Amendment be accepted.
If respondent’s view is to prevail, a person arrested by law enforcement officers who announce that they believe such person to be responsible for a particular crime in order to calm the fears of an aroused populace, presumably obtains a claim against such officers under § 1983. And since it is surely far more clear from the language of the Fourteenth Amendment that “life” is protected against state deprivation than it is that reputation is protected against state injury, it would be difficult to see why the survivors of an innocent bystander mistakenly shot by a policeman or negligently killed by a sheriff driving a government vehicle, would not have claims equally cognizable under § 1983.
It is hard to perceive any logical stopping place to such a line of reasoning. Respondent’s construction would seem almost necessarily to result in every legally cognizable injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting under “color of law” establishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We think it would come as a great surprise to those who drafted and shepherded the adoption of that Amendment to learn that it worked such a result, and a study of our decisions convinces us they do not support the construction urged by respondent.
II
The result reached by the Court of Appeals, which respondent seeks to sustain here, must be bottomed on one of two premises. The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 make actionable many wrongs inflicted by government employees which had heretofore been thought to give rise only to state-law tort claims. The second premise is that the infliction by state officials of a “stigma” to one’s reputation is somehow different in kind from the infliction by the same official of harm or injury to other interests protected by state law, so that an injury to reputation is actionable under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment even if other such harms are not. We examine each of these premises in turn.
A
The first premise would be contrary to pronouncements in our cases on more than one occasion, with respect to the scope of § 1983 and of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the leading case of Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945), the Court considered the proper application of the criminal counterpart of § 1983, likewise intended by Congress to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. In his opinion for the Court plurality in that case, Mr. Justice Douglas observed:
“Violation of local law does not necessarily mean that federal rights have been invaded. The fact that a prisoner is assaulted, injured, or even murdered by state officials does ,not necessarily mean that he is deprived of any right protected or secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” 325 U. S., at 108-109.
After recognizing that Congress’ power to make criminal the conduct of state officials under the aegis of the Fourteenth Amendment was not unlimited because that Amendment “did not alter the basic relations between the States and the national government,” the plurality opinion observed that Congress should not be understood to have attempted
“to make all torts of state officials federal crimes. It brought within [the criminal provision] only specified acts done ‘under color’ of law and then only those acts which deprived a person of some right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Id., at 109.
This understanding of the limited effect of the Fourteenth Amendment was not lost in the Court’s decision in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961). There the Court was careful to point out that the complaint stated a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment because it alleged an unreasonable search and seizure violative of the guarantee “contained in the Fourth Amendment [and] made applicable to the States by reason of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id., at 171. Respondent, however, has pointed to no specific constitutional guarantee safeguarding the interest he asserts has been invaded. Rather, he apparently believes that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause should ex proprio vigore extend to him a right to be free of injury wherever the State may be characterized as the tortfeasor. But such a reading would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States. We have noted the “constitutional shoals” that confront any attempt to derive from congressional civil rights statutes a body of general federal tort law, Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U. S. 88, 101-102 (1071); a fortiori, the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause cannot be the source for such law.
B
The second premise upon which the result reached by the Court of Appeals could be rested — that the infliction by state officials of a “stigma” to one’s reputation is somehow different in kind from infliction by a state official of harm to other interests protected by state law — is equally untenable. The words “liberty” and “property” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment do not in terms single out reputation as a candidate for special protection over and above other interests that may be protected by state law. While we have in a number of our prior cases pointed out the frequently drastic effect of the “stigma” which may result from defamation by the government in a variety of contexts, this line of cases does not establish the proposition that reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is either “liberty” or “property” by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause. As we have said, the Court of Appeals, in reaching a contrary conclusion, relied primarily upon Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U. S. 433 (1971). We think the correct import of that decision, however, must be derived from an examination of the precedents upon which it relied, as well as consideration of the other decisions by this Court, before and after Constantineau, which bear upon the relationship between governmental defamation and the guarantees of the Constitution. While not uniform in their treatment of the subject, we think that the weight of our decisions establishes no constitutional doctrine converting every defamation by a public official into a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.
In United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946), the Court held that an Act of Congress which specifically forbade payment of any salary or compensation to three named Government agency employees was an unconstitutional bill of attainder. The three employees had been proscribed because a House of Representatives subcommittee found them guilty of “subversive activity,” and therefore unfit for Government service. The Court, while recognizing that the underlying charges upon which Congress’ action was premised “stigmatized [the employees’] reputation and seriously impaired their chance to earn a living,” id., at 314, also made it clear that “[w]hat is involved here is a congressional proscription of [these employees], prohibiting their ever holding a government job.” Ibid.
Subsequently, in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 (1951), the Court examined the validity of the Attorney General’s designation of certain organizations as “Communist” on a list which he furnished to the Civil Service Commission. There was no majority opinion in the case ; Mr. Justice Burton, who announced the judgment of the Court, wrote an opinion which did not reach the petitioners’ constitutional claim. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who agreed with Mr. Justice Burton that the petitioners had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, noted that “publicly designating an organization as within the proscribed categories of the Loyalty Order does not directly deprive anyone of liberty or property.” Id., at 164. Mr. Justice Douglas, who likewise concluded that petitioners had stated a claim, observed in his separate opinion:
“This is not an instance of name calling by public officials. This is a determination of status — a proceeding to ascertain whether the organization is or is not ‘subversive.’ This determination has consequences that are serious to the condemned organizations. Those consequences flow in part, of course, from public opinion. But they also flow from actions of regulatory agencies that are moving in the wake of the Attorney General’s determination to penalize or police these organizations.” Id., at 175.
Mr. Justice Jackson, who likewise agreed that petitioners had stated a claim, commented:
“I agree that mere designation as subversive deprives the organizations themselves of no legal right or immunity. By it they are not dissolved, subjected to any legal prosecution, punished, penalized, or prohibited from carrying on any of their activities. Their claim of injury is that they cannot attract audiences, enlist members, or obtain contributions as readily as before. These, however, are sanctions applied by public disapproval, not by law.” Id., at 183-184.
He went on to say:
“[T]he real target of all this procedure is the government employee who is a member of, or sympathetic to, one or more accused organizations. He not only may be discharged, but disqualified from employment, upon no other ground than such membership or sympathetic affiliation. ... To be deprived not only of present government employment but of future opportunity for it certainly is no small injury when government employment so dominates the field of opportunity.” Id., at 184H85.
Mr. Justice Reed, writing for himself, The Chief Justice, and Mr. Justice Minton, would have held that petitioners failed to state a claim for relief. In his dissenting opinion, after having stated petitioners’ claim that their listing resulted in a deprivation of liberty or property contrary to the procedure required by the Fifth Amendment, he said:
“The contention can be answered summarily by saying that there is no deprivation of any property or liberty of any listed organization by the Attorney General’s designation. It may be assumed that the listing is hurtful to their prestige, reputation and earning power. It may be such an injury as would entitle organizations to damages in a tort action against persons not protected by privilege. . . . This designation, however, does not prohibit any business of the organizations, subject them to any punishment or deprive them of liberty of speech or other freedom.” Id., at 202.
Thus at least six of the eight Justices who participated in that case viewed any “stigma” imposed by official action of the Attorney General of the United States, divorced from its effect on the legal status of an organization or a person, such as loss of tax exemption or loss of government employment, as an insufficient basis for invoking the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952), the Court again recognized the potential “badge of infamy” which might arise from being branded disloyal by the government. Id., at 191. But it did not hold this sufficient by itself to invoke the procedural due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment; indeed, the Court expressly refused to pass upon the procedural due process claims of petitioners in that case. Id., at 192. The Court noted that petitioners would, as a result of their failure to execute the state loyalty oath, lose their teaching positions at a state university. It held such state action to be arbitrary because of its failure to distinguish between innocent and knowing membership in the associations named in the list prepared by the Attorney General of the United States. Id., at 191. See also Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331, 347 (1955).
A decade after Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, supra, the Court returned to consider further the requirements of procedural due process in this area in the case of Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 (1961). Holding that the discharge of an employee of a Government contractor in the circumstances there presented comported with the due process required by the Fifth Amendment, the Court observed:
“Finally, it is to be noted that this is not a case where government action has operated to bestow a badge of disloyalty or infamy, with an attendant foreclosure from other employment opportunity. See Wieman v. Updegraf, 344 U. S. 183, 190-191; Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 140-141 . . , ” Id., at 898. (Emphasis supplied.)
Two things appear from the line of cases beginning with Lovett. The Court has recognized the serious damage that could be inflicted by branding a government employee as “disloyal," and thereby stigmatizing his good name. But the Court has never held that the mere defamation of an individual, whether by branding him disloyal or otherwise, was sufficient to invoke the guarantees of procedural due process absent an accompanying loss of government employment.
It is noteworthy that in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), and Howard v. Lyons, 360 U. S. 593 (1959), this Court had before it two actions for defamation brought against federal officers. But in neither opinion is there any intimation that any of the parties to those cases, or any of the Members of this Court, had the remotest idea that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment might itself form the basis for a claim for defamation against federal officials.
It was against this backdrop that the Court in 1971 decided Constantineau. There the Court held that a Wisconsin statute authorizing the practice of “posting” was únconstitutional because it failed to provide procedural safeguards of notice and an opportunity to be heard, prior to an individual’s being “posted.” Under the statute “posting” consisted of forbidding in writing the sale or delivery of alcoholic beverages to certain persons who were determined to have become hazards to themselves, to their family, or to the community by reason of their “excessive drinking.” The statute also made it a misdemeanor to sell or give liquor to any person so posted. See 400 U. S., at 434 n. 2.
There is undoubtedly language in Constantineau, which is sufficiently ambiguous to justify the reliance upon it by the Court of Appeals:
“Yet certainly where the state attaches ‘a badge of infamy’ to the citizen, due process comes into play. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 191. ‘[T]he right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.’ Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
“Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.” Id., at 437 (emphasis supplied).
The last paragraph of the quotation could be taken to mean that if a government official defames a person, without more, the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are brought into play. If read that way, it would represent a significant broadening of the holdings of Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952), and Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123 (1951), relied upon by the Constantineau Court in' its analysis in the immediately preceding paragraph. We should not-read this language as significantly broadening those holdings without in any way adverting to the fact if there is any other possible interpretation of Constantineau’s language. We believe there is.
We think that the italicized language in the last sentence quoted, “because of what the government is doing to him,” referred to the fact that the governmental action taken in that case deprived the individual of a right previously held under state law — the right to purchase or obtain liquor in common with the rest of the citizenry. “Posting,” therefore, significantly altered her status as a matter of state law, and it was that alteration of legal status which, combined with the injury resulting from the defamation, justified the invocation of procedural safeguards. The “stigma” resulting from the defamatory character of the posting was doubtless an important factor in evaluating the extent of harm worked by that act, but we do not think that such defamation, standing alone, deprived Constantineau of any “liberty” protected by the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This conclusion is reinforced by our discussion of the subject a little over a year later in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564 (1972). There we noted that “the range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite,” id., at 570, and that with respect to property interests they are
“of course, . . . not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law— rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id., at 577.
While Roth recognized that governmental action defaming an individual in the course of declining to rehire him could entitle the person to notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the defamation, its language is quite inconsistent with any notion that a defamation perpetrated by a government official but unconnected with any refusal to rehire would be actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment:
“The state, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community. . . .
“Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining to re-employ the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.” Id., at 573 (emphasis supplied).
Thus it was not thought sufficient to establish a claim under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment that there simply be defamation by a state official; the defamation had to occur in the course of the termination of employment. Certainly there is no suggestion in Roth to indicate that a hearing would be required each time the State in its capacity as employer might be considered responsible for a statement defaming an employee who continues to be an employee.
This conclusion is quite consistent with our most recent holding in this area, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), that suspension from school based upon charges of misconduct could trigger the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court noted that charges of misconduct could seriously damage the student’s reputation, id., at 574-575, it also took care to point out that Ohio law conferred a right upon all children to attend school, and that the act of the school officials suspending the student there involved resulted in a denial or deprivation of that right.
Ill
It is apparent from our decisions that there exists a variety of interests which are difficult of definition but are nevertheless comprehended within the meaning of either “liberty” or “property” as meant in the Due Process Clause. These interests attain this constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially recognized and protected by state law, and we have repeatedly ruled that the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever the State seeks to remove or significantly alter that protected status. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971), for example, the State by issuing drivers’ licenses recognized in its citizens a right to operate a vehicle on the highways of the State. The Court held that the State could not withdraw this right without giving petitioner due process. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 (1972), the State afforded parolees the right to remain at liberty as long as the conditions of their parole were not violated. Before the State could alter the status of a parolee because of alleged violations of these conditions, we held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process of law required certain procedural safeguards.
In each of these cases, as a result of the state action complained of, a right or status previously recognized by state law was distinctly altered or extinguished. It was this alteration, officially removing the interest from the recognition and protection previously afforded by the State, which we found sufficient to invoke the procedural guarantees contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the interest in reputation alone which respondent seeks to vindicate in this action in federal court is quite different from the “liberty” or “property” recognized in those decisions. Kentucky law does not extend to respondent any legal guarantee of present enjoyment of reputation which has been altered as a result of petitioners’ actions. Rather his interest in reputation is simply one of a number which the State may protect against injury by virtue of its tort law, providing a forum for vindication of those interests by means of damages actions. And any harm or injury to that interest, even where as here inflicted by an officer of the State, does not result in a deprivation of any "liberty” or “property” recognized by state or federal law, nor has it worked any change of respondent’s status as theretofore recognized under the State’s laws. For these reasons we hold that the interest in reputation asserted in this case is neither “liberty” nor “property” guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of law.
Respondent in this case cannot assert denial of any right vouchsafed to him by the State and thereby protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. That being the case, petitioners’ defamatory publications, however seriously they may have harmed respondent’s reputation, did not deprive him of any “liberty” or “property” interests protected by the Due Process Clause.
IV
Respondent’s complaint also alleged a violation of a “right to privacy guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.” The Court of Appeals did not pass upon this claim since it found the allegations of a due process violation sufficient to require reversal of the District Court’s order. As we have agreed with the District Court on the due process issue, we find it necessary to pass upon respondent’s other theory in order to determine whether there is any support for the litigation he seeks to pursue.
While there is no “right of privacy” found in any specific guarantee of the Constitution, the Court has recognized that “zones of privacy” may be created by more specific constitutional guarantees and thereby impose limits upon government power. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 152-153 (1973). Respondent’s case, however, comes within none of these areas. He does not seek to suppress evidence seized in the course of an unreasonable search. See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 8-9 (1968). And our other “right of privacy” cases, while defying categorical description, deal generally with substantive aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Roe the Court pointed out that the personal rights found in this guarantee of personal privacy must be limited to those which are “fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” as described in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937). The activities detailed as being within this definition were ones very different from that for which respondent claims constitutional protection — matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. In these areas it has been held that there are limitations on the States’ power to substantively regulate conduct.
Respondent’s claim is far afield from this line of decisions. He claims constitutional protection against the disclosure of the fact of his arrest on a shoplifting charge. His claim is based, not upon any challenge to the State’s ability to restrict his freedom of action in a sphere contended to be “private,” but instead on a claim that the State may not publicize a record of an official act such as an arrest. None of our substantive privacy decisions hold this or anything like this, and we decline to enlarge them in this manner.
None of respondent’s theories of recovery were based upon rights secured to him by the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners therefore were not liable to him under § 1983. The judgment of the Court of Appeals holding otherwise is Reversed.
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The “and laws” provision of 42 U. S. C. § 1983 is not implicated in this case.
It is not disputed that petitioners’ actions were a part of their official conduct and that this element of a § 1983 cause of action is satisfied here.
If respondent is correct in his. contention that defamation by a state official is actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment, it would of course follow that defamation by a federal official should likewise be actionable under the cognate Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Surely the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no more stringent- requirements upon state officials than does the Fifth upon their federal counterparts. We thus consider this Court’s decisions interpreting either Clause as relevant to our examination of respondent’s claim.
We cannot agree with the suggestion of our Brother BreNNAN, dissenting, -post, at 727, that the actions of these two petitioner law enforcement officers come within the language used by Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 433 (1969). They are not by any conceivable stretch of the imagination, either separately or together, "an agency whose sole or predominant function, without serving any other public interest, is to expose and publicize the names of persons it finds guilty of wrongdoing.” Id., at 438. Indeed, the actions taken by these petitioners in this case fall far short of the more formalized proceedings' of the Commission on Civil Rights established by Congress in 1957, the procedures of which were upheld against constitutional challenge by this Court in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420 (1960). There the Court described the functions of the Commission in this language:
“It does not adjudicate. It does not hold trials or determine anyone’s civil or criminal liability. It does not issue orders. Nor does it indict, punish, or impose any legal sanctions. It does not make determinations depriving anyone of his life, liberty, or property. In short, the Commission does not and cannot take any affirmative action which will affect an individual’s legal rights. The only purpose of its existence is to find facts which may subsequently be used as the basis for legislative or executive action.” Id., at 441 (emphasis supplied).
Addressing itself to the question of whether the Commission’s “proceedings might irreparably harm those being investigated by subjecting them to public opprobrium and scorn, the distinct likelihood of losing their jobs, and the possibility of criminal prosecu-itons,” the Court said that “even if such collateral consequences were to flow from the Commission’s investigations, they would not be the result of any affirmative determinations made by the Commission, and they would not affect the legitimacy of the Commission’s investigative function.” Id., at 443.
There are other interests, of course, protected not by virtue of their recognition by the law of a particular State but because they are guaranteed in one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights which has been “incorporated” into the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1983 makes a deprivation of such rights actionable independently of state law. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961).
Our discussion in Part III is limited to consideration of the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause and is not intended to describe those substantive limitations upon state action which may be encompassed within the concept of “liberty” expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Part IV, infra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title 18 U. S. C. § 924 (c) authorizes the imposition of enhanced penalties on a defendant who uses or carries a firearm while committing a federal felony. The question for decision in these cases is whether that section may be applied to a defendant who uses a firearm in the course of a felony that is proscribed by a statute which itself authorizes enhancement if a dangerous weapon is used. We hold that the sentence received by such a defendant may be enhanced only under the enhancement provision in the statute defining the felony he committed and that § 924 (c) does not apply in such a case.
I
Petitioners Anthony LaRocca, Jr., and Michael Busic were tried together on a multicount indictment charging drug, firearms, and assault offenses flowing from a narcotics conspiracy and an attempt to rob an undercover agent. The evidence showed that in May 1976 the two arranged a drug buy with an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration who was to supply $30,000 in cash. When the agent arrived with the money, LaRocca attempted to rob him at gunpoint. The agent signalled for reinforcements, and as other officers began to close in LaRocca fired several shots at them. No one was hit and the agents succeeded in disarming and arresting LaRocca. Busic was also arrested and the officers seized a gun he was carrying in his belt but had not drawn. Additional weapons were found in the pair's automobile.
A jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania convicted petitioners of narcotics and possession-of-firearms counts, and of two counts of armed assault on federal officers in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 111— LaRocca as the actual triggerman and Busic as an aider and abettor, and thus derivatively a principal under 18 U. S. C. § 2. In addition, LaRocca was convicted of using a firearm in the commission of a federal felony in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924 (c) (1), and Busic was convicted of carrying a firearm in the commission of a federal felony in violation of 18 U. S. C. 1924(c)(2). Each petitioner was sentenced to a total of 30 years, of which 5 resulted from concurrent sentences on the narcotics charges, 5 were a product of concurrent terms on the firearms and assault charges, and 20 were imposed for the § 924 (c) violations.
The defendants appealed, contending, among other things, that they could not be sentenced consecutively for assaulting a federal officer with a dangerous weapon as defined in 18 U. S. C. § 111 and for the use of a firearm in connection with that crime as provided in § 924 (c) . In an opinion announced before Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6 (1978), was decided, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that the imposition in LaRocca’s case of enhanced sentences under both § 924 (c) and § 111 for a single assault with a firearm violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the two statutes required proof of identical elements. 587 F. 2d 577, 583-584 (1978). Accordingly, LaRocca’s case was remanded to the District Court for re-sentencing under either § 111 or § 924 (c), at the Government’s election. Since the § 924 (c) charge against Busic alleged not that he used, a firearm (§ 924 (c)(1)), but rather that he carried one (§ 924 (c)(2)), the Court of Appeals held that no like infirmity invalidated his conviction and sentence. In its view, the § 111 and § 924 (c) charges against him did not require proof of the same elements and hence did not merge because the former could be established merely by showing that Busic had aided and abetted LaRocca’s use of a gun to assault the federal officers, while the latter required proof of the additional fact that Busic had unlawfully carried a gun. 587 F. 2d, at 584.
Following this Court’s decision in Simpson v. United States, supra, the Court of Appeals granted a petition for rehearing and vacated its double jeopardy holding with regard to LaRocca on grounds there was no reason to reach the constitutional question. 587 F. 2d, at 587-589. Thereafter, it proceeded as a matter of statutory construction to arrive at a nearly identical conclusion — namely, that LaRocca’s sentence could not be enhanced under both § 111 and § 924 (c) but that he could be sentenced under either at the Government’s election. The Court of Appeals did not alter its holding with regard to Busic. We granted certiorari, 442 U. S. 916 (1979), and now reverse the enhanced sentences that were imposed on both petitioners under § 924 (c).
II
We turn first to the case of petitioner LaRocca because it poses most directly the key question of legislative intent. Our starting point, like that of the parties, is Simpson, supra. There we considered the relationship between § 924 (c) and the federal bank robbery statute, 18 U. S. C. § 2113, which, like the assault provision at issue here, 18 U. S. C. § 111, predates § 924 (c) and provides by its own terms for enhanced punishment where the felony is committed with a dangerous weapon. Relying upon the legislative history and applicable canons of statutory construction, Simpson held that the Congress cannot be understood to have intended that a defendant who has been convicted of robbing a bank with a firearm may be sentenced under both § 924 (c) and § 2113 (d). The parties to the instant cases agree that Simpson clearly prohibits the imposition on these petitioners of similarly enhanced sentences. under both § 924 (c) and § 111. But the Government contends that Simpson resolved only the double enhancement question — that the Court’s holding and opinion should not be read to find § 924 (c) inapplicable where the prosecution proceeds under that provision rather than the enhancement provision of a predicate felony statute like § 111. Such a reading, the Government asserts, is supported by the facts presented in Simpson, the language used to describe the actual “holding,” the most likely inferences that may be drawn as to what Congress would have wanted had it focussed on the precise problem, and the asserted irrationality of some of the consequences that would flow from a holding that § 924 (c) is inapplicable in cases like the present cases.
We disagree. In our view, Simpson’s language and reasoning support one conclusion alone — that prosecution and enhanced sentencing under § 924 (c) is simply not permissible where the predicate felony statute contains its own enhancement provision. This result is supported not only by the general principles underlying the doctrine of stare decisis— principles particularly apposite in cases of statutory construction — but also by the legislative history and relevant canons of statutory construction. The Government has not persuaded us that this result is irrational or depends upon implausible inferences as to congressional intent. And to the extent that cases can be hypothesized in which this holding may support curious or seemingly unreasonable comparative sentences, it suffices to say that the asserted unreasonableness flows not from Simpson and this decision, but rather from the statutes as Congress wrote them. If corrective action is needed, it is the Congress that must provide it. “It is not for us to speculate, much less act, on whether Congress would have altered its stance had the specific events of this case been anticipated.” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 185 (1978).
Our reasoning has several strands. It begins, as indeed it must, with the text and legislative history of § 924 (c). By its terms, that provision tells us nothing about the way Congress intended to mesh the new enhancement scheme with analogous provisions in pre-existing statutes defining federal crimes. Moreover, as Simpson noted, 435 U. S., at 13, and n. 7, § 924 (e) was offered as an amendment on the House floor by Representative Poff, 114 Cong. Rec. 22231 (1968), and passed on the same day. Id., at 22248. Accordingly, the committee reports and congressional hearings to which we normally turn for aid in these situations simply do not exist, and we are forced in consequence to search for clues to congressional intent in the sparse pages of floor debate that make up the relevant legislative history. The crucial material for present purposes is the following observation by Representative Poff:
“For the sake of legislative history, it should be noted that my substitute is not intended to apply to title 18, sections 111, 112, or 113 which already define the penalties for the use of a firearm in assaulting officials, with sections 2113 or 2114 concerning armed robberies of the mail or banks, with section 2231 concerning armed assaults upon process servers or with chapter 44 which defines other firearm felonies.” Id., at 22232.
Simpson pointed out that “[t]his statement is clearly probative of a legislative judgment that the purpose of § 924 (c) is already served whenever the substantive federal offense provides enhanced punishment for use of a dangerous weapon.” 435 U. S., at 13. Moreover, Representative Poff’s remarks were the only ones touching on the present question that were before the House when § 924 (c) was adopted, and it is therefore reasonable to assume that they represent the understanding of the Congressmen who voted for the proposal.
Reliance on Representative Poff’s statement of legislative intent is consistent with the position taken by the Department of Justice in 1971 when it advised prosecutors not to proceed under §924 (c)(1) if the predicate felony statute provided for “ ‘increased penalties where a firearm is used in the commission of the offense,’ ” Simpson, supra, at 16, quoting 19 U. S. Attys. Bull. No. 3, p. 63 (U. S. Dept, of Justice, 1971). Moreover, this view is fully consistent with two tools of statutory construction relied upon in Simpson. The first is the oft-cited rule that “ ‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.’ ” United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347 (1971), quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971). And the second is the principle that a more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general one, regardless of their temporal sequence. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 489-490 (1973). In Simpson, these principles counseled against double enhancement. They served as “an outgrowth of our reluctance to increase or multiply punishments absent a clear and definite legislative directive.” 435 U. S., at 15-16. Here they play a similar role, and thus help confirm the conclusion that § 924 (c) may not be applied at all in the present situation.
The Government seeks to minimize the force of these principles of statutory construction by urging (1) that there is no ambiguity in § 924 (c) and thus that the rule of lenity is not properly called into play and (2) that in fact it is § 924 (c) that is the more specific statute because it relates only to firearms while § 111 would permit enhancement for any dangerous weapon. We find each contention flawed. As to the first, the claim that there exists no ambiguity does not stand up. Plainly the text of the statute fails to address the issue pertinent to decision of these cases — whether Congress intended (1) to provide for enhanced penalties only for crimes not containing their own enhancement provisions, (2) to provide an alternative enhancement provision applicable to all felonies, or (3) to provide a duplicative enhancement provision which would permit double enhancement where the underlying felony was proscribed by a statute like § 111. Our task here, as in Simpson, is to ascertain as best we can which approach Congress had in mind. The rule of lenity, like reference to appropriate legislative materials, is one of the tools we use to do so.
The Government’s second contention — that § 924 (c) rather than § 111 should be viewed as the more specific statute — is both facially unpersuasive and likely to lead to curious consequences. Indeed, were the Government correct we would be forced to conclude that with regard to firearms cases § 924 (c) impliedly repealed all pre-existing enhancement provisions. Yet there is not a shred of evidence to suggest that this is what Congress intended. Moreover, such a result would be inconsistent with Simpson and in any event would not give the Government what it wants because it would not permit the prosecutor to choose between § 924 (c) and § 111.
In addition to contesting the rule of lenity and specific-versus-general arguments, the Government contends that our reading of the legislative materials is unreasonable because those who supported the Poff amendment — including Representative Poff himself — were clearly committed to meting out stiff penalties for use of a firearm in the course of a felony and would not have followed any course inconsistent with that commitment. The argument is overdrawn. In the first place, we do not think our construction is inconsistent with a congressional desire to deal severely with firearm abuses. As we understand it, the Government's argument is not that our construction reads Congress to have diminished the penalty for firearm use, but only that our construction fails to enhance that penalty to the hilt. Yet it is patently clear that Congress too has failed to enhance that penalty to the hilt — it set maximum sentences as well as a variety of other limits on the available punishment. Thus, while Congress had a general desire to deter firearm abuses, that desire was not unbounded. Our task here is to locate one of the boundaries, and the inquiry is not advanced by the assertion that Congress wanted no boundaries.
More specifically, some accommodation between § 924 (c) and statutes like § 111 is obviously necessary. And since some pre-existing statutes provided for sentences less severe than § 924 (c) and others for penalties more severe, any rule of priority would lead in certain circumstances to a punishment less severe than might have been achieved under another rule of priority. The Government in effect argues that had Representative Poff and his colleagues foreseen this problem they would have eschewed any priority rule and instead rested complete discretion in the prosecutor. We do not dispute that a rule permitting prosecutors freedom of choice might give greater effect to a legislative desire to increase the penalties for firearm use, but the same could be said of any number of constructions of the statute, including the one rejected in Simpson. Indeed, by rejecting double enhancement Simpson exposes the stark and unidimensional quality of any calculus which attempts to construe the statute on the basis of an assumption that in enacting § 924 (c) Congress' sole objective was to increase the penalties for firearm use to the maximum extent possible.
The fact that the enhanced sentences authorized in some predicate felony statutes are greater than those set forth in § 924 (c) while those in others are less provides a partial response to the Government’s contention that our construction would lead to irrational sentencing patterns in which some less severe crimes are punished more than other more severe ones. The fact is that any interpretation might have led to differences in treatment that are not intuitively reasonable. In consequence, the presence of differences here fails to shake our confidence in our construction. More broadly, it is simply not for this Court to substitute its accommodation between old and new enhancement provisions for the one apparently chosen by Congress. On the contrary, “in our constitutional system the commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with 'common sense and the public weal.’ ” TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S., at 195.
Ill
What we have said thus far disposes of LaRocca’s case by making it clear that he may not be sentenced under § 924 (c) for using his gun to assault the federal officers. This holding also applies in Busic’s case. But in that case the Government has a fallback position. Even if a person who uses a gun to violate § 111 may not be sentenced for doing so under § 924 (c)(1), the argument goes, a person who carnes a gun in the commission of a § 111 violation may be sentenced under § 924 (c) (2) because the enhancement provision of § 111 does not apply to those who carry but do not use their weapons. Thus, the Government urges, whatever our holding with regard to LaRocca, Busic may be sentenced under § 924 (c) (2) for carrying his gun while committing the crime of aiding and abetting LaRocca’s violation of § 111.
The central flaw in this argument as applied here is that Busic is being punished for using a weapon. Through the combination of § 111 and 18 U. S. C. § 2, he was found guilty as a principal of using a firearm to assault the undercover agents. LaRocca’s gun, in other words, became Busic’s as a matter of law. And the Government's argument thus amounts to the contention that had Busic shot one gun at the officers and carried another in his belt he could have been punished under § 111 for the one he fired and under § 924 (c) (2) for the one he did not fire. Similarly, this argument would suggest, Busic might be punished for carrying a gun in his belt and also for shooting that same gun. Yet such results are wholly implausible. They would stand both Simpson and our holding in Part II, supra, on their heads, impute to Congress the unlikely intention to punish each weapon as a separate offense, and create a situation in which aiders and abettors would often be more culpable and more severely punished than those whom they aid and abet. We decline to read the statutes to produce such an ungainly result. It seems to us that our holding of Part II is equally applicable here — Busic’s vicarious assault and use of a dangerous weapon are subject to prosecution and punishment under § 111 and he has been duly prosecuted and punished pursuant to that provision. In such a case, Simpson, the legislative history, and applicable canons of statutory construction make it clear that neither subsection of § 924 (c) is available.
These cases are reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
The facts are recited in the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 587 F. 2d 577, 579-580 (1978).
The five narcotics counts alleged violations of 21 U. S. C. §§ 841 (a) (1), 843 (b), and 846. The firearms counts involving both petitioners charged violations of 26 U. S. C. §§ 5861 (c), 5861 (d), and 5871, and 18 U. S. C. §§ 922 (h) and 924 (a). LaRocca was named in six of these counts and Busic in five. In addition, Busic was convicted on three counts of unlawful firearms possession in violation of 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202 (a) (1). The indictment is reproduced at App. 5-15.
The § 924 (e) counts on which the two were convicted recited as predicate felonies both the narcotics violation^ and the assaults on federal officers. In the courts below the Government attempted to support the § 924 (c) convictions in part by arguing that whatever their validity when superimposed on the assault charges, they could validly be grounded on the drug counts. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention, concluding that the jury might have found the drug conspiracy to have come to an end before the robbery and assault. 587 F. 2d, at 584, n. 5, and 588, n. 3. The Government does not press this argument in this Court, and we accordingly treat the eases as though the § 924 (c) charges recited only the assaults on federal officers as predicate felonies.
Title 18 U. S. C. § 111 provides as follows:
“Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
“Whoever, in the commission of any such acts uses a deadly or dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.”
Among the persons designated in 18 U. S. C. § 1114 are officers or employees of the Drug Enforcement Administration.
Title 18 U. S. C. § 924 (c) provides:
“Whoever—
“(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, or
“(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States [,]
“shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years. In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than two nor more than twenty-five years and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence in the case of a second or subsequent conviction of such person or give him a probationary sentence, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of such felony.”
For present purposes, §§2113 and 111 are fully analogous. Therefore, what Simpson held of the relationship between § 924 (c) and the one applies to that section’s relationship with the other as well.
Petitioners in Simpson had been sentenced under both enhancement provisions. 435 U. S., at 9.
Simpson’s final paragraph stated in part: “Accordingly, we hold that in a prosecution growing out of a single transaction of bank robbery with firearms, a defendant may not be sentenced under both § 2113 (d) and § 924 (c).” Id., at 16.
Section 924 (e) was enacted as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968 in the wake of the assassinations of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. It clearly was an attempt to take major steps to prevent firearm abuses. Thus, it is argued, it is unlikely that Congress would have wanted the severe penalties of § 924 (c) to be pre-empted by less stringent penalties provided in pre-existing enhancement provisions.
For example, the Government notes that under such a holding a person who breaks into a Post Office in violation of 18 U. S. C. §2115, which contains no enhancement provision, could receive an extra 10 years under § 924 (c) for using a gun to shoot the lock off. In contrast, the sentence of a person who draws a gun and fires a number of shots while robbing a bank could not be enhanced under that provision because the bank robbery statute’s enhancement clause would take precedence. That clause, §2113 (d), permits a sentence of up to 25 years, but even if he had not used a weapon this person could have received 20 years under § 2113 (a). Accordingly, the incremental penalty the bank robber can receive for using the firearm is only 5 years as opposed to 10 for the Post Office robber.
This interpretation receives additional support from the fact that the Conference Committee chose the Poff version over a Senate proposal which, according to its sponsor, 114 Cong. Rec. 27142 (1968), would have permitted enhancement for the use of a firearm even where the predicate offense contained its own enhancement clause. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1956, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 31-32 (1968). We recognize, as the Government points out, that the Senate version differed in other respects as well; but insofar as it points in any direction this chain of events supports reliance on the Poff statement.
Indeed, § 924 (c) is itself fairly broad. It refers to “firearms,” a term defined in 18 U. S. C. §§ 921 (a) (3) and (4) to include bombs, grenades, rockets, mines, and similar devices in addition to guns.
The disposition in Simpson was to remand for proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Court. On remand, the Court of Appeals vacated the § 924 (c) sentences and approved and affirmed those under § 2113 (d) — a disposition that would have been improper were the Government correct in its specificity argument.
Section 924 (c) provides for maximum incremental penalties for use of a firearm of 10 years for a first offender and 25 years for a second offender. Under §2113, the incremental penalty available for use of a dangerous weapon in the course of an otherwise forceful bank robbery is 5 years (25 years under §2113 (d) less 20 years under §2113 (a)), while the incremental penalty for using a weapon in the course of an otherwise nonviolent robbery is 15 years (25 years less 10 years under § 2113 (b)) if the goods taken are worth more than $100 and 24 years (25 years less 1 year) if the goods taken are worth less. And under 18 U. S. C. § 2114, another statute referred to by Representative Poff, the incremental cost to the defendant of using a gun to assault a person having custody of the mail or property of the United States is 15 years. Thus, a ruling making § 924 (c) pre-emptive would increase some incremental penalties while actually decreasing others. In contrast, the Poff rule merely leaves these penalties where they were set by Congress in the first place — it makes no existing firearm penalty smaller or larger.
One of the Government’s examples is described in n. 10, supra. The unlikeliness of the hypothetical and the fact that it compares only incremental and not total penalties suggest that the possibility of genuinely troubling comparative sentences may be exaggerated.
Title 18 U. S. C. § 2 provides in relevant part that “[w]hoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”
On these facts, for example, the Government’s view would permit Busic — the aider and abettor — to be sentenced under both § 924 (c) and § 111 — while LaRocca — the triggerman — could be sentenced only under the latter. That this is so is a product not of our holding in Part II, but of the Government’s theory itself. This is quite clear if one assumes for purposes of argument that LaRocca could have been punished under § 924 (c) (1) for using his gun. Were that the case, Busic, too would have been guilty of that crime as an aider and abettor. And the Government’s argument here would lead to the conclusion that he could also be guilty of violating § 924 (c) (2) by carrying his own gun. In short, while he neither shot nor drew his gun, he would have been subject to fully twice the penalties that would have faced his more culpable comrade.
Our result with regard to Busic flows as much from the logic and language of 18 U. S. C. § 2 as from anything peculiar to § 924 (c). Section 2 makes Busic punishable “as a principal,” and those words mean what they say. One consequence is that aiders and abettors may be held vicariously liable “regardless of the fact that they may be incapable of committing the specific violation which they are charged to have aided and abetted.” S. Rep. No. 1020, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1951). Another is that there will inevitably exist cases in which a decision to treat an aider and abettor as a principal may be inconsistent with prosecuting and punishing him as well for some of his individual acts of aiding and abetting. Phrased differently, once he has been treated as a principal some of his lesser acts in furtherance of the central violation may merge into it. On these facts, § 2 appears to require that we treat Busic as though he used LaRocca’s gun to commit this assault. It would be incongruous to treat him at the same time as a separate individual punishable as though he had carried a different gun in the course of a different crime.
The Government makes a conditional plea that should we find § 924 (c) to be inapplicable to these petitioners we vacate not only the § 924 (c) sentences, but also those imposed by the District Court under § 111. This, the Government urges, would permit that court to resentence petitioners under the enhancement provision of the latter statute. The argument is that the District Court intended to deal severely with the assaults in question and should not be prevented from doing so by its choice of the incorrect enhancement provision. The Court of Appeals has not considered this contention in this context and we are reluctant to do so without the benefit of that court’s views. Accordingly, we express no opinion as to whether in the particular circumstances of these eases such a disposition would be permissible.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent Servette, Inc., is a wholesale distributor of specialty merchandise stocked by retail food chains in Los Angeles, California. In 1960, during a strike which Local 848 of the Wholesale Delivery Drivers and Salesmen’s Union was conducting against Servette, the Local’s representatives sought to support the strike by asking managers of supermarkets of the food chains to discontinue handling merchandise supplied by Servette. In most instances the representatives warned that handbills asking the public not to buy named items distributed by Servette would be passed out in front of stores which refused to cooperate, and in a few cases handbills were in fact passed out. A complaint was issued on charges by Servette that this conduct violated subsections (i) and (ii) of § 8 (b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, which, in relevant part, provide that it is an unfair labor practice for a union
“(i) ... to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person ... to engage in ... a refusal in the course of his employment to . . . handle . . . commodities or to perform any services; or”
“(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person . . . where in either case an object thereof is—
“(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease . . . dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person . . .
Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public . . . that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer . . . .”
The National Labor Relations Board dismissed the complaint. The Board adopted the finding of the Trial Examiner that “the managers of McDaniels Markets were authorized to decide as they best could whether to continue doing business with Servette in the face of threatened or actual handbilling. This, a policy decision, was one for them to make. The evidence is persuasive that the same authority was vested in the managers of Kory.” 133 N. L. R. B. 1506. The Board held that on these facts the Local’s efforts to enlist the cooperation of the supermarket managers did not constitute inducement of an “individual” within the meaning of that term in subsection (i); the Board held further that the handbilling, even if constituting conduct which “threaten [s], coerce [s], or restraints] any person” under subsection (ii), was protected by the quoted proviso to amended § 8 (b) (4). 133 N. L. R. B. 1501. The Court of Appeals set aside the Board’s order, holding that the term “individual” in subsection (i) was to be read literally, thus including the supermarket managers, and that the distributed products were not “produced” by Servette within the meaning of the proviso, thus rendering its protection unavailable. 310 F. 2d 659. We granted certiorari, 374 U. S. 805. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals correctly read the term “individual” in subsection (i) as including the supermarket managers, but it erred in holding that the Local’s attempts to enlist the aid of the managers constituted inducement of the managers in violation of the subsection. The 1959 statute amended §8 (b)(4)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, which made it unlawful to induce or encourage “the employees of any employer” to strike or engage in a “concerted” refusal to work. We defined the central thrust of that statute to be to forbid “a union to induce employees to strike against or to refuse to handle goods for their employer when an object is to force him or another person to cease doing business with some third party.” Local 1976, Carpenters’ Union v. Labor Board, 357 U. S. 93, 98. In the instant case, however, the Local, in asking the managers not to handle Servette items, was not attempting to induce or encourage them to cease performing their managerial duties in order to force their employers to cease doing business with Servette. Rather, the managers were asked to make a managerial decision which the Board found was within their authority to make. Such an appeal would not have been a violation of § 8 (b) (4) (A) before 1959, and we think that the legislative history of the 1959 amendments makes it clear that the amendments were not meant to render such an appeal an unfair labor practice.
The 1959 amendments were designed to close certain loopholes in the application of § 8 (b)(4)(A) which had been exposed in Board and court decisions. Thus, it had been held that the term “the employees of any employer” limited the application of the statute to those within the statutory definitions of “employees” and “employer.” Section 2 (2) of the National Labor Relations Act defines “employer” to exclude the federal and state governments and their agencies or subdivisions, nonprofit hospitals, and employers subject to the Railway Labor Act. 29 U. S. C. § 152 (2). The definition of “employee” in § 2 (3) excludes agricultural laborers, supervisors, and employees of an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act. 29 U. S. C. § 152 (3). Furthermore, since the section proscribed only inducement to engage in a strike or “concerted” refusal to perform services, it had been held that it was violated only if the inducement was directed at two or more employees. To close these loopholes, subsection (i) substituted the phrase “any individual employed by any person” for “the employees of any employer,” and deleted the word “concerted.” The first change was designed to make the provision applicable to refusals by employees who were not technically “employees” within the statutory definitions, and the second change was intended to make clear that inducement directed to only one individual was proscribed. But these changes did not expand the type of conduct which §8 (b)(4) (A) condemned, that is, union pressures calculated to induce the employees of a secondary employer to withhold their services in order to force their employer to cease dealing with the primary employer.
Moreover, the division of § 8 (b)(4) into subsections (i) and (ii) by the 1959 amendments has direct relevance to the issue presented by this case. It had been held that § 8 (b) (4) (A) did not reach threats of labor trouble made to the secondary employer himself. Congress decided that such conduct should be made unlawful, but only when it amounted to conduct which “threaten [s], coerce[s] or restraints] any person”; hence the addition of subsection (ii). The careful creation of separate standards differentiating the treatment of appeals to the employees of the secondary employer not to perform their employment services, from appeals for other ends which are attended by threats, coercion or restraint, argues conclusively against the interpretation of subsection (i) as reaching the Local's appeals to the supermarket managers in this case. If subsection (i), in addition to prohibiting inducement of employees to withhold employment services, also reaches an appeal that the managers exercise their delegated authority by making a business judgment to cease dealing with the primary employer, subsection (ii) would be almost superfluous. Harmony between (i) and (ii) is best achieved by construing subsection (i) to prohibit inducement of the managers to withhold their services from their employer, and subsection (ii) to condemn an attempt to induce the exercise of discretion only if the inducement would “threaten, coerce, or restrain” that exercise.
We turn finally to the question whether the proviso to amended §8 (b)(4) protected the Local’s handbilling. The Court of Appeals, following its decision in Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. Labor Board, 310 F. 2d 591 (C. A. 9th Cir.), held that the proviso did not protect the Local’s conduct because, as a distributor, Servette was not directly involved in the physical process of creating the products, and thus “does not produce any products.” The Board on the other hand followed its ruling in Lohman Sales Co., 132 N. L. R. B. 901, that products “produced by an employer” included products distributed, as here, by a wholesaler with whom the primary dispute exists. We agree with the Board. The proviso was the outgrowth of a profound Senate concern that the unions’ freedom to appeal to the public for support of their case be adequately safeguarded. We elaborated the history of the proviso in Labor Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, post, p. 58, decided today. It would fall far short of achieving this basic purpose if the proviso applied only in situations where the union’s labor dispute is with the manufacturer or processor. Moreover, a primary target of the 1959 amendments was the secondary boycotts conducted by the Teamsters Union, which ordinarily represents employees not of manufacturers, but of motor carriers. There is nothing in the legislative history which suggests that the protection of the proviso was intended to be any narrower in coverage than the prohibition to which it is an exception, and we see no basis for attributing such an incongruous purpose to Congress.
The term “produced” in other labor laws was not unfamiliar to Congress. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the term is defined as “produced, manufactured, mined, handled, or in any other manner worked on . . . ,” 29 U. S. C. § 203 (j), and has always been held to apply to the wholesale distribution of goods. The term “production” in the War Labor Disputes Act has been similarly applied to a general retail department and mail-order business. The Court of Appeals’ restrictive reading of “producer” was prompted in part by the language of § 8 (b)(4)(B), which names as a proscribed object of the conduct defined in subsections (i) and (ii) “forcing or requiring any person to cease . . . dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer.” (Italics supplied.) In its decision in Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. Labor Board, supra, the Court of Appeals reasoned that since a “processor” and a “manufacturer” are engaged in the physical creation of goods, the word “producer” must be read as limited to one who performs similar functions. On the contrary, we think that “producer” must be given a broader reach, else it is rendered virtually superfluous.
Finally, the warnings that handbills would be distributed in front of noncooperating stores are not prohibited as “threats” within subsection (ii). The statutory protection for the distribution of handbills would be undermined if a threat to engage in protected conduct were not itself protected.
Reversed.
The supermarket chains principally involved were Kory’s Markets, Inc., and McDaniels Markets. The testimony mentioned only one other chain, Daylight Markets, one of whose store managers made an unsworn statement that he was interviewed on one occasion, and that although he refused to cooperate, the Local did not handbill at his store. Servette’s products are primarily candy, liquor, holiday supplies and specialty articles.
The handbill was as follows:
“To the Patrons of This Store
“Wholesale Delivery Drivers & Salesmen’s Local No. 848 urgently requests that you do not buy the following products distributed by Servette, Inc.:
“Brach’s Candy
“Servette Candy
“Good Season Salad Dressing
“Old London Products
“The Servette Company which distributes these products refuses to negotiate with the Union that represents its drivers. The Company is attempting to force the drivers to sign individual ‘'Yellow Dog’ contracts.
“These contracts will destroy the wages and working conditions that the drivers now enjoy, and will set them back 20 years in their struggle for decent wages and working conditions.
“The drivers of Servette appreciate your cooperation in this fight.”
As amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act) § 704 (a), 73 Stat. 542-543, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. IV, 1963) §158 (b)(4).
The Board reached a contrary conclusion on the authority of its decision in Carolina Lumber Co., 130 N. L. R. B. 1438, 1443, which viewed the statute as distinguishing “low level” supervisors from “high level” supervisors, holding that inducement of “low level” supervisors is impermissible but inducement of “high level” supervisors is permitted. We hold today that this is not the distinction drawn by the statute; rather, the question of the applicability of subsection (i) turns upon whether the union’s appeal is to cease performing employment services, or is an appeal for the exercise of managerial discretion.
Section 8 (b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140, 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (4), read as follows:
“Sec. 8 (b). It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
“(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person.”
In view of these definitions, it was permissible for a union to induce work stoppages by minor supervisors, and farm, railway or public employees. See Ferro-Co Corp., 102 N. L. R. B. 1660 (supervisors) ; Arkansas Express, Inc., 92 N. L. R. B. 255 (supervisors); Conway’s Express, 87 N. L. R. B. 972, 980, aff’d, 195 F. 2d 906, 911 (C. A. 2d Cir.) (supervisors); Great Northern R. Co., 122 N. L. R. B. 1403, enforcement denied, 272 F. 2d 741 (C. A. 9th Cir.), and supplemental Board decision, 126 N. L. R. B. 57 (railroad employees); Smith Lumber Co., 116 N. L. R. B. 1756, enforcement denied, 246 F. 2d 129, 132 (C. A. 5th Cir.) (railroad employees); Paper Makers Importing Co., Inc., 116 N. L. R. B. 267 (municipal employees). Compare Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., 87 N. L. R. B. 720, 721, enforced, 89 U. S. App. D. C. 155, 191 F. 2d 642, cert. denied, 342 U. S. 869 (agricultural labor organization).
See Joliet Contractors Assn. v. Labor Board, 202 F. 2d 606, 612 (C. A. 7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U. S. 824; cf. Labor Board v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U. S. 665, 671.
The changes made in § 8 (b) (4) (A) by subsection (i) first appeared in the Administration bill, which was introduced by Senator Goldwater. See § 503 (a) of S. 748,1 Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 142. The Secretary of Labor testified that the change would cure the situation whereby unions could “avoid the existing provisions by inducing individual employees, or workers not defined as employees by the act such as railroad and agricultural workers — to refuse to handle the products of the person with whom they want the employer to cease doing business,” Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 505, etc., 86th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 265. The Lan-drum-Griffin bill introduced in the House contained a subsection (i) similar to that of the Administration bill. Section 705 (a) of H. R. 8400,1 Leg. Hist. 680. An analysis submitted by its sponsors explained the purpose of the amendment as had the Secretary of Labor, and added that the omission of the word “concerted” was to prevent the unions from inducing employees one at a time to engage in secondary boycotts. 105 Cong. Rec. 14347, II Leg. Hist. 1522-1523. See also 105 Cong. Rec. 15531-15532 (Congressman Griffin), II Leg. Hist. 1568.-
Thus, the following colloquy occurred between Secretary of Labor Mitchell and Senator Kennedy with respect to the provision of the Administration bill analogous to § 8 (b) (4) (ii):
“Senator Kennedy. Mr. Secretary . . .
“I would like to ask you a question regarding section 503 (a) of your bill: There is a manufacturer of clothing ‘A.’ He begins to purchase the products of a plant which is under the domination of racketeers .... Would it be a violation of section 503 of your bill if the business agent of the Clothing Workers Union at company A spoke to the plant manager and requested him not to order materials— nonunion materials — from the racketeer plant in Pennsylvania?
“Secretary Mitchell. We don’t think it would be, Senator.
“Senator Kennedy. Now, supposing the plant in Pennsylvania was a nonunion plant, would it be a violation under your bill for union leaders in another company to go to his plant manager and ask him not to buy goods from the nonunion plant?
“Secretary Mitchell. Request him not to buy? No.
“Senator Kennedy. Now, if the representative of the union at plant A told the manufacturer that the members of the union would not continue to work on goods which were secured from the racketeer’s shop?
“Secretary Mitchell. In that case, it is my interpretation of our proposal that that would be coercion. And our proposal prohibits coercion for the purpose of bringing pressure on an employer not to buy merchandise from a neutral third party.” Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 505, etc., 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 304^305.
See Sealright Pacific, Ltd., 82 N. L. R. B. 271, 272, n. 4; Rabouin v. Labor Board, 195 F. 2d 906, 911-912 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Labor Board v. International Union of Brewery Workers, 272 F. 2d 817, 819 (C. A. 10th Cir.).
Accord, Labor Board v. Local 294, Teamsters, 298 F. 2d 105 (C. A. 2d Cir.); and see Alpert v. Local 379, Teamsters, 184 F. Supp. 558 (D. C. D. Mass.).
The Conference Committee in adopting subsection (ii) understood that the subsection would reach only threats, restraints or coercion of the secondary employer and not a mere request to him for voluntary cooperation. Senator Dirksen, one of the conferees, stated that the new amendment “makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to try to coerce or threaten an employer directly (but not to persuade or ask him) in order — • ... To get him to stop doing business with another firm or handling its goods.” 105 Cong. Rec. 19849, II Leg. Hist. 1823. (Italics supplied.)
See, e. g., 105 Cong. Rec. 1730, II Leg. Hist. 993-994; 105 Cong. Rec. 6105, II Leg. Hist. 1028; 105 Cong. Rec. 6669, II Leg. Hist. 1196; 105 Cong. Rec. 3926-3927, II Leg. Hist. 1469-1470; 105 Cong. Rec. 15544, II Leg. Hist. 1580.
See, e. g., Mitchell v. Pidcock, 299 F. 2d 281 (C. A. 5th Cir.); McComb v. Wyandotte Furniture Co., 169 F. 2d 766 (C. A. 8th Cir.); McComb v. Blue Star Auto Stores, 164 F. 2d 329 (C. A. 7th Cir.) ; Walling v. Friend, 156 F. 2d 429 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Walling v. Mutual Wholesale Food Co., 141 F. 2d 331, 340 (C. A. 8th Cir.).
United States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 F. 2d 369 (C. A. 7th Cir.).
We attach no significance to the fact that another version of the proviso read:
“Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection (b) shall be construed ... to prohibit publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an establishment is operated, or goods are produced or distributed, by an employer engaged in a labor dispute . . . .” 105 Cong. Ree. 17333, II Leg. Hist. 1383.
This version was in a request by the Senate conferees for instructions but was not made the subject of debate or vote because Senate and House conferees reached agreement on the proviso.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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G
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Black,
announced by Mr. Justice Harlan.
David H. Scull was convicted of contempt in the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia, for refusing to obey a decision of that court ordering him to answer a number of questions put to him by a Legislative Investigative Committee of the Virginia Géneral Assembly. On appeal the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. . Scull contended at the Committee hearings, in the courts below, and in this Court that the Virginia statute authorizing the investigation, both on its face and as applied, violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He claimed, among other things, that: (1) The Committee was “established and given investigative authority, as part of a legislative program of ‘massive resistance’ to the United States Constitution and the Supreme Court’s desegregation decisions, in order to harass, vilify, and publicly embarrass members of the NAACP and others who are attempting to secure integrated public schooling in Virginia.” (2) The questions asked him violated his rights of free speech, assembly and petition by constituting an unjustified restraint upon his associations with others in “legal and laudable political and humanitarian causes.” (3) “The information sought from [him] was neither intended to, nor could reasonably be expected to, assist the Legislature in any proper legislative function.” (4) Despite his requests, repeated at every stage of the proceedings, the Committee failed to inform him “in what respect its questions were pertinent- to the subject under inquiry . . . .” We granted certiorari to consider these constitutional challenges to the validity of petitioner’s contempt conviction. 357 U. S. 903. After careful consideration, we find it unnecessary to pass on any of these constitutional questions except the last one because we think the record discloses an. unmistakable cloudiness in the testimony of the Committee Chairman as to what was sought of Scull, as well as why it was sought. Scull was therefore not given a fair opportunity, at the peril of contempt, to determine whether he was within ,his rights in refusing to answer and consequently his conviction must fall under the procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Scull is a printer and calendar publisher in Annandale, Virginia, where he has been a long-time resident active in religious, civic and welfare groups. Soon after this Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, holding segregation in the public schools to be unconstitutional, SculLbegan to advocate compliance with the requirements of the Brown case. In December of 1954, Scull and a group of other citizens met at a church in Alexandria to consider and discuss “the part which concerned and conscientious citizens can best play in helping to achieve the community adjustments necessary to protect the educational and constitutional rights of all citizens as recently defined and interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States.” The group decided to prepare and publish through a “Citizens Clearing House On Public Education” information about the Virginia educational program and to report on the progress made 15y various Parent-Teacher Associations in Northern Virginia in developing programs for “orderly integration.”
One of the newsletters published by the Clearing House was obtained by the Fairfax Citizens’ Council, a group which vigorously opposed any desegregation of Virginia schools. The Council republished a large part of the letter in a pamphlet entitled “The Shocking Truth!” It called attention to the fact that the newsletter was being “disseminated through Box 218, Annandale, Va. (David Scull),”' and' stated .that “communications with the N. A. A. C. P., Southern Regional Council, Clearing House, B’nai B’rith, Council on Human Relations, American Friends and many other pro-integration groups are tunneled through Box 218, Annandale, Va., and membership is encouraged if not actually suggested by the P. T. A. Federation.”,
The pamphlet came to the attention of Delegate James M. Thomson, Chairman of the Virginia Committee on Law Reform and Racial Activities, who promptly subpoenaed Scull to appear and testify. This group, commonly called the “Thomson Committee,” was established a few months after the Virginia General Assembly adopted a resolution attacking the Brown decision and pledging that the Legislature would take all constitutionally available measures to resist desegregation in the public schools. The bill setting up the “Thomson Committee” was one of a series relating to segregation passed on the same day. Among these were bills establishing, a pupil-assignment' plan, providing for the withdrawal of state funds from integrated schools and • forbidding barratry, champerty and maintenance. While they did not mention the NAACP by name, Chairman Thomson testified below that in the course of the “legislative battle” over them he had stated that with “this set of bills . . . ‘we can bust that organization . . . wide open.’ ”
Scull appeared before the Thomson Committee, as ordered. He answered several questions about his publishing business, and then was asked whether he belonged “to an organization known as The Fairfax County Council on Human Relations.” He replied that “on advice of counsel I wish to state that the language of the subpoena delivered to me was so broad and vague . . . that before going further I wish to ask you to tell me the specific subject of your inquiry today, so that I may judge which of your questions are pertinent.” Chairman Thomson told him that the general subjects under inquiry were “threefold”: (1) the tax status of racial organizations and of contributions to them; (2) the effect of integration or its threat on the public schools of Virginia and on the State’s. general welfare; and (3) the violation of certain statutes against “champerty, barratry, and maintenance, or the unauthorized practice of the law.” He told Scull, however, that several of these subjects “primarily do not deal with you.” Scull then filed a statement of his objections to the questioning and emphasized that he had not been “properly informed of the subject of inquiry.” Without clarifying Chairman Thomson’s ambiguous statement or specifying which of the “several” subjects did not apply to Scull, the Committee proceeded to ask the 31 questions listed in the footnote below.
' It is difficult to see how some of these questions have any relationship to the subjects the Committee was •authorized to investigate, or how Scull could possibly discover any such relationship from the Chairman’s statement.. It does seem that several of the questions asked were aimed at connecting Scull with barratry or cham-perty, but it was never made wholly clear to Scull, either before or after the questioning, that this was one of the subjects under inquiry as far as he was concerned. Nevertheless, Scull was cited to appear before the Circuit Court to show cause why he should not be compelled to answer.
In the Circuit Court the Chairman sought to explain his ambiguous statements about the scope of the investigation. Far from clarifying the matter, however, his testimony added to the confusion, since he successively ruled out as inapplicable to Scull each of the subjects which the Legislature had authorized the Committee to investigate. On first being asked which of the three subjects applied to Scull, he testified:
Ror my personal standpoint, I would say that the one dealing with the taxable status does not, affect him here,-and likewise the one — I have forgotten whether I stated it or not, but I would think thát the integration or the threat of integration pn public school systems, on the general welfare, would apply.
“Looking at it in retrospect, the other on cham-perty, barratry, and maintenance would not apply. I don’t recall whether I did say ór did not say. We did specifically with the third one: Champerty, barratry, and maintenance.”
Later the following colloquy took place:
Counsel for Scull: “Q. Now, is it also correct that you said several which primarily do not deal with you?”
Chairman Thomson: “A. If the transcript says it there,' I said it.
“Q. Which of those three were you referring to when you said, ‘Several which primarily do not deal with you’?
“A. I think it is the last mentioned there. [The last mentioned was barratry.]
“Q. Would you just state for the record so that it is clear on the record which ones you were referring to that did.not deal with Mr. Scull?
“A. The violation of -those statutes dealing with champerty, barratry, and maintenance, and general unauthorized practice of the law.
“Q. Those did not deal with Mr. Scull?
“A. No, no; I think in the connection that we are dealing with here, that the ones spoken of first did not apply; only the latter one did apply that I was making.
“Q. Now I am confused.”
Subsequently, Chairman Thomson stated that barratry applied to a certain “section of the testimony” but did not identify which section. Still later he undertook to specify the section but instead of' doing so he made what may have been a general retraction and said, “The whole-statement would be applicable to the entire transcript and the fact that he was advised of each one of them would be applicable to the entire transcript.”
The judge who ordered Scull to answer the questions made no clearer statement of their pertinence to the investigation or to basic state interests than had the Committee Chairman. His holding was merely that “the questions are of a preliminary nature and in developing the inquiry to secure-, the information which the Committee is after appears to the Court to be perfectly proper line of inquiry.” He at no time analyzed the individual questions asked, nor explained to Scull what it was that the Committee wanted from him and how the questions put to him related to .these desires.
The events leading to Scull’s subpoena, as well as the questions asked him, make it unmistakably clear that the Committee’s investigation touched an.area of speech, press, and association of vital public importance. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460-466, this Court held that such areas of individual liberty cannot be invaded unless a compelling state interest is clearly shown. But we do not reach that question because the record shows that the purposes of . the inquiry, as announced by the Chairman, were so unclear, in fact conflicting, that Scull did not have an opportunity of understanding the basis for the questions or any justification on the part of the Committee for seeking the information he refused to give. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, 208-209, 214-215. To sustain his conviction for contempt under these circumstances would be to send him to jail for a crime he could not with reasonable certainty know he was committing.. This Court has often held that fundamental fairness requires that such reasonable certainty exist. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453; Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223, 230; Watkins v. United States,354 U. S. 178, 208-209, 214-215, 217; Flaxer v. United States, 358 U. S. 147, 151. Certainty is all the more essential when vagueness might induce individuals to forego their rights of speech, press, and association for fear of violating an unclear law. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507. Such is plainly the ease here. The information given to Scull was far too wavering, confused and cloudy to sustain his conviction.
The case is reversed and remanded to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
See Va. Acts 1956, S. J. Res. 3.
See generally, Ya. Acts, E. S. 1956, cc. 31-37, 56-71.
The Committee was authorized to: “make a thorough investigation of the activities of corporations, organizations, associations and other like groups which seek to influence, encourage or promote litigation-relating to racial activities in this State. The Committee shall conduct its investigation so as to collect evidence and information which shall be necessary or useful in
“(1) determining the need, or lack of need, for legislation which wpuld assist in the investigation of such organizations, corporations and associations relative to the State income tax laws;
“ (2)" determining the need, or lack of need, for legislation redefining the taxable status of such corporations, associations, organizations and other groups; as above referred to, and further defining the status of donations to such organizations or corporations -from a taxation standpoint; .and
“(■3) determining the effect which integration or the threat of integration could have on the operation of the public schools in the State or the general welfare of the State and whether- the laws of barratry, champerty and maintenance are being violated in connection therewith.” Va. Acts, E. S. 1956, c. 37.
(1) “Are you a member of The Fairfax County Council on Human Relations?”
(2) “Are you a member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People?”
(3) “Have you contributed to any of the suits, contributed financially to any of the suits designed to bring about racial integration in the public schools?”
(4) “Have you paid court costs in any of the suits designed to bring about racial integration in the State of Virginia?”
(5) “Have you paid attorneys’ fées to any attorneys in regard to racial litigation involved in the integration of the public schools in Virginia?”
(6) “Have you attended any meetings at which the formulation of suits against the State of Virginia in racial integration suits-in the public schools have been discussed?”
(7) "I notice in your statement that you say that you think you have a'moral duty to counsel with a fellow citizen as to his legal rights if he is ignorant of them. Do you feel qualified to counsel with him as-to his legal rights?”
(8) “Who else uses that box number [No. 218 in Annandale; Va;] besides yourself?”
(9) “Does the Fairfax County Council on Human Relations use . that box?”
(10) “Has the NAACP used that number from time to time?”
(11) “Has the organization known as the Citizens Clearing House used that box number?”
(12) “Has the Fairfax County Federation of PTA’s used that number?”
(13) “Has the Fairfax County Federation of P-TA Workshops on Supreme Court Decisions on the Public Schools used that box number?”
(14) “Has Miss Caroline H. Planck or-Mrs. Barbara Marx used that box number?”
(15) “Do you know Mrs. Planck or Mrs. Marx?”
(16) “Has Dr. E. B. Henderson used that box number?”
.(17) “Has -the National Conference of Christians and Jews used that box number?”
(18). “Has the Save Our Schools Committee of Fairfax County used that box number?”
(19) “Has Mr. Warren D. Quenstedt used that box?”
(20) “Has Mr. E. A. Prichard used that number?”
(21) “Has the American Civil Liberties Union used that same box number?”
(22) “Has the Americans For Democratic Action, known as ADA, used that box number?”
(23) “Has the Japanese-American Citizens League used that box number?”
(24) “Has the Washington Inter-Racial Workshop used that same number?”
(25) “Has the American Friends Service Committee used that box number?” ‘ ’
(26) “Does the Community Council for Social Progress use the same box number?”
(27) “Does B’nai Brith use that same box number?”
(28) “Does the Communist Party use that box number?”
(29) “Do you belong, to any racial organization, and by ‘racial’ I mean organizations whose membership is interracial in character or • organizations that are instituting or fostering racial litigation?”
(30) “Have you ever been called as a witness before any Congressional Committee?”
(31) “Has your name ever been cited by any Congressional Committee as being on any list of members of any organizations that' are cited as subversive?”
Question 28 asked if the Communist Party-.used Box'218; Question-30 asked if Scull had ever been, called as a witness before a Congressional Committee; Question 31 asked if his name had ever been cited by any Congressional Committee as being on any list of members of any organizations that are cited as subversive; Nothing in the language of the Act authorizing the Committee or in the state-, mént of' Chairman Thomson about the subjects -under inquiry, could lead Scull to think that it was the Committee’s duty to investigate Communist or subversive activities.
See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 460-466; United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41. Among the questions asked were several dealing directly with political activity. Question 19, for example asked if Mr. Warren D. Quenstedt, a candidate for Congress had used Scull’s post-office box.
Four members of this Court adhere to the view they expressed in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 251, and “do not now conceive of any circumstances wherein a state interest would justify infringement of rights in these fields.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004), this Court considered whether the Constitution bars defense counsel from conceding a capital defendant's guilt at trial "when [the] defendant, informed by counsel, neither consents nor objects," id., at 178, 125 S.Ct. 551. In that case, defense counsel had several times explained to the defendant a proposed guilt-phase concession strategy, but the defendant was unresponsive. Id., at 186, 125 S.Ct. 551. We held that when counsel confers with the defendant and the defendant remains silent, neither approving nor protesting counsel's proposed concession strategy, id., at 181, 125 S.Ct. 551, "[no] blanket rule demand[s] the defendant's explicit consent" to implementation of that strategy, id., at 192, 125 S.Ct. 551.
In the case now before us, in contrast to Nixon, the defendant vociferously insisted that he did not engage in the charged acts and adamantly objected to any admission of guilt. App. 286-287, 505-506. Yet the trial court permitted counsel, at the guilt phase of a capital trial, to tell the jury the defendant "committed three murders.... [H]e's guilty." Id., at 509, 510. We hold that a defendant has the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel's experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty. Guaranteeing a defendant the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence," the Sixth Amendment so demands. With individual liberty-and, in capital cases, life-at stake, it is the defendant's prerogative, not counsel's, to decide on the objective of his defense: to admit guilt in the hope of gaining mercy at the sentencing stage, or to maintain his innocence, leaving it to the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
I
On May 5, 2008, Christine and Willie Young and Gregory Colston were shot and killed in the Youngs' home in Bossier City, Louisiana. The three victims were the mother, stepfather, and son of Robert McCoy's estranged wife, Yolanda. Several days later, police arrested McCoy in Idaho. Extradited to Louisiana, McCoy was appointed counsel from the public defender's office. A Bossier Parish grand jury indicted McCoy on three counts of first-degree murder, and the prosecutor gave notice of intent to seek the death penalty. McCoy pleaded not guilty. Throughout the proceedings, he insistently maintained he was out of State at the time of the killings and that corrupt police killed the victims when a drug deal went wrong. App. 284-286. At defense counsel's request, a court-appointed sanity commission examined McCoy and found him competent to stand trial.
In December 2009 and January 2010, McCoy told the court his relationship with assigned counsel had broken down irretrievably. He sought and gained leave to represent himself until his parents engaged new counsel for him. In March 2010, Larry English, engaged by McCoy's parents, enrolled as McCoy's counsel. English eventually concluded that the evidence against McCoy was overwhelming and that, absent a concession at the guilt stage that McCoy was the killer, a death sentence would be impossible to avoid at the penalty phase. McCoy, English reported, was "furious" when told, two weeks before trial was scheduled to begin, that English would concede McCoy's commission of the triple murders. Id., at 286. McCoy told English "not to make that concession," and English knew of McCoy's "complet[e] oppos[ition] to [English] telling the jury that [McCoy] was guilty of killing the three victims"; instead of any concession, McCoy pressed English to pursue acquittal. Id., at 286-287.
At a July 26, 2011 hearing, McCoy sought to terminate English's representation, id., at 449, and English asked to be relieved if McCoy secured other counsel, id., at 458. With trial set to start two days later, the court refused to relieve English and directed that he remain as counsel of record. Id., at 461. "[Y]ou are the attorney," the court told English when he expressed disagreement with McCoy's wish to put on a defense case, and "you have to make the trial decision of what you're going to proceed with." Id., at 469.
At the beginning of his opening statement at the guilt phase of the trial, English told the jury there was "no way reasonably possible" that they could hear the prosecution's evidence and reach "any other conclusion than Robert McCoy was the cause of these individuals' death." Id., at 504. McCoy protested; out of earshot of the jury, McCoy told the court that English was "selling [him] out" by maintaining that McCoy "murdered [his] family." Id., at 505-506. The trial court reiterated that English was "representing" McCoy and told McCoy that the court would not permit "any other outbursts." Id., at 506. Continuing his opening statement, English told the jury the evidence is "unambiguous," "my client committed three murders." Id., at 509. McCoy testified in his own defense, maintaining his innocence and pressing an alibi difficult to fathom. In his closing argument, English reiterated that McCoy was the killer. On that issue, English told the jury that he "took [the] burden off of [the prosecutor]." Id., at 647. The jury then returned a unanimous verdict of guilty of first-degree murder on all three counts. At the penalty phase, English again conceded "Robert McCoy committed these crimes," id., at 751, but urged mercy in view of McCoy's "serious mental and emotional issues," id., at 755. The jury returned three death verdicts.
Represented by new counsel, McCoy unsuccessfully moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by allowing English to concede McCoy "committed three murders," id., at 509, over McCoy's objection. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that defense counsel had authority so to concede guilt, despite the defendant's opposition to any admission of guilt. See 2014-1449 (La.10/19/16), 218 So.3d 535. The concession was permissible, the court concluded, because counsel reasonably believed that admitting guilt afforded McCoy the best chance to avoid a death sentence.
We granted certiorari in view of a division of opinion among state courts of last resort on the question whether it is unconstitutional to allow defense counsel to concede guilt over the defendant's intransigent and unambiguous objection. 582 U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 53, 198 L.Ed.2d 781 (2017). Compare with the instant case, e.g., Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 842-846 (Del.2009) (counsel's pursuit of a "guilty but mentally ill" verdict over defendant's "vociferous and repeated protestations" of innocence violated defendant's "constitutional right to make the fundamental decisions regarding his case"); State v. Carter, 270 Kan. 426, 440, 14 P.3d 1138, 1148 (2000) (counsel's admission of client's involvement in murder when client adamantly maintained his innocence contravened Sixth Amendment right to counsel and due process right to a fair trial).
II
A
The Sixth Amendment guarantees to each criminal defendant "the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." At common law, self-representation was the norm. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 823, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (citing 1 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, The History of English Law 211 (2d ed. 1909)). As the laws of England and the American Colonies developed, providing for a right to counsel in criminal cases, self-representation remained common and the right to proceed without counsel was recognized. Faretta, 422 U.S., at 824-828, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Even now, when most defendants choose to be represented by counsel, see, e.g., Goldschmidt & Stemen, Patterns and Trends in Federal Pro Se Defense, 1996-2011: An Exploratory Study, 8 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 81, 91 (2015) (0.2% of federal felony defendants proceeded pro se ), an accused may insist upon representing herself-however counterproductive that course may be, see Faretta, 422 U.S., at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525. As this Court explained, "[t]he right to defend is personal," and a defendant's choice in exercising that right "must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.' " Ibid. (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-351, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)); see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-177, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) ("The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused.").
The choice is not all or nothing: To gain assistance, a defendant need not surrender control entirely to counsel. For the Sixth Amendment, in "grant[ing] to the accused personally the right to make his defense," "speaks of the 'assistance' of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant." Faretta, 422 U.S., at 819-820, 95 S.Ct. 2525 ; see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382, n. 10, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979) (the Sixth Amendment "contemplat[es] a norm in which the accused, and not a lawyer, is master of his own defense"). Trial management is the lawyer's province: Counsel provides his or her assistance by making decisions such as "what arguments to pursue, what evidentiary objections to raise, and what agreements to conclude regarding the admission of evidence." Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 248, 128 S.Ct. 1765, 170 L.Ed.2d 616 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Some decisions, however, are reserved for the client-notably, whether to plead guilty, waive the right to a jury trial, testify in one's own behalf, and forgo an appeal. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983).
Autonomy to decide that the objective of the defense is to assert innocence belongs in this latter category. Just as a defendant may steadfastly refuse to plead guilty in the face of overwhelming evidence against her, or reject the assistance of legal counsel despite the defendant's own inexperience and lack of professional qualifications, so may she insist on maintaining her innocence at the guilt phase of a capital trial. These are not strategic choices about how best to achieve a client's objectives; they are choices about what the client's objectives in fact are. See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899, 1908, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017) (self-representation will often increase the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome but "is based on the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty"); Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 165, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("Our system of laws generally presumes that the criminal defendant, after being fully informed, knows his own best interests and does not need them dictated by the State.").
Counsel may reasonably assess a concession of guilt as best suited to avoiding the death penalty, as English did in this case. But the client may not share that objective. He may wish to avoid, above all else, the opprobrium that comes with admitting he killed family members. Or he may hold life in prison not worth living and prefer to risk death for any hope, however small, of exoneration. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-22 (it is for the defendant to make the value judgment whether "to take a minuscule chance of not being convicted and spending a life in... prison"); Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant's Right to Control the Case, 90 B.U.L. Rev. 1147, 1178 (2010) (for some defendants, "the possibility of an acquittal, even if remote, may be more valuable than the difference between a life and a death sentence"); cf. Jae Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. ----, ----, 137 S.Ct. 1958, 1969, 198 L.Ed.2d 476 (2017) (recognizing that a defendant might reject a plea and prefer "taking a chance at trial"
despite "[a]lmost certai [n]" conviction (emphasis deleted)). When a client expressly asserts that the objective of "his defence" is to maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts, his lawyer must abide by that objective and may not override it by conceding guilt. U.S. Const. Amdt. 6 (emphasis added); see ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(a) (2016) (a "lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of the representation").
Preserving for the defendant the ability to decide whether to maintain his innocence should not displace counsel's, or the court's, respective trial management roles. See Gonzalez, 553 U.S., at 249, 128 S.Ct. 1765 ("[n]umerous choices affecting conduct of the trial" do not require client consent, including "the objections to make, the witnesses to call, and the arguments to advance"); cf. post, at 1515 - 1516. Counsel, in any case, must still develop a trial strategy and discuss it with her client, see Nixon, 543 U.S., at 178, 125 S.Ct. 551, explaining why, in her view, conceding guilt would be the best option. In this case, the court had determined that McCoy was competent to stand trial, i.e., that McCoy had "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding." Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam )). If, after consultations with English concerning the management of the defense, McCoy disagreed with English's proposal to concede McCoy committed three murders, it was not open to English to override McCoy's objection. English could not interfere with McCoy's telling the jury "I was not the murderer," although counsel could, if consistent with providing effective assistance, focus his own collaboration on urging that McCoy's mental state weighed against conviction. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-23.
B
Florida v. Nixon, see supra, at 1505 - 1506, is not to the contrary. Nixon's attorney did not negate Nixon's autonomy by overriding Nixon's desired defense objective, for Nixon never asserted any such objective. Nixon "was generally unresponsive" during discussions of trial strategy, and "never verbally approved or protested" counsel's proposed approach. 543 U.S., at 181, 125 S.Ct. 551. Nixon complained about the admission of his guilt only after trial. Id., at 185, 125 S.Ct. 551. McCoy, in contrast, opposed English's assertion of his guilt at every opportunity, before and during trial, both in conference with his lawyer and in open court. See App. 286-287, 456, 505-506. See also Cooke, 977 A.2d, at 847 (distinguishing Nixon because, "[i]n stark contrast to the defendant's silence in that case, Cooke repeatedly objected to his counsel's objective of obtaining a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, and asserted his factual innocence consistent with his plea of not guilty"). If a client declines to participate in his defense, then an attorney may permissibly guide the defense pursuant to the strategy she believes to be in the defendant's best interest. Presented with express statements of the client's will to maintain innocence, however, counsel may not steer the ship the other way. See Gonzalez, 553 U.S., at 254, 128 S.Ct. 1765 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("[A]ction taken by counsel over his client's objection...
ha[s] the effect of revoking [counsel's] agency with respect to the action in question.").
The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that English's refusal to maintain McCoy's innocence was necessitated by Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) (2017), which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent." 218 So.3d, at 564. Presenting McCoy's alibi defense, the court said, would put English in an "ethical conundrum," implicating English in perjury. Id., at 565 (citing Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173-176, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986) ). But McCoy's case does not resemble Nix, where the defendant told his lawyer that he intended to commit perjury. There was no such avowed perjury here. Cf. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3, Comment 8 ("The prohibition against offering false evidence only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false."). English harbored no doubt that McCoy believed what he was saying, see App. 285-286; English simply disbelieved McCoy's account in view of the prosecution's evidence. English's express motivation for conceding guilt was not to avoid suborning perjury, but to try to build credibility with the jury, and thus obtain a sentence lesser than death. Id., at 287. Louisiana's ethical rules might have stopped English from presenting McCoy's alibi evidence if English knew perjury was involved. But Louisiana has identified no ethical rule requiring English to admit McCoy's guilt over McCoy's objection. See 3 W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 11.6(c), p. 935 (4th ed. 2015) ("A lawyer is not placed in a professionally embarrassing position when he is reluctantly required... to go to trial in a weak case, since that decision is clearly attributed to his client.").
The dissent describes the conflict between English and McCoy as "rare" and "unlikely to recur." Post, at 1512, 1514 - 1515, and n. 2. Yet the Louisiana Supreme Court parted ways with three other State Supreme Courts that have addressed this conflict in the past twenty years. People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686, 691 (Colo.2010) ("Although defense counsel is free to develop defense theories based on reasonable assessments of the evidence, as guided by her professional judgment, she cannot usurp those fundamental choices given directly to criminal defendants by the United States and the Colorado Constitutions."); Cooke, 977 A.2d 803 (Del.2009) ; Carter, 270 Kan. 426, 14 P.3d 1138 (2000). In each of the three cases, as here, the defendant repeatedly and adamantly insisted on maintaining his factual innocence despite counsel's preferred course: concession of the defendant's commission of criminal acts and pursuit of diminished capacity, mental illness, or lack of premeditation defenses. See Bergerud, 223 P.3d, at 690-691 ; Cooke, 977 A.2d, at 814 ; Carter, 270 Kan., at 429, 14 P.3d, at 1141. These were not strategic disputes about whether to concede an element of a charged offense, cf. post, at 1515 - 1516; they were intractable disagreements about the fundamental objective of the defendant's representation. For McCoy, that objective was to maintain "I did not kill the members of my family." Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. In this stark scenario, we agree with the majority of state courts of last resort that counsel may not admit her client's guilt of a charged crime over the client's intransigent objection to that admission.
III
Because a client's autonomy, not counsel's competence, is in issue, we do not apply our ineffective-assistance-of-counsel jurisprudence, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), or United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), to McCoy's claim. See Brief for Petitioner 43-48; Brief for Respondent 46-52. To gain redress for attorney error, a defendant ordinarily must show prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S., at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Here, however, the violation of McCoy's protected autonomy right was complete when the court allowed counsel to usurp control of an issue within McCoy's sole prerogative.
Violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment-secured autonomy ranks as error of the kind our decisions have called "structural"; when present, such an error is not subject to harmless-error review. See, e.g., McKaskle, 465 U.S., at 177, n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944 (harmless-error analysis is inapplicable to deprivations of the self-representation right, because "[t]he right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless"); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (choice of counsel is structural); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49-50, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984) (public trial is structural). Structural error "affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds," as distinguished from a lapse or flaw that is "simply an error in the trial process itself." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). An error may be ranked structural, we have explained, "if the right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest," such as "the fundamental legal principle that a defendant must be allowed to make his own choices about the proper way to protect his own liberty." Weaver, 582 U.S., at ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1908 (citing Faretta, 422 U.S., at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525 ). An error might also count as structural when its effects are too hard to measure, as is true of the right to counsel of choice, or where the error will inevitably signal fundamental unfairness, as we have said of a judge's failure to tell the jury that it may not convict unless it finds the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 582 U.S., at ---- - ----, 137 S.Ct., at 1908 (citing Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S., at 149, n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2557, and Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) ).
Under at least the first two rationales, counsel's admission of a client's guilt over the client's express objection is error structural in kind. See Cooke, 977 A.2d, at 849 ("Counsel's override negated Cooke's decisions regarding his constitutional rights, and created a structural defect in the proceedings as a whole."). Such an admission blocks the defendant's right to make the fundamental choices about his own defense. And the effects of the admission would be immeasurable, because a jury would almost certainly be swayed by a lawyer's concession of his client's guilt. McCoy must therefore be accorded a new trial without any need first to show prejudice.
Larry English was placed in a difficult position; he had an unruly client and faced a strong government case. He reasonably thought the objective of his representation should be avoidance of the death penalty. But McCoy insistently maintained: "I did not murder my family." App. 506. Once he communicated that to court and counsel, strenuously objecting to English's proposed strategy, a concession of guilt should have been off the table. The trial court's allowance of English's admission of McCoy's guilt despite McCoy's insistent objections was incompatible with the Sixth Amendment. Because the error was structural, a new trial is the required corrective.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice ALITO, with whom Justice THOMAS and Justice GORSUCH join, dissenting.
The Constitution gives us the authority to decide real cases and controversies; we do not have the right to simplify or otherwise change the facts of a case in order to make our work easier or to achieve a desired result. But that is exactly what the Court does in this case. The Court overturns petitioner's convictions for three counts of first-degree murder by attributing to his trial attorney, Larry English, something that English never did. The Court holds that English violated petitioner's constitutional rights by "admit[ting] h[is] client's guilt of a charged crime over the client's intransigent objection." Ante, at 1510 - 1511. But English did not admit that petitioner was guilty of first-degree murder. Instead, faced with overwhelming evidence that petitioner shot and killed the three victims, English admitted that petitioner committed one element of that offense, i.e., that he killed the victims. But English strenuously argued that petitioner was not guilty of first-degree murder because he lacked the intent (the mens rea ) required for the offense. App. 508-512. So the Court's newly discovered fundamental right simply does not apply to the real facts of this case.
I
The real case is far more complex. Indeed, the real situation English faced at the beginning of petitioner's trial was the result of a freakish confluence of factors that is unlikely to recur.
Retained by petitioner's family, English found himself in a predicament as the trial date approached. The evidence against his client was truly "overwhelming," as the Louisiana Supreme Court aptly noted. 2014-1449 (La.10/19/16), 218 So.3d 535, 565 (2016). Among other things, the evidence showed the following. Before the killings took place, petitioner had abused and threatened to kill his wife, and she was therefore under police protection. On the night of the killings, petitioner's mother-in-law made a 911 call and was heard screaming petitioner's first name. She yelled: " 'She ain't here, Robert... I don't know where she is. The detectives have her. Talk to the detectives. She ain't in there, Robert.' " Id., at 542. Moments later, a gunshot was heard, and the 911 call was disconnected.
Officers were dispatched to the scene, and on arrival, they found three dead or dying victims-petitioner's mother-in-law, her husband, and the teenage son of petitioner's wife. The officers saw a man who fit petitioner's description fleeing in petitioner's car. They chased the suspect, but he abandoned the car along with critical evidence linking him to the crime: the cordless phone petitioner's mother-in-law had used to call 911 and a receipt for the type of ammunition used to kill the victims. Petitioner was eventually arrested while hitchhiking in Idaho, and a loaded gun found in his possession was identified as the one used to shoot the victims. In addition to all this, a witness testified that petitioner had asked to borrow money to purchase bullets shortly before the shootings, and surveillance footage showed petitioner purchasing the ammunition on the day of the killings. And two of petitioner's friends testified that he confessed to killing at least one person.
Despite all this evidence, petitioner, who had been found competent to stand trial and had refused to plead guilty by reason of insanity, insisted that he did not kill the victims. He claimed that the victims were killed by the local police and that he had been framed by a farflung conspiracy of state and federal officials, reaching from Louisiana to Idaho. Petitioner believed that even his attorney and the trial judge had joined the plot. App. 509.
Unwilling to go along with this incredible and uncorroborated defense, English told petitioner "some eight months" before trial that the only viable strategy was to admit the killings and to concentrate on attempting to avoid a sentence of death. 218 So.3d, at 558. At that point-aware of English's strong views-petitioner could have discharged English and sought new counsel willing to pursue his conspiracy defense; under the Sixth Amendment, that was his right. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). But petitioner stated "several different times" that he was "confident with Mr. English." App. 411, 437.
The weekend before trial, however, petitioner changed his mind. He asked the trial court to replace English, and English asked for permission to withdraw. Petitioner stated that he had secured substitute counsel, but he was unable to provide the name of this new counsel, and no new attorney ever appeared. The court refused these requests and also denied petitioner's last-minute request to represent himself. (Petitioner does not challenge these decisions here.) So petitioner and English were stuck with each other, and petitioner availed himself of his right to take the stand to tell his wild story. Under those circumstances, what was English supposed to do?
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that English could not have put on petitioner's desired defense without violating state ethics rules, see 218 So.3d, at 564-565, but this Court effectively overrules the state court on this issue of state law, ante, at 1509 - 1510. However, even if it is assumed that the Court is correct on this ethics issue, the result of mounting petitioner's conspiracy defense almost certainly would have been disastrous. That approach stood no chance of winning an acquittal and would have severely damaged English's credibility in the eyes of the jury, thus undermining his ability to argue effectively against the imposition of a death sentence at the penalty phase of the trial. As English observed, taking that path would have only "help[ed] the District Attorney send [petitioner] to the death chamber." App. 396. (In Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 191-192, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004), this Court made essentially the same point.) So, again, what was English supposed to do?
When pressed at oral argument before this Court, petitioner's current counsel eventually provided an answer: English was not required to take any affirmative steps to support petitioner's bizarre defense, but instead of conceding that petitioner shot the victims, English should have ignored that element entirely. Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-23. So the fundamental right supposedly violated in this case comes down to the difference between the two statements set out below.
Constitutional : "First-degree murder requires proof both that the accused killed the victim and that he acted with the intent to kill. I submit to you that my client did not have the intent required for conviction for that offense."
Unconstitutional : "First-degree murder requires proof both that the accused killed the victim and that he acted with the intent to kill. I admit that my client shot and killed the victims, but I submit to you that he did not have the intent required for conviction for that offense."
The practical difference between these two statements is negligible. If English had conspicuously refrained from endorsing petitioner's story and had based his defense solely on petitioner's dubious mental condition, the jury would surely have gotten the message that English was essentially conceding that petitioner killed the victims. But according to petitioner's current attorney, the difference is fundamental. The first formulation, he admits, is perfectly fine. The latter, on the other hand, is a violation so egregious that the defendant's conviction must be reversed even if there is no chance that the misstep caused any harm. It is no wonder that the Court declines to embrace this argument and instead turns to an issue that the case at hand does not actually present.
II
The constitutional right that the Court has now discovered-a criminal defendant's right to insist that his attorney contest his guilt with respect to all charged offenses-is like a rare plant that blooms every decade or so. Having made its first appearance today, the right is unlikely to figure in another case for many years to come. Why is this so?
First, it is hard to see how the right could come into play in any case other than a capital case in which the jury must decide both guilt and punishment. In all other cases, guilt is almost always the only issue for the jury, and therefore admitting guilt of all charged offenses will achieve nothing. It is hard to imagine a situation in which a competent attorney might take that approach. So the right that the Court has discovered is effectively confined to capital cases.
Second, few rational defendants facing a possible death sentence are likely to insist on contesting guilt where there is no real chance of acquittal and where admitting guilt may improve the chances of avoiding execution. Indeed, under such circumstances, the odds are that a rational defendant will plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence. By the same token, an attorney is unlikely to insist on admitting guilt over the defendant's objection unless the attorney believes that contesting guilt would be futile. So the right is most likely to arise in cases involving irrational capital defendants.
Third, where a capital defendant and his retained attorney cannot agree on a basic trial strategy, the attorney and client will generally part ways unless, as in this case, the court is not apprised until the eve of trial. The client will then either search for another attorney or decide to represent himself. So the field of cases in which this right might arise is limited further still-to cases involving irrational capital defendants who disagree with their
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, Central Hardware Co. (Central), owns and operates two retail' hardware stores in Indianapolis, Indiana. Each store is housed in a large building, containing 70,000 square feet of floor space, and housing no other retail establishments. The stores are surrounded on three sides by ample parking facilities, accommodating approximately 350 automobiles. The parking lots are owned by Central, and are . maintained solely for the use of Central’s customers and employees. While there are other retail establishments in the vicin-. ity of Central’s stores, these establishments are not a part of a shopping center complex, and they maintain their own separate parking lots. . .
Approximately a week before Central opened its stores, the Retail Clerks Union, Local 725, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIÓ (the Union), began an organization campaign at both stores. The campaign consisted primarily of solicitation by nonemployee Union organizers on Central’s parking lots. The nonemployee organizers confronted Central’s employees in the parking lots and- sought to persuade them to sign cards authorizing the Union to represent them in an appropriate bargaining unit. As a part of the organization campaign, an “undercover agent for the Union” was infiltrated into the employ of Central, receiving full-time salary from both the Union and the company. This agent solicited employees to join the Union, and obtained a list of the employees of the two stores which was about 80% complete.
Central had a no-solicitation rule which it enforced against all solicitational activities in its stores and on its parking lots. A number of employees complained to Central’s local, management that they were being harassed by the organizers, and these complaints were forwarded to Central’s corporate headquarters in St. Louis, Missouri. The St. Louis officials directed the Indianapolis management to enforce the nonemployee no-solicitation rule and keep all Union organizers off the company premises, including the parking lots. Although most of the nonemployee Union organizers had either left Indianapolis or ceased work on the Central organization campaign, the Indianapolis management had occasion to assert the nonemployee no-solicitation rule on several occasions.
One arrest was made when a field organizer, for the Union was confronted by the manager of one of the stores on its parking lot, and refused to leave after being requested to do so. The field organizer asserted, that he was a “customer” and. insisted upon entering the store. The police were called, and when the organizer persisted in his refusal to leave, he was arrested.
Shortly after Central received complaints from its employees as to harassment by the organizers, Central filed unfair labor* practice charges against the Union. The Union subsequently filed unfair labor practice charges against Central. After an investigation, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) dismissed Central’s charges against the Union, and issued a complaint against Central on the Unio'n’s ch'arges.-
The Board held that . Central’s nonemployee no-solicitation rule was overly broad, and that its enforcement violated §8 (a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board reasoned that the character and use of Central’s parking lots distinguished the case from NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105 (1056),. and brought it within the principle of Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U. S. 308 (1968).. 181 N. L. R. B. 491 (1970). A divided Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed, and ordered enforcement of the Board’s order enjoining Central from enforcing any rule prohibiting nonemployee Union organizers from using its parking lots to solicit employees on behalf of the Union. 439 F. 2d 1321 (1971). We granted certiorari to consider whether the principle of Logan Valley is applicable to this case. 404 U. S. 1014 (1972). We conclude that it is not.
I
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 29 U. S. C. § 157, guarantees to employees the'right “to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations.” This guarantee includes both the right of union officials to discuss organization with employees, and the right of employees to discuss organization among themselves. Section 8 (a)(1) of the Act, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a)(1), makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed” in § 7. But organization rights are not viable in a vacuum; their effectiveness depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages and dis-' advantages of organization from others. Early in the history of the administration of the Act the Board recognized the importance of freedom of communication to the free exercise of organization rights. See Peyton Packing Co., 49 N. L. R. B. 828 (1943), enforced, 142 F. 2d 1009 (CA3), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 730 (1944).
In seeking to provide information essential to the free exercise of organization rights, union organizers have often éngaged in .conduct inconsistent with traditional notions of private property rights. The Board and the courts have the duty to resolve conflicts between organization rights and property rights, and to seek a proper accommodation between the two. This Court addressed the conflict which often arises between organization rights and property rights in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105 (1956). The Babcock & Wilcox Co. operated a manufacturing plant on a 100-acre tract about one mile from a community of 21,000 people. The plant buildings were enclosed within a fence, employee access being through several gates. Approximately 90% of the employees drove to work in' private cars, and the company maintained a parking lot for the employees. Only employees and deliverymen normally' used the parking lot. The company had a rule forbidding the distribution of literature on company property. The Board found that the company’s parking lot and the walkway leading from it to the plant entrance were the only “safe and practicable” places in the vicinity of the plant for distribution of union literature, and held the company guilty of an unfair labor practice for enforcing the no-distribution rule and thereby denying union organizers limited access to company property. The Board ordered the company to rescind its no-distribution rule insofar as it related to nonemployee union representatives seeking to distribute union literature on the parking lot and walkway area.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused enforcement of the Board’s order on the ground that the Act did not authorize the Board to impose a servitude . on an employer’s' property where no employee was involved. This- Court affirmed on the ground that the availability of alternative channels of communication made the intrusion on the employer’s property rights ordered by the Board unwarranted. The Court in Bab-cock stated the guiding principle for adjusting conflicts between § 7 rights and property rights:
“Organization rights are granted to workers by the same authority,'the National Government, that preserves property rights. Accommodation between the two must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other. The employer may not affirmatively interfere with organization; the union may not always insist that the employer aid organization. But when the inaccessibility of employees makes ineffective the reasonable attempts by nonemployees to communicate with them through the usual channels, the right to exclude from property has been required to yield to the extent needed to permit communication of information on the right to organize.” 351 U. S., at 112.
The principle of Babcock is limited to this accommodation between organization rights, and property rights. This principle requires a “yielding” of property rights only in the context of an organization campaign. Moreover, the allowed intrusion on property rights is limited to that necessary to facilitate the exercise of employees’ § 7 rights. After the requisite need for access to the employer’s property has been shown, the access is limited to (i) union organizers; (ii) prescribed non working areas of the employer’s premises; and (iii) the duration of organization activity. In short, the principle of accommodation announced in Babcock is limited to labor organization campaigns, and the “yielding” of property rights it may require is both temporary and minimal.
II
The principle applied in Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U. S. 308 (1968), is quite different. While it is true that Logan Valley involved labor picketing, the decision rests on constitutional grounds; it is not a § 7 case.
Logan Valley had its genesis in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946). Marsh involved a “company town,” an economic anachronism rarely encountered today. The town was wholly owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corp., yet it had all of the characteristics of any other American town. Gulf Shipbuilding held title to all the land in the town, including that covered by streets and sidewalks. Gulf Shipbuilding also provided municipal services, such as sewerage service and police protection, to the residents of the town. A Jehovah’s Witness undertook to distribute religious literature on a sidewalk near the post office in the “business block” of the town, and was arrested on a trespassing charge. She was subsequently convicted of the crime of trespassing, and the Alabama courts upheld the conviction on appeal. This Court reversed, holding that Alabama could not permit a corporation to assume the functions of a municipal government and at the same time deny First Amendment rights through the application of the State’s criminal trespass law.
In Logan Valley, over a strong dissent by Mr. Justice Black, the author of Marsh,. the Court applied the reasoning of Marsh to a modern economic phenomenon, the shoppihg center complex. The Logan Valley Mall was a complex of retail establishments, which the Court regarded under the factual circumstances as the functional equivalent of the “community business block” of the company town in Marsh. The corporate owner of Logan Valley Mall obtained a state court injunction against peaceful picketing on the shopping center-property, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the issuance of the injunction on the ground that the picketing constituted a trespass on private property. This Court reversed, holding that Pennsylvania could not “delegate the power, through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members of the public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant with the use to which the property is actually put.” 391 U. S., at 319-320.
III
The Board and the Court of Appeals held that Logan Valley rather than Babcock controlled this case. The Board asserts that the distinguishing feature between these two cases is that in Logan Valley the owner had “diluted his property interest by opening his property to the general public for his own economic advantage.” The emphasis, both in the argument on behalf of the jBoard and in the opinion below, is on the opening of the property “to the general public.”
This analysis misconceives the rationale of Logan Valley. Logan Valley involved a large commercial shopping center which the Court found had displaced, in certain relevant respects, the functions of the normal municipal “business block.” First and Fourteenth Amendment free-speech rights were deemed infringed under the facts of that case when the property owner invoked the trespass laws of the State against the pickets.
Before an owner of private property can be.subjected to the commands of the First and Fourteenth Amendments the privately owned property must assume to some significant degree the functional attributes of public property devoted to public use. The First and Fourteenth Amendments are limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of private property used only for private purposes. The only fact relied upon for the argument that Central's parking lots have acquired the characteristics of a public municipal facility is that they are “open to the public.”. Such an argument could be made with respect to almost every retail and service establishment in the country, regardless of size or location. To accept it would cut Logan Valley entirely away from its roots in Marsh. It would also constitute an unwarranted infringement of long-settled rights of private property protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We hold that the Board and the Court of Appeals erred in applying Logan Valley to this case.
The . Trial. Examiner concluded that no reasonable means of communication with employees were available to the nonemployee Union organizers other than solicitation in Central's parking lots. The Board adopted this conclusion. Central vigorously contends that this conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. The Court of Appeals did not consider this contention, because it viewed Logan Valley controlling rather than Babcock. The determination whether on the record as a whole there is substantial evidence to support agency findings is a matter entrusted primarily to the courts of appeals. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U. S. 474 (1951). Since the Court Appeals has not yet Considered this question in. light the principles of NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., supra, the judgment is vacated, and the case will be remanded that court for such consideration.
is so ordered.
See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 533-534 (1945).
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 N. L. R. B. 485, 486 (1954).
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 222 F. 2d 316 (CA5 1955).
Brief for the NLRB 20.
439 F. 2d, at 1326-1328.
For a full discussion of Logan Valley and the- circumstances in which it is applicable, see the decision of the Court today in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, post, p. 551.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
G
|
sc_issuearea
|
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