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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
DNA testing has an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty. It has the potential to significantly improve both the criminal justice system and police investigative practices. The Federal Government and the States have recognized this, and have developed special approaches to ensure that this evidentiary tool can be effectively incorporated into established criminal procedure — usually but not always through legislation.
Against this prompt and considered response, the respondent, William Osborne, proposes a different approach: the recognition of a freestanding and far-reaching constitutional right of access to this new type of evidence. The nature of what he seeks is confirmed by his decision to file this lawsuit in federal court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, not within the state criminal justice system. This approach would take the development of rules and procedures in this area out of the hands of legislatures and state courts shaping policy in a focused manner and turn it over to federal courts applying the broad parameters of the Due Process Clause. There is no reason to constitutionalize the issue in this way. Because the decision below would do just that, we reverse.
I
A
This lawsuit arose out of a violent crime committed 16 years ago, which has resulted in a long string of litigation in the state and federal courts. On the evening of March 22, 1993, two men driving through Anchorage, Alaska, solicited sex from a female prostitute, K. G. She agreed to perform fellatio on both men for $100 and got in their ear. The three spent some time looking for a place to stop and ended up in a deserted area near Earthquake Park. When K. G. demanded payment in advance, the two men pulled out a gun and forced her to perform fellatio on the driver while the passenger penetrated her vaginally, using a blue condom she had brought. The passenger then ordered K. G. out of the car and told her to lie face-down in the snow. Fearing for her life, she refused, and the two men choked her and beat her with the gun. When K. G. tried to flee, the passenger beat her with a wooden axe handle and shot her in the head while she lay on the ground. They kicked some snow on top of her and left her for dead. 521 F. 3d 1118,1122 (CA9 2008) (case below); Osborne v. State, 163 P. 3d 973, 975-976 (Alaska App. 2007) (Osborne II); App. 27, 42-44.
K. G. did not die; the bullet had only grazed her head. Once the two men left, she found her way back to the road, and flagged down a passing car to take her home. Ultimately, she received medical care and spoke to the police. At the scene of the crime, the police recovered a spent shell easing, the axe handle, some of K. G.’s clothing stained with blood, and the blue condom. Jackson v. State, No. A-5276 etc. (Alaska App., Feb. 7, 1996), App. to Pet. for Cert. 117a.
Six days later, two military police officers at Fort Richardson pulled over Dexter Jackson for flashing his headlights at another vehicle. In his car they discovered a gun (which matched the shell casing), as well as several items K. G. had been carrying the night of the attack. Id., at 116a, 118a-119a. The car also matched the description K. G. had given to the police. Jackson admitted that he had been the driver during the rape and assault, and told the police that William Osborne had been his passenger. 521 F. 3d, at 1122-1123; 423 F. 3d 1050, 1051-1052 (CA9 2005); Osborne v. State, 110 P. 3d 986, 990 (Alaska App. 2005) (Osborne I). Other evidence also implicated Osborne. K. G. picked out his photograph (with some uncertainty) and at trial she identified Osborne as her attacker. Other witnesses testified that shortly before the crime, Osborne had called Jackson from an arcade, and then driven off with him. An axe handle similar to the one at the scene of the crime was found in Osborne’s room on the military base where he lived.
The State also performed DQ Alpha testing on sperm found in the blue condom. DQ Alpha testing is a relatively inexact form of DNA testing that can clear some wrongly accused individuals, but generally cannot narrow the perpetrator down to less than 5% of the population. See Dept, of Justice, National Comm’n on the Future of DNA Evidence, The Future of Forensic DNA Testing 17 (NCJ 183697, 2000) (hereinafter Future of Forensic DNA Testing); Dept, of Justice, National Comm’n on the Future of DNA Evidence, Post-conviction DNA Testing: Recommendations for Handling Requests 27 (NCJ 177626, 1999) (hereinafter Postconvietion DNA Testing). The semen found on the condom had a genotype that matched a blood sample taken from Osborne, but not ones from Jackson, K. G., or a third suspect named James Hunter. Osborne is black, and approximately 16% of black individuals have such a genotype. App. 117-119. In other words, the testing ruled out Jackson and Hunter as possible sources of the semen, and also ruled out over 80% of other black individuals. The State also examined some pubic hairs found at the scene of the crime, which were not susceptible to DQ Alpha testing, but which state witnesses attested to be similar to Osborne’s. App. to Pet. for Cert. 117a.
B
Osborne and Jackson were convicted by an Alaska jury of kidnaping, assault, and sexual assault. They were acquitted of an additional count of sexual assault and of attempted murder. Finding it “‘nearly miraculous’” that K. G. had survived, the trial judge sentenced Osborne to 26 years in prison, with 5 suspended. Id., at 128a. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Id., at 113a-130a.
Osborne then sought postconviction relief in Alaska state court. He claimed that he had asked his attorney, Sidney Billingslea, to seek more discriminating restriction-fragment-length-polymorphism (RFLP) DNA testing during trial, and argued that she was constitutionally ineffective for not doing so. Billingslea testified that after investigation, she had concluded that further testing would do more harm than good. She planned to mount a defense of mistaken identity, and thought that the imprecision of the DQ Alpha test gave her “ ‘very good numbers in a mistaken identity, cross-racial identification case, where the victim was in the dark and had bad eyesight.’” Osborne 1, 110 P. 3d, at 990. Because she believed Osborne was guilty, “‘insisting on a more advanced... DNA test would have served to prove that Osborne committed the alleged crimes.’” Ibid. The Alaska Court of Appeals concluded that Billingslea’s decision had been strategic and rejected Osborne’s claim. Id., at 991-992.
In this proceeding, Osborne also sought the DNA testing that Billingslea had failed to perform, relying on an Alaska postconviction statute, Alaska Stat. §12.72 (2008), and the State and Federal Constitutions. In two decisions, the Alaska Court of Appeals concluded that Osborne had no right to the RFLP test. According to the court, § 12.72 “apparently” did not apply to DNA testing that had been available at trial. Osborne I, 110 P. 3d, at 992-993. The court found no basis in our precedents for recognizing a federal constitutional right to DNA evidence. Id., at 993. After a remand for further findings, the Alaska Court of Appeals concluded that Osborne could not claim a state constitutional right either, because the other evidence of his guilt was too strong and RFLP testing was not likely to be conclusive. Osborne II, 163 P. 3d, at 979-981. Two of the three judges wrote separately to say that “[i]f Osborne could show that he were in fact innocent, it would be unconscionable to punish him,” and that doing so might violate the Alaska Constitution. Id., at 984-985 (Mannheimer, J., concurring).
The court relied heavily on the fact that Osborne had confessed to some of his crimes in a 2004 application for parole— in which it is a crime to lie. Id., at 978-979, 981 (majority opinion) (citing Alaska Stat. §11.56.210 (2002)). In this statement, Osborne acknowledged forcing K. G. to have sex at gunpoint, as well as beating her and covering her with snow. 163 P. 3d, at 977-978, n. 11. He repeated this confession before the parole board. Despite this acceptance of responsibility, the board did not grant him discretionary parole. App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a. In 2007, he was released on mandatory parole, but he has since been rearrested for another offense, and the State has petitioned to revoke this parole. Brief for Petitioners 7, n. 3.
Meanwhile, Osborne had also been active in federal court, suing state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. He claimed that the Due Process Clause and other constitutional provisions gave him a constitutional right to access the DNA evidence for what is known as short-tandem-repeat (STR) testing (at his own expense). App. 24. This form of testing is more discriminating than the DQ Alpha or RFLP methods available at the time of Osborne’s trial. The District Court first dismissed the claim under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994), holding it “inescapable” that Osborne sought to “set the stage” for an attack on his conviction, and therefore “must proceed through a writ of habeas corpus.” App. 207 (internal quotation marks omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that § 1983 was the proper vehicle for Osborne’s claims, while “expressing] no opinion as to whether Osborne ha[d] been deprived of a federally protected right.” 423 F. 3d, at 1056.
On cross-motions for summary judgment after remand, the District Court concluded that “there does exist, under the unique and specific facts presented, a very limited constitutional right to the testing sought.” 445 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1081 (2006) (some emphasis deleted). The court relied on several factors: that the testing Osborne sought had been unavailable at trial, that the testing could be accomplished at almost no cost to the State, and that the results were likely to be material. Id., at 1081-1082. It therefore granted summary judgment in favor of Osborne.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on the prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory evidence recognized in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U. S. 39 (1987), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). While acknowledging that our precedents “involved only the right to pre-trial disclosure,” the court concluded that the Due Process Clause also “extends the government’s duty to disclose (or the defendant’s right of access) to post-conviction proceedings.” 521 F. 3d, at 1128. Although Osborne’s trial and appeals were over, the court noted that he had a “potentially viable” state constitutional claim of “actual innocence,” id., at 1130, and relied on the “well-established assumption” that a similar claim arose under the Federal Constitution, id., at 1131; cf. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390 (1993). The court held that these potential claims extended some of the State’s Brady obligations to the postconviction context.
The court declined to decide the details of what showing must be made to access the evidence because it found “Osborne’s case for disclosure... so strong on the facts” that “[wjherever the bar is, he crosses it.” 521 F. 3d, at 1134. While acknowledging that Osborne’s prior confessions were “certainly relevant,” the court concluded that they did not “necessarily trum[p]... the right to obtain post-conviction access to evidence” in light of the “emerging reality of wrongful convictions based on false confessions.” Id., at 1140.
We granted certiorari to decide whether Osborne’s claims could be pursued using § 1983, and whether he has a right under the Due Process Clause to obtain postconviction access to the State’s evidence for DNA testing. 555 U. S. 992 (2008); Pet. for Cert. i. We now reverse on the latter ground.
II
Modern DNA testing can provide powerful new evidence unlike anything known before. Since its first use in criminal investigations in the mid-1980s, there have been several major advances in DNA technology, culminating in STR technology. It is now often possible to determine whether a biological tissue matches a suspect with near certainty. While of course many criminal trials proceed without any forensic and scientific testing at all, there is no technology comparable to DNA testing for matching tissues when such evidence is at issue. Postconviction DNA Testing 1-2; Future of Forensic DNA Testing 13-14. DNA testing has exonerated wrongly convicted people, and has confirmed the convictions of many others.
At the same time, DNA testing alone does not always resolve a case. Where there is enough other incriminating evidence and an explanation for the DNA result, science alone cannot prove a prisoner innocent. See House v. Bell, 547 U. S. 518, 540-548 (2006). The availability of technologies not available at trial cannot mean that every criminal conviction, or even every criminal conviction involving biological evidence, is suddenly in doubt. The dilemma is how to harness DNA’s power to prove innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the established system of criminal justice.
That task belongs primarily to the legislature. “[T]he States are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful examinations,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 719 (1997), of how to ensure the fair and effective use of this testing within the existing criminal justice framework. Forty-six States have already enacted statutes dealing specifically with access to DNA evidence. See generally Brief for State of California et al. as Amici Curiae 3-13; Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1629, 1719 (2008) (surveying state statutes); see also An Act to Improve the Preservation and Accessibility of Biological Evidence, Mississippi S. 2709 (enacted March 16, 2009); An Act to Provide for DNA Testing for Certain Inmates for the Purposes of Determining Whether They May Have Been Wrongfully Convicted, South Dakota H. R. 1166 (enacted March 11, 2009). The State of Alaska itself is considering joining them. See An Act Relating to Post-conviction DNA Testing, H. 174, 26th Leg., 1st Sess. (2009) (proposed legislation similar to that enacted by the States). The Federal Government has also passed the Innocence Protection Act of 2004, §411, 118 Stat. 2278, codified in part at 18 U. S. C. § 3600, which allows federal prisoners to move for court-ordered DNA testing under certain specified conditions. That Act also grants money to States that enact comparable statutes, §413, 118 Stat. 2285, note following 42 U. S. C. § 14136, and as a consequence has served as a model for some state legislation. At oral argument, Osborne agreed that the federal statute is a model for how States ought to handle the issue. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33, 38-39; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19-26 (defending constitutionality of Innocence Protection Act).
These laws recognize the value of DNA evidence but also the need for certain conditions on access to the State’s evidence. A requirement of demonstrating materiality is common, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3600(a)(8), but it is not the only one. The federal statute, for example, requires a sworn statement that the applicant is innocent. § 3600(a)(1). This requirement is replicated in several state statutes. E. g., Cal. Penal Code Ann. §§ 1405(b)(1), (c)(1) (West Supp. 2009); Fla. Stat. §925.11(2)(a)(3) (2007); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651-D:2(I)(b) (West 2007); S. C. Code Ann. §17-28-40 (Supp. 2008). States also impose a range of diligence requirements. Several require the requested testing to “have been technologically impossible at trial.” Garrett, supra, at 1681, and n. 242. Others deny testing to those who declined testing at trial for tactical reasons. E. g., Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-301(4) (Lexis 2008).
Alaska is one of a handful of States yet to enact legislation specifically addressing the issue of evidence requested for DNA testing. But that does not mean that such evidence is unavailable for those seeking to prove their innocence. Instead, Alaska courts are addressing how to apply existing laws for discovery and postconviction relief to this novel technology. See Osborne I, 110 P. 3d, at 992-993; Patterson v. State, No. A-8814, 2006 WL 573797, *4 (Alaska App., Mar. 8, 2006). The same is true with respect to other States that do not have DNA-specific statutes. E.g., Fagan v. State, 957 So. 2d 1159 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). Cf. Mass. Rule Crim. Proc. 30(c)(4) (2009).
First, access to evidence is available under Alaska law for those who seek to subject it to newly available DNA testing that will prove them to be actually innocent. Under the State’s general postconviction relief statute, a prisoner may challenge his conviction when “there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard by the court, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice.” Alaska Stat. § 12.72.010(4) (2008). Such a claim is exempt from otherwise applicable time limits if “newly discovered evidence,” pursued with due diligence, “establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant is innocent.” § 12.72.020(b)(2).
Both parties agree that under these provisions of § 12.72, “a defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief if the defendant presents newly discovered evidence that establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is innocent.” Osborne I, supra, at 992 (internal quotation marks omitted). If such a claim is brought, state law permits general discovery. See Alaska Rule Crim. Proc. 35.1(g) (2008-2009). Alaska courts have explained that these procedures are available to request DNA evidence for newly available testing to establish actual innocence. See Patterson, supra, at *4 (“If Patterson had brought the DNA analysis request as part of his previous application for [postconviction] relief... he would have been able to request production of evidence”).
In addition to this statutory procedure, the Alaska Court of Appeals has invoked a widely accepted three-part test to govern additional rights to DNA access under the State Constitution. Osborne II, 163 P. 3d, at 974-975. Drawing on the experience with DNA evidence of State Supreme Courts around the country, the Court of Appeals explained that it was “reluctant to hold that Alaska law offers no remedy to defendants who could prove their factual innocence.” Osborne 1, 110 P. 3d, at 995; see id., at 995, n. 27 (citing decisions from other state courts). It was “prepared to hold, however, that a defendant who seeks post-conviction DNA testing... must show (1) that the conviction rested primarily on eyewitness identification evidence, (2) that there was a demonstrable doubt concerning the defendant’s identification as the perpetrator, and (3) that scientific testing would likely be conclusive on this issue.” Id., at 995. Thus, the Alaska courts have suggested that even those who do not get discovery under the State’s criminal rules have available to them a safety valve under the State Constitution.
This is the background against which the Federal Court of Appeals ordered the State to turn over the DNA evidence in its possession, and it is our starting point in analyzing Osborne’s constitutional claims.
Ill
The parties dispute whether Osborne has invoked the proper federal statute in bringing his claim. He sued under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, which gives a cause of action to those who challenge a State’s “deprivation of any rights... secured by the Constitution.” The State insists that Osborne’s claim must be brought under 28 U. S. C. § 2254, which allows a prisoner to seek “a writ of habeas corpus... on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution.”
While Osborne’s claim falls within the literal terms of § 1983, we have also recognized that § 1983 must be read in harmony with the habeas statute. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Heck, 512 U. S., at 487. “Stripped to its essence,” the State says, “Osborne’s § 1983 action is nothing more than a request for evidence to support a hypothetical claim that he is actually innocent.... [T]his hypothetical claim sounds at the core of habeas corpus.” Brief for Petitioners 19.
Osborne responds that his claim does not sound in habeas at all. Although invalidating his conviction is of course his ultimate goal, giving him the evidence he seeks “would not necessarily imply the invalidity of [his] confinement.” Brief for Respondent 21. If he prevails, he would receive only access to the DNA, and even if DNA testing exonerates him, his conviction is not automatically invalidated. He must bring an entirely separate suit or a petition for clemency to invalidate his conviction. If he were proved innocent, the State might also release him on its own initiative, avoiding any need to pursue habeas at all.
Osborne also invokes our recent decision in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74 (2005). There, we held that prisoners who sought new hearings for parole eligibility and suitability need not proceed in habeas. We acknowledged that the two plaintiffs “hope[d]” their suits would “help bring about earlier release,” id., at 78, but concluded that the §1983 suit would not accomplish that without further proceedings. “Because neither prisoner’s claim would necessarily spell speedier release, neither l[ay] at the core of habeas corpus.” Id., at 82 (internal quotation marks omitted). Every Court of Appeals to consider the question since Dotson has decided that because access to DNA evidence similarly does not “necessarily spell speedier release,” ibid., it can be sought under § 1983. See 423 F. 3d, at 1055-1056; Savory v. Lyons, 469 F. 3d 667, 672 (CA7 2006); McKithen v. Brown, 481 F. 3d 89, 103, and n. 15 (CA2 2007). On the other hand, the State argues that Dotson is distinguishable because the challenged procedures in that case did not affect the ultimate “exercise of discretion by the parole board.” Brief for Petitioners 32. It also maintains that Dotson does not set forth “the exclusive test for whether a prisoner may proceed under § 1983.” Brief for Petitioners 32.
While we granted certiorari on this question, our resolution of Osborne’s claims does not require us to resolve this difficult issue. Accordingly, we will assume without deciding that the Court of Appeals was correct that Heck does not bar Osborne’s § 1983 claim. Even under this assumption, it was wrong to find a due process violation.
IV
A
“No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 1; accord, Amdt. 5. This Clause imposes procedural limitations on a State’s power to take away protected entitlements. See, e. g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U. S. 220, 226-239 (2006). Osborne argues that access to the State’s evidence is a “process” needed to vindicate his right to prove himself innocent and get out of jail. Process is not an end in itself, so a necessary premise of this argument is that he has an entitlement (what our precedents call a “liberty interest”) to prove his innocence even after a fair trial has proved otherwise. We must first examine this asserted liberty interest to determine what process (if any) is due. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 570-571 (1972); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U. S. 238, 250-251 (1983).
In identifying his potential liberty interest, Osborne first attempts to rely on the Governor’s constitutional authority to “grant pardons, commutations, and reprieves.” Alaska Const., Art. Ill, §21. That claim can be readily disposed of. We have held that noncapital defendants do not have a liberty interest in traditional state executive clemency, to which no particular claimant is entitled as a matter of state law. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U. S. 458, 464 (1981). Osborne therefore cannot challenge the constitutionality of any procedures available to vindicate an interest in state clemency.
Osborne does, however, have a liberty interest in demonstrating his innocence with new evidence under state law. As explained, Alaska law provides that those who use “newly discovered evidence” to “establis[h] by clear and convincing evidence that [they are] innocent” may obtain “vacation of [their] conviction or sentence in the interest of justice.” Alaska Stat. §§ 12.72.020(b)(2), 12.72.010(4). This “state-created right can, in some circumstances, beget yet other rights to procedures essential to the realization of the parent right.” Dumschat, supra, at 463; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556-558 (1974).
The Court of Appeals went too far, however, in concluding that the Due Process Clause requires that certain familiar preeonviction trial rights be extended to protect Osborne’s postconviction liberty interest. After identifying Osborne’s possible liberty interests, the court concluded that the State had an obligation to comply with the principles of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83. In that case, we held that due process requires a prosecutor to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defendant before trial. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that nothing in our precedents suggested that this disclosure obligation continued after the defendant was convicted and the case was closed, 521 F. 3d, at 1128, but it relied on prior Ninth Circuit precedent applying “Brady as a post-conviction right,” ibid, (citing Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F. 2d 746, 749-750 (1992)). Osborne does not claim that Brady controls this case, Brief for Respondent 39-40, and with good reason.
A criminal defendant proved guilty after a fair trial does not have the same liberty interests as a free man. At trial, the defendant is presumed innocent and may demand that the government prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. But. “[o]nee a defendant has been afforded a fair trial and convicted of the offense for which he was charged, the presumption of innocence disappears.” Herrera, 506 U. S., at 399. “Given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty.” Dumschat, supra, at 464 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
The State accordingly has more flexibility in deciding what procedures are needed in the context of postconviction relief. “[W]hen a State chooses to offer help to those seeking relief from convictions,” due process does not “dictat[e] the exact form such assistance must assume.” Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U. S. 551, 559 (1987). Osborne’s right to due process is not parallel to a trial right, but rather must be analyzed in light of the fact that he has already been found guilty at a fair trial, and has only a limited interest in postconviction relief. Brady is the wrong framework.
Instead, the question is whether consideration of Osborne’s claim within the framework of the State’s procedures for postconviction relief “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” or “transgresses any recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation.” Medina v. California, 505 U. S. 437, 446, 448 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Herrera, supra, at 407-408 (applying Medina to postconviction relief for actual innocence); Finley, supra, at 556 (postconviction relief procedures are constitutional if they “compor[t] with fundamental fairness”). Federal courts may upset a State’s postconviction relief procedures only if they are fundamentally inadequate to vindicate the substantive rights provided.
We see nothing inadequate about the procedures Alaska has provided to vindicate its state right to postconviction relief in general, and nothing inadequate about how those procedures apply to those who seek access to DNA evidence. Alaska provides a substantive right to be released on a sufficiently compelling showing of new evidence that establishes innocence. It exempts such claims from otherwise applicable time limits. The State provides for discovery in postconviction proceedings, and has — through judicial decision — specified that this discovery procedure is available to those seeking access to DNA evidence. Patterson, 2006 WL 573797, *4. These procedures are not without limits. The evidence must indeed be newly available to qualify under Alaska’s statute, must have been diligently pursued, and must also be sufficiently material. These procedures are similar to those provided for DNA evidence by federal law and the law of other States, see, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 3600(a), and they are not inconsistent with the “traditions and conscience of our people” or with “any recognized principle of fundamental fairness,” Medina, supra, at 446, 448 (internal quotation marks omitted).
And there is more. While the Alaska courts have not had occasion to conclusively decide the question, the Alaska Court of Appeals has suggested that the State Constitution provides an additional right of access to DNA. In expressing its “reluctante] to hold that Alaska law offers no remedy” to those who belatedly seek DNA testing, and in invoking the three-part test used by other state courts, the court indicated that in an appropriate case the State Constitution may provide a failsafe even for those who cannot satisfy the statutory requirements under general postconviction procedures. Osborne I, 110 P. 3d, at 995-996.
To the degree there is some uncertainty in the details of Alaska’s newly developing procedures for obtaining postconviction access to DNA, we can hardly fault the State for that. Osborne has brought this §1983 action without ever using these procedures in filing a state or federal habeas claim relying on actual innocence. In other words, he has not tried to use the process provided to him by the State or attempted to vindicate the liberty interest that is now the centerpiece of his claim. When Osborne did request DNA testing in state court, he sought RFLP testing that had been available at trial, not the STR testing he now seeks, and the state court relied on that fact in denying him testing under Alaska law. Id., at 992 (“[T]he DNA testing that Osborne proposes to perform on this evidence existed at the time of Osborne’s trial”); Osborne II, 163 P. 3d, at 984 (Mannheimer, J., concurring) (“[T]he DNA testing [Osborne] proposes would not yield ‘new evidence’ for purposes of... [Alaska Stat. §12.72.010]” because it was “available at the time of Osborne’s trial”).
His attempt to sidestep state process through a new federal lawsuit puts Osborne in a very awkward position. If he simply seeks the DNA through the State’s discovery procedures, he might well get it. If he does not, it may be for a perfectly adequate reason, just as the federal statute and all state statutes impose conditions and limits on access to DNA evidence. It is difficult to criticize the State’s procedures when Osborne has not invoked them. This is not to say that Osborne must exhaust state-law remedies. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 500-501 (1982). But it is Osborne’s burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of the state-law procedures available to him in state postconviction relief. Cf. Medina, supra, at 453. These procedures are adequate on their face, and without trying them, Osborne can hardly complain that they do not work in practice.
As a fallback, Osborne also obliquely relies on an asserted federal constitutional right to be released upon proof of “actual innocence.” Whether such a federal right exists is an open question. We have struggled with it over the years, in some cases assuming, arguendo, that it exists while also noting the difficult questions such a right would pose and the high standard any claimant would have to meet. House, 547 U. S., at 554-555; Herrera, 506 U. S., at 398-417; see also id., at 419-421 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id., at 427-428 (SCALIA, J., concurring); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 159, n. 87 (1970). In this case too we can assume without deciding that such a claim exists, because even if so there is no due process problem. Osborne does not dispute that a federal actual innocence claim (as opposed to a DNA access claim) would be brought in habeas. Brief for Respondent 22-24. If such a habeas claim is viable, federal procedural rules permit discovery “for good cause.” 28 U. S. C. §2254 Rule 6; Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U. S. 899, 908-909 (1997). Just as with state law, Osborne cannot show that available discovery is facially inadequate, and cannot show that it would be arbitrarily denied to him.
B
The Court of Appeals below relied only
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 11(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSAor Act), 52Stat. 1066, 29 U. S. C. § 211(a), authorizes the Secretary of Labor to investigate and gather data regarding wages, hours, and other conditions of employment to determine whether an employer is violating the Act. Section 9 of the FLSA, 29 U. S. C. § 209, empowers the Secretary of Labor to subpoena witnesses and documentary evidence relating to any matter under investigation. Pursuant to those provisions, an official of the Department of Labor served an administrative subpoena duces tecum on an employee of appellee Lone Steer, Inc., a motel and restaurant located in Steele, N. D. The subpoena directed an officer or agent of appellee with personal knowledge of appellee’s records to appear at the Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor in Bismarck, N. D., and to produce certain payroll and sales records. In an action filed by appellee to challenge the validity of the subpoena, the District Court for the District of North Dakota held that, although the Secretary of Labor had complied with the applicable provisions of the PLSA in issuing the subpoena, enforcement of the subpoena would violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution because the Secretary had not previously obtained a judicial warrant. We noted probable jurisdiction of the Secretary’s appeal, 462 U. S. 1105 (1983), and we now reverse the judgment of the District Court.
On January 6, 1982, A1 Godes, a Compliance Officer with the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, telephoned Susanne White, appellee’s manager, to inform her that he intended to begin an investigation of appellee the following morning and to request that she have available for inspection payroll records for all employees for the past two years. White telephoned Godes later that day to inform him that it would not be convenient to conduct the inspection on the following morning. After some preliminary skirmishing between the parties, during which appellee inquired about the scope and reason for the proposed investigation and appellants declined to provide specific information, Godes and Gerald Hill, Assistant Area Director from the Wage and Hour Division in Denver, arrived at appellee’s premises on February 2, 1982, for the purpose of conducting the investigation. After waiting for White, Godes served the administrative subpoena at issue here on one of appellee’s other employees. The subpoena was directed to any employee of appellee having custody and personal knowledge of the records specifically described therein, records which appellee was required by law to maintain. See 29 CFR §§ 516.2(a), 516.5(c) (1983). The subpoena directed the employee to appear with those records at the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor in Bismarck, N. D.
Appellee refused to comply with the subpoena and sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court, claiming that the subpoena constituted an unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Appellants counterclaimed for enforcement of the subpoena. The District Court concluded that the actions of appellants in issuing the administrative subpoena “unquestionably comport with the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §201, et seq.” App. A to Juris. Statement 6a. Relying on our decision in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 (1978), however, the District Court held that the applicable provisions of the FLSA violate the Fourth Amendment insofar as they authorize the Secretary of Labor to issue an administrative subpoena without previously having obtained a judicial warrant. In Barlow’s this Court declared unconstitutional the provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) which authorized inspectors to enter an employer’s premises without a warrant to conduct inspections of work areas. The District Court rejected appellants’ arguments that Barlow’s is not dispositive of the issue here by stating:
“It is reasonable to conclude that the exigencies of an entry upon commercial premises for the purpose of conducting a safety and health inspection designed to protect the personal well-being of employees supply more compelling bases for proceeding without a warrant than the circumstances presented here, where entry is sought for the purpose of determining compliance with wage and hour regulations. The reasoning of the Supreme Court in Barlow’s applies with equal — if not greater— force in the instant situation.
“In sum, I hold that the Secretary of Labor may not proceed to enter upon the premises of Lone Steer, Inc., for the purpose of inspecting its records under Section 11 of the Fair Labor Standards Act without first having obtained a valid warrant.” App. A to Juris. Statement 8a.
We think that the District Court undertook to decide a case not before it when it held that appellants may not “enter upon the premises” of appellee to inspect its records without first having obtained a warrant. The only “entry” upon appel-lee’s premises by appellants, so far as the record discloses, is that of Godes on February 2, 1982, when he and Gerald Hill entered the motel and restaurant to attempt to conduct an investigation. The stipulation of facts entered into by the parties, App. 11-17, and incorporated into the opinion of the District Court, App. A to Juris. Statement 2a-8a, describe what happened next:
“They asked for Ms. White and were told she was not available but expected shortly. They were offered some coffee, and waited in the lobby area. After 20-30 minutes, when Ms. White had not appeared, Mr. Godes served an Administrative Subpoena Duces Tecum on employee Karen Arnold.” App. 15.
An entry into the public lobby of a motel and restaurant for the purpose of serving an administrative subpoena is scarcely the sort of governmental act which is forbidden by the Fourth Amendment. The administrative subpoena itself did not authorize either entry or inspection of appellee’s premises; it merely directed appellee to produce relevant wage and hour records at appellants’ regional office some 25 miles away.
The governmental actions which required antecedent administrative warrants in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra, and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), are quite different from the governmental action in this case. In Barlow’s an OSHA inspector sought to conduct a search of nonpublic working areas of an electrical and plumbing installation business. In Camara a San Francisco housing inspector sought to inspect the premises of an apartment building in that city. See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967) (involving a similar search by a fire inspector of commercial premises). In each case, this Court held that an administrative warrant was required before such a search could be conducted without the consent of the owner of the premises.
It is plain to us that those cases turned upon the effort of the government inspectors to make nonconsensual entries into areas not open to the public. As we have indicated, no such entry was made by appellants in this case. Thus the enforceability of the administrative subpoena duces tecum at issue here is governed, not by our decision in Barlow’s as the District Court concluded, but rather by our decision in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 (1946). In Oklahoma Press the Court rejected an employer’s claim that the subpoena power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor by the FLSA violates the Fourth Amendment.
“The short answer to the Fourth Amendment objections is that the records in these cases present no question of actual search and seizure, but raise only the question whether orders of court for the production of specified records have been validly made; and no sufficient showing appears to justify setting them aside. No officer or other person has sought to enter petitioners’ premises against their will, to search them, or to seize or examine their books, records or papers without their assent, otherwise than pursuant to orders of court authorized by law and made after adequate opportunity to present objections . . . Id., at 195 (footnotes omitted).
We cited Oklahoma Press with approval in See v. City of Seattle, supra, a companion case to Camara, and described the constitutional requirements for administrative subpoenas as follows:
“It is now settled that, when an administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the Fourth Amendment requires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome.” See v. City of Seattle, supra, at 544 (footnote omitted).
See also United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 632, 652-653 (1950).
Thus although our cases make it clear that the Secretary of Labor may issue an administrative subpoena without a warrant, they nonetheless provide protection for a subpoenaed employer by allowing him to question the reasonableness of the subpoena, before suffering any penalties for refusing to comply with it, by raising objections in an action in district court. See v. City of Seattle, supra, at 544-545; Oklahoma Press, supra, at 208-209. Our holding here, which simply reaffirms our holding in Oklahoma Press, in no way leaves an employer defenseless against an unreasonably burdensome administrative subpoena requiring the production of documents. We hold only that the defenses available to an employer do not include the right to insist upon a judicial warrant as a condition precedent to a valid administrative subpoena.
Appellee insists that “[t]he official inspection procedure used by the appellants reveal[s] that the use of the administrative subpoena is inextricably intertwined with the entry process,” Brief for Appellee 11, and states that it is appellants’ established policy to seek entry inspections by expressly relying on its inspection authority under §11 of the FLSA. Id., at 12. We need only observe that no non-consensual entry into protected premises was involved in this case.
The judgment of the District Court is accordingly
Reversed.
Section 11(a), as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 211(a), provides:
“The Administrator or his designated representatives may investigate and gather data regarding the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment in any industry subject to this chapter, and may enter and inspect such places and such records (and make such transcriptions thereof), question such employees, and investigate such facts, conditions, practices, or matters as he may deem necessary or appropriate to determine whether any person has violated any provision of this chapter, or which may aid in the enforcement of the provisions of this chapter. Except as provided in section 212 of this title and in subsection (b) of this section, the Administrator shall utilize the bureaus and divisions of the Department of Labor for all the investigations and inspections necessary under this section. Except as provided in section 212 of this title, the Administrator shall bring all actions under section 217 of this title to restrain violations of this chapter.”
Although § 11(a) grants investigatory authority specifically to the Wage and Hour Administrator, pursuant to Reorg. Plan No. 6 of 1950, 3 CFR 1004 (1949-1953 comp.), 64 Stat. 1263, 5 U. S. C. App. p. 743, the functions of all officers of the Department of Labor, including the Wage and Hour Administrator, are transferred to the Secretary of Labor, who may in turn delegate those functions.
Section 9 of the FLSA provides that for the purpose of any hearing or investigation under the provisions of the Act, § 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 722, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 49, is made applicable “to the jurisdiction, powers, and duties of the Administrator, the Secretary of Labor and the industry committees.” Section 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, as set forth in 15 U. S. C. § 49, provides in pertinent part:
“[T]he Commission, or its duly authorized agent or agents, shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy any documentary evidence of any person, partnership, or corporation being investigated or proceeded against; and the Commission shall have power to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all such documentary evidence relating to any matter under investigation. Any member of the Commission may sign subpoenas, and members and examiners of the Commission may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence.
“Such attendance of witnesses, and the production of such documentary evidence, may be required from any place in the United States, at any designated place of hearing. And in case of disobedience to a subpoena the Commission may invoke the aid of any court of the United States in requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence.
“Any of the district courts of the United States within the jurisdiction of which such inquiry is carried on may, in ease of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, partnership, or corporation issue an order requiring such person, partnership, or corporation to appear before the Commission, or to produce documentary evidence if so ordered, or to give evidence touching the matter in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.”
Because the District Court’s order seemed only to bar “entry” onto ap-pellee’s premises, appellants filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the District Court’s order did “not address the relief sought by the Secretary.” App. A to Juris. Statement 15a. They sought to amend the District Court’s order so as to compel appellee to produce documents at appellants’ Bismarck office, emphasizing that compliance with such an order would not require an “entry” onto appellee’s premises. The District Court denied the motion without opinion. Id., at 13a-14a.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought as a class action under 42 U. S. C. i 1983 in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to enjoin the enforcement of an Illinois statute that prohibits state medical assistance payments for all abortions except those “necessary for the preservation of the life of the woman seeking such treatment.” The plaintiffs were two physicians who perform medically necessary abortions for indigent women, a welfare rights organization, and Jane Doe, an indigent pregnant woman who alleged that she desired an abortion that was medically necessary, but not necessary to save her life. The defendant was the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, the agency charged with administering the State’s medical assistance programs. Two other physicians intervened as defendants.
The plaintiffs challenged the Illinois statute on both federal statutory and constitutional grounds. They asserted, first, that Title XIX of the Social Security Act, commonly known as the “Medicaid” Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. II), requires Illinois to provide coverage in its Medicaid plan for all medically necessary abortions, whether or not the life of the pregnant woman is endangered. Second, the plaintiffs argued that the public funding by the State of medically necessary services generally, but not of certain medically necessary abortions, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The District Court initially held that it would abstain from considering the complaint until the state courts had construed the challenged statute. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. Zbaraz v. Quern, 572 F. 2d 582. The appellate court held that abstention was inappropriate under the circumstances, and remanded the case for further proceedings, including consideration of the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. On remand, the District Court certified two plaintiff classes: (1) a class of all pregnant women eligible for the Illinois medical assistance programs who desire medically necessary, but not life-preserving, abortions, and (2) a class of all Illinois physicians who perform medically necessary abortions for indigent women and who are certified to obtain reimbursement under the Illinois medical assistance programs.
Addressing the merits of the complaint, the District Court concluded that Title XIX and the regulations promulgated thereunder require a participating State under the Medicaid program to provide funding for all medically necessary abortions. According to the District Court, the so-called “Hyde Amendment” — under which Congress has prohibited the use of federal funds to reimburse the costs of certain medically necessary abortions — does not relieve a State of its independent obligation under Title XIX to provide Medicaid funding for all medically necessary abortions. Thus, the District Court permanently enjoined the enforcement of the Illinois statute insofar as it denied payments for abortions that are “medically necessary or medically indicated according to the professional medical judgment of a licensed physician in Illinois, exercised in light of all factors affecting a woman’s health.”
The Court of Appeals again reversed. Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F. 2d 196. Reaching the same conclusion as had the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Preterm, Inc., v. Dukakis, 591 F. 2d 121, the court held that the Hyde Amendment “alters Title XIX in such a way as to allow states to limit funding to the categories of abortions specified in that amendment.” 596 F. 2d, at 199. It further held, however, that a participating State may not, consistent with Title XIX, withhold funding for those medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is available under the Hyde Amendment. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the District Court with instructions that the permanent injunction be modified so as to require continued state funding only “for those abortions fundable under the Hyde Amendment.” Id., at 202. The Court of Appeals also directed the District Court to proceed expeditiously to resolve the constitutional questions it had not reached. The District Court was specifically directed to consider “whether the Hyde Amendment, by limiting funding for abortions to certain circumstances even if such abortions are medically necessary, violates the Fifth Amendment.” Ibid, (footnote omitted).
On the second remand, the District Court notified the Attorney General of the United States that the constitutionality of an Act of Congress had been drawn into question, and the United States intervened, pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403 (a), to defend the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment. Zbaraz v Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212, 1215, n. 3. In view of the fact that the plaintiffs had not challenged the Hyde Amendment, but rather only the Illinois statute, the District Court expressed misgivings about the propriety of passing on the constitutionality of the federal law. . But noting that the same reasoning would apply in determining the constitutional validity of both the Illinois statute and the Hyde Amendment, the District Court observed: “Although we are not persuaded that the federal and state enactments are inseparable and would hesitate to inject into the proceeding the issue of the constitutionality of a law not directly under attack by plaintiffs, we are obviously constrained to obey the Seventh Circuit’s mandate. Therefore, while our discussion of the constitutional questions will address only the Illinois statute, the same analysis applies to the Hyde Amendment and the relief granted will encompass both laws.” Ibid.
The District Court then concluded that both the Illinois-statute and the Hyde Amendment are unconstitutional insofar as they deny funding for “medically necessary abortions prior to the point of fetal viability.” Id., at 1221. If the public funding of abortions were restricted to those covered by the Hyde Amendment, the District Court thought that the effect would “be to increase substantially maternal morbidity and mortality among indigent pregnant women.” Id., at 1220. The District Court held that the state and federal funding restrictions violate the constitutional standard of equal protection because
“a pregnant woman’s interest in her health so outweighs any possible state interest in the life of a non-viable fetus that, for a woman medically in need of an abortion, the state’s interest is not legitimate. At the point of viability, however, 'the relative weights of the respective interests involved’ shift, thereby legitimizing the state’s interests. After that point, therefore, ... a state may withhold funding for medically necessary abortions that are not life-preserving, even though it funds all other . medically necessary operations.” Id., at 1221.
Accordingly, the District Court enjoined the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid from enforcing the Illinois statute to deny payment under the state medical assistance programs for medically necessary abortions prior to fetal viability. The District Court did not, however, enjoin any action by the United States.
The intervening-defendant physicians, the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, and the United States each appealed directly to this Court, averring jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1252. This Court consolidated the appeals and postponed further consideration of the question of jurisdiction until the hearing on the merits. 444 U. S. 962.
I
The asserted basis for this Court’s jurisdiction over these appeals is 28 U. S. C. § 1252, which provides in relevant part:
“Any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory or final judgment, decree or order of any court of the United States . . . holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional in any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the United States or any of its agencies, or any officer or employee thereof, as such officer or employee, is a party.”
It is quite obvious that the literal requirements of § 1252 are satisfied in the present cases, for these appeals were taken from the final judgment of a federal court declaring unconstitutional an Act of Congress — the Hyde Amendment — in a civil action to which the United States was a party by reason of its intervention pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2403 (a).
It is equally clear, however, that the appellees and the United States are correct in asserting that the District Court in fact lacked jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, for the court acted in the absence of a case or controversy sufficient to permit an exercise of judicial power under Art. Ill of the Constitution. None of the parties to these eases ever challenged the validity of the Hyde Amendment, and the appellees could have been awarded all the relief they sought entirely on the basis of the District Court’s ruling with regard to the Illinois statute. The constitutional validity of the Hyde Amendment was interjected as an issue in these cases only by the erroneous mandate of the Court of Appeals. But, even though the District Court was simply following that mandate, the directive of the Court of Appeals could not create a case or controversy where none otherwise existed. It is clear, therefore, that the District Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Art. Ill in declaring the Hyde Amendment unconstitutional.
The question thus arises whether the District Court’s lack of jurisdiction in declaring the Hyde Amendment unconstitutional divests this Court of jurisdiction over these appeals. We think not. As the Court in McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S. 21, 31-32, observed:
“Our previous cases have recognized that this Court’s jurisdiction under § 1252 in no way depends on whether the district court had jurisdiction. On the contrary, an appeal under § 1252 brings before us, not only the constitutional question, but the whole ease, including threshold issues of subject-matter jurisdiction, and whether a three-judge court was required.” (Citations omitted.)
Thus, in the McLucas case, which involved an appeal under § 1252 from a single-judge District Court, this Court preter-mitted the question whether the single-judge District Court had had jurisdiction to enter the challenged preliminary injunction, and instead resolved the appeal on the merits. It follows from McLucas that, notwithstanding the fact that the District Court was without jurisdiction to declare the Hyde Amendment unconstitutional, this Court has jurisdiction over these appeals and thus may review the “whole case.”
II
Disposition of the merits of these appeals does not require extended discussion. Insofar as we have already concluded that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to declare the Hyde Amendment unconstitutional, that portion of its judgment must be vacated. See, e. g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U. S. 302; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346. The remaining questions concern the Illinois statute. The ap-pellees argue that (1) Title XIX requires Illinois to provide coverage in its state Medicaid plan for all medically necessary abortions, whether or not the life of the pregnant woman is endangered, and (2) the funding by Illinois of medically necessary services generally, but not of certain medically necessary abortions, violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both arguments are foreclosed by our decision today in Harris v. McRae, ante, p. 279. As to the appellees’ statutory argument, we have concluded in McRae that a participating State is not obligated under Title XIX to pay for those medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable under the Hyde Amendment. As to their constitutional argument, we have concluded in McRae that the Hyde Amendment does not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment by withholding public funding for certain medically necessary abortions, while providing funding for other medically necessary health services. It follows, for the same reasons, that the comparable funding restrictions in the Illinois statute do not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the cases are remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, see ante, p. 329.]
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall, see ante, p. 337.]
[For dissenting opinion' of Mr. Justice Blackmun, see ante, p. 348.]
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stevens, see ante, p. 349.]
The statute is codified as Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23 (1979). It provides in relevant part:
Ҥ 5-5. [Medical services.] The Illinois Department, by rule, shall determine the quantity and quality of the medical assistance for which payment will be authorized, and the medical services to be provided, which may include all or part of the following: [listing 16 categories of medical services], but not including abortions, or induced miscarriages or premature births, unless, in the opinion of a physician, such procedures are necessary for the preservation of the life of the woman seeking such treatment. . .
"§ 6-1. Eligibility requirements. . . . Nothing in this Article shall be construed to permit the granting of financial aid where the purpose of such aid is to obtain an abortion, induced miscarriage or induced premature birth unless, in the opinion of a physician, such procedures are necessary for the preservation of the life of the woman seeking such treatment. ...”
Ҥ 7-1. Eligibility requirements. Aid in meeting the costs of necessary medical, dental, hospital, boarding or nursing care, or burial shall be given under this Article [to eligible persons], except where such aid is for the purpose of obtaining an abortion, induced miscarriage nr induced premature birth unless, in the opinion of a physician, such procedures are necessary for the preservation of the life of the woman seeking such treatment. . .
The medical assistance programs at issue here are the Illinois Medicaid plan, which is jointly funded by the Federal Government and the State of Illinois, and two fully state-funded programs, the Illinois General Assistance and Local Aid to Medically Indigent Programs.
All opinions of the District Court other than that now under review are unreported.
Since September 1976, Congress has prohibited — by means of the “Hyde Amendment” to the annual appropriations for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now divided into the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Education) — the use of any federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program except under certain specified circumstances. The current version of the Hyde Amendment, applicable for fiscal year 1980, provides:
“[N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health service.” Pub. L. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926.
See also Pub. L. 96-86, § 118, 93 Stat. 662. This version of the Hyde Amendment is broader than that applicable for fiscal year 1977, which did not include the “rape or incest” exception, Pub. L. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434, but narrower than that applicable for most of fiscal year 1978 and all of fiscal year 1979, which had an additional exception for “instances where severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother would result if the pregnancy were carried to term when so determined by two physicians,’' Pub. L. 95-205, §101, 91 Stat. 1460; Pub. L. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1586. In this opinion, the term “Hyde Amendment” is used generically to refer to all three versions, except where indicated otherwise.
Neither the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid nor the intervening-physicians sought review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The District Court in the proceedings now on appeal proceeded on the premise that Title XIX obligates Illinois to fund all abortions reimbursable under the Hyde Amendment. That issue, therefore, is not before us on these appeals.
Although the medical assistance programs funded exclusively by the State are not governed directly by either Title XIX or the Hyde Amendment, the Court of Appeals concluded that the modified injunction requiring state payments for abortions fundable under the Hyde Amendment should apply to all three Illinois medical assistance programs, see n. 2, supra. 596 F. 2d, at 202-203. Relying on a statement in the State’s brief, the Court of Appeals held that the challenged Illinois statute was intended to represent the State’s understanding of the congressional purpose reflected in the original Hyde Amendment. Id., at 203. The Court of Appeals thus declined to sever the various funding restrictions in the Illinois statute.
Section 2403 (a) provides:
“In any action, suit or proceeding in a court of the United States to which the United States or any agency, officer or employee thereof is not a party, wherein the constitutionality of any Act of Congress affecting the public interest is drawn in question, the court shall certify such fact to the Attorney General, and shall permit the United States to intervene for presentation of evidence, if evidence is otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the question of constitutionality. The United States shall, subject to the applicable provisions of law, have all the rights of a party and be subject to all liabilities of a party as to court costs to the extent necessary for a proper presentation of the facts and law relating to the question of constitutionality.”
The District Court refused to stay its order, and the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid and the intervening-defendant physicians moved in this Court for a stay pending appeal. That motion was denied. 442 L’. S. 1309 (Stevens, J., in chambers). A reapplication by the intervening-defendant physicians also was denied. 442 U. S. 915.
Title XIX does not prohibit “[a] participating State . . . [from] including] in its Medicaid plan those medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable [under the Hyde Amendment].” Harris v. McRae, ante, at 311, n. 16.
Although this Court need not pass on the remainder of the judgment in a case in which an appeal under § 1252 is taken from a court that lacked jurisdiction to declare a federal statute unconstitutional, see FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 352 U. S. 977, we are empowered to do so because “an appeal under § 1252 brings before us, not only the constitutional question, but the whole case.” McLucas v. DeChamplain, 421 U. S., at 31. Here, there is no reason not to resolve the “whole case” on the merits. The remainder of the case that is properly before this Court, and which clearly involves a justiciable controversy, includes both the appellees’ federal statutory and constitutional challenges to the Illinois statute.
This case was decided by the District Court under the version of the Hyde Amendment applicable during fiscal year 1979, and Congress has since narrowed the ambit of the Hyde Amendment for fiscal year 1980, see n. 4, supra. The recent statutory revision does not, however, affect the outcome of either issue now before the Court. The statutory issue is not affected, because we today conclude in Harris v. McRae, ante, at 306-311, that Title XIX does not require a participating State to fund those medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable under the Hyde Amendment, including the version of the Hyde Amendment applicable for fiscal year 1980. The constitutional issue is not affected, because, regardless of whether the State of Illinois is obligated to fund all abortions for which federal reimbursement is available under the Hyde Amendment, we conclude in Harris v. McRae that even the most restrictive version of the Hyde Amendment — which is similar to the Illinois statute at issue here — does not violate the equal protection standard of the Constitution. Since the outcome of these issues is not affected by the recent changes in the Hyde Amendment, we need not defer review in order to provide the District Court with an opportunity to evaluate the effects of these changes in the federal law.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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E
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question which brought this case here, and is now found to be the dispositive issue, is whether the so-called act of state doctrine serves to sustain petitioner’s claims in this litigation. Such claims are ultimately founded on a decree of the Government of Cuba expropriating certain property, the right to the proceeds of which is here in controversy. The act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory.
I.
In February and July of 1960, respondent Farr, Whit-lock & Co., an American commodity broker, contracted to purchase Cuban sugar, free alongside the steamer, from a wholly owned subsidiary of Compania Azucarera Ver-tientes-Camaguey de Cuba (C. A. V.), a corporation organized under Cuban law whose capital stock was owned principally by United States residents. Farr, Whitlock agreed to pay for the sugar in New York upon presentation of the shipping documents and a sight draft.
On July 6, 1960, the Congress of the United States amended the Sugar Act of 1948 to permit a presidentially directed reduction of the sugar quota for Cuba. On the same day President Eisenhower exercised the granted power. The day of the congressional enactment, the Cuban Council of Ministers adopted “Law No. 851,” which characterized this reduction in the Cuban sugar quota as an act of “aggression, for political purposes” on the part‘of the United States, justifying the taking of countermeasures by Cuba. The law gave the Cuban President and Prime Minister discretionary power to nationalize by forced expropriation property or enterprises in which American nationals had an interest. Although a system of compensation was formally provided, the possibility of payment under it may well be deemed illusory. Our State Department has described the Cuban law as “manifestly in violation of those principles of international law which have long been accepted by the free countries of the West. It is in its essence discriminatory, arbitrary and confiscatory.”
Between August 6 and August 9, 1960, the sugar covered by the contract between Farr, Whitlock and C. A. V. was loaded, destined for Morocco, onto the S. S. Hornfels, which was standing offshore at the Cuban port of Jucaro' (Santa Maria). On the day loading commenced, the Cuban President and Prime Minister, acting pursuant to Law No. 851, issued Executive Power Resolution No. 1. It provided for the compulsory expropriation of all property and enterprises, and of rights and interests arising therefrom, of certain listed companies, including C. A. V., wholly or principally owned by American nationals. The preamble reiterated the alleged injustice of the American reduction of the Cuban sugar quota and emphasized the importance of Cuba’s serving as an example for other countries^to follow “in their struggle to free themselves from the brutal claws of Imperialism.” In consequence of the resolution, the consent of the Cuban Government was necessary before a ship carrying sugar of a named company could leave Cuban waters. In order to obtain this consent, Farr, Whitlock, on August 11, entered into contracts, identical to those it had made with C. A. V., with the Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, an instrumentality of the Cuban Government. The S. S. Hornfels sailed for Morocco on August 12.
Banco Exterior assigned the bills of lading to petitioner, also an instrumentality of the Cuban Government, which instructed its agent in New York, Societe Generate, to deliver the bills and a sight draft in the sum of $175,250.69 to Farr, Whitlock in return for payment. Societe Generale’s initial tender of the documents was refused by Farr, Whitlock, which on the same day was notified of C. A. V.’s claim that as rightful owner of the sugar it was entitled to the proceeds. In return for a promise not to turn the funds over to petitioner or its agent, C. A. V. agreed to indemnify Farr, Whitlock for any loss. Farr, Whitlock subsequently accepted the shipping documents, negotiated the bills of lading to its customer, and received payment for the sugar. It refused, however, to hand over the proceeds to Societe Generale. Shortly thereafter, Farr, Whitlock was served with an order of the New York Supreme Court, which had appointed Sabbatino as Temporary Receiver of C. A. V.’s New York assets, enjoining it from taking any action in regard to the money claimed by C. A. V. that might result in its removal from the State. Following this, Farr, Whitlock, pursuant to court order, transferred the funds to Sab-batino, to abide the event of a judicial determination as to their ownership.
Petitioner then instituted this action in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York. Alleging conversion of the bills of lading, it sought to recover the proceeds thereof from Farr, Whitlock and to enjoin the receiver from exercising any dominion over such proceeds. Upon motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, the District Court, 193 F. Supp. 375, sustained federal in personam jurisdiction despite state control of the funds. It found that the sugar was located within Cuban territory at the time of expropriation and determined that under merchant law common to civilized countries Farr, Whitlock could not have asserted ownership of the sugar against C. A. V. before making payment. It concluded that C. A. Y. had a property interest in the sugar subject to the territorial jurisdiction of Cuba. The court then dealt with the question of Cuba’s title to the sugar, on which rested petitioner’s claim of conversion. While acknowledging the continuing vitality of the act of state doctrine, the court believed it inapplicable when the questioned foreign act is in violation of international law- Proceeding on the basis that a taking invalid under international law does not convey good title, the District Court found the Cuban expropriation decree to violate such law in three separate respects: it was motivated by a retaliatory and not a public purpose; it discriminated against American nationals; and it failed to provide adequate compensation. Summary judgment against petitioner was accordingly granted.
The Court of Appeals, 307 F. 2d 845, affirming the decision on similar grounds, relied on two letters (not before the District Court) written by State Department officers which it took as evidence that the Executive Branch had no objection to a judicial testing of the Cuban decree’s validity. The court was unwilling to declare that any one of the infirmities found by the District Court rendered the taking invalid under international law, but was satisfied that in combination they had that effect. We granted certiorari because the issues involved bear importantly on the conduct of the country’s foreign relations and more particularly on the proper role of the Judicial Branch in this sensitive area. 372 U. S. 905. For reasons to follow we decide that the judgment below must be reversed.
Subsequent to the decision of the Court of Appeals, the C. A. Y. receivership was terminated by the State Supreme Court; the funds in question were placed in escrow, pending the outcome of this suit. C. A. V. has moved in this Court to be substituted as a party in the place of Sabbatino. Although it is true that Sabbatino’s defensive interest in this litigation has largely, if not entirely, reflected that of C. A. V., this is true also of Farr, Whitlock’s position. There is no indication that Farr, Whitlock has not adequately represented C. A. V.’s interest or that it will not continue to do so. Moreover, insofar as disposition of the case here is concerned, C. A. V. has been permitted as amicus to brief and argue its position before this Court. In these circumstances we are not persuaded that the admission of C. A. V. as a party is necessary at this stage to safeguard any claim either that it has already presented or that it may present in the future course of this litigation. Accordingly, we are constrained to deny C. A. V.’s motion to be admitted as a party, without prejudice however to the renewal of such a motion in the lower courts if it appears that C. A. V.’s interests are not adequately represented by Farr, Whit-lock and that the granting of such a motion will not disturb federal jurisdiction. Cf. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267; Indianapolis v. Chase Nat’l Bank, 314 U. S. 63, at 69; Ex parte Edelstein, 30 F. 2d 636, at 638.
Before considering the holding below with respect to the act of state doctrine, we must deal with narrower grounds urged for dismissal of the action or for a judgment on the merits in favor of respondents.
II.
It is first contended that this petitioner, an instrumentality of the Cuban Government, should be denied access to American courts because Cuba is an unfriendly power and does not permit nationals of this country to obtain relief in its courts. Even though the respondents did not raise this point in the lower courts we think it should be considered here. If the courts of this country should be closed to the government of a foreign state, the underlying reason is one of national policy transcending the interests of the parties to the action, and this Court should give effect to that policy sua sponte even at this stage of the litigation.
Under principles of comity governing this country’s relations with other nations, sovereign states are allowed to sue in the courts of the United States, The Sapphire, 11 Wall. 164, 167; Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, 134. This Court has called “comity” in the legal sense “neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 163-164. Although comity is often associated with the existence of friendly relations between states, e. g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 589; Russian Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 258, 139 N. E. 259, 260, prior to some recent lower court cases which have questioned the right of instrumentalities of the Cuban Government to sue in our courts, the privilege of suit has been denied only to governments at war with the United States, Ex parte Don Ascanio Colonna, 314 U. S. 510; see § 7 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 416, 417, 50 U. S. C. App. § 7; cf. Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532; Caperton v. Bowyer, 14 Wall. 216, 236, or to those not recognized by this country, The Penza, 277 F. 91; Russian Republic v. Cibrario, supra.
Respondents, pointing to the severance of diplomatic relations, commercial embargo, and freezing of Cuban assets in this country, contend that relations between the United States and Cuba manifest such animosity that unfriendliness is clear, and that the courts should be closed to the Cuban Government. We do not agree. This Court would hardly be competent to undertake assessments of varying degrees of friendliness or its absence, and, lacking some definite touchstone for determination, we are constrained to consider any relationship, short of war, with a recognized sovereign power as embracing the privilege of resorting to United States courts. Although the severance of diplomatic relations is an overt act with objective significance in the dealings of sovereign states, we are unwilling to say that it should inevitably result in the withdrawal of the privilege of bringing suit. Severance may take place for any number of political reasons, its duration is unpredictable, and whatever expression of animosity it may imply does not approach that implicit in a declaration of war.
It is perhaps true that nonrecognition of a government in certain circumstances may reflect no greater unfriendliness than the severance of diplomatic relations with a recognized government, but the refusal to recognize has a unique legal aspect. It signifies this country’s unwillingness to acknowledge that the government in question speaks as the sovereign authority for the territory it purports to control, see Russian Republic v. Cibrario, supra, at 260-263, 139 N. E., at 261-263. Political recognition is exclusively a function of the Executive. The possible incongruity of judicial “recognition,” by permitting suit, of a government not recognized by the Executive is corn-pletely absent when merely diplomatic relations are broken.
The view that the existing situation between the United States and Cuba should not lead to a denial of status to sue is buttressed by the circumstance that none of the acts of our Government have been aimed at closing the courts of this country to Cuba, and more particularly by the fact that the Government has come to the support of Cuba’s “act of state” claim in this very litigation.
Respondents further urge that reciprocity of treatment is an essential ingredient of comity generally, and, therefore, of the privilege of foreign states to bring suit here. Although Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, contains some broad language about the relationship of reciprocity to comity, the case in fact imposed a requirement of reciprocity only in regard to conclusiveness of judgments, and even then only in limited circumstances. Id., at 170-171. In Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 300 F. 741, 747 (D. C. S. D. N. Y.), Judge Learned Hand pointed out that the doctrine of reciprocity has apparently been confined to foreign judgments.
There are good reasons for declining to extend the principle to the question of standing of sovereign states to sue. Whether a foreign sovereign will be permitted to sue involves a problem more sensitive politically than whether the judgments of its courts may be re-examined, and the possibility of embarrassment to the Executive Branch in handling foreign relations is substantially more acute. Re-examination of judgments, in principle, reduces rather than enhances the possibility of injustice being done in a particular case; refusal to allow suit makes it impossible for a court to see that a particular dispute is fairly resolved. The freezing of Cuban assets exemplifies the capacity of the political branches to assure, through a variety of techniques (see infra, pp. 431, 435-436), that the national interest is protected against a country which is thought to be improperly denying the rights of United States citizens.
Furthermore, the question whether a country gives res judicata effect to United States judgments presents a relatively simple inquiry. The precise status of the United States Government and its nationals before foreign courts is much more difficult to determine. To make such an investigation significant, a court would have to discover not only what is provided by the formal structure of the foreign judicial system, but also what the practical possibilities of fair treatment are. The courts, whose powers to further the national interest in foreign affairs are necessarily circumscribed as compared with those of the political branches, can best serve the rule of law by not excluding otherwise proper suitors because of deficiencies in their legal systems.
We hold that this petitioner is not barred from access to the federal courts.
III.
Respondents claimed in the lower courts that Cuba had expropriated merely contractual rights the situs of which was in New York, and that the propriety of the taking was, therefore, governed by New York law. The District Court rejected this contention on the basis of the right of ownership possessed by C. A. V. against Farr, Whitlock prior to payment for the sugar. That the sugar itself was expropriated rather than a contractual claim is further supported by Cuba’s refusal to let the S. S. Hornfels sail until a new contract had been signed. Had the Cuban decree represented only an attempt to expropriate a contractual right of C. A. V., the forced delay of shipment and Farr, Whitlock’s subsequent contract with petitioner’s assignor would have been meaningless. Neither the District Court’s finding concerning the location of the S. S. Hornfels nor its conclusion that Cuba had territorial jurisdiction to expropriate the sugar, acquiesced in by the Court of Appeals, is seriously challenged here. Respondents’ limited view of the expropriation must be rejected.
Respondents further contend that if the expropriation was of the sugar itself, this suit then becomes one to enforce the public law of a foreign state and as such is not cognizable in the courts of this country. They rely on the principle enunciated in federal and state cases that a court need not give effect to the penal or revenue laws of foreign countries or sister states. See, e. g., The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123; Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657 (all relating to penal laws); Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F. 2d 600, aff’d on other grounds, 281 U. S. 18; City of Detroit v. Proctor, 44 Del. 193, 61 A. 2d 412; City of Philadelphia v. Cohen, 11 N. Y. 2d 401, 184 N. E. 2d 167, 230 N. Y. S. 2d 188 (all relating to revenue laws).
The extent to which this doctrine may apply to other kinds of public laws, though perhaps still an open question, need not be decided in this case. For we have been referred to no authority which suggests that the doctrine reaches a public law which, as here, has been fully executed within the foreign state. Cuba’s restraint of the S. S. Hornfels must be regarded for these purposes to have constituted an effective taking of the sugar, vesting in Cuba C. A. Y.’s property right in it. Farr, Whit-lock’s contract with the Cuban bank, however compelled to sign Farr, Whitlock may have felt, represented indeed a recognition of Cuba’s dominion over the property.
In these circumstances the question whether the rights acquired by Cuba are enforceable in our courts depends not upon the doctrine here invoked but upon the act of state doctrine discussed in the succeeding sections of this opinion.
IV.
The classic American statement of the act of state doctrine, which appears to have taken root in England as early as 1674, Blad v. Bamfield, 3 Swans. 604, 36 Eng. Rep. 992, and began to emerge in the jurisprudence of this country in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see, e. g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dali. 199, 230; Hudson v. Guestier, 4 Cranch 293, 294; The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 7 Cranch 116, 135, 136; L’Invincible, 1 Wheat. 238, 253; The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, 336, is found in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, where Chief Justice Fuller said for a unanimous Court (p. 252):
“Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.”
Following this precept the Court in that case refused to inquire into acts of Hernandez, a revolutionary Venezuelan military commander whose government had been later recognized by the United States, which were made the basis of a damage action in this country by Underhill, an American citizen, who claimed that he had been unlawfully assaulted, coerced, and detained in Venezuela by Hernandez.
None of this Court’s subsequent cases in which the act of state doctrine was directly or peripherally involved manifest any retreat from Underhill. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347; Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297; Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S. 304; Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U. S. 468; United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324; United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203. On the contrary in two of these cases, Oetjen and Ricaud, the doctrine as announced in Underhill was reaffirmed in unequivocal terms.
Oetjen involved a seizure of hides from a Mexican citizen as a military levy by General Villa, acting for the forces of General Carranza, whose government was recognized by this country subsequent to the trial but prior to decision by this Court. The hides were sold to a Texas corporation which shipped them to the United States and assigned them to defendant. As assignee of the original owner, plaintiff replevied the hides, claiming that they had been seized in violation of the Hague Conventions. In affirming a judgment for defendant, the Court suggested that the rules of the Conventions did not apply to civil war and that, even if they did, the relevant seizure was not in violation of them. 246 U. S., at 301-302. Nevertheless, it chose to rest its decision on other grounds. It described the designation of the sovereign as a political question to be determined by the legislative and executive departments rather than the judicial department, invoked the established rule that such recognition operates retroactively to validate past acts, and found the basic tenet of Underhill to be applicable to the case before it.
“The principle that the conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another is as applicable to a case involving the title to property brought within the custody of a court, such as we have here, as it was held to be to the cases cited, in which claims for damages were based upon acts done in a foreign country, for it rests at last upon the highest considerations of international comity and expediency. To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign State to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly ‘imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.’ ” Id., at 303-304.
In Bimud the facts were similar — another general of the Carranza forces seized lead bullion as a military levy — except that the property taken belonged to an American citizen. The Court found Underhill, American Banana, and Oetjen controlling. Commenting on the nature of the principle established by those cases, the opinion stated that the rule
“does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction once acquired over a case. It requires only that, when it is made to appear that the foreign government has acted in a given way on the subject-matter of the litigation, the details of such action or the merit of the result cannot be questioned but must be accepted by our courts as a rule for their decision. To accept a ruling authority and to decide accordingly is not a surrender or abandonment of jurisdiction but is an exercise of it. It results that the title to the property in this case must be determined by the result of the action taken by the military authorities of Mexico....” 246 U. S., at 309.
To the same effect is the language of Mr. Justice Cardozo in the Shapleigh case, supra, where, in commenting on the validity of a Mexican land expropriation, he said (299 U. S., at 471): “The question is not here whether the proceeding was so conducted as to be a wrong to our nationals under the doctrines of international law, though valid under the law of the situs of the land. For wrongs of that order the remedy to be followed is along the channels of diplomacy.”
In deciding the present case the Court of Appeals relied in part upon an exception to the unqualified teachings of Underhill, Oetjen, and Ricaud which that court had earlier indicated. In Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F. 2d 246, suit was brought to recover from an assignee property allegedly taken, in effect, by the Nazi Government because plaintiff was Jewish. Recognizing the odious nature of this act of state, the court, through Judge Learned Hand, nonetheless refused to consider it invalid on that ground. Rather, it looked to see if the Executive had acted in any manner that would indicate that United States Courts should refuse to give effect to such a foreign decree. Finding no such evidence, the court sustained dismissal of the complaint. In a later case involving similar facts the same court again assumed examination of the German acts improper, Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Ameri-kaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 173 F. 2d 71, but, quite evidently following the implications of Judge Hand’s opinion in the earlier case, amended its mandate to permit evidence of alleged invalidity, 210 F. 2d 376, subsequent to receipt by plaintiff’s attorney of a letter from the Acting Legal Adviser to the State Department written for the purpose of relieving the court from any constraint upon the exercise of its jurisdiction to pass on that question.
This Court has never had occasion to pass upon the so-called Bernstein exception, nor need it do so now. For whatever ambiguity may be thought to exist in the two letters from State Department officials on which the Court of Appeals relied, 307 F. 2d, at 858, is now removed by the position which the Executive has taken in this Court on the act of state claim; respondents do not indeed contest the view that these letters were intended to reflect no more than the Department’s then wish not to make any statement bearing on this litigation.
The outcome of this case, therefore, turns upon whether any of the contentions urged by respondents against the application of the act of state doctrine in the premises is acceptable: (1) that the doctrine does not apply to acts of state which violate international law, as is claimed to be the case here; (2) that the doctrine is inapplicable unless the Executive specifically interposes it in a particular case; and (3) that, in any event, the doctrine may not be invoked by a foreign government plaintiff in our courts.
y.
Preliminarily, we discuss the foundations on which we deem the act of state doctrine to rest, and more particularly the question of whether state or federal law governs its application in a federal diversity case.
We do not believe that this doctrine is compelled either by the inherent nature of sovereign authority, as some of the earlier decisions seem to imply, see Underhill, supra; American Banana, supra; Oetjen, supra, at 303, or by some principle of international law. If a transaction takes place in one jurisdiction and the forum is in another, the forum does not by dismissing an action or by applying its own law purport to divest the first jurisdiction of its territorial sovereignty; it merely declines to adjudicate or makes applicable its own law to parties or property before it. The refusal of one country to enforce the penal laws of another (supra, pp. 413-414) is a typical example of an instance when a court will not entertain a cause of action arising in another jurisdiction. While historic notions of sovereign authority do bear upon the wisdom of employing the act of state doctrine, they do not dictate its existence.
That international law does not require application of the doctrine is evidenced by the practice of nations. Most of the countries rendering decisions on the subject fail to follow the rule rigidly. No international arbitral or judicial decision discovered suggests that international law prescribes recognition of sovereign acts of foreign governments, see 1 Oppenheim’s International Law, § 115aa (Lauterpacht, 8th ed. 1955), and apparently no claim has ever been raised before an international tribunal that failure to apply the act of state doctrine constitutes a breach of international obligation. If international law does not prescribe use of the doctrine, neither does it forbid application of the rule even if it is claimed that the act of state in question violated international law. The traditional view of international law is that it establishes substantive principles for determining whether one country has wronged another. Because of its peculiar nation-to-nation character the usual method for an individual to seek relief is to exhaust local remedies and then repair to the executive authorities of his own state to persuade them to champion his claim in diplomacy or before an international tribunal. See United States v. Diekelman, 92 U. S. 520, 524. Although it is, of course, true that United States courts apply international law as a part of our own in appropriate circumstances, Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 281; The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, 423; The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677, 700, the public law of nations can hardly dictate to a country which is in theory wronged how to treat that wrong within its domestic borders.
Despite the broad statement in Oetjen that “The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative... Departments,” 246 U. S., at 302, it cannot of course be thought that “every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 211. The text of the Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of state.
The act of state doctrine does, however, have “constitutional” underpinnings. It arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of international relations. The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the- Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country’s pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere. Many commentators disagree with this view; they have striven by means of distinguishing and limiting past decisions and by advancing various considerations of policy to stimulate a narrowing of the apparent scope of the rule. Whatever considerations are thought to predominate, it is plain that the problems involved are uniquely federal in nature. If federal authority, in this instance this Court, orders the field of judicial competence in this area for the federal courts, and the state courts are left free to formulate their own rules, the purposes behind the doctrine could be as effectively undermined as if there had been no federal pronouncement on the subject.
We could perhaps in this diversity action avoid the question of deciding whether federal or state law is applicable to this aspect of the litigation. New York has enunciated the act of state doctrine in terms that echo those of federal decisions decided during the reign of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1. In Hatch v. Baez, 7 Hun 596, 599 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.), Underhill was foreshadowed by the words, “the courts of one country are bound to abstain from sitting in judgment on the acts of another government done within its own territory.” More recently, the Court of Appeals in Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N. Y. 220, 224, 186 N. E. 679, 681, has declared, “The courts of one independent government will not sit in judgment upon the validity of the acts of another done within its own territory, even when such government seizes and sells the property of an American citizen within its boundaries.” Cf. Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897; Holser v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N. Y. 474, 14 N. E. 2d 798. But cf. Frenkel & Co. v. L’Urbaine Fire Ins. Co., 251 N. Y. 243, 167 N. E. 430. Thus our conclusions might well be the same whether we dealt with this problem as one of state law, see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487; Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498, or federal law.
However, we are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law. It seems fair to assume that the Court did not have rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. Soon thereafter, Professor Philip C. Jessup, now a judge of the International Court of Justice, recognized the potential dangers were Erie extended to legal problems affecting international relations. He cautioned that rules of international law should not be left to divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations. His basic rationale is equally applicable to the act of state doctrine.
The Court in the pre-Erie act of state cases, although not burdened by the problem of the source of applicable law, used language sufficiently strong and broad-sweeping to suggest that state courts were not left free to develop their own doctrines (as they would have been had this Court merely been interpreting common law under Swift v. Tyson, supra). The Court of Appeals in the first Bernstein case, supra, a diversity suit, plainly considered the decisions of this Court, despite the intervention of Erie, to be controlling in regard to the act of state question, at the same time indicating that New York law governed other aspects of the case. We are not without other precedent for a determination that federal law governs; there are enclaves of federal judge-made law which bind the States. A national body of federal-court-built law has been held to have been contemplated by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448. Principles formulated by federal judicial law have been thought by this Court to be necessary to protect uniquely federal interests, D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U. S. 447; Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363. Of course the federal interest guarded in all these cases is one the ultimate statement of which is derived from a federal statute. Perhaps more directly in point are the bodies of law applied between States over boundaries and in regard to the apportionment of interstate waters.
In Hinderlider v. La Plata River Co., 304 U. S. 92, 110, in an opinion handed down the same day as Erie and by the same author, Mr. Justice Brandéis, the Court declared, “For whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of 'federal common law’ upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive.” Although the suit was between two private litigants and the relevant States could not be made parties, the Court considered itself free to determine the effect of an interstate compact regulating water apportionment. The decision implies that no State can undermine the federal interest in equitably apportioned interstate waters even if it deals with private parties. This would not mean that, absent a compact, the apportionment scheme could not be changed judicially or by Congress, but only that apportionment is a matter of federal law. Cf. Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546, 597-598. The problems surrounding the act of state doctrine are, albeit
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A three-judge District Court sustained the validity of a Mississippi statutory program under which textbooks are purchased by the State and lent to students in both public and private schools, without reference to whether any participating private school has racially discriminatory policies. 340 F. Supp. 1003 (ND Miss. 1972). We noted probable jurisdiction, 409 U. S. 839.
I
Appellants, who are parents of four schoolchildren in Tunica County, Mississippi, filed a class action on behalf of students throughout Mississippi to enjoin in part the enforcement of the Mississippi textbook lending program. The complaint alleged that certain of the private schools excluded students on the basis of race and that, by supplying textbooks to students attending such private schools, appellees, acting for the State, have provided direct state aid to racially segregated education. It was also alleged that the textbook aid program thereby impeded the process of fully desegregating public schools, in violation of appellants’ constitutional rights.
Private schools in Mississippi have experienced a marked growth in recent years. As recently as the 1963-1964 school year, there were only 17 private schools other than Catholic schools; the total enrollment was 2,362 students. In these nonpublic schools 916 students were Negro, and 192 of these were enrolled in special schools for retarded, orphaned, or abandoned children. By September 1970, the number of private non-Catholic schools had increased to 155 with a student population estimated at 42,000, virtually all white. Ap-pellees do not challenge the statement, which is fully documented in appellants’ brief, that “the creation and enlargement of these [private] academies occurred simultaneously with major events in the desegregation of public schools . ...”
This case does not raise any question as to the right of citizens to maintain private schools with admission limited to students of particular national origins, race, or religion or of the authority of a State to allow such schools. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925). The narrow issue before us, rather, is a particular form of tangible assistance the State provides to students in private schools in common with all other students by lending textbooks under the State’s 33-year-old program for providing free textbooks to all the children of the State. The program dates back to a 1940 appeal for improved educational facilities by the Governor of Mississippi to the state legislature. The legislature then established a state textbook purchasing board and authorized it to select, purchase, and distribute free textbooks for all schoolchildren through the first eight grades. In 1942, the program was extended to cover all high school students, and, as codified, the statutory authorization remains substantially unchanged. Miss. Code Ann. § 6634 et seq. (1942).
Administration of the textbook program is vested in the Mississippi Textbook Purchasing Board, whose members include the Governor, the State Superintendent of Education, and three experienced educators appointed by the Governor for four-year terms. Id., §§ 6634, 6641. The Board employs a full-time administrator as its Executive Secretary. Textbooks may be purchased only “for use in those courses set up in the state course of study adopted by the State Board of Education, or courses established by special acts of the Legislature.” Id., § 6646. For each course of study, there is a "rating committee” composed of appointed members, id., § 6641 (l)(d), and only those books approved by the relevant rating committee may be purchased from publishers at a price which cannot “be higher than the lowest prices at which the same books are being sold anywhere in the United States.” Id., §6646 (1).
The books are kept at a central book repository in Jackson. Id., § 6641 (1) (f). Appellees send to each school district, and, in recent years, to each private school requisition forms listing approved textbooks available from the State for free distribution to students. The local school district or the private school sends a requisition form to the Purchasing Board for approval by the Executive Secretary, who in turn forwards the approved form to the Jackson book repository where the order is routinely filled and the requested books shipped directly to the school district or the private school.
The District Court found that “34,000 students are presently receiving state-owned textbooks while attending 107 all-white, nonsectarian private schools which have been formed throughout the state since the inception of public school desegregation.” 340 F. Supp., at 1011. During the 1970-1971 school year, these schools held 173,424 books, for which Mississippi paid $490,239. The annual expenditure for replacements or new texts is approximately $6 per pupil, or a total of approximately $207,000 for the students enrolled in the participating private segregated academies, exclusive of mailing costs which are borne by the State as well.
In dismissing the complaint the District Court stressed, first, that the statutory scheme was not motivated by a desire to further racial segregation in the public schools, having been enacted first in 1940, long before this Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), and consequently, long before there was any occasion to have a policy or reason to foster the development of racially segregated private academies. Second, the District Court took note that providing textbooks to private sectarian schools had been approved by this Court in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968), and that “[t]he essential inquiry, therefore, is whether we should apply a more stringent standard for determining what constitutes state aid to a school in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ban against denial of the equal protection of the law than the Supreme Court has applied in First Amendment cases.” 340 F. Supp., at 1011. The District Court held no more stringent standard should apply on the facts of this case, since, as in Allen, the books were provided to the students and not to the schools. Finally, the District Court concluded that the textbook loans did not interfere with or impede the State’s acknowledged duty to establish a unitary school system under this Court's holding in Green v. County School Board, 391 U. S. 430, 437 (1968), since
“[depriving any segment of school children of state-owned textbooks at this point in time is not necessary for the establishment or maintenance of state-wide unitary schools. Indeed, the public schools which plaintiffs acknowledge were fully established as unitary schools throughout the state no later than 1970-71, continue to attract 90% of the state's educable children. There is no showing that any child enrolled in private school, if deprived of free textbooks, would withdraw from private school and subsequently enroll in the public schools.'' 340 F. Supp., at 1013.
II
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), the Court held that a State’s role in the education of its citizens must yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education for their children in a privately operated school of the parents’ choice. In the 1971 Term we reaffirmed the vitality of Pierce, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 213 (1972), and there has been no suggestion in the present case that we alter our view of Pierce. Yet the Court’s holding in Pierce is not without limits. As Mr. Justice White observed in his concurring opinion in Yoder, Pierce “held simply that while a State may posit [educational] standards, it may not pre-empt the educational process by requiring children to attend public schools.” Id., at 239.
Appellees fail to recognize the limited scope of Pierce when they urge that the right of parents to send their children to private schools under that holding is at stake in this case. The suggestion is made that the rights of parents under Pierce would be undermined were the lending of free textbooks denied to those who attend private schools — in other words, that schoolchildren who attend private schools might be deprived of the equal protection of the laws were they invidiously classified under the state textbook loan program simply because their parents had exercised the constitutionally protected choice to send the children to private schools.
We do not see the issue in appellees’ terms. In Pierce, the Court affirmed the right of private schools to exist and to operate; it said nothing of any supposed right of private or parochial schools to share with public schools in state largesse, on an equal basis or otherwise. It has never been held that if private schools are not given some share of public funds allocated for education that such schools are isolated into a classification violative of the Equal Protection Clause. It is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to say that such schools must, as a matter of equal protection, receive state aid.
The appellees intimate that the State must provide assistance to private schools equivalent to that which it provides to public schools without regard to whether the private schools discriminate on racial grounds. Clearly, the State need not. Even as to church-sponsored schools whose policies are nondiscriminatory, any absolute right to equal aid was negated, at least by implication, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971). The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment strictly confine state aid to sectarian education. Even assuming, therefore, that the Equal Protection Clause might require state aid to be granted to private nonsectarian schools in some circumstances — health care or textbooks, for example — a State could rationally conclude as a matter of legislative policy that constitutional neutrality as to sectarian schools might best be achieved by withholding all state assistance. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). In the same way, a State's special interest in elevating the quality of education in both public and private schools does not mean that the State must grant aid to private schools without regard to constitutionally mandated standards forbidding state-supported discrimination. That the Constitution may compel toleration of private discrimination in some circumstances does not mean that it requires state support for such discrimination.
Ill
The District Court’s holding therefore raises the question whether and on what terms a State may — as a matter of legislative policy- — provide tangible assistance to students attending private schools. Appellants assert, not only that the private schools are in fact racially discriminatory, but also that aid to them in any form is in derogation of the State’s obligation not to support discrimination in education.
This Court has consistently affirmed decisions enjoining state tuition grants to students attending racially discriminatory private schools. A textbook lending program is not legally distinguishable from the forms of state assistance foreclosed by the prior cases. Free textbooks, like tuition grants directed to private school students, are a form of financial assistance inuring to the benefit of the private schools themselves. An inescapable educational cost for students in both public and private schools is the expense of providing all necessary-learning materials. When, as here, that necessary expense is borne by the State, the economic consequence is to give aid to the enterprise; if the school engages in discriminatory practices the State by tangible aid in the form of textbooks thereby gives support to such discrimination. Racial discrimination in state-operated schools is barred by the Constitution and “[i]t is also axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage or promote private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish.” Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458, 475-476 (MD Ala. 1967).
We do not suggest that a State violates its constitutional duty merely because it has provided any form of state service that benefits private schools said to be racially discriminatory. Textbooks are a basic educational tool and, like tuition grants, they are provided only in connection with schools; they are to be distinguished from generalized services government might provide to schools in common with others. Moreover, the textbooks provided to private school students by the State in this case are a form of assistance readily available from sources entirely independent of the State — unlike, for example, “such necessities of life as electricity, water, and police and fire protection.” Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U. S. 163, 173 (1972). The State has neither an absolute nor operating monopoly on the procurement of school textbooks; anyone can purchase them on the open market.
The District Court laid great stress on the absence of a showing by appellants that “any child enrolled in private school, if deprived of free textbooks, would withdraw from private school and subsequently enroll in the public schools.” 340 F. Supp., at 1013. We can accept this factual assertion; we cannot and do not know, on this record at least, whether state textbook assistance is the determinative factor in the enrollment of any students in any of the private schools in Mississippi. We do not agree with the District Court in its analysis of the legal consequences of this uncertainty, for the Constitution does not permit the State to aid discrimination even when there is no precise causal relationship between state financial aid to a private school and the continued well-being of that school. A State may not grant the type of tangible financial aid here involved if that aid has a significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination. “[Decisions on the constitutionality of state involvement in private discrimination do not turn on whether the state aid adds up to 51 percent or adds up to only 49 per cent of the support of the segregated institution.” Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm’n, 275 F. Supp. 833, 854 (ED La. 1967).
The recurring theme of appellees’ argument is a sympathetic one — that the State’s textbook loan program is extended to students who attend racially segregated private schools only because the State sincerely wishes to foster quality education for all Mississippi children, and, to that end, has taken steps to insure that no sub-group of schoolchildren will be deprived of an important educational tool merely because their parents have chosen to enroll them in segregated private schools. We need not assume that the State’s textbook aid to private schools has been motivated by other than a sincere interest in the educational welfare of all Mississippi children. But good intentions as to one valid objective do not serve to negate the State’s involvement in violation of a constitutional duty. “The existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action that has an impermissible effect.” Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451, 462 (1972). The Equal Protection Clause would be a sterile promise if state involvement in possible private activity could be shielded altogether from constitutional scrutiny simply because its ultimate end was not discrimination but some higher goal.
The District Court offered as further support for its holding the finding that Mississippi’s public schools “were fully established as unitary schools throughout the state no later than 1970-71 [and] continue to attract 90% of the state’s educable children.” 340 F. Supp., at 1013. We note, however, that overall statewide attendance figures do not fully and accurately reflect the impact of private schools in particular school districts. In any event, the constitutional infirmity of the Mississippi textbook program is that it significantly aids the organization and continuation of a separate system of private schools which, under the District Court holding, may discriminate if they so desire. A State’s constitutional obligation requires it to steer clear, not only of operating the old dual system of racially segregated schools, but also of giving significant aid to institutions that practice racial or other invidious discrimination. That the State’s public schools are now fully unitary, as the District Court found, is irrelevant.
IV
Appellees and the District Court also placed great reliance on our decisions in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), and Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). In Everson, we held that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment did not prohibit New Jersey from “spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and other schools.” 330 U. S., at 17. Allen, following Everson, sustained a New York law requiring school textbooks to be lent free of charge to all students, including those in attendance at parochial schools, in specified grades.
Neither Allen nor Everson is dispositive of the issue before us in this case. Religious schools “pursue two goals, religious instruction and secular education.” Board of Education v. Allen, supra, at 245. And, where carefully limited so as to avoid the prohibitions of the “effect” and “entanglement” tests, States may assist church-related schools in performing their secular functions, Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, post, at 774, 775; Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, post, at 481, not only because the States have a substantial interest in the quality of education being provided by private schools, see Cochran v. Louisiana Board of Education, 281 U. S. 370, 375 (1930), but more importantly because assistance properly confined to the secular functions of sectarian schools does not substantially promote the readily identifiable religious mission of those schools and it does not interfere with the free exercise rights of others.
Like a sectarian school, a private school — even one that discriminates — fulfills an important educational function; however, the difference is that in the context of this case the legitimate educational function cannot be isolated from discriminatory practices — if such in fact exist. Under Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), discriminatory treatment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire educational process. The private school that closes its doors to defined groups of students on the basis of constitutionally suspect criteria manifests, by its own actions, that its educational processes are based on private belief that segregation is desirable in education. There is no reason to discriminate against students for reasons wholly unrelated to individual merit unless the artificial barriers are considered an essential part of the educational message to be communicated to the students who are admitted. Such private bias is not barred by the Constitution, nor does it invoke any sanction of laws, but neither can it call on the Constitution for material aid from the State.
Our decisions under the Establishment Clause reflect the “internal tension in the First Amendment between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause,” Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 677 (1971). This does not mean, as we have already suggested, that a State is constitutionally obligated to provide even “neutral” services to sectarian schools. But the transcendent value of free religious exercise in our constitutional scheme leaves room for “play in the joints” to the extent of cautiously delineated secular governmental assistance to religious schools, despite the fact that such assistance touches on the conflicting values of the Establishment Clause by indirectly benefiting the religious schools and their sponsors.
In contrast, although the Constitution does not proscribe private bias, it places no value on discrimination as it does on the values inherent in the Free Exercise Clause. Invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections. And even some private discrimination is subject to special remedial legislation in certain circumstances under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment; Congress has made such discrimination unlawful in other significant contexts. However narrow may be the channel of permissible state aid to sectarian schools, Nyquist, supra; Levitt, supra, it permits a greater degree of state assistance than may be given to private schools which engage in discriminatory practices that would be unlawful in a public school system.
Y
At oral argument, appellees expressed concern over the process of determining the scope of relief to be granted should appellants prevail on the merits. That aspect of the case presents problems but the procedural details need not be fully resolved here. The District Court’s assumption that textbook loans were permissible, even to racially discriminating private schools, obviated any necessity for that court to determine whether some of the private schools could properly be classified as “racially discriminatory” and how that determination might best be made. We construe the complaint as contemplating an individual determination as to each private school in Mississippi whose students now receive textbooks under the State’s textbook loan program; relief on an assumption that all private schools were discriminating, thus foreclosing individualized consideration, would not be appropriate.
The proper injunctive relief can be granted without implying a finding that all the private schools alleged to be receiving textbook aid are in fact practicing restrictive admission policies. Private schools are not fungible and the fact that some or even most may practice discrimination does not warrant blanket condemnation. The District Court can appropriately direct the appellees to submit for approval a certification procedure under which any school seeking textbooks for its pupils may apply for participation on behalf of pupils. The certification by the school to the Mississippi Textbook Purchasing Board should, among other factors, affirmatively declare its admission policies and practices, state the number of its racially and religiously identifiable minority students and such other relevant data as is consistent with this opinion. The State’s certification of eligibility would, of course, be subject to judicial review.
This school-by-school determination may be cumbersome but no more so than the State’s process of ascertaining compliance with educational standards. No presumptions flow from mere allegations; no one can be required, consistent with due process, to prove the absence of violation of law.
The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Me. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Brennan concur in the result.
App. 40-41.
Brief for Appellants 8-9.
See Norwood v. Harrison, 340 F. Supp. 1003, 1007 (ND Miss. 1972).
The regulation for distribution of state-owned textbooks from 1940 through 1970 provided as follows:
“For the distribution of free textbooks the local control will be placed in the hands of the County Superintendent of Education. All requisitions for books shall be made through him and all shipments of books shall be invoiced through him. At his discretion he may set up certain regulations governing the distribution of books within the county, such regulations not to conflict with the regulations adopted by the State Textbook Board or provisions of the Free Textbook Act.”
This regulation was revised on October 14, 1970, to read as follows:
“Public Schools. The administration of the textbook program in the public schools shall be the responsibility of the administrative heads of the county units, consolidated districts, and municipal separate districts set up by the Legislature. All textbook transactions between the public schools and the State shall be carried on through them. It shall be the duty of these local custodians to render all reports required by the State; to place orders for textbooks for the pupils in their schools ....
“Private Schools. Private and parochial school programs shall be the responsibility of the State Textbook Board. All textbook transactions will be carried out between the Board and the administrative heads of these schools. Their duties shall be the same as outlined above for public schools.”
The variation in the figures as to schools and students is accounted for by the District Court’s omission of particular kinds of schools in making the findings. The earlier and higher figures are found in the briefs and are not disputed.
Brown v. South Carolina Board of Education, 296 F. Supp. 199 (SC), aff’d per curiam, 393 U. S. 222 (1968); Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm’n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (ED La. 1967), aff’d per curiam, 389 U. S. 571 (1968). See Wallace v. United States, 389 U. S. 215 (1967), aff’g Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458, 475 (MD Ala.). Mississippi’s tuition grant programs were invalidated in Coffey v. State Educational Finance Comm’n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (SD Miss. 1969); Coffey v. State Educational Finance Comm’n, SD Miss., CA No. 2906, decided Sept. 2,1970 (unreported). The latter case involved a statute which provided for tuition loans rather than tuition grants. See Green v. Connolly, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (DC), aff’d sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U. S. 997 (1971).
Appellees misperceive the “child benefit” theory of our cases decided under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. See, e. g., Cochran v. Louisiana Board of Education, 281 U. S. 370 (1930), and Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U. S. 236 (1968). In those cases the Court observed that the direct financial benefit of textbook loans to students is “to parents and children, not to schools,” id,, at 244, in the sense that parents and children — not schools— would in most instances be required to procure their textbooks if the State did not. But the Court has never denied that “free books make it more likely that some children choose to attend a sectarian school,” ibid., just as in other cases involving aid to sectarian schools we have acknowledged that the various forms of state assistance “surely aid these [religious] institutions ... in the sense that religious bodies would otherwise have been forced to find other sources from which to finance these services.” Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672, 679 (1971). Plainly, religion benefits indirectly from governmental aid to parents and children; nevertheless, “[t]hat religion may indirectly benefit from governmental aid . . . does not convert that aid into an impermissible establishment of religion.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 664 (1971) (opinion of White, J.).
The leeway for indirect aid to sectarian schools has no place in defining the permissible scope of state aid to private racially discriminatory schools. “State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds, or property cannot be squared with the [Fourteenth] Amendment’s command that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 19 (1958). Thus Mr. Justice White, the author of the Court’s opinion in Allen, supra, and a dissenter in Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, noted there that in his view, legislation providing assistance to any sectarian school which restricted entry on racial or religious grounds would, to that extent, be unconstitutional. Lemon, supra, at 671 n. 2. See Part IV, infra.
Accord, Griffin v. State Board of Education, 296 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (ED Va. 1969), superseding Griffin v. State Board of Education, 239 F. Supp. 560 (ED Va. 1965); Brown v. South Carolina Board of Education, supra.
In Tunica County, for example, where appellants reside, in response to Green v. Connally, supra, and Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U. S. 19 (1969), all white children were withdrawn from public schools and placed in a private academy housed in local church facilities and staffed by the principal and 17 high school teachers of the county system, who resigned in mid-year to accept jobs at the new academy. See United States v. Tunica County School District, 323 F. Supp. 1019 (ND Miss. 1970), aff’d, 440 F. 2d 377 (CA5 1971). As of the time of the filing of this lawsuit, the successor Tunica Institute of Learning enrolled 495 students, all white, and would not attest to an open enrollment policy. Similar histories of Holmes County, Canton Municipal Separate School District, Jackson Municipal Separate School District, Amite County, Indianola Municipal Separate School District, and Grenada Municipal Separate School District are recited, without challenge by appellees, in Brief for Appellants 14r-19.
See, e. g., Griffin v. Breekenridge, 403 U. S. 88 (1971); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409 (1968); 42 U. S. C. § 2000a et seq. (barring discrimination in public accommodations); 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. (barring discrimination in private employment); 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et seq. (barring discrimination in private housing transactions).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents another phase of the Indiana Gross Income Tax Act of 1933, which has been before this Court in a series of cases beginning with Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307. The Act imposes a tax upon “the receipt of the entire gross income” of residents and dom-iciliaries of Indiana but excepts from its scope “such gross income as is derived from business conducted in commerce between this state and other states of the United States ... to the extent to which the State of Indiana is prohibited from taxing such gross income by the Constitution of the United States.” Indiana Laws 1933, pp. 388, 392, as amended, Laws 1937, pp. 611, 615, Burns’ Ind. Stat. Anno. § 64-2601 et seg.
Appellant’s predecessor, domiciled in Indiana, was trustee of an estate created by the will of a decedent domiciled in Indiana at the time of his death. During 1940, the trustee instructed his Indiana broker to arrange for the sale at stated prices of securities forming part of the trust estate. Through the broker’s New York correspondents the securities were offered for sale on the New York Stock Exchange. When a purchaser was found, the New York brokers notified the Indiana broker who in turn informed the trustee, and the latter brought the securities to his broker for mailing to New York. Upon their delivery to the purchasers, the New York brokers received the purchase price, which, after deducting expenses and commission, they transmitted to the Indiana broker. The latter delivered the proceeds less his commission to the trustee. On the gross receipts of these sales, amounting to $65,214.20, Indiana, under the Act of 1933, imposed a tax of 1%. Having paid the tax under protest, the trustee brought this suit for its recovery. The Supreme Court of Indiana, reversing a court of first instance, sustained the tax on the ground that the situs of the securities was in Indiana. 221 Ind. 675, 51 N. E. 2d 6. The case is here on appeal under § 237 (a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 344 (a), and has had the consideration which two arguments afford.
The power of the States to tax and the limitations upon that power imposed by the Commerce Clause have necessitated a long, continuous process of judicial adjustment. The need for such adjustment is inherent in a federal government like ours, where the same transaction has aspects that may concern the interests and involve the authority of both the central government and the constituent States.
The history of this problem is spread over hundreds of volumes of our Reports. To attempt to harmonize all that has been said in the past would neither clarify what has gone before nor guide the future. Suffice it to say that especially in this field opinions must be read in the setting of the particular cases and as the product of preoccupation with their special facts.
Our starting point is clear. In two recent cases we applied the principle that the Commerce Clause was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact laws for the protection and encouragement of commerce among the States, but by its own force created an area of trade free from interference by the States. In short, the Commerce Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761; Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373. In so deciding we reaffirmed, upon fullest consideration, the course of adjudication unbroken through the Nation’s history. This limitation on State power, as the Morgan case so well illustrates, does not merely forbid a State to single out interstate commerce for hostile action. A State is also precluded from taking any action which may fairly be deemed to have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade between States. It is immaterial that local commerce is subjected to a similar encumbrance. It may commend itself to a State to encourage a pastoral instead of an industrial society. That is its concern and its privilege. But to compare a State’s treatment of its local trade with the exertion of its authority against commerce in the national domain is to compare incomparables.
These principles of limitation on State power apply to all State policy no matter what State interest gives rise to its legislation. A burden on interstate commerce is none the lighter and no less objectionable because it is imposed by a State.under the taxing power rather than under manifestations of police power in the conventional sense. But, in the necessary accommodation between local needs and the overriding requirement of freedom for the national commerce, the incidence of a particular type of State action may throw the balance in support of the local need because interference with the national interest is remote or unsubstantial. A police regulation of local aspects of interstate commerce is a power often essential to a State in safeguarding vital local interests. At least until Congress chooses to enact a nation-wide rule, the power will not be denied to the State. The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 402 et seq.; S. C. Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177; Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U. S. 202, 209-12. State taxation falling on interstate commerce, on the other hand, can only be justified as designed to make such commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys. But revenue serves as well no matter what its source. To deny to a State a particular source of income because it taxes the very process of interstate commerce does not impose a crippling limitation on a State’s ability to carry on its local function. Moreover, the burden on interstate commerce involved in a direct tax upon it is inherently greater, certainly less uncertain in its consequences, than results from the usual police regulations. The power to tax is a dominant power over commerce. Because the greater or more threatening burden of a direct tax on commerce is coupled with the lesser need to a State of a particular source of revenue, attempts at such taxation have always been more carefully scrutinized and more consistently resisted than police power regulations of aspects of such commerce. The task of scrutinizing is a task of drawing lines. This is the historic duty of the Court so long as Congress does not undertake to make specific arrangements between the National Government and the States in regard to revenues from interstate commerce. See Act of July 3, 1944, 58 Stat. 723; H. Doc. 141, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., “Multiple Taxation of Air Commerce”; and compare 54 Stat. 1059, 4 U. S. C. § 13 et seq. (permission to States to extend taxing power to Federal areas). Considerations of proximity and degree are here, as so often in the law, decisive.
It has been suggested that such a tax is valid when a similar tax is placed on local trade, and a specious appearance of fairness is sought to be imparted by the argument that interstate commerce should not be favored at the expense of local trade. So to argue is to disregard the life of the Commerce Clause. Of course a State is not required to give active advantage to interstate trade. But it cannot aim to control that trade even though it desires to control its own. It cannot justify what amounts to a levy upon the very process of commerce ■ across States lines by pointing to a similar hobble on its local trade. It is true that the existence of a tax on its local commerce detracts from the deterrent effect of a tax on interstate commerce to the extent that it removes the temptation to sell the goods locally. But the fact of such a tax, in any event, puts impediments upon the currents of commerce across the State line, while the aim of the Commerce Clause was precisely to prevent States from exacting toll from those engaged in national commerce. The Commerce Clause does not involve an exercise in the logic of empty categories. It operates within the framework of our federal scheme and with due regard to the national experience reflected by the decisions of this Court, even though the terms in which these decisions have been cast may have varied. Language alters, and there is a fashion in judicial writing as in other things.
This case, like Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, supra, involves a tax imposed by the State of the seller on the proceeds of interstate sales. To extract a fair tithe from interstate commerce for the local protection afforded to it, a seller State need not impose the kind of tax which Indiana here levied. As a practical matter, it can make such commerce pay its way, as the phrase runs, apart from taxing the very sale. Thus, it can tax local manufacture even if the products are destined for other States. For some purposes, manufacture and the shipment of its products beyond a State may be looked upon as an integral transaction. But when accommodation must be made between state and national interests, manufacture within a State, though destined for shipment outside, is not a seamless web so as to prevent a State from giving the manufacturing part detached relevance for purposes of local taxation. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459; Utah Power & L. Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165. It can impose license taxes on domestic and foreign corporations who would do business in the State, Cheney Brothers Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 147; St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 364, though it cannot, even under the guise of such excises, “hamper” interstate commerce. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56 (particularly White, J. concurring at p. 63); Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law (1918) 118-23, 128-31. It can tax the privilege of residence in the State and measure the privilege by net income, including that derived from interstate commerce. U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321; cf. Atlantic Coast Line v. Daughton, 262 U. S. 413. And where, as in this case, the commodities subsequently sold interstate are securities, they can be reached by a property tax by the State of domicil of the owner. Virginia v. Imperial Sales Co., 293 U. S. 15, 19; and see Citizens National Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99.
These illustrative instances show that a seller State has various means of obtaining legitimate contribution to the costs of its government, without imposing a direct tax on interstate sales. While these permitted taxes may, in an ultimate sense, come out of interstate commerce, they are not, as would be a tax on gross receipts, a direct imposition on that very freedom of commercial flow which for more than a hundred and fifty years has been the ward of the Commerce Clause.
It is suggested, however, that the validity of a gross sales tax should depend on whether another State has also sought to impose its burden on the transactions. If another State has taxed the same interstate transaction, the burdensome consequences to interstate trade arq undeniable. But that, for the time being, only one State has taxed is irrelevant to the kind of freedom of trade which the Commerce Clause generated. The immunities implicit in the Commerce Clause and the potential taxing power of a State can hardly be made to depend, in the world of practical affairs, on the shifting incidence of the varying tax laws of the various States at a particular moment. Courts are not possessed of instruments of determination so delicate as to enable them to weigh the various factors in a complicated economic setting which, as to an isolated application of a State tax, might mitigate the obvious burden generally created by a direct tax on commerce. Nor is there any warrant in the constitutional principles heretofore applied by this Court to support the notion that a State may be allowed one single-tax-worth of direct interference with the free flow of commerce. An exaction by a State from interstate commerce falls not because of a proven increase in the cost of the product. What makes the tax invalid is the fact that there is interference by a State with the freedom of interstate commerce. Such a tax by the seller State alone must be judged burdensome in the context of the circumstances in which the tax takes effect. Trade being a sensitive plant, a direct tax upon it to some extent at least deters trade even if its effect is not precisely calculable. Many States, for instance, impose taxes on the consumption of goods, and such taxes have been sustained regardless of the extra-State origin of the goods, or whether a tax on their sale had been imposed by the seller State. Such potential taxation by consumer States is but one factor pointing to the deterrent effect on commerce by a superimposed gross receipts tax.
It has been urged that the force of the decision in the Adams case has been sapped by McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S. 33. The decision in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White was found not to impinge upon “the rationale of the Adams Manufacturing Co. ease,” and the tax was sustained because it was “conditioned upon a local activity, delivery of goods within the state upon their purchase for consumption.” 309 U. S. at 58. Compare McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327. Taxes which have the same effect as consumption taxes are properly differentiated from a direct imposition on interstate commerce, such as was before the Court in the Adams case and is now before us. The tax on the sale itself cannot be differentiated from a direct unapportioned tax on gross receipts which has been definitely held beyond the State taxing power ever since Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230, and Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326. See also, e. g., Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Kansas, 240 U. S. 227, 231; Puget Sound Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 90, 94; and compare Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66. For not even an “internal regulation” by a State will be allowed if it directly affects interstate commerce. Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 494.
Nor is American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459, or Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340, any justification for the present tax. The American Mfg. Co. case involved an imposition by St. Louis of a license fee upon the conduct of manufacturing within that city. It has long been settled that a State can levy such an occupation tax graduated according to the volume of manufacture. In that case, to lighten the manufacturer’s burden, the imposition of the occupation tax was made contingent upon the actual sale of the goods locally manufactured. Sales in St. Louis of goods made elsewhere were not taken into account in measuring the license fee. That tax, then, unlike this, was not in fact a tax on gross receipts. Cf. Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418. And, if words are to correspond to things, the tax now here is not “a tax on the transfer of property” within the State, which was the basis for sustaining the tax in Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, supra, at 348.
There remains only the claim that an interstate sale of intangibles differs from an interstate sale of tangibles in respects material to the issue in this case. It was by this distinction that the Supreme Court of Indiana sought to escape the authority of Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, supra. Latin tags like mobilia seguuntur personam often do service for legal analysis, but they ought not to confound constitutional issues. What Mr. Justice Holmes said about that phrase is relevant here. “It is a fiction, the historical origin of which is familiar to scholars, and it is this fiction that gives whatever meaning it has to the saying mobilia sequuntur personam. But being a fiction it is not allowed to obscure the facts, when the facts become important.” Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 204. Of course this is an interstate sale. And constitutionally it is commerce no less and no different because the subject was pieces of paper worth $65,214.20, rather than machines.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Black dissents.
Compare Report of the (Australian) Royal Commission on the Constitution (1929) pp. 260, 322-24, and Report of the (Canadian) Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (1940), bk. II, pp. 62-67, 111-21, 150-62, 216-19. See Australia, Act No. 1, 1946, repealing Act No. 20, 1942, and Act No. 43, 1942; South Australia v. Commonwealth, 65 C. L. R. 373; also Proposals of the Government of Canada, Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction, pp. 47-49; Proceedings of the Dominion-Provincial Conference (1945) passim, particularly the statement of Prime Minister Mackenzie King, p. 388, and the discussion following. And see Maxwell, The Fiscal Impact of Federalism in the United States (1946) cc. II, XIII, XIV.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Despite a grant of immunity in response to the assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege not to be a witness against himself, petitioner refused to answer questions put to him before a Kings County, New York, grand jury. On December 7, 1965, a trial judge found that the questions put had been proper and directed petitioner to answer them. Petitioner refused; the trial court, after allowing petitioner a week’s time to change his mind, signed a commitment order stating that by “his contumacious and unlawful refusal after being sworn as a witness to answer any legal and proper interrogatories and for his wilful disobedience to the lawful mandate of this Court” petitioner had “committed a criminal contempt of court in the immediate view and presence of the Court and that said contempt was wilful and unlawful and in violation of Section 750 of the Judiciary Law of the State of New York . . . Petitioner was sentenced to 30 days and fined $250.
Appellate proceedings proved fruitless. Petitioner then offered to testify, the offer was refused, and petitioner paid his fine and served his sentence. On October 10, 1966, petitioner was indicted under § 600, subd. 6, of the New York Penal Law of 1909 “for his contumacious and unlawful refusal, after being duly sworn as a witness, to answer legal and proper interrogatories.” The trial court dismissed the indictment on double jeopardy grounds but the appellate court reversed. The reversal was sustained by the Court of Appeals, which concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment and the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment did not bar the indictment. The court reasoned that petitioner had committed two acts of contempt — one on October 14, 1965, before the grand jury, and the other on December 7 when he refused to obey the order of the judge — and that the trial judge had committed petitioner for civil, not criminal, contempt.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals must be vacated. The judgment of the New York trial court entered on December 15, 1965, was for “criminal contempt,” petitioner was sentenced to a definite term in jail and ordered to pay a fine, and neither the prosecutor nor the trial court considered his offer to testify as sufficient to foreclose execution of the sentence. For purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, petitioner was confined and penalized for criminal contempt. Yates v. United States, 355 U. S. 66 (1957); see also Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U. S. 373 (1966); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U. S. 364 (1966); Oriel v. Russell, 278 U. S. 358 (1929). To the extent that the judgment of the Court of Appeals rested on a contrary view, it must be set aside. It also appears from its supplemental response that the State considers the two acts of contempt on October 14 and on December 7 as being partially intertwined. As we understand it from the State’s response, petitioner’s refusal to answer on October 14 did not mature into a complete contempt until December 7 when the trial court passed on the propriety of the grand jury’s inquiry and petitioner thereafter refused to obey the court’s direction to return to the grand jury and answer the questions properly put to him.
In view of the New York Court of Appeals’ misconception of the nature of the contempt judgment entered against petitioner for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause and in view of the substantial question of New York law that has emerged, we are disinclined at this juncture to entertain and determine the double jeopardy question presented by petitioner. The better course is to grant the petition for writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals, and remand the case to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, thus affording that court the opportunity to reconsider the validity of the indictment under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution.
So ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
After World War II Congress authorized retirement pay for nonregular military personnel with at least 20 years of service in the Reserves or National Guard. However, under 10 U. S. C. § 1331 (c), those who had been in the Reserves before World War II are not eligible for benefits unless they performed active duty during wartime. Appellee had no such active duty. He contends that he may not be denied benefits for which he is otherwise eligible simply because he had prewar service in the Guard. In the District Court he argued that the statute violates the equal protection principle inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In this Court he also argues that the statute should be construed as merely providing that his years of prewar service must be ignored for the purpose of determining his eligibility. We reject both arguments.
The case is here on direct appeal from a summary judgment entered by a three-judge District Court sitting in the Eastern District of New York. That court ordered the Secretary of the Army to pay retirement benefits to appellee and to place the members of the class he represents on the retirement rolls. 409 F. Supp. 831 (1976). Because the three-judge court was properly convened, we have jurisdiction even though the decision of the District Court can be read as resting on its interpretation of the statute rather than squarely on constitutional grounds.
Section 1331 (c) plainly discriminates between persons who were in the Reserves before August 16, 1945, and those who performed their first service after that date. The statute says that the members of the former group are not “eligible for retired pay” unless they performed active duty during specified dates when the country was engaged in hostilities.
Appellee acknowledges that the statute creates two distinct classes of reservists. He contends, however, that the members of his class are not ineligible for benefits, but merely are prevented from counting pre-World War II service as part of the 20 years of “satisfactory service” needed to qualify. The argument is foreclosed by the plain language of the statute. Moreover, the legislative history reveals a congressional purpose inconsistent with appellee’s interpretation.
Section 1331 (c) is a description of persons who are not eligible for retirement pay. It does not describe periods of service which may or may not be counted toward eligibility. Its text plainly disqualifies the persons it describes. Furthermore, § 1331 (a), which defines the conditions of eligibility for retirement pay, states that a person meeting these conditions is entitled to retirement pay “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c).” It is difficult to believe that language this clear could be the product of a drafting error. We are persuaded that Congress meant what it so plainly said.
An explanation for excluding certain persons from benefits—as opposed to excluding part of their service—was given by the chairman, of the Senate Armed Services Committee during the hearings on the bill. He pointed out that the provision would “make certain that no one who drops out of the Reserves to avoid service in the war is qualified under the bill. This is concurred in by the services and the Reserves.” The Senate Committee had been advised by the Army Chief of Staff that: “The purpose of reservists was to fight in the war. If he did not fight in the wars we did have, we feel he should not qualify.”
These comments describe a purpose to disqualify certain persons rather than merely a purpose to treat a part of their service as unsatisfactory.
In 1958 Congress amended § 1331 (c) to remove the disqualification for persons who served in the Korean conflict. The history of this amendment reflects an intent to make retirement pay available for otherwise “ineligible persons” rather than a desire to classify periods of service as satisfactory. The statutory language and its legislative history convincingly demonstrate that Congress made a deliberate decision to deny retirement pay to members of appellee’s class.
Appellee argues that the Constitution requires equal treatment for all reservists with 20 years of satisfactory service and that it is totally irrational to disqualify some of them simply because they had additional years of service before August 16, 1945. We disagree.
The retirement pay program was intended to provide an inducement to qualified personnel to remain active in the Reserves in order to maintain a cadre of trained soldiers for use in active duty if the need should arise. Such an inducement would be unlikely to achieve its intended purpose if offered to persons who had dropped out of the Reserves to avoid service during the war. Moreover, the decision not to offer the inducement to reservists whose failure to serve was involuntary, reflects a predictive judgment that a past obstacle to active service may have a continuing effect on future availability.
When Congress enacted the statute in 1948, it did not penalize the members of appellee’s class; it merely made a judgment that they were somewhat less desirable prospects for future active duty than others, and therefore decided not to offer them a special inducement to remain in the Reserves. The statutory exclusion is unquestionably the product of a deliberate and rational choice which Congress had the constitutional power to make.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948, 10 U. S. C. § 1331 et seq., authorizes retirement pay for reservists and guardsmen who have accumulated 20 years of eligible service, are 60 years of age, and are not disqualified by § 1331 (c).
Section 1331 (c) provides:
“No person who, before August 16, 1945, was a Reserve of an armed force, or a member of the Army without component or other category covered by section 1332 (a) (1) of this title except a regular component, is eligible for retired pay under this chapter, unless he performed active duty after April 5, 1917, and before November 12, 1918, or after September 8, 1940, and before January 1, 1947, or unless he performed active duty (other than for training) after June 26, 1950, and before July 28, 1953.”
Appellee served in the National Guard from 1933 to 1940 and again from 1947 to 1967. The record does not reveal the reason for appellee’s failure to serve during World War II. Although he was in the Guard between June 26, 1950 and July 28, 1953, he performed no active duty (other than for training) during that time; again, the record does not reveal why he did not perform active duty during the Korean hostilities. At oral argument in the District Court appellee’s counsel represented that appellee had been unable to serve in World War II because of injuries received in an automobile accident, but there is no support in the record for this assertion. For purposes of this appeal, however, we assume that his failure to serve in World War II was involuntary.
Federal jurisdiction was predicated on 28 U. S. C. § 1361.
The class as certified by the District Court, App. 38, includes all
“persons at least 60 years of age who have performed 20 years of service computed under 10 USC § 1332 since August 16, 1945 and otherwise are entitled to Retired Pay for Non-Regular Military Service, except that before August 16, 1945 they were a Reserve of an armed force or a member of the Army without component and did not perform active duty after April 5, 1917 but before November 12, 1918, or after September 8, 1940 and before January 1, 1947, or after June 26, 1950 and before July 28, 1953, and therefore were disqualified from Retired Pay Benefits by virtue of 10 USC §1331 (c).” Id., at 6.
The District Court stayed its judgment as to all members of the class other than appellee.
The only basis for injunctive relief set forth in the complaint was the alleged unconstitutionality of § 1331 (c); a three-judge court was therefore required to hear the application for injunctive relief. See 28 U. S. C. § 2282.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1253 provides:
“Except as otherwise provided by law, any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing, an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges.”
See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 712-713, n. 8.
The same bill that contained § 1331 (c) also created a point system for determining whether sufficient service was performed in a given year to count toward the 20-year requirement. 10 U. S. C. § 1332. Years served before the point system are automatically considered “satisfactory service.” § 1332 (a). Appellee contends that Congress generally excluded such years of prior service because the point system had not been in effect, and therefore there was no way to determine whether substantial service had been rendered in those years. Then, appellee argues, Congress made an exception for those men who served in World War II as a reward for their wartime service.
Section 1331 (c) is quoted in full in n. 2, supra.
Hearings on H. R. 2744 before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 77 (1948).
Id., at 29.
In the interim, there was a slight change in the language of the provision. As originally enacted, it provided that such persons would not be eligible for “retirement benefits.” § 302 (a), 62 Stat. 1087. When Title 10 was enacted into positive law, the language was changed to "retired pay.” 70A Stat. 102. Appellee argues that the original language was ambiguous, because the phrase the “right to accrue retirement benefits” was used elsewhere in the same Act to refer to the accrual of credit for years of satisfactory service. See § 304, 62 Stat. 1089. But we see no reason to assume that the same meaning was intended, for one section refers to “accrual” of additional benefits, while the other refers to “eligibility” for any benefits.
For instance, the Senate Report described the amendment as a bill “to make retired pay for nonregular service available to certain persons . . . .” S. Rep. No. 2188, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1958). The same understanding was expressed during the House hearings by the representative of the Defense Department. He stated that “[t]he Department of Defense favors the extension of such retirement benefits to a small group of Reserve personnel who would be eligible for this benefit but for the fact that they do not meet the requirement of having performed active service during World Wars I or II.” Hearings on Consideration of S. 2630, H. R. 4381, H. R. 8775 and H. R. 781 before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on Armed Services, No. 88, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 7897 (1957). A later colloquy is to the same effect:
“Mr. Winstead. And there would be no differential in the pay for retirement with those years counted if this passed as to what they would get if we did not pass this?
“Mr. Ducander. They won’t be able to retire at all.
“Mr. Winstead. They should be covered.” Id., at 7905.
The Senate Report states that the primary purpose of the Act was “to provide an inducement to members of Reserve components to remain active in the Reserves over a long period of time, thereby providing a better trained and more ready Reserve to meet the needs of our national-defense structure.” S. Rep. No. 1543, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1948). See also Hearings on H. R. 2744, n. 10, supra, at 13 (testimony of Gen. Dahlquist), 22-24 (testimony of Col. Maas).
See the excerpt from the legislative history quoted, supra, at 638. Although the statutory exclusion is broader than necessary to accomplish that purpose, it cannot be doubted that it would apply to the persons that Congress wanted to be certain to disqualify.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal presents the. issue whether a beneficiary of the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) may refuse a home visit by the caseworker without risking the termination, of benefits.
The New York State and City social services commissioners appeal from a judgment and decree of a divided three-judge District Court holding invalid and unconstitutional in application § 134 of the New York Social Services Law, § 175 of the New York Policies Governing the Administration of Public Assistance, and §§ 351.10 and 351.21 of Title 18 of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations, and granting injunctive relief. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (SDNY 1969). This Court noted probable jurisdiction but, by a divided vote, denied a requested stay. 397 U. S. 904.
The District Court majority held that a mother receiving AFDC relief may refuse, without forfeiting her. right to that relief, the periodic home visit which the cited New York statutes and regulations 'prescribe as a condition for the continuance of assistance under the program. The beneficiary’s thesis, and that of the District Court majority, is that home visitation is a search and, when not consented to or when not supported by a warrant based on probable cause, violates the beneficiary’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Judge McLean, in dissent, thought it unrealistic to regard the home visit as a search; felt that the requirement of a search warrant to issue only upon a showing of probable cause would make the AFDC program “in effect another criminal statute” and would “introduce a hostile arm’s length element into the relationship’-’ between worker and mother, “a relationship which can be effective only when it is based upon mutual confidence and trust”; and concluded that the majority’s holding struck “a damaging blow” to an important social welfare program. 303 F. Supp., at 946.
I
The case comes to us on the pleadings and supporting affidavits and without the benefit of testimony which an extended hearing would have provided. The pertinent facts, however, are not in dispute.
Plaintiff Barbara James is the mother of a son, Maurice, who was born in May 1967. They reside in New York City. Mrs. James first applied for AFDC assistance shortly before Maurice’s birth. A caseworker made a visit to her apartment at that time without objection. The assistance was authorized.
Two years later, on May 8, 1969, a caseworker wrote Mrs. James that she would visit her home on May 14. Upon receipt of this advice, Mrs. James telephoned the worker that, although she was willing to supply information “reasonable and relevant” to her need for public assistance, any discussion was not to take place at her home. The -worker told Mrs. James that she was required by law to visit in her home and that refusal to permit the visit would result in the termination of assistance. Permission was still denied.
On May 13 the City Department of Social Services sent Mrs. James a notice of intent to discontinue assistance because of the visitation refusal. The notice advised the beneficiary of her right to a hearing before a review officer. The hearing was requested and was held on-May 27. Mrs. James appeared with an attorney at that hearing. They continued, to refuse permission for a worker to visit the James home, but again expressed willingness to cooperate and to permit visits elsewhere. The review officer ruled that the refusal was a proper ground for the termination of assistance. His written decision stated:
“The home visit which Mrs. James refuses to permit is for the purpose of determining if there are any changes in her situation that might affect her . eligibility to continue to receive Public Assistance, or that might affect the amount of such assistance, and to see if there are any social services which the Department of Social Services can provide to the family.”
A notice of termination issued on Juné 2.
Thereupon, without seeking a hearing at the state level, Mrs. James, individually and on behalf of Maurice, and purporting to act on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, instituted the present civil rights suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983. She alleged the denial of rights guaranteed to her under the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and under Subchapters IV and XVI of the Social Security Act and regulations issued thereunder. She further alleged that she and her son have no income, resources, or support other than the benefits received under the AFDC program. She asked for declaratory and injunctive relief. A temporary restraining order was issued on June 13, James v. Goldberg, 302 F. Supp. 478 (SDNY 1969), and the three-judge District Court was convened.
II
The federal aspects of the AFDC program deserve mention. They are provided for in Subchapter IV, Part A, of the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§ 601-610 (1964 ed. and Supp. V). Section 401 of. the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 601 (1964 ed., Supp. V), specifies its purpose, namely, “encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services ... to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life . . . The same section authorizes the federal appropriation for payments to States that qualify. Section 402, 42 U. S. C. § 602 (1964 ed., Supp. V), provides that a state plan, among other things, must “provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for aid to families with dependent children is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness”; must “provide that the State agency will make such reports ... as the Secretary [of Health, Education, and Welfare] may from time to time require”; must “provide that the State agency shall, in determining need, take into consideration any other income and resources of any child or relative claiming aid”; and must “provide that where the State agency has reason to believe’ that the home in which a relative and child receiving aid reside is unsuitable for' the child because of the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of such child it shall bring such condition to the attention of the appropriate court or law enforcement agencies in the State . . . Section 405, 42 U. S. C. § 605, provides that..
“Whenever the State agency has reason to believe that any páyments of aid . . . made with respect to a child are not being or may not be used in the best interests of the child, the State agency may provide for such counseling and guidance services with respect to the use of such payments and the management of other funds by the relative ... in order to assure use of such payments in the best interests, of such child, and may provide for advising such relative that continued failure to so use such payments will result in substitution therefor of protective payments ... or in seeking the appointment of a guardian ... or in. the imposition of criminal or civil penalties . . .. .”
III
When a case involves a home and some type of official intrusion into that home, as this case appears to do, an immediate and natural reaction is one of concern about Fourth Amendment rights and the protection which that Amendment is intended to afford. Its emphasis indeed is upon one of the most precious aspects of personal security in the home: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects ; . . .” This Court has characterized that right as “basic to a free society.” Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 27 (1949); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967). And over the years the Court consistently has been most protective of the privacy of the dwelling. See, for example, Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626-630 (1886); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 (1969); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U. S. 30 (1970). In Camara Mr. Justice White, after noting that the “translation of the abstract prohibition against 'unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable guidelines, for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task,” went on to observe,
“Nevertheless, one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable’ unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” 387 U. S., at 528-529.
He pointed out, too, that one’s Fourth Amendment protection sübsists apart from his being suspected of criminal behavior. 387 U. S., at 530.
IV
This natural and quite proper protective attitude, however, is not a factor in this case, for the seemingly obvious and simple reason that we. are not concerned here with any search by the New York social service agency in the Fourth Amendment meaning of that term. It is true that the governing statute and regulations appear to make mandatory the initial home visit and the subsequent periodic “contacts” (which may include home visits) for the inception and continuance of aid. It is also true that the caseworker’s posture in the home visit is perhaps, in a sense, both rehabilitative and investigative. But this latter aspect, we think, is given too broad a character and far more emphasis than it deserves if it is equated with a search in the traditional criminal law context. We note, too, that the visitation in itself is not forced or compelled, and .that the bene-Sciary’s denial of permission is not a criminal act. If iorisent to the visitation is withheld, no visitation takes place. The aid then never begins or merely ceases, as the case may be. There is no entry of the home and there is no search.
V
If however, we were to assume that a caseworker’s home visit, before or subsequent to the beneficiary’s initial qualification for. benefits, somehow (perhaps because the average beneficiary might feel she is in no position to refuse consent to the visit), and despite its interview nature, does possess some of the characteristics of a search in the traditional sense, we nevertheless conclude that the visit does not fall within the Fourth Amendment’s proscription. This is because it does not descend to the level of unreasonableness. It is unreasonableness which is the Fourth Amendment’s standard. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 9 (1968); Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 222 (1960). And Mr. Chief Justice Warren observed in Terry that “the specific content and incidents of this, right must be shaped by the context in which it is asserted.” 392 U. S., at 9.
There are a number of factors that compel us to conclude that the home visit proposed for Mrs. James is not unreasonable:
1. The public’s interest in .this particular segment of the area of assistance to the unfortunate is protection and aid for the dependent child whose family requires such aid for that child.. The focus is on the child and, further, it is on the child who is dependent. There is no more worthy object of the public’s concern. The dependent . child’s. needs are paramount, and only with hesitancy would we relegate those needs, in the scale of comparative values, to a position secondary to what the . mother claims as her rights.
2. The agency, with tax funds provided from federal as well as from state sources, is fulfilling a public trust. The State, working through its qualified welfare agency, has appropriate and paramount interest and concern in seeing and assuring that the intended and proper objects of that tax-produced assistance are the ones who benefit; from the aid it dispenses. . Surely it is not unreasonable, in the Fourth Amendment sense or in any other sense of that term, that the State have at its command a gentle means, of limited extent and of practical and. considerate application, of achieving that, assurance.
3. One who dispenses purely private charity naturally has an interest in and expects to know how his charitable funds are utilized and put to work. The public, when it is the provider, rightly expects the same. It might well expect more, because of the trust aspect of public funds, and the recipient, as well as the caseworker,, has not only an interest but an obligation.
4. The emphasis of the New York statutes and regulations is upon the home, upon “close contact” with the beneficiary, upon restoring the aid recipient “to a condition of self-support,” and upon the relief of his distress. The. federal emphasis is no different. It is upon “assistance and rehabilitation,” upon maintaining and strengthening family life, and upon “maximum self-support and personál independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection . . . .” 42 U. S. C. §601 (1964 ed., Supp. V); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 479 (1970), and id., at 510 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It requires cooperation from the state agency upon specified standards and in specified ways. And it is concerned about any possible exploitation of the child.
5. The home visit, it is true, is not required by federal statute or regulation. But it has been noted that the visit is “the heart of welfare administration”; that it affords “a personal, rehabilitative orientation, unlike that. of most federal programs”; and that the “more pronounced service orientation” effected by Congress with the 1956 amendments to the Social Security Act “gave redoubled importance to the practice of home visiting.” Note, Rehabilitation, Investigation and the Welfare Home Visit, 79 Yale L. J. 746, 748 (1970). The home visit is an established routine in States besides New York.
6. The means employed by the New York agency are significant. Mrs. James received written notice several days in advance of the intended home visit. The date was specified. Section 134-a of the New York Social Services Law, effective April 1, 1967, and set forth, in n. 2, supra, sets the tone. Privacy is emphasized. The applicant-recipient is made the primary source of information as to eligibility. Outside informational sources, other than public records, aré to be consulted only with the beneficiary’s consent. Forcible entry or entry under false pretenses or visitation outside working hours or snooping in the home are forbidden. HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, §§ 2200 (a) and 2300; 18 NYCRR §§351.1, 351.6, and 351.7. All this minimizes any “burden” upon the homeownér’s right against unreasonable intrusion.
7. Mrs. James, in fact, on this record presents no specific complaint of any unreasonable intrusion of her home and nothing that supports an inference that the desired home visit had as its purpose the obtaining of information as to criminal activity. She complains of no proposed visitation at an awkward or retirement hour. She suggests no forcible entry. She refers to no snooping. She describes no impolite or reprehensible conduct of any kind. She alleges only, in general and nonspecific terms, that on previous visits and, on information and belief, on visitation at the home of other aid recipients, “questions concerning personal relationships, beliefs and behavior are raised and pressed which are unnecessary for a determination of continuing eligibility.” Paradoxically, this same complaint could be. made of a conference held elsewhere than in the home, and yet this is what is sought by Mrs. James. The same complaint could be made of the census taker’s questions. See Me. Justice Makshall’s opinion, as United States Circuit Judge, in United States v. Rickenbacker, 309 F. 2d 462 (CA2 1962), cert. denied, 371 U. S, 962. What Mrs. James appears to want from the agency that provides her and her infant son with the necessities for life is the right to receive those necessities upon her own informational terms, to utilize the Fourth Amendment as a wedge for imposing those terms, and to avoid questions of any kind.
8. We are not persuaded, as Mrs.- James would have us be, that all information pertinent to the issue of eligibility can be obtained by the agency through an interview at a place other than the home, or, as the District Court majority suggested, by examining a lease or a birth certificate, or . by periodic medical examinations, or by interviews with school personnel. 303 F. Supp., at 943. Although these secondary sources might be helpful, they would not always assure verification of actual residence or-of actual physical presence in the home, which are requisites for AFDC benefits, or of impending medical needs. And, of course, little children, such as Maurice James, are not yet registered in school.
9. The visit is not one by police or uniformed authorrity. It is made by "a caseworker of some training whose primary objective is, or should be, the welfare, not the prosecution, of the aid recipient for whom the worker has profound responsibility. As has already been stressed, the program concerns dependent children and the. needy families of those children. It does not deal with crime or with the actual or suspected perpetrators of crime. The caseworker is not a sleuth but rather, we trust, is a friend to one in need.
10. The home visit is not a criminal investigation, does not equate with a criminal investigation, and despite the announced fears of Mrs. James and those who would join her, is not in aid of any criminal proceeding. If the visitation serves to discourage misrepresentation or fraud, such a byproduct of that visit does not impress upon the visit itself a dominant criminal investigative aspect. And if the visit should, by chance, lead to the discovery of fraud and a criminal prosecution should follow, then, even assuming that the evidence discovered upon the home visitation is admissible, an issue upon which we express no opinion, that is a routine and expected fact of life and a consequence no greater than that which necessarily ensues upon any other discovery by a citizen of criminal conduct.
11. The warrant procedure, which the plaintiff appears to claim to be so precious to her, even if civil in nature, is not without its seriously objectionablé features in the welfare context. If a warrant could be obtained (the plaintiff affords us little help as to how it would be obtained), it presumably could be applied for ex parte, its execution would require no notice, it would justify entry by force, and its hours for execution would not be so limited as those prescribed for home visitation. The warrant necessarily would imply conduct either criminal or out of compliance with an asserted governing standard. Of course, the force behind the warrant argument, welcome to the one asserting it, is the fact that it would have to rest upon probable cause, and probable cause in the welfare context, as Mrs. James concedes, requires more than the mere need of the caseworker to see the child in the home and to have assurance that the child is there and is receiving the benefit of the aid that has been authorized for it. In this setting, the warrant argument is out of place.
It seems to us that the situation is akin to that where an Internal Revenue Service agent, in making a routine civil audit of a tapayer’s income tax return, asks that the taxpayer produce for the agent’s review some, proof of a deduction the taxpayer has asserted to his benefit in the computation of his tax. If thé taxpayer refuses, . there is, absent fraud, only a disallowance of the claimed deduction and a consequent additional tax. The taxpayer is fully within his “rights” in refusing to produce the proof, but in maintaining and asserting those rights a tax detriment results and it is a detriment of the taxpayer’s own making. So here Mrs. James has the “right” to refuse the home visit, but a consequence in the form of cessation of aid,' similar to the taxpayer’s resultant additional tax, flows' from that refusal. The choice is entirely hers, and nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved.
VI
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and its companion case, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 (1967), both by a divided. Court, are not inconsistent with our result here. Those cases concerned, respectively, a refusal of entry to city housing inspectors checking for a violation of a building’s occupancy permit, and a refusal of entry to a fire department representative interested in compliance with a city’s fire code. In each case a majority of this Court held that the Fourth Amendment barred prosecution for refusal to permit the desired warrantless inspection. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 (1959), a case that reáched an opposing result and that concerned a request by a health officer for entry in order to check the source of a rat infestation, was pro tanto overruled. Both Frank and Camara involved dwelling quarters. See had to do with a commercial warehouse.
But the facts of the three cases are significantly different from those before us. Each concerned a true search, for violations. Frank was a criminal prosecution for the owner’s refusal to permit entry. So, too, was See. Cam-ara had to do with a writ of prohibition sought to prevent an already pending criminal prosecution. The community welfare aspects, of course, were highly important, but each case arose in a criminal context where a genuine search was denied and prosecution followed.
In contrast, Mrs. James is not being prosecuted for her refusal to permit the home visit and is not about to be so prosecuted. Her wishes in that respect are fully honored. We. have not been told, and have not found, that her refusal is made a criminal act by any applicable New York or federal statute. The only consequence of her refusal is that the payment of benefits ceases. Important and serious as this is, the situation is no different than if she had exercised a similar negative choice initially and refrained frorp applying for AFDC benefits. If a statute made her refusal a criminal offense, and if this case were one concerning her prosecution under that statute, Camara and See would have conceivable pertinency.
VII
Our holding today does not mean, of course, that a termination of benefits upon refusal of a home visit is to be upheld against constitutional challenge, under all conceivable circumstances. The early morning maás raid upon homes of welfare recipients is not unknown. See Parrish v. Civil Service Comm’n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P. 2d 223 (1967); Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 Yale L. J. 1347 (1963). But that is not this case. Facts of that kind present another cáse for another day.
We therefore conclude that the home visitation as structured by the New York statutes and regulations is a reasonable administrative tool; that it serves a valid and proper administrative purpose for the dispensation of the AFDC program; that, it'is not an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and that it violates no right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
Reversed and remanded with directions to enter a judgment of dismissal.
It is so , ordered.
Mr. Justice White concurs in the judgment and joins the opinion of the Court with the exception of Part IV thereof.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 256 n. 1 (1970), the Court observed that AFDC is a categorical assistance program supported by federal grants-in-aid but administered by the States according to regulations of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. See New York Social Services Law §§ 343-362 (1966 and Supp. 1969-1970). Aspects of AFDC have been considered in King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970); and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 (1970).
Ҥ 134. Supervision.
“The public welfare officials responsible . . ..'for investigating any. application for public assistance and care, shall maintain close contact with persons granted public assistance and care. Such persons shall be visited as frequently as is provided by the rules of the board' and/or regulations of the department or required by the circumstances of the case, in order that any treatment-or service tending to restore such persons to a condition of self-support and to relieve their distress may be rendered and in order that assistance or care may be given only in such amount and as long as necessary. The circumstances of a person receiving continued care shall be re-investigated as frequently as the rules of the board or regulations of the department may require.”
Section 134-a, as added by Laws 1967, c. 183, effective April 1, 1967, provides:
“In accordance with regulations- of the department, any investigation or- reinvestigation of eligibility . . . shall be limited to those factors reasonably necessary to insure that expenditures shall be in accord with applicable provisions of this chapter and the rules of the board and regulations of the department and shall be conducted in siich manner so as not to violate any civil right of the applicant or recipient. In making such investigation or reinvfestigation, sources of information, other than public records, shall be consulted only with the permission of the applicant or recipient. However, if such permission is not granted by the applicant or recipient, the appropriate public welfare official may deny, suspend or discontinue public assistance or care until such time as he may- be satisfied that such applicant or recipient is eligible therefor.”
“Mandatory visits must be made in accordance with law that requires that persons be visited at least once .every three months if they are receiving . . . Aid to Dependent Children . . .
4 “Section 351.10. Required, home . visits and contacts. Social investigation as defined and described . . . shall be made of each application or- reapplication for public assistance or-care as the basis for determination of initial eligibility.
“a. Determination of initial eligibility, shall include contact with the applicant and at least one home visit which shall be made promptly in accordance with agency policy. . . .”
“Section 351.21. Required contacts. Contacts with recipients and collateral sources shall be adequate as to content and frequency and shall include home visits, office interviews, correspondence, reports oh resources and other necessary documentation.”
Section 3.69.2 of Title 18 provides in part: “(c) Welfare of child or minor. A child or minor shall be considered to be eligible for ADC if his home situation is one in which his physical, mental and moral well-being will be safeguarded and his religious faith preserved and protected. (1) In determining the ability of a parent or relative to care for the child so that this purpose is achieved, the home shall be judged by the same standards as are applied to self-maintaining families in the community. When, at the time of application, a home does not meet the usual standards of health and decency but the welfare of the child is not endangered, ADC shall be granted and defined services provided in an effort to improve the situation. Where appropriate, consultation or direct service shall be requested from child welfare.”
No issue of procedural due process is raised in. this case. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970), and Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U. S. 280 (1970).
The federal regulations require only periodic redeterminations of eligibility. HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, pt. IV, § 2200 (d). But they also require verification of eligibility by making field- investigations “including home visits” in a selected sample of cases. Pt. II, §6200 (a)(3).
See, e. g., Ala., Manual for Administration of Public Assistance, pt. 1-8 (B) (1968 rev.); Ariz., Regulations promulgated pursuant to Rev. Stat. Ann. §46-203 (1956), Reg. 3-203.6 (1968); Ark. Stat. Ann. §83-131 (1960); Cal. State Dept, of Social Welfare. Handbook, C-012.50 (1964); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 119-9-1 et seq. (Supp. 1967), as amended, Laws 1969, c. 279; Fla. Public Assistance c. 100; Ga. Division of Social Administration — Public Assistance Manual, pt. III, §V (D)(2), pt. VIII (A) (1) (b) (1969); Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 23, §4-7 (1967); Ind. Ann. Stat. §52-1247 (1964), Dept. Pub. Welfare, Rules & Regs., Reg. 2-403 (1965); Mich. Public Assistance Manual, Item 243 (3) (F) (Rqv.) (1967); Miss. Code Ann. § 7177 (1942) (Laws of 1940, c. 294); Mo. Public Assistance Manual, Dept, of Welfare, § III (1969); Nebraska, State Plan and Manual Regulations, pt. IX, §§ 5760, 5771; N. J., Manual of Administration, Division of Public Welfare, pt. II, §§2120, 2122 (1969); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 13-1-13 (1953), Health and Social Services Dept. Manual, §§211.5, 272.11; S, C. Dept, of Public Welfare Manual, Vol. IV (D)(2); S. D. Comp. Laws Ann. §28-7-7 (1967) (formerly S. D. Code §55.3805); Tenn. Code Ann. §14-309 (1955), Public Assistance Manual, Vol. II, p. 212 (1968 rev.); Wis. Stat. § 49.19 (2) (1967).
It is true that the record contains 12 affidavits, all essentially identical, of aid recipients (other than Mrs. James) which recite that a caseworker “most often” comes without notice; that when he does, the plans the recipient had for that time cannot be carried out; that the visit is “very embarrassing to me if the caseworker, comes when I have company”; and that the caseworker “sometimes asks very personal questions” in front of children.
We have examined Mrs. James’ case record with the New York City Department of Social Services, which, as an exhibit, accompanied defendant Wyman’s answer. It discloses numerous interviews from the time of the initial one on April 27, 1967, until the attempted termination in June 1969. The record is revealing as to Mrs. James’ failure ever really to satisfy the requirements for eligibility; as to constant and repeated demands; as to attitude toward the caseworker; as to reluctance to cooperate; as to evasiveness; and as to occasional belligerency. There are indications that all was not always well with the infant Maurice (skull fracture, a dent in the head, a possible rat bite). The picture is a sad and unhappy one.
§ 406 (a) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V); § 349B1 of the New York Social Services Law.
The amicus brief submitted on behalf of the Social Services Employees Union Local 371, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, the bargaining representative for the social service staff" employed in the New York City Department of Social Services,- recites that “caseworkers are either badly trained or untrained” and that “[generally, a case-. worker is not only poorly trained, but also young and inexperienced . . . Despite this astonishing description by the union of the. lack of qualification of its own members for the work they are employed to do, we must assume that the caseworker possesses at least some qualifications and some dedication to duty.
See, for example, New York Social Services Law § 145.
New York Code Crim. Proc. § 801.
See Appendix II to this opinion.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U. S. 39 (1990) (per curiam), a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, we must decide whether this rule was “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.” 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V). We hold that it was not.
I
During a fight with his estranged girlfriend in March 1975, petitioner Melvin Tyler shot and killed their 20-day-old daughter. A jury found Tyler guilty of second-degree murder, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. After sentencing, Tyler assiduously sought postconviction relief. By 1986, he had filed five state petitions, all of which were denied. See State ex rel. Tyler v. Blackburn, 494 So. 2d 1171 (La. 1986); State v. Tyler, 446 So. 2d 1226 (La. 1984); State ex rel. Tyler v. State, 437 So. 2d 1142 (La. 1983); State v. Tyler, 430 So. 2d 92 (La. 1983); State ex rel. Tyler v. Maggio, 428 So. 2d 483 (La. 1982). He next filed a federal habeas petition, which was unsuccessful as well. Tyler v. Butler, No. 88cv4929 (ED La.), aff’d, Tyler v. Whitley, 920 F. 2d 929 (CA5 1990). After this Court’s decision in Cage, Tyler continued his efforts. Because the jury instruction defining reasonable doubt at Tyler’s trial was substantively identical to the instruction condemned in Cage, Tyler filed a sixth state postconviction petition, this time raising a Cage claim. The State District Court denied relief, and the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. State ex rel. Tyler v. Cain, 684 So. 2d 950 (1996).
In early 1997, Tyler returned to federal court. Seeking to pursue his Cage claim, Tyler moved the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for permission to file a second habeas corpus application, as required by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214. The Court of Appeals recognized that it could not grant the motion unless Tyler made “a prima facie showing,” § 2244(b)(3)(C), that his “claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to eases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” § 2244(b)(2)(A). Finding that Tyler had made the requisite prima facie showing, the Court of Appeals granted the motion, thereby allowing Tyler to file a habeas petition in District Court.
The District Court proceeded to the merits of Tyler’s claim and held that, although Cage should apply retroactively, App. 5-7 (citing Humphrey v. Cain, 138 F. 3d 552 (CA5 1998) (en banc)), Tyler was not entitled to collateral relief. Under AEDPA, a state prisoner can prevail only if the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” § 2254(d)(1). Concluding that Tyler could not overcome this barrier, the District Court denied his petition.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. Judgt. order reported at 218 F. 3d 744 (CA5 2000). It stated, however, that the District Court erred by failing first to determine whether Tyler “satisfied AEDPA’s successive habeas standard.” App. 15. AEDPA requires a district court to dismiss a claim in a second or successive application unless, as relevant here, the applicant “shows” that the “claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” §2244(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added); §2244(b)(4). Relying on Circuit precedent, see Brown v. Leming, 171 F. 3d 1031 (CA5 1999); In re Smith, 142 F. 3d 832 (CA5 1998), the Court of Appeals concluded that Tyler did not meet this standard because he “could not show that any Supreme Court decision renders the Cage decision retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” App. 15.
The Courts of Appeals are divided on the question whether Cage was “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,” as required by 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Compare Rodriguez v. Superintendent, 139 F. 3d 270 (CA1 1998) (holding that Cage has not been made retroactive by the Supreme Court); Brown, supra (same); In re Hill, 113 F. 3d 181 (CA11 1997) (same), with West v. Vaughn, 204 F. 3d 53 (CA3 2000) (holding that Cage has been made retroactive to cases on collateral review). To resolve this conflict, we granted certiorari. 531 U. S. 1051 (2000).
h — <
AEDPA greatly restricts the power of federal courts to award relief to state prisoners who file second or successive habeas corpus applications. If the prisoner asserts a claim that he has already presented in a previous federal ha-beas petition, the claim must be dismissed in all cases. § 2244(b)(1). And if the prisoner asserts a claim that was not presented in a previous petition, the claim must be dismissed unless it falls within one of two narrow exceptions. One of these exceptions is for claims predicated on newly discovered facts that call into question the accuracy of a guilty verdict. § 2244(b)(2)(B). The other is for certain claims relying on new rules of constitutional law. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
It is the latter exception that concerns us today. Specifically, § 2244(b)(2)(A) covers claims that “rel[y] on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” This provision establishes three prerequisites to obtaining relief in a second or successive petition: First, the rule on which the claim relies must be a “new rule” of constitutional law; second, the rule must have been “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court”; and third, the claim must have been “previously unavailable.” In this case, the parties ask us to interpret only the second requirement; respondent does not dispute that Cage created a “new rule” that was “previously unavailable.” Based on the plain meaning of the text read as a whole, we conclude that “made” means “held” and, thus, the requirement is satisfied only if this Court has held that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.
A
As commonly defined, “made” has several alternative meanings, none of which is entirely free from ambiguity. See, e. g., Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 718-719 (1991) (defining “to make” as “to cause to happen,” “to cause to exist, occur or appear,” “to lay out and construct,” and “to cause to act in a certain way”). Out of context, it may thus be unclear which meaning should apply in § 2244(b)(2)(A), and how the term should be understood. We do not, however, construe the meaning of statutory terms in a vacuum. Rather, we interpret the words “in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989). In § 2244(b)(2)(A), the word “made” falls within a clause that reads as follows: “[A] new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.” (Emphasis added.) Quite significantly, under this provision, the Supreme Court is the only entity that can “ma[k]e” a new rule retroactive. The new rule becomes retroactive, not by the decisions of the lower court or by the combined action of the Supreme Court and the lower courts, but simply by the action of the Supreme Court.
The only way the Supreme Court can, by itself, “lay out and construct” a rule’s retroactive effect, or “cause” that effect “to exist, occur, or appear,” is through a holding. The Supreme Court does not “ma[k]e” a rule retroactive when it merely , establishes principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower courts. In such an event, any legal conclusion that is derived from the principles is developed by the lower court (or perhaps by a combination of courts), not by the Supreme Court. We thus conclude that a new rule is not “made retroactive to cases on collateral review” unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive.
To be sure, the statute uses the word “made,” not “held.” But we have already stated, in a decision interpreting another provision of AEDPA, that Congress need not use the word “held” to require as much. In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362 (2000), we concluded that the phrase “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added), “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions,” id., at 412. The provision did not use the word “held,” but the effect was the same. Congress, needless to say, is permitted to use synonyms in a statute. And just as “determined” and “held” are synonyms in the context of § 2254(d)(1), “made” and “held” are synonyms in the context of § 2244(b)(2)(A).
We further note that our interpretation is necessary for the proper implementation of the collateral review structure created by AEDPA. Under the statute, before a state prisoner may file a second or successive habeas application, he “shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.” § 2244(b)(3)(A). The court of appeals must make a decision on the application within 30 days. § 2244(b)(3)(D). In this limited time, the court of appeals must determine whether the application “makes a prima facie showing that [it] satisfies the [second habeas standard].” § 2244(b)(3)(C). It is unlikely that a court of appeals could make such a determination in the allotted time if it had to do more than simply rely on Supreme Court holdings on retroactivity. The stringent time limit thus suggests that the courts of appeals do not have to engage in the difficult legal analysis that can be required to determine questions of retroactivity in the first instance.
B
Because “made” means “held” for purposes of § 2244(b)(2)(A), it is clear that the Cage rule has not been “made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.” Cage itself does not hold that it is retroactive. The only holding in Cage is that the particular jury instruction violated the Due Process Clause.
Tyler argues, however, that a subsequent case, Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U. S. 275 (1993), made the Cage rule retroactive. But Sullivan held only that a Cage error is structural — i. e., it is not amenable to harmless-error analysis and “will always invalidate the conviction.” 508 U. S., at 279. Conceding that the holding in Sullivan does not render Cage retroactive to cases on collateral review, Tyler contends that the reasoning in Sullivan makes clear that retroactive application is warranted by the principles of Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). Under Teague, a new rule can be retroactive to cases on collateral review if, and only if, it falls within one of two narrow exceptions to the general rule of nonretro-activity. Id., at 311-313 (plurality opinion). See also O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U. S. 151, 156-157 (1997). The exception relevant here is for “watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 478 (1993). To fall within this exception, a new rule must meet two requirements: Infringement of the rule must “seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction,” and the rule must “' “alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements” ’ essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) (quoting Teague, supra, at 311 (plurality opinion), in turn quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part)).
According to Tyler, the reasoning of Sullivan demonstrates that the Cage rule satisfies both prongs of this Teague exception. First, Tyler notes, Sullivan repeatedly emphasized that a Cage error fundamentally undermines the reliability of a trial’s outcome. And second, Tyler contends, the central point of Sullivan is that a Cage error deprives a defendant of a bedrock element of procedural fairness: the right to have the jury make the determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Tyler’s arguments fail to persuade, however. The most he can claim is that, based on the principles outlined in Teague, this Court should make Cage retroactive to cases on collateral review. What is clear, however, is that we have not “made” Cage retroactive to eases on collateral review.
Justice Breyer observes that this Court can make a rule retroactive over the course of two cases. See post, at 672-673 (dissenting opinion). We do not disagree that, with the right combination of holdings, the Court could do this. But even so, the Court has not made Cage retroactive. Multiple cases can render a new rule retroactive only if the holdings in those cases necessarily dictate retroactivity of the new rule. The only holding in Sullivan is that a Cage error is structural error. There is no second case that held that all structural-error rules apply retroactively or that all structural-error rules fit within the second Teague exception. The standard for determining whether an error is structural, see generally Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U. S. 279 (1991), is not coextensive with the second Teague exception, and a holding that a particular error is structural does not logically dictate the conclusion that the second Teague exception has been met.
Ill
Finally, Tyler suggests that, if Cage has not been made retroactive to cases on collateral review, we should make it retroactive today. We disagree. Because Tyler’s habeas application was his second, the District Court was required to dismiss it unless Tyler showed that this Court already had made Cage retroactive. § 2244(b)(4) (“A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to be filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of this section”); § 2244(b)(2)(A) (“A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless . . . the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to eases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable”). We cannot decide today whether Cage is retroactive to eases on collateral review, because that decision would not help Tyler in this case. Any statement on Cage’s retroactivity would be dictum, so we decline to comment further on the issue.
* * *
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
In Cage, this Court observed that a reasonable juror “could have” interpreted the instruction at issue to permit a finding of guilt without the requisite proof 498 U. S., at 41. In Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62, 72, and n. 4 (1991), however, this Court made clear that the proper inquiry is not whether the instruction “could have” been applied unconstitutionally, but whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so apply it. See also Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U. S. 1, 6 (1994) (“The constitutional question in the present cases... is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the [constitutional] standard”).
AEDPA requires that, “[b]efore a second or successive application . .. is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.” 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. V).
This requirement differs from the one that applicants must satisfy in order to obtain permission from a court of appeals to file a second or successive petition. As noted above, a court of appeals may authorize such a filing only if it determines that the applicant makes a “prima facie showing” that the application satisfies the statutory standard. § 2244(b)(3)(C). But to survive dismissal in district court, the applicant must actually “sho[w]” that the claim satisfies the standard.
Similarly, the Supreme Court does not make a rule retroactive through dictum, which is not binding. Cf. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 67 (1996) (contrasting dictum with holdings, which include the final disposition of a case as well as the preceding determinations “necessary to that result” (emphasis added)).
Tyler argues that defining “made” to mean “held” would create an anomaly: When it is obvious that a rule should be retroactive, the courts of appeals will not be in conflict, and this Court will never decide to hear the ease and will never make the rule retroactive. Thus, Tyler concludes, we should construe § 2244(b)(2)(A) to allow for retroactive application whenever the “principles” of our decisions, as interpreted by the courts of appeals, indicate that retroactivity is appropriate. This argument is flawed, however. First, even if we disagreed with the legislative decision to establish stringent procedural requirements for retroactive application of new rules, we do not have license to question the decision on policy grounds. See Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253-254 (1992). Second, the “anomalous” result that Tyler predicts is speculative at best, because AEDPA does not limit our discretion to grant certiorari to cases in which the courts of appeals have reached divergent results.
We also reject Tyler’s attempt to find support in our disposition in Adams v. Evatt, 511 U. S. 1001 (1994). In Adams, we vacated an opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which had held that Cage was not retroactive, and remanded for further consideration in light of Sullivan. Our order, however, was not a “final determination on the merits.” Henry v. Rock Hill, 376 U. S. 776, 777 (1964) (per curiam). It simply indicated that, in light of “intervening developments,” there was a “reasonable probability” that the Court of Appeals would reject a legal premise on which it relied and which may affect the outcome of the litigation. Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U. S. 163, 167 (1996) (per curiam).
As explained above, the second Teague exception is available only if the new rule “alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements” ’ essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 242 (1990) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion), in turn quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgments in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added)). Classifying an error as structural does not necessarily alter our understanding of these bedrock procedural elements. Nor can it be said that all new rules relating to due process (or even the “fundamental requirements of due process,” see post, at 674 (dissenting opinion)) alter such understanding. See, e. g., Sawyer, supra, at 244 (holding that the rule in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320 (1985), did not fit within the second Teague exception even though it “added to an existing guarantee of due process protection against fundamental unfairness”); O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U. S. 151, 167 (1997) (holding that the rule in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994), which has been described as serving “one of the hallmarks of due process,” id., at 175 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment), did not fit within the second Teague exception). On the contrary, the second Teague exception is reserved only for truly “watershed” rules. See O’Dell, supra, at 167; see also Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 396 (1994) (describing such rules as “groundbreaking”); Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 478 (1993) (explaining that the exception is limited to “a small core of rules,” which not only seriously enhance accuracy but also “requir[e] ‘observance of those procedures that... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ ”) (quoting Teague, supra, at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted)); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 495 (1990) (focusing on “primacy and centrality” of the rule). As we have recognized, it is unlikely that any of these watershed rules “ha[s] yet to emerge.” Sawyer, supra, at 243 (quoting Teague, supra, at 313 (plurality opinion)); see also Graham, supra, at 478.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
At his criminal trial, petitioner claimed that the Government used certain peremptory challenges to remove black jurors solely on the grounds of race, contrary to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (1986). The District Court accepted the Government’s explanations for its challenges, and petitioner was convicted. He pursued his Batson claim in the Court of Appeals, claiming that the Government’s explanations were pretextual. The Government asserted that petitioner had not made out a prima facie Batson error and that it had race-neutral reasons for each challenge. The Court of Appeals did not rule on these competing claims, for it held that no appellate inquiry was required into the merits of a Batson claim if the jury finally chosen represented a fair cross section of the community, as did this jury. The conviction was affirmed.
Petitioner, seeking certiorari, urges that the Court of Appeals relied on an erroneous ground in rejecting the Batson claim. The United States agrees that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that as long as the petit jury chosen satisfied the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section concept, it need not inquire into the claim that the prosecution had stricken jurors on purely racial grounds. That holding, the Government states, is contrary to Batson and is also discredited by our decision in Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474 (1990), which held that the fair-cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment did not apply to the petit jury and which was handed down after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion below. The Government urges us to deny certiorari, however, because petitioner failed to make out a prima facie case of intentional discrimination and because the reasons given for the challenges were race-neutral grounds for decision that the Court of Appeals did not reach.
When the Government has suggested that an error has been made by the court below, it is not unusual for us to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment below, and direct reconsideration in light of the representations made by the United States in this Court. See, e. g., Biddle v. United States, 484 U. S. 1054 (1988); Malone v. United States, 484 U. S. 919 (1987). Nor is it novel to do so in a case where error is conceded but it is suggested that there is another ground on which the decision below could be affirmed if the case were brought here. Indeed, a case decided earlier this Term presented such a situation and, without dissent, we vacated the judgment below for reconsideration in light of the position asserted by the Government in this Court. Chappell v. United States, 494 U. S. 1075 (1990). This is the appropriate course to follow in this case. If the judgment below rested on an improvident ground, as the Government suggests, the Court of Appeals should in the first instance pass on the adequacy of the Government’s reasons for exercising its peremptory challenges.
Consequently, the motion of petitioner for leave to proceed informa pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for further consideration in light of the position asserted by the Government in its brief filed May 21, 1990.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Harlan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
By motion for leave to file a bill of complaint, Ohio seeks to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction. Because of the importance and unusual character of the issues tendered we set the matter for oral argument, inviting the Solicitor General to participate and to file a brief on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae. For reasons that follow we deny the motion for leave to file.
The action, for abatement of a nuisance, is brought on behalf of the State and its citizens, and names as defendants Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. (Wyandotte), Dow Chemical Co. (Dow America), and Dow Chemical Company of Canada, Ltd. (Dow Canada). Wyandotte is incorporated in Michigan and maintains its principal office and place of business there. Dow America is incorporated in Delaware, has its principal office and place of business in Michigan, and owns all the stock of Dow Canada. Dow Canada is incorporated, and does business, in Ontario. A majority of Dow Canada’s directors are residents of the United States.
The complaint alleges that Dow Canada and Wyan-dotte have each dumped mercury into streams whose courses ultimately reach Lake Erie, thus contaminating and polluting that lake’s waters, vegetation, fish, and wildlife, and that Dow America is jointly responsible for the acts of its foreign subsidiary. Assuming the State’s ability to prove these assertions, Ohio seeks a decree: (1) declaring the introduction of mercury into Lake Erie’s tributaries a public nuisance; (2) perpetually enjoining these defendants from introducing mercury into Lake Erie or its tributaries; (3) requiring defendants either to remove the mercury from Lake Erie or to pay the costs of its removal into a fund to be administered by Ohio and used only for that purpose; (4) directing defendants to pay Ohio monetary damages for the harm done to Lake Erie, its fish, wildlife, and vegetation, and the citizens and inhabitants of Ohio.
Original jurisdiction is said to be conferred on this Court by Art. Ill of the Federal Constitution. Section 2, cl. 1, of that Article, provides: “The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State . . . and between a State . . . and foreign . . . Citizens or Subjects.” Section 2, cl. 2, provides: “In all Cases ... in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.” Finally, 28 U. S. C. § 1251 (b) provides: “The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of ... (3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another State or against aliens.”
While we consider that Ohio’s complaint does state a cause of action that falls within the compass of our original jurisdiction, we have concluded that this Court should nevertheless decline to exercise that jurisdiction.
I
That we have jurisdiction seems clear enough. Beyond doubt, the complaint on its face reveals the existence of a genuine “case or controversy” between one State and citizens of another, as well as a foreign subject. Diversity of citizenship is absolute. Nor is the nature of the cause of action asserted a bar to the exercise of our jurisdiction. While we have refused to entertain, for example, original actions designed to exact compliance with a State's penal laws, Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265 (1888), or that seek to embroil this tribunal in “political questions,” Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475 (1867); Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50 (1868), this Court has often adjudicated controversies between States and between a State and citizens of another State seeking to abate a nuisance that exists in one State yet produces noxious consequences in another. See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208 (1901) (complaint filed), 200 U. S. 496 (1906) (final judgment); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230 (1907); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296 (1921); New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U. S. 473 (1931). In short, precedent leads almost ineluctably to the conclusion that we are empowered to resolve this dispute in the first instance.
Ordinarily, the foregoing would suffice to settle the issue presently under consideration: whether Ohio should be granted leave to file its complaint. For it is a time-honored maxim of the Anglo-American common-law tradition that a court possessed of jurisdiction generally must exercise it. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821). Nevertheless, although it may initially have been contemplated that this Court would always exercise its original jurisdiction when properly called upon to do so, it seems evident to us that changes in the American legal system and the development of American society have rendered untenable, as a practical matter, the view that this Court must stand willing to adjudicate all or most legal disputes that may arise between one State and a citizen or citizens of another, even though the dispute may be one over which this Court does have original jurisdiction.
As our social system has grown more complex, the States have increasingly become enmeshed in a multitude of disputes with persons living ' outside their borders. Consider, for example, the frequency with which States and nonresidents clash over the application of state laws concerning taxes, motor vehicles, decedents’ estates, business torts, government contracts, and so forth. It would, indeed, be anomalous were this Court to be held out as a potential principal forum for settling such controversies. The simultaneous development of “long-arm jurisdiction” means, in most instances, that no necessity impels us to perform such a role. And the evolution of this Court’s responsibilities in the American legal system has brought matters to a point where much would be sacrificed, and little gained, by our exercising original jurisdiction over issues bottomed on local law. This Court’s paramount responsibilities to the national system lie almost without exception in the domain of federal law. As the impact on the social structure of federal common, statutory, and constitutional law has expanded, our attention has necessarily been drawn more and more to such matters. We have no claim to special competence in dealing with the numerous conflicts between States and nonresident individuals that raise no serious issues of federal law.
This Court is, moreover, structured to perform as an appellate tribunal, ill-equipped for the task of factfinding and so forced, in original cases, awkwardly to play the role of factfinder without actually presiding over the introduction of evidence. Nor is the problem merely our lack of qualifications for many of these tasks potentially within the purview of our original jurisdiction; it is compounded by the fact that for every case in which we might be called upon to determine the facts and apply unfamiliar legal norms we would unavoidably be reducing the attention we could give to those matters of federal law and national import as to which we are the primary overseers.
Thus, we think it apparent that we must recognize “the need [for] the exercise of a sound discretion in order to protect this Court from an abuse of the opportunity to resort to its original jurisdiction in the enforcement by States of claims against citizens of other States.” Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1, 19 (1939), opinion of Chief Justice Hughes. See also Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439, 464-465 (1945), and id., at 469-471 (dissenting opinion), We believe, however, that the focus of concern embodied in the above-quoted statement of Chief Justice Hughes should be somewhat refined. In our opinion, we may properly exercise such discretion, not simply to shield this Court from noisome, vexatious, or unfamiliar tasks, but also, and we believe principally, as a technique for promoting and furthering the assumptions and value choices that underlie the current role of this Court in the federal system. Protecting this Court per se is at best a secondary consideration. What gives rise to the necessity for recognizing such discretion is pre-eminently the diminished societal concern in our function as a court of original jurisdiction and the enhanced importance of our role as the final federal appellate court. A broader view of the scope and purposes of our discretion would inadequately take account of the general duty of courts to exercise that jurisdiction they possess.
Thus, at this stage we go no further than to hold that, as a general matter, we may decline to entertain a complaint brought by a State against the citizens of another State or country only where we can say with assurance that (1) declination of jurisdiction would not disserve any of the principal policies underlying the Article III jurisdictional grant and (2) the reasons of practical wisdom that persuade us that this Court is an inappropriate forum are consistent with the proposition that our discretion is legitimated by its use to keep this aspect of the Court’s functions attuned to its other responsibilities.
II
In applying this analysis to the facts here presented, we believe that the wiser course is to deny Ohio’s motion for leave to file its complaint.
A
Two principles seem primarily to have underlain conferring upon this Court original jurisdiction over cases and controversies between a State and citizens of another State or country. The first was the belief that no State should be compelled to resort to the tribunals of other States for redress, since parochial factors might often lead to the appearance, if not the reality, of partiality to one’s own. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 475-476 (1793); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S., at 289. The second was that a State, needing an alternative forum, of necessity had to resort to this Court in order to obtain a tribunal competent to exercise jurisdiction over the acts of nonresidents of the aggrieved State.
Neither of these policies is, we think, implicated in this lawsuit. The courts of Ohio, under modern principles of the scope of subject matter and in personam jurisdiction, have a claim as compelling as any that can be made out for this Court to exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate the instant controversy, and they would decide it under the same common law of nuisance upon which our determination would have to rest. In essence, the State has charged Dow Canada and Wyandotte with the commission of acts, albeit beyond Ohio’s territorial boundaries, that have produced and, it is said, continue to produce disastrous effects within Ohio’s own domain. While this Court, and doubtless Canadian courts, if called upon to assess the validity of any decree rendered against either Dow Canada or Wyandotte, would be alert to ascertain whether the judgment rested upon an even-handed application of justice, it is unlikely that we would totally deny Ohio’s competence to act if the allegations made here are proved true. See, e. g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (CA2 1945); ALI, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 2d, § 18. And while we cannot speak for Canadian courts, we have been given no reason to believe they would be less receptive to enforcing a decree rendered by Ohio courts than one issued by this Court. Thus, we do not believe exercising our discretion to refuse to entertain this complaint would undermine any of the purposes for which Ohio was given the authority to bring it here.
B
Our reasons for thinking that, as a practical matter, it would be inappropriate for this Court to attempt to adjudicate the issues Ohio seeks to present are several. History reveals that the course of this Court’s prior efforts to settle disputes regarding interstate air and water pollution has been anything but smooth. In Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 520-522 (1906), Justice Holmes was at pains to underscore the great difficulty that the Court faced in attempting to pronounce a suitable general rule of law to govern such controversies. The solution finally grasped was to saddle the party seeking relief with an unusually high standard of proof and the Court with the duty of applying only legal principles “which [it] is prepared deliberately to maintain against all considerations on the other side,” id., at 521, an accommodation which, in cases of this kind, the Court has found necessary to maintain ever since. See, e. g., New York v. New Jersey, 256 U. S., at 309. Justice Clarke’s closing plea in New York v. New Jersey, id., at 313, strikingly illustrates the sense of futility that has accompanied this Court’s attempts to treat with the complex technical and political matters that inhere in all disputes of the kind at hand:
“We cannot withhold the suggestion, inspired by the consideration of this case, that the grave problem of sewage disposal presented by the large and growing populations living on the shores of New York Bay is one more likely to be wisely solved by cooperative study and by conference and mutual concession on the part of representatives of the States so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any court however constituted.”
The difficulties that ordinarily beset such cases are severely compounded by the particular setting in which this controversy has reached us. For example, the parties have informed us, without contradiction, that a number of official bodies are already actively involved in regulating the conduct complained of here. A Michigan circuit court has enjoined Wyandotte from operating its mercury cell process without judicial authorization. The company is, moreover, currently utilizing a recycling process specifically approved by the Michigan Water Resources Commission and remains subject to the continued scrutiny of that agency. Dow Canada reports monthly to the Ontario Water Resources Commission on its compliance with the commission’s order prohibiting the company from passing any mercury into the environment.
Additionally, Ohio and Michigan are both participants in the Lake Erie Enforcement Conference, convened a year ago by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 62 Stat. 1155, as amended. The Conference is studying all forms and sources of pollution, including mercury, infecting Lake Erie. The purpose of this Conference is to provide a basis for concerted remedial action by the States or, if progress in that regard is not rapidly made, for corrective proceedings initiated by the Federal Government. 33 U. S. C. §466g (1964 ed. and Supp. V). And the International Joint Commission, established by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between the United States and Canada, 36 Stat. 2448, issued on January 14, 1971, a comprehensive report, the culmination of a six-year study carried out at the request of the contracting parties, concerning the contamination of Lake Erie. That document makes specific recommendations for joint programs to abate these environmental hazards and recommends that the IJC be given authority to supervise and coordinate this effort.
In view of all this, granting Ohio’s motion for leave to file would, in effect, commit this Court’s resources to the task of trying to settle a small piece of a much larger problem that many competent adjudicatory and conciliatory bodies are actively grappling with on a more practical basis.
The nature of the case Ohio brings here is equally disconcerting. It can fairly be said that what is in dispute is not so much the law as the facts. And the factfinding process we are asked to undertake is, to say the least, formidable. We already know, just from what has been placed before us on this motion, that Lake Erie suffers from several sources of pollution other than mercury; that the scientific conclusion that mercury is a serious water pollutant is a novel one; that whether and to what extent the existence of mercury in natural waters can safely or reasonably be tolerated is a question for which there is presently no firm answer; and that virtually no published research is available describing how one might extract mercury that is in fact contaminating water. Indeed, Ohio is raising factual questions that are essentially ones of first impression to the scientists. The notion that appellate judges, even with the assistance of a most competent Special Master, might appropriately undertake at this time to unravel these complexities is, to say the least, unrealistic. Nor would it suffice to impose on Ohio an unusually high standard of proof. That might serve to mitigate our personal difficulties in seeking a just result that comports with sound judicial administration, but would not lessen the complexity of the task of preparing responsibly to exercise our judgment, or the serious drain on the resources of this Court it would entail. Other factual complexities abound. For example, the Department of the Interior has stated that eight American companies are discharging, or have discharged, mercury into Lake Erie or its tributaries. We would, then, need to assess the business practices and relative culpability of each to frame appropriate relief as to the one now before us.
Finally, in what has been said it is vitally important to stress that we are not called upon by this lawsuit to resolve difficult or important problems of federal law and that nothing in Ohio’s complaint distinguishes it from any one of a host of such actions that might, with equal justification, be commenced in this Court. Thus, entertaining this complaint not only would fail to serve those responsibilities we are principally charged with, but could well pave the way for putting this Court into a quandary whereby we must opt either to pick and choose arbitrarily among similarly situated litigants or to devote truly enormous portions of our energies to such matters.
To sum up, this Court has found even the simplest sort of interstate pollution case an extremely awkward vehicle to manage. And this case is an extraordinarily complex one both because of the novel scientific issues of fact inherent in it and the multiplicity of governmental agencies already involved. Its successful resolution would require primarily skills of factfinding, conciliation, detailed coordination with — and perhaps not infrequent deference to — other adjudicatory bodies, and close supervision of the technical performance of local industries. We have no claim to such expertise or reason to believe that, were we to adjudicate this case, and others like it, we would not have to reduce drastically our attention to those controversies for which this Court is a proper and necessary forum. Such a serious intrusion on society’s interest in our most deliberate and considerate performance of our paramount role as the supreme federal appellate court could, in our view, be justified only by the strictest necessity, an element which is evidently totally lacking in this instance.
Ill
What has been said here cannot, of course, be taken as denigrating in the slightest the public importance of the underlying problem Ohio would have us tackle. Reversing the increasing contamination of our environment is manifestly a matter of fundamental import and utmost urgency. What is dealt with above are only considerations respecting the appropriate role this Court can assume in efforts to eradicate such environmental blights. We mean only to suggest that our competence, is necessarily limited, not that our concern should be kept within narrow bounds.
Ohio’s motion for leave to file its complaint is denied without prejudice to its right to commence other appropriate judicial proceedings.
It is so ordered.
The matter is well treated in the Solicitor General’s amicus brief, which satisfactorily deals with a number of considerations which we find it unnecessary to discuss in this opinion.
While we possess jurisdiction over Dow America and Wyandotte simply on the basis of their citizenship, the problem with respect to Dow Canada is quite different with regard to two major issues: whether that foreign corporation has “contacts” of the proper sort sufficient to bring it personally before us, and whether service of process can lawfully be made upon Dow Canada. Were we to decide to entertain this complaint, however, it seems reasonably clear that the better course would be to reserve this aspect of the jurisdictional issue pending ascertainment of additional facts, rather than to resolve it now. Thus, for purposes of ruling on Ohio’s motion for leave to file its complaint, we treat the question of jurisdiction over all three defendants as a unitary one.
In our view the federal statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1251 (b) (3), providing that our original jurisdiction in cases such as these is merely concurrent with that of the federal district courts, reflects this same judgment. However, this particular case cannot be disposed of by transferring it to an appropriate federal district court since this statute by itself does not actually confer jurisdiction on those courts, see C. Wright, Federal Courts 502 (2d ed. 1970), and no other statutory jurisdictional basis exists. The fact that there is diversity of citizenship among the parties would not support district court jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1332 because that statute does not deal with cases in which a State is a party. Nor would federal question jurisdiction exist under 28 U. S. C. § 1331. So far as it appears from the present record, an action such as this, if otherwise cognizable in federal district court, would have to be adjudicated under state law. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
Justice Holmes’ analysis appears to rest, in part, on the fact that in the case before him the conduct complained of was the act of a sovereign State. However, we see no reason why the determination to impose a high standard of proof would not be equally compelling in a case such as the one before us. Arguably, the necessity for applying virtually unexceptionable legal principles does not obtain where conduct never previously subjected to state law scrutiny is involved, but this is not the case here. See text, infra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue is whether the State of Wyoming violated the Equal Protection Clause by allocating one of the 64 seats in its House of Representatives to a county the population of which is considerably lower than the average population per state representative.
I
Since Wyoming became a State in 1890, its legislature has consisted of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The State’s Constitution provides that each of the State’s counties “shall constitute a senatorial and representative district” and that “[e]ach county shall have at least one senator and one representative.” The senators and representatives are required to be “apportioned among the said counties as nearly as may be according to the number of their inhabitants.” Wyo. Const., Art. 3, §3. The State has had 23 counties since 1922. Because the apportionment of the Wyoming House has been challenged three times in the past 20 years, some background is helpful.
In 1963 voters from the six most populous counties filed suit in the District Court for the District of Wyoming challenging the apportionment of the State’s 25 senators and 61 representatives. The three-judge District Court held that the apportionment of the Senate — one senator allocated to each of the State’s 23 counties, with the two largest counties having two senators — so far departed from the principle of population equality that it was unconstitutional. Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp. 247, 251-252 (Wyo. 1964), supplemented, 251 F. Supp. 450 (1965), aff’d sub nom. Harrison v. Schaefer, 383 U. S. 269 (1966). But the court upheid the apportionment of the State House of Representatives. The State’s constitutional requirement that each county shall have at least one representative had produced deviations from population equality: the average deviation from the ideal number of residents per representative was 16%, while the maximum percentage deviation between largest and smallest number of residents per representative was 90%. See 1 App. Exhibits 16. The District Court held that these population disparities were justifiable as “the result of an honest attempt, based on legitimate considerations, to effectuate a rational and practical policy for the house of representatives under conditions as they exist in Wyoming.” 240 F. Supp., at 251.
The 1971 reapportionment of the House was similar to that in 1963, with an average deviation of 15% and a maximum deviation of 86%. 1 App. Exhibits 18. Another constitutional challenge was brought in the District Court. The three-judge court again upheld the apportionment of the House, observing that only “five minimal adjustments” had been made since 1963, with three districts gaining a representative and two districts losing a representative because of population shifts. Thompson v. Thomson, 344 F. Supp. 1378, 1380 (Wyo. 1972).
The present case is a challenge to Wyoming’s 1981 statute reapportioning its House of Representatives in accordance with the requirements of Art. 3, § 3, of the State Constitution. Wyo. Stat. §28-2-109 (Supp. 1983). The 1980 census placed Wyoming’s population at 469,557. The statute provided for 64 representatives, meaning that the ideal apportionment would be 7,337 persons per representative. Each county was given one representative, including the six counties the population of which fell below 7,337. The deviations from population equality were similar to those in prior decades, with an average deviation of 16% and a maximum deviation of 89%. See 1 App. Exhibits 19-20.
The issue in this case concerns only Niobrara County, the State’s least populous county. Its population of 2,924 is less than half of the ideal district of 7,337. Accordingly, the general statutory formula would have dictated that its population for purposes of representation be rounded down to zero. See § 28 — 2—109(a)(ii). This would have deprived Niobrara County of its own representative for the first time since it became a county in 1913. The state legislature found, however, that “the opportunity for oppression of the people of this state or any of them is greater if any county is deprived a representative in the legislature than if each is guaranteed at least one (1) representative.” It therefore followed the State Constitution’s requirement and expressly provided that a county would receive a representative even if the statutory formula rounded the county’s population to zero. § 28 — 2—109(a)(iii). Niobrara County thus was given one seat in a 64-seat House. The legislature also provided that if this representation for Niobrara County were held unconstitutional, it would be combined with a neighboring county in a single representative district. The House then would consist of 63 representatives. § 28-2-109(a)(iv).
Appellants, members of the state League of Women Voters and residents of seven counties in which the population per representative is greater than the state average, filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Wyoming. They alleged that “[b]y granting Niobrara County a representative to which it is not statutorily entitled, the voting privileges of Plaintiffs and other citizens and electors of Wyoming similarly situated have been improperly and illegally diluted in violation of the 14th Amendment. . . .” App. 3-4. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would prevent the State from giving a separate representative to Nio-brara County, thus implementing the alternative plan calling for 63 representatives.
The three-judge District Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. 536 F. Supp. 780 (1982). The court noted that the narrow issue presented was the alleged discriminatory effect of a single county’s representative, and concluded, citing expert testimony, that “the ‘dilution’ of the plaintiffs’ votes is de minimis when Niobrara County has its own representative.” Id., at 783. The court also found that Wyoming’s policy of granting a representative to each county was rational and, indeed, particularly well suited to the special needs of Wyoming. Id., at 784.
We noted probable jurisdiction, 459 U. S. 819 (1982), and now affirm.
HH H-1
A
In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 568 (1964), the Court held that “the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.” This holding requires only “that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts ... as nearly of equal population as is practicable,” for “it is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of residents, or citizens, or voters.” Id., at 577. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 745-748 (1973) (describing various difficulties in measurement of population).
We have recognized that some deviations from population equality may be necessary to permit the States to pursue other legitimate objectives such as “maintain[ing] the integrity of various political subdivisions” and “providing] for compact districts of contiguous territory.” Reynolds, supra, at 578. As the Court stated in Gaffney, “[a]n unrealistic overemphasis on raw population figures, a mere nose count in the districts, may submerge these other considerations and itself furnish a ready tool for ignoring factors that in day-to-day operation are important to an acceptable representation and apportionment arrangement.” 412 U. S., at 749.
In view of these considerations, we have held that “minor deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification by the State.” Id., at 745. Our decisions have established, as a general matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10% falls within this category of minor deviations. See, e. g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 418 (1977); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 764 (1973). A plan with larger disparities in population, however, creates a prima facie case of discrimination and therefore must be justified by the State. See Swann v. Adams, 385 U. S. 440, 444 (1967) (“De minimis deviations are unavoidable, but variations of 30% among senate districts and 40% among house districts can hardly be deemed de minimis and none of our cases suggests that differences of this magnitude will be approved without a satisfactory explanation grounded on acceptable state policy”). The ultimate inquiry, therefore, is whether the legislature’s plan “may reasonably be said to advance [a] rational state policy” and, if so, “whether the population disparities among the districts that have resulted from the pursuit of this plan exceed constitutional limits.” Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 328 (1973).
B
In this case there is no question that Niobrara County’s deviation from population equality — 60% below the mean — is more than minor. There also can be no question that Wyoming’s constitutional policy — followed since statehood — of using counties as representative districts and ensuring that each county has one representative is supported by substantial and legitimate state concerns. In Abate v. Mundt, 403 U. S. 182, 185 (1971), the Court held that “a desire to preserve the integrity of political subdivisions may justify an apportionment plan which departs from numerical equality.” See Mahan v. Howell, supra, at 329. Indeed, the Court in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, singled out preservation of political subdivisions as a clearly legitimate policy. See 377 U. S., at 580-581.
Moreover, it is undisputed that Wyoming has applied this factor in a manner “free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.” Roman v. Sincock, 377 U. S. 695, 710 (1964). The State’s policy of preserving county boundaries is based on the State Constitution, has been followed for decades, and has been applied consistently throughout the State. As the District Court found, this policy has particular force, given the peculiar size and population of the State and the nature of its governmental structure. See n. 5, supra; 536 F. Supp., at 784. In addition, population equality is the sole other criterion used, and the State’s apportionment formula ensures that population deviations are no greater than necessary to preserve counties as representative districts. See Mahan v. Howell, supra, at 326 (evidence is clear that the plan “ ‘produces the minimum deviation above and below the norm, keeping intact political boundaries’ ”). Finally, there is no evidence of “a built-in bias tending to favor particular political interests or geographic areas.” Abate v. Mundt, supra, at 187. As Judge Doyle stated below:
“[T]here is not the slightest sign of any group of people being discriminated against here. There is no indication that the larger cities or towns are being discriminated against; on the contrary, Cheyenne, Laramie, Casper, Sheridan, are not shown to have suffered in the slightest . . . degree. There has been no preference for the cattle-raising or agricultural areas as such.” 536 F. Supp., at 788 (specially concurring).
In short, this case presents an unusually strong example of an apportionment plan the population variations of which are entirely the result of the consistent and nondiscriminatory application of a legitimate state policy. This does not mean that population deviations of any magnitude necessarily are acceptable. Even a neutral and consistently applied criterion such as use of counties as representative districts can frustrate Reynolds’ mandate of fair and effective representation if the population disparities are excessively high. “[A] State’s policy urged in justification of disparity in district population, however rational, cannot constitutionally be permitted to emasculate the goal of substantial equality.” Mahan v. Howell, supra, at 326. It remains true, however, as the Court in Reynolds noted, that consideration must be given “to the character as well as the degree of deviations from a strict population basis.” 377 U. S., at 581. The consistency of application and the neutrality of effect of the nonpopulation criteria must be considered along with the size of the population disparities in determining whether a state legislative apportionment plan contravenes the Equal Protection Clause.
C
Here we are not required to decide whether Wyoming’s nondiscriminatory adherence to county boundaries justifies the population deviations that exist throughout Wyoming’s representative districts. Appellants deliberately have limited their challenge to the alleged dilution of their voting power resulting from the one representative given to Nio-brara County. The issue therefore is not whether a 16% average deviation and an 89% maximum deviation, considering the state apportionment plan as a whole, are constitutionally permissible. Rather, the issue is whether Wyoming’s policy of preserving county boundaries justifies the additional deviations from population equality resulting from the provision of representation to Niobrara County.
It scarcely can be denied that in terms of actual effect on appellants’ voting power, it matters little whether the 63-member or 64-member House is used. The District Court noted, for example, that the seven counties in which appellants reside will elect 28 representatives under either plan. The only difference, therefore, is whether they elect 43.75% of the legislature (28 of 64 members) or 44.44% of the legislature (28 of 63 members). 536 F. Supp., at 783. The District Court aptly described this difference as “de minimis.” Ibid.
We do not suggest that a State is free to create and allocate an additional representative seat in any way it chooses simply because that additional seat will have little or no effect on the remainder of the State’s voters. The allocation of a representative to a particular political subdivision still may violate the Equal Protection Clause if it greatly exceeds the population variations existing in the rest of the State and if the State provides no legitimate justifications for the creation of that seat. Here, however, considerable population variations will remain even if Niobrara County’s representative is eliminated. Under the 63-member plan, the average deviation per representative would be 13% and the maximum deviation would be 66%. See 1 App. Exhibits 22. These statistics make clear that the grant of a representative to Niobrara County is not a significant cause of the population deviations that exist in Wyoming.
Moreover, we believe that the differences between the two plans are justified on the basis of Wyoming’s longstanding and legitimate policy of preserving county boundaries. See swpra, at 841, n. 5, and 843-844. Particularly where there is no “taint of arbitrariness or discrimination,” Roman v. Sincock, 377 U. S., at 710, substantial deference is to be accorded the political decisions of the people of a State acting through their elected representatives. Here it is noteworthy that by enacting the 64-member plan the State ensured that its policy of preserving county boundaries applies nondiscriminatorily. The effect of the 63-member plan would be to deprive the voters of Niobrara County of their own representative, even though the remainder of the House of Representatives would be constituted so as to facilitate representation of the interests of each county. See 536 F. Supp., at 784; id., at 786 (Doyle, J., specially concurring). In these circumstances, we are not persuaded that Wyoming has violated the Fourteenth Amendment by permitting Nio-brara County to have its own representative.
The judgment of the District Court is
Affirmed.
Article 3, § 3, of the Wyoming Constitution provides in relevant part: “Each county shall constitute a senatorial and representative district; the senate and house of representatives shall be composed of members elected by the legal voters of the counties respectively, every two (2) years. They shall be apportioned among the said counties as nearly as may be according to the number of their inhabitants. Each county shall have at least one senator and one representative; but at no time shall the number of members of the house of representatives be less than twice nor greater than three times the number of members of the senate.”
An example of the disparity in population was that Laramie County, the most populous county in the State, had two senators for its 60,149 people, whereas Teton County, the least populous county in the State, had one senator for its 3,062 people. See Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp., at 250, n. 3.
Wyoming Stat. §28-2-109 (Supp. 1982) provides in relevant part:
“(a) The ratios for the apportionment of senators and representatives are fixed as follows:
“(ii) The ratio for the apportionment of the representatives is the smallest number of people per representative which when divided into the population in each representative district as shown by'the official results of the 1980 federal decennial census with fractions rounded to the nearest whole number results in a house with sixty-three (63) representatives;
“(iii) If the number of representatives for any county is rounded to zero (0) under the formula in paragraph (a)(ii) of this section, that county shall be given one (1) representative which is in addition to the sixty-three (63) representatives provided by paragraph (a)(ii) of this section;
“(iv) If the provisions of paragraph (a)(iii) of this section are found to be unconstitutional or have an unconstitutional result, then Niobrara county shall be joined to Goshen county in a single representative district and the house of representatives shall be apportioned as provided by paragraph (a)(ii) of this section.”
The legislature made the following findings:
“It is hereby declared the policy of this state is to preserve the integrity of county boundaries as election districts for the house of representatives. The legislature has considered the present population, needs, and other characteristics of each county. The legislature finds that the needs of each county are unique and the interests of each county must be guaranteed a voice in the legislature. The legislature therefore, will utilize the provisions of article 3, section 3, of the Wyoming constitution as the determining standard in the reapportionment of the Wyoming house of representatives which guarantees each county at least one (1) representative. The legislature finds that the opportunity for oppression of the people of this state or any of them is greater if any county is deprived a representative in the legislature than if each is guaranteed at least one (1) representative. The legislature finds that the dilution of the power of counties which join together in making these declarations is trivial when weighed against the need to maintain the integrity of county boundaries. The legislature also finds that it is not practical or necessary to increase the size of the legislature beyond the provisions of this act in order to meet its obligations to apportion in accordance with constitutional requirements consistent with this declaration.” 1981 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 76, §3.
The District Court stated:
“Wyoming as a state is unique among her sister states. A small population is encompassed by a large area. Counties have always been a major form of government in the State. Each county has its own special economic and social needs. The needs of the people are different and distinctive. Given the fact that the representatives from the combined counties of Niobrara and Goshen would probably come from the larger county, i. e., Goshen, the interests of the people of Niobrara County would be virtually unprotected.
“The people within each county have many interests in common such as public facilities, government administration, and work and personal problems. Under the facts of this action, to deny these people their own representative borders on abridging their right to be represented in the determination of their futures.
“In Wyoming, the counties are the primary administrative agencies of the State government. It has historically been the policy of the State that counties remain in this position.
“The taxing powers of counties are limited by the Constitution and some State statutes. Supplemental monies are distributed to the counties in accordance with appropriations designated by the State Legislature. It comes as no surprise that the financial requirements of each county are different. Without representation of their own in the State House of Representatives, the people of Niobrara County could well be forgotten.” 536 F. Supp., at 784.
In contrast, many of our prior decisions invalidating state apportionment plans were based on the lack of proof that deviations from population equality were the result of a good-faith application of legitimate districting criteria. See, e. g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 25 (1975) (“It is far from apparent that North Dakota policy currently requires or favors strict adherence to political lines. . . . Furthermore, a plan devised by [the Special Master] demonstrates that. . . the policy of maintaining township lines [does not] preven[t] attaining a significantly lower population variance”); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U. S. 120, 124 (1967) (per curiam) (District Court did not “demonstrate why or how respect for the integrity of county lines required the particular deviations” or “articulate any satisfactory grounds for rejecting at least two other plans presented to the court, which respected county lines but which produced substantially smaller deviations”); Swann v. Adams, 385 U. S. 440, 445-446 (1967) (no evidence presented that would justify the population disparities).
As the Reynolds Court explained:
“Carried too far, a scheme of giving at least one seat in one house to each political subdivision (for example, to each county) could easily result, in many States, in a total subversion of the equal-protection principle in that legislative body. This would be especially true in a State where the number of counties is large and many of them are sparsely populated, and the number of seats in the legislative body being apportioned does not significantly exceed the number of counties.” 377 U. S., at 581.
See also Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 419 (1977) (“[T]he policy against breaking county boundary lines is virtually impossible of accomplishment in a State where population is unevenly distributed among 82 counties, from which 52 Senators and 122 House members are to be elected”).
This discussion in Reynolds is illustrated by the senatorial districts in Wyoming that were invalidated in 1963. Each county in the State had one senator, while the two largest counties had two. Because county population varied substantially, extremely large disparities in population per senator resulted. The six most populous counties, with approximately 65% of the State’s population, had eight senators, whereas the six least populous counties, with approximately 8% of the population, had six senators. See Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp., at 251, n. 5. The Wyoming House of Representatives presents a different case because the number of representatives is substantially larger than the number of counties.
Counsel for appellants, who represent the state League of Women Voters, explained at oral argument: “[A] referendum had been passed by the League of Women Voters which authorized the attack of only that one portion of the reapportionment plan. It was felt by the membership or by the leadership of that group that no broader authority would ever be given because of the political ramifications and arguments that would be presented by the membership in attacking or considering . . . that broader authority.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 8.
The dissent suggests that we are required to pass upon the constitutionality of the apportionment of the entire Wyoming House of Representatives. See post, at 857-859 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although in some prior cases challenging the apportionment of one legislative house the Court has addressed the constitutionality of the other house’s apportionment as well, we never have held that a court is required to do so. For example, in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735 (1973), we considered only the apportionment of the Connecticut General Assembly, noting expressly that the “Senate plan was not challenged in the District Court” and that “[a]ppellees do not challenge the Senate districts on the ground of their population deviations.” Id., at 739, n. 5. In this case, we see no reason why appellants should not be bound by the choices they made when filing this lawsuit.
Similarly, appellees note that under the 64-member plan, 46.65% of the State’s voters theoretically could elect 51.56% of the representatives. Under the 63-member plan, 46.65% of the population could elect 50.79% of the representatives. See 1 App. Exhibits 32-33.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Court’s decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977), required a re-examination of long-held perceptions as to “advertising” by lawyers. This appeal presents the question whether certain aspects of the revised ethical rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri regulating lawyer advertising conform to the requirements of Bates.
I
As with many of the States, until the decision in Bates, Missouri placed an absolute prohibition on advertising by lawyers. After the Court’s invalidation of just such a prohibition in Bates, the Committee on Professional Ethics and Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Missouri revised that court’s Rule 4 regulating lawyer advertising. The Committee sought to “strike a midpoint between prohibition and unlimited advertising,” and the revised regulation of advertising, adopted with slight modification by the State Supreme Court, represents a compromise. Lawyer advertising is permitted, but it is restricted to certain categories of information, and in some instances, to certain specified language.
Thus, part B of DR 2-101 of the Rule states that a lawyer may “publish ... in newspapers, periodicals and the yellow pages of telephone directories” 10 categories of information: name, address and telephone number: areas of practice; date and place of birth; schools attended; foreign language ability; office hours; fee for an initial consultation; availability of a schedule of fees; credit arrangements; and the fixed fee to be charged for certain specified “routine” legal services/ Although the Rule does not state explicitly that these 10 categories of information or the 3 indicated forms of printed advertisement are the only information and the only means of advertising that will be permitted,' that is the interpretation given the Rule by the State Supreme Court and the Advisory Committee charged with its enforcement.
In addition to these guidelines, and under authority of the Rule, the Advisory Committee has issued an addendum to the Rule providing that if the lawyer chooses to list areas of practice in his advertisement, he must do so in one of two prescribed ways. He may list one of three general descriptive terms specified in the Rule — “General Civil Practice,” “General Criminal Practice,” or “General Civil and Criminal Practice.” Alternatively, he may use one or more of a list of 23 areas of practice, including, for example, “Tort Law,” “Family Law,” and “Probate and Trust Law.” He may not list both a general term and specific subheadings, nor may he deviate from the precise wording stated in the Rule. He may not indicate that his practice is “limited” to the listed areas and he must include a particular disclaimer of certification of expertise following any listing of specific areas of practice.
Finally, one further aspect of the Rule is relevant in this case. DR 2-102 of Rule 4 regulates the use of professional announcement cards. It permits a lawyer or firm to mail a dignified “brief professional announcement card stating new or changed associates or addresses, change of firm name, or similar matters.” The Rule, however, does not permit a general mailing; the announcement cards may be sent only to “lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives.” Mo. Rev. Stat., Sup. Ct. Rule 4, DR 2-102(A)(2) (1978) (Index Vol.).
II
Appellant graduated from law school in 1973 and was admitted to the Missouri and Illinois Bars in the same year. After a short stint with the Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington, D. C., appellant moved to St. Louis, Mo., in April 1977, and began practice as a sole practitioner. As a means of announcing the opening of his office, he mailed professional announcement cards to a selected list of addressees. In order to reach a wider audience, he placed several advertisements in local newspapers and in the yellow pages of the local telephone directory.
The advertisements at issue in this litigation appeared in January, February, and August 1978, and included information that was not expressly permitted by Rule 4. They included the information that appellant was licensed in Missouri and Illinois. They contained, in large capital letters, a statement that appellant was “Admitted to Practice Before THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.” And they included a listing of areas of practice that deviated from the language prescribed by the Advisory Committee — e. g., “personal injury” and “real estate” instead of “tort law” and “property law” — and that included several areas of law without analogue in the list of areas prepared by the Advisory Committee — e. g., “contract,” “zoning & land use,” “communication,” “pension & profit sharing plans.’" See n. 6, supra. In addition, and with the exception of the advertisement appearing in August 1978, appellant failed to include the required disclaimer of certification of expertise after the listing of areas of practice.
On November 19, 1979, the Advisory Committee filed an information in the Supreme Court of Missouri charging appellant with unprofessional conduct. The information charged appellant with publishing three advertisements that listed areas of law not approved by the Advisory Committee, that listed the courts in which appellant was admitted to practice, and, in the case of two of the advertisements, that failed to include the required disclaimer of certification. The information also charged appellant with sending announcement cards to “persons other than lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives” in violation of DR 2-102(A)(2). In response, appellant argued that, with the exception of the disclaimer requirement, each of these restrictions upon advertising was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
In a disbarment proceeding, the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the constitutionality of DR 2-101 of Rule 4 and issued a private reprimand. 609 S. W. 2d 411 (1981). But the court did not explain the reasons for its decision, nor did it state whether it found appellant to have violated each of the charges lodged against him or only some of them. Indeed, the court only purported to uphold the constitutionality of DR 2-101; it did not mention the propriety of DR 2-102, which governs the use of announcement cards.
Writing in separate dissenting opinions, Chief Justice Bardgett and Judge Seiler argued that the information should be dismissed. The dissenters suggested that the State did not have a significant interest either in requiring the use of certain, specified words to describe areas of practice or in prohibiting a lawyer from informing the public as to the States and courts in which he was licensed to practice. Nor would the dissenters have found the mailing of this sort of information to be unethical.
V-H HH t-H
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350 (1977), the Court considered whether the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech announced in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748 (1976), applied to the regulation of advertising by lawyers. The Bates Court held that indeed lawyer advertising was a form of commercial speech, protected by the First Amendment, and that “advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression.” 433 U. S., at 383.
More specifically, the Bates Court held that lawyers must be permitted to advertise the fees they charge for certain “routine” legal services. The Court concluded that this sort of price advertising was not “inherently” misleading, and therefore could not be prohibited on that basis. The Court also rejected a number of other justifications for broad restrictions upon advertising including the potential adverse effect of advertising on professionalism, on the administration of justice, and on the cost and quality of legal services, as well as the difficulties of enforcing standards short of an outright prohibition. None of these interests was found to be sufficiently strong or sufficiently affected by lawyer advertising to justify a prohibition.
But the decision in Bates nevertheless was a narrow one. The Court emphasized that advertising by lawyers still could be regulated. False, deceptive, or misleading advertising remains subject to restraint, and the Court recognized that advertising by the professions poses special risks of deception — “because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). The Court suggested that claims as to quality or in-person solicitation might be so likely to mislead as to warrant restriction. And the Court noted that a warning or disclaimer might be appropriately required, even in the context of advertising as to price, in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or deception. “[T]he bar retains the power to correct omissions that have the effect of presenting an inaccurate picture, [although] the preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than less.” Id., at 375.
In short, although the Court in Bates was not persuaded that price advertising for “routine” services was necessarily or inherently misleading, and although the Court was not receptive to other justifications for restricting such advertising, it did not by any means foreclose restrictions on potentially or demonstrably misleading advertising. Indeed, the Court recognized the special possibilities for deception presented by advertising for professional services. The public’s comparative lack of knowledge, the limited ability of the professions to police themselves, and the absence of any standardization in the “product” renders advertising for professional services especially susceptible to abuses that the States have a legitimate interest in controlling.
Thus, the Court has made clear in Bates and subsequent cases that regulation — and imposition of discipline — are permissible where the particular advertising is inherently likely to deceive or where the record indicates that a particular form or method of advertising has in fact been deceptive. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 462 (1978), the Court held that the possibility of “fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of ‘vexatious conduct’” was so likely in the context of in-person solicitation, that such solicitation could be prohibited. And in Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1 (1979), we held that Texas could prohibit the use of trade names by optometrists, particularly in view of the considerable history in Texas of deception and abuse worked upon the consuming public through the use of trade names.
Commercial speech doctrine, in the context of advertising for professional services, may be summarized generally as follows: Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. But when the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information, e. g., a listing of areas of practice, if the information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive. Thus, the Court in Bates suggested that the remedy in the first instance is not necessarily a prohibition but preferably a requirement of disclaimers or explanation. 433 U. S., at 375. Although the potential for deception and confusion is particularly strong in the context of advertising professional services, restrictions upon such advertising may be no broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the deception.
Even when a communication is not misleading, the State retains some authority to regulate. But the State must assert a substantial interest and the interference with speech must be in proportion to the interest served. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S. 557, 563-564 (1980). Restrictions must be narrowly drawn, and the State lawfully may regulate only to the extent regulation furthers the State’s substantial interest. Thus, in Bates, the Court found that the potentially adverse effect of advertising on professionalism and the quality of legal services was not sufficiently related to a substantial state interest to justify so great an interference with speech. 433 U. S., at 368-372, 375-377.
IV
We now turn to apply these generalizations to the circumstances of this case.
The information lodged against appellant charged him with four separate kinds of violation of Rule 4: listing the areas of his practice in language or in terms other than that provided by the Rule, failing to include a disclaimer, listing the courts and States in which he had been admitted to practice, and mailing announcement cards to persons other than “lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends, and relatives.” Appellant makes no challenge to the constitutionality of the disclaimer requirement, and we pass on to the remaining three infractions.
Appellant was reprimanded for deviating from the precise listing of areas of practice included in the Advisory Committee addendum to Rule 4. The Advisory Committee does not argue that appellant’s listing was misleading. The use of the words “real estate” instead of “property” could scarcely mislead the public. Similarly, the listing of areas such as “contracts” or “securities,” that are not found on the Advisory Committee’s list in any form, presents no apparent danger of deception. Indeed, as Chief Justice Bardgett explained in dissent, in certain respects appellant’s listing is more informative than that provided in the addendum. Because the listing published by the appellant has not been shown to be misleading, and because the Advisory Committee suggests no substantial interest promoted by the restriction, we conclude that this portion of Rule 4 is an invalid restriction upon speech as applied to appellant’s advertisements.
Nor has the Advisory Committee identified any substantial interest in a rule that prohibits a lawyer from identifying the jurisdictions in which he is licensed to practice. Such information is not misleading on its face. Appellant was licensed to practice in both Illinois and Missouri. This is factual and highly relevant information particularly in light of the geography of the region in which appellant practiced.
Somewhat more troubling is appellant’s listing, in large capital letters, that he was a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States. See Appendix to this opinion. The emphasis of this relatively uninformative fact is at least bad taste. Indeed, such a statement could be misleading to the general public unfamiliar with the requirements of admission to the Bar of this Court. Yet there is no finding to this effect by the Missouri Supreme Court. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the inclusion of this information was misleading. Nor does the Rule specifically identify this information as potentially misleading or, for example, place a limitation on type size or require a statement explaining the nature of the Supreme Court Bar.
Finally, appellant was charged with mailing cards announcing the opening of his office to persons other than “lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends and relatives.” Mailings and handbills may be more difficult to supervise than newspapers. But again we deal with a silent record. There is no indication that an inability to supervise is the reason the State restricts the potential audience of announcement cards. Nor is it clear that an absolute prohibition is the only solution. For example, by requiring a filing with the Advisory Committee of a copy of all general mailings, the State may be able to exercise reasonable supervision over such mailings. There is no indication in the record of a failed effort to proceed along such a less restrictive path. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S., at 566 (“we must determine whether the regulation ... is not more extensive than is necessary to serve” the governmental interest asserted).
In sum, none of the three restrictions in the Rule upon appellant’s First Amendment rights can be sustained in the circumstances of this case. There is no finding that appellant’s speech was misleading. Nor can we say that it was inherently misleading, or that restrictions short of an absolute prohibition would not have sufficed to cure any possible deception. We emphasize, as we have throughout the opinion, that the States retain the authority to regulate advertising that is inherently misleading or that has proved to be misleading in practice. There may be other substantial state interests as well that will support carefully drawn restrictions. But although the States may regulate commercial speech, the First and Fourteenth Amendments require that they do so with care and in a manner no more extensive than reasonably necessary to further substantial interests. The absolute prohibition on appellant’s speech, in the absence of a finding that his speech was misleading, does not meet these requirements.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri is
Reversed.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
The advertisement above appeared in the yellow pages of the Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. telephone directory for St. Louis Suburban West issued in February 1978, and was the basis for Count II of the Information.
Prior to the 1977 revision, Rule 4 provided in pertinent part:
“(A) A lawyer shall not prepare, cause to be prepared, use, or participate in the use of, any form of public communication that contains professionally self-laudatory statements calculated to attract lay clients; as used herein, ‘public communication’ includes, but is not limited to, communication by means of television, radio, motion picture, newspaper, magazine, or book. “(B) A lawyer shall not publicize himself, his partner, or associate as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in city or telephone directories, or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf . . . .” Mo. Sup. Ct. Rules Ann., Rule 4, DR 2-101, p. 63 (Vernon 1981) (historical note).
Report of Committee to Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Missouri (Sept. 9, 1977), reprinted in App. A-30.
The 10 listed “routine” services are: an uncontested dissolution of marriage; an uncontested adoption; an uncontested personal bankruptcy; an uncomplicated change of name; a simple warranty or quitclaim deed; a simple deed of trust; a simple promissory note; an individual Missouri or federal income tax return; a simple power of attorney; and a simple will. Mo. Rev. Stat., Sup. Ct. Rule 4, DR 2-10KB) (1978) (Index VoL). The Rule authorizes the Advisory Committee to approve additions to this list of routine services. Ibid.
Indeed, on its face, the Rule would appear to suggest that its specific provisions are intended only to provide a safe harbor, and not to prohibit all other forms of advertising or categories of information. This impression is conveyed by the Rule’s inclusion of a general prohibition on misleading advertising in DR 2-101(A):
“A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate in the use of any form of public communication respecting the quality of legal services or containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim.” Rule 4, DR 2-10KA).
The Advisory Committee is a standing committee of the Supreme Court of Missouri and is responsible for prosecuting disciplinary proceedings and for giving formal and informal opinions on the Canons of Professional Responsibility. See Rule 5.
The addendum to the rule promulgated by the Advisory Committee provided in relevant part as follows:
“[T]he following areas for fields of law may be advertised by use of the specific language hereinafter set out:
1. ‘General Civil Practice’
2. ‘General Criminal Practice’
3. ‘General Civil and Criminal Practice.’
“If a lawyer or law firm uses one of the above, no other area can be used .... If one of the above is not used, then a lawyer or law firm can use one or more of the following:
1. ‘Administrative Law1
2. ‘Anti-Trust Law’
3. ‘Appellate Practice’
4. ‘Bankruptcy’
5. ‘Commercial Law’
6. ‘Corporation Law and Business Organizations’
7. ‘Criminal Law’
8. ‘Eminent Domain Law1
9. ‘Environmental Law’
10. ‘Family Law1
11. ‘Financial Institution Law’
12. ‘Insurance Law’
13. ‘International Law’
14. ‘Labor Law’
15. ‘Local Government Law’
16. ‘Military Law’
17. ‘Probate and Trust Law’
18. ‘Property Law'
19. ‘Public Utility Law’
20. ‘Taxation Law’
21. ‘Tort Law’
22. ‘Trial Practice’
23. ‘Workers Compensation Law.’
No deviation from the above phraseology will be permitted and no statement of limitation of practice can be stated.
“If one or more of these specific areas of practice are used in any advertisement, the following statement must be included . . . :
‘Listing of the above areas of practice does not indicate any certification of expertise therein.’” Rule 4, Addendum III (Adv. Comm. Nov. 13, 1977).
This provision of Rule 4 was not altered by the 1977 amendments.
In an advertisement published in the August 1978 yellow pages for St. Louis, and typical of appellant’s other advertisements, appellant included a listing of 23 areas of practice. Four of the areas conformed to the language prescribed in the Rule — “bankruptcy,” “anti-trust,” “labor,” and “criminal.” Eleven of the areas deviated from the precise language of the Rule — “tax,” “corporate,” “partnership,” “real estate,” “probate,” “wills, estate planning,” “personal injury,” “trials & appeals,” “workmen’s compensation,” “divorce-separation,” and “custody-adoption,” instead of, respectively, and as required by the Rule, “taxation law,” “corporation law and business organizations,” “property law,” “probate & trust law,” “tort law,” “trial practice,” “appellate practice,” “workers compensation law,” and “family law.” Eight other areas listed in the advertisement are not listed in any manner by the Advisory Committee’s addendum: "contract,” “aviation,” “securities-bonds,” “pension & profit sharing plans,” “zoning & land use,” “entertainment/sports,” “food, drug & cosmetic,” and “communication.”
A photograph of the advertisements as they appeared in the St. Louis, Suburban West, Telephone Directory for February 1978, and in the January/February 1978 issue of the West End Word is reproduced as an Appendix to this opinion. In all of appellant's advertisements the statement as to his membership in the Bar of the United States Supreme Court was printed conspicuously in large capital letters.
The dissenting judges differed in several respects. Chief Justice Bardgett considered that appellant’s listing of the fact that he was admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court was not improper; Judge Seiler argued that this information was more misleading than helpful. Moreover, Judge Seiler argued that appellant should not be penalized for having omitted a disclaimer of certification when the addendum requiring the disclaimer was not available until after appellant had placed the advertisements and after it was too late to add the disclaimer. Chief Justice Bardgett’s dissent omits any mention of appellant’s failure to include a disclaimer. See n. 18, infra. Finally, Chief Justice Bardgett expressed his belief that our decision in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S. 557 (1980), concerning the regulation of commercial speech, does not apply in its entirety to the regulation of lawyer advertising. Judge Seiler appeared to take the opposite position. Both of the dissenting opinions reflect a thoughtful examination of the charges made against appellant.
The Court in Virginia Pharmacy, expressly reserved this question:
“We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of commercial advertising by pharmacists. Although we express no opinion as to other professions, the distinctions, historical and functional, between professions, may require consideration of quite different factors. Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not dispense standardized products; they render professional services of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds of advertising.” 425 U. S., at 773, n. 25.
Even as to price advertising, the Court suggested that some regulation would be permissible. For example, the bar may “define the services that must be included in an advertised package . . . .” 433 U. S., at 373, n. 28, and the bar could require disclaimers or explanations to avoid false hopes, id., at 384 (“[S]ome limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like, might be required of even an advertisement of the kind ruled upon today so as to assure that the consumer is not misled”).
Presumably, too, the bar may designate the services that may be considered “routine. ” Moreover, the Court might reach a different decision as to price advertising on a different record. If experience with particular price advertising indicates that the public is in fact misled or that disclaimers are insufficient to prevent deception, then the matter would come to the Court in an entirely different posture. The commercial speech doctrine is itself based in part on certain empirical assumptions as to the benefits of advertising. If experience proves that certain forms of advertising are in fact misleading, although they did not appear at first to be “inherently” misleading, the Court must take such experience into account. Cf. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S., at 372 (“We are not persuaded that restrained professional advertising . . . will be misleading”).
See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U. S. 1, 11, n. 9 (1979) (“When dealing with restrictions on commercial speech we frame our decisions narrowly, ‘allowing modes of regulation [of commercial speech] that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression’ ” (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 456 (1978)); Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S., at 771-772, and n. 24 (“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake. . . . Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading. We foresee no obstacle to a State’s dealing effectively with this problem. The First Amendment, as we construe it today, does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely”) (citations and footnote omitted).
In addition, the Bates Court noted that reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising would still be permissible, while “the special problems of advertising on the electronic broadcast media will warrant special consideration.” 433 U. S., at 384.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct proposed by the American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards provide that “a lawyer may advertise services through public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical, radio or television, or through written communication not involving personal contact.” Rule 7.2(a). Rule 7.1 prohibits misleading advertising in the following terms:
“A lawyer shall not make any false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
“(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;
“(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or
"(c) compares the lawyer’s services with other lawyers’ services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated.”
Commentary following the Rule suggests that the Rule would prohibit “advertisements about results obtained on behalf of a client, such as the amount of a damage award or the lawyer’s record in obtaining favorable verdicts, and advertisements containing client endorsements.”
It is understood that the format of the proposed new Rules will be considered by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at its 1982 midyear meeting and that the substance of the Rules will be considered at the 1982 annual meeting. We, of course, imply no view as to these proposals.
See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S., at 566:
“In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”
As the discussion in the text above indicates, the Central Hudson formulation must be applied to advertising for professional services with' the understanding that the special characteristics of such services afford opportunities to mislead and confuse that are not present when standardized products or services are offered to the public. See n. 10, supra.
We recognize, of course, that the generalizations summarized above do not afford precise guidance to the bar and the courts. They do represent the general principles that may be distilled from our decisions in this developing area of the law. As they are applied on a case-by-case basis — as in Part IV of this opinion — more specific guidance will be available.
We note that the restrictions placed upon appellant’s speech by Rule 4 imposed a restriction only upon commercial speech — “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, supra, at 561. By describing his services and qualifications, appellant’s sole purpose was to encourage members of the public to engage him for personal profit.
At oral argument counsel for appellant stated that the constitutionality of the disclaimer requirement was not before the Court, and that “[t]he disciplinary action was not based on a failure to include the disclaimer.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 16.
Although, the Supreme Court of Missouri did not explicitly indicate whether appellant was in violation of each and every one of the charges made against him, that is the implication of the opinion particularly when read in light of the more detailed dissenting opinions.
Rule 7.2(b) of the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association requires that “[a] copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication shall be kept for one year after its dissemination.”
,"The Advisory Committee argues that a general mailing from a lawyer would be “frightening” to the public unaccustomed to receiving letters from law offices. If indeed this is likely, the lawyer could be required to stamp “This is an Advertisement” on the envelope. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U. S. 530, 541-542 (1980) (billing insert is not a significant intrusion upon privacy, and privacy interest can be protected through means other than a general prohibition).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
F
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we consider again the circumstances in which a fiduciary under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) may sue a beneficiary for reimbursement of medical expenses paid by the ERISA plan, when the beneficiary has recovered for its injuries from a third party.
I
Marlene Sereboff’s employer sponsors a health insurance plan administered by respondent Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc., and covered by ERISA, 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. III). Marlene Sereboff and her husband Joel are beneficiaries under the plan. The plan provides for payment of certain covered medical expenses and contains an “Acts of Third Parties” provision. This provision “applies when [a beneficiary is] sick or injured as a result of the act or omission of another person or party,” and requires a beneficiary who “receives benefits” under the plan for such injuries to “reimburse [Mid Atlantic]” for those benefits from “[a]ll recoveries from a third party (whether by lawsuit, settlement, or otherwise).” App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a. The provision states that “[Mid Atlantic’s] share of the recovery will not be reduced because [the beneficiary] has not received the full damages claimed, unless [Mid Atlantic] agrees in writing to a reduction.” Ibid.
The Sereboffs were involved in an automobile accident in California and suffered injuries. Pursuant to the plan’s coverage provisions, the plan paid the couple’s medical expenses. The Sereboffs filed a tort action in state court against several third parties, seeking compensatory damages for injuries suffered as a result of the accident. Soon after the suit was commenced, Mid Atlantic sent the Sereboffs’ attorney a letter asserting a lien on the anticipated proceeds from the suit, for the medical expenses Mid Atlantic paid on the Sereboffs’ behalf. App. 87-90. On several occasions over the next two years, Mid Atlantic sent similar correspondence to the attorney and to the Sereboffs, repeating its claim to a lien on a portion of the Sereboffs’ recovery, and detailing the medical expenses as they accrued and were paid by the plan.
The Sereboffs’ tort suit eventually settled for $750,000. Neither the Sereboffs nor their attorney sent any money to Mid Atlantic in satisfaction of its claimed lien which, after Mid Atlantic completed its payments on the Sereboffs’ behalf, totaled $74,869.37.
Mid Atlantic filed suit in District Court under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(3), seeking to collect from the Sereboffs the medical expenses it had paid on their behalf. Since the Sereboffs’ attorney had already distributed the settlement proceeds to them, Mid Atlantic sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requiring the couple to retain and set aside at least $74,869.37 from the proceeds. The District Court approved a stipulation by the parties, under which the Sereboffs agreed to “preserve $74,869.37 of the settlement funds” in an investment account, “until the [District] Court rules on the merits of this case and all appeals, if any, are exhausted.” App. 69.
On the merits, the District Court found in Mid Atlantic’s favor and ordered the Sereboffs to pay Mid Atlantic the $74,869.37, plus interest, with a deduction for Mid Atlantic’s share of the attorney’s fees and court costs the Sereboffs had incurred in state court. See 303 F. Supp. 2d 691, 316 F. Supp. 2d 265 (Md. 2004). The Sereboffs appealed and the Fourth Circuit affirmed in relevant part. 407 F. 3d 212 (2005). The Fourth Circuit observed that the Courts of Appeals are divided on the question whether § 502(a)(3) authorizes recovery in these circumstances. See id., at 219-220, n. 7. We granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement. 546 U. S. 1030 (2005).
II
A
A fiduciary may bring a civil action under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA “(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.” 29 U. S. C. § 1132(a)(3). There is no dispute that Mid Atlantic is a fiduciary under ERISA and that its suit in District Court was to “enforce . . . the terms of” the “Acts of Third Parties” provision in the Sereboffs’ plan. The only question is whether the relief Mid Atlantic requested from the District Court was “equitable” under § 502(a)(3)(B).
This is not the first time we have had occasion to clarify the scope of the remedial power conferred on district courts by § 502(a)(3)(B). In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U. S. 248 (1993), we construed the provision to authorize only “those categories of relief that were typically available in equity,” and thus rejected a claim that we found sought “nothing other than compensatory damages.” Id., at 256, 255. We elaborated on this construction of § 502(a)(3)(B) in Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U. S. 204 (2002), which involved facts similar to those in this case. Much like the “Acts of Third Parties” provision in the Sereboffs’ plan, the plan in Knudson reserved “ ‘a first lien upon any recovery, whether by settlement, judgment or otherwise,’ that the beneficiary receives from [a] third party.” Id., at 207. After Knudson was involved in a car accident, Great-West paid medical bills on her behalf and, when she recovered in tort from a third party for her injuries, Great-West sought to collect from her for the medical bills it had paid. Id., at 207-209.
In response to the argument that Great-West’s claim in Knudson was for “restitution” and thus equitable under § 502(a)(3)(B) and Mertens, we noted that “not all relief falling under the rubric of restitution [was] available in equity.” 534 U. S., at 212. To decide whether the restitutionary relief sought by Great-West was equitable or legal, we examined cases and secondary legal materials to determine if the relief would have been equitable “[i]n the days of the divided bench.” Ibid. We explained that one feature of equitable restitution was that it sought to impose a constructive trust or equitable lien on “particular funds or property in the defendant’s possession.” Id., at 213. That requirement was not met in Knudson, because “the funds to which petitioners claim[ed] an entitlement” were not in Knudson’s possession, but had instead been placed in a “Special Needs Trust” under California law. Id., at 214, 207. The kind of relief Great-West sought, therefore, was “not equitable — the imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien on particular property — but legal — the imposition of personal liability for the benefits that [Great-West] conferred upon [Knudson].” Id., at 214. We accordingly determined that the suit could not proceed under § 502(a)(3). Ibid.
That impediment to characterizing the relief in Knudson as equitable is not present here. As the Fourth Circuit explained below, in this case Mid Atlantic sought “specifically identifiable” funds that were “within the possession and control of the Sereboffs” — that portion of the tort settlement due Mid Atlantic under the terms of the ERISA plan, set aside and “preserved [in the Sereboffs’] investment accounts.” 407 F. 3d, at 218. Unlike Great-West, Mid Atlantic did not simply seek “to impose personal liability ... for a contractual obligation to pay money.” Knudson, 534 U. S., at 210. It alleged breach of contract and sought money, to be sure, but it sought its recovery through a constructive trust or equitable lien on a specifically identified fund, not from the Sereboffs’ assets generally, as would be the case with a contract action at law. ERISA provides for equitable remedies to enforce plan terms, so the fact that the action involves a breach of contract can hardly be enough to prove relief is not equitable; that would make § 502(a)(3)(B)(ii) an empty promise. This Court in Knudson did not reject Great-West’s suit out of hand because it alleged a breach of contract and sought money, but because Great-West did not seek to recover a particular fund from the defendant. Mid Atlantic does.
B
While Mid Atlantic’s case for characterizing its relief as equitable thus does not falter because of the nature of the recovery it seeks, Mid Atlantic must still establish that the basis for its claim is equitable. See id., at 213 (whether remedy “is legal or equitable depends on ‘the basis for [the plaintiff’s] claim’ and the nature of the underlying remedies sought”). Our ease law from the days of the divided bench confirms that Mid Atlantic’s claim is equitable. In Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U. S. 117 (1914), for instance, attorneys Street and Alexander performed work for Barnes, another attorney, who promised them “one-third of the contingent fee” he expected in the case. Id., at 119. In upholding their equitable claim to this portion of the fee, Justice Holmes recited “the familiar rul[e] of equity that a contract to convey a specific object even before it is acquired will make the contractor a trustee as soon as he gets a title to the thing.” Id., at 121. On the basis of this rule, he concluded that Barnes’ undertaking “create[d] a lien” upon the portion of the monetary recovery due Barnes from the client, ibid., which Street and Alexander could “follow . . . into the hands of . . . Barnes,” “as soon as [the fund] was identified,” id., at 123.
Much like Barnes’ promise to Street and Alexander,, the “Acts of Third Parties” provision in the Sereboffs’ plan specifically identified a particular fund, distinct from the Sereboffs’ general assets — “[a]ll recoveries from a third party (whether by lawsuit, settlement, or otherwise)” — and a particular share of that fund to which Mid Atlantic was entitled — “that portion of the total recovery which is due [Mid Atlantic] for benefits paid.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a. Like Street and Alexander in Barnes, therefore, Mid Atlantic could rely on a “familiar rul[e] of equity” to collect for the medical bills it had paid on the Sereboffs’ behalf. Barnes, supra, at 121. This rule allowed them to “follow” a portion of the recovery “into the [Sereboffs’] hands” “as soon as [the settlement fund] was identified,” and impose on that portion a constructive trust or equitable lien. 232 U. S., at 123.
The Sereboffs object that Mid Atlantic’s suit would not have satisfied the conditions for “equitable restitution” at common law, particularly the “strict tracing rules” that allegedly accompanied this form of relief. Reply Brief for Petitioners 8. When an equitable lien was imposed as restitutionary relief, it was often the case that an asset belonging to the plaintiff had been improperly acquired by the defendant and exchanged by him for other property. A central requirement of equitable relief in these circumstances, the Sereboffs argue, was the plaintiff’s ability to “‘trac[e]’ the asset into its products or substitutes,” or “trace his money or property to some particular funds or assets.” 1D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies §4.3(2), pp. 591, n. 10, 592 (2d ed. 1993).
But as the Sereboffs themselves recognize, an equitable lien sought as a matter of restitution, and an equitable lien “by agreement,” of the sort at issue in Barnes, were different species of relief. See Brief for Petitioners 24-25; Reply Brief for Petitioners 11; see also 1 Dobbs, supra, §4.3(3), at 601; 1 G. Palmer, Law of Restitution § 1.5, p. 20 (1978). Barnes confirms that no tracing requirement of the sort asserted by the Sereboffs applies to equitable liens by agreement or assignment: The plaintiffs in Barnes could not identify an asset they originally possessed, which was improperly acquired and converted into property the defendant held, yet that did not preclude them from securing an equitable lien. To the extent Mid Atlantic’s action is proper under Barnes, therefore, its asserted inability to satisfy the. “strict tracing rules” for “equitable restitution” is of no consequence. Reply Brief for Petitioners 8.
The Sereboffs concede as much, stating that they “do not contend — and have never suggested — that any tracing was historically required when an equitable lien was imposed by agreement” Id., at 11. Their argument is that such tracing was required when an equitable lien was “predicated on a theory of equitable restitution.” Ibid. The Sereboffs appear to assume that Knudson endorsed application of all the restitutionary conditions — including restitutionary tracing rules — to every action for an equitable lien under § 502(a)(3). This assumption is inaccurate. Knudson simply described in general terms the conditions under which a fiduciary might recover when it was seeking equitable restitution under a provision like that at issue in this case. There was no need in Knudson to catalog all the circumstances in which equitable liens were available in equity; Great-West claimed a right to recover in restitution, and the Court concluded only that equitable restitution was unavailable because the funds sought were not in Knudson’s possession. 534 U. S., at 214.
The Sereboffs argue that, even under Barnes, equitable relief would not have been available to fiduciaries relying on plan provisions like the one at issue here, because when the beneficiary agrees to such a provision “no third-party recovery” exists which the beneficiary can “place . . . beyond his control and grant [the fiduciary] a complete and present right therein.” Brief for Petitioners 26, 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). It may be true that, in contract cases, equity originally required identification at the time the contract was made of the fund to which a lien specified in the contract attached. See, e. g., Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441, 447 (1875) (“[A] mere agreement to pay out of such fund is not sufficient. Something more is necessary. There must be an appropriation of the fund pro tanto”). But Barnes explicitly disapproved of this rule, observing that Trist addressed the issue only in dicta (since the contract containing the lien provision in Trist was illegal), and treating the “question as at large,” even in light of earlier opinions that had dealt with it head on. Barnes, supra, at 120 (citing Trist, supra; Christmas v. Russell, 14 Wall. 69 (1872); Wright v. Ellison, 1 Wall. 16 (1864)).
Apart from those cases, which Barnes discredited, the Sereboffs offer little to undermine the plain indication in Barnes that the fund over which a lien is asserted need not be in existence when the contract containing the lien provision is executed. See 4 S. Symons, Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence § 1236, pp. 699-700 (5th ed. 1941) (“[A]n agreement to charge, or to assign . . . property not yet in existence,” although “creat[ing] no legal estate or interest in the things when they afterwards come into existence . . . does constitute an equitable lien upon the property” just as would “a lien upon specific things existing and owned by the contracting party at the date of the contract”); Peugh v. Porter, 112 U. S. 737, 742 (1885) (“[I]n contemplation of equity, [it] is not material” that the “very fund now in dispute” was “not... in existence” when an equitable lien over that fund was created). Indeed, the most they can muster in this regard are several state cases predating Barnes and a single decision that rests, contrary to the Sereboffs’ characterization, on the simple conclusion that a contractual provision purporting to secure an equitable lien did not properly do so. See Brief for Petitioners 26; Reply Brief for Petitioners 12; Taylor v. Wharton, 43 App. D. C. 104 (1915).
The Sereboffs finally fall back on the argument that Barnes announced a special rule for attorneys claiming an equitable lien over funds promised under a contingency fee arrangement. Outside of this context, they say, the “typical rules regarding equitable liens by assignment” persisted and would have prevented recovery here. Reply Brief for Petitioners 13.
But Barnes did not attach any particular significance to the identity of the parties seeking recovery. See 232 U. S., at 119. And as Barnes itself makes clear, other cases of this Court — not involving attorney’s contingency fees — apply the same “familiar rul[e] of equity that a contract to convey a specific object even before it is acquired will make the contractor a trustee as soon as he gets a title to the thing.” Id., at 121. In Walker v. Brown, 165 U. S. 654 (1897), for instance, the Court approved an equitable lien over municipal bonds transferred to a company to facilitate its business. When a supplier of the company suspended shipments because of delinquent debts, the individual who had transferred the bonds assured the supplier that “ ‘any indebtedness that they may be owing you at any time, shall be paid before the return to me of these bonds ... and that these bonds ... are at the risk of the business of [the company], so far as any claim you may have against [it].’” Id., at 663. The Court found that this undertaking created an equitable lien on the bonds, which the supplier could enforce against the individual after the bonds had been returned to him when the company became insolvent. Id., at 666. As in Barnes, the Court resolved the case by applying general equitable principles, stating that “[t]o dedicate property to a particular purpose, to provide that a specified creditor and that creditor alone shall be authorized to seek payment of his debt from the property or its value, is unmistakably to create an equitable lien.” 165 U. S., at 666.
C
Shifting gears, the Sereboffs contend that the lower courts erred in allowing enforcement of the “Acts of Third Parties” provision, without imposing various limitations that they say would apply to “truly equitable relief grounded in principles of subrogation.” Reply Brief for Petitioners 5. According to the Sereboffs, they would in an equitable subrogation action be able to assert certain equitable defenses, such as the defense that subrogation may be pursued only after a victim had been made whole for his injuries. Id., at 5-6. Such defenses should be available against Mid Atlantic’s action, the Sereboffs claim, despite the plan provision that “[Mid Atlantic’s] share of the recovery will not be reduced because [the beneficiary] has not received the full damages claimed, unless [Mid Atlantic] agrees , in writing to a reduction.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a.
But Mid Atlantic’s claim is not considered equitable because it is a subrogation claim. As explained, Mid Atlantic’s action to enforce the “Acts of Third Parties” provision qualifies as an equitable remedy because it is indistinguishable from an action to enforce an equitable lien established by agreement, of the sort epitomized by our decision in Barnes. See 4 Palmer, Law of Restitution §23.18(72), at 470 (A subrogation lien “is not an express lien based on agreement, but instead is an equitable lien impressed on moneys on the ground that they ought to go to the insurer”). Mid Atlantic need not characterize its claim as a freestanding action for equitable subrogation. Accordingly, the parcel of equitable defenses the Sereboffs claim accompany any such action are beside the point.
* * *
Under the teaching of Barnes and similar cases, Mid Atlantic’s action in the District Court properly- sought “equitable relief” under § 502(a)(3); the judgment of the Fourth Circuit is affirmed in relevant part.
It is so ordered.
Compare Administrative Comm. of Wal-Mart Assoc. Health & Welfare Plan v. Willard, 393 F. 3d 1119 (CA10 2004), Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F. 3d 348 (CA5 2003), and Administrative Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assoc. Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco, 338 F. 3d 680 (CA7 2003), with Qualchoice, Inc. v. Rowland, 367 F. 3d 638 (CA6 2004), and Westaff (USA) Inc. v. Arce, 298 F. 3d 1164 (CA9 2002).
The Sereboffs argue that, even if the relief Mid Atlantic sought was “equitable” under § 502(a)(3), it was not “appropriate” under that provision in that it contravened principles like the make-whole doctrine. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals considered the argument that Mid Atlantic’s claim was not “appropriate” apart from the contention that it was not “equitable,” and from our examination of the record it does not appear that the Sereboffs raised this distinct assertion below. We decline to consider it for the first time here. See National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Smith, 525 U. S. 459, 470 (1999).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a civil antitrust action brought by the Government in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The defendants — three corporations and two individuals — are engaged in the business of promoting professional championship boxing contests. The Government’s complaint charges that the defendants, in the course of this business, have violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. After this Court's decision in Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U. S. 356, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The District Court granted the motion in reliance upon the Toolson decision and Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U. S. 200. The case, together with United States v. Shubert, ante, p. 222, is here on direct appeal under the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C §29.
The Government’s complaint alleges that promoters of professional championship boxing contests
“make a substantial utilization of the channels of interstate trade and commerce to:
“(a) negotiate contracts with boxers, advertising agencies, seconds, referees, judges, announcers, and other personnel living in states other than those in which the promoters reside;
“(b) arrange and maintain training quarters in states other than those in which the promoters reside;
“(c) lease suitable arenas, and arrange other details for boxing contests, particularly when the contests are held in states other than those in which the promoters reside;
“(d) sell tickets to contests across state lines; “(e) negotiate for the sale of and sell rights to make and distribute motion pictures of boxing contests to the 18,000 theatres in the United States;
“(f) negotiate for the sale of and sell rights to broadcast and telecast boxing contests to homes through more than 3,000 radio stations and 100 television stations in the United States; and
“ (g) negotiate for the sale of and sell rights to telecast boxing contests to some 200 motion picture the-atres in various states of the United States for display by large-screen television.”
The promoter’s receipts from the sale of television, radio, and motion picture rights to championship matches, according to the complaint, represent on the average over 25% of the promoter’s total revenue and in some instances exceed the revenue derived from the sale of admission tickets. The complaint alleges that the defendants have restrained and monopolized this trade and commerce— “the promotion, exhibition, broadcasting, telecasting, and motion picture production and distribution of professional championship boxing contests in the United States”— through a conspiracy to exclude competition in their line of business. The conspiracy, it is claimed, began in 1949 with an agreement among the defendants and Joe Louis, then heavyweight champion of the world, that Louis would resign his title, that he would procure exclusive rights to the services of the four leading title contenders in a series of elimination contests which would result in the recognition of a new heavyweight champion, that he would also obtain exclusive rights to broadcast, televise, and film these contests, and that he would assign all such exclusive rights to the defendants. The defendants have allegedly sought to maintain and effectuate this conspiracy by the following means: by eliminating the “leading competing promoter” of championship matches; by acquiring the exclusive right to promote professional boxing contests in all the “principal arenas” where championship matches can be successfully presented; and by requiring each title contender to agree, as a condition of fighting for the championship, that if he wins he would, for a period of three (and sometimes five) years, take part only in title contests promoted by the defendants. As a consequence of these acts, the complaint alleges, the defendants have promoted, or participated in the promotion of, all but two of the 21 championship matches held in the United States between June 1949 and the filing of the complaint in March 1952.
These allegations must of course be taken as true at this stage of the proceeding. And the defendants do not deny that the allegations state a cause of action if their business is subject to the Sherman Act. The question thus presented is whether the defendants’ business as described in the complaint — the promotion of professional championship boxing contests on a multistate basis, coupled with the sale of rights to televise, broadcast, and film the contests for interstate transmission — constitutes “trade or commerce among the several States” within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
The question is perhaps a novel one in that this Court has never before considered the antitrust status of the boxing business. Yet, if it were not for Federal Baseball and Toolson, we think that it would be too clear for dispute that the Government’s allegations bring the defendants within the scope of the Act. A boxing match — like the showing of a motion picture (United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 183) or the performance of a vaudeville act (Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U. S. 271) or the performance of a legitimate stage attraction (United States v. Shubert, ante, p. 222) — “is of course a local affair.” But that fact alone does not bar application of the Sherman Act to a business based on the promotion of such matches, if the business is itself engaged in interstate commerce or if the business imposes illegal restraints on interstate commerce. Apart from Federal Baseball and Toolson, it would be sufficient, we believe, to rest on the allegation that over 25% of the revenue from championship boxing is derived from interstate operations through the sale of radio, television, and motion picture rights. Compare United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U. S. 218, 225-226; Times-Picayune Co. v. United States, 345 U. S. 594, 602, n. 11; Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U. S. 219, 227-235; United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U. S. 293, 297-298; United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfrs. Assn., 336 U. S. 460, 464; United States v. Employing Plasterers Assn., 347 U. S. 186, 189; and cases collected in the Shubert opinion. See also Currin v. Wallace, 306 U. S. 1, 10; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127-128.
Notwithstanding these decisions, the defendants contend that they are exempt from the Sherman Act under the rule of stare decisis. They, like the defendants in the Shubert case, base this contention on Federal Baseball and Toolson. But they would be content with a more restrictive interpretation of Federal Baseball and Toolson than the defendants in the Shubert case. The Shubert defendants argue that Federal Baseball and Toolson immunized all businesses built around the live presentation of local exhibitions. The defendants in the instant case argue that Federal Baseball and Toolson immunized only such businesses as involve exhibitions of an athletic nature. We cannot accept either argument.
For the reasons stated in the Toolson opinion and restated in United States v. Shubert, ante, p. 222, Toolson neither overruled Federal Baseball nor necessarily reaffirmed all that was said in Federal Baseball. Instead, “[wjithout re-examination of the underlying issues,” the Court adhered to Federal Baseball “so far as that decision determines that Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.” 346 U. S., at 357. We have held today in the Shubert case that Toolson is not authority for exempting other businesses merely because of the circumstance that they are also based on the performance of local exhibitions. That ruling is fully applicable here.
Moreover, none of the factors underlying the Toolson decision are present in the instant case. At the time the Government’s complaint was filed, no court had ever held that the boxing business was not subject to the antitrust laws. Indeed, this Court’s decision in the Hart case, less than a year after the Federal Baseball decision, clearly established that Federal Baseball could not be relied upon as a basis of exemption for other segments of the entertainment business, athletic or otherwise. Surely there is nothing in the Holmes opinion in the Hart case to suggest, even remotely, that the Court was drawing a line between athletic and nonathletic entertainment. Nor do we see the relevance of such a distinction for the purpose of determining what constitutes “trade or commerce among the several States.” The controlling consideration in Federal Baseball and Hart was, instead, a very practical one — the degree of interstate activity involved in the particular business under review. It follows that stare decisis cannot help the defendants here; for, contrary to their argument, Federal Baseball did not hold that all businesses based on professional sports were outside the scope of the antitrust laws. The issue confronting us is, therefore, not whether a previously granted exemption should continue, but whether an exemption should be granted in the first instance. And that issue is for Congress to resolve, not this Court. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533, 561.
The issue was, in fact, before Congress only recently. In 1951, four identical bills were introduced in Congress— three in the House and one in the Senate — forbidding the application of the antitrust laws “to organized professional sports enterprises or to acts in the conduct of such enterprises.” Extensive hearings on the three House bills were conducted by the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary; no hearings were held on the Senate bill. At the conclusion of its hearings, the House Subcommittee unanimously declared its opposition to the four bills. Its report states:
“The requested exemption would extend to all professional sports enterprises and to all acts in the conduct of such enterprises. The law would no longer require competition in any facet of business activity of any sport enterprise. Thus the sale of radio and television rights, the management of stadia, the purchase and sale of advertising, the concession industry, and many other business activities, as well as the aspects of baseball which are solely related to the promotion of competition on the playing field, would be immune and untouchable. Such a broad exemption could not be granted without substantially repealing the antitrust laws.” (Italics added.)
With respect to baseball, the Subcommittee recommended a postponement of any legislation until the status of Federal Baseball was clarified in the courts. No further action was taken on any of the bills; Congress thus left intact the then-existing coverage of the antitrust laws. Yet the defendants in the instant case are now asking this Court for precisely the same exemption which enactment of those bills would have afforded. Their remedy, if they are entitled to one, lies in further resort to Congress, as we have already stated. For we agree that “Such a broad exemption could not be granted without substantially repealing the antitrust laws.”
As in the Shubert case, we are concerned here only with the sufficiency of the Government’s complaint. We hold that the complaint states a cause of action and that the Government is entitled to an opportunity to prove its allegations. The judgment of the court below is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Burton, retaining the views expressed in his dissent in the Toolson case, 346 U. S. 356, 357, joins the opinion and judgment of the Court in this case. Mr. Justice Reed joins in this concurrence.
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice Minton, see post, p. 248.]
[For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Minton, see post, p. 251.]
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
The complaint describes the “Nature of Trade and Commerce Involved” as follows:
10. Boxers usually compete in amateur tournaments as a preliminary to becoming professionals. As amateurs they receive no pay and box under the sponsorship of local independent boxing clubs, associations or other organizations. When they become professionals, they contract to box an opponent on a per bout basis for local promoters and receive a fee. If their skill as professional boxers results in an increasing willingness of the public to pay to view their contests, they can demand higher fees and a greater percentage of receipts from the sale of tickets and other rights. If their skill increases, they engage in preliminary and other bouts throughout the United States and eventually participate in major bouts. The fee for a major bout is usually a sum guaranteed by the promoter or a predetermined percentage of the net receipts from the sale of tickets and motion picture, radio and television rights.
11. The most lucrative asset to a professional boxer is recognition and designation by the various state athletic commissions and others as “world champion” in the division in which he competes. These divisions are:
flyweight. 112 lbs.
bantamweight . 118 ”
featherweight. 126 ”
lightweight. 135 ”
welterweight. 147 ”
middleweight. 160 ”
light heavyweight. 175 ”
heavyweight. All above 175 lbs.
A “world champion” gains his title by defeating the existing champion or by eliminating all contenders, and remains world champion in his division until he is, in turn, defeated by a contender or resigns the title. Such a title affords to its holder financial returns from personal appearances and exhibitions throughout the United States, from endorsements and other activities, as well as a greater percentage of the receipts from his bouts. The promotion of professional championship boxing contests is also more lucrative than the promotion of other boxing contests.
iSe12. Of the various “world championships,” the heavyweight division is the most important to boxers and promoters, as it returns the greatest financial benefits. The flyweight and bantamweight divisions are not of substantial importance in the United States because very few American boxers are of such light weights. No championship contest has been held in the flyweight division in the United States since 1935; none in the bantamweight division since 1947.
13." The promotion of professional championship boxing contests, in which the winners achieve “world champion” titles, includes negotiating and executing contracts with boxers for the main and preliminary bouts, arranging and maintaining training quarters, leasing suitable arenas, such as stadia or ball parks where substantial numbers of the public may be seated to view the contest, negotiating and executing contracts for the employment of matchmakers, advertising agencies, press agents, seconds, referees, judges, announcers and other personnel; organizing, assembling, and arranging other details necessary to the exhibition of the contests; selling tickets and rights to make motion pictures of the contests and to distribute them throughout the United States and in foreign countries; and selling rights to transmit the contests by radio or television throughout the United States and foreign countries.
14. Promoters of professional championship boxing contests make a substantial utilization of the channels of interstate trade and commerce to:
(a) negotiate contracts with boxers, advertising agencies, seconds, referees, judges, announcers, and other personnel living in states other than those in which the promoters reside;
(b) arrange and maintain training quarters in states other than those in which the promoters reside;
(c) lease suitable arenas, and arrange other details for boxing contests, particularly when the contests are held in states other than those in which the promoters reside;
(d) sell tickets to contests across state lines;
(e) negotiate for the sale of and sell rights to make and distribute motion pictures of boxing contests to the 18,000 theatres in the United States ;
(f) negotiate for the sale of and sell rights to broadcast and telecast boxing contests to homes through more than 3,000 radio stations and 100 television stations in the United States; and
(g) negotiate for the sale of and sell rights to telecast boxing contests to some 200 motion picture theatres in various states of the United States for display by large-screen television.
15. Motion picture films of professional championship boxing contests are distributed and exhibited in theatres throughout the United States and in foreign countries. Similarly, radio and television broadcasts of such contests are transmitted throughout the United States and radio broadcasts of them are also transmitted to foreign countries.
16. The 21 major professional championship boxing contests promoted in the United States since June 1949 have produced a gross income from admissions and the sale of motion picture, radio and television rights of approximately $4,500,000.00. The total such gross income for all professional boxing contests in the United States during this period, including the championship contests, has been approximately $15,000,000.00.
16 (a). A promoter of a professional championship fight usually derives substantially all of his revenue from two sources: (a) sale of tickets of admission and (b) sale of rights to telecast, broadcast and produce and distribute motion pictures of the fight. In such fights, sale of television, radio and motion picture rights account for a substantial proportion of the promoter’s total revenue. Since 1949 sale of these rights has represented, on the average, over 25% of the total revenue derived from championship fights, and has exceeded, in some instances, the revenue received from sale of tickets of admission. With the progressive and continuing expansion of television facilities, the proportion of the promoter’s total revenue derived from television, radio and motion pictures, has been on an ascending curve, in relation to revenue derived from sale of tickets of admission. In the Marciano-Walcott heavyweight championship fight of May 15, 1953, at Chicago, Illinois, promoted by defendants IBC (N. Y.), IBC (Ill.), James D. Norris and Arthur M. Wirtz, the promoters’ receipts from sale of tickets of admission were, after federal admission taxes, $253,462.37, while their television, radio and motion picture revenue was approximately $300,000.
The corporate defendants are International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., International Boxing Club, and Madison Square Garden Corporation. The individual defendants are James D. Norris and Arthur M. Wirtz. The individual defendants, together with Madison Square Garden Corporation, own 80% of the stock of International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., and International Boxing Club. The nature of the business involved is described in an appendix to this opinion.
15 U. S. C. §§ 1 and 2. These sections provide:
Ҥ 1. . . . Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared by sections 1-7 of this title to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ....
“§ 2. . . . Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”
Section 4 confers jurisdiction on the district courts “to prevent and restrain violations of sections 1-7 of this title” in equity proceedings instituted under the direction of the Attorney General.
The District Court’s opinion was oral and not transcribed. All the parties agree, however, that the dismissal was based on Federal Baseball and Toolson.
The complaint further alleges that “With the progressive and continuing expansion of television facilities, the proportion of the promoter’s total revenue derived from television, radio and motion pictures, has been on an ascending curve
All three media are concededly engaged in interstate commerce. E. g., Federal Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 279 (radio); Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F. 2d 153, 154 (C. A. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 929 (television); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131 (motion pictures).
Shall v. Henry, 211 F. 2d 226 (C. A. 7th Cir.), was decided subsequent to the decision below. So also was Peller v. International Boxing Club, unreported, Civil 52 C 813, April 23, 1954 (D. C. N. D. Ill.). The unreported decision (D. C. N. D. Ill.) which Shall v. Henry affirmed was decided prior to the decision below but after the filing of the Government’s complaint.
H. R. 4229, 4230, 4231, and S. 1526, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. These bills were introduced “by friends of baseball because they feared that the continued existence of organized baseball as America’s national pastime was in substantial danger by the threat of impending litigation.” H. R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 1.
The House hearings were stated to be on “the problem of whether or not organized baseball should be exempted from the operation of the antitrust laws.” Hearings on “Organized Baseball” before the House Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1.
H. R. Rep. No. 2002 (entitled “Organized Baseball”), 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 230. Between the hearings and the report, the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power was reconstituted as the Antitrust Subcommittee. The report was submitted directly to the full House pursuant to H. Res. 95,82d Cong., 1st Sess.
Id., at 134-136, 231-232.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Clark
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the question whether § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 13a, making it a crime to sell goods at “unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor,” is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite as applied to sales made below cost with such purpose. National Dairy and Raymond J. Wise, a vice-president and director, upon being charged, inter alia, with violating § 3 by making sales below cost for the purpose of destroying competition, moved for dismissal of the Robinson-Pat-man Act counts of the indictment on the ground that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. The District Court granted the motion and ordered dismissal. On direct appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U. S. C. § 3731, we noted probable jurisdiction, 368 U. S. 808, because of the importance of the issue in the administration of the Robinson-Patman Act. We have concluded that the order of dismissal was error and therefore remand the case for trial.
I.
National Dairy is engaged in the business of purchasing, processing, distributing and selling milk and other dairy products throughout the United States. Through its processing plant in Kansas City, Missouri, National Dairy has for the past several years been in competition with national concerns and various local dairies in the Greater Kansas City area and the surrounding areas of Kansas and Missouri. In the Greater Kansas City-market National Dairy distributes its products directly, but cities and towns in the surrounding Kansas and Missouri areas outside this market are served by independent distributors who purchase milk from National Dairy and resell on their own account.
The indictment charged violations of both the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1, and the Robinson-Patman Act in Kansas City and in six local markets in the adjacent area. The Robinson-Patman counts charged National Dairy and Wise with selling milk in those markets "at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition.” Further specifying the acts complained of, the indictment charged National Dairy with having “utilized the advantages it possesses by reason of the fact that it operates in a great many different geographical localities in order to finance and subsidize a price war against the small dairies selling milk in competition with it ... by intentionally selling milk [directly or to a distributor] at prices below National’s cost.” In five of the markets National Dairy’s pricing practice was alleged to have resulted in “severe financial losses to small dairies,” and in two others the effect was claimed to have been to “eliminate competition” and “drive small dairies from” the market.
National Dairy and Wise moved to dismiss all of the Robinson-Patman counts on the grounds that the statutory provision, “unreasonably low prices,” is so vague and indefinite as to violate the due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment and an indictment based on this provision is violative of the Sixth Amendment in that it does not adequately apprise them of the charges. The District Court, after rendering an oral opinion holding that § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite, granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the § 3 counts. The case came here on direct appeal from the order of dismissal.
II.
National Dairy and Wise urge that § 3 is to be tested solely “on its face” rather than as applied to the conduct charged in the indictment, i. e., sales below cost for the purpose of destroying competition. The Government, on the other hand, places greater emphasis on the latter, contending that whether or not there is doubt as to the validity of the statute in all of its possible applications, § 3 is plainly constitutional in its application to the conduct alleged in the indictment.
It is true that a statute attacked as vague must initially be examined “on its face,” but it does not follow that a readily discernible .dividing line can always be drawn, with statutes falling neatly into one of the two categories of “valid” or “invalid” solely on the basis of such an examination.
We do not evaluate § 3 in the abstract.
“The delicate power of pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with reference to hypothetical cases .... [A] limiting construction could be given to the statute by the court responsible for its construction if an application of doubtful constitutionality were . . . presented. We might add that application of this rule frees the Court not only from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from premature interpretations of statutes in areas where their constitutional application might be cloudy.” United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 22 (1960).
The strong presumptive validity that attaches to an Act of Congress has led this Court to hold many times that statutes are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language. E. g., Jordan v. De George, 341 U. S. 223, 231 (1951), and United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1, 7 (1947). Indeed, we have consistently sought an interpretation which supports the constitutionality of legislation. E. g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 47 (1953); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932); see Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945).
Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. United States v. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 617 (1954). In determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be examined in the light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged. Robinson v. United States, 324 U. S. 282 (1945). In view of these principles we must conclude that if § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act gave National Dairy and Wise sufficient warning that selling below cost for the purpose of destroying competition is unlawful, the statute is constitutional as applied to them. This is not to say that a bead-sight indictment can correct a blunderbuss statute, for the latter itself must be sufficiently focused to forewarn of both its reach and coverage. We therefore consider the vagueness attack solely in relation to whether the statute sufficiently warned National Dairy and Wise that selling “below cost” with predatory intent was within its prohibition of “unreasonably low prices.”
III.
The history of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act indicates that selling below cost, unless mitigated by some acceptable business exigency, was intended to be prohibited by the words “unreasonably low prices.” That sales below cost without a justifying business reason may come within the proscriptions of the Sherman Act has long been established. See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911). Further, when the Clayton Act was enacted in 1914 to strengthen the Sherman Act, Congress passed § 2 to cover price discrimination by large companies which compete by lowering prices, “oftentimes below the cost of production . . . with the intent to destroy and make unprofitable the business of their competitors.” H. R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8. The 1936 enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act was for the purpose of “strengthening the Clayton Act provisions,” Federal Trade Comm’n v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U. S. 536, 544 (1960), and the Act was aimed at a specific weapon of the monopolist — predatory pricing. Moreover, § 3 was described by Representative Utterback, a House manager of the joint conference committee, as attaching “criminal penalties in addition to the civil liabilities and remedies already provided by the Clayton Act.” 80 Cong. Rec. 9419.
This Court, in 'Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co., 348 U. S. 115 (1954), a case based in part on § 3, recognized the applicability of the Robinson-Patman Act to conduct quite similar to that with which National Dairy and Wise are charged here. The Court said, “Congress by the Clayton Act and Robinson-Patman Act barred the use of interstate business to destroy local business” through programs in which “profits made in interstate activities would underwrite the losses of local price-cutting campaigns.” Id., at 120, 119.
In proscribing sales at “unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor” we believe that Congress condemned sales made below cost for such purpose. And we believe that National Dairy and Wise could reasonably understand from the statutory language that the conduct described in the indictment was proscribed by the Act. They say, however, that this is but the same horse with a different bridle because the phrase “below cost” is itself a vague and indefinite expression in business.
Whether “below cost” refers to “direct” or “fully distributed” cost or some other level of cost computation cannot be decided in the abstract. There is nothing in the record on this point, and it may well be that the issue will be rendered academic by a showing that National Dairy sold below any of these cost levels. Therefore, we do not reach this issue here. As we said in Automatic Canteen Co. v. Federal Trade Common, 346 U. S. 61, 65 (1953): “Since precision of expression is not an outstanding characteristic of the Robinson-Patman Act, exact formulation of the issue before us is necessary to avoid inadvertent pronouncement on statutory language in one context when the same language may require separate consideration in other settings.”
Finally, we think the additional element of predatory intent alleged in the indictment and required by the Act provides further definition of the prohibited conduct. We believe the notice here is more specific than that which was held adequate in Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91 (1945), in which a requirement of intent served to “relieve the statute of the objection that it punishes without warning an offense of which the accused was unaware.” Id., at 102; see id., at 101-107. Proscribed by the statute in Screws was the intentional achievement of a result, i. e., the willful deprivation of certain rights. The Act here, however, in prohibiting sales at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition, listed as elements of the illegal conduct not only the intent to achieve a result — destruction of competition — but also the act — selling at unreasonably low prices — done in furtherance of that design or purpose. It seems clear that the necessary specificity of warning is afforded when, as here, separate, though related, statutory elements of prohibited activity come to focus on one course of conduct.
United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921), on which much reliance is placed, is inapposite here. In Cohen the Act proscribed “any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge.” The charge in the indictment was in the exact language of the statute, and, in specifying the conduct covered by the charge, the indictment did nothing more than state the price the defendant was alleged to have collected. Hence, the Court held that a “specific or definite” act was neither proscribed by the Act nor alleged in the indictment. Id., at 89. Moreover, the standard held too vague in Cohen was without a meaningful referent in business practice or usage. “[T]here was no accepted and fairly stable commercial standard which could be regarded as impliedly taken up and adopted by the statute . . . .” Small Co. v. American Sugar Rfg. Co., 267 U. S. 233, 240-241 (1925). In view of the business practices against which § 3 was unmistakably directed and the specificity of the violations charged in the indictment here, both absent in Cohen, the proffered analogy to that case must be rejected.
In this connection we also note that the approach to “vagueness” governing a case like this is different from that followed in cases arising under the First Amendment. There we are concerned with the vagueness of the statute “on its face” because such vagueness may in itself deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable conduct. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88,98 (1940); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415. No such factor is present here where the statute is directed only at conduct designed to destroy competition, activity which is neither constitutionally protected nor socially desirable. We are thus permitted to consider the warning provided by § 3 not only in terms of the statute “on its face” but also in the light of the conduct to which it is applied. The reliance of National Dairy and Wise on First Amendment cases is therefore misplaced.
IV.
This opinion is not to be construed, however, as holding that every sale below cost constitutes a violation of § 3. Such sales are not condemned when made in furtherance of a legitimate commercial objective, such as the liquidation of excess, obsolete or perishable merchandise, or the need to meet a lawful, equally low price of a competitor. 80 Cong. Rec. 6332, 6334; see Ben Hur Coal Co. v. Wells, 242 F. 2d 481 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1957). Sales below cost in these instances would neither be “unreasonably low” nor made with predatory intent. But sales made below cost without legitimate commercial objective and with specific intent to destroy competition would clearly fall within the prohibitions of § 3.
Since the indictment charges the latter conduct and, as noted, supra, n. 2, we are bound by the well-pleaded allegations of the indictment, we must conclude that National Dairy and Wise were adequately forewarned of the illegal conduct charged against them and remand the case for trial. Our holding, of course, does not foreclose proof on the merits as to the reasonableness of the alleged pricing conduct or, for that matter, the absence of the predatory intent necessary to conviction.
Reversed and remanded.
Seven counts of the 15-count indictment charged violations of § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act counts relate to the same course of conduct.
One Robinson-Patman count, number 13, charges Raymond J. Wise, a vice-president and director of National, with authorizing National’s pricing practice and ordering its effectuation in the Kansas City market. United States v. Wise, 370 U. S. 405 (1962), involves two Sherman Act counts of the indictment which named Wise as a defendant.
It should be noted that, in reviewing a case in which a motion to dismiss was granted, we are required to accept well-pleaded allegations of the indictment as the hypothesis for decision. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U. S. 337, 343 (1952).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in these consolidated cases is whether the portion of a money judgment or settlement paid to a plaintiff’s attorney under a contingent-fee agreement is income to the plaintiff under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. I). The issue divides the courts of appeals. In one of the instant cases, Banks v. Commissioner, 345 F. 3d 373 (2003), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held the contingent-fee portion of a litigation recovery is not included in the plaintiff’s gross income. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits also adhere to this view, relying on the holding, over Judge Wisdom’s dissent, in Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F. 2d 119, 125-126 (CA5 1959). Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F. 3d 353, 363-365 (CA5 2000); Foster v. United States, 249 F. 3d 1275, 1279-1280 (CA11 2001). In the other case under review, Banaitis v. Commissioner, 340 F. 3d 1074 (2003), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a contingent fee is excluded from the plaintiff’s gross income if state law gives the plaintiff’s attorney a special property interest in the fee, but not otherwise. Six Courts of Appeals have held the entire litigation recovery, including the portion paid to an attorney as a contingent fee, is income to the plaintiff. Some of these Courts of Appeals discuss state law, but little of their analysis appears to turn on this factor. Raymond v. United States, 355 F. 3d 107, 113-116 (CA2 2004); Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F. 3d 881, 883-884 (CA7 2001); Baylin v. United States, 43 F. 3d 1451, 1454-1455 (CA Fed. 1995). Other Courts of Appeals have been explicit that the fee portion of the recovery is always income to the plaintiff regardless of the nuances of state law. O’Brien v. Commissioner, 38 T. C. 707, 712 (1962), aff’d, 319 F. 2d 532 (CA3 1963) (per curiam); Young v. Commissioner, 240 F. 3d 369, 377-379 (CA4 2001); Hukkanen-Campbell v. Commissioner, 274 F. 3d 1312, 1313-1314 (CA10 2001). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 541 U. S. 958 (2004).
We hold that, as a general rule, when a litigant’s recovery constitutes income, the litigant’s income includes the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a contingent fee. We reverse the decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits.
I
A. Commissioner v. Banks
In 1986, respondent John W. Banks, II, was fired from his job as an educational consultant with the California Department of Education. He retained an attorney on a contingent-fee basis and filed a civil suit against the employer in a United States District Court. The. complaint alleged employment discrimination in violation of 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981 and 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq., and Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 12965 (West 1986). The original complaint asserted various additional claims under state law, but Banks later abandoned these. After trial commenced in 1990, the parties settled for $464,000. Banks paid $150,000 of this amount to his attorney pursuant to the fee agreement.
Banks did not include any of the $464,000 in settlement proceeds as gross income in his 1990 federal income tax return. In 1997 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued Banks a notice of deficiency for the 1990 tax year. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner’s determination, finding that all the settlement proceeds, including the $150,000 Banks had paid to his attorney, must be included in Banks’ gross income.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part. 345 F. 3d 373 (2003). It agreed the net amount received by Banks was included in gross income but not the amount paid to the attorney. Relying on its prior decision in Estate of Clarks ex rel. Brisco-Whitter v. United States, 202 F. 3d 854 (2000), the court held the contingent-fee agreement was not an anticipatory assignment of Banks’ income because the litigation recovery was not already earned, vested, or even relatively certain to be paid when the contingent-fee contract was made. A contingent-fee arrangement, the court reasoned, is more like a partial assignment of income-producing property than an assignment of income. The attorney is not the mere beneficiary of the client’s largess, but rather earns his fee through skill and diligence. 345 F. 3d, at 384-385 (quoting Estate of Clarks, supra, at 857-858). This reasoning, the court held, applies whether or not state law grants the attorney any special property interest (e. g., a superior lien) in part of the judgment or settlement proceeds.
B. Commissioner v. Banaitis
After leaving his job as a vice president and loan officer at the Bank of California in 1987, Sigitas J. Banaitis retained an attorney on a contingent-fee basis and brought suit in Oregon state court against the Bank of California and its successor in ownership, the Mitsubishi Bank. The complaint alleged that Mitsubishi Bank willfully interfered with Banaitis’ employment contract, and that the Bank of California attempted to induce Banaitis to breach his fiduciary duties to customers and discharged him when he refused. The jury awarded Banaitis compensatory and punitive damages. After resolution of all appeals and post-trial motions, the parties settled. The defendants paid $4,864,547 to Banaitis; and, following the formula set forth in the contingent-fee contract, the defendants paid an additional $3,864,012 directly to Banaitis’ attorney.
Banaitis did not include the amount paid to his attorney in gross income on his federal income tax return, and the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner’s determination, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 340 F. 3d 1074 (2003). In contrast to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Banaitis court viewed state law as pivotal. Where state law confers on the attorney no special property rights in his fee, the court said, the whole amount of the judgment or settlement ordinarily is included in the plaintiff’s gross income. Id., at 1081. Oregon state law, however, like the law of some other States, grants attorneys a superior lien in the contingent-fee portion of any recovery. As a result, the court held, contingent-fee agreements under Oregon law operate not as an anticipatory assignment of the client’s income but as a partial transfer to the attorney of some of the client’s property in the lawsuit.
II
To clarify why the issue here is of any consequence for tax purposes, two preliminary observations are useful. The first concerns the general issue of deductibility. For the tax years in question the legal expenses in these eases could have been taken as miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to the ordinary requirements, 26 U. S. C. §§ 67-68 (2000 ed. and Supp. I), but doing so would have been of no help to respondents because of the operation of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). For noncorporate individual taxpayers, the AMT establishes a tax liability floor equal to 26 percent of the taxpayer’s “alternative minimum taxable income” (minus specified exemptions) up to $175,000, plus 28 percent of alternative minimum taxable income over $175,000. §§ 55(a), (b) (2000 ed.). Alternative minimum taxable income, unlike ordinary gross income, does not allow any miscellaneous itemized deductions. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i).
Second, after these cases arose Congress enacted the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 118 Stat. 1418. Section 703 of the Act amended the Code by adding § 62(a)(19). Id., at 1546. The amendment allows a taxpayer, in computing adjusted gross income, to deduct “attorney fees and court costs paid by, or on behalf of, the taxpayer in connection with any action involving a claim of unlawful discrimination.” Ibid. The Act defines “unlawful discrimination” to include a number of specific federal statutes, §§ 62(e)(1) to (16), any federal whistle-blower statute, §62(e)(17), and any federal, state, or local law “providing for the enforcement of civil rights” or “regulating any aspect of the employment relationship ... or prohibiting the discharge of an employee, the discrimination against an employee, or any other form of retaliation or reprisal against an employee for asserting rights or taking other actions permitted by law,” § 62(e)(18). Id., at 1547-1548. These deductions are permissible even when the AMT applies. Had the Act been in force for the transactions now under review, these cases likely would not have arisen. The Act is not retroactive, however, so while it may cover future taxpayers in respondents’ position, it does not pertain here.
Ill
The Internal Revenue Code defines “gross income” for federal tax purposes as “all income from whatever source derived.” 26 U. S. C. § 61(a). The definition extends broadly to all economic gains not otherwise exempted. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U. S. 426, 429-430 (1955); Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U. S. 28, 49 (1949). A taxpayer cannot exclude an economic gain from gross income by assigning the gain in advance to another party. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U. S. 591, 604 (1948); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 116-117 (1940). The rationale for the so-called anticipatory assignment of income doctrine is the principle that gains should be taxed “to those who earned them,” Lucas, supra, at 114, a maxim we have called “the first principle of income taxation,” Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U. S. 733, 739-740 (1949). The anticipatory assignment doctrine is meant to prevent taxpayers from avoiding taxation through “arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent [income] when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it.” Lucas, 281 U. S., at 115. The rule is preventative and motivated by administrative as well as substantive concerns, so we do not inquire whether any particular assignment has a discernible tax avoidance purpose. As Lucas explained, “no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew.” Ibid.
Respondents argue that the anticipatory assignment doctrine is a judge-made antifraud rule with no relevance to contingent-fee contracts of the sort at issue here. The Commissioner maintains that a contingent-fee agreement should be viewed as an anticipatory assignment to the attorney of a portion of the client’s income from any litigation recovery. We agree with the Commissioner.
In an ordinary case attribution of income is resolved by asking whether a taxpayer exercises complete dominion over the income in question. Glenshaw Glass Co., supra, at 431; see also Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U. S. 203, 209 (1990); Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., 405 U. S. 394, 403 (1972). In the context of anticipatory assignments, however, the assignor often does not have dominion over the income at the moment of receipt. In that instance the question becomes whether the assignor retains dominion over the income-generating asset, because the taxpayer “who owns or controls the source of the income, also controls the disposition of that which he could have received himself and diverts the payment from himself to others as the means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants.” Horst, supra, at 116-117. See also Lucas, supra, at 114-115; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122, 124-125 (1940); Sunnen, supra, at 604. Looking to control over the income-generating asset, then, preserves the principle that income should be taxed to the party who earns the income and enjoys the consequent benefits.
In the case of a litigation recovery the income-generating asset is the cause of action that derives from the plaintiff’s legal injury. The plaintiff retains dominion over this asset throughout the litigation. We do not understand respondents to argue otherwise. Rather, respondents advance two counterarguments. First, they say that, in contrast to the bond coupons assigned in Horst, the value of a legal claim is speculative at the moment of assignment, and may be worth nothing at all. Second, respondents insist that the claimant’s legal injury is not the only source of the ultimate recovery. The attorney, according to respondents, also contributes income-generating assets — effort and expertise— without which the claimant likely could not prevail. On these premises respondents urge us to treat a contingent-fee agreement as establishing, for tax purposes, something like a joint venture or partnership in which the client and attorney combine their respective assets — the client’s claim and the attorney’s skill — and apportion any resulting profits.
We reject respondents’ arguments. Though the value of the plaintiff’s claim may be speculative at the moment the fee agreement is signed, the anticipatory assignment doctrine is not limited to instances when the precise dollar value of the assigned income is known in advance. Lucas, supra; United States v. Basye, 410 U. S. 441, 445, 450-452 (1973). Though Horst involved an anticipatory assignment of a predetermined sum to be paid on a specific date, the holding in that case did not depend on ascertaining a liquidated amount at the time of assignment. In each of the cases before us, as in Horst, the taxpayer retained control over the income-generating asset, diverted some of the income produced to another party, and realized a benefit by doing so. As Judge Wesley correctly concluded in a recent case, the rationale of Horst applies fully to a contingent-fee contract. Raymond v. United States, 355 F. 3d, at 115-116. That the amount of income the asset would produce was uncertain at the moment of assignment is of no consequence.
We further reject the suggestion to treat the attorney-client relationship as a sort of business partnership or joint venture for tax purposes. The relationship between client and attorney, regardless of the variations in particular compensation agreements or the amount of skill and effort the attorney contributes, is a quintessential principal-agent relationship. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1, Comment e (1957) (hereinafter Restatement); ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3, and Comment 1; Rule 1.7, and Comment 1 (2002). The client may rely on the attorney’s expertise and special skills to achieve a result the client could not achieve alone. That, however, is true of most principal-agent relationships, and it does not alter the fact that the client retains ultimate dominion and control over the underlying claim. The control is evident when it is noted that, although the attorney can make tactical decisions without consulting the client, the plaintiff still must determine whether to settle or proceed to judgment and make, as well, other critical decisions. Even where the attorney exercises independent judgment without supervision by, or consultation with, the client, the attorney, as an agent, is obligated to act solely on behalf of, and for the exclusive benefit of, the client-principal, rather than for the benefit of the attorney or any other party. Restatement §§ 13, 39, 387.
The attorney is an agent who is dutybound to act only in the interests of the principal, and so it is appropriate to treat the full amount of the recovery as income to the principal. In this respect Judge Posner’s observation is apt: “[T]he contingent-fee lawyer [is not] a joint owner of his client’s claim in the legal sense any more than the commission salesman is a joint owner of his employer’s accounts receivable.” Kenseth, 259 F. 3d, at 883. In both cases a principal relies on an agent to realize an economic gain, and the gain realized by the agent’s efforts is income to the principal. The portion paid to the agent may be deductible, but absent some other provision of law it is not excludable from the principal’s gross income.
This rule applies whether or not the attorney-client contract or state law confers any special rights or protections on the attorney, so long as these protections do not alter the fundamental principal-agent character of the relationship. Cf. Restatement § 13, Comment b, and § 14G, Comment a (an agency relationship is created where a principal assigns a chose in action to an assignee for collection and grants the assignee a security interest in the claim against the assign- or’s debtor in order to compensate the assignee for his collection efforts). State laws vary with respect to the strength of an attorney’s security interest in a contingent fee and the remedies available to an attorney should the client discharge or attempt to defraud the attorney. No state laws of which we are aware, however, even those that purport to give attorneys an “ownership” interest in their fees, e. g., 340 F. 3d, at 1082-1083 (discussing Oregon law); Cotnam, 263 F. 2d, at 125 (discussing Alabama law), convert the attorney from an agent to a partner.
Respondents and their amici propose other theories to exclude fees from income or permit deductibility. These suggestions include: (1) The contingent-fee agreement establishes a Subchapter K partnership under 26 U. S. C. §§ 702, 704, and 761, Brief for Respondent in No. 03-907, pp. 5-21; (2) litigation recoveries are proceeds from disposition of property, so the attorney’s fee should be subtracted as a capital expense pursuant to §§1001, 1012, and 1016, Brief for Association of Trial Lawyers of America as Amicus Curiae 23-28, Brief for Charles Davenport as Amicus Curiae 3-13; and (3) the fees are deductible reimbursed employee business expenses under § 62(a)(2)(A) (2000 ed. and Supp. I), Brief for Stephen B. Cohen as Amicus Curiae. These arguments, it appears, are being presented for the first time to this Court. We are especially reluctant to entertain novel propositions of law with broad implications for the tax system that were not advanced in earlier stages of the litigation and not examined by the Courts of Appeals. We decline comment on these supplementary theories. In addition, we do not reach the instance where a relator pursues a claim on behalf of the United States. Brief for Taxpayers Against Fraúd Education Fund as Amicus Curiae 10-20.
IV
The foregoing suffices to dispose of Banaitis’ case. Banks’ case, however, involves a farther consideration. Banks brought his claims under federal statutes that authorize fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs’ attorneys. He contends that application of the anticipatory assignment principle would be inconsistent with the purpose of statutory fee-shifting provisions. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U. S. 82, 86 (1990) (observing that statutory fees enable “plaintiffs to employ reasonably competent lawyers without cost to themselves if they prevail”). In the federal system statutory fees are typically awarded by the court under the lodestar approach, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 433 (1983), and the plaintiff usually has little control over the amount awarded. Sometimes, as when the plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief, or when the statute caps plaintiffs’ recoveries, or when for other reasons damages are substantially less than attorney’s fees, court-awarded attorney’s fees can exceed a plaintiff’s monetary recovery. See, e. g., Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U. S. 561, 564-565 (1986) (compensatory and punitive damages of $33,350; attorney’s fee award of $245,456.25). Treating the fee award as income to the plaintiff in such cases, it is argued, can lead to the perverse result that the plaintiff loses money by winning the suit. Furthermore, it is urged that treating statutory fee awards as income to plaintiffs would undermine the effectiveness of fee-shifting statutes in deputizing plaintiffs and their lawyers to act as private attorneys general.
We need not address these claims. After Banks settled his case, the fee paid to his attorney was calculated solely on the basis of the private contingent-fee contract. There was no court-ordered fee award, nor was there any indication in Banks’ contract with his attorney, or in the settlement agreement with the defendant, that the contingent fee paid to Banks’ attorney was in lieu of statutory fees Banks might otherwise have been entitled to recover. Also, the amendment added by the American Jobs Creation Act redresses the concern for many, perhaps most, claims governed by fee-shifting statutes.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
. The Chief Justice took no part in the decision of these cases.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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L
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted the writ of certiorari to review the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, denying petitioner relief in habeas corpus proceedings after the District Court had granted relief.
On October 1, 1969, the Assembly of the Wisconsin Legislature passed a resolution citing petitioner for contempt and directing his confinement in the Dane County jail for a period of six months or for the duration of the 1969 Regular Session of the legislature, whichever was shorter. The resolution recited that petitioner had, two days previously, led a gathering of people which, by its presence on the floor of the Assembly during a regular meeting in violation of an Assembly Rule, “prevented the Assembly from conducting public business and performing its constitutional duty.” The resolution contained a finding that petitioner’s actions constituted “disorderly conduct in the immediate view of the house and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings” which the Assembly was authorized to punish under the State Constitution and statutes.
The record before us contains little to flesh out the recitations of the contempt resolution with the details of petitioner’s conduct on the day of September 29, 1969. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in its opinion denying petitioner’s application for habeas corpus, took judicial notice that petitioner’s conduct was designed to protest cuts in the state budget for certain welfare programs, and that the “occupation” of the Assembly chamber by petitioner and his supporters continued from midday to “well toward midnight,” during all of which time the Assembly was prevented from conducting its lawful business.
The contempt resolution was adopted without giving notice to petitioner or affording him an opportunity to present a defense or information in mitigation. A copy of the resolution was then served on petitioner who, at the time the resolution was passed, was already confined in the Dane County jail following his arrest on disorderly conduct charges arising out of the same incident as that underlying the resolution. Petitioner’s confinement after he was served with the resolution was pursuant to its authority.
Petitioner then commenced actions in both state and federal courts contending that his confinement violated his constitutional rights, and seeking his release. Petitioner’s applications for habeas corpus were denied by the Circuit Court for Dane County and the Wisconsin Supreme Court. However, after the state courts had acted, the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted petitioner’s federal habeas application. The District Court was of the view that petitioner had been denied due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment by the failure of the Assembly to accord him “some minimal opportunity to appear and to respond to a charge” prior to the imposition of punishment for contempt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the holding of the District Court; the holding of the panel was adopted by a narrowly divided court on rehearing en banc. We granted certiorari. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that petitioner was denied due process of law by the procedures employed in punishing him for contempt, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
The past decisions of this Court expressly recognizing the power of the Houses of the Congress to punish contemptuous conduct leave little question that the Constitution imposes no general barriers to the legislative exercise of such power. E. g., Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125 (1935); Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (1821). There is nothing in the Constitution that would place greater restrictions on the States than on the Federal Government in this regard. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 199 (1881). We are therefore concerned only with the procedures that the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution requires a state legislature to meet in imposing punishment for contemptuous conduct committed in its presence.
This Court has often recognized that the requirements of due process cannot be ascertained through mechanical application of a formula. See, e. g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886, 894-895 (1961) ; Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S. 420 (1960). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in another context, aptly stated that due process “is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess. . . .” Joint AntiFascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 162-163 (1951) (concurring opinion). Courts must be sensitive to the nature of a legislative contempt proceeding and the “possible burden on that proceeding” that a given procedure might entail. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U. S., at 442. Legislatures are not constituted to conduct full-scale trials or quasi-judicial proceedings and we should not demand that they do so although they possess inherent power to protect their own processes and existence by way of contempt proceedings. For this reason, the Congress of the United States, for example, no longer undertakes to exercise its contempt powers in all cases but elects to delegate that function to federal courts. 52 Stat. 942, 2 U. S. C. §§ 192-194.
The potential for disrupting or immobilizing the vital legislative processes of State and Federal Governments that would flow from a rule requiring a full-blown legislative “trial” prior to the imposition of punishment for contempt of the legislature is a factor entitled to very great weight; this is particularly true where the contemptuous conduct, as here, is committed directly in the presence of the legislative body. The past decisions of this Court strongly indicate that the panoply of procedural rights that are accorded a defendant in a criminal trial has never been thought necessary in legislative contempt proceedings. The customary practice in Congress has been to provide the contemnor with an opportunity to appear before the bar of the House, or before a committee, and give answer to the misconduct charged against him. See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S., at 143-144; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., at 173, 174; Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat., at 209-211; Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 532 (1917). Such would appear to have been the general practice in colonial times, and in the early state legislatures. This practice more nearly resembles the traditional right of a criminal defendant to allocution prior to the imposition of sentence than it does a criminal prosecution. See Green v. United States, 365 U. S. 301 (1961).
II
In this case, however, there is no occasion to define or delineate precisely what process is due and must be accorded to a contemnor prior to the legislative imposition of punishment for contemptuous conduct. Here, the Wisconsin Assembly, two days after the conduct had occurred, found petitioner in contempt and sentenced him to confinement without giving him notice of any kind or opportunity to answer. There is no question of his having fled or become otherwise unavailable for, as we have noted, he was confined in the county jail at the time, and could easily have been given notice, if indeed not compelled, to appear before the Assembly. We find little in our past decisions that would shed light on the precise problem, but nothing to give warrant to the summary procedure employed here, coming as it did two days after the contempt. Indeed, we have stated time and again that reasonable notice of a charge and an opportunity to be heard in defense before punishment is imposed are “basic in our system of jurisprudence.” In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948). See, e. g., Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S., at 143, 164-165, 171-172, 178, 185 (concurring opinions of Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson, JJ.); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. S. 196, 201 (1948). We have emphasized this fundamental principle where rights of less standing than personal liberty were at stake. E. g., Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337 (1969); Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 18 (1938); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914). In Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950), the Court stated:
“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” 339 U. S., at 313.
Although this language was addressed to judicial adjudication, historical practice would indicate that legislatures themselves have recognized the value of prior notice and hearing in cases of legislative contempt.
In exercise of the right to be heard, however briefly— the length and nature of which would traditionally be left largely to the legislative body — the putative con-temnor might establish, for example, that it was a case of mistaken identity, or, also by way of affirmative defense, that he was mentally incompetent. Other matters in explanation or mitigation might lessen the harshness of the legislative judgment or avoid punishment altogether.
III
Wisconsin, however, argues that the power of a legislature to summarily punish for contempts committed in its immediate presence follows logically from the recognized power of courts in that respect. E. g., Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289 (1888). Even if it be assumed that courts and legislatures are fully analogous in this respect, the recorded cases dealing with the power of a court to impose summary punishment for contempt committed in its immediate presence show that such power has not ordinarily been exercised under conditions such as those here, with a lapse of two days following the event and without notice or opportunity for hearing of any kind. A legislature, like a court, must, of necessity, possess the power to act “immediately” and “instantly” to quell disorders in the chamber if it is to be able to maintain its authority and continue with the proper dispatch of its business. In re Oliver, 333 U. S., at 274-275; Ex parte Terry, 128 U. S., at 308, 310; Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U. S. 212, 214 (1971); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U. S. 455, 463 (1971). Where, however, the contemptuous episode has occurred two days previously, it is much more difficult to argue that action without notice or hearing of any kind is necessary to preserve order and enable a legislative body to proceed with its business.
The function of the contempt process by a legislative body is perhaps more related to deterrence of those disposed to create disorders than to restoring order. But the deterrence function can equally be served — perhaps even better — by giving notice and bringing the con-temnor before the body and giving opportunity to be heard before being declared in contempt and sentenced.
Where a court acts immediately to punish for contemptuous conduct committed under its eye, the con-temnor is present, of course. There is then no question of identity, nor is hearing in a formal sense necessary because the judge has personally seen the offense and is acting on the basis of his own observations. Moreover, in such a situation, the contemnor has normally been given an opportunity to speak in his own behalf in the nature of a right of allocution. See Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 613-614 (1960); Brown v. United States, 359 U. S. 41, 52 (1959); United States v. Sacher, 182 F. 2d 416, 418 (CA2 1950), aff’d, 343 U. S. 1 (1952). Even in those circumstances, as we have noted, the conduct and utterance might be found excusable by a legislature or a court should it develop that the contemnor was suffering from some mental disorder rendering him unable to conform his conduct to requirements of the law and conventional behavior. Where, however, a legislative body acts two days after the event, in the absence of the contemnor, and without notice to him, there is no assurance that the members of the legislature are acting, as a judge does in a contempt case, on the basis of personal observation and identification of the contemnor engaging in the conduct charged, nor is there any opportunity whatsoever for him to speak in defense or mitigation, if he is in fact the offender.
Ex parte Terry, supra, does not control this case. There the circuit court acted promptly after the con-temnor — who was a lawyer — had voluntarily absented himself from the courtroom and while he was present in an adjacent room of the court building. This Court concluded that the contemnor could not defeat the jurisdiction of the circuit court to act as soon as reasonably possible to punish the contempt by his voluntary departure from the courtroom. 128 U. S., at 310-311. The Court reasoned that
“The departure of the petitioner from the courtroom to another room, near by, in the same building, was his voluntary act. And his departure, without making some apology for, or explanation of, his conduct, might justly be held to aggravate his offence, and to make it plain that, consistently with the public interests, there should be no delay, upon the part of the court, in exerting its power to punish.” Id., at 311.
Dealing only with the narrow circumstances present in Terry, the Court expressly reserved the question whether the circuit court would have had the power to proceed on a subsequent day without according the con-temnor an opportunity to be heard. Id., at 314. By way of contrast, the resolution in this case was, as we have noted, adopted two days after the event and while petitioner was being detained in the county jail in the same city, and hence available to be served with notice. In Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1 (1952), the Court approved the trial judge’s action in waiting until the end of a nine-month trial to summarily hold defense counsel in contempt for breaches committed during the trial. However, the Court was careful to observe that an immediate holding of contempt during the trial might have prejudiced the defendants in the eyes of the jury or otherwise impeded their advocacy. Moreover, the contemnors were present throughout the course of the trial, were repeatedly warned by the trial judge that their conduct was contemptuous, were advised that they could be called to account later, and - were given an opportunity to speak.
At a very early stage in our history this Court stated that the legislative contempt power should be limited to “[t]he least possible power adequate to the end proposed.” Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat., at 231; In re Oliver, 333 U. S., at 274. While a different result might well follow had the Wisconsin Assembly acted immediately upon occurrence of the contemptuous conduct and while the contemnor was in the chamber, or nearby within the Capitol building, as in Terry, we conclude that the procedures employed in this case were beyond the legitimate scope of that power because of the absence of notice or any opportunity to respond. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The text of the October 1 resolution was as follows:
“1969 Spec. Sess. ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION
“Citing James E. Groppi for contempt of the Assembly and directing his commitment to the Dane county jail.
“In that James E. Groppi led a gathering of people on September 29, 1969, which by its presence on the floor of the Assembly during a meeting of the 1969 regular session of the Wisconsin Legislature in violation of Assembly Rule 10 prevented the Assembly from conducting public business and performing its constitutional duty; now, therefore, be it
“Resolved by the Assembly, That the Assembly finds that the above-cited action by James E. Groppi constituted “disorderly conduct in the immediate view of the house and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings” and is an offense punishable as a contempt under Section 13.26 (1) (b) of the Wisconsin Statutes and Article IV, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution and therefore:
“(1) Finds James E. Groppi guilty of contempt of the Assembly; and
“(2) In accordance with Section 13.26 and 13.27 of the Wisconsin Statutes, orders the imprisonment of James E. Groppi for a period of 6 months, or for the duration of the 1969 regular session, whichever is briefer, in the Dane county jail and directs the sheriff of Dane county to seize said person and deliver him to the jailer of the Dane county jail; and, be it further
“Resolved, That the Assembly directs that a copy of this resolution be transmitted to the Dane county district attorney for further action by him under Section 13.27 (2) of the Wisconsin Statutes; and, be it further
“Resolved, That the attorney general is respectfully requested to represent the Assembly in any litigation arising herefrom.”
Article IV, § 8, Wisconsin Constitution provides in part:
“Each house may determine the rules of its own proceedings, punish for contempt and disorderly behavior . . . .”
Section 13.26, Wis. Stat. (1967), provides in part:
“(1) Each house may punish as a contempt, by imprisonment, a breach of its privileges or the privileges of its members . . . for . . .
“(b) Disorderly conduct in the immediate view of the house and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings.
“(2) The term of imprisonment a house may impose under this section shall not extend beyond the same session of the legislature.”
On oral argument, counsel for petitioner conceded these facts. The paucity of the record may be attributed to the fact that the District Court acted on the pleadings without an evidentiary hearing.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, 27. Petitioner was subsequently tried in County Court on the disorderly conduct charge. He was discharged by the court after the jury was unable to reach a verdict.
See generally 2 A. Hinds, Precedents of the House of Representatives, ce. 51, 52; E. Eberling, Congressional Investigations: A Study of the Origin and Development of the Power of Congress to Investigate and Punish for Contempt (1928).
Hinds discusses an assault by one reporter on another on the floor of the House on June 11, 1836. The House did not proceed immediately to hold the party in contempt, but appointed a select committee to investigate the matter. The contemnor appeared before the committee and admitted his offense. Before it acted on the report of the committee by passing a contempt resolution, the House brought the contemnor before the Bar of the House. Hinds, supra, at § 1630. Hinds also discusses numerous instances of “direct” contempts committed by members of the House in which the con-temnor was afforded an opportunity to speak in his behalf. See §§ 1642-1643, 1647, 1648, 1650-1653, 1657, 1665.
See M. Clarke, Parliamentary Privilege in the American Colonies 103-105, 109-111 and n. 47, 112-113 (1943); Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. Pa. L. Rev. 691, 704-705, 707, 711-712, 716, 718, 719-722, 724-725 (1926).
In the latter case, a legislative body, like a court, might direct a psychiatric examination. It can be assumed that one so disoriented as not to appreciate the nature of his acts would not be punished for contemptuous conduct.
Under circumstances such as those in this case, neither a court nor a legislative body has any obligation to afford a contemnor a forum to expound his political, economic, or social views; but this does not mean that some brief period to present matter specifically in defense, extenuation, or mitigation is not required.
The Court has been careful to limit strictly the exercise of the summary contempt power to cases in which it was clear that all of the elements of misconduct were personally observed by the judge. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U. S. 212, 214-215 (1971); In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 275-276 (1948).
One of the contemnors was a layman who had acted as his own lawyer.
182 F. 2d, at 428.
Id., at 418. Although he imposed sentence before hearing the contemnors, the trial judge would, no doubt have modified his action had their statements proved persuasive. See United States v. Galante, 298 F. 2d 72, 76 (CA2 1962) (Friendly, J., concurring and dissenting). Modification of contempt penalties is common where the contemnor apologizes or presents matter in mitigation.
The present practice of Parliament is described in E. May, The Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament (17th ed. 1964) as follows:
“When the contempt is committed in the actual view of either House, as, for example, where a witness prevaricates, gives false evidence or refuses to answer, the House proceeds at once, without hearing the offender, unless by way of apology or to manifest his contrition, to punish him for his contempt.” Id., at 133 (emphasis added).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
D
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We noted probable jurisdiction to decide (a) whether § 12(f) of the Military Selective Service Act, 96 Stat. 748, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462(f), which denies federal financial assistance under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 to male students who fail to register for the draft under the Act, is a bill of attainder; and (b) whether § 12(f) compels those students who elect to request federal aid to incriminate themselves in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
I
Section 3 of the Military Selective Service Act, 62 Stat. 605, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. §453, empowers the President to require every male citizen and male resident alien between the ages of 18 and 26 to register for the draft. Sections 12(b) and (c) of that Act impose criminal penalties for failure to register. On July 2, 1980, President Carter issued a Proclamation requiring young men to register within 30 days of their 18th birthday. Presidential Proclamation No. 4771, 3 CFR 82 (1981).
Appellee students (hereafter appellees) are anonymous individuals who were required to register before September 1,1982. On September 8, Congress enacted the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L. 97-252, 96 Stat. 718. Section 1113(a) of that Act added § 12(f) to the Military Selective Service Act. Section 12(f)(1) provides that any person who is required to register and fails to do so “in accordance with any proclamation” issued under the Military Selective Service Act “shall be ineligible for any form of assistance or benefit provided under title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965.” Section 12(f)(2) requires applicants for Title IV assistance to file with their institutions of higher education a statement attesting to their compliance with the draft registration law and regulations issued under it. Sections 12(f)(3) and (4) require the Secretary of Education, in agreement with the Director of Selective Service, to prescribe methods for verifying such statements of compliance and to issue implementing regulations.
Regulations issued in final form on April 11, 1983, see 48 Fed. Reg. 15578, provide that no applicant may receive Title IV aid unless he files a statement of compliance certifying that he is registered with the Selective Service or that, for a specified reason, he is not required to register. 34 CFR § 668.24(a) (1983). The regulations allow a student who has not previously registered, although required to do so, to establish eligibility for Title IV aid by registering, filing a statement of registration compliance, and, if required, verifying that he is registered. § 668.27(b)(1). The statement of compliance does not require the applicant to state the date that he registered.
In November 1982 the Minnesota Public Interest Research Group filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota seeking to enjoin the operation of § 12(f). The District Court dismissed the Minnesota Group for lack of standing but allowed three anonymous students to intervene as plaintiffs. 557 F. Supp. 923 (1983); 557 F. Supp. 925 (1983). The intervenors alleged that they reside in Minnesota, that they need financial aid to pursue their educations, that they intend to apply for Title IV assistance, and that they are legally required to register with the Selective Service but have failed to do so. This suit was informally consolidated with a separate action brought by three other anonymous students making essentially the same allegations as the intervenors.
In March 1983 the District Court granted a preliminary injunction restraining the Selective Service System from enforcing § 12(f). After finding that appellees had demonstrated a threat of irreparable injury, the court held that appellees were likely to succeed on the merits. First, the District Court thought it likely that § 12(f) was a bill of attainder. The court interpreted the statutory bar to student aid as applicable to students who registered late. Thus interpreted, the statute “clearly singles out an ascertainable group based on past conduct” and “legislatively determines the guilt of this ascertainable group.” Doe v. Selective Service System, 557 F. Supp. 937, 942, 943 (1983). The court viewed the denial of aid as punishment within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause because it “deprives students of the practical means to achieve the education necessary to pursue many vocations in our society.” Id., at 944. Second, the District Court found it likely that § 12(f) violated appel-lees’ Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. In the District Court’s view, the statement of compliance required by § 12(f)(2) compels students who have not registered for the draft and need financial aid to confess to the fact of nonregistration, which is a crime. 50 U. S. C. App. § 462(a).
On June 16, 1983, the District Court entered a permanent, nationwide injunction against the enforcement of § 12(f). The court held that the regulations making late registrants eligible for aid were inconsistent with the statute and concluded that the statute was an unconstitutional attainder. It also held the statute to violate appellees’ constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
On June 29, we stayed the District Court’s June 16 order pending the timely docketing and final disposition of this appeal. Selective Service System v. Doe, 463 U. S. 1215. We noted probable jurisdiction on December 5, 1983, 464 U. S. 1006, and we reverse.
II
The District Court held that § 12(f) falls within the category of congressional actions that Art. I, § 9, cl. 3, of the Constitution bars by providing that “[n]o Bill of Attainder . . . shall be passed.” A bill of attainder was most recently described by this Court as “a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.” Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 468 (1977); see United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 383, n. 30 (1968); United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 315 (1946). Appellants argue that § 12(f) does not satisfy any of these three requirements, i. e., specification of the affected persons, punishment, and lack of a judicial trial.
A
In forbidding bills of attainder, the draftsmen of the Constitution sought to prohibit the ancient practice of the Parliament in England of punishing without trial “specifically designated persons or groups.” United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, 447 (1965). Historically, bills of attainder generally named the persons to be punished. However, “[t]he singling out of an individual for legislatively prescribed punishment constitutes an attainder whether the individual is called by name or described in terms of conduct which, because it is past conduct, operates only as a designation of particular persons.” Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S. 1, 86 (1961). When past activity serves as “a point of reference for the ascertainment of particular persons ineluctably designated by the legislature” for punishment, id., at 87, the Act may be an attainder. See Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 324 (1867).
In Cummings the Court struck down a provision of the Missouri post-Civil War Reconstruction Constitution that barred persons from various professions unless they stated under oath that they had not given aid or comfort to persons engaged in armed hostility to the United States and had never “‘been a member of, or connected with, any order, society, or organization, inimical to the government of the United States.’” Id., at 279. The Court recognized that the oath was required, not “as a means of ascertaining whether parties were qualified” for their professions, id., at 320, but rather to effect a punishment for having associated with the Confederacy. Although the State Constitution did not mention the persons or groups required to take the oath by name, the Court concluded that in creating a qualification having no possible relation to their fitness for their chosen professions, the Constitution was intended “to reach the person, not the calling.” Ibid.
On the same day that it decided Cummings, the Court struck down a similar oath that was required for admission to practice law in the federal courts. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1867). Like the oath considered in Cummings, the oath “operate[d] as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion” from the practice of law, id., at 377, since past affiliation with the Confederacy prevented attorneys from taking the oath without perjuring themselves. See Cummings v. Missouri, supra, at 327. In both Cummings and Garland, the persons in the group disqualified were defined entirely by irreversible acts committed by them.
The District Court in this case viewed § 12(f) as comparable to the provisions of the Reconstruction laws declared unconstitutional in Cummings and Garland, because it thought the statute singled out nonregistrants and made them ineligible for aid based on their past conduct, i. e., failure to register. To understand the District Court’s analysis, it is necessary to turn to its construction of the statute. The court noted that § 12(f) disqualifies applicants for financial assistance unless they have registered “in accordance with any proclamation issued under [§3 of the Military Selective Service Act],” and that Proclamation No. 4771 requires those born after January 1, 1963, to register within 30 days of their 18th birthday. See 3 CFR 82 (1981). In the court’s view, the language of § 12(f), coupled with the Proclamation’s 30-day registration requirement, precluded late registrants from qualifying for Title IV aid. Having construed § 12(f) as precluding late registration, the District Court read the statute to be retrospective, in that it denies financial assistance to an identifiable group — nonregistrants—based on their past conduct. The District Court acknowledged that implementing regulations would allow students who had not previously registered to become eligible for Title IV benefits by registering, see 34 CFR § 668.27(b)(1) (1983), but the court declared those regulations to be void because they conflicted with what the District Court viewed as § 12(f )’s requirement of registration within the time prescribed by Proclamation No. 4771.
We reject the District Court’s view that § 12(f) requires registration within the time fixed by Proclamation No. 4771. That view is plainly inconsistent with the structure of § 12(f) and with the legislative history. Subsection (f)(4) of the statute requires the Secretary of Education to issue regulations providing that “any person” to whom the Secretary proposes to deny Title IV assistance shall be given notice of the proposed denial and “not less than thirty days” after such notice to “establis[h] that he has complied with the registration requirement.” 50 U. S. C. App. § 462(f)(4). The statute clearly gives nonregistrants 30 days after receiving notice that they are ineligible for Title IV aid to register for the draft and qualify for aid. See 34 CFR § 668.27(b)(1) (1983). To require registration within the time fixed by the Presidential Proclamation would undermine this provision allowing “any person” 30 days after notification to establish compliance with the registration requirement. This was clearly a grace period.
The District Court also ignored the relevant legislative history. Congress’ purpose in enacting § 12(f) was to encourage registration by those who must register, but have not yet done so. Proponents of the legislation emphasized that those failing to register timely can qualify for aid by registering late. The District Court failed to take account of this legislative purpose. See Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U. S. 870 (1984). Nor did its construction of § 12(f) give adequate deference to the views of the Secretary of Education, who had helped to draft the statute. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U. S. 125, 144 (1979); see 128 Cong. Rec. 18363 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Solomon).
The judicial function is “not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations,” CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 571 (1973). Section 12(f) does not make late registrants ineligible for Title IV aid.
Because it allows late registration, § 12(f) is clearly distinguishable from the provisions struck down in Cummings and Garland. Cummings and Garland dealt with absolute barriers to entry into certain professions for those who could not file the required loyalty oaths; no one who had served the Confederacy could possible comply, for his status was irreversible. By contrast, § 12(f)’s requirements, far from irreversible, can be met readily by either timely or late filing. “Far from attaching to . . . past and ineradicable actions,” ineligibility for Title IV benefits “is made to turn upon continuingly contemporaneous fact” which a student who wants public assistance can correct. Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U. S., at 87.
B
Even if the specificity element were deemed satisfied by § 12(f), the statute would not necessarily implicate the Bill of Attainder Clause. The proscription against bills of attainder reaches only statutes that inflict punishment on the specified individual or group. In determining whether a statute inflicts punishment within the proscription against bills of attainder, our holdings recognize that the severity of a sanction is not determinative of its character as punishment. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 616, and n. 9 (1960). That burdens are placed on citizens by federal authority does not make those burdens punishment. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S., at 470; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S., at 324 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Conversely, legislative intent to encourage compliance with the law does not establish that a statute is merely the legitimate regulation of conduct. Punishment is not limited solely to retribution for past events, but may involve deprivations inflicted to deter future misconduct. United States v. Brown, 381 U. S., at 458-459. It is thus apparent that, though the governing criteria for an attainder may be readily indicated, “each case has turned on its own highly particularized context.” Flemming v. Nestor, supra, at 616.
In deciding whether a statute inflicts forbidden punishment, we have recognized three necessary inquiries: (1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute, “viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes”; and (3) whether the legislative record “evinces a congressional intent to punish.” Nixon, supra, at 473, 475-476, 478. We conclude that under these criteria § 12(f) is not a punitive bill of attainder.
1
At common law, bills of attainder often imposed the death penalty; lesser punishments were imposed by bills of pains and penalties. The Constitution proscribes these lesser penalties as well as those imposing death. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall., at 323. Historically used in England in times of rebellion or “violent political excitements,” ibid., bills of pains and penalties commonly imposed imprisonment, banishment, and the punitive confiscation of property. Nixon, supra, at 474. In our own country, the list of punishments forbidden by the Bill of Attainder Clause has expanded to include legislative bars to participation by individuals or groups in specific employments or professions.
Section 12(f) imposes none of the burdens historically associated with punishment. As this Court held in Flemming v. Nestor, supra, at 617, “the sanction is the mere denial of a noncontractual governmental benefit. No affirmative disability or restraint is imposed,” and Congress has inflicted “nothing approaching the ‘infamous punishment’ of imprisonment” or other disabilities historically associated with punishment.
Congress did not even deprive appellees of Title IV benefits permanently; appellees can become eligible for Title IV aid at any time simply by registering late and thus “carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets.” Shillitani v. United States, 384 U. S. 364, 368 (1966). A statute that leaves open perpetually the possibility of qualifying for aid does not fall within the historical meaning of forbidden legislative punishment.
2
Our inquiry does not end with a determination that § 12(f) does not inflict punishment in its historical sense. To ensure that the Legislature has not created an impermissible penalty not previously held to be within the proscription against bills of attainder, we must determine whether the challenged statute can be reasonably said to further nonpunitive goals. Nixon, 433 U. S., at 475-476.
The legislative history reflects that § 12(f) represents the considered congressional decision to further nonpunitive legislative goals. Congress was well aware that more than half a million young men had failed to comply with the registration requirement. The legislators emphasized that one of the primary purposes of § 12(f) was to encourage those required to register to do so.
Conditioning receipt of Title IV aid on registration is plainly a rational means to improve compliance with the registration requirement. Since the group of young men who must register for the draft overlaps in large part with the group of students who are eligible for Title IV aid, Congress reasonably concluded that § 12(f) would be a strong tonic to many nonregistrants.
Section 12(f) also furthers a fair allocation of scarce federal resources by limiting Title IV aid to those who are willing to meet their responsibilities to the United States by registering with the Selective Service when required to do so. As one Senator stated:
“This amendment seeks not only to increase compliance with the registration requirement but also to insure the most fair and just usage of Federal education benefits. During these times of extreme budgetary constraints, times when even the most worthwhile programs are cut back drastically, this Government has every obligation to see that Federal dollars are spent in the most fair and prudent manner possible. ... If students want to further their education at the expense of their country, they cannot expect these benefits to be provided without accepting their fair share of the responsibilities to that Government.”
Certain aspects of the legislation belie the view that § 12(f) is a punitive measure. Section 12(f) denies Title IV benefits to innocent as well as willful nonregistrants. Yet punitive legislation ordinarily does not reach those whose failure to comply with the law is not willful. Thus, in stressing that the legislation would reach unintentional violators, 128 Cong. Rec. 18355-18356 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Solomon); id., at 18357 (remarks of Rep. Simon); id., at 9666 (remarks of Sen. Stennis), proponents indicated that they intended to regulate all nonregistrants, rather than to single out intentional nonregistrants for punishment. In this same nonpunitive spirit, Congress also allowed all nonregistrants to qualify for Title IV aid simply by registering late, instead of choosing to punish willful nonregistrants by denying them benefits even if they registered belatedly.
We see therefore that the legislative history provides convincing support for the view that, in enacting § 12(f) Congress sought, not to punish anyone, but to promote compliance with the draft registration requirement and fairness in the allocation of scarce federal resources. Section 12(f) clearly furthers nonpunitive legislative goals.
C
Because § 12(f) does not single out an identifiable group that would be ineligible for Title IV aid or inflict punishment within the meaning of Bill of Attainder Clause, we hold that the District Court erred in striking down § 12(f) as an impermissible attainder.
Ill
Appellees assert that § 12(f) violates the Fifth Amendment by compelling nonregistrants to acknowledge that they have failed to register timely when confronted with certifying to their schools that they have complied with the registration law. Pointing to the fact that the willful failure to register within the time fixed by Proclamation No. 4771 is a criminal offense punishable under §§ 12(a) and (b), they contend that § 12(f) requires them — since in fact they have not registered — to confess to a criminal act and that this is “compulsion” in violation of their Fifth Amendment rights.
However, a person who has not registered clearly is under no compulsion to seek financial aid; if he has not registered, he is simply ineligible for aid. Since a nonregistrant is bound to know that his application for federal aid would be denied, he is in no sense under any “compulsion” to seek that aid. He has no reason to make any statement to anyone as to whether or not he has registered.
If appellees decide to register late, they could, of course, obtain Title IV aid without providing any information to their school that would incriminate them, since the statement to the school by the applicant is simply that he is in compliance with the registration law; it does not require him to disclose whether he was a timely or a late registrant. See n. 2, supra. A late registrant is therefore not required to disclose any incriminating information in order to become eligible for aid.
Although an applicant who registers late need not disclose that fact in his application for financial aid, appellants concede that a late registrant must disclose that his action is untimely when he makes a late registration with the Selective Service; the draft registration card must be dated and contain the registrant’s date of birth. 32 CFR § 1615.4 (1983). This raises the question whether § 12(f) violates appellees’ Fifth Amendment rights because they must register late in order to get aid and thus reveal to the Selective Service the failure to comply timely with the registration law. Appel-lees contend that, under our holding in Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 83-84 (1973), the very risk that they will be ineligible for financial aid constitutes “compulsion” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
In Turley we held that “the plaintiffs’ [architects’] disqualification from public contracting for five years as a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege is violative of their Fifth Amendment rights.” Id., at 83. However, nonregistrants such as appellees are not in the same position as potential public contractors in Turley. An 18-year-old male who refuses to register is, of course, subject to prosecution for failure to register, but he is not compelled by law to acknowledge his failure to comply. Only when he registers — including a late registration — will he be asked to state his date of birth and thus acknowledge that he did not timely register.
None of these appellees has registered and thus none of them has been confronted with a need to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege when asked to disclose his date of birth. Unlike the architects in Turley, these appellees have not been denied the opportunity to register and in no sense have they been disqualified for financial aid “for asserting a constitutional privilege.” Ibid.
It is well settled that, “in the ordinary case, if a witness under compulsion to testify makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the government has not ‘compelled’ him to incriminate himself,” Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U. S. 420, 427 (1984); “[ajnswers may be compelled regardless of the privilege if there is immunity from federal and state use of the compelled testimony or its fruits in connection with a criminal prosecution against the person testifying,” Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 276 (1968). However, these appellees, not having sought to register, have had no occasion to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege when asked to state their dates of birth; the Government has net refused any request for immunity for their answers or otherwise threatened them with penalties for invoking the privilege as in Turley. Under these circumstances, § 12(f) does not violate their Fifth Amendment rights by forcing them to acknowledge during the registration process they have avoided that they have registered late.
> I — I
We conclude that § 12(f) does not violate the proscription against bills of attainder. Nor have appellees raised a cognizable claim under the Fifth Amendment.
The judgment of the District Court is
Reversed.
Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision of this case.
Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U. S. C. § 1070 et seq., provides financial assistance to qualified students in postsecondary educational programs. Title IV aid is available at both colleges and universities, as well as at numerous kinds of business, trade, and technical schools. §§ 1085(b), (c), 1088.
The regulations include a model statement of registration compliance that the Secretary of Education has indicated satisfies the requirements of 34 CFR § 668.24(a) (1983):
“STATEMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PURPOSE/ REGISTRATION COMPLIANCE
“_I certify that I am not required to be registered with Selective Service, because:'
“_I am female.
“_I am in the armed services on active duty (Note: Members of the Reserves and National Guard are not considered on active duty.)
“_I have not reached my 18th birthday.
“_I was born before 1960.
“_I am a permanent resident of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands or the Northern Mariana Islands.
“_I certify that I am registered with Selective Service.
“Signature:_
“Date:_
“NOTICE: You will not receive title IV financial aid unless you complete this statement and, if required, give proof to your school of your registration compliance. . . .” 34 CFR § 668.25 (1983).
We agree with appellants that the statute does not single out an identifiable group and that the denial of Title IV aid does not constitute punishment. Appellants also argue that § 12(f) does not dispense with a judicial trial, noting that a hearing is provided in the event of disagreement between the applicant and the Secretary about whether the applicant has registered, § 12(f)(4), and that the decision made at that hearing is subject to judicial review. Appellants’ argument is meritless. Congress has not provided a judicial trial to those affected by the statute.
128 Cong. Rec. 18356 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Whitehurst); ibid. (remarks of Rep. Solomon); id., at 18369 (remarks of Rep. Stratton); id., at 9664 (remarks of Sen. Hayakawa); id., at 9666 (remarks of Sen. Jepsen).
Id., at 18356 (remarks of Rep. Whitehurst); id., at 18357 (remarks of Rep. Simon); id., at 18368 (remarks of Rep. Montgomery); id., at 18369 (remarks of Rep. Stratton). As Senator Stennis stated:
“I thought of the proposition here where some youngster might have overlooked signing up or might have misunderstood it or had not been correctly informed, but he is not going to be penalized for that because he still has complete control of the situation. All he will have to do is just to comply with the law, and that will automatically make him eligible so far as this prohibition or restriction is concerned.” Id., at 9666.
As the Solicitor General points out, one construction of the statute that avoids a constitutional problem is to make aid contingent on registration in the manner, but not the time, required by any proclamation. See Presidential Proclamation No. 4771, 3 CFR 84 (1981) (“Persons who are required to be registered shall comply with the registration procedures and other rules and regulations prescribed by the Director of Selective Service”).
All of the appellees in this case had failed to comply with the registration requirements when § 12(f) was enacted. As to 18-year-olds who have entered the class of nonregistrants after August 9, 1982 — 30 days before the enactment of § 12(f) — the statute is clearly prospective; ineligibility for financial aid is merely a deprivation in addition to potential criminal liability for the failure to register for the draft.
“The fact that harm is inflicted by governmental authority does not make it punishment. Figuratively speaking all discomforting action may be deemed punishment because it deprives of what otherwise would be enjoyed. But there may be reasons other than punitive for such deprivation.” 328 U. S., at 324.
See, e. g., United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437 (1965), in which Communist Party members were barred from offices in labor unions; United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303 (1946), in which the law in question cut off salaries to three named Government employees; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867), in which a priest was disqualified from practicing as a clergyman; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (1867), in which lawyers were barred from the practice of law.
Appellees argue that the underpinnings of Flemming have been removed by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 262 (1970), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 332 (1976). Goldberg held only that public assistance “benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them,” 397 U. S., at 262, and that due process affords qualified recipients a pretermination evidentiary hearing to guard against erroneous termination. The Court stressed that “the crucial factor in this context ... is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.” Id., at 264 (emphasis in original). Mathews reached the same conclusion with respect to disability benefits. Even Flemming noted that the interest of a covered employee under the Social Security Act “fall[s] within the protection from arbitrary governmental action afforded by the Due Process Clause,” 363 U. S., at 611, while holding that Congress’ disqualification of certain deportees from receipt of Social Security benefits was not an attainder, id., at 617.
See, e. g., 128 Cong. Rec. 18356 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Solomon); id., at 9666 (remarks of Sen. Jepsen).
See id., at 18356 (remarks of Rep. Solomon); id., at 18369 (remarks of Rep. Stratton); id., at 9664 (remarks of Sen. Hayakawa); id., at 9666 (remarks of Sen. Stennis); ibid, (remarks of Sen. Jepsen).
The Military Selective Service Act, 50 U. S. C. App. §453, requires certain males between the ages of 18 and 26 to register. Those who fail to register, though required to do so, are a significant part of the class to which Title IV assistance is otherwise offered. Title IV aid is available for a broad range of postsecondary educational programs at colleges, universities, and vocational schools. 20 U. S. C. § 1085(a); see n. 1, supra.
128 Cong. Rec. 9664-9665 (1982) (remarks of Sen. Hayakawa); see also id., at 9664 (remarks of Sen. Mattingly); id., at 18356 (remarks of Rep. Montgomery).
Applying the third part of the Nixon test, the District Court concluded that § 12(f) is a punitive measure. But the District Court relied in part on the statements of legislators who opposed the statute because they thought the statute punished nonregistrants. 128 Cong. Rec. 18358-18359 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Edgar); id., at 18359-18360 (remarks of Rep. Goldwater); id., at 9666 (remarks of Sen. Durenberger). These statements are entitled to little, if any, weight, since they were made by opponents of the legislation. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395 (1951).
The District Court also relied on several isolated statements expressing understandable indignation over the decision of some nonregistrants to show their defiance of the law. See 128 Cong. Rec. 18356 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Montgomery); id., at 9665 (remarks of Sen. Hayakawa). But such statements do not constitute “the unmistakable evidence of punitive intent which ... is required before a Congressional enactment of this kind may be struck down.” Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 619 (1960).
The dissent reads Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968), and Grosso v. United States, 390 U. S. 62 (1968), to create in this case an exception to the normal rule requiring assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. In Marchetti and Grosso, however, anyone who asserted the privilege on a wagering return did not merely call attention to himself; the very filing necessarily admitted illegal gambling activity. Those cases are therefore clearly distinguishable on their facts. See Grosso, at 73 (Brennan, J., concurring); United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259, 263 (1927).
Appellees also assert that § 12(f) violates equal protection because it discriminates against less wealthy nonregistrants. That argument is meritless. Section 12(f) treats all nonregistrants alike, denying aid to both the poor and the wealthy. But even if the statute discriminated against poor nonregistrants because more wealthy nonregistrants could continue to pay for their postsecondary educations, the statute must be sustained if rationally related to a legitimate Government interest. Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 322-324 (1980). That standard is easily met here, because § 12(f) is rationally related to the legitimate Government objectives of encouraging registration and fairly allocating scarce federal resources. See supra, at 854.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Me. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent Leon Newsome was arrested pursuant to N. Y. Penal Law § 240.35 (6) for loitering in the lobby of a New York City Housing Authority apartment building. A search of Newsome conducted at the time of his arrest produced a small quantity of heroin and related narcotics paraphernalia. Consequently, in addition to the offense of loitering, he was also charged with possession of a dangerous drug, fourth degree, N. Y. Penal Law § 220.05 (now codified, as modified, as N. Y. Penal Law § 220.03), and criminally possessing a hypodermic instrument. N. Y. Penal Law § 220.45.
The New York City Criminal Court conducted a non-jury trial on the loitering charge and a hearing on New-some’s motion to suppress the evidence seized at the time of his arrest. Newsome argued that the arresting officer did not have probable cause for the loitering arrest, that there was insufficient evidence to support a loitering conviction, and that the loitering statute was unconstitutional and therefore could not serve as the basis for either a loitering conviction or a lawful search incident to arrest. The court rejected these arguments, found Newsome guilty of loitering, and denied the motion to suppress.
One month later, on the date scheduled for trial on the drug charges, Newsome withdrew his prior pleas of not guilty and pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of attempted possession of dangerous drugs. N. Y. Penal Law § 110. He was immediately sentenced to 90 days’ imprisonment on the attempted-possession conviction and received an unconditional release on the loitering conviction.
At the sentencing proceeding Newsome indicated his intention to appeal both the loitering conviction and the denial of his motion to suppress the drugs and related paraphernalia seized at the time of his arrest. Appeal of the adverse decision on the motion to suppress was authorized by N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-c (now re-codified as N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 710.20 (1), 710.70 (2)), which provided that an order denying a motion to suppress evidence alleged to have been obtained as a result of unlawful search and seizure “may be reviewed on appeal from a judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment of conviction is predicated upon a plea of guilty.” •
On direct appeal to the Appellate Term of the New York Supreme Court, the loitering conviction was reversed for insufficient' evidence and a defective information. Because the court held that there was probable cause to arrest Newsome for loitering, however, the search incident to that arrest was upheld and the drug conviction affirmed. Newsome sought further review of the drug conviction, but leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. This Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Newsome v. New York, 405 U. S. 908.
Newsome then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The petition reiterated the claim that the loitering statute was unconstitutional, that Newsome's arrest was therefore invalid, and that as a result the evidence seized incident to that arrest should have been suppressed. Prior to the District Court's decision on the merits of Newsome’s petition, the New York Court of Appeals declared New York's loitering statute unconstitutional. People v. Berck, 32 N. Y. 2d 567, 300 N. E. 2d 411. In light of the Berck decision, the District Court granted Newsome’s application for a writ of habeas corpus.
The petitioner, the Attorney General of New York, who had been granted leave by the District Court to intervene as a respondent in the habeas corpus proceeding, appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court, United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F. 2d 1166, adhering to its earlier rulings that a New York defendant who has utilized state procedures to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress may pursue his constitutional claim on a federal habeas corpus petition although the conviction was based on a plea of guilty. Id., at 1169-1171. The court held that New York’s loitering statute violated due process because it failed to specify adequately the conduct it proscribed and failed to provide sufficiently clear guidance for police, prosecutors, and the courts so that they could enforce the statute in a manner consistent with the constitutional requirement that arrests be based on probable cause. Id., at 1171-1174. Accordingly, the court held that because Newsome was searched incident to an arrest for the violation of a statute found to be unconstitutional on the ground that it substituted mere suspicion for probable cause as the basis for arrest, the search of Newsome was also constitutionally invalid. The court concluded that the evidence seized should have been suppressed, and affirmed the District Court’s judgment granting the writ of habeas corpus. Id., at 1174-1175.
The Attorney General of New York sought review here of both the Court of Appeals’ decision that Newsome had not waived his right to file a federal habeas corpus petition by pleading guilty and its decision as to the constitutionality of New York’s loitering statute. Because of a conflict between the judgment in the present case and a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, we granted certiorari limited to the question of a defendant’s right to file a federal habeas corpus petition challenging the lawfulness of a search or the voluntariness of a confession or presenting other constitutional claims when a State provides for appellate review of those issues after a guilty plea. 417 U. S. 967.
I
In contending that Newsome is precluded from raising his constitutional claims in this federal habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner relies primarily on this Court’s decisions in the guilty-plea trilogy of Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, and on our decision in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258. The Brady trilogy announced the general rule that a guilty plea, intelligently and voluntarily made, bars the later assertion of constitutional challenges to the pretrial proceedings. This principle was reaffirmed in Tollett v. Henderson, supra, at 267: "When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”
But the Court also suggested in the Brady trilogy that an exception to this general rule might be proper when a State decides to permit a defendant to appeal from an adverse ruling in a pretrial hearing despite the fact that his conviction is based on a guilty plea. See McMann v. Richardson, supra, at 766, and n. 11, 770 n. 13. The justification for such an exception lies in the special nature of the guilty plea of a New York defendant like Newsome.
In most States a defendant must plead not guilty and go to trial to preserve the opportunity for state appellate review of his constitutional challenges to arrest, admissibility of various pieces of evidence, or the voluntariness of a confession. A defendant who chooses to plead guilty rather than go to trial in effect deliberately refuses to present his federal claims to the state court in the first instance. McMann v. Richardson, supra, at 768. Once the defendant chooses to bypass the orderly procedure for litigating his constitutional claims in order to take the benefits, if any, of a plea of guilty, the State acquires a legitimate expectation of finality in the conviction thereby obtained. Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 438. It is in this sense, therefore, that ordinarily “a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.” Tollett v. Henderson, supra, at 267.
New York, however, has chosen not to treat a guilty plea as such a “break in the chain of events” with regard to certain types of constitutional claims raised in pretrial proceedings. For a New York defendant whose basic defense consists of one of those constitutional claims and who has already lost a pretrial motion to suppress based on that claim, there is no practical difference in terms of appellate review between going to trial and pleading guilty. In neither event does the State assert any claim of finality because of the judgment of conviction. In either event under New York procedure the defendant has available the full range of state appellate review of his constitutional claims. As to those claims, therefore, there is no “break” at all in the usual state procedure for adjudicating constitutional issues. The guilty plea operates simply as a procedure by which the constitutional issues can be litigated without the necessity of going through the time and effort of conducting a trial, the result of which is foreordained if the constitutional claim is invalid. The plea is entered with the clear understanding and expectation by the State, the defendant, and the courts that it will not foreclose judicial review of the merits of the alleged constitutional violations.
In sum, although termed by the New York Criminal Procedure Law a “guilty plea,” the same label given to the pleas entered by the defendants in the Brady trilogy of cases and Tollett v. Henderson, Newsome’s plea had legal consequences quite different from the consequences of the pleas entered in traditional guilty-plea cases. Far from precluding review of independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of his “guilty plea,” Newsome’s plea carried with it the guarantee that judicial review of his constitutional claims would continue to be available to him. In this respect there is no meaningful difference between Newsome’s conviction and a New York conviction entered after a trial.
Because of the entirely different expectations surrounding Newsome’s plea and the completely different legal consequences flowing from it, earlier guilty-plea cases holding that “[t]he focus of federal habeas inquiry is the nature of the advice [of counsel] and the voluntariness of the plea, not the existence as such of an antecedent constitutional infirmity,” Tollett v. Henderson, supra, at 266, are simply inapposite. Newsome has satisfied all the prerequisites for invoking the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts. He is no less entitled to federal review of his constitutional claim than is any other defendant who raises his claim in a timely fashion, in accordance with state procedure, and who pursues his claim through all available levels of state appellate review.
II
Denying Newsome the right to file a federal habeas corpus petition raising his claim of an unconstitutional seizure would not only deprive him of a federal forum despite the fact that he has satisfied all the requirements for invoking federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, it would also frustrate the State’s policy in providing for post-guilty plea appellate review of pretrial motions to suppress.
Many defendants recognize that they cannot prevail at trial unless they succeed in suppressing either evidence seized by the police or an allegedly involuntary confession. Such defendants in States with the generally prevailing rule of finality of guilty pleas will often insist on proceeding to trial for the sole purpose of preserving their claims of illegal seizures or involuntary confessions for potential vindication on direct appellate review or in collateral proceedings. Recognizing the completely unnecessary waste of time and energy consumed in such trials, New York has chosen to discourage them by creating a procedure which permits a defendant to obtain appellate review of certain pretrial constitutional claims without imposing on the State the burden of going to trial.
To deny federal habeas corpus relief to those in New-some’s position would make New York’s law a trap for the unwary. On the other hand, it is safe to predict that those New York defendants who knew that federal habeas corpus would be foreclosed would again be dissuaded from pleading guilty and instead would insist on •a trial solely to preserve the right to an ultimate federal forum in which to litigate their constitutional claims. Such a result would eviscerate New York’s commendable efforts to relieve the problem of congested criminal trial calendars in a manner that does not diminish the opportunity for the assertion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
Accordingly, we hold that when state law permits a defendant to plead guilty without forfeiting his right to judicial review of specified constitutional issues, the defendant is not foreclosed from pursuing those constitutional claims in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Section 813-c was directed to the right to appeal an adverse ruling on a claim of an unlawful search and seizure after a plea of guilty. N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-g (recodified as N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 710.20,(3), 710.70 (2)), permitted similar appeals from denials of motions to suppress allegedly coerced confessions. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 766 n. 11. New York now also provides by statute for post-guihy plea appeals from denials of motions to suppress identification testimony claimed to be tainted by improper pretrial identifications. N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§710.20 (5), 710.70 (2).
The District Court initially dismissed the petition because New-some, who had been released on bail pending final disposition of his case, was not "in custody” as required by 28 U. S. C. §2241. Newsome appealed the dismissal, and, in light of this Court's holding on the custody question in Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U. S. 345, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit remanded the case to the District Court for a decision on the merits.
California, like New York, permits a defendant to appeal specified adverse pretrial rulings even though he subsequently pleads guilty. Cal. Penal Code § 1538.5 (m). Unlike the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by a divided vote held that such a defendant may not pursue his constitutional claim on a federal habeas corpus petition. Mann v. Smith, 488 F. 2d 245, 247.
Certiorari was granted limited to Question 1 in Attorney General Lefkowitz’ petition: “Does a state defendant’s plea of guilty waive federal habeas corpus review of his conviction, even though under state law he has been permitted review in the state appellate courts of the denial of his motion, on constitutional grounds, to suppress the evidence that would have been offered against him had there been a trial?” 417 U. S. 967.
Since the guilty pleas in McMann v. Richardson were entered prior to the effective date of New York’s statutory scheme permitting a defendant pleading guilty to challenge on appeal the admissibility of evidence allegedly seized improperly or of an allegedly coerced confession, the Court in McMann expressly reserved ruling on the question presented by the judgment now before us. 397 U. S., at 770 n. 13. That express reservation unquestionably belies the argument advanced in the dissenting opinion of MR. Justice White, post, at 297-298, that the question before us was answered in Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, a case decided together with McMann.
The petitioner concedes that this review ultimately includes the certiorari or appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Indeed, in Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, we reversed a state-court conviction on the ground that the appellant’s motion to suppress evidence should have been granted, notwithstanding the fact that the appellant had pleaded guilty and pursued his appeal under § 813-c. See id., at 45 n. 2. If Newsome’s guilty plea is not a sufficient “break in the chain of events [that] preceded it” to prevent review of his constitutional claims in this Court, then a fortiori the plea cannot rationally foreclose resort to federal habeas relief. For even when state procedural grounds are adequate to bar direct review of a conviction in this Court, federal habeas corpus relief is nonetheless available to litigate the defendant’s constitutional claims unless there has been a deliberate bypass of the state procedures. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 428-431.
New York could easily have provided that, rather than pleading “guilty,” a defendant who intends to appeal his pretrial claim of an involuntary confession or an unlawful seizure but has no desire to impose upon the State the burden of going to trial should plead “not guilty” and at the same time stipulate to all the evidence the State can introduce to prove his guilt. Upon the inevitable entry of a judgment of conviction based on the stipulation, the defendant would then be able to pursue his state appellate remedies. And, presumably, because there would then be no “solemn admission of guilt,” all would concede that the defendant would not be foreclosed from pursuing those constitutional claims in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. But the only difference between such a procedure and the one New York has chosen is that the plea entered is labeled a plea of “not guilty” rather than “guilty” and there is a stipulation by the defendant as to the facts the State would prove demonstrating his guilt rather than a recitation by the defendant in court. The availability of federal habeas corpus depends upon functional reality, not upon an infatuation with labels. See Fay v. Noia, supra.
Newsome is “in custody” within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 2241. See n. 2, supra. His petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleged that this custody was in violation of the laws of the United States. §2241 (c)(3). And he has satisfied the exhaustion requirement of 28 U. S. C. §2254 by presenting his federal claims to the state courts on direct appeal. See Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U. S. 59.
In Fay v. Noia, supra, the Court held that a federal habeas judge may deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately bypassed the orderly state-court procedures for reviewing his constitutional claim. 372 U. S., at 438. But the Court also held that if the state courts have entertained the federal constitutional claims on the merits in a subsequent proceeding, notwithstanding the deliberate bypass, the federal courts have no discretion to deny the applicant habeas relief to which he is otherwise entitled. Id., at 439. It would seem to follow necessarily that when there is no bypass of state appellate procedures, deliberate or otherwise, and the state courts entertained the federal claims on the merits, a federal habeas corpus court must also determine the merits of the applicant’s claim.
At the time Newsome pleaded guilty the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had repeatedly held that a New York defendant who has utilized § 813-c in the state courts may pursue his constitutional claim on a federal habeas corpus petition. E. g., United States ex rel. Rogers v. Warden, 381 F. 2d 209; United States ex rel. Molloy v. Follette, 391 F. 2d 231.
The Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure would create an even broader right of appeal than is currently provided for in New York, permitting post-guilty-plea appeal of any order denying a pretrial motion which, if granted, would be dispositive of the case. Uniform Rule Crim. Proc. 444 (d).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The Court is advised that the respondent died in Washington, D. C., on March 24, 1993. The Court’s order granting the writ of certiorari, see 504 U. S. 908 (1992), therefore is vacated, and the petition for certiorari is dismissed. See Mintzes v. Buchanon, 471 U. S. 154 (1985).
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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I
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Blackmun
delivered the opinion of the Court. The Internal Revenue Code and the Social Security Act direct the Secretary of the Treasury to “intercept” certain tax refunds payable to persons who have failed to meet child-support obligations. In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that payments involving eamed-income credits could be intercepted. 752 F. 2d 1433 (1985). We granted certiorari, 472 U. S. 1016 (1985), because this ruling was in conflict with decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Tenth Circuits. See Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury, 751 F. 2d 351 (CA10 1984); Nelson v. Regan, 731 F. 2d 105 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. Manning v. Nelson, 469 U. S. 853 (1984).
I
A
Stanley Sorenson, the husband of petitioner Marie Soren-son, was legally obligated to make child-support payments for a child of his previous marriage who was in the custody of his former wife. Mr. Sorenson was unemployed because of a disability and fell behind on those support payments. His former wife applied for welfare benefits from the State of Washington. Since 1975, the program for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) has required, as a condition of eligibility, that applicants for welfare assign to the State concerned any right to child-support payments that has accrued at the time of assignment. Pub. L. 93-647, § 101(c)(5)(C), 88 Stat. 2359, 42 U. S. C. §602(a)(26)(A). Thus, Stanley Sorenson’s former wife turned over to the State her right to collect the payments Mr. Sorenson had failed to make.
Stanley and Marie Sorenson also had their own dependent child living with them. They thus were potentially eligible to receive an earned-income credit. For the calendar year 1981, the time relevant to this lawsuit, § 43 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, provided that an individual responsible for the support of a child living with him was allowed “as a credit against the tax imposed ... for the taxable year an amount equal to 10 percent of so much of the earned income for the taxable year as does not exceed $5,000.” As the amount of the taxpayer’s earned income increased, the amount of the credit decreased, reaching zero when the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income reached $10,000.
Unlike certain other credits, which can be used only to offset tax that would otherwise be owed, the earned-income credit is “refundable.” Thus, if an individual’s earned-income credit exceeds his tax liability, the excess amount is “considered an overpayment” of tax under § 6401(b), as it then read, of the 1954 Code. Subject to specified setoffs, § 6402(a) directs the Secretary to credit or refund “any overpayment” to the person who made it. An individual who is entitled to an earned-income credit that exceeds the amount of tax he owes thereby receives the difference as if he had overpaid his tax in that amount.
B
In February 1982, petitioner and her husband timely filed a joint federal income tax return for the calendar year 1981. Petitioner had worked during part of that year, and all the Sorenson family income for the year was attributable to her wages and unemployment compensation benefits. By the return so filed, the Sorensons anticipated a refund of $1408.90, consisting in part of excess withholding on petitioner’s wages and in part of an earned-income credit. The Internal Revenue Service, however, notified the Sorensons that $1,132 of the anticipated refund was being retained, under the authority granted it by the tax-intercept law, and would be paid over to the State of Washington because that State had been assigned the right to collect Mr. Sorenson’s unpaid child-support obligations. See Second Declaration of Peter Greenfield, Exh. B, Sorenson v. Secretary of Treasury, No. C82-441C (WD Wash.).
The tax-intercept law essentially directs the Secretary to give priority to a State’s claim for recoupment of welfare payments made to a family who failed to receive child support, see § 402(a)(26)(A) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(26)(A), over an individual’s claim for refund of tax overpayment. See § 6402(a), as amended, of the 1954 Code. The intercept law originally was enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), Pub. L. 97-35, §2331, 95 Stat. 860. First, OBRA § 2331(a) added §464 to the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §664. That section directs the Secretaries of the Treasury and of Health and Human Services to establish a scheme by which a State is to notify the Secretary of the Treasury of persons who owe past-due child-support payments that have been assigned to it, and directs the Secretary of the Treasury to intercept tax-refund payments that would otherwise be paid to those persons:
“Upon receiving notice from a State agency administering [an AFDC plan]. . . that a named individual owes past-due support which has been assigned to such State pursuant to section 402(a)(26), the Secretary of the Treasury shall determine whether any amounts, as refunds of Federal taxes paid, are payable to such individual (regardless of whether such individual filed a tax return as a married or unmarried individual). If the Secretary of the Treasury finds that any such amount is payable, he shall withhold from such refunds an amount equal to the past-due support, and pay such amount to the State agency (together with notice of the individual’s home address) for distribution in accordance with section 457(b)(3).” § 464(a), 42 U. S. C. § 664(a).
Section 2331(c) of OBRA amended the Internal Revenue Code. It added a new subsection to the provision governing the Secretary of the Treasury’s authority to refund overpay-ments to taxpayers. The new subsection, § 6402(c), requires the Secretary to withhold from the refund otherwise due the taxpayer the amount owed the State in past-due child support and to remit the amount withheld to the State:
“The amount of any overpayment to be refunded to the person making the overpayment shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support (as defined in section 464(c) of the Social Security Act) owed by that person of which the Secretary has been notified by a State in accordance with section 464 of the Social Security Act. The Secretary shall remit the amount by which the overpayment is so reduced to the State to which such support has been assigned and notify the person making the overpayment that so much of the overpayment as was necessary to satisfy his obligation for past-due support has been paid to the State. This subsection shall be applied to an overpayment prior to its being credited to a person’s future liability for an internal revenue tax.”
C
After negotiations concerning the status of tax refunds in community property States such as Washington — issues that are not germane to the question now presented to this Court — the Secretary ultimately withheld only half of the refund increment the Sorensons claimed. Petitioner then filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington seeking, among other things, a declaration that §464 of the Social Security Act did not reach a refund attributable to an excess earned-income credit. The District Court rejected the Secretary’s jurisdictional arguments, which were renewed on appeal to the Court of Appeals but which are not pressed in this Court. See Brief for Respondents 5, n. 1. But it agreed with the Secretary’s arguments on the merits and granted summary judgment for the Government. 557 F. Supp. 729 (1982).
The Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. 752 F. 2d 1433 (CA9 1985). It rejected petitioner’s statutory construction arguments, and held that, since the Code expressly defined excess earned-income credits as “overpayments,” and disbursed those excess credits to recipients through the income tax refund process, the credits were “payable ‘as’ refunds of federal taxes paid” and therefore could be intercepted. Id., at 1441 (emphasis in original). Congress used the broad terms “any amounts” and “any overpayment” in the tax-intercept law and gave no indication that it intended to exclude earned-income credit payments from these terms.
The Court of Appeals also rejected petitioner’s argument that the Secretary’s position conflicted with Congress’ intention to provide benefits to the poor through the earned-income credit. First, the legislative history of §43 did not suggest that the earned-income credit was intended primarily as a type of welfare grant; rather, it was meant to negate the disincentive to work caused by Social Security taxes. Since the earned-income credit was payable as a lump sum, it was more like excess withholding, which was clearly reachable by the intercept program, than it was like wages, a portion of which Congress exempted from the assessment and collection process. See 752 F. 2d, at 1443, n. 1. Second, had Congress intended to exempt earned-income credit payments from the intercept program, it could have done so expressly. Instead, it provided that any amount payable through the federal tax-refund process might be intercepted. “In the face of this rather clear statutory mandate,” said the Court of Appeals, “we conclude that we are not free to speculate that Congress intended otherwise.” Id., at 1443.
HH hH
Petitioner advances two arguments to support her claim that an excess earned-income credit cannot be intercepted. First, she claims that the language and structure of the interlocking statutory provisions that make up the intercept law exclude an earned-income credit from its reach: excess earned-income credits are neither “overpayments” nor “refunds of Federal taxes paid,” and only those items are subject to interception. Second, she claims that permitting interception of an earned-income credit would frustrate Congress’ aims in providing the credit, and thus that Congress could not have intended the intercept law to reach earned-income credits. We find neither argument persuasive.
A
The Internal Revenue Code’s treatment of earned-income credits supports the Government’s position. An individual can receive the amount by which his entitlement to an earned-income credit exceeds his tax liability only because § 6401(b) of the Code defines that amount as an “overpayment,” and § 6402 provides a mechanism for disbursing over-payments, namely, the income tax refund process. The re-fundability of the earned-income credit is thus inseparable from its classification as an overpayment of tax. Petitioner therefore acknowledges that the excess earned-income credit is an “overpayment” for purposes of § 6402(a), the general provision that authorizes all tax refunds. See n. 4, supra. If it were not, the Secretary would lack authorization for refunding it to her. She claims, however, that while an excess earned-income credit is an “overpayment” for purposes of § 6402(a), it is not an “overpayment” for purposes of § 6402(c), which requires that the “amount of any overpayment . . . shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support” assigned to the State.
The normal rule of statutory construction assumes that “ ‘identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.’” Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 87 (1934), quoting Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 433 (1932). That the Internal Revenue Code includes an explicit definition of “overpayment” in the same sub-chapter strengthens the presumption. And that both subsections concern the tax-refund treatment of “overpayment[s]” is especially damaging to any claim that “the words, though in the same act, are found in such dissimilar connections as to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in the different parts of the act with different intent.” Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S., at 87.
Petitioner and the two Courts of Appeals that have excluded excess earned-income credits from the definition of “overpayment” used in § 6402(c) offer two bases for their position. First, they believe that § 6402(c) limits §6401(b)’s broad definition “by [using] the phrase ‘overpayment to be refunded to the person making the overpayment.’” Nelson v. Regan, 731 F. 2d, at 111; see Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury, 751 F. 2d, at 356. Not all overpayments, they suggest, are refunded to persons who “made” them, since some— those consisting of earned-income credits — may be refunded to persons who actually have not paid any tax. We disagree. All refunds made by the Secretary under § 6402(a) are paid to “the person who made the overpayment.” The phrase merely identifies the person entitled to the refund; it does not restrict the nature of the refund itself. Petitioner must characterize herself as a person who has “made” an overpayment; otherwise, she cannot claim her excess earned-income credit. The phrase in § 6402(c) on which petitioner and the Second and Tenth Circuits relied is virtually identical to the phrase used in § 6402(a). Since the words cannot have the limiting effect petitioner proposes when used in § 6402(a), no justification exists for giving them such a construction in § 6402(c).
Second, petitioner and the Second and Tenth Circuits perceive a tension between § 6401(b)’s and § 6402(a)’s treatment of excess earned-income credits and §464(a)’s treatment of interceptable amounts. As used in those Code sections, “overpayment” includes more than “refunds of Federal taxes paid,” the phrase used in the Social Security Act. Since §464 and § 6402(c) were enacted simultaneously as part of OBRA, petitioner and the two Circuits believe that § 6402(c) should be harmonized with §464 rather than with §§ 6401(b) and 6402(a). See Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury, 751 F. 2d, at 357; Nelson v. Regan, 731 F. 2d., at 111.
This second argument, it seems to us, misperceives the structure of the tax-intercept law, and manufactures a tension that need not exist. OBRA’s placement of provisions regarding interception in both Acts reflects a division of functions. The tax-intercept program lies at the intersection of the Social Security Act’s concern in Subchapter IV, Part D, with child support, and the Internal Revenue Code’s concern in Chapter 65, Subchapter A, with the treatment of credits in the tax-refund process. Section 464 addresses the concerns of the States that have received AFDC-related grants. It defines past-due child support, authorizes procedures by which the States can notify the Secretary of the Treasury of their entitlement to recover such past-due support, and directs the Secretary to aid the States, through his control over the tax-refund process, in recouping that support. Sections 6401 and 6402 address the operation of the tax-refund process under the Internal Revenue Code. They define the status of certain tax credits, set up a mechanism for disbursing refunds, and direct the Secretary to divert certain amounts from the refund process. To the extent that the tax-intercept law regulates the relationship of the Secretary of the Treasury to refund claimants, it does so through § 6402, and not through a provision that governs the Secretary’s relationship to state agencies.
Petitionerj however, views §6402(c)’s reference to §464 as indicating that § 464(a) is meant to be read into § 6402(c) as a limitation on the Secretary’s intercept powers. This argument depends on a somewhat strained construction of § 6402(c)’s statement that “[t]he amount of any overpayment to be refunded to the person making the overpayment shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support. . . owed by that person of which the Secretary has been notified by a State in accordance with section 464 of the Social Security Act.” Petitioner claims that “[t]he words ‘in accordance with section 464 of the Social Security Act’... do not modify ‘has been notified by a State,’ as one might initially assume. Rather they belatedly modify the words ‘shall be reduced.’” Brief for Petitioner 18. In petitioner’s view, her construction would lead to the conclusion that a refund can be reduced only to the extent that the refund represents a refund of tax actually paid, since that is all § 464(a) permits.
We disagree with both petitioner’s construction of § 6402(c) and her reading of § 464(a). First, it seems far more plausible that the words modify the nearest verb. If they are given this more natural reading, then § 6402(c) directs the Secretary to intercept only that amount which properly is classified as past-due support and of which he properly has been notified.
But even if the reference in § 6402(c) to §464 were read to refer solely to § 464(a), nothing in that subsection exempts excess earned-income credits from interception. Petitioner and the Second and Tenth Circuits recast their argument regarding the meaning of “overpayment” by contending that the amount of a refund that is attributable to an excess earned-income credit is not a “refun[d] of Federal taxes paid,” and that § 464(a) permits interception of only “amounts, as refunds of Federal taxes paid”:
“A refund of federal taxes is a repayment of money paid by a taxpayer in excess of that taxpayer’s liability. Although the earned income credit is given effect through the income tax return, the credit is not a tax refund because eligibility for the credit is not contingent upon payment of any federal income tax.” Rucker v. Secretary of Treasury, 751 F. 2d, at 356.
But just as eligibility for an earned-income credit does not depend upon an individual’s actually having paid any tax, the Code’s classification of the credit as an “overpayment” to be refunded is similarly independent of the individual’s actually having made any payment. Cf. § 6401(c). The Ninth Circuit correctly held that, to the extent an excess earned-income credit is “payable” to an individual, it is payable as if it were a refund of tax paid. 752 F. 2d, at 1441. Section 464(a)’s reference to the tax-refund process is best understood as a directive to the Secretary that he follow the procedures established by the Internal Revenue Code for calculating and disbursing refunds, rather than as an attempt implicitly to redefine terms given special meaning by the Code.
B
Nor do we agree with petitioner’s claim that Congress did not intend the intercept program to reach excess earned-income credits. Petitioner and the Government agree that Congress never mentioned the earned-income credit in enacting OBRA. See Brief for Petitioner 24; Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. But it defies belief that Congress was unaware, when it provided in § 6402(c) that “any overpayment to be refunded . . . shall be reduced by the amount of any past-due support” (emphasis added), that this would include refunds attributable to excess earned-income credits. Congress had previously expressly defined an excess earned-income credit as an “overpayment,” in § 6401(b) of the Internal Revenue Code — the section immediately preceding the section to which Congress added the intercept provision.
What petitioner and the Second and Tenth Circuits are really claiming is that the intercept law should be read narrowly to avoid frustrating the goals of the earned-income credit program. The earned-income credit was enacted to reduce the disincentive to work caused by the imposition of Social Security taxes on earned income (welfare payments are not similarly taxed), to stimulate the economy by tunneling funds to persons likely to spend the money immediately, and to provide relief for low-income families hurt by rising food and energy prices. Each is an undeniably important objective. It is impossible, however, for us to say that these goals outweigh the goals served by the subsequently enacted tax-intercept program — securing child support from absent parents whenever possible and reducing the number of families on welfare. Congress of course could conclude that families eligible for earned-income credits have a more compelling claim to the funds involved than do either the States or non-AFDC families. But it is equally clear that Congress could have decided that the more pressing need was to alleviate the “devastating consequences for children and the taxpayers” of the epidemic of nonsupport. See Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on Spending Reduction Proposals, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 34 (1981) (statement of Secretary Schweiker).
The ordering of competing social policies is a quintessentially legislative function. In light of Congress’ decision to direct the interception of any overpayment otherwise refundable to a taxpayer, the Ninth Circuit correctly refused to “speculate that Congress intended otherwise.” 752 F. 2d, at 1443. Its judgment, accordingly, is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Section 402(a)(26)(A) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 602(a)(26)(A), requires the assignment to the State of “any rights to support from any other person such applicant may have (i) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other family member for whom the applicant is applying for or receiving aid, and (ii) which have accrued at the time such assignment is executed.”
By the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, § 471(c)(1), 98 Stat. 826, Congress redesignated § 43 as § 32. By § 1042 of that Act, 98 Stat. 1043, it raised the earned-income percentage from 10 to 11 percent, the maximum amount of the credit from $500 to $550, and the eligibility ceiling from $10,000 to $11,000.
At the time relevant to this lawsuit, § 6401(b) of the 1954 Code provided, in pertinent part:
“If the amount allowable as credits under sections 31 (relating to tax withheld on wages), and 39 (relating to certain uses of gasoline, special fuels, and lubricating oil), and 43 (relating to earned income credit), exceeds the tax imposed by subtitle A (reduced by the credits allowable under subpart A of part IV of subehapter A of chapter 1, other than the credits allowable under sections 31, 39, and 43), the amount of such excess shall be considered an overpayment.”
Section 6401(b) was amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1984. Section 474(r)(36) of that Act, 98 Stat. 846, designated existing § 6401(b) as § 6401(b)(1) and substituted the following language for the language quoted above:
“If the amount allowable as credits under subpart C of part IV of sub-chapter A of chapter 1 (relating to refundable credits) exceeds the tax imposed by subtitle A (reduced by the credits allowable under subparts A, B, and D of such part IV), the amount of such excess shall be considered an overpayment.”
The earned-income credit remains refundable under the revised provision, since it is within the category of “refundable credits.” See Tax Reform Act of 1984, §471, 98 Stat. 825.
The version of § 6402(a) in effect for the tax year 1981 provided:
“In the case of any overpayment, the Secretary, within the applicable period of limitations, may credit the amount of such overpayment, including any interest allowed thereon, against any liability in respect of an internal revenue tax on the part of the person who made the overpayment and shall, subject to subsection (c), refund any balance to such person.”
The question presented by this case is the scope of subsection (c) — the provision governing the offset of past-due child-support payments.
Section 2653(b)(2) of the Spending Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1155, amended § 6402(a). Under amended § 6402(a), the Secretary’s authority, with respect to refunds payable after December 31, 1985, and before January 1, 1988, see § 2653(c) of the 1984 Act, 98 Stat. 1156, is restricted by a new subsection (d) as well as by subsection (e) of § 6402. Section 2653(b)(1) of the 1984 Act, 98 Stat. 1154, added the new subsection (d). Section 6402(d) requires the offset of debts owed to various federal agencies. Under § 6402(d)(2), the collection of past-due child-support payments pursuant to § 6402(c) has priority over the collection of debts covered by § 6402(d).
Section 464(a) was amended by the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. 98-378, § 21, 98 Stat. 1322, which authorized the interception and diversion of refunds for the benefit of non-AFDC children as well as children receiving AFDC benefits. The Amendments also provided additional procedural protections for refund claimants whose refunds are intercepted.
In light of Congress’ specific reference to § 464(c) earlier in § 6402(c), it seems particularly likely that Congress would have referred to subsection (a) of § 464 expressly had it meant “in accordance with § 464(a)” rather than in accordance with the entire scheme for identifying past-due support payments and notifying the Federal Government of such obligations set out in §464.
That Congress could not have viewed the earned-income credit as immune from seizure to satisfy child-support obligations is suggested by a number of other factors as well. As the Government notes, once an individual has actually received his tax-refund payment, the proceeds of that refund, even if they reflect an earned-income credit component, are subject to levy under § 6305 of the Code. The fact that the Government may not have used this cumbersome procedure, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 23-25, reflects the economic inefficiency of locating and pursuing a payment that cannot exceed $550 rather than a lack of authority to do so. And certainly no one has suggested that the former spouse to whom a support obligation not assigned to the State is owed would be precluded from employing the judicial process to attach and seize the credit once the recipient had received it.
See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 94-36, pp. 11, 33 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 94-19, pp. 3-4, 29-31 (1975); Hearings on H. R. 2166 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 66, 315 (1975); Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means on the President’s Authority to Adjust Imports of Petroleum; Public Debt Ceiling Increase; and Emergency Tax Proposals, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 661, 742-743, 797 (1975); 121 Cong. Rec. 4609 (1975).
See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 98-387, pp. 5-8 (1984); Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on Spending Reduction Proposals, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 19, 34-35, 81, 312 (1981); Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means on Tax Aspects of the President’s Economic Program, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 159, 237 (1981).
Even if Congress’ sole concern were providing funds to the neediest children involved, it is far from certain that all children living in households receiving refunds of earned-income credits are needier than all children owed past-due child support. When the earned-income credit is claimed at the end of the tax year (an individual can, pursuant to § 3507 of the Code, receive an advance on his earned-income credit over the course of the year), it may in fact go to a recipient who is not currently needy. For example, an individual, with a dependent child, who was unemployed during most of 1981 and therefore earned only $5,000, but found a job paying $20,000 per year on January 1, 1982, would have been able to claim in a tax return filed in April 1982 an earned-income credit of $500, despite the fact that, in late spring 1982, when the refund check ultimately arrived, the individual might no longer be needy.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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L
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner was convicted in a New York trial court in 1966 on three counts of conspiracy to extort, attempted extortion, and coercion. The case for the prosecution rested principally on the content of two telephone conversations between the petitioner and one of his co-conspirators. Tapes and transcripts of those conversations were introduced at the trial over the petitioner’s objection that they had been obtained by an unlawful wiretap. The conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York and by the New York Court of Appeals. We granted certiorari.
The telephone calls in question were made in 1964 by the petitioner from outside New York City to a co-conspirator at a bar in Manhattan. The conversations were recorded by means of a device attached to wires of the central terminal box in the basement of the building in which the bar was located. This wiretapping was conducted pursuant to a warrant issued under N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a, the statute with which this Court subsequently dealt in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, in reversing a conviction under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The petitioner contends that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments as construed in Berger, as well as § 605 of the Federal Communications Act, prohibited the introduction of the intercepted conversations and therefore require reversal of. his conviction. For the reasons stated below, we reject these contentions and affirm the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals.
Not until last Term in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, did this Court overrule its prior decisions that the Fourth Amendment encompassed seizures of speech only if the law enforcement officers committed a trespass or at least physically invaded a constitutionally protected area of the speaker. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, explicitly held that wiretapping conducted without such an intrusion was not an unlawful search or seizure. That rule was not modified by Berger v. New York. The Court's discussion of Olmstead in Berger, while recognizing that other cases had negated the statements in Olmstead that conversations are never protected by the Fourth Amendment, cast no doubt upon “[t]he basis of the [Olmstead] decision” — “that the Constitution did not forbid the obtaining of evidence by wiretapping unless it involved actual unlawful entry into the house.” Furthermore, the Court in Berger found the overbreadth of N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a repugnant to the Fourth Amendment only to the limited extent that it permitted a “trespassory intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.”
Olmstead, then, stated the controlling interpretation of the Fourth Amendment with respect to wiretapping until it was overruled by Katz. And in Desist v. United States, ante, p. 244, we have held today that Katz is to be applied wholly prospectively. Since the wiretapping in this case occurred before Katz was decided and was accomplished without any intrusion into a constitutionally protected area of the petitioner, its fruits were not inadmissible under the exclusionary rule of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643.
Nor did § 605 of the Federal Communications Act require exclusion of the intercepted conversations. Until our decision last Term in Lee v. Florida, 392 U. S. 378, state trial courts were free to accept evidence violative of | 605. Lee extended the Nardone exclusionary rule of § 605 to the States, but that decision has also been held to apply only prospectively. Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U. S. 80. The wiretapping evidence was introduced at the petitioner’s trial in 1966, long before the date of our decision in Lee.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinions in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41, 70, and Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 364.
28 App. Div. 2d 647, 282 N. Y. S. 2d 207.
21 N. Y. 2d 86, 233 N. E. 2d 818.
390 U. S. 1023.
Section 605, 48 Stat. 1103, 47 U. S. C. § 605, reads in pertinent part as follows:
“ [N] o person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge . . . the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person . . . .”
The petitioner also contends that the prosecutor’s references to the recorded conversations as “confessions” were so inaccurate and misleading as to deny him due process. We do not believe that that characterization of the evidence raises any substantial federal question. The jury was aware that the prosecutor was adverting to the overheard conversations and knew the circumstances under which the incriminating statements had been made. In contrast to the situation in Miller v. Pate, 386 U. S. 1, there was here no misrepresentation about evidence which the jurors were not themselves in a position to evaluate.
See Desist v. United States, ante, at 247-248.
388 U. S., at 51.
Id., at 44. See also id., at 43, 57, 60, 64, 69.
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199.
Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379, holding that evidence seized in violation of § 605 by federal officers was not admissible in federal criminal trials. See also Benanti v. United States, 355 U. S. 96, holding that such evidence seized by state officers must also be excluded from federal trials.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Murphy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case centers on two issues: (1) whether it was proper for a federal district court to entertain a habeas corpus petition filed by a state prisoner who, having secured a ruling from the highest state court on his federal constitutional claim, had failed to seek a writ of certiorari in this Court; (2) whether the federal district court correctly held that the prisoner had been deprived of his constitutional right to counsel at the trial for a non-capital state offense.
On February 19, 1945, petitioner Wade was arrested in Palm Beach County, Florida, upon the charge of breaking and entering. He was held in jail until brought to trial before a jury on March 14, 1945, in the Criminal Court of Record of Palm Beach County. Just before the trial started, he asked the trial judge to appoint counsel to represent him, claiming that it was financially impossible to employ one himself. The judge refused the request and the trial proceeded. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the same day and Wade was immediately sentenced to serve five years in the state penitentiary.
Wade then obtained the aid of counsel. On March 16, two days after the trial and conviction, this counsel filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Palm Beach County. The petition claimed that the refusal of the judge to appoint counsel for Wade at the trial was a denial of the due process of law guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The writ was issued, a hearing was had, and the Circuit Court thereupon granted the motion of the state’s attorney to quash the writ. This action was taken on the authority of two decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida holding that under Florida law a trial court has no duty to appoint counsel to represent the accused in a non-capital case. Watson v. State, 142 Fla. 218, 194 So. 640; Johnson v. State, 148 Fla. 510, 4 So. 2d 671.
Wade’s counsel appealed the decision of the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court of Florida. In the latter court, the state’s Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as frivolous. Two points were emphasized in this motion: (1) Wade had not appealed from his conviction or even filed a motion for a new trial; (2) the Circuit Court had quashed the habeas corpus writ on the authority of the two cases cited in its order. The Supreme Court, upon consideration of this motion, granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. No written opinion was filed and no indication was given whether the appeal was dismissed for one or both of the reasons advanced by the Attorney General. The date of this action was May 14, 1945. No attempt was made to secure a writ of certiorari from this Court.
Nearly a year later, on May 8, 1946, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. This petition alleged that the refusal to appoint counsel for Wade at the trial deprived him of his constitutional right to due process of law. And the petition further stated that this point had not been raised by way of appeal from the conviction because of the belief that the Watson and Johnson cases made it plain that the Supreme Court of Florida “has no power of reversal of a conviction because defendants were not represented by counsel, and for that reason failed to obtain a fair trial, except in capital cases, and this case is not a capital case.” Such was the reason given for the belief that an appeal would have been useless and of no avail. But the petition pointed out that in order to exhaust all his remedies in the state courts before applying to a federal court, Wade had pursued a writ of habeas corpus all the way through the Florida courts.
The District Court granted the writ and a hearing was held on May 17, 1946. Both Wade and the trial judge testified as to the events surrounding the refusal to appoint counsel. After hearing this testimony and the argument of counsel, the District Court concluded that under the circumstances the denial of Wade’s request was contrary to the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby rendering void the judgment and commitment under which Wade was held. But the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require the appointment of counsel in non-capital state cases unless the state law so required. 158 F. 2d 614.
We then granted certiorari. After the case had been submitted to us on briefs, we ordered the case restored to the docket for reargument on two points: “(1) the propriety of the exercise of jurisdiction by the District Court in this case when it appears of record, in the state’s motion for dismissal of the appeal on habeas corpus, that petitioner had not availed himself of the remedy of appeal from his conviction, apparently open after trial though now barred by limitation ... (2) whether the failure of Florida to make this objection in this proceeding affects the above problem.”
In our view, it was proper for the District Court to entertain Wade’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and to proceed to a determination of the merits of Wade’s constitutional claim. The crucial point is that Wade has exhausted one of the two alternative routes open in the Florida courts for securing an answer to his constitutional objection. It now appears that a defendant who is denied counsel in a non-capital case in Florida may attack the constitutionality of such treatment either by the direct method of an appeal from the conviction or by the collateral method of habeas corpus. Since Wade chose the latter alternative and pursued it through to the Supreme Court of Florida, he has done all that could be done to secure a determination of his claim by the Florida courts. The fact that he might have appealed his conviction and made the same claim and received the same answer does not detract from the completeness with which Florida has disposed of his claim on habeas corpus. The exhaustion of but one of several available alternatives is all that is necessary.
At the time the Supreme Court of Florida dismissed Wade’s habeas corpus appeal, however, the propriety of the habeas corpus method of raising the right of counsel issue was anything but clear. The failure of that court to specify the reason for the dismissal made it possible to construe the action as a holding that a direct appeal from the conviction was the only remedy available to Wade. The Attorney General’s motion to dismiss the habeas corpus appeal seemed to make that point and the Supreme Court might have adopted it as the sole ground of dismissal. Had that been the situation, the case before us would be in an entirely different posture. Wade would then be in the position of seeking relief in a federal court after having chosen to forego the opportunity to secure recognition of his claim by the exclusive mode designated by Florida.
But the doubts as to the availability of habeas corpus in Florida for the purpose at hand have been dispelled by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Johnson v. Mayo, 158 Fla. 264, 28 So. 2d 585. That case was a habeas corpus proceeding in which the Florida court proceeded to pass upon the merits of a claim identical with that raised by Wade. In so doing, the court relied upon the disposition of Wade’s habeas corpus appeal, stating that it had been dismissed as frivolous. As the Johnson case makes clear, Wade’s appeal was considered frivolous because the right to counsel in a non-capital case is counter to the settled law of Florida. Reference was made in the Johnson decision to the contrary decisions in other states and to “the rule in the Federal Courts but we are of the view that those decisions do not control in Florida.” 158 Fla. at 266, 28 So. 2d at 586.
Thus the Supreme Court of Florida announced unambiguously less than a year and a half after its dismissal of Wade’s appeal that its action had been grounded on the merits of the constitutional issue tendered by Wade, rather than on a holding that a direct appeal was the only way to raise that issue. It is not for us to contradict this construction by the Florida court and to attribute the dismissal of Wade’s appeal to a state ground of procedure which is negatived by both the decision and the reasoning in the later Johnson case.
The only real problem in this case concerning the propriety of the District Court entertaining Wade’s petition relates to the effect of his failure to seek a writ of certiorari from this Court following the action of the Supreme Court of Florida on his habeas corpus appeal. It has been said that “Ordinarily an application for habeas corpus by one detained under a state court judgment of conviction for crime will be entertained by a federal court only after all state remedies available, including all appellate remedies in the state courts and in this Court by appeal or writ of certiorari, have been exhausted.” Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114, 116-117. The problem is to reexamine this statement in the light of the facts of this case.
The requirement that state remedies be exhausted before relief is sought in the federal courts is grounded primarily upon the respect which federal courts have for the state judicial processes and upon the administrative necessities of the federal judiciary. State courts are duty bound to give full effect to federal constitutional rights and it cannot be assumed that they will be derelict in their duty. Only after state remedies have been exhausted without the federal claim having been vindicated may federal courts properly intervene. Indeed, any other rule would visit upon the federal courts an impossible burden, forcing them to supervise the countless state criminal proceedings in which deprivations of federal constitutional rights are alleged.
But the reasons for this exhaustion principle cease after the highest state court has rendered a decision on the merits of the federal constitutional claim. The state procedure has then ended and there is no longer any danger of a collision between federal and state authority. The problem shifts from the consummation of state remedies to the nature and extent of the federal review of the constitutional issue. The exertion of such review at this point, however, is not in any real sense a part of the state procedure. It is an invocation of federal authority growing out of the supremacy of the Federal Constitution and the necessity of giving effect to that supremacy if the state processes have failed to do so.
After state procedure has been exhausted, the concern is with the appropriate federal forum in which to pursue further the constitutional claim. The choice lies between applying directly to this Court for review of the constitutional issue by certiorari or instituting an original habeas corpus proceeding in a federal district court. Considerations of prompt and orderly procedure in the federal courts will often dictate that direct review be sought first in this Court. And where a prisoner has neglected to seek that review, such failure may be a relevant consideration for a district court in determining whether to entertain a subsequent habeas corpus petition.
But the factors which make it desirable to present the constitutional issue directly and initially to this Court do not justify a hard and fast rule to that effect, especially in view of the volume of this Court’s business. Writs of certiorari are matters of grace. Matters relevant to the exercise of our certiorari discretion frequently result in denials of the writ without any consideration of the merits. The constitutional issue may thus have no bearing upon the denial of the writ. Where it is apparent or even possible that such would be the disposition of a petition for certiorari from the state court’s judgment, failure to file a petition should not prejudice the right to file a habeas corpus application in a district court. Good judicial administration is not furthered by insistence on futile procedure.
Moreover, the flexible nature of the writ of habeas corpus counsels against erecting a rigid procedural rule that has the effect of imposing a new jurisdictional limitation on the writ. Habeas corpus is presently available for use by a district court within its recognized jurisdiction whenever necessary to prevent an unjust and illegal deprivation of human liberty. Cf. Price v. Johnston, 334 U. S. 266, 283. Where the matter is otherwise within the jurisdiction of the district court, it is within the discretion of that court to weigh the failure to seek certiorari against the miscarriage of justice that might result from a failure to grant relief. In short, we refuse to codify the failure to invoke the discretionary certiorari powers of this Court into an absolute denial of the district court’s power to entertain a habeas corpus application. The prevention of undue restraints on liberty is more important than mechanical and unrealistic administration of the federal courts.
Fear has sometimes been expressed that the exercise of the district court’s power to entertain habeas corpus petitions under these circumstances might give rise to frequent instances of a single federal judge upsetting the judgment of a state court, often the highest court of the state. But to restrict the writ of habeas corpus for such reason is to limit it on the basis of a discredited fear. Experience has demonstrated that district court judges have used this power sparingly and that only in a negligible number of instances have convictions sustained by state courts been reversed. Statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts show that during the fiscal years of 1943, 1944 and 1945 there was an average of 451 habeas corpus petitions filed each year in federal district courts by prisoners serving state court sentences; of these petitions, an average of but 6 per year resulted in a reversal of the conviction and a release of the prisoner. The releases thus constituted only 1.3% of the total petitions filed. In light of such figures, it cannot be said that federal judges have lightly exercised their power to release prisoners held under the authority of a state. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 253.
In the instant case, we believe that it was well within the discretion of the District Court to consider Wade’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Florida courts had given a full and conclusive answer to his claim that he had been denied his constitutional right to counsel. No other remedies were available in Florida. True, he did not seek certiorari following the dismissal of his habeas corpus appeal by the Supreme Court of Florida. But at the time of that dismissal, it was extremely doubtful, to say the least, whether the constitutional issue had really been decided. That doubt was such as to make it reasonably certain that this Court would have denied certiorari on the theory that an adequate state ground appeared to underlie the judgment. His failure to make this futile attempt to secure certiorari accordingly should not prejudice his subsequent petition for habeas corpus in the District Court. Otherwise he would be left completely remediless, having been unable to secure relief. from the Florida courts and being barred from invoking the aid of the federal courts.
As to the merits of Wade’s constitutional claim, the District Court made the following findings after a hearing at which Wade and the trial judge gave testimony:
“The Court has heard the evidence of the respective parties and the argument of their counsel. It appears that petitioner, at the time of his trial in the Criminal Court of Record of Palm Beach, Florida, was eighteen years old, and though not wholly a stranger to the Court Room, having been convicted of prior offenses, was still an inexperienced youth unfamiliar with Court procedure, and not capable of adequately representing himself. It is admitted by the Judge who presided at petitioner’s trial on March 6, 1945 that petitioner in open Court, before trial commenced, requested said Judge to appoint counsel for him, but the request was denied and petitioner placed on trial without counsel. . . . The denial of petitioner’s request in the circumstances here involved constitutes a denial of due process, contrary to the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution, which renders void the judgment and commitment under which petitioner is held. . . .”
As the Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out, the evidence at the hearing before the District Court further showed that during the progress of the trial Wade (a) was advised by the trial judge of his right to challenge jurors and excuse as many as six without reason, a right which he did not exercise; (b) was afforded an opportunity, which he accepted, to cross-examine state witnesses; (c) took the stand and testified in his own behalf; and (d) was offered the privilege of arguing his case to the jury but declined, as did the prosecuting attorney.
We are not disposed to disagree with the findings and conclusion of the District Court. Its determination was a purely factual one to the effect that Wade was an inexperienced youth incapable of adequately representing himself even in a trial which apparently involved no complicated legal questions. This is a judgment which is peculiarly within the province of the trier of facts, based upon personal observation of Wade. And we do not find that the District Court’s determination was clearly erroneous.
There are some individuals who, by reason of age, ignorance or mental capacity, are incapable of representing themselves adequately in a prosecution of a relatively simple nature. This incapacity is purely personal and can be determined only by an examination and observation of the individual. Where such incapacity is present, the refusál to appoint counsel is a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Circuit Court of Appeals was therefore in error in reversing the District Court’s judgment. It was also in error in assuming that the failure to appoint counsel in a non-capital case in a state court is a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment only if the law of the state requires such an appointment. To the extent that there is a constitutional right to counsel in this type of case it stems directly from the Fourteenth Amendment and not from state statutes. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, 473.
Reversed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondents are 19 named individuals who commenced this civil rights action, individually and on behalf of a class of citizens of the city of Cairo, Illinois, against the State’s Attorney for Alexander County, Illinois, his investigator, the Police Commissioner of Cairo, and the petitioners here, Michael O’Shea and Dorothy Spomer, Magistrate and Associate Judge of the Alexander County Circuit Court, respectively, alleging that they have intentionally engaged in, and are continuing to engage in, various patterns and practices of conduct in the administration of the criminal justice system in Alexander County that deprive respondents of rights secured by the First, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and by 42 U. S. C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985. The complaint, as amended, alleges that since the early 1960’s, black citizens of Cairo, together with a small number of white persons on their behalf, have been actively, peaceably and lawfully seeking equality of opportunity and treatment in employment, housing, education, participation in governmental decisionmaking and in ordinary day-to-day relations with white citizens and officials of Cairo, and have, as an important part of their protest, participated in, and encouraged others to participate in, an economic boycott of city merchants who respondents consider have engaged in racial discrimination. Allegedly, there 'had resulted a great deal of tension and antagonism among the white citizens and officials of Cairo.
The individual respondents are 17 black and two white residents of Cairo. The class, or classes, which they purport to represent are alleged to include “all those who, on account of their race or creed and because of their exercise of First Amendment rights, have [been] in the past and continue to be subjected to the unconstitutional and selectively discriminatory enforcement and administration of criminal justice in Alexander County,” as well as financially poor persons “who, on account of their poverty, are unable to afford bail, or are unable to afford counsel and jury trials in city ordinance violation cases.” The complaint charges the State’s Attorney, his investigator, and the Police Commissioner with a pattern and practice of intentional racial discrimination in the performance of their duties, by which the state criminal laws and procedures are deliberately applied more harshly to black residents of Cairo and inadequately applied to white persons who victimize blacks, to deter respondents from engaging in their lawful attempt to achieve equality. Specific supporting examples of such conduct involving some of the individual respondents are detailed in the complaint as to the State’s Attorney and his investigator.
With respect to the petitioners, the county magistrate and judge, a continuing pattern and practice of conduct, under color of law, is alleged to have denied and to continue to deny the constitutional rights of respondents and members of their class in three respects:
(1) petitioners set bond in criminal cases according to an unofficial bond schedule without regard to the facts of a case or circumstances of an individual defendant in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments;
(2) “on information and belief” they set sentences higher and impose harsher conditions for respondents and members of their class than for white persons, and (3) they require respondents and members of their class when charged with violations of city ordinances which carry fines and possible jail penalties if the fine cannot be paid, to pay for a trial by jury' in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Each of these continuing practices is alleged to have been carried out intentionally to deprive respondents and their class of the protections of the county criminal justice system and to deter them from engaging in their boycott and similar activities. The complaint further alleges that there is no adequate remedy at law and requests that the practices be enjoined. No damages were sought against the petitioners in this case, nor were any specific instances involving the individually named respondents set forth in the claim against these judicial officers.
The District Court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction to issue the injunctive relief prayed for and on the ground that petitioners were immune from suit with respect to acts done in the course of their judicial duties. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 (1967), on which the District Court relied, did not forbid the issuance of injunctions against judicial officers if it is alleged and proved that they have knowingly engaged in conduct intended to discriminate against a cognizable class of persons on the basis of race; Absent sufficient remedy at law, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the event respondents proved their allegations, the District Court should proceed to fashion appropriate injunctive relief to prevent petitioners from depriving others of their constitutional rights in the course of carrying out their judicial duties in the future. We granted certiorari. 411 U. S. 915 (1973).
I
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The complaint failed to satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Art. Ill of the Constitution that those who seek to invoke the power of federal courts must allege an actual case or controversy. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 94-101 (1968); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 421-425 (1969) (opinion of Marshall, J.). Plaintiffs in the federal courts “must allege soxpe threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action before a federal court may assume jurisdiction.” Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 (1973). There must be a “personal stake in the outcome” such as to “assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962). Nor is the principle different where statutory issues are raised. Cf. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669, 687 (1973). Abstract injury is not enough. It must be alleged that the plaintiff “has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury” as the result of the challenged statute or official conduct. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 488 (1923). The injury or threat of injury must be both “real and immediate,” not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S. 103, 109-110 (1969); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U. S. 270, 273 (1941); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 89-91 (1947). Moreover, if none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 32-33 (1962); Indiana Employment Division v. Burney, 409 U. S. 540 (1973). See 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ 23.10-1, n. 8 (2d ed. 1971).
In the complaint that began this action, the sole allegations of injury are that petitioners “have engaged in and continue to engage in, a pattern and practice of conduct ... all of which has deprived and continues to deprive plaintiffs and members of their class of their” constitutional rights and, again, that petitioners “have denied and continue to deny to plaintiffs and members of their class their constitutional rights” by illegal bond-setting, sentencing, and jury-fee practices. None of the named plaintiffs is identified as himself having suffered any injury in the manner specified. In sharp contrast to the claim for relief against the State’s Attorney where specific instances of misconduct with respect to particular individuals are alleged, the claim against petitioners alleges injury in only the most general terms. At oral argument, respondents’ counsel stated that some of the named plaintiffs-respondents, who could be identified by name if necessary, had actually been defendants in proceedings before petitioners and had suffered from the alleged unconstitutional practices. Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, however, if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects. Neither the complaint nor respondents’ counsel suggested that any of the named plaintiffs at the time the complaint was filed were themselves serving an allegedly illegal sentence or were on trial or awaiting trial before petitioners. Indeed, if any of the respondents were then serving an assertedly unlawful sentence, the complaint would inappropriately be seeking relief from or modification of current, existing custody. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973). Furthermore, if any were then on trial or awaiting trial in state proceedings, the complaint would be seeking injunctive relief that a federal court should not provide. Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971); see also Part II, infra. We thus do not strain to read inappropriate meaning into the con-clusory allegations of this complaint.
Of course, past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. But here the prospect of future injury rests on the likelihood that respondents will again be arrested for and charged with violations of the criminal law and will again be subjected to bond proceedings, trial, or sentencing before petitioners. Important to this assessment is the absence of allegations that any relevant criminal statute of the State of Illinois is unconstitutional on its face or as applied or that respondents have been or will be improperly charged with violating criminal law. If the statutes that might possibly be enforced against respondents are valid laws, and if charges under these statutes are not improvidently made or pressed, the question becomes whether any perceived threat to respondents is sufficiently real and immediate to show an existing controversy simply because they anticipate violating lawful criminal statutes and being tried for their offenses, in which event they may appear before petitioners and, if they do, will be affected by the allegedly illegal conduct charged. Apparently, the proposition is that if respondents proceed to violate an unchallenged law and if they are charged, held to answer, and tried in any proceedings before petitioners, they will be subjected to the discriminatory practices that petitioners are alleged to have followed. But it seems to us that attempting to anticipate whether and when these respondents will be charged with crime and will be made to appear before either petitioner takes us into the area of speculation and conjecture. See Younger v. Harris, supra, at 41-42. The nature of respondents’ activities is not described in detail and no specific threats are alleged to have been made against them. Accepting that they are deeply involved in a program to eliminate racial discrimination in Cairo and that tensions are high, we are nonetheless unable to. conclude that the case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied by general assertions or inferences that in the course of their activities respondents will be prosecuted for violating valid criminal laws. We assume that respondents will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged course of conduct said to be followed by petitioners.
As in Golden v. Zwickler, we doubt that there is “ ‘sufficient immediacy and reality’ ” to respondents’ allegations of future injury to warrant invocation of the jurisdiction of the District Court. There, “it was wholly conjectural that another occasion might arise when Zwickler might be prosecuted for distributing the handbills referred to in the complaint.” 394 U. S., at 109. Here we can only speculate whether respondents will be arrested, either again or for the first time, for violating a municipal ordinance or a state statute, particularly in the absence of any allegations that unconstitutional criminal statutes are being employed to deter constitutionally protected conduct. Cf. Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 101-102 (1971) (opinion of Brennan, J.). Even though Zwickler attacked a specific statute under which he had previously-been prosecuted, the threat of a new prosecution was not sufficiently imminent to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the federal courts. Similarly, respondents here have not pointed to any imminent prosecutions contemplated against any of their number and they naturally do not suggest that any one of them expects to violate valid criminal laws. Yet their vulnerability to the alleged threatened injury from which relief is sought is necessarily contingent upon the bringing of prosecutions against one or more of them. Under these circumstances, where respondents do not claim any constitutional right to engage in conduct proscribed by therefore presumably permissible state laws, or indicate that it is otherwise their intention to so conduct themselves, the threat of injury from the alleged course of conduct they attack is simply too remote to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement and permit adjudication by a federal court.
In Boyle v. Landry, 401 U. S. 77, 81 (1971), the Court ordered a complaint dismissed for insufficiency of its allegations where there was no basis for inferring “that any one or more of the citizens who brought this suit is in any jeopardy of suffering irreparable injury if the State is left free to prosecute under the intimidation statute in the normal manner.” The Court expressed the view that “the normal course of state criminal prosecutions cannot be disrupted or blocked on the basis of charges which in the last analysis amount to nothing more than speculation about the future.” Ibid. A similar element of uncertainty about whether the alleged injury will be likely to .occur is present in this case, and a similar reluctance to interfere with the normal operation of state administration of its criminal laws in the manner sought by respondents strengthens the conclusion that the allegations in this complaint are too insubstantial to warrant federal adjudication of the merits of respondents’ claim.
The foregoing considerations obviously shade into those determining whether the complaint states a sound basis for equitable relief; and even if we were inclined to consider the complaint as presenting an existing case or controversy, we would firmly disagree with the Court of Appeals that an adequate basis for equitable relief against petitioners had been stated. The Court has recently reaffirmed the “basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37, 43-44 (1971). Additionally, recognition of the need for a proper balance in the concurrent operation of federal and state courts counsels restraint against the issuance of injunctions against state officers engaged in the administration of the State’s criminal laws in the absence of a showing of irreparable injury which is “ Toth great and immediate.’ ” Id., at 46. See, e.g., Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U. S. 240 (1926); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943). In holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 is an Act of Congress that falls within the “expressly authorized” exception to the absolute bar against federal injunctions directed at state court proceedings provided by 28 U. S. C. § 2283, the Court expressly observed that it did not intend to “question or qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 243 (1972). Those principles preclude equitable intervention in the circumstances present here.
Respondents do not seek to strike down a single state statute, either on its face or as applied; nor do they seek to enjoin any criminal prosecutions that might be brought under a challenged criminal law. In fact, respondents apparently contemplate that prosecutions will be brought under seemingly valid state laws. What they seek is an injunction aimed at controlling or preventing the occurrence of specific events that might take place in the course of future state criminal trials. The order the Court of Appeals thought should be available if respondents proved their allegations would be operative only where permissible state prosecutions are pending against one or more of the beneficiaries of the injunction. Apparently the order would contemplate interruption , of state proceedings to adjudicate assertions of noncompliance by petitioners. This seems to us nothing less than an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings which would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that Younger v. Harris, supra, and related cases sought to prevent.
A federal court should not intervene to establish the basis for future intervention that would be so intrusive and unworkable. In concluding that injunctive relief would be available in this case because it would not interfere with prosecutions to be commenced under challenged statutes, the Court of Appeals misconceived the underlying basis for withholding federal equitable relief when the normal course of criminal proceedings in the state courts would otherwise be disrupted. The objection is to unwarranted anticipatory interference in the state criminal process by means of continuous or piecemeal interruptions of the state proceedings by litigation in the federal courts; the object is to sustain “[t]he special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.” Stefanelli v. Minara, 342 U. S. 117, 120 (1951). See also Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U. S. 392 (1963); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U. S. 381 (1961); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U. S. 458 (1961); cf. Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214 (1956). An injunction of the type contemplated by respondents and the Court of Appeals would disrupt the normal course of proceedings in the state courts via resort to the federal suit for determination of the claim ab initio, just as would the request for injunctive relief from an ongoing state prosecution against the federal plaintiff which was found to be unwarranted in Younger. Moreover, it would require for its enforcement the continuous supervision by the federal court over the conduct of the petitioners in the course of future criminal trial proceedings involving any of the members of the respondents’ broadly defined class. The Court of Appeals disclaimed any intention of requiring the District Court to sit in constant day-to-day supervision of these judicial officers, but the “periodic reporting” system it thought might be warranted would constitute a form of monitoring of the operation of state court functions that is antipathetic to established principles of comity. Cf. Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808 (1966). Moreover, because an injunction against acts which might occur in the course of future criminal proceedings would necessarily impose continuing obligations of compliance, the question arises of how compliance might be enforced if the beneficiaries of the injunction were to charge that it had been disobeyed. Presumably, any member of respondents’ class who appeared as an accused before petitioners could allege and have adjudicated a claim that petitioners were in contempt of the federal court’s injunction order, with review of adverse decisions in the Court of Appeals and, perhaps, in this Court. Apart from the inherent difficulties in defining the proper standards against which such claims might be measured, and the significant problems of proving noncompliance in individual cases, such a major continuing intrusion of the equitable power of the federal courts into the daily conduct of state criminal proceedings is in sharp conflict with the principles of equitable restraint which this Court has recognized in the decisions previously noted.
Respondents have failed, moreover, to establish the basic requisites of the issuance of equitable relief in these circumstances — the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law. We have already canvassed the necessarily conjectural nature of the threatened injury to which respondents are allegedly .subjected. And if any of the respondents are ever prosecuted and face trial, or if they are illegally sentenced, there are available state and federal procedures which could provide relief from the wrongful conduct alleged. Open to a victim of the discriminatory practices asserted under state law are the right to a substitution of judge or a change of venue, Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 38, §§ 114-5, 114-6 (1971), review on direct appeal or on postconviction collateral review, and the opportunity to demonstrate that the conduct of these judicial officers is so prejudicial to the administration of justice that available disciplinary proceedings, including the possibility of suspension or removal, are warranted. Ill. Const., Art. VI, § 15 (e). In appropriate circumstances, moreover, federal habeas relief would undoubtedly be available.
Nor is it true that unless the injunction sought is available federal law will exercise no deterrent effect in these circumstances. Judges who would willfully discriminate on the ground of race or otherwise would willfully deprive the citizen of his constitutional rights, as this complaint alleges, must take account of 18 U. S. C. § 242. See Greenwood v. Peacock, supra, at 830; United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 793-794 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U. S. 745, 753-754 (1966); Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 101-106 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941). Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 187 (1961). That section provides:
“Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . .”
Whatever may be the case with respect to civil liability generally, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967), or civil liability for willful corruption, see Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U. S. 106, 110-111 (1913); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347, 350, 354 (1872), we have never held that the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise criminal deprivations of constitutional rights. Cf. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880). On the contrary, the- judicially fashioned doctrine of official immunity does not reach “so far as to immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress . . . .” Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 627 (1972).
Considering the availability of other avenues of relief open to respondents for the serious conduct they assert, and the abrasive and unmanageable intercession which the injunctive relief they seek would represent, we conclude that, apart from the absence of an existing case or controversy presented by respondents for adjudication, the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that the District Court should entertain respondents’ claim.
Reversed.
While the Court of Appeals did not attempt to specify exactly what type of injunctive relief might be justified, it at least suggested that it might include a requirement of “periodic reports of various types of aggregate data on actions on bail and sentencing.” 468 F. 2d, at 416. The dissenting judge urged that a federal district court has no power to supervise and regulate by mandatory injunction the discretion which state court judges may exercise within the limits of the powers vested in them by law, and that any relief contemplated by the majority holding which might be applicable to the pattern and practice alleged, if proven, would subject the petitioners to the continuing supervision of the District Court, the necessity of defending their motivations in each instance when the fixing of bail or sentence was challenged by a Negro defendant as inconsistent with the equitable relief granted, and the possibility of a contempt citation for failure to comply with the relief awarded. Id., at 415-417.
We have previously noted that “Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute. See, e. g., Traficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U. S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., concurring); Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U. S. 1, 6 (1968).” Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617 n. 3 (1973). But such statutes do not purport to bestow the right to sue in the absence of any indication that invasion of the statutory right has occurred or is likely to occur. Title 42 U. S. C. § 1983, in particular, provides for liability to the “party injured” in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. Perforce, the constitutional requirement of an actual case or controversy remains. Respondents still must show actual or threatened injury of some ldnd to establish standing in the constitutional sense.
There was no class determination in this case as the complaint was dismissed on grounds which did not require that determination to be made. Petitioners assert that the lack of standing of the named respondents to raise the class claim is buttressed by the incongruous nature of the class respondents seek to represent. The class is variously and incompatibly defined in the complaint as those residents of Cairo, both Negro and white, who have boycotted certain businesses in that city and engaged in similar activities for the purpose of combatting racial discrimination, as a class of all Negro citizens suffering racial discrimination in the application of the criminal justice system in Alexander County (though two white persons are named respondents), and as all poor persons unable to afford bail, counsel, or jury trials in city ordinance cases. The absence of specific claims of injury as a result of any of the wrongful practices charged, in light of the ambiguous and contradictory class definition proffered, bolsters our conclusion that these respondents cannot invoke federal jurisdiction to hear the claims they present in support of their request for injunctive relief.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 21, 23, 26.
It was noted in Stefanelli that in suits brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 “we have withheld relief in equity even when recognizing that comparable facts would create a cause of action for damages. Compare Giles v. Harris, 189 U. S. 475, with Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268.” 342 U. S., at 122.
See n. 3, supra.
See n. 1, supra.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal from a judgment of conviction entered by the Recorder’s Court of the City of Detroit, Michigan, challenges the constitutionality of the following provision, § 343, of the Michigan Penal Code:
“Any person who shall import, print, publish, sell, possess with the intent to sell, design, prepare, loan, give away, distribute or offer for sale, any book, magazine, newspaper, writing, pamphlet, ballad, printed paper, print, picture, drawing, photograph, publication or other thing, including any recordings, containing obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious language, or obscene, immoral, lewd or lascivious prints, pictures, figures or descriptions, tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth, or shall introduce into any family, school or place of education or shall buy, procure, receive or have in his possession, any such book, pamphlet, magazine, newspaper, writing, ballad, printed paper, print, picture, drawing, photograph, publication or other thing, either for the purpose of sale, exhibition, loan or circulation, or with intent to introduce the same into any family, school or place of education, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”
Appellant was charged with its violation for selling to a police officer what the trial judge characterized as “a book containing obscene, immoral, lewd, lascivious language, or descriptions, tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth.” Appellant moved to dismiss the proceeding on the claim that application of § 343 unduly restricted freedom of speech as protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the statute (1) prohibited distribution of a book to the general public on the basis of the undesirable influence it may have upon youth; (2) damned a book and proscribed its sale merely because of some isolated passages that appeared objectionable when divorced from the book as a whole; and (3) failed to provide a sufficiently definite standard of guilt. After hearing the evidence, the trial judge denied the motion, and, in an oral opinion, held that “. . . the defendant is guilty because he sold a book in the City of Detroit containing this language [the passages deemed offensive], and also because the Court feels that even viewing the book as a whole, it [the objectionable language] was not necessary to the proper development of the theme of the book nor of the conflict expressed therein.'" Appellant was fined $100.
Pressing his federal claims, appellant applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan. Although the State consented to the granting of the application “because the issues involved in this case are of great public interest, and because it appears that further clarification of the language of . . . [the statute] is necessary,” leave to appeal was denied. In view of this denial, the appeal is here from the Recorder’s Court of Detroit. We noted probable jurisdiction. 350 U. S. 963.
Appellant’s argument here took a wide sweep. We need not follow him. Thus, it is unnecessary to dissect the remarks of the trial judge in order to determine whether he construed § 343 to ban the distribution of books merely because certain of their passages, when viewed in isolation, were deemed objectionable. Likewise, we are free to put aside the claim that the Michigan law falls within the doctrine whereby a New York obscenity statute was found invalid in Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507.
It is clear on the record that appellant was convicted because Michigan, by § 343, made it an offense for him to make available for the general reading public (and he in fact sold to a police officer) a book that the trial judge found to have a potentially deleterious influence upon youth. The State insists that, by thus quarantining the general reading public against books not too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield juvenile innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general welfare. Surely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig. Indeed, the Solicitor General of Michigan has, with characteristic candor, advised the Court that Michigan has a statute specifically designed to protect its children against obscene matter “tending to the corruption of the morals of youth.” But the appellant was not convicted for violating this statute.
We have before us legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal. The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children. It thereby arbitrarily curtails one of those liberties of the individual, now enshrined in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that history has attested as the indispensable conditions for the maintenance and progress of a free society. We are constrained to reverse this conviction.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result.
Section 142 of Michigan’s Penal Code provides:
“Any person who shall sell, give away or in any way furnish to any minor child any book, pamphlet, or other printed paper or other thing, containing obscene language, or obscene prints, pictures, figures or descriptions tending to the corruption of the morals of youth, or any newspapers, pamphlets or other printed paper devoted to the publication of criminal news, police reports, or criminal deeds, and any person who shall in any manner hire, use or employ such child to sell, give away, or in any manner distribute such books; pamphlets or printed papers, and any person having the care, custody or control of any such child, who shall permit him or her to engage in any such employment, shall be guilty of' a misdemeanor.”
Section 143 provides:
“Any person who shall exhibit upon any public street or highway, or in any other place within the view of children passing on any public street or highway, any book, pamphlet or other printed paper or thing containing obscene language or obscene prints, figures, or descriptions, tending to the corruption of the morals of youth, or any newspapers, pamphlets, or other printed paper or thing devoted to the publication of criminal news, police reports or criminal deeds, shall on conviction thereof be guilty of a misdemeanor.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930 calls for “antidumping” duties on “foreign merchandise” sold in the United States at “less than its fair value,” 19 U. S. C. § 1673, but does not touch international sales of services. These cases test the application of this antidumping provision to imports of low enriched uranium (LEU), a highly processed derivative of natural uranium used as nuclear fuel, when domestic utilities contract to obtain LEU for cash plus unenriched uranium delivered to a foreign enricher. Although the parties’ contracts call these transactions sales of uranium enrichment services, the Commerce Department treats them as sales of “foreign merchandise” subject to the antidumping provision. The issue is whether the Commerce Department’s way of seeing the transactions as sales of goods rather than services reflects a permissible interpretation and application of § 1673. We hold that it does.
I
There are five steps in transforming elemental uranium into fuel rods for nuclear powerplants. After uranium ore is mined, it is milled into uranium concentrate called “yellow-cake,” which is next converted into uranium hexafluoride gas or “feed uranium.” The fissionable isotope in unenriched feed uranium is then concentrated, producing LEU in pellet form, which is in turn made into uranium fuel rods. These cases are about the fourth step: enriching uranium feedstock into LEU.
The uranium isotope needed for a nuclear reaction, U-235, amounts only to 0.711 percent by weight of natural uranium. Uranium whose concentration or “assay,” of U-235 has been enhanced to 20 percent or more is weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium, whereas LEU has a U-235 assay of 3 to 5 percent, making it useful as nuclear fuel. One way to produce LEU, and the method at issue in these cases, is gaseous diffusion, whereby gaseous feed uranium is pushed through a long series of filters, separating the gas into two streams. The stream passing through the filters (the “product stream”) gains a higher concentration of the lighter U-235 isotope than the stream that is filtered out (the “tails”). Because the concentration reached at each individual filter is minor, the gas must be forced through hundreds or even thousands of filters, at great expenditure of electricity, before the product stream reaches the desired assay. The amount of energy required to enrich a quantity of feed uranium to a given assay is measured in terms of an industry standard called a “separative work unit” or SWU (pronounced “swoo”). In practice, however, a given degree of enrichment will depend on adjusting the quantities of two separate variables, feed uranium and electricity, in inverse proportions. Thus, if the electric rate is stable but the value of feed uranium falls, an enricher may produce LEU by “overfeeding,” subjecting a greater quantity of feed uranium to fewer SWUs, and when the value of feed uranium goes up and electricity does not, “underfeeding” can use more SWUs to squeeze extra U-235 from the tails.
Nuclear utilities generally get LEU in one of two ways. Under an “enriched uranium product” or “EUP” contract, a utility simply buys a desired quantity and assay of LEU for cash. Under a “SWU contract,” the utility provides a quantity of feed uranium and pays the enricher for the SWUs to produce the quantity and assay of LEU called for. Despite their name, SWU contracts do not require that the contractual number of SWUs actually be applied to the quantity of uranium provided, Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Low Enriched Uranium From France, 66 Fed. Reg. 65877, 65884 (2001) (hereinafter LEU from France); rather, the enricher remains free to overfeed or underfeed so long as it delivers the specified LEU. Moreover, because feed uranium is fungible, and “for all intents and purposes, trades like a commodity,” ibid., and because profitable operation of an enrichment plant requires the constant processing of feed uranium from the enricher’s undifferentiated stock, the LEU provided to a utility under a SWU contract cannot be traced to the particular unenriched uranium the utility provided.
Petitioners, USEC Inc. and its subsidiary, United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC collectively), run the only uranium enrichment factory in the United States, which was built by the United States Government in the 1950s and run by various federal agencies until it was leased to USEC in 1998. In December 2000, USEC petitioned the Commerce Department for relief under § 731 of the Tariff Act, alleging that LEU imported from France and other European countries under both EUP and SWU contracts was being sold in the United States at less than fair value and was materially harming domestic industry. Notice of Initiation of Anti-dumping Duty Investigations: Low Enriched Uranium From France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, 66 Fed. Reg. 1080 (2001).
Section 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by § 101 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 93 Stat. 162, as amended, 19 U. S. C. § 1673, provides a two-step process to address harm to domestic manufacturing from foreign goods sold at an unfair price:
“If—
“(1) the administering authority [the Secretary of Commerce] determines that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair value, and “(2) the [United States International Trade] Commission determines that—
“(A) an industry in the United States—
“(i) is materially injured, or
“(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
“(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded,
“by reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for importation,
“then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, in an amount equal to the amount by which the normal value exceeds the export price (or the constructed export price) for the merchandise. ...”
See also § 1677(1) (designating the Secretary of Commerce as the “ ‘administering authority’ ”); § 1677(2) (explaining that the term “ ‘Commission’ ” refers to the United States International Trade Commission).
The Tariff Act’s antidumping provision derives from similar terms in the Anti-Dumping Act, 1921, 42 Stat. 11, which were adopted to “protec[t] our industries and labor against a now common species of commercial warfare of dumping goods on our markets at less than cost or home value if necessary until our industries are destroyed . . ..” H. R. Rep. No. 1, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1921).
Following the USEC charges, the Commerce Department opened an investigation into the practices of respondents, a French enricher, Eurodif S. A., its owner, Compagnie Général des Matiéres Nucléaires (now ARE VA NC), its U. S. subsidiary, COGEMA (now AREVA NC, Inc.), and United States utilities that consume LEU (Eurodif collectively). Eurodif conceded that EUP contracts were for the sale of LEU, but argued that SWU contracts involved only the sale of uranium enrichment services, and were therefore outside the scope of §1673. LEU from France, 66 Fed. Reg. 65882-65883.
In its final determination, the Commerce Department concluded that LEU from France, including LEU acquired under SWU contracts, was being sold, or likely to be sold, in the United States at less than fair value. Id., at 65878. In deciding that SWU contracts are for a sale of LEU, not enrichment services, the Department stressed several features of the transactions. First, because the enrichment process accounts for approximately 60 percent of the value of LEU and works a “substantial transformation” on uranium feedstock, id., at 65881, enrichment creates “the essential character” of LEU, id., at 65884. Second, “enrichers not only have complete control over the enrichment process, but in fact control the level of usage of the natural uranium provided.” Ibid. Third, the utilities themselves take no part in the manufacture of LEU and are the sole purchasers of the product. Ibid.
The Commerce Department also rejected the argument that LEU transferred pursuant to SWU contracts should not be considered “sold” in light of a “tolling” regulation then (but no longer) in effect. Ibid. The regulation stated that a “toller,” a subcontractor who sells processing services in, or material for incorporation into, subject merchandise, would not be considered a manufacturer or producer “where the toller or subcontractor does not acquire ownership, and does not control the relevant sale, of the subject merchandise.” 19 CFR § 351.401(h) (2000) (withdrawn in Import Administration, Withdrawal of Regulations Governing the Treatment of Subcontractors (“Tolling” Operations), 73 Fed. Reg. 16517 (2008) (hereinafter Tolling Operations)). This regulation, the Commerce Department explained, was intended to apply in situations where a good is first sold by a manufacturer and then resold by an exporter or reseller. LEU from France, 66 Fed. Reg. 65880. The regulation provides that in such a situation the second sale should be used to calculate the U. S. price and normal value of the manufactured good; however, the Commerce Department concluded, the regulation was not meant to preclude antidumping duties where a manufacturer makes the only relevant sale that can be used to establish U. S. price and normal value. Ibid,.; id., at 65884-65885.
Finally, the Commerce Department reasoned that language in SWU contracts speaking of the transactions as the sale of enrichment services could not control, lest deferring to the parties’ characterizations allow them to “convert trade in goods into trade in so-called ‘manufacturing services,’.. . thereby exposing industries to injury by unfair trade practices without the remedy of the [antidumping] laws.” Id., at 65881. In economic reality, the Commerce Department said, “the contracts designated as SWU contracts are functionally equivalent to those designated as EUP transactions.” Id., at 65885.
Eurodif challenged the Department’s determination before the Court of International Trade (CIT), which remanded for “a more persuasive explanation” of the tolling regulation. USEC Inc. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1326 (2003). On remand, the Commerce Department repeated that the tolling regulation governed which price should be used to calculate antidumping duties, not whether imports are subject to the antidumping provision in the first instance. Final Remand Determination, USEC Inc. and United States Enrichment Corp. v. United States (June 23, 2003), App. G to Pet. for Cert. 211a (hereinafter Final Remand Determination). The Department further explained its conclusion that SWU contracts lead to transfers of LEU for consideration. The contracts and other evidence in the record convinced the Department that “enrichers own, and hold title to, all the LEU they produce,” id., at 217a, a conclusion grounded on findings that “enrichers hold inventories of uranium from various sources, including uranium owned by the enricher itself, and produce LEU without relying solely upon the input from a particular customer.” Id., at 221a. Finally, the Department emphasized that the enrichers “have complete control over the enrichment process and control the amount of uranium and energy actually used in producing the LEU.” Id., at 231a.
The CIT was unconvinced and reversed, relying on what it candidly recognized as a “legal fiction” expressed in SWU contracts, “that the very feed uranium delivered by a utility to an enricher is enriched and then returned as LEU to the utility.” USEC Inc. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1339 (2003). The CIT reasoned, because “nothing in the record support[ed] a determination that the enricher has any ownership rights,” the Commerce Department’s determination was “unsupported by substantial evidence and not in accordance with law.” Id., at 1340.
USEC challenged this conclusion in an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which affirmed. Eurodif S. A. v. United States, 411 F. 3d 1355 (2005) (Eurodif I). The court approached the issues much as the CIT had, with the observation that “the SWU contracts in this case do not evidence any intention by the parties to vest the enrichers with ownership rights in the delivered unenriched uranium or the finished LEU.” Id., at 1362. It recalled that in a previous case, Florida Power & Light Co. v. United States, 307 F. 3d 1364 (CA Fed. 2002), it had accepted the Government’s position that SWU contracts were for services, not for “ ‘disposal of personal property,’ ” and so were outside the cause of action provided by the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U. S. C. § 601 et seq. Eurodif I, supra, at 1363, and n. 3 (quoting Florida Power & Light Co., supra, at 1373). While the court conceded that SWU agreements “do ‘not fall neatly’ either into the category of contracts for services or the category of contracts for the sale of goods,” 411 F. 3d, at 1364 (quoting Florida Power & Light Co., supra, at 1373-1374), it still concluded that “even under the deferential standard of review that we apply in this case, we choose not to ignore our previous holdings,” Eurodif I, supra, at 1363.
Shortly after this decision, we held in National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 982-983 (2005), that a court’s choice of one reasonable reading of an ambiguous statute does not preclude an implementing agency from later adopting a different reasonable interpretation. On rehearing, the Federal Circuit responded to National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. by explaining that it had not rejected the Commerce Department’s position because it conflicted with the prior interpretive choice that carried the day in Florida Power & Light. Eurodif S. A. v. United States, 423 F. 3d 1275, 1277-1278 (2005). The Circuit, rather, saw no statutory uncertainty to be resolved: “the antidumping duty statute unambiguously applies to the sale of goods and not services” and “it is clear that [SWU] contracts are contracts for services and not goods.” Id., at 1278. After final judgment was entered, Eurodif S. A. v. United States, 506 F. 3d 1051, 1053 (CA Fed. 2007), we granted certiorari, 553 U. S. 1003 (2008), to consider whether transactions under SWU contracts may be subjected to antidumping duties under the Tariff Act. We now reverse.
II
The issue is not whether, for purposes of 19 U. S. C. § 1673, the better view is that a SWU contract is one for the sale of services, not goods. The statute gives this determination to the Department of Commerce in the first instance, § 1677(1), and when the Department exercises this authority in the course of adjudication, its interpretation governs in the absence of unambiguous statutory language to the contrary or unreasonable resolution of language that is ambiguous. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 229-230 (2001) (citing Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984)). This is so even after a change in regulatory treatment, which “is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s interpretation under the Chevron framework.” National Cable & Telecommunications Assn., 545 U. S., at 981. “ ‘[T]he whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.’” Ibid, (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 742 (1996)).
In approaching the Department’s position on the application of § 1673, two threshold propositions must be taken as given. First, we think the Department reasonably concluded that §1673 is not limited by its terms to cash-only sales. Otherwise, any sale of a manufactured product could be exempted from the operation of § 1673 by a contractual term stating part of the purchase price in terms of a commodity.
Second, in applying § 1673, the Commerce Department is not bound by the “legal fiction [created by SWU contracts] that the very feed uranium delivered by a utility to an en-richer is enriched and then returned as LEU to the utility.” USEC, 281 F. Supp. 2d, at 1339. The parties are free to contract as they wish, and they may genuinely regard SWU agreements as contracts for the sale of enrichment services. But, whatever the significance of such a term in a contract dispute, cf. Florida Power & Light Co., 307 F. 3d 1364, it is well settled that in reading regulatory and taxation statutes, “form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality,” Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967). See also Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U. S. 561, 573 (1978) (“Tn the field of taxation, administrators of the laws, and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal written documents are not rigidly binding’ ” (quoting Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U. S. 252, 255 (1939))). Surrender to private contractual terms is especially uncalled for in dealing with international tariffs, as Congress saw when it amended the Tariff Act to say that the sale of foreign merchandise includes “the entering into of any leasing arrangement regarding the merchandise that is equivalent to the sale of the merchandise. ” Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 602(b)(2), 98 Stat. 3024, 19 U. S. C. § 1673.
Since public law is not constrained by private fiction, the test of the Department’s position turns first on whether the statute clearly excludes a transaction involving mixed payment for LEU that may and almost certainly will be produced from uranium feed distinct from what the utility provides. No one disputes that § 1673 applies to the sale of goods, not services, LEU from France, 66 Fed. Reg. 65882-65883. Nor do we think anyone would deny that the exchange of cash combined with a commodity for a product that uses that very commodity as a constituent material is sometimes a sale of services and sometimes a sale of goods, the distinction being clear at the extremes. A customer who comes to a laundry with cash and dirty shirts is clearly purchasing cleaning services, not clean shirts. And a customer who provides cash and sand to a manufacturer of generic silicon processors is clearly buying computer chips rather than sand enhancement services.
But the line blurs when the facts get more complicated, and SWU contracts exemplify a class of transactions that the Federal Circuit recognized does “ ‘not fall neatly’ either into the category of contracts for services or the category of contracts for the sale of goods.” Eurodif I, 411 F. 3d, at 1364 (quoting Florida Power & Light Co., supra, at 1373-1374). The agreement is not like the laundry ticket, which says that the same shirts are supposed to come back, just minus the dirt around the collar. And it is not on all fours with the agreement of the chip buyer and the manufacturer, in which it is inescapable that the silicon processors delivered are a separate good from the sand provided. Section 1673 simply does not speak with the precision necessary to say definitively whether it applies to the LEU and the agreement that gives the utility a right to get it.
This is the very situation in which we look to an authoritative agency for a decision about the statute’s scope, which is defined in cases at the statutory margin by the agency’s application of it, and once the choice is made we ask only whether the department’s application was reasonable. As to that, the Commerce Department relied on two related characteristics of these transactions in deciding SWU contracts should be treated as a sale of LEU. It stressed that the utility in a SWU contract provides cash plus a fungible commodity that is not tracked after its delivery to the en-richer, in exchange for a product owned by the enricher. And it recognized that the enrichment process results in a substantial transformation of the unenriched uranium.
The combination of these characteristics reasonably captures a common understanding of the sale of a good. Because an individual’s shirts are not fungible, they are tracked during the cleaning process and returned to the same customer who brought them in; there are no good reasons to treat them as owned for a time by the laundry, and no one does. And without any transfer of ownership, the salient feature of the transaction is the cleaning of the shirt, a service. Conversely, where a constituent material is untracked and fungible, ownership is usually seen as transferred, and the transaction is less likely to be a sale of services, as the Court explained years ago in distinguishing a common law bailment from a sale:
“[W]here logs are delivered to be sawed into boards, or leather to be made into shoes, rags into paper, olives into oil, grapes into wine, wheat into flour, if the product of the identical articles delivered is to be returned to the original owner in a new form, it is said to be a bailment, and the title never vests in the manufacturer. If, on the other hand, the manufacturer is not bound to return the same wheat or flour or paper, but may deliver any other of equal value, it is said to be a sale or a loan, and the title to the thing delivered vests in the manufacturer.” Powder Co. v. Burkhardt, 97 U. S. 110, 116 (1878).
And when the manufacturer is not only free to return different material, but also substantially transforms the material it uses, it is even more likely that the object of the transaction will be seen as a new product, not work on enduring material of primary interest to the buyer. After all, what makes the hypothetical exchange of sand for silicon processors so obviously a sale of goods is the extreme transformation brought about by the chip manufacturer.
These are good analytical grounds to show that SWU transactions are reasonably placed within the ambit of sale of goods, and the Department’s reliance on them is reinforced by practical reasons aimed at preserving the effectiveness of antidumping duties. There is no dispute that LEU sold under an EUP contract at less than fair value must be subjected to antidumping duties under §1673, there being a clear sale of goods when a domestic utility pays a single sale price in cash for the feed uranium and enrichment components represented by LEU. If foreign enrichers set this price below the fair value of LEU, the domestic enrichment industry is obviously open to material injury, the very threat the antidumping statute was meant to counter, see H. R. Rep. No. 1, at 23. But the same injury would occur if a SWU contract were untouchable. Under a SWU contract, the domestic utility pays cash to a third party for unenriched uranium and provides this along with additional cash in exchange for LEU; any EUP contract could be structured as a SWU contract simply by splitting the transaction in two, one contract to buy unenriched uranium and another to enrich it. And the restructuring would not stop with uranium; contracts for imported pasta would be replaced by separate contracts for wheat and wheat processing services, sweater imports would give way to separate contracts for wool and knitting services, and antidumping duties would primarily chastise the uncreative. The Commerce Department’s attempt to foreclose this absurd result by treating SWU transactions as sales of goods is eminently reasonable.
Ill
Where a domestic buyer’s cash and an untracked, fungible commodity are exchanged with a foreign contractor for a substantially transformed version of the same commodity, the Commerce Department may reasonably treat the transaction as the sale of a good under § 1673. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
LEU can also be produced through a centrifuge method or by back-blending unenriched uranium with weapons-grade uranium.
Many SWU contracts give the utility the option of providing a comparable quantity of uranium concentrate in lieu of the specified feed uranium. App. 13, 83, 268-269 (Sealed).
There are only five major uranium enrichers in the world, a scarcity that illustrates the “huge financial investment in facilities and a technically skilled work force” necessary to support the enrichment process. LEU from France, 66 Fed. Reg. 65884.
The Commerce Department concluded in a separate determination that LEU from the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands was not being sold, or likely to be sold, at less than fair value. Notice of Final Determinations of Sales at Not Less Than Fair Value: Low Enriched Uranium From the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands, id., at 65886. .
In February 2002, the International Trade Commission found that imports of LEU from France materially injured the enrichment industry in the United States, allowing the imposition of antidumping duties. U. S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Low Enriched Uranium From France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (Pub. No. 3486).
The specific factual findings on which an agency relies in applying its interpretation are conclusive unless unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S. C. § 706(2)(E).
Respondents’ assertion that the Commerce Department’s prior tolling regulation is inconsistent with its position in these cases is therefore beside the point. For the reasons given by the Department in its remand determination, we are not convinced that the tolling regulation precludes viewing SWU transactions as the sale of LEU; but even if it did, it has since been withdrawn, Tolling Operations, 73 Fed. Reg. 16517, and cannot now constrain the Commerce Department’s interpretive authority under Chevron. National Cable & Telecommunications Assn., 545 U. S., at 981 (“Unexplained inconsistency is, at most, a reason for holding an interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice under the Administrative Procedure Act”). Likewise, even if the position taken by the Department of Energy in Florida Power & Light Co. v. United States, 307 F. 3d 1364 (CA Fed. 2002), was inconsistent with the Government’s position here, it would not speak to the deference owed the Commerce Department under Chevron.
Respondents argue that, after determining that SWU contracts involved the sale of LEU, the Commerce Department employed an impermissible methodology by constructing the normal value of the LEU based on the combined costs to Eurodif of obtaining feed uranium and enrichment. Brief for Respondent Eurodif S. A. et al. 48-50. These calculations, respondents argue, “were a charade, underscoring that the anti-dumping law[s] cannot be applied to these SWU contracts.” Id., at 48. To the degree respondents’ argument is that antidumping duties may never be applied to mixed cash-commodity sales, it is doomed by implausibility. If respondents are contending that the Commerce Department’s dumping determination improperly assessed the normal value of LEU, they are raising an issue well outside the scope of our grant of certiorari.
Eurodif argues that the Commerce Department erred in concluding that enrichers own LEU prior to its delivery under a SWU contract. Id., at 36-37. While the precise form of this argument is unclear, it fails under any reading. Respondents seem to mean that the Commerce Department’s interpretation of § 1673 is impermissible as being inconsistent with the formal terms of SWU contracts, an argument we rejected above. The argument could also be read to suggest that the Commerce Department lacked substantial evidence to conclude that, contractual formalities aside, enrichers in fact own the LEU provided under SWU contracts prior to its delivery. But the evidence in the record not only supports the Department’s conclusion, it compels it. It is undisputed that the LEU delivered under a SWU contract is not actually derived from the feed uranium provided as consideration; as the CIT observed, the notion that the same feed uranium delivered by a utility to an enricher is enriched and then returned as LEU to the utility is “a legal fiction.” USEC Inc. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1339 (2003). Moreover, the enricher is free to vary the amount of feed uranium used to produce an order of LEU, either stockpiling feed uranium or supplementing its stores from other sources. Finally, the SWU contracts at issue provide that the utility retains title to the feed uranium until delivery of the LEU, at which point it obtains title in the LEU. In light of this process, some entity must own the LEU prior to delivery and obtain title to the feed uranium after delivery, absent some modern analog to the abhorrent possibility of an abeyance of seizen; the enricher is the only serious candidate.
Common law definitions do not necessarily control the meaning of terms in modern trade laws; we merely mean to show the long pedigree of the distinction relied upon by the Commerce Department.
This would be particularly easy in these cases, since COGEMA, Eurodif’s parent company, “is a major world supplier of natural uranium for the production of LEU.” Final Remand Determination, App. G to Pet. for Cert. 221a, n. 38. In fact, many SWU contracts provide that if a utility fails to deliver feed uranium, the enrieher will substitute feed uranium of its own, which may then be purchased from the enrieher. App. 13-14, 185-186, 537 (Sealed).
Eurodif suggests the Commerce Department could combat such circumvention of antidumping duties by taxing domestic downstream sales of such products. Brief for Respondent Eurodif S. A. et al. 58-54. But this ignores the substantial number of manufactured goods that are not resold. More fundamentally, this argument fails to explain why the Commerce Department should be required to chase after downstream resellers when the first sale has the same economic substance.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
When this litigation was first before us we recognized the existence of a federal “common law” which could give rise to a claim for abatement of a nuisance caused by interstate water pollution. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 (1972). Subsequent to our decision, Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. We granted cer-tiorari to consider the effect of this legislation on the previously recognized cause of action. 445 U. S. 926.
I
Petitioners, the city of Milwaukee, the Sewerage Commission of the city of Milwaukee, and the Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County of Milwaukee, are municipal corporations organized under the laws of Wisconsin. Together they construct, operate, and maintain sewer facilities serving Milwaukee County, an area of some 420 square miles with a population of over one million people. The facilities consist of a series of sewer systems and two sewage treatment plants located on the shores of Lake Michigan 25 and 39 miles from the Illinois border, respectively. The sewer systems are of both the “separated” and “combined” variety. A separated sewer system carries only sewage for treatment; a combined sewer system gathers both sewage and storm water runoff and transports them in the same conduits for treatment. On occasion, particularly after a spell of wet weather, overflows occur in the system which result in the discharge of sewage directly into Lake Michigan or tributaries leading into Lake Michigan. The overflows occur at discrete discharge points throughout the system.
Respondent Illinois complains that these discharges, as well as the inadequate treatment of sewage at the two treatment plants, constitute a threat to the health of its citizens. Pathogens, disease-causing viruses and bacteria, are allegedly discharged into the lake with the overflows and inadequately treated sewage and then transported by lake currents to Illinois waters. Illinois also alleges that nutrients in the sewage accelerate the eutrophication, or aging, of the lake. Respondent Michigan intervened on this issue only.
Illinois’ claim was first brought to this Court when Illinois sought leave to file a complaint under our original jurisdiction. Illinois v. Milwaukee, supra. We declined to exercise original jurisdiction because the dispute was not between two States, and Illinois had available an action in federal district court. The Court reasoned that federal law applied to the dispute, one between a sovereign State and political subdivisions of another State concerning pollution of interstate waters, but that the various laws which Congress had enacted “touching interstate waters” were “not necessarily the only federal remedies available.” Id., at 101, 103. Illinois could appeal to federal common law to abate a public nuisance in interstate or navigable waters. The Court recognized, however, that:
“It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But until that time comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water pollution.” Id., at 107.
On May 19, 1972, Illinois filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking abatement, under federal common law, of the pub-blic nuisance petitioners were allegedly creating by their discharges.
Five months later Congress, recognizing that “the Federal water pollution control program... has been inadequate in every vital aspect,” S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 7 (1971), 2 Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 93-1, p. 1425 (1973) (hereinafter Leg. Hist.), passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816. The Amendments established a new system of regulation under which it is illegal for anyone to discharge pollutants into the Nation’s waters except pursuant to a permit. §§ 301, 402 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1311, 1342 (1976 ed. and Supp. III). To the extent that the Environmental Protection Agency, charged with administering the Act, has promulgated regulations establishing specific effluent limitations, those limitations are incorporated as conditions of the permit. See generally EPA v. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S. 200 (1976). Permits are issued either by the EPA or a qualifying state agency. Petitioners operated their sewer systems and discharged effluent under permits issued by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR), which had duly qualified under § 402 (b) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1342 (b) (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), as a permit-granting agency under the superintendence of the EPA. See EPA v. State Water Resources Control Board, supra, at 208. Petitioners did not fully comply with the requirements of the permits and, as contemplated by the Act, §402 (b)(7), 33 U. S. C. § 1342 (b)(7), see Wis. Stat. Ann. § 147.29 (West 1974), the state agency brought an enforcement action in state court. On May 25,1977, the state court entered a judgment requiring discharges from the treatment plants to meet the effluent limitations set forth in the permits and establishing a detailed timetable for the completion of planning and additional construction to control sewage overflows.
Trial on Illinois’ claim commenced on January 11, 1977. On July 29 the District Court rendered a decision finding that respondents had proved the existence of a nuisance under federal common law, both in the discharge of inadequately treated sewage from petitioners’ plants and in the discharge of untreated sewage from sewer overflows, The court ordered petitioners to eliminate all overflows and to achieve specified effluent limitations on treated sewage. App. to Pet. for Cert. F-25 — F-26. A judgment order entered on November 15 specified a construction timetable for the completion of detention facilities to eliminate overflows. Separated sewer overflows are to be completely eliminated by 1986; combined sewer overflows by 1989. The detention facilities to be constructed must be large enough to permit full treatment of water from any storm up to the largest storm on record for the Milwaukee area. Id., at D-l. Both the aspects of the decision concerning overflows and concerning effluent limitations, with the exception of the effluent limitation for phosphorus, went considerably beyond the terms of petitioners’ previously issued permits and the enforcement order of the state court.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 599 F. 2d 151. The court ruled that the 1972 Amendments had not pre-empted the federal common law of nuisance, but that “[i]n applying the federal common law of nuisance in a water pollution case, a court should not ignore the Act but should look to its policies and principles for guidance.” Id., at 164. The court reversed the District Court insofar as the effluent limitations it imposed on treated sewage were more stringent than those in the permits and applicable EPA regulations. The order to eliminate all overflows, however, and the construction schedule designed to achieve this goal, were upheld.
II
Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78 (1938); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32 (1812). The enactment of a federal rule in an area of national concern, and the decision whether to displace state law in doing so, is generally made not by the federal judiciary, purposefully insulated from democratic pressures, but by the people through their elected representatives in Congress. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U. S. 63, 68 (1966). Erie recognized as much in ruling that a federal court could not generally apply a federal rule of decision, despite -the existence of jurisdiction, in the absence of an applicable Act of Congress.
When Congress has not spoken to a particular issue, however, and when there exists a “significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law,” Wallis, supra, at 68, the Court has found it necessary, in a “few and restricted” instances, Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U. S. 647, 651 (1963), to develop federal common law. See, e. g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363, 367 (1943). Nothing in this process suggests that courts are better suited to develop national policy in areas governed by federal common law than they are in other areas, or that the usual and important concerns of an appropriate division of functions between the Congress and the federal judiciary are inapplicable. See TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194 (1978); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 317 (1980); United States v. Gilman, 347 U. S. 507, 511-513 (1954). We have always recognized that federal common law is “subject to the paramount authority of Congress.” New Jersey v. New York, 283 U. S. 336, 348 (1931). It is resorted to “[i]n absence of an applicable Act of Congress,” Clearfield Trust, supra, at 367, and because the Court is compelled to consider federal questions “which cannot be answered from federal statutes alone,” D’Oench, Duhme Co. v. FDIC, 315 U. S. 447, 469 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring). See also Board of Commissioners v. United States, 308 U. S. 343, 349 (1939); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U. S. 580, 594 (1973); Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U. S. 25, 35 (1977) (Burger, C. J., concurring in judgment). Federal common law is a “necessary expedient^” Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train, 539 F. 2d 1006, 1008 (CA4 1976) (en banc), and when Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision, rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears. This was pointedly recognized in Illinois v. Milwaukee itself, 406 U. S., at 107 (“new federal laws and new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance”), and in the lower court decision extensively relied upon in that case, Texas v. Pankey, 441 F. 2d 236, 241 (CA10 1971) (federal common law applies “[u]ntil the field has been made the subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized administrative standards”) (quoted in Illinois v. Milwaukee, supra, at 107, n. 9).
In Arizona v. California, 373 U. S. 546 (1963), for example, the Court declined to apply the federal common-law doctrine of equitable apportionment it had developed in dealing with interstate water disputes because Congress, in the view of a majority, had addressed the question:
“It is true that the Court has used the doctrine of equitable apportionment to decide river controversies between States. But in those cases Congress had not made any statutory apportionment. In this case, we have decided that Congress has provided its own method for allocating among the Lower Basin States the mainstream water to which they are entitled under the Compact. Where Congress has so exercised its constitutional power over waters, courts have no power to substitute their own notions of an ‘equitable apportionment’ for the apportionment chosen by Congress.” Id., at 565-566.
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U. S. 618 (1978), the Court refused to provide damages for “loss of society” under the general maritime law when Congress had not provided such damages in the Death on the High Seas Act:
“We realize that, because Congress has never enacted a comprehensive maritime code, admiralty courts have often been called upon to supplement maritime statutes. The Death on the High Seas Act, however, announces Congress’ considered judgment on such issues as the beneficiaries, the limitations period, contributory negligence, survival, and damages.... The Act does not address every issue of wrongful-death law,... but when it does speak directly to a question, the courts are not free to ‘supplement’ Congress’ answer so thoroughly that the Act becomes meaningless.” Id., at 625.
Thus the question was whether the legislative scheme “spoke directly to a question” — in that case the question of damages — not whether Congress had affirmatively proscribed the use of federal common law. Our “commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental” to continue to rely on federal common law “by judicially decreeing what accords with ‘common sense • and the public weal’ ” when Congress has addressed the problem. TV A v. Hill, supra, at 195.
Contrary to the suggestions of respondents, the appropriate analysis in determining if federal statutory law governs a question previously the subject of federal common law is not the same as that employed in deciding if federal law pre-empts state law. In considering the latter question “ 'we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947)). While we have not hesitated to find pre-emption of state law, whether express or implied, when Congress has so indicated, see Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 157 (1978), or when enforcement of state regulations would impair “federal superintendence of the field,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142 (1963), our analysis has included “due regard for the presuppositions of our embracing federal system, including the principle of diffusion of power not as a matter of doctrinaire localism but as a promoter of democracy.” San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 243 (1959). Such concerns are not implicated in the same fashion when the question is whether federal statutory or federal common law governs, and accordingly the same sort of evidence of a clear and manifest purpose is not required. Indeed, as noted, in cases such as the present “we start with the assumption” that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law.
Ill
We conclude that, at least so far as concerns the claims of respondents, Congress has not left the formulation of appropriate federal standards to the courts through application of often vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity jurisprudence, but rather has occupied the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency. The 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act were not merely another law “touching interstate waters” of the sort surveyed in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S., at 101-103, and found inadequate to supplant federal common law. Rather, the Amendments were viewed by Congress as a “total restructuring” and “complete rewriting” of the existing water pollution legislation considered in that case. 1 Leg. Hist. 350-351 (remarks of Chairman Blatnik of the House Committee which drafted the House version of the Amendments) ; id., at 359-360 (remarks of Rep. Jones). See S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 95 (.1971), 2 Leg. Hist. 1511; id., at 1271 (remarks of Chairman Randolph of the Senate Committee which drafted the Senate version of the Amendments); see also EPA v. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U. S., at 202-203. Congress’ intent in enacting the Amendments was clearly to establish an all-encompassing program of water pollution regulation. Every point source discharge is prohibited unless covered by a permit, which directly subjects the discharger to the administrative apparatus established by Congress to achieve its goals. The “major purpose” of the Amendments was “to establish a comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of water pollution.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 95, 2 Leg. Hist. 1511 (emphasis supplied). No Congressman’s remarks on the legislation were complete without reference to the “comprehensive” nature of the Amendments. A House sponsor described the bill as “the most comprehensive and far-reaching water pollution bill we have ever drafted,” 1 Leg. Hist. 369 (Rep. Mizell), and Senator Randolph, Chairman of the responsible Committee in the Senate, stated: “It is perhaps the most comprehensive legislation ever developed in its field. It is perhaps the most comprehensive legislation that the Congress of the United States has ever developed in this particular field of the environment.” 2 id., at 1269. This Court was obviously correct when it described the 1972 Amendments as establishing “a comprehensive program for controlling and abating water pollution.” Train v. City of New York, 420 U. S. 35, 37 (1975). The establishment of such a self-consciously comprehensive program by Congress, which certainly did not exist when Illinois v. Milwaukee was decided, strongly suggests that there is no room for courts to attempt to improve on that program with federal common law. See Texas v. Pankey, 441 F. 2d, at 241.
Turning to the particular claims involved in this case, the action of Congress in supplanting the federal common law is perhaps clearest when the question of effluent limitations for discharges from the two treatment plants is considered. The duly issued permits under which the city Commission discharges treated sewage from the Jones Island and South Shore treatment plants incorporate, as required by the Act, see § 402 (b)(1), 33 U. S. C. § 1342 (b)(1) (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), the specific effluent limitations established by EPA regulations pursuant to § 301 of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1311 (1976 ed. and Supp. III). App. 371-394, 395-424; see 40 CFR § 133.102 (1980). There is thus no question that the problem of effluent limitations has been thoroughly addressed through the administrative scheme established by Congress, as contemplated by Congress. This being so there is no basis for a federal court to impose more stringent limitations than those imposed under the regulatory regime by reference to federal common law, as the District Court did in this case. The Court of Appeals, we believe, also erred in stating:
“Neither the minimum effluent limitations prescribed by EPA pursuant to the provisions of the Act nor the effluent limitations imposed by the Wisconsin agency under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System limit a federal court’s authority to require compliance with more stringent limitations under the federal common law.” 599 F. 2d, at 173.
Federal courts lack authority to impose more stringent effluent limitations under federal common law than those imposed by the agency charged by Congress with administering this comprehensive scheme.
The overflows do not present a different case. They are point source discharges and, under the Act, are prohibited unless subject to a duly issued permit. As with the discharge of treated sewage, the overflows, through the permit procedure of the Act, are referred to expert administrative agencies for control. All three of the permits issued to petitioners explicitly address the problem of overflows. The Jones Island and South Shore permits, in addition to covering discharges from the treatment plants, also cover overflows from various lines leading to the plants. As issued on December 24, 1974, these permits require the city Commission “to initiate a program leading to the elimination or control of all discharge overflow and/or bypass points in the [Jones Island or South Shore, respectively] Collector System... to assure attainment of all applicable Water Quality Standards.” App. 378-379, 416. The specific discharge points are identified. The Commission was required to submit a detailed plan to DNR designed to achieve these objectives, including alternative engineering solutions and cost estimates, file a report on an attached form for all overflows that do occur, install monitoring devices on selected overflows discharge points, and file more detailed quarterly reports on the overflows from those points. The Commission was also required to complete “facilities planning” for the combined sewer area. “The facilities planning elements include a feasibility study, cost-effectiveness analysis and environmental assessment for elimination or control of the discharges from the combined sewers.” Quarterly progress reports on this planning are required. Id., at 379. A permit issued to the city on December 18, 1974, covers discharges “from sanitary sewer crossovers, combined sewer crossovers and combined sewer overflows.” Id., at 425. Again the discharge points are specifically identified. As to separated sewers, the city “is required to initiate a program leading to the elimination of the sanitary sewer crossovers (gravity) and the electrically operated relief pumps....” Id., at 438. A detailed plan to achieve this objective must be submitted, again with alternative engineering solutions and cost estimates, any overflows must be reported to DNR on a specified form, and monitoring devices are required to be installed on selected points to provide more detailed quarterly reports. As to the combined sewers, the city “is required to initiate a program leading to the attainment of control of overflows from the city’s combined sewer system....” Id., at 443. The city is required to cooperate with and assist the city Commission in facilities planning for combined sewers, see supra, this page, submit quarterly progress reports to DNR, file reports on all discharges, and install monitoring devices on selected discharge points to provide more detailed quarterly reports “until the discharges are eliminated or controlled.” App. 444.
The enforcement action brought by the DNR in state court resulted in a judgment requiring “ [elimination of any bypassing or overflowing which occurs within the sewerage systems under dry weather by not later than July 1, 1982.” Id., at 465. Wet weather overflows from separated sewers were to be subject to a coordinated effort by the Commissions resulting in correction of the problem by July 1, 1986, pursuant to a plan submitted to the DNR. Id., at 469-471. As to the combined sewer overflows, the Commissions were required to accomplish an abatement project, with design work completed by July 1, 1981, and construction by July 1, 1993. Annual progress reports were required to be submitted to the DNR. Id., at 471-472.
It is quite clear from the foregoing that the state agency duly authorized by the EPA to issue discharge permits under ^the Act has addressed the problem of overflows from petitioners’ sewer system. The agency imposed the conditions it considered best suited to further the goals of the Act, and provided for detailed progress reports so that it could continually monitor the situation. Enforcement action considered appropriate by the state agency was brought, as contemplated by the Act, again specifically addressed to the overflow problem. There is no “interstice” here to be filled by federal common law: overflows are covered by the Act and have been addressed by the regulatory regime established by the Act. Although a federal court may disagree with the regulatory approach taken by the agency with responsibility for issuing permits under the Act, such disagreement alone is no basis for the creation of federal common law.
Respondents strenuously argue that federal common law continues to be available, stressing that neither in the permits nor the enforcement order are there any effluent limitations on overflows. This argument, we think, is something of a red herring. The difference in treatment between overflows and treated effluent by the agencies is due to differences in the nature of the problems, not the extent to which the problems have been addressed. The relevant question with overflow discharges is not, as with discharges of treated sewage, what concentration of various pollutants will be permitted. Rather the question is what degree of control will be required in preventing overflows and ensuring that the sewage undergoes treatment. This question is answered by construction plans designed to accommodate a certain amount of sewage that would otherwise be discharged on overflow occasions. The EPA has not promulgated regulations mandating specific control guidelines because of a recognition that the problem is “site specific.” See, e. g., EPA Program Requirements Memorandum PRM No. 75-34 (Dec. 16, 1975):
“The costs and benefits of control of various portions of pollution due to combined sewer overflows and bypasses vary greatly with the characteristics of the sewer and treatment system, the duration, intensity, frequency, and aerial extent of precipitation, the type and extent of development in the service area, and the characteristics, uses and water quality standards of the receiving waters. Decisions on grants for control of combined sewer overflows, therefore, must be made on a case-by-case basis after detailed planning at the local level.”
See also EPA, Report to Congress on Control of Combined Sewer Overflow in the United States 7-1, 7-13 (MCD-50, 1978). Decision is made on a case-by-case basis, through the permit procedure, as was. done here. Demanding specific regulations of general applicability before concluding that Congress has addressed the problem to the exclusion of federal common law asks the wrong question. The question is whether the field has been occupied, not whether it has been occupied in a particular manner.
The invocation of federal common law by the District Court and the Court of Appeals in the face of congressional legislation supplanting it is peculiarly inappropriate in areas as complex as water pollution control. As the District Court noted:
“It is well known to all of us that the arcane subject matter of some of the expert testimony in this case was sometimes over the heads of all of us to one height or another. I would certainly be less than candid if I did not acknowledge that my grasp of some of the testimony was less complete than I would like it to be....” App. to Pet. for Cert. P-4.
Not only are the technical problems difficult — doubtless the reason Congress vested authority to administer the Act in administrative agencies possessing the necessary expertise— but the general area is particularly unsuited to the approach inevitable under a regime of federal common law. Congress criticized past approaches to water pollution control as being “sporadic” and “ad hoc,” S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 95 (1971), 2 Leg. Hist. 1511, apt characterizations of any judicial approach applying federal common law, see Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310, 319 (1955).
It is also significant that Congress addressed in the 1972 Amendments one of the major concerns underlying the recognition of federal common law in Illinois v. Milwaukee. We were concerned in that ease that Illinois did not have any forum in which to protect its interests unless federal common law were created. See 406 U. S., at 104, 107. In the 1972 Amendments Congress provided ample opportunity for a State affected by decisions of a neighboring State’s permit-granting agency to seek redress. Under §402 (b)(3), 33 U. S. C. § 1342 (b)(3), a state permit-granting agency must ensure that any State whose waters may be affected by the issuance of a permit receives notice of the permit application and the opportunity to participate in a public hearing. Wisconsin law accordingly guarantees such notice and hearing, see Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 147.11, 147.13 (West Supp. 1980-1981). Respondents received notice of each of the permits involved here, and public hearings were held, but they did not participate in them in any way. Section 402 (b) (5), 33 U. S. C. § 1342 (b) (5), provides that state permit-granting agencies must ensure that affected States have an opportunity to submit written recommendations concerning the permit applications to the issuing State and the EPA, and both the affected State and the EPA must receive notice and a statement of reasons if any part of the recommendations of the affected State are not accepted. Again respondents did not avail themselves of this statutory opportunity. Under § 402 (d) (2) (A), 33 U. S. C. § 1342 (d)(2)(A) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), the EPA may veto any permit issued by a State when waters of another State may be affected. Respondents did not request such action. Under § 402 (d) (4) of the Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1342 (d) (4) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), added in.1977, the EPA itself may issue permits if a stalemate between an issuing and objecting State develops. The basic grievance of respondents is that the permits issued to petitioners pursuant to the Act do not impose stringent enough controls on petitioners’ discharges. The statutory scheme established by Congress provides a forum for the pursuit of such claims before expert agencies by means of the permit-granting process. It would be quite inconsistent with this scheme if federal courts were in effect to “write their own ticket” under the guise of federal common law after permits have already been issued and permittees have been planning and operating in reliance on them.
Respondents argue that congressional intent to preserve the federal common-law remedy recognized in Illinois v. Milwaukee is evident in §§ 510 and 505 (e) of the statute, 33 U. S. C. §§ 1370, 1365 (e). Section 510 provides that nothing in the Act shall preclude States from adopting and enforcing limitations on the discharge of pollutants more stringent than those adopted under the Act. It is one thing, however, to say that States may adopt more stringent limitations through state administrative processes, or even that States may establish such limitations through state nuisance law, and apply them to in-state dischargers. It is quite another to say that the States may call upon federal courts to employ federal common law to establish more stringent standards applicable to out-of-state dischargers. Any standards established under federal common law are federal standards, and so the authority of States to impose more stringent standards under § 510 would not seem relevant. Section 510 clearly contemplates state authority to establish more stringent pollution limitations; nothing in it, however, suggests that this was to be done by federal-court actions premised on federal common law.
Subsection 505 (e) provides:
“Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency)” (emphasis supplied).
Respondents argue that this evinces an intent to preserve the federal common law of nuisance. We, however, are inclined to view the quoted provision as meaning what it says: that nothing in § 505, the citizen-suit provision, should be read as limiting any other remedies which might exist.
Subsection 505 (e) is virtually identical to subsections in the citizen-suit provisions of several environmental statutes. The subsection is common language accompanying citizen-suit provisions and we think that it means only that the provision of such suit does not revoke other remedies. It most assuredly cannot be read to mean that the Act as a whole does not supplant formerly available federal common-law actions but only that the particular section authorizing citizen suits does not do so. No one, however, maintains that the citizen-suit provision pre-empts federal common law.
We are thus not persuaded that § 505 (e) aids respondents in this case, even indulging the unlikely assumption that the reference to “common law” in § 505 (e) includes the limited federal common law as opposed to the more routine state common law. See Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train, 539 F. 2d, at 1009, n. 9.
The dissent considers “particularly revealing,” post, at 343, a colloquy involving Senators Griffin, Muskie, and Hart, concerning the pendency of an action by the EPA against Reserve Mining Co. Senator Griffin expressed concern that “one provision in the conference agreement might adversely affect a number of pending lawsuits brought under the Refuse Act of 1899,” including the Reserve Mining litigation. 1 Leg. Hist. 190. The provision which concerned Senator Griffin, enacted as § 402 (k), 86 Stat. 883, 33 U. S. C. § 1342 (k), provides, in pertinent part:
“Until December 31, 1974, in any case where a permit for discharge has been applied for pursuant to this section, but final administrative disposition of such application has not been made, such discharge shall not be a violation of (1) section 301, 306, or 402 of this Act, or (2) section 13 of the Act of March 3, 1899, unless the Administrator or other plaintiff proves that final administrative disposition of such application has not been made because of the failure of the applicant to furnish information reasonably required or requested in order to process the application.”
Senator Griffin was concerned about the relation between this provision and § 4 (a) of the bill, which provided that “[n]o suit, action or other proceeding lawfully commenced by or against the Administrator or any other officer or employee of the United States in his official capacity or in relation to the discharge of his official duties under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act as in effect immediately prior to the date of enactment of the Act shall abate by reason of the taking effect of the amendment made by section 2 of this Act.” Senator Griffin stated that “when these provisions are read together, it is not altogether clear what effect is intended with respect to pending Federal court suits against polluters violating the Refuse Act of 1899.”
Senator Muskie responded to Senator Griffin’s concerns by quoting § 4 («•) and stating that “[w]ithout any question it was the intent of the conferees that this provision include enforcement actions brought under the Refuse Act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and any other acts of Congress.” 1 Leg. Hist. 193. Later Senator Hart stated: “It is my understanding,... after the explanation of the Senator from Maine, that the suit now pending against the Reserve Mining Co., under the Refuse Act of 1899 will in no way be affected nor will any of the other counts under the existing Federal Water Pollution Control Act or other law.” Id., at 211. When Senator Muskie’s and Hart’s remarks are viewed in this context it is clear that they do not bear on the issue now before the Court. In the first place, although there was a federal common-law claim in the Reserve Mining litigation, Senator Griffin focused on the Refuse Act of 1899— not federal common law. Senator Muskie, with his reference to “other acts of Congress,” rather clearly was not discussing federal common law. Most importantly, however, Senator Muskie based his response to Senator Griffin — that
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Powell
delivered the ¡opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan constitutes a “security” within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities Acts).
I
In 1954 multiemployer collective bargaining between Local 705 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America and Chicago trucking firms produced a pension plan for employees represented by the Local. The plan was compulsory and noncontributory. Employees had no choice as to participation in the plan, and did not have the option of demanding that the employer’s contribution be paid directly to them as a substitute for pension eligibility. The employees paid nothing to the plan themselves.
The collective-bargaining agreement initially set employer contributions to the Pension Trust Fund at $2 a week for each man-week of covered employment. The Board of Trustees of the Fund, a body composed of an equal number of employer and union representatives, was given sole authority to set the level of benefits but had no control over the amount of required employer contributions. Initially, eligible employees received $75 a month in benefits upon retirement. Subsequent collective-bargaining agreements called for greater employer contributions, which in turn led to higher benefit payments for retirees. At the time respondent brought suit, employers contributed $21.50 per employee man-week and pension payments ranged from $425 to $525 a month depending on age at retirement. In order to receive a pension an employee was required to have 20 years of continuous service, including time worked before the start of the plan.
The meaning of “continuous service” is at the center of this dispute. Respondent began working as a truckdriver in the Chicago area in 1950, and joined Local 705 the following year. When the plan first went into effect, respondent automatically received 5 years’ credit toward the 20-year service requirement because of his earlier work experience. He retired in 1973 and applied to the plan’s administrator for a pension. The administrator determined that respondent was ineligible because of a break in service between December 1960 and July 1961. Respondent appealed the decision to the trustees, who affirmed. Respondent then asked the trustees to waive the continuous-service rule as it applied to him. After the trustees refused to waive the rule, respondent brought suit in federal court against the International Union (Teamsters), Local 705 (Local), and Louis Peick, a trustee of the Fund.
Respondent’s complaint alleged that the Teamsters, the Local, and Peick misrepresented and omitted to state material facts with respect to the value of a covered employee’s interest in the pension plan. Count I of the complaint charged that these misstatements and omissions constituted a fraud in connection with the sale of a security in violation of § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b), and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1978). Count II charged that the same conduct amounted to a violation of § 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U, S. C. § 77q. Other counts alleged violations of various labor-law and common-law duties. Respondent sought to proceed on behalf of all prospective beneficiaries of Teamsters pension plans and against all Teamsters pension funds.
The petitioners moved to dismiss the first two counts of the complaint on the ground that respondent had no cause of action under the Securities Acts. The District Court denied the motion. 410 F. Supp. 541 (ND Ill. 1976). It held that respondent’s interest in the Pension Fund constituted a security within the meaning of § 2 (1) of the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), and § 3 (a) (10) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (10), because the plan created an “investment contract” as that term had been interpreted in SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946). It also determined that there had been a “sale” of this interest to respondent within the meaning of § 2 (3) of the Securities Act, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (3), and § 3 (a) (14) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c (a) (14). It believed respondent voluntarily gave value for his interest in the plan, because he had voted on collective-bargaining agreements that chose employer contributions to the Fund instead of other wages or benefits.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was certified for appeal pursuant to 28 IT. S. C. § 1292 (b), and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 561 F. 2d 1223 (1977). Relying on its perception of the economic realities of pension plans and various actions of Congress and the SEC with respect to such plans, the court ruled that respondent’s interest in the Pension Fund was a “security.” According to the court, a “sale” took place either when respondent ratified a collective-bargaining agreement embodying the Fund or when he accepted or retained covered employment instead of seeking other work. The court did not believe the subsequent enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, 29 U. S. C. § 1001 et seg., affected the application of the Securities Acts to pension plans, as the requirements and purposes of ERISA were perceived to be different from those of the Securities Acts. We granted certiorari, 434 U. S. 1061 (1978), and now reverse.
II
“The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 197, 199, and n. 19 (1976). In spite of the substantial use of employee pension plans at the time they were enacted, neither § 2 (1) of the Securities Act nor § 3 (a) (10) of the Securities Exchange Act, which define the term “security” in considerable detail and with numerous examples, refers to pension plans of any type. Acknowledging this omission in the statutes, respondent contends that an employee’s interest in a pension plan is an “investment contract,” an instrument which is included in the statutory definitions of a security.
To determine whether a particular financial relationship constitutes an investment contract, “[t]he test is whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.” Howey, 328 U. S., at 301. This test is to be applied in light of “the substance — the economic realities of the transaction— rather than the names that may have been employed by the parties.” United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 851-852 (1975). Accord, Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 336 (1967); Howey, supra, at 298. Cf. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U. S. 65, 80 (1969) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[0]ne must apply a test in terms of the purposes of the Federal Acts...”). Looking separately at each element of the Howey test, it is apparent that an employee’s participation in a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan such as the Teamsters’ does not comport with the commonly held understanding of an investment contract.
A. Investment of Money
An employee who participates in a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan by definition makes no payment into the pension fund. He only accepts employment, one of the conditions of which is eligibility for a possible benefit on retirement. Respondent contends, however, that he has “invested” in the Pension Fund by permitting part of his compensation from his employer to take the form of a deferred pension benefit. By allowing his employer to pay money into the Fund, and by contributing his labor to his employer in return for these payments, respondent asserts he has made the kind of investment which the Securities Acts were intended to regulate.
In order to determine whether respondent invested in the Fund by accepting and remaining in covered employment, it is necessary to look at the entire transaction through which he obtained a chance to receive pension benefits. In every decision of this Court recognizing the presence of a “security” under the Securities Acts, the person found to have been an investor chose to give up a specific consideration in return for a separable financial interest with the characteristics of a security. See Tcherepnin, supra (money paid for bank capital stock); SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U. S. 202 (1967) (portion of premium paid for variable component of mixed variable- and fixed-annuity contract); Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., supra (premium paid for variable-annuity contract) ; Howey, supra (money paid for purchase, maintenance, and harvesting of orange grove); SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943) (money paid for land and oil exploration). Even in those cases where the interest acquired had intermingled security and nonsecurity aspects, the interest obtained had “to a very substantial degree elements of investment contracts... Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., supra, at 91 (Brennan, J., concurring). In every case the purchaser gave up some tangible and definable consideration in return for an interest that had substantially the characteristics of a security.
In a pension plan such as this one, by contrast, the purported investment is a relatively insignificant part of an employee’s total and indivisible compensation package. No portion of an employee’s compensation other than the potential pension benefits has any of the characteristics of a security, yet these noninvestment interests cannot be segregated from the possible pension benefits. Only in the most abstract sense may it be said that an employee “exchanges” some portion of his labor in return for these possible benefits. He surrenders his labor as a whole, and in return receives a compensation package that is substantially devoid of aspects resembling a security. His decision to accept and retain covered employment may have only an attenuated relationship, if any, to perceived investment possibilities of a future pension. Looking at the economic realities, it seems clear that an employee is selling his labor primarily to obtain a livelihood, not making an investment.
Respondent also argues that employer contributions on his behalf constituted his investment into the Fund. But it is inaccurate to describe these payments as having been “on behalf” of any employee. The trust agreement used employee man-weeks as a convenient way to measure an employer’s overall obligation to the Fund, not as a means of measuring the employer’s obligation to any particular employee. Indeed, there was no fixed relationship between contributions to the Fund and an employee’s potential benefits. A pension plan with “defined benefits,” such as the Local’s, does not tie a qualifying employee’s benefits to the time he has worked. See n. 3, supra. One who has engaged in covered employment for 20 years will receive the same benefits as a person who has worked for 40, even though the latter has worked twice as long and induced a substantially larger employer contribution. Again, it ignores the economic realities to equate employer contributions with an investment by the employee.
B. Expectation of Profits From a Common Enterprise
As we observed in Forman, the “touchstone” of the Howey test “is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.” 421 U. S., at 852. The Court of Appeals believed that Daniel’s expectation of profit derived from the Fund’s successful management and investment of its assets. To the extent pension benefits exceeded employer contributions and depended on earnings from the assets, it was thought they contained a profit element. The Fund’s trustees provided the managerial efforts which produced this profit element.
As in other parts of its analysis, the court below found an expectation of profit in the pension plan only by focusing on one of its less important aspects to the exclusion of its more significant elements. It is true that the Fund, like other holders of large assets, depends to some extent on earnings from its assets. In the case of a pension fund, however, a far larger portion of its income comes from employer contributions, a source in no way dependent on the efforts of the Fund’s managers. The Local 705 Fund, for example, earned a total of $31 million through investment of its assets between February 1955 and January 1977. During this same period employer contributions totaled $153 million. Not only does the greater share of a pension plan’s income ordinarily come from new contributions, but unlike most entrepreneurs who manage other people’s money, a plan usually can count on increased employer contributions, over which the plan itself has no control, to cover shortfalls in earnings.
The importance of asset earnings in relation to the other benefits received from employment is diminished further by the fact that where a plan has substantial preconditions to vesting, the principal barrier to an individual employee’s realization of pension benefits is not the financial health of the fund. Rather, it is his own ability to meet the fund’s eligibility requirements. Thus, even if it were proper to describe the benefits as a “profit” returned on some hypothetical investment by the employee, this profit would depend primarily on the employee’s efforts to meet the vesting requirements, rather than the fund’s investment success. When viewed in light of the total compensation package an employee must receive in order to be eligible for pension benefits, it becomes clear that the possibility of participating in a plan’s asset earnings “is far too speculative and insubstantial to bring the entire transaction within the Securities Acts,” Forman, 421 U. S., at 856.
III
The court below believed that its construction of the term “security” was compelled not only by the perceived resemblance of a pension plan to an investment contract but also by various actions of Congress and the SEC with regard to the Securities Acts. In reaching this conclusion, the court gave great weight to the SEC’s explanation of these events, an explanation which for the most part the SEC repeats here. Our own review of the record leads us to believe that this reliance on the SEC’s interpretation of these legislative and administrative actions was not justified.
A. Actions of Congress
The SEC in its amicus curiae brief refers to several actions of Congress said to evidence an understanding that pension plans are securities. A close look at each instance, however, reveals only that Congress might have believed certain kinds of pension plans, radically different from the one at issue here, came within the coverage of the Securities Acts. There is no evidence that Congress at any time thought noncontributory plans similar to the one before us were subject to federal regulation as securities.
The first action cited was the rejection by Congress in 1934 of an amendment to the Securities Act that would have exempted employee stock investment and stock option plans from the Act’s registration requirements. The amendment passed the Senate but was eliminated in conference. The legislative history of the defeated proposal indicates it was intended to cover plans under which employees contributed their own funds to a segregated investment account on which a return was realized. See H. R.. Conf. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 41 (1934); Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, pp. 895-896 (1941). In rejecting the amendment, Congress revealed a concern that certain interests having the characteristics of a security not be excluded from Securities Act protection simply because investors realized their return in the form of retirement benefits. At no time, however, did Congress indicate that pension benefits in and of themselves gave a transaction the characteristics of a security.
The SEC also relies on a 1970 amendment of the Securities Act which extended § 3’s exemption from registration to include “any interest or participation in a single or collective trust fund maintained by a bank... which interest or participation is issued in connection with... a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan which meets the requirements for qualification under section 401 of title 26,...” § 3 (a) (2) of the Securities Act, as amended, 84 Stat. 1434, 1498, 15 U. S. C. § 77c (a) (2). It argues that in creating a registration exemption, the amendment manifested Congress’ understanding that the interests covered by the amendment otherwise were subject to the Securities Acts. It interprets “interest or participation in a single... trust fund... issued in connection with... a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan” as referring to a prospective beneficiary’s interest in a pension fund. But this construction of the 1970 amendment ignores that measure’s central purpose, which was to relieve banks and insurance companies of certain registra-tration obligations. The amendment recognized only that a pension plan had “an interest or participation” in the fund in which its assets were held, not that prospective beneficiaries of a plan had any interest in either the plan’s bank-maintained assets or the plan itself.
B. SEC Interpretation
The court below believed, and it now is argued to us, that almost from its inception the SEC has regarded pension plans as falling within the scope of the Securities Acts. We are asked to defer to what is seen as a longstanding interpretation of these statutes by the agency responsible for their administration. But there are limits, grounded in the language, purpose, and history of the particular statute, on how far an agency properly may go in its interpretative role. Although these limits are not always easy to discern, it is clear here that the SEC's position is neither longstanding nor even arguably within the outer limits of its authority to interpret these Acts.
As we have demonstrated above, the type of pension plan at issue in this case bears no resemblance to the kind of financial interests the Securities Acts were designed to regulate. Further, the SEC’s present position is flatly contradicted by its past actions. Until the instant litigation arose, the public record reveals no evidence that the SEC had ever considered the Securities Acts to be applicable to noncontributory pension plans. In 1941, the SEC first articulated the position that voluntary, contributory plans had investment characteristics that rendered them “securities” under the Acts. At the same time, however, the SEC recognized that noncontributory plans were not covered by the Securities Acts because such plans did not involve a “sale” within the meaning of the statutes. Opinions of Assistant General Counsel, [1941-1944 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Serv. ¶ 75,195 (1941) ; Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Proposed Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 895, 896-897 (1941) (testimony of Commissioner Purcell).
In an attempt to reconcile these interpretations of the Securities Acts with its present stand, the SEC now augments its past position with two additional propositions. First, it is argued, noncontributory plans are “securities” even where a “sale” is not involved. Second, the previous concession that noncontributory plans do not involve a “sale” was meant to apply only to the registration and reporting requirements of the Securities Acts; for purposes of the antifraud provisions, a “sale” is involved. As for the first proposition, we observe that none of the SEC opinions, reports, or testimony cited to us address the question. As for the second, the record is unambiguously to the contrary. Both in its 1941 statements and repeatedly since then, the SEC has declared that its “no sale” position applied to the Securities Acts as a whole. See opinions of Assistant General Counsel, [1941-1944 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Serv. ¶ 75,195, p. 75,387 (1941); Hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, supra, at 888, 896-897; Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H. R. Doc. No. 92-64, pt. 3, p. 996 (1971) (“[T]he Securities Act does not apply...”); Hearings before the Subcommittee on Welfare and Pension Funds of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on Welfare and Pension Plans Investigation, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 943-946 (1955). Congress acted on this understanding when it proceeded to develop the legislation that became ERISA. See, e. g., Interim Report of Activities of the Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, 1971, S. Rep. No. 92-634, p. 96 (1972) (“Pension and profit-sharing plans are exempt from coverage under the Securities Act of 1933... unless the plan is a voluntary contributory pension plan and invests in the securities of the employer company an amount greater than that paid into the plan by the employer”) (emphasis added). As far as we are aware, at no time before this case arose did the SEC intimate that the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts nevertheless applied to noncontributory pension plans.
IV
If any further evidence were needed to demonstrate that pension plans of the type involved are not subject to the Securities Acts, the enactment of ERISA in 1974, 88 Stat., 829, would put the matter to rest. Unlike the Securities Acts, ERISA deals expressly and in detail with pension plans. ERISA requires pension plans to disclose specified information to employees in a specified manner, see 29 U. S. C. §§ 1021-1030, in contrast to the indefinite and uncertain disclosure obligations imposed by the antifraud provisions of the Securities Acts, see Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U. S. 462, 474-477 (1977); TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U. S. 438 (1976). Further, ERISA regulates the substantive terms of pension plans, setting standards for plan funding and limits on the eligibility requirements an employee must meet. For example, with respect to the underlying issue in this case— whether respondent served long enough to receive a pension— § 203 (a) of ERISA, 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (a), now sets the minimum level of benefits an employee must receive after accruing specified years of service, and § 203 (b), 29 U. S. C. § 1053 (b), governs continuous-service requirements. Thus, if respondent had retired after § 1053 took effect, the Fund would have been required to pay him at least a partial pension. The Securities Acts, on the other hand, do not purport to set the substantive terms of financial transactions.
The existence of this comprehensive legislation governing the use and terms of employee pension plans severely undercuts all arguments for extending the Securities Acts to noncontributory, compulsory pension plans. Congress believed that it was filling a regulatory void when it enacted ERISA, a belief which the SEC actively encouraged. Not only is the extension of the Securities Acts by the court below unsupported by the language and history of those Acts, but in light of ERISA it serves no general purpose. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U. S. 99, 104-107 (1977). Cf. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U. S, 235, 250 (1970). Whatever benefits employees might derive from the effect of the Securities Acts are now provided in more definite form through ERISA.
V
We hold that the Securities Acts do not apply to a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan. Because the first two counts of respondent’s complaint do not provide grounds for relief in federal court, the District Court should have granted the motion to dismiss them. The judgment below is therefore
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
For examples of other noneontributory, compulsory pension plans, see Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U. S. 234, 236-237 (1978); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 500-501 (1978); Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U. S. 581, 590 (1977).
Contributions were tied to the number of employees rather than the amount of work performed. For example, payments had to be made even for weeks where an employee was on leave of absence, disabled, or working for only a fraction of the week. Conversely, employers did not have to increase their contribution for weeks in which an employee worked overtime or on a holiday. Trust Agreement, Art. 3, § 1, App. 62a.
Because the Fund made the same payments to each employee who qualified for a pension and retired at the same age, rather than establishing an individual account for each employee tied to the amount of employer contributions attributable to his period of service, the plan provided a “defined benefit.” See 29 U. S. C. § 1002 (35); Alabama Power Co. v. Davis, supra, at 593 n. 18.
Respondent was laid off from December 1960 until April 1961. In addition, no contributions were paid on his behalf between April and July 1961, because of embezzlement by his employer’s bookkeeper. During this 7-month period respondent could have preserved his eligibility by making the contributions himself, but he failed to do so.
Count III charged the Teamsters and the Local with violating their duty of fair representation under § 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a), and Count V (later amended as Count VI) charged the Teamsters, the Local, Peick, and all other Teamsters Pension Fund trustees with violating their obligations under § 302 (c) (5) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 186 (c) (5). Count IV accused all defendants of common-law fraud and deceit.
As of the time of appeal to the Seventh Circuit the District Court had not yet ruled on any class-certification issues.
Section 2 (1) of the Securities Act, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), defines a “security” as
“any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a'security/ or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.”
The definition of a “security” in § 3 (a) (10) of the Securities Exchange Act is virtually identical and, for the purposes of this case, the coverage of the two Acts may be regarded as the same. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 342 (1967).
Section 2 (3) of the Securities Act provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he term ‘sale’ or ‘sell’ shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a security, for value.” Section 3 (a) (14) of the Securities Exchange Act states that “[t]he terms'sale’ and'sell’ each include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of.” Although the latter definition does not refer expressly to a disposition for value, the court below did not decide whether the Securities Exchange Act nevertheless impliedly incorporated the Securities Act definition, cf. n. 7, supra, as in its view respondent did give value for his interest in the pension plan. In light of our disposition of the question whether respondent’s interest was a “security,” we need not decide whether the meaning of “sale” under the Securities Exchange Act is any different from its meaning under the Securities Act.
The Court of Appeals and the District Court also held that § 17 (a) of the Securities Act provides private parties with an implied cause of action for damages. In light of our disposition of this case, we express no views on this issue.
Respondent did not have any cause of action under ERISA itself, as that Act took effect after he had retired.
Respondent also argues that his interest constitutes a “certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement.” The court below did not consider this claim, as respondent had not seriously pressed the argument and the disposition of the “investment contract” issue made it unnecessary to decide the question. 561 F. 2d 1223, 1230 n. 15 (CA7 1977). Similarly, respondent here does not seriously contend that a “certificate of interest... in any profit-sharing agreement” has any broader meaning under the Securities Acts than an “investment contract.” In Forman, supra, we observed that the Howey test, which has been used to determine the presence of an investment contract, “embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court’s decisions defining a security.” 421 U. S., at 852.
This is not to say that a person’s “investment,” in order to meet the definition of an investment contract, must take the form of cash only, rather than of goods and services. See Forman, supra, at 852 n. 16.
Under the terms of the Local’s pension plan, for example, respondent received credit for the five years he worked before the Fund was created, even though no employer contributions had been made during that period.
In addition, the Fund received $7,500,000 from smaller pension funds with which it merged over the years.
See Note, The Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Laws to Compulsory, Noncontributory Pension Plans After Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 64 Va. L. Rev. 305, 315 (1978).
See Note, Interest in Pension Plans as Securities: Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 184, 201 (1978).
The amendment would have added the following language to §4 (1) of the Securities Act:
“As used in this paragraph, the term 'public offering’ shall not be deemed to include an offering made solely to employees by an issuer or by its affiliates in connection with a bona fide plan for the payment of extra compensation or stock investment plan for the exclusive benefit of such employees.” 78 Cong. Rec. 8708 (1934).
Section 17 (c) of the Securities Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (c), and § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b) (when read with §§ 3 (a) (10) and (12) of that Act), indicate that the antifraud provisions of the respective Acts continue to apply to interests that come within the exemptions created by § 3 (a) (2) of the Securities Act and § 3 (a) (12) of the Securities Exchange Act.
See S. Rep. No. 91-184, p. 27 (1969); Hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on Mutual Fund Legislation of 1967, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 1341-1342 (1967); Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 L. & Contemp. Probs. 795, 819-837 (1964); Saxon & Miller, Common Trust Funds, 53 Geo. L. J. 994 (1965). The SEC argues that the addition by the House of the language “single or” before "common trust fund” indicated an intent to cover the underlying plans that invested in bank-maintained funds. The legislative history, however, indicates that the change was meant only to eliminate the negative inference suggested by the unrevised language that banks would have to register the segregated investment funds they administered for particular plans. Because the provision as a whole dealt only with the relationship between a plan and its bank, the revision did not affect the registration status of the underlying pension plan. See 116 Cong. Rec. 33287 (1970). This was consistent with the SEC’s interpretation of the provision. Hearings, supra, at 1326. The subsequent addition of another provision excepting from the exemption funds “under which an amount in excess of the employer’s contribution is allocated to the purchase of securities... issued by the employer or by any company directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by or under common control with the employer” appears to have been simply an additional safeguard to confirm the SEC’s authority to require such plans, and only such plans, to register. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1631, p. 31 (1970).
It is a commonplace in our jurisprudence that an administrative agency’s consistent, longstanding interpretation of the statute under which it operates is entitled to considerable weight. United States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, 422 U. S. 694, 719 (1975); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U. S. 65, 74 (1974); Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617, 626-627 (1971); Udall v. Tollman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). This deference is a product both of an awareness of the practical expertise which an agency normally develops, and of a willingness to accord some measure of flexibility to such an agency as it encounters new and unforeseen problems over time. But this deference is constrained by our obligation to honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, purpose, and history. On a number of occasions in recent years this Court has found it necessary to reject the SEC’s interpretation of various provisions of the Securities Acts. See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 117-119 (1978); Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 1, 41 n. 27 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 212-214 (1976); Forman, 421 U. S., at 858 n. 25; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 759 n. 4 (1975) (Powell, J,, concurring); Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418, 425-427 (1972).
Sub
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Sotomayor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, farmer debtors.may treat- certain claims owed to a governmental unit resulting from the disposition of farm assets as discharge-able, unsecured liabilities. 11 U. S. C. § 1222(a)(2)(A). One such claim is for “any tax... incurred by the estate.” § 503(b)(l)(B)(i). The question presented is whether a federal income tax liability resulting from individual debtors' sale of a farm during the pendency of a Chapter 12 bankruptcy is “incurred by the estate” and thus dischargeable. We hold that it is not.
I
A
In 1986, Congress enacted Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, §1201 et seq., to allow farmer debtors with regular annual income to adjust their debts. Chapter 12 was modeled on Chapter 13, § 1301 et seq., which permits individual debtors with regular annual income to preserve existing assets subject to a “court-approved plan under which they pay creditors out of their future income.” Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U. S. 505, 508 (2010). Chapter 12 debtors similarly file a plan of reorganization. § 1221. To be confirmed, the plan must provide for the full payment of priority claims. § 1222(a)(2).
In the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPÁ), § 1003, 119 Stat. 186, Congress created an exception to that requirement:
“Contents of plan
“(a) The plan shall—
“(2) provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to priority under section 507, unless—
“(A) the claim is a claim owed to a governmental unit that arises as a result of the sale, transfer, exchange, or other disposition of any farm asset used in the debtor’s farming operation, in which case the claim shall be treated as an unsecured claim that is not entitled to priority under section 507, but the debt shall be treated in such manner only if the debtor receives a discharge.”
11 U.S. c: §1222.
Under § 1222(a)(2)(A), certain governmental claims resulting from the disposition of farm assets are downgraded to general, unsecured claims that are dischargeable after less than full payment. See § 1228(a). The claims are stripped of their priority status.
That exception, however, applies only to claims in the plan that are “entitled to priority under section 507” in the first place. Section 507 lists 10 categories of such claims. Two pertain to taxes: One category, § 507(a)(8), covers prepetition taxes, and is inapplicable in this case. The other, § 507(a)(2), covers “administrative expenses allowed under section 503(b),” which in turn includes “any tax... incurred by the estate.” §503(b)(l)(B)(i). Thus, for postpetition taxes to be entitled to priority under §507 and eligible for the § 1222(a)(2)(A) exception, the taxes must be “incurred by the estate.”
B
Petitioners Lynwood and Brenda Hall petitioned for bankruptcy under Chapter 12 and sold their farm shortly thereafter. Petitioners initially proposed a plan of reorganization under which they would pay off outstanding liabilities with proceeds from the sale. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) objected, asserting a federal income tax of $29,000 on the capital gains from the farm sale.
Petitioners amended their proposal to treat the income tax as a general, unsecured claim to be paid to the extent funds were available, with the unpaid balance discharged. Again the IRS objected. Taxes on income from a postpetition farm sale, the IRS argued, remain the debtors’ independent responsibility because they are neither collectible nor dis-chargeable in bankruptcy.
The Bankruptcy Court sustained the objection. The court reasoned that because a Chapter 12 estate is not a separate taxable entity under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), see 26 U. S. C. §§1398, 1399, it cannot “incur” taxes for purposes of 11 U. S. C. § 503(b).
The District Court reversed, expressing doubt that IRC provisions are relevant to interpreting § 503(b). Based on its reading of legislative history, the District Court determined that Congress intended § 1222(a)(2)(A) to extend to petitioners’ postpetition taxes.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 617 F. 3d 1161 (2010). The Court of Appeals held that the Chapter 12 estate does not “incur” the postpetition federal income taxes for purposes of § 503(b) because it is not a separate taxable entity under the IRC, and noted that Congress repeatedly has indicated the relevance of the IRC’s taxable entity provisions to the Bankruptcy Code. Although “sympathetic” to the view that the postpetition tax liabilities should be dischargeable, the Court of Appeals held that “the opérative language simply failed to make its way into the statute.” Id., at 1167. The Court of Appeals concluded that because the taxes do not qualify under § 503(b), they are not priority claims in the plan eligible for the § 1222(a) (2)(A) exception.
Judge Paez dissented, siding with a sister Circuit that had concluded that Congress intended § 1222(a)(2)(A) to extend to such postpetition federal income taxes. We granted certiorari to resolve the split of authority. 564 U. S. 1003 (2011).
II
A
Our resolution of this case turns on the meaning of a phrase in § 503(b) of the Bankruptcy Code: “incurred by the estate.” The parties agree that § 1222(a)(2)(A) applies only to priority claims collectible in the bankruptcy plan and that postpetition federal income taxes so qualify only if they constitute a “tax... incurred by the estate.” § 503(b)(1)(B)(i).
The phrase “incurred by the estate” bears a plain and natural reading. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U. S. 397, 403 (2011) (“When a statute does not define a term, we typically ‘give the phrase its ordinary meaning’”). To “incur,” one must “suffer or bring on oneself (a liability or expense).” Black’s Law Dictionary 836 (9th ed. 2009); see also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1146 (1976) (“to... become liable or subject to: bring down upon oneself”); Random House Dictionary 722 (1966) (“to become liable or subject to through one’s own action; bring upon oneself”). A tax “incurred by the estate” is a tax for which the estate itself is liable.
As the IRC makes clear, only certain estates are liable for federal income taxes. Title 26 U. S. C. §§ 1398 and 1399 address taxation in bankruptcy and define the division of responsibilities for the payment of taxes between the estate and the debtor on a chapter-by-chapter basis. Section 1398 provides that when an individual debtor files for Chapter 7 or 11 bankruptcy, the estate shall be liable for taxes. In such cases, the trustee files a separate return on the estate’s behalf and “[t]he tax” on “the taxable income of the estate... shall be paid by the trustee.” § 1398(e)(1); see also § 6012(b)(4) (“Returns of... an estate of an individual under chapter 7 or 11... shall be made by the fiduciary thereof”). Section 1399 provides that “[ejxcept in any case to which section 1398 applies, no separate taxable entity shall result from the commencement of a [bankruptcy] case.” In Chapter 12 and 13 cases, then, there is no separately taxable estate. The debtor — not the trustee — is generally liable for taxes and files the only tax return. See In re Lindsey, 142 B. R. 447, 448 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Okla. 1992) (“It is clear that, pursuant to 26 U. S. C. § 1398 and 1399, the standing Chapter 12 trustee neither files a return nor pays federal income tax”); cf. infra, at 621-522 (discussing special trustee duties in corporate-debtor cases).
These provisions suffice to resolve this case: Chapter 12 estates are not taxable entities. Petitioners, not the estate itself, are required to file the tax return and are liable for the taxes resulting from their postpetition farm sale. The postpetition federal income tax liability is not “incurred by the estate” and thus is neither collectible nor dischargeable in the Chapter 12 plan.
B
Our reading of “incurred by the estate” as informed by the IRC’s separate taxable entity rules draws support from a related provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 346, and its longstanding interplay with 26 U. S. C. §§ 1398 and 1399. That relationship illustrates that from the inception of the current Bankruptcy Code, Congress has specified on a chapter-by-chapter basis which estates are separately taxable and therefore liable for taxes. That relationship also refutes the dissent’s suggestion that applying such rules is an incongruous importation of “tax law” unconnected to “bankruptcy principles (as Congress understood them).” Post, at 631 (opinion of Breyer, J.). And it reinforces the reasonableness of our view that whether an estate “incurs” taxes under § 503(b) turns on such chapter-by-chapter distinctions.
In the original Bankruptcy Code, Congress included a provision, §346, that set out a chapter-specific division of tax liabilities between the estate and the debtor. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 2565. Section 346(b)(1) provided that in an individual-debtor Chapter 7 or 11 bankruptcy, “any income of the estate may be taxed under a State or local law imposing a tax... only to the estate, and may not be taxed to such individual.” 92 Stat. 2565 (emphasis added); see also 11 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶TX12.03[5][b][i], p. TX12-21 (16th ed. 2011) (hereinafter Collier) (Section 346(b) “provided that in a case under chapter 7 [or] 11... the estate of an individual is a taxable entity”). Section 346(d) provided, meanwhile, that in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, “any income of the estate or the debtor may be taxed under a State- or local law imposing a tax... only to the debtor, and may not be taxed to the estate ” 92 Stat. 2566 (emphasis added). Congress thus established that the estate in an individual-debtor Chapter 7 or 11 bankruptcy is a separate taxable entity; the estate in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy is not.
Although §346 concerned state or local taxes, Congress applied its framework to federal taxes two years later. In the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 3397, Congress enacted 26 U. S. C. §§1398 and 1399. Section 1398 of the IRC, much like § 346(b) in the Bankruptcy Code, established that the estate is separately taxable in individual-debtor Chapter 7 or 11 cases. Section 1399 of the IRC, much like § 346(d) in the Bankruptcy Code, clarified that the estate is not separately taxable in Chapter 13 (and now Chapter 12) cases.
In 2005, Congress in BAPCPA amended § 346 and crystallized the connection between- the Bankruptcy Code and the IRC. Section 346 now expressly aligns its assignment of state or local taxes with the rules for federal taxes, providing in relevant part:
“(a) Whenever the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 provides that a separate taxable estate or entity is created in a case concerning a debtor under this title, and the income... of such estate shall be taxed to or claimed by the estate, a separate taxable estate is also created for purposes of any State and local law imposing a tax on or measured by income and such income... shall be taxed to or claimed by the estate and may not be taxed to or claimed by the debtor....
“(b) Whenever the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 provides that no separate taxable estate shall be created in a case concerning a debtor under this title, and the income... of an estate shall be taxed to or claimed by the debtor, such income... shall be taxed to or claimed by the debtor under a State or local law imposing a tax on or measured by income and may not be taxed to or claimed by the estate” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, whenever the estate is separately taxable under federal income tax law, that “is also” the case under state or local income tax law, § 346(a), and vice versa, § 346(b). And given that the Bankruptcy Code instructs that the assignment of state or local tax liabilities shall turn on the IRC’s separate taxable entity rules, there is parity in turning to such rules in assigning federal tax liabilities.
In the same Act, Congress added § 1222(a)(2)(A). Section 1222(a)(2)(A) carves out an exception to the ordinary priority classification scheme. But § 1222(a)(2)(A) did not purport to redefine which claims are otherwise entitled to priority, much less alter the underlying division of tax liability between the estate and the debtor in Chapter 12 cases. “We assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation,” Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19, 32 (1990), and the existing law at the enactment of § 1222(a) (2)(A) indicated that an estate’s liability for taxes turned on chapter-by-chapter separate taxable entity rules.
C
The statutory structure further reinforces our holding that petitioners’ postpetition income taxes are not “incurred by the estate.” As a leading bankruptcy treatise and lower courts recognize, “[b]ecause chapter 12 was modeled on chapter 13, and because so many of the provisions are identical, chapter 13 cases construing provisions corresponding to chapter 12 provisions may be relied on as authority in chapter 12 cases.” 8 Collier ¶1200.01[5], at 1200-10; In re Lopez, 372 B. R. 40, 45, n. 13 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA9 2007); Justice v. Valley Nat. Bank, 849 F. 2d 1078, 1083 (CA8 1988). We agree. Section 1322(a)(2), like § 1222(a)(2), requires full payment of “all claims entitled to priority under section 507” under the plan. Both provisions cross-reference the same section of the Code, § 507, and in turn, the same subsection, § 503(b). Both are treated alike by IRC §§1398 and 1399. Whether postpetition taxes qualify under § 503(b) in Chapter 13 thus sheds light on whether they so qualify in petitioners’ Chapter 12 case.
Bankruptcy courts and commentators have reasoned that postpetition income taxes are not “incurred by the estate” under § 503(b) because “a tax on postpetition income of the debtor or of the chapter 13 estate is not a liability of the chapter 13 estate; it is a liability of the debtor alone.” 8 Collier ¶ 1305.02[1], at 1305-5 and 1305-6. For over a decade, the Government has likewise hewed to the position that “since post-petition tax liabilities are, in Chapter 13 cases, incurred by the debtor, rather than the bankruptcy estate,.characterizing such liabilities as administrative expenses is inconsistent with section 503.” IRS Chief Counsel Advice No. 200113027, p. 6 (Mar. 30, 2001), 2001 WL 307746; see also Internal Revenue Manual §5.9.10.9.2(3) (2006) (hereinafter IRM); IRS Litigation Guideline Memorandum GL-26, p. 9 (Dec. 16,1996), 1996 WL 33107107. We see no reason to depart from those established understandings. To “ ‘hold the Chapter 13 estate liable for [a] tax when it does not exist as a taxable entity defies common sense as well as Congress’ intent.’” In re Whall, 391 B. R. 1, 4 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mass. 2008). The same holds true for a Chapter 12 estate.
A provision in Chapter 13 confirms that postpetition income taxes fall outside § 503(b). Section 1305(a)(1) provides that “[a] proof of claim may be filed by any entity that holds a claim against the debtor... for taxes that become payable to a governmental unit while the ease is pending.” (Emphasis added.) That provision gives holders of postpetition claims the option of collecting postpetition taxes within the bankruptcy case — an option that the Government would never need to invoke if postpetition tax liabilities were already collectible inside the bankruptcy. Accordingly, lest we render §1305 “‘inoperative or superfluous,’” Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U. S. 88, 101 (2004), it is clear that postpetition income taxes are not automatically collectible in a Chapter 13 plan and, a fortiori, are not administrative' expenses under § 503(b).
It follows that postpetition income taxes are not automatically collectible in petitioners’ Chapter 12 plan. Because both chapters cross-reference § 503(b) in an identical manner, see §§ 1222(a)(2), 1322(a)(2), we are cognizant that any conflicting reading of § 503(b) here could disrupt settled Chapter 13 practices. See Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U. S. 213, 221 (1998) (the Court “'will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure’ ”). Chapter 13 filings outnumber Chapter 12 filings six hundredfold. See U. S. Bankruptcy Courts — Cases Commenced During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2011 (Table P-2) (estimating 676 and 417,503 annual Chapter 12 and 13 filings, respectively), http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/Bankruptcy Statistics.aspx (as visited May 14, 2012, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Yet adopting petitioners’ reading of § 503(b) would mean that, in every Chapter 13 case, the Government could ignore § 1305 and expect priority payment of postpetition income taxes in every plan.
At bottom, “identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc., 551 U. S. 224, 232 (2007). Absent any indication that Congress intended a conflict between two closely related chapters, we.decline to create one.
Ill
Petitioners and the-dissent advance several arguments for why the postpetition income taxes at issue should be consid-' ered “incurred by the estate,” notwithstanding the IRC’s separate taxable entity rules. But none provides sufficient reason to overcome the statute’s plain language, context, and structure.
Petitioners primarily argue that “incurred by the estate” has a temporal meaning. Petitioners emphasize that the estate only comes into existence after a bankruptcy petition is filed. Thus, they reason, taxes “incurred by the estate” refers to all taxes “incurred postpetition,” regardless of whether the estate is liable for the tax and regardless of the chapter under which a case is filed. Although all taxes “incurred by the estate” are necessarily incurred postpetition, not all taxes incurred postpetition are “incurred by the estate.” That an estate cannot incur liability until it exists does not mean that every liability that arises after that point automatically becomes the estate’s liability. And there is no textual basis to focus on when the liability is incurred, as opposed to whether the liability is incurred “by the estate.”
Alternatively, petitioners contend that a tax should be considered “incurred by the estate” so long as it is payable out of estate assets. Income from postpetition sales of farm assets is considered property of the estate. See § 1207(a). Petitioners argue that even if the debtor — and not the estate — is liable for a tax, the tax is still “incurred by the estate” because the funds the debtor uses to pay the tax are property of the estate. But that too strains the text beyond what it can bear. To concede that someone other than the estate is liable for filing the return and paying the tax, and yet maintain that the estate is the one that has “incurred” the tax, defies the ordinary meaning of “incur” as bringing a liability upon oneself.
The dissent, echoing both of these points, urges that we “simply... consider the debtor and estate as merged.” Post, at 534. “The English language,” the dissent reasons, “permits this reading” and “do[es] not require” our reading. Post, at 531. But any reading of “tax... incurred by the estate” that is contingent on merging the debtor and estate— despite Congress’ longstanding efforts to distinguish between when tax liabilities are borne by the debtor or borne by the estate — is not a natural construction of the statute as written.
Moreover, these alternative readings create a conflict between § 503(b) and § 346(b). Petitioners consider postpetition state or local income taxes, like federal income taxes, to be “incurred by the estate” under § 503(b). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5. But § 346(b) requires that such taxes be borne by the Chapter 12 debtor, not the estate. It is implausible to maintain that taxes are “incurred by the estate” when § 346(b) specifically prohibits such taxes from being “taxed to or claimed by the estate.”
To buttress their counterintuitive readings of the text, petitioners and the dissent suggest that there is a long history of treating postpetition taxes as administrative expenses entitled to priority. Both point to two legislative Reports accompanying the 1978 enactment of §503. But; neither snippet from which they quote is inconsistent with today’s holding, and we have cautioned against “allowing ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language.” Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562, 572 (2011).
Petitioners also point to cases suggesting that postpetition taxes were treated as administrative expenses. E. g., United States v. Noland, 517 U. S. 535, 543 (1996) (corporate Chapter 11 debtor); Nicholas v. United States, 384 U. S. 678, 687-688 (1966) (corporate Chapter XI case under predecessor Bankruptcy Act). But those cases involve corporate debtors and are therefore inapposite. Among estates that are not separately taxable, those involving corporate debtors have long been singled out by Congress for special responsibilities. See H. R. Rep., at 277 (even “[i]f the estate is not a separate taxable entity,” administrative responsibility can “var[y] according to the nature of the debtor”). Although estates of corporate debtors are not separate taxable entities under 26 U. S. C. §§ 1398 and 1399, the IRC requires a trustee that “has possession of or holds title to all or substantially all the property or business of a corporation” to “make the return of income for such. corporation.” § 6012(b)(3). In effect, Congress provided that the trustee in a corporate-debtor case may shoulder responsibility that parallels that borne by the trustee of a separate taxable entity. In any event, petitioners do not deny that neither the separate taxable entity provisions nor the special provisions for corporate debtors apply to them.
Finally, petitioners and the dissent contend that the purpose of 11 U. S. C. § 1222(a)(2)(A) was to provide debtors with robust relief from tax debts, relying on statements by a single Senator on unenacted bills introduced in years preceding the enactment. See Brief for Petitioners 23-36. They argue that deeming § 1222(a)(2)(A) inapplicable to their post-petition income taxes would undermine that purpose and confine the exception to prepetition taxes. But we need not resolve here what other claims, if any, are covered by § 1222(a)(2)(A). Whatever the 2005 Congress’ intent with respect to § 1222(a)(2)(A), that provision merely carved out an exception to the pre-existing priority classification scheme. The exception could only apply to claims “entitled to priority under section 507” in the first place. That pre-existing scheme was in turn premised on antecedent, decades-old understandings about the scope of § 503(b) and the division of tax liabilities between estates and debtors. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U. S. 410, 419 (1992) (“When Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not write ‘on a clean slate’”). If Congress wished to alter these background norms, it needed to enact a provision to enable post-petition income taxes to be collected in the Chapter 12 plan in the first place.
The dissent concludes otherwise by an inverted analysis. Rather than demonstrate that such claims were treated as § 507 priority claims in the first place, the dissent begins with the single Senator’s stated purpose for the exception to that priority scheme. Post, at 529-530. It then reasons backwards from there, and in the process upsets background norms in both Chapters 12 and 13.
Certainly, there may be compelling policy reasons for treating postpetition income tax liabilities as dischargeable. But if Congress intended that result, it did not so provide in the statute. Given the statute’s plain language, context, and structure, it is not for us to rewrite the statute, particularly in this complex terrain of interconnected provisions and exceptions enacted over nearly three decades. Petitioners’ position threatens ripple effects beyond this individual case for debtors in Chapter 13 and the broader bankruptcy scheme that we need not invite. As the Court of Appeals noted, “Congress is entirely free to change the law by amending the text.” 617 F. 3d, at 1167.
‡ ⅜ ⅜
We hold that the federal income tax liability resulting from petitioners’ postpetition farm sale is not “incurred by the estate” under § 503(b) and thus is neither collectible nor dis-chargeable in the Chapter 12 plan. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
It is so ordered.
Compare In re Dawes, 652 F. 3d 1236 (CA10 2011), and 617 F. 3d 1161 (CA9 2010) (ease below), with Knvdsen v. IRS, 581 F. 3d 696 (CA8 2009) (postpetition federal taxes are eligible for the § 1222(a)(2)(A) exception and thus dischargeable).
Because we hold that the postpetition federal income taxes at issue are not collectible in the plan because they are not “incurred by the estate,” we need not address the Government’s broader alternative argument that Chapter 12 plans are exclusively limited to prepetition claims.
For those of us for whom it is relevant, the legislative history confirms that Congress viewed § 346 as defining which estates were separate taxable entities. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 275 (1977) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.) (“A threshold issue to be considered when a debtor files a petition under title 11 is whether the estate created... should be treated as a separate taxable entity”); id., at 334 (“Subsection (d) indicates that the estate in a chapter 13 case is not a separate taxable entity”); accord, S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 45 (1978) (hereinafter S. Rep.); H. R. Rep., at 335 (noting “the creation of the estate of an individual under chapters 7 or 11 of title 11 as a separate taxable entity”); accord, S. Rep., at 46.
The Reports also tie separate taxable entity status to the responsibility to file returns and pay taxes. See H. R. Rep., at 277 (“If the estate is a separate taxable entity, then the representative of the estate is responsible for filing any income tax returns and paying any taxes due by the estate”); id,., at 278 (“When the estate is not a separate taxable entity, then taxation of the debtor should be conducted on the same basis as if no petition were filed”).
A dispute over Committee jurisdiction led to the insertion of “State or local” before each mention of “law imposing a tax.” Compare H. R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 346 (1977), with § 346, 92 Stat. 2565. Nonetheless, the House Report underscored that the policy behind § 346 applied equally to federal taxes:
“[T]here is a strong bankruptcy policy that these provisions apply equally to Federal, State, and local taxes. However, in order to avoid any possible jurisdictional conflict with the Ways and Means Committee over the applicability of these provisions to Federal taxes, H. R. 8200 has been amended to make the sections inapplicable to Federal taxes. The amendment... will obviate the need for a sequential referral of the bill to Ways and Means, which will be considering these provisions and other bankruptcy-related tax law later in this Congress.” H. R. Rep., at 275.
See, e.g., In re Maxfield, No. 04-60355, 2009 WL 2105953, *5-*6 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ND Ind., Feb. 19, 2009); In re Jagours, 236 B. R. 616, 620 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Tex. 1999); In re Whall, 391 B. R. 1, 5-6 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mass. 2008); In re Brown, No. 05-41071, 2006 WL 3370867, *3 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mass., Nov. 20,2006); In re Gyulafia, 65 B. R. 913,916 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Kan. 1986).
The dissent suggests that Chapter 12 can be distinguished from Chapter IS because Chapter 12 bankruptcies tend to be longer, such that the treatment of taxes is more “important.” Post, at 535. As a practical matter, it is not clear that Chapter 12 bankruptcies are substantially longer. Compare Brief for Neil E. Harl et al. as Amici Curiae 33 (median Chapter 12 case duration is under 8 months) with TV. of Oral Arg. 49 (“on average we’re talking about 4 months in a chapter 13 ease”). In any event, there is no indication that Congress intended any difference in duration — if it anticipated a difference at all — to flip the characterization of postpetition income taxes from one chapter to the other. Nor does the absence of a § 1305 equivalent in Chapter 12 justify shoehorning postpetition taxes into § 503(b), as the dissent argues. That Chapter 12 lacks a provision allowing such taxes to be brought inside the plan only clarifies that such taxes fall outside of the plan.
The dissent alternatively suggests that it “do[es] not see the serious harm in treating the relevant taxes as ‘administrative expenses’ in both Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 cases.” Post, at 536. The “harm” is to settled understandings in Chapter 13 to the contrary. The “harm” is also to § 1305; to avoid rendering § 1305 a nullity, the dissent recasts the provision as applicable not to all “taxes that become payable... while the ease is pending,” but only those payable “after the Chapter 13 Plan is confirmed.” Ibid. The dissent does not claim, however, that this was Congress’ intent for § 1305, as Congress’ choice of words would be exceedingly overbroad if it were. And the dissent’s novel reading contravenes ample Chapter 13 authority recognizing no such limitation on §1305’s scope. E. g., 8 Collier ¶1305.02 (citing cases).
IRS manuals dating back to 1998 indicate that the Government did not view postpetition federal income taxes as collectible in an individual debt- or’s Chapter 12 plan, even when that view was adverse to its interests. See IRM §25.17.12.9.3 (2004); id., §25.17.12.9.3(1) (2002); id., §5.9, ch. 10.8(4) (1999); id., §5.9, ch. 10.8(4) (1998). Until the enactment of 11 U. S. C. § 1222(a)(2)(A), treating such taxes as priority claims in the plan would have assured the Government of full payment before or at the time of the plan.
The House Report stated — after noting that, in addition to prepetition taxes; “certain other taxes are entitled to priority” — that “[t]axes arising from the operation of the estate after bankruptcy are entitled to priority as administrative expenses.” H. R. Rep., at 193. That is still true. Many taxes arising after bankruptcy, as in individual-debtor Chapter 7 or 11 eases, remain entitled to priority as administrative expenses. The Senate Report, meanwhile, stated: “In general, administrative expenses include taxes which the trustee incurs in administering the debtor’s estate, including taxes on capital gains from sales of property by the trustee and taxes on income earned by the estate during the case.” S. Rep., at 66 (emphasis added). That likewise remains true. Administrative expenses still include income taxes that “the trustee,” as opposed to the debtor, has incurred — again, as in individual-debtor Chapter 7 or 11 eases.
The original §346 established that the estate of a corporate debtor is not a separate taxable entity, but nonetheless provided that “the trustee shall make any [State or local] tax return otherwise required... to be filed by or on behalf of such... corporation.” §§346(c)(l)-(2), 92 Stat. 2566. The current §346 similarly states, in the same provision deeming the debtor taxable when there is no separate taxable estate, that “[t]he trustee shall make such tax returns of income of corporations.... The estate shall be liable for any [State or local] tax imposed on such corporation.” § 346(b).
The dissent opines that employment taxes must be administrative expenses “incurred by the estate” because, in its view, they “do not
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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L
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A group of white firefighters sued the city of Birmingham, Alabama (City), and the Jefferson County Personnel Board (Board) alleging that they were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified black firefighters. They claimed that the City and the Board were making promotion decisions on the basis of race in reliance on certain consent decrees, and that these decisions constituted impermissible racial discrimination in violation of the Constitution and federal statutes. The District Court held that the white firefighters were precluded from challenging employment decisions taken pursuant to the decrees, even though these firefighters had not been parties to the proceedings in which the decrees were entered. We think this holding contravenes the general rule that a person cannot be deprived of his legal rights in a proceeding to which he is not a party.
The litigation in which the consent decrees were entered began in 1974, when the Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and seven black individuals filed separate class-action complaints against the City and the Board. They alleged that both had engaged in racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices in various public service jobs in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000e et seq., and other federal law. After a bench trial on some issues, but before judgment, the parties entered into two consent decrees, one between the black individuals and the City and the other between them and the Board. These proposed decrees set forth an extensive remedial scheme, including long-term and interim annual goals for the hiring of blacks as firefighters. The decrees also provided for goals for promotion of blacks within the fire department.
The District Court entered an order provisionally approving the decrees and directing publication of notice of the upcoming fairness hearings. App. 694-696. Notice of the hearings, with a reference to the general nature of the decrees, was published in two local newspapers. At that hearing, the Birmingham Firefighters Association (BFA) appeared and filed objections as amicus curiae. After the hearing, but before final approval of the decrees, the BFA and two of its members also moved to intervene on the ground that the decrees would adversely affect their rights. The District Court denied the motions as untimely and approved the decrees. United States v. Jefferson County, 28 FEP Cases 1834 (ND Ala. 1981). Seven white firefighters, all members of the BFA, then filed a complaint against the City and the Board seeking injunctive relief against enforcement of the decrees. The seven argued that the decrees would operate to illegally discriminate against them; the District Court denied relief. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a.
Both the denial of intervention and the denial of injunctive relief were affirmed on appeal. United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F. 2d 1511 (CA11 1983). The District Court had not abused its discretion in refusing to let the BFA intervene, thought the Eleventh Circuit, in part because the firefighters could “institut[e] an independent Title VII suit, asserting specific violations of their rights.” Id., at 1518. And, for the same reason, petitioners had not adequately shown the potential for irreparable harm from the operation of the decrees necessary to obtain injunctive relief. Id., at 1520.
A new group of white firefighters, the Wilks respondents, then brought suit against the City and the Board in District Court. They too alleged that, because of their race, they were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks in violation of federal law. The Board and the City admitted to making race-conscious employment decisions, but argued that the decisions were unassailable because they were made pursuant to the consent decrees. A group of black individuals, the Martin petitioners, were allowed to intervene in their individual capacities to defend the decrees.
The defendants moved to dismiss the reverse discrimination cases as impermissible collateral attacks on the consent decrees. The District Court denied the motions, ruling that the decrees would provide a defense to claims of discrimination for employment decisions “mandated” by the decrees, leaving the principal issue for trial whether the challenged promotions were indeed required by the decrees. App. 237-239, 250. After trial the District Court granted the motion to dismiss. App. to Pet. for Cert. 67a. The court concluded that “if in fact the City was required to [make promotions of blacks] by the consent decree, then they would not be guilty of [illegal] racial discrimination” and that the defendants had “established] that the promotions of the black indivictuals . . . were in fact required by the terms of the consent decree.” Id., at 28a.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that, “[bjecause . . . [the Wilks respondents] were neither parties nor privies to the consent decrees, . . . their independent claims of unlawful discrimination are not precluded.” In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation, 833 F. 2d 1492, 1498 (1987). The court explicitly rejected the doctrine of “impermissible collateral attack” espoused by other Courts of Appeals to immunize parties to a consent decree from charges of discrimination by nonparties for actions taken pursuant to the decree. Ibid. Although it recognized a “strong public policy in favor of voluntary affirmative action plans,” the panel acknowledged that this interest “must yield to the policy against requiring third parties to submit to bargains in which their interests were either ignored or sacrificed.” Ibid. The court remanded the case for trial of the discrimination claims, suggesting that the operative law for judging the consent decrees was that governing voluntary affirmative-action plans. Id., at 1497.
We granted certiorari, 487 U. S. 1204 (1988), and now affirm the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment. All agree that “[i]t is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.” Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 40 (1940). See, e. g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 327, n. 7 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 328-329 (1971); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U. S. 100, 110 (1969). This rule is part of our “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §4449, p. 417 (1981) (hereafter 18 Wright). A judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings.
Petitioners argue that, because respondents failed to timely intervene in the initial proceedings, their current challenge to actions taken under the consent decree constitutes an impermissible “collateral attack.” They argue that respondents were aware that the underlying suit might affect them, and if they chose to pass up an opportunity to intervene, they should not be permitted to later litigate the issues in a new action. The position has sufficient appeal to have commanded' the approval of the great majority of the Federal Courts of Appeals, but we agree with the contrary view expressed by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in these cases.
We begin with the words of Justice Brandéis in Chase National Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U. S. 431 (1934):
“The law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a hearing the burden of voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a stranger. . . . Unless duly summoned to appear in a legal proceeding, a person not a privy may rest assured that a judgment recovered therein will not affect his legal rights.” Id. at 441.
While these words were written before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we think the Rules incorporate the same principle; a party seeking a judgment binding on another cannot obligate that person to intervene; he must be joined. See Hazeltine, supra, at 110 (judgment against Hazeltine vacated because it was not named as a party or served, even though as the parent corporation of one of the parties it clearly knew of the claim against it and had made a special appearance to contest jurisdiction). Against the background of permissive intervention set forth in Chase National Bank, the drafters cast Rule 24, governing intervention, in permissive terms. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a) (intervention as of right) (“Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene”); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(b) (permissive intervention) (“Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene”). They determined that the concern for finality and completeness of judgments would be “better [served] by mandatory joinder procedures.” 18 Wright §4452, p. 453. Accordingly, Rule 19(a) provides for mandatory joinder in circumstances where a judgment rendered in the absence of a person may “leave . . . persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring . . . inconsistent obligations. . . .” Rule 19(b) sets forth the factors to be considered by a court in deciding whether to allow an action to proceed in the absence of an interested party.
Joinder as a party, rather than knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree. The parties to a lawsuit presumably know better than anyone else the nature and scope of relief sought in the action, and at whose expense such relief might be granted. It makes sense, therefore, to place on them a burden of bringing in additional parties where such a step is indicated, rather than placing on potential additional parties a duty to intervene when they acquire knowledge of the lawsuit. The linchpin of the “impermissible collateral attack” doctrine — the attribution of preclusive effect to a failure to intervene — is therefore quite inconsistent with Rule 19 and Rule 24.
Petitioners argue that our decisions in Penn-Central Merger and N & W Inclusion Cases, 389 U. S. 486 (1968), and Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U. S. 102 (1968), suggest an opposite result. The Penn-Central litigation took place in a special statutory framework enacted by Congress to allow reorganization of a huge railway system. Primary jurisdiction was in the Interstate Commerce Commission, with very restricted review in a statutory three-judge District Court. Review proceedings were channeled to the District Court for the Southern District of New York, and proceedings in other District Courts were stayed. The District Court upheld the decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission in both the merger and the inclusion proceedings, and the parties to that proceeding appealed to this Court. Certain Pennsylvania litigants had sued in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to set aside the Commission’s order, and this action was stayed pending the decision in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. We held that the borough of Moosic, one of the Pennsylvania litigants, could not challenge the Commission’s approval of the merger and inclusion in the Pennsylvania District Court, pointing out the unusual nationwide character of the action and saying “[i]n these circumstances, it would be senseless to permit parties seeking to challenge the merger and the inclusion orders to bring numerous suits in many different district courts.” 389 U. S., at 505, n. 4.
We do not think that this holding in Penn Central, based as it was upon the extraordinary nature of the proceedings challenging the merger of giant railroads and not even mentioning Rule 19 or Rule 24, affords a guide to the interpretation of the rules relating to joinder and intervention in ordinary civil actions in a district court.
Petitioners also rely on our decision in Provident Bank, swpra, as authority for the view which they espouse. In that case we discussed Rule 19 shortly after parts of it had been substantially revised, but we expressly left open the question whether preclusive effect might be attributed to a failure to intervene. 390 U. S., at 114-115.
Petitioners contend that a different result should be reached because the need to join affected parties will be burdensome and ultimately discouraging to civil rights' litigation. Potential adverse claimants may be numerous and difficult to identify; if they are not joined, the possibility for inconsistent judgments exists. Judicial resources will be needlessly consumed in relitigation of the same question.
Even if we were wholly persuaded by these arguments as a matter of policy, acceptance of them would require a rewriting rather than an interpretation of the relevant Rules. But we are not persuaded that their acceptance would lead to a more satisfactory method of handling cases like these. It must be remembered that the alternatives are a duty to intervene based on knowledge, on the one hand, and some form of joinder, as the Rules presently provide, on the other. No one can seriously contend that an employer might successfully defend against a Title VII claim by one group of employees on the ground that its actions were required by an earlier decree entered in a suit brought against it by another, if the later group did not have adequate notice or knowledge of the earlier suit.
The difficulties petitioners foresee in identifying those who could be adversely affected by a decree granting broad remedial relief are undoubtedly present, but they arise from the nature of the relief sought and not because of any choice between mandatory intervention and joinder. Rule 19’s provisions for joining interested parties are designed to accommodate the sort of complexities that may arise from a decree affecting numerous people in various ways. We doubt that a mandatory intervention rule would be any less awkward. As mentioned, plaintiffs who seek the aid of the courts to alter existing employment policies, or the employer who might be subject to conflicting decrees, are best able to bear the burden of designating those who would be adversely affected if plaintiffs prevail; these parties will generally have a better understanding of the scope of likely relief than employees who are not named but might be affected. Petitioners’ alternative does not eliminate the need for, or difficulty of, identifying persons who, because of their interests, should be included in a lawsuit. It merely shifts that responsibility to less able shoulders.
Nor do we think that the system of joinder called for by the Rules is likely to produce more relitigation of issues than the converse rule. The breadth of a lawsuit and concomitant relief may be at least partially shaped in advance through Rule 19 to avoid needless clashes with future litigation. And even under a regime of mandatory intervention, parties who did not have adequate knowledge of the suit would relitigate issues. Additional questions about the adequacy and timeliness of knowledge would inevitably crop up. We think that the system of joinder presently contemplated by the Rules best serves the many interests involved in the run of litigated cases, including cases like the present ones.
Petitioners also urge that the congressional policy favoring voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims, referred to in cases such as Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U. S. 79 (1981), also supports the “impermissible collateral attack” doctrine. But once again it is essential to note just what is meant by “voluntary settlement. ” A voluntary settlement in the form of a consent decree between one group of employees and their employer cannot possibly “settle,” voluntarily or otherwise, the conflicting claims of another group of employees who do not join in the agreement. This is true even if the second group of employees is a party to the litigation:
“[P]arties who choose to resolve litigation through settlement may not dispose of the claims of a third party . . . without that party’s agreement. A court’s approval of a consent decree between some of the parties therefore cannot dispose of the valid claims of nonconsenting intervenors.” Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U. S. 501, 529 (1986).
Insofar as the argument is bottomed on the idea that it may be easier to settle claims among a disparate group of affected persons if they are all before the court, joinder bids fair to accomplish that result, as well as a regime of mandatory intervention.
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. That court remanded the case for trial of the reverse discrimination claims. Birmingham Reverse Discrimination, 833 F. 2d, at 1500-1502. Petitioners point to language in the District Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law which suggests that respondents will not prevail on the merits. We agree with the view of the Court of Appeals, however, that the proceedings in the District Court may have been affected by the mistaken view that respondents’ claims on the merits were barred to the extent they were inconsistent with the consent decree.
Affirmed.
Judge Anderson, dissenting, “agreefd] with the opinion for the court that these plaintiffs [the Wilks respondents] were not parties to the prior litigation which resulted in the consent decree, and that the instant plaintiffs are not bound by the consent decree and should be free on remand to challenge the consent decree prospectively and test its validity against the recent Supreme Court precedent.” In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation, 833 F. 2d, at 1503. He distinguished, however, between claims for prospective relief and claims for backpay, the latter being barred, in his opinion, by the City’s good-faith reliance on the decrees. Id., at 1502.
We have recognized an exception to the general rule when, in certain limited circumstances, a person, although not a party, has his interests adequately represented by someone with the same interests who is a party. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 41-42 (1940) (“class” or “representative” suits); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (same); Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147, 154-155 (1979) (control of litigation on behalf of one of the parties in the litigation). Additionally, where a special remedial scheme exists expressly foreclosing successive litigation by nonlitigants, as for example in bankruptcy or probate, legal proceedings may terminate preexisting rights if the scheme is otherwise consistent with due process. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U. S. 513, 529-530, n. 10 (1984) (“[Pjroof of claim must be presented to the Bankruptcy Court ... or be lost”); Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478, (1988) (nonclaim statute terminating unsubmitted claims against the estate). Neither of these exceptions, however, applies in these cases.
For a sampling of cases from the Circuits applying the “impermissible collateral attack” rule or its functional equivalent, see, e. g., Striff v. Mason, 849 F. 2d 240, 245 (CA6 1988); Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F. 2d 1144, 1146-1147 (CA2 1986), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 484 U. S. 301 (1988); Thaggard v. Jackson, 687 F. 2d 66, 68-69 (CA5 1982), cert. denied sub nom. Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U. S. 900 (1983) (REHNQUIST, J.. joined by Brennan, J., dissenting); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F. 2d 541, 558 (CA6 1982), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984); Dennison v. Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power, 658 F. 2d 694, 696 (CA9 1981); Goins v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 657 F. 2d 62, 64 (CA4 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 940 (1982); Society Hill Civic Assn. v. Harris, 632 F. 2d 1045, 1052 (CA3 1980). Apart from the instant one, the only Circuit decision of which we are aware that would generally allow collateral attacks on consent decrees by nonparties is Dunn v. Carey, 808 F. 2d 555, 559-560 (CA7 1986).
Rule 19(a) provides:
“A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction . . . shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person’s absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the perso>i’s ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper ease, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that party would render the venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed from the action.” (Emphasis added.)
Rule 19(b) provides:
“If a person . . . cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.”
The dissent argues, on the one hand, that respondents have not been “bound” by the decree but, rather, that they are only suffering practical adverse effects from the consent decree. Post, at 770-772. On the other hand, the dissent characterizes respondents’ suit not as an assertion of their own independent rights, but as a collateral attack on the consent decrees which, it is said, can only proceed on very limited grounds. Post, at 783-787. Respondents in their suit have alleged that they are being racially discriminated against by their employer in violation of Title VII: either the fact that the disputed employment decisions are being made pursuant to a consent decree is a defense to respondents’ Title VII claims or it is not. If it is a defense to challenges to employment practices which would otherwise violate Title VII, it is very difficult to see why respondents are not being “bound” by the decree.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether a person can sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act to recover damages from the United States Government for personal injuries sustained during confinement in a federal prison, by reason of the negligence of a government employee. For reasons to be developed below, we hold that such suits are within-the purview of the Act.
This litigation, brought here by the Government as a single case, arises from two separate suits for personal injuries brought by respondents Henry Winston and Carlos Muniz in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Both sought damages for personal injuries suffered while, they were confined in federal prisons. The district judge granted the Government’s motions to dismiss in both cases on the ground that such suits were not permitted by the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed, four judges, dissenting. 305 F. 2d 264, 287. Because the decision below involves an important question in the construction of the Federal Tort Claims Act and because two Courts of Appeals had previously reached a contrary result, we granted certiorari. 371 U. S. 919.
Winston alleged that in April 1959, while he was confined in the United States Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana, he began suffering dizziness, loss of balance, and difficulty with his vision. Upon Winston’s Initial complaint, the prison medical officer’s diagnosis was borderline hypertension; the treatment, a reduction in weight. Winston’s symptoms nevertheless recurred with increasing severity over the next nine months; he was unable to keep his balance and fell frequently. He also began to suffer periodic loss of vision. Despite repeated comT plaints to the prison officers, Winston was given no further-treatment, except some dramamine for his dizziness. In January 1960, Winston’s attorney became alarmed by his condition and had him examined by a consulting physician. In February 1960, an operation successfully removed the. benign brain tumor which had caused Winston’s difficulties, but his.sight.could not be saved. Winston alleged that the negligence of the prison employeés was responsible for the delay in diagnosis and removal of the tumor and caused his blindness.
Respondent Muniz alleged that he was, in August 1959, a prisoner in a federal correctional institution in Danbury, Connecticut. On -the afternoon of August 24, Muniz was outside one of the institution’s dormitories when- he was struck by an inmate, and then pursued by 12 inmates into another dormitory. A prison: guard, apparently choosing to confine the altercation instead of -interceding, locked the dormitory. The 12 inmates who had chased Muniz into the dormitory set upon him, beating him with chairs and sticks until he was unconscious. Muniz sustained a fractured skull and ultimately lost the vision of his right eye; He alleged that the prison officials were negligent in failing to provide enough guards to prevent the assaults leading to his injuries and in letting prisoners, some of whom were mentally abnormal, intermingle without adequate supervision.
Whether respondents are entitled to maintain these suits requires us to determine what Congress- intended when it passed the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946. This question would not appear at first glance to pose serious difficulty. Congress used neither intricate nor restrictive language in waiving the Government’s sovereign immunity. It gave the District Courts jurisdiction
“of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages,. :. for... personal injury... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U. S. C..§ 1346 (b).
The Act also provides that the “United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U. S. C. § 2674. Congress qualified this general waiver of immunity in 28 U. S. C. § 2680 by excepting from the Act claims arising from certain government activity, such as transmission of postal matter, assessment of taxes, imposition of a quarantine, or operation of the Panama Canal. None of the exceptions precludes suit against the Government by federal prisoners for injuries sustained in prison. So far as it appears from the face of the Act, Congress has clearly consented to suits such as those involved in the case at bar. Whether a claim could be made out would depend upon whether a private individual under like circumstances would be liable under state law, but prisoners are at least not prohibited from suing. Since a -number of lower courts have nevertheless reached a contrary conclusion, largely in reliance upon our decision in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135, we deem it appropriate to make a more detailed investigation into the intent of Congress.
An.examination of the legislative history of the Act reinforces our conclusion that Congress intended to permit such suits. For a number of reasons, it appears that Congress was well aware of claims by federal prisoners and that its failure to exclude them from the provisions of the Act in 28 U. S. C. § 2680 was deliberate. First, the Federal Tort Claims Act, as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, was designed not only to avoid injustice to those having meritorious claims hitherto barred by sovereign immunity, but to eliminate the burden on Congress of investigating and passing upon private bills seeking individual relief. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15, 24-25; Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135, 139-140. The task of screening these bills was substantial. See, e. g., 74 Cong. Rec. 6868. Private claim bills introduced in the Sixty-eighth through the Seventy-eighth Congresses averaged 2,000 or more per Congress, roughly 20% of which were enacted. H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. Among the private claim bills were a number submitted on behalf of federal prisoners, of which, between 1935 and 1946/Congress passed 21. The much larger number of private bills that must have been introduced were therefore among those adding to Congress’ burdens. In these circumstances it cannot be assumed that Congress was unaware of their presence.
A second indication that Congress was conscious of claims by federal prisoners is found in the prior versions of the Act. Efforts to permit tort suits against the Government began in 1925 with the introduction of H. R. 12178, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. Thereafter, at least one bill was introduced in every Congress, with the exception of the Seventy-fifth, until the present Act was passed by the Seventy-ninth Congress in 1946. Though the provisions of these bills underwent change during the intervening 21 years, the similarities are noteworthy. With the amendment of S. 1912 in the Sixty-ninth Congress, First Session, for example, came the first specific exceptions to. the general waiver of sovereign immunity. Two of those exceptions, relating to postal matters and taxation, were cast in language virtually identical to that used in the Act ultimately passed 20 years later. And as exceptions were added over the years, most relieved the Government from liability in the same circumstances as the present Act. Only a few exceptions were at one time proposed and later dropped, without counterpart in the present Act. One such exception related to claims by federal prisoners. Six of the 31 bills introduced in Congress between 1925 and 1946 either barred prisoners from suing while in federal prison or precluded suit upon any claim for injury to or death of a prisoner. That such, an exception was absent from the Act itself is significant in view of the consistent course of development of the bills proposed over the years and the marked reliance by each succeeding Congress upon the language of the earlier bills. We therefore feel that the want of an exception for prisoners’ claims reflects a deliberate choice, rather than an inadvertent omission.
Finally, the Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary made explicit reference to. the laws of four States, which had relaxed, to differing degrees, the rule of sovereign immunity. H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. The report noted that such “legislation does not appear to have had any detrimental or undesirable effect.” Id., at 3. In one of those four States, New York, it was well settled by 1946 that persons could recover for injuries sustained in prison. Congressional equanimity in the face of puch liability further strengthens the conclusion that Congress intended to permit suits by federal prisoners.
Considering the plain import of the statutory language, the number of prisoners’ claims among the individual applications for private bills leading to the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the frequent mention of a pris„oner-claims exception in proposed bills, and the reference, among others, to New York law, which permitted recovery by prisoners, we believe it is clear that Congress intended to waive sovereign immunity in cases arising from prisoners’’ claims.
The Government argues nevertheless that we should. imply an exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. For one thing, the Government urges that our decision in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135, controls. For another, it maintains that the impact of liability upon prison discipline would so seriously impair the administration of our prisons that Congress could not have intended such an “extreme” result.
The Court held, in Feres v. United States, that a soldier could not sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries which “arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” 340 U. S., at 146. Among the principal reasons articulated for doing so were: (1) the absence of an analogous or parallel liability, on the part of either an individual or a State; no.individual has power to mobilize a militia, no State had been held liable to its militiamen; (2) the presence of a comprehensive compensation system for service personnel; (3) the dearth of private bills from the military; (4) the distinctly federal relationship of the soldier to his superiors and the Government, which should not be disturbed, by state laws; and (5) the variations in state law to which soldiers would be subjected, involuntarily, since they have no choice in where they go. Although we find no occasion to question Feres, so far as military claims are concerned, the reasons for that decision are not compelling here.
First, the Government’s liability is no longer restricted to circumstances in which government bodies have traditionally been responsible for misconduct of their employees. The Act extends to novel and unprecedented forms of liability as well. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61; Rayonier, Inc., v. United States, 352 U. S. 315. And in any event, an analogous form of liability exists. A number of States have allowed prisoners to recover from their jailers for negligently caused injuries and sévéral States have allowed such recovery against themselves.
Second, the presence of a compensation system, persuasive in Feres, does not of necessity preclude a suit for negligence. In United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, a veteran sought damages for negligent treatment in a Veterans Administration Hospital aggravating a service-incurred injury. The veteran received additional compensation for the aggravation of the injury, even though he was-no longer on active duty. The Court nonetheless held that he could bring suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Also, the compensation system in effect for prisoners in 1946 was not comprehensive. It provided compensation only for injuries incurred while engaged in prison industries. Neither Winston nor Muniz would have been.covered.
Third, private bills.were never a. problem in the military, Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135, 140, as Congress might have thought them to be in the case of prisoners.
Admittedly, the remaining reasons for the decision in Feres, flowing from the impact of state law upon d federal establishment, could have relevance to the prisons as well as the armed forces. The variations in state law may to some extent hamper uniform administration of federal prisons,.as it was feared they woulckhamper the military. And the prisoners’ opportunities to recover may be affected by differences in state law over which'they have no control, a position shared by service personnel whose location is determined by government order rather than personal volition. So far as uniformity of operation is concerned, however, we have been given few concrete examples of how variations in personal injury law would impair the prison system. We are told not that the Government will be judged under too high a standard but under too many. This seems more a matter of conjecture than of reality. The published decisions in which prisoners have sought damages have related more to the precautions necessary to protect a kitchen worker from getting steel wool in his fingers, to protect a prisoner from an exploding emery wheel, or to protect a prisoner from falling off á ladder, than to some delicate matter of-prison administration. Even a matter such as improper medical treatment can be judged under the varying state laws of malpractice without violent dislocation of prison routine. Cf. Panella v. United States, 216 F. 2d 622 (C. A. 2d Cir.). Without more definite indication of the risks of harm from diversity, we conclude that the prison system will not be disrupted by the application of Connecticut law in one case and Indiana law in another to decide whether the Government should be liable to a prisoner for the negligence of its employees. Finally, though the Government expresses some concern that the nonuniform right to recover will prejudice prisoners, it nonetheless seems clear that no recovery would prejudice them even more.
In the last analysis, Feres seems best explained -by the
“peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty... United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 112.
We also are reluctant to believe that the possible abuses stemming from prisoners’ suits are so serious that all chance of recovery should be denied. It is possible, as the Government suggests, that frivolous suits will be brought, designed only to harass or, more sinister, discover details of prison security useful in planning an escape. And it is possible that the Government will be subjected to the burden of pretrial preparation, discovery, and trial, even though it prevails on the merits. This seems an inescapable concomitant of any form of liability. It is also possible that litigation will damage prison discipline, as the Government most vigorously argues. However, we have been shown no evidence that these possibilities have become actualities in the many States allowing suits against jailers, or the smaller number allowing recovery- directly against the States themselves. See notes 15 and 16, supra.
In addition, Congress has taken steps to protect the Government from liability that would seriously handicap efficient government operations. We do not intimate any opinion upon their applicability to these complaints, since no such, issue is presented for our review. We simply note that the Government is not without defenses. Most important, the Government is relieved from liability on
“Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (a). (Emphasis added,)
Also, the Government is not liable for the intentional torts of its employees, 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (h), for which prisoners might be especially tempted to initiate retributive litigation. We are confident that district judges, sitting without a jury as required by 28 U. S. 'C. § 2402, will be able to dispose of complaints intelligently without undue harm coming to our federal prisons., Federal rules of procedure are not so inflexible that clearly frivolous suits need embarrass prison officials or burden United States Attorneys’ offices.
One last point remains. Jailers in some States are not liable to their prisoners. For example, several States have decided that a warden in charge of a penitentiary, Carder v. Steiner, 225 Md. 271, 170 A. 2d 220, or a sheriff in charge of a county, jail, Bush v. Babb, 23 Ill. App. 2d 285, 162 N. E. 2d 594, is immune from suit because he exercises a quasi-judicial function requiring the use of discretion. Another has decided that the master of a house of correction has no duty of care toward his prisoners which would make him liable for his negligences O’Hare v. Jones, 161 Mass. 391, 37 N. E. 371. And there are overtones in these decisions suggesting that liability is also denied because of the fear that prison discipline would otherwise be. undermined. Such cases should not be persuasive. Just as we refused to import the “casuistries of municipal liability for torts” in Indian Towing, so we think it improper to limit suits by federal prisoners because of restrictive state rules of immunity. Whether a discretionary function is involved is a matter to be decided under 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (a), rather than under state rules relating to political, judicial, quasi-judicial, and ministerial functions. And the duty of care owed by the Bureau of Prisons to federal prisoners is fixed by 18 U. S. C. § 4042, independent' of an inconsistent state rule. Finally, having decided that discipline in the federal-prisons will not be so seriously-impaired that all recovery should be denied for negligently inflicted injuries, We should not at the same time make recovery depend upon a State’s decision to the contrary.
The Federal Tort Claims-Act provides much-needed relief to those suffering injury from the negligence of government employees. We should not, at the same time that state courts are striving to mitigate the' hardships caused by sovereign immunity, narrow the remedies provided by Congress. As we said in Rayonier, Inc., v. United States, supra, at 320, “There is no justification, for this Court to read exemptions into the Act beyond those provided by Congress. If the Act is to be altered that is a function for the same body that adopted it.”
Affirmed..
Mk. Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
28 U. S. C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671-2680.
The orders of the District Court were initially reversed by a panel of three judges, one judge dissenting. 305 F. 2d 253, 285. On rehearing en banc, the panel decisions were upheld. 305. F. 2d 264, 287.
James v. United States, 280 F. 2d 428 (C-. A. 8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U. S. 845; Lack v. United States, 262 F. 2d 167 (C. A. 8th Cir.) ; Jones v. United States; 249 F. 2d 864 (C, A. 7th Cir.).
James v. United States, 280 F. 2d 428 (C. A. 8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U. S. 845; Lack v. United States, 262 F. 2d 167 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Jones v. United States, 249 F. 2d 864 (C. A. 7th Cir.); Berman v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 107; Golub v. United States, Civil No. 148-117, D. C. S. D. N. Y., Oct. 5, 1959; Collins v. United States, No. T-1509, D. C. D. Kansas, Jan. 29, 1958; Trostle v. United States, No. 1493, D. C. W. D. Mo., Feb. 20, 1958; Van Zuch v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 468; Shew v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 1; Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906; Ellison v. United States, No. 1003, D. C. W. D. N. C., July 26, 1951.
August 2, 1946, c. 753, 60 Stat. 812.
To ensure transfer of private claims to the courts, Congress prohibited introduction of private bills for claims cognizable under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 131, 60 Stat. 831, 2 U. S. C. § 190g.
Act of August 13, 1935, 49 Stat. 2132; Act of August 26, 1935, 49 Stat. 2182; Act of March 7, 1936, 49 Stat. 2233; Act of March 7, 1936, 49 Stat. 2234; Act of June 11, 1937, 50 Stat. 986; Act of June 15, 1937, 50 Stat. 993; Act of June 29, 1937, 50 Stat. 1011; Act of July 19, 1937, 50 Stat. 1036; Act of April 13,1938, 52 Stat. 1293; Act of July 15, 1939, 53 Stat. 1473; Act of August 5, 1939, 53 Stat. 1501; Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 955; Act of November 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 971; Act of-February 10, 1942, 56 Stat. 1101; Act of February 18, 1942, 56 Stat. 1112; Act of June 6, 1942; 56 Stat. 1180; Act of December 17, 1942, 56 Stat. 1244; Act of February 22, 1944, 58 Stat.- 948; Act of May 29, 1944, 58 Stat. 982; Act of December 20, 1944, 58 Stat. 1070; Act of July 25, 1946, 60 Stat. 1264.
The Government already had consented to suits upon admiralty and maritime torts involving government vessels in the Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat. 525, 46 U. S. C. §§ 741-752, and the Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat. 1112, 46 U. S. C. §§ 781-790.
In a few bills, an exception was made for claims arising out of negligent treatment in government hospitals. No such exception was made in the Act and sovereign immunity was clearly waived as to such claims. See, e. g., United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110.
Three exceptions would have barred recovery under the Act where comprehensive compensation schemes were in effect : (1) claims covered by.the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act; (2) claims for personal injuries incurred by military personnel on active duty; and (3) claims for destruction of personal property belonging to military personnel on active duty covered by predecessors of the Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945. The three applicable compensation statutes have been held to be exclusive: (1) Johansen v. United States, 343 U. S. 427; Sasse v. United States, 201 F. 2d 871 (C. A. 7th Cir.) ; but cf. Parr v. United States, 172 F. 2d 462 (C. A. 10th Cir.); (2) Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (at least to the extent of service-connected injuries of active duty personnel); and (3) Preferred Ins. Co. v. United States, 222 F. 2d 942 (C. A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U. S. 837.
Exceptions relating to the. administration of laws by the SEC and FTC or to the effect of an Act of Congress or an Executive Order no longer appear, but are subsumed under 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (a), which excludes claims based “upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid...”
Other than the exception for prisoners’ claims, discussed in the text, the only remaining exceptions having no counterpart in the present Act barred liability for governmental activity relating to flood control, harbor and river work, and irrigation projects. To the extent that these activities constitute “discretionary function [s],” the exception of 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (a) still preserves government immunity. United States v. Ure, 225 F. 2d 709 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Coates v. United States, 181 F. 2d 816 (C. A. 8th Cir.); McGillic v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 565.
H. R. 17168, 71st Cong., 3d Sess.; S. 211, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 4567, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.; H. R. 5065, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 1833,- 73d Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 1043, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
The House Report accompanied H. R. 181, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., which related-only to tort claims. The Federal Tort Claims Act passed at the Second Session of the Seventy-ninth Congress as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was virtually identical to H. R. 181, except that there was no limitation of liability.
N. Y. Laws 1929, e. 467, provided, in part:
“The state hereby waives its immunity from liability for the torts of its officers and employees and consents to have its liability for such torts determined in accordance with the same rules of law as apply to an action in the supreme court against an individual or a corporation, and the state hereby assumes liability for such acts, and jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the court of claims to hear and determine all claims against the state to recover damages for injuries to property or for personal injury caused by the misfeasance or negligence of the officers or employees of the state while acting as such officer or employee....”
The laws of the other three States to which Congress.referred, California, Arizona, and Illinois, conferred jurisdiction upon the state courts to hear suits against the state governments for negligence. Cal. Stat. 1893, c. 45; Ariz. Laws 1912, c. 59; Ill. Laws 1917, p. 325. However, the state courts did not construe the grant of jurisdiction as a waiver of sovereign immunity and continued to find the Government immune, at least when it was acting in a governmental rather than a proprietary capacity. E. g., Denning v. State, 123 Cal. 316, 55 P. 1000; State v. Sharp, 21 Ariz. 424, 189 P. 631; Monahan v. State, 10 C. C. R. 10 (Ill. Ct. of Claims).
The House Report does not make this distinction apparent, nor for that matter does the report refer with any particularity to the laws of any State.
E. g., Paige v. State, 269 N. Y. 352,199 N. E. 6.17 (1936); White v. State, 260 App. Div. 413, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 526, aff’d, 285 N. Y. 728, 34 N. E. 2d 896 (1941). The remedy was limited to some extent, however, since a “civil death” statute, N. Y. Penal Law § 510, precluded suit while the person was still in prison.
At the time Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act, Illinois had just amended its laws and waived its sovereign immunity in tort suits. Ill. Laws 1945, p. 660 (now Ill. Rev. Stat., 1961, c. 37, § 439.8). Under this amendment, Illinois prisoners were permitted to recover against the State for negligently caused injuries incurred in prison. E. g., Moore v. State, 21 C. C. R. 282 (Ill. Ct. of Claims). This change in Illinois law occurred after H. R, Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., was prepared and was not brought to Congress’ attention.
It is true, as the Government points out, that Congress has; since 1946, passed private bills for the relief of federal prisoners. E. g., Act of June 21, 1955, 69 Stat. A30; Act of June 29, 1956, 70 Stat. A97. Since § 131 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 2 U. S. C. § 190g, does not permit such bills if recovery is available under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Congress’ passage of private bills must, the Government argues, be taken as congressional approval of the decisions barring suit by federal prisoners. However, the construction given an Act of the Seventy-ninth Congress by the Eighty-fourth Congress is not determinative, Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 593, and the acquiescence of subsequent Congresses does not of necessity constitute approval. “We do not expect Congress to make an affirmative move every time a lower court indulges in an erroneous interpretation.” Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U. S. 524, 534.
See cases collected at 14 A. L. R. 2d 353; see also Woody, Recovery by Federal Prisoners under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 36 Wash. L. Rev. 338, 353, n. 83.
New York, see note 12, supra; Illinois, see note 13, supra; North Carolina, N. C. Gen. Stat., 1958, § 143-291; Ivey v. North Carolina Prison Dept., 252 N. C. 615, 114 S. E. 2d 812; Washington, Wash. Laws 1961, c. 136.
The predecessor of 18 U. S. C. § 4126 provided compensation in 1946 only for prisoners working for Federal Prison Industries, Inc. Only 20% of all federal prisoners were so engaged. 1957 Rep. Atty. Gen. 409. And even those prisoners would not have been covered for injuries sustained outside working hours. In 1961, Congress extended compensation “to inmates or their dependents for injuries suffered in any industry or in any work activity in connection with the maintenance or operation of the institution where confined.” 18 U. S. C. §4126, as amended, Sept. 26, 1961, 75 Stat. 681. Even this broadened coverage fails to reach roughly 10% of the prisoners who are physically unable to work. 1957 Rep. Atty. Gen. 409. And, in any event, the compensation system still fails to provide for non-work injuries, contrary to that applicable to military personnel. Finally, the alteration of a compensation scheme 15 years after Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act does not provide reliable insight into the then existing congressional intent.
See note 7, supra.
One suggestion was that Kansas might find a 10 to 1 guard to prisoner ratio necessary, while Alabama would be satisfied with 30 to 1; thus the wardens of penitentiaries at Leavenworth and Atlanta would have to shape their conduct to different state standards. It Would seem more probable, however, that no State has so carefully delineated the boundary between negligence and reasonable care and that, in any event, wardens would assign the number of guards they could afford or thought necessary, rather than the number that might satisfy state concepts of due care.
See Van Zuch v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 468.
See Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906.
See Lack v. United States, 262 F. 2d 167 (C. A. 8th Cir.).
See, e. g., Morton v. United States, 97 U. S. App. D. C. 84, 228 F. 2d 431.
Ibid.
Though there are a number of instances in which federal courts have declined to review matters of internal prison discipline and administration, frequently upon application for habeas corpus, they have reviewed serious charges of deprivation of constitutional rights, e. g., Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F. 2d 233 (C. A:2d Cir.); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F. 2d 196 (C. A. 4th Cir.). See also Panella v. United States, 216 F. 2d 622 (C. A. 2d Cir.) (U. S. Public Health Service Hospital, Lexington, Ky.); Coffin v. Reichard; 143 F. 2d 443 (C. A. 6th Cir.) (U. S. Public Health Service Hospital, Lexington, Ky.).
18 U. S. C. §4042 provides:
“The Bureau of Prisons, under the direction of the Attorney General, shall—
“(1) have charge of the management and regulation of all Federal penal and correctional institutions;
“(2) provide suitable quarters and provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States, or held as witnesses or otherwise;
“(3) provide for the protection, instruction, and discipline of all persons charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States.”
Respondent Muniz suggests that a federal law should be developed, since some federal prisons are within federal enclaves. The suggestion is impractical, since some prisons are not within enclaves, and aforestalled by 45 Stat. 54, 16 U. S. C. § 457, which provides:
“In the case of the death of any person by the neglect or wrongful act. of another within a national park or other place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, within the exterior boundaries of
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question is whether want of a federal cause of action to try claims of title to land obtained at a federal tax sale precludes removal to federal court of a state action with nondiverse parties raising a disputed issue of federal title law. We answer no, and hold that the national interest in providing a federal forum for federal tax litigation is sufficiently substantial to support the exercise of federal-question jurisdiction over the disputed issue on removal, which would not distort any division of labor between the state and federal courts, provided or assumed by Congress.
h-H
In 1994, the Internal Revenue Service seized Michigan real property belonging to petitioner Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc., to satisfy Grable’s federal tax delinquency. Title 26 U. S. C. § 6335 required the IRS to give notice of the seizure, and there is no dispute that Grable received actual notice by certified mail before the IRS sold the property to respondent Darue Engineering & Manufacturing. Although Grable also received notice of the sale itself, it did not exercise its statutory right to redeem the property within 180 days of the sale, § 6337(b)(1), and after that period had passed, the Government gave Darue a quitclaim deed, §6339.
Five years later, Grable brought a quiet title action in state court, claiming that Darue’s record title was invalid because the IRS had failed to notify Grable of its seizure of the property in the exact manner required by § 6335(a), which provides that written notice must be “given by the Secretary to the owner of the property [or] left at his usual place of abode or business.” Grable said that the statute required personal service, not service by certified mail.
Darue removed the ease to Federal District Court as presenting a federal question, because the claim of title depended on the interpretation of the notice statute in the federal tax law. The District Court declined to remand the case at Grable’s behest after finding that the “claim does pose a ‘significant question of federal law,’ ” Tr. 17 (Apr. 2, 2001), and ruling that Grable’s lack of a federal right of action to enforce its claim against Darue did not bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction. On the merits, the court granted summary judgment to Darue, holding that although § 6335 by its terms required personal service, substantial compliance with the statute was enough. 207 F. Supp. 2d 694 (WD Mich. 2002).
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 377 F. 3d 592 (2004). On the jurisdictional question, the panel thought it sufficed that the title claim raised an issue of federal law that had to be resolved, and implicated a substantial federal interest (in construing federal tax law). The court went on to affirm the District Court’s judgment on the merits. We granted certiorari on the jurisdictional question alone, 543 U. S. 1042 (2005), to resolve a split within the Courts of Appeals on whether Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804 (1986), always requires a federal cause of action as a condition for exercising federal-question jurisdiction. We now affirm.
h-H
Darue was entitled to remove the quiet title action if Grable could have brought it in federal «¿strict court originally, 28 U. S. C. § 1441(a), as a civil action “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” §1331. This provision for federal-question jurisdiction is invoked by and large by plaintiffs pleading a cause of action created by federal law (e. g., claims under 42 U. S. C. § 1983). There is, however, another longstanding, if less frequently encountered, variety of federal “arising under” jurisdiction, this Court having recognized for nearly 100 years that in certain cases federal-question jurisdiction will lie over state-law claims that implicate significant federal issues. E. g., Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U. S. 486, 490-491 (1917). The doctrine captures the commonsense notion that a federal court ought to be able to hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues, see ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 164-166 (1968).
The classic example is Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921), a suit by a shareholder claiming that the defendant corporation could not lawfully buy certain bonds of the National Government because their issuance was unconstitutional. Although Missouri law provided the cause of action, the Court recognized federal-question jurisdiction because the principal issue in the ease was the federal constitutionality of the bond issue. Smith thus held, in a somewhat generous statement of the scope of the doctrine, that a state-law claim could give rise to federal-question jurisdiction so long as it “appears from the [complaint] that the right to relief depends upon the construction or application of [federal law].” Id., at 199.
The Smith statement has been subject to some trimming to fit earlier and later cases recognizing the vitality of the basic doctrine, but shying away from the expansive view that mere need to apply federal law in a state-law claim will suffice to open the “arising under” door. As early as 1912, this Court had confined federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims to those that “really and substantially in-volv[e] a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of [federal] law.” Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 561, 569. This limitation was the ancestor of Justice Cardozo’s later explanation that a request to exercise federal-question jurisdiction over a state action calls for a “common-sense accommodation of judgment to [the] kaleidoscopic situations” that present a federal issue, in “a selective process which picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside.” Gully v. First Nat. Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, 117-118 (1936). It has in fact become a constant refrain in such cases that federal jurisdiction demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum. E. g., Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U. S. 156, 164 (1997); Merrell Dow, supra, at 814, and n. 12; Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U. S. 1, 28 (1983).
But even when the state action discloses a contested and substantial federal question, the exercise of federal jurisdiction is subject to a possible veto. For the federal issue will ultimately qualify for a federal forum only if federal jurisdiction is consistent with congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts governing the application of § 1331. Thus, Franchise Tax Bd. explained that the appropriateness of a federal forum to hear an embedded issue could be evaluated only after considering the “welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system.” Id., at 8. Because arising-under jurisdiction to hear a state-law claim always raises the possibility of upsetting the state-federal line drawn (or- at least assumed) by Congress, the presence of a disputed federal issue and the ostensible importance of a federal forum are never necessarily dispositive; there must always be an assessment of any disruptive portent in exercising federal jurisdiction. See also Merrell Dow, 478 U. S., at 810.
These considerations have kept us from stating a “single, precise, all-embracing” test for jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in state-law claims between nondiverse parties. Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U. S. 800, 821 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring). We have not kept them out simply because they appeared in state raiment, as Justice Holmes would have done, see Smith, supra, at 214 (dissenting opinion), but neither have we treated “federal issue” as a password opening federal courts to any state action embracing a point of federal law. Instead, the question is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congres-sionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.
Ill
A
This case warrants federal jurisdiction. Grable’s state complaint must specify “the facts establishing the superiority of [its] claim,” Mich. Ct. Rule 3.411(B)(2)(c) (West 2005), and Grable has premised its superior title claim on a failure by the IRS to give it adequate notice, as defined by federal law. Whether Grable was given notice within the meaning of the federal statute is thus an essential element of its quiet title claim, and the meaning of the federal statute is actually in dispute; it appears to be the only legal or factual issue contested in the case. The meaning of the federal tax provision is an important issue of federal law that sensibly belongs in a federal court. The Government has a strong interest in the “prompt and certain collection of delinquent taxes,” United States v. Rodgers, 461 U. S. 677, 709 (1983), and the ability of the IRS to satisfy its claims from the property of delinquents requires clear terms of notice to allow buyers like Darue to satisfy themselves that the Service has touched the bases necessary for good title. The Government thus has a direct interest in the availability of a federal forum to vindicate its own administrative action, and buyers (as well as tax delinquents) may find it valuable to come before judges used to federal tax matters. Finally, because it will be the rare state title case that raises a contested matter of federal law, federal jurisdiction to resolve genuine disagreement over federal tax title provisions will portend only a microscopic effect on the federal-state division of labor. See n. 3, infra.
This conclusion puts us in venerable company, quiet title actions having been the subject of some of the earliest exercises of federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims. In Hopkins, 244 U. S., at 490-491, the question was federal jurisdiction over a quiet title action based on the plaintiffs’ allegation that federal mining law gave them the superior claim. Just as in this case, “the facts showing the plaintiffs’ title and the existence and invalidity of the instrument or record sought to be eliminated as a cloud upon the title are essential parts of the plaintiffs’ cause of action.” Id., at 490. As in this case again, “it is plain that a controversy respecting the construction and effect of the [federal] laws is involved and is sufficiently real and substantial.” Id., at 489. This Court therefore upheld federal jurisdiction in Hopkins, as well as in the similar quiet title matters of Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U. S. 526, 528 (1903), and Wilson Cypress Co. v. Del Pozo y Marcos, 236 U. S. 635, 643-644 (1915). Consistent with those eases, the recognition of federal jurisdiction is in order here.
B
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804 (1986), on which Grable rests its position, is not to the contrary. Merrell Dow considered a state tort claim resting in part on the allegation that the defendant drug company had violated a federal misbranding prohibition, and was thus presumptively negligent under Ohio law. Id., at 806. The Court assumed that federal law would have to be applied to resolve the claim, but after closely examining the strength of the federal interest at stake and the implications of opening the federal forum, held federal jurisdiction unavailable. Congress had not provided a private federal cause of action for violation of the federal branding requirement, and the Court found “it would . .. flout, or at least undermine, congressional intent to conclude that federal courts might nevertheless exercise federal-question jurisdiction and provide remedies for violations of that federal statute solely because the violation ... is said to be a . .. ‘proximate cause’ under state law.” Id., at 812.
Because federal law provides for no quiet title action that could be brought against Darue, Grable argues that there can be no federal jurisdiction here, stressing some broad language in Merrell Dow (including the passage just quoted) that on its face supports Grable’s position, see Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction over State Law Claims Post -Merrell Dow, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2272, 2280-2282 (2002) (discussing split in Courts of Appeals over private right of action requirement after Merrell Dow). But an opinion is to be read as a whole, and Merrell Dow cannot be read whole as overturning decades of precedent, as it would have done by effectively adopting the Holmes dissent in Smith, see supra, at 314, and converting a federal cause of action from a sufficient condition for federal-question jurisdiction into a necessary one.
In the first place, Merrell Dow disclaimed the adoption of any bright-line rule, as when the Court reiterated that “in exploring the outer reaches of § 1331, determinations about federal jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system.” 478 U. S., at 810. The opinion included a lengthy footnote explaining that questions of jurisdiction over state-law claims require “careful judgments,” id., at 814, about the “nature of the federal interest at stake,” id., at 814, n. 12 (emphasis deleted). And as a final indication that it did not mean to make a federal right of action mandatory, it expressly approved the exercise of jurisdiction sustained in Smith, despite the want of any federal cause of action available to Smith's shareholder plaintiff. 478 U. S., at 814, n. 12. Merrell Dow then, did not toss out, but specifically retained, the contextual enquiry that had been Smith’s hallmark for over 60 years. At the end of Merrell Dow, Justice Holmes was still dissenting.
Accordingly, Merrell Dow should be read in its entirety as treating the absence of a federal private right of action as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the “sensitive judgments about congressional intent” that § 1331 requires. The absence of any federal cause of action affected Merrell Dow’s result two ways. The Court saw the fact as worth some consideration in the assessment of substantiality. But its primary importance emerged when the Court treated the combination of no federal cause of action and no preemption of state remedies for misbranding as an important clue to Congress’s conception of the scope of jurisdiction to be exercised under § 1331. The Court saw the missing cause of action not as a missing federal door key, always required, but as a missing welcome mat, required in the circumstances, when exercising federal jurisdiction over a state misbrand-ing action would have attracted a horde of original filings and removal cases raising other state claims with embedded federal issues. For if the federal labeling standard without a federal cause of action could get a state claim into federal court, so could any other federal standard without a federal cause of action. And that would have meant a tremendous number of cases.
One only needed to consider the treatment of federal violations generally in garden variety state tort law. “The violation of federal statutes and regulations is commonly given negligence per se effect in state tort proceedings.” Restatement (Third) of Torts § 14, Reporters’ Note, Comment a, p. 195 (Tent. Draft No. 1, Mar. 28, 2001). See also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts §36, p. 221, n. 9 (5th ed. 1984) (“[T]he breach of a federal statute may support a negligence per se claim as a matter of state law” (collecting authority)). A general rule of exercising federal jurisdiction over state claims resting on federal mislabeling and other statutory violations would thus have heralded a potentially enormous shift of traditionally state cases into federal courts. Expressing concern over the “increased volume of federal litigation,” and noting the importance of adhering to “legislative intent,” Merrell Dow thought it improbable that the Congress, having made no provision for a federal cause of action, would have meant to welcome any state-law tort case implicating federal law “solely because the violation of the federal statute is said to [create] a rebuttable presumption [of negligence] . . . under state law.” 478 U. S., at 811-812 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this situation, no welcome mat meant keep out. Merrell Dow’s analysis thus fits within the framework of examining the importance of having a federal forum for the issue, and the consistency of such a forum with Congress’s intended division of labor between state and federal courts.
As already indicated, however, a comparable analysis yields a different jurisdictional conclusion in this case. Although Congress also indicated ambivalence in this case by providing no private right of action to Grable, it is the rare state quiet title action that involves contested issues of federal law, see n. 3, supra. Consequently, jurisdiction over actions like Grable’s would not materially affect, or threaten to affect, the normal currents of litigation. Given the absence of threatening structural consequences and the clear interest the Government, its buyers, and its delinquents have in the availability of a federal forum, there is no good reason to shirk from federal jurisdiction over the dispositive and contested federal issue at the heart of the state-law title claim.
IV
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, upholding federal jurisdiction over Grable’s quiet title action, is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Accordingly, we have no occasion to pass upon the proper interpretation of the federal tax provision at issue here.
Compare Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F. 3d 761, 764 (CA7 1994) (finding that federal-question jurisdiction over a state-law claim requires a parallel federal private right of action), with Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F. 3d 799, 806 (CA4 1996) (finding that a federal private action is not required).
The quiet title eases also show the limiting effect of the requirement that the federal issue in a state-law claim must actually be in dispute to justify federal-question jurisdiction. In Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 561 (1912), this Court found that there was no federal-question jurisdiction to hear a plaintiff’s quiet title claim in part because the federal statutes on which title depended were not subject to “any controversy respecting their validity, construction, or effect.” Id., at 570. As the Court put it, the requirement of an actual dispute about federal law was “especially” important in “suit[s] involving rights to land acquired under a law of the United States,” because otherwise “every suit to establish title to land in the central and western states would so arise [under federal law], as all titles in those States are traceable back to those laws.” Id., at 569-570.
Federal law does provide a quiet title cause of action against the Federal Government. 28 U. S. C. § 2410. That right of action is not relevant here, however, because the Federal Government no longer has any interest in the property, having transferred its interest to Darue through the quitclaim deed.
For an extremely rare exception to the sufficiency of a federal right of action, see Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505, 507 (1900).
Other jurisdictions treat a violation of a federal statute as evidence of negligence or, like Ohio itself in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U. S. 804 (1986), as creating a rebuttable presumption of negligence. Restatement §14, Reporters’ Note, Comment c, at 196. Either approach could still implicate issues of federal law.
At oral argument Grable’s counsel espoused the position that after Merrell Dow, federal-question jurisdiction over state-law claims absent a federal right of action could be recognized only where a constitutional issue was at stake. There is, however, no reason in text or otherwise to draw such a rough line. As Merrell Dow itself suggested, constitutional questions may be the more likely ones to reach the level of substantiality that can justify federal jurisdiction. 478 U. S., at 814, n. 12. But a flat ban on statutory questions would mechanically exclude significant questions of federal law like the one this case presents.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under Arizona law, candidates for state office who accept public financing can receive additional money from the State in direct response to the campaign activities of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups. Once a set spending limit is exceeded, a publicly financed candidate receives roughly one dollar for every dollar spent by an opposing privately financed candidate. The publicly financed candidate also receives roughly one dollar for every dollar spent by independent expenditure groups to support the privately financed candidate, or to oppose the publicly financed candidate. We hold that Arizona’s matching funds scheme substantially burdens protected political speech without serving a compelling state interest and therefore violates the First Amendment.
I
A
The Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act, passed by initiative in 1998, created a voluntary public financing system to fund the primary and general election campaigns of candidates for state office. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §16-940 et seq. (West 2006 and Supp. 2010). All eligible candidates for Governor, secretary of state, attorney general, treasurer, superintendent of public instruction, the corporation commission, mine inspector, and the state legislature (both the House and Senate) may opt to receive public funding. § 16-950(D) (West Supp. 2010). Eligibility is contingent on the collection of a specified number of five-dollar contributions from Arizona voters, §§16-946(B) (West 2006), 16-950 (West Supp. 2010), and the acceptance of certain campaign restrictions and obligations. Publicly funded candidates must agree, among other things, to limit their expenditure of personal funds to $500, § 16-941(A)(2) (West Supp. 2010); participate in at least one public debate, § 16-956(A)(2); adhere to an overall expenditure cap, § 16-941(A); and return all unspent public moneys to the State, § 16-953.
In exchange for accepting these conditions, participating candidates are granted public funds to conduct their campaigns. In many cases, this initial allotment may be the whole of the State’s financial backing of a publicly funded candidate. But when certain conditions are met, publicly funded candidates are granted additional “equalizing” or matching funds. §§ 16-952(A), (B), and (C)(4)-(5) (providing for “[e]qual funding of candidates”).
Matching funds are available in both primary and general elections. In a primary, matching funds are triggered when a privately financed candidate’s expenditures, combined with the expenditures of independent groups made in support of the privately financed candidate or in opposition to a publicly financed candidate, exceed the primary election allotment of state funds to the publicly financed candidate. §§ 16-952(A), (C). During the general election, matching funds are triggered when the amount of money a privately financed candidate receives in contributions, combined with the expenditures of independent groups made in support of the privately financed candidate or in opposition to a publicly financed candidate, exceed the general election allotment of state funds to the publicly financed candidate. §16-952(B). A privately financed candidate’s expenditures of his personal funds are counted as contributions for purposes of calculating matching funds during a general election. See ibid.-, Citizens Clean Elections Commission, Ariz. Admin. Code, Rule R2-20-113(B)(1)(f) (Sept. 2009).
Once matching funds are triggered, each additional dollar that a privately financed candidate spends during the primary results in one dollar in additional state funding to his publicly financed opponent (less a 6% reduction meant to account for fundraising expenses). §16-952(A). During a general election, every dollar that a candidate receives in contributions — which includes any money of his own that a candidate spends on his campaign — results in roughly one dollar in additional state funding to his publicly financed opponent. In an election where a privately funded candidate faces multiple publicly financed candidates, one dollar raised or spent by the privately financed candidate results in an almost one dollar increase in public funding to each of the publicly financed candidates.
Once the public financing cap is exceeded, additional expenditures by independent groups can result in dollar-for-dollar matching funds as well. Spending by independent groups on behalf of a privately funded candidate, or in opposition to a publicly funded candidate, results in matching funds. § 16-952(C). Independent expenditures made in support of a publicly financed candidate can result in matching funds for other publicly financed candidates in a race. Ibid. The matching funds provision is not activated, however, when independent expenditures are made in opposition to a privately financed candidate. Matching funds top out at two times the initial authorized grant of public funding to the publicly financed candidate. § 16-952(E).
Under Arizona law, a privately financed candidate may raise and spend unlimited funds, subject to state-imposed contribution limits and disclosure requirements. Contributions to candidates for statewide office are limited to $840 per contributor per election cycle and contributions to legislative candidates are limited to $410 per contributor per election cycle. See §§ 16-905(A)(1), 16-941(B)(1); Ariz. Dept, of State, Office of the Secretary of State, 2009-2010 Contribution Limits (rev. Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.azsos.gov/ election/2010/Info/Campaign_Contribution_Limits_2010.htm (all Internet materials as visited June 24, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court's case file).
An example may help clarify how the Arizona matching funds provision operates. Arizona is divided into 30 districts for purposes of electing members to the State’s House of Representatives. Each district elects two representatives to the House biannually. In the last general election, the number of candidates competing for the two available seats in each district ranged from two to seven. See State of Arizona Official Canvass, 2010 General Election Report (compiled and issued by the Arizona secretary of state). Arizona’s Fourth District had three candidates for its two available House seats. Two of those candidates opted to accept public funding; one candidate chose to operate his campaign with private funds.
In that election, if the total funds contributed to the privately funded candidate,, added to that candidate’s expenditure of personal funds and the expenditures of supportive independent groups, exceeded $21,479 — the allocation of public funds for the general election in a contested State House race — the matching funds provision would be triggered. See Citizens Clean Elections Commission, Participating Candidate Guide 2010 Election Cycle 30 (Aug. 10, 2010). At that point, a number of different political activities could result in the distribution of matching funds. For example:
• If the privately funded candidate spent $1,000 of his own money to conduct a direct mailing, each of his publicly funded opponents would receive $940 ($1,000 less the 6% offset).
• If the privately funded candidate held a fundraiser that generated $1,000 in contributions, each of his publicly funded opponents would receive $940.
• If an independent expenditure group spent $1,000 on a, brochure expressing its support for the privately financed candidate, each of the publicly financed candidates would receive $940 directly.
• If an independent expenditure group spent $1,000 on a brochure opposing one of the publicly financed candidates, but saying nothing about the privately financed candidate, the publicly financed candidates would receive $940 directly.
• If an independent expenditure group spent $1,000 on a brochure supporting one of the publicly financed candidates, the other publicly financed candidate would receive $940 directly, but the privately financed candidate would receive nothing.
• If an independent expenditure group spent $1,000 on a brochure opposing the privately financed candidate, no matching funds would be issued.
A publicly financed candidate would continue to receive additional state money in response to fundraising and spending by the privately financed candidate and independent expenditure groups until that publicly financed candidate received a total of $64,437 in state funds (three times the initial allocation for a State House race).
B
Petitioners in this action, plaintiffs below, are five past and future candidates for Arizona state office — four members of the House of Representatives and the Arizona state treasurer — and two independent groups that spend money to support and oppose Arizona candidates. They filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the matching funds provision. The candidates and independent expenditure groups argued that the matching funds provision unconstitutionally penalized their speech and burdened their ability to fully exercise their First Amendment rights;'
The District Court agreed that this provision “constitute[d] a substantial burden” on the speech of privately financed candidates because it “award[s] funds to a [privately financed] candidate’s opponent” based on the privately financed candidate’s speech. App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 10-239, p. 69 (internal quotation marks omitted). That court further held that “no compelling interest [was] served by the” provision that might justify the burden imposed. Id., at 69, 71. The District Court entered a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the matching funds provision, but stayed implementation of that injunction to allow the State to file an appeal. Id., at 76-81.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stayed the District Court’s injunction pending appeal. Id., at 84-85. After hearing the action on the merits, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. The Court of Appeals concluded that the matching funds provision “imposes only a minimal burden on First Amendment rights” because it “does not actually prevent anyone from speaking in the first place or cap campaign expenditures.” 611 F. 3d 510, 513, 525 (2010). In that court’s view, any burden imposed by the matching funds provision was justified because the provision “bears a substantial relation to the State’s important interest in reducing quid pro quo political corruption.” Id., at 513.
We stayed the Court of Appeals’ decision, vacated the stay of the District Court’s injunction, see 560 U. S. 938 (2010), and later granted certiorari, 562 U. S. 1060 (2010).
II
Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation” of our system of government. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam). As a result, the First Amendment “ 'has its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.” Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 272 (1971)). “Laws that burden political speech are” accordingly “subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 340 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Federal Election Comm’n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 256 (1986).
Applying these principles, we have invalidated government-imposed restrictions on campaign expenditures, Buckley, supra, at 52-54, restraints on independent expenditures applied to express advocacy groups, Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, at 256-265, limits on uncoordinated political party expenditures, Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 518 U. S. 604, 608 (1996) (opinion of Breyer, J.) (Colorado I), and regulations barring unions, nonprofit and other associations, and corporations from making independent expenditures for electioneering communication, Citizens United, supra, at 372.
At the same time, we have subjected strictures on campaign-related speech that we have found less onerous to a lower level of scrutiny and upheld those restrictions. For example, after finding that the restriction at issue was “closely drawn” to serve a “sufficiently important interest,” see, e. g., McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 136 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 387-388 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted), we have upheld government-imposed limits on contributions to candidates, Buckley, supra, at 23-35, caps on coordinated party expenditures, Federal Election Comm’n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 437 (2001) (Colorado II), and requirements that political funding sources disclose their identities, Citizens United, supra, at 371.
Although the speech of the candidates and independent expenditure groups that brought this suit is not directly capped by Arizona’s matching funds provision, those parties contend that their political speech is substantially burdened by the state law in the same way that speech was burdened by the law we recently found invalid in Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. 724 (2008). In Davis, we considered a First Amendment challenge to the so-called “Millionaire’s Amendment” of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U. S. C. § 441a-1(a). Under that Amendment, if a candidate for the United States House of Representatives spent more than $350,000 of his personal funds, “a new, asymmetrical regulatory scheme [came] into play.” 554 U. S., at 729. The opponent of the candidate who exceeded that limit was permitted to collect individual contributions up to $6,900 per contributor — three times the normal contribution limit of $2,300. See ibid. The candidate who spent more than the personal funds limit remained subject to the original contribution cap. Davis argued that this scheme “burden[ed] his exercise of his First Amendment right to make unlimited expenditures of his personal funds because” doing so had “the effect of enabling his opponent to raise more money and to use that money to finance speech that counteracted] and thus diminishe[d] the effectiveness of Davis’ own speech.” Id., at 736.
In addressing the constitutionality of the Millionaire’s Amendment, we acknowledged that the provision did not impose an outright cap on a candidate’s personal expenditures. Id., at 738-739. We nonetheless concluded that the-. Amendment was unconstitutional because it forced a candidate “to choose between the First Amendment right to engage in unfettered political speech and subjection to discriminatory fundraising limitations.” Id., at 739. Any candidate who chose to spend more than $350,000 of his own money was forced to “shoulder a special and potentially significant burden” because that choice gave fundraising advantages to the candidate’s adversary. Ibid. We determined that this constituted an “unprecedented penalty” and “impose[d] a substantial burden on the exercise of the First Amendment right to use personal funds for campaign speech,” and concluded that the Government had failed to advance any compelling interest that would justify such a burden. Id., at 739-740.
A
1
The logic of Davis largely controls our approach to this action. Much like the burden placed on speech in Davis, the matching funds provision “imposes an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises [his] First Amendment right[s].” Id., at 739. Under that provision, “the vigorous exercise of the right to use personal funds to finance campaign speech” leads to “advantages for opponents in the competitive context of electoral politics.” Ibid.
Once a privately financed candidate has raised or spent more than the State’s initial grant to a publicly financed candidate, each personal dollar spent by the privately financed candidate results in an award of almost one additional dollar to his opponent. That plainly forces the privately financed candidate to “shoulder a special and potentially significant burden” when choosing to exercise his First Amendment right to spend funds on behalf of his candidacy. Ibid. If the law at issue in Davis imposed a burden on candidate speech, the Arizona law unquestionably, does so as well.
The penalty imposed by Arizona’s matching funds provision is different in some respects from the penalty imposed by the law we struck down in Davis. But those differences make the Arizona law more constitutionally problematic, not less. See Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F. 3d 213, 244-245 (CA2 2010). First, the penalty in Davis consisted of raising the contribution limits for one of the candidates. The candidate who benefited from the increased limits still had to go out and raise the funds. He may or may not have been able to do so. The other candidate, therefore, faced merely the possibility that his opponent would be able to raise additional funds, through contribution limits that remained subject to a cap. And still the Court held that this was an “unprecedented penalty,” a “special and potentially significant burden” that had to be justified by a compelling state interest — a rigorous First Amendment hurdle. 554 U. S., at 739-740. Here the benefit to the publicly financed candidate is the direct and automatic release of public money. That is a far heavier burden than in Davis.
Second, depending on the specifics of the election at issue, the matching funds provision can create a multiplier effect. In the Arizona Fourth District House election previously discussed, see supra, at 731-732, if the spending cap were exceeded, each dollar spent by the privately funded candidate would result in an additional dollar of campaign funding to each of that candidate’s publicly financed opponents. In such a situation, the matching funds provision forces privately funded candidates to fight a political hydra of sorts. Each dollar they spend generates two adversarial dollars in response. Again, a markedly more significant burden than in Davis.
Third, unlike the law at issue in Davis, all of this is to some extent out of the privately financed candidate’s hands. Even if that candidate opted to spend less than the initial public financing cap, any spending by independent expenditure groups to promote the privately financed candidate’s election — regardless whether such support was welcome or helpful — could trigger matching funds. What is more, that state money would go directly to the publicly funded candidate to use as he saw fit. That disparity in control — giving money directly to a publicly financed candidate, in response to independent expenditures that cannot be coordinated with the privately funded candidate — is a substantial advantage for the publicly funded candidate. That candidate can allocate the money according to his own campaign strategy, which the privately financed candidate could not do with the independent group expenditures that triggered the matching funds. Cf. Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 357 (“ ‘The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent... undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate’ ” (quoting Buckley, 424 U. S., at 47)).
The burdens that this regime places on independent expenditure groups are akin to those imposed on the privately financed candidates themselves. Just as with the candidate the independent group supports, the more money spent on that candidate’s behalf or in opposition to a publicly funded candidate, the more money the publicly funded candidate receives from the State. And just as with the privately financed candidate, the effect of a dollar spent on election speech is a guaranteed financial payout to the publicly funded candidate the group opposes. Moreover, spending one dollar can result in the flow of dollars to multiple candidates the group disapproves of, dollars directly controlled by the publicly funded candidate or candidates.
In some ways, the burden the Arizona law imposes on independent expenditure groups is worse than the burden it imposes on privately financed candidates, and thus substantially worse than the burden we found constitutionally impermissible in Davis. If a candidate contemplating an electoral run in Arizona surveys the campaign landscape and decides that the burdens imposed by the matching funds regime make a privately funded campaign unattractive, he at least has the option of taking public financing. Independent expenditure groups, of course, do not.
Once the spending cap is reached, an independent expenditure group that wants to support a particular candidate— because of that candidate’s stand on an issue of concern to the group — can only avoid triggering matching funds in one of two ways. The group can either opt to change its message from one addressing the merits of the candidates to one addressing the merits of an issue, or refrain from speaking altogether. Presenting independent expenditure groups with such a choice makes the matching funds provision particularly burdensome to those groups. And forcing that choice — trigger matching funds, change your message, or do not speak — certainly contravenes “the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.” Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 573 (1995); cf. Citizens United, supra, at 340 (“the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints”); Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 477, n. 9 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C. J.) (the argument that speakers can avoid the burdens of a law “by changing what they say” does not mean the law complies with the First Amendment).
2
Arizona, the Clean Elections Institute, Inc., and the United States offer several arguments attempting to explain away the existence or significance of any burden imposed by matching funds. None is persuasive.
Arizona contends that the matching funds provision is distinguishable from the law we invalidated in Davis. The State correctly points out that our decision in Davis focused on the asymmetrical contribution limits imposed by the Millionaire’s Amendment. See 554 U. S., at 729. But that is not because — as the State asserts — the reach of that opinion is limited to asymmetrical contribution limits. Brief for State Respondents 26-32. It is because that was the particular burden on candidate speech we faced in Davis. And whatever the significance of the distinction in general, there can be no doubt that the burden on speech is significantly greater in this action than in Davis: That means that the law here — like the one in Davis — must be justified by a compelling state interest.
The State argues that the matching funds provision actually results in more speech by “increas [ing] debate about issues of public concern” in Arizona elections and “promoting] the free and open debate that the First Amendment was intended to foster.” Brief for State Respondents 41; see Brief for Respondent Clean Elections Institute 55. In the State's view, this promotion of First Amendment ideals offsets any burden the law might impose on some speakers.
Not so. Any increase in speech resulting from the Arizona law is of one kind and one kind only — that of publicly financed candidates. The burden imposed on privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups reduces their speech; “restriction^] on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression.” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 19. Thus, even if the matching funds provision did result in more speech by publicly financed candidates and more speech in general, it would do so at the expense of impermissibly burdening (and thus reducing) the speech of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups. This sort of “beggar thy neighbor” approach to free speech — “restricting] the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others” — is “wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” Id., at 48-49.
We have rejected government efforts to increase the speech of some at the expense of others outside the campaign finance context. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 244, 258 (1974), we held unconstitutional a Florida law that required any newspaper assailing a political candidate’s character to allow that candidate to print a reply. We have explained that while the statute in that case “purported to advance free discussion,... its effect was to deter newspapers from speaking out in the first instance” because it “penalized the newspaper’s own expression.” Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U. S. 1, 10 (1986) (plurality opinion). Such a penalty, we concluded, could not survive First Amendment scrutiny. The Arizona law imposes a similar penalty: The State grants funds to publicly financed candidates as a direct result of the speech of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups. The argument that this sort of burden promotes free and robust discussion is no more persuasive here than it was in Tornillo,
Arizona asserts that no “candidate or independent expenditure group is ‘obliged personally to express a message he disagrees with’ ” or “ ‘required by the government to subsidize a message he disagrees with.’” Brief for State Respondents 32 (quoting Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U. S. 550, 557 (2005)). True enough. But that does not mean that the matching funds provision does not burden speech. The direct result of the speech of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups is a state-provided monetary subsidy to a political rival. That cash subsidy, conferred in response to political speech, penalizes speech to a greater extent and more directly than the Millionaire’s Amendment in Davis. The fact that this may result in more speech by the other candidates is no more adequate a justification here than it was in Davis. See 554 U. S., at 741-742.
In disagreeing with our conclusion, the dissent relies on cases in which we have upheld government subsidies against First Amendment challenge, and asserts that “[w]e have never, not once, understood a viewpoint-neutral subsidy given to one speaker to constitute a First Amendment burden on another.” Post, at 769. But none of those cases— not one — involved a subsidy given in direct response to the political speech of another, to allow the recipient to counter that speech. And nothing in the analysis we employed in those cases suggests that the challenged subsidies would have survived First Amendment scrutiny if they were triggered by someone else’s political speech.
The State also argues, and the Court of Appeals concluded, that any burden on privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups is more analogous to the burden placed on speakers by the disclosure and disclaimer requirements we recently upheld in Citizens United than to direct restrictions on candidate and independent expenditures. See 611 F. 3d, at 525; Brief for State Respondents 21, 35; Brief for Respondent Clean Elections Institute 16-17. This analogy is not even close. A political candidate’s disclosure of his funding resources does not result in a cash windfall to his opponent, or affect their respective disclosure obligations.
The State and the Clean Elections Institute assert that the candidates and independent expenditure groups have failed to “cite specific instances in which they decided not to raise or spend funds,” Brief for State Respondents 11; see id., at 11-12, and have “failed to present any reliable evidence that Arizona’s triggered matching funds deter then-speech, ” Brief for Respondent Clean Elections Institute 6; see id., at 6-8. The record in this action, which we must review in its entirety, does not support those assertions. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984).
That record contains examples of specific candidates curtailing fundraising efforts, and actively discouraging supportive independent expenditures, to avoid triggering matching funds. See, e.g., App. 567 (Rick Murphy), 578 (Dean Martin); App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 10-239, at 329 (John McComish), 300 (Tony Bouie). The record also includes examples of independent expenditure groups deciding not to speak in opposition to a candidate, App. 569 (Arizona Taxpayers Action Committee), or in support of a candidate, id., at 290 (Club for Growth), to avoid triggering matching funds. In addition, Dr. David Primo, an expert involved in the action, “found that privately financed candidates facing the prospect of triggering matching funds changed the timing of their fundraising activities, the timing of their expenditures, and, thus, their overall campaign strategy.” Reply Brief for Petitioner Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s (AEEC) Freedom Club PAC et al. 12; see also id., at 11-17 (listing additional sources of evidence detailing the burdens imposed by the matching funds provision); Brief for Petitioner AFEC’s Freedom Club PAC et al. 14-21 (AFEC Brief) (same); Brief for Petitioner McComish et al. 30-37 (same).
The State contends that if the matching funds provision truly burdened the speech of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups, spending on behalf of privately financed candidates would cluster just below the triggering level, but no such phenomenon has been observed. Brief for State Respondents 39; Brief for Respondent Clean Elections Institute 18-19. That should come as no surprise. The hypothesis presupposes a privately funded candidate who would spend his own money just up to the matching funds threshold, when he could have simply taken matching funds in the first place.
Furthermore, the Arizona law takes into account all manner of uncoordinated political activity in awarding matching funds. If a privately funded candidate wanted to hover just below the triggering level, he would have to make guesses about how much he will receive in the form of contributions and supportive independent expenditures. He might well guess wrong.
In addition, some candidates may be willing to bear the burden of spending above the cap. That a candidate is willing to do so does not make the law any less burdensome. See Davis, 554 U. S., at 739 (that candidates may choose to make “personal expenditures to support their campaigns” despite the burdens imposed by the Millionaire’s Amendment does not change the fact that “they must shoulder a special and potentially significant burden if they make that choice”). If the State made privately funded candidates pay a $500 fine to run as such, the fact that candidates might choose to pay it does not make the fine any less burdensome.
While there is evidence to support the contention of the candidates and independent expenditure groups that the matching funds provision burdens their speech, “it is never easy to prove a negative” — here, that candidates and groups did not speak or limited their speech because of the Arizona law. Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 218 (1960). In any event, the burden imposed by the matching funds provision is evident and inherent in the choice that confronts privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups. Cf. Davis, supra, at 738-740. Indeed even candidates who sign up for public funding recognize the burden matching funds impose on private speech, stating that they participate in the program because “matching funds... discouraged opponents, special interest groups, and lobbyists from campaigning against” them. GAO, Campaign Finance Reform: Experiences of Two States That Offered Full Public Funding for Political Candidates 27 (GAO-10-390, 2010). As in Davis, we do not need empirical evidence to determine that the law at issue is burdensome. See 554 U. S., at 738-740 (requiring no evidence of a burden whatsoever).
It is clear not only to us but to every other court to have considered the question after Davis that a candidate or independent group might not spend money if the direct result of that spending is additional funding to political adversaries. See, e. g., Green Party of Conn., 616 F. 3d, at 242 (matching funds impose “a substantial burden on the exercise of First Amendment rights” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 611 F. 3d, at 524 (case below) (matching funds create “potential chilling effects” and “impose some First Amendment burden”); Scott v. Roberts, 612 F. 3d 1279, 1290 (CA11 2010) (“we think it is obvious that the [matching funds] subsidy imposes a burden on [privately financed] candidates”); id., at 1291 (“we know of no court that doubts that a [matching funds] subsidy like the one at issue here burdens” the speech of privately financed candidates); see also Day v. Holahan, 34 F. 3d 1356, 1360 (CA8 1994) (it is “clear” that matching funds provisions infringe on “protected speech because of the chilling effect” they have “on the political speech of the person or group making the [triggering] expenditure” (cited in Davis, supra, at 739)). The dissent’s disagreement is little more than disagreement with Davis.
The State correctly asserts that the candidates and independent expenditure groups “do not... claim that a single lump sum payment to publicly funded candidates,” equivalent to the maximum amount of state financing that a candidate can obtain through matching funds, would impermissi-bly burden their speech. Brief for State Respondents 56; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. The State reasons that if providing all the money up front would not burden speech, providing it piecemeal does not do so either. And the State further argues that such incremental administration is necessary to ensure that public funding is not under- or over-distributed. See Brief for State Respondents 56-57.
These arguments miss the point. It is not the amount of funding that the State provides to publicly financed candidates that is constitutionally problematic in this action. It is the manner in which that funding is provided — in direct response to the political speech of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups. And the fact that the State's matching mechanism may be more efficient than other alternatives — that it may help the State in “finding the sweet-spot” or “fine-tuning” its financing system to avoid a drain on public resources, post, at 779 (Kagan, J., dissenting) — is of no moment; “the First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency,” Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 795 (1988).
The United States as amicus contends that “[providing additional funds to petitioners’ opponents does not make petitioners’ own speech any less effective” and thus does not substantially burden speech. Brief for United States 27. Of course it does. One does not have to subscribe to the view that electoral debate is zero sum, see AFEC Brief 30, to see the flaws in the United States’ perspective. All else being equal, an advertisement supporting the election of a candidate that goes without a response is often more effective than an advertisement that is directly controverted. And even if the publicly funded candidate decides to use his new money to address a different issue altogether, the end goal of that spending is to claim electoral victory over the opponent that triggered the additional state funding. See Davis, 554 U. S., at 736.
B
Because the Arizona matching funds provision imposes a substantial burden on the speech of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups, “that provision cannot stand unless it is 'justified by a compelling state interest,’ ” id., at 740 (quoting Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U. S., at 256).
There is a debate between the parties in this action as to what state interest is served by the matching funds provision. The privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups contend that the provision works to “level[] electoral opportunities” by equalizing candidate “resources and influence.” Brief for Petitioner McComish et al. 64; see AFEC Brief 23. The State and the Clean Elections Institute counter that the provision “furthers Arizona’s interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption.” Brief for State Respondents 42; Brief for Respondent Clean Elections Institute 47.
1
There is ample support for the argument that the matching funds provision seeks to “level the playing field” in terms of candidate resources. The clearest evidence is of course the very operation of the provision: It ensures that campaign funding is equal, up to three times the initial public funding allotment. The text of the Citizens Clean Elections Act itself confirms this purpose. The statutory provision setting up the matching funds regime is titled “Equal funding of candidates.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-952 (West Supp. 2010). The Act refers to the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Burton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In these cases we sustain the validity of collective-bargaining agreements whereby an employer, in determining relative seniority of employment among its employees, gives them credit for pre-employment military service as well as the credit required by statute for post-employment military service.
These proceedings were begun in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky by respondent Huffman, acting individually and on behalf of a class of about 275 fellow employees of the Ford Motor Company, petitioner in Case No. 193 (here called Ford). His complaint is that his position, and that of each member of his class, has been lowered on the seniority roster at Ford’s Louisville works, because of certain provisions in collective-bargaining agreements between Ford and the International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, CIO, petitioner in Case No. 194 (here called International). He contends that those provisions have violated his rights, and those of each member of his class, under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended. He contends also that International’s acceptance of those provisions exceeded its authority as a collective-bargaining representative under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. He asks, accordingly, that the provisions be declared invalid insofar as they prejudice the seniority rights of members of his class, and that appropriate injunctive relief be granted against Ford and International. After answer, both sides asked for summary judgment.
The District Court dismissed the action without opinion but said in its order that it was “of the opinion that the collective bargaining agreement expresses an honest desire for the protection of the interests of all members of the union and is not a device of hostility to veterans. The Court finds that said collective bargaining agreement sets up a seniority system which the Court deems not to be arbitrary, discriminatory or in any respect unlawful.” The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, one judge dissenting. 195 F. 2d 170. Ford and International filed separate petitions for certiorari seeking to review the same decision of the Court of Appeals. We granted both because of the widespread use of contractual provisions comparable to those before us, and because of the general importance of the issue in relation to collective bargaining. 344 U. S. 814.
The pleadings state that Huffman entered the employ of Ford September 23, 1943, was inducted into military service November 18, 1944, was discharged July 1, 1946, and, within 30 days, was reemployed by Ford with seniority dating from September 23, 1943, as provided by statute. It does not appear whether the other members of his class are veterans but, like him, all have seniority computed from their respective dates of employment by Ford.
The pleadings allege further that Huffman and the members of his class all have been laid off or furloughed from their respective employments at times and for periods when they would not have been so laid off or furloughed except for the provisions complained of in the collective-bargaining agreements. Those provisions state, in substance, that after July 30, 1946, in determining the order of retention of employees, all veterans in the employ of Ford “shall receive seniority credit for their period of service, subsequent to June 21, 1941 in the land or naval forces or Merchant Marine of the United States or its allies, upon completion of their probationary period” of six months.
The effect of these provisions is that whereas Huffman’s seniority, and that of the members of his class, is computed from their respective dates of employment by Ford and they have been credited with their subsequent military service, if any, yet in some instances they are now surpassed in seniority by employees who entered the employ of Ford after they did but who are credited with certain military service which they rendered before their employment by Ford.
Respondent contended in the Court of Appeals that allowance of credit for pre-employment military service was invalid because it went beyond the credit prescribed by the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. That argument was rejected unanimously. 195 F. 2d 170, 173. It has not been pressed here. There is nothing in that statute which prohibits allowing such a credit if the employer and employees agree to do so. The statutory rights of returning veterans are subject to changes in the conditions of their employment which have occurred in regular course during their absence in military service, where the changes are not hostile devices discriminating against veterans. Aeronautical Lodge v. Campbell, 337 U. S. 521; and see Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U. S. 40; Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U. S. 275. See also, Oakley v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 338 U. S. 278, as to a veteran’s seniority status more than one year after his reemployment.
On the other hand, the second objection raised by respondent was sustained by a majority of the members of the Court of Appeals. This objection was that the authority of International, as a certified bargaining representative, was limited by statute and was exceeded when International agreed to the provisions that are before us.
The authority of every bargaining representative under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, is stated in broad terms:
“Sec. 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
“Sec. 9. (a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) 61 Stat. 140, 143, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) §§ 157, 159 (a).
In the absence of limiting factors, the above purposes, including “mutual aid or protection” and “other conditions of employment,” are broad enough to cover terms of seniority. The National Labor Relations Act, as passed in 1935 and as amended in 1947, exemplifies the faith of Congress in free collective bargaining between employers and their employees when conducted by freely and fairly chosen representatives of appropriate units of employees. That the authority of bargaining representatives, however, is not absolute is recognized in Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 198-199, in connection with comparable provisions of the Railway Labor Act. Their statutory obligation to represent all members of an appropriate unit requires them to make an honest effort to serve the interests of all of those members, without hostility to any. Id., at 198, 202-204; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U. S. 210, 211; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U. S. 768.
Any authority to negotiate derives its principal strength from a delegation to the negotiators of a discretion to make such concessions and accept such advantages as, in the light of all relevant considerations, they believe will best serve the interests of the parties represented. A major responsibility of negotiators is to weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages of differing proposals. A bargaining representative, under the National. Labor Relations Act, as amended, often is a labor organization but it is not essential that it be such. The employees represented often are members of the labor organization which represents them at the bargaining table, but it is not essential that they be such. The bargaining representative, whoever it may be, is responsible to, and owes complete loyalty to, the interests of all whom it represents. In the instant controversy, International represented, with certain exceptions not material here, all employees at the Louisville works, including both the veterans with, and those without, prior employment by Ford, as well as the employees having no military service. Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms of any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees. The mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.
Compromises on a temporary basis, with a view to long-range advantages, are natural incidents of negotiation. Differences in wages, hours and conditions of employment reflect countless variables. Seniority rules governing promotions, transfers, layoffs and similar matters may, in the first instance, revolve around length of competent service. Variations acceptable in the discretion of bargaining representatives, however, may well include differences based upon such matters as the unit within which seniority is to be computed, the privileges to which it shall relate, the nature of the work, the time at which it is done, the fitness, ability or age of the employees, their family responsibilities, injuries received in course of service, and time or labor devoted to related public service, whether civil or military, voluntary or involuntary. See, e. g., Hartley v. Brotherhood of Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N. W. 885; and see also, Williamson & Harris, Trends in Collective Bargaining (1945), 100-103.
The National Labor Relations Act, as amended, gives a bargaining representative not only wide responsibility but authority to meet that responsibility. We have held that a collective-bargaining representative is within its authority when, in the general interest of those it represents, it agrees to allow union chairmen certain advantages in the retention of their employment, even to the prejudice of veterans otherwise entitled to greater seniority. Aeronautical Lodge v. Campbell, supra, at 526-529.
The public policy and fairness inherent in crediting employees with time spent in military service in time of war or national emergency is so clear that Congress, in the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, required some credit to be given for it in computing seniority both in governmental and in private employment. See note 5, supra. Congress there prescribed that employees who left their private civilian employment to enter military service should receive seniority credit for such military service, provided their prior civilian employment, however brief, was bona fide and not on a temporary basis. There is little that justifies giving such a substantial benefit to a veteran with brief prior civilian employment that does not equally justify giving it to a veteran who was inducted into military service before having a chance to enter any civilian employment, or to a veteran who never worked for the particular employer who hired him after his return from military service. The respective values of all such veterans, as employees, are substantially the same. From the point of view of public policy and industrial stability, there is much to be said, especially in time of war or emergency, for allowing credit for all military service. Any other course adopts the doubtful policy of favoring those who stay out of military service over those who enter it.
The above considerations took concrete form in the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944 which added the requirement that credit for military service be given by every civilian federal agency, whether the military service preceded or followed civilian employment. Apparently recognizing the countless variations in conditions affecting private employment, Congress, however, did not make credit for such pre-employment military service compulsory in private civilian employment. A little later, the Administrator of the Retraining and Reemployment Administration of the United States Department of Labor assembled a representative committee to recommend principles to serve as guides to private employers in their employment of veterans and others. Among 15 prinei-pies developed by that committee, and “wholeheartedly” endorsed by the Secretary of Labor, in 1946, were the following:
“8. All veterans having reemployment rights under Federal statutes should be accorded these statutory rights as a minimum.
“13. Newly hired veterans who have served a probationary period and qualified for employment should be allowed seniority credit, at least for purposes of job retention, equal to time spent in the armed services plus time spent in recuperation from service-connected injuries or disabilities either through hospitalization or vocational training.”
The provisions before us reflect such a policy. It is not necessary to define here the limits to which a collective-bargaining representative may go in accepting proposals to promote the long-range social or economic welfare of those it represents. Nothing in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, so limits the vision and action of a bargaining representative that it must disregard public policy and national security. Nor does anything in that Act compel a bargaining representative to limit seniority clauses solely to the relative lengths of employment of the respective employees. Aeronautical Lodge v. Campbell, supra, at 526, and 528-529, n. 5. For examples of negotiated provisions protecting veterans from loss of seniority upon their return to private civilian employment, recognized by the National War Labor Board as coming within the proper scope of collective bargaining, in 1945, see, In re American Can Co., 27 War Lab. Rep. 634, 28 War Lab. Rep. 764, and In re Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 24 War Lab. Rep. 322, 28 War Lab. Rep. 483. See also, Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Collective Bargaining Contracts (1941), 369 et seq.
The provisions before us are within reasonable bounds of relevancy. They extended but slightly, during a period of war and emergency, the acceptance of credits for military service under circumstances where comparable credit already was required, by statute, in favor of all who had been regularly employed by Ford before entering military service. These provisions conform to the recommendation of responsible Government officials and round out a statutory requirement which, unless so rounded out, produces discriminations of its own. A failure to adopt these provisions might have resulted in more friction among employees represented by International than did their adoption.
The several briefs of amici curiae, filed here by consent of all parties, demonstrate the widespread acceptance and relevance of the type of provisions before us.
We hold that International, as a collective-bargaining representative, had authority to accept these provisions. Accordingly, we find no ground sufficient to establish the invalidity of the provisions before us or to sustain an injunction against either petitioner. In accord: Haynes v. United Chemical Workers, 190 Tenn. 165, 228 S. W. 2d 101.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals which reversed that of the District Court therefore is reversed. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed and the cause is remanded to it.
Reversed and remanded.
Where the context permits, “military service” in this opinion includes service in the land or naval forces or Merchant Marine of the United States or its allies.
54 Stat. 890, 56 Stat. 724, 58 Stat. 798, 60 Stat. 341, 50 U. S. C. App. § 308.
49 Stat. 452, 61 Stat. 140, 65 Stat. 601, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) §§ 157-159.
In No. 194, International also questions the jurisdiction of the District Court. International recognizes that one issue in the case is whether it engaged in an unfair labor practice when it agreed to the allowance of credit for pre-employment military service in computations of employment seniority. It then argues that the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 146, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 160 (a), vests the initial jurisdiction over such an issue exclusively in the National Labor Relations Board. This question was not argued in the Court of Appeals nor mentioned in its opinion and, in view of our position on the merits, it is not discussed here. Our decision interprets the statutory authority of a collective-bargaining representative to have such breadth that it removes all ground for a substantial charge that International, by exceeding its authority, committed an unfair labor practice. As to a somewhat comparable question considered in connection with the Railway Labor Act, see Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U. S. 210; Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 204-207.
“Sec. 8. . . .
“(b) In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such training and service, has left or leaves a position, other than a temporary position, in the employ of any employer and who (1) receives such certificate [of satisfactory completion of his period of training and service], (2) is still qualified to perform the duties of such position, and (3) makes application for reemployment within ninety days after he is relieved from such training and service . . .
“(B) if such position was in the employ of a private employer, such employer shall restore such person to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay unless the employer’s circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so; ... .” 54 Stat. 890, 58 Stat. 798, 50 U. S. C. App. § 308 (b) (B).
Article VIII of a supplementary agreement between Ford and International, dated July 30, 1946, contained the following:
“Section 13 — • ....
“(c) Any veteran of World War II who was not employed by any person or company at the time of his entry into the service of the land or naval forces or the Merchant Marine and who is a citizen of the United States and served with the allies and who has been honorably discharged from such training and service and who is hired by the company after he is relieved from training and service in the land or naval forces or after completion of service in the Merchant Marine shall, upon having been employed for six (6) months and not before, receive seniority credit for the period of such service subsequent to June 21, 1941, provided:
“(1) Such veteran must apply for employment within ninety (90) days from the time he is relieved from such training or service in the land or naval forces or the time of his completion of such service in the Merchant Marine, and must obtain such employment within twelve (12) months from the time he is relieved from such training and service in the land or naval forces or the time of his completion of such service in the Merchant Marine.
“(2) Such veteran shall not have previously exercised his right in any plant of this or any other company.
“(3) A veteran so employed shall submit his service discharge papers to the company at the end of aforesaid probationary period of employment and the company shall place thereon in permanent form a statement showing that the veteran has exercised this right, such statement to be signed by representatives of the company and the Union, and a copy thereof placed in the employee’s record and a copy furnished to the Union.
“(d) It is further understood and agreed that, regardless of any of the foregoing, all veterans in the [employ] of the company at the time the Contract is thus amended shall receive seniority credit for their period of service, subsequent to June SI, WJ^l in the land or naval forces or Merchant Marine of the United States or its allies, upon completion of their probationary period.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The above provisions were continued in effect, in substantially identical form, in an agreement of August 21, 1947. An agreement of September 28, 1949, provided:
“Section 12. ...
“(c) Any employee who, prior to the effective date of this Agreement, has received the seniority credit provided for in Article VIII, Section 13 (c) or (d) of the Agreement between the Company and the Union dated August 21, 1947, or the comparable provision in the Supplementary Agreement between the Company and the Union dated July 30, 1946, shall continue to receive such seniority credit.”
On Huffman’s return to Ford in July, 1946, his employment seniority, including his military service, dated from September 23, 1943. It totaled about 33 months, including about 14 months of pre-service company employment and 19 of post-employment military service. An example of a veteran who, due to the agreements before us, outranks Huffman in employment seniority is one who entered military service July 1, 1943, without any prior employment, served honorably until discharged March 1, 1945, and, thereafter, has been employed continuously by Ford, including six months of satisfactory probationary employment. His seniority dates from July 1, 1943. By July 1, 1946, it totaled 36 months, including 20 months of pre-employment military service, and 16 of post-service company employment. However, except for the collective-bargaining agreements, Huffman would then have outranked such a veteran by about 17 months, although Huffman’s military service totaled one month less, his employment by Ford two months less and his combined military service and company employment three months less than that of such a veteran.
“Sec. 12. In any reduction in personnel in any civilian service of any Federal agency, competing employees shall be released in accordance with Civil Service Commission regulations which shall give due effect to tenure of employment, military preference, length of service, and efficiency ratings: Provided, That the length of time spent in active service in the armed forces of the United States of each such employee shall be credited in computing length of total service: . . . .” 58 Stat. 390, 5 U. S. C. §861.
This “Committee of Nine” consisted of representatives from the Business Advisory Council to the Secretary of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, American Federation of Labor, Congress of Industrial Organizations, Railway Labor Executives’ Association, American Legion, Disabled American Veterans and Veterans of Foreign Wars.
Reemployment of Veterans Under Collective Bargaining, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, October, 1947, Statement of Employment Principles dated October 7, 1946, App. D, pp. 46-48; and see Bulletin of Retraining and Reemployment Administration, United States Department of Labor, October 10, 1946, p. 5; Harbison, Seniority Problems During Demobilization and Reconversion, Industrial Relations Section, Department of Economics and Social Institutions, Princeton University (1944) 12-14.
Collective Bargaining Provisions — Seniority, Bull. No. 908-11, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1949), quotes many seniority clauses as examples of those then in use and including many factors other than length of employment. Among those quoted is the following:
“61. Veteran Not Previously Employed Given Seniority Credit for Time Spent in Armed Forces
“Any veteran of World War II who has been discharged, other than dishonorably, from the armed forces of the United States and who immediately prior to his acceptance in the armed forces was not previously employed by [name of company] and who is employed by [name of company] within twelve (12) months after his discharge, provided it is his first place of employment after his discharge, shall take his place on the seniority list after completing the sixty (60) day trial period. His seniority shall be computed from the day of his acceptance into the armed forces. However, no veteran covered by this section shall have seniority prior to December 7, 1941.” P. 13.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
CHIEF Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Government administratively imposed monetary penalties and occupational debarment on petitioners for violation of federal banking statutes, and later criminally indicted them for essentially the same conduct. We hold that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not a bar to the later criminal prosecution because the administrative proceedings were civil, not criminal. Our reasons for so holding in large part disavow the method of analysis used in United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 448 (1989), and reaffirm the previously established rule exemplified in United States v. Ward, 448 U. S. 242, 248-249 (1980).
During the early and mid-1980’s, petitioner John Hudson was the chairman and controlling shareholder of the First National Bank of Tipton (Tipton) and the First National Bank of Hammon (Hammon). During the same period, petitioner Jack Rackley was president of Tipton and a member of the board of directors of Hammon, and petitioner Larry Baresel was a member of the board of directors of both Tipton and Hammon.
An examination of Tipton and Hammon led the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) to conclude that petitioners had used their bank positions to arrange a series of loans to third parties in violation of various federal banking statutes and regulations. According to the OCC, those loans, while nominally made to third parties, were in reality made to Hudson in order to enable him to redeem bank stock that he had pledged as collateral on defaulted loans.
On February 13,1989, OCC issued a “Notice of Assessment of Civil Money Penalty.” The notice alleged that petitioners had violated 12 U. S. C. §§ 84(a)(1) and 375b (1982 ed.) and 12 CFR §§ 31.2(b) and 215.4(b) (1986) by causing the banks with which they were associated to make loans to nominee borrowers in a maimer that unlawfully allowed Hudson to receive the benefit of the loans. App. to Pet. for Cert. 89a. The notice also alleged that the illegal loans resulted in losses to Tipton and Hammon of almost $900,000 and contributed to the failure of those banks. Id., at 97a. However, the notice contained no allegation of any harm to the Government as a result of petitioners’ conduct. “After taking into account the size of the financial resources and the good faith of [petitioners], the gravity of the violations, the history of previous violations and other matters as justice may require, as required by 12 U. S. C. §§ 93(b)(2) and 504(b),” OCC assessed penalties of $100,000 against Hudson and $50,000 each against Raekley and Baresel. Id., at 89a. On August 31, 1989, OCC also issued a “Notice of Intention to Prohibit Further Participation” against each petitioner. Id., at 99a. These notices, which were premised on the identical allegations that formed the basis for the previous notices, informed petitioners that OCC intended to bar them from further participation in the conduct of “any insured depository institution.” Id., at 100a.
In October 1989, petitioners resolved the OCC proceedings against them by each entering into a “Stipulation and Consent Order.” These consent orders provided that Hudson, Baresel, and Raekley would pay assessments of $16,500, $15,000, and $12,500 respectively. Id., at 130a, 140a, 135a. In addition, each petitioner agreed not to “participate in any manner” in the affairs of any banking institution without the written authorization of the OCC and all other relevant regulatory agencies. Id., at 131a, 141a, 136a.
In August 1992, petitioners were indicted in the Western District of Oklahoma in a 22-eount indictment on charges of conspiracy, 18 U. S. C. §371, misapplication of bank funds, §§656 and 2, and making false bank entries, §1005. The violations charged in the indictment rested on the same lending transactions that formed the basis for the prior administrative actions brought by OCC. Petitioners moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, but the District Court denied the motions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s holding on the nonparticipation sanction issue, but vacated and remanded to the District Court on the money sanction issue. 14 F. 3d 536 (CA10 1994). The District Court on remand granted petitioners’ motion to dismiss the indictments. This time the Government appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. 92 F. 3d 1026 (1996). That court held, following HaVper, that the actual fines imposed by the Government were not so grossly disproportional to the proved damages to the Government as to render the sanctions “punishment” for double jeopardy purposes. We granted certiorari, 520 U. S. 1165 (1997), because of concerns about the wide variety of novel double jeopardy claims spawned in the wake of Halper. We now affirm, but for different reasons.
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no “person [shall] be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” We have long recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the imposition of all additional sanctions that could, “‘in common parlance,’” be described as punishment. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 549 (1943) (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 19 (1852)). The Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense, Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U. S. 391, 399 (1938); see also Hess, supra, at 548-549 (“Only” “criminal punishment” “subjeet[s] the defendant to ‘jeopardy within the constitutional meaning”); Breed v. Jones, 421 U. S. 519, 528 (1975) (“In the constitutional sense, jeopardy describes the risk that is traditionally associated with a criminal prosecution”), and then only when such occurs in successive proceedings, see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 Ú. S. 359, 366 (1983).
Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory construction. Helvering, supra, at 399. A court must first ask whether the legislature, “in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other.” Ward, 448 U. S., at 248. Even in those eases where the legislature “has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect,” id., at 248-249, as to “transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,” Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 148, 154 (1956).
In making this latter determination, the factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963), provide useful guideposts, including: (1) “[wjhether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter (4) “whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and (7) “whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.” It is important to note, however, that “these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face,” id., at 169, and “only the clearest proof” will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty, Ward, supra, at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our opinion in United States v. Halper marked the first time we applied the Double Jeopardy Clause to a sanction without first determining that it was criminal in nature. In that case, Irwin Halper was convicted of, inter alia, violating the criminal false claims statute, 18 U. S. C. § 287, based on his submission of 65 inflated Medicare claims each of which overcharged the Government by $9. He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and fined $5,000. The Government then brought an action against Halper under the civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1982 ed., Supp. II). The remedial provisions of the False Claims Act provided that a violation of the Act rendered one “liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of $2,000, an amount equal to 2 times the amount of damages the Government sustains because of the act of that person, and costs of the civil action.” Id., § 3729. Given Halper’s 65 separate violations of the Act, he appeared to be liable for a penalty of $130,000, despite the fact he actually defrauded the Government of less than $600. However, the District Court, concluded that a penalty of this magnitude would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause in light of Halper’s previous criminal conviction. While explicitly recognizing that the statutory damages provision of the Act “was not itself a criminal punishment,” the District Court nonetheless concluded that application of the full penalty to Halper would constitute a second “punishment” in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 490 U. S., at 438-439.
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed. As the Halper Court saw it, the imposition of “punishment” of any kind was subject to double jeopardy constraints, and whether a sanction constituted “punishment” depended primarily on whether it served the traditional “goals of punishment,” namely, “retribution and deterrence.” Id., at 448. Any sanction that was so “overwhelmingly disproportionate” to the injury caused that it could not “fairly be said solely to serve [the] remedial purpose” of compensating the Government for its loss, was thought to be explainable only as “serving either retributive or deterrent purposes.” See id., at 448-449 (emphasis added).
The analysis applied by the Halper Court deviated from our traditional double jeopardy doctrine in two key respects. First, the Halper Court bypassed the threshold question: whether the successive punishment at issue is a “criminal” punishment. Instead, it focused on whether the sanction, regardless of whether it was civil or criminal, was so grossly disproportionate to the harm caused as to constitute “punishment.” In so doing, the Court elevated a single Kennedy factor — whether the sanction appeared excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purposes — to dispositive status. But as we emphasized in Kennedy itself, no one factor should be considered controlling as they “may often point in differing directions.” 372 U. S., at 169. The second significant departure in Halper. was the Court’s decision to “asses[s] the character of the actual sanctions imposed,” 490 U. S., at 447, rather than, as Kennedy demanded, evaluating the “statute on its face” to determine whether it provided for what amounted to a criminal sanction, 372 U. S., at 169.
We believe that Halper’s deviation from longstanding double jeopardy principles was ill considered. AlS subsequent eases have demonstrated, Hamper’s test for determining whether a particular sanction is “punitive,” and thus subject to the strictures of the Double Jeopardy Clause, has proved unworkable. We have since recognized that all civil penalties have some deterrent effect. See Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S. 767, 777, n. 14 (1994); United States v. Ursery, 518 U. S. 267, 284-285, n. 2 (1996). If a sanction must be “solely” remedial (i. e., entirely nonde-terrent) to avoid implicating the Double Jeopardy Clause, then no civil penalties are beyond the scope of the Clause. Under Halper’s method of analysis, a court must also look at the “sanction actually imposed” to determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated. Thus, it will not be possible to determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause is violated until a defendant has proceeded through a trial to judgment. But in those eases where the civil proceeding follows the criminal proceeding, this approach flies in the face of the notion that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the government from even “attempting a second time to punish criminally.” Helvering, 303 U. S., at 399 (emphasis added).
Finally, it should be noted that some of the ills at which Halper was directed are addressed by other constitutional provisions. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses already protect individuals from sanctions which are downright irrational. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483 (1955). The Eighth Amendment protects against excessive civil fines, including forfeitures. Alexander v. United States, 509 U. S. 544 (1993); Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602 (1993). The additional protection afforded by extending double jeopardy protections to proceedings heretofore thought to be civil is more than offset by the confusion created by attempting to distinguish between “punitive” and “nonpunitive” penalties.
Applying traditional double jeopardy principles to the facts of this ease, it is clear that the criminal prosecution of these petitioners would not. violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. It is evident that Congress intended the OCC money penalties and debarment sanctions imposed for violations of 12 U. S. C. §§ 84 and 375b to be civil in nature. As for the money penalties, both §§ 93(b)(1) and 504(a), which authorize the imposition of monetary penalties for violations of §§ 84 and 375b respectively, expressly provide that such penalties are “civil.” While the provision authorizing debarment contains no language explicitly denominating the sanction as civil, we think it significant that the authority to issue debarment orders is conferred upon the “appropriate Federal banking agencies].” §§ 1818(e)(1)-(3). That such authority was conferred upon administrative agencies is prima facie evidence that Congress intended to provide for a civil sanction. See Helvering, supra, at 402; United States v. Spector, 343 U. S. 169, 178 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Administrative determinations of liability to deportation have been sustained as constitutional only by considering them to be-exclusively civil in nature, with no criminal consequences or connotations”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 235 (1896) (holding that quintessential criminal punishments may be imposed only “by a judicial trial”).
Turning to the second stage of the Ward test, we find-that there is little evidence, much less the clearest proof that we require, suggesting that either OCC money penalties or debarment sanctions are “so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal despite Congress’ intent to the contrary.” Ursery, supra, at 290. First, neither money penalties nor debarment has historically been viewed as punishment. We have long recognized that “revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted,” such as a debarment, “is characteristically free of the punitive criminal element.” Helvering, 303 U. S., at 399, and n. 2. Similarly, “the payment of fixed or variable sums of money [is a] sanction which ha[s] been recognized as enforeible by civil proceedings since the original revenue law of 1789.” Id., at 400.
Second, the sanctions imposed not an tive disability or restraint,” as that term is normally understood. While petitioners have been prohibited from further participating in the banking industry, this is “certainly nothing approaching the 'infamous punishment’ of imprisonment.” Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 617 (1960). Third, neither sanction comes into play “only” on a finding of scienter. The provisions under which the money penalties were imposed, 12 U. S. C. §§ 93(b) and 504, allow for the assessment of a penalty against any person “who violates” any of the underlying banking statutes, without regard to the violator’s state of mind. “Good faith” is considered by OCC in determining the amount of the penalty to be imposed, § 93(b)(2), but a penalty ean be imposed even in the absence of bad faith. The fact that petitioners’ “good faith” was considered in determining the amount of the penalty to be imposed in this case is irrelevant, as we look only'to “the statute on its face” to determine whether a penalty is criminal in nature. Kennedy, 372 U. S., at 169. Similarly, while debarment may be imposed for a “willful” disregard “for the safety or soundness of [an] insured depository institution,” willfulness is not a prerequisite to debarment; it is sufficient that the disregard for the safety and soundness of the institution was “continuing." § 1818(e)(1)(C)(ii).
Fourth, the conduct for which OCC sanctions are imposed may also be criminal (and in this ease formed the basis for petitioners’ indictments). This fact is insufficient to render the money penalties and debarment sanctions criminally punitive, Ursery, 518 U. S., at 292, particularly in the double jeopardy context, see United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688, 704 (1993) (rejecting “same-conduct” test for double jeopardy purposes).
Finally, we recognize that the imposition of both money penalties and debarment sanctions will deter others from emulating petitioners’ conduct, a traditional goal of criminal punishment. But the mere presence of this purpose is insufficient to render a sanction criminal, as deterrence “may serve civil as well as criminal goals.” Ursery, supra, at 292; see also Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U. S. 442, 452 (1996) (“[Forfeiture . . . serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose”). For example, the sanctions at issue here, while intended to deter future wrongdoing, also serve to promote the stability of the banking industry. To hold that the mere presence of a deterrent purpose renders such sanctions “criminal” for double jeopardy purposes would severely undermine the Government’s ability to engage in effective regulation of institutions sueh as banks.
In sum, there simply is very little showing, to say nothing of the “clearest proof ” required by Ward, that OCC money penalties and debarment sanctions are criminal.. The Double Jeopardy Clause is therefore no obstacle to their trial on the pending indictments, and it may proceed.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is accordingly
Affirmed.
Tipton and Hammon are two very small towns in western Oklahoma.
The consent orders also contained language providing that they did not constitute "a waiver of any right, power, or authority of any other representatives of the United States, or agencies thereof, to bring other actions deemed appropriate.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 133a, 143a, 138a. The Court of Appeals ultimately held that this provision was not a waiver of petitioners’ double jeopardy claim. 14 F. 3d 536, 539 (CA10 1994).
Only petitioner Raekley was indicted for making false bank entries in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1005.
E. g., Zukas v. Hinson, 1997 WL 623648 (CA11, Oet. 21, 1997) (challenge to FAA revocation of a commercial pilot’s license as violative of double jeopardy); E. B. v. Verniero, 119 F. 3d 1077 (CA3 1997) (challenge to “Megan’s Law” as violative of double jeopardy); Jones v. Securities & Exchange Comm’n, 115 F. 3d 1173 (CA4 1997) (challenge to SEC debarment proceeding as violative of double jeopardy); United States v. Rice, 109 F. 3d 151 (CA3 1997) (challenge to criminal drug prosecution following general military discharge for same conduct as violative of double jeopardy); United States v. Hatfield, 108 F. 3d 67 (CA4 1997) (challenge to criminal fraud prosecution as foreclosed by previous debarment from Government contracting); Taylor v. Cisneros, 102 F. 3d 1334 (CA3 1996) (challenge to eviction from federally subsidized housing based on guilty plea to possession of drug paraphernalia as violative of double jeopardy); United States v. Galan, 82 F. 3d 639 (CA5) (challenge to prosecution for prison escape following prison disciplinary proceeding as violative of double jeopardy), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 867 (1996).
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens criticizes us for reexamining our Halper opinion rather than deciding the case on what he believes is the narrower Blockburger grounds. But the question upon which we granted certiorari in this ease is “whether imposition upon petitioners of monetary-fines as in personam civil penalties by the Department of the Treasury, together with other sanctions, is ‘punishment’ for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Pet. for Cert. i. It is this question, and not the Blockburger issue, upon which there is a conflict among the Courts of Appeals. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in this case did not even pass upon the Bloekbwrger question, finding it unnecessary to do so. 92 F. 3d, at 1028, n. 3.
In Kurth Ranch, we held that the presence a purpose effect is not dispositive of the double jeopardy question. 511 U. S., at 781. Rather, we applied a Kennedy-like test, see 511 U. S., at 780-783, before concluding that Montana’s dangerous drug tax was “the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution,” id., at 784. Similarly, in Ursery, we rejected the notion that civil in rem forfeitures violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 518 U. S., at 270-271. We upheld such forfeitures, relying on the historical support for the notion that such forfeitures are civil and thus do not implicate double jeopardy. Id., at 292.
“We... hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.” United States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435, 448-449 (1989).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners, the named representatives of a class of undocumented and unadmitted aliens from Haiti, sued respondent Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). They alleged, inter alia, that they had been denied parole by INS officials on the basis of race and national origin. See 711 F. 2d 1455 (CA11 1983) (panel opinion) (Jean I). The en banc Eleventh Circuit concluded that any such discrimination concerning parole would not violate the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because of the Government’s plenary authority to control the Nation’s borders. That court remanded the case to the District Court for consideration of petitioners’ claim that their treatment violated INS regulations, which did not authorize consideration of race or national origin in determining whether or not an excludable alien should be paroled. 727 F. 2d 957 (1984) (Jean II). We granted certiorari. 469 U. S. 1071. We conclude that the Court of Appeals should not have reached and decided the parole question on constitutional grounds, but we affirm its judgment remanding the case to the District Court.
Petitioners arrived in this country sometime after May 1981, and represent a part of the recent influx of undocumented excludable aliens who have attempted to migrate from the Caribbean basin to south Florida. Section 235(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 199, 8 U. S. C. § 1225(b), provides that “[e]very alien . . . who may not appear to the examining immigration officer at the port of arrival to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land shall be detained for further inquiry to be conducted by a special inquiry officer.” Section 212(d)(5)(A) of the Act, 66 Stat. 188, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), authorizes the Attorney General “in his discretion” to parole into the United States any such alien applying for admission “under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest.” The statute further provides that such parole shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien, and that the alien shall be returned to custody when in the opinion of the Attorney General the purposes of the parole have been served.
For almost 30 years before 1981, the INS had followed a policy of general parole for undocumented aliens arriving on our shores seeking admission to this country. In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, however, large numbers of undocumented aliens arrived in south Florida, mostly from Haiti and Cuba. Concerned about this influx of undocumented aliens, the Attorney General in the first half of 1981 ordered the INS to detain without parole any immigrants who could not present a prima facie case for admission. The aliens were to remain in detention pending a decision on their admission or exclusion. This new policy of detention rather than parole was not based on a new statute or regulation. By July 31, 1981, it was fully in operation in south Florida.
Petitioners, incarcerated and denied parole, filed suit in June 1981, seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. §2241 and declaratory and injunctive relief. The amended complaint set forth two claims pertinent here. First, petitioners alleged that the INS’s change in policy was unlawfully effected without observance of the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §553. Petitioners also alleged that the restrictive parole policy, as executed by INS officers in the field, violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment because it discriminated against petitioners on the basis of race and national origin. Specifically, petitioners alleged that they were impermissibly denied parole because they were black and Haitian.
The District Court certified the class as “all Haitian aliens who have arrived in the Southern District of Florida on or after May 20, 1981, who are applying for entry into the United States and who are presently in detention pending exclusion proceedings ... for whom an order of exclusion has not been entered . . ." Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 1004, 1005 (SD Fla. 1982). After discovery and a 6-week bench trial the District Court held for petitioners on the APA claim, but concluded that petitioners had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence discrimination on the basis of race or national origin in the denial of parole. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973 (1982); see also id., at 1004.
The District Court held that because the new policy of detention and restrictive parole was not promulgated in accordance with APA rulemaking procedures, the INS policy under which petitioners were incarcerated was “null and void,” and the prior policy of general parole was restored to “full force and effect,” 544 F. Supp., at 1006. The District Court ordered the release on parole of all incarcerated class members, about 1,700 in number. See ibid. Additionally, the court enjoined the INS from enforcing a rule of detaining unadmitted aliens until the INS complied with the APA rule-making process, 5 U. S. C. §§552, 553.
Under the District Court’s order, the INS retained the discretion to detain unadmitted aliens who were deemed a security risk or likely to abscond, or who had serious mental or physical ailments. The court’s order also subjected the paroled class members to certain conditions, such as compliance with the law and attendance at required INS proceedings. The court retained jurisdiction over any class member whose parole might be revoked for violating the conditions of parole.
Although all class members were released on parole forthwith, the District Court imposed a 30-day stay upon its order enjoining future use of the INS’s policy of incarceration without parole. The purpose of this stay was to permit the INS to promulgate a new parole policy in compliance with the APA. The INS promulgated this new rule promptly. See 8 CFR §212.5 (1985); 47 Fed. Reg. 30044 (1982), as amended, 47 Fed. Reg. 46494 (1982). Both petitioners and respondents agree that this new rule requires even-handed treatment and prohibits the consideration of race and national origin in the parole decision. Except for the initial 30-day stay, the District. Court’s injunction against the prior INS policy ended the unwritten INS policy put into place in the first half of 1981. Some 100 to 400 members of the class are currently in detention; most of these have violated the terms of their parole but some may have arrived in this country after the District Court’s judgment. It is certain, however, that no class member is being held under the prior INS policy which the District Court invalidated. See Jean II, 727 F. 2d, at 962.
After the District Court entered its judgment, respondents appealed the decision on the APA claim and petitioners cross-appealed the decision on the discrimination claim. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment on the APA claim, although on a somewhat different rationale than the District Court. Jean I, 711 F. 2d, at 1455. The panel went on to decide the constitutional discrimination issue as well, holding that the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee applied to parole of unadmitted aliens, and the District Court’s finding of no invidious discrimination on the basis of race or national origin was clearly erroneous. The panel ordered, inter alia, continued parole of the class members, an injunction against discriminatory enforcement of INS parole policies, and any further relief necessary “to ensure that all aliens, regardless of their nationality or origin, are accorded equal treatment.” Id., at 1509-1510.
The Eleventh Circuit granted a rehearing en banc, thereby vacating the panel opinion. See 11th Cir. Ct. Rule 26(k). After hearing argument, the en banc court held that the APA claim was moot because the Government was no longer detaining any class members under the stricken incarceration and parole policy. All class members who were incarcerated had either violated the terms of their parole or were postjudgment arrivals detained under the regulations adopted after the District Court’s order of June 29, 1982. Jean II, supra, at 962. The en banc court then turned to the constitutional issue and held that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the consideration of unadmitted aliens for parole. According to the court the grant of discretionary authority to the Attorney General under 8 U. S. C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) permitted the Executive to discriminate on the basis of national origin in making parole decisions.
Although the court in Jean II rejected petitioners’ constitutional claim, it accorded petitioners relief based upon the current INS parole regulations, see 8 CFR §212.5 (1985), which are facially neutral and which respondents and petitioners admit require parole decisions to be made without regard to race or national origin. Because no class members were being detained under the policy held invalid by the District Court, the en banc court ordered a remand to the District Court to permit a review of the INS officials’ discretion under the nondiscriminatory regulations which were promulgated in 1982 and are in current effect. The court stated:
“The question that the district court must therefore consider with regard to the remaining Haitian detainees is thus not whether high-level executive branch officials such as the Attorney General have the discretionary authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to discriminate between classes of aliens, but whether lower-level INS officials have abused their discretion by discriminating on the basis of national origin in violation of facially neutral instructions from their superiors.” Jean II, 727 F. 2d, at 963.
The court stated that the statutes and regulations, as well as policy statements of the President and the Attorney General, required INS officials to consider aliens for parole individually, without consideration of race or national origin. Thus on remand the District Court was to ensure that the INS had exercised its broad discretion in an individualized and nondiscriminatory manner. See id., at 978-979.
The court noted that the INS’s power to parole or refuse parole, as delegated by Congress in the United States Code, e.g., 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182(d)(5)(A), 1225(b), 1227(a), was quite broad. 727 F. 2d, at 978-979. The court held that this power was subject to review only on a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. According to the court “immigration officials clearly have the authority to deny parole to unad-mitted aliens if they can advance a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide reason’ for doing so.” Jean II, supra, at 977, citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 770 (1972).
The issue we must resolve is aptly stated by petitioners:
“This case does not implicate the authority of Congress, the President, or the Attorney General. Rather, it challenges the power of low-level politically unresponsive government officials to act in a manner which is contrary to federal statutes . . . and the directions of the President and the Attorney General, both of whom provided for a policy of non-discriminatory enforcement.” Brief for Petitioners 37.
Petitioners urge that low-level INS officials have invidiously discriminated against them, and notwithstanding the new neutral regulations and the statutes, these low-level agents will renew a campaign of discrimination against the class members on parole and those members who are currently detained. Petitioners contend that the only adequate remedy is “declaratory and injunctive relief” ordered.by this Court, based upon the Fifth Amendment. The limited statutory remedy ordered by the court in Jean II, petitioners contend, is insufficient. For their part respondents are also eager to have us reach the Fifth Amendment issue. Respondents wish us to hold that the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment has no bearing on an unadmitted alien’s request for parole.
“Prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision.” Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U. S. 89, 99 (1981); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 60 (1980); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 361, n. 10 (1983), citing Ashwander v. TV A, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This is a “fundamental rule of judicial restraint.” Three Affiliated Tribes of Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 467 U. S. 138 (1984). Of course, the fact that courts should not decide constitutional issues unnecessarily does not permit a court to press statutory construction “to the point of disingenuous evasion” to avoid a constitutional question. United States v. Locke, 471 U. S. 84, 96 (1985). As the Court stressed in Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101, 105 (1944), “[i]f there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.” See also United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U. S. 725, 737 (1950); Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 257 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Had the court in Jean II followed this rule, it would have addressed the issue involving the immigration statutes and INS regulations first, instead of after its discussion of the Constitution. Because the current statutes and regulations provide petitioners with nondiscriminatory parole consideration — which is all they seek to obtain by virtue of their constitutional argument — there was no need to address the constitutional issue.
Congress has delegated its authority over incoming undocumented aliens to the Attorney General through the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. The Act provides that any alien “who [upon arrival in the United States] may not appear to [an INS] examining officer . . . to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land” is to be detained for examination by a special inquiry officer or immigration judge of the INS. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a); see 8 CFR §236.1 (1985). The alien may request parole pending the decision on his admission. Under 8 U. S. C. § 1182(d)(5)(A),
“[t]he Attorney General may . . . parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States.”
The Attorney General has delegated his parole authority to his INS District Directors under new regulations promulgated after the District Court’s order in this case. See 8 CFR §212.5 (1985). Title 8 CFR §212.5 provides a lengthy list of neutral criteria which bear on the grant or denial of parole. Respondents concede that the INS’s parole discretion under the statute and these regulations, while exceedingly broad, does not extend to considerations of race or national origin. Respondents’ position can best be seen in this colloquy from oral argument:
“Question: You are arguing that constitutionally you would not be inhibited from discriminating against these people on whatever ground seems appropriate. But as I understand your regulations, you are also maintaining that the regulations do not constitute any kind of discrimination against these people, and . . . your agents in the field are inhibited by your own regulations from doing what you say the Constitution would permit you to do.”
“Solicitor General: That’s correct.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 28-29.
See also Brief for Respondents 18-19; 8 U. S. C. § 1182(d) (5)(A); 8 CFR §212.5 (1985); cf. Statement of the President, United States Immigration and Refugee Policy (July 31, 1981), 17 Weekly Comp, of Pres. Doc. 829 (1981). As our dissenting colleagues point out, post, at 862-863, the INS has adopted nationality-based criteria in a number of regulations. These criteria are noticeably absent from the parole regulations, a fact consistent with the position of both respondents and petitioners that INS parole decisions must be neutral as to race or national origin.
Accordingly, we affirm the en banc court’s judgment insofar as it remanded to the District Court for a determination whether the INS officials are observing this limit upon their broad statutory discretion to deny parole to class members in detention. On remand the District Court must consider: (1) whether INS officials exercised their discretion under § 1182(d)(5)(A) to make individualized determinations of parole, and (2) whether INS officials exercised this broad discretion under the statutes and regulations without regard to race or national origin.
Petitioners protest, however, that such a nonconstitutional remedy will permit lower-level INS officials to commence parole revocation and discriminatory parole denial against class members who are currently released on parole. But these officials, while like all others bound by the provisions of the Constitution, are just as surely bound by the provisions of the statute and of the regulations. Respondents concede that the latter do not authorize discrimination on the basis of race and national origin. These class members are therefore protected by the terms of the Court of Appeals’ remand from' the very conduct which they fear. The fact that the protection results from the terms of a regulation or statute, rather than from a constitutional holding, is a necessary consequence of the obligation of all federal courts to avoid constitutional adjudication except where necessary.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the District Court for consideration of petitioner’s claims based on the statute and regulations is
Affirmed.
The record does not inform us of exactly how many class members are in detention, and whether these are postjudgment arrivals or original class members who violated the terms of their parole as set by the District Court. The precise makeup of the class may be addressed on remand. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 42; Jean II, 727 F. 2d 957, 962 (1984); Order on Mandate, Louis v. Nelson, No. 81-1260, p. 1, n. 1 (SD Fla. June 8, 1984); Record, Vol. 17, pp. 4014, 4026, 4085.
The APA issue is not before us and we express no view on it. The court in Jean II was presented with other issues, none germane to the issues we discuss today.
We have no quarrel with the dissent’s view that the proper reading of important statutes and regulations may not be always left to the stipulation of the parties. But when all parties, including the agency which wrote and enforces the regulations, and the en banc court below, agree that regulations neutral on their face must be applied in a neutral manner, we think that interpretation arrives with some authority in this Court.
The dissent relies upon such cases as Young v. United States, 315 U. S. 257, 259 (1942), and Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U. S. 617 (1971), even though those cases have faint resemblance to this one. In Young the Government confessed error, arguing that the Court of Appeals was wrong in its affirmance of a conviction under a broad reading of the Harrison Anti-Narcotics Act. Because of the importance of a consistent interpretation of criminal statutes, we declined to adopt the Solicitor General’s view, and rejected the Circuit Court’s interpretation without ourselves considering and deciding the merits of the question. See 315 U. S., at 258-259. Young has little bearing on the interpretation of the INS regulations at issue today.
In Camp the Solicitor General attempted to defend a banking regulation promulgated by the Comptroller, which was in apparent conflict with federal banking statutes. We rejected the gloss placed upon these statutes by the Solicitor General on appeal; the Comptroller had offered no pre-litigation administrative interpretation of these statutes, and the Solicitor General’s post hoc interpretation could not cure the conflict between the challenged regulation and the statutes.
The interpretation of INS regulations we adopt today involves no post hoc rationalizations of agency action. Unlike the Court in Camp we do not view the new INS policy or the interpretation of that policy agreed to by all parties and the en banc Court of Appeals to be merely a litigation stance in defense of the agency action which precipitated this litigation.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner did not take the witness stand at his trial on a criminal charge in a state court. Over his objection the trial judge instructed the jury not to draw any adverse inference from the petitioner’s decision not to testify. The question before us is whether the giving of such an instruction over the defendant’s objection violated the Constitution.
I
The petitioner was brought to trial in an Oregon court on a charge of escape in the second degree. The evidence showed that he had been an inmate of the Multnomah County Correctional Institution, a minimum-security facility in Multnomah County, Ore. On June 16, 1975, he received a special overnight pass requiring him to return by 10 o’clock the following evening. He did not return. The theory of the defense, supported by the testimony of a psychiatrist and three lay witnesses, was that the petitioner was not criminally responsible for his failure to return to the institution.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial judge informed counsel in chambers that he intended to include the following instruction in his charge to the jury:
“Under the laws of this State a defendant has the option to take the witness stand to testify in his or her own behalf. If a defendant chooses not to testify, such a circumstance gives rise to no inference or presumption against the defendant, and this must not be considered by you in determining the question of guilt or innocence.”
Defense counsel objected to the giving of that instruction, and, after it was given, the following colloquy took place in chambers:
“ [Defense Counsel]: . . . I have one exception.
“I made this in Chambers prior to the closing statement. I told the Court that I did not want an instruction to the effect that the defendant doesn’t have to take the stand, because I felt that that’s like waving a red flag in front of the jury....
“THE COURT: The defendant did orally request the Court just prior to instructing that the Court not give the usual instruction to the effect that there are no inferences to be drawn against the defendant for failing to take the stand in his own behalf.
“The Court felt that it was necessary to give that instruction in order to properly protect the defendant, and therefore, the defendant may have his exception.”
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the petitioner’s conviction and ordered a new trial on the ground that “the better rule is to not give instructions ostensibly designed for defendant’s benefit over the knowledgeable objection of competent defense counsel.” 25 Ore. App. 539, 542, 549 P. 2d 1287, 1288. The Oregon Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, holding that the giving of the instruction over the objection of counsel did not violate the constitutional rights of the defendant. 277 Ore. 569, 561 P. 2d 612.
The petitioner then sought review in this Court, claiming that the instruction infringed upon both his constitutional privilege not to be compelled to incriminate himself, and his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. Because of conflicting decisions in several other courts, we granted certiorari, 434 U. S. 889.
II
A
The Fifth Amendment commands that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” This guarantee was held to be applicable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1. That case, decided in 1964, established that “the same standards” must attach to the privilege “in either a federal or state proceeding.” Id., at 11. Less than a year later the Court held in Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, that it is a violation of this constitutional guarantee to tell a jury in a state criminal trial that a defendant’s failure to testify supports an unfavorable inference against him.
In Griffin, the prosecutor had encouraged the jury to draw adverse inferences from the defendant’s failure to respond to the testimony against him. And the trial judge had instructed the jury that as to evidence which the defendant might be expected to explain, his failure to testify could be taken “ 'into consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that may' be reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable.’ ” Id., at 610. In setting aside the judgment of conviction, the Court held that the Constitution “forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” Id., at 615.
The Griffin opinion expressly reserved decision “on whether an accused can require . . . that the jury be instructed that his silence must be disregarded.” Id., at 615 n. 6. It is settled in Oregon, however, that a defendant has an absolute right to require such an instruction. State v. Patton, 208 Ore. 610, 303 P. 2d 513. The petitioner in the present case does not question this rule, nor does he assert that the instruction actually given was in any respect an erroneous statement of the law. His argument is, quite simply, that this protective instruction becomes constitutionally impermissible when given over the defendant’s objection.
In the Griffin case, the petitioner argues, the Court said that “comment on the refusal to testify” violates the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, 380 U. S., at 614, and thus the “comment” made by the trial judge over the defendant’s objection in the present case was a literal violation of the language of the Griffin opinion. Quite apart from this semantic argument, the petitioner contends that it is an invasion of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, as that privilege was perceived in the Griffin case, for a trial judge to draw the jury’s attention in any way to a defendant’s failure to testify unless the defendant acquiesces. We cannot accept this argument, either in terms of the language of the Griffin opinion or in terms of the basic postulates of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
It is clear from even a cursory review of the facts and the square holding of the Griffin case that the Court was there concerned only with adverse comment, whether by the prosecutor or the trial judge — “comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” Id., at 615. The Court reasoned that such adverse comment amounted to “a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly.” Id., at 614.
By definition, “a necessary element of compulsory self-incrimination is some kind of compulsion.” Hoffa v. United States, 385 U. S. 293, 304. The Court concluded in Griffin that unconstitutional compulsion was inherent in a trial where prosecutor and judge were free to ask the jury to draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s failure to take the witness stand. But a judge’s instruction that the jury must draw no adverse inferences of any kind from the defendant’s exercise of his privilege not to testify is “comment” of an entirely different order. Such an instruction cannot provide the pressure on a defendant found impermissible in Griffin. On the contrary, its very purpose is to remove from the jury’s deliberations any influence of unspoken adverse inferences. It would be strange indeed to conclude that this cautionary instruction violates the very constitutional provision it is intended to protect.
The petitioner maintains, however, that whatever beneficent effect such an instruction may have in most cases, it may in some cases encourage the jury to draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s silence, and, therefore, it cannot constitutionally be given in any case when a defendant objects to it. Specifically, the petitioner contends that in a trial such as this one, where the defense was presented through several witnesses, the defendant can reasonably hope that the jury will not notice that he himself did not testify. In such circumstances, the giving of the cautionary instruction, he says, is like “waving a red flag in front of the jury.”
The petitioner’s argument would require indulgence in two very doubtful assumptions: First, that the jurors have not noticed that the defendant did not testify and will not, therefore, draw adverse inferences on their own; second, that the jurors will totally disregard the instruction, and affirmatively give weight to what they have been told not to consider at all. Federal constitutional law cannot rest on speculative assumptions so dubious as these.
Moreover, even if the petitioner’s simile be accepted, it does not follow that the cautionary instruction in these circumstances violates the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The very purpose of a jury charge is to flag the jurors’ attention to concepts that must not be misunderstood, such as reasonable doubt and burden of proof. To instruct them in the meaning of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is no different.
It may be wise for a trial judge not to give such a cautionary instruction over a defendant’s objection. And each State is, of course, free to forbid its trial judges from doing so as a matter of state law. We hold only that the giving of such an instruction over the defendant’s objection does not violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
B
The petitioner’s second argument is based upon his constitutional right to counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25. That right was violated, he says, when the trial judge refused his lawyer’s request not to give the instruction in question, thus interfering with counsel’s trial strategy. That strategy assertedly was based upon studious avoidance of any mention of the fact that the defendant had not testified.
The argument is an ingenious one, but, as a matter of federal constitutional law, it falls of its own weight once the petitioner’s primary argument has been rejected. In sum, if the instruction was itself constitutionally accurate, and if the giving of it over counsel’s objection did not violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, then the petitioner’s right to the assistance of counsel was not denied when the judge gave the instruction. To hold otherwise would mean that the constitutional right to counsel would be implicated in almost every wholly permissible ruling of a trial judge, if it is made over the objection of the defendant’s lawyer.
In an adversary system of criminal justice, there is no right more essential than the right to the assistance of counsel. But that right has never been understood to confer upon defense counsel the power to veto the wholly permissible actions of the trial judge. It is the judge, not counsel, who has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of a fair and lawful trial. “ ‘[T]he judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of law.’ Quercia v. United States, 289 U. S. 466, 469 (1933).” Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80, 86.
The trial judge in this case determined in the exercise of his duty to give the protective instruction in the defendant’s interest. We have held that it was no violation of the defendant’s constitutional privilege for him to do so, even over the objection of defense counsel. Yet the petitioner argues that his constitutional right to counsel means that this instruction could constitutionally be given only if his lawyer did not object to it. We cannot accept the proposition that the right to counsel, precious though it be, can operate to prevent a court from instructing a jury in the basic constitutional principles that govern the administration of criminal justice.
For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oregon is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Section 162.155 of Ore. Rev. Stat. (1977) provides, in pertinent part:
“(1) A person commits the crime of escape in the second degree if:
"(c) He ¡escapes from a correctional facility."
Section 161.295 of Ore. Rev. Stat. (1977) provides:
"(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
“(2) . . . [T]he terms 'mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.”
The federal courts have generally held that giving the protective instruction over the defendant’s objection is not a constitutional violation. See, e. g., United States v. Williams, 172 U. S. App. D. C. 290, 295, 521 F. 2d 950, 955; United States v. McGann, 431 F. 2d 1104, 1109 (CA5); United States v. Rimanich, 422 F. 2d 817, 818 (CA7); but cf. Mengarelli v. United States Marshal ex rel. Dist. of Nevada, 476 F. 2d 617 (CA9); United States v. Smith, 392 F. 2d 302 (CA4). By contrast, several state courts have held, although not always in constitutional terms, that the giving of such an instruction in these circumstances is prejudicial error. See, e. g., Russell v. State, 240 Ark. 97, 398 S. W. 2d 213 (reversible error); People v. Molano, 253 Cal. App. 2d 841, 61 Cal. Rptr. 821 (proscribed by Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609); Gross v. State, 261 Ind. 489, 306 N. E. 2d 371 (violates Fifth Amendment); State v. Kimball, 176 N. W. 2d 864 (Iowa) (may violate spirit of Griffin).
The Malloy decision overruled the long-settled doctrine of Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, and Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105; Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U. S. 117, 127-129.
The practice held unconstitutional in Griffin had previously been the subject of considerable academic and professional controversy. See, e. g., Note, Comment on Defendant’s Failure to Take the Stand, 57 Yale L. J. 145 (1947); Bruce, The Right to Comment on the Failure of the Defendant to Testify, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 226 (1932). Indeed, at one time the practice had enjoyed the approval of the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association. 9 ALI Proceedings 202, 203 (1931); 56 A. B. A. Rep. 137-159 (1931); 59 A. B. A. Rep. 130-141 (1934). And instructions similar to those at issue in Griffin had been sanctioned by the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence. ALI Model Code of Evidence, Rule 201 (1942); Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 23 (4) (1953).
In Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, it was held that the rule of Griffin v. California was not to be given retrospective application.
It has long been established that a defendant in a federal criminal trial has that right as a matter of statutory law. Bruno v. United States, 308 U. S. 287.
The petitioner also relies upon a remark in the dissenting opinion in United States v. Gainey, 380 U. S. 63, 73: or, if the defendant sees fit, he may choose to have no mention made of his silence by anyone.” This reliance is misplaced. The Gainey case did not involve the Fifth Amendment; the statement in the dissenting opinion expressed the author’s understanding of a federal statute, not the Constitution; and, perhaps most important, the statement was subscribed to by no other Member of the Court.
Compulsion was also found to be present in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605, where the State required a defendant who chose to testify to take the witness stand ahead of any other defense witnesses. Thus a defendant was compelled to make his decision — whether or not to testify — at a point in the trial when he could not know if his testimony would be necessary or even helpful to his case. Id., at 610-611.
It has often been noted that such inferences may be inevitable. Jeremy Bentham wrote more than 150 years ago: “[Bjetween delinquency on the one hand, and silence under inquiry on the other, there is a manifest connexion; a connexion too natural not to be constant and inseparable.” 5 J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 209 (1827). And Wigmore, among many others, made the same point: "What inference does a plea of privilege support? The layman’s natural first suggestion would probably be that the resort to privilege in each instance is a clear confession of crime.” 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §2272, p. 426 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
As this Court has remarked before: “[W]e have not yet attained that certitude about the human mind which would justify us in ... a dogmatic assumption that jurors, if properly admonished, neither could nor would heed the instructions of the trial court . . . .” Bruno v. United States, supra, at 294.
More than 50 years ago, Judge Learned Hand dealt with this question in a single sentence: “It is no. doubt better if a defendant requests no charge upon the subject, for the trial judge to say nothing about it; but to say that when he does, it is error, carries the doctrine of self-incrimination to an absurdity.” Becher v. United States, 5 F. 2d 45, 49 (CA2).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The motion of respondent to proceed in forma pawperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted.
This habeas corpus case involves the presentation to a federal appellate court of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that had never been raised in a state court. Respondent, Isadore Serrano, was convicted of the murder of Debra Gomez in Sunnyside Park, East Chicago, Ind. At trial, Norma Hernandez testified that Serrano had told her that he had killed Gomez. The respondent was represented by William Walker. Upon cross-examination, Mrs. Hernandez stated that the firm of Walker & Walker had represented her on a traffic ticket in the past and that she had asked William Walker to represent her on a pending robbery charge, unrelated to the Gomez slaying. Serrano did not challenge the effectiveness of counsel in his appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, which affirmed his conviction, Serrano v. State, 266 Ind. 126, 360 N. E. 2d 1257 (1977), or before theEederal District Court, which dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The issue was first raised in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which reversed the District Court’s dismissal on grounds that Serrano’s attorney’s representation of a prosecution witness constituted a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective representation. 654 F. 2d 725 (1981). While acknowledging that the ineffective-assistance argument had never been presented to the state courts, the court nevertheless decided that “in view of the clear violation” of respondent’s rights and “in the interest of judicial economy,” there was no reason to await the state court’s consideration of the issue. App. to Pet. for Cert A-3.
No cases were cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its decision. Nor could such support reasonably be found. It has been settled for nearly a century that a state prisoner must normally exhaust available state remedies before a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by the federal courts. Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 (1886); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1944); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U. S. 394, 404-405 (1959); Nelson v. George, 399 U. S. 224, 229 (1970); Picard v. Connor, 404 U. S. 270 (1971); Pitchess v. Davis, 421 U. S. 482 (1975). The exhaustion requirement, now codified in the federal ha-beas statute, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2254(b) and (c), serves to minimize friction between our federal and state systems of justice by allowing the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights. Picard v. Connor, supra,, at 275; Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 250 (1971). An exception is made only if there is no opportunity to obtain redress in state court or if the corrective process is so clearly deficient as to render futile any effort to obtain relief. See, e. g., Wilwording v. Swenson, supra, at 250. State courts are “equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution,” Ex parte Roy all, supra, at 251, and here neither the Court of Appeals nor the respondent contends that Indiana’s postconviction procedures are inadequate to adjudicate the ineffective-assistance claim. Because obvious constitutional errors, no less than obscure transgressions, are subject to the requirements of § 2254(b), the Court of Appeals was obligated to dismiss respondent’s petition.
Sound judicial policy points in the same direction. Creating a new exception for “clear violations” would not promote judicial economy, but rather would invite habeas petitioners to make a practice of first seeking relief on these grounds in federal courts. Significantly more time and resources would be consumed as district and appellate courts examined the merits to determine whether a claim met the requisite level of validity to justify dispensing with the exhaustion requirement. It is likely that in most cases the violation would not be so “clear” and that state prisoners would be directed to seek relief in the state system. Moreover, even when such clear violations are found, considerations of federal-state comity would still inhere, and it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for the federal courts to upset a state-court conviction without affording to the state courts the opportunity to correct a constitutional violation. Picard v. Connor, supra, at 275.
The Court of Appeals engrafted an exception onto the ha-beas statute not envisioned by Congress, inconsistent with the clear mandate of the Act, and irreconcilable with our decisions requiring the exhaustion of state judicial remedies. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Justice Marshall dissents.
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40 (1967), referred to by respondent as an example where the possibility of success in the state courts did not require denying relief, is not to the contrary. The habeas petitioner in Roberts thoroughly exhausted his state remedies, and we held, relying upon Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 449, n. 3 (1953), that “Congress had not intended ‘to require repetitious applications to state courts.’” 389 U. S., at 42.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 2254 provides in pertinent part:
“(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court should not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
“(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.”
Indiana Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies, Rule 1, § 1, provides that
“(a) Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime by a court of this state, and who claims
“(1) that the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state
“. . . may institute at any time a proceeding under this rule to secure relief.”
The Seventh Circuit has previously recognized that resort to this procedure was necessary to fully exhaust state remedies. Evans v. Lane, 419 F. 2d 1337, cert. denied, 398 U. S. 939 and 944 (1970).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
An amendment to the California Constitution provides that state courts shall not order mandatory pupil assignment or transportation unless a federal court would do so to remedy a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The question for our decision is whether this provision is itself in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
HH
This litigation began almost 20 years ago in 1963, when minority students attending school in the Los Angeles Unified School District (District) filed a class action in state court seeking desegregation of the District’s schools. The case went to trial some five years later, and in 1970 the trial court issued an opinion finding that the District was substantially segregated in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions. The court ordered the District to prepare a desegregation plan for immediate use. App. 139.
On the District’s appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed, but on a different basis. Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P. 2d 28 (1976). While the trial court had found de jure segregation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, see App. 117, 120-121, the California Supreme Court based its affirmance solely upon the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution. The court explained that under the California Constitution “state school boards... bear a constitutional obligation to take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in the public schools, whether the segregation be de facto or de jure in origin.” 17 Cal. 3d, at 290, 551 P. 2d, at 34. The court remanded to the trial court for preparation of a “reasonably feasible” plan for school desegregation. Id., at 310, 551 P. 2d, at 48.
On remand, the trial court rejected the District’s mostly voluntary desegregation plan but ultimately approved a second plan that included substantial mandatory school reassignment and transportation — “busing”—on a racial and ethnic basis. The plan was put into effect in the fall of 1978, but after one year’s experience, all parties to the litigation were dissatisfied. See 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 636, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495, 497 (1981). Although the plan continued in operation, the trial court began considering alternatives in October 1979.
In November 1979 the voters of the State of California ratified Proposition I, an amendment to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the State Constitution. Proposition I conforms the power of state courts to order busing to that exercised by the federal courts under the Fourteenth Amendment:
“[N]o court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy a specific violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under federal decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon such party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause... ”
Following approval of Proposition I, the District asked the Superior Court to halt all mandatory reassignment and busing of pupils. App. 185. On May 19, 1980, the court denied the District’s application. The court reasoned that Proposition I was of no effect in this case in light of the court’s 1970 finding of de jure segregation by the District in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shortly thereafter, the court ordered implementation of a revised desegregation plan, one that again substantially relied upon mandatory pupil reassignment and transportation.
The California Court of Appeal reversed. 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1981). The court found that the trial court’s 1970 findings of fact would not support the conclusion that the District had violated the Federal Constitution through intentional segregation. Thus, Proposition I was applicable to the trial court's desegregation plan and would bar that part of the plan requiring mandatory student reassignment and transportation. Moreover, the court concluded that Proposition I was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 654, 170 Cal. Rptr., at 509. The court found no obligation on the part of the State to retain a greater remedy at state law against racial segregation than was provided by the Federal Constitution. Ibid. The court rejected the claim that Proposition I was adopted with a discriminatory purpose. Id., at 654-655,170 Cal. Rptr., at 509.
Determining Proposition I to be applicable and constitutional, the Court of Appeal vacated the orders entered by the Superior Court. The California Supreme Court denied hearing. App. to Pet. for Cert. 73a. We granted certiorari. 454 U. S. 892 (1981).
II
We agree with the California Court of Appeal m rejecting the contention that once a State chooses to do “more” than the Fourteenth Amendment requires, it may never recede. We reject an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment so destructive of a State’s democratic processes and of its ability to experiment. This interpretation has no support in the decisions of this Court.
Proposition I does not inhibit enforcement of any federal law or constitutional requirement. Quite the contrary, by its plain language the Proposition seeks only to embrace the requirements of the Federal Constitution with respect to mandatory school assignments and transportation. It would be paradoxical to conclude that by adopting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the voters of the State thereby had violated it. Moreover, even after Proposition I, the California Constitution still imposes a greater duty of desegregation than does the Federal Constitution. The state courts of California continue to have an obligation under state law to order segregated school districts to use voluntary desegregation techniques, whether or not there has been a finding of intentional segregation. The school districts themselves retain a state-law obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to desegregate, and they remain free to adopt reassignment and busing plans to effectuate desegregation.
Nonetheless, petitioners contend that Proposition I is unconstitutional on its face. They argue that Proposition I employs an “explicit racial classification” and imposes a “race-specific” burden on minorities seeking to vindicate state-created rights. By limiting the power of state courts to enforce the state-created right to desegregated schools, petitioners contend, Proposition I creates a “dual court system” that discriminates on the basis of race. They emphasize that other state-created rights may be vindicated by the state courts without limitation on remedies. Petitioners argue that the “dual court system” created by Proposition I is unconstitutional unless supported by a compelling state interest.
We would agree that if Proposition I employed a racial classification it would be unconstitutional unless necessary to further a compelling state interest. “A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979). See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 196 (1964). But Proposition I does not embody a racial classification. It neither says nor implies that persons are to be treated differently on account of their race. It simply forbids state courts to order pupil school assignment or transportation in the absence of a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The benefit it seeks to confer — neighborhood schooling — is made available regardless of race in the discretion of school boards. Indeed, even if Proposition I had a racially discriminatory effect, in view of the demographic mix of the District it is not.clear which race or races would be affected the most or in what way. In addition, this Court previously has held that even when a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect on a racial minority, the Fourteenth Amendment is violated only if a discriminatory purpose can be shown.
Similarly, the Court has recognized that a distinction may exist between state action that discriminates on the basis of race and state action that addresses, in neutral fashion, race-related matters. This distinction is implicit in the Court’s repeated statement that the Equal Protection Clause is not violated by the mere repeal of race-related legislation or policies that were not required by the Federal Constitution in the first place. In Dayton Bd. of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 414 (1977), we found that the school board’s mere repudiation of an earlier resolution calling for desegregation did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 376 (1967), and again in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385, 390, n. 5 (1969), we were careful to note that the laws under review did more than “mere[ly] repeal” existing antidiscrimination legislation. In sum, the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial classification.
Were we to hold that the mere repeal of race-related legislation is unconstitutional, we would limit seriously the authority of States to deal with the problems of our heterogeneous population. States would be committed irrevocably to legislation that has proved unsuccessful or even harmful in practice. And certainly the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment would not be advanced by an interpretation that discouraged the States from providing greater protection to racial minorities. Nor would the purposes of the Amendment be furthered by requiring the States to maintain legislation designed to ameliorate race relations or to protect racial minorities but which has produced just the opposite effects. Yet these would be the results of requiring a State to maintain legislation that has proved unworkable or harmful when the State was under no obligation to adopt the legislation in the first place. Moreover, and relevant to this case, we would not interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to require the people of a State to adhere to a judicial construction of their State Constitution when that Constitution itself vests final authority in the people.
III
Petitioners seek to avoid the force of the foregoing considerations by arguing that Proposition I is not a “mere repeal.” Relying primarily on the decision in Hunter v. Erickson, supra, they contend that Proposition I does not simply repeal a state-created right but fundamentally alters the judicial system so that “those seeking redress from racial isolation in violation of state law must be satisfied -with less than full relief from a state court.” We do not view Hunter as controlling here, nor are we persuaded by petitioners’ characterization of Proposition I as something more than a mere repeal.
In Hunter the Akron city charter had been amended by the voters to provide that no ordinance regulating real estate on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin could take effect until approved by a referendum. As a result of the charter amendment, a fair housing ordinance, adopted by the City Council at an earlier date, was no longer effective. In holding the charter amendment invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the charter amendment was not a simple repeal of the fair housing ordinance. The amendment “not only suspended the operation of the existing ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but also required the approval of the electors before any future [anti-discrimination] ordinance could take effect.” 393 U. S., at 389-390. Thus, whereas most ordinances regulating real property would take effect once enacted by the City Council, ordinances prohibiting racial discrimination in housing would be forced to clear an additional hurdle. As such, the charter amendment placed an impermissible, “special burde[n] on racial minorities within the governmental process.” Id., at 391.
Hunter involved more than a “mere repeal” of the fair housing ordinance; persons seeking antidiscrimination housing laws — presumptively racial minorities — were “singled out for mandatory referendums while no other group... face[d] that obstacle.” James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 142 (1971). By contrast, even on the assumption that racial minorities benefited from the busing required by state law, Proposition I is less than a “repeal” of the California Equal Protection Clause. As noted above, after Proposition I, the State Constitution still places upon school boards a greater duty to desegregate than does the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nor can it be said that Proposition I distorts the political process for racial reasons or that it allocates governmental or judicial power on the basis of a discriminatory principle. “The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.” Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147 (1940). Remedies appropriate in one area of legislation may not be desirable in another. The remedies available for violation of the antitrust laws, for example, are different than those available for violation of the Civil Rights Acts. Yet a “dual court system” — one for the racial majority and one for the racial minority — is not established simply because civil rights remedies are different from those available in other areas. Surely it was constitutional for the California Supreme Court to caution that although “in some circumstances busing will be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation plan,” in other circumstances “its ‘costs,’ both in financial and educational terms, will render its use inadvisable.” See n. 3, swpra. It was equally constitutional for the people of the State to determine that the standard of the Fourteenth Amendment was more appropriate for California courts to apply in desegregation cases than the standard repealed by Proposition I.
In short, having gone beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution, the State was free to return in part to the standard prevailing generally throughout the United States. It could have conformed its law to the Federal Constitution in every respect. That it chose to pull back only in part, and by preserving a greater right to desegregation than exists under the Federal Constitution, most assuredly does not render the Proposition unconstitutional on its face.
H-t <1
The California Court of Appeal also rejected petitioners claim that Proposition I, if facially valid, was nonetheless unconstitutional because enacted with a discriminatory purpose. The court reasoned that the purposes of the Proposition were well stated in the Proposition itself. Voters may have been motivated by any of these purposes, chief among them the educational benefits of neighborhood schooling. The court found that voters also may have considered that the extent of mandatory busing, authorized by state law, actually was aggravating rather than ameliorating the desegregation problem. See n. 1, supra. It characterized petitioners’ claim of discriminatory intent on the part of millions of voters as but “pure speculation.” 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 655, 170 Cal. Rptr., at 509.
In Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967), the Court considered the constitutionality of another California Proposition. In that case, the California Supreme Court had concluded that the Proposition was unconstitutional because it gave the State’s approval to private racial discrimination. This Court agreed, deferring to the findings made by the California court. The Court noted that the California court was “armed... with the knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning the passage and potential impact” of the Proposition and “familiar with the milieu in which that provision would operate.” Id., at 378. Similarly, in this case, again involving the circumstances of passage and the potential impact of a Proposition adopted at a statewide election, we see no reason to differ with the conclusions of the state appellate court.
Under decisions of this Court, a law neutral on its face still may be unconstitutional if motivated by a discriminatory purpose. In determining whether such a purpose was the motivating factor, the racially disproportionate effect of official action provides “an ‘important starting point.’” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S., at 274, quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266 (1977).
Proposition I in no way purports to limit the power of state courts to remedy the effects of intentional segregation with its accompanying stigma. The benefits of neighborhood schooling are racially neutral. This manifestly is true in Los Angeles where over 75% of the public school body is composed of groups viewed as racial minorities. See nn. 1 and 16, supra. Moreover, the Proposition simply removes one ■means of achieving the state-created right to desegregated education. School districts retain the obligation to alleviate segregation regardless of cause. And the state courts still may order desegregation measures other than pupil school assignment or pupil transportation.
Even if we could assume that Proposition I had a disproportionate adverse effect on racial minorities, we see no reason to challenge the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the voters of the State were not motivated by a discriminatory purpose. See 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 654-655, 170 Cal. Rptr., at 509. In this case the Proposition was approved by an overwhelming majority of the electorate. It received support from members of all races. The purposes of the Proposition are stated in its text and are legitimate, nondiscriminatory objectives. In these circumstances, we will not dispute the judgment of the Court of Appeal or impugn the motives of the State’s electorate.
Accordingly the judgment of the California Court of Appeal is
Affirmed.
In 1980 the District included 562 schools with 650,000 students in an area of 711 square miles. In 1968 when the case went to trial, the District was 53.6% white, 22.6% black, 20% Hispanic, and 3.8% Asian and other. By October 1980 the demographic composition had altered radically: 23.7% white, 23.3% black, 45.3% Hispanic, and 7.7% Asian and other. See 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 642, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495, 501 (1981).
“The findings in this case adequately support the trial court’s conclusion that the segregation in the defendant school district is de jure in nature. We shall explain, however, that we do not rest our decision on this characterization because we continue to adhere to our conclusion in [Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P. 2d 878 (1963)] that school boards in California bear a constitutional obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation'regardless of its cause.’ ” Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d, at 285, 551 P. 2d, at 30. The court explained that federal cases were not controlling:
“In focusing primarily on... federal decisions... defendant ignores a significant line of California decisions, decisions which authoritatively establish that in this state school boards do bear a constitutional obligation to take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in the public schools, whether the segregation be de facto or de jure in origin.” Id., at 290, 551 P. 2d, at 33-34.
In stating general principles to guide the trial court on remand, the State Supreme Court discussed the “busing” question: “While critics have sometimes attempted to obscure the issue, court decisions time and time again emphasized that ‘busing’ is not a constitutional end in itself but is simply one potential tool which may be utilized to satisfy a school district’s constitutional obligation in this field.... [I]n some circumstances busing will be an appropriate and useful element in a desegregation plan, while in other instances its ‘costs,’ both in financial and educational terms, will render its use inadvisable.” Id., at 309, 551 P. 2d, at 47. It noted as well that a state court should not intervene to speed the desegregation process so long as the school board takes “reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation,” id., at 305, 551 P. 2d, at 45, and that “a court cannot properly issue a ‘busing’ order so long as a school district continues to meet its constitutional obligations.” Id., at 310, 551 P. 2d, at 48.
The plan provided for the mandatory reassignment of approximately 40,000 students in the fourth through eighth grades. Some of these children were bused over long distances requiring daily round-trip bus rides of as long as two to four hours. In addition, the plan provided for the voluntary transfer of some 30,000 students.
Respondent Bustop, Inc., unsuccessfully sought to stay implementation of the plan. See Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 439 U. S. 1380 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers); Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 439 U. S. 1384 (1978) (Powell, J., in chambers).
Proposition I was placed before the voters following a two-thirds vote of each house of the state legislature. Cal. Const., Art. 18, § 1. The State Senate approved the Proposition by a vote of 28 to 6, the State Assembly by a vote of 62 to 17. The voters favored the Proposition by a vote of 2,433,312 (68.6%) to 1,112,923 (31.4%). The Proposition received a majority of the vote in each of the State’s 58 counties and in 79 of the State’s 80 assembly districts. California Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote, November 6, 1979, Election 3-4, 43-49.
Proposition I added a lengthy proviso to Art. 1, § 7(a), of the California Constitution. Following passage of Proposition I, § 7 now provides, in relevant part:
“(a) A person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws; provided, that nothing contained herein or elsewhere in this Constitution imposes upon the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obligations or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation. In enforcing this subdivision or any other provision of this Constitution, no court of this state may impose upon the State of California or any public entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil transportation, (1) except to remedy a specific violation by such party that would also constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, and (2) unless a federal court would be permitted under federal decisional law to impose that obligation or responsibility upon such party to remedy the specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.
“Nothing herein shall prohibit the governing board of a school district from voluntarily continuing or commencing a school integration plan after the effective date of this subdivision as amended.
“In amending this subdivision, the Legislature and people of the State of California find and declare that this amendment is necessary to serve compelling public interests, including those of making the most effective use of the limited financial resources now and prospectively available to support public education, maximizing the educational opportunities and protecting the health and safety of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of parents to participate in the educational process, preserving harmony and tranquility in this state and its public schools, preventing the waste of scarce fuel resources, and protecting the environment.”
The Superior Court ordered the immediate implementation of the revised plan. The District was unsuccessful in its effort to gain a stay of the plan pending appeal. See Board of Education v. Superior Court, 448 U. S. 1343 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers).
“When the 1970 findings of the trial court are reviewed in the light of the correct applicable federal law, it is apparent that no specific segregative intent with discriminatory purpose was found. The thrust of the findings of the trial court was that passive maintenance by the Board of a neighborhood school system in the face of widespread residential racial imbalance amounted to de jure segregation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.... But a school board has no duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to meet and overcome the effect of population movements.” 113 Cal. App. 3d, at 645-646, 170 Cal. Rptr., at 503.
The Court of Appeal also rejected the claim that Proposition I deprived minority children of a “vested right” to desegregated education in violation of due process. See id., at 655-656,170 Cal. Rptr., at 509-510. Petitioners no longer advance this claim.
On March 16, 1981, the District directed that mandatory pupil reassignment under the Superior Court’s revised plan be terminated on April 20, 1981. On that date, parents of children who had been reassigned were given the option of returning their children to neighborhood schools. According to respondent Board of Education, approximately 7,000 pupils took this option of whom 4,300 were minority students. Brief for Respondent Board of Education 10.
The state courts refused to enjoin termination of the plan. On April 17, 1981, however, the United States District Court for the Central District of California issued a temporary restraining order preventing termination of the plan. Los Angeles NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 513 F. Supp. 717. The District Court found that there was a “fair chance” that intentional segregation by the District could be demonstrated. Id,., at 720. The District Court’s order was vacated on the following day by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Los Angeles Unified School District v. District Court, 650 F. 2d 1004 (1981). On remand the District Court denied the District’s motion to dismiss. This ruling has been certified for interlocutory appeal. See Brief for Respondent Board of Education 10, n. 4.
On September 10, 1981, the Superior Court approved a new, voluntary desegregation plan.
Respondent Bustop, Inc., argues that far from doing “more” than the Fourteenth Amendment requires, the State actually violated the Amendment by assigning students on the basis of race when such assignments were not necessary to remedy a federal constitutional violation. See Brief for Respondent Bustop, Inc., 10-18. We do not reach this contention.
In this respect this case differs from the situation presented in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, ante, p. 457.
In an opinion delivered after Proposition I was enacted, the California Supreme Court stated that “the amendment neither releases school districts from their state constitutional obligation to take reasonably feasible steps to alleviate segregation regardless of its cause, nor divests California courts of authority to order desegregation measures other than pupil school assignment or pupil transportation.” McKinny v. Oxnard Union High School District Board of Trustees, 31 Cal. 3d 79, 92-93, 642 P. 2d 460, 467 (1982). Moreover, the Proposition only limits state courts when enforcing the State Constitution. Thus, the Proposition would not bar state-court enforcement of state statutes requiring busing for desegregation or for any other purpose. Cf. Brown v. Califano, 201 U. S. App. D. C. 235, 244, 627 F. 2d 1221, 1230 (1980) (legislation limiting power of federal agency to require busing by local school boards held constitutional in view of the “effective avenues for desegregation” left open by the legislation).
“[I]t is racial discrimination in the judicial apparatus of the state, not racial discrimination in the state’s schools, that petitioners challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment in this case.” Brief for Petitioners 48.
In Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969), the Court invalidated a city charter amendment which placed a special burden on racial minorities in the political process. The Court considered that although the law was neutral on its face, “the reality is that the law’s impact falls on the minority.” Id., at 391. In light of this reality and the distortion of the political process worked by the charter amendment, the Court considered that the amendment employed a racial classification despite its facial neutrality. In this case the elements underlying the holding in Hunter are missing. See infra.
A neighborhood school policy in itself does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 28 (1971) (“Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on a racial basis. All things being equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes”). Cf. 20 U. S. C. § 1701: “(a) The Congress declares it to be the policy of the United States that — (1) all children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educational opportunity without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin; and (2) the neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining public school assignments.”
In the Los Angeles School District, white students are now the racial minority, see n. 1, supra. Similarly, in Los Angeles County, racial minorities, including those of Spanish origin, constitute the majority of the population. See U. S. Dept. of Commerce, 1980 Census of Population and Housing, California, Advance Reports 6 (Mar. 1981).
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 238-248 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 265 (1977); James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, 141 (1971).
Proposition I is not limited to busing for the purpose of racial desegregation. It applies neutrally to “pupil school assignment or pupil transportation” in general. Even so, it is clear that court-ordered busing in excess of that required by the Fourteenth Amendment, as one means of desegregating schools, prompted the initiation and probably the adoption of Proposition I.
See Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman, 443 U. S., at 531, n. 5 (“Racial imbalance, we noted in Dayton I, is not per se a constitutional violation, and rescission of prior resolutions proposing desegregation is unconstitutional only if the resolutions were required in the first place by the Fourteenth Amendment”).
In Hunter we noted that “we do not hold that mere repeal of an existing [antidiscrimination] ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment.” 393 U. S., at 390, n. 5. In Reitman the Court held that California Proposition 14 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment not because it repealed two pieces of antidiscrimination legislation, but because the Proposition involved the State in private racial discrimination: “Here we are dealing with a provision which does not just repeal an existing law forbidding private racial discriminations. Section 26 was intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market.” 387 U. S., at 380-381.
Of course, if the purpose of repealing legislation is to disadvantage a racial minority, the repeal is unconstitutional for this reason. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369 (1967).
See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 228 (1971) (“To hold... that every public facility or service, once opened, constitutionally ‘locks in’ the public sponsor so that it may not be dropped... would plainly discourage the expansion and enlargement of needed services in the long run”) (Burger, C. J., concurring); Reitman v. Mulkey, supra, at 395 (“Opponents of state antidiscrimination statutes are now in a position to argue that such legislation should be defeated because, if enacted, it may be unrepealable”) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In his dissenting opinion in Reitman v. Mulkey, supra, at 395, Justice Harlan remarked upon the need for legislative flexibility when dealing with the “delicate and troublesome problems of race relations.” He noted: “The lines that have been and must be drawn in this area, fraught as it is with human sensibilities and frailties of whatever race or creed, are difficult ones. The drawing of them requires understanding, patience, and compromise, and is best done by legislatures rather than by courts. When legislation in this field is unsuccessful there should be wide opportunities for legislative amendment, as well as for change through such processes as the popular initiative and referendum.” 387 U. S., at 395-396.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. See id., at 7-8 (“The fact that a state may be free to remove a right or remove a duty, does not mean that it has the same freedom to leave the right in place but simply, in a discriminatory way we argue, provide less than full judicial remedy”).
“In the case before us... the city of Akron has not attempted to allocate governmental power on the basis of any general principle. Here, we have a provision that has the clear purpose of making it more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities to achieve legislation that is in their interest.” 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring).
The Hunter Court noted that although “the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner,” id., at 391, a charter amendment making it more difficult to pass antidiscrimination legislation could only disadvantage racial minorities in the governmental process.
Petitioners contend that Proposition I only restricts busing for the purpose of racial discrimination. The Proposition is neutral on its face, however, and respondents — as well as the State in its amicus brief — take issue with petitioners’ interpretation of the provision.
Similarly, a “dual constitution” is not established when the State chooses to go beyond the requirements of the Federal Constitution in some areas but not others. Nor is a “dual executive branch” created when an agency is given enforcement powers in one area but not in another. Cf. Brown v. Califano, 201 U. S. App. D. C. 235, 627 F. 2d 1221 (1980) (upholding federal legislation prohibiting a federal executive agency, but not local school officials or federal courts, from requiring busing).
The Proposition contains its own statement of purpose:
“[T]he Legislature and people of the State of California find and declare that this amendment is necessary to serve compelling public interests, including those of making the most effective use of the limited financial resources now and prospectively available to support public education, maximizing the educational opportunities and protecting the health and safety of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of parents to participate in the educational process, preserving harmony and tranquility in this state and its public schools, preventing the waste of scarce fuel, resources, and protecting the environment.”
Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 253 (“The extent of deference that one pays to the trial court’s determination of the factual issue, and indeed, the extent to which one characterizes the intent issue as a question of fact or a question of law, will vary in different contexts”) (Stevens, J., concurring).
In Brown v. Califano, supra, the Court of Appeals found that a federal statute preventing the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) from requiring busing “to a school other than the school which is nearest the student’s home,” 42 U. S. C. § 200
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is a federal crime for a convicted felon to be in unlawful possession of a firearm. 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1). The ordinary maximum sentence for that crime is 10 years of imprisonment. § 924(a)(2). If, however, when the unlawful possession occurred, the felon had three previous convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense, the punishment is increased to a minimum term of 15 years. § 924(e). The instant case is another in a series in which the Court is called upon to interpret § 924(e) to determine if a particular previous conviction was for a “violent felony/’ as that term is used in the punishment enhancement statute. See James v. United States, 550 U. S. 192 (2007); Begay v. United States, 553 U. S. 137 (2008); Chambers v. United States, 555 U. S. 122 (2009).
In this case the previous conviction in question is under an Indiana statute that makes it a criminal offense whenever the driver of a vehicle knowingly or intentionally “flees from a law enforcement officer.” Ind. Code §35-44-3-3 (2004). The relevant text of the statute is set out in the discussion below. For the reasons explained, the vehicle flight that the statute proscribes is a violent felony as the federal statute uses that term.
I
Petitioner Marcus Sykes pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1), in connection with an attempted robbery of two people at gunpoint. Sykes had previous convictions for at least three felonies. On two separate occasions Sykes used a firearm to commit robbery, in one case to rob a man of his $200 wristwatch and in another to rob a woman of her purse.
His third prior felony is the one of concern here. Sykes was convicted for vehicle flight, in violation of Indiana’s “resisting law enforcement” law. Ind. Code §35-44-3-3. That law provides:
“(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally:
“(1) forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of his duties as an officer;
“(2) forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with the authorized service or execution of a civil or criminal process or order of a court; or
“(3) flees from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by visible or audible means, identified himself and ordered the person to stop;
“commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor, except as provided in subsection (b).
“(b) The offense under subsection (a) is a:
“(1) Class D felony if:
“(A) the offense is described in subsection (a)(3) and the person uses a vehicle to commit the offense; or
“(B) while committing any offense described in subsection (a), the person draws or uses a deadly weapon, inflicts bodily injury on another person, or operates a vehicle in a manner that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person;
“(2) Class C felony if, while committing any offense described in subsection (a), the person operates a vehicle in a manner that causes serious bodily injury to another person; and
“(3) Class B felony if, while committing any offense described in subsection (a), the person operates a vehicle in a manner that causes the death of another person.”
Here, as will be further explained, Sykes used a vehicle to flee after an officer ordered him to stop, which was, as the statute provides, a class D felony. The Court of Appeals of Indiana has interpreted the crime of vehicle flight to require “a knowing attempt to escape law enforcement.” Woodward v. State, 770 N. E. 2d 897, 901 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Woodward involved a driver who repeatedly flashed his bright lights and failed to obey traffic signals. Id., at 898. When an officer activated his emergency equipment, the defendant became “aware... that [the officer] wanted him to pull his vehicle over,” but instead drove for a mile without “stopping, slowing, or otherwise acknowledging” the officer because, he later testified, he “was ‘trying to rationalize why [he] would be pulled over.’ ” Id., at 898,901. Though the defendant later claimed that he was also seeking a “well-lighted place to stop where there would be someone who knew him,” id., at 901, his actions suggested otherwise. He passed two gas stations, a food outlet store, and a McDonald’s before pulling over. When he got out of the ear, he began to shout profanities at the pursuing officer. Ibid. By that time, the officer had called for backup and exited his own vehicle with his gun drawn. Id., at 898. In answering the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the above evidence, the Indiana court held that because he knew that a police officer sought to stop him, the defendant could not “choose the location of the stop” and insist on completing the stop “on his own terms,” as he had done, “without adequate justification,” which he lacked. Id., at 901-902.
In the instant case a report prepared for Sykes’ federal sentencing describes the details of the Indiana crime. After observing Sykes driving without using needed headlights, police activated their emergency equipment for a traffic stop. Sykes did not stop. A chase ensued. Sykes wove through traffic, drove on the wrong side of the road and through yards containing bystanders, passed through a fence, and struck the rear of a house. Then he fled on foot. He was found only with the aid of a police dog.
The District Court decided that his three prior convictions, including the one for violating the prohibition on vehicle flight in subsection (b)(1)(A) of the Indiana statute just discussed, were violent felonies for purposes of § 924(e) and sentenced Sykes to 188 months of imprisonment. On appeal Sykes conceded that his two prior robbery convictions were violent felonies. He did not dispute that his vehicle flight offense was a felony, but he did argue that it was not violent. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 598 F. 3d 334 (2010). The court’s opinion was consistent with the rulings of the Courts of Appeals in the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits. Powell v. United States, 430 F. 3d 490 (CA1 2005) (per curiam); United States v. Harri mon, 568 F. 3d 531, 534-537 (CA5 2009); United States v. LaCasse, 567 F. 3d 763, 765-767 (CA6 2009); United States v. McConnell, 605 F. 3d 822, 827-830 (CA10 2010) (finding the flight to be a “crime of violence” under the “nearly identical” § 4B1.2(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines). It was in conflict with a ruling by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Harrison, 558 F. 3d 1280, 1291-1296 (2009), and at least in tension, if not in conflict, with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Tyler, 580 F. 3d 722, 724-726 (2009), and for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Kelly, 422 F. 3d 889, 892-897 (2005), United States v. Jennings, 515 F. 3d 980, 992-993 (2008), and United States v. Peterson, No. 07-30465, 2009 WL 3437834, *1 (Oct. 27, 2009). The writ of certiorari, 561 U. S. 1058 (2010), allows this Court to address the conflict.
II
In determining whether an offense is a violent felony, this Court has explained,
“we employ the categorical approach .... Under this approach, we look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense, and do not generally consider the particular facts disclosed by the record of conviction. That is, we consider whether the elements of the offense are of the type that would justify its inclusion within the residual provision, without inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular offender.” James, 550 U. S., at 202 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 599-602 (1990).
So while there may be little doubt that the circumstances of the flight in Sykes’ own case were violent, the question is whether §35-44-3-3 of the Indiana Code, as a categorical matter, is a violent felony.
Under 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(B), an offense is deemed a violent felony if it is a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment that
“(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or
“(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”
Resisting law enforcement through felonious vehicle flight does not meet the requirements of clause (i), and it is not among the specific offenses named in clause (ii). Thus, it is violent under this statutory scheme only if it fits within the so-called residual provision of clause (ii). To be a violent crime, it must be an offense that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”
The question, then, is whether Indiana’s prohibition on flight from an officer by driving a vehicle — the violation of Indiana law for which Sykes sustained his earlier conviction — falls within the residual clause because, as a categorical matter, it presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The offenses enumerated in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) — burglary, extortion, arson, and crimes involving the use of explosives — provide guidance in making this determination. For instance, a crime involves the requisite risk when “the risk posed by [the crime in question] is comparable to that posed by its closest analog among the enumerated offenses.” James, 550 U. S., at 203 (explaining that attempted burglary poses risks akin to that of completed burglary).
When a perpetrator defies a law enforcement command by fleeing in a car, the determination to elude capture makes a lack of concern for the safety of property and persons of pedestrians and other drivers an inherent part of the offense. Even if the criminal attempting to elude capture drives without going at foil speed or going the wrong way, he creates the possibility that police will, in a legitimate and lawful manner, exceed or almost match his speed or use force to bring- him within their custody, A perpetrator’s indifference to these collateral consequences has violent — even lethal-potential for others. A criminal who takes flight and creates a risk of this dimension takes action similar in degree of danger to that involved in arson, which also entails intentional release of a destructive force dangerous to others. This similarity is a beginning point in establishing that vehicle flight presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
Another consideration is a. comparison to the crime of burglary. Burglary is dangerous because it can end in confrontation leading to violence. Id., at 200. The same is true of vehicle flight, but to an even greater degree. The attempt Lo elude capture is a direct challenge to an officer’s authority. It is a provocative and dangerous act that dares, and in a typical case requires, the officer to give chase. The felon’s conduct gives the officer reason to believe that the defendant has something more serious than a traffic violation to hide. In Sykes’ case, officers pursued a man with two prior violent felony convictions and marijuana in his possession. In other cases officers may discover more about the violent potential of the fleeing suspect by running a check on the license plate or by recognizing the fugitive as a convicted felon. See, e. g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332, 336 (2009).
Because an accepted way to restrain a driver who poses dangers to others is through seizure, officers pursuing fleeing drivers may deem themselves dutybound to escalate their response to ensure the felon is apprehended. Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372, 385 (2007), rejected the possibility that police could eliminate the danger from a vehicle flight by giving up the chase because the perpetrator “might have been just as likely to respond by continuing to drive recklessly as by slowing down and wiping his brow.” And once the pursued vehicle is stopped, it is sometimes necessary for officers to approach with guns drawn to effect arrest. Confrontation with police is the expected result of vehicle flight. It places property and persons at serious risk of injury.
Risk of violence is inherent to vehicle flight. Between the confrontations that initiate and terminate the incident, the intervening pursuit creates high risks of crashes. It presents more certain risk as a categorical matter than burglary. It is well known that when offenders use motor vehicles as their means of escape they create serious potential risks of physical injury to others. Flight from a law enforcement officer invites, even demands, pursuit. As that pursuit continues, the risk of an accident accumulates. And having chosen to flee, and thereby commit a crime, the perpetrator has all the more reason to seek to avoid capture.
Unlike burglaries, vehicle flights from an officer by definitional necessity occur when police are present, are flights in defiance of their instructions, and are effected with a vehicle that can be used in a way to cause serious potential risk of physical injury to another. See post, at 19-21 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); see also post, at 21-22 (listing Indiana cases addressing ordinary intentional vehicle flight and noting the high-risk conduct that those convictions involved).
Although statistics are not dispositive, here they confirm the commonsense conclusion that Indiana’s vehicular flight crime is a violent felony. See Chambers, 555 U. S., at 129 (explaining that statistical evidence sometimes “helps provide a conclusive . . . answer” concerning the risks that crimes present). As Justice Thomas explains, chase-related crashes kill more than 100 nonsuspeets every year. See post, at 19. Injury rates are much higher. Studies show that between 18% and 41% of chases involve crashes, which always carry a risk of injury, and that between 4% and 17% of all chases end in injury. See post, at 20.
A 2008 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) study examined 7,737 police pursuits reported by 56 agencies in 30 States during 2001-2007. C. Lum & G. Fachner, Police Pursuits in an Age of Innovation and Reform 54. Those pursuits, the study found, resulted in 313 injuries to police and bystanders, a rate of slightly over 4 injuries to these nonsuspects per 100 pursuits. Id., at 57. Given that police may be least likely to pursue suspects where the dangers to bystanders are greatest — i. e., when flights occur at extraordinarily high speeds — it is possible that risks associated with vehicle flight are even higher.
Those risks may outstrip the dangers of at least two offenses enumerated in 18 U. S. C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). According to a study by the Department of Justice, approximately 3.7 million burglaries occurred on average each year in the United States between 2003 and 2007. Bureau of Justice Statistics, S. Catalano, Victimization During Household Burglary 1 (Sept. 2010). Those burglaries resulted in an annual average of approximately 118,000 injuries, or 3.2 injuries for every 100 burglaries. Id., at 9-10. That risk level is 20% lower than that which the IACP found for vehicle pursuits.
The U. S. Fire Administration (USFA) maintains the world’s largest databank on fires. It secures participation from over one-third of U. S. fire departments. It reports an estimated 38,400 arsons in 2008. Those fires resulted in an estimated 1,255 injuries, or 3.3 injuries per 100 arsons. USFA, Methodology Used in the Development of the Topical Fire Research Series, http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/ pdf/tfrs/methodology.pdf (all Internet materials as visited June 3, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file); USFA, Nonresidential Building Intentional Fire Trends (Dec. 2010), http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/statistics/ nonres_bldg_intentional_fire_trends.pdf; USFA, Residential Building Causes, http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/xls/ estimates/res_bldg_fire„cause.xlsx; USFA, Residential and Nonresidential Fire Estimate Summaries, 2003-2008, http:// www.usfa.dhs.gov/ statistics / estimates / index.shtm. That risk level is about 20% lower than that reported by the IACP for vehicle flight.
Ill
Sykes argues that, regardless of risk level, typical vehicle flights do not involve the kinds of dangers that the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (ACCA) residual clause demands. In his view this Court’s decisions in Begay and Chambers require ACCA predicates to be purposeful, violent, and aggressive in ways that vehicle flight is not. Sykes, in taking this position, overreads the opinions of this Court.
ACCA limits the residual clause to crimes “typically committed by those whom one normally labels ‘armed career criminals,”’ that is, crimes that “show an increased likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately point the gun and pull the trigger.” Begay, 553 U. S., at 146. In general, levels of risk divide crimes that qualify from those that do not. See, e. g., James, 550 U. S. 192 (finding attempted burglary risky enough to qualify). Chambers is no exception. 555 U. S., at 128-129 (explaining that failure to report does not qualify because the typical offender is not “significantly more likely than others to attack, or physically to resist, an apprehender”).
The sole decision of this Court concerning the reach of ACCA’s residual clause in which risk was not the dispositive factor is Begay, which held that driving under the influence (DUI) is not an ACCA predicate. There, the Court stated that DUI is not purposeful, violent, and aggressive. 553 U. S., at 145-148. But the Court also gave a more specific reason for its holding. “[T]he conduct for which the drunk driver is convicted (driving under the influence) need not be purposeful or deliberate,” id., at 145 (analogizing DUI to strict-liability, negligence, and recklessness crimes). By contrast, the Indiana statute at issue here has a stringent mens rea requirement. Violators must act “knowingly or intentionally.” Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3(a); see Woodward, 770 N. E. 2d, at 901 (construing the statute to require “a knowing attempt to escape law enforcement” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The phrase “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” has no precise textual link to the residual clause, which requires that an ACCA predicate “otherwise involv[e] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Begay phrase is an addition to the statutory text. In many cases the purposeful, violent, and aggressive inquiry will be redundant with the inquiry into risk, for crimes that fall within the former formulation and those that present serious potential risks of physical injury to others tend to be one and the same. As between the two inquiries, risk levels provide a categorical and manageable standard that suffices to resolve the case before us.
Begay involved a crime akin to strict-liability, negligence, and recklessness crimes; and the purposeful, violent, and aggressive formulation was used in that case to explain the result. The felony at issue here is not a strict-liability, negligence, or recklessness crime and because it is, for the reasons stated and as a categorical matter, similar in risk to the listed crimes, it is a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
<!
Sykes finds it significant that his flight conviction was not under the Indiana provision that criminalizes flight in which the offender “operates a vehicle in a manner that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person.” Ind. Code § 35 — 44—3—3(b)(1)(B). In structuring its laws in this way, Sykes contends, Indiana confirmed that it did not intend subsection (b)(l)(A)’s general prohibition on vehicle flight to encompass the particular class of vehicle flights that subsection (b)(1)(B) reaches.
Sykes’ argument is unconvincing. Indiana treats violations of subsections (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B) as crimes of the same magnitude. They are both class D felonies, and both carry terms of between six months and three years, Ind. Code §35-50-2-7(a). The distinction between the provisions is their relationship to subsection (a), which prohibits, among other acts, much conduct in which a person “(1) forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer . . .; (2) forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with the authorized service or execution of . . . process . . . ; or (3) flees from a law enforcement officer.” § 35-44-3-3(a). Subsection (b)(1)(A) only involves the conduct barred by subsection (a)(3) — flight—which, it states, is a felony whenever committed with a vehicle. Under subsection (b)(1)(B), by contrast, any of the offenses in subsection (a) is a felony if the offender commits it while using a vehicle to create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. Taken together, the statutory incentives always favor prosecuting vehicle flights under subsection (b)(1)(A) rather than subsection (b)(1)(B). They reflect a judgment that some offenses in subsection (a) can be committed without a vehicle or without creating substantial risks. They reflect the further judgment that this is not so for vehicle flights.
Serious and substantial risks are an inherent part of vehicle flight. Under subsection (b)(1)(A), they need not be proved separately to secure a conviction equal in magnitude to those available for other forms of resisting, law enforcement with a vehicle that involve similar risks.
In other words, the “similarity in punishment for these related, overlapping offenses suggests that [subsection (b)(1)(A)] is the rough equivalent of one type of [subsection (b)(1)(B)] violation.” Post, at 25 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment); see also ibid., n. 2. By adding subsection (b)(1)(A) in 1998, the Indiana Legislature determined that subsection (b)(1)(A) by itself sufficed as a basis for the punishments available under subsection (b)(1)(B). Post, at 25-26; see also ibid., n. 2 (identifying reckless endangerment statutes with similar structures); cf. post, at 27 (explaining that because in most cases Indiana does not “specify what additional punishment is warranted when [a] crime kills or injures,” its provisions creating higher penalties for vehicle flights that do so reflect a judgment that these flights are “inherently risky”).
The Government would go further and deem it irrelevant under the residual clause whether a crime is a lesser included offense even in cases where that offense carries a less severe penalty than the offense that includes it. As the above discussion indicates, however, the case at hand does not present the occasion to decide that question.
V
Congress chose to frame ACCA in general and qualitative, rather than encyclopedic, terms. It could have defined violent felonies by compiling a list of specific covered offenses. Under the principle that all are deemed to know the law, every armed felon would then be assumed to know which of his prior felonies could serve to increase his sentence. Given that ACCA “requires judges to make sometimes difficult evaluations of the risks posed by different offenses,” this approach could simplify adjudications for judges in some cases. James, 550 U. S., at 210, n. 6.
Congress instead stated a normative principle. The residual clause imposes enhanced punishment for unlawful possession of the firearm when the relevant prior offenses involved a potential risk of physical injury similar to that presented by burglary, extortion, arson, and crimes involving use of explosives. The provision instructs potential recidivists regarding the applicable sentencing regime if they again transgress. It states an intelligible principle and provides guidance that allows a person to “conform his or her conduct to the law.” Chicago v. Morales, 527 U. S. 41, 58 (1999) (plurality opinion). Although this approach may at times be more difficult for courts to implement, it is within congressional power to enact. See James, supra, at 210, n. 6 (giving examples of federal laws similar to ACCA’s residual clause); see also 18 U. S. C. § 1031(b)(2) (“conscious or reckless risk of serious personal injury”);' § 2118(e)(3) (“risk of death, significant physical pain . . . ”); §2246(4) (“substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain . . . ”); § 2258B(b)(2)(B) (2006 ed., Supp. Ill) (“substantial risk of causing physical injury”); § 3286(b) (2006 ed.) (“forseeable risk of .. . death or serious bodily injury to another person” (footnote omitted)); § 4243(d) (“substantial risk of bodily injury to another person”); §§ 4246(a), (d), (d)(2), (e), (e)(1), (e)(2), (f), (g) (same); § 4247(c)(4)(C) (same).
VI
Felony vehicle flight is a violent felony for purposes of ACCA. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
The Final Report of the Special Master is received and ordered filed.
DECREE
This cause, having come to be heard on the Second Report of the Special Master appointed by this Court, and on the Parties’ Joint Motion for Approval of Final Settlement Stipulation, which accompanies said Report, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The Final Settlement Stipulation executed by all of the parties to this case and filed with the Special Master on December 16, 2002, is approved;
2. This action is recommitted to the Special Master for the sole purpose of deciding procedural questions arising in the completion by the state parties of the RRCA Groundwater Model pursuant to the binding procedures prescribed by the Final Settlement Stipulation. All claims, counterclaims, and cross-claims for which leave to file was or could have been sought in this case arising prior to December 15, 2002, are hereby dismissed with prejudice effective upon the filing by the Special Master of a final report certifying adoption of the RRCA Groundwater Model by the state parties.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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K
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Hans Ackermann filed a motion in the District Court for the Western District of Texas to set aside a judgment entered December 7, 1943, in that court can-celling his certificate of naturalization. The motion was filed March 25, 1948, pursuant to amended Rule 60 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which became effective March 19, 1948. The United States filed a motion to dismiss petitioner’s motion. The District Court denied petitioner’s motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 178 F. 2d 983. We granted certiorari. 339 U. S. 962.
The question is whether the District Court erred in denying the motion for relief under Rule 60 (b).
Petitioner and his wife Frieda were natives of Germany. They were naturalized in 1938. They resided, as now, at Taylor, Texas, where petitioner and Max Keilbar owned and operated a German language newspaper. Frieda Ackermann wrote for the paper. She was a sister of Keilbar, who was also a native of Germany and who had been naturalized in 1933.
In 1942 complaints were filed against all three to cancel their naturalization on grounds of fraud. Petitioner and Keilbar were represented by counsel and answered the complaints. After an order of consolidation, trial of the three cases began November 1, 1943, and separate judgments were entered December 7, 1943, cancelling and setting aside the orders admitting them to citizenship. Keilbar appealed to the Court of Appeals, and by stipulation with the United States Attorney his case in that court was reversed, and the complaint against him was ordered dismissed. The Ackermanns did not appeal.
Petitioner in his motion here under consideration alleges that his “failure to appeal from said judgment is excusable” for the reason that he had no money or property other than his home in Taylor, Texas, owned by him and his wife and worth $2,500, “and the costs of transcribing the evidence and printing the record and brief on appeal were estimated at not less than $5,000.00.” On December 11, 1943, petitioner was detained in an Alien Detention Station at Seagoville, Texas. Before time for appeal had expired, petitioner was advised by his attorney that he and his wife could not appeal on affidavits of inability to pay costs until they had “appropriated said home to the payment of such costs to the full extent of the proceeds of a sale thereof”; that this information distressed them, and they sought advice from W. F. Kelley, “Assistant Commissioner for Alien Control, Immigration and Naturalization Department,” in whose custody petitioner and his wife were being held, “and he being a person in whom they had great confidence”; that Kelley on being informed of their financial condition and the advice of their attorney that it would be necessary for them to dispose of their home in order to appeal, advised them in substance to “hang on to their home,” and told them further that they had lost their American citizenship and were stateless, and that they would be released at the end of the war; that relying upon Kelley’s advice, they refrained from appealing from said judgments; that on April 29, 1944, after time for appeal had expired, they were interned, and on January 25,1946, the Attorney General ordered them to depart within thirty days or be deported. They did not depart, and they have not been deported, although the orders of deportation are still outstanding. Petitioner further alleged that he would show that the judgment of December 7, 1943, was unlawful and erroneous by producing the record in the Keilbar case.
The District Court on September 28, 1948, denied petitioner’s motion to vacate the judgment of denaturalization, the court stating in the order that “there is no merit to said motion.”
It will be noted that petitioner alleged in his motion that his failure to appeal was excusable. A motion for relief because of excusable neglect as provided in Rule 60 (b) (1) must, by the rule’s terms, be made not more than one year after the judgment was entered. The judgment here sought to be relieved from was more than four years old. It is immediately apparent that no relief on account of “excusable neglect” was available to this petitioner on the motion under consideration.
But petitioner seeks to bring himself within Rule 60 (b) (6), which applies if “any other reason justifying relief” is present, as construed and applied in Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601. The circumstances alleged in the motion which petitioner asserts bring him within Rule 60 (b) (6) are that the denaturalization judgment was erroneous; that he did not appeal and raise that question because his attorney advised him he would have to sell his home to pay costs, while Kelley, the Alien Control officer, in whom he alleges he had confidence and upon whose advice he relied, told him “to hang on to their home” and that he would be released at the end of the war; and that these circumstances justify failure to appeal the denaturalization judgment.
We cannot agree that petitioner has alleged circumstances showing that his failure to appeal was justifiable. It is not enough for petitioner to allege that he had confidence in Kelley. On the allegations of the motion before us, Kelley was a stranger to petitioner. In that state of the pleadings there are two reasons why petitioner cannot be heard to say his neglect to appeal brings him within the rule. First, anything said by Kelley could not be used to relieve petitioner of his duty to take legal steps to protect his interest in litigation in which the United States was a party adverse to him. Munro v. United States, 303 U. S. 36; Burnham Chemical Co. v. Krug, 81 F. Supp. 911, 913, aff’d per curiam sub nom. Burnham Chemical Co. v. Chapman, 86 U. S. App. D. C. 412, 181 F. 2d 288. Secondly, petitioner had no right to repose confidence in Kelley, a stranger. There is no allegation of any fact or circumstance which shows that Kelley had any undue influence over petitioner or practiced any fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or duress upon him. There are no allegations of privity or any fiduciary relations existing between them. Indeed, the allegations of the motion all show the contrary. However, petitioner had a confidential adviser in his own counsel. Instead of relying upon that confidential adviser, he freely accepted the advice of a stranger, a source upon which he had no right to rely. Petitioner made a considered choice not to appeal, apparently because he did not feel that an appeal would prove to be worth what he thought was a required sacrifice of his home. His choice was a risk, but calculated and deliberate and such as follows a free choice. Petitioner cannot be relieved of such a choice because hindsight seems to indicate to him that his decision not to appeal was probably wrong, considering the outcome of the Keilbar case. There must be an end to litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to be relieved from.
As further evidence of the inadequacy of petitioner’s motion to bring himself within any division of Rule 60 (b) which would excuse him from not having taken an appeal, we call attention to the fact that Keilbar got the record before the Court of Appeals, and it contained all the evidence that was introduced as to petitioner and his wife, who were tried together with Keilbar. The Ackermanns and Keilbar were related, yet no effort was made to get into the Court of Appeals and use the same record as to the evidence that Keilbar used. It certainly would not have taken five thousand dollars or one-tenth thereof for petitioner and his wife to have supplemented the Keilbar record with that pertaining to themselves and to prepare a brief, even if all of it were printed. We are further aware of the practice of the Courts of Appeals permitting litigants who are poor but not paupers to file typewritten records and briefs at a very small cost to them. With the same counsel representing petitioner as represented his kinsman Keilbar, and with Frieda Acker-mann having funds sufficient to employ separate counsel, failure to appeal because of the fear of losing his home in defraying the expenses of the brief and record, makes it further evident that Rule 60 (b) has no application to petitioner in this setting.
The Klapprott case was a case of extraordinary circumstances. Mr. Justice Black stated in the following words why the allegations in the Klapprott case, there taken as true, brought it within Rule 60 (b) (6):
“But petitioner’s allegations set up an extraordinary situation which cannot fairly or logically be classified as mere ‘neglect’ on his part. The undenied facts set out in the petition reveal far more than a failure to defend the denaturalization charges due to inadvertence, indifference, or careless disregard of consequences. For before, at the time, and after the default judgment was entered, petitioner was held in jail in New York, Michigan, and the District of Columbia by the United States, his adversary in the denaturalization proceedings. Without funds to hire a lawyer, petitioner was defended by appointed counsel in the criminal cases. Thus petitioner’s prayer to set aside the default judgment did not rest on mere allegations of ‘excusable neglect.’ The foregoing allegations and others in the petition tend to support petitioner’s argument that he was deprived of any reasonable opportunity to make a defense to the criminal charges instigated by officers of the very United States agency which supplied the secondhand information upon which his citizenship was taken away from him in his absence. The basis of his petition was not that he had neglected to act in his own defense, but that in jail as he was, weakened from illness, without a lawyer in the denaturalization proceedings or funds to hire one, disturbed and fully occupied in efforts to protect himself against the gravest criminal charges, he was no more able to defend himself in the New Jersey court than he would have been had he never received notice of the charges.” Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 613-614.
By no stretch of imagination can the voluntary, deliberate, free, untrammeled choice of petitioner not to appeal compare with the Klapprott situation. Mr. Justice Black set forth in order the extraordinary circumstances alleged by Klapprott. We paraphrase them and give the comparable situation of Ackermann.
In the spring of 1942 Klapprott was ill, and the illness left him financially poor and unable to work. On May 12, 1942, proceedings were commenced in a New Jersey District Court to cancel his citizenship. As for Ackermann, when he was sued he was well, and had a home worth $2,500, one-half interest in a newspaper, and the means to employ counsel.
When complaint was served upon Klapprott, he had no money to hire a lawyer, and he wrote an answer to the complaint filed against him and a letter to the American Civil Liberties Union asking it to represent him without fee. Ackermann had the means to hire and did hire able counsel of his own choice who prepared and filed an answer for him.
In less than two months after the complaint was served on the penniless, ill Klapprott, he was arrested for conspiracy to violate the Selective Service Act and taken to New York and jailed in default of bond. His letter to the American Civil Liberties Union was taken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation before time for him to answer had expired, and was not mailed by that Bureau. Ackermann was never indicted or in jail from the time complaint was filed against him until after judgment, during all of which time he had the benefit of counsel and freedom of movement and action.
Within ten days after his arrest, Klapprott was defaulted in the citizenship proceedings in New Jersey. He was still in jail in New York. No evidence was offered to prove the complaint in the denaturalization proceedings, which complaint was verified on information and belief only. In Ackermann’s case, no default was entered. He appeared in person and by counsel and had a trial in open court with able counsel to defend him. Much evidence was introduced and a record was made of it.
Klapprott was convicted in New York and sent to a penitentiary in Michigan. He was later transferred to the District of Columbia, where he was lodged in jail and tried on another charge, later dismissed. The New York conviction was reversed, but he had been in'jail for about two years. He was then lodged at Ellis Island for deportation because his citizenship had been cancelled in the New Jersey proceedings where he had been defaulted. While at Ellis Island, the motion to relieve from the default judgment cancelling his citizenship was prepared and filed, denied by the District Court and the Court of Appeals and finally sustained by this Court. Ackermann was never under criminal charges or detained while the suit for cancellation of his citizenship was pending. During all of that time he was free, well, and able to defend himself, and in that regard had able counsel representing him in a trial in open court. Even after the judgment cancelling his citizenship, he had counsel and free access to him, although detained by the United States Government.
From a comparison of the situations shown by the allegations of Klapprott and Ackermann, it is readily apparent that the situations of the parties bore only the slightest resemblance to each other. The comparison strikingly points up the difference between no choice and choice; imprisonment and freedom of action; no trial and trial; no counsel and counsel; no chance for negligence and inexcusable negligence. Subsection 6 of Rule 60 (b) has no application to the situation of petitioner. Neither the circumstances of petitioner nor his excuse for not appealing is so extraordinary as to bring him within Klapprott or Rule 60 (b) (6).
The motion for relief was properly denied, and the judgment is
Affirmed.
No. 36, Frieda Ackermann v. United States, is a companion case to No. 35, and it was stipulated that the decision in No. 36 should be the same as in No. 35. The judgment in No. 36 therefore is also
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Clark took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
“Relief From Judgment or Order.
“(b) Mistakes; INAdverteNCe; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59 (b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does, not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as provided in Section 57 of the Judicial Code, U. S. C., Title 28, § 118, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.” Fed. Rules Civ. Proe., 60 (b).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision is whether Louisiana’s “Balanced Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction” Act (Creationism Act), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§17:286.1-17:286.7 (West 1982), is facially invalid as violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
I
The Creationism Act forbids the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools unless accompanied by instruction in “creation science.” § 17:286.4A. No school is required to teach evolution or creation science. If either is taught, however, the other must also be taught. Ibid. The theories of evolution and creation science are statutorily defined as “the scientific evidences for [creation or evolution] and inferences from those scientific evidences.” §§ 17.286.3(2) and (3).
Appellees, who include parents of children attending Louisiana public schools, Louisiana teachers, and religious leaders, challenged the constitutionality of the Act in District Court, seeking an injunction and declaratory relief. Appellants, Louisiana officials charged with implementing the Act, defended on the ground that the purpose of the Act is to protect a legitimate secular interest, namely, academic freedom. Appellees attacked the Act as facially invalid because it violated the Establishment Clause and made a motion for summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion. Aguillard v. Treen, 634 F. Supp. 426 (ED La. 1985). The court held that there can be no valid secular reason for prohibiting the teaching of evolution, a theory historically opposed by some religious denominations. The court further concluded that “the teaching of ‘creation-science’ and ‘creationism,’ as contemplated by the statute, involves teaching ‘tailored to the principles’ of a particular religious sect or group of sects.” Id., at 427 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 106 (1968)). The District Court therefore held that the Creationism Act violated the Establishment Clause either because it prohibited the teaching of evolution or because it required the teaching of creation science with the purpose of advancing a particular religious doctrine.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 765 F. 2d 1251 (CA5 1985). The court observed that the statute’s avowed purpose of protecting academic freedom was inconsistent with requiring, upon risk of sanction, the teaching of creation science whenever evolution is taught. Id., at 1257. The court found that the Louisiana Legislature’s actual intent was “to discredit evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of creationism, a religious belief.” Ibid. Because the Creationism Act was thus a law furthering a particular religious belief, the Court of Appeals held that the Act violated the Establishment Clause. A suggestion for rehearing en banc was denied over a dissent. 778 F. 2d 225 (CA5 1985). We noted probable jurisdiction, 476 U. S. 1103 (1986), and now affirm.
II
The Establishment Clause forbids the enactment of any law “respecting an establishment of religion.” The Court has applied a three-pronged test to determine whether legislation comports with the Establishment Clause. First, the legislature must have adopted the law with a secular purpose. Second, the statute’s principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Third, the statute must not result in an excessive entanglement of government with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612-613 (1971). State action violates the Establishment Clause if it fails to satisfy any of these prongs.
In this case, the Court must determine whether the Establishment Clause was violated in the special context of the public elementary and secondary school system. States and local school boards are generally afforded considerable discretion in operating public schools. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, 683 (1986); id., at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 507 (1969). “At the same time... we have necessarily recognized that the discretion of the States and local school boards in matters of education must be exercised in a manner that comports with the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment.” Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U. S. 853, 864 (1982).
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools. Families entrust public schools with the education of their children, but condition their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and their attendance is involuntary. See, e. g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U. S. 373, 383 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 60, n. 51 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349, 369 (1975); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 252-253 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). The State exerts great authority and coercive power through mandatory attendance requirements, and because of the students’ emulation of teachers as role models and the children’s susceptibility to peer pressure. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, supra, at 683; Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 81 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Furthermore, “[t]he public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its schools....” Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 231 (1948) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
Consequently, the Court has been required often to invalidate statutes which advance religion in public elementary and secondary schools. See, e. g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, supra (school district’s use of religious school teachers in public schools); Wallace v. Jaffree, supra (Alabama statute authorizing moment of silence for school prayer); Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S. 39 (1980) (posting copy of Ten Commandments on public classroom wall); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968) (statute forbidding teaching of evolution); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra (daily reading of Bible); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962) (recitation of “denominationally neutral” prayer).
Therefore, in employing the three-pronged Lemon test, we must do so mindful of the particular concerns that arise in the context of public elementary and secondary schools. We now turn to the evaluation of the Act under the Lemon test.
r*H I — I l-H
Lemon s first prong focuses on the purpose that animated adoption of the Act. “The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). A governmental intention to promote religion is clear when the State enacts a law to serve a religious purpose. This intention may be evidenced by promotion of religion in general, see Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 52-53 (Establishment Clause protects individual freedom of conscience “to select any religious faith or none at all”), or by advancement of a particular religious belief, e. g., Stone v. Graham, supra, at 41 (invalidating requirement to post Ten Commandments, which are “undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths”) (footnote omitted); Epperson v. Arkansas, supra, at 106 (holding that banning the teaching of evolution in public schools violates the First Amendment since “teaching and learning” must not “be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma”). If the law was enacted for the purpose of endorsing religion, “no consideration of the second or third criteria [of Lemon] is necessary.” Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 56. In this case, appellants have identified no clear secular purpose for the Louisiana Act.
True, the Act’s stated purpose is to protect academic freedom. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §17:286.2 (West 1982). This phrase might, in common parlance, be understood as referring to enhancing the freedom of teachers to teach what they will. The Court of Appeals, however, correctly concluded that the Act was not designed to further that goal. We find no merit in the State’s argument that the “legislature may not [have] use[d] the terms 'academic freedom’ in the correct legal sense. They might have [had] in mind, instead, a basic concept of fairness; teaching all of the evidence.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 60. Even if “academic freedom” is read to mean “teaching all of the evidence” with respect to the origin of human beings, the Act does not further this purpose. The goal of providing a more comprehensive science curriculum is not furthered either by outlawing the teaching of evolution or by requiring the teaching of creation science.
A
While the Court is normally deferential to a State’s articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be sincere and not a sham. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S., at 64 (Powell, J., concurring); id., at 75 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Stone v. Graham, supra, at 41; Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S., at 223-224. As Justice O’Connor stated in Wallace: “It is not a trivial matter, however, to require that the legislature manifest a secular purpose and omit all sectarian endorsements from its laws. That requirement is precisely tailored to the Establishment Clause’s purpose of assuring that Government not intentionally endorse religion or a religious practice.” 472 U. S., at 75 (concurring in judgment).
It is clear from the legislative history that the purpose of the legislative sponsor, Senator Bill Keith, was to narrow the science curriculum. During the legislative hearings, Senator Keith stated: “My preference would be that neither [creationism nor evolution] be taught.” 2 App. E-621. Such a ban on teaching does not promote — indeed, it undermines — the provision of a comprehensive scientific education.
It is equally clear that requiring schools to teach creation science with evolution does not advance academic freedom. The Act does not grant teachers a flexibility that they did not already possess to supplant the present science curriculum with the presentation of theories, besides evolution, about the origin of life. Indeed, the Court of Appeals found that no law prohibited Louisiana public school teachers from teaching any scientific theory. 765 F. 2d, at 1257. As the president of the Louisiana Science Teachers Association testified, “[a]ny scientific concept that’s based on established fact can be included in our curriculum already, and no legislation allowing this is necessary.” 2 App. E-616. The Act provides Louisiana schoolteachers with no new authority. Thus the stated purpose is not furthered by it.
The Alabama statute held unconstitutional in Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, is analogous. In Wallace, the State characterized its new law as one designed to provide a 1-minute period for meditation. We rejected that stated purpose as insufficient, because a previously adopted Alabama law already provided for such a 1-minute period. Thus, in this case, as in Wallace, “[a]ppellants have not identified any secular purpose that was not fully served by [existing state law] before the enactment of [the statute in question].” 472 U. S., at 59.
Furthermore, the goal of basic “fairness” is hardly furthered by the Act’s discriminatory preference for the teaching of creation science and against the teaching of evolution. While requiring that curriculum guides be developed for creation science, the Act says nothing of comparable guides for evolution. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §17:286.7A (West 1982). Similarly, resource services are supplied for creation science but not for evolution. §17:286.7B. Only “creation scientists” can serve on the panel that supplies the resource services. Ibid. The Act forbids school boards to discriminate against anyone who “chooses to be a creation-scientist” or to teach “creationism,” but fails to protect those who choose to teach evolution or any other noncreation science theory, or who refuse to teach creation science. § 17:286.4C.
If the Louisiana Legislature’s purpose was solely to maximize the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of science instruction, it would have encouraged the teaching of all scientific theories about the origins of humankind. But under the Act’s requirements, teachers who were once free to teach any and all facets of this subject are now unable to do so. Moreover, the Act fails even to ensure that creation science will be taught, but instead requires the teaching of this theory only when the theory of evolution is taught. Thus we agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the Act does not serve to protect academic freedom, but has the distinctly different purpose of discrediting “evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of creationism....” 765 F. 2d, at 1257.
B
Stone v. Graham invalidated the State’s requirement that the Ten Commandments be posted in public classrooms. “The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact.” 449 U. S., at 41 (footnote omitted). As a result, the contention that the law was designed to provide instruction on a “fundamental legal code” was “not sufficient to avoid conflict with the First Amendment.” Ibid. Similarly Abmgton School Dist. v. Schempp held unconstitutional a statute “requiring the selection and reading at the opening of the school day of verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer by the students in unison,” despite the proffer of such secular purposes as the “promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature.” 374 U. S., at 223.
As in Stone and Abington, we need not be blind in this case to the legislature’s preeminent religious purpose in enacting this statute. There is a historic and contemporaneous link between the teachings of certain religious denominations and the teaching of evolution. It was this link that concerned the Court in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 (1968), which also involved a facial challenge to a statute regulating the teaching of evolution. In that case, the Court reviewed an Arkansas statute that made it unlawful for an instructor to teach evolution or to use a textbook that referred to this scientific theory. Although the Arkansas antievolution law did not explicitly state its predominate religious purpose, the Court could not ignore that “[t]he statute was a product of the upsurge of ‘fundamentalist’ religious fervor” that has long viewed this particular scientific theory as contradicting the literal interpretation of the Bible. Id., at 98, 106-107. After reviewing the history of antievolution statutes, the Court determined that “there can be no doubt that the motivation for the [Arkansas] law was the same [as other anti-evolution statutes]: to suppress the teaching of a theory which, it was thought, ‘denied’ the divine creation of man.” Id., at 109. The Court found that there can be no legitimate state interest in protecting particular religions from scientific views “distasteful to them,” id., at 107 (citation omitted), and concluded “that the First Amendment does not permit the State to require that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma,” id., at 106.
These same historic and contemporaneous antagonisms between the teachings of certain religious denominations and the teaching of evolution are present in this case. The preeminent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind. The term “creation science” was defined as embracing this particular religious doctrine by those responsible for the passage of the Creationism Act. Senator Keith’s leading expert on creation science, Edward Bou-dreaux, testified at the legislative hearings that the theory of creation science included belief in the existence of a supernatural creator. See 1 App. E-421 — E-422 (noting that “creation scientists” point to high probability that life was “created by an intelligent mind”). Senator Keith also cited testimony from other experts to support the creation-science view that “a creator [was] responsible for the universe and everything in it.” 2 App. E-497. The legislative history therefore reveals that the term “creation science,” as contemplated by the legislature that adopted this Act, embodies the religious belief that a supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of humankind.
Furthermore, it is not happenstance that the legislature required the teaching of a theory that coincided with this religious view. The legislative history documents that the Act’s primary purpose was to change the science curriculum of public schools in order to provide persuasive advantage to a particular religious doctrine that rejects the factual basis of evolution in its entirety. The sponsor of the Creationism Act, Senator Keith, explained during the legislative hearings that his disdain for the theory of evolution resulted from the support that evolution supplied to views contrary to his own religious beliefs. According to Senator Keith, the theory of evolution was consonant with the “cardinal principle^] of religious humanism, secular humanism, theological liberalism, aetheistism [sic].” 1 App. E-312 — E-313; see also 2 App. E-499 — E-500. The state senator repeatedly stated that scientific evidence supporting his religious views should be included in the public school curriculum to redress the fact that the theory of evolution incidentally coincided with what he characterized as religious beliefs antithetical to his own. The legislation therefore sought to alter the science curriculum to reflect endorsement of a religious view that is antagonistic to the theory of evolution.
In this case, the purpose of the Creationism Act was to restructure the science curriculum to conform with a particular religious viewpoint. Out of many possible science subjects taught in the public schools, the legislature chose to affect the teaching of the one scientific theory that historically has been opposed by certain religious sects. As in Epperson, the legislature passed the Act to give preference to those religious groups which have as one of their tenets the creation of humankind by a divine creator. The “overriding fact” that confronted the Court in Epperson was “that Arkansas’ law selects from the body of knowledge a particular segment which it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with... a particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group.” 393 U. S., at 103. Similarly, the Creationism Act is designed either to promote the theory of creation science which embodies a particular religious tenet by requiring that creation science be taught whenever evolution is taught or to prohibit the teaching of a scientific theory disfavored by certain religious sects by forbidding the teaching of evolution when creation science is not also taught. The Establishment Clause, however, “forbids alike the preference of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed antagonistic to a particular dogma.” Id., at 106-107 (emphasis added). Because the primary purpose of the Creationism Act is to advance a particular religious belief, the Act endorses religion in violation of the First Amendment.
We do not imply that a legislature could never require that scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught. Indeed, the Court acknowledged in Stone that its decision forbidding the posting of the Ten Commandments did not mean that no use could ever be made of the Ten Commandments, or that the Ten Commandments played an exclusively religious role in the history of Western Civilization. 449 U. S., at 42. In a similar way, teaching a variety of scientific theories about the origins of humankind to schoolchildren might be validly done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science instruction. But because the primary purpose of the Creationism Act is to endorse a particular religious doctrine, the Act furthers religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.
> 1 — I
Appellants contend that genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute, and therefore the District Court erred in granting summary judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” A court’s finding of improper purpose behind a statute is appropriately determined by the statute on its face, its legislative history, or its interpretation by a responsible administrative agency. See, e. g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S., at 56-61; Stone v. Graham, 449 U. S., at 41-42; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S., at 103-109. The plain meaning of the statute’s words, enlightened by their context and the contemporaneous legislative history, can control the determination of legislative purpose. See Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, at 74 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962); Jay v. Boyd, 351 U. S. 345, 357 (1956). Moreover, in determining the legislative purpose of a statute, the Court has also considered the historical context of the statute, e. g., Epper-son v. Arkansas, supra, and the specific sequence of events leading to passage of the statute, e. g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977).
In this case, appellees’ motion for summary judgment rested on the plain language of the Creationism Act, the legislative history and historical context of the Act, the specific sequence of events leading to the passage of the Act, the State Board’s report on a survey of school superintendents, and the correspondence between the Act’s legislative sponsor and its key witnesses. Appellants contend that affidavits made by two scientists, two theologians, and an education administrator raise a genuine issue of material fact and that summary judgment was therefore barred. The affidavits define creation science as “origin through abrupt appearance in complex form” and allege that such a viewpoint constitutes a true scientific theory. See App. to Brief for Appellants A-7 to A-40.
We agree with the lower courts that these affidavits do not raise a genuine issue of material fact. The existence of “un-controverted affidavits” does not bar summary judgment. Moreover, the postenactment testimony of outside experts is of little use in determining the Louisiana Legislature’s purpose in enacting this statute. The Louisiana Legislature did hear and rely on scientific experts in passing the bill, but none of the persons making the affidavits produced by the appellants participated in or contributed to the enactment of the law or its implementation. The District Court, in its discretion, properly concluded that a Monday-morning “battle of the experts” over possible technical meanings of terms in the statute would not illuminate the contemporaneous purpose of the Louisiana Legislature when it made the law. We therefore conclude that the District Court did not err in finding that appellants failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and in granting summary judgment.
V
The Louisiana Creationism Act advances a religious doctrine by requiring either the banishment of the theory of evolution from public school classrooms or the presentation of a religious viewpoint that rejects evolution in its entirety. The Act violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it seeks to employ the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious purpose. The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is
Affirmed.
Justice O’Connor joins all but Part II of this opinion.
Appellants, the Louisiana Governor, the Attorney General, the State Superintendent, the State Department of Education and the St. Tammany Parish School Board, agreed not to implement the Creationism Act pending the final outcome of this litigation. The Louisiana Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, and the Orleans Parish School Board were among the original defendants in the suit but both later realigned as plaintiffs.
The District Court initially stayed the action pending the resolution of a separate lawsuit brought by the Act’s legislative sponsor and others for declaratory and injunctive relief. After the separate suit was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, Keith v. Louisiana Department of Education, 553 F. Supp. 295 (MD La. 1982), the District Court lifted its stay in this case and held that the Creationism Act violated the Louisiana Constitution. The court ruled that the State Constitution grants authority over the public school system to the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education rather than the state legislature. On appeal, the Court of Appeals certified the question to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which found the Creationism Act did not violate the State Constitution, Aguillard v. Treen, 440 So. 2d 704 (1983). The Court of Appeals then remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether the Creationism Act violates the Federal Constitution. Aguillard v. Treen, 720 F. 2d 676 (CA5 1983).
The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion....” Under the Fourteenth Amendment, this “fundamental concept of liberty” applies to the States. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
The Lemon test has been applied in all eases since its adoption in 1971, except in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 783 (1983), where the Court held that the Nebraska Legislature’s practice of opening a session with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court based its conclusion in that ease on the historical acceptance of the practice. Such a historical approach is not useful in determining the proper roles of church and state in public schools, since free public education was virtually nonexistent at the time the Constitution was adopted. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 80 (1985) (O’CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 238, and n. 7 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
The potential for undue influence is far less significant with regard to college students who voluntarily enroll in courses. “This distinction warrants a difference in constitutional results.” Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra, at 253 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). Thus, for instance, the Court has not questioned the authority of state colleges and universities to offer courses on religion or theology. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 271 (1981) (Powell, J.); id., at 281 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
The Court of Appeals stated that “[a]cademie freedom embodies the principle that individual instructors are at liberty to teach that which they deem to be appropriate in the exercise of their professional judgment.” 765 F. 2d, at 1257. But, in the State of Louisiana, courses in public schools are prescribed by the State Board of Education and teachers are not free, absent permission, to teach courses different from what is required. Tr. of Oral Arg. 44-46. “Academic freedom,” at least as it is commonly understood, is not a relevant concept in this context. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals explained, the Act “requires, presumably upon risk of sanction or dismissal for failure to comply, the teaching of creation-science whenever evolution is taught. Although states may prescribe public school curriculum concerning science instruction under ordinary circumstances, the compulsion inherent in the Balanced Treatment Act is, on its face, inconsistent with the idea of academic freedom as it is universally understood.” 765 F. 2d, at 1257 (emphasis in original). The Act actually serves to diminish academic freedom by removing the flexibility to teach evolution without also teaching creation science, even if teachers determine that such curriculum results in less effective and comprehensive science instruction.
The Creationism Act’s provisions appear among other provisions prescribing the courses of study in Louisiana’s public schools. These other provisions, similar to those in other States, prescribe courses of study in such topics as driver training, civics, the Constitution, and free enterprise. None of these other provisions, apart from those associated with the Creationism Act, nominally mandates “equal time” for opposing opinions within a specific area of learning. See, e. g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:261-17:281 (West 1982 and Supp. 1987).
The dissent concludes that the Act’s purpose was to protect the academic freedom of students, and not that of teachers. Post, at 628. Such a view is not at odds with our conclusion that if the Act’s purpose was to provide comprehensive scientific education (a concern shared by students and teachers, as well as parents), that purpose was not advanced by the statute’s provisions. Supra, at 587.
Moreover, it is astonishing that the dissent, to prove its assertion, relies on a section of the legislation that was eventually deleted by the legislature. Compare § 3702 in 1 App. E-292 (text of section prior to amendment) with La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:286.2 (West 1982). The dissent contends that this deleted section — which was explicitly rejected by the Louisiana Legislature-reveals the legislature’s “obviously intended meaning of the statutory terms ‘academic freedom.’” Post, at 628. Quite to the contrary, Boudreaux, the main expert relied on by the sponsor of the Act, cautioned the legislature that the words “academic freedom” meant “freedom to teach science.” 1 App. E-429. His testimony was given at the time the legislature was deciding whether to delete this section of the Act.
See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Ed., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1258-1264 (ED Ark. 1982) (reviewing historical and contemporary antagonisms between the theory of evolution and religious movements).
The Court evaluated the statute in light of a series of antievolution statutes adopted by state legislatures dating back to the Tennessee statute that was the focus of the celebrated Scopes trial in 1925. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S., at 98, 101, n. 8, and 109. The Court found the Arkansas statute comparable to this Tennessee “monkey law,” since both gave preference to “ ‘religious establishments which have as one of their tenets or dogmas the instantaneous creation of man.’ ” Id., at 103, n. 11 (quoting Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 126, 289 S. W. 363, 369 (1927) (Chambliss, J., concurring)).
While the belief in the instantaneous creation of humankind by a supernatural creator may require the rejection of every aspect of the theory of evolution, an individual instead may choose to accept some or all of this scientific theory as compatible with his or her spiritual outlook. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 23-29.
Boudreaux repeatedly defined creation science in terms of a theory that supports the existence of a supernatural creator. See, e. g., 2 App. E-501 — E-502 (equating creation science with a theory pointing “to conditions of a creator”); 1 App. E-153 — E-154 (“Creation... requires the direct involvement of a supernatural intelligence”). The lead witness at the hearings introducing the original bill, Luther Sunderland, described creation science as postulating “that everything was created by some intelligence or power external to the universe.” Id., at E-9 — E-10.
Senator Keith believed that creation science embodied this view: “One concept is that a creator however you define a creator was responsible for everything that is in this world. The other concept is that it just evolved. ” Id., at E-280. Besides Senator Keith, several of the most vocal legislators also revealed their religious motives for supporting the bill in the official legislative history. See, e. g., id., at E-441, E-443 (Sen. Saunders noting that bill was amended so that teachers could refer to the Bible and other religious texts to support the creation-science theory); 2 App. E-561— E-562, E-610 (Rep. Jenkins contending that the existence of God was a scientific fact).
See, e. g., 1 App. E-74 — E-75 (noting that evolution is contrary to his family’s religious beliefs); id., at E-313 (contending that evolution advances religions contrary to his own); id., at E-357 (stating that evolution is “almost a religion” to science teachers); id., at E-418 (arguing that evolution is cornerstone of some religions contrary to his own); 2 App. E-763— E-764 (author of model bill, from which Act is derived, sent copy of the model bill to Senator Keith and advised that “I view this whole battle as one between God and anti-God forces.... [I]f evolution is permitted to continue... it will continue to be made to appear that a Supreme Being is unnecessary...”).
Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found a clear secular purpose, while both agreed that the Creationism Act’s primary purpose was to advance religion. “When both courts below are unable to discern an arguably valid secular purpose, this Court normally should hesitate to find one.” Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S., at 66 (Powell, J., concurring).
There is “no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 323 (1986) (emphasis in original).
The experts, who were relied upon by the sponsor of the bill and the legislation’s other supporters, testified that creation science embodies the religious view that there is a supernatural creator of the universe. See, supra, at 591-592.
Appellants contend that the affidavits are relevant because the term “creation science” is a technical term similar to that found in statutes that regulate certain scientific or technological developments. Even assuming, arguendo, that “creation science” is a term of art as represented by appellants, the definition provided by the relevant agency provides a better insight than the affidavits submitted by appellants in this case. In a 1981 survey conducted by the Louisiana Department of Education, the school super
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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C
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Bankruptcy Code allows the States to define what property a debtor may exempt from the bankruptcy estate that will be distributed among his creditors. 11 U. S. C. § 522(b). The Code also provides that judicial liens encumbering exempt property can be eliminated. § 522(f). The question in this case is whether that elimination can operate when the State has defined the exempt property in such a way as specifically to exclude property encumbered by judicial liens.
I
In 1975, Helen Owen, the respondent, obtained a judgment against petitioner Dwight Owen, her former husband, for approximately $160,000. The judgment was recorded in Sarasota County, Florida, in July 1976. Petitioner did not at that time own any property in Sarasota County, but under Florida law, the judgment would attach to any after-acquired property recorded in the county. B. A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 153 Fla. 304, 14 So. 2d 667 (1943). In 1984, petitioner purchased a condominium in Sarasota County; upon acquisition of title, the property became subject to respondent’s judgment lien. Porter-Mallard Co. v. Dugger, 117 Fla. 137, 157 So. 429 (1934).
One year later, Florida amended its homestead law so that petitioner’s condominium, which previously had not qualified as a homestead, thereafter did. Under the Florida Constitution, homestead property is “exempt from forced sale . . . and no judgment, decree or execution [can] be a lien thereon . . . ,” Fla. Const., Art. 10, §4(a). The Florida courts have interpreted this provision, however, as being inapplicable to pre-existing liens, i. e., liens that attached before the property acquired its homestead status. Bessemer v. Gersten, 381 So. 2d 1344, 1347, n. 1 (Fla. 1980); Aetna Ins. Co. v. LaGasse, 223 So. 2d 727, 728 (Fla. 1969); Pasco v. Harley, 73 Fla. 819, 824-825, 75 So. 30, 32-33 (1917); Volpitta v. Fields, 369 So. 2d 367, 369 (Fla. App. 1979); Lyon v. Arnold, 46 F. 2d 451, 452 (CA5 1931). Pre-existing liens, then, are in effect an exception to the Florida homestead exemption.
In January 1986, petitioner filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Code, and claimed a homestead exemption in his Sarasota condominium. The condominium, valued at approximately $135,000, was his primary asset; his liabilities included approximately $350,000 owed to respondent. The Bankruptcy Court discharged petitioner’s personal liability for these debts, and sustained, over respondent’s objections, his claimed exemption.
The condominium, however, remained subject to respondent’s pre-existing lien, and after discharge, petitioner moved to reopen his case to avoid the lien pursuant to § 522(f)(1). The Bankruptcy Court refused to decree the avoidance; the District Court affirmed, finding that the lien had attached before the property qualified for the exemption, and that Florida law therefore did not exempt the lien-eneumbered property. 86 B. R. 691 (MD Fla. 1988). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the same ground. 877 F. 2d 44 (1989). We granted certiorari. 495 U. S. 929 (1990).
II
An estate in bankruptcy consists of all the interests in property, legal and equitable, possessed by the debtor at the time of filing, as well as those interests recovered or recoverable through transfer and lien avoidance provisions. An exemption is an interest withdrawn from the estate (and hence from the creditors) for the benefit of the debtor. Section 522 determines what property a debtor may exempt. Under § 522(b), he must select between a list of federal exemptions (set forth in § 522(d)) and the exemptions provided by his State, “unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor . . . specifically does not so authorize,” § 522(b)(1)— that is, unless the State “opts out” of the federal list. If a State opts out, then its debtors are limited to the exemptions provided by state law. Nothing in subsection (b) (or elsewhere in the Code) limits a State’s power to restrict the scope of its exemptions; indeed, it could theoretically accord no exemptions at all.
Property that is properly exempted under §522 is (with some exceptions) immunized against liability for prebank-ruptcy debts. § 522(c). No property can be exempted (and thereby immunized), however, unless it first falls within the bankruptcy estate. Section 522(b) provides that the debtor may exempt certain property “from property of the estate”; obviously, then, an interest that is not possessed by the estate cannot be exempted. Thus, if a debtor holds only bare legal title to his house—if, for example, the house is subject to a purchase-money mortgage for its full value — then only that legal interest passes to the estate; the equitable interest remains with the mortgage holder, § 541(d). And since the equitable interest does not pass to the estate, neither can it pass to the debtor as an exempt interest in property. Legal title will pass, and can be the subject of an exemption; but the property will remain subject to the lien interest of the mortgage holder. This was the rule of Long v. Bullard, 117 U. S. 617 (1886), codified in § 522. Only where the Code empowers the court to avoid liens or transfers can an interest originally not within the estate be passed to the estate, and subsequently (through the claim of an exemption) to the debtor.
It is such an avoidance provision that is at issue here, to which we now turn. Section 522(f) reads as follows:
“(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is —
“(1) a judicial lien; or
“(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest . . . .”
The lien in the present case is a judicial lien, and we assume without deciding that it fixed “on an interest of the debtor in property.” See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, ante, p. 291. The question presented by this case is whether it “impairs an exemption to which [petitioner] would have been entitled under subsection (b).” Since Florida has chosen to opt out of the listed federal exemptions, see Fla. Stat. §222.20 (1989), the only subsection (b) exemption at issue is the Florida homestead exemption described above. Respondent suggests that, to resolve this case, we need only ask whether the judicial lien impairs that exemption. It obviously does not, since the Florida homestead exemption is not assertable against pre-existing judicial liens. To permit avoidance of the lien, respondent urges, would not presene the exemption but would expand it.
At first blush, this seems entirely reasonable. Several Courts of Appeals in addition to the Eleventh Circuit here have reached this result with respect to built-in limitations on state exemptions, though others have rejected it. What must give us pause, however, is that this result has been widely and uniformly rejected with respect to built-in limitations on the federal exemptions. Most of the federally listed exemptions (set forth in § 522(d)) are explicitly restricted to the “debtor’s aggregate interest” or the “debtor’s interest” up to a maximum amount. See §§ 522(d)(1)—(6), (8). If respondent’s approach to § 522(f) were applied, all of these exemptions (and perhaps others as well) would be limited by unavoided encumbering liens, see § 522(c). The federal homestead exemption, for example, allows the debtor to exempt from the property of the estate “[t]he debtor’s aggregate interest, not to exceed $7,500 in value, in ... a residence.” § 522(d)(1). If respondent’s interpretation of § 522(f) were applied to this exemption, a debtor who owned a house worth $10,000 that was subject to a judicial lien for $9,000 would not be entitled to the full homestead exemption of $7,500. The judicial lien would not be avoidable under § 522(f), since it does not “impair” the exemption, which is limited to the debtor’s “aggregate interest” of $1,000. The uniform practice of bankruptcy courts, however, is to the contrary. To determine the application of § 522(f) they ask not whether the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor is in fact entitled, but whether it impairs an exemption to which he would have been entitled but for the lien itself.
As the preceding italicized words suggest, this reading is more consonant with the text of § 522(f)—which establishes as the baseline, against which impairment is to be measured, not an exemption to which the debtor “is entitled,” but one to which he “would have been entitled.” The latter phrase denotes a state of affairs that is conceived or hypothetical, rather than actual, and requires the reader to disregard some element of reality. “Would have been” but for what? The answer given, with respect to the federal exemptions, has been but for the lien at issue, and that seems to us correct. The only other conceivable possibility is but for a waiver— harking back to the beginning phrase of § 522(f), “Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions . . . .” The use of contrary-to-fact construction after a “notwithstanding” phrase is not, however, common usage, if even permissible. Moreover, though one might employ it when the “notwithstanding” phrase is the main point of the provision in question (“Notwithstanding any waiver, a debtor shall retain those exemptions to which he would have been entitled under subsection (b)”), it would be most strange to employ it where the “notwithstanding” phrase, as here, is a,n aside. The point of § 522(f) is not to exclude waivers (though that is done in passing, waivers are addressed directly in § 522(e)) but to provide that the debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien. In that context, for every instance in which “would have been entitled” may be accurate (because the incidentally mentioned waiver occurred) there will be thousands of instances in which “is entitled” should have been used. It seems to us that “would have been entitled” must refer to the generality, if not indeed the universality, of cases covered by the provision; and on that premise the only conceivable fact we are invited to disregard is the existence of the lien.
This reading must also be accepted, at least with respect to the federal exemptions, if § 522(f) is not to become an irrelevancy with respect to the most venerable, most common, and most important exemptions. The federal exemptions for homesteads (§ 522(d)(1)), for motor vehicles (§ 522(d)(2)), for household goods and wearing apparel (§ 522(d)(3)), and for tools of the trade (§ 522(d)(6)), are all defined by reference to the debtor’s “interest” or “aggregate interest,” so that if respondent’s interpretation is accepted, no encumbrances of these could be avoided. Surely § 522(f) promises more than that — and surely it would be bizarre for the federal scheme to prevent the avoidance of liens on those items, but to permit it for the less crucial items (for example, an “unmatured life insurance contract owned by the debtor,” § 522(d)(7)) that are not described in such fashion as unquestionably to exclude liens.
We have no doubt, then, that the lower courts’ unanimously agreed-upon manner of applying § 522(f) to federal exemptions — ask first whether avoiding the lien would entitle the debtor to an exemption, and if it would, then avoid and recover the lien — is correct. The question then becomes whether a different interpretation should be adopted for state exemptions. We do not see how that could be possible. Nothing in the text of § 522(f) remotely justifies treating the two categories of exemptions differently. The provision refers to the impairment of “exemption[s] to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b),” and that includes federal exemptions and state exemptions alike. Nor is there any overwhelmingly clear policy impelling us, if we possessed the power, to create a distinction that the words of the statute do not contain. Respondent asserts that it is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s “opt-out” policy, whereby the States may define their own exemptions, to refuse to take those exemptions with all their built-in limitations. That is plainly not true, however, since there is no doubt that a state exemption which purports to be available “unless waived” will be given full effect, even if it has been waived, for purposes of § 522(f)—the first phrase of which, as we have noted, recites that it applies “[notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions.” See Dominion Bank of Cumberlands, NA v. Nuckolls, 780 F. 2d 408, 412 (CA4 1985). Just as it is not inconsistent with the policy of permitting state-defined exemptions to have another policy disfavoring waiver of exemptions, whether federal- or state-created; so also it is not inconsistent to have a policy disfavoring the impingement of certain types of liens upon exemptions, whether federal- or state-created. We have no basis for pronouncing the opt-out policy absolute, but must apply it along with whatever other competing or limiting policies the statute contains.
On the basis of the analysis we have set forth above with respect to federal exemptions, and in light of the equivalency of treatment accorded to federal and state exemptions by § 522(f), we conclude that Florida’s exclusion of certain liens from the scope of its homestead protection does not achieve a similar exclusion from the Bankruptcy Code’s lien avoidance provision.
Ill
The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily resolve this case. Section 522(f) permits the avoidance of the “fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor.” Some courts have held it inapplicable to a lien that was already attached to property when the debtor acquired it, since in such a case there never was a “fixing of a lien” on the debtor’s interest. See In re McCormick, 18 B. R. 911, 914 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Pa.), aff’d, 22 B. R. 997 (WD Pa. 1982); In re Scott, 12 B. R. 613, 615 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Okla. 1981). Under Florida law, the lien may have attached simultaneously with the acquisition of the property interest. If so, it could be argued that the lien did not fix “on an interest of the debtor.” See Farrey v. Sander-foot, ante, p. 291. The Court of Appeals did not pass on this issue, nor on the subsidiary question whether the Florida statute extending the homestead exemption was a taking, cf. United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U. S. 70 (1982). We express no opinion on these points, and leave them to be considered by the Court of Appeals on remand.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
See In re Pine, 717 F. 2d 281 (CA6 1983); In re McManus, 681 F. 2d 353 (CA5 1982).
See In re Brown, 734 F. 2d 119 (CA2 1984); Dominion Bank of Cumberland's, NA v. Nuckolls, 780 F. 2d 408 (CA4 1985); In re Thompson, 750 F. 2d 628 (CA8 1984); In re Leonard, 866 F. 2d 335 (CA10 1989).
Exemption (7) refers to a life insurance contract “owned” by the debtor, and exemptions (10) and (11) refer to various benefits, awards, and payments that the debtor has a “right to receive.” §§ 522(d)(7), (10), (11). Only exemption (9), § 522(d)(9), contains no language arguably excluding property subject to lien.
See, e. g., In re Simonson, 758 F. 2d 103, 105 (CA3 1985); In re Brantz, 106 B. R. 62, 68 (Bkrtey. Ct. ED Pa. 1989); In re Carney, 47 B. R. 296, 299 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Mass. 1985); In re Losieniecki, 17 B. R. 136, 138 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Pa. 1981). See also 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 522.29 (15th ed. 1990); B. Weintraub & A. Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual ¶4.08[2] (1986); Bowmar, Avoidance of Judicial Liens that Impair Exemptions in Bankruptcy: The Workings of 11 U. S. C. § 522(f)(1), 63 Am. Bankr. L. J. 375, 387-388, and n. 85 (1989) (hereinafter Bowmar). Some courts have held that § 522(f) allows the avoidance of liens even when, after the avoidance, there would be no debtor’s interest in the property to which a § 522(d) exemption could attach. See, e. g., In re Richardson, 55 B. R. 526 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ND Ohio 1985); In re Chesanow, 25 B. R. 228, 231 (Bkrtcy. Ct. Conn. 1982). But see, e. g., In re Hooper, 60 B. R. 640, 641 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Pa. 1986); In re Barone, 31 B. R. 540 (Bkrtcy. Ct. ED Pa. 1983). Today’s opinion does not speak to this issue. Finally, at least one court has suggested that equity excluding the liens is required for there to be an “interest” within the scope of § 522(f), In re Miller, 8 B. R. 43 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Mo. 1980), but that position has been rejected, In re Cole, 15 B. R. 322, 323, n. 1 (Bkrtcy. Ct. WD Mo. 1981).
For a more precise formulation, see In re Brantz, 106 B. R., at 68; In re Carney, 47 B. R., at 299; Bowmar 388-392.
In the dissent’s view, the question is whether the lien impairs an “exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled at the time the lien ‘fixed.’” Post, at 317. Under the Code, however, the question is whether the lien impairs an “exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b),” and under subsection (b), exempt property is determined “on the date of the filing of the petition,” not when the lien fixed. 11 U. S. C. §§ 522(f), (b)(2)(A). We follow the language of the Code.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
CHIEF Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent represents plaintiffs who claim injuries resulting from the use of orthopedic bone screws in the pedi-cles of their spines. Petitioner is a consulting company that assisted the screws’ manufacturer, AeroMed Corporation, in navigating the federal regulatory process for these devices. Plaintiffs say petitioner made fraudulent representations to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA or Administration) in the course of obtaining approval to market the screws. Plaintiffs further claim that such representations were at least a “but for” cause of injuries that plaintiffs sustained from the implantation of these devices: Had the representations not been made, the FDA would not have approved the devices, and plaintiffs would not have been injured. Plaintiffs sought damages from petitioner under state tort law. We hold that such claims are pre-empted by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 52 Stat. 1040, as amended by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), 90 Stat. 539, 21 U. S. C. § 301 (1994 ed. and Supp. Y).
H-1
Regulation of medical devices is governed by the two Acts just named. The MDA separates devices into three categories: Class I devices are those that present no unreasonable risk of illness or injury and therefore require only general manufacturing controls; Class’ll devices are those possessing a greater potential dangerousness and thus warranting more stringent controls; Class III devices “presen[t] a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury” and therefore incur the FDA’s strictest regulation. § 360c(a)(l)(C)(ii)(II). It is not disputed that the bone screws manufactured by AcroMed are Class III devices.
Class III devices must complete a thorough review process with the FDA before they may be marketed. This pre-market approval (PMA) process requires the applicant to demonstrate a “reasonable assurance” that the device is both “safe . . . [and] effective under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof.” §§360e(d)(2)(A), (B). Among other information, an application must include all known reports pertaining to the device’s safety and efficacy, see § 360e(c)(l)(A); “a full statement of the components, ingredients, and properties and of the principle or principles of operation of such device,” § 360e(c)(l)(B); “a full description of the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and, when relevant, packing and installation of, such device,” § 360e(c)(l)(C); samples of the device (when practicable), see § 360e(c)(l)(E); and “specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such device,” § 360e(c)(l)(F). The PMA process is ordinarily quite time consuming because the FDA’s review requires an “average of 1,200 hours [for] each submission.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 477 (1996) (citing Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy & Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Ser. No. 100-34), p. 384 (1987); Kahan, Premarket Approval Versus Premarket Notification: Different Routes to the Same Market, 39 Food Drug Cosm. L. J. 510, 512-514 (1984)).
An exception to the PMA requirement exists for devices that were already on the market prior to the MDA’s enactment in 1976. See 21 U. S. C. § 360e(b)(1)(A). The MDA allows these “predicate” devices to remain available until the FDA initiates and completes the PMA process. In order to avoid the potentially monopolistic consequences of this predicate-device exception, the MDA allows other manufacturers to distribute (also pending completion of the predicate device’s PMA review) devices that are shown to be “substantially equivalent” to a predicate device. § 360e(b)(1)(B).
Demonstrating that a device qualifies for this exception is known as the “§ 510(k) process,” which refers to the section of the original MDA containing this provision. Section 510(k) submissions must include the following: “Proposed labels, labeling, and advertisements sufficient to describe the device, its intended use, and the directions for its use,” 21 CFR § 807.87(e) (2000); “[a] statement indicating the device is similar to and/or different from other products of comparable type in commercial distribution, accompanied by data to support the statement,” § 807.87(f); “[a] statement that the submitter believes, to the best of his or her knowledge, that all data and information submitted in the pre-market notification are truthful and accurate and that no material fact has been omitted,” § 807.87(k); and “[a]ny additional information regarding the device requested by the [FDA] Commissioner that is necessary for the Commissioner to make a finding as to whether or not the device is substantially equivalent to a device in commercial distribution,” §807.87(1).
In 1984, AeroMed sought §510(k) approval for its bone screw device, indicating it for use in spinal surgery. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liability Litigation, 159 F. 3d 817, 820 (CA3 1998). The FDA denied approval on the grounds that the Class III device lacked substantial equivalence to a predicate device. See ibid. In September 1985, with the assistance of petitioner, AeroMed filed another §510(k) application. “The application provided additional information about the . . . device and again indicated its intended use in spinal surgery. The FDA again rejected the application, determining that the device was not substantially equivalent to a predicate device and that it posed potential risks not exhibited by other spinal-fixation systems.” Ibid. In December 1985, AeroMed and petitioner filed a third § 510(k) application.
“AeroMed and [petitioner] split the . . . device into its component parts, renamed them ‘nested bone plates’ and ‘[cancellous] bone screws’ and filed a separate §510(k) application for each component. In both applications, a new intended use was specified: rather than seeking clearance for spinal applications, they sought clearance to market the plates and screws for use in the long bones of the arms and legs. AeroMed and Buckman claimed that the two components were substantially equivalent to predicate devices used in long bone surgery. The FDA approved the devices for this purpose in February 1986.” Ibid.
Pursuant to its designation by the Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation as the transferee court for In re: Orthopedic Bone Screw Liability Litigation, MDL No. 1014, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has been the recipient of some 2,300 civil actions related to these medical devices. Many of these actions include state-law causes of action claiming that petitioner and AcroMed made fraudulent representations to the FDA as to the intended use of the bone screws and that, as a result, the devices were improperly given market clearance and were subsequently used to the plaintiffs’ detriment. The District Court dismissed these “fraud-on-the-FDA” claims, first on the ground that they were expressly pre-empted by the MDA, and then, after our decision in Medtronic, on the ground that these claims amounted to an improper assertion of a private right of action under the MDA. See 159 F. 3d, at 821.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that plaintiffs’ fraud claims were neither expressly nor impliedly pre-empted. We granted certiorari, 530 U. S. 1273 (2000), to resolve a split among the Courts of Appeals on this question, see Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F. 3d 216, 233-236 (CA6 2000) (identifying split and holding such claims expressly pre-empted), and we now reverse.
II
Policing fraud against federal agencies is hardly “a field which the States have traditionally occupied,” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947), such as to warrant a presumption against finding federal pre-emption of a state-law cause of action. To the contrary, the relationship between a federal agency and the entity it regulates is inherently federal in character because the relationship originates from, is governed by, and terminates according to federal law. Cf. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U. S. 500, 504-505 (1988) (allowing pre-emption of state law by federal common law where the interests at stake are “uniquely federal” in nature). Here, petitioner’s dealings with the FDA were prompted by the-MDA, and the very subject matter of petitioner’s statements were dictated by that statute’s provisions. Accordingly — and in contrast to situations implicating “federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety,” Medtronic, 518 U. S., at 485 — no presumption against pre-emption obtains in this case.
Given this analytical framework, we hold that the plaintiffs’ state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims conflict with, and are therefore impliedly pre-empted by, federal law. The conflict stems from the fact that the federal statutory scheme amply empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud against the Administration, and that this authority is used by the Administration to achieve a somewhat delicate balance of statutory objectives. The balance sought by the Administration can be skewed by allowing fraud-on-the-FDA claims under state tort law.
As described in greater detail above, the § 510(k) process sets forth a comprehensive scheme for determining whether an applicant has demonstrated that a product is substantially equivalent to a predicate device. Among other information, the applicant must submit to the FDA “[proposed labels, labeling, and advertisements sufficient to describe the device, its intended use, and the directions for its use,” 21 CFR § 807.87(e) (2000), and a statement attesting to and explaining the similarities to and/or differences from similar devices (along with supporting data), see § 807.87(f). The FDA is also empowered to require additional necessary information. See §807.87(1). Admittedly, the §510(k) process lacks the PMA review’s rigor: The former requires only a showing of substantial equivalence to a predicate device, while the latter involves a time-consuming inquiry into the risks and efficacy of each device. Nevertheless, to achieve its limited purpose, the § 510(k) process imposes upon applicants a variety of requirements that are designed to enable the FDA to make its statutorily required judgment as to whether the device qualifies under this exception.
Accompanying these disclosure requirements are various provisions aimed at detecting, deterring, and punishing false statements made during this and related approval processes. The FDA is empowered to investigate suspected fraud, see 21 U. S. C. § 372; 21 CFR § 5.35 (2000), and citizens may report wrongdoing and petition the agency to take action, § 10.30. In addition to the general criminal proscription on making false statements to the Federal Government, 18 U. S. C. § 1001 (1994 ed., Supp. V), the FDA may respond to fraud by seeking injunctive relief, 21 U. S. C. §332, and civil penalties, 21 U. S. C. § 333(f)(1)(A); seizing the device, § 334(a)(2)(D); and pursuing criminal prosecutions, § 333(a). The FDA .thus has at its disposal a variety of enforcement options that allow it to make a measured response to suspected fraud upon the Administration.
This flexibility is a critical component of the statutory and regulatory framework under which the FDA pursues difficult (and often competing) objectives. For example, with respect to Class III devices, the FDA simultaneously maintains the exhaustive PMA and the more limited §510(k) processes in order to ensure both that medical devices are reasonably safe and effective and that, if the device qualifies under the §510(k) exception, it is on the market within a relatively short period of time. Similarly, "off-label” usage of medical devices (use of a device for some other purpose than that for which it has been approved by the FDA) is an accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate in this area without directly interfering with the practice of medicine. See, e. g., Beck & Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 Food & Drug L. J. 71,76-77 (1998) (noting that courts, several States, and the "FDA itself reeogniz[e] the value and propriety of off-label use”). Indeed, a recent amendment to the FDCA expressly states in part that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship.” 21 U. S. C. § 396 (1994 ed., Supp. V). Thus, the FDA is charged with the difficult task of regulating the marketing and distribution of medical devices without intruding upon decisions statutorily committed to the discretion of health care professionals.
State-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims inevitably conflict with the FDA’s responsibility to police fraud consistently with the Administration’s judgment and objectives. As a practical matter, complying with the FDA’s detailed regulatory regime in the shadow of 50 States’ tort regimes will dramatically increase the burdens facing potential applicants — burdens not contemplated by Congress in enacting the FDCA and the MDA. Would-be applicants may be discouraged from seeking §510(k) approval of devices with potentially beneficial off-label uses for fear that such use might expose the manufacturer or its associates (such as petitioner) to unpredictable civil liability. In effect, then, fraud-on-the-FDA claims could cause the Administration’s reporting requirements to deter off-label use despite the fact that the FDCA expressly disclaims any intent to directly regulate the practice of medicine, see 21 U. S. C. § 396 (1994 ed., Supp. V), and even though off-label use is generally accepted.
Conversely, fraud-on-the-FDA claims would also cause applicants to fear that their disclosures to the FDA, although deemed appropriate by the Administration, will later be judged insufficient in state court. Applicants would then have an incentive to submit a deluge of information that the Administration neither wants nor needs, resulting in additional burdens on the FDA’s evaluation of an application. As a result, the comparatively speedy § 510(k) process could encounter delays, which would, in turn, impede competition among predicate devices and delay health care professionals’ ability to prescribe appropriate off-label uses.
Respondent relies heavily on Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238 (1984), which it reads to “ereat[e] a virtually irrefutable presumption against implied preemption of private damage remedies predicated on an alleged conflict with a federal remedial scheme.” Brief for Respondent 34. Silkwood is different from the present case, however, in several respects. Silkwood’s claim was not based on any sort of fraud-on-the-agency theory, but on traditional state tort law principles of the duty of care owed by the producer of plutonium fuel pins to an employee working in its plant. See 464 U. S., at 241. Moreover, our decision there turned on specific statutory evidence that Congress “disclaimed any interest in promoting the development and utilization of atomic energy by means that fail to provide adequate remedies for those who are injured by exposure to hazardous nuclear materials.” Id., at 257. In the present case, by contrast, we have clear evidence that Congress intended that the MDA be enforced exclusively by the Federal Government. 21 U.S.C. § 337(a).
Respondent also suggests that we should be reluctant to find a pre-emptive conflict here because Congress included an express pre-emption provision in the MDA. See Brief for Respondent 37. To the extent respondent posits that anything other than our ordinary pre-emption principles apply under these circumstances, that contention must fail in light of our conclusion last Term in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861 (2000), that neither an express pre-emption provision nor a saving clause “bar[s] the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.” Id., at 869.
We must also reject respondent’s attempt to characterize both the claims at issue in Medtronic (common-law negligence action against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective pacemaker lead) and the fraud claims here as “claims arising from violations of FDCA requirements.” Brief for Respondent 38. Notwithstanding the fact that Medtronic did not squarely address the question of implied pre-emption, it is clear that the Medtronic claims arose from the manufacturer’s alleged failure to use reasonable care in the production of the product, not solely from the violation of FDCA requirements. See 518 U. S., at 481. In the present case, however, the fraud claims exist solely by virtue of the FDCA disclosure requirements. Thus, although Medtronic can be read to allow certain state-law causes of actions that parallel federal safety requirements, it does not and cannot stand for the proposition that any violation of the FDCA will support a state-law claim.
In sum, were plaintiffs to maintain their fraud-on-the-agency claims here, they would not be relying on traditional state tort law which had predated the federal enactments in questions. On the contrary, the existence of these federal enactments is a critical element in their case. For the reasons stated above, we think this sort of litigation would exert an extraneous pull on the scheme established by Congress, and it is therefore pre-empted by that scheme.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
The District Court also determined that the plaintiffs’ fraud claims failed for lack of proximate cause, see In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liability Litigation, 159 F. 3d 817, 821 (CA3 1998), but that question is not presently before us.
In light of this conclusion, we express no view on whether these claims are subject to express pre-emption under 21 U. S. C. §360k.
Title 18 U. S. C. § 1001(a) (1994 ed., Supp. V) provides: “[Wlhoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; [or] makes any materially false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or representation; or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”
The FDCA leaves no doubt that it is the Federal Government rather than private litigants who are authorized to file suit for noneompliance with the medical device provisions: “[A]ll such proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this chapter shall be by and in the name of the United States.” 21 U. S. C. § 337(a).
See Green & Schultz, Tort Law Deference to FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 88 Geo. L. J. 2119, 2133 (2000) (“Physicians may prescribe drugs and devices for off-label uses”); Smith, Physician Modification of Legally Marketed Medical Devices: Regulatory Implications Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 55 Food & Drug L. J. 245, 251-252 (2000) (discussing off-label use in terms of the “practice of medicine doetrinef, which] stands firmly for the proposition that regulatory efforts are directed primarily at device marketing by manufacturers, not device use by physicians”); Beck & Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 Food & Drug L. J. 71, 72 (1998) (“Off-label use is widespread in the medical community and often is essential to giving patients optimal medical care, both of which medical ethics, FDA, and most courts recognize”).
In light of the likely impact that the fraud-on-the-FDA claims would have on the administration of the Administration’s duties, we must reject respondent’s contention that these claims “will... affect only the litigants and will not have the kind of direct impact on the United States, which preemption is designed to protect from undue incursion.” Brief for Respondent 30 (citing Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U. S. 25 (1977)).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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J
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Minton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
It is the public policy of the State of Washington that employers shall not coerce their employees’ choice of representatives for purposes of collective bargaining. Do the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution permit the State, in reliance on this policy, to enjoin peaceful picketing carried on for the purpose of compelling an employer to sign a contract with a labor union which coerces his employees’ choice of bargaining representative?
The State answered in the affirmative. An injunction was issued in narrow terms enjoining petitioners “from endeavoring to compel plaintiff to coerce his employees to join the defendant union or to designate defendant union as their representative for collective bargaining, by picketing the hotel premises of plaintiff . . . .” The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed, 34 Wash. 2d 38, 207 P. 2d 699, and we granted certiorari. 338 U. S. 903.
At the time of the controversy, respondent employed about fifteen persons at Enetai Inn, a small hotel which he operates in Bremerton, Washington. Just prior to May 1,1946, representatives of the petitioner union called upon respondent about organizing his employees and asked him to sign a contract with the union which would require his employees to join the union. None of the employees was a member of any union active in the area. Respondent replied that that was a matter for the employees to decide. He gave the union and its representatives permission freely to visit and solicit his employees for membership while he was absent on a brief trip to Los Angeles. Upon his return, the union representatives again approached him about signing a contract. The representatives admitted that they had not secured any members among the employees, and respondent again replied that it was a matter for the employees. On May 2, 1946, respondent was advised that the union proposed to have the Enetai Inn placed on the “We Do Not Patronize” list, and a meeting for the purpose of attempting to reach a settlement was suggested. At the meeting held a few days later respondent was represented by his attorney. The union still insisted that respondent sign the contract, and respondent through his attorney still declined to sign on the ground that that would require him to coerce his employees to join a union, contrary to state law.
The union asked for and was granted a meeting with respondent’s employees at which the union representatives might present their case. Six representatives of organized labor attended this meeting, held on May 10, 1946. Eleven of the employees attended. One was a bellboy whose work the union apparently did not wish to have covered. Respondent was again represented by his attorney. The union representatives were given complete and unhampered opportunity to present their arguments for unionization to the employees. No statement was made by anyone on behalf of respondent or the employees. After the union representatives had completed their presentation, all withdrew except the employees who then took a vote as to whether they wished to join the union. Of the eleven voting, nine voted against joining, one was undecided, and the bellboy, whose membership the union did not desire, voted to join. The result was immediately reported to the union representatives and to respondent’s attorney. Several days later respondent was notified that his hotel had been placed on the “We Do Not Patronize” list and pickets began walking in front of his hotel bearing a sign reading: “Enetai Inn — Unfair to Organized Labor.” The picketing was carried on by a single picket at a time and was intermittent and peaceful.
With the exception of refusing to sign the contract requiring his employees to join the union, respondent had complied with all of the requests and demands of the union. That single refusal was what caused the union to brand respondent’s place of business as unfair. After the picketing started, respondent’s attorney agreed to talk to respondent again to see if he would consider signing the contract. After consulting with respondent, the attorney wrote the union’s attorney that respondent was willing to negotiate further with the union but would not sign the type of contract that had been tendered him. The union then offered a contract which provided that present employees should not be required to join the union as a condition of continued employment, but that any employees hired in the future would be required to join within fifteen days or be discharged. The new contract also provided that the union should be the bargaining representative for both union and nonunion employees. The second contract was just the first contract in slow motion. Respondent refused to sign it for the same reason he had refused to sign the previously tendered contract.
The peaceful picketing continued, and on June 29,1946, respondent filed this suit for an injunction and damages. On the first hearing the trial court granted petitioners’ motion for a nonsuit and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court of Washington reversed on appeal. 29 Wash. 2d 488, 188 P. 2d 97. Upon remand the trial court on September 20, 1948, entered judgment for respondent for damages for the “wrongful picketing” in the sum of $500 and permanently enjoined petitioners in the previously quoted language. This judgment the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed on July 1, 1949, by a divided court. 34 Wash. 2d 38, 207 P. 2d 699.
The State of Washington has what is sometimes referred to as a “Little Norris-LaGuardia Act,” which provides that no injunction shall issue in a “labor dispute,” as defined in the Act, except in conformity with the provisions of the Act; nor shall any injunction issue contrary to the public policy declared in the Act. No “labor dispute” as determined by the law of Washington was held to exist in this case. There was no injunction against picketing generally. It was held that the objective of the picketing was violative of the public policy against employer coercion of employees’ choice of bargaining representative, and that the picketing should be enjoined on that narrow ground.
Does the injunction, limited as it is to restraining petitioners from picketing respondent’s hotel for the purpose of compelling him to coerce his employees’ choice of bargaining representative, constitute an abridgment of the right of free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
This Court has said that picketing is in part an exercise of the right of free speech guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. 293; Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321; Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U. S. 468. But since picketing is more than speech and establishes a locus in quo that has far more potential for inducing action or nonaction than the message the pickets convey, this Court has not hesitated to uphold a state’s restraint of acts and conduct which are an abuse of the right to picket rather than a means of peaceful and truthful publicity. Thus in Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, the picketing in issue, considered in isolation, was peaceful, but had been found to be enmeshed with and set in such a background of violence that it was a part of a pattern of violence. This Court held that peaceful picketing under such circumstances might properly be enjoined by the State.
In Hotel & Restaurant Employees’ International Alliance v. Wisconsin E. R. B., 315 U. S. 437, this Court upheld the right of Wisconsin through its Employment Relations Board to issue a cease and desist order against violence in picketing and boycotting by the union involved. Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter’s Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, upheld a decree enjoining the union from picketing a cafe having no business connection with the place where the industrial dispute centered. And in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, the Court sustained a decree enjoining picketing which was peaceful and informative but was carried on for the purpose of coercing the employer to violate the antitrust law of Missouri.
The public policy of any state is to be found in its constitution, acts of the legislature, and decisions of its courts. “Primarily it is for the lawmakers to determine the public policy of the State.” Twin City Pipe Line Company v. Harding Glass Company, 283 U. S. 353, 357.
The State of Washington has by legislative enactment declared its public policy on the subject of organization of workers for bargaining purposes. The pertinent part of this statute is set forth in the margin. The meaning and effect of this declaration of policy is found in its application by the highest court of the State to the concrete facts of the instant case. Under the so-enunciated public policy of Washington, it is clear that workers shall be free to join or not to join a union, and that they shall be free from the coercion, interference, or restraint of employers of labor in the designation of their representatives for collective bargaining. Picketing of an employer to compel him to coerce his employees’ choice of a bargaining representative is an attempt to induce a transgression of this policy, and the State here restrained the advocates of such transgression from further action with like aim. To judge the wisdom of such policy is not for us; ours is but to determine whether a restraint of picketing in reliance on the policy is an unwarranted encroachment upon rights protected from state abridgment by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Petitioners insist that the Swing case, supra, is controlling. We think not. In that case this Court struck down the State’s restraint of picketing based solely on the absence of an employer-employee relationship. An adequate basis for the instant decree is the unlawful objective of the picketing, namely, coercion by the employer of the employees’ selection of a bargaining representative. Peaceful picketing for any lawful purpose is not prohibited by the decree under review. The State has not here, as in Swing, relied on the absence of an employer-employee relationship. Thus the State has not, as was the case there, excluded “workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him.” 312 U. S. at 326.
The Washington statute has not been construed by the Washington courts in this case to prohibit picketing of workers by other workers. The construction of the statute which we are reviewing only prohibits coercion of workers by employers. We cannot agree with petitioners’ reading of this injunction that “whatever types of picketing were to be carried out by the union would be in violation of the decree.” Respondent does not contend that picketing per se has been enjoined but only that picketing which has as its purpose violation of the policy of the State. There is no contention that picketing directed at employees for organization purposes would be violative of that policy. The decree does not have that effect.
We are of the opinion that Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, controls the disposition of this case, and that it therefore must be affirmed. In the Giboney case it is true that the state law which made the objective of the picketing unlawful had criminal sanctions. The Washington statute here has no criminal sanctions. Petitioners seek to distinguish Giboney on that- ground. This Court there said: “But placards used as an essential and inseparable part of a grave offense against an important public law cannot immunize that unlawful conduct from state control. . . . And it is clear that appellants were doing more than exercising a right of free speech or press. . . . They were exercising their economic power together with that of their allies to compel Empire to abide by union rather than by state regulation of trade.” 336 U. S. at 502-503. It is not the presence of criminal sanctions which makes a state policy “important public law.” Much public policy does not readily lend itself to accompanying criminal sanctions. Whether to impose criminal sanctions in connection with a given policy is itself a question of policy.
Here, as in Giboney, the union was using its economic power with that of its allies to compel respondent to abide by union policy rather than by the declared policy of the State. That state policy guarantees workers free choice of representatives for bargaining purposes. If respondent had complied with petitioners’ demands and had signed one of the tendered contracts and lived up to its terms, he would have thereby coerced his employees. The employees would have had no free choice as to whether they wished to organize or what union would be their representative.
The public policy of Washington relied upon by the courts below to sustain this injunction is an important and widely accepted one. The broad purpose of the Act from which this policy flows was to prevent unreasonable judicial interference with legitimate objectives of workers. But abuse by workers or organizations of workers of the declared public policy of such an Act is no more to be condoned than violation of prohibitions against judicial interference with certain activities of workers. We therefore find no unwarranted restraint of picketing here. The injunction granted was tailored to prevent a specific violation of an important state law. The decree was limited to the wrong being perpetrated, namely, “an abusive exercise of the right to picket.” Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U. S. at 295. The judgment is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Black is of the opinion that this case is controlled by the principles announced in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, and therefore concurs in the Court’s judgment.
Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Washington Labor Disputes Act, Rem. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1940) § 7612. Certain sections of this Act were held unconstitutional by the Washington Court in Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Company, 188 Wash. 396, 63 P.2d 397.
The Washington Supreme Court reviewed its decisions in this field in its first opinion in the instant case. O’Neil v. Building Service Employees Union, 9 Wash. 2d 507, 115 P. 2d 662, and S & W Fine Foods v. Retail Delivery Drivers and Salesmen’s Union, 11 Wash. 2d 262, 118 P. 2d 962, had treated any peaceful picketing as lawful. American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, was held to be controlling in both cases. But in the instant case, both the O’Neil and S & W cases were characterized as wrong in principle and were expressly overruled. The court quoted from Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 27 Wash. 2d 193, 206, 177 P. 2d 873, 880, where it was said that peaceful picketing is an exercise of the right of free speech which loses the protection of constitutional guaranty where “it steps over the line from persuasion to coercion.”
“In the interpretation of this act and in determining tiie jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the State of Washington, as such jurisdiction and authority are herein defined and limited, the public policy of the State of Washington is hereby declared as follows:
“Whereas, Under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protections; therefore, the following definitions of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the State of Washington are hereby enacted.” Rem. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1940) § 7612-2.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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C
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice O’Connor
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, Kevin Wiggins, argues that his attorneys’ failure to investígate his background and present mitigating evidence of his unfortunate life history at his capital sentencing proceedings violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In this case, we consider whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit erred in upholding the Maryland Court of Appeals’ rejection of this claim.
I
A
On September 17, 1988, police discovered 77-year-old Florence Lacs drowned in the bathtub of her ransacked apartment in Woodlawn, Maryland. Wiggins v. State, 352 Md. 580, 585, 724 A. 2d 1, 5 (1999). The State indicted petitioner for the crime on October 20,1988, and later filed a notice of intention to seek the death penalty. Two Baltimore County public defenders, Carl Schlaich and Michelle Nethercott, assumed responsibility for Wiggins’ case. In July 1989, petitioner elected to be tried before a judge in Baltimore County Circuit Court. Ibid. On August 4, after a 4-day trial, the court found petitioner guilty of first-degree murder, robbery, and two counts of theft. App. 32.
After his conviction, Wiggins elected to be sentenced by a jury, and the trial court scheduled the proceedings to begin on October 11, 1989. On September 11, counsel filed a motion for bifurcation of sentencing in hopes of presenting Wiggins’ case in two phases. Id., at 34. Counsel intended first to prove that Wiggins did not act as a “principal in the first degree,” ibid. — i. e., that he did not kill the victim by his own hand. See Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §413 (1996) (requiring proof of direct responsibility for death eligibility). Counsel then intended, if necessary, to present a mitigation case. In the memorandum in support of their motion, counsel argued that bifurcation would enable them to present each case in its best light; separating the two cases would prevent the introduction of mitigating evidence from diluting their claim that Wiggins was not directly responsible for the murder. App. 36-42, 37.
On October 12, the court denied the bifurcation motion, and sentencing proceedings commenced immediately thereafter. In her opening statement, Nethercott told the jurors they would hear evidence suggesting that someone other than Wiggins actually killed Lacs. Id., at 70-71. Counsel then explained that the judge would instruct them to weigh Wiggins’ clean record as a factor against a death sentence. She concluded: “ ‘You’re going to hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life. It has not been easy for him. But he’s worked. He’s tried to be a productive citizen, and he’s reached the age of 27 with no convictions for prior crimes of violence and no convictions, period.... I think that’s an important thing for you to consider.’ ” Id., at 72. During the proceedings themselves, however, counsel introduced no evidence of Wiggins’ life history.
Before closing arguments, Schlaich made a proffer to the court, outside the presence of the jury, to preserve bifurcation as an issue for appeal. He detailed the mitigation case counsel would have presented had the court granted their bifurcation motion. He explained that they would have introduced psychological reports and expert testimony demonstrating Wiggins’ limited intellectual capacities and childlike emotional state on the one hand, and the absence of aggressive patterns in his behavior, his capacity for empathy, and his desire to function in the world on the other. See id., at 349-351. At no point did Schlaich proffer any evidence of petitioner’s life history or family background. On October 18, the court instructed the jury on the sentencing task before it, and later that afternoon, the jury returned with a sentence of death. Id., at 409-410. A divided Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. Wiggins v. State, 324 Md. 551, 597 A. 2d 1359 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U. S. 1007 (1992).
B
In 1993, Wiggins sought postconviction relief in Baltimore County Circuit Court. With new counsel, he challenged the adequacy of his representation at sentencing, arguing that his attorneys had rendered constitutionally defective assistance by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence of his dysfunctional background. App. to Pet. for Cert. 132a. To support his claim, petitioner presented testimony by Hans Selvog, a licensed social worker certified as an expert by the court. App. 419. Selvog testified concerning an elaborate social history report he had prepared containing evidence of the severe physical and sexual abuse petitioner suffered at the hands of his mother and while in the care of a series of foster parents. Relying on state social services, medical, and school records, as well as interviews with petitioner and numerous family members, Selvog chronicled petitioner’s bleak life history. App. to Pet. for Cert. 163a.
According to Selvog’s report, petitioner’s mother, a chronic alcoholic, frequently left Wiggins and his siblings home alone for days, forcing them to beg for food and to eat paint chips and garbage. Id., at 166a-167a. Mrs. Wiggins’ abusive behavior included beating the children for breaking into the kitchen, which she often kept locked. She had sex with men while her children slept in the same bed and, on one occasion, forced petitioner’s hand against a hot stove burner — an incident that led to petitioner’s hospitalization. Id., at 167a-171a. At the age of six, the State placed Wiggins in foster care. Petitioner’s first and second foster mothers abused him physically, id., at 175a-176a, and, as petitioner explained to Selvog, the father in his second foster home repeatedly molested and raped him. Id., at 176a-179a. At age 16, petitioner ran away from his foster home and began living on the streets. He returned intermittently to additional foster homes, including one in which the foster mother’s sons allegedly gang-raped him on more than one occasion. Id., at 190a. After leaving the foster care system, Wiggins entered a Job Corps program and was allegedly sexually abused by his supervisor. Id., at 192a.
During the postconviction proceedings, Schlaich testified that he did not remember retaining a forensic social worker to prepare a social history, even though the State made funds available for that purpose. App. 487-488. He explained that he and Nethercott, well in advance of trial, decided to focus their efforts on “ ‘retrying] the factual case’ ” and disputing Wiggins’ direct responsibility for the murder. Id., at 485-486. In April 1994, at the close of the proceedings, the judge observed from the bench that he could not remember a capital case in which counsel had not compiled a social history of the defendant, explaining, “ ‘[n]ot to do a social history, at least to see what you have got, to me is absolute error. I just — I would be flabbergasted if the Court of Appeals said anything else.’” Id., at 605. In October 1997, however, the trial court denied Wiggins’ petition for postcon-viction relief. The court concluded that “when the decision not to investigate... is a matter of trial tactics, there is no ineffective assistance of counsel.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 155a-156a.
The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of relief, concluding that trial counsel had made “a deliberate, tactical decision to concentrate their effort at convincing the jury” that appellant was not directly responsible for the murder. Wiggins v. State, 352 Md., at 608, 724 A. 2d, at 15. The court observed that counsel knew of Wiggins’ unfortunate childhood. They had available to them both the pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report prepared by the Division of Parole and Probation, as required by Maryland law, Md. Ann. Code, Art. 41, §4-609(d) (1988), as well as “more detailed social service records that recorded incidences of physical and sexual abuse, an alcoholic mother, placements in foster care, and borderline retardation.” 352 Md., at 608-609, 724 A. 2d, at 15. The court acknowledged that this evidence was neither as detailed nor as graphic as the history elaborated in the Selvog report but emphasized that “counsel did investigate and were aware of appellant’s background.” Id., at 610, 724 A. 2d, at 16 (emphasis in original). Counsel knew that at least one uncontested mitigating factor — Wiggins’ lack of prior convictions — would be before the jury should their attempt to disprove Wiggins’ direct responsibility for the murder fail. As a result, the court concluded, Schlaich and Nethercott “made a reasoned choice to proceed with what they thought was their best defense.” Id., at 611-612, 724 A. 2d, at 17.
C
In September 2001, Wiggins filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court. The trial court granted him relief, holding that the Maryland courts’ rejection of his ineffective assistance claim “involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.” Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 557 (2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362 (2000)). The court rejected the State’s defense of counsel’s “tactical” decision to “‘retry guilt,’” concluding that for a strategic decision to be reasonable, it must be “based upon information the attorney has made after conducting a reasonable investigation.” 164 F. Supp. 2d, at 558. The court found that though counsel were aware of some aspects of Wiggins’ background, that knowledge did not excuse them from their duty to make a “fully informed and deliberate decision” about whether to present a mitigation case. In fact, the court concluded, their knowledge triggered an obligation to look further. Id., at 559.
Reviewing the District Court’s decision de novo, the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that counsel had made a reasonable strategic decision to focus on petitioner’s direct responsibility. Wiggins v. Corcoran, 288 F. 3d 629, 639-640 (2002). The court contrasted counsel’s complete failure to investigate potential mitigating evidence in Williams, 288 F. 3d, at 640, with the fact that Schlaich and Nethercott knew at least some details of Wiggins’ childhood from the PSI and social services records, id., at 641. The court acknowledged that counsel likely knew further investigation “would have resulted in more sordid details surfacing,” but agreed with the Maryland Court of Appeals that counsel’s knowledge of the avenues of mitigation available to them “was sufficient to make an informed strategic choice” to challenge petitioner’s direct responsibility for the murder. Id., at 641-642. The court emphasized that conflicting medical testimony with respect to the time of death, the absence of direct evidence against Wiggins, and unexplained forensic evidence at the crime scene supported counsel’s strategy. Id., at 641.
We granted certiorari, 537 U. S. 1027 (2002), and now reverse.
II
A
Petitioner renews his contention that his attorneys’ performance at sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The amendments to 28 U. S. C. § 2254, enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), circumscribe our consideration of Wiggins’ claim and require us to limit our analysis to the law as it was “clearly established” by our precedents at the time of the state court’s decision. Section 2254 provides:
“(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
“(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
We have made clear that the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to “grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts” of petitioner’s case. Williams v. Taylor, supra, at 413; see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U. S. 685, 694 (2002). In other words, a federal court may grant relief when a state court has misapplied a “governing legal principle” to “a set of facts different from those of the case in which the principle was announced.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U. S. 63, 76 (2003) (citing Williams v. Taylor, supra, at 407). In order for a federal court to find a state court’s application of our precedent “unreasonable,” the state court’s decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. See Lockyer, supra, at 75. The state court’s application must have been “objectively unreasonable.” See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S., at 409.
We established the legal principles that govern claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id., at 687. To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id., at 688. We have declined to articulate specific guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct and instead have emphasized that “[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Ibid.
In this case, as in Strickland, petitioner’s claim stems from counsel’s decision to limit the scope of their investigation into potential mitigating evidence. Id., at 673. Here, as in Strickland, counsel attempt to justify their limited investigation as reflecting a tactical judgment not to present mitigating evidence at sentencing and to pursue an alternative strategy instead. In rejecting the respondent’s claim, we defined the deference owed such strategic judgments in terms of the adequacy of the investigations supporting those judgments:
“[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the cireum-stances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Id., at 690-691.
Our opinion in Williams v. Taylor is illustrative of the proper application of these standards. In finding Williams’ ineffectiveness claim meritorious, we applied Strickland and concluded that counsel’s failure to uncover and present voluminous mitigating evidence at sentencing could not be justified as a tactical decision to focus on Williams’ voluntary confessions, because counsel had not “fulfilled] their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.” 529 U. S., at 396 (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, commentary, p. 4-55 (2d ed. 1980)). While Williams had not yet been decided at the time the Maryland Court of Appeals rendered the decision at issue in this case, cf. post, at 542 (Scalia, J., dissenting), Williams’ case was before us on habeas review. Contrary to thé dissent’s contention, post, at 543, we therefore made no new law in resolving Williams’ ineffectiveness claim. See Williams, 529 U. S., at 390 (noting that the merits of Williams’ claim “are squarely governed by our holding in Strickland”); see also id., at 395 (noting that the trial court correctly applied both components of the Strickland standard to petitioner’s claim and proceeding to discuss counsel’s failure to investigate as a violation of Strickland’s performance prong). In highlighting counsel’s duty to investigate, and in referring to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice as guides, we applied the same “clearly established” precedent of Strickland we apply today. Cf. 466 U. S., at 690-691 (establishing that “thorough investigation[s]” are “virtually unchallengeable” and underscoring that “counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations”); see also id., at 688-689 (“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like... are guides to determining what is reasonable”).
In light of these standards, our principal concern in deciding whether Schlaich and Nethercott exercised “reasonable professional judgmen[t],” id., at 691, is not whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case. Rather, we focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of Wiggins’ background was itself reasonable. Ibid. Cf. Williams v. Taylor, supra, at 415 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting counsel’s duty to conduct the “requisite, diligent” investigation into his client’s background). In assessing counsel’s investigation, we must conduct an objective review of their performance, measured for “reasonableness.under prevailing professional norms,” Strickland, 466 U. S., at 688, which includes a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen “from counsel’s perspective at the time,” id., at 689 (“[E]very effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight”).
B
1
The record demonstrates that counsel’s investigation drew from three sources. App. 490-491. Counsel arranged for William Stejskal, a psychologist, to conduct a number of tests on petitioner. Stejskal concluded that petitioner had an IQ of 79, had difficulty coping with demanding situations, and exhibited features of a personality disorder. Id., at 44-45, 349-351. These reports revealed nothing, however, of petitioner’s life history. Tr. of Oral Arg. 24-25.
With respect to that history, counsel had available to them the written PSI, which included a one-page account of Wiggins’ “personal history” noting his “misery as a youth,” quoting his description of his own background as “ ‘disgusting,’ ” and observing that he spent most of his life in foster care. App. 20-21. Counsel also “tracked down” records kept by the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (DSS) documenting petitioner’s various placements in the State’s foster care system. Id., at 490; Lodging of Petitioner. In describing the scope of counsel’s investigation into petitioner’s life history, both the Fourth Circuit and the Maryland Court of Appeals referred only to these two sources of information. See 288 F. 3d, at 640-641; Wiggins v. State, 352 Md., at 608-609, 724 A. 2d, at 15.
Counsel’s decision not to expand their investigation beyond the PSI and the DSS records fell short of the professional standards that prevailed in Maryland in 1989. As Schlaich acknowledged, standard practice in Maryland in capital cases at the time of Wiggins’ trial included the preparation of a social history report. App. 488. Despite the fact that the Public Defender’s office made funds available for the retention of a forensic social worker, counsel chose not to commission such a report. Id., at 487. Counsel’s conduct similarly fell short of the standards for capital defense work articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA) — standards to which we long have referred as “guides to determining what is reasonable.” Strickland, supra, at 688; Williams v. Taylor, supra, at 396. The ABA Guidelines provide that investigations into mitigating evidence “should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.” ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 11.4.1(C), p. 93 (1989) (emphasis added). Despite these well-defined norms, however, counsel abandoned their investigation of petitioner’s background after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources. Cf. id., 11.8.6, p. 133 (noting that among the topics counsel should consider presenting are medical history, educational history, employment and training history, family and social history, prior adult and juvenile correctional experience, and religious and cultural influences (emphasis added)); 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, commentary, p. 4-55 (2d ed. 1982) (“The lawyer also has a substantial and important role to perform in raising mitigating factors both to the prosecutor initially and to the court at sentencing.... Investigation is essential to fulfillment of these functions”).
The scope of their investigation was also unreasonable in light of what counsel actually discovered in the DSS records. The records revealed several facts: Petitioner’s mother was a chronic alcoholic; Wiggins was shuttled from foster home to foster home and displayed some emotional difficulties while there; he had frequent, lengthy absences from school; and, on at least one occasion, his mothér left him and his siblings aloné for days without food. See Lodging of Petitioner 54-95, 126, 131-136, 140, 147, 159-176. As the Federal District Court emphasized, any reasonably competent attorney would have realized that pursuing these leads was necessary to making an informed choice among possible defenses, particularly given the apparent absence of any aggravating factors in petitioner’s background. 164 F. Supp. 2d, at 559. Indeed, counsel uncovered no evidence in their investigation to suggest that a mitigation case, in its own right, would have been counterproductive, or that further investigation would have been fruitless; this case is therefore distinguishable from our precedents in which we have found limited investigations into mitigating evidence to be reasonable. See, e. g., Strickland, supra, at 699 (concluding that counsel could “reasonably surmise... that character and psychological evidence would be of little help”); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U. S. 776, 794 (1987) (concluding counsel’s limited investigation was reasonable because he interviewed all witnesses brought to his attention, discovering little that was helpful and much that was harmful); Darden v. Wainuflright, 477 U. S. 168, 186 (1986) (concluding that counsel engaged in extensive preparation and that the decision to present a mitigation case would have resulted in the jury hearing £vi-dence that petitioner had been convicted of violent crimes and spent much of his life in jail). Had counsel investigated further, they might well have discovered the sexual abuse later revealed during state postconviction proceedings.
The record of the actual sentencing proceedings underscores the unreasonableness of counsel’s conduct by suggesting that their failure to investigate thoroughly resulted from inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment. Counsel sought, until the day before sentencing, to have the proceedings bifurcated into a retrial of guilt and a mitigation stage. See supra, at 515. On the eve of sentencing, counsel represented to the court that they were prepared to come forward with mitigating evidence, App. 45, and that they intended to present such evidence in the event the court granted their motion to bifurcate. In other words, prior to sentencing, counsel never actually abandoned the possibility that they would present a mitigation defense. Until the court denied their motion, then, they had every reason to develop the most powerful mitigation case possible.
What is more, during the sentencing proceeding itself, counsel did not focus exclusively on Wiggins’ direct responsibility for the murder. After introducing that issue in her opening statement, id., at 70-71, Nethereott entreated the jury to consider not just what Wiggins “is found to have done,” but also “who [he] is.” Id., at 70. Though she told the jury it would “hear that Kevin Wiggins has had a difficult life,” id., at 72, counsel never followed up on that suggestion with details of Wiggins’ history. At the same time, counsel called a criminologist to testify that inmates serving life sentences tend to adjust well and refrain from further violence in prison — testimony with no bearing on,whether petitioner committed the murder by his own hand. Id., at 311-312. Far from focusing exclusively on petitioner’s direct responsibility, then, counsel put on a halfhearted mitigation case, taking precisely the type of “ ‘shotgun’ ” approach the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded counsel sought to avoid. Wiggins v. State, 352 Md., at 609, 724 A. 2d, at 15. When viewed in this light, the “strategic decision” the state courts and respondents all invoke to justify counsel’s limited pursuit of mitigating evidence resembles more a post hoc rationalization of counsel’s conduct than an accurate description of their deliberations prior to sentencing.
In rejecting petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim, the Maryland Court of Appeals appears to have assumed that because counsel had some information with respect to petitioner’s background — the information in the PSI and the DSS records — they were in a position to make a tactical choice not to present a mitigation defense. Id., at 611-612, 724 A. 2d, at 17 (citing federal and state precedents finding ineffective assistance in cases in which counsel failed to conduct an investigation of any kind). In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney’s investigation, however, a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further. Even assuming Schlaich and Nethercott limited the scope of their investigation for strategic reasons, Strickland does not establish that a cursory investigation automatically justifies a tactical decision with respect to sentencing strategy. Rather, a reviewing court must consider the reasonableness of the investigation said to support that strategy. 466 U. S., at 691.
The Maryland Court of Appeals’ application of Strickland’s governing legal principles was objectively unreasonable. Though the state court acknowledged petitioner’s claim that counsel’s failure to prepare a social history “did not meet the minimum standards of the profession,” the court did not conduct an assessment of whether the decision to cease all investigation upon obtaining the PSI and the DSS records actually demonstrated reasonable professional judgment. Wiggins v. State, 352 Md., at 609, 724 A. 2d, at 16. The state court merely assumed that the investigation was adequate. In light of what the PSI and the DSS records actually revealed, however, counsel chose to abandon their investigation at an unreasonable juncture, making a fully informed decision with respect to sentencing strategy impossible. The Court of Appeals’ assumption that the investigation was adequate, ibid., thus reflected an unreasonable application of Strickland. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). As a result, the court’s subsequent deference to counsel’s strategic decision not “to present every conceivable mitigation defense,” 352 Md., at 610, 724 A. 2d, at 16, despite the fact that counsel based this alleged choice on what we have made clear was an unreasonable investigation, was also objectively unreasonable. As we established in Strickland, “strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” 466 U. S., at 690-691.
Additionally, the court based its conclusion, in part, on a clear factual error — that the “social service records... recorded incidences of... sexual abuse.” 352 Md., at 608-609, 724 A. 2d, at 15. As the State and the United States now concede, the records contain no mention of sexual abuse, much less of the repeated molestations and rapes of petitioner detailed in the Selvog report. Brief for Respondents 22; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26; App. to Pet. for Cert. 175a-179a, 190a. The state court’s assumption that the records documented instances of this abuse has been shown to be incorrect by “clear and convincing evidence,” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(e)(1), and reflects “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” § 2254(d)(2). This partial reliance on an erroneous factual finding further highlights the unreasonableness of the state court’s decision.
The dissent insists that this Court’s hands are tied, under § 2254(d), “by the state court’s factual determinations that Wiggins’ trial counsel ‘did investigate and were aware of [Wiggins’] background,’” post, at 550. But as we have made clear, the Maryland Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the scope of counsel’s investigation into petitioner’s background met the legal standards set in Strickland represented an objectively unreasonable application of our precedent. § 2254(d)(1). Moreover, the court’s assumption that counsel learned of a major aspect of Wiggins’ background, i. e., the sexual abuse, from the DSS records was clearly erroneous. The requirements of § 2254(d) thus pose no bar to granting petitioner habeas relief.
2
In their briefs to this Court, the State and the United States contend that counsel, in fact, conducted a more thorough investigation than the one we have just described. This conclusion, they explain, follows from Schlaich’s post-conviction testimony that he knew of the sexual abuse Wiggins suffered, as well as of the hand-burning incident. According to the State and its amicus, the fact that counsel claimed to be aware of this evidence, which was not in the social services records, coupled with Schlaich’s statement that he knew what was in “other people’s reports,” App. 490-491, suggests that counsel’s investigation must have extended beyond the social services records. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31-36; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26-27, n. 4; Brief for Respondents 35. Schlaich simply “was not asked to and did not reveal the source of his knowledge” of the abuse. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27, n. 4.
In considering this reading of the state postconviction record, we note preliminarily that the Maryland Court of Appeals clearly assumed both that counsel's investigation began and ended with the PSI and the DSS records and that this investigation was sufficient in scope to satisfy Strickland’s reasonableness requirement. See Wiggins v. State, 352 Md., at 608, 724 A. 2d, at 15. The court also assumed, erroneously, that the social services records cited incidences of sexual abuse. See id., at 608-609, 724 A. 2d, at 15. Respondents’ interpretation of Schlaich’s postconvietion testimony therefore has no bearing on whether the Maryland Court of Appeals’ decision reflected an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland.
In its assessment of the Maryland Court of Appeals’ opinion, the dissent apparently does not dispute that if counsel’s investigation in this case had consisted exclusively of the PSI and the DSS records, the court’s decision would have constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland. See post, at 543-544. Of necessity, then, the dissent’s primary contention is that the Maryland Court of Appeals did decide that Wiggins’ counsel looked beyond the PSI and the DSS records and that we must therefore defer to that finding under § 2254(e)(1). See post, at 544-551. Had the court found that counsel’s investigation extended beyond the PSI and the DSS records, the dissent, of course, would be correct that § 2254(e) would require that we defer to that finding. But the state court made no such finding.
The dissent bases its conclusion on the Maryland Court of Appeals’ statements that “ ‘[c]ounsel were aware that appellant had a most unfortunate childhood,’” and that “‘counsel did investigate and were aware of appellant’s background.’ ” See post, at 540, 545 (quoting Wiggins v. State, supra, at 608, 610, 724 A. 2d, at 15, 16). But the state court’s description of how counsel learned of petitioner’s childhood speaks for itself. The court explained: “Counsel were aware that appellant had a most unfortunate childhood. Mr. Schlaich had available to him not only the pre-sentence investigation report... but also more detailed social service records.” See 352 Md., at 608-609, 724 A. 2d, at 15. This construction reflects the state court’s understanding that the investigation consisted of the two sources the court mentions. Indeed, when describing counsel’s investigation into petitioner’s background, the court never so much as implies that counsel uncovered any source other than the PSI and the DSS records. The court’s conclusion that counsel were aware of “incidences of... sexual abuse” does not suggest otherwise, cf. supra, at 518, because the court assumed that counsel learned of such incidents from the social services records. Wiggins v. State, 352 Md., at 608-609, 724 A. 2d, at 15.
The court’s subsequent statement that, “as noted, counsel did investigate and were aware of appellant’s background,” underscores our conclusion that the Maryland Court of Appeals assumed counsel’s investigation into Wiggins’ childhood consisted of the PSI and the DSS records. The court’s use of the phrase “as noted,” which the dissent ignores, further confirms that counsel’s investigation consisted of the sources previously described, i. e., the PSI and the DSS records. It is the dissent, therefore, that “rests upon a fundamental fallacy,” post, at 544 — that the Maryland Court of Appeals determined that Schlaich’s investigation extended beyond the PSI and the DSS records.
We therefore must determine, de novo, whether counsel reached beyond the PSI and the DSS records in their investigation of petitioner’s background. The record as a whole does not support the conclusion that counsel conducted a more thorough investigation than the one we have described. The dissent, like the State and the United States, relies primarily on Schlaich’s postconviction testimony to establish that counsel investigated more extensively. But the questions put to Schlaich during his postconviction testimony all referred to what he knew from the social services records; the line of questioning, after all, first directed him to his discovery of those documents. His subsequent reference to “other people’s reports,” made in direct response to a question concerning petitioner’s mental retardation, appears to be an acknowledgment of the psychologist’s reports we know counsel commissioned — reports that also revealed nothing of the sexual abuse Wiggins experienced. App. 349. As the state trial judge who heard this testimony
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Burton
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The ultimate issue here is whether Maryland has violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by authorizing its courts, in prosecutions in Anne Arundel County for certain gambling misdemeanors, to admit evidence procured by illegal search or seizure. The violation is charged because Maryland, at the same time, prohibits the admission of such evidence in like prosecutions in other counties, and, even in Anne Arundel County, prohibits its admission in prosecutions for many other misdemeanors. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that Maryland’s action is valid.
In 1952, police officers of Anne Arundel County arrested the appellant, Salsburg, and two other men, in a two-room building in the rear of a garage on the Governor Ritchie Highway in that County. The officers had no warrant but, when they received no answer to their knock on the locked door of the rear room, they broke it open with an ax. Upon entering, they found appellant and two companions, apparently engaged in' operating a betting pool on horse races, and arrested them. The officers seized three telephones, two adding, machines, several racing forms and much paraphernalia commonly used in operating such a betting pool. The State concedes that the entry, search and seizure were illegal.
Salsburg and his companions were brought to trial in the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County charged with making or selling a book or pool on the result of a running race of horses in violation of Flack’s Md. Ann. Code, 1951, Art. 27, § 306. Before trial each of the accused moved to quash the warrant, suppress and return the seized evidence, and dismiss the proceeding against him, all on the ground that the proceeding depended upon illegally seized evidence. Each claimed that the admission of such evidence was prohibited by a Maryland statute, known as the Bouse Act, and that a 1951 amendment to that Act which purported to allow the admission of such evidence, in such a prosecution in Anne Arundel County, was invalid because in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court admitted the evidence. Each of the accused was convicted and sentenced to serve six months in the Maryland House of Correction as well as to pay $1,000 plus costs. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the convictions of Salsburg’s companions on the ground that neither of them could complain of the illegality of the search or seizure because they had no title to or interest in the premises searched. Rizzo v. Maryland, 201 Md. 206, 93 A. 2d 280. As to Salsburg, the tenant of the premises, the Court of Appeals heard further argument on the constitutionality of the 1951 amendment and then affirmed the trial court. 201 Md. 212, 94 A. 2d 280. His case is here on appeal. 28 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 1257 (2).
The history of the Bouse Act is enlightening. Originally Maryland courts followed the common-law practice of admitting evidence in criminal prosecutions without regard to the legality of its obtention. Lawrence v. Maryland, 103 Md. 17, 32-37, 63 A. 96, 102-104. In 1914, the decision in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, announced a contrary rule of practice in the federal courts. It held that evidence illegally seized by federal officers is not admissible in federal prosecutions. In 1928, the Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to adopt that practice and reaffirmed the Maryland common-law practice. Meisinger v. Maryland, 155 Md. 195, 141 A. 536. In 1929, the General Assembly of Maryland passed the Bouse Act substantially adopting the federal practice for prosecutions of misdemeanors in the state courts. This left the common-law practice in. effect in felony cases. Marshall v. Maryland, 182 Md. 379, 384, 35 A. 2d 115, 118; Delnegro v. Maryland, 198 Md. 80, 86, 81 A. 2d 241, 244.
In 1935, prosecutions under the “Health-Narcotic Drugs” subtitle of the general title “Crimes and Punishments” were exempted from the Bouse Act. In 1947, a proviso was added exempting, in Baltimore County, prosecutions for unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon. Md. Laws 1947, c. 752. In 1951, that proviso was extended to Baltimore City and 13 counties, including Anne Arundel. Md. Laws 1951, c. 145. In the same year the amendment now before us exempted prosecutions in Anne Arundel County “for a violation of the gambling laws as contained in Sections 288 to 307, inclusive, of Article 27 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1939 Edition) [now §§ 303-329 of the 1951 edition], sub-title ‘Gaming,’ or in any laws amending or supplementing said sub-title.” Id., c. 704. Also in 1951 this exemption was extended to Wicomico and Prince George’s Counties. Id., c. 710.
Appellant concedes that the State has the legislative “power” to choose either the rule which excludes or that which admits illegally seized evidence. He does not attack the validity of the application of one to felonies and of the other to misdemeanors. He contends, however, that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when Maryland admits the illegally seized evidence in prosecutions for certain misdemeanors in certain counties, but excludes it in prosecutions for the same type of misdemeanors in other counties and for somewhat comparable misdemeanors in the same and other counties. He sees no rational basis for the classifications made in the 1951 amendment.
Whatever may be our view as to the desirability of the classifications, we conclude that the 1951 amendment is within the liberal legislative license allowed a state in prescribing rules of practice. A state has especially wide discretion in prescribing practice relating to its police power, as is the case here.
The 1951 amendment establishes no additional or different offenses in Anne Arundel County. It deals only with the admissibility of evidence in the prosecution of certain misdemeanors otherwise established by law. Rules of evidence, being procedural in their nature, are peculiarly discretionary with the law-making authority, one of whose primary responsibilities is to prescribe procedures for enforcing its laws. Several states have followed diametrically opposite policies as to the admission of illegally seized evidence. See Appendix, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 33-39. See also, Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 594-596. Maryland seeks to derive some benefit from each of the policies.
Appellant complains further that prosecutions for lottery misdemeanors are subject to the rule of exclusion of the Bouse Act, while those for operating gambling pools are exempt. He complains also that prosecutions for violations of county gambling restrictions are subject to the Act, while violations of comparable state gambling restrictions are not. In our opinion such differences are not fatal to the legislative scheme. We do not sit as a superlegislature or a censor. “To be able to find fault with a law is not to demonstrate its invalidity. It may seem unjust and oppressive, yet be free from judicial interference. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations — illogical, it may be, and unscientific.” Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 69-70. See also, Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U. S. 265, 268. Cf. Johnson v. Maryland, 193 Md. 136, 66 A. 2d 504.
We find little substance to appellant’s claim that distinctions based on county areas are necessarily so unreasonable as to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause relates to equality between persons as such rather than between areas. This was established long ago in a decision which upheld a statute of Missouri requiring that, in the City of St. Louis and four counties, appeals be made to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, whereas appeals made elsewhere in that State must be directed to the Supreme Court of Missouri. Speaking for the Court, Justice Bradley said:
“[T]here is nothing in the Constitution to prevent any State from adopting any system of laws or judicature it sees fit for all or any part of its territory. If the State of New York, for example, should see fit to adopt the civil law and its method of procedure for New York City and the surrounding counties, and the common law and its method of procedure for the rest of the State, there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent its doing so. This would not, of itself, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, be a denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. ... It means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and under like circumstances.” Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 31.
There seems to be no doubt that Maryland could validly grant home rule to each of its 23 counties and to the City of Baltimore to determine this rule of evidence by local option. It is equally clear, although less usual, that a state legislature may itself determine such an issue for each of its local subdivisions, having in mind the needs and desires of each. Territorial uniformity is not a constitutional requisite. Ocampo v. United States, 234 U. S. 91, 98-99.
Maryland has followed a policy of thus legislating, through its General Assembly, upon many matters of local concern, including the prescription of different substantive offenses in different counties. The cumbersomeness of such centrally enacted legislation as compared with the variations which may result from home rule is a matter for legislative discretion, not judicial supervision, except where there is a clear conflict with constitutional limitations. We find no such conflict here.
The presumption of reasonableness is with the State. While the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the legislation was not on him, the Attorney General of Maryland has suggested here several considerations bearing appropriately upon the action of the General Assembly. Maryland lies largely between the metropolitan centers of Baltimore, in Maryland, and of Washington, in the District of Columbia. Between them are Anne Arundel County, adjoining Baltimore, and Prince George’s County, adjoining Washington. In Anne Arundel lies Annapolis, the capital of the State, and considerable rural territory. Those locations suggest that, in matters related to concentrations of population, the state government might well find reason to prescribe, at least on an experimental basis, substantive restrictions and variations in procedure that would differ from those elsewhere in the State. Criminal law provides a long-established field for such legislative discretion. In this connection, the Attorney General referred specifically to an increase in gambling activity in Anne Arundel County which he attributed in part to a policy adopted by the Criminal Court of Baltimore in imposing maximum prison sentences for gambling offenses, thus tending to drive gambling operations into adjoining areas. He suggested, as a justification for a legislative distinction between prosecutions for violations of state lottery laws and of the gambling laws here specified, that the former were of a more readily detected and easily proved character than the latter.
We find no merit in the suggestion of appellant that the 1951 amendment to the Bouse Act affirmatively sanctions illegal searches arid seizures in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If the statute were so interpreted such a question might arise. However, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has not so interpreted it and nothing in its text suggests approval of illegal searches and seizures. The Act offers to offending searchers and seizers no protection or immunity from anything — be it civil liability, criminal liability or disciplinary action.
We sustain the validity of the 1951 amendment to the Bouse Act and the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, accordingly, is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Reed took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
In the warrant which started this proceeding before a Justice of the Peace, the section was identified as Art. 27, §291, Flack’s Md. Ann. Code, 1939.
At the time of the trial, the Bouse Act, including amendments, appeared as follows in Art. 35, § 5, Flack’s Md. Ann. Code, 1951:
“No evidence in the trial of misdemeanors shall be deemed admissible where the same shall have been procured by, through, or in consequence of any illegal search or seizure or of any search and seizure prohibited by the Declaration of Rights of this State; nor shall any evidence in such cases be admissible if procured by, through or in consequence of a search and seizure, the effect of the admission of which would be to compel one to give evidence against himself in a criminal case; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall prohibit the use of such evidence in Baltimore County, Baltimore City, Anne Arundel, Caroline, Carroll, Cecil, Frederick, Harford, Kent, Prince George’s, Queen Anne’s, Talbot, Washington, Wicomico and Worcester Counties, in the prosecution of any person for unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon. Provided, further, that nothing in this section shall prohibit the use of such evidence in Anne Arundel, Wicomico and Prince George’s Counties in the prosecution of any person for a violation of the gambling laws as contained in Sections 308-329, inclusive, of Article 27, sub-title ‘Gaming,’ or in any laws amending or supplementing said sub-title.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The original Bouse Act, Md. Laws 1929, c. 194, consisted of only that part of the first sentence which precedes the first proviso in Art. 35, § 5, Flack’s Md. Ann. Code, 1951. See note 2, supra.
Md. Laws 1935, c. 59, now Art. 27, § 368, of Flack’s Md. Ann. Code, 1951.
This trend has continued. In 1952, the exemption as to prosecutions for unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon was made statewide. Md. Laws 1952, c. 59. In 1953, the exemption as to prosecutions under the above-specified gambling laws has been extended to Worcester, Howard and Cecil Counties. Md. Laws 1953, cc. 84, 419. Finally, prosecutions in Wicomico County, under certain alcoholic beverage laws, have been exempted. Id., c. 581.
“The Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. Great diversities in these respects may exist in two States separated only by an imaginary line. On one side of this line there may be a right of trial by jury, and on the other side no such right. Each State prescribes its own modes of judicial proceeding. If diversities of laws and judicial proceedings may exist in the several States without violating the equality clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no solid reason why there may not be such diversities in different parts of the same State.” Id., at 31. See also, Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589, 597-599; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 72.
E. g., as to local option in relation to intoxicating liquor, see Lloyd v. Dottison, 194 U. S. 445; Rippey v. Texas, 193 U. S. 504; and see Ft. Smith Light Co. v. Board of Improvement, 274 U. S. 387, 391.
Without appraising their validity, but as illustrating Maryland practice, we find Flack’s Md. Ann. Code, 1951, full of such examples. Art. 2B — differing requirements as to sales of alcoholic beverages in various counties and cities; Art. 27, § 136 — one county is exempted from a general prohibition against interference with water supply; § 146 — deals with the effect of disorderly conduct in three counties; § 545 — exempts two counties from certain provisions against placing tacks, broken glass, etc., on highways; § 566 — makes special provisions as to junk yards in five counties; §§ 578-610B — prescribe a variety of Sabbath-breaking provisions for several counties and municipalities; Art. 51, § 7 — grants a right of jury service to women, except in ten counties; § 9 — provides varying methods of selecting jury panels in several counties. “It has long been the practice of the Maryland Legislature either to enact local laws or to exempt particular counties from the operation of general laws.” Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 187 Md. 67, 80, 48 A. 2d 593, 600; Stevens v. Maryland, 89 Md. 669, 674, 43 A. 929, 931. Cf. Maryland Coal & Realty Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 193 Md. 627, 69 A. 2d 471.
"... It is ... a maxim of constitutional law that a legislature is presumed to have acted within constitutional limits, upon full knowledge of the facts, and with the purpose of promoting the interests of the people as a whole, and courts will not lightly hold that an act duly passed by the legislature was one in the enactment of which it has transcended its power.” Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 104. “A statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.” Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580, 584. See also, Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U. S. 152, 157-158; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-79.
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, supra. The State is not bound “to strike at all evils at the same time or in the same way.” Sender v. Oregon Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608, 610.
“. . .we have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 28.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The National Labor Relations Board found that Bowman Transportation, Inc., committed unfair labor practices by assisting District 50, United Mine Workers, as a means of defeating the efforts of a Teamsters Local to organize its workers. The cease-and-desist order which issued was in the standard form directing the company to withdraw and withhold recognition from District 50 unless and until it received the Board’s certification as the exclusive representative of the employees. 112 N. L. R. B. 387. But the United Mine Workers is not in compliance with § 9 (f), (g), and (h), added by the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 143, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (f), (g), (h). It is therefore not eligible for a Board certification and in consequence the Bowman employees may never have an opportunity to select District 50 as their representative. The Board denied the United Mine Workers’ application to delete the requirement for a Board certification. 113 N. L. R. B. 786. The question arises whether the requirement for a Board certification in these circumstances exceeds the Board’s discretionary power under § 10 (c), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (c), to fashion remedies to dissipate the effects of an employer’s unfair labor practices in assisting a union.
The union petitioned the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia under § 10 (f), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (f), which authorizes a Court of Appeals to “enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as só modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board . . . .” The Court of Appeals, 99 U. S. App. D. C. 104, 237 F. 2d 585, did not delete the provisions for Board certification but modified the order so that the company would be free to recognize District 50 not only when certified by the Board but, alternatively, when District 50 “shall have been freely chosen as such [representative] by a majority of the employees after all effects of unfair labor practices have been eliminated.” 99 U. S. App. D. C., at 107, 237 F. 2d, at 588.
The Board’s order also required the company to post for at least 60 days a notice prepared by the Board. In the notice the^company would state to its employees that it would not discourage membership in, or interrogate the employees concerning their activities on behalf of, “. . . Teamsters . . . Local No. 612, or any other labor organization . . . ,” and, further, that the company would “. . . withhold all recognition from District 50 . . . unless and until said organization shall have been certified as such representative by the . . . Board.” 112 N. L. R. B. 387, 391. The parties raised no objection to the notice either before the Board or in the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals on its own motion struck from the notice the references to the Teamsters Local, stating its view that “references to that union in the Board’s form of notice are susceptible of being construed as” indicating that the Board “prefers Teamsters.” 99 U. S. App. D. C., at 108, 237 F. 2d, at 589. The court also added, to the paragraph in the notice stating that the company would withhold recognition from District 50 until the union received a Board certification, the alternative “or [until District 50] shall have been selected as such [representative] by a majority of our employees at a time at least 60 days later than the date of this notice.” 99 U. S. App. D. C., at 109, 237 F. 2d, at 590.
Because important questions of the administration of the Act were raised, we granted certiorari on the Board’s petition. 352 U. S. 999.
The Board’s order was fashioned under § 10 (c), 29 U. S. C. § 160 (c), which vests remedial power in the Board to redress unfair labor practices by “an order requiring such person [committing the unfair labor practice] to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies of this Act . . . .” The Board’s discretionary authority to fashion remedies to purge unfair labor practices necessarily has a broad reach. Labor Board v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584, 600. But the power is not limitless; it is contained by the requirement that the remedy shall be “appropriate,” Labor Board v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., 310 U. S. 318, and shall “be adapted to the situation which calls for redress,” Labor Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, 348. The Board may not apply “a remedy it has worked out on the basis of its experience, without regard to circumstances which may make its application to a particular situation oppressive and therefore not calculated to effectuate a policy of the Act.” Labor Board v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U. S. 344, 349. The Board’s provision for a Board certification must therefore be examined in the light of its appropriateness in the circumstances of this case.
In formulating remedies for unfair labor practices involving interference by employers with their employees’ freedom of choice of a representative, the Board has always distinguished the remedy appropriate in the case of a union dominated by an employer from the remedy appropriate in the case of a union assisted but undomi-nated by an employer. In the case of a dominated union the Board usually orders the complete disestablishment of the union so that it can never be certified by the Board: This Court has sustained such orders. Labor Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261; Labor Board v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U. S. 241. On the other hand, in the case of the assisted but undominated union, the Board has consistently directed the employer to withhold recognition from the assisted union until the union receives a Board certification. The basis for the distinction is that, in the Board’s judgment, the free choice by employees of an agent capable of acting as their true representative, in the case of a dominated union, is improbable under any circumstances, while the free choice of an assisted but undominated union, capable of acting as their true representative, is a reasonable possibility after the effects of the employer’s unfair labor practices have been dissipated. See Labor Board v. Wemyss, 212 F. 2d 465, 471, 472.
The reason for the Board’s certification requirement is to invoke the normal electoral processes by which a free choice of representatives is assured. The Board’s opinion in this case states that
“. . . the Board has, since its earliest days, recognized that the policies of the Act could best be effectuated in cases involving violations of Section 8 (a) (2) by directing the offending employers to withhold the preferred treatment afforded to the labor organizations involved until the effect of the unfair labor practices had been dissipated and the majority status of such unions had been established in an atmosphere free of restraint and coercion.” 113 N. L. R. B. 786, 787.
Again,
“. . . in the case of an assisted but undominated labor organization, the Board has required the offending employer to withdraw and withhold recognition from the assisted union until it was certified, thus enabling the Board to assure the affected employees that their statutory right to freely choose a bargaining representative shall be preserved by conducting an election under conditions which will render such a choice possible.” 113 N. L. R. B. 786, 788.
It is thus clear that the most significant element of the remedy is not the formality of certification but an election, after a lapse of time and under proper safeguards, by which employees in “the privacy and independence of the voting booth,” Brooks v. Labor Board, 348 U. S. 96, 99-100, may freely register their choice whether or not they desire to be represented by the assisted union.
In this case of a noncomplying union, however, requiring the formality of Board certification in addition to an election has the same effect as disestablishment. This is because District 50 can never be certified by the Board so long as the United Mine Workers remain out of compliance with § 9 (f), (g), and (h). But disestablishment has been applied by the Board and upheld by the courts only in the case of a dominated union, where a free choice of a truly representative union is improbable under any circumstances, and therefore where an abridgment óf the statutory right of employees does not result. District 50 was found by the Board to be an assisted but not a dominated union, so that a free choice of District 50 by Bowman’s employees is a reasonable possibility. Therefore the certification requirement here misapplies the Board’s own policy by actually defeating the statutory rights of Bowman’s employees.
The Board reasoned that since this Court has sustained its power under § 10 (c)' “to dissipate the effect of an unfair labor practice by completely removing a dominated union . . . , the Board manifestly has the statutory power to impose the lesser sanction of certification in the case of an assisted union . . . .” 113 N. L. R. B. 786, 788. Even if we grant the premise that the Board may remove a dominated union, it does not follow that the Board may remove this merely assisted union. Certification under the circumstances of this case is not the “lesser sanction” but is substantially the same as removal. Unlike an assisted union, a dominated union is deemed inherently incapable of ever fairly representing its members. Labor Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra, at 270, 271; Labor Board v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., supra, at 250.
We do not think, however, that the Board lacks authority to effect a remedy in this case which would properly reconcile the objectives of eliminating improper employer interference and preserving the employees’ full choice of a bargaining representative. The prohibitions of § 9 (f) and (h) against investigation of representatives, the requirement of § 9 (c) of Board-conducted elections connected with such investigations, and the prohibition of § 9 (g) against certification of a non complying union, are concerned not with remedial orders under § 10 (c) but with questions of representation and unfair labor practices “raised by a labor organization.” The single objective of § 9 (f), (g), and (h) was “to stop the use of the Labor Board” by noncomplying unions. Labor Board v. Dant, 344 U. S. 375, 385. These subsections contain nothing compelling the Board to insist upon a Board certification and thus to deny the employees the right at an election held under proper safeguards to select the noncomplying assisted union for their representative. Nothing in the subsections, for example, is a barrier to the conduct by the Board of an election not followed by a certification, or to the making of an arrangement with another appropriate agency, state or federal, for the conduct of the election under conditions prescribed by the Board. Clearly an election under such circumstances will also achieve the Board’s prime objective in these cases, viz., to “demonstrate that . . . [the assisted union’s] right to be the exclusive representative of the employees involved has been established in an atmosphere free of restraint and coercion.” 113 N. L. R. B. 786, 788. Indeed, in its brief, the Board impliedly admits the irrelevance of the formality of certification to the effectiveness of the fashioned remedy, stating that “. . . if that view [of certification] is rejected, the Board may perhaps devise other measures which will enable it to make certain that the employees’ choice of bargaining representative is in fact made in an atmosphere free of restraint and coercion . . . .” In a footnote the Board suggests such an alternative: “. . . [T]he Board might conduct an election among the employees and certify the union if it wins the election provided it is in compliance but otherwise certify only the arithmetical results. . . .”
The Board’s opinion also states that to dispense with a certification in the case of a noncomplying assisted union, while requiring a certification in the case of a complying union, “would negative the policy and intent of Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Act.” 113 N. L. R. B. 786, 790. But this misinterprets the scope of those provisions. “Subsections (f), (g) and (h) of § 9 merely describe advantages that may be gained by compliance with their conditions. The very specificity of the advantages to be gained and the express provision for the loss of these advantages imply that no consequences other than those so listed shall result from noncompliance.” United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U. S. 62, 73. Congress did not in § 9 (f), (g), and (h) make the filing required by those subsections compulsory or a condition precedent to the right of a noncomplying union to be recognized as the exclusive representative of the employees. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., supra. Similarly, the Board cannot, through the requirement of a Board certification, make noncompliance a reason for denying the employees the right to choose the assisted union at an election which can readily serve its designed purpose without such certification. Finally, we do not believe that the issuance of an order in the case of a noncomplying assisted union different from the form of order consistently used in cases of complying assisted unions extends “preferred treatment” to the noncomplying union. What it does in fact is to give the noncomplying union substantially the same treatment as a complying union instead of subjecting it to disabilities not intended by Congress as a result of noncompliance. The Board’s order is therefore not appropriate or adapted to the situation calling for redress and constitutes an abuse of the Board’s discretionary power.
However, the modifications of the cease-and-desist order made by the Court of Appeals go beyond permissible limits of judicial review under § 10 (f) and cannot be sustained. The Court’s alternative to Board certification dispenses with the necessity of an election and can be interpreted, as the Board argues, to leave to the offending employer and the assisted union the decision when the effect of the unfair labor practice has been eliminated and the employees have regained their freedom of action. Nothing said in the Arkansas Flooring case, upon which the Court of Appeals relied, justifies the Court of Appeals in going so far as to dispense with an election under proper safeguards. This Court has long recognized the propriety of an agency’s chqice of an election as the proper means to assure dissipation of the unwholesome effects of the employer’s unlawful assistance to a union. See Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548. The Board’s discretion here was exceeded only in the inflexibility of the requirement for a Board certification notwithstanding its inappropriateness in the circumstances of this case.
The rewriting of the notice to be posted was improper insofar as it deleted reference to the Teamsters Union, because no objection to the notice in this respect was ever raised by the parties before the Board. Labor Board v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U. S. 344, 350; Labor Board v. Cheney California Lumber Co., 327 U. S. 385, 388-389; cf. Federal Power Comm’n v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348 U. S. 492, 497. Section 10 (e) of the Act provides: “No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the . . . [Court of Appeals], unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances.” No extraordinary circumstances were shown here.
The orderly administration of the Act and due regard for the respective functions of the Board and reviewing courts require that we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals with instructions to remand the case to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
The Teamsters Local was International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL, Local No. 612. The Board concurred in the Trial Examiner’s findings that when the Teamsters Local was picketing the premises the company rendered illegal support and assistance to District 50 by negotiating the details of a contract with officials of that union before a single employee had actually authorized it as a representative, by showing the draft contract to the drivers at a meeting convened by and presided over by the company president, who assured them that if necessary he would advance the money for dues, after which, and within less than three hours, the drivers signed District 50 authorization cards, established a local which held its first meeting, at the president’s suggestion, on company premises, and concluded a contract with the company.
This remedy was apparently first adopted in Lenox Shoe Co., 4 N. L. R. B. 372, 388, decided December 3, 1937.
Subsection (f) provides that no investigation shall be made by the Board concerning the representation of employees raised by a labor organization, and no complaint of unfair labor practices shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization, unless the organization and any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent shall have filed with the Secretary of Labor copies of the union’s constitution and by-laws and a report showing, among other things, the names of officers and agents whose aggregate compensation and allowance for the preceding year exceeded $5,000, the amounts paid to each, the manner in which such officers and agents were selected, the amount of initiation fees and dues charged to union members, the union’s procedures followed with respect to qualification for membership, election as officers and stewards, etc. The subsection also requires the filing with the Secretary of a report showing union receipts, disbursements, and assets and liabilities. Subsection (g) requires, among other things, the filing annually with the Secretary of reports bringing up to date the information required to be supplied under subsection (f). Subsection (h) provides that no investigation of a question of representation raised by a labor organization shall be made and no complaint of unfair labor practices pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization shall issue unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed within the preceding year by each officer of the organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member or supporter of, any organization that believes in or teaches the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by illegal or unconstitutional methods.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
G
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 85 S.Ct. 176, 13 L.Ed.2d 99 (1964), this Court held that a patent holder cannot charge royalties for the use of his invention after its patent term has expired. The sole question presented here is whether we should overrule Brulotte. Adhering to principles of stare decisis, we decline to do so. Critics of the Brulotte rule must seek relief not from this Court but from Congress.
I
In 1990, petitioner Stephen Kimble obtained a patent on a toy that allows children (and young-at-heart adults) to role-play as "a spider person" by shooting webs-really, pressurized foam string-"from the palm of [the] hand." U.S. Patent No. 5,072,856, Abstract (filed May 25, 1990). Respondent Marvel Entertainment, LLC (Marvel) makes and markets products featuring Spider-Man, among other comic-book characters. Seeking to sell or license his patent, Kimble met with the president of Marvel's corporate predecessor to discuss his idea for web-slinging fun. Soon afterward, but without remunerating Kimble, that company began marketing the " Web Blaster"-a toy that, like Kimble's patented invention, enables would-be action heroes to mimic Spider-Man through the use of a polyester glove and a canister of foam.
Kimble sued Marvel in 1997 alleging, among other things, patent infringement. The parties ultimately settled that litigation. Their agreement provided that Marvel would purchase Kimble's patent in exchange for a lump sum (of about a half-million dollars) and a 3% royalty on Marvel's future sales of the Web Blaster and similar products. The parties set no end date for royalties, apparently contemplating that they would continue for as long as kids want to imitate Spider-Man (by doing whatever a spider can).
And then Marvel stumbled across Brulotte, the case at the heart of this dispute. In negotiating the settlement, neither side was aware of Brulotte. But Marvel must have been pleased to learn of it. Brulotte had read the patent laws to prevent a patentee from receiving royalties for sales made after his patent's expiration. See 379 U.S., at 32, 85 S.Ct. 176. So the decision's effect was to sunset the settlement's royalty clause. On making that discovery, Marvel sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court confirming that the company could cease paying royalties come 2010-the end of Kimble's patent term. The court approved that relief, holding that Brulotte made "the royalty provision... unenforceable after the expiration of the Kimble patent." 692 F.Supp.2d 1156, 1161 (D.Ariz.2010). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, though making clear that it was none too happy about doing so. "[T]he Brulotte rule," the court complained, "is counterintuitive and its rationale is arguably unconvincing." 727 F.3d 856, 857 (2013).
We granted certiorari, 574 U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 781, 190 L.Ed.2d 649 (2014), to decide whether, as some courts and commentators have suggested, we should overrule Brulotte. For reasons of stare decisis, we demur.
II
Patents endow their holders with certain superpowers, but only for a limited time. In crafting the patent laws, Congress struck a balance between fostering innovation and ensuring public access to discoveries. While a patent lasts, the patentee possesses exclusive rights to the patented article-rights he may sell or license for royalty payments if he so chooses. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1). But a patent typically expires 20 years from the day the application for it was filed. See § 154(a)(2). And when the patent expires, the patentee's prerogatives expire too, and the right to make or use the article, free from all restriction, passes to the public. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230, 84 S.Ct. 784, 11 L.Ed.2d 661 (1964).
This Court has carefully guarded that cut-off date, just as it has the patent laws' subject-matter limits: In case after case, the Court has construed those laws to preclude measures that restrict free access to formerly patented, as well as unpatentable, inventions. In one line of cases, we have struck down state statutes with that consequence. See, e.g., id., at 230-233, 84 S.Ct. 784 ; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152, 167-168, 109 S.Ct. 971, 103 L.Ed.2d 118 (1989) ; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-238, 84 S.Ct. 779, 11 L.Ed.2d 669 (1964). By virtue of federal law, we reasoned, "an article on which the patent has expired," like an unpatentable article, "is in the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so." Sears, 376 U.S., at 231, 84 S.Ct. 784. In a related line of decisions, we have deemed unenforceable private contract provisions limiting free use of such inventions. In Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 66 S.Ct. 101, 90 L.Ed. 47 (1945), for example, we determined that a manufacturer could not agree to refrain from challenging a patent's validity. Allowing even a single company to restrict its use of an expired or invalid patent, we explained, "would deprive... the consuming public of the advantage to be derived" from free exploitation of the discovery. Id., at 256, 66 S.Ct. 101. And to permit such a result, whether or not authorized "by express contract," would impermissibly undermine the patent laws. Id., at 255-256, 66 S.Ct. 101 ; see also, e.g., Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 400-401, 67 S.Ct. 416, 91 L.Ed. 374 (1947) (ruling that Scott Paper applies to licensees); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668-675, 89 S.Ct. 1902, 23 L.Ed.2d 610 (1969) (refusing to enforce a contract requiring a licensee to pay royalties while contesting a patent's validity).
Brulotte was brewed in the same barrel. There, an inventor licensed his patented hop-picking machine to farmers in exchange for royalties from hop crops harvested both before and after his patents' expiration dates. The Court (by an 8-1 vote) held the agreement unenforceable-"unlawful per se "-to the extent it provided for the payment of royalties "accru[ing] after the last of the patents incorporated into the machines had expired." 379 U.S., at 30, 32, 85 S.Ct. 176. To arrive at that conclusion, the Court began with the statutory provision setting the length of a patent term. See id., at 30, 85 S.Ct. 176 (quoting the then-current version of § 154 ). Emphasizing that a patented invention "become[s] public property once [that term] expires," the Court then quoted from Scott Paper : Any attempt to limit a licensee's post-expiration use of the invention, "whatever the legal device employed, runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws." 379 U.S., at 31, 85 S.Ct. 176 (quoting 326 U.S., at 256 ). In the Brulotte Court's view, contracts to pay royalties for such use continue "the patent monopoly beyond the [patent] period," even though only as to the licensee affected. 379 U.S., at 33, 85 S.Ct. 176. And in so doing, those agreements conflict with patent law's policy of establishing a "post-expiration... public domain" in which every person can make free use of a formerly patented product. Ibid.
The Brulotte rule, like others making contract provisions unenforceable, prevents some parties from entering into deals they desire. As compared to lump-sum fees, royalty plans both draw out payments over time and tie those payments, in each month or year covered, to a product's commercial success. And sometimes, for some parties, the longer the arrangement lasts, the better-not just up to but beyond a patent term's end. A more extended payment period, coupled (as it presumably would be) with a lower rate, may bring the price the patent holder seeks within the range of a cash-strapped licensee. (Anyone who has bought a product on installment can relate.) See Brief for Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center et al. as Amici Curiae 17. Or such an extended term may better allocate the risks and rewards associated with commercializing inventions-most notably, when years of development work stand between licensing a patent and bringing a product to market. See, e.g., 3 R. Milgrim & E. Bensen, Milgrim on Licensing § 18.05, p. 18-9 (2013). As to either goal, Brulotte may pose an obstacle.
Yet parties can often find ways around Brulotte, enabling them to achieve those same ends. To start, Brulotte allows a licensee to defer payments for pre-expiration use of a patent into the post-expiration period; all the decision bars are royalties for using an invention after it has moved into the public domain. See 379 U.S., at 31, 85 S.Ct. 176 ; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969). A licensee could agree, for example, to pay the licensor a sum equal to 10% of sales during the 20-year patent term, but to amortize that amount over 40 years. That arrangement would at least bring down early outlays, even if it would not do everything the parties might want to allocate risk over a long timeframe. And parties have still more options when a licensing agreement covers either multiple patents or additional non-patent rights. Under Brulotte, royalties may run until the latest-running patent covered in the parties' agreement expires. See 379 U.S., at 30, 85 S.Ct. 176. Too, post-expiration royalties are allowable so long as tied to a non-patent right-even when closely related to a patent. See, e.g., 3 Milgrim on Licensing § 18.07, at 18-16 to 18-17. That means, for example, that a license involving both a patent and a trade secret can set a 5% royalty during the patent period (as compensation for the two combined) and a 4% royalty afterward (as payment for the trade secret alone). Finally and most broadly, Brulotte poses no bar to business arrangements other than royalties-all kinds of joint ventures, for example-that enable parties to share the risks and rewards of commercializing an invention.
Contending that such alternatives are not enough, Kimble asks us to abandon Brulotte in favor of "flexible, case-by-case analysis" of post-expiration royalty clauses "under the rule of reason." Brief for Petitioners 45. Used in antitrust law, the rule of reason requires courts to evaluate a practice's effect on competition by "taking into account a variety of factors, including specific information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the [practice] was imposed, and the [practice's] history, nature, and effect." State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997). Of primary importance in this context, Kimble posits, is whether a patent holder has power in the relevant market and so might be able to curtail competition. See Brief for Petitioners 47-48; Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44, 126 S.Ct. 1281, 164 L.Ed.2d 26 (2006) ("[A] patent does not necessarily confer market power"). Resolving that issue, Kimble notes, entails "a full-fledged economic inquiry into the definition of the market, barriers to entry, and the like." Brief for Petitioners 48 (quoting 1 H. Hovenkamp, M. Janis, M. Lemley, & C. Leslie, IP and Antitrust § 3.2e, p. 3-12.1 (2d ed., Supp. 2014) (Hovenkamp)).
III
Overruling precedent is never a small matter. Stare decisis -in English, the idea that today's Court should stand by yesterday's decisions-is "a foundation stone of the rule of law." Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2036, 188 L.Ed.2d 1071 (2014). Application of that doctrine, although "not an inexorable command," is the "preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-828, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). It also reduces incentives for challenging settled precedents, saving parties and courts the expense of endless relitigation.
Respecting stare decisis means sticking to some wrong decisions. The doctrine rests on the idea, as Justice Brandeis famously wrote, that it is usually "more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406, 52 S.Ct. 443, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (dissenting opinion). Indeed, stare decisis has consequence only to the extent it sustains incorrect decisions; correct judgments have no need for that principle to prop them up. Accordingly, an argument that we got something wrong-even a good argument to that effect-cannot by itself justify scrapping settled precedent. Or otherwise said, it is not alone sufficient that we would decide a case differently now than we did then. To reverse course, we require as well what we have termed a "special justification"-over and above the belief "that the precedent was wrongly decided." Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. ----, ----, 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2407, 189 L.Ed.2d 339 (2014).
What is more, stare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision, like Brulotte, interprets a statute. Then, unlike in a constitutional case, critics of our ruling can take their objections across the street, and Congress can correct any mistake it sees. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-173, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989). That is true, contrary to the dissent's view, see post, at 2417 - 2418 (opinion of ALITO, J.), regardless whether our decision focused only on statutory text or also relied, as Brulotte did, on the policies and purposes animating the law. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601-602, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010). Indeed, we apply statutory stare decisis even when a decision has announced a "judicially created doctrine" designed to implement a federal statute. Halliburton, 573 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2411. All our interpretive decisions, in whatever way reasoned, effectively become part of the statutory scheme, subject (just like the rest) to congressional change. Absent special justification, they are balls tossed into Congress's court, for acceptance or not as that branch elects.
And Congress has spurned multiple opportunities to reverse Brulotte -openings as frequent and clear as this Court ever sees. Brulotte has governed licensing agreements for more than half a century. See Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74, 82-83, 128 S.Ct. 579, 169 L.Ed.2d 472 (2007) (stating that "long congressional acquiescence," there totaling just 14 years, "enhance[s] even the usual precedential force we accord to our interpretations of statutes" (internal quotation marks omitted)). During that time, Congress has repeatedly amended the patent laws, including the specific provision ( 35 U.S.C. § 154 ) on which Brulotte rested. See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 532(a), 108 Stat. 4983 (1994) (increasing the length of the patent term); Act of Nov. 19, 1988, § 201, 102 Stat. 4676 (limiting patent-misuse claims). Brulotte survived every such change. Indeed, Congress has rebuffed bills that would have replaced Brulotte's per se rule with the same antitrust-style analysis Kimble now urges. See, e.g., S. 1200, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Tit. II (1987) (providing that no patent owner would be guilty of "illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his or her licensing practices... unless such practices... violate the antitrust laws"); S. 438, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., § 201(3) (1988) (same). Congress's continual reworking of the patent laws-but never of the Brulotte rule-further supports leaving the decision in place.
Nor yet are we done, for the subject matter of Brulotte adds to the case for adhering to precedent. Brulotte lies at the intersection of two areas of law: property (patents) and contracts (licensing agreements). And we have often recognized that in just those contexts-"cases involving property and contract rights"-considerations favoring stare decisis are "at their acme." E.g., Payne, 501 U.S., at 828, 111 S.Ct. 2597 ; Khan, 522 U.S., at 20, 118 S.Ct. 275. That is because parties are especially likely to rely on such precedents when ordering their affairs. To be sure, Marvel and Kimble disagree about whether Brulotte has actually generated reliance. Marvel says yes: Some parties, it claims, do not specify an end date for royalties in their licensing agreements, instead relying on Brulotte as a default rule. Brief for Respondent 32-33; see 1 D. Epstein, Eckstrom's Licensing in Foreign and Domestic Operations § 3.13, p. 3-13, and n. 2 (2014) (noting that it is not "necessary to specify the term... of the license" when a decision like Brulotte limits it "by law"). Overturning Brulotte would thus upset expectations, most so when long-dormant licenses for long-expired patents spring back to life. Not true, says Kimble: Unfair surprise is unlikely, because no "meaningful number of [such] license agreements... actually exist." Reply Brief 18. To be honest, we do not know (nor, we suspect, do Marvel and Kimble). But even uncertainty on this score cuts in Marvel's direction. So long as we see a reasonable possibility that parties have structured their business transactions in light of Brulotte, we have one more reason to let it stand.
As against this superpowered form of stare decisis, we would need a superspecial justification to warrant reversing Brulotte. But the kinds of reasons we have most often held sufficient in the past do not help Kimble here. If anything, they reinforce our unwillingness to do what he asks.
First, Brulotte's statutory and doctrinal underpinnings have not eroded over time. When we reverse our statutory interpretations, we most often point to subsequent legal developments-"either the growth of judicial doctrine or further action taken by Congress"-that have removed the basis for a decision. Patterson, 491 U.S., at 173, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (calling this "the primary reason" for overruling statutory precedent). But the core feature of the patent laws on which Brulotte relied remains just the same: Section 154 now, as then, draws a sharp line cutting off patent rights after a set number of years. And this Court has continued to draw from that legislative choice a broad policy favoring unrestricted use of an invention after its patent's expiration. See supra, at 2406 - 2407. Scott Paper -the decision on which Brulotte primarily relied-remains good law. So too do this Court's other decisions refusing to enforce either state laws or private contracts constraining individuals' free use of formerly patented (or unpatentable) discoveries. See supra, at 2406 - 2407. Brulotte, then, is not the kind of doctrinal dinosaur or legal last-man-standing for which we sometimes depart from stare decisis. Compare, e.g., Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2164-2166, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013) (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring). To the contrary, the decision's close relation to a whole web of precedents means that reversing it could threaten others. If Brulotte is outdated, then (for example) is Scott Paper too? We would prefer not to unsettle stable law.
And second, nothing about Brulotte has proved unworkable. See, e.g., Patterson, 491 U.S., at 173, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (identifying unworkability as another "traditional justification" for overruling precedent). The decision is simplicity itself to apply. A court need only ask whether a licensing agreement provides royalties for post-expiration use of a patent. If not, no problem; if so, no dice. Brulotte's ease of use appears in still sharper relief when compared to Kimble's proposed alternative. Recall that he wants courts to employ antitrust law's rule of reason to identify and invalidate those post-expiration royalty clauses with anti-competitive consequences. See supra, at 2408 - 2409. But whatever its merits may be for deciding antitrust claims, that "elaborate inquiry" produces notoriously high litigation costs and unpredictable results. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 343, 102 S.Ct. 2466, 73 L.Ed.2d 48 (1982). For that reason, trading in Brulotte for the rule of reason would make the law less, not more, workable than it is now. Once again, then, the case for sticking with long-settled precedent grows stronger: Even the most usual reasons for abandoning stare decisis cut the other way here.
IV
Lacking recourse to those traditional justifications for overruling a prior decision, Kimble offers two different ones. He claims first that Brulotte rests on a mistaken view of the competitive effects of post-expiration royalties. He contends next that Brulotte suppresses technological innovation and so harms the nation's economy. (The dissent offers versions of those same arguments. See post, at 2415 - 2417.) We consider the two claims in turn, but our answers to both are much the same: Kimble's reasoning may give Congress cause to upset Brulotte, but does not warrant this Court's doing so.
A
According to Kimble, we should overrule Brulotte because it hinged on an error about economics: It assumed that post-patent royalty "arrangements are invariably anticompetitive." Brief for Petitioners 37. That is not true, Kimble notes; indeed, such agreements more often increase than inhibit competition, both before and after the patent expires. See id., at 36-40. As noted earlier, a longer payment period will typically go hand-in-hand with a lower royalty rate. See supra, at 2407. During the patent term, those reduced rates may lead to lower consumer prices, making the patented technology more competitive with alternatives; too, the lesser rates may enable more companies to afford a license, fostering competition among the patent's own users. See Brief for Petitioners 38. And after the patent's expiration, Kimble continues, further benefits follow: Absent high barriers to entry (a material caveat, as even he would agree, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 12-13, 23), the licensee's continuing obligation to pay royalties encourages new companies to begin making the product, figuring that they can quickly attract customers by undercutting the licensee on price. See Brief for Petitioners 38-39. In light of those realities, Kimble concludes, "the Brulotte per se rule makes little sense." Id., at 11.
We do not join issue with Kimble's economics-only with what follows from it. A broad scholarly consensus supports Kimble's view of the competitive effects of post-expiration royalties, and we see no error in that shared analysis. See id., at 13-18 (citing numerous treatises and articles critiquing Brulotte ). Still, we must decide what that means for Brulotte. Kimble, of course, says it means the decision must go. Positing that Brulotte turned on the belief that post-expiration royalties are always anticompetitive, he invokes decisions in which this Court abandoned antitrust precedents premised on similarly shaky economic reasoning. See Brief for Petitioners 55-56 (citing, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 127 S.Ct. 2705, 168 L.Ed.2d 623 (2007) ; Illinois Tool Works, 547 U.S. 28, 126 S.Ct. 1281, 164 L.Ed.2d 26 ). But to agree with Kimble's conclusion, we must resolve two questions in his favor. First, even assuming Kimble accurately characterizes Brulotte's basis, does the decision's economic mistake suffice to overcome stare decisis? Second and more fundamentally, was Brulotte actually founded, as Kimble contends, on an analysis of competitive effects?
If Brulotte were an antitrust rather than a patent case, we might answer both questions as Kimble would like. This Court has viewed stare decisis as having less-than-usual force in cases involving the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Khan, 522 U.S., at 20-21, 118 S.Ct. 275. Congress, we have explained, intended that law's reference to "restraint of trade" to have "changing content," and authorized courts to oversee the term's "dynamic potential." Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731-732, 108 S.Ct. 1515, 99 L.Ed.2d 808 (1988). We have therefore felt relatively free to revise our legal analysis as economic understanding evolves and (just as Kimble notes) to reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice's competitive consequences. See Leegin, 551 U.S., at 899-900, 127 S.Ct. 2705. Moreover, because the question in those cases was whether the challenged activity restrained trade, the Court's rulings necessarily turned on its understanding of economics. See Business Electronics Corp., 485 U.S., at 731, 108 S.Ct. 1515. Accordingly, to overturn the decisions in light of sounder economic reasoning was to take them "on [their] own terms." Halliburton, 573 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2410.
But Brulotte is a patent rather than an antitrust case, and our answers to both questions instead go against Kimble. To begin, even assuming that Brulotte relied on an economic misjudgment, Congress is the right entity to fix it. By contrast with the Sherman Act, the patent laws do not turn over exceptional law-shaping authority to the courts. Accordingly, statutory stare decisis -in which this Court interprets and Congress decides whether to amend-retains its usual strong force. See supra, at 2409. And as we have shown, that doctrine does not ordinarily bend to "wrong on the merits"-type arguments; it instead assumes Congress will correct whatever mistakes we commit. See supra, at 2408 - 2409. Nor does Kimble offer any reason to think his own "the Court erred" claim is special. Indeed, he does not even point to anything that has changed since Brulotte -no new empirical studies or advances in economic theory. Compare, e.g., Halliburton, 573 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2409-2411 (considering, though finding insufficient, recent economic research). On his argument, the Brulotte Court knew all it needed to know to determine that post-patent royalties are not usually anticompetitive; it just made the wrong call. See Brief for Petitioners 36-40. That claim, even if itself dead-right, fails to clear stare decisis's high bar.
And in any event, Brulotte did not hinge on the mistake Kimble identifies. Although some of its language invoked economic concepts, see n. 4, supra, the Court did not rely on the notion that post-patent royalties harm competition. Nor is that surprising. The patent laws-unlike the Sherman Act-do not aim to maximize competition (to a large extent, the opposite). And the patent term-unlike the "restraint of trade" standard-provides an all-encompassing bright-line rule, rather than calling for practice-specific analysis. So in deciding whether post-expiration royalties comport with patent law, Brulotte did not undertake to assess that practice's likely competitive effects. Instead, it applied a categorical principle that all patents, and all benefits from them, must end when their terms expire. See Brulotte, 379 U.S., at 30-32, 85 S.Ct. 176 ; supra, at 2406 - 2408. Or more specifically put, the Court held, as it had in Scott Paper, that Congress had made a judgment: that the day after a patent lapses, the formerly protected invention must be available to all for free. And further: that post-expiration restraints on even a single licensee's access to the invention clash with that principle. See Brulotte, 379 U.S., at 31-32, 85 S.Ct. 176 (a licensee's obligation to pay post-patent royalties conflicts with the "free market visualized for the post-expiration period" and so "runs counter to the policy and purpose of the patent laws" (quoting Scott Paper, 326 U.S., at 256, 66 S.Ct. 101 )). That patent (not antitrust) policy gave rise to the Court's conclusion that post-patent royalty contracts are unenforceable-utterly "regardless of a demonstrable effect on competition." 1 Hovenkamp § 3.2d, at 3-10.
Kimble's real complaint may go to the merits of such a patent policy-what he terms its "formalis[m]," its "rigid[ity]", and its detachment from "economic reality." Brief for Petitioners 27-28. But that is just a different version of the argument that Brulotte is wrong. And it is, if anything, a version less capable than the last of trumping statutory stare decisis. For the choice of what patent policy should be lies first and foremost with Congress. So if Kimble thinks patent law's insistence on unrestricted access to formerly patented inventions leaves too little room for pro-competitive post-expiration royalties, then Congress, not this Court, is his proper audience.
B
Kimble also seeks support from the wellspring of all patent policy: the goal of promoting innovation. Brulotte, he contends, "discourages technological innovation and does significant damage to the American economy." Brief for Petitioners 29. Recall that would-be licensors and licensees may benefit from post-patent royalty arrangements because they allow for a longer payment period and a more precise allocation of risk. See supra, at 2407. If the parties' ideal licensing agreement is barred, Kimble reasons, they may reach no agreement at all. See Brief for Petitioners 32. And that possibility may discourage invention in the first instance. The bottom line, Kimble concludes, is that some "breakthrough technologies will never see the light of day." Id., at 33.
Maybe. Or, then again, maybe not. While we recognize that post-patent royalties are sometimes not anticompetitive, we just cannot say whether barring them imposes any meaningful drag on innovation. As we have explained, Brulotte leaves open various ways-involving both licensing and other business arrangements-to accomplish payment deferral and risk-spreading alike. See supra, at 2408. Those alternatives may not offer the parties the precise set of benefits and obligations they would prefer. But they might still suffice to bring patent holders and product developers together and ensure that inventions get to the public. Neither Kimble nor his amici have offered any empirical evidence connecting Brulotte to decreased innovation; they essentially ask us to take their word for the problem. And the United States, which acts as both a licensor and a licensee of patented inventions while also implementing patent policy, vigorously disputes that Brulotte has caused any "significant real-world economic harm." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 30. Truth be told, if forced to decide that issue, we would not know where or how to start.
Which is one good reason why that is not our job. Claims that a statutory precedent has "serious and harmful consequences" for innovation are (to repeat this opinion's refrain) "more appropriately addressed to Congress." Halliburton, 573 U.S., at ----, 134 S.Ct., at 2413. That branch, far more than this one, has the capacity to assess Kimble's charge that Brulotte suppresses technological progress. And if it concludes that Brulotte works such harm, Congress has the prerogative to determine the exact right response-choosing the policy fix, among many conceivable ones, that will optimally serve the public interest. As we have noted, Congress legislates actively with respect to patents, considering concerns of just the kind Kimble raises. See supra, at 241
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Powell
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents a question as to the standard of proof required to find a vertical price-fixing conspiracy in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
I
Petitioner Monsanto Co. manufactures chemical products, including agricultural herbicides. By the late 1960’s, the time at issue in this case, its sales accounted for approximately 15% of the corn herbicide market and 3% of the soybean herbicide market. In the corn herbicide market, the market leader commanded a 70% share. In the soybean herbicide market, two other competitors each had between 30% and 40% of the market. Respondent Spray-Rite Service Corp. was engaged in the wholesale distribution of agricultural chemicals from 1955 to 1972. Spray-Rite was essentially a family business, whose owner and president, Donald Yapp, was also its sole salaried salesman. Spray-Rite was a discount operation, buying in large quantities and selling at a low margin.
Spray-Rite was an authorized distributor of Monsanto herbicides from 1957 to 1968. In October 1967, Monsanto announced that it would appoint distributors for 1-year terms, and that it would renew distributorships according to several new criteria. Among the criteria were: (i) whether the distributor’s primary activity was soliciting sales to retail dealers; (ii) whether the distributor employed trained salesmen capable of educating its customers on the technical aspects of Monsanto’s herbicides; and (iii) whether the distributor could be expected “to exploit fully” the market in its geographical area of primary responsibility. Shortly thereafter, Monsanto also introduced a number of incentive programs, such as making cash payments to distributors that sent salesmen to training classes, and providing free deliveries of products to customers within a distributor’s area of primary responsibility.
In October 1968, Monsanto declined to renew Spray-Rite’s distributorship. At that time, Spray-Rite was the 10th largest out of approximately 100 distributors of Monsanto’s primary corn herbicide. Ninety percent of Spray-Rite’s sales volume was devoted to herbicide sales, and 16% of its sales were of Monsanto products. After Monsanto’s termination, Spray-Rite continued as a herbicide dealer until 1972. It was able to purchase some of Monsanto’s products from other distributors, but not as much as it desired or as early in the season as it needed. Monsanto introduced a new corn herbicide in 1969. By 1972, its share of the corn herbicide market had increased to approximately 28%. Its share of the soybean herbicide market had grown to approximately 19%.
Spray-Rite brought this action under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1. It alleged that Monsanto and some of its distributors conspired to fix the resale prices of Monsanto herbicides. Its complaint further alleged that Monsanto terminated Spray-Rite’s distributorship, adopted compensation programs and shipping policies, and encouraged distributors to boycott Spray-Rite in furtherance of this conspiracy. Monsanto denied the allegations of conspiracy, and asserted that Spray-Rite’s distributorship had been terminated because of its failure to hire trained salesmen and promote sales to dealers adequately.
The case was tried to a jury. The District Court instructed the jury that Monsanto’s conduct was per se unlawful if it was in furtherance of a conspiracy to fix prices. In answers to special interrogatories, the jury found that (i) the termination of Spray-Rite was pursuant to a conspiracy between Monsanto and one or more of its distributors to set resale prices, (ii) the compensation programs, areas of primary-responsibility, and/or shipping policies were created by Monsanto pursuant to such a conspiracy, and (iii) Monsanto conspired with one or more distributors to limit Spray-Rite’s access to Monsanto herbicides after 1968. The jury awarded $3.5 million in damages, which was trebled to $10.5 million. Only the first of the jury’s findings is before us today.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 684 F. 2d 1226 (1982). It held that there was sufficient evidence to satisfy Spray-Rite’s burden of proving a conspiracy to set resale prices. The court stated that “proof of termination following competitor complaints is sufficient to support an inference of concerted action.” Id., at 1238. Canvassing the testimony and exhibits that were before the jury, the court found evidence of numerous complaints from competing Monsanto distributors about Spray-Rite’s price-cutting practices. It also noted that there was testimony that a Monsanto official had said that Spray-Rite was terminated because of the price complaints.
In substance, the Court of Appeals held that an antitrust plaintiff can survive a motion for a directed verdict if it shows that a manufacturer terminated a price-cutting distributor in response to or following complaints by other distributors. This view brought the Seventh Circuit into direct conflict with a number of other Courts of Appeals. We granted cer-tiorari to resolve the conflict. 460 U. S. 1010 (1983). We reject the statement by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit of the standard of proof required to submit a case to the jury in distributor-termination litigation, but affirm the judgment under the standard we announce today.
p — H HH
This Court has drawn two important distinctions that are at the center of this and any other distributor-termination case. First, there is the basic distinction between concerted and independent action — a distinction not always clearly drawn by parties and courts. Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires that there be a “contract, combination ... or conspiracy” between the manufacturer and other distributors in order to establish a violation. 15 U. S. C. §1. Independent action is not proscribed. A manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so independently. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300, 307 (1919); cf. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960). Under Colgate, the manufacturer can announce its resale prices in advance and refuse to deal with those who fail to comply. And a distributor is free to acquiesce in the manufacturer’s demand in order to avoid termination.
The second important distinction in distributor-termination cases is that between concerted action to set prices and concerted action on nonprice restrictions. The former have been per se illegal since the early years of national antitrust enforcement. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 404-409 (1911). The latter are judged under the rule of reason, which requires a weighing of the relevant circumstances of a case to decide whether a restrictive practice constitutes an unreasonable restraint on competition. See Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36 (1977).
While these distinctions in theory are reasonably clear, often they are difficult to apply in practice. In Sylvania we emphasized that the legality of arguably anticompetitive conduct should be judged primarily by its “market impact.” See, e. g., id., at 51. But the economic effect of all of the conduct described above — unilateral and concerted vertical price setting, agreements on price and nonprice restrictions — is in many, but not all, cases similar or identical. See, e. g., Parke, Davis, supra, at 44; n. 7, supra. And judged from a distance, the conduct of the parties in the various situations can be indistinguishable. For example, the fact that a manufacturer and its distributors are in constant communication about prices and marketing strategy does not alone show that the distributors are not making independent pricing decisions. A manufacturer and its distributors have legitimate reasons to exchange information about the prices and the reception of their products in the market. Moreover, it is precisely in cases in which the manufacturer attempts to further a particular marketing strategy by means of agreements on often costly nonprice restrictions that it will have the most interest in the distributors’ resale prices. The manufacturer often will want to ensure that its distributors earn sufficient profit to pay for programs such as hiring and training additional salesmen or demonstrating the technical features of the product, and will want to see that “free-riders” do not interfere. See Sylvania, supra, at 55. Thus, the manufacturer’s strongly felt concern about resale prices does not necessarily mean that it has done more than the Colgate doctrine allows.
Nevertheless, it is of considerable importance that independent action by the manufacturer, and concerted action on nonprice restrictions, be distinguished from price-fixing agreements, since under present law the latter are subject to per se treatment and treble damages. On a claim of concerted price fixing, the antitrust plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to carry its burden of proving that there was such an agreement. If an inference of such an agreement may be drawn from highly ambiguous evidence, there is a considerable danger that the doctrines enunciated in Syl-vania and Colgate will be seriously eroded.
The flaw in the evidentiary standard adopted by the Court of Appeals in this case is that it disregards this danger. Permitting an agreement to be inferred merely from the existence of complaints, or even from the fact that termination came about “in response to” complaints, could deter or penalize perfectly legitimate conduct. As Monsanto points out, complaints about price cutters “are natural — and from the manufacturer’s perspective, unavoidable — reactions by distributors to the activities of their rivals.” Such complaints, particularly where the manufacturer has imposed a costly set of nonprice restrictions, “arise in the normal course of business and do not indicate illegal concerted action.” Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 671 F. 2d 1168, 1172 (CA8 1982), on rehearing en banc, 712 F. 2d 1235 (CA8 1983) (affirming District Court judgment by an equally divided court). Moreover, distributors are an important source of information for manufacturers. In order to assure an efficient distribution system, manufacturers and distributors constantly must coordinate their activities to assure that their product will reach the consumer persuasively and efficiently. To bar a manufacturer from acting solely because the information upon which it acts originated as a price complaint would create an irrational dislocation in the market. See F. Warren-Boulton, Vertical Control of Markets 13, 164 (1978). In sum, “[t]o permit the inference of concerted action on the basis of receiving complaints alone and thus to expose the defendant to treble damage liability would both inhibit management’s exercise of its independent business judgment and emasculate the terms of the statute.” Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco., Inc., 637 F. 2d 105, 111, n. 2 (CA3 1980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 911 (1981).
Thus, something more than evidence of complaints is needed. There must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting independently. As Judge Aldisert has written, the antitrust plaintiff should present direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others “had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.” Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, supra, at 111; accord, H. L. Moore Drug Exchange v. Eli Lilly & Co., 662 F. 2d 935, 941 (CA2 1981), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 880 (1982); cf. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 810 (1946) (Circumstances must reveal “a unity of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement”).
HH HH
A
Applying this standard to the facts of this case, we believe there was sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to have concluded that Monsanto and some of its distributors were parties to an “agreement” or “conspiracy” to maintain resale prices and terminate price cutters. In fact there was substantial direct evidence of agreements to maintain prices. There was testimony from a Monsanto district manager, for example, that Monsanto on at least two occasions in early 1969, about five months after Spray-Rite was terminated, approached price-cutting distributors and advised that if they did not maintain the suggested resale price, they would not receive adequate supplies of Monsanto’s new corn herbicide. Tr. 1929-1934. When one of the distributors did not assent, this information was referred to the Monsanto regional office, and it complained to the distributor’s parent company. There was evidence that the parent instructed its subsidiary to comply, and the distributor informed Monsanto that it would charge the suggested price. Id., at 1933-1934. Evidence of this kind plainly is relevant and persuasive as to a meeting of minds.
An arguably more ambiguous example is a newsletter from one of the distributors to his dealer-customers. The newsletter is dated October 1, 1968, just four weeks before Spray-Rite was terminated. It was written after a meeting between the author and several Monsanto officials, id., at 2564, 2571-2573, and discusses Monsanto’s efforts to “ge[t] the ‘market place in order.’” App. A-65. The newsletter reviews some of Monsanto’s incentive and shipping policies, and then states that in addition “every effort will be made to maintain a minimum market price level.” Id., at A-66. The newsletter relates these efforts as follows:
“In other words, we are assured that Monsanto’s company-owned outlets will not retail at less than their suggested retail price to the trade as a whole. Furthermore, those of us on the distributor level are not likely to deviate downward on price to anyone as the idea is implied that doing this possibly could discolor the outlook for continuity as one of the approved distributors during the future upcoming seasons. So, none interested in the retention of this arrangement is likely to risk being deleted from this customer service opportunity. Also, as far as the national accounts are concerned, they are sure to recognize the desirability of retaining Monsanto’s favor on a continuing basis by respecting the wisdom of participating in the suggested program in a manner assuring order on the retail level ‘playground’ throughout the entire country. It is elementary that harmony can only come from following the rules of the game and that in case of dispute, the decision of the umpire is final.” Id., at A-66 — A-67.
It is reasonable to interpret this newsletter as referring to an agreement or understanding that distributors and retailers would maintain prices, and Monsanto would not undercut those prices on the retail level and would terminate competitors who sold at prices below those of complying distributors; these were “the rules of the game.”
B
If, as the courts below reasonably could have found, there was evidence of an agreement with one or more distributors to maintain prices, the remaining question is whether the termination of Spray-Rite was part of or pursuant to that agreement. It would be reasonable to find that it was, since it is necessary for competing distributors contemplating compliance with suggested prices to know that those who do not comply will be terminated. Moreover, there is some circumstantial evidence of such a link. Following the termination, there was a meeting between Spray-Rite’s president and a Monsanto official. There was testimony that the first thing the official mentioned was the many complaints Monsanto had received about Spray-Rite’s prices. Tr. 774, 1295. In addition, there was reliable testimony that Monsanto never discussed with Spray-Rite prior to the termination the distributorship criteria that were the alleged basis for the action. See 684 F. 2d, at 1239. By contrast, a former Monsanto salesman for Spray-Rite’s area testified that Monsanto representatives on several occasions in 1965-1966 approached Spray-Rite, informed the distributor of complaints from other distributors — including one major and influential one, see Tr. 126, 135 — and requested that prices be maintained. Id., at 109-110, 114. Later that same year, Spray-Rite’s president testified, Monsanto officials made explicit threats to terminate Spray-Rite unless it raised its prices. Id., at 619, 711.
H — ( <
We conclude that the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect standard to the evidence in this case. The correct standard is that there must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of independent action by the manufacturer and distributor. That is, there must be direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective. Under this standard, the evidence in this case created a jury issue as to whether Spray-Rite was terminated pursuant to a price-fixing conspiracy between Monsanto and its distributors. The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
These areas of primary responsibility were not exclusive territorial restrictions. Approximately 10 to 20 distributors were assigned to each area, and distributors were permitted to sell outside their assigned area.
The three special interrogatories were as follows:
“1. Was the decision by Monsanto not to offer a new contract to plaintiff for 1969 made by Monsanto pursuant to a conspiracy or combination with one or more of its distributors to fix, maintain or stabilize resale prices of Monsanto herbicides?
“2. Were the compensation programs and/or areas of primary responsibility, and/or shipping policy created by Monsanto pursuant to a conspiracy to fix, maintain or stabilize resale prices on Monsanto herbicides?
“3. Did Monsanto conspire or combine with one or more of its distributors so that one or more of those distributors would limit plaintiff’s access to Monsanto herbicides after 1968?” 684 F. 2d 1226, 1233 (CA7 1982).
The jury answered “Yes” to each of the interrogatories.
See n. 6, infra.
The court later in the same paragraph restated the standard of sufficiency as follows: “Proof of distributorship termination in response to competing distributors’ complaints about the terminated distributor’s pricing policies is sufficient to raise an inference of concerted action.” 684 F. 2d, at 1239 (emphasis added). It may be argued that this standard is different from the one quoted in text in that this one requires a showing of a minimal causal connection between the complaints and the termination of the plaintiff, while the textual standard requires only that the one “follow” the other. As we explain infra, at 763-764, the difference is not ultimately significant in our analysis.
The court below recognized that its standard was in conflict with that articulated in Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F. 2d 105, 110-111 (CA3 1980), cert. denied, 451U. S. 911 (1981). Other Courts of Appeals also have rejected the standard adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of America, 677 F. 2d 946, 952-953 (CA2), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1007 (1982); Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F. 2d 1190, 1199 (CA6 1982), cert. pending, No. 82-848; Bruce Drug, Inc. v. Hollister Inc., 688 F. 2d 853, 856-857 (CA1 1982); see also Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F. 2d 840, 845 (CA10 1981). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has adopted the Seventh Circuit’s standard. See Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F. 2d 1207, 1213-1215 (1983). One panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also has adopted that standard, see Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F. 2d 984, 990-992 (1982), while another appears to have rejected it in an opinion issued the same day, see Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 671 F. 2d 1168, 1172 (1982). On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals was equally divided between the two positions. Compare Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 712 F. 2d 1235 (1983) (en banc), with Battle v. Watson, 712 F. 2d 1238, 1240 (1983) (en banc) (McMillian, J., dissenting).
Monsanto also challenges another part of the Court of Appeals’ opinion. It argues that the court held that the nonprice restrictions in this case — the compensation and shipping policies — would be judged under a rule of reason rather than a per se rule ‘“only if there is no allegation that the [nonpriee] restrictions are part of a conspiracy to fix prices.’” Brief for Petitioner 15 (emphasis deleted) (quoting 684 F. 2d, at 1237). Monsanto asserts that under this holding a mere allegation that nonprice restrictions were part of a price conspiracy would subject them to per se treatment. Monsanto contends this view undermines our decision in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36 (1977), that such restrictions are subject to the rule of reason.
If this were what the Court of Appeals held, it would present an arguable conflict. We think, however, that Monsanto misreads the court’s opinion. Read in context, the court’s somewhat broad language fairly may be read to say that a plaintiff must prove, as well as allege, that the nonprice restrictions were in fact a part of a price conspiracy. Thus, later in its opinion the court notes that the District Court properly instructed the jury that “Monsanto’s otherwise lawful compensation programs and shipping policies were per se unlawful if undertaken as part of an illegal scheme to fix prices.” 684 F. 2d, at 1237 (emphasis added). The court cited White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U. S. 253, 260 (1963), in which this Court wrote that restrictive practices ancillary to a price-fixing agreement would be restrained only if there was a finding that the two were sufficiently linked. And the Court of Appeals elsewhere noted the jury’s finding that the nonprice practices here were “created by Monsanto pursuant to a conspiracy to fix . . . resale prices.” 684 F. 2d, at 1233.
Monsanto does not dispute Spray-Rite’s view that if the nonprice practices were proved to have been instituted as part of a price-fixing conspiracy, they would be subject to per se treatment. See Brief for Petitioner 23-27. Instead, Monsanto argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the nonprice practices were “created by Monsanto pursuant to” a price-fixing conspiracy. Monsanto failed to make its sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument in the Court of Appeals with respect to this finding, see Brief for Defendant-Appellant Monsanto Co. in No. 80-2232 (CAT), pp. 27-34, and the court did not address the point. We therefore decline to reach it. See, e. g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 147, n. 2 (1970); Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200 (1927).
In view of Monsanto’s concession that a proper finding that nonprice practices were part of a price-fixing conspiracy would suffice to subject the entire conspiracy to per se treatment, Sylvania is not applicable to this case. In that case only a nonprice restriction was challenged. See 433 U. S., at 51, n. 18. Nothing in our decision today undercuts the holding of Sylvania that nonprice restrictions are to be judged under the rule of reason. In fact, the need to ensure the viability of Sylvania is an important consideration in our rejection of the Court of Appeals’ standard of sufficiency of the evidence. See infra, at 763.
The Solicitor General (by brief only) and several other amici suggest that we take this opportunity to reconsider whether “ccntract[s], combination[s]... or conspiracies]” to fix resale prices should always be unlawful. They argue that the economic effect of resale price maintenance is little different from agreements on nonprice restrictions. See generally Continen tal T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S., at 69-70 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (citing sources); Baker, Interconnected Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section One Labyrinth: Is Sylvania a Way Out?, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1457, 1465-1466 (1981). They say that the economic objections to resale price maintenance that we discussed in Sylvania, supra, at 51, n. 18 — such as that it facilitates horizontal cartels — can be met easily in the context of rule-of-reason analysis.
Certainly in this case we have no occasion to consider the merits of this argument. This case was tried on perse instructions to the jury. Neither party argued in the District Court that the rule of reason should apply to a vertical price-fixing conspiracy, nor raised the point on appeal. In fact, neither party before this Court presses the argument advanced by amici. We therefore decline to reach the question, and we decide the case in the context in which it was decided below and argued here.
We do not suggest that evidence of complaints has no probative value at all, but only that the burden remains on the antitrust plaintiff to introduce additional evidence sufficient to support a finding of an unlawful contract, combination, or conspiracy.
The concept of “a meeting of the minds” or “a common scheme” in a distributor-termination ease includes more than a showing that the distributor conformed to the suggested price. It means as well that evidence must be presented both that the distributor communicated its acquiescence or agreement, and that this was sought by the manufacturer.
In addition, there was circumstantial evidence that Monsanto sought agreement from the distributor to conform to the resale price. The threat to cut off the distributor’s supply came during Monsanto’s “shipping season” when herbicide was in short supply. The jury could have concluded that Monsanto sought this agreement at a time when it was able to use supply as a lever to force compliance.
The newsletter also is subject to the interpretation that the distributor was merely describing the likely reaction to unilateral Monsanto pronouncements. But Monsanto itself appears to have construed the flyer as reporting a price-fixing understanding. Six weeks after the newsletter was written, a Monsanto official wrote its author a letter urging him to “correct immediately any misconceptions about Monsanto’s marketing policies.” App. A-98. The letter disavowed any intent to enter into an agreement on resale prices. The interpretation of these documents and the testimony surrounding them properly was left to the jury.
Monsanto argues that the reference could have been to complaints by Monsanto employees rather than distributors, suggesting that the price controls were merely unilateral action, rather than accession to the demands of the distributors. The choice between two reasonable interpretations of the testimony properly was left for the jury. See also Tr. 1298 (identifying source of one complaint as a distributor).
The existence of the illegal joint boycott after Spray-Rite’s termination, a finding that the Court of Appeals affirmed and that is not before us, is further evidence that Monsanto and its distributors had an understanding that prices would be maintained, and that price cutters would be terminated. This last, however, is also consistent with termination for other reasons, and is probative only of the ability of Monsanto and its distributors to act in concert.
Monsanto’s contrary evidence has force, but we agree with the courts below that it was insufficient to take the issue from the jury. It is true that there was no testimony of any complaints about Spray-Rite's pricing for the 15 months prior to termination. But it was permissible for the jury to conclude that there were complaints during that period from the evidence that they continued after 1968 and from the testimony that they were mentioned at Spray-Rite’s post-termination meeting with Monsanto. There is also evidence that resale prices in fact did not stabilize after 1968. On the other hand, the former Monsanto salesman testified that prices were more stable in 1969-1970 than in his earlier stint in 1965-1966. Id,., at 217. And, given the evidence that Monsanto took active measures to stabilize prices, it may be that distributors did not assent in sufficient numbers, or broke their promises. In any event, we cannot say that the courts below erred in finding that Spray-Rite produced substantial evidence of the concerted action required by § 1 of the Sherman Act, and that — despite the sharp conflict in evidence — the case properly was submitted to the jury.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Ginsburg
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III-A, and an opinion with respect to Part III-B, in which Justice O’Connor, Justice Souter, and Justice Breyer join.
This case concerns the proper construction of the anti-discrimination provision contained in the public services portion (Title II) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 337, 42 U. S. C. §12132. Specifically, we confront the question whether the proscription of discrimination may require placement of persons with mental disabilities in community settings rather than in institutions. The answer, we hold, is a qualified yes. Such action is in order when the State’s treatment professionals have determined that community placement is appropriate, the transfer from institutional care to a less restrictive setting is not opposed by the affected individual, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities. In so ruling, we affirm the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in substantial part. We remand the case, however, for further consideration of the appropriate relief, given the range of facilities the State maintains for the care and treatment of persons with diverse mental disabilities, and its obligation to administer services with an even hand.
I
This case, as it comes to us, presents no constitutional question. The complaints filed by plaintiffs-respondents L. C. and E. W. did include such an issue; L. C. and E. W. alleged that defendants-petitioners, Georgia health care officials, failed to afford them minimally adequate care and freedom from undue restraint, in violation of their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Complaint ¶¶ 87-91; Intervenor’s Complaint ¶¶ 30-34. But neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals reached those Fourteenth Amendment claims. See Civ. No. 1:95-cv-1210-MHS (ND Ga., Mar. 26,1997), pp. 5-6, 11-13, App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a-35a, 40a-41a; 138 F. 3d 893, 895, and n. 3 (CA11 1998). Instead, the courts below resolved the case solely on statutory grounds. Our review is similarly confined. Cf. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 450 (1985) (Texas city’s requirement of special use permit for operation of group home for mentally retarded, when other care and multiple-dwelling facilities were freely permitted, lacked rational basis and therefore violated Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). Mindful that it is a statute we are construing, we set out first the legislative and regulatory prescriptions on which the case turns.
In the opening provisions of the ADA, Congress stated findings applicable to the statute in all its parts. Most relevant to this case, Congress determined that
“(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem;
“(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as... institutionalization...;
“(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion,... failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices,... [and] segregation...42 U. S. C. §§ 12101(a)(2), (3), (5).
Congress then set forth prohibitions against discrimination in employment (Title I, §§ 12111-12117), public services furnished by governmental entities (Title II, §§12131-12165), and public accommodations provided by private entities (Title III, §§12181-12189). The statute as a whole is intended “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” § 12101(b)(1).
This case concerns Title II, the public services portion of the ADA. The provision of Title II centrally at issue reads:
“Subject to the provisions of this subehapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” §201, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. §12182.
Title IFs definition section states that “public entity” includes “any State or local government,” and “any department, agency, [or] special purpose district.” §§ 12131(1)(A), (B). The same section defines “qualified individual with a disability” as
“an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” § 12131(2).
On redress for violations of §12132’s discrimination prohibition, Congress referred to remedies available under § 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 92 Stat. 2982, 29 U. S. C. § 794a. See §203, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 12133 (“The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in [§505 of the Rehabilitation Act] shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 12132 of this title.”).
Congress instructed the Attorney General to issue regulations implementing provisions of Title II, including § 12132’s discrimination proscription. See § 204, as set forth in § 12134(a) (“[T]he Attorney General shall promulgate regulations in an accessible format that implement this part.”). The Attorney GeneraFs regulations, Congress further directed, “shall be consistent with this chapter and with the coordination regulations... applicable to recipients of Federal financial assistance under [§504 of the Rehabilitation Act].” §204, as set forth in 42 U. S. C. § 12134(b). One of the § 504 regulations requires recipients of federal funds to “administer programs and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified handicapped persons.” 28 CFR § 41.51(d) (1998).
As Congress instructed, the Attorney General issued Title II regulations, see 28 CFR pt. 35 (1998), including one modeled on the § 504 regulation just quoted; called the “integration regulation,” it reads:
“A public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals -with disabilities.” 28 CFR § 35.130(d) (1998).
The preamble to the Attorney General’s Title II regulations defines “the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities” to mean “a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible.” 28 CFR pt. 35, App. A, p. 450 (1998). Another regulation requires public entities to “make reasonable modifications” to avoid “discrimination on the basis of disability,” unless those modifications would entail a “fundamental] alter[ation]”; called here the “reasonable-modifications regulation,” it provides:
“A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 28 CFR § 35.130(b)(7) (1998).
We recite these regulations with the caveat that we do not here determine their validity. While the parties differ on the proper construction and enforcement of the regulations, we do not understand petitioners to challenge the regulatory formulations themselves as outside the congressional authorization. See Brief for Petitioners 16-17, 36, 40-41; Reply Brief 15-16 (challenging the Attorney General’s interpretation of the integration regulation).
II
With the key legislative provisions in full view, we summarize the facts underlying this dispute. Respondents L. C. and E. W. are mentally retarded women; L. C. has also been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and E. W. with a personality disorder. Both women have a history of treatment in institutional settings. In May 1992, L. C. was voluntarily admitted to Georgia Regional Hospital at Atlanta (GRH), where she was confined for treatment in a psychiatric unit. By May 1993, her psychiatric condition had stabilized, and L. C.’s treatment team at GRH agreed that her needs could be met appropriately in one of the community-based programs the State supported. Despite this evaluation, L. C. remained institutionalized until February 1996, when the State plaeed her in a community-based treatment program.
E. W. was voluntarily admitted to GRH in February 1995; like L. C., E. W. was confined for treatment in a psychiatric unit. In March 1995, GRH sought to discharge E. W. to a homeless shelter, but abandoned that plan after her attorney filed an administrative complaint. By 1996, E. W.’s treating psychiatrist concluded that she could be treated appropriately in a community-based setting. She nonetheless remained institutionalized until a few months after the District Court issued its judgment in this case in 1997.
In May 1995, when she was still institutionalized at GRH, L. C. filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, challenging her continued confinement in a segregated environment. Her complaint invoked 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and provisions of the ADA, §§ 12131-12134, and named as defendants, now petitioners, the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Human Resources, the Superintendent of GRH, and the Executive Director of the Fulton County Regional Board (collectively, the State). L. C. alleged that the State’s failure to place her in a community-based program, once her treating professionals determined that such placement was appropriate, violated, inter alia, Title II of the ADA. L. C.’s pleading requested, among other things, that the State place her in a community care residential program, and that she receive treatment with the ultimate goal of integrating her into the mainstream of society. E. W. intervened in the action, stating an identical claim.
The District Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of L. C. and E. W. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a-42a. The court held that the State’s failure to place L. C. and E. W. in an appropriate community-based treatment program violated Title II of the ADA. See id., at 39a, 41a. In so ruling, the court rejected the State’s argument that inadequate funding, not discrimination against L. C. and E. W. “by reason of” their disabilities, accounted for their retention at GRH. Under Title II, the court concluded, "unnecessary institutional segregation of the disabled constitutes discrimination per se, which cannot be justified by a lack of funding.” Id., at 37a.
In addition to contending that L. C. and E. W. had not shown discrimination “by reason of [their] disabilities],” the State resisted court intervention on the ground that requiring immediate transfers in cases of this order would “fundamentally alter” the State’s activity. The State reasserted that it was already using all available funds to provide services to other persons with disabilities. See id., at 38a. Rejecting the State’s “fundamental alteration” defense, the court observed that existing state programs provided community-based treatment of the kind for which L. C. and E. W. qualified, and that the State could “provide services to plaintiffs in the community at considerably less cost than is required to maintain them in an institution.” Id., at 39a.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court, but remanded for reassessment of the State’s cost-based defense. See 138 F. 3d, at 905. As the appeals court read the statute and regulations: When “a disabled individual’s treating professionals find that a community-based placement is appropriate for that individual, the ADA imposes a duty to provide treatment in a community setting — the most integrated setting appropriate to that patient’s needs”; “[w]here there is no such finding [by the treating professionals], nothing in the ADA requires the deinstitutionalization of th[e] patient.” Id., at 902.
The Court of Appeals recognized that the State’s duty to provide integrated services “is not absolute”; under the Attorney General’s Title II regulation, “reasonable modifications” were required of the State, but fundamental alterations were not demanded. Id., at 904. The appeals court thought it clear, however, that “Congress wanted to permit a cost defense only in the most limited of circumstances.” Id., at 902. In conclusion, the court stated that a cost justification would fail “[u]nless the State can prove that requiring it to [expend additional funds in order to provide L, C. and E. W. with integrated services] would be so unreasonable given the demands of the State’s mental health budget that it would fundamentally alter the service [the State] provides.” Id., at 905. Because it appeared that the District Court had entirely ruled out a “lack of funding” justification, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 37a, the appeals court remanded, repeating that the District Court should consider, among other things, “whether the additional expenditures necessary to treat L. C. and E. W. in community-based care would be unreasonable given the demands of the State’s mental health budget.” 138 F. 3d, at 905.
We granted certiorari in view of the importance of the question presented to the States and affected individuals. See 525 U. S. 1054 (1998).
III
Endeavoring to carry out Congress’ instruction to issue regulations implementing Title II, the Attorney General, in the integration and reasonable-modifications regulations, see supra, at 591-592, made two key determinations. The first concerned the scope of the ADA’s discrimination proscription, 42 U. S. C. § 12132; the second concerned the obligation of the States to counter discrimination. As to the first, the Attorney General concluded that unjustified placement or retention of persons in institutions, severely limiting their exposure to the outside community, constitutes a form of discrimination based on disability prohibited by Title II. See 28 CFR § 35.130(d) (1998) (“A public entity shall administer services... in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Helen L. v. DiDario, No. 94-1243 (CA3 1994), pp. 8, 15-16 (unnecessary segregation of persons with disabilities constitutes a form of discrimination prohibited by the ADA and the integration regulation). Regarding the States’ obligation to avoid unjustified isolation of individuals with disabilities, the Attorney General provided that States could resist modifications that “would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 28 CFR § 35.130(b)(7) (1998).
The Court of Appeals essentially upheld the Attorney General’s construction of the ADA. As just recounted, see supra, at 595-596, the appeals court ruled that the unjustified institutionalization of persons with mental disabilities violated Title II; the court then remanded with instructions to measure the cost of caring for L. C. and E. W. in a community-based facility against the State’s mental health budget.
We affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision in substantial part. Unjustified isolation, we hold, is properly regarded as discrimination based on disability. But we recognize, as well, the States’ need to maintain a range of facilities for the care and treatment of persons with diverse mental disabilities, and the States’ obligation to administer services with an even hand. Accordingly, we further hold that the Court of Appeals’ remand instruction was unduly restrictive. In evaluating a State’s fundamental-alteration defense, the District Court must consider, in view of the resources available to the State, not only the cost of providing community-based care to the litigants, but also the range of services the State provides others with mental disabilities, and the State’s obligation to mete out those services equitably.
A
We examine first whether, as the Eleventh Circuit held, undue institutionalization qualifies as discrimination “by reason of... disability.” The Department of Justice has consistently advocated that it does. Because the Department is the agency directed by Congress to issue regulations implementing Title II, see supra, at 591-592, its views warrant respect. We need not inquire whether the degree of deference described in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 887, 844 (1984), is in order; “Bit is enough to observe that the well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a statute ‘constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’ ” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 642 (1998) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 139-140 (1944)).
The State argues that L. C. and E. W. encountered no discrimination “by reason of” their disabilities because they were not denied community placement on account of those disabilities. See Brief for Petitioners 20. Nor were they subjected to “discrimination,” the State contends, because “‘discrimination’ necessarily requires uneven treatment of similarly situated individuals,” and L. C. and E. W. had identified no comparison class, i. e., no similarly situated individuals given preferential treatment. Id., at 21. We are satisfied that Congress had a more comprehensive view of the concept of discrimination advanced in the ADA.
The ADA stepped up earlier measures to secure opportunities for people with developmental disabilities to enjoy the benefits of community living. The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, a 1975 measure, stated in aspirational terms that “[t]he treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental disabilities... should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person’s personal liberty.” 89 Stat. 502, 42 U. S. C. §6010(2) (1976 ed.) (emphasis added); see also Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 24 (1981) (concluding that the § 6010 provisions “were intended to be hortatory, not mandatory”). In a related legislative endeavor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Congress used mandatory language to proscribe discrimination against persons with disabilities. See 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §794 (1976 ed.) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” (Emphasis added.)) Ultimately, in the ADA, enacted in 1990, Congress not only required all public entities to refrain from discrimination, see 42 U. S. C. § 12132; additionally, in findings applicable to the entire statute, Congress explicitly identified unjustified “segregation” of persons with disabilities as a “for[m] of discrimination.” See § 12101(a)(2) (“historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem”); § 12101(a)(5) (“individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including... segregation”).
Recognition that unjustified institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of discrimination reflects two evident judgments. First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life. Cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 755 (1984) (“There can be no doubt that [stigmatizing injury often caused by racial discrimination] is one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory government action.”); Los Angeles Dept, of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, 707, n. 13 (1978) (“ Tn forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’” (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F. 2d 1194, 1198 (CA7 1971)). Second, confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment. See Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae 20-22. Dissimilar treatment correspondingly exists in this key respect: In order to receive needed medical services, persons with mental disabilities must, because of those disabilities, relinquish participation in community life they could enjoy given reasonable accommodations, while persons without mental disabilities can receive the medical services they need without similar sacrifice. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 6-7,17.
The State urges that, whatever Congress may have stated as its findings in the ADA, the Medicaid statute “reflected a congressional policy preference for treatment in the institution over treatment in the community.” Brief for Petitioners 31. The State correctly used the past tense. Since 1981, Medicaid has provided funding for state-run home and community-based care through a waiver program. See 95 Stat. 812-818, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396n(c); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 20-21. Indeed, the United States points out that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) “has a policy of encouraging States to take advantage of the waiver program, and often approves more waiver slots than a State ultimately uses.” Id., at 25-26 (further observing that, by 1996, “HHS approved up to 2109 waiver slots for Georgia, but Georgia used only 700”).
We emphasize that nothing in the ADA or its implementing regulations condones termination of institutional settings for persons unable to handle or benefit from community settings. Title II provides only that “qualified individualfs] with a disability” may not “be subjected to discrimination.” 42 U. S. C. § 12132. “Qualified individuals,” the ADA further explains, are persons with disabilities who, “with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices,... mee[t] the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” § 12181(2).
Consistent with these provisions, the State generally may rely on the reasonable assessments of its own professionals in determining whether an individual “meets the essential eligibility requirements” for habilitation in a community-based program. Absent such qualification, it would be inappropriate to remove a patient from the more restrictive setting. See 28 CFR § 35.130(d) (1998) (public entity shall administer services and programs in “the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities” (emphasis added)); cf. School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U. S. 273, 288 (1987) (“[C]ourts normally should defer to the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials.”). Nor is there any federal requirement that community-based treatment be imposed on patients who do not desire it. See 28 CFR § 35.130(e)(1) (1998) (“Nothing in this part shall be construed to require an individual with a disability to accept an accommodation... which such individual chooses not to accept.”); 28 CFR pt. 35, App. A, p. 450 (1998) (“[P]ersons with disabilities must be provided the option of declining to accept a particular accommodation.”). In this case, however, there is no genuine dispute concerning the status of L. C. and E. W. as individuals “qualified” for noninstitutional care: The State’s own professionals determined that community-based treatment would be appropriate for L. G. and E. W., and neither woman opposed such treatment. See supra, at 593.
B
The State’s responsibility, once it provides community-based treatment to qualified persons with disabilities, is not boundless. The reasonable-modifications regulation speaks of "reasonable modifications” to avoid discrimination, and allows States to resist modifications that entail a “fundamenta[l] alteration]” of the States’ services and programs. 28 CFR § 35.130(b)(7) (1998). The Court of Appeals construed this regulation to permit a cost-based defense “only in the most limited of circumstances,” 138 F. 3d, at 902, and remanded to the District Court to consider, among other things, “whether the additional expenditures necessary to treat L. C. and E. W. in community-based care would be unreasonable given the demands of the State’s mental health budget,” id., at 905.
The Court of Appeals’ construction of the reasonable-modifications regulation is unacceptable for it would leave the State virtually defenseless once it is shown that the plaintiff is qualified for the service or program she seeks. If the expense entailed in placing one or two people in a community-based treatment program is properly measured for reasonableness against the State’s entire mental health budget, it is unlikely that a State, relying on the fundamental-alteration defense, could ever prevail. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 27 (State’s attorney argues that Court of Appeals’ understanding of the fundamental-alteration defense, as expressed in its order to the District Court, “will always preclude the State from a meaningful defense”); cf. Brief for Petitioners 37-38 (Court of Appeals’ remand order “mistakenly asks the district court to examine [the fundamental-alteration] defense based on the cost of providing community care to just two individuals, not all Georgia citizens who desire community care”); 1:95— cv-1210-MHS (ND Ga., Oct. 20, 1998), p. 3, App. 177 (District Court, on remand, declares the impact of its decision beyond L. C. and E.W. “irrelevant”). Sensibly construed, the fundamental-alteration component of the reasonable-modifications regulation would allow the State to show that, in the allocation of available resources, immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the responsibility the State has undertaken for the care and treatment of a large and diverse population of persons with mental disabilities.
When it granted summary judgment for plaintiffs in this case, the District Court compared the cost of caring for the plaintiffs in a community-based setting with the cost of caring for them in an institution. That simple comparison showed that community placements cost less than institutional confinements. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 39a. As the United States recognizes, however, a comparison so simple overlooks costs the State cannot avoid; most notably, a “State... may experience increased overall expenses by funding community placements without being able to take advantage of the savings associated with the closure of institutions.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21.
As already observed, see supra, at 601-602, the ADA is not reasonably read to impel States to phase out institutions, placing patients in need of close care at risk. Cf post, at 610 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Nor is it the ADA’s mission to drive States to move institutionalized patients into an inappropriate setting, such as a homeless shelter, a placement the State proposed, then retracted, for E. W. See supra, at 593. Some individuals, like L. C. and E. W. in prior years, may need institutional care from time to time “to stabilize acute psychiatric symptoms.” App. 98 (affidavit of Dr. Richard L. Elliott); see 138 F. 3d, at 903 (“[T]here may be times [when] a patient can be treated in the community, and others whe[n] an institutional placement is necessary.”); Reply Brief 19 (placement in a community-based treatment program does not mean the State will no longer need to retain hospital accommodations for the person so placed). For other individuals, no placement outside the institution may ever be appropriate. See Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae 22-23 (“Some individuals, whether mentally retarded or mentally ill, are not prepared at particular times — perhaps in the short run, perhaps in the long run — for the risks and exposure of the less protective environment of community settings”; for these persons, “institutional settings are needed and must remain available.”); Brief for Voice of the Retarded et al. as Amici Curiae 11 (“Each disabled person is entitled to treatment in the most integrated setting possible for that person — recognizing that, on a ease-by-case basis, that setting may be in an institution.”); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 327 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“For many mentally retarded people, the difference between the capacity to do things for themselves within an institution and total dependence on the institution for all of their needs is as much liberty as they ever will know.”).
To maintain a range of facilities and to administer services with an even hand, the State must have more leeway than the courts below understood the fundamental-alteration defense to allow. If, for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with. mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated, the reasonable-modifications standard would be met. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5 (State’s attorney urges that, “by asking [a] person to wait a short time until a community bed is available, Georgia does not exclude [that] person by reason of disability, neither does Georgia discriminate against her by reason of disability”); see also id., at 25 (“[I]t is reasonable for the State to ask someone to wait until a community placement is available.”). In such circumstances, a court would have no warrant effectively to order displacement of persons at the top of the community-based treatment waiting list by individuals lower down who commenced civil actions.
* * *
For the reasons stated, we conclude that, under Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities when the State’s treatment professionals determine that such placement is appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities. The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is therefore affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
The ABA, enacted in 1990, is the Federal Government’s most recent and extensive endeavor to address discrimination against persons with disabilities. Earlier legislative efforts included the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 355, 29 U. S. C. §701 et seq. (1976 ed.), and the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 89 Stat. 486, 42 U. S. C. §6001 et seq. (1976 ed.), enacted in 1975. In the ADA, Congress for the first time referred expressly to “segregation” of persons with disabilities as a “for[m] of discrimination,” and to discrimination that persists in the area of “institutionalization.” §§ 12101(a)(2), (3), (5).
2 The ADA defines “disability,” “with respect to an individual,” as
“(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
“(B) a record of such an impairment; or
“(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” § 12102(2).
There is no dispute that L. C. and E. W. are disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
In addition to the provisions set out in Part A governing public services generally, see §§ 12131-12134, Title II contains in Part B a host of provisions governing public transportation services, see §§ 12141-12165.
Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act incorporates the remedies, rights, and procedures set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for violations of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See 29 U. S. C. § 794a(a)(2). Title VI, in turn, directs each federal department authorized to extend financial assistance to any department or agency of a State to issue rules and regulations consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing financial assistance. See 78 Stat. 252, 42 U. S. C. §2000d-1. Compliance with such requirements may be effected by the termination or denial of federal funds, or “by any other means authorized by law.” Ibid. Remedies both at law and in equity are available for violations of the statute. See §2000d-7(a)(2).
Congress directed the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations implementing the portion of Title II concerning public transportation. See 42 U. S. C. §§ 12143(b), 12149, 12164. As stated in the regulations, a person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of Title II may seek to enforce its provisions by commencing a private lawsuit, or by filing a complaint with (a) a federal agency that provides funding to the public entity that is the subject of the complaint, (b) the Department of Justice for referral to an appropriate agency, or (e) one of eight federal agencies responsible for investigating complaints arising under Title II: the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Education, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Transportation. See 28 CFR §§ 35.170(c), 35.172(b), 35.190(b) (1998).
The ADA contains several other provisions allocating regulatory and enforcement responsibility. Congress instructed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to issue regulations implementing Title I, see 42 U. S. C. § 12116; the EEOC, the Attorney General, and persons alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of Title I may enforce its provisions, see § 12117(a). Congress similarly instructed the Secretary of Transportation and the Attorney General to issue regulations implementing provisions of Title III, see §§ 12186(a)(1), (b); the Attorney General and persons alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of Title III may enforce its provisions, see §§ 12188(a)(1), (b). Each federal agency responsible for ADA implementation may render technical assistance to affected individuals and institutions with respect to provisions of the ADA for which the agency has responsibility. See § 12206(c)(1).
L. C. and E. W. are currently receiving treatment in community-based programs. Nevertheless, the case is not
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq., is enforceable. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that this Court’s decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 (1974), forbids enforcement of such arbitration provisions. We disagree and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
Respondents are members of the Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ (Union). Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 49 Stat. 449, as amended, the Union is the exclusive bargaining representative of employees within the building-services industry in New York City, which includes building cleaners, porters, and doorpersons. See 29 U. S. C. § 159(a). In this role, the Union has exclusive authority to bargain on behalf of its members over their “rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.” Ibid. Since the 193G’s, the Union has engaged in industrywide collective bargaining with the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc. (RAB), a multiemployer bargaining association for the New York City real-estate industry. The agreement between the Union and the RAB is embodied in their Collective Bargaining Agreement for Contractors and Building Owners (CBA). The CBA requires Union members to submit all claims of employment discrimination to binding arbitration under the CBA’s grievance and dispute resolution procedures:
“30. NO DISCRIMINATION
“There shall be no discrimination against any present or future employee by reason of race, creed, color, age, disability, national origin, sex, union membership, or any characteristic protected by law, including, but not limited to, claims made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Code,... or any other similar laws, rules or regulations. AH such claims shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure (Articles V and VI) as the sole and exclusive remedy for violations. Arbitrators shall apply appropriate law in rendering decisions based upon claims of discrimination.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a.
Petitioner 14 Penn Plaza LLC is a member of the RAB. It owns and operates the New York City office building where, prior to August 2003, respondents worked as night lobby watchmen and in other similar capacities. Respondents were directly employed by petitioner Temco Service Industries, Inc. (Temco), a maintenance service and cleaning contractor. In August 2003, with the Union’s consent, 14 Penn Plaza engaged Spartan Security, a unionized security services contractor and affiliate of Temco, to provide licensed security guards to staff the lobby and entrances of its building. Because this rendered respondents’ lobby services unnecessary, Temco reassigned them to jobs as night porters and light-duty cleaners in other locations in the building. Respondents contend that these reassignments led to a loss in income, caused them emotional distress, and were otherwise less desirable than their former positions.
At respondents’ request, the Union filed grievances challenging the reassignments. The grievances alleged that petitioners: (1) violated the CBA’s ban on workplace discrimination by reassigning respondents on account of their age; (2) violated seniority rules by failing to promote one of the respondents to a handyman position; and (3) failed to equitably rotate overtime. After failing to obtain relief on any of these claims through the grievance process, the Union requested arbitration under the CBA.
After the initial arbitration hearing, the Union withdrew the first set of respondents’ grievances — the age-discrimination claims — from arbitration. Because it had consented to the contract for new security personnel at 14 Penn Plaza, the Union believed that it could not legitimately object to respondents’ reassignments as discriminatory. But the Union continued to arbitrate the seniority and overtime claims, and, after several hearings, the claims were denied.
In May 2004, while the arbitration was ongoing but after the Union withdrew the age-discrimination claims, respondents filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that petitioners had violated their rights under the ADEA. Approximately one month later, the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights, which explained that the agency’s “‘review of the evidence... fail[ed] to indicate that a violation ha[d] occurred,’ ” and notified each respondent of his right to sue. Pyett v. Pennsylvania Building Co., 498 F. 3d 88, 91 (CA2 2007).
Respondents thereafter filed suit against petitioners in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging that their reassignment violated the ADEA and state and local laws prohibiting age discrimination. Petitioners filed a motion to compel arbitration of respondents’ claims pursuant to §§ 3 and 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §§ 3, 4. The District Court denied the motion because under Second Circuit precedent, “even a clear and unmistakable union-negotiated waiver of a right to litigate certain federal and state statutory claims in a judicial forum is unenforceable.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 21a. Respondents immediately appealed the ruling under §16 of the FAA, which authorizes an interlocutory appeal of “an order... refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title” or “denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed.” 9 U. S. C. §§16(a)(l)(AMB).
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 498 F. 3d 88. According to the Court of Appeals, it could not compel arbitration of the dispute because Gardner-Denver, which “remains good law,” held “that a collective bargaining agreement could not waive covered workers’ rights to a judicial forum for causes of action created by Congress.” 498 F. 3d, at 92, 91, n. 3 (citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U. S., at 49-51). The Court of Appeals observed that the Gardner-Denver decision was in tension with this Court’s more recent decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20 (1991), which “held that an individual employee who had agreed individually to waive his right to a federal forum could be compelled to arbitrate a federal age discrimination claim.” 498 F. 3d, at 91, n. 3 (citing Gilmer, supra, at 33-35; emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals also noted that this Court previously declined to resolve this tension in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U. S. 70, 82 (1998), where the waiver at issue was not “clear and unmistakable.” 498 F. 3d, at 91, n. 3.
The Court of Appeals attempted to reconcile Gardner-Denver and Gilmer by holding that arbitration provisions in a collective-bargaining agreement, “which purport to waive employees’ rights to a federal forum with respect to statutory claims, are unenforceable.” 498 F. 3d, at 93-94. As a result, an individual employee would be free to choose compulsory arbitration under Gilmer, but a labor union could not collectively bargain for arbitration on behalf of its members. We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. 1178 (2008), to address the issue left unresolved in Wright, which continues to divide the Courts of Appeals, and now reverse.
II
A
The NLRA governs federal labor-relations law. As permitted by that statute, respondents designated the Union as their “exclusive representative]... for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.” 29 U. S. C. § 159(a). As the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative, the Union “enjoys broad authority... in the negotiation and administration of [the] collective bargaining contract.” Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U. S. 735, 739 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). But this broad authority “is accompanied by a responsibility of equal scope, the responsibility and duty of fair representation.” Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 342 (1964). The employer has a corresponding duty under the NLRA to bargain in good faith “with the representatives of his employees” on wages, hours, and conditions of employment. 29 U. S. C. § 158(a)(5); see also § 158(d).
In this instance, the Union and the RAB, negotiating on behalf of 14 Penn Plaza, collectively bargained in good faith and agreed that employment-related discrimination claims, including claims brought under the ADEA, would be resolved in arbitration. This freely negotiated term between the Union and the RAB easily qualifies as a “conditio[n] of employment” that is subject to mandatory bargaining under § 159(a). See Litton Financial Printing Div., Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 501 U. S. 190, 199 (1991) (“[A]rrangements for arbitration of disputes are a term or condition of employment and a mandatory subject of bargaining”); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U. S. 574, 578 (1960) (“[Arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself”); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U. S. 448, 455 (1957) (“Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike”). The decision to fashion a collective-bargaining agreement to require arbitration of employment-discrimination claims is no different from the many other decisions made by parties in designing grievance machinery.
Respondents, however, contend that the arbitration clause here is outside the permissible scope of the collective-bargaining process because it affects the “employees’ individual, non-economic statutory rights.” Brief for Respondents 22; see also post, at 281-283 (Souter, J., dissenting). We disagree. Parties generally favor arbitration precisely because of the economics of dispute resolution. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105, 123 (2001) (“Arbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of particular importance in employment litigation, which often involves smaller sums of money than disputes concerning commercial contracts”). As in any contractual negotiation, a union may agree to the inclusion of an arbitration provision in a collective-bargaining agreement in return for other concessions from the employer. Courts generally may not interfere in this bargained-for exchange. “Judicial nullification of contractual concessions... is contrary to what the Court has recognized as one of the fundamental policies of the National Labor Relations Act — freedom of contract.” NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U. S. 322, 328 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
As a result, the CBA’s arbitration provision must be honored unless the ADEA itself removes this particular class of grievances from the NLRA’s broad sweep. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 628 (1985). It does not. This Court has squarely held that the ADEA does not preclude arbitration of claims brought under the statute. See Gilmer, 500 U. S., at 26-33.
In Gilmer, the Court explained that “[although all statutory claims may not be appropriate for arbitration, ‘[hjaving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.’ ” Id., at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., supra, at 628). And “[i]f Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by the ADEA to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.” 500 U. S., at 29 (internal quotation marks and some brackets omitted). The Court determined that “nothing in the text of the ADEA or its legislative history explicitly precludes arbitration.” Id., at 26-27. The Court also concluded that arbitrating ADEA disputes would not undermine the statute’s “remedial and deterrent function.” Id., at 28 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the end, the employee’s “generalized attacks” on “the adequacy of arbitration procedures” were “insufficient to preclude arbitration of statutory claims,” id., at 30, because there was no evidence that “Congress, in enacting the ADEA, intended to preclude arbitration of claims under that Act,” id., at 35.
The Gilmer Court’s interpretation of the ADEA fully applies in the collective-bargaining context. Nothing in the law suggests a distinction between the status of arbitration agreements signed by an individual employee and those agreed to by a union representative. This Court has required only that an agreement to arbitrate statutory antidiscrimination claims be “explicitly stated” in the collective-bargaining agreement. Wright, 525 U. S., at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted). The CBA under review here meets that obligation. Respondents incorrectly counter that an individual employee must personally “waive” a “[substantive] right” to proceed in court for a waiver to be “knowing and voluntary” under the ADEA. 29 U. S. C. § 626(f)(1). As explained below, however, the agreement to arbitrate ADEA claims is not the waiver of a “substantive right” as that term is employed in the ADEA. Wright, supra, at 80; see infra, at 265-266. Indeed, if the “right” referred to in § 626(f)(1) included the prospective waiver of the right to bring an ADEA claim in court, even a waiver signed by an individual employee would be invalid as the statute also prevents individuals from “waiving] rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is executed.” § 626(f)(1)(C).
Examination of the two federal statutes at issue in this ease, therefore, yields a straightforward answer to the question presented: The NLRA provided the Union and the RAB with statutory authority to collectively bargain for arbitration of workplace discrimination claims, and Congress did not terminate that authority with respect to federal age-discrimination claims in the ADEA. Accordingly, there is no legal basis for the Court to strike down the arbitration clause in this CBA, which was freely negotiated by the Union and the RAB, and which clearly and unmistakably requires respondents to arbitrate the age-discrimination claims at issue in this appeal. Congress has chosen to allow arbitration of ADEA claims. The Judiciary must respect that choice.
B
The CBA’s arbitration provision is also fully enforceable under the Gardner-Denver line of cases. Respondents interpret Gardner-Denver and its progeny to hold that “a union cannot waive an employee’s right to a judicial forum under the federal antidiscrimination statutes” because “allowing the union to waive this right would substitute the union’s interests for the employee’s antidiscrimination rights.” Brief for Respondents 12. The “combination of union control over the process and inherent conflict of interest with respect to discrimination claims,” they argue, “provided the foundation for the Court’s holding [in Gardner-Denver] that arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement could not preclude an individual employee’s right to bring a lawsuit in court to vindicate a statutory discrimination claim.” Id., at 15. We disagree.
1
The holding of Gardner-Denver is not as broad as respondents suggest. The employee in that case was covered by a collective-bargaining agreement that prohibited “discrimination against any employee on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or ancestry” and that guaranteed that “[n]o employee will be discharged... except for just cause.” 415 U. S., at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted). The agreement also included a “multistep grievance procedure” that culminated in compulsory arbitration for any “differences aris[ing] between the Company and the Union as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement” and “any trouble aris[ing] in the plant.” Id., at 40-41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The employee was discharged for allegedly producing too many defective parts while working for the respondent as a drill operator. He filed a grievance with his union claiming that he was “ ‘unjustly discharged’ ” in violation of the “ ‘just cause’” provision within the collective-bargaining agreement. Id., at 39, 42. Then at the final prearbitration step of the grievance process, the employee added a claim that he was discharged because of his race. Id., at 38-42.
The arbitrator ultimately ruled that the employee had been “ ‘discharged for just cause,’ ” but “made no reference to [the] claim of racial discrimination.” Id., at 42. After obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, the employee filed a claim in Federal District Court, alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The District Court issued a decision, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which granted summary judgment to the employer because it concluded that “the claim of racial discrimination had been submitted to the arbitrator and resolved adversely to [the employee].” Id., at 43. In the District Court’s view, “having voluntarily elected to pursue his grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of the collective-bargaining agreement,” the employee was “bound by the arbitral decision” and precluded from suing his employer on any other grounds, such as a statutory claim under Title VII. Ibid.
This Court reversed the judgment on the narrow ground that the arbitration was not preclusive because the collective-bargaining agreement did not cover statutory claims. As a result, the lower courts erred in relying on the “doctrine of election of remedies” to bar the employee’s Title VII claim. Id., at 49. “That doctrine, which refers to situations where an individual pursues remedies that are legally or factually inconsistent” with each other, did not apply to the employee’s dual pursuit of arbitration and a Title VII discrimination claim in district court. Ibid. The employee’s collective-bargaining agreement did not mandate arbitration of statutory antidiscrimination claims. Id., at 49-50. “As the proctor of the bargain, the arbitrator’s task is to effectuate the intent of the parties.” Id., at 53. Because the collective-bargaining agreement gave the arbitrator “authority to resolve only questions of contractual rights,” his decision could not prevent the employee from bringing the Title VII claim in federal court “regardless of whether certain contractual rights are similar to, or duplicative of, the substantive rights secured by Title VII.” Id., at 53-54; see also id., at 50.
The Court also explained that the employee had not waived his right to pursue his Title VII claim in federal court by participating in an arbitration that was premised on the same underlying facts as the Title VII claim. See id., at 52. Thus, whether the legal theory of preclusion advanced by the employer rested on “the doctrines of election of remedies” or was recast “as resting instead on the doctrine of equitable estoppel and on themes of res judicata and collateral estoppel,” id., at 49, n. 10 (internal quotation marks omitted), it could not prevail in light of the collective-bargaining agreement’s failure to address arbitration of Title VII claims. See id., at 46, n. 6 (“[W]e hold that the federal policy favoring arbitration does not establish that an arbitrator’s resolution of a contractual claim is dispositive of a statutory claim under Title VII” (emphasis added)).
The Court’s decisions following Gardner-Denver have not broadened its holding to make it applicable to the facts of this case. In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U. S. 728 (1981), the Court considered “whether an employee may bring an action in federal district court, alleging a violation of the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act,... after having unsuccessfully submitted a wage claim based on the same underlying facts to a joint grievance committee pursuant to the provisions of his union’s collective-bargaining agreement.” Id., at 729-730. The Court held that the unsuccessful arbitration did not preclude the federal lawsuit. Like the collective-bargaining agreement in Gardner-Denver, the arbitration provision under review in Barrentine did not expressly reference the statutory claim at issue. See 450 U. S., at 731, n. 5. The Court thus reiterated that an “arbitrator’s power is both derived from, and limited by, the collective-bargaining agreement” and “[h]is task is limited to construing the meaning of the collective-bargaining agreement so as to effectuate the collective intent of the parties.” Id., at 744.
McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U. S. 284 (1984), was decided along similar lines. The question presented in that case was “whether a federal court may accord preclusive effect to an unappealed arbitration award in a case brought under [42 U. S. C. § 1983].” Id., at 285. The Court declined to fashion such a rule, again explaining that “because an arbitrator’s authority derives solely from the contract, Barren-tine, supra, at 744, an arbitrator may not have the authority to enforce § 1983” when that provision is left unaddressed by the arbitration agreement. Id., at 290. Accordingly, as in both Gardner-Denver and Barrentine, the Court’s decision in McDonald hinged on the scope of the collective-bargaining agreement and the arbitrator’s parallel mandate.
The facts underlying Gardner-Denver, Barrentine, and McDonald reveal the narrow scope of the legal rule arising from that trilogy of decisions. Summarizing those opinions in Gilmer, this Court made clear that the Gardner-Denver line of cases “did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims.” 500 U. S., at 35. Those decisions instead “involved the quite different issue whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims. Since the employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory, claims, and the labor arbitrators were not authorized to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably was held not to preclude subsequent statutory actions.” Ibid.; see also Wright, 525 U. S., at 76; Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U. S. 107, 127, n. 21 (1994). Gardner-Denver and its progeny thus do not control the outcome where, as is the case here, the collective-bargaining agreement’s arbitration provision expressly covers both statutory and contractual discrimination claims.
2
We recognize that apart from their narrow holdings, the Gardner-Denver line of cases included broad dicta that were highly critical of the use of arbitration for the vindication of statutory antidiscrimination rights. That skepticism, however, rested on a misconceived view of arbitration that this Court has since abandoned.
First, the Court in Gardner-Denver erroneously assumed that an agreement to submit statutory discrimination claims to arbitration was tantamount to a waiver of those rights. See 415 U. S., at 51 (“[T]here can be no prospective waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII” (emphasis added)). For this reason, the Court stated, “the rights conferred [by Title VII] can form no part of the collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII.” Ibid.; see also id., at 56 (“[W]e have long recognized that The choice of forums inevitably affects the scope of the substantive right to be vindicated’ ” (quoting U. S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U. S. 351, 359-360 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring))).
The Court was correct in concluding that federal antidiscrimination rights may not be prospectively waived, see 29 U. S. C. § 626(f)(1)(C); see supra, at 259, but it confused an agreement to arbitrate those statutory claims with a prospective waiver of the substantive right. The decision to resolve ADEA claims by way of arbitration instead of litigation does not waive the statutory right to be free from workplace age discrimination; it waives only the right to seek relief from a court in the first instance. See Gilmer, supra, at 26 (‘“[B]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum’” (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U. S., at 628)). This “Court has been quite specific in holding that arbitration agreements can be enforced under the FAA without contravening the policies of congressional enactments giving employees specific protection against discrimination prohibited by federal law.” Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U. S., at 123. The suggestion in Gardner-Denver that the decision to arbitrate statutory discrimination claims was tantamount to a substantive waiver of those rights, therefore, reveals a distorted understanding of the compromise made when an employee agrees to compulsory arbitration.
In this respect, Gardner-Denver is a direct descendant of the Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427 (1953), which held that an agreement to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933 was unenforceable. See id., at 438. The Court subsequently overruled Wilko and, in so doing, characterized the decision as “pervaded by... ‘the old judicial hostility to arbitration.’” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 480 (1989). The Court added: “To the extent that Wilko rested on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes.” Id., at 481; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp., supra, at 626-627 (“[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution”). The timeworn “mistrust of the arbitral process” harbored by the Court in Gardner-Denver thus weighs against reliance on anything more than its core holding. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U. S. 220, 231-232 (1987); see also Gilmer, 500 U. S., at 34, n. 5 (reiterating that Gardner-Denver’s view of arbitration “has been undermined by [the Court’s] recent arbitration decisions”). Indeed, in light of the “radical change, over two decades, in the Court’s receptivity to arbitration,” Wright, 525 U. S., at 77, reliance on any judicial decision similarly littered with Wilko’s overt hostility to the enforcement of arbitration agreements would be ill advised.
Second, Gardner-Denver mistakenly suggested that certain features of arbitration made it a forum “well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes,” but “a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII.” 415 U. S., at 56. According to the Court, the “factfinding process in arbitration” is “not equivalent to judicial factfinding” and the “informality of arbitral procedure... makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal courts.” Id., at 57, 58. The Court also questioned the competence of arbitrators to decide federal statutory claims. See id., at 57 (“[T]he specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land”); Barrentine, 450 U. S., at 743 (“Although an arbitrator may be competent to resolve many preliminary factual questions, such as whether the employee ‘punched in’ when he said he did, he may lack the competence to decide the ultimate legal issue whether an employee’s right to a minimum wage or to overtime pay under the statute has been violated”). In the Court’s view, “the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of courts, and judicial construction has proved especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad language frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law concepts.” Gardner-Denver, supra, at 57; see also McDonald, 466 U. S., at 290 (“An arbitrator may not... have the expertise required to resolve the complex legal questions that arise in § 1983 actions”).
These misconceptions have been corrected. For example, the Court has “recognized that arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling the factual and legal complexities of antitrust claims, notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction and supervision” and that “there is no reason to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law.” McMahon, supra, at 232; Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U. S., at 634 (“We decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators”). An arbitrator’s capacity to resolve complex questions of fact and law extends with equal force to discrimination claims brought under the ADEA. Moreover, the recognition that arbitration procedures are more streamlined than federal litigation is not a basis for finding the forum somehow inadequate; the relative informality of arbitration is one of the chief reasons that parties select arbitration. Parties “trad[e] the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.” Id., at 628. In any event, “[i]t is unlikely... that age discrimination claims require more extensive discovery than other claims that we have found to be arbitrable, such as [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act] and antitrust claims.” Gilmer, supra, at 31. At bottom, objections centered on the nature of arbitration do not offer a credible basis for discrediting the choice of that forum to resolve statutory antidiscrimination claims.
Third, the Court in Gardner-Denver raised in a footnote a “further concern” regarding “the union’s exclusive control over the manner and extent to which an individual grievance is presented.” 415 U. S., at 58, n. 19. The Court suggested that in arbitration, as in the collective-bargaining process, a union may subordinate the interests of an individual employee to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit. Ibid.; see also McDonald, supra, at 291 (“The union’s interests and those of the individual employee are not always identical or even compatible. As a result, the union may present the employee’s grievance less vigorously, or make different strategic choices, than would the employee”); see also Barrentine, supra, at 742; post, at 284, n. 4 (Souter, J., dissenting).
We cannot rely on this judicial policy concern as a source of authority for introducing a qualification into the ADEA that is not found in its text. Absent a constitutional barrier, “it is not for us to substitute our view of... policy for the legislation which has been passed by Congress.” Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U. S. 33, 52 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress is fully equipped “to identify any category of claims as to which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp., supra, at 627. Until Congress amends the ADEA to meet the conflict-of-interest concern identified in the Gardner-Denver dicta, and seized on by respondents here, there is “no reason to color the lens through which the arbitration clause is read” simply because of an alleged conflict of interest between a union and its members. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., supra, at 628. This is a “battl[e] that should be fought among the political branches and the industry. Those parties should not seek to amend the statute by appeal to the Judicial Branch.” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 462 (2002).
The conflict-of-interest argument also proves too much. Labor unions certainly balance the economic interests of some employees against the needs of the larger work force as they negotiate collective-bargaining agreements and implement them on a daily basis. But this attribute of organized labor does not justify singling out an arbitration provision for disfavored treatment. This “principle of majority rule” to which respondents object is in fact the central premise of the NLRA. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U. S. 50, 62 (1975). “In establishing a regime of majority rule, Congress sought to secure to all members of the unit the benefits of their collective strength and bargaining power, in full awareness that the superior strength of some individuals or groups might be subordinated to the interest of the majority.” Ibid, (footnote omitted); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U. S. 330, 338 (1953) (“The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected”); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Rychlik, 352 U. S. 480, 498 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It was Congress’ verdict that the benefits of organized labor outweigh the sacrifice of individual liberty that this system necessarily demands. Respondents’ argument that they were deprived of the right to pursue their ADEA claims in federal court by a labor union with a conflict of interest is therefore unsustainable; it amounts to a collateral attack on the NLRA.
In any event, Congress has accounted for this conflict of interest in several ways. As indicated above, the NLRA has been interpreted to impose a “duty of fair representation” on labor unions, which a union breaches “when its conduct toward a member of the bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Marquez v. Screen Actors, 525 U. S. 33, 44 (1998). This duty extends to “challenges leveled not only at a union’s contract administration and enforcement efforts but at its negotiation activities as well.” Beck, 487 U. S., at 743 (citation omitted). Thus, a union is subject to liability under the NLRA if it illegally discriminates against older workers in either the formation or governance of the collective-bargaining agreement, such as by deciding not to pursue a grievance on behalf of one of its members for discriminatory reasons. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 177 (1967) (describing
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case, like Ginzburg v. United States, ante, p. 463, also decided today, involves convictions under a criminal obscenity statute. A panel of three judges of the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York found appellant guilty of violating § 1141 of the New York Penal Law by hiring others to prepare obscene books, publishing obscene books, and possessing obscene books with intent to sell them. 26 Misc. 2d 152, 207 N. Y. S. 2d 390 (1960). He was sentenced to prison terms aggregating three years and ordered to pay $12,000 in fines for these crimes. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed those convictions. 17 App. Div. 2d 243, 234 N. Y. S. 2d 342 (1962). The Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. 15 N. Y. 2d 671, 204 N. E. 2d 209 (1964), remittitur amended, 15 N. Y. 2d 724, 205 N. E. 2d 201 (1965). We noted probable jurisdiction. 380 U. S. 960. We affirm.
Appellant was not prosecuted for anything he said or believed, but for what he did, for his dominant role in several enterprises engaged in producing and selling allegedly obscene books. Fifty books are involved in this case. They portray sexuality in many guises. Some depict relatively normal heterosexual relations, but more depict such deviations as sado-masochism, fetishism, and homosexuality. Many have covers with drawings of scantily clad women being whipped, beaten, tortured, or abused. Many, if not most, are photo-offsets of typewritten books written and illustrated by authors and artists according to detailed instructions given by the appellant. Typical of appellant’s instructions was that related by one author who testified that appellant insisted that the books be “full of sex scenes and lesbian scenes .... [T]he sex had to be very strong, it had to be rough, it had to be clearly spelled out. ... I had to write sex very bluntly, make the sex scenes very strong. . . . [T]he sex scenes had to be unusual sex scenes between men and women, and women and women, and men and men. . . . [H]e wanted scenes in which women were making love with women .... [H]e wanted sex scenes ... in which there were lesbian scenes. He didn’t call it lesbian, but he described women making love to women and men . . . making love to men, and there were spankings and scenes — sex in an abnormal and irregular fashion.” Another author testified that appellant instructed him “to deal very graphically with . . . the darkening of the flesh under flagellation . . . .” Artists testified in similar vein as to appellant’s instructions regarding illustrations and covers for the books.
All the books are cheaply prepared paperbound “pulps” with imprinted sales prices that are several thousand percent above costs. All but three were printed by a photo-offset printer who was paid 400 or 150 per copy, depending on whether it was a “thick” or “thin” book. The printer was instructed by appellant not to use appellant’s name as publisher but to print some fictitious name on each book, to “make up any name and address.” Appellant stored books on the printer’s premises and paid part of the printer’s rent for the storage space. The printer filled orders for the books, at appellant’s direction, delivering them to appellant’s retail store, Publishers’ Outlet, and, on occasion, shipping books to other places. Appellant paid the authors, artists, and printer cash for their services, usually at his bookstore.
I.
Appellant attacks § 1141 as invalid on its face, contending that it exceeds First Amendment limitations by proscribing publications that are merely sadistic or masochistic, that the terms “sadistic” and “masochistic” are impermissibly vague, and that the term “obscene” is also impermissibly vague. We need not decide the merits of the first two contentions, for the New York courts held in this case that the terms “sadistic” and “masochistic,” as well as the other adjectives used in § 1141 to describe proscribed books, are “synonymous with 'obscene.’ ” 26 Misc. 2d, at 154, 207 N. Y. S. 2d, at 393. The contention that the term “obscene” is also impermissibly vague fails under our holding in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 491-492. Indeed, the definition of “obscene” adopted by the New York courts in interpreting § 1141 delimits a narrower class of conduct than that delimited under the Roth definition, People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N. Y. 2d 578, 586-587, 175 N. E. 2d 681, 685-686 (1961), and thus § 1141, like the statutes in Roth, provides reasonably ascertainable standards of guilt.
Appellant also objects that § 1141 is invalid as applied, first, because the books he was convicted of publishing, hiring others to prepare, and possessing for sale are not obscene, and second, because the proof of scienter is inadequate.
1. The Nature of the Material. — The First Amendment prohibits criminal prosecution for the publication and dissemination of allegedly obscene books that do not satisfy the Roth definition of obscenity. States are free to adopt other definitions of obscenity only to the extent that those adopted stay within the bounds set by the constitutional criteria of the Roth definition, which restrict the regulation of the publication and sale of books to that traditionally and universally tolerated in our society.
The New York courts have interpreted obscenity in § 1141 to cover only so-called “hard-core pornography,” see People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N. Y. 2d 578, 586-587, 175 N. E. 2d 681, 685-686 (1961), quoted in note 4, supra. Since that definition of obscenity is more stringent than the Roth definition, the judgment that the constitutional criteria are satisfied is implicit in the application of § 1141 below. Indeed, appellant’s sole contention regarding the nature of the material is that some of the books involved in this prosecution, those depicting various deviant sexual practices, such as flagellation, fetishism, and lesbianism, do not satisfy the prurient-appeal requirement because they do not appeal to a prurient interest of the “average person” in sex, that “instead of stimulating the erotic, they disgust and sicken.” We reject this argument as being founded on an unrealistic interpretation of the prurient-appeal requirement.
Where the material is designed for and primarily disseminated to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large, the prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex of the members of that group. The reference to the “average” or “normal” person in Roth, 354 U. S., at 489-490, does not foreclose this holding. In regard to the prurient-appeal requirement, the concept of the “average” or “normal” person was employed in Roth to serve the essentially negative purpose of expressing our rejection of that aspect of the Hicklin test, Regina v. Hicklin, [1868] L. R. 3 Q. B. 360, that made the impact on the most susceptible person determinative. We adjust the prurient-appeal requirement to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests of its intended and probable recipient group; and since our holding requires that the recipient group be defined with more specificity than in terms of sexually immature persons, it also avoids the inadequacy of the most-susceptible-person facet of the Hicklin test.
No substantial claim is made that the books depicting sexually deviant practices are devoid of prurient appeal to sexually deviant groups. The evidence fully establishes that these books were specifically conceived and marketed for such groups. Appellant instructed his authors and artists to prepare the books expressly to induce their purchase by persons who would probably be sexually stimulated by them. It was for this reason that appellant “wanted an emphasis on beatings and fetishism and clothing — irregular clothing, and that sort of thing, and again sex scenes between women; always sex scenes had to be very strong.” And to be certain that authors fulfilled his purpose, appellant furnished them with such source materials as Caprio, Variations in Sexual Behavior, and Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis. Not only was there proof of the books’ prurient appeal, compare United States v. Klaw, 350 F. 2d 155 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1965), but the proof was compelling; in addition appellant’s own evaluation of his material confirms such a finding. See Ginzburg v. United States, ante, p. 463.
2. Scienter.—In People v. Finkelstein, 9 N. Y. 2d 342, 344-345, 174 N. E. 2d 470, 471 (1961), the New York Court of Appeals authoritatively interpreted § 1141 to require the “vital element of scienter,” and it defined the required mental element in these terms:
“A reading of the statute [§ 1141] as a whole clearly indicates that only those who are in some manner aware of the character of the material they attempt to distribute should be punished. It is not innocent but calculated purveyance of filth which is exorcised . ...” (Emphasis added.)
Appellant’s challenge to the validity of § 1141 founded on Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, is thus foreclosed, and this construction of § 1141 makes it unnecessary for us to define today “what sort of mental element is requisite to a constitutionally permissible prosecution.” Id., at 154. The Constitution requires proof of scienter to avoid the hazard of self-censorship of constitutionally protected material and to compensate for the ambiguities inherent in the definition of obscenity. The New York definition of the scienter required by § 1141 amply serves those ends, and therefore fully meets the demands of the Constitution. Cf. Roth v. United States, 354 U. S., at 495-496 Warren, C. J., concurring).
Appellant’s principal argument is that there was insufficient proof of scienter. This argument is without merit. The evidence of scienter in this record consists, in part, of appellant’s instructions to his artists and writers; his efforts to disguise his role in the enterprise that published and sold the books; the transparency of the character of the material in question, highlighted by the titles, covers, and illustrations; the.massive number of obscene books appellant published, hired others to prepare, and possessed for sale; the repetitive quality of the sequences and formats of the books; and the exorbitant prices marked on the books. This evidence amply shows that appellant was “aware of the character of the material” and that his activity was “not innocent but calculated purveyance of filth.”
II.
Appellant claims that all but one of the books were improperly admitted in evidence because they were fruits of illegal searches and seizures. This claim is not capable in itself of being brought here by appeal, but only by a petition for a writ of certiorari under 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (3) (1964 ed.) as specifically setting up a federal constitutional right. Nevertheless, since appellant challenged the constitutionality of § 1141 in this prosecution, and the New York courts sustained the statute, the case is properly here on appeal, and our unrestricted notation of probable jurisdiction justified appellant’s briefing of the search and seizure issue. Flournoy v. Weiner, 321 U. S. 253, 263; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 547. The nonappealable issue is treated, however, as if contained in a petition for a writ of certiorari, see 28 U. S. C. § 2103 (1964 ed.), and the unrestricted notation of probable jurisdiction of the appeal is to be understood as a grant of the writ on that issue. The issue thus remains within our certiorari jurisdiction, and we may, for good reason, even at this stage, decline to decide the merits of the issue, much as we would dismiss a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. We think that this is a case for such an exercise of our discretion.
The far-reaching and important questions tendered by this claim are not presented by the record with sufficient, clarity to require or justify their decision. Appellant’s standing to assert the claim in regard to all the seizures is not entirely clear; there is no finding on the extent or nature of his interest in two book stores, the Main Stem Book Shop and Midget Book Shop, in which some of the books were seized. The State seeks to justify the basement storeroom seizure, in part, on the basis of the consent of the printer-accomplice; but there were no findings as to the authority of the printer over the access to the storeroom, or as to the voluntariness of his alleged consent. It is also maintained that the seizure in the storeroom was made on the authority of a search warrant; yet neither the affidavit upon which the warrant issued nor the warrant itself is in the record. Finally, while the search and seizure issue has a First Amendment aspect because of the alleged massive quality of the seizures, see A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205, 206 (opinion of Brennan, J.); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, the record in this regard is inadequate. There is neither evidence nor findings as to how many of the total available copies of the books in the various bookstores were seized and it is impossible to determine whether the books seized in the basement storeroom were on the threshold of dissemination. Indeed, this First Amendment aspect apparently was not presented or considered by the state courts, nor was it raised in appellant’s jurisdictional statement; it appeared for the first time in his brief on the merits.
In light of these circumstances, which were not fully apprehended at the time we took the case, we decline to reach the merits of the search and seizure claim; insofar as notation of probable jurisdiction may be regarded as a grant of the certiorari writ on the search and seizure issue, that writ is dismissed as improvidently granted. “Examination of a case on the merits . . . may bring into ‘proper focus’ a consideration which . . . later indicates that the grant was improvident.” The Monrosa v. Carbon Black, 359 U. S. 180, 184.
Affirmed.
[For dissenting opinion of MR. Justice Douglas, see ante, p. 482.]
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
THE CONVICTIONS BEING REVIEWED.
§ 1141 Counts Naming the Book
Title of Book Pub- Hiring Possession lishing Others
Chances Go Around 1 63 111 H
Impact 2 64 112 (N
Female Sultan 3 65 113 M
Satin Satellite 4 rH
Her Highness 5 67 115 lO
Mistress of Leather 6 68 116 CO
Educating Edna 7 69 117 N
Strange Passions 8 70 118
The Whipping Chorus Girls 9 71 119
Order Of The Day and Bound Maritally 10 72 120
11 Dance With the Dominant Whip 11 73 121
12 Cult Of The Spankers 12 74 122
13 Confessions 13 75 123
14 & 46 The Hours Of Torture 14 & 40 76 124
15&47 Bound In Rubber 15&41 77 125
16 & 48 Arduous Figure Training at Bondhaven 16&42 78 126
17&49 Return Visit To Fetterland 17&43 79 127
18 Fearful Ordeal In Restraintland 18 80 128
19 & 50 Women In Distress 19&44 81 129
20 & 54 Pleasure Parade No. 1 20&48 82 130
21 & 57 Screaming Flesh 21 & 51 86 134
22 & 58 Fury 22 & 52
23 So Firm So Fully Packed 23 87 135
24 I’ll Try Anything Twice 24
25 & 59 26 Masque Catanis 25 & 53 26
§ 1141 Counts Naming the Book
Title of Book Pub- Hiring lishing Others Possession
The Violated Wrestler 89 137 27
Betrayal 28
Swish Bottom 29 90 138
Raw Dames 30 91 139
The Strap Returns 31 92 140
Dangerous Years 32 93 141
Columns of Agony 37 95 144
The Tainted Pleasure 38 96 145
Intense Desire 39 97 146
Pleasure Parade No. 4 45 85 133
Pleasure Parade No. 3 46 84 132
Pleasure Parade No. 2 47 83 131
Sorority Girls Stringent Initiation 49 98 147
Terror At The Bizarre Museum 50 99 148
Temptation 57
Peggy’s Distress On Planet Venus 58 101 150
Ways of Discipline 59 102 151
Mrs. Tyrant’s Finishing School 60 103 152
Perilous Assignment 61 104 153
Bondage Correspondence 107 156
Woman Impelled 106 155
Eye Witness 108 157
Stud Broad 109 158
Queen Bee no-159
Section 1141 of the Penal Law, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
“1. A person who . . . has in his possession with intent to sell, lend, distribute . . . any obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, sadistic, masochistic or disgusting book ... or who . . . prints, utters, publishes, or in any manner manufactures, or prepares any such book ... or who
“2. In any manner, hires, employs, uses or permits any person to do or assist in doing any act or thing mentioned in this section, or any of them,
“Is guilty of a misdemeanor ....
“4. The possession by any person of six or more identical or similar articles coming within the provisions of subdivision one of this section is presumptive evidence of a violation of this section.
“5. The publication for sale of any book, magazine or pamphlet designed, composed or illustrated as a whole to appeal to and commercially exploit prurient interest by combining covers, pictures, drawings, illustrations, caricatures, cartoons, words, stories and advertisements or any combination or combinations thereof devoted to the description, portrayal or deliberate suggestion of illicit sex, including adultery, prostitution, fornication, sexual crime and sexual perversion or to the exploitation of sex and nudity by the presentation of nude or partially nude female figures, posed, photographed or otherwise presented in a manner calculated to provoke or incite prurient interest, or any combination or combinations thereof, shall be a violation of this section.”
The information charged 159 counts of violating § 1141; in each instance a single count named a single book, although often the same book was the basis of three counts, each alleging one of the three types of § 1141 offenses. Of these, 11 counts were dismissed on motion of the prosecutor at the outset of the trial and verdicts of acquittal were entered on seven counts at the end of trial. The remaining § 1141 counts on which appellant was convicted are listed in the Appendix to this opinion.
Appellant was also convicted on 33 counts charging violations of § 330 of the General Business Law for failing to print the publisher’s and printer’s names and addresses on the books. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions under these counts, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The State has not sought review of that decision in this Court.
The trial court divided the counts into five groups for purposes of sentencing. One group consisted of the possession counts concerning books seized from a basement storeroom in a warehouse; a second group of possession counts concerned books seized from appellant’s retail bookstore, Publishers’ Outlet; the third consisted of the publishing counts; the fourth consisted of the counts charging him with hiring others to prepare the books, and the fifth consisted of the counts charging violations of the General Business Law. Sentences of one year and a $3,000 fine were imposed on one count of each of the first four groups; the prison sentences on the first three were made consecutive and that on the count in the fourth group was made concurrent with that in the third group. A $500 fine was imposed on one count in the fifth group. Sentence was suspended on the convictions on all other counts. The suspension of sentence does not render moot the claims as to invalidity of the convictions on those counts.
“It [obscene material covered by § 1141] focuses predominantly upon what is sexually morbid, grossly perverse and bizarre, without any artistic or scientific purpose or justification. Recognizable ‘by the insult it offers, invariably, to sex, and to the human spirit’ (D. H. Lawrence, Pornography and Obscenity [1930], p. 12), it is to be differentiated from the bawdy and the ribald. Depicting dirt for dirt’s sake, the obscene is the vile, rather than the coarse, the blow to sense, not merely to sensibility. It smacks, at times, of fantasy and unreality, of sexual perversion and sickness and represents, according to one thoughtful scholar, ‘a debauchery of the sexual faculty.’ (Murray, Literature and Censorship, 14 Books on Trial 393, 394; see, also, Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 65.)” 9 N. Y. 2d, at 587, 175 N. E. 2d, at 686.
See also People v. Fritch, 13 N. Y. 2d 119, 123, 192 N. E. 2d 713, 716 (1963):
“In addition to the foregoing tests imposed by the decisions of the [United States] Supreme Court, this court interpreted section 1141 of the Penal Law in People v. Richmond County News ... as applicable only to material which may properly be termed ‘hard-core pornography.’ ”
The stringent scienter requirement of §1141, as interpreted in People v. Finkelstein, 9 N. Y. 2d 342, 345, 174 N. E. 2d 470, 472 (1961), also eviscerates much of appellant’s vagueness claim. See, infra, pp. 510-512. See generally, Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337, 342; American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 412-413; Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 101—104 (opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas) ; United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 524; Gorin v. United States, 312 U. S. 19, 27-28; Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497, 501-503; Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343, 348.
It could not be plausibly maintained that all of the appellant’s books, including those dominated by descriptions of relatively normal heterosexual relationships, are devoid of the requisite prurient appeal.
See Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U. S. 478, 482 (opinion of Harlan, J.); Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 72-73 (1960).
It is true that some of the material in Alberts v. California, decided with Roth, resembled the deviant material involved here. But no issue involving the obscenity of the material was before us in either case. 354 TJ. S., at 481, n. 8. The basic question for decision there was whether the publication and sale of obscenity, however defined, could be criminally punished in light of First Amendment guarantees. Our discussion of definition was not intended to develop all the nuances of a definition required by the constitutional guarantees.
See generally, 1 American Handbook of Psychiatry 593-604 (Arieti ed. 1959), for a description of the pertinent types of deviant sexual groups.
For a similar scienter requirement see Model Penal Code §251.4 (2); Commentary, Model Penal Code (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1957), 14, 49-51; cf. Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 Col. L. Rev. 669, 677 (1963).
We do not read Judge Froessel’s parenthetical reference to knowledge of the contents of the books in his opinion in People v. Finkelstein, 11 N. Y. 2d 300, 304, 183 N. E. 2d 661, 663 (1962), as a modification of this definition of scienter. Cf. People v. Fritch, 13 N. Y. 2d 119, 126, 192 N. E. 2d 713, 717-718 (1963).
The scienter requirement set out in the text would seem to be, as a matter of state law, as applicable to publishers as it is to booksellers; both types of activities are encompassed within subdivision 1 of § 1141. Moreover, there is no need for us to speculate as to whether this scienter requirement is also present in subdivision 2 of § 1141 (making it a crime to hire others to prepare obscene books), for appellant’s convictions for that offense involved books for the publication of which he was also convicted.
No constitutional claim was asserted below or in this Court as to the possible duplicative character of the hiring and publishing counts.
The first appeal in Finkelstein defining the scienter required by § 1141 was decided after this case was tried, but before the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals affirmed these convictions. We therefore conclude that the state appellate courts were satisfied that the § 1141 scienter requirement was correctly applied at trial.
The § 1141 counts did not allege appellant’s knowledge of the character of the books, but appellant has not argued, below or here, that this omission renders the information constitutionally inadequate.
Unlike the claim here, the challenges decided in the appeals in Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, and A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205, implicated the constitutional validity of statutory schemes establishing procedures for seizing the books.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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C
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment by a jury in the Circuit Court of Lauder-dale County, Mississippi. The only issue before us is whether fingerprints obtained from petitioner should have been excluded from evidence as the product of a detention which was illegal under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The rape occurred on the evening of December 2, 1965, at the victim’s home in Meridian, Mississippi. The victim could give no better description of her assailant than that he was a Negro youth. Finger and palm prints found on the sill and borders of the window through which the assailant apparently entered the victim’s home constituted the only other lead available at the outset of the police investigation. Beginning on December 3, and for a period of about 10 days, the Meridian police, without warrants, took at least 24 Negro youths to police headquarters where they were questioned briefly, fingerprinted, and then released without charge. The police also interrogated 40 or 50 other Negro youths either at police headquarters, at school, or on the street. Petitioner, a 14-year-old youth who had occasionally worked for the victim as a yardboy, was brought in on December 3 and released after being fingerprinted and routinely questioned. Between December 3 and December 7, he was interrogated by the police on several occasions— sometimes in his home or in a car, other times at police headquarters. This questioning apparently related primarily to investigation of other potential suspects. Several times during this same period petitioner was exhibited to the victim in her hospital room. A police officer testified that these confrontations were for the purpose of sharpening the victim’s description of her assailant by providing “a gauge to go by on size and color.” The victim did not identify petitioner as her assailant at any of these confrontations.
On December 12, the police drove petitioner 90 miles to the city of Jackson and confined him overnight in the Jackson jail. The State conceded on oral argument in this Court that there was neither a warrant nor probable cause for this arrest. The next day, petitioner, who had not yet been afforded counsel, took a lie detector test and signed a statement. He was then returned to and confined in the Meridian jail. On December 14, while so confined, petitioner was fingerprinted a second time. That same day, these December 14 prints, together with the fingerprints of 23 other Negro youths apparently still under suspicion, were sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, D. C., for comparison with the latent prints taken from the window of the victim’s house. The FBI reported that petitioner’s prints matched those taken from the window. Petitioner was subsequently indicted and tried for the rape, and the fingerprint evidence was admitted in evidence at trial over petitioner’s timely objections that the fingerprints should be excluded as the product of an unlawful detention. The Mississippi Supreme Court sustained the admission of the fingerprint evidence and affirmed the conviction. 204 So. 2d 270 (1967). We granted certiorari. 393 U. S. 821 (1968). We reverse.
At the outset, we find no merit in the suggestion in the Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion that fingerprint evidence, because of its trustworthiness, is not subject to the proscriptions of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Our decisions recognize no exception to the rule that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible at trial, however relevant and trustworthy the seized evidence may be as an item of proof. The exclusionary rule was fashioned as a sanction to redress and deter overreaching governmental conduct prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. To make an exception for illegally seized evidence which is trustworthy would fatally undermine these purposes. Thus, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655 (1961), we held that “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.” (Italics supplied.) Fingerprint evidence is no exception to this comprehensive rule. We agree with and adopt the conclusion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Bynum v. United States, 104 U. S. App. D. C. 368, 370, 262 F. 2d 465, 467 (1958):
“True, fingerprints can be distinguished from statements given during detention. They can also be distinguished from articles taken from a prisoner’s possession. Both similarities and differences of each type of evidence to and from the others are apparent. But all three have the decisive common characteristic of being something of evidentiary value which the public authorities have caused an arrested person to yield to them during illegal detention. If one such product of illegal detention is proscribed, by the same token all should be proscribed.”
We turn then to the question whether the detention of petitioner during which the fingerprints used at trial were taken constituted an unreasonable seizure of his person in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The opinion of the Mississippi Supreme Court proceeded on the mistaken premise that petitioner’s prints introduced at trial were taken during his brief detention on December 3. In fact, as both parties before us agree, the fingerprint evidence used at trial was obtained on December 14, while petitioner was still in detention following his December 12 arrest. The legality of his arrest was not determined by the Mississippi Supreme Court. However, on oral argument here, the State conceded that the arrest on December 12 and the ensuing detention through December 14 were based on neither a warrant nor probable cause and were therefore constitutionally invalid. The State argues, nevertheless, that this invalidity should not prevent us from affirming petitioner’s conviction. The December 3 prints were validly obtained, it is argued, and “it should make no difference in the practical or legal sense which [fingerprint] card was sent to the F. B. I. for comparison.” It may be that it does make a difference in light of the objectives of the exclusionary rule, see Bynum v. United States, supra, at 371-372, 262 F. 2d, at 468-469, but we need not decide the question since we have concluded that the prints of December 3 were not validly obtained.
The State makes no claim that petitioner voluntarily accompanied the police officers to headquarters on December 3 and willingly submitted to fingerprinting. The State's brief also candidly admits that “[a] 11 that the Meridian Police could possibly have known about petitioner at the time . . . would not amount to probable cause for his arrest . ...” The State argues, however, that the December 3 detention was of a type which does not require probable cause. Two rationales for this position are suggested. First, it is argued that the detention occurred during the investigatory rather than accusatory stage and thus was not a seizure requiring probable cause. The second and related argument is that, at the least, detention for the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints does not require probable cause.
It is true that at the time of the December 3 detention the police had no intention of charging petitioner with the crime and were far from making him the primary focus of their investigation. But to argue that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the investigatory stage is fundamentally to misconceive the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Investigatory seizures would subject unlimited numbers of innocent persons to the harassment and ignominy incident to involuntary detention. Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed "arrests” or “investigatory detentions.” We made this explicit only last Term in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 19 (1968), when we rejected “the notions that the Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the officers stop short of something called a ‘technical arrest' or a ‘full-blown search.’ ”
Detentions for the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are no less subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. It is arguable, however, that, because of the unique nature of the fingerprinting process, such detentions might, under narrowly defined circumstances, be found to comply with the Fourth Amendment even though there is no probable cause in the traditional sense. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967). Detention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of police searches and detentions. Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an individual’s private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search. Nor can fingerprint detention be employed repeatedly to harass any individual, since the police need only one set of each person’s prints. Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifications or confessions and is not subject to such abuses as the improper line-up and the “third degree.” Finally, because there is no danger of destruction of fingerprints, the limited detention need not come unexpectedly or at an inconvenient time. For this same reason, the general requirement that the authorization of a judicial officer be obtained in advance of detention would seem not to admit of any exception in the fingerprinting context.
We have no occasion in this case, however, to determine whether the requirements of the Fourth Amendment could be met by narrowly circumscribed procedures for obtaining, during the course of a criminal investigation, the fingerprints of individuals for whom there is no probable cause to arrest. For it is clear that no attempt was made here to employ procedures which might comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment: the detention at police headquarters of petitioner and the other young Negroes was not authorized by a judicial officer; petitioner was unnecessarily required to undergo two fingerprinting sessions; and petitioner was not merely fingerprinted during the December 3 detention but also subjected to interrogation. The judgment of the Mississippi Supreme Court is therefore
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The statement was not introduced at the trial.
Fingerprint evidence would seem no more “trustworthy” than other types of evidence — such as guns, narcotics, gambling equipment — which are routinely excluded if illegally obtained.
Brief for Respondent 8.
The Government argued in Bynum that the controversy over the introduction in evidence of a particular set of fingerprints was “much ado over very little,” because another set properly taken was available and might have been used. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument: “It bears repeating that the matter of primary judicial concern in all cases of this type is the imposition of effective sanctions implementing the Fourth Amendment guarantee against illegal arrest and detention. Neither the fact that the evidence obtained through such detention is itself trustworthy or the fact that equivalent evidence can conveniently be obtained in a wholly proper way militates against this overriding consideration. It is entirely irrelevant that it may be relatively easy for the government to prove guilt without using the product of illegal detention. The important thing is that those administering the criminal law understand that they must do it that way.” 104 U. S. App. D. C., at 371-372, 262 F. 2d, at 468-469. On Bynum’s retrial another set of fingerprints in no way connected with his unlawful arrest was used, and he was again convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed this conviction. 107 U. S. App. D. C. 109, 274 F. 2d 767 (1960).
Brief for Respondent 3.
The State relies on various statements in our cases which approve general questioning of citizens in the course of investigating a crime. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 477-478 (1966); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U. S. 568, 635 (concurring opinion) (1961). But these statements merely reiterated the settled principle that while the police have the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to compel them to answer.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pennsylvania law required that rates for electricity be fixed without consideration of a utility’s expenditures for electrical generating facilities which were planned but never built, even though the expenditures were prudent and reasonable when made. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that such a law did not take the utilities’ property in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We agree with that conclusion, and hold that a state scheme of utility regulation does not “take” property simply because it disallows recovery of capital investments that are not “used and useful in service to the public.” 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1315 (Supp. 1988).
I
In response to predictions of increased demand for electricity, Duquesne Light Company (Duquesne) and Pennsylvania Power Company (Penn Power) joined a venture in 1967 to build more generating capacity. The project, known as the Central Area Power Coordination Group (CAPCO), involved three other electric utilities and had as its objective the construction of seven large nuclear generating units. In 1980 the participants canceled plans for construction of four of the plants. Intervening events, including the Arab oil embargo and the accident at Three Mile Island, had radically changed the outlook both for growth in the demand for electricity and for nuclear energy as a desirable way of meeting that demand. At the time of the cancellation, Duquesne’s share of the preliminary construction costs associated with the four halted plants was $34,697,389. Penn Power had invested $9,569,665.
In 1980, and again in 1981, Duquesne sought permission from the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) to recoup its expenditures for the unbuilt plants over a 10-year period. The Commission deferred ruling on the request until it received the report from its investigation of the CAPCO construction. That report was issued in late 1982. The report found that Duquesne and Penn Power could not be faulted for initiating the construction of more nuclear generating capacity at the time they joined the CAPCO project in 1967. The projections at that time indicated a growing demand for electricity and a cost advantage to nuclear capacity. It also found that the intervening events which ultimately confounded the predictions could not have been predicted, and that work on the four nuclear plants was stopped at the proper time. In summing up, the Administrative Law Judge found “that the CAPCO decisions in regard to the [canceled plants] at every stage to their cancellation, were reasonable and prudent.” App. to Juris. Statement 19h. He recommended that Duquesne and Penn Power be allowed to amortize their sunk costs in the project over a 10-year period. The PUC adopted the conclusions of the report. App. to Juris. Statement li.
In 1982, Duquesne again came before the PUC to obtain a rate increase. Again, it sought to amortize its expenditures on the canceled plants over 10 years. In January 1983, the PUC issued a final order which granted Duquesne the authority to increase its revenues $105,8 million to a total yearly revenue in excess of $800 million. Pennsylvania PUC v. Duquesne Light Co., 57 Pa. P. U. C. 1, 51 P. U. R. 4th 198 (1983). The rate increase included $3.5 million in revenue representing the first payment of the 10-year amortization of Duquesne’s $35 million loss in the CAPCO plants.
The Pennsylvania Office of the Consumer Advocate (Consumer Advocate) moved the PUC for reconsideration in light of a state law enacted about a month before the close of the 1982 Duquesne rate proceeding. The Act, No. 335, 1982 Pa. Laws 1473, amended the Pennsylvania Utility Code by limiting “the consideration of certain costs in the rate base.” It provided that “the cost of construction or expansion of a facility undertaken by a public utility producing . . . electricity shall not be made a part of the rate base nor otherwise included in the rates charged by the electric utility until such time as the facility is used and useful in service to the public.” 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1315 (Supp. 1988). On reconsideration, the PUC affirmed its original rate order. Pennsylvania PUC v. Duquesne Light Co., 57 Pa. P. U. C. 177, 52 P. U. R. 4th 644 (1983). It read the new law as excluding the costs of canceled plants (obviously not used and useful) from the rate base, but not as preventing their recovery through amortization.
Meanwhile another CAPCO member, Penn Power, also sought to amortize its share of the canceled CAPCO power-plants over a 10-year period. The PUC granted Penn Power authority to increase its revenues by $15.4 million to a total of $184.2 million. Pennsylvania PUC v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 58 Pa. P. U. C. 305, 60 P. U. R. 4th 593 (1984). Part of that revenue increase represented $956,967 for the first year of the 10-year amortized recovery of Penn Power’s costs in the aborted nuclear plants.
The Consumer Advocate appealed both of these decisions to the Commonwealth Court, which by a divided vote held that the Commission had correctly construed § 1315. Cohen v. Pennsylvania PUC, 90 Pa. Commw. 98, 494 A. 2d 58 (1985). The Consumer Advocate then appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and that court reversed. Barasch v. Pennsylvania PUC, 516 Pa. 142, 532 A. 2d 325 (1987). That court held that the controlling language of the Act prohibited recovery of the costs in question either by inclusion in the rate base or by amortization. The court rejected appellants’ constitutional challenge to the statute thus interpreted, observing that “[t]he ‘just compensation’ safeguarded to a utility by the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution is a reasonable return on the fair value of its property at the time it is being used for public service. ” Id., at 163, 532 A. 2d, at 335. Since the instant CAPCO investment was not serving the public and did not constitute an operating expense, no constitutional rights to recovery attached to it. The court remanded to the PUC for further proceedings to correct its rate order, giving effect to the exclusion required by Act 335. Duquesne and Penn Power appealed to this Court arguing that the effect of Act 335 excluding their prudently incurred costs from the rate violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment. We noted probable jurisdiction. 485 U. S. 933 (1988).
II
Although the parties have not discussed it, we must first inquire into our jurisdiction to decide this case. See Jackson v. Ashton, 8 Pet. 148 (1834); Mansfield C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379 (1884). Our jurisdiction here rests on 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2), which authorizes this Court to review “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest Court of a State in which a decision could be had . . . [b]y appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution . . . and the decision is in favor of its validity.” Although this case has been remanded for further proceedings to revise the relevant rate orders, we hold that for purposes of our appellate jurisdiction the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is final.
We have acknowledged that the words of § 1257(2) could well be interpreted to preclude review in this Court as long as any proceedings remain in state court. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 124 (1945). In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 477 (1975), however, we recognized that in practice the final judgment rule has not been interpreted so strictly. Cox outlined four circumstances in which the adjudication of a federal issue in a case by the highest available state court had been reviewed in this Court notwithstanding the prospect of some further state-court proceedings.
This case falls into the first of the four categories. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has finally adjudicated the constitutionality of Act 335 in the context of otherwise completed rate proceedings and so has left “the outcome of further proceedings preordained.” Cox, supra, at 479. We do not think that the PUC might undo the effects of Act 335 on remand by allowing recovery of the disputed costs in some other way consistent with state law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Act does not leave its effect in doubt; the CAPCO related costs may not be “otherwise included in the rates charged.” 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1315 (1986). We are satisfied that we are presented with the State’s last word on the constitutionality of Act 335 and that all that remains is the straightforward application of its clear directive to otherwise complete rate orders. We therefore have jurisdiction. See Cox, supra, at 479; Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214 (1966).
Ill
As public utilities, both Duquesne and Penn Power are under a state statutory duty to serve the public. A Pennsylvania statute provides that “[e]very public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and reasonable service and facilities” and that “[s]uch service also shall be reasonably continuous and without unreasonable interruptions or delay.” 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1501 (1986). Although their assets are employed in the public interest to provide consumers of the State with electric power, they are owned and operated by private investors. This partly public, partly private status of utility property creates its own set of questions under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The guiding principle has been that the Constitution protects utilities from being limited to a charge for their property serving the public which is so “unjust” as to be confiscatory. Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 597 (1896) (A rate is too low if it is “so unjust as to destroy the value of [the] property for all the purposes for which it was acquired,” and in so doing “practically deprive[s] the owner of property without due process of law”); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline. Co., 315 U. S. 575, 585 (1942) (“By long standing usage in the field of rate regulation, the ‘lowest reasonable rate’ is one which is not confiscatory in the constitutional sense”); FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U. S. 380, 391-392 (1974) (“All that is protected against, in a constitutional sense, is that the rates fixed by the Commission be higher than a confiscatory level”). If the rate does not afford sufficient compensation, the State has taken the use of utility property without paying just compensation and so violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. As has been observed, however, “[h]ow such compensation may be ascertained, and what are the necessary elements in such an inquiry, will always be an embarrassing question.” Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 546 (1898). See also Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 790 (1968) (“[Njeither law nor economics has yet devised generally accepted standards for the evaluation of rate-making orders”).
At one time, it was thought that the Constitution required rates to be set according to the actual present value of the assets employed in the public service. This method, known as the “fair value” rule, is exemplified by the decision in Smyth v. Ames, supra. Under the fair value approach, a “company is entitled to ask ... a fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the public convenience,” while on the other hand, “the public is entitled to demand . . . that no more be exacted from it for the use of [utility property] than the services rendered by it are reasonably worth.” 169 U. S., at 547. In theory the Smyth v. Ames fair value standard mimics the operation of the competitive market. To the extent utilities’ investments in plants are good ones (because their benefits exceed their costs) they are rewarded with an opportunity to earn an “above-cost” return, that is, a fair return on the current “market value” of the plant. To the extent utilities’ investments turn out to be bad ones (such as plants that are canceled and so never used and useful to the public), the utilities suffer because the investments have no fair value and so justify no return.
Although the fair value rule gives utilities strong incentive to manage their affairs well and to provide efficient service to the public, it suffered from practical difficulties which ultimately led to its abandonment as a constitutional requirement. In response to these problems, Justice Brandéis had advocated an alternative approach as the constitutional minimum, what has become known as the “prudent investment” or “historical cost” rule. He accepted the Smyth v. Ames eminent domain analogy, but concluded that what was “taken” by public utility regulation is not specific physical assets that are to be individually valued, but the capital prudently devoted to the public utility enterprise by the utilities’ owners. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 262 U. S. 276, 291 (1923) (dissenting opinion). Under the prudent investment rule, the utility is compensated for all prudent investments at their actual cost when made (their “historical” cost), irrespective of whether individual investments are deemed necessary or beneficial in hindsight. The utilities incur fewer risks, but are limited to a standard rate of return on the actual amount of money reasonably invested.
Forty-five years ago in the landmark case of FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944), this Court abandoned the rule of Smyth v. Ames, and held that the “fair value” rule is not the only constitutionally acceptable method of fixing utility rates. In Hope we ruled that historical cost was a valid basis on which to calculate utility compensation. 320 U. S., at 605 (“Rates which enable [a] company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risk assumed certainly cannot be condemned as invalid, even though they might produce only a meager return on the so called ‘fair value’ rate base”). We also acknowledged in that case that all of the subsidiary aspects of valuation for ratemaking purposes could not properly be characterized as having a constitutional dimension, despite the fact that they might affect property rights to some degree. Today we reaffirm these teachings of Hope Natural Gas: “[I]t is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unreasonable, judicial inquiry ... is at an end. The fact that the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is not then important.” Id, at 602. This language, of course, does not dispense with all of the constitutional difficulties when a utility raises a claim that the rate which it is permitted to charge is so low as to be confiscatory: whether a particular rate is “unjust” or “unreasonable” will depend to some extent on what is a fair rate of return given the risks under a particular rate-setting system, and on the amount of capital upon which the investors are entitled to earn that return. At the margins, these questions have constitutional overtones.
Pennsylvania determines rates under a slightly modified form of the historical cost/prudent investment system. Neither Duquesne nor Penn Power alleges that the total effect of the rate order arrived at within this system is unjust or unreasonable. In fact the overall effect is well within the bounds of Hope, even with total exclusion of the CAPCO costs. Duquesne was authorized to earn a 16.14% return on common equity and an 11.64% overall return on a rate base of nearly $1.8 billion. See Pennsylvania PUC v. Duquesne Light Co., 57 Pa. P. U. C., at 51, 51 P. U. R. 4th, at 243. Its $35 million investment in the canceled plants comprises roughly 1.9% of its total base. The denial of plant amortization will reduce its annual allowance by 0.4%. Similarly, Penn Power was allowed a charge of 15.72% return on common equity and a 12.02% overall return. Its investment in the CAPCO plants comprises only 2.4% of its $401.8 million rate base. See Pennsylvania PUC v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 58 Pa. P. U. C., at 331-332, 60 P. U. R. 4th, at 618. The denial of amortized recovery of its $9.6 million investment in CAPCO will reduce its annual revenue allowance by only 0.5%.
Given these numbers, it appears that the PUC would have acted within the constitutional range of reasonableness if it had allowed amortization of the CAPCO costs but set a lower rate of return on equity with the result that Duquesne and Penn Power received the same revenue they will under the instant orders on remand. The overall impact of the rate orders, then, is not constitutionally objectionable. No argument has been made that these slightly reduced rates jeopardize the financial integrity of the companies, either by leaving them insufficient operating capital or by impeding their ability to raise future capital. Nor has it been demonstrated that these rates are inadequate to compensate current equity holders for the risk associated with their investments under a modified prudent investment scheme.
Instead, appellants argue that the Constitution requires that subsidiary aspects of Pennsylvania’s ratemaking methodology be examined piecemeal. One aspect which they find objectionable is the constraint Act 335 places on the PUC’s decisions. They urge that such legislative direction to the PUC impermissibly interferes with the PUC’s duty to balance consumer and investor interest under Permian Basin, 390 U. S., at 792. Appellants also note the theoretical inconsistency of Act 335, suddenly and selectively applying the used and useful requirement, normally associated with the fair value approach, in the context of Pennsylvania’s system based on historical cost. Neither of the errors appellants perceive in this case is of constitutional magnitude.
It cannot seriously be contended that the Constitution prevents state legislatures from giving specific instructions to their utility commissions. We have never doubted that state legislatures are competent bodies to set utility rates. And the Pennsylvania PUC is essentially an administrative arm of the legislature. See, e. g., Barasch v. Pennsylvania PUC, 516 Pa., at 171, 532 A. 2d, at 339 (“The Commission is but an instrumentality of the state legislature for the performance of [ratemaking]”); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 433 (1913) (“The rate-making power is a legislative power and necessarily implies a range of legislative discretion”). We stated in Permian Basin that the commission “must be free, within the limitations imposed by pertinent constitutional and statutory commands, to devise methods of regulation capable of equitably reconciling diverse and conflicting interests.” 390 U. S., at 767 (emphasis added). This is not to say that any system of ratemaking applied by a utilities commission, including the specific instructions it has received from its legislature, will necessarily be constitutional. But if the system fails to pass muster, it will not be because the legislature has performed part of the work.
Similarly, an otherwise reasonable rate is not subject to constitutional attack by questioning the theoretical consistency of the method that produced it. “It is not theory, but the impact of the rate order which counts.” Hope, 320 U. S., at 602. The economic judgments required in rate proceedings are often hopelessly complex and do not admit of a single correct result. The Constitution is not designed to arbitrate these economic niceties. Errors to the detriment of one party may well be canceled out by countervailing errors or allowances in another part of the rate proceeding. The Constitution protects the utility from the net effect of the rate order on its property. Inconsistencies in one aspect of the methodology have no constitutional effect on the utility’s property if they are compensated by countervailing factors in some other aspect.
Admittedly, the impact of certain rates can only be, evaluated in the context of the system under which they are imposed. One of the elements always relevant to setting the rate under Hope is the return investors expect given the risk of the enterprise. Id., at 603 (“[Rjeturn to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks”); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of West Virginia, 262 U. S. 679, 692-693 (1923) (“A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return . . . equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties”). The risks a utility faces are in large part defined by the rate methodology because utilities are virtually always public monopolies dealing in an essential service, and so relatively immune to the usual market risks. Consequently, a State’s decision to arbitrarily switch back and forth between methodologies in a way which required investors to bear the risk of bad investments at some times while denying them the benefit of good investments at others would raise serious constitutional questions. But the instant case does not present this question. At all relevant times, Pennsylvania’s rate system has been predominantly but not entirely based on historical cost and it has not been shown that the rate orders as modified by Act 335 fail to give a reasonable rate of return on equity given the risks under such a regime. We therefore hold that Act 335’s limited effect on the rate order at issue does not result in a constitutionally impermissible rate.
Finally we address the suggestion of the Pennsylvania Electric Association as amicus that the prudent investment rule should be adopted as the constitutional standard. We think that the adoption of any such rule would signal a retreat from 45 years of decisional law in this area which would be as unwarranted as it would be unsettling. Hope clearly held that “the Commission was not bound to the use of any single formula or combination of formulae in determining rates.” 320 U. S. at 602. More recently, we upheld the Federal Power Commission’s departure from the individual producer cost-of-service (prudent investment) system. In Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U. S. 294 (1963), the FPC had concluded after extensive hearings that “the individual company cost-of-service method, based on theories of original cost and prudent investment, was not a workable or desirable method for determining the rates of independent producers and that the ‘ultimate solution’ lay in what has become to be known as the area rate approach: ‘the determination of fair prices . . . based on reasonable financial requirements of the industry.’” Id., at 298-299. In upholding the FPC’s area rate methodology against the argument that the individual eompany prudent investment rule was constitutionally required, the Court observed:
“[T]o declare that a particular method of rate regulation is so sanctified as to make it highly unlikely that any other method could be sustained would be wholly out of keeping with this Court’s consistent and clearly articulated approach to the question of the Commission’s power to regulate rates. It has repeatedly been stated that no single method need be followed by the Commission in considering the justness and reasonableness of rates.” Id., at 309 (collecting cases).
See also FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U. S. at 387-390.
The adoption of a single theory of valuation as a constitutional requirement would be inconsistent with the view of the Constitution this Court has taken since Hope Natural Gas, supra. As demonstrated in Wisconsin v. FPC, circumstances may favor the use of one ratemaking procedure over another. The designation of a single theory of ratemaking as a constitutional requirement would unnecessarily foreclose alternatives which could benefit both consumers and investors. The Constitution within broad limits leaves the States free to decide what ratesetting methodology best meets their needs in balancing the interests of the utility and the public.
Affirmed.
The PUC exercises a legislative grant of power to enforce the Pennsylvania public utilities laws. 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 501 (1986). “[T]he authority of the Commission must arise either from the express words of the pertinent statutes or by strong and necessary implication therefrom.” Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 504 Pa. 312, 317, 473 A. 2d 997, 999 (1984) (collecting cases).
Act 335 amended the Pennsylvania Utility Code by adding 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1315. The relevant parts of Act 335 read as follows:
“AN ACT
“Amending Title 66 (Public Utilities) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, providing a limitation on the consideration of certain costs in the rate base for electric public utilities.
“Section 1. Title 66 ... is amended by adding a section to read:
Ҥ 1315. Limitation on consideration of certain costs for electric utilities.
“Except for such nonrevenue producing, nonexpense reducing investments as may be reasonably shown to be necessary to improve environmental conditions at existing facilities or improve safety at existing facilities or as may be required to convert facilities to the utilization of coal, the cost of construction or expansion of a facility undertaken by a public utility producing, generating, transmitting, distributing or furnishing electricity shall not be made a part of the rate base nor otherwise included in the rates charged by the electric utility until such time as the facility is used and useful in service to the public. Except as stated in this section, no electric utility property shall be deemed used and useful until it is presently providing actual utility service to the customers.
“Section 2. This act shall be applicable to all proceedings pending before the Public Utility Commission and the courts at this time. Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to modify or change existing law with regard to rate making treatment of investment in facilities of fixed utilities other than electric facilities.
“Section 3. This act shall take effect immediately.
“APPROVED — The 30th day of December, A. D. 1982.” (Emphasis added.)
On October 10, 1985, too late to affect this case, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted Act 1985-62 which added 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 520 (Supp. 1988) to the state utility code. Under § 520, the PUC is now authorized to permit amortized recovery of prudently incurred investment in canceled generating units.
As a result of recent legislation, this Court will not long have appellate jurisdiction over cases of the instant type. Public L. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662, effective September 25, 1988, and applicable to judgments rendered on or after that date, eliminates substantially all of our appellate jurisdiction, including § 1257(2). Persons aggrieved by state-court judgments should now file a petition for certiorari, rather than appeal. See S. Rep. No. 100-300 (1988); H. R. Rep. No. 100-660 (1988); B. Boskey & E. Gressman, The Supreme Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 109 S. Ct. LXXXI (1988).
Perhaps the most serious problem associated with the fair value rule was the “laborious and baffling task of finding the present value of the utility.” Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 262 U. S. 276, 292-294 (1923) (Brandeis, J. dissenting). The exchange value of a utility’s assets, such as powerplants, could not be set by a market price because such assets were rarely bought and sold. Nor could the capital assets be valued by the stream of income they produced because setting that stream of income was the very object of the rate proceeding. According to Brandéis, the Smyth v. Ames test usually degenerated to proofs about how much it would cost to reconstruct the asset in question, a hopelessly hypothetical, complex, and inexact process. 262 U. S., at 292-294.
The system avoids the difficult valuation problems encountered under the Smyth v. Ames test because it relies on the actual historical cost of investments as the basis for setting the rate. The amount of a utility’s actual outlays for assets in the public service is more easily ascertained by a ratemaking body because less judgment is required than in valuing an asset.
Pennsylvania values property in the rate base according to its historical cost. As provided by 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1311(b) (1986), “[t]he value of the property of the public utility included in the rate base shall be the original cost of the property when first devoted to the public service less the applicable accrued depreciation.” Accordingly, the PUC declared in Duquesne’s rate proceeding that “we shall adopt as the fair value of the respondent’s rate base, the original cost measure of value.” Pennsylvania PUC v. Duquesne Light Co., 57 Pa. P. U. C. 1, 5, 51 P. U. R. 4th 198, 202 (1983). It held likewise in Penn Power’s case. See Pennsylvania PUC v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 58 Pa. P. U. C. 305, 310, 60 P. U. R. 4th 593, 597 (1984) (same).
Having adjusted the historical cost in various ways to account for such things as depreciation and working capital, the PUC proceeds to set a rate of return based largely on the cost of capital to the enterprise. The cost of each component of the utility’s capital is considered, i. e., “the cost of debt, the cost of preferred stock, and the cost of common stock[,] [t]he latter being determined by the return required to sell such stock upon reasonable terms in the market.” Pennsylvania PUC v. Duquesne Light Co., supra, at 42, 51 P. U. R. 4th, at 235; Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of West Virginia, 262 U. S. 679, 692-693 (1923). It then exercises “informed judgment” to set the total rate of return based on these component costs of capital. Ibid. See also Pennsylvania PUC v. Pennsylvania Power, supra, at 325-326, 60 P. U. R. 4th, at 611-621.
The bulk of the rate based on capital, then, represents a return (set by costs of capital) on a rate base (determined by historical cost). These are features of the historical cost/prudent investment system. Pennsylvania has modified the system in several instances, however, when prudent investments will never be used and useful. For such occurrences, it has allowed amortization o/the capital lost, but does not allow the utility to earn a return on that investment. See, e. g., Pennsylvania PUC v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 55 Pa. P. U. C. 478, 486 (1982) (amortization of company’s investment in contaminated Three Mile Island Unit 2); Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Pennsylvania PUC, 61 Pa. Commw. 325, 433 A. 2d 620 (1981) (excluding from the rate base a portion of a utility’s generating plant that was excess capacity, but allowing recovery of the operating expenses, including depreciation charges on the entire plants); UGI Corp. v. Pennsylvania PUC, 49 Pa. Commw. 69, 410 A. 2d 923 (1980) (permitting amortization of terminated feasibility studies); Pennsylvania PUC v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 46 Pa. P. U. C. 746, 750 (1973) (10-year amortization of unusual expenses caused by tropical storm). The loss to utilities from prudent but ultimately unsuccessful investments under such a system is greater than under a pure prudent investment rule, but less than under a fair value approach. Pennsylvania’s modification slightly increases the overall risk of investments in utilities over the pure prudent investment rule. Presumably the PUC adjusts the risk premium element of the rate of return on equity accordingly.
Duquesne’s embedded cost of debt was 9.42%. Pennsylvania PUC v. Duquesne Light Co., 57 Pa. P. U. C., at 44, 51 P. U. R. 4th, at 237. Penn Power’s debt service was at 10.25%. Pennsylvania PUC v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 58 Pa. P. U. C., at 332, 60 P. U. R. 4th, at 618.
Indeed, the issue of constitutional concern has usually been just the reverse of appellants’ objection. Challenges to state and federal laws have been raised on the ground that the legislatures have delegated too much authority and discretion. See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928) (federal delegation of authority to set import tariff rates); York R. Co. v. Driscoll, 331 Pa. 193, 200 A. 864 (1938) (PUC’s authorization to exempt utility securities from reporting and registration requirements an unconstitutional delegation of legislative povrer under Pennsylvania Constitution because it allowed the utility to nullify the statutory reporting requirements).
For example, rigid requirement of the prudent investment rule would foreclose hybrid systems such as the one Pennsylvania used before the effective date of Act 335 and now uses again. See n. 4, supra. It would also foreclose a return to some form of the fair value rule just as its practical problems may be diminishing. The emergent market for wholesale electric energy could provide a readily available objective basis for determining the value of utility assets.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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D
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
An applicant for admission to the Bar of New York must be a citizen of the United States, have lived in the State for at least six months, and pass a written examination conducted by the State Board of Law Examiners. In addition, New York requires that the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court in the judicial department where an applicant resides must “be satisfied that such person possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counsellor-at-law.” New York Judiciary Law §90, subd. 1, par. a (1968). To carry out this provision, the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules require the appointment, in each of the four Judicial Departments into which the Supreme Court is divided, of a Committee or Committees on Character and Fitness. Section 528.1 of the Rules of the New York Court of Appeals for the Admission of Attorneys and Counsellors-at-Law requires that the character and general fitness specified in Judiciary Law § 90 “must be shown by the affidavits of two reputable persons residing in the city or county in which [the applicant] resides, one of whom must be a practicing attorney of the Supreme Court of this State.” The Committees also require the applicant himself to fill out a questionnaire. After receipt of the affidavits and questionnaire, the Committees conduct a personal interview with each applicant. As a final step before actual admission to the Bar, an applicant must take an oath that he will support the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of New York.
This case involves a broad attack, primarily on First Amendment vagueness and overbreadth grounds, upon this system for screening applicants for admission to the New York Bar. The appellants, plaintiffs in the trial court, are organizations and individuals claiming to represent a class of law students and law graduates similarly situated, seeking or planning to seek admission to practice law in New York. They commenced two separate actions for declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, naming as defendants two Committees on Character and Fitness and their members and two Appellate Divisions and their judges. The complaints attacked the statutes, rules, and screening procedures as invalid on their face or as applied in the First and Second Departments. A three-judge court was convened and consolidated the two suits.
In a thorough opinion, the court considered the appellants’ claims and found certain items on the questionnaires as they then stood to be so vague, overbroad, and intrusive upon applicants’ private lives as to be of doubtful constitutional validity. It granted the partial relief indicated by these findings, approving or further amending the revised questions submitted by the appel-lees to conform to its opinion. It upheld the statutes and rules as valid on their face and, with the exceptions noted, sustained the validity of New York’s system. This appeal followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 396 U. S. 999.
We note at the outset that no person involved in this case has been refused admission to the New York Bar. Indeed, the appellants point to no case in which they claim any applicant has ever been unjustifiably denied permission to practice law in New York State under these or earlier statutes, rules, or procedures. The basic thrust of the appellants’ attack is, rather, that New York’s system by its very existence works a “chilling effect” upon the free exercise of the rights of speech and association of students who must anticipate having to meet its requirements.
I
The three-judge District Court, although divided on other questions, was unanimous in finding no constitutional infirmity in New York’s statutory requirement that applicants for admission to its Bar must possess “the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counsellor-at-law.” We have no difficulty in affirming this holding. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S. 36, 40-41; Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232, 247 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Long usage in New York and elsewhere has given well-defined contours to this requirement, which the appellees have construed narrowly as encompassing no more than “dishonorable conduct relevant to the legal profession,” see 299 F. Supp., at 144 n. 20 (separate opinion of Motley, J.); see also Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra, at 247 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The few reported cases in which bar admission has been denied on character grounds in New York all appear to have involved instances of misconduct clearly inconsistent with the standards of a lawyer’s calling.
This Court itself requires of applicants for admission to practice before it that “their private and professional characters shall appear to be good.” Every State, plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, requires some similar qualification.
But, the appellants contend, even though the statutory standard may be constitutionally valid, the methods used by the Committees to satisfy themselves that applicants meet that standard are not. Specifically, the appellants object to the terms of the third-party affidavits attesting to an applicant’s good moral character. During this litigation, the appellees revised the affidavit forms in several respects. Whatever may have been said of the affidavits formerly used, we can find nothing in the present forms remotely vulnerable to constitutional attack. In the Second Department, for example, an affiant is asked to state whether he has visited the applicant’s home and, if so, how often. We think it borders on the frivolous to say that such an inquiry offends the applicant’s “right to privacy protected by the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.” It is the applicant who selects the two people who will sign affidavits on his behalf, and the Committees may reasonably inquire as to the nature and extent of an affiant’s actual acquaintance with the applicant.
II
As stated at the outset of this opinion, New York has further standards of eligibility for admission to its Bar. An applicant must be a United States citizen and a New York resident of six months’ standing. And before he may be finally admitted to practice, an applicant must swear (or affirm) that he will support the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of New York. Reflecting these requirements, Rule 9406 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules directs the Committees on Character and Fitness not to certify an applicant for admission “unless he shall furnish satisfactory proof to the effect” that he is a citizen of the United States, has resided in New York for at least six months, has complied with the applicable statutes and rules, and “believes in the form of the government of the United States and is loyal to such government.”
The appellants do not take issue with the citizenship and minimum-residence requirements, nor with the items on the questionnaires for applicants dealing with these requirements. Their constitutional attack is mounted against the requirement of belief “in the form of” and loyalty to the Government of the United States, and upon those parts of the questionnaires directed thereto.
We do not understand the appellants to question the constitutionality of the actual oath an applicant must take before admission to practice. In any event, there can be no doubt of its validity. It merely requires an applicant to swear or affirm that he will “support the constitution of the United States” as well as that of the State of New York. See Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339, aff’d per curiam, 390 U. S. 36; Hosack v. Smiley, 276 F. Supp. 876, aff’d per curiam, 390 U. S. 744; Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152, aff’d per curiam, 397 U. S. 317.
If all we had before us were the language of Rule 9406, which seems to require an applicant to furnish proof of his belief in the form of the Government of the United States and of his loyalty to the Government, this would be a different case. For the language of the Rule lends itself to a construction that could raise substantial constitutional questions, both as to the burden of proof permissible in such a context under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, and as to the permissible scope of inquiry into an applicant’s political beliefs under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, e. g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109; Speiser v. Randall, supra, at 527; Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U. S. 399; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234. But this case comes before us in a significant and unusual posture: the appellees are the very state authorities entrusted with the definitive interpretation of the language of the Rule. We therefore accept their interpretation, however we might construe that language were it left for us to do so. If the appellees be regarded as state courts, we are of course bound by their construction. See, e. g., Baggett v. Bullitt, supra, at 375; Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University, 360 U. S. 684, 688; Speiser v. Randall, supra, at 519; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 5-6. If they are viewed as state administrative agencies charged with enforcement and construction of the Rule, their view is at least entitled to “respectful consideration,” Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U. S. 87, 96 (Cardozo, J.), and we see no reason not to accept their interpretation in this case.
The appellees have made it abundantly clear that their construction of the Rule is both extremely narrow and fully cognizant of protected constitutional freedoms. There are three key elements to this construction. First, the Rule places upon applicants no burden of proof. Second, “the form of the government of the United States” and the “government” refer solely to the Constitution, which is all that the oath mentions. Third, “belief” and “loyalty” mean no more than willingness to take the constitutional oath and ability to do so in good faith.
Accepting this construction, we find no constitutional invalidity in Rule 9406. There is “no showing of an intent to penalize political beliefs.” Konigsherg v. State Bar, 366 U. S., at 54. At the most, the Rule as authoritatively interpreted by the appellees performs only the function of ascertaining that an applicant is not one who “swears to an oath pro forma while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or indifference to the oath.” Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116, 132.
Ill
As this case comes to us from the three-judge panel, the questionnaire applicants are asked to complete contains only two numbered questions reflecting the disputed provision of Rule 9406. They are as follows:
“26. (a) Have you ever organized or helped to organize or become a member of any organization or group of persons which, during the period of your membership or association, you knew was advocating or teaching that the government of the United States or any state or any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown or overturned by force, violence or any unlawful means? - If your answer is in the affirmative, state the facts below.
“(b) If your answer to (a) is in the affirmative, did you, during the period of such membership or association, have the specific intent to further the aims of such organization or group of persons to overthrow or overturn the government of the United States or any state or any political subdivision thereof by force, violence or any unlawful means?
“27. (a) Is there any reason why you cannot take and subscribe to an oath or affirmation that you will support the constitutions of the United States and of the State of New York? If there is, please explain.
“(b) Can you conscientiously, and do you, affirm that you are, without any mental reservation, loyal to and ready to support the Constitution of the United States?” -.
In dealing with these questions, we emphasize again that there has been no showing that any applicant for admission to the New York Bar has been denied admission either because of his answers to these or any similar questions, or because of his refusal to answer them. Necessarily, therefore, we must consider the validity of the questions only on their face, in light of Rule 9406 as construed by the agencies entrusted with its administration.
Question 26 is precisely tailored to conform to the relevant decisions of this Court. Our cases establish that inquiry into associations of the kind referred to is permissible under the limitations carefully observed here. We have held that knowing membership in an organization advocating the overthrow of the Government by force or violence, on the part of one sharing the specific intent to further the organization’s illegal goals, may be made criminally punishable. Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 228-230. It is also well settled that Bar examiners may ask about Communist affiliations as a preliminary to further inquiry into the nature of the association and may exclude an applicant for refusal to answer. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U. S., at 46-47. See also, e. g., United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589; Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11; Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U. S. 399; Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716. Surely a State is constitutionally entitled to make such an inquiry of an applicant for admission to a profession dedicated to the peaceful and reasoned settlement of disputes between men, and between a man and his government. The very Constitution that the appellants invoke stands as a living embodiment of that ideal.
As to Question 27, there can hardly be doubt of its constitutional validity in light of our earlier discussion of Rule 9406 and the appellees’ construction of that Rule. The question is simply supportive of the appellees’ task of ascertaining the good faith with which an applicant can take the constitutional oath. Indeed, the “without any mental reservation” language of part (b) is the same phrase that appears in the oath required of all federal uniformed and civil service personnel. 5 U. S. C. § 3331 (1964 ed., Supp. V). New York’s question, however, is less demanding than the federal oath. Taking the oath is a requisite for federal employment, but there is no indication that a New York Bar applicant would not be given the opportunity to explain any “mental reservation” and still gain admission to the Bar.
IV
Finally, there emerges from the appellants’ briefs and oral argument a more fundamental claim than any to which we have thus far adverted. They suggest that, whatever the facial validity of the various details of a screening system such as New York’s, there inheres in such a system so constant a threat to applicants that constitutional deprivations will be inevitable. The implication of this argument is that no screening would be constitutionally permissible beyond academic examination and extremely minimal checking for serious, concrete character deficiencies. The principal means of policing the Bar would then be the deterrent and punitive effects of such post-admission sanctions as contempt, disbarment, malpractice suits, and criminal prosecutions.
Such an approach might be wise policy, but decisions based on policy alone are not for us to make. We have before us a State whose agents have evidently been scrupulous in the use of the powers that the appellants attack, and who have shown every willingness to keep their investigations within constitutionally permissible limits. We are not persuaded that careful administration of such a system as New York’s need result in chilling effects upon the exercise of constitutional freedoms. Consequently, the choice between systems like New York’s and approaches like that urged by the appellants rests with the legislatures and other policy-making bodies of the individual States. New York has made its choice. To disturb it would be beyond the power of this Court.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
[For concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, see ante, p. 34.]
APPENDIX TO OPINION OP THE COURT
New York Judiciary Law (1968): Article 4 — Appellate Division.
§ 90. Admission to and removal from practice by appellate division; character committees
1. a. Upon the state board of law examiners certifying that a person has passed the required examination, or that the examination has been dispensed with, the appellate division of the supreme court in the department to which such person shall have been certified by the state board of law examiners, if it shall be satisfied that such person possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counsellor-at-law, shall admit him to practice as such attorney and counsellor-at-law in all the courts of this state, provided that he has in all respects complied with the rules of the court of appeals and the rules of the appellate divisions relating to the admission of attorneys.
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (1963): Article 94 — Admission to Practice.
Rule 9401. Committee
The appellate division in each judicial department shall appoint a committee of not less than three practicing lawyers for each judicial district within the department, for the purpose of investigating the character and fitness of every applicant for admission to practice as an attorney and counselor at law in the courts of this state. Each member of such committee shall serve until his death, resignation or the appointment of his successor. A lawyer who has been or who shall be appointed a member of the committee for one district may be appointed a member of the committee for another district within the same department.
Rule 9404. Certificate of character and fitness
Unless otherwise ordered by the appellate division, no person shall be admitted to practice without a certificate from the proper committee that it has carefully investigated the character and fitness of the applicant and that, in such respects, he is entitled to admission. To enable the committee to make such investigation the committee, subject to the approval of the justices of the appellate division, is authorized to prescribe and from time to time to amend a form of statement or questionnaire on which the applicant shall set forth in his usual handwriting all the information and data required by the committee and the appellate division justices, including specifically his present and past places of actual residence, listing the street and number, if any, and the period of time he resided at each place.
Rule 9406. Proof
No person shall receive said certificate from any committee and no person shall be admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law in the courts of this state, unless he shall furnish satisfactory proof to the effect:
1. that he believes in the form of the government of the United States and is loyal to such government;
2. that he is a citizen of the United States;
3. that he has been an actual resident of the state of New York for six months prior to the filing of his application for admission to practice; and
4. that he has complied with all the requirements of this rule and with all the requirements of the applicable statutes of this state, the applicable rules of the court of appeals and the applicable rules of the appellate division in which his application is pending, relating to the admission to practice as an attorney and counselor at law.
New York Judiciary Law Appendix (Supp. 1970): Rules of the Court of Appeals for the Admission of Attorneys and Counselors-at-Law.
PART 528 — PROOF OF MORAL CHARACTER
§ 528.1 General regulation
Every applicant for admission to the bar must produce before a committee on character and fitness appointed by an Appellate Division of the Supreme Court and file with such committee evidence that he possesses the good moral character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor at law as provided in section 90 of the Judiciary Law, which must be shown by the affidavits of two reputable persons residing in the city or county in which he resides, one of whom must be a practicing attorney of the Supreme Court of this State.
§ 528.2 Supporting affidavits
Such affidavits must state that the applicant is, to the knowledge of the affiant, a person of good moral character and must set forth in detail the facts upon which such knowledge is based. Such affidavits shall not be conclusive, and the court may make further examination and inquiry through its committee on character and fitness or otherwise.
§ 528.3 Certificate of Board of Law Examiners
Every applicant who pursued the study of law pursuant to these rules must file with such committee on character and fitness his certificate from the State Board of Law Examiners showing compliance with these rules.
§ 528.4 Discretion of Appellate Division
The justices of the Appellate Division in each department shall adopt for their respective departments such additional rules for ascertaining the moral and general fitness of applicants as to such justices may seem proper.
AFFIDAVIT WITH RESPECT TO CHARACTER OF APPLICANT
Supreme Court of the State of New York
Appellate DivisioN: First Judicial Department
In the Matter of the Application of 1. For Admission to the Bar
2., being duly sworn, makes the following statement:
3. Residence of affiant:
4. Nature of affiant’s business:
5. Business address of affiant:
6. Length and nature of affiant’s acquaintance with applicant:
a. Residence of applicant:
b. Persons with whom applicant lives (if known to affiant):
7. Affiant’s conclusions as to applicant’s moral character:
8. Facts upon which affiant’s knowledge or opinion as to applicant’s moral character is based:
9. IF THIS AFFIDAVIT IS MADE BY THE SPONSORING ATTORNEY, his sponsors’ statement (see items 9 and 10 of instruction sheet) may be made here:
(Signature)
Sworn to before me this. day of., 19_
(DO NOT FORGET TO HAVE ALL AFFIDAVITS NOTARIZED)
(Note: No back shall be put on Affidavits)
NEW YORK SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT
Form for Affidavit of Character and Residence
PLEASE NOTE
The answers to all questions are to be written, preferably in typewriting, by or under the direction of the affiant.
It is desired that both the subject matter and the language of each answer shall be supplied by the affiant and not by the applicant.
Nothing not personally known to affiant should be stated.
deposes and says that the answers to the following questions have been written by or under the direction of affiant, and that both questions and answers have been carefully read by affiant and that the several answers are true of affiant’s own knowledge, except those stated to have been made on information and belief, and those stated to give the opinion or belief of affiant, and as to those answers, affiant believes them to be true.
1. (a) Home address of affiant (including County).
(b) Business address.
2. Nature of business? (If a lawyer, state whether or not you are a practising attorney of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, and/or an attorney of any court or courts in any other state, country or jurisdiction, specifying each such state, country or jurisdiction, and give place of admission to the Bar, and approximate date of such admission.)
3. How long have you known the applicant personally?
4. State whether you are related to applicant by blood or marriage, or if there is any business, professional or similar relationship between you and the applicant or his family?
5. Describe briefly your associations with the applicant, setting forth how such associations began, and indicate in what activities (business, scholastic, cultural, recreational, athletic, social or otherwise) you have participated with applicant. It is not a sufiicient answer merely to repeat the above words in parenthesis, but the particular activities should be specified.
6. How often have you come in contact with applicant during the entire period of acquaintance? (“Frequently” or “often” or other indefinite statement is not a satisfactory answer.)
7. What is your conclusion as to applicant’s moral character? (Reserve details for next question.)
8. State in detail the facts upon which your knowledge or opinion as to applicant’s character is based.
9. Have you visited applicant’s
(a) parental home;
(b) marital home, if any;
(c) any other home or place of abode applicant may have had?
10. (a) How often have you visited the parental, marital or other home or place of abode of applicant? (“Frequently” or “often” or other indefinite statement is not a satisfactory answer. Note that in most cases visits will be less frequent than the contacts mentioned in Q. 6, above.)
(b) During what years (stating approximate dates) ?
(c) At what addresses (listing them specifically) ?
The New York statute, rules, and affidavit forms relevant to the issues in this litigation are set out in the Appendix to this opinion.
N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law and Rules, Rule 9401 (1963); see also id,., Rule 9404.
These Rules, originally enacted by the State Legislature, may be amended either by the legislature or by the New York Judicial Conference. N. Y. Judiciary Law §229, subd. 3 (1968); N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law and Rules, Rule 102 (1963).
N. Y. Judiciary Law Appendix § 528.1 (Supp. 1970). This section, recently renumbered with no change in its wording, is referred to throughout the briefs and earlier opinions as Rule VIII of the New York Court of Appeals.
Answers to these questionnaires are treated as confidential.
N. Y. Judiciary Law § 466 (1968); N. Y. Const., Art. XIII, § 1.
The suits were brought under 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3) and 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
299 F. Supp. 117. The appellees had already, both before and after the commencement of this litigation, eliminated or revised certain questions to which the appellants had originally raised objections. See id., at 129 and n. 6.
No cross-appeal has been taken from this partial grant of the requested injunction. We therefore have no occasion to consider whether the District Court’s action was correct.
Our jurisdiction of this appeal rests on 28 U. S. C. § 1253, the three-judge panel having been properly convened since the suits attacked state statutes as violative of the Federal Constitution and requested injunctive relief, 28 U. S. C. §2281, which the District Court partially denied.
The appellees are the Committees on Character and Fitness of the First and Second Departments; their individual members; the First and Second Departments of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York; and their individual justices. The appellees contend, as they did below, that the state courts and their justices are not within the jurisdiction of the federal courts because they are not "persons” within the meaning of 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The District Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the courts and the justices were acting in an administrative capacity and that an injunction here could have no inhibiting effect on the proper performance of judicial duties. 299 F. Supp., at 123-124. The appellees took no cross-appeal and did not press the point in their motion to affirm. We therefore pursue the matter no further.
299 F. Supp., at 124-125 (majority opinion of Friendly, J.); id., at 143-144 (separate opinion of Motley, J.).
See, e. g., Matter of Cassidy, 268 App. Div. 282, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 202, aff'd per curiam, 296 N. Y. 926, 73 N. E. 2d 41; Matter of Portnow, 253 App. Div. 395, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 553; Matter of Greenblatt, 253 App. Div. 391, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 569; Matter of Peters, 221 App. Div. 607, 225 N. Y. S. 144, aff’d per curiam, 250 N. Y. 595, 166 N. E. 337; cf. Matter of Anonymous, 17 N. Y. 2d 674, 216 N. E. 2d 612.
Cf. also In re Stolar, ante, p. 23, in which it appears that the petitioner there had previously been admitted to the New York Bar under the standards in use before the commencement of this litigation. There is, moreover, no indication that either Charles Evans Hughes or John W. Davis, despite the fears refected in Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion, post, at 180-181, encountered any difficulty whatever in gaining admission to the New York Bar.
U. S. Sup. Ct. Rule 5 (1).
See 6 1971 Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, passim (103d ed. 1970).
In the District Court the appellants also attacked — unsuccessfully — the practice of conducting personal interviews. They do not appear to press such objections here, either as to the practice generally or as to the conduct of any particular interviews.
Cf. U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 3:
“The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . .
See also U. S. Sup. Ct. Rule 5 (4), requiring an applicant for admission to the Bar of this Court to swear or affirm that he will “support the Constitution of the United States.”
Rule 9406 does not itself directly impinge upon applicants; it is rather an instruction to the appellees, touching applicants only as filtered through the appellees’ construction.
As this case comes to us from the District Court, the sum total of what applicants must do in the first instance to satisfy any “burden” placed upon them by the Rule is simply to answer two questions on the questionnaire they submit to the appellee committees. These questions are discussed in Part III of this opinion, infra.
The District Court ordered the elimination or revision of the following questions contained in the questionnaires at the time this litigation was commenced:
“26. Have you ever organized or helped to organize or become a member of or participated in any way whatsoever in the activities of any organization or group of persons which teaches (or taught) or advocates (or advocated) that the Government of the United States or any State or any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown or overturned by force, violence or any unlawful means ? - If your answer is in the affirmative, state the facts below.
“27 (a). Do you believe in the principles underlying the form of government of the United States of America? -”
“31. Is there any incident in your life not called for by the foregoing questions which has any favorable or detrimental bearing on your character or fitness? - If the answer is ‘Yes’ state the facts.” [In the Second Department the words “favorable or” did not appear.]
None of the above questions is in issue here.
Division of Question 26 into two parts is wholly permissible under Konigsberg v. State Bar, supra, which approved asking whether an applicant had ever been a member of the Communist Party without asking in the same question whether the applicant shared its illegal goals. Moreover, this division narrows the class of applicants as to whom the Committees are likely to find further investigation appropriate. For those who answer part (a) in the negative, that is the end of the matter.
Give name of applicant as it appears on the certificate of the State Board of Law Examiners.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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C
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is reversed and the cáse is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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C
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Powell
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, IV, and V, and an opinion with respect to Part. III-B, in which The Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Scalia join.
The question in this case is whether a court properly may enforce an agreement in which a criminal defendant releases his right to file an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 in return for a prosecutor’s dismissal of pending criminal charges.
I.
In 1983, a grand jury m Rockingham County, New Hampshire, indicted David Champy for aggravated felonious sexual assault. Respondent Bernard Rumery, a friend of Champy’s, read about the charges in a local newspaper. Seeking information about the charges, he telephoned Mary Deary, who was acquainted with both Rumery and Champy. Coincidentally, Deary had been the victim of the assault in question and was expected to be the principal witness against Champy. The record does not reveal directly the date or substance of this conversation between Rumery and Deary, but Deary apparently was disturbed by the call. On March 12, according to police records, she called David Barrett, the Chief of Police for the town of Newton. She told him that Rumery was trying to force her to drop the charges against Champy. Rumery talked to Deary again on May 11. The substance of this conversation also is disputed. Rumery claims that Deary called him and that she raised the subject of Champy’s difficulties. According to the police records, however, Deary told Chief Barrett that Rumery had threatened that, if Deary went forward on the Champy case, she would “end up like” two women who recently had been murdered in Lowell, Massachusetts. App. 49. Barrett arrested Rumery and accused him of tampering with a witness in violation of N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 641:5(I)(b) (1986), a Class B felony.
Rumery promptly retained Stephen Woods, an experienced criminal defense attorney. Woods contacted Brian Graf, the Deputy County Attorney for Rockingham County. He warned Graf that he “had better [dismiss] these charges, because we’re going to win them and after that we’re going to sue.” App. 11. After further discussions, Graf and Woods reached an agreement, under which Graf would dismiss the charges against Rumery if Rumery would agree not to sue the town, its officials, or Deary for any harm caused by the arrest. All parties agreed that one factor in Graf’s decision not to prosecute Rumery was Graf’s desire to protect Deary from the trauma she would suffer if she were forced to testify. As the prosecutor explained in the District Court:
“I had been advised by Chief Barrett that Mary Deary did not want to testify against Mr. Rumery. The witness tampering charge would have required Mary Deary to testify. . . .
“I think that was a particularly sensitive type of case where you are dealing with a victim of an alleged aggravated felonious sexual assault.” Id., at 52 (deposition of Brian Graf).
See also App. to Pet. for Cert. B-2 (District Court’s findings of fact); App. 20 (deposition of defense counsel Woods).
Woods drafted an agreement in which Rumery agreed to release any claims he might have against the town, its officials, or Deary if Graf agreed to dismiss the criminal charges (the release-dismissal agreement). After Graf approved the form of the agreement, Woods presented it to Rumery. Although Rumery’s recollection of the events was quite different, the District Court found that Woods discussed the agreement with Rumery in his office for about an hour and explained to Rumery that he would forgo all civil actions if he signed the agreement. Three days later, on June 6, 1983, Rumery returned to Woods’ office and signed the agreement. The criminal charges were dropped.
Ten months later, on April 13, 1984, Rumery filed an action under § 1983 in the Federal District Court for the District of New Hampshire. He alleged that the town and its officers had violated his constitutional rights by arresting him, defaming him, and imprisoning him falsely. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, relying on the release-dismissal agreement as an affirmative defense. Rumery argued that the agreement was unenforceable because it violated public policy. The court rejected Rumery’s argument and concluded that a “release of claims under section 1983 is valid . . . if it results from a decision that is voluntary, deliberate and informed.” App. to Pet. for Cert. B-6. The court found that Rumery
“is a knowledgeable, industrious individual with vast experience in the business world. . . . [H]e intelligently and carefully, after weighing all the factors, concluded that it would be in his best interest and welfare to sign the covenant. He was also represented by a very competent attorney with more than ordinary expertise in the sometimes complex area of criminal law.” Id., at B-4.
The court then dismissed Rumery’s suit.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed. It adopted a per se rule invalidating release-dismissal agreements. The court stated:
“It is difficult to envision how release agreements, negotiated in exchange for a decision not to prosecute, serve the public interest. Enforcement of such covenants would tempt prosecutors to trump up charges in reaction to a defendant’s civil rights claim, suppress evidence of police misconduct, and leave unremedied deprivations of constitutional rights.” 778 F. 2d 66, 69 (1985).
Because the case raises a question important to the administration of criminal justice, we granted the town’s petition for a writ of certiorari. 475 U. S. 1118 (1986). We reverse.
II
We begin by noting the source of the law that governs this case. The agreement purported to waive a right to sue conferred by a federal statute. The question whether the policies underlying that statute may in some circumstances render that waiver unenforceable is a question of federal law. We resolve this question by reference to traditional common-law principles, as we have resolved other questions about the principles governing §1983 actions. E. g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U. S. 522, 539-540 (1984). The relevant principle is well established: a promise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by enforcement of the agreement.
III
The Court of Appeals concluded that the public interests related to release-dismissal agreements justified a per se rule of invalidity. We think the court overstated the perceived problems and also failed to credit the significant public interests that such agreements can further. Most importantly, the Court of Appeals did not consider the wide variety of factual situations that can result in release-dismissal agreements. Thus, although we agree that in some cases these agreements may infringe important interests of the criminal defendant and of society as a whole, we do not believe that the mere possibility of harm to these interests calls for a per se rule.
A
Rumery’s first objection to release-dismissal agreements is that they are inherently coercive. He argues that it is unfair to present a criminal defendant with a choice between facing criminal charges and waiving his right to sue under § 1983. We agree that some release-dismissal agreements may not be the product of an informed and voluntary decision. The risk, publicity, and expense of a criminal trial may intimidate a defendant, even if he believes his defense is meritorious. But this possibility does not justify invalidating all such agreements. In other contexts criminal defendants are required to make difficult choices that effectively waive constitutional rights. For example, it is well settled that plea bargaining does not violate the Constitution even though a guilty plea waives important constitutional rights. See Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 752-753 (1970); Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 264 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring). We see no reason to believe that release-dismissal agreements pose a more coercive choice than other situations we have accepted. E. g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U. S. 212 (1978) (upholding a statute that imposed higher sentences on defendants who went to trial than on those who entered guilty pleas). As Justice Harlan explained:
“The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring ‘the making of difficult judgments’ as to which course to follow. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S., at 769. Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.” Crampton v. Ohio, decided with McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 213 (1971).
In many cases a defendant’s choice to enter into a release-dismissal agreement will reflect a highly rational judgment that the certain benefits of escaping criminal prosecution exceed the speculative benefits of prevailing in a civil action. Rumery’s voluntary decision to enter this agreement exemplifies such a judgment. Rumery is a sophisticated businessman. He was not in jail and was represented by an experienced criminal lawyer, who drafted the agreement. Rumery considered the agreement for three days before signing it. The benefits of the agreement to Rumery are obvious: he gained immunity from criminal prosecution in consideration of abandoning a civil suit that he may well have lost.
Because Rumery voluntarily waived his right to sue under §1983, the public interest opposing involuntary waiver of constitutional rights is no reason to hold this agreement invalid. Moreover, we find that the possibility of coercion in the making of similar agreements insufficient by itself to justify a per se rule against release-dismissal bargains. If there is such a reason, it must lie in some external public interest necessarily injured by release-dismissal agreements.
B
As we noted above, the Court of Appeals held that all release-dismissal agreements offend public policy because it believed these agreements “tempt prosecutors to trump up charges in reaction to a defendant’s civil rights claim, suppress evidence of police misconduct, and leave unremedied deprivations of constitutional rights.” 778 F. 2d, at 69. We can agree that in some cases there may be a substantial basis for this concern. It is true, of course, that § 1983 actions to vindicate civil rights may further significant public interests. But it is important to remember that Rumery had no public duty to institute a § 1983 action merely to further the public’s interest in revealing police misconduct. Congress has confined the decision to bring such actions to the injured individuals, not to the public at large. Thus, we hesitate to elevate more diffused public interests above Rumery’s considered decision that he would benefit personally from the agreement.
We also believe the Court of Appeals misapprehended the range of public interests arguably affected by a release-dismissal agreement. The availability of such agreements may threaten important public interests. They may tempt prosecutors to bring frivolous charges, or to dismiss meritorious charges, to protect the interests of other officials. But a per se rule of invalidity fails to credit other relevant public interests and improperly assumes prosecutorial misconduct.
The vindication of constitutional rights and the exposure of official misconduct are not the only concerns implicated by § 1983 suits. No one suggests that all such suits are meritorious. Many are marginal and some are frivolous. Yet even when the risk of ultimate liability is negligible, the burden of defending such lawsuits is substantial. Counsel may be retained by the official, as well as the governmental entity. Preparation for trial, and the trial itself, will require the time and attention of the defendant officials, to the detriment of their public duties. In some cases litigation will extend over a period of years. This diversion of officials from their normal duties and the inevitable expense of defending even unjust claims is distinctly not in the public interest. To the extent release-dismissal agreements protect public officials from the burdens of defending such unjust claims, they further this important public interest.
A per se rule invalidating release-dismissal agreements also assumes that prosecutors will seize the opportunity for wrongdoing. In recent years the Court has considered a number of claims that prosecutors have acted improperly. E. g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S. 598 (1985); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U. S. 368 (1982); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357 (1978). Our decisions in those cases uniformly have recognized that courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as government enforcement priorities. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S., at 607. Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because these decisions' “are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake,” we have been “properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.” Id., at 607-608. See United States v. Goodwin, supra, at 373.
Against this background of discretion, the mere opportunity to act improperly does not compel an assumption that all — or even a significant number of — release-dismissal agreements stem from prosecutors abandoning “the independence of judgment required by [their] public trust,” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 423 (1976). Rather, tradition and experience justify our belief that the great majority of prosecutors will be faithful to their duty. Indeed, the merit of this view is illustrated by this case, where the only evidence of prosecutorial misconduct is the agreement itself.
Because release-dismissal agreements may further legitimate prosecutorial and public interests, we reject the Court of Appeals’ holding that all such agreements are invalid per se.
IV
Turning to the agreement presented by this case, we conclude that the District Court’s decision to enforce the agreement was correct. As we have noted, supra, at 394, it is clear that Rumery voluntarily entered the agreement. Moreover, in this case the prosecutor had an independent, legitimate reason to make this agreement directly related to his prosecutorial responsibilities. The agreement foreclosed both the civil and criminal trials concerning Rumery, in which Deary would have been a key witness. She therefore was spared the public scrutiny and embarrassment she would have endured if she had had to testify in either of those cases. Both the prosecutor and the defense attorney testified in the District Court that this was a significant consideration in the prosecutor’s decision. Supra, at 390.
In sum, we conclude that this agreement was voluntary, that there is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, and that enforcement of this agreement would not adversely affect the relevant public interests.
V
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court for dismissal of the complaint.
It is so ordered.
By the time this case was litigated in the District Court, Woods had become the County Attorney for Rockingham County. App. 51.
Cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178(1) (1981). See also Crampton v. Ohio, decided with McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 213 (1971) (“The threshold question is whether compelling [a defendant to decide whether to waive constitutional rights] impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved”).
We recognize that the analogy between plea bargains and release-dismissal agreements is not complete. The former are subject to judicial oversight. Moreover, when the State enters a plea bargain with a criminal defendant, it receives immediate and tangible benefits, such as promptly imposed punishment without the expenditure of prosecutorial resources, see Brady v. United States, 397 U. S., at 752. Also, the defendant’s agreement to plead to some crime tends to ensure some satisfaction of the public’s interest in the prosecution of crime and confirms that the prosecutor’s charges have a basis in fact. The benefits the State may realize in particular cases from release-dismissal agreements may not be as tangible, but they are not insignificant.
Actions taken for these reasons properly have been recognized as unethical. See ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 7-105 (1980).
Prosecutors themselves rarely are held liable in §1983 actions. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976) (discussing prosecutorial immunity). Also, in many States and municipalities — perhaps in most — prosecutors are elected officials and are entirely independent of the civil authorities likely to be defendants in § 1983 suits. There may be situations, of course, when a prosecutor is rhotivated to protect the interests of such officials or of police. But the constituency of an elected prosecutor is the public, and such a prosecutor is likely to be influenced primarily by the general public interest.
In 1985, the federal district courts disposed of 47,360 criminal cases. Of these, only 6,053, or about 12.8%, ended after a trial. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts 374 (1985). As we have recognized, if every serious criminal charge were evaluated through a full-scale criminal trial, “the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities,” Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 260 (1971).
Of course, the Court has found that certain actions are so likely to result from prosecutorial misconduct that it has “ ‘presume[d]’ an improper vindictive motive,” United States v. Goodwin, 457 U. S. 368, 373 (1982). E. g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21 (1974) (holding that it violates the Due Process Clause for a prosecutor to increase charges in response to a defendant’s exercise of his right to appeal). But the complexity of pretrial decisions by prosecutors suggests that judicial evaluation of those decisions should be especially deferential. Thus, the Court has never accepted such a blanket claim with respect to pretrial decisions. See United States v. Goodwin, supra; Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357 (1978).
Justice Stevens’ evaluation of the public interests associated with release-dismissal agreements relies heavily on his view that Rumery is a completely innocent man. Post, at 404-407. He rests this conclusion on the testimony Rumery and his attorney presented to the District Court, but fails to acknowledge that the District Court’s factual findings gave little credence to this testimony. Justice Stevens also gives great weight to the fact that Rumery “must be presumed to be innocent.” Post, at 404. But this is not a criminal case. This is a civil case, in which Rumery bears the ultimate burden of proof.
Cf. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 14 — 1.8(a)(iii) (2d ed. 1980) (following a guilty plea, it is proper for the sentencing judge to consider that the defendant “by making public trial unnecessary, has demonstrated genuine consideration for the victims . . . by . . . preventing] unseemly public scrutiny or embarrassment”).
We note that two Courts of Appeals have applied a voluntariness standard to determine the enforceability of agreements entered into after trial, in which the defendants released possible § 1983 claims in return for sentencing considerations. See Bushnell v. Rossetti, 760 F. 2d 298 (CA4 1984); Jones v. Taber, 648 F. 2d 1201 (CA9 1981). We have no occasion in this case to determine whether an inquiry into voluntariness alone is sufficient to determine the enforceability of release-dismissal agreements. We also note that it would be helpful to conclude release-dismissal agreements under judicial supervision. Although such supervision is not essential to the validity of an otherwise-proper agreement, it would help ensure that the agreements did not result from prosecutorial misconduct.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The petition for rehearing and the motion to remand for trial on unresolved issues are granted as herein indicated. The judgment of this Court of May 3, 1965, 381 U. S. 41, is vacated, and in lieu thereof the following judgment is entered; “The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is modified to direct that the case be remanded to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania for further proceedings with respect to the unresolved issues tendered in petitioners’ bill of complaint, and is in all other respects affirmed.”
R ü SQ Qrdered
Mr. Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Harlan, believing that a remand is legally unjustified, dissent from that part of the Court’s order.
Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
. The question presented is whether § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1, has been violated by agreements among competing physicians setting, by majority vote, the maximum fees that they may claim in full payment for health services provided to policyholders of specified insurance plans. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the question could not be answered without evaluating the actual purpose and effect of the agreements at a full trial. 643 F. 2d 553 (1980). Because the undisputed facts disclose a violation of the statute, we granted certiorari, 450 U. S. 979 (1981), and now reverse.
h-H
In October 1978 the State of Arizona filed a civil complaint against two county medical societies and two “foundations for medical care” that the medical societies had organized. The complaint alleged that the defendants were engaged in illegal price-fixing conspiracies. After the defendants filed their answers, one of the medical societies was dismissed by consent, the parties conducted a limited amount of pretrial discovery, and the State moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. The District Court denied the motion, but entered an order pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b), certifying for interlocutory appeal the question “whether the FMC membership agreements, which contain the promise to abide by maximum fee schedules, are illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act.”
The Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, affirmed the District Court’s order refusing to enter partial summary judgment, but each of the three judges on the panel had a different view of the case. Judge Sneed was persuaded that “the challenged practice is not a per se violation.” 643 F. 2d, at 560. Judge Kennedy, although concurring, cautioned that he had not found “these reimbursement schedules to be per se proper, [or] that an examination of these practices under the rule of reason at trial will not reveal the proscribed adverse effect on competition, or that this court is foreclosed at some later date, when it has more evidence, from concluding that such schedules do constitute per se violations.” Ibid. Judge Larson dissented, expressing the view that a per se rule should apply and, alternatively, that a rule-of-reason analysis should condemn the arrangement even if a per se approach was not warranted. Id., at 56S-569.
Because the ultimate question presented by the certiorari petition is whether a partial summary judgment should have been entered by the District Court, we must assume that the respondents’ version of any disputed issue of fact is correct. We therefore first review the relevant undisputed facts and then identify the factual basis for the respondents’ contention that their agreements on fee schedules are not unlawful.
p-H h-H
The Maricopa Foundation for Medical Care is a nonprofit Arizona corporation composed of licensed doctors of medicine, osteopathy, and podiatry engaged in private practice. Approximately 1,750 doctors, representing about 70% of the practitioners in Maricopa County, are members.
The Maricopa Foundation was organized in 1969 for the purpose of promoting fee-for-service medicine and to provide the community with a competitive alternative to existing health insurance plans. The foundation performs three primary activities. It establishes the schedule of maximum fees that participating doctors agree to accept as payment in full for services performed for patients insured under plans approved by the foundation. It reviews the medical necessity and appropriateness of treatment provided by its members to such insured persons. It is authorized to draw checks on insurance company accounts to pay doctors for services performed for covered patients. In performing these functions, the foundation is considered an “insurance administrator” by the Director of the Arizona Department of Insurance. Its participating doctors, however, have no financial interest in the operation of the foundation.
The Pima Foundation for Medical Care, which includes about 400 member doctors, performs similar functions. For the purposes of this litigation, the parties seem to regard the activities of the two foundations as essentially the same. No challenge is made to their peer review or claim administration functions. Nor do the foundations allege that these two activities make it necessary for them to engage in the practice of establishing maximum-fee schedules.
At the time this lawsuit was filed, each foundation made use of “relative values” and “conversion factors” in compiling its fee schedule. The conversion factor is the dollar amount used to determine fees for a particular medical specialty. Thus, for example, the conversion factors for “medicine” and “laboratory” were $8 and $5.50, respectively, in 1972, and $10 and $6.50 in 1974. The relative value schedule provides a numerical weight for each different medical service — thus, an office consultation has a lesser value than a home visit. The relative value was multiplied by the conversion factor to determine the maximum fee. The fee schedule has been revised periodically. The foundation board of trustees would solicit advice from various medical societies about the need for change in either relative values or conversion factors in their respective specialties. The board would then formulate the new fee schedule and submit it to the vote of the entire membership.
The fee schedules limit the amount that the member doctors may recover for services performed for patients insured under plans approved by the foundations. To obtain this approval the insurers — including self-insured employers as well as insurance companies — agree to pay the doctors' charges up to the scheduled amounts, and in exchange the doctors agree to accept those amounts as payment in full for their services. The doctors are free to charge higher fees to uninsured patients, and they also may charge any patient less than the scheduled maxima. A patient who is insured by a foundation-endorsed plan is guaranteed complete coverage for the full amount of his medical bills only if he is treated by a foundation member. He is free to go to a nonmember physician and is still covered for charges that do not exceed the maximum-fee schedule, but he must pay any excess that the nonmember physician may charge.
The impact of the foundation fee schedules on medical fees and on insurance premiums is a matter of dispute. The State of Arizona contends that the periodic upward revisions of the maximum-fee schedules have the effect of stabilizing and enhancing the level of actual charges by physicians, and that the increasing level of their fees in turn increases insurance premiums. The foundations, on the other hand, argue that the schedules impose a meaningful limit on physicians’ charges, and that the advance agreement by the doctors to accept the maxima enables the insurance carriers to limit and to calculate more efficiently the risks they underwrite and therefore serves as an effective cost-containment mechanism that has saved patients and insurers millions of dollars. Although the Attorneys General of 40 different States, as well as the Solicitor General of the United States and certain organizations representing consumers of medical services, have filed amicus curiae briefs supporting the State of Arizona’s position on the merits, we must assume that the respondents’ view of the genuine issues of fact is correct.
This assumption presents, but does not answer, the question whether the Sherman Act prohibits the competing doctors from adopting, revising, and agreeing to use a maximum-fee schedule in implementation of the insurance plans.
HH H-l ► — 4
The respondents recognize that our decisions establish that price-fixing agreements are unlawful on their face. But they argue that the per se rule does not govern this case because the agreements at issue are horizontal and fix maximum prices, are among members of a profession, are in an industry with which the judiciary has little antitrust experience, and are alleged to have procompetitive justifications. Before we examine each of these arguments, we pause to consider the history and the meaning of the per se rule against price-fixing agreements.
A
Section 1 of the Sherman Act of 1890 literally prohibits every agreement “in restraint of trade.” In United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U. S. 505 (1898), we recognized that Congress could not have intended a literal interpretation of the word “every”; since Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911), we have analyzed most restraints under the so-called “rule of reason.” As its name suggests, the rule of reason requires the fact-finder to decide whether under all the circumstances of the case the restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition.
The elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness of a challenged business practice entails significant costs. Litigation of the effect or purpose of a practice often is extensive and complex. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 5 (1958). Judges often lack the expert understanding of industrial market structures and behavior to determine with any confidence a practice’s effect on competition. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596, 609-610 (1972). And the result of the process in any given case may provide little certainty or guidance about the legality of a practice in another context. Id., at 609, n. 10; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, supra, at 5.
The costs of judging business practices under the rule of reason, however, have been reduced by the recognition of per se rules. Once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable. As in every rule of general application, the match between the presumed and the actual is imperfect. For the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that a fullblown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable.
Thus the Court in Standard Oil recognized that inquiry under its rule of reason ended once a price-fixing agreement was proved, for there was "a conclusive presumption which brought [such agreements] within the statute.” 221 U. S., at 65. By 1927, the Court was able to state that “it has... often been decided and always assumed that uniform price-fixing by those controlling in any substantial manner a trade or business in interstate commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Law.” United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 398.
“The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow. Once established, it may be maintained unchanged because of the absence of competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed. Agreements which create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the government in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it has become unreasonable through the mere variation of economic conditions.” Id., at 397-398.
Thirteen years later, the Court could report that “for over forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation adhered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense.” United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 218 (1940). In that case a glut in the spot market for gasoline had prompted the major oil refiners to engage in a concerted effort to purchase and store surplus gasoline in order to maintain stable prices. Absent the agreement, the companies argued, competition was cutthroat and self-defeating. The argument did not carry the day:
“Any combination which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity. Even though the members of the price-fixing group were in no position to control the market, to the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be directly interfering with the free play of market forces. The Act places all such schemes beyond the pale and protects that vital part of our economy against any degree of interference. Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not particular price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive. It has not permitted the age-old cry of ruinous competition and competitive evils to be a defense to price-fixing conspiracies. It has no more allowed genuine or fancied competitive abuses as a legal justification for such schemes than it has the good intentions of the members of the combination. If such a shift is to be made, it must be done by the Congress. Certainly Congress has not left us with any such choice. Nor has the Act created or authorized the creation of any special exception in favor of the oil industry. Whatever may be its peculiar problems and characteristics, the Sherman Act, so far as price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike.” Id., at 221-222.
The application of the per se rule to maximum-price-fixing agreements in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U. S. 211 (1951), followed ineluctably from Socony-Vacuum:
“For such agreements, no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment. We reaffirm what we said in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 223: ‘Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.’” 340 U. S., at 213.
Over the objection that maximum-price-fixing agreements were not the “economic equivalent” of minimum-price-fixing agreements, Kiefer-Stewart was reaffirmed in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968):
“Maximum and minimum price fixing may have different consequences in many situations. But schemes to fix maximum prices, by substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the competitive market, may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers to compete and survive in that market. Competition, even in a single product, is not cast in a single mold. Maximum prices may be fixed too low for the dealer to furnish services essential to the value which goods have for the consumer or to furnish services and conveniences which consumers desire and for which they are willing to pay. Maximum price fixing may channel distribution through a few large or specifically advantaged dealers who otherwise would be subject to significant nonprice competition. Moreover, if the actual price charged under a maximum price scheme is nearly always the fixed maximum price, which is increasingly likely as the maximum price approaches the actual cost of the dealer, the scheme tends to acquire all the attributes of an arrangement fixing minimum prices.” Id., at 152-153 (footnote omitted).
We have not wavered in our enforcement of the per se rule against price fixing. Indeed, in our most recent price-fixing case we summarily reversed the decision of another Ninth Circuit panel that a horizontal agreement among competitors to fix credit terms does not necessarily contravene the antitrust laws. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U. S. 643 (1980).
B
Our decisions foreclose the argument that the agreements at issue escape per se condemnation because they are horizontal and fix maximum prices. Kiefer-Stewart and Albrecht place horizontal agreements to fix maximum prices on the same legal — even if not economic — footing as agreements to fix minimum or uniform prices. The per se rule “is grounded on faith in price competition as a market force [and not] on a policy of low selling prices at the price of eliminating competition.” Rahl, Price Competition and the Price Fixing Rule — Preface and Perspective, 57 Nw. U. L. Rev. 137, 142 (1962). In this case the rule is violated by a price restraint that tends to provide the same economic rewards to all practitioners regardless of their skill, their experience, their training, or their willingness to employ innovative and difficult procedures in individual cases. Such a restraint also may discourage entry into the market and may deter experimentation and new developments by individual entrepreneurs. It may be a masquerade for an agreement to fix uniform prices, or it may in the future take on that character.
Nor does the fact that doctors — rather than nonprofessionals — are the parties to the price-fixing agreements support the respondents’ position. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 788, n. 17 (1975), we stated that the “public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently.” See National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679, 696 (1978). The price-fixing agreements in this case, however, are not premised on public service or ethical norms. The respondents do not argue, as did the defendants in Goldfarb and Professional Engineers, that the quality of the professional service that their members provide is enhanced by the price restraint. The respondents’ claim for relief from the per se rule is simply that the doctors’ agreement not to charge certain insureds more than a fixed price facilitates the successful marketing of an attractive insurance plan. But the claim that the price restraint will make it easier for customers to pay does not distinguish the medical profession from any other provider of goods or services.
We are equally unpersuaded by the argument that we should not apply the per se rule in this case because the judiciary has little antitrust experience in the health care industry. The argument quite obviously is inconsistent with Socony-Vacuum. In unequivocal terms, we stated that, “[w]hatever may be its peculiar problems and characteristics, the Sherman Act, so far as price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike.” 310 U. S., at 222. We also stated that “[t]he elimination of so-called competitive evils [in an industry] is no legal justification” for price-fixing agreements, id., at 220, yet the Court of Appeals refused to apply the per se rule in this case in part because the health care industry was so far removed from the competitive model. Consistent with our prediction in Socony-Vacuum, 310 U. S., at 221, the result of this reasoning was the adoption by the Court of Appeals of a legal standard based on the reasonableness of the fixed prices, an inquiry we have so often condemned. Finally, the argument that the per se rule must be rejustified for every industry that has not been subject to significant antitrust litigation ignores the rationale for per se rules, which in part is to avoid “the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable — an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.” Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S., at 5.
The respondents’ principal argument is that the per se rule is inapplicable because their agreements are alleged to have procompetitive justifications. The argument indicates a misunderstanding of the per se concept. The anticompet-itive potential inherent in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if procompetitive justifications are offered for some. Those claims of enhanced competition are so unlikely to prove significant in any particular case that we adhere to the rule of law that is justified in its general application. Even when the respondents are given every benefit of the doubt, the limited record in this case is not inconsistent with the presumption that the respondents’ agreements will not significantly enhance competition.
The respondents contend that their fee schedules are pro-competitive because they make it possible to provide consumers of health care with a uniquely desirable form of insurance coverage that could not otherwise exist. The features of the foundation-endorsed insurance plans that they stress are a choice of doctors, complete insurance coverage, and lower premiums. The first two characteristics, however, are hardly unique to these plans. Since only about 70% of the doctors in the relevant market are members of either foundation, the guarantee of complete coverage only applies when an insured chooses a physician in that 70%. If he elects to go to a nonfoundation doctor, he may be required to pay a portion of the doctor’s fee. It is fair to presume, however, that at least 70% of the doctors in other markets charge no more than the “usual, customary, and reasonable” fee that typical insurers are willing to reimburse in full. Thus, in Maricopa and Pima Counties as well as in most parts of the country, if an insured asks his doctor if the insurance coverage is complete, presumably in about 70% of the cases the doctor will say “Yes” and in about 30% of the cases he will say “No.”
It is true that a binding assurance of complete insurance coverage — as well as most of the respondents’ potential for lower insurance premiums — can be obtained only if the insurer and the doctor agree in advance on the maximum fee that the doctor will accept as full payment for a particular service. Even if a fee schedule is therefore desirable, it is not necessary that the doctors do the price fixing. The record indicates that the Arizona Comprehensive Medical/ Dental Program for Foster Children is administered by the Maricopa Foundation pursuant to a contract under which the maximum-fee schedule is prescribed by a state agency rather than by the doctors. This program and the Blue Shield plan challenged in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U. S. 205 (1979), indicate that insurers are capable not only of fixing maximum reimbursable prices but also of obtaining binding agreements with providers guaranteeing the insured full reimbursement of a participating provider’s fee. In light of these examples, it is not surprising that nothing in the record even arguably supports the conclusion that this type of insurance program could not function if the fee schedules were set in a different way.
The most that can be said for having doctors fix the maximum prices is that doctors may be able to do it more efficiently than insurers. The validity of that assumption is far from obvious, but in any event there is no reason to believe that any savings that might accrue from this arrangement would be sufficiently great to affect the competitiveness of these kinds of insurance plans. It is entirely possible that the potential or actual power of the foundations to dictate the terms of such insurance plans may more than offset the theoretical efficiencies upon which the respondents’ defense ultimately rests.
C
Our adherence to the per se rule is grounded not only on economic prediction, judicial convenience, and business certainty, but also on a recognition of the respective roles of the Judiciary and the Congress in regulating the economy. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S., at fill-612. Given its generality, our enforcement of the Sherman Act has required the Court to provide much of its substantive content. By articulating the rules of law with some clarity and by adhering to rules that are justified in their general application, however, we enhance the legislative prerogative to amend the law. The respondents’ arguments against application of the per se rule in this case therefore are better directed to the Legislature. Congress may consider the exception that we are not free to read into the statute.
> HH
Having declined the respondents invitation to cut back on the per se rule against price fixing, we are left with the respondents’ argument that their fee schedules involve price fixing in only a literal sense. For this argument, the respondents rely upon Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U. S. 1 (1979).
In Broadcast Music we were confronted with an antitrust challenge to the marketing of the right to use copyrighted compositions derived from the entire membership of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP). The so-called “blanket license” was entirely different from the product that any one composer was able to sell by himself. Although there was little competition among individual composers for their separate compositions, the blanket-license arrangement did not place any restraint on the right of any individual copyright owner to sell his own compositions separately to any buyer at any price. But a “necessary consequence” of the creation of the blanket license was that its price had to be established. Id., at 21. We held that the delegation by the composers to ASC AP of the power to fix the price for the blanket license was not a species of the price-fixing agreements categorically forbidden by the Sherman Act. The record disclosed price fixing only in a “literal sense.” Id., at 8.
This case is fundamentally different. Each of the foundations is composed of individual practitioners who compete with one another for patients. Neither the foundations nor the doctors sell insurance, and they derive no profits from the sale of health insurance policies. The members of the foundations sell medical services. Their combination in the form of the foundation does not permit them to sell any different product. Their combination has merely permitted them to sell their services to certain customers at fixed prices and arguably to affect the prevailing market price of medical care.
The foundations are not analogous to partnerships or other joint arrangements in which persons who would otherwise be competitors pool their capital and share the risks of loss as well as the opportunities for profit. In such joint ventures, the partnership is regarded as a single firm competing with other sellers in the market. The agreement under attack is an agreement among hundreds of competing doctors concerning the price at which each will offer his own services to a substantial number of consumers. It is true that some are surgeons, some anesthesiologists, and some psychiatrists, but the doctors do not sell a package of three kinds of services. If a clinic offered complete medical coverage for a flat fee, the cooperating doctors would have the type of partnership arrangement in which a price-fixing agreement among the doctors would be perfectly proper. But the fee agreements disclosed by the record in this case are among independent competing entrepreneurs. They fit squarely into the horizontal price-fixing mold.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Blackmun and Justice O’Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
The complaint alleged a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act as well as of the Arizona antitrust statute. The state statute is interpreted in conformity with the federal statute. 643 F. 2d 533, 554, n. 1 (CA9 1980). The State of Arizona prayed for an injunction but did not ask for damages.
The District Court offered three reasons for its decision. First, citing Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36 (1977), the court stated that “a recent antitrust trend appears to be emerging where the Rule of Reason is the preferred method of determining whether a particular practice is in violation of the antitrust law.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 43. Second, “the two Supreme Court cases invalidating maximum price-fixing, [Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U. S. 211 (1951), and Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968)], need not be read as establishing a per se rule.” Id., at 44. Third, “a profession is involved here.” Id., at 45. Under the rule-of-reason approach, the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability could not be granted “because there is insufficient evidence as to the [purpose and effect of the allegedly unlawful practices and the power of the defendants.]” Id., at 47.
The District Court also denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the ground that they were engaged in the business of insurance within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 et seq. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 39-41. The defendants did not appeal that portion of the District Court order. 643 F. 2d, at 559, and n. 7.
The quoted language is the Court of Appeals’ phrasing of the question. Id., at 554. The District Court had entered an order on June 5,1979, providing, in relevant part:
“The plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability is denied with leave to file a similar motion based on additional evidence if appropriate.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 48.
On August 8, 1979, the District Court entered a further order providing:
“The Order of this Court entered June 5, 1979 is amended by addition of the following: This Court’s determination that the Rule of Reason approach should be used in analyzing the challenged conduct in the instant case to determine whether a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act has occurred involves a question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and an immediate appeal from the Order denying plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability may materially advance the ultimate determination of the litigation. Therefore, the foregoing Order and determination of the Court is certified for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292(b).” Id., at 50-51.
Judge Sneed explained his reluctance to apply the per se rule substantially as follows: The record did not indicate the actual purpose of the maximum-fee arrangements or their effect on competition in the health care industry. It was not clear whether the assumptions made about typical price restraints could be carried over to that industry. Only recently had this Court applied the antitrust laws to the professions. Moreover, there already were such significant obstacles to pure competition in the industry that a court must compare the prices that obtain under the maximum-fee arrangements with those that would otherwise prevail rather than with those that would prevail under ideal competitive conditions. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit had not applied Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U. S. 211 (1951), and Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968), to horizontal agreements that establish maximum prices; some of the economic assumptions underlying the rule against maximum price fixing were not sound.
Judge Kennedy’s concurring opinion concluded as follows:
“There does not now appear to be a controlling or definitive analysis of the market impact caused by the arrangements under scrutiny in this case, but trial may reveal that the arrangements are, at least in their essentials, not peculiar to the medical industry and that they should be condemned.” 643 F. 2d, at 560.
Judge Larson stated, in part:
“Defendants formulated and dispersed relative value guides and conversion factor lists which together were used to set an upper limit on fees received from third-party payors. It is clear that these activities constituted maximum price-fixing by competitors. Disregarding any ‘special industry’ facts, this conduct is per se illegal. Precedent alone would mandate application of the per se standard.
“I find nothing in the nature of either the medical profession or the health care industry that would warrant their exemption from per se rules for price-fixing.” Id., at 563-564 (citations omitted).
Most health insurance plans are of the fee-for-service type. Under the typical insurance plan, the insurer agrees with the insured to reimburse the insured for “usual, customary, and reasonable” medical charges. The third-party insurer, and the insured to the extent of any excess charges, bears the economic risk that the insured will require medical treatment. An alternative to the. fee-for-service type of insurance plan is illustrated by the health maintenance organizations authorized under the Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42 U. S. C. § 300e et seq. Under this form of prepaid health plan, the consumer pays a fixed periodic fee to a functionally integrated group of doctors in exchange for the group’s agreement to provide any medical treatment that the subscriber might need. The economic risk is thus borne by the doctors.
The record contains divergent figures on the percentage of Pima County doctors that belong to the foundation. A 1975 publication of the foundation reported 80%; a 1978 affidavit by the executive director of the foundation reported 30%.
In 1980, after the District Court and the Court of Appeals had rendered judgment, both foundations apparently discontinued the use of relative values and conversion factors in formulating the fee schedules. Moreover, the Maricopa Foundation that year amended its bylaws to provide that the fee schedule would be adopted by majority vote of its board of trustees and not by vote of its members. The challenge to the foundation activities as we have described them in the text, however, is not mooted by these changes. See United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629 (1953).
The parties disagree over whether the increases in the fee schedules are the cause or the result of the increases in the prevailing rate for medical services in the relevant markets. There appears to be agreement, however, that 85-95% of physicians in Maricopa County bill at or above the maximum reimbursement levels set by the Maricopa Foundation.
Seven different insurance companies underwrite health insurance plans that have been approved by the Maricopa Foundation, and three companies underwrite the plans approved by the Pima Foundation. The record contains no firm data on the portion of the health care market that is covered by these plans. The State relies upon a 1974 analysis indicating that the insurance plans endorsed by the Maricopa Foundation had about 63% of the prepaid health care market, but the respondents contest the accuracy of this analysis.
“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal....” 15 U. S. C. § 1.
Justice Brandéis provided the classic statement of the rule of reason in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238 (1918):
“The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.”
For a thoughtful and brief discussion of the costs and benefits of rule-of-reason versus per se rule analysis of price-fixing agreements, see F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 438-443 (1970). Professor Scherer’s “opinion, shared by a majority of American economists concerned with antitrust policy, is that in the present legal framework the costs of implementing a rule of reason would exceed the benefits derived from considering each restrictive agreement on its merits and prohibiting only those which appear unreasonable.” Id., at 440.
“Among the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements.” Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U. S., at 5 (citations omitted). See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 522-523 (1948).
Thus, in applying the per se rule to invalidate the restrictive practice in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U. S. 596 (1972), we stated that “[w]hether or not we would decide this case the same way under the rule of reason used by
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), we said that in certain circumstances a warrantless seizure by police of an item that comes within plain view during their lawful search of a private area may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See id., at 465-471 (plurality opinion); id., at 505-506 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting); id., at 521-522 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). We granted certiorari, 475 U. S. 1107 (1986), in the present case to decide whether this “plain view” doctrine may be invoked when the police have less than probable cause to believe that the item in question is evidence of a crime or is contraband.
HH
On April 18, 1984, a bullet was fired through the floor of respondent’s apartment, striking and injuring a man in the apartment below. Police officers arrived and entered respondent’s apartment to search for the shooter, for other victims, and for weapons. They found and seized three weapons, including a sawed-off rifle, and in the course of their search also discovered a stocking-cap mask.
One of the policemen, Officer Nelson, noticed two sets of expensive stereo components, which seemed out of place in the squalid and otherwise ill-appointed four-room apartment. Suspecting that they were stolen, he read and recorded their serial numbers — moving some of the components, including a Bang and Olufsen turntable, in order to do so — which he then reported by phone to his headquarters. On being advised that the turntable had been taken in an armed robbery, he seized it immediately. It was later determined that some of the other serial numbers matched those on other stereo equipment taken in the same armed robbery, and a warrant was obtained and executed to seize that equipment as well. Respondent was subsequently indicted for the robbery.
The state trial court granted respondent’s motion to suppress the evidence that had been seized. The Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed. It was conceded that the initial entry and search, although warrantless, were justified by the exigent circumstance of the shooting. The Court of Appeals viewed the obtaining of the serial numbers, however, as an additional search, unrelated to that exigency. Relying upon a statement in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385 (1978), that a “warrantless search must be ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation,”’ id., at 393 (citation omitted), the Court of Appeals held that the police conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, requiring the evidence derived from that conduct to be excluded. 146 Ariz. 533, 534-535, 707 P. 2d 331, 332-333 (1985). Both courts-the trial court explicitly and the Court of Appeals by necessary implication — rejected the State’s contention that Officer Nelson’s actions were justified under the “plain view” doctrine of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review, and the State filed this petition.
r — 1 h — I
As an initial matter, the State argues that Officer Nelson s actions constituted neither a “search” nor a “seizure” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. We agree that the mere recording of the serial numbers did not constitute a seizure. To be sure, that was the first step in a process by which respondent was eventually deprived of the stereo equipment. In and of itself, however, it did not “meaningfully interfere” with respondent’s possessory interest in either the serial numbers or the equipment, and therefore did not amount to a seizure. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U. S. 463, 469 (1985).
Officer Nelson’s moving of the equipment, however, did constitute a “search” separate and apart from the search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry into the apartment. Merely inspecting those parts of the turntable that came into view during the latter search would not have constituted an independent search, because it would have produced no additional invasion of respondent’s privacy interest. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U. S. 765, 771 (1983). But taking action, unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce a new invasion of respondent’s privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the entry. This is why, contrary to Justice Powell’s suggestion, post, at 333, the “distinction between ‘looking’ at a suspicious object in plain view and ‘moving’ it even a few inches” is much more than trivial for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. It matters not that the search uncovered nothing of any great personal value to respondent — serial numbers rather than (what might conceivably have been hidden behind or under the equipment) letters or photographs. A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.
Ill
The remaining question is whether the search was “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.
On this aspect of the case we reject, at the outset, the apparent position of the Arizona Court of Appeals that because the officers’ action directed to the stereo equipment was unrelated to the justification for their entry into respondent’s apartment, it was ipso facto unreasonable. That lack of relationship always exists with regard to action validated under the “plain view” doctrine; where action is taken for the purpose justifying the entry, invocation of the doctrine is superfluous. Mincey v. Arizona, supra, in saying that a warrantless search must be “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation,” 437 U. S., at 393 (citation omitted), was addressing only the scope of the primary search itself, and was not overruling by implication the many cases acknowledging that the “plain view” doctrine can legitimate action beyond that scope.
We turn, then, to application of the doctrine to the facts of this case. “It is well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant,” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S., at 465 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). Those circumstances include situations “[w]here the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such [evidence] is supported ... by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement,” ibid., such as the exigent-circumstances intrusion here. It would be absurd to say that an object could lawfully be seized and taken from the premises, but could not be moved for closer examination. It is clear, therefore, that the search here was valid if the “plain view” doctrine would have sustained a seizure of the equipment.
There is no doubt it would have done so if Officer Nelson had probable cause to believe that the equipment was stolen. The State has conceded, however, that he had only a “reasonable suspicion,” by which it means something less than probable cause. See Brief for Petitioner 18-19.* We have not ruled on the question whether probable cause is required in order to invoke the “plain view” doctrine. Dicta in Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573, 587 (1980), suggested that the standard of probable cause must be met, but our later opinions in Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730 (1983), explicitly regarded the issue as unresolved, see id., at 742, n. 7 (plurality opinion); id., at 746 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
We now hold that probable cause is required. To say otherwise would be to cut the “plain view” doctrine loose from its theoretical and practical moorings. The theory of that doctrine consists of extending to nonpublic places such as the home, where searches and seizures without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable, the police’s longstanding authority to make warrantless seizures in public places of such objects as weapons and contraband. See Payton v. New York, supra, at 586-587. And the practical justification for that extension is the desirability of sparing police, whose viewing of the object in the course of a lawful search is as legitimate as it would have been in a public place, the inconvenience and the risk — to themselves or to preservation of the evidence — of going to obtain a warrant. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 468 (plurality opinion). Dispensing with the need for a warrant is worlds apart from permitting a lesser standard of cause for the seizure than a warrant would require, i. e., the standard of probable cause. No reason is apparent why an object should routinely be seizable on lesser grounds, during an unrelated search and seizure, than would have been needed to obtain a warrant for that same object if it had been known to be on the premises.
We do not say, of course, that a seizure can never be justified on less than probable cause. We have held that it can— where, for example, the seizure is minimally intrusive and operational necessities render it the only practicable means of detecting certain types of crime. See, e. g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411 (1981) (investigative detention of vehicle suspected to be transporting illegal aliens); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 (1975) (same); United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 709, and n. 9 (1983) (dictum) (seizure of suspected drug dealer’s luggage at airport to permit exposure to specially trained dog). No special operational necessities are relied on here, however — but rather the mere fact that the items in question came lawfully within the officer’s plain view. That alone cannot supplant the requirement of probable cause.
The same considerations preclude us from holding that, even though probable cause would have been necessary for a seizure, the search of objects in plain view that occurred here could be sustained on lesser grounds. A dwelling-place search, no less than a dwelling-place seizure, requires probable cause, and there is no reason in theory or practicality why application of the “plain view” doctrine would supplant that requirement. Although the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment injunction against unreasonable searches is quite different from that protected by its injunction against unreasonable seizures, see Texas v. Brown, supra, at 747-748 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment), neither the one nor the other is of inferior worth or necessarily requires only lesser protection. We have not elsewhere drawn a categorical distinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree of justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police action, and we see no reason for a distinction in the particular circumstances before us here. Indeed, to treat searches more liberally would especially erode the plurality’s warning in Coolidge that “the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.” 403 U. S., at 466. In short, whether legal authority to move the equipment could be found only as an inevitable concomitant of the authority to seize it, or also as a consequence of some independent power to search certain objects in plain view, probable cause to believe the equipment was stolen was required.
Contrary to the suggestion in Justice O’Connor’s dissent, post, at 339, this concession precludes our considering whether the probable-cause standard was satisfied in this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Murphy, and Mr. Justice Rutledge concur.
The petitioner was indicted for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917. The specific charge was that, in order to injure the United States and to aid the German Reich, she and twenty-three others had conspired during the second World War to collect and deliver vital military information to German agents.
With no money to hire a lawyer and without the benefit of counsel the petitioner appeared before a federal district judge, told him that the indictment had been explained to her, signed a paper stating that she waived the “right to be represented by counsel at the trial of this cause,” and then pleaded guilty. Under her plea she could have been sentenced to death or to imprisonment for not more than thirty years. After thirteen months in jail following her plea, the court sentenced her to four years in prison.
In this habeas corpus proceeding she charged that the sentence, resting as it did solely on her plea of guilty, was invalid for two reasons: First, she alleged that the plea was entered by reason of the coercion, intimidation, and deception of federal officers in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Second, she alleged that she neither understandingly waived the benefit of the advice of counsel nor was provided with the assistance of counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment. As the Government concedes, these charges entitle the petitioner to have the issues heard and determined in a habeas corpus proceeding, and, if true, invalidate the plea and sentence. The District Court heard evidence offered by both the petitioner and the Government, and then found that she had failed to prove either contention. 72 F. Supp. 994. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting. 161 F. 2d 113.
On the basis of what he designated as “the undisputed evidence,” the dissenting judge concluded that petitioner had pleaded guilty because of her reliance upon the legal advice of a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) lawyer-agent, which advice “was, though honestly given, false.” Neither the District Court nor the majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals controverted this conclusion of the dissenting judge. A challenge to a plea of guilty made by an indigent defendant, for whom no lawyer has been provided, on the ground that the plea was entered in reliance upon advice given by a government lawyer-agent, raises serious constitutional questions. Under these circumstances we granted certiorari in this case. 331 U. S. 800.
It thus becomes apparent that determination of the questions presented depends upon what the evidence showed. There was conflicting testimony on many points in this case. We do not attempt to resolve these conflicts. Our conclusion is reached from the following facts shown by the testimony of government agents or by undisputed evidence offered by petitioner.
The petitioner was born in Germany. In that country she bore the title of countess. She and her husband came to the United States in December, 1926. Since 1930 they have lived in Detroit where the petitioner has been a housewife and her husband an instructor in German at Wayne University. Her husband is a naturalized citizen of the United States; her own naturalization papers have been pending for some time. They have four children, three of whom were born in this country as American citizens.
August 24, 1943, between 6 and 7 a. m., six FBI agents came to their home. The petitioner was in bed. She was informed that she must get up and go with them. The home was searched with her husband’s permission. She was taken to the local office of the FBI, fingerprinted, photographed, and examined by a physician. From there she was taken to the Immigration Detention Home, placed in solitary confinement, and, with one exception noted below, not permitted to see or communicate with anyone outside for the next four days. Two FBI agents persistently but courteously examined her every day from about 10 a. m. until about 9 p. m. She knew nothing about her arrest and detention except that she was being held indefinitely on a presidential warrant “as a dangerous enemy alien.” She was informed “that the FBI is an investigating agency, and not a prosecuting, and as an enemy alien I [she] was not allowed to see an attorney.” During this first period of questioning, the only relaxation of petitioner’s incommunicado status was a single permission to relay instructions through an FBI agent to her husband who was told how to look after their nine-year-old diabetic child. This child, for whom the mother had specially cared since his infancy, required a strict diet and injections twice daily.
September 1, eight days after her early morning arrest, petitioner was taken before an Enemy Alien Hearing Board. She was not then informed of any specific charges against her, but she was told that she could not be “represented by a legal attorney” at the hearing. The results of this hearing were not made known to her. At its conclusion she was returned to the detention home.
September 18 the petitioner was handed the indictment against her. In our printed record this document covers a little more than fourteen pages. It charges generally, in the language of the statute, that the twenty-four defendants conspired to violate the statute. It also enumerates 47 overt acts alleged to have been performed in pursuance of the objects of the conspiracy, five of which acts specifically refer to the petitioner. Four out of the five merely allege that the petitioner “met and conferred with” one or more of the other defendants; the fifth alleges that she “introduced” someone to one of the defendants.
September 21, almost a month after her arrest, the petitioner and a co-defendant, Mrs. Leonhardt, were taken to the courthouse for arraignment. Upon being told that the two defendants had no attorney and no means to obtain one, the judge said he would appoint counsel right away and would not arraign them until they had seen an attorney. They were then led “to the bull pen to wait for the attorney.” Before any attorney arrived they were taken back into the courtroom. Court was in session. As explained by petitioner and corroborated by others, “Judge Moinet was on the bench, and there seemed to be a trial going on, because Judge Moinet appointed a lawyer in the courtroom. He said, ‘Come here, “so-and-so”, and help these two women out,’ and the young lawyer objected to that; he said he didn’t want to have anything to do with that. But then he consented just for the arraignment, to help out, and he came over to us — we were sitting on the side bench — and he asked me, ‘How do you want to plead?’ I said, ‘Not guilty.’ And he asked Mrs. Leonhardt, and she said the same thing. So he told us that, he whispered to us, in fact, he went over it, whispered that it would not be advisable, but I do not know even now why, but he suggested it would be proper to stand mute.” In this two to five minute whispered conversation (the lawyer said “a couple of minutes”) the lawyer asked both defendants if they “understood what this was all about.” They indicated that they did. He did not even see the indictment, did not inform the petitioner as to the nature of the charge against her or as to her possible defenses, and did not inquire if she knew the punishment that could be imposed for her alleged offense. The case on trial was then interrupted, the charge was made against the defendants, who stood mute, and a plea of not guilty was entered. With reference to their future representation by an attorney, the petitioner’s uncontradicted testimony was that the judge “said he would appoint an attorney right away, and I understood that the gentleman was to be expected to come right away.”
The two women, unable to get out on bond, were then immediately taken from the courthouse to the Wayne County jail. The matron there informed the petitioner that she had strict orders to hold the petitioner and Mrs. Leonhardt “incommunicado.” Notwithstanding this order, however, the FBI agents continued to visit and talk with both of them and a third defendant, Mrs. Behrens, every day except Sunday. During this period all three of them were allowed to read and discuss among themselves the unfavorable newspaper reports which their arrest and indictment had occasioned. They talked also with the FBI agents about this adverse publicity and about how they should plead to the charges.
September 25, one month and one day after Mrs. von Moltke’s arrest, two lawyers came to the jail to see her. They had been sent by her husband. One of them appears to have taken the husband’s language course at Wayne University. These lawyers’ message was the first communication she had been permitted to receive from her husband since her removal to the county jail. She had been so well shut off from the outside world that she thought he did not even know where she was then confined. These lawyers informed her that, although they had come at her husband’s request, they would not represent her as counsel. Furthermore, they warned her that they would not even hold what she said in confidence, and that they would feel free to disclose anything she told them to the Government. Only one of the lawyers appeared at the trial. He testified that the petitioner was concerned during their visit for her children and her husband, whom the university had removed from his $4,000 position the day after her arrest. She particularly inquired whether it would help her husband to get his university position back if she pleaded guilty, but received no counsel on the subject one way or another. In fact, the lawyers emphasized a number of times that they could not and would not advise her what she should do. Although they gave her a form of cross-examination regarding the charges against her in the indictment, they did not attempt to explain to her the implications of these charges, or to advise her as to any possible defenses to them, or to inform her of the permissible punishments under the indictment.
September 28, three days after the lawyers’ visit, the petitioner and Mrs. Leonhardt were taken by FBI agents to the marshal’s office where they talked with the assistant district attorney about what plea they should enter. Mrs. Leonhardt announced there that she would plead guilty, which plea she later entered, but the petitioner first asked for the opportunity of discussing the matter with her husband. He came to the marshal’s office, was allowed to talk with his wife in the “bull pen,” and advised her not to do anything before she saw a lawyer. She then declined to plead guilty and was taken back to jail.
October 7, nine days later, she did plead guilty without having talked to any lawyer in the meantime except the FBI agent-attorneys, although she had seen her husband several more times. A few days before the 7th, Mrs. Behrens had entered a plea of guilty, and rumors reached the petitioner that other defendants named in the indictment would also plead guilty. During the interval between the 28th of September and petitioner’s plea of guilty on the 7th of October, the FBI men had talked to her daily. She had particularly asked them whether under United States law she would have the right to a trial if all her co-defendants pleaded guilty. The agent’s reply, as he remembered it, was “that the question of the trial would be up to the United States Attorney’s Office.” She also repeatedly plied the agents with questions as to what plea she should enter in order to reduce as much as possible the injurious publicity of the affair, and what would be the least harmful course to make it possible for her husband to recover his old position. She was also vitally interested in whether she would be deported, and whether, if she did plead guilty, her sentence could be served close to her family. All of these subjects the agents talked over with her in their daily conversations and one of them offered to, and did, discuss them with the assistant district attorney on her behalf. Following this discussion, the agent brought back word to the petitioner that the assistant district attorney could not control deportation, publicity, or the place of her imprisonment, but that if she pleaded guilty he would write a letter to the controlling authorities and recommend that she be imprisoned close to her family.
About this time one of the lawyer-agents of the FBI discussed the petitioner’s legal problems with her at great length. According to his testimony he did his best to explain the implications of the indictment. She told this agent-attorney about a statement she had heard while in jail that unless she pleaded guilty her husband would be involved,- and she asked the agent if this were true. He replied that he could not answer this question. She also asked one of the lawyer-agents whether mere association with people guilty of a crime — such association as that with which she was charged in the five overt acts — was sufficient in itself to bring about her conviction under the indictment. This agent, according to the petitioner, then explained the indictment to her by the use of a “Rum Runners” plot as an example. She testified that he said: “That if there is a group of people in a 'Rum’ plan who violate the law, and another person is there and the person doesn’t know the people who are planning the violation and doesn’t know what is going on, but still it seemed after two years this plan is carried out, in the law the man who was present becomes... the person nevertheless is guilty of conspiracy....” The FBI agent did not deny that he had given her the rum runner illustration. In fact, the agent said that it was quite possible that the conversation had occurred.
During the ten days prior to her plea of guilty, petitioner had many conversations with FBI agents about how she should plead to the indictment. In resolving her doubts she had no legal counsel upon whom to rely except the government lawyer-agents, since neither she nor her husband could afford a lawyer, and the counsel promised by Judge Moinet never appeared. Her chief concern in trying to decide whether to plead guilty was not the indictment, or possible imprisonment; as was testified by government agents, “She was concerned about her husband and his job,” and “she was hoping to do whatever would be best for her husband and her child.” That her troubled state of mind was recognized by the prosecuting attorney is shown by these leading questions he asked her on cross-examination:
“Q. Now, isn’t it true that up until the time you plead guilty you repeatedly asked the agents for advice as to whether you should plead guilty or not? Isn’t that true?
“A. There was nobody else I could ask.
“Q. Well, just say yes or no.
“A. Yes.”
October 7, having reached a temporary decision, she went with two of the agents to the assistant district attorney and told him that she wanted to plead guilty. Since Judge Moinet was not available, she was taken before another judge who was unfamiliar with the case. At first he would not accept the plea of guilty because she then had no lawyer, and the record before him indicated that she had previously pleaded not guilty under the advice of counsel. But in response to the judge’s questions, she said that she understood the indictment and was voluntarily entering a plea of guilty. The judge then permitted petitioner to sign a written waiver of counsel. The whole matter appears to have been disposed of by routine questioning within five minutes during an interlude in another trial. If any explanation of the implications of the indictment or of the consequences of her plea was then mentioned by the judge, or by anyone in his presence, the record does not show it. Nor is there anything to indicate she was informed that a sentence of death could be imposed under the charges. The judge appears not to have asked petitioner whether she was able to hire a lawyer, why she did not want one, or who had given her advice in connection with her plea. Apparently he was not informed that the petitioner’s only legal counsel had come from FBI agents.
Petitioner continued thereafter to worry about whether she had acted wisely in changing her plea to guilty. On learning in January, 1944, from an FBI agent that she could request permission to withdraw the plea, she sent messages to the district attorney, seeking such permission. Some months later Judge Moinet appointed counsel solely for the purpose of filing a motion for leave to withdraw her plea. Counsel did file such a motion, but its dismissal as tardy was required by the Criminal Appeals Rules, even if the motion had been made when petitioner first learned of her rights. Had the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty not been tardy, the court would have been required to consider it in the light of what this Court declared in Kercheval v. United States, 274 U. S. 220, 223: “A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or an extra-judicial confession; it is itself a conviction.... Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences.”
It is suggested that some adverse inference should be drawn against the petitioner because she failed to try to appeal from her conviction and sentence following the denial of her motion. In view of her counsel’s appointment solely for “the purpose of moving that she be allowed to withdraw her plea” of guilty, it is questionable whether he had authority to prosecute an appeal from her conviction and sentence. At least the appointed counsel did not take an appeal and he was the only lawyer petitioner had. Furthermore, the futility of an appeal based upon the trial court’s refusal to permit the withdrawal of her plea was obvious, in view of her failure to meet the strict requirements of Rule II (4). It seems pretty plain that the petitioner has raised the question here in the only proper way — by habeas corpus proceedings.
We accept the government’s contention that the petitioner is an intelligent, mentally acute woman. It is not now necessary to determine whether, as the Government argues, the District Court might reasonably have rejected much of petitioner’s testimony. Nor need we pass upon the government’s contention that the evidence might have supported a finding that the FBI lawyer-agent did not actually give her the erroneous advice that mere association with criminal conspirators was sufficient in and of itself to make a person guilty of criminal conspiracy. For, assuming the correctness of the two latter contentions, we are of the opinion that the undisputed testimony previously summarized shows that when petitioner pleaded guilty, she did not have that full understanding and comprehension of her legal rights indispensable to a valid waiver of the assistance of counsel.
First. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that an accused, unable to hire a lawyer, shall be provided with the assistance of counsel for his defense in all criminal prosecutions in the federal courts. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U. S. 275, 286; see Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134, 136-137. This Court has been particularly solicitous to see that this right was carefully preserved where the accused was ignorant and uneducated, was kept under close surveillance, and was the object of widespread public hostility. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45. The petitioner’s case bristled with factors that made it all the more essential that, before accepting a waiver of her constitutional right to counsel, the court be satisfied that she fully comprehended her perilous position. We were waging total war with Germany. She had a German name. She was a German. She had been a German countess. The war atmosphere was saturated at that time with a suspicion and fear of Germans. The indictment charged that while this country was at war with Germany and Japan the petitioner had conspired with others to betray our military secrets to Germany. She had been kept in close confinement since her arrest. Many of her alleged co-conspirators had already pleaded guilty. If found guilty, she could have been, and many people might think should have been, legally put to death as punishment for violation of the Espionage Act. If not executed, she could have been. imprisoned for thirty years or for such shorter period as the judge in his discretion might fix. Even when the trial court was about to impose sentence on this petitioner following her plea of guilty, a lawyer might have rendered her invaluable aid in calling to the court’s attention any mitigating circumstances that might have inclined him.to fix a lighter penalty for her. Anyone charged with espionage in wartime under the statute in question would have sorely needed a lawyer; Mrs. von Moltke, in particular, desperately needed the best she could get.
Second. A waiver of the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is of no less moment to an accused who must decide whether to plead guilty than to an accused who stands trial. See Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 471, 475. Prior to trial an accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel to make an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what plea should be entered. Determining whether an accused is guilty or innocent of the charges in a complex legal indictment is seldom a simple and easy task for a layman, even though acutely intelligent. Conspiracy charges frequently are of broad and confusing scope, and that is particularly true of conspiracies under the Espionage Act. See, e. g., Gorin v. United States, 312 U. S. 19; United States v. Heine, 151 F. 2d 813. And especially misleading to a layman are the overt act allegations of a conspiracy. Such charges are often, as in this indictment, mere statements of past associations or conferences with other persons, which activities apparently are entirely harmless standing alone. A layman reading the overt act charges of this indictment might reasonably think that one could be convicted under the indictment simply because he had, in perfect innocence, associated with some criminal at the time and place alleged. The undisputed evidence in this case that petitioner was concerned about many of these legal questions — such as the' significance of the overt act charges, and her possibilities of defense should all her bo-defendants plead guilty — emphasizes her need for the aid of counsel at this stage.
Third. It is the solemn duty of a federal judge before whom a defendant appears without counsel to make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps necessary to insure the fullest protection of this constitutional right at every stage of the proceedings. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 463; Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271, 278. This duty cannot be discharged as though it were a mere procedural formality. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, the trial court, instead of appointing counsel particularly charged with the specific duty of representing the defendants, appointed the entire local bar. This Court treated such a cavalier designation of counsel as a mere gesture, and declined to recognize it as a compliance with the constitutional mandate relied on in that case. It is in this light that we view the appointment of counsel for petitioner when she was arraigned. This lawyer, apparently reluctant to accept the case at all, agreed to represent her only when promised by the judge that it would take only two or three minutes to perform his duty. And it seems to have taken no longer. Even though we assume that this attorney did the very best he could under the circumstances, we cannot accept this designation of counsel by the trial court as anything more than token obedience to his constitutionally required duty to appoint counsel for petitioner. Arraignment is too important a step in a criminal proceeding to give such wholly inadequate representation to one charged with a crime. The hollow compliance with the mandate of the Constitution at a stage so important as arraignment might be enough in itself to convince one like petitioner, who previously had never set foot in an American courtroom, that a waiver of this right to counsel was no great loss — just another legalistic formality. We are unable to agree with the government’s argument that the momentary appointment of the lawyer for arraignment purposes supports the contention that the petitioner intelligently waived her right to counsel. In fact, that court episode points in the other direction, for the judge then told the petitioner that he would appoint another lawyer “right away” for her — which he never did until long after she had pleaded guilty, too late to do her any good.
Fourth. We have said: “The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused — whose life or liberty is at stake — is without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused.” To discharge this duty properly in light of the strong presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand. The fact that an accused may tell him that he is informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right does not automatically end the judge’s responsibility. To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understanding^ and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered.
This case graphically illustrates that a mere routine inquiry — the asking of several standard questions followed by the signing of a standard written waiver of counsel— may leave a judge entirely unaware of the facts essential to an informed decision that an accused has executed a valid waiver of his right to counsel. And this case shows that such routine inquiries may be inadequate although the Constitution “does not require that under all circumstances counsel be forced upon a defendant.” Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173, 174-175. For the record demonstrates that the petitioner welcomed legal aid from all possible sources; there would have been no necessity for forcing counsel on her.
Twice the court did designate counsel for petitioner. The first occasion was upon her arraignment. Petitioner appears willingly to have cooperated with this appointed counsel for the two or three minutes he was called upon to act. The second occasion was when counsel was named for the sole purpose of moving to withdraw her plea of guilty. Notwithstanding her unfortunate first encounter with court-appointed counsel and despite the fact that counsel was not designated the second time until it was obviously months too late to submit this motion under the procedural rules, there is no complaint that the petitioner failed to cooperate with him. And the record is filled with evidence from many witnesses that the petitioner persistently sought legal advice from all of the very limited number of people she was permitted to see during the period of her close incarceration before her plea of guilty was entered. It is apparent from the record that when she did plead guilty the slightest deviation from the court’s routine procedure would have revealed the petitioner’s perplexity and doubt. For the testimony of all the witnesses points unerringly to the existence of the uncertainty which was obviously just below the surface of the petitioner’s statements to the judge.
Fifth. The right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution contemplates the services of an attorney devoted solely to the interests of his client. Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60, 70. Before pleading guilty this petitioner undoubtedly received advice and counsel about the indictment against her, the legal questions involved in a trial under it, and many other matters concerning her case. This counsel came solely from government representatives, some of whom were lawyers. The record shows that these representatives were uniformly courteous to her, although there is no indication that they ever deviated in the slightest from the course dictated by their loyalty to the Government as its agents. In the course of her association with these agents, she appears to have developed a great confidence in them. Some of their evidence indicates a like confidence in her.
The Constitution does not contemplate that prisoners shall be dependent upon government agents for legal counsel and aid, however conscientious and able those agents may be. Undivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service to a client are prized traditions of the American lawyer. It is this kind of service for which the Sixth Amendment makes provision. And nowhere is this service deemed more honorable than in case of appointment to represent an accused too poor to hire a lawyer, even though the accused may be a member of an unpopular or hated group, or may be charged with an offense which is peculiarly abhorrent.
The admitted circumstances here cannot support a holding that petitioner intelligently and understandingly waived her right to counsel. She was entitled to counsel other than that given her by Government agents. She is still entitled to that counsel before her life or her liberty can be taken from her.
What has been said represents the views of Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Murphy, and Mr. Justice Rutledge. They would therefore reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, set aside the prior judgment of the District Court and direct that court to grant the petitioner’s prayer for release from further imprisonment under the judgment based on her plea of guilty. Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Jackson, for the reasons stated in a separate opinion, agree that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals should be reversed, and that the District Court’s prior judgment should be set aside, but they are of the opinion that, after setting aside its judgment, the District Court should further consider, and make explicit findings on, the questions of fact discussed in the separate opinion.
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the District Court is set aside. The cause is remanded to the District Court so that it may hold further hearings and give consideration to, and make explicit findings on, the questions of fact discussed in the separate opinion. If upon such further hearings and consideration the District Court finds that the petitioner did not competently, intelligently, and with full understanding of the implications, waive her. constitutional right to counsel, an order should be entered directing that she be released from further custody under the judgment based on her plea.
It is so ordered.
Separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in which Mr. Justice Jackson joins.
The appropriate disposition of this case turns for me on the truth of petitioner’s allegation that she was advised by an F. B. I. agent, active in the case, that one who merely associated, however innocently, with persons who were parties to a criminal conspiracy was equally guilty.
We are dealing, no doubt, with a person of intellectual acuteness. But it would be very rare, indeed, even for an extremely intelligent layman to have the understanding necessary to decide what course was best calculated to serve her interests when charged with participation in a conspiracy. The too easy abuses to which a charge of conspiracy may be put have occasioned weighty animadversion by the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges. Report of the Attorney General, 1925, pp. 5-6; and see also the observations of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Falcone, 109 F. 2d 579, 581; affirmed in 311 U. S. 205. The subtleties of refined distinctions to which a charge of conspiracy may give rise are reflected in this Court’s decisions. See, e. g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750. Because of its complexity, the law of criminal conspiracy, as it has unfolded, is more difficult of comprehension by the laity than that which defines other types of crimes. Thus, as may have been true of petitioner, an accused might be found in the net of a conspiracy by reason of the relation of her acts to acts of others, the significance of which she may not have appreciated, and which may result from the application of criteria more delicate than those which determine guilt as to the usual substantive offenses. Accordingly, if an F. B. I. agent, acting as a member of the prosecution, gave her, however honestly, clearly erroneous legal advice which might well have induced her to believe that she was guilty under the law as expounded to her by one who for her represented the Government, a person in the petitioner’s situation might well have thought a defense futile and the mercy of the court her best hope. Such might have been her conclusion, however innocent she may have deemed herself to be. I could not regard a plea of guilty made under such circumstances, made without either the advice of counsel exclusively representing her or after a searching inquiry by the court into the understanding that lay behind it, as having been made on the necessary basis of informed, self-determined choice.
Of course an accused “in the exercise of a free and intelligent choice, and with the considered approval of the court... may... competently and intelligently waive” his right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 275; and see Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458. There must be both the capacity to make an understanding choice and an absence of subverting factors so that the choice is clearly free and responsible. If the choice is beclouded, whether by duress or by misleading advice, however honestly offered by a member of the prosecution, a plea of guilty accepted without more than what this record discloses can hardly be called a refusal to put the inner feeling of innocence to the fair test of the law with intelligent awareness of consequences. Therefore, if the F. B. I. agent had admitted that the petitioner accurately stated his advice to her, or if the District Court upon a conflict of testimony had found that memory or truth lay with the petitioner, I could not escape the conclusion that the circumstances under which the petitioner’s plea of guilty was accepted did not measure up to the safeguards heretofore enunciated by this Court for accepting a plea of guilty, especially where a sentence of death was at hazard.
On the record as we have it, however, I cannot tell whether the advice which, if given, would have colored the plea of guilty was actually given. If the unrevealing words of the cold record spoke to me with the clarity which they convey to four of my brethren, I should agree that the petitioner must be discharged. Conversely, if the District Court’s opinion conveyed to me the findings which it radiates to my other brethren, I too would conclude that the judgment should be affirmed.
Unfortunately, the record does not give me a firm basis for judgment regarding the crucial issue of the F. B. I. agent’s advice to the petitioner. It is not disputed that the agent, who was also a lawyer, did talk with her and did discuss legal issues with her. But he neither admitted nor denied whether, in the course of his discussions with her, he expounded the law so as hardly to leave her escape, however innocent under a correct view of the law she may have been. He did not even suggest that even though he did not remember, he was confident that he could not have given her the kind of misleading legal information she attributed to him. On the contrary, he added that “it is quite possible that Mrs. von Moltke’s memory is better than mine.” From the dead page, in connection with the rest of the agent’s testimony, this suggests a scrupulous witness. But I cannot now recreate his tone of voice or the gloss that personality puts upon speech. Therefore I am unable to determine whether the petitioner pleaded guilty in reliance on the palpably erroneous advice of an F. B. I. lawyer-agent who, as the symbol of the prosecution, owed it to an accused in petitioner’s position to give her accurate guidance, if he gave any.
Nor does the District Judge’s opinion resolve these difficulties for me. From what he wrote it would be the most tenuous guessing whether he rejected the petitioner’s account of the F. B. I. agent’s counselling or whether he did not attach to that issue the legal significance which I deem controlling. Since the record affords neither resolving evidence nor the District Court’s finding on what I deem to be the circumstance of controlling importance, I would send the cause back to the District Court for further proceedings with a view to a specific finding of fact regarding the conversation between petitioner and the F. B. I. agent, with as close a recreation of the incident as is now possible.
Section 32 defines the
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to decide how immigration judges should apply a deportation (removal) provision, defined with reference to federal drug laws, to an alien convicted of a state drug-paraphernalia misdemeanor.
Lawful permanent resident Moones Mellouli, in 2010, pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense under Kansas law, the possession of drug paraphernalia to "store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5709(b)(2) (2013 Cum. Supp.). The sole "paraphernalia" Mellouli was charged with possessing was a sock in which he had placed four orange tablets. The criminal charge and plea agreement did not identify the controlled substance involved, but Mellouli had acknowledged, prior to the charge and plea, that the tablets were Adderall. Mellouli was sentenced to a suspended term of 359 days and 12 months' probation.
In February 2012, several months after Mellouli successfully completed probation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers arrested him as deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) based on his Kansas misdemeanor conviction. Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) authorizes the removal of an alien "convicted of a violation of... any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21 )." We hold that Mellouli's Kansas conviction for concealing unnamed pills in his sock did not trigger removal under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The drug-paraphernalia possession law under which he was convicted, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5709(b), by definition, related to a controlled substance: The Kansas statute made it unlawful "to use or possess with intent to use any drug paraphernalia to... store [or] conceal... a controlled substance." But it was immaterial under that law whether the substance was defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802. Nor did the State charge, or seek to prove, that Mellouli possessed a substance on the § 802 schedules. Federal law ( § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) ), therefore, did not authorize Mellouli's removal.
I
A
This case involves the interplay between several federal and state statutes. Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, as amended, authorizes the removal of an alien "convicted of a violation of... any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21 ), other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana." Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) incorporates 21 U.S.C. § 802, which limits the term "controlled substance" to a "drug or other substance" included in one of five federal schedules. § 802(6).
The statute defining the offense to which Mellouli pleaded guilty, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5709(b), proscribes "possess[ion] with intent to use any drug paraphernalia to," among other things, "store" or "conceal" a "controlled substance." Kansas defines "controlled substance" as any drug included on its own schedules, and makes no reference to § 802 or any other federal law. § 21-5701(a). At the time of Mellouli's conviction, Kansas' schedules included at least nine substances not included in the federal lists. See § 65-4105(d)(30), (31), (33), (34), (36) (2010 Cum. Supp.); § 65-4111(g) (2002); § 65-4113(d)(1), (e), (f) (2010 Cum. Supp.); see also Brief for Respondent 9, n. 2.
The question presented is whether a Kansas conviction for using drug paraphernalia to store or conceal a controlled substance, § 21-5709(b), subjects an alien to deportation under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which applies to an alien "convicted of a violation of [a state law] relating to a controlled substance (as defined in [ § 802 ] )."
B
Mellouli, a citizen of Tunisia, entered the United States on a student visa in 2004. He attended U.S. universities, earning a bachelor of arts degree, magna cum laude, as well as master's degrees in applied mathematics and economics. After completing his education, Mellouli worked as an actuary and taught mathematics at the University of Missouri-Columbia. In 2009, he became a conditional permanent resident and, in 2011, a lawful permanent resident. Since December 2011, Mellouli has been engaged to be married to a U.S. citizen.
In 2010, Mellouli was arrested for driving under the influence and driving with a suspended license. During a postarrest search in a Kansas detention facility, deputies discovered four orange tablets hidden in Mellouli's sock. According to a probable-cause affidavit submitted in the state prosecution, Mellouli acknowledged that the tablets were Adderall and that he did not have a prescription for the drugs. Adderall, the brand name of an amphetamine-based drug typically prescribed to treat attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, is a controlled substance under both federal and Kansas law. See 21 CFR § 1308.12(d)(1) (2014) (listing "amphetamine" and its "salts" and "isomers"); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4107(d)(1) (2013 Cum. Supp.) (same). Based on the probable-cause affidavit, a criminal complaint was filed charging Mellouli with trafficking contraband in jail.
Ultimately, Mellouli was charged with only the lesser offense of possessing drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor. The amended complaint alleged that Mellouli had "use[d] or possess[ed] with intent to use drug paraphernalia, to-wit: a sock, to store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance." App. 23. The complaint did not identify the substance contained in the sock. Mellouli pleaded guilty to the paraphernalia possession charge; he also pleaded guilty to driving under the influence. For both offenses, Mellouli was sentenced to a suspended term of 359 days and 12 months' probation.
In February 2012, several months after Mellouli successfully completed probation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers arrested him as deportable under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) based on his paraphernalia possession conviction. An Immigration Judge ordered Mellouli deported, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the order. Mellouli was deported in 2012.
Under federal law, Mellouli's concealment of controlled-substance tablets in his sock would not have qualified as a drug-paraphernalia offense. Federal law criminalizes the sale of or commerce in drug paraphernalia, but possession alone is not criminalized at all. See 21 U.S.C. § 863(a) - (b). Nor does federal law define drug paraphernalia to include common household or ready-to-wear items like socks; rather, it defines paraphernalia as any "equipment, product, or material" which is "primarily intended or designed for use " in connection with various drug-related activities. § 863(d) (emphasis added). In 19 States as well, the conduct for which Mellouli was convicted-use of a sock to conceal a controlled substance-is not a criminal offense. Brief for National Immigrant Justice Center et al. as Amici Curiae 7. At most, it is a low-level infraction, often not attended by a right to counsel. Id., at 9-11.
The Eighth Circuit denied Mellouli's petition for review. 719 F.3d 995 (2013). We granted certiorari, 573 U.S. ----, 134 S.Ct. 2873, 189 L.Ed.2d 831 (2014), and now reverse the judgment of the Eighth Circuit.
II
We address first the rationale offered by the BIA and affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, which differentiates paraphernalia offenses from possession and distribution offenses. Essential background, in evaluating the rationale shared by the BIA and the Eighth Circuit, is the categorical approach historically taken in determining whether a state conviction renders an alien removable under the immigration statute. Because Congress predicated deportation "on convictions, not conduct," the approach looks to the statutory definition of the offense of conviction, not to the particulars of an alien's behavior. Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1669, 1701, 1746 (2011). The state conviction triggers removal only if, by definition, the underlying crime falls within a category of removable offenses defined by federal law. Ibid. An alien's actual conduct is irrelevant to the inquiry, as the adjudicator must "presume that the conviction rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts criminalized" under the state statute. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 1684-1685, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
The categorical approach "has a long pedigree in our Nation's immigration law." Id., at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 1685. As early as 1913, courts examining the federal immigration statute concluded that Congress, by tying immigration penalties to convictions, intended to "limi[t] the immigration adjudicator's assessment of a past criminal conviction to a legal analysis of the statutory offense," and to disallow "[examination] of the facts underlying the crime." Das, supra, at 1688, 1690.
Rooted in Congress' specification of conviction, not conduct, as the trigger for immigration consequences, the categorical approach is suited to the realities of the system. Asking immigration judges in each case to determine the circumstances underlying a state conviction would burden a system in which "large numbers of cases [are resolved by] immigration judges and front-line immigration officers, often years after the convictions." Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 Geo. Immigration L. J. 257, 295 (2012). By focusing on the legal question of what a conviction necessarily established, the categorical approach ordinarily works to promote efficiency, fairness, and predictability in the administration of immigration law. See id., at 295-310; Das, supra, at 1725-1742. In particular, the approach enables aliens "to anticipate the immigration consequences of guilty pleas in criminal court," and to enter "'safe harbor' guilty pleas [that] do not expose the [alien defendant] to the risk of immigration sanctions." Koh, supra, at 307. See Das, supra, at 1737-1738.
The categorical approach has been applied routinely to assess whether a state drug conviction triggers removal under the immigration statute. As originally enacted, the removal statute specifically listed covered offenses and covered substances. It made deportable, for example, any alien convicted of "import[ing]," "buy[ing]," or "sell[ing]" any "narcotic drug," defined as "opium, coca leaves, cocaine, or any salt, derivative, or preparation of opium or coca leaves, or cocaine." Ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596-597. Over time, Congress amended the statute to include additional offenses and additional narcotic drugs. Ultimately, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 replaced the increasingly long list of controlled substances with the now familiar reference to "a controlled substance (as defined in [ § 802 ] )." See § 1751, 100 Stat. 3207-47. In interpreting successive versions of the removal statute, the BIA inquired whether the state statute under which the alien was convicted covered federally controlled substances and not others.
Matter of Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274 (1965), is illustrative. At the time the BIA decided Paulus, the immigration statute made deportable any alien who had been "convicted of a violation of... any law or regulation relating to the illicit possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marihuana." Id., at 275. California controlled certain "narcotics," such as peyote, not listed as "narcotic drugs" under federal law. Ibid. The BIA concluded that an alien's California conviction for offering to sell an unidentified "narcotic" was not a deportable offense, for it was possible that the conviction involved a substance, such as peyote, controlled only under California law. Id., at 275-276. Because the alien's conviction was not necessarily predicated upon a federally controlled "narcotic drug," the BIA concluded that the conviction did not establish the alien's deportability. Id., at 276.
Under the Paulus analysis, adhered to as recently as 2014 in Matter of Ferreira, 26 I. & N. Dec. 415 (BIA 2014), Mellouli would not be deportable. Mellouli pleaded guilty to concealing unnamed pills in his sock. At the time of Mellouli's conviction, Kansas' schedules of controlled substances included at least nine substances-e.g., salvia and jimson weed-not defined in § 802. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4105(d)(30), (31). The state law involved in Mellouli's conviction, therefore, like the California statute in Paulus, was not confined to federally controlled substances; it required no proof by the prosecutor that Mellouli used his sock to conceal a substance listed under § 802, as opposed to a substance controlled only under Kansas law. Under the categorical approach applied in Paulus, Mellouli's drug-paraphernalia conviction does not render him deportable. In short, the state law under which he was charged categorically "relat[ed] to a controlled substance," but was not limited to substances "defined in [ § 802 ]."
The BIA, however, announced and applied a different approach to drug-paraphernalia offenses (as distinguished from drug possession and distribution offenses) in Matter of Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. 118 (2009). There, the BIA ranked paraphernalia statutes as relating to "the drug trade in general." Id., at 121. The BIA rejected the argument that a paraphernalia conviction should not count at all because it targeted implements, not controlled substances. Id., at 120. It then reasoned that a paraphernalia conviction "relates to" any and all controlled substances, whether or not federally listed, with which the paraphernalia can be used. Id., at 121. Under this reasoning, there is no need to show that the type of controlled substance involved in a paraphernalia conviction is one defined in § 802.
The Immigration Judge in this case relied upon Martinez Espinoza in ordering Mellouli's removal, quoting that decision for the proposition that " 'the requirement of a correspondence between the Federal and State controlled substance schedules, embraced by Matter of Paulus... has never been extended' " to paraphernalia offenses. App. to Pet. for Cert. 32 (quoting Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec., at 121 ). The BIA affirmed, reasoning that Mellouli's conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia "involves drug trade in general and, thus, is covered under [ § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) ]." App. to Pet. for Cert. 18. Denying Mellouli's petition for review, the Eighth Circuit deferred to the BIA's decision in Martinez Espinoza, and held that a Kansas paraphernalia conviction "'relates to' a federal controlled substance because it is a crime... 'associated with the drug trade in general.' " 719 F.3d, at 1000.
The disparate approach to state drug convictions, devised by the BIA and applied by the Eighth Circuit, finds no home in the text of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The approach, moreover, "leads to consequences Congress could not have intended." Moncrieffe, 569 U.S., at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 1690. Statutes should be interpreted "as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme." FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). The BIA, however, has adopted conflicting positions on the meaning of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), distinguishing drug possession and distribution offenses from offenses involving the drug trade in general, with the anomalous result that minor paraphernalia possession offenses are treated more harshly than drug possession and distribution offenses. Drug possession and distribution convictions trigger removal only if they necessarily involve a federally controlled substance, see Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274, while convictions for paraphernalia possession, an offense less grave than drug possession and distribution, trigger removal whether or not they necessarily implicate a federally controlled substance, see Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. Dec. 118. The incongruous upshot is that an alien is not removable for possessing a substance controlled only under Kansas law, but he is removable for using a sock to contain that substance. Because it makes scant sense, the BIA's interpretation, we hold, is owed no deference under the doctrine described in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).
III
Offering an addition to the BIA's rationale, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that a state paraphernalia possession conviction categorically relates to a federally controlled substance so long as there is "nearly a complete overlap" between the drugs controlled under state and federal law. 719 F.3d, at 1000. The Eighth Circuit's analysis, however, scarcely explains or ameliorates the BIA's anomalous separation of paraphernalia possession offenses from drug possession and distribution offenses.
Apparently recognizing this problem, the Government urges, as does the dissent, that the overlap between state and federal drug schedules supports the removal of aliens convicted of any drug crime, not just paraphernalia offenses. As noted, § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) authorizes the removal of any alien "convicted of a violation of... any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in [ § 802 ] )." According to the Government, the words "relating to" modify "law or regulation," rather than "violation." Brief for Respondent 25-26 (a limiting phrase ordinarily modifies the last antecedent). Therefore, the Government argues, aliens who commit "drug crimes" in States whose drug schedules substantially overlap the federal schedules are removable, for "state statutes that criminalize hundreds of federally controlled drugs and a handful of similar substances, are laws'relating to' federally controlled substances." Brief for Respondent 17.
We do not gainsay that, as the Government urges, the last reasonable referent of "relating to," as those words appear in § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), is "law or regulation." The removal provision is thus satisfied when the elements that make up the state crime of conviction relate to a federally controlled substance. As this case illustrates, however, the Government's construction of the federal removal statute stretches to the breaking point, reaching state-court convictions, like Mellouli's, in which "[no] controlled substance (as defined in [ § 802 ] )" figures as an element of the offense. We recognize, too, that the § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) words to which the dissent attaches great weight, i.e., "relating to," post, at 1991 - 1992, are "broad" and "indeterminate." Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 2191, 2199-2200, 186 L.Ed.2d 275 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). As we cautioned in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995), those words, "extend[ed] to the furthest stretch of [their] indeterminacy,... stop nowhere." "[C]ontext," therefore, may "tu [g]... in favor of a narrower reading." Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1074, 1083, 191 L.Ed.2d 64 (2015). Context does so here.
The historical background of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) demonstrates that Congress and the BIA have long required a direct link between an alien's crime of conviction and a particular federally controlled drug. Supra, at 1987 - 1988. The Government's position here severs that link by authorizing deportation any time the state statute of conviction bears some general relation to federally controlled drugs. The Government offers no cogent reason why its position is limited to state drug schedules that have a "substantial overlap" with the federal schedules. Brief for Respondent 31. A statute with any overlap would seem to be related to federally controlled drugs. Indeed, the Government's position might well encompass convictions for offenses related to drug activity more generally, such as gun possession, even if those convictions do not actually involve drugs (let alone federally controlled drugs). The Solicitor General, while resisting this particular example, acknowledged that convictions under statutes "that have some connection to drugs indirectly" might fall within § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. This sweeping interpretation departs so sharply from the statute's text and history that it cannot be considered a permissible reading.
In sum, construction of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) must be faithful to the text, which limits the meaning of "controlled substance," for removal purposes, to the substances controlled under § 802. We therefore reject the argument that any drug offense renders an alien removable, without regard to the appearance of the drug on a § 802 schedule. Instead, to trigger removal under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), the Government must connect an element of the alien's conviction to a drug "defined in [ § 802 ]."
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.
The Court reverses the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on the ground that it misapplied the federal removal statute. It rejects the Government's interpretation of that statute, which would supply an alternative ground for affirmance. Yet it offers no interpretation of its own. Lower courts are thus left to guess which convictions qualify an alien for removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), and the majority has deprived them of their only guide: the statutory text itself. Because the statute renders an alien removable whenever he is convicted of violating a law "relating to" a federally controlled substance, I would affirm.
I
With one exception not applicable here, § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) makes removable "[a]ny alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )." I would hold, consistent with the text, that the provision requires that the conviction arise under a "law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )." Thus, Mellouli was properly subject to removal if the Kansas statute of conviction "relat[es] to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )," regardless of whether his particular conduct would also have subjected him to prosecution under federal controlled-substances laws. See ante, at 1986 ("An alien's actual conduct is irrelevant to the inquiry"). The majority's 12 references to the sock that Mellouli used to conceal the pills are thus entirely beside the point.
The critical question, which the majority does not directly answer, is what it means for a law or regulation to "relat[e] to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )." At a minimum, we know that this phrase does not require a complete overlap between the substances controlled under the state law and those controlled under 21 U.S.C. § 802. To "relate to" means " 'to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with.' " Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)). In ordinary parlance, one thing can "relate to"
another even if it also relates to other things. As ordinarily understood, therefore, a state law regulating various controlled substances may "relat[e] to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )" even if the statute also controls a few substances that do not fall within the federal definition.
The structure of the removal statute confirms this interpretation. Phrases like "relating to" and "in connection with" have broad but indeterminate meanings that must be understood in the context of "the structure of the statute and its other provisions." Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 2191, 2200, 186 L.Ed.2d 275 (2013) ("in connection with"); see also New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995) ("relate to"); see generally California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324, 117 S.Ct. 832, 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997) (describing the Court's efforts to interpret the " 'clearly expansive' " "relate to" language in the pre-emption provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974). In interpreting such phrases, we must be careful to honor Congress' choice to use expansive language. Maracich, supra, at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 2199 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (noting that a statute should be interpreted broadly in light of Congress' decision to use sweeping language like "in connection with"); see also, e.g., Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 484, 124 S.Ct. 983, 157 L.Ed.2d 967 (2004) (GINSBURG, J.) (interpreting Environmental Protection Agency's authority in light of the "notably capacious terms" contained in its authorizing statute).
Here, the "structure of the statute and its other provisions" indicate that Congress understood this phrase to sweep quite broadly. Several surrounding subsections of the removal statute reveal that when Congress wanted to define with greater specificity the conduct that subjects an alien to removal, it did so by omitting the expansive phrase "relating to." For example, a neighboring provision makes removable "[a]ny alien who... is convicted under any law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale, exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying... any weapon, part, or accessory which is a firearm or destructive device (as defined in section 921(a) of title 18)." 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added). This language explicitly requires that the object of the offense fit within a federal definition. Other provisions adopt similar requirements. See, e.g., § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (making removable "[a]ny alien who... is convicted of a crime of domestic violence," where "the term 'crime of domestic violence' means any crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18)... committed by" a person with a specified family relationship with the victim); see generally § 1101(a)(43) (defining certain aggravated felonies using federal definitions as elements). That Congress, in this provision, required only that a law relate to a federally controlled substance, as opposed to involve such a substance, suggests that it understood "relating to" as having its ordinary and expansive meaning. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983).
Applying this interpretation of "relating to," a conviction under Kansas' drug paraphernalia statute qualifies as a predicate offense under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). That state statute prohibits the possession or use of drug paraphernalia to "store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5709(b)(2) (2013 Cum. Supp.). And, as used in this statute, a "controlled substance" is a substance that appears on Kansas' schedules, § 21-5701(a), which in turn consist principally of federally controlled substances. Ante, at 1984 - 1985; see also Brief for Petitioner 3 (listing nine substances on Kansas' schedules that were not on the federal schedules at the time of Mellouli's arrest); Brief for Respondent 8 (noting that, at the time of Mellouli's arrest, more than 97 percent of the named substances on Kansas' schedules were federally controlled). The law certainly "relat[es] to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )" because it prohibits conduct involving controlled substances falling within the federal definition in § 802.
True, approximately three percent of the substances appearing on Kansas' lists of "controlled substances" at the time of Mellouli's conviction did not fall within the federal definition, ante, at 1984 - 1985, meaning that an individual convicted of possessing paraphernalia may never have used his paraphernalia with a federally controlled substance. But that fact does not destroy the relationship between the law and federally controlled substances. Mellouli was convicted for violating a state law "relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )," so he was properly removed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
II
A
The majority rejects this straightforward interpretation because it "reach[es] state-court convictions... in which '[no] controlled substance (as defined in [ § 802 ] )' figures as an element of the offense." Ante, at 1990. This assumes the answer to the question at the heart of this case: whether the removal statute does in fact reach such convictions. To answer that question by assuming the answer is circular.
The majority hints that some more limited definition of "relating to" is suggested by context. See ibid. I wholeheartedly agree that we must look to context to understand indeterminate terms like "relating to," which is why I look to surrounding provisions of the removal statute. These "reveal that when Congress wanted to define with greater specificity the conduct that subjects an alien to removal, it did so by omitting the expansive phrase'relating to.' " Supra, at 1992. For its part, the majority looks to the context of other provisions referring to "controlled substances" without a definitional parenthetical, ante, at 1990, n. 11, and rejoins that the most natural reading of the statute "shrinks to the vanishing point the words 'as defined in [ § 802 ],' " ante, at 1988, n. 9. But the definition of controlled substances does play a role in my interpretation, by requiring that the law bear some relationship to federally controlled substances. Although we need not establish the precise boundaries of that relationship in this case given that Kansas' paraphernalia law clearly qualifies under any reasonable definition of "relating to," the definition of controlled substances imposes a meaningful limit on the statutes that qualify.
B
The majority appears to conclude that a statute "relates to" a federally controlled substance if its "definition of the offense of conviction" necessarily includes as an element of that offense a federally controlled substance. Ante, at 1986. The text will not bear this meaning.
The first problem with the majority's interpretation is that it converts a removal provision expressly keyed to features of the statute itself into one keyed to features of the underlying generic offense. To understand the difference, one need look no further than this Court's decision in Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. ----, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013). In that case, removal was predicated on the generic offense of "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance." Id., at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 1683. Thus, in order to satisfy the federal criteria, it was necessary for the state offense at issue to have as elements the same elements that make up that generic offense. Id., at ----, 133 S.Ct., at 1684-1685. By contrast, § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) does not refer to a generic offense for which we must discern the relevant criteria from its nature. Instead, it establishes the relevant criteria explicitly, and does so for the law of conviction itself rather than for some underlying generic offense-that is, the law of conviction must "relat [e] to" a federally controlled substance.
The only plausible way of reading the text here to refer to a generic offense that has as one element the involvement of a federally controlled substance would be to read "relating to" as modifying "violation" instead of "law." Under that reading, the statute would attach immigration consequences to a "violation... relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )," rather than a violation of a "law... relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21 )." Yet the majority expressly-and correctly-rejects as grammatically incorrect Mellouli's argument that the "relating to" clause modifies "vi
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Kennedy
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Clarence E. Hill challenges the constitutionality of a three-drug sequence the State of Florida likely would use to execute him by lethal injection. Seeking to enjoin the procedure, he filed this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1983. The District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit construed the action as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordered it dismissed for noncompliance with the requirements for a second and successive petition. The question before us is whether Hill’s claim must be brought by an action for a writ of habeas corpus under the statute authorizing that writ, 28 U. S. C. §2254, or whether it may proceed as an action for relief under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
This is not the first time we have found it necessary to discuss which of the two statutes governs an action brought by a prisoner alleging a constitutional violation. See, e. g., Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U. S. 637 (2004); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973). Hill’s suit, we now determine, is comparable in its essentials to the action the Court allowed to proceed under § 1983 in Nelson, supra. In accord with that precedent we now reverse.
I
In the year 1983, Hill was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. When his conviction and sentence became final some five years later, the method of execution then prescribed by Florida law was electrocution. Fla. Stat. §922.10 (1987). On January 14, 2000 — four days after the conclusion of Hill’s first, unsuccessful round of federal habeas corpus litigation — Florida amended the controlling statute to provide: “A death sentence shall be executed by lethal injection, unless the person sentenced to death affirmatively elects to be executed by electrocution.” §922.105(1) (2003). The now-controlling statute, which has not been changed in any relevant respect, does not specify a particular lethal injection procedure. Implementation is the responsibility of the Florida Department of Corrections. See ibid.; Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam). The department has not issued rules establishing a specific lethal injection protocol, and its implementing policies and procedures appear exempt from Florida’s Administrative Procedure Act. See §922.105(7).
After the statute was amended to provide for lethal injection, the Florida Supreme Court heard a death row inmate’s claim that the execution procedure violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. Sims v. State, supra. In Sims, the complainant, who had acquired detailed information about the procedure from the State, contended the planned three-drug sequence of injections would cause great pain if the drugs were not administered properly. 754 So. 2d, at 666-668. The Florida Supreme Court rejected this argument as too speculative. Id., at 668.
On November 29, 2005, the Governor of Florida signed Hill’s death warrant, which ordered him to be executed on January 24, 2006. Hill requested information about the lethal injection protocol, but the department provided none. App. 21, n. 3 (Verified Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief ¶ 15, n. 3 (hereinafter Complaint)). Hill then challenged, for the first time, the State’s lethal injection procedure. On December 15, 2005, he filed a successive post-conviction petition in state court, relying upon the Eighth Amendment. The trial court denied Hill’s request for an evidentiary hearing and dismissed his claim as procedurally barred. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed on January 17,2006. Hill v. State, 921 So. 2d 579, cert. denied, 546 U. S. 1219 (2006).
Three days later — and four days before his scheduled execution — Hill brought this action in District Court pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983. Assuming the State would use the procedure discussed at length in the Sims decision, see App. 20-21, and n. 3 (Complaint ¶ 15, n. 3), Hill alleged that the first drug injected, sodium pentothal, would not be a sufficient anesthetic to render painless the administration of the second and third drugs, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. There was an ensuing risk, Hill alleged, that he could remain conscious and suffer severe pain as the pancuronium paralyzed his lungs and body and the potassium chloride caused muscle cramping and a fatal heart attack. Id., at 18-21 (Complaint ¶¶9-16). The complaint sought an injunction “barring defendants from executing Plaintiff in the manner they currently intend.” Id., at 22 (Complaint ¶¶ 19-20).
The District Court found that under controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent the § 1983 claim was the functional equivalent of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id., at 15 (relying on Robinson v. Crosby, 358 F. 3d 1281 (2004)). Because Hill had sought federal habeas corpus relief in an earlier action, the District Court deemed his petition successive and thus barred for failure to obtain leave to file from the Court of Appeals as required by 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b). On the day of the scheduled execution the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Hill’s action was a successive petition and that it would deny any application for leave to file a successive petition because § 2244(b)(2) would not allow his claim to proceed. Hill v. Crosby, 437 F. 3d 1084, 1085 (CA11 2006). After issuing a temporary stay of execution, this Court granted Hill’s petition for certiorari and continued the stay pending our resolution of the case. 546 U. S. 1158 (2006).
II
“Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U. S. C. § 2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. § 1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1988. Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U. S. 749, 750 (2004) (per curiam) (citing Preiser, 411 U. S., at 500). An inmate’s challenge to the circumstances of his confinement, however, may be brought under § 1983. 540 U. S., at 750.
In Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U. S. 637, we addressed whether a challenge to a lethal injection procedure must proceed as a habeas corpus action. The complainant had severely compromised peripheral veins, and Alabama planned to apply an invasive procedure on his arm or leg to enable the injection. He sought to enjoin the procedure, alleging it would violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court observed that the question whether a general challenge to a method of execution must proceed under habeas was a difficult one. The claim was not easily described as a challenge to the fact or duration of a sentence; yet in a State where the legislature has established lethal injection as the method of execution, “a constitutional challenge seeking to permanently enjoin the use of lethal injection may amount to a challenge to the fact of the sentence itself.” Id., at 644.
Nelson did not decide this question. The lawsuit at issue, as the Court understood the case, did not require an injunction that would challenge the sentence itself. The invasive procedure in Nelson was not mandated by law, and the inmate appeared willing to concede the existence of an acceptable alternative procedure. Id., at 645-646. Absent a finding that the challenged procedure was necessary to the lethal injection, the Court concluded, injunctive relief would not prevent the State from implementing the sentence. Consequently, the suit as presented would not be deemed a challenge to the fact of the sentence itself. See ibid.
The decision in Nelson also observed that its holding was congruent with the Court’s precedents addressing civil rights suits for damages that implicate habeas relief. Those cases provide that prisoners’ suits for damages can be barred from proceeding under § 1983 when a judgment in the prisoner’s favor necessarily implies the invalidity of the prisoner’s sentence. See, e. g., Heck, 512 U. S., at 487; Close, supra, at 751. The action in Nelson, however, was not analogous to a damages suit filed to circumvent the limits imposed by the habeas statute. The suit did not challenge an execution procedure required by law, so granting relief would not imply the unlawfulness of the lethal injection sentence. See 541 U. S., at 647.
In the case before us we conclude that Hill’s § 1983 action is controlled by the holding in Nelson. Here, as in Nelson, Hill’s action if successful would not necessarily prevent the State from executing him by lethal injection. The complaint does not challenge the lethal injection sentence as a general matter but seeks instead only to enjoin respondents “from executing [Hill] in the manner they currently intend.” App. 22 (Complaint ¶ 20). The specific objection is that the anticipated protocol allegedly causes “a foreseeable risk of . . . gratuitous and unnecessary” pain. Id., at 46 (Application for Stay of Execution and for Expedited Appeal). Hill concedes that “other methods of lethal injection the Department could choose to use would be constitutional,” Brief for Petitioner 17, and respondents do not contend, at least to this point in the litigation, that granting Hill’s injunction would leave the State without any other practicable, legal method of executing Hill by lethal injection. Florida law, moreover, does not require the department of corrections to use the challenged procedure. See Fla. Stat. §§922.105(1), (7) (prescribing lethal injection and leaving implementation to the department of corrections). Hill’s challenge appears to leave the State free to use an alternative lethal injection procedure. Under these circumstances a grant of injunctive relief could not be seen as barring the execution of Hill’s sentence.
One difference between the present case and Nelson, of course, is that Hill challenges the chemical injection sequence rather than a surgical procedure preliminary to the lethal injection. In Nelson, however, the State argued that the invasive procedure was not a medical operation separable from the lethal injection but rather a “necessary prerequisite to, and thus an indispensable part of, any lethal injection procedure.” 541 U. S., at 645. The Court reasoned that although venous access was necessary for lethal injection, it' did not follow that the State’s chosen means of access were necessary; “the gravamen of petitioner’s entire claim” was that the procedure was “gratuitous.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted). The same is true here. Although the injection of lethal chemicals is an obvious necessity for the execution, Hill alleges that the challenged procedure presents a risk of pain the State can avoid while still being able to enforce the sentence ordering a lethal injection.
One concern is that the foregoing analysis may be more theoretical than real based on the practicalities of the case. A procedure that avoids the harms Hill alleges, for instance, may be susceptible to attack for other purported risks of its own. Respondents and their supporting amici thus contend that the legal distinction between habeas corpus and § 1983 actions must account for the practical reality of capital litigation tactics: Inmates file these actions intending to forestall execution, and Nelson’s emphasis on whether a suit challenges something “necessary” to the execution provides no endpoint to piecemeal litigation aimed at delaying the execution. Viewed in isolation, no single component of a given execution procedure may be strictly necessary, the argument goes, and a capital litigant may put off execution by challenging one aspect of a procedure after another. The amici States point to Nelson’s aftermath as a cautionary example, contending that on remand the District Court allowed Nelson to amend his complaint and that litigation over the constitutionality of Alabama’s adopted alternative — one that Nelson had previously proposed — continues to this day. See Brief for State of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae 7-14.
Respondents and their supporting amici conclude that two different rules should follow from these practical considerations. The United States as amicus curiae contends that a capital litigant’s § 1983 action can proceed if, as in Nelson, supra, at 646, the prisoner identifies an alternative, authorized method of execution. A suit like Hill’s that fails to do so, the United States maintains, is more like a claim challenging the imposition of any method of execution — which is to say, the execution itself — because it shows the complainant is unable or unwilling to concede acceptable alternatives “[e]xcept in the abstract.” Brief for United States 14.
Although we agree courts should not tolerate abusive litigation tactics, see Part III, infra, even if the United States’ proposed limitation were likely to be effective we could not accept it. It is true that the Nelson plaintiff’s affirmative identification of an acceptable alternative supported our conclusion that the suit need not proceed as a habeas action. 541 U. S., at 646 (citing the inmate’s complaint and affidavits). That fact, however, was not decisive. Nelson did not change the traditional pleading requirements for § 1983 actions. If the relief sought would foreclose execution, recharacterizing a complaint as an action for habeas corpus might be proper. See id., at 644, 646. Cf. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524 (2005). Imposition of heightened pleading requirements, however, is quite a different matter. Specific pleading requirements are mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and not, as a general rule, through case-by-case determinations of the federal courts. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8 and 9; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U. S. 506, 512-514 (2002).
Respondents and the States as amici frame their argument differently. While not asking the Court in explicit terms to overrule Nelson, they contend a challenge to a procedure implicating the direct administration of an execution must proceed as a habeas action. Brief for Respondents 30-31; Brief for Alabama, supra, at 16-18. They rely on cases barring §1983 damages actions that, if successful, would imply the invalidation of an existing sentence or confinement. See, e. g., Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U. S. 641 (1997); Heck, 512 U. S. 477. Those cases, they contend, demonstrate that the test of whether an action would undermine a sentence must “be applied functionally.” Brief for Alabama, supra, at 16. By the same logic, it is said, a suit should be brought in habeas if it would frustrate the execution as a practical matter.
This argument cannot be squared with Nelson’s observation that its criterion — whether a grant of relief to the inmate would necessarily bar the execution — is consistent with Heck’s and Balisok’s approach to damages actions that implicate habeas relief. Nelson, supra, at 646-647. In those cases the question is whether “the nature of the challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity” of the confinement or sentence. Balisok, supra, at 645. As discussed above, and at this stage of the litigation, the injunction Hill seeks would not necessarily foreclose the State from implementing the lethal injection sentence under present law, and thus it could not be said that the suit seeks to establish “unlawfulness [that] would render a conviction or sentence invalid.” Heck, supra, at 486. Any incidental delay caused by allowing Hill to file suit does not cast on his sentence the kind of negative legal implication that would require him to proceed in a habeas action.
Ill
Filing an action that can proceed under § 1983 does not entitle the complainant to an order staying an execution as a matter of course. Both the State and the victims of crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, 556 (1998). Our conclusions today do not diminish that interest, nor do they deprive federal courts of the means to protect it.
We state again, as we did in Nelson, that a stay of execution is an equitable remedy. It is not available as a matter of right, and equity must be sensitive to the State’s strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue interference from the federal courts. 541 U. S., at 649-650. See In re Blodgett, 502 U. S. 236, 239-240 (1992) (per curiam); Delo v. Stokes, 495 U. S. 320, 323 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Thus, like other stay applicants, inmates seeking time to challenge the manner in which the State plans to execute them must satisfy all of the requirements for a stay, including a showing of a significant possibility of success on the merits. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 895-896 (1983). See also Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U. S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (preliminary injunction not granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion).
A court considering a stay must also apply “a strong equitable presumption against the grant of a stay where a claim could have been brought at such a time as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring entry of a stay.” Nelson, supra, at 650. See also Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U. S. 653, 654 (1992) (per curiam) (noting that the “last-minute nature of an application” or an applicant’s “attempt at manipulation” of the judicial process may be grounds for denial of a stay).
After Nelson a number of federal courts have invoked their equitable powers to dismiss suits they saw as speculative or filed too late in the day. See, e. g., Hicks v. Taft, 431 F. 3d 916 (CA6 2005); White v. Johnson, 429 F. 3d 572 (CA5 2005); Boyd v. Beck, 404 F. Supp. 2d 879 (EDNC 2005). Although the particular determinations made in those cases are not before us, we recognize that the problem they address is significant. Repetitive or piecemeal litigation presumably would raise similar concerns. The federal courts can and should protect States from dilatory or speculative suits, but it is not necessary to reject Nelson to do so.
The equities and the merits of Hill’s underlying action are also not before us. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Stewart
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On Wednesday, April 10, 1963, officials of Birmingham, Alabama, filed a bill of complaint in a state circuit court asking for injunctive relief against 139 individuals and two organizations. The bill and accompanying affidavits stated that during the preceding seven days:
“[Respondents [had] sponsored and/or participated in and/or conspired to commit and/or to encourage and/or to participate in certain movements, plans or projects commonly called ‘sit-in’ demonstrations, ‘kneel-in’ demonstrations, mass street parades, trespasses on private property after being warned to leave the premises by the owners of said property, congregating in mobs upon the public streets and other public places, unlawfully picketing private places of business in the City of Birmingham, Alabama; violation of numerous ordinances and statutes of the City of Birmingham and State of Alabama . . . .”
It was alleged that this conduct was “calculated to provoke breaches of the peace,” “threaten [ed] the safety, peace and tranquility of the City,” and placed “an undue burden and strain upon the manpower of the Police Department.”
The bill stated that these infractions of the law were expected to continue and would “lead to further imminent danger to the lives, safety, peace, tranquility and general welfare of the people of the City of Birmingham,” and that the “remedy by law [was] inadequate.” The circuit judge granted a temporary injunction as prayed in the bill, enjoining the petitioners from, among other things, participating in or encouraging mass street parades or mass- processions without a permit as required by a Birmingham ordinance.
Five of the eight petitioners were served with copies of the writ early the next morning. Several hours later four of them held a press conference. There a statement was distributed, declaring their intention to disobey the injunction because it was “raw tyranny under the guise of maintaining law and order.” At this press conference one of the petitioners stated: “That they had respect for the Federal Courts, or Federal Injunctions, but in the past the State Courts had favored local law enforcement, and if the police couldn’t handle it, the mob would.”
That night a meeting took place at which one of the petitioners announced that “[ijnjunction or no injunction we are going to march tomorrow.” The next afternoon, Good Friday, a large crowd gathered in the vicinity of Sixteenth Street and Sixth Avenue North in Birmingham. A group of about 50 or 60 proceeded to parade along the sidewalk while a crowd of 1,000 to 1,500 onlookers stood by, “clapping, and hollering, and [w]hooping.” Some of the crowd followed the marchers and spilled out into the street. At least three of the petitioners participated in this march.
Meetings sponsored by some of the petitioners were held that night and the following night, where calls for volunteers to “walk” and go to jail were made. On Easter Sunday, April 14, a crowd of between 1,500 and 2,000 people congregated in the midafternoon in the vicinity of Seventh Avenue and Eleventh Street North in Birmingham. One of the petitioners was seen organizing members of the crowd in formation. A group of about 50, headed by three other petitioners, started down the sidewalk two abreast. At least one other petitioner was among the marchers. Some 300 or 400 people from among the onlookers followed in a crowd that occupied the entire width of the street and overflowed onto the sidewalks. Violence occurred. Members of the crowd threw rocks that injured a newspaperman and damaged a police motorcycle.
The next day the city officials who had requested the injunction applied to the state circuit court for an order to show cause why the petitioners should not be held in contempt for violating it. At the ensuing hearing the petitioners sought to attack the constitutionality of the injunction on the ground that it was vague and over-broad, and restrained free speech. They also sought to attack the Birmingham parade ordinance upon similar grounds, and upon the further ground that the ordinance had previously been administered in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
The circuit judge refused to consider any of these contentions, pointing out that there had been neither a motion to dissolve the injunction, nor an effort to comply with it by applying for a permit from the city commission before engaging in the Good Friday and Easter Sunday parades. Consequently, the court held that the only issues before it were whether it had jurisdiction to issue the temporary injunction, and whether thereafter the petitioners had knowingly violated it. Upon these issues the court found against the petitioners, and imposed upon each of them a sentence of five days in jail and a $50 fine, in accord with an Alabama statute.
The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. That court, too, declined to consider the petitioners’ constitutional attacks upon the injunction and the underlying Birmingham parade ordinance:
“It is to be remembered that petitioners are charged with violating a temporary injunction. We are not reviewing a denial of a motion to dissolve or discharge a temporary injunction. Petitioners did not file any motion to vacate the temporary injunction until after the Friday and Sunday parades. Instead, petitioners deliberately defied the order of the court and did engage in and incite others to engage in mass street parades without a permit.
“We hold that the circuit court had the duty and authority, in the first instance, to determine the validity of the ordinance, and, until the decision of the circuit court is reversed for error by orderly review, either by the circuit court or a higher court, the orders of the circuit court based on its decision are to be respected and disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be punished. Howat v. State of Kansas, 258 U. S. 181.” 279 Ala. 53, 60, 62-63, 181 So. 2d 493, 500, 502.
Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181, was decided by this Court almost 50 years ago. That was a case in which people had been punished by a Kansas trial court for refusing to obey an antistrike injunction issued under the state industrial relations act. They had claimed a right to disobey the court’s order upon the ground that the state statute and the injunction based upon it were invalid under the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of Kansas had affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court “had general power to issue injunctions in equity and that, even if its exercise of the power was erroneous, the injunction was not void, and the defendants were pre-eluded from attacking it in this collateral proceeding . . . that, if the injunction was erroneous, jurisdiction was not thereby forfeited, that the error was subject to correction only by the ordinary method of appeal, and disobedience to the order constituted contempt.” 258 U. S., at 189.
This Court, in dismissing the writ of error, not only unanimously accepted but fully approved the validity of the rule of state law upon which the judgment of the Kansas court was grounded:
“An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction with equity powers upon pleadings properly invoking its action, and served upon persons made parties therein and within the jurisdiction, must be obeyed by them however erroneous the action of the court may be, even if the error be in the assumption of the validity of a seeming but void law going to the merits of the case. It is for the court of first instance to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its orders based on its decision are to be respected, and disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be punished.” 258 U. S., at 189-190.
The rule of state law accepted and approved in Howat v. Kansas is consistent with the rule of law followed by the federal courts.
In the present case, however, we are asked to hold that this rule of law, upon which the Alabama courts relied, was constitutionally impermissible. We are asked to say that the Constitution compelled Alabama to allow the petitioners to violate this injunction, to organize and engage in these mass street parades and demonstrations, without any previous effort on their part to have the injunction dissolved or modified, or any attempt to secure a parade permit in accordance with its terms. Whatever the limits of Howat v. Kansas, we cannot accept the petitioners’ contentions in the circumstances of this case.
Without question the state court that issued the injunction had, as a court of equity, jurisdiction over the petitioners and over the subject matter of the controversy. And this is not a case where the injunction was transparently invalid or had only a frivolous pretense to validity. We have consistently recognized the strong interest of state and local governments in regulating the use of their streets and other public places. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77; Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U. S. 395; Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39. When protest takes the form of mass demonstrations, parades, or picketing on public streets and sidewalks, the free passage of traffic and the prevention of public disorder and violence become important objects of legitimate state concern. As the Court stated, in Cox v. Louisiana, “We emphatically reject the notion . . . that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by pure speech.” 379 U. S. 536, 555. And as a unanimous Court stated in Cox v. New Hampshire:
“Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend.” 312 U. S., at 574.
The generality of the language contained in the Birmingham parade ordinance upon which the injunction was based would unquestionably raise substantial constitutional issues concerning some of its provisions. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147; Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558; Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290. The petitioners, however, did not even attempt to apply to the Alabama courts for an authoritative construction of the ordinance. Had they done so, those courts might have given the licensing authority granted in the ordinance a narrow and precise scope, as did the New Hampshire courts in Cox v. New Hampshire and Poulos v. New Hampshire, both supra. Cf. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. 87, 91; City of Darlington v. Stanley, 239 S. C. 139, 122 S. E. 2d 207. Here, just as in Cox and Poulos, it could not be assumed that this ordinance was void on its face.
The breadth and vagueness of the injunction itself would also unquestionably be subject to substantial constitutional question. But the way to raise that question was to apply to the Alabama courts to have the injunction modified or dissolved. The injunction in all events clearly prohibited mass parading without a permit, and the evidence shows that the petitioners fully understood that prohibition when they violated it.
The petitioners also claim that they were free to disobey the injunction because the parade ordinance on which it was based had been administered in the past in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion. In support of this claim they sought to introduce evidence that, a few days before the injunction issued, requests for permits to picket had been made to a member of the city commission. One request had been rudely rebuffed, and this same official had later made clear that he was without power to grant the permit alone, since the issuance of such permits was the responsibility of the entire city commission. Assuming the truth of this proffered evidence, it does not follow that the parade ordinance was void on its face. The petitioners, moreover, did not apply for a permit either to the commission itself or to any commissioner after the injunction issued. Had they done so, and had the permit been refused, it is clear that their claim of arbitrary or discriminatory administration of the ordinance would have been considered by the state circuit court upon a motion to dissolve the injunction.
This case would arise in quite a different constitutional posture if the petitioners, before disobeying the injunction, had challenged it in the Alabama courts, and had been met with delay or frustration of their constitutional claims. But there is no showing that such would have been the fate of a timely motion to modify or dissolve the injunction. There was an interim of two days between the issuance of the injunction and the Good Friday march. The petitioners give absolutely no explanation of why they did not make some application to the state court during that period. The injunction had issued ex parte; if the court had been presented with the petitioners’ contentions, it might well have disolved or at least modified its order in some respects. If it had not done so, Alabama procedure would have provided for an expedited process of appellate review. It cannot be presumed that the Alabama courts would have ignored the petitioners’ constitutional claims. Indeed, these contentions were accepted in another case by an Alabama appellate court that struck down on direct review the conviction under this very ordinance of one of thesé same petitioners.
The rule of law upon which the Alabama courts relied in this case was one firmly established by previous precedents. We do not deal here, therefore, with a situation where a state court has followed a regular past practice of entertaining claims in a given procedural mode, and without notice has abandoned that practice to the detriment of a litigant who finds his claim foreclosed by a novel procedural bar. Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U. S. 146. This is not a case where a procedural requirement has been sprung upon an unwary litigant when prior practice did not give him fair notice of its existence. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U. S. 284, 291.
The Alabama Supreme Court has apparently never in any criminal contempt case entertained a claim of non-jurisdictional error. In Fields v. City of Fairfield, 273 Ala. 688, 143 So. 2d 177, decided just three years before the present case, the defendants, members of a “White Supremacy” organization who had disobeyed an injunction, sought to challenge the constitutional validity of a permit ordinance upon which the injunction was based. The Supreme Court of Alabama, finding that the trial court had jurisdiction, applied the same rule of law which was followed here:
“As a general rule, an unconstitutional statute is an absolute nullity and may not form the basis of any legal right or legal proceedings, yet until its unconstitutionality has been judicially declared in appropriate proceedings, no person charged with its observance under an order or decree may disregard or violate the order or the decree with immunity from a charge of contempt of court; and he may not raise the question of its unconstitutionality in collateral proceedings on appeal from a judgment of conviction for contempt of the order or decree . . . .” 273 Ala., at 590, 143 So. 2d, at 180.
These precedents clearly put the petitioners on notice that they could not bypass orderly judicial review of the injunction before disobeying it. Any claim that they were entrapped or misled is wholly unfounded, a conclusion confirmed by evidence in the record showing that when the petitioners deliberately violated the injunction they expected to go to jail.
The rule of law that Alabama followed in this case reflects a belief that in the fair administration of justice no man can be judge in his own case, however exalted his station, however righteous his motives, and irrespective of his race, color, politics, or religion. This Court cannot hold that the petitioners were constitutionally free to ignore all the procedures of the law and carry their battle to the streets. One may sympathize with the petitioners’ impatient commitment to their cause. But respect for judicial process is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law, which alone can give abiding meaning to constitutional freedom.
Affirmed.
APPENDIX A TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
“Temporary Injunction — April 10, 1963.
“A verified Bill of Complaint in the above styled cause having been presented to me on this the 10th of April 1963 at 9:00 O’Clock P. M. in the City of Birmingham, Alabama.
“Upon consideration of said verified Bill of Complaint and the affidavits of Captain G. Y. Evans and Captain George Wall, and the public welfare, peace and safety requiring it, it is hereby considered, ordered, adjudged and decreed that a peremptory or a temporary writ of injunction be and the same is hereby issued in accordance with the prayer of said petition.
“It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the Court that upon the complainant entering into a good and sufficient bond conditioned as provided by law, in the sum of Twenty five Hundred Dollars ($2500.00), same to be approved by the Register of this Court that the Register issue a peremptory or temporary writ of injunction that the respondents and the others identified in said Bill of Complaint, their agents, members, employees, servants, followers, attorneys, successors and all other persons in active concert or participation with the respondents and all persons having notice of said order from continuing any act hereinabove designated particularly: engaging in, sponsoring, inciting or encouraging mass street parades or mass processions or like demonstrations without a permit, trespass on private property after being warned to leave the premises by the owner or person in possession of said private property, congregating on the street or public places into mobs, and unlawfully picketing business establishments or public buildings in the City of Birmingham, Jefferson County, State of Alabama or performing acts calculated to cause breaches of the peace in the City of Birmingham, Jefferson County, in the State of Alabama or from conspiring to engage in unlawful street parades, unlawful processions, unlawful demonstrations, unlawful boycotts, unlawful trespasses, and unlawful picketing or other like unlawful conduct or from violating the ordinances of the City of Birmingham and the Statutes of the State of Alabama or from doing any acts designed to consummate conspiracies to engage in said unlawful acts of parading, demonstrating, boycotting, trespassing and picketing or other unlawful acts, or from engaging in acts and conduct customarily known as 'kneel-ins’ in churches in violation of the wishes and desires of said churches.
“W. A. Jenkins, Jr., As Circuit Judge of the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama, In Equity Sitting.”
APPENDIX B TO OPINION OF THE COURT.
“In our struggle for freedom we have anchored our faith and hope in the rightness of the Constitution and the moral laws of the universe.
“Again and again the Federal judiciary has made it clear that the priviledges [sic] guaranteed under the First and the Fourteenth Amendments are to [sic] sacred to be trampled upon by the machinery of state government and police power. In the past we have abided by Federal injunctions out of respect for the forthright and consistent leadership that the Federal judiciary has given in establishing the principle of integration as the law of the land.
“However we are now confronted with recalcitrant forces in the Deep South that will use the courts to perpetuate the unjust and illegal system of racial separation.
“Alabama has made clear its determination to defy the law of the land. Most of its public officials, its legislative body and many of its law enforcement agents have openly defied the desegregation decision of the Supreme Court. We would feel morally and legal [sic] responsible to obey the injunction if the courts of Alabama applied equal justice to all of its citizens. This would be sameness made legal. However the ussuance [sic] of this injunction is a blatant of difference made legal.
“Southern law enforcement agencies have demonstrated now and again that they will utilize the force of law to misuse the judicial process.
“This is raw tyranny under the guise of maintaining law and order. We cannot in all good conscience obey such an injunction which is an unjust, undemocratic and unconstitutional misuse of the legal process.
“We do this not out of any desrespect [sic] for the law but out of the highest respect for the law. This is not an attempt to evade or defy the law or engage in chaotic anarchy. Just as in all good conscience we cannot obey unjust laws, neither can we respect the unjust use of the courts.
“We believe in a system of law based on justice and morality. Out of our great love for the Constitution of the U. S. and our desire to purify the judicial system of the state of Alabama, we risk this critical move with an awareness of the possible consequences involved.”
The text of the injunction is reproduced as Appendix A to this opinion.
The Birmingham parade ordinance, § 1159 of the Birmingham City Code, provides that:
“It shall be unlawful to organize or hold, or to assist in organizing or holding, or to take part or participate in, any parade or procession or other public demonstration on the streets or other public ways of the city, unless a permit therefor has been secured from the commission.
“To secure such permit, written application shall be made to the commission, setting forth the probable number of persons, vehicles and animals which will be engaged in such parade, procession or other public demonstration, the purpose for which it is to be held or had, and the streets or other public ways over, along or in which it is desired to have or hold such parade, procession or other public demonstration. The commission shall grant a written permit for such parade, procession or other public demonstration, prescribing the streets or other public ways which may be used therefor, unless in its judgment the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require that it be refused. It shall be unlawful to use for such purposes any other streets or public ways than those set out in said permit.
“The two preceding paragraphs, however, shall not apply to funeral processions.”
The full statement is reproduced as Appendix B to this opinion.
“The circuit court, or judges thereof when exercising equity jurisdiction and powers may punish for contempt by fine not exceeding fifty dollars, and by imprisonment, not exceeding five days, one or both.” Ala. Code, Tit. 13, § 143. See also id., §§ 4-5, 126.
The circuit court dismissed the contempt proceedings against several individuals on grounds of insufficient evidence.
Those petitioners who participated in the April 11 press conference contend that the circuit court improperly relied on this incident in finding them guilty of contempt, claiming that they were engaged in constitutionally protected free speech. We find no indication that the court considered the incident for any purpose other than the legitimate one of establishing that the participating petitioners’ subsequent violation of the injunction by parading without a permit was willful and deliberate.
The Alabama Supreme Court quashed the conviction of one defendant because of insufficient proof that he knew of the injunction before violating it, and the convictions of two others because there was no showing that they had disobeyed the order. 279 Ala. 53, 64, 181 So. 2d 493, 504.
Two of the petitioners here claim that there was a complete dearth of evidence to establish that they had knowledge of the injunction before violating it, and that their convictions are therefore constitutionally defective under the principle of Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U. S. 199. The Alabama Supreme Court’s recitation of the evidence on this issue, which is supported by the record, plainly shows this claim is without foundation. It is, of course, a familiar doctrine that proof of the elements of criminal contempt may be established by circumstantial evidence. Bullock v. United States, 265 F. 2d 683, cert. denied sub nom. Kasper v. United States, 360 U. S. 932.
Brougham v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 205 F. 857; Trickett v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist., 25 F. 2d 851, cert. denied, 278 U. S. 624; O’Hearne v. United States, 62 App. D. C. 285, 66 F. 2d 933, cert. denied, 290 U. S. 683; Locke v. United States,, 75 F. 2d 157, cert. denied, 295 U. S. 733; McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F. 2d 211, cert. denied sub nom. McCann v. Leibell, 299 U. S. 603; McLeod v. Majors, 102 F. 2d 128; Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F. 2d 92, cert. denied, 355 U. S. 834. See also Ex parte Rowland, 104 U. S. 604; In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443; In re Burras, 136 U. S. 586; United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563; United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258.
In In re Green, 369 U. S. 689, the petitioner was convicted of criminal contempt for violating a labor injunction issued by an Ohio court. Relying on the pre-emptive command of the federal labor law, the Court held that the state courts were required to hear Green’s claim that the state court was without jurisdiction to issue the injunction. The petitioner in Green, unlike the petitioners here, had attempted to challenge the validity of the injunction before violating it by promptly applying to the issuing court for an order vacating the injunction. The petitioner in Green had further ofered to prove that the court issuing the injunction had agreed to its violation as an appropriate means of testing its validity.
Ala. Const., Art. 6, § 144; Ala. Code, Tit. 7, §§ 1038-1039.
See n. 1, supra.
Mrs. Lola Hendricks, not a petitioner in this ease, testified that on April 3:
“I went to Mr. Connor’s office, the Commissioner’s office at the City Hall Building. We went up and Commissioner Connor met us at the door. He asked, ‘May I help you?’ I told him, ‘Yes, sir, we came up to apply or see about getting a permit for picketing, parading, demonstrating.’
“I asked Commissioner Connor for the permit, and asked if he could issue the permit, or other persons who would refer me to, persons who would issue a permit. He said, ‘No, you will not get a permit in Birmingham, Alabama to picket. I will picket you over to the City Jail,’ and he repeated that twice.”
Commissioner Connor sent the following telegram to one of the petitioners on April 5:
“Under the provisions of the city code of the City of Birmingham, a permit to picket as requested by you cannot be granted by me individually but is the responsiboity [sic] of the entire commission. I insist that you and your people do not start any picketing on the streets in Birmingham, Alabama.
“Eugene ‘Bull’ Connor, Commissioner of Public Safety.”
In its opinion, that court stated: “The legal and orderly processes of the Court would require the defendants to attack the unreasonable denial of such permit by the Commission of the City of Birmingham through means of a motion to dissolve the injunction at which time this Court would have the opportunity to pass upon the question of whether or not a compliance with the ordinance was attempted and whether or not an arbitrary and capricious denial of such request was made by the Commission of the City of Birmingham. Since this course of conduct was not sought by the defendants, the Court is of the opinion that the validity of its injunction order stands upon its prima facie authority to execute the same.”
Ala. Code, Tit. 7 App., Sup. Ct. Rule 47.
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 43 Ala. App. 68, 180 So. 2d 114. The ease is presently pending on certiorari review in the Alabama Supreme Court.
As early as 1904, the Alabama Supreme Court noted that: “An evident distinction is to be made in contempt proceedings for the violation of the writ of injunction, where the writ is improvidently or irregularly issued, and where it is issued without jurisdiction ...” Old Dominion Telegraph Co. v. Powers, 140 Ala. 220, 226, 37 So. 195, 197. See Board of Revenue of Covington County v. Merrill, 193 Ala. 521, 68 So. 971.
Reversed on other grounds, 375 U. S. 248.
The same rule of law was followed in Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F. 2d 92. There, a federal court had ordered the public high school in Clinton, Tennessee, to desegregate. Kasper “arrived from somewhere in the East,” and organized a campaign “to run the Negroes out of the school.” The federal court issued an ex parte restraining order enjoining Kasper from interfering with desegregation. Relying upon the First Amendment, Kasper harangued a crowd “to the effect that although he had been served with the restraining order, it did not mean anything . . . .” His conviction for criminal contempt was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. That court concluded that “an injunetional order issued by a court must be obeyed,” whatever its seeming invalidity, citing Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181. This Court denied certiorari, 355 U. S. 834.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Before a minor has an abortion in Montana, one of her parents must be notified. A waiver, or “judicial bypass,” of the notification requirement is allowed if the minor can convince a court that notification would not be in her best interests. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down Montana’s parental notification law as unconstitutional, holding that the judicial bypass did not sufficiently protect the right of minors to have an abortion. Because the Ninth Circuit’s holding is in direct conflict with our precedents, we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse.
In 1995, Montana enacted the Parental Notice of Abortion Act. The Act prohibits a physician from performing an abortion on a minor unless the physician has notified one of the minor’s parents or the minor’s legal guardian 48 hours in advance. Mont. Code Ann. §50-20-204 (1995). However, an “unemancipated” minor may petition the state youth court to waive the notification requirement, pursuant to the statute’s “judicial bypass” provision. § 50-20-212 (quoted in full in an appendix to this opinion). The provision gives the minor a right to court-appointed counsel, and guarantees expeditious handling of the minor’s petition (since the petition is automatically granted if the youth court fails to rule on the petition within 48 hours from the time it is filed). §§ 50-20-212(2)(a), (3). The minor’s identity remains anonymous, and the proceedings and related documents are kept confidential. §50-20-212(3).
If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that any of the following three conditions are met, it must grant the petition and waive the notice requirement: (i) the minor is “sufficiently mature to decide whether to have an abortion”; (ii) “there is evidence of a pattern of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse” of the minor by one of her parents, a guardian, or a custodian; or (iii) “the notification of a parent or guardian is not in the best interests of the [minor].” §§ 50-20-212(4), (5) (emphasis added). It is this third condition which is at issue here.
Before the Act’s effective date, respondents — several physicians who perform abortions, and other medical personnel — filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Act was unconstitutional and an order enjoining its enforcement. The District Court for the District of Montana, addressing only one of respondents’ arguments, held that the Act was unconstitutional because the third condition set out above was too narrow. According to the District Court, our precedents require that judicial bypass mechanisms authorize waiver of the notice requirement whenever “the abortion would be in [the minor’s] best interests,” not just when “notification would not be in the minor’s best interests.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 17a (emphasis in original) (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 640-642 (1979) (plurality opinion)). Three days before the Act was to go into effect, the District Court enjoined its enforcement.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that it was bound by its prior decision in Glick v. McKay, 937 F. 2d 434 (CA9 1991). See Wicklund v. Salvagni, 93 F. 3d 567, 571-572 (CA9 1996). Glick struck down Nevada’s parental notification statute which, like Montana’s statute here, allowed a minor to bypass the notification requirement if a court determined that the notification would not be in the minor’s best interests. The court’s conclusion was based on its analysis of our decisions in Bellotti v. Baird, supra, and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U. S. 502 (1990).
In Bellotti, we struck down a statute requiring a minor to obtain the consent of both parents before having an abortion, subject to a judicial bypass provision, because the judicial bypass provision was too restrictive, unconstitutionally burdening a minor’s right to an abortion. 443 U. S., at 647 (plurality opinion); id., at 655-656 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). The Court’s principal opinion explained that a constitutional parental consent statute must contain a bypass provision that meets four criteria: (i) allow the minor to bypass the consent requirement if she establishes that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make the abortion decision independently; (ii) allow the minor to bypass the consent requirement if she establishes that the abortion would be in her best interests; (iii) ensure the minor’s anonymity; and (iv) provide for expeditious bypass procedures. Id., at 643-644 (plurality opinion). See also Akron, 497 U. S., at 511-513 (restating the four requirements).
In Akron, we upheld a statute requiring a minor to notify one parent before having an. abortion, subject to a judicial bypass provision. We declined to decide whether a parental notification statute must include some sort of bypass provision to be constitutional. Id., at 510. Instead, we held that this bypass provision satisfied the four Bellotti criteria required for bypass provisions in parental consent statutes, and that a fortiori it satisfied any criteria that might be required for bypass provisions in parental notification statutes. Critically for the case now before us, the judicial bypass provision we examined in Akron was substantively indistinguishable from both the Montana judicial bypass provision at issue here and the Nevada provision at issue in Glick. See 497 U. S., at 508 (summarizing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.85 (1995)). The judicial bypass provision in Akron allowed a court to waive the notification requirement if it determined by clear and convincing evidence “that notice is not in [the minor’s] best interests” (not that an abortion is in her best interests). 497 U. S., at 508 (emphasis added) (citing § 2151.85(A)(4)). And we explicitly held that this provision satisfied the second Bellotti requirement, that “the procedure must allow the minor to show that, even if she cannot make the abortion decision by herself, ‘the desired abortion would be in her best interests.’” 497 U. S., at 511 (quoting Bellotti, supra, at 644).
Despite the fact that Akron involved a parental notification statute, and Bellotti involved a parental consent statute; despite the fact that Akron involved a statute virtually identical to the Nevada statute at issue in Glick; and despite the fact that Akron explicitly held that the statute met all of the Bellotti requirements, the Ninth Circuit in Glick struck down Nevada’s parental notification statute as inconsistent with Bellotti:
“Rather than requiring the reviewing court to consider the minor’s ‘best interests’ generally, the Nevada statute requires the consideration of “best interests” only with respect to the possible consequences of parental notification. The best interests of a minor female in obtaining an abortion may encompass far more than her interests in not notifying a parent of the abortion decision. Furthermore, in Bellotti, the court expressly stated, ‘[i]f, all things considered, the court determines that an abortion is in the minor’s best interests, she is entitled to court authorization without any parental involvement.’ Bellotti, 443 U. S. at 648 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Nevada statute impermissibly narrows the Bellotti 'best interests’ criterion, and is unconstitutional.” 937 F. 2d, at 439.
Based entirely on Glide, the Ninth Circuit in this case affirmed the District Court’s ruling that the Montana statute is unconstitutional, since the statute allows waiver of the notification requirement only if the youth court determines that notification — not the abortion itself — is not in the minor’s best interests. 93 F. 3d, at 572.
As should be evident from the foregoing, this decision simply cannot be squared with our decision in Akron. The Ohio parental notification statute at issue there was indistinguishable in any relevant way from the Montana statute at issue here. Both allow for judicial bypass if the minor shows that parental notification is not in her best interests. We asked in Akron whether this met the Bellotti requirement that the minor be allowed to show that “the desired abortion would be in her best interests.” We explicitly held that it did. 497 U. S., at 511. Thus, the Montana statute meets this requirement, too. In concluding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit was mistaken.
Respondents (as did the Ninth Circuit in Glick) place great emphasis on our statement in Akron, that “[t]he statute requires the juvenile court to authorize the minor’s consent where the court determines that the abortion is in the minor’s best interest.” 497 U. S., at 511 (emphasis added) (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.85(C)(2) (Supp. 1988)). But since we had clearly stated that the statute actually required such authorization only when the court determined that notification would not be in the minor’s best interests, it is wrong to take our statement to imply that the statute said otherwise. Rather, underlying our statement was an assumption that a judicial bypass procedure requiring a minor to show that parental notification is not in her best interests is equivalent to a judicial bypass procedure requiring a minor to show that abortion without notification is in her best interests, as the context of the opinion, the statutory language, and the concurring opinion all make clear.
Respondents, echoing the Ninth Circuit in Glick, claim that there is a constitutionally significant distinction between requiring a minor to show that parental notification is not in her best interests, and requiring a minor to show that an abortion (without such notification) is in her best interests. See Brief in Opposition 12-13; 937 F. 2d, at 438-439. But the Montana statute draws no such distinction, and respondents cite no Montana state-court decision suggesting that the statute permits a court to separate the question whether parental notification is not in a minor’s best interest from an inquiry into whether abortion (without notification) is in the minor’s best interest. As with the Ohio statute in Akron, the challenge to the Montana statute here is a facial one. Under these circumstances, the Ninth Circuit was incorrect to assume that Montana’s statute “narrow[edj” the Bellotti test, 937 F. 2d, at 439, as interpreted in Akron.
Because the reasons given by the District Court and the Ninth Circuit for striking down the Act are inconsistent with our precedents, we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX TO PER CURIAM OPINION
Mont. Code Ann. §50-20-212 (1995):
“(1) The requirements and procedures under this section are available to minors and incompetent persons whether or not they are residents of this state.
“(2) (a) The minor or incompetent person may petition the youth court for a waiver of the notice requirement and may participate in the proceedings on the person’s own behalf. The petition must include a statement that the petitioner is pregnant and is not emancipated. The court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the petitioner. A guardian ad litem is required to maintain the confidentiality of the proceedings. The youth court shall advise the petitioner of the right to court-appointed counsel and shall provide the petitioner with counsel upon request.
“(b) If the petition filed under subsection (2)(a) alleges abuse as a basis for waiver of notice, the youth court shall treat the petition as a report under 41-3-202. The provisions of Title 41, chapter 3, part 2, apply to an investigation conducted pursuant to this subsection.
“(3) Proceedings under this section are confidential and must ensure the anonymity of the petitioner. All proceedings under this section must be sealed. The petitioner may file the petition using a pseudonym or using the petitioner’s initials. All documents related to the petition are confidential and are not available to the public. The proceedings on the petition must be given preference over other pending matters to the extent necessary to ensure that the court reaches a prompt decision. The court shall issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law and rule within 48 hours of the time that the petition is filed unless the time is extended at the request of the petitioner. If the court fails to rule within 48 hours and the time is not extended, the petition is granted and the notice requirement is waived.
“(4) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner is sufficiently mature to decide whether to have an abortion, the court shall issue an order authorizing the minor to consent to the performance or inducement of an abortion without the notification of a parent or guardian.
“(5) The court shall issue an order authorizing the petitioner to consent to an abortion without the notification of a parent or guardian if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that:
“(a) there is evidence of a pattern of physical, sexual, or emotional abuse of the petitioner by one or both parents, a guardian, or a custodian; or
“(b) the notification of a parent or guardian is not in the best interests of the petitioner.
“(6) If the court does not make a finding specified in subsection (4) or (5), the court shall dismiss the petition.
“(7) A court that conducts proceedings under this section shall issue written and specific findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting its decision and shall order that a confidential record of the evidence, findings, and conclusions be maintained.
“(8) The supreme court may adopt rules providing an expedited confidential appeal by a petitioner if the youth court denies a petition. An order authorizing an abortion without notice is not subject to appeal.
“(9) Filing fees may not be required of a pregnant minor who petitions a court for a waiver of parental notification or appeals a denial of a petition.”
Section 50-20-204 provides in relevant part: “A physician may not perform an abortion upon a minor or an incompetent person unless the physician has given at least 48 hours’ actual notice to one parent or to the legal guardian of the pregnant minor or incompetent person of the physician’s intention to perform the abortion.... If actual notice is not possible after a reasonable effort, the physician or the physician’s agent shall give alternate notice as provided in 50-20-205.” Section 50-20-205 provides for notice by certified mail. The notice requirement does not apply if “a medical emergency exists and there is insufficient time to provide notice.” §50-20-208(1).
“ ‘Emancipated minor’ means a person under 18 years of age who is or has been married or who has been granted an order of limited emancipation by a court... .” § 50-20-203(3).
See Bellotti, 443 U. S., at 654, n. 1 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]his case [does not] determin[e] the constitutionality of a statute which does no more than require notice to the parents, without affording them or any other third party an absolute veto”).
See 497 U. S., at 517 (“if she can demonstrate that her maturity or best interests favor abortion without notifying one of her parents”); id.., at 522 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“Although it need not take the form of a judicial bypass, the State must provide an adequate mechanism for cases in which the minor is mature or notice would not be in her best interests” (emphasis added)); Ohio Rev. Code Aim. § 2151.85(C)(2) (1994) (“[I]f the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence,... that the notification of the parents, guardian, or custodian of the [minor] otherwise is not in the best interest of [the minor], the court shall issue an order authorizing the [minor] to consent to the performance or inducement of an abortion without the notification of her parents, guardian, or custodian”). See also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U. S. 417, 497 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (interpreting Minnesota judicial bypass procedure which requires minor to show that “an abortion . . . without notification of her parents, guardian, or conservator would be in her best interests,” Minn. Stat. § 144.343(6) (1988) (emphasis added), as authorizing exemption from strictures of parental notification scheme in “those cases in which ... notification of the minor’s parents is not in the minor’s best interests” (emphasis added)).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
E
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the authority of a U. S. District Court, on its own initiative, to dismiss as untimely a state prisoner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214, sets a one-year limitation period for filing such petitions, running from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The one-year clock is stopped, however, during the time the petitioner’s “properly filed” application for state postconviction, relief “is pending.” §2244(d)(2). Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, that tolling period does not include the 90 days in which a petitioner might have sought certiorari review in this Court challenging state-court denial of postconviction relief. Coates v. Byrd, 211 F. 3d 1225, 1227 (2000).
In the case before us, the State’s answer to the federal habeas petition “agree[d] the petition [was] timely” because it was “filed after 352 days of untolled time.” App. 24. Inspecting the pleadings and attachments, a Federal Magistrate Judge determined that the State had miscalculated the tolling time. Under Circuit precedent, the untolled time was 388 days, rendering the petition untimely by some three weeks. After affording the petitioner an opportunity to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed for failure to meet the statutory deadline, and finding petitioner’s responses inadequate, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of the petition. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that “[a] concession of timeliness by the state that is patently erroneous does not compromise the authority of a district court sua sponte to dismiss a habeas petition as untimely, under AEDPA.” Day v. Crosby, 391 F. 3d 1192, 1195 (CA11 2004) (per curiam).
The question presented is whether a federal court lacks authority, on its own initiative, to dismiss a habeas petition as untimely, once the State has answered the petition without contesting its timeliness. Ordinarily in civil litigation, a statutory time limitation is forfeited if not raised in a defendant’s answer or in an amendment thereto. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8(c), 12(b), and 15(a). And we would count it an abuse of discretion to override a State’s deliberate waiver of a limitations defense. In this case, however, the federal court confronted no intelligent waiver on the State’s part, only an evident miscalculation of the elapsed time under a statute designed to impose a tight time constraint on federal habeas petitioners. In the circumstances here presented, we hold, the federal court had discretion to correct the State’s error and, accordingly, to dismiss the petition as untimely under AEDPA’s one-year limitation.
I
Petitioner Patrick A. Day was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 55 years in prison by a Florida trial court. Day unsuccessfully appealed the sentence, which was affirmed on December 21, 1999. Day did not seek this Court’s review of the final state-court decision; his time to do so expired on March 20, 2000.
Three hundred and fifty-three (353) days later, Day unsuccessfully sought state postconvietion relief. The Florida trial court’s judgment denying relief was affirmed on appeal, and the appellate court issued its mandate on December 3, 2002. See Nyland v. Moore, 216 F. 3d 1264, 1267 (CA11 2000) (under Florida law, appellate order “is pending” until the mandate issues). Thirty-six (36) days thereafter, on January 8, 2003, Day petitioned for federal habeas relief asserting several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. A Magistrate Judge, finding the petition “in proper form,” App. 21, ordered the State to file an answer, id., at 21-22. In its responsive pleading, the State failed to raise AEDPA’s one-year limitation as a defense. See supra, at 201. Overlooking controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent, see Coates, 211 F. 3d, at 1227, the State calculated that the petition had been “filed after 352 days of untolled time,” and was therefore “timely.” App. 24. The State’s answer and attachments, however, revealed that, had the State followed the Eleventh Circuit’s instruction on computation of elapsed time, the timeliness concession would not have been made: Under the Circuit’s precedent, more than one year, specifically, 388 days of untolled time, had passed between the finality of Day’s state-court conviction and the filing of his federal habeas petition.
A newly assigned Magistrate Judge noticed the State’s computation error and ordered Day to show cause why his federal habeas petition should not be dismissed as untimely. Id., at 26-30. Determining that Day’s responses did not overcome the time bar, the Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal of the petition, App. to Pet. for Cert. 8a-15a, and the District Court adopted that recommendation, id., at 7a.
The Eleventh Circuit granted Day a certificate of appeal-ability on the question “[wjhether the district court erred in addressing the timeliness of [Day’s] habeas corpus petition . . . after the [State] had conceded that [the] petition was timely.” App. 37. In a decision rendered two years earlier, Jackson v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 292 F. 3d 1347 (2002), the Eleventh Circuit had ruled that, “even though the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the district court may review sua sponte the timeliness of [a federal habeas] petition.” Id., at 1349. Adhering to Jackson, and satisfied that the State’s concession of timeliness “was patently erroneous,” the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Day’s petition. 391 F. 3d, at 1192-1195.
We granted certiorari sub nom. Day v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 1164 (2005), in view of the division among the Circuits on the question whether a district court may dismiss a federal habeas petition as untimely under AEDPA, despite the State’s failure to raise the one-year limitation in its answer to the petition or its erroneous concession of the timeliness issue. Compare, e. g., Long v. Wilson, 393 F. 3d 390, 401-404 (CA3 2004), and 391 F. 3d, at 1194-1195 (case below), with Scott v. Collins, 286 F. 3d 923, 930-931 (CA6 2002), and Nardi v. Stewart, 354 F. 3d 1134, 1141-1142 (CA9 2004).
II
A statute of limitations defense, the State acknowledges, is not “jurisdictional,” hence courts are under no obligation to raise the time bar sua sponte. See, e. g., Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F. 3d 117, 122 (CA2 2000); Hill v. Braxton, 277 F. 3d 701, 705 (CA4 2002); Davis v. Johnson, 158 F. 3d 806, 810 (CA5 1998); cf. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 458 (2004) (defendant forfeited untimeliness argument “by failing to raise the issue until after [the] complaint was adjudicated on the merits”). In this respect, the limitations defense resembles other threshold barriers — exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default, nonretroactivity — courts have typed “nonjurisdictional,” although recognizing that those defenses “implicate] values beyond the concerns of the parties.” Acosta, 221 F. 3d, at 123 (“The AEDPA statute of limitation promotes judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial resources, safeguards the accuracy of state court judgments by requiring resolution of constitutional questions while the record is fresh, and lends finality to state court judgments within a reasonable time.”).
On the exhaustion of state remedies doctrine, requiring state prisoners, before invoking federal habeas jurisdiction, to pursue remedies available in state court, Granberry v. Greer, 481 U. S. 129 (1987), is the pathmarking case. We held in Granberry that federal appellate courts have discretion to consider the issue of exhaustion despite the State’s failure to interpose the defense at the district-court level. Id., at 133. Later, in Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 389 (1994), we similarly held that “a federal court may, but need not, decline to apply [the nonretroactivity rule announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion),] if the State does not argüe it.” See also Schiro v. Farley, 510 U. S. 222, 229 (1994) (declining to address nonretroactivity defense that State raised only in Supreme Court merits brief, “[although we undoubtedly have the discretion to reach” the argument).
While the issue remains open in this Court, see Trest v. Cain, 522 U. S. 87, 90 (1997), the Courts of Appeals have unanimously held that, in appropriate circumstances, courts, on their own initiative, may raise a petitioner’s procedural default, i. e., a petitioner’s failure properly to present an alleged constitutional error in state court, and the consequent adequacy and independence of state-law grounds for the state-court judgment. See Brewer v. Marshall, 119 F. 3d 993, 999 (CA1 1997); Rosario v. United States, 164 F. 3d 729, 732 (CA2 1998); Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F. 3d 506, 520 (CA3 2002); Yeatts v. Angelone, 166 F. 3d 255, 261 (CA4 1999); Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F. 3d 348, 358 (CA5 1998); Sowell v. Bradshaw, 372 F. 3d 821, 830 (CA6 2004); Kurzawa v. Jordan, 146 F. 3d 435, 440 (CA7 1998); King v. Kemna, 266 F. 3d 816, 822 (CA8 2001) (en banc); Vang v. Nevada, 329 F. 3d 1069, 1073 (CA9 2003); United States v. Wiseman, 297 F. 3d 975, 979 (CA10 2002); Moon v. Head, 285 F. 3d 1301, 1315, n. 17 (CA11 2002).
Petitioner Day relies heavily on Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (Habeas Rules), i. e., the procedural Rules governing federal habeas petitions from state prisoners, in urging that AEDPA’s limitation may be raised by a federal court sua sponte only at the preanswer, initial screening stage. Habeas Rule 4 provides that district courts “must promptly examine”, state prisoner habeas petitions and must dismiss the petition “[i]f it plainly appears . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Once an answer has been ordered and filed, Day maintains, the court loses authority to rule the petition untimely sua sponte. At that point, according to Day, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure hold sway. See Habeas Rule 11 (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or these rules, may be applied to a proceeding under these rules.”). Under the Civil Procedure Rules, a defendant forfeits a statute of limitations defense, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c), not asserted in its answer, see Rule 12(b), or an amendment thereto, see Rule 15(a).
The State, on the other hand, points out that the statute of limitations is akin to other affirmative defenses to habeas petitions, notably, exhaustion of state remedies, procedural default, and nonretroactivity. Indeed, the statute of limitations is explicitly aligned with those other defenses under the current version of Habeas Rule 5(b), which provides that the State’s answer to a habeas petition “must state whether any claim in the petition is barred by a failure to exhaust state remedies, a procedural bar, non-retroactivity, or a statute of limitations.” The considerations of comity, finality, and the expeditious handling of habeas proceedings that motivated AEDPA, the State maintains, counsel against an excessively rigid or formal approach to the affirmative defenses now listed in Habeas Rule 5. Citing Granberry, 481 U. S., at 131-134, as the instructive case, the State urges express recognition of an “intermediate approach.” Brief for Respondent 14 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id., at 25. In lieu of an inflexible rule requiring dismissal whenever AEDPA’s one-year clock has run, or, at the opposite extreme, a rule treating the State’s failure initially to plead the one-year bar as an absolute waiver, the State reads the statutes, Rules, and decisions in point to permit the “exercise [of] discretion in each case to decide whether the administration of justice is better served by dismissing the case on statute of limitations grounds or by reaching the merits of the petition.” Id., at 14. Employing that “intermediate approach” in this particular case, the State argues, the petition should not be deemed timely simply because a government attorney calculated the days in between petitions incorrectly.
We agree, noting particularly that the Magistrate Judge, instead of acting sua sponte, might have informed the State of its obvious computation error and entertained an amendment to the State’s answer. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(a) (leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires”); see also 28 U. S. C. § 2243 (State’s response to habeas petition may be amended by leave of court); cf. Long, 393 F. 3d, at 402-404 (District Court raised the statute of limitations sua sponte, the State agreed with that disposition, and the Court of Appeals treated that agreement as a constructive amendment to the State’s answer). Recognizing that an amendment to the State’s answer might have obviated this controversy, we see no dispositive difference between that route, and the one taken here. See Brief for Respondent 24 (“Here, the State did not respond to the show cause order because its concession of timeliness was based on an erroneous calculation and it agreed the petition should be dismissed as untimely.”); cf. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U. S. 473, 487 (2000) (admonishing against interpretation of procedural prescriptions in federal habeas cases to “trap the unwary pro se prisoner” (quoting Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 520 (1982))).
In sum, we hold that district courts are permitted, but not obliged, to consider, sua sponte, the timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas petition. We so hold, noting that it would make scant sense to distinguish in this regard AEDPA’s time bar from other threshold constraints on federal habeas petitioners. See supra, at 206-207; Habeas Rule 5(b) (placing “a statute of limitations” defense on a par with “failure to exhaust state remedies, a procedural bar, [and] nonretroactivity”); Long, 393 F. 3d, at 404 (“AEDPA’s statute of limitations advances the same concerns as those advanced by the doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default, and must be treated the same.”). We stress that a district court is not required to doublecheck the State’s math. If, as this Court has held, “[district judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants,” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U. S. 225, 231 (2004), then, by the same token, they surely have no obligation to assist attorneys representing the State. Nevertheless, if a judge does detect a clear computation error, no Rule, statute, or constitutional provision commands the judge to suppress that knowledge. Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(a) (clerical errors in the record “arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party”).
Of course, before acting on its own initiative, a court must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions. See, e.g., Acosta, 221 F. 3d, at 124-125; McMillan v. Jarvis, 332 F. 3d 244, 250 (CA4 2003). Further, the court must assure itself that the petitioner is not significantly prejudiced by the delayed focus on the limitation issue, and “determine whether the interests of justice would be better served” by addressing the merits or by dismissing the petition as time barred. See Granberry, 481 U. S., at 136. Here, the Magistrate Judge gave Day due notice and a fair opportunity to show why the limitation period should not yield dismissal of the petition. The notice , issued some nine months after the State answered the petition. No court proceedings or action occurred in the interim, and nothing in the record suggests that the State “strategically” withheld the defense or chose to relinquish it. From all that appears in the record, there was merely an inadvertent error, a miscalculation that was plain under Circuit precedent, and no abuse of discretion in following this Court’s lead in Granberry and Caspari, described supra, at 206-207.
* H=
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Until AEDPA took effect in 1996, no statute of limitations applied to habeas petitions. See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U. S. 644, 654 (2005). Courts invoked the doctrine of “prejudicial delay” to screen out unreasonably late filings. See generally 2 R. Hertz & J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure §24 (4th ed. 2001). In AEDPA, Congress prescribed a uniform rule: “A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d)(1).
Day urges this Court to find his petition timely. He asserts that the Eleventh Circuit misinterpreted § 2244(d)(2) in holding that AEDPA’s time limitation was not tolled during the 90-day period he could have petitioned this Court to review the denial of his motion for state postconviction relief. See Brief for Petitioner 45-50. This question was not “set out in the petition [for certiorari], or fairly included therein,” and we therefore do not consider it here. This Court’s Rule 14.1(a). We note, however, that the Court recently granted certiorari in Lawrence v. Florida, No. 05-8820, post, p. 1039 (cert. granted, Mar. 27, 2006), which presents the question whether AEDPA’s time limitation is tolled during the pendency of a petition for certiorari from a judgment denying state postconviction relief. The instant opinion, we emphasize, addresses only the authority of the District Court to raise AEDPA’s time bar, not the correctness of its decision that the limitation period had run.
Day reads the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in this case as rendering mandatory a district court’s sua sponte application of AEDPA’s one-year limitation, even when the respondent elects to waive the limitation and oppose the petition solely on the merits. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-8. He points to a sentence in the Eleventh Circuit’s brief per curiam opinion stating: “A federal court that sits in collateral review of a criminal judgment of a state court has an obligation to enforce the federal statute of limitations.” 391 F. 3d, at 1194. We read the Eleventh Circuit’s summary disposition in line with that court’s description of its controlling precedent: “We . . . ruled that, ‘even though the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the district court may review sua sponte the timeliness of [a federal habeas] petition.’ ” Ibid. (referring to Jackson v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 292 F. 3d, at 1349; emphasis added); see also 391 F. 3d, at 1195 (State’s “patently erroneous” concession of timeliness “does not compromise the authority of a district court sua sponte to dismiss a habeas petition as untimely” under AEDPA’s one-year limitation (emphasis added)).
In AEDPA, enacted nearly a decade after Granberry, Congress expressly provided that “[a] State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b)(3).
Trest held that a Court of Appeals was not obliged to raise procedural default on its own initiative, but declined to decide whether courts have discretion to do so. 522 U. S., at 89.
Were we to accept Day’s position, courts would never (or, at least, hardly ever) be positioned to raise AEDPA’s time bar sua sponte. As this Court recognized in Pliler v. Ford, 542 U. S. 225, 282 (2004), information essential to the time calculation is often absent — as it was in this case — until the State has filed, along with its answer, copies of documents from the state-court proceedings.
The Habeas Rules were amended after the proceedings below. We cite the current version because both parties agree that the amendments to Rules 4 and 11, effective December 1, 2004, wrought no relevant substantive change.
See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276 (2005) (AEDPA’s time bar “quite plainly serves the well-recognized interest in the finality of state court judgments”; it “reduces the potential for delay on the road to finality.” (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 179 (2001))).
The Court is unanimous on this point. See post, at 216, n. 2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The procedural hindrance in Pliler was the petitioner’s failure to exhaust state remedies. The Court in that case declined to rule on the propriety of the stay-and-abeyance procedure that would enable a habeas petitioner to remain in federal court while exhausting unexhausted claims in state court. 542 U. S., at 231. In a later decision, Rhines, 544 U. S., at 278-279, this Court held that a district court has discretion to stay a mixed petition (i. e., one that includes both exhausted and unexhausted claims) to allow a habeas petitioner to present his unexhausted claims to the state court in the first instance, then return to federal court for review of his perfected petition.
A district court’s discretion is confined within these limits. As earlier noted, should a State intelligently choose to waive a statute of limitations defense, a district court would not be at liberty to disregard that choice. See supra, at 202. But see post, at 217-218 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether a prisoner whose conviction became final before our decision in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U. S. 1079 (1992) (per curiam), is foreclosed from relying on that decision in a federal habeas corpus proceeding because it announced a “new rule” as defined in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989).
I
On February 5, 1983, Cary Michael Lambrix and his girlfriend, Frances Smith, met Clarence Moore and Aleisha Bryant at a local tavern. The two couples returned to Lam-brix’s trailer for dinner, where Lambrix killed Moore and Bryant in brutal fashion. Lambrix was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder. In the sentencing phase of trial, the jury rendered an advisory verdict recommending that the trial court sentence Lambrix to death on both counts. The trial court, after finding five aggravating circumstances in connection with the murder of Moore, four aggravating circumstances in connection with the murder of Bryant, and no mitigating circumstances as to either murder, sentenced Lambrix to death on both counts. Lambrix’s conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal by the Florida Supreme Court. Lambrix v. State, 494 So. 2d 1143 (1986).
After the Florida courts denied his repeated efforts to obtain collateral relief, Lambrix v. Dugger, 529 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 1988); Lambrix v. State, 534 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 1988); Lambrix v. State, 559 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1990), Lambrix filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2254 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida; that court rejected all of his claims. While Lambrix’s appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, this Court decided Espinosa v. Florida, supra, which held that if the sentencing judge in a “weighing” State (i. e., a State that requires specified aggravating circumstances to be weighed against any mitigating circumstances at the sentencing phase of a capital trial) is required to give deference to a jury’s advisory sentencing recommendation, then neither the jury nor the judge is constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances. Since Florida is such a State, and since one of Lambrix’s claims was that his sentencing jury was improperly instructed on the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” (HAC) aggravator, Espinosa had obvious relevance to his habeas petition. Rather than address this issue in the first instance, however, the Eleventh Circuit held its proceedings in abeyance to permit Lambrix to present his Espinosa claim to the Florida state courts.
The Florida Supreme Court rejected Lambrix’s Espinosa claim without considering its merits on the ground that the claim was procedurally barred. Lambrix v. Singletary, 641 So. 2d 847 (1994). That court explained that although Lam-brix had properly preserved his Espinosa objection at trial by requesting a limiting instruction on the HAC aggravator, he had failed to raise the issue on direct appeal. 641 So. 2d, at 848. The Florida Supreme Court also rejected Lambrix’s claim that the procedural bar should be excused because his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the forfeited issue, explaining that this claim was itself procedurally barred and was, in any event, meritless. Id., at 848-849.
After the Florida Supreme Court entered judgment against Lambrix, the Eleventh Circuit adjudicated his ha-beas petition. Without even acknowledging the procedural bar — which was expressly raised and argued by the State— the Court of Appeals proceeded to address the Espinosa claim, and determined that Espinosa announced a new rule which cannot be applied retroactively on federal habeas under Teague v. Lane, supra. 72 F. 3d 1500, 1503 (1996). We granted certiorari. 519 U. S. 958 (1996).
II
Before turning to the question presented m this case, we pause to consider the State’s contention that Lambrix’s Es-pinosa claim is procedurally barred because he failed to contend that the jury was instructed with a vague HAC aggra-vator on his direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. According to the State, the Florida Supreme Court “has consistently required that an Espinosa issue must have been objected to at trial and pursued on direct appeal in order to be reviewed in postconviction proceedings.” Brief for Respondent 30, citing Chandler v. Dugger, 634 So. 2d 1066, 1069 (Fla. 1994), Jackson v. Dugger, 633 So. 2d 1051, 1055 (Fla. 1993), and Henderson v. Singletary, 617 So. 2d 313 (Fla.), cert. denied, 507 U. S. 1047 (1993).
In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 729 (1991), we reaffirmed that this Court “will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” See also Harris v. Reed, 489 U. S. 255, 262 (1989). We in fact lack jurisdiction to review such independently supported judgments on direct appeal: Since the state-law determination is sufficient to sustain the decree, any opinion of-this Court on the federal.question would be purely advisory. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 125-126 (1945); see also Sochor v. Florida, 504 U. S. 527, 533-534, and n. (1992). The “independent and adequate state ground” doctrine is not technically jurisdictional when a federal court considers a state prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §2254, since the federal court is not formally reviewing a judgment, but is determining whether the prisoner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” We have nonetheless held that the doctrine applies to bar consideration on federal habeas of federal claims that have been defaulted under state law. Coleman, supra, at 729-730, 750; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 81, 82 (1977), discussing Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, 486-487 (1953), and Ex parte Spencer, 228 U. S. 652 (1913); Harris, supra, at 262.
Application of the “independent and adequate state ground” doctrine to federal habeas review is based upon equitable considerations of federalism and comity. It “ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U. S., at 732. “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Ibid. If the “independent and adequate state ground” doctrine were not applied, a federal district court or court of appeals would be able to review claims that this Court would have been unable to consider on direct review. See id., at 730-731.
We have never had occasion to consider whether a federal court should resolve a State’s contention that a petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred before considering whether his claim is Teague barred. Our opinions, however — most particularly, Coleman — certainly suggest that the procedural-bar issue should ordinarily be considered first. It was speculated at oral argument that the Court of Appeals may have resolved the Teague issue without first considering procedural bar because our opinions have stated that the Teague retroactivity decision is to be made as a “threshold matter.” E. g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U. S. 302, 329 (1989); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 389 (1994). That simply means, however, that the Teague issue should be addressed “before considering the merits of [a] claim.” 510 U. S., at 389. It does not mean that the Teague inquiry is antecedent to consideration of the general prerequisites for federal habeas corpus which are unrelated to the merits of the particular claim— such as the requirement that the petitioner be “in custody,” see 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a), or that the state-court judgment not be based on an independent and adequate state ground. Constitutional issues are generally to be avoided, and as even a cursory review of this Court’s new-rule cases reveals (including our discussion in Part IV, infra), the Teague inquiry requires a detailed analysis of federal constitutional law. See, e. g., Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S. 227, 233-241 (1990); Penry, supra, at 316-319; Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U. S. 333, 339-344 (1993); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 488-494 (1990).
We are somewhat puzzled that the Eleventh Circuit, after having held proceedings in abeyance while petitioner brought his claim in state court, did not so much as mention the Florida Supreme Court’s determination that Lambrix’s Espinosa claim was procedurally barred. The State of Florida raised that point before both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, going so far as to reiterate it in a postjudgment Motion for Clarification and/or Modification of Opinion before the Court of Appeals, reprinted at App. 176. A State’s procedural rules are of vital importance to the orderly administration of its criminal courts; when a federal court permits them to be readily evaded, it undermines the criminal justice system. We do not mean to suggest that the procedural-bar issue must invariably be resolved first; only that it ordinarily should be. Judicial economy might counsel giving the Teague question priority, for example, if it were easily resolvable against the habeas petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue involved complicated issues of state law. Cf. 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b)(2) (permitting a federal court to deny a habeas petition on the merits notwithstanding the applicant’s failure to exhaust state remedies).
Despite our puzzlement at the Court of Appeals’ failure to resolve this case on the basis of procedural bar, we hesitate to resolve it on that basis ourselves. Lambrix asserts several reasons why his claim is not procedurally barred, which seem to us insubstantial but may not be so; as we have repeatedly recognized, the courts of appeals and district courts are more familiar than we with the procedural practices of the States in which they regularly sit, see, e. g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 267, n. 7 (1980); County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U. S. 140, 153-154 (1979). Rather than prolong this litigation by a remand, we proceed to decide the case on the Teague grounds that the Court of Appeals used.
III
Florida employs a three-stage sentencing procedure. First, the jury weighs statutorily specified aggravating circumstances against any mitigating circumstances, and renders an “advisory sentence” of either life imprisonment or death. Fla. Stat. §921.141(2) (Supp. 1992). Second, the trial court weighs the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and enters a sentence of life imprisonment or death; if the latter, its findings must be set forth in writing. §921.141(3). The jury’s advisory sentence is entitled to “great weight” in the trial court’s determination, Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975), but the court has an independent obligation to determine the appropriate punishment, Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191, 1197 (Fla. 1980). Third, the Florida Supreme Court automatically reviews all cases in which the defendant is sentenced to death. §921.141(4).
Lambrix’s jury, which was instructed on five aggravating circumstances, recommended that he be sentenced to death for each murder. The trial court found five aggravating circumstances as to Moore’s murder and four as to Bryant’s, including that each murder was “especially heinous and atrocious”; it found no mitigating circumstances as to either murder; it concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating, and sentenced Lambrix to death on each count. App. 20-21. Although Lambrix failed to raise any claims concerning the sentencing procedure on direct appeal, the Florida Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s findings as to the aggravating circumstances. Lambrix v. State, 494 So. 2d, at 1148.
Lambrix contends that the jury’s consideration of the HAC aggravator violated the Eighth Amendment because the jury instructions concerning this circumstance failed to provide sufficient guidance to limit the jury’s discretion. Like the Eleventh Circuit, see 72 F. 3d, at 1503, we assume, arguendo, that this was so. Lambrix further contends (and this is at the heart of the present case) that the trial court’s independent weighing did not cure this error. Prior to our opinion in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U. S. 1079 (1992), the State had contended that Lambrix was not entitled to relief because the sentencing judge properly found and weighed a narrowed HAC aggravator. In Espinosa, however, we established the principle that if a “weighing” State requires the sentencing trial judge to give deference to a jury’s advisory recommendation, neither the judge nor the jury is constitutionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circumstances. Lam-brix seeks the benefit of that principle; the State contends that it constitutes a new rule under Teague and thus cannot be relied on in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
In Teague we held that, in general, “new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.” 489 U. S., at 310-311. To apply Teague, a federal court engages in a three-step process. First, it determines the date upon which the defendant’s conviction became final. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S., at 390. Second, it must ‘“[s]urve[y] the legal landscape as it then existed,’ Graham v. Collins, [506 U. S. 461, 468 (1993)], and ‘determine whether a state court considering [the defendant’s] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution,’ Saffle v. Parks, 494 U. S. 484, 488 (1990).” Ibid. Finally, if the court determines that the habeas petitioner seeks the benefit of a new rule, the court must consider whether the reliéf sought falls within one of the two narrow exceptions to nonretroactivity. See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U. S., at 345.
IV
Lambrix’s conviction became final on November 24, 1986, when his time for filing a petition for certiorari expired. Thus, our first and principal task is to survey the legal landscape as of that date, to determine whether the rule later announced in Espinosa was dictated by then-existing precedent — whether, that is, the unlawfulness of Lambrix’s conviction was apparent to all reasonable jurists. See, e. g., Graham v. Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 477 (1993); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 415 (1990); id., at 417-418 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In Espinosa, we determined that the Florida capital jury is, in an important respect, a cosentencer with the judge. As we explained: “Florida has essentially split the weighing process in two. Initially, the jury weighs aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the result of that weighing process is then in turn weighed within the trial court’s process of weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” 505 U. S., at 1082. We then concluded that the jury’s consideration of a vague aggravator tainted the trial court’s sentence because the trial court gave deference to the jury verdict (and thus indirectly weighed the vague aggravator) in the course of weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Ibid. We reasoned that this indirect weighing created the same risk of arbitrariness as the direct weighing of an invalid aggravating factor. Ibid.
In our view, Espinosa was not dictated by precedent, but announced a new rule which cannot be used as the basis for federal habeas corpus relief. It is significant that Espinosa itself did not purport to rely upon any controlling precedent. The opinion cited only a single case, Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U. S. 372, 382 (1985), in support of its central conclusion that indirect weighing of an invalid aggravator “creates the same potential for arbitrariness” as direct weighing of an invalid aggravator. Espinosa, 505 U. S., at 1082. And it introduced that lone citation with a “cf.” — an introductory signal which shows authority that supports the point in dictum or by analogy, not one that “controls” or “dictates” the result.
Baldwin itself contains further evidence that Espinosa set forth a new rule. Baldwin considered the constitutionality of Alabama’s death sentencing scheme, in which the jury’was required to “fix the punishment at death” if it found the defendant guilty of an aggravated offense, whereupon the trial court would conduct a sentencing hearing at which it would determine a sentence of death or of life imprisonment. 472 U. S., at 376. The defendant contended that because the jury’s mandatory sentence would have been unconstitutional standing alone, see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 288-305 (1976) (plurality opinion), it was impermissible for the trial court to consider that verdict in determining its own sentence. We did not reach that contention because we concluded that under Alabama law the jury’s verdict formed no part of the trial judge’s sentencing calculus. Id., at 382. We noted, however, on the page of the opinion that Espinosa cited, that the defendant’s “argument conceivably might have merit if the judge actually were required to consider the jury’s ‘sentence’ as a recommendation as to the sentence the jury believed would be appropriate, cf. Proffitt v. Flor ida, 428 U. S. 242 (1976), and if the judge were obligated to accord some deference to it.” Baldwin, 472 U. S., at 382 (emphasis added); see also id., at 386, n. 8 (“expressing] no view” on the same point). This highly tentative expression, far from showing that Baldwin “dictate[sj” the result in Espinosa, see Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U. S., at 235, suggests just the opposite. Indeed, in Baldwin the Chief Justice, who believed that Alabama’s scheme did contemplate that the trial judge would consider the jury’s “sentence,” nonetheless held the scheme constitutional. 472 U. S., at 392 (opinion concurring in judgment).
The Supreme Court decisions relied upon most heavily by petitioner are Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356 (1988); and Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738 (1990). In Godfrey, we held that Georgia’s “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman” aggravator was impermissibly vague, reasoning that there was nothing in the words “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman” “that implies any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence,” and concluded that these terms alone “gave the jury no guidance.” 446 U. S., at 428-429 (plurality opinion). Similarly, in Maynard v. Cartwright, applied retroactively to February 1985 in Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S. 222 (1992), we held that Oklahoma’s HAC aggravator, which is identically worded to Florida’s HAC aggravator, was impermissibly vague because the statute gave no more guidance than the vague aggravator at issue in Godfrey and the sentencing jury was not given a limiting instruction. 486 U. S., at 363-364.
Although Godfrey and Maynard support the proposition that vague aggravators must be sufficiently narrowed to avoid arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, these cases, and others, demonstrate that the failure to instruct the sentencing jury properly with respect to the aggravator does not automatically render a defendant’s sentence unconstitutional. We have repeatedly indicated that a sentencing jury’s consideration of a vague aggravator can be cured by appellate review. Thus, in Godfrey itself, we were less concerned about the failure to instruct the jury properly than we were about the Georgia Supreme Court’s failure to narrow the facially vague aggravator on appeal. Had the Georgia Supreme Court applied a narrowing construction of the aggravator, we would have rejected the Eighth Amendment challenge to Godfrey’s death sentence, notwithstanding the failure to instruct the jury on that narrowing construction. Godfrey, supra, at 431-432. Likewise in Maynard, we stressed that the vague HAC aggravator had not been sufficiently limited on appeal by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals “to cure the unfettered discretion of the jury.” 486 U. S., at 364.
We reached a similar conclusion in Clemons v. Mississippi, applied retroactively to February 1985 in Stringer. Clemons considered the question whether the sentencer’s weighing of a vague HAC aggravator rendered that sentence unconstitutional in a “weighing” State. The sentencing jury in Clemons, as in Maynard, was given a HAC instruction that was unconstitutionally vague. We held that “the Federal Constitution does not prevent a state appellate court from upholding a death sentence that is based in part on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance either by reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating evidence or by harmless-error review.” Clemons, supra, at 741, 745; see also Stringer, supra, at 230.
The principles of the above-described cases do not dictate the result we ultimately reached in Espinosa. Florida, unlike Oklahoma, see Maynard, supra, at 360, had given its facially vague HAC aggravator a limiting construction sufficient to satisfy the Constitution. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U. S., at 255-256 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); id., at 260 (White, J., concurring in judgment). Thus, unlike the sentencing juries in Clemons, Maynard, and Godfrey, who were not instructed with a properly limited aggravator, the sentencing trial judge in Espinosa did find the HAC aggravator under a properly limited construction. See Espinosa, 505 U. S., at 1082, citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 653 (1990). A close examination of the Florida death penalty scheme persuades us that a reasonable jurist considering Lambrix's sentence in 1986 could have reached a conclusion different from the one Espinosa announced in 1992. There were at least three different, but somewhat related, approaches that would have suggested a different outcome:
(1) The mere cabining of the trial court’s discretion would avoid arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, and thus avoid unconstitutionality. In Proffitt v. Florida, supra, we upheld the Florida death penalty scheme against the contention that it resulted in arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 188 (1976), because “trial judges are given specific and detailed guidance to assist them in deciding whether to impose a death penalty or imprisonment for life” and because the Florida Supreme Court reviewed sentences for consistency. Proffitt, 428 U. S., at 253 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); id., at 260-261 (opinion of White, J., joined by the Chief Justice and Rehnquist, J.). (In Proffitt itself, incidentally, the jury had not been instructed on an appropriately narrowed HAC aggravator, see Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1264, n. 57 (CA11 1982), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 1002 (1983).) From what was said in Proffitt it would, as the en banc Eleventh Circuit noted, “sensibly follow that the judge’s proper review of the sentence cures any risk of arbitrariness occasioned by the jury’s consideration of an unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstance.” Glock v. Singletary, 65 F. 3d 878, 886 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 888 (1996). It could have been argued, of course, as Justice Stevens contends, see post, at 543 (dissenting opinion), that prior constitutional error by a sentencing-determining jury would make a difference, but both the conclusion and the premise of that argument were debatable: not only whether it would make a difference, but even (as the succeeding point demonstrates) whether there was any constitutional error by a sentencing-determining jury.
(2) There was no error for the trial judge to cure, since under Florida law the trial court, not the jury, ivas the sen-tencer. In Espinosa we concluded, in effect, that the jury was at least in part a cosentencer along with the trial court. That determination can fairly be traced to our opinion in Sochor v. Florida, 504 U. S. 527 (1992), decided just three weeks earlier, where we explained that under Florida law the trial court “is at least a constituent part of ‘the sen-teneer,’ ” implying that the jury was that as well. Id., at 535-536. That characterization is in considerable tension with our pre-1986 view. In Proffitt, for example, after considering Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975), on which Espinosa primarily relied, the Court determined that the trial court was the sentences E. g., 428 U. S., at 249 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (“[T]he actual sentence is determined by the trial judge” (emphasis added)); id., at 251 (the trial court is “[t]he sentencing authority in Florida”); id., at 252 (“[T]he sentence is determined by the judge rather than by the jury”); id., at 260 (White, J., concurring in judgment). We even distinguished the Florida scheme from the Georgia scheme on the ground that “in Florida the sentence is determined by the trial judge rather than by the jury.” Id., at 252 (joint opinion) (emphasis added). Some eight years later, just two years before petitioner’s conviction became final, we continued to describe the judge as the sentencer. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447 (1984); see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939, 952-954 (1983) (plurality opinion); id., at 962 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). (Although he now believes the jury is a co-sentencer, at the time Lambrix’s conviction became final Justice Stevens had explained that “the sentencing authority [is] the jury in Georgia, the judge in Florida.” Ibid.) It would not have been unreasonable to rely on what we had said in Proffitt, Spaziano, and Barclay — that the trial court was the sentencer — and to conclude that where the sentencer considered properly narrowed aggravators there was simply no error under Godfrey or Maynard. The Florida Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit held precisely that in 1989, see Smalley v. State, 546 So. 2d 720, 722; Bertolotti v. Dugger, 883 F. 2d 1503, 1526-1527, cert. denied, 497 U. S. 1032 (1990); and in 1985 the Eleventh Circuit foresaw the possibility of such a holding: “[Spaziano’s] reasoning calls into question whether any given error in such a merely ‘advisory’ proceeding should be considered to be of constitutional magnitude.” Proffitt v. Wainwright, 756 F. 2d 1500, 1502.
(3) The trial court’s weighing of properly narrowed ag-gravators and mitigators was sufficiently independent of the jury to cure any error in the jury’s consideration of a vague aggravator. Although the Florida Supreme Court had interpreted its statute — which provided that the judge was the sentencer, Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3) (Supp. 1992), and that the jury rendered merely an “advisory sentence,” § 921.141(2) — as requiring the trial judge to give “great weight” to a jury’s advisory recommendation, Tedder v. State, supra, that court nonetheless emphasized that the trial court must “independently weigh the evidence in aggravation and mitigation,” and that “[ujnder no combination of circumstances can th[e] [jury’s] recommendation usurp the judge’s role by limiting his discretion.” Eutzy v. State, 458 So. 2d 755, 759 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1045 (1985). In one case, the Florida Supreme Court vacated a sentence because the trial court had given “undue weight to the jury’s recommendation of death and did not make an independent judgment of whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.” Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191, 1197 (1980) (emphasis added). In Spaziano v. Florida, supra, we acknowledged that the Florida trial court conducts “its own weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,” id., at 451, and that “[Regardless of the jury’s recommendation, the trial judge is required to conduct an independent review of the evidence and to make his own findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances,” id., at 466 (emphasis added); see also Proffitt, 428 U. S., at 251. Given these precedents, it was reasonable to think that the trial court’s review would at least constitute the sort of “reweighing” that would satisfy Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738 (1990), see also Stringer, 503 U. S., at 237. In fact, given the view of some Members of this Court that appellate reweighing was inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment, see, e. g., Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U. S. 376, 400-401, 404 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.); Clemons, supra, at 769-772 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), it would have been reasonable to think that trial-court reweighing was preferable. As one Court of Appeals was prompted to note, “Clemons’s holding, which arguably points in the opposite direction from Espinosa, indicates that even in 1990 Espinosa’s result would not have been dictated by precedent.” Glock v. Singletary, 65 F. 3d, at 887 (en banc).
That Espinosa announced a new rule is strongly confirmed by our decision in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990). Although decided after petitioner’s conviction became final, Walton is a particularly good proxy for what a reasonable jurist would have thought in 1986, given that the only relevant cases decided by this Court in the interim were Maynard and Clemons, the holdings of both of which, we later held, were compelled by the law in 1985, see Stringer, supra. In Walton, we rejected a claim that Arizona’s HAC aggravator failed sufficiently to channel the sentencer’s discretion. Summarizing Godfrey and Maynard, we explained that “in neither case did the state appellate court, in reviewing the propriety of the death sentence, purport to affirm the death sentence by applying a limiting definition,” and this, we said, “w[as] crucial to the conclusion we reached in Maynard.” Walton, supra, at 653. This reasoning suggests that even following Maynard, a weighing-state death sentence would satisfy the Eighth Amendment so long as the vague aggravator was narrowed at some point in the process. Additionally, in the course of our opinion, we characterized Clemons as follows:
“[E]ven if a trial judge fails to apply the narrowing construction or applies an improper construction, the Constitution does not necessarily require that a state appellate court vacate a death sentence based on that factor. Rather, as we held in Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738 (1990), a state appellate court may itself determine whether the evidence supports the existence of the aggravating circumstance as properly defined or the court may eliminate consideration of the factor altogether and determine whether any remaining aggravating circumstances are sufficient to warrant the death penalty.” Walton, supra, at 653-654 (emphasis added).
Our use of the disjunctive suggests that as late as 1990, if a Florida trial court determined that the defendant’s conduct fell within the narrowed HAC aggravator, the sentence would satisfy the Eighth Amendment irrespective of whether the trial court reweighed the aggravating and mitigating factors. The holdings in Stringer, Maynard, Clem ons, and Godfrey cannot be thought to suggest otherwise, because there was no indication in those cases that the state courts had found the facts of the crimes to fall within appropriately narrowed definitions of the aggravators. Before Espinosa, we had never invalidated a death sentence where a court found the challenged aggravator to be within the appellate court’s narrowed definition of a facially vague aggravator.
Most of Justice Stevens’s dissent is devoted to making a forceful case that Espinosa was a reasonable interpretation of prior law — perhaps even the most reasonable one. But the Teague inquiry — which is applied to Supreme Court decisions that are, one must hope, usually the most reasonable interpretation of prior law — requires more than that. It asks whether Espinosa was dictated by precedent — i. e., whether no other interpretation was reasonable. We think it plain from the above that a jurist considering all the relevant material (and not, like Justice Stevens’s dissent, considering only the material that favors the Espinosa result) could
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case presents two related questions arising under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Respondents brought this suit in the Maine Superior Court alleging that petitioners, the State of Maine and its Commissioner of Human Services, violated § 1983 by depriving respondents of welfare benefits to which they were entitled under the federal Social Security Act, specifically 42 U. S. C. §602 (a) (7). The petitioners present two issues: (1) whether § 1983 encompasses claims based on purely statutory violations of federal law, and (2) if so, whether attorney’s fees under § 1988 may be awarded to the prevailing party in such an action.
I
Respondents, Lionel and Joline Thiboutot, are married and have eight children, three of whom are Lionel’s by a previous marriage. The Maine Department of Human Services notified Lionel that, in computing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits to which he was entitled for the three children exclusively his, it would no longer make allowance for the money spent to support the other five children, even though Lionel is legally obligated to support them. Respondents, challenging the State’s interpretation of 42 U. S. C, §602 (a)(7), exhausted their state administrative remedies and then sought judicial review of the administrative action in the State Superior Court. By amended complaint, respondents also claimed relief under § 1983 for themselves and others similarly situated. The Superior Court’s judgment enjoined petitioners from enforcing the challenged rule and ordered them to adopt new regulations, to notify class members of the new regulations, and to pay the correct amounts retroactively to respondents and prospectively to eligible class members. The court, however, denied respondents’ motion for attorney’s fees. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 405 A. 2d 230 (1979), concluded that respondents had no entitlement to attorney’s fees under state law, but were eligible for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U. S. C. § 1988. We granted certiorari. 444 TJ. S. 1042 (1980). We affirm.
II
Section 1983 provides:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” (Emphasis added.)
The question before us is whether the phrase “and laws,” as used in § 1983, means what it says, or whether it should be limited to some subset of laws. Given that Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase, the plain language of the statute undoubtedly embraces respondents’ claim that petitioners violated the Social Security Act.
Even were the language ambiguous, however, any doubt as to its meaning has been resolved by our several cases suggesting, explicitly or implicitly, that the § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970), for example, “held that suits in federal court under § 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of participating States.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 675 (1974). Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U. S. 658, 700-701 (1978), as support for its conclusion that municipalities are “persons” under § 1983, reasoned that “there can be no doubt that § 1 of the Civil Rights Act [of 1871] was intended to provide a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights.” Similarly, Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 622, 649 (1980), in holding that the common-law immunity for discretionary functions provided no basis for according municipalities a good-faith immunity under § 1983, noted that a court “looks only to whether the municipality has conformed to the requirements of the Federal Constitution and statutes.” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U. S. 225, 240, n. 30 (1972), and Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 543, n. 7 (1972), noted that § 1983’s predecessor “was enlarged to provide protection for rights, privileges, or immunities secured by federal law.” Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U. S. 808, 829-830 (1966), observed that under § 1983 state “officers may be made to respond in damages not only for violations of rights conferred by federal equal civil rights laws, but for violations of other federal constitutional and statutory rights as well.” The availability of this alternative sanction helped support the holding that 28 U. S. C. § 1443 (1) did not permit removal to federal court of a state prosecution in which the defense was that the state law conflicted with the defendants’ federal rights. As a final example, Mr. Justice Stone, writing in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 525-526 (1939), expressed the opinion that § 1983 was the product of an “extension] to include rights, privileges and immunities secured by the laws of the United States as well as by the Constitution.”
While some might dismiss as dictum the foregoing statements, numerous and specific as they are, our analysis in several § 1983 cases involving Social Security Act (SSA) claims has relied on the availability of a § 1983 cause of action for statutory claims. Constitutional claims were also raised in these cases, providing a jurisdictional base, but the statutory claims were allowed to go forward, and were decided on the merits, under the court’s pendent jurisdiction. In each of the following cases § 1983 was necessarily the exclusive statutory cause of action because, as the Court held in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 673-674; id., at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting), the SSA affords no private right of action against a State. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U. S. 125, 132, and n. 13 (1979) (state foster care program inconsistent with SSA); Quern v. Mandley, 436 U. S. 725, 729, and n. 3 (1978) (state emergency assistance program consistent with SSA); Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U. S. 338 (1975) (state shelter allowance provisions inconsistent with SSA); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282 (1971) (state prohibition against AFDC aid for college students inconsistent with SSA); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309, 311 (1968) (state cohabitation prohibition inconsistent with SSA). Cf. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 532-533, 543 (1974) (District Court had jurisdiction to decide whether state recoupment provisions consistent with SSA) ; Carter v. Stanton, 405 U. S. 669, 670 (1972) (District Court had jurisdiction to decide whether state absent-spouse rule consistent with SSA).
In the face of the plain language of § 1983 and our consistent treatment of that provision, petitioners nevertheless persist in suggesting that the phrase “and laws” should be read as limited to civil rights or equal protection laws. Petitioners suggest that when § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, which accorded jurisdiction and a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by “the Constitution of the United States,” was divided by the 1874 statutory revision into a remedial section, Rev. Stat. § 1979, and jurisdictional sections, Rev. Stat. §§563 (12) and 629 (16), Congress intended that the same change made in § 629 (16) be made as to each of the new sections as well. Section 629 (16), the jurisdictional provision for the circuit courts and the model for the current jurisdictional provision, 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3), applied to deprivations of rights secured by “the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law providing for equal rights.” On the other hand, the remedial provision, the predecessor of § 1983, was expanded to apply to deprivations of rights secured by “the Constitution and laws,” and § 563 (12), the provision granting jurisdiction to the district courts, to deprivations of rights secured by “the Constitution of the United States, or of any right secured by any law of the United States.”
We need not repeat at length the detailed debate over the meaning of the scanty legislative history concerning the addition of the phrase “and laws.” See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600 (1979); id., at 623 (Powell, J., concurring); id., at 646 (White, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 672 (Stewart, J., dissenting). One conclusion which emerges clearly is that the legislative history does not permit a definitive answer. Id., at 610-611; id., at 674 (Stewart, J., dissenting). There is no express explanation offered for the insertion of the phrase “and laws.” On the one hand, a principal purpose of the added language was to “ensure that federal legislation providing specifically for equality of rights would be brought within the ambit of the civil action authorized by that statute.” Id., at 637 (Powell, J., concurring). On the other hand, there are no indications that that was the only purpose, and Congress’ attention was specifically directed to this new language. Representative Lawrence, in a speech to the House of Representatives that began by observing that the revisers had very often changed the meaning of existing statutes, 2 Cong. Rec. 825 (1874), referred to the civil rights statutes as “possibly [showing] verbal modifications bordering on legislation,” id., at 827. He went on to read to Congress the original and revised versions. In short, Congress was aware of what it was doing, and the legislative history does not demonstrate that the plain language was not intended. Petitioners’ arguments amount to the claim that had Congress been more careful, and had it fully thought out the relationship among the various sections, it might have acted differently. That argument, however, can best be addressed to Congress, which, it is important to note, has remained quiet in the face of our many pronouncements on the scope of § 1983. Cf. TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 (1978).
Ill
Petitioners next argue that, even if this claim is within § 1983, Congress did not intend statutory claims to be covered by the Civil Eights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, which added the following sentence to 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (emphasis added):
“In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1988, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U. S. C. 1681 et seq.] or in any civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U. S. C. 2000d et seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”
Once again, given our holding in Part II, supra, the plain language provides an answer. The statute states that fees are available in any § 1983 action. Since we hold that this statutory action is properly brought under § 1983, and since § 1988 makes no exception for statutory § 1983 actions, § 1988 plainly applies to this suit.
The legislative history is entirely consistent with the plain language. As was true with § 1983, a major purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act was to benefit those claiming deprivations of constitutional and civil rights. Principal sponsors of the measure in both the House and the Senate, however, explicitly stated during the floor debates that the statute would make fees available more broadly. Representative Drinan explained that the Act would apply to § 1983 and that § 1983 “authorizes suits against State and local officials based upon Federal statutory as well as constitutional rights. For example Blue against Craig, 505 F. 2d 830 (4th Cir. 1974).” 122 Cong. Rec. 35122 (1976). Senator Kennedy also included an SSA case as an example of the cases “enforcing] the rights promised by Congress or the Constitution” which the Act would embrace. Id., at 33314. In short, there can be no question that Congress passed the Fees Act anticipating that it would apply to statutory § 1983 claims.
Several States, participating as amici curiae, argue that even if § 1988 applies to § 1983 claims alleging deprivations of statutory rights, it does not apply in state courts. There is no merit to this argument. As we have said above, Mar tinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277 (1980), held that § 1983 actions may be brought in state courts. Representative Drinan described the purpose of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act as “authorizing] the award of a reasonable attorney’s fee in actions brought in State or Federal courts.” 122 Cong. Rec. 35122 (1976). And Congress viewed the fees authorized by § 1988 as “an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain” compliance with § 1983. S. Rep. No, 94-1011, p. 5 (1976). It follows from this history and from the Supremacy Clause that the fee provision is part of the § 1983 remedy whether the action is brought in federal or state court.
Affirmed.
Petitioners also argue that jurisdiction to hear. § 1983 claims rests exclusively with the federal courts. Any doubt that state courts may also entertain such actions was dispelled by Martinez v. California, 444 U. S. 277, 283-284, n. 7 (1980). There, while reserving the question whether state courts are obligated to entertain § 1983 actions, we held that Congress has not barred them from doing so.
The State did not appeal the judgment against it.
The Supreme Judicial Court remanded to allow the Superior Court to exercise its discretion under § 1988 to determine the appropriate disposition of the fee request.
Where the plain language, supported by consistent judicial interpretation, is as strong as it is here, ordinarily “it is not necessary to look beyond the words of the statute.” TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 184, n. 29 (1978).
In his concurring opinion in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600 (1979), Me. Justice Powell’s argument proceeds on the basis of the flawed premise that Congress did not intend to change the meaning of existing laws when it revised the statutes in 1874. He assumed that Congress had instructed the revisers not to make changes, and that the revisers had obeyed those instructions. In fact, the second section of the statute creating the Revision Commission, 14 Stat. 75, mandated that the commissioners “mak[e] such alterations as may be necessary to reconcile the contradictions, supply the omissions, and amend the imperfections of the original text.” Furthermore, it is clear that Congress understood this mandate to authorize the Commission to do more than merely “copy and arrange in proper order, and classify in heads the actual text of statutes in force.” 2 Cong. Rec. 825 (1874). We have already decided that the “customary stout assertions of the codifiers that they had merely clarified and reorganized without changing substance” cannot be taken at face value. United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787, 803 (1966) (holding that the revisers significantly broadened the forerunner of 18 U. S. C. §242).
There is no inherent illogic in construing § 1983 more broadly than § 1343 (3) was construed in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, supra. It would only mean that there are statutory rights which Congress has decided cannot be enforced in the federal courts unless 28 U. S. C. §1331 (a)’s $10,000 jurisdictional amount is satisfied.
The States appearing as amid suggest that Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678 (1978), left open the issue whether Congress, exercising its power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, could set aside the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in statutory as opposed to constitutional cases. Hutto, however, concluded alternatively that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar attorney’s fee awards in federal courts because the fee awards are part of costs, which “have traditionally been awarded without regard for the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id., at 695. No Eleventh Amendment question is present, of course, where an action is brought in a state court since the Amendment, by its terms, restrains only “[t]he Judicial power of the United States.”
In Blue v. Craig, the plaintiffs claimed that North Carolina’s Medicaid plan was inconsistent with the SSA.
“In a case now pending, officials accepted Social Security Act funds for years for certain medical screening programs when in fact they had no such programs in most of the State. Bond v. Stanton, 528 F. 2d 688 (7th Cir. 1976).” 122 Cong. Rec. 33314 (1976). In the same list of examples, Senator Kennedy included La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F. R. D. 94 (ND Cal. 1972), in which plaintiffs demonstrated violations of “the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 and various sections of 23 U. S. C. dealing with housing displacement and relocation.” Id., at 95.
The Committee Reports are in accord. The Senate Report recognized that actions under § 1983 covered by the Act would include suits “redressing violations of the Federal Constitution or laws.” S. Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 4 (1976). The House Report, after suggesting that a party prevailing on a claim which could not support a fee award should be entitled to a determination on an attached claim covered by § 1988 in order to determine eligibility for fees, recognizes that a special problem is presented because “[i]n some instances . . . the claim with fees may involve a constitutional question. . . .” H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 4, n. 7 (1976). The negative pregnant is that in other instances the claim with fees need not involve a constitutional question.
The state courts which have addressed this issue have reached that same result. 405 A. 2d 230, 239 (Me. 1979) (case below); Ramirez v. County of Hudson, 169 N. J. Super. 455, 404 A. 2d 1271 (1979); Tobeluk v. Lind, 589 P. 2d 873 (Alaska 1979); Young v. Toia, 66 App. Div. 2d 377, 413 N. Y. S. 2d 530 (1979); Lange v. Nature Conservancy, Inc., 24 Wash. App. 416, 422, 601 P. 2d 963, 967 (1979); Board of Trustees v. Holso, 584 P. 2d 1009 (Wyo. 1978); Thorpe v. Durango School District, 41 Colo. App. 473, 591 P. 2d 1329 (1978), cert. granted by Colorado Supreme Court (1979).
If fees were not available in state courts, federalism concerns would be raised because most plaintiffs would have no choice but to bring their complaints concerning state actions to federal courts. Moreover, given that there is a class of cases stating causes of action under § 1983 but not cognizable in federal court absent the $10,000 jurisdictional amount of §1331 (a), see n. 6, supra, some plaintiffs would be forced to go to state courts, but contrary to congressional intent, would still face financial disincentives to asserting their claimed deprivations of federal rights.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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B
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1949, the petitioner, Gordon P. Haynes, became sick and unable to work while employed by the Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company. At that time the company had in effect a comprehensive “Plan for Employees’ Pensions, Disability Benefits and Death Benefits.” This plan had been in force since 1913 when it was adopted by Southern Bell and other companies in the American Telephone and Telegraph Company system. A written copy of the plan, which was prepared much like an insurance policy, was given every person upon his initial employment by the company. Among other things, the plan provided that Southern Bell “undertakes in accordance with these Regulations, to provide for the payment of definite amounts to its employees when they are disabled by accident or sickness.” Under the plan every employee was entitled, after two years’ service with Southern Bell, to receive “sickness disability benefits” when he missed work because of illness. These payments began on the eighth calendar day of absence due to illness. The amount and duration of payments were set out with specificity and varied with the length of service. For example, employees who had worked for Southern Bell from two to five years were entitled to full pay for four weeks and one-half pay for nine additional weeks; employees who had been with the company for more than twenty-five years were entitled to full pay for fifty-two weeks. The company reserved the right to change or terminate the plan but agreed that no changes would be made which affected “the rights of any employee, without his consent, to any benefit or pension to which he may have previously become entitled hereunder.”
Under the plan petitioner was paid $2,100 in sickness disability benefits during 1949. Since he had been an employee of the company for more than twenty-five years this was the full equivalent of what he would have received had he been working. The Government collected $318.44 income tax on petitioner’s sickness benefits. He brought this action for a refund contending that these receipts were not taxable because of § 22 (b) (5) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code which exempted from taxable income “amounts received, through accident or health insurance ... as compensation for personal injuries or sickness.” The District Court held that the payments received by petitioner on account of sickness were not taxable and directed a refund. The Court of Appeals reversed, accepting the Government’s contention that Southern Bell’s plan was not “health insurance” but a “wage continuation plan.” 233 F. 2d 413. In Epmeier v. United States, 199 F. 2d 508, the Seventh Circuit held that disability payments under a plan similar to Southern Bell’s were not taxable. Because of this conflict we granted certiorari, 352 U. S. 820.
The crucial question is whether the Southern Bell plan should be treated as “health insurance” within the meaning of § 22 (b)(5). Broadly speaking, health insurance is an undertaking by one person for reasons satisfactory to him to indemnify another for losses caused by illness. We believe that the Southern Bell disability plan comes within this meaning of health.insurance.
If Southern Bell had purchased from a commercial insurance company health insurance that provided its employees with precisely the same kind of protection promised under its own plan, the Government concedes that the payments received by ailing employees from the commercial company would not have been taxable. Nevertheless it argues that Southern Bell’s plan should not be treated as “health insurance” because the employees paid no fixed periodic premiums, there was no definite fund created to assure payment of the disability benefits, and the amount and duration of the benefits varied "with the length of service. We do not believe that these facts remove the plan from the general category of health insurance. The payment of premiums in a fixed amount at regular intervals is not a necessary element of insurance. Similarly there is no necessity for a definite fund set aside to meet the insurer’s obligations. And the fact that the amount and duration of benefits increased with the length of time that an employee worked for Southern Bell reflected the added value to the company of extra years of experience and service. Apparently the Government relies on these facts primarily to show that Southern Bell’s plan did not contain features which would be present in the normal commercial insurance contract. The Government, however, offers no persuasive reason why the term “health insurance” in § 22 (b) (5) should be limited to the particular forms of insurance conventionally made available by commercial companies. Certainly there is nothing in the language of §22 (b)(5) which compels this limitation.
There is no support in the legislative history for the Government’s argument that Congress intended to restrict the exemption provided in § 22 (b)(5) to “conventional modes of insurance” and not to include employer disability plans. For reasons deemed satisfactory, Congress, since 1918, has chosen not to tax receipts from health and accident insurance contracts. The language of § 22 (b)(5) appeared in the Revenue Act of 1918 and has reappeared without relevant change in all succeeding revenue acts up to 1954. The term “health insurance” was not defined in any of these acts or in any of the committee reports. There has been no uniform administrative practice which can be drawn upon to support the narrow meaning of §22 (b)(5) now urged by the Government. Administrative rulings since 1918 appear to have regularly vacillated between holding receipts under company disability plans taxable and holding that they are not taxable. Under these circumstances we see no reason why the term “health insurance” in § 22 (b)(5) should not be given its broad general meaning. See Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U. S. 531.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the District Court which held that petitioner was entitled to a refund is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
26 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 22 (b) (5).
The Government points to several other aspects of the Southern Bell plan as demonstrating that it is not “health insurance.” After consideration of the Government’s contentions in this respect we find they are without merit.
In Epmeier v. United States, 199 F. 2d 508, 511, the Seventh Circuit was of the opinion that: “The provisions of Section 22 (b) (5) undoubtedly were intended to relieve a taxpayer who has the misfortune to become ill or injured, of the necessity of paying income tax upon insurance benefits received to combat the ravages of disease or accident.”
Section 22 (b) (5) can be traced to § 213 (b) (6) of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1066. In §§ 104, 105 and 106 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. (Supp. Ill) §§ 104-106, Congress again exempted amounts received through health insurance. However these new provisions limited the exclusion for receipts similar to those involved here to a maximum of $100 per week. We do not accept the Government’s contention that the enactment of §§ 10<H06 shows that Congress in 1918, and in Succeeding revenue measures, intended to distinguish between conventional commercial insurance and an employer’s plan like that of Southern Bell’s.
T. D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918); G. C. M. 23511, Cum. Bull. 86 (1943); I. T. 4000, 1 Cum. Bull. 21 (1950); I. T. 4015, 1 Cum. Bull. 23 (1950); I. T. 4107, 2 Cum. Bull. 73 (1952); Rev. Rul. 208, 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 102. For a discussion of the difficulties of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company’s system because of the shifting administrative practice see Hearings before House Committee on Ways and Means on Forty Topics Pertaining to the General Revision of the Internal Revenue Code, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 363.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
L
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., imposes significant penalties on those who defraud the Government. This case concerns a theory of False Claims Act liability commonly referred to as "implied false certification." According to this theory, when a defendant submits a claim, it impliedly certifies compliance with all conditions of payment. But if that claim fails to disclose the defendant's violation of a material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement, so the theory goes, the defendant has made a misrepresentation that renders the claim "false or fraudulent" under § 3729(a)(1)(A). This case requires us to consider this theory of liability and to clarify some of the circumstances in which the False Claims Act imposes liability.
We first hold that, at least in certain circumstances, the implied false certification theory can be a basis for liability. Specifically, liability can attach when the defendant submits a claim for payment that makes specific representations about the goods or services provided, but knowingly fails to disclose the defendant's noncompliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement. In these circumstances, liability may attach if the omission renders those representations misleading.
We further hold that False Claims Act liability for failing to disclose violations of legal requirements does not turn upon whether those requirements were expressly designated as conditions of payment. Defendants can be liable for violating requirements even if they were not expressly designated as conditions of payment. Conversely, even when a requirement is expressly designated a condition of payment, not every violation of such a requirement gives rise to liability. What matters is not the label the Government attaches to a requirement, but whether the defendant knowingly violated a requirement that the defendant knows is material to the Government's payment decision.
A misrepresentation about compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement must be material to the Government's payment decision in order to be actionable under the False Claims Act. We clarify below how that rigorous materiality requirement should be enforced.
Because the courts below interpreted § 3729(a)(1)(A) differently, we vacate the judgment and remand so that those courts may apply the approach set out in this opinion.
I
A
Enacted in 1863, the False Claims Act "was originally aimed principally at stopping the massive frauds perpetrated by large contractors during the Civil War." United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309, 96 S.Ct. 523, 46 L.Ed.2d 514 (1976). "[A] series of sensational congressional investigations" prompted hearings where witnesses "painted a sordid picture of how the United States had been billed for nonexistent or worthless goods, charged exorbitant prices for goods delivered, and generally robbed in purchasing the necessities of war." United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599, 78 S.Ct. 950, 2 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1958). Congress responded by imposing civil and criminal liability for 10 types of fraud on the Government, subjecting violators to double damages, forfeiture, and up to five years' imprisonment. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.
Since then, Congress has repeatedly amended the Act, but its focus remains on those who present or directly induce the submission of false or fraudulent claims. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (imposing civil liability on "any person who ... knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval"). A "claim" now includes direct requests to the Government for payment as well as reimbursement requests made to the recipients of federal funds under federal benefits programs. See § 3729(b)(2)(A). The Act's scienter requirement defines "knowing" and "knowingly" to mean that a person has "actual knowledge of the information," "acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information," or "acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information." § 3729(b)(1)(A). And the Act defines "material" to mean "having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property." § 3729(b)(4).
Congress also has increased the Act's civil penalties so that liability is "essentially punitive in nature." Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000). Defendants are subjected to treble damages plus civil penalties of up to $10,000 per false claim. § 3729(a) ; 28 CFR § 85.3(a)(9) (2015) (adjusting penalties for inflation).
B
The alleged False Claims Act violations here arose within the Medicaid program, a joint state-federal program in which healthcare providers serve poor or disabled patients and submit claims for government reimbursement. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. The facts recited in the complaint, which we take as true at this stage, are as follows. For five years, Yarushka Rivera, a teenage beneficiary of Massachusetts' Medicaid program, received counseling services at Arbour Counseling Services, a satellite mental health facility in Lawrence, Massachusetts, owned and operated by a subsidiary of petitioner Universal Health Services. Beginning in 2004, when Yarushka started having behavioral problems, five medical professionals at Arbour intermittently treated her. In May 2009, Yarushka had an adverse reaction to a medication that a purported doctor at Arbour prescribed after diagnosing her with bipolar disorder. Her condition worsened; she suffered a seizure that required hospitalization. In October 2009, she suffered another seizure and died. She was 17 years old.
Thereafter, an Arbour counselor revealed to respondents Carmen Correa and Julio Escobar-Yarushka's mother and stepfather-that few Arbour employees were actually licensed to provide mental health counseling and that supervision of them was minimal. Respondents discovered that, of the five professionals who had treated Yarushka, only one was properly licensed. The practitioner who diagnosed Yarushka as bipolar identified herself as a psychologist with a Ph. D., but failed to mention that her degree came from an unaccredited Internet college and that Massachusetts had rejected her application to be licensed as a psychologist. Likewise, the practitioner who prescribed medicine to Yarushka, and who was held out as a psychiatrist, was in fact a nurse who lacked authority to prescribe medications absent supervision. Rather than ensuring supervision of unlicensed staff, the clinic's director helped to misrepresent the staff's qualifications. And the problem went beyond those who treated Yarushka. Some 23 Arbour employees lacked licenses to provide mental health services, yet-despite regulatory requirements to the contrary-they counseled patients and prescribed drugs without supervision.
When submitting reimbursement claims, Arbour used payment codes corresponding to different services that its staff provided to Yarushka, such as "Individual Therapy" and "family therapy." 1 App. 19, 20. Staff members also misrepresented their qualifications and licensing status to the Federal Government to obtain individual National Provider Identification numbers, which are submitted in connection with Medicaid reimbursement claims and correspond to specific job titles. For instance, one Arbour staff member who treated Yarushka registered for a number associated with " 'Social Worker, Clinical,' " despite lacking the credentials and licensing required for social workers engaged in mental health counseling. 1 id., at 32.
After researching Arbour's operations, respondents filed complaints with various Massachusetts agencies. Massachusetts investigated and ultimately issued a report detailing Arbour's violation of over a dozen Massachusetts Medicaid regulations governing the qualifications and supervision required for staff at mental health facilities. Arbour agreed to a remedial plan, and two Arbour employees also entered into consent agreements with Massachusetts.
In 2011, respondents filed a qui tam suit in federal court, see 31 U.S.C. § 3730, alleging that Universal Health had violated the False Claims Act under an implied false certification theory of liability. The operative complaint asserts that Universal Health (acting through Arbour) submitted reimbursement claims that made representations about the specific services provided by specific types of professionals, but that failed to disclose serious violations of regulations pertaining to staff qualifications and licensing requirements for these services. Specifically, the Massachusetts Medicaid program requires satellite facilities to have specific types of clinicians on staff, delineates licensing requirements for particular positions (like psychiatrists, social workers, and nurses), and details supervision requirements for other staff. See 130 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 429.422 -424, 429.439 (2014). Universal Health allegedly flouted these regulations because Arbour employed unqualified, unlicensed, and unsupervised staff. The Massachusetts Medicaid program, unaware of these deficiencies, paid the claims. Universal Health thus allegedly defrauded the program, which would not have reimbursed the claims had it known that it was billed for mental health services that were performed by unlicensed and unsupervised staff. The United States declined to intervene.
The District Court granted Universal Health's motion to dismiss the complaint. Circuit precedent had previously embraced the implied false certification theory of liability. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 385-387 (C.A.1 2011). But the District Court held that respondents had failed to state a claim under that theory because, with one exception not relevant here, none of the regulations that Arbour violated was a condition of payment. See 2014 WL 1271757, *1, *6-*12 (D.Mass., Mar. 26, 2014).
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed in relevant part and remanded. 780 F.3d 504, 517 (2015). The court observed that each time a billing party submits a claim, it "implicitly communicate[s] that it conformed to the relevant program requirements, such that it was entitled to payment." Id., at 514, n. 14. To determine whether a claim is "false or fraudulent" based on such implicit communications, the court explained, it "asks simply whether the defendant, in submitting a claim for reimbursement, knowingly misrepresented compliance with a material precondition of payment." Id., at 512. In the court's view, a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement can be a condition of payment either by expressly identifying itself as such or by implication. Id., at 512-513. The court then held that Universal Health had violated Massachusetts Medicaid regulations that "clearly impose conditions of payment." Id., at 513. The court further held that the regulations themselves "constitute[d] dispositive evidence of materiality," because they identified adequate supervision as an "express and absolute" condition of payment and "repeated[ly] reference[d]" supervision. Id., at 514 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We granted certiorari to resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals over the validity and scope of the implied false certification theory of liability. 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 582, 193 L.Ed.2d 465 (2015). The Seventh Circuit has rejected this theory, reasoning that only express (or affirmative) falsehoods can render a claim "false or fraudulent" under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A).
United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 711-712 (2015). Other courts have accepted the theory, but limit its application to cases where defendants fail to disclose violations of expressly designated conditions of payment. E.g., Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (C.A.2 2001). Yet others hold that conditions of payment need not be expressly designated as such to be a basis for False Claims Act liability. E.g., United States v. Science Applications Int'l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1269 (C.A.D.C.2010) (SAIC ).
II
We first hold that the implied false certification theory can, at least in some circumstances, provide a basis for liability. By punishing defendants who submit "false or fraudulent claims," the False Claims Act encompasses claims that make fraudulent misrepresentations, which include certain misleading omissions. When, as here, a defendant makes representations in submitting a claim but omits its violations of statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements, those omissions can be a basis for liability if they render the defendant's representations misleading with respect to the goods or services provided.
To reach this conclusion, "[w]e start, as always, with the language of the statute." Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 668, 128 S.Ct. 2123, 170 L.Ed.2d 1030 (2008) (brackets in original; internal quotation marks omitted). The False Claims Act imposes civil liability on "any person who ... knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval." § 3729(a)(1)(A). Congress did not define what makes a claim "false" or "fraudulent." But "[i]t is a settled principle of interpretation that, absent other indication, Congress intends to incorporate the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses." Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. ----, ----, 133 S.Ct. 2720, 2724, 186 L.Ed.2d 794 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). And the term "fraudulent" is a paradigmatic example of a statutory term that incorporates the common-law meaning of fraud. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (the term "actionable 'fraud' " is one with "a well-settled meaning at common law").
Because common-law fraud has long encompassed certain misrepresentations by omission, "false or fraudulent claims" include more than just claims containing express falsehoods. The parties and the Government agree that misrepresentations by omission can give rise to liability. Brief for Petitioner 30-31; Brief for Respondents 22-31; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16-20.
The parties instead dispute whether submitting a claim without disclosing violations of statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements constitutes such an actionable misrepresentation. Respondents and the Government invoke the common-law rule that, while nondisclosure alone ordinarily is not actionable, "[a] representation stating the truth so far as it goes but which the maker knows or believes to be materially misleading because of his failure to state additional or qualifying matter" is actionable. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 529, p. 62 (1976). They contend that every submission of a claim for payment implicitly represents that the claimant is legally entitled to payment, and that failing to disclose violations of material legal requirements renders the claim misleading. Universal Health, on the other hand, argues that submitting a claim involves no representations, and that a different common-law rule thus governs: nondisclosure of legal violations is not actionable absent a special " 'duty ... to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question,' " which it says is lacking in Government contracting. Brief for Petitioner 31 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(1), at 119).
We need not resolve whether all claims for payment implicitly represent that the billing party is legally entitled to payment. The claims in this case do more than merely demand payment. They fall squarely within the rule that half-truths-representations that state the truth only so far as it goes, while omitting critical qualifying information-can be actionable misrepresentations. A classic example of an actionable half-truth in contract law is the seller who reveals that there may be two new roads near a property he is selling, but fails to disclose that a third potential road might bisect the property. See Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 257 N.Y. 393, 400, 178 N.E. 672, 674 (1931) (Cardozo, J.). "The enumeration of two streets, described as unopened but projected, was a tacit representation that the land to be conveyed was subject to no others, and certainly subject to no others materially affecting the value of the purchase." Ibid. Likewise, an applicant for an adjunct position at a local college makes an actionable misrepresentation when his resume lists prior jobs and then retirement, but fails to disclose that his "retirement" was a prison stint for perpetrating a $12 million bank fraud. See 3 D. Dobbs, P. Hayden, & H. Bublick, Law of Torts § 682, pp. 702-703, and n. 14 (2d ed. 2011) (citing Sarvis v. Vermont State Colleges, 172 Vt. 76, 78, 80-82, 772 A.2d 494, 496, 497-499 (2001) ).
So too here, by submitting claims for payment using payment codes that corresponded to specific counseling services, Universal Health represented that it had provided individual therapy, family therapy, preventive medication counseling, and other types of treatment. Moreover, Arbour staff members allegedly made further representations in submitting Medicaid reimbursement claims by using National Provider Identification numbers corresponding to specific job titles. And these representations were clearly misleading in context. Anyone informed that a social worker at a Massachusetts mental health clinic provided a teenage patient with individual counseling services would probably-but wrongly-conclude that the clinic had complied with core Massachusetts Medicaid requirements (1) that a counselor "treating children [is] required to have specialized training and experience in children's services," 130 Code Mass. Regs. § 429.422, and also (2) that, at a minimum, the social worker possesses the prescribed qualifications for the job, § 429.424(C). By using payment and other codes that conveyed this information without disclosing Arbour's many violations of basic staff and licensing requirements for mental health facilities, Universal Health's claims constituted misrepresentations.
Accordingly, we hold that the implied certification theory can be a basis for liability, at least where two conditions are satisfied: first, the claim does not merely request payment, but also makes specific representations about the goods or services provided; and second, the defendant's failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements makes those representations misleading half-truths.
III
The second question presented is whether, as Universal Health urges, a defendant should face False Claims Act liability only if it fails to disclose the violation of a contractual, statutory, or regulatory provision that the Government expressly designated a condition of payment. We conclude that the Act does not impose this limit on liability. But we also conclude that not every undisclosed violation of an express condition of payment automatically triggers liability. Whether a provision is labeled a condition of payment is relevant to but not dispositive of the materiality inquiry.
A
Nothing in the text of the False Claims Act supports Universal Health's proposed restriction. Section 3729(a)(1)(A) imposes liability on those who present "false or fraudulent claims" but does not limit such claims to misrepresentations about express conditions of payment. See SAIC, 626 F.3d, at 1268 (rejecting any textual basis for an express-designation rule). Nor does the common-law meaning of fraud tether liability to violating an express condition of payment. A statement that misleadingly omits critical facts is a misrepresentation irrespective of whether the other party has expressly signaled the importance of the qualifying information. Supra, at 1999 - 2001.
The False Claims Act's materiality requirement also does not support Universal Health. Under the Act, the misrepresentation must be material to the other party's course of action. But, as discussed below, see infra, at 2003 - 2004, statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements are not automatically material, even if they are labeled conditions of payment. Cf. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 39, 131 S.Ct. 1309, 179 L.Ed.2d 398 (2011) (materiality cannot rest on "a single fact or occurrence as always determinative" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Nor does the Act's scienter requirement, § 3729(b)(1)(A), support Universal Health's position. A defendant can have "actual knowledge" that a condition is material without the Government expressly calling it a condition of payment. If the Government failed to specify that guns it orders must actually shoot, but the defendant knows that the Government routinely rescinds contracts if the guns do not shoot, the defendant has "actual knowledge." Likewise, because a reasonable person would realize the imperative of a functioning firearm, a defendant's failure to appreciate the materiality of that condition would amount to "deliberate ignorance" or "reckless disregard" of the "truth or falsity of the information" even if the Government did not spell this out.
Universal Health nonetheless contends that False Claims Act liability should be limited to undisclosed violations of expressly designated conditions of payment to provide defendants with fair notice and to cabin liability. But policy arguments cannot supersede the clear statutory text. Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, n. 4, 133 S.Ct. 596, 607, n. 4, 184 L.Ed.2d 433 (2012). In any event, Universal Health's approach risks undercutting these policy goals. The Government might respond by designating every legal requirement an express condition of payment. But billing parties are often subject to thousands of complex statutory and regulatory provisions. Facing False Claims Act liability for violating any of them would hardly help would-be defendants anticipate and prioritize compliance obligations. And forcing the Government to expressly designate a provision as a condition of payment would create further arbitrariness. Under Universal Health's view, misrepresenting compliance with a requirement that the Government expressly identified as a condition of payment could expose a defendant to liability. Yet, under this theory, misrepresenting compliance with a condition of eligibility to even participate in a federal program when submitting a claim would not.
Moreover, other parts of the False Claims Act allay Universal Health's concerns. "[I]nstead of adopting a circumscribed view of what it means for a claim to be false or fraudulent," concerns about fair notice and open-ended liability "can be effectively addressed through strict enforcement of the Act's materiality and scienter requirements." SAIC,supra, at 1270. Those requirements are rigorous.
B
As noted, a misrepresentation about compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement must be material to the Government's payment decision in order to be actionable under the False Claims Act. We now clarify how that materiality requirement should be enforced.
Section 3729(b)(4) defines materiality using language that we have employed to define materiality in other federal fraud statutes: "[T]he term 'material' means having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property." See Neder, 527 U.S., at 16, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (using this definition to interpret the mail, bank, and wire fraud statutes); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988) (same for fraudulent statements to immigration officials). This materiality requirement descends from "common-law antecedents." Id., at 769, 108 S.Ct. 1537. Indeed, "the common law could not have conceived of 'fraud' without proof of materiality." Neder, supra, at 22, 119 S.Ct. 1827 ; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 30 (describing common-law principles and arguing that materiality under the False Claims Act should involve a "similar approach").
We need not decide whether § 3729(a)(1)(A)'s materiality requirement is governed by § 3729(b)(4) or derived directly from the common law. Under any understanding of the concept, materiality "look[s] to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged misrepresentation." 26 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 69:12, p. 549 (4th ed. 2003) (Williston). In tort law, for instance, a "matter is material" in only two circumstances: (1) "[if] a reasonable man would attach importance to [it] in determining his choice of action in the transaction"; or (2) if the defendant knew or had reason to know that the recipient of the representation attaches importance to the specific matter "in determining his choice of action," even though a reasonable person would not. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538, at 80. Materiality in contract law is substantially similar. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 162(2), and Comment c, pp. 439, 441 (1979) ("[A] misrepresentation is material" only if it would "likely ... induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent," or the defendant "knows that for some special reason [the representation] is likely to induce the particular recipient to manifest his assent" to the transaction).
The materiality standard is demanding. The False Claims Act is not "an all-purpose antifraud statute," Allison Engine, 553 U.S., at 672, 128 S.Ct. 2123 or a vehicle for punishing garden-variety breaches of contract or regulatory violations. A misrepresentation cannot be deemed material merely because the Government designates compliance with a particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement as a condition of payment. Nor is it sufficient for a finding of materiality that the Government would have the option to decline to pay if it knew of the defendant's noncompliance. Materiality, in addition, cannot be found where noncompliance is minor or insubstantial. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 543, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943) (contractors' misrepresentation that they satisfied a non-collusive bidding requirement for federal program contracts violated the False Claims Act because "[t]he government's money would never have been placed in the joint fund for payment to respondents had its agents known the bids were collusive"); see also Junius Constr., 257 N.Y., at 400, 178 N.E., at 674 (an undisclosed fact was material because "[n]o one can say with reason that the plaintiff would have signed this contract if informed of the likelihood" of the undisclosed fact).
In sum, when evaluating materiality under the False Claims Act, the Government's decision to expressly identify a provision as a condition of payment is relevant, but not automatically dispositive. Likewise, proof of materiality can include, but is not necessarily limited to, evidence that the defendant knows that the Government consistently refuses to pay claims in the mine run of cases based on noncompliance with the particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement. Conversely, if the Government pays a particular claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, that is very strong evidence that those requirements are not material. Or, if the Government regularly pays a particular type of claim in full despite actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, and has signaled no change in position, that is strong evidence that the requirements are not material.
These rules lead us to disagree with the Government's and First Circuit's view of materiality: that any statutory, regulatory, or contractual violation is material so long as the defendant knows that the Government would be entitled to refuse payment were it aware of the violation. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 30; Tr. of Oral Arg. 43 (Government's "test" for materiality "is whether the person knew that the government could lawfully withhold payment"); 780 F.3d, at 514 ; see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 26, 29 (statements by respondents' counsel endorsing this view). At oral argument, the United States explained the implications of its position: If the Government contracts for health services and adds a requirement that contractors buy American-made staplers, anyone who submits a claim for those services but fails to disclose its use of foreign staplers violates the False Claims Act. To the Government, liability would attach if the defendant's use of foreign staplers would entitle the Government not to pay the claim in whole or part-irrespective of whether the Government routinely pays claims despite knowing that foreign staplers were used. Id ., at 39-45. Likewise, if the Government required contractors to aver their compliance with the entire U.S. Code and Code of Federal Regulations, then under this view, failing to mention noncompliance with any of those requirements would always be material. The False Claims Act does not adopt such an extraordinarily expansive view of liability.
* * *
Because both opinions below assessed respondents' complaint based on interpretations of § 3729(a)(1)(A) that differ from ours, we vacate the First Circuit's judgment and remand the case for reconsideration of whether respondents have sufficiently pleaded a False Claims Act violation. See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Industry Pension Fund, 575 U.S. ----, ----, 135 S.Ct. 1318, 1332-1333, 191 L.Ed.2d 253 (2015). We emphasize, however, that the False Claims Act is not a means of imposing treble damages and other penalties for insignificant regulatory or contractual violations. This case centers on allegations of fraud, not medical malpractice. Respondents have alleged that Universal Health misrepresented its compliance with mental health facility requirements that are so central to the provision of mental health counseling that the Medicaid program would not have paid these claims had it known of these violations. Respondents may well have adequately pleaded a violation of § 3729(a)(1)(A). But we leave it to the courts below to resolve this in the first instance.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Although Universal Health submitted some of the claims at issue before 2009, we assume-as the parties have done-that the 2009 amendments to the False Claims Act apply here. Universal Health does not argue, and we thus do not consider, whether pre-2009 conduct should be treated differently.
The False Claims Act abrogates the common law in certain respects. For instance, the Act's scienter requirement "require[s] no proof of specific intent to defraud." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(B). But we presume that Congress retained all other elements of common-law fraud that are consistent with the statutory text because there are no textual indicia to the contrary. See Neder, 527 U.S., at 24-25, 119 S.Ct. 1827.
This rule recurs throughout the common law. In tort law, for example, "if the defendant does speak, he must disclose enough to prevent his words from being misleading." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 106, p. 738 (5th ed. 1984). Contract law also embraces this principle. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161, Comment a, p. 432 (1979). And we have used this definition in other statutory contexts. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 44, 131 S.Ct. 1309, 179 L.Ed.2d 398 (2011) (securities law).
As an alternative argument, Universal Health asserts that misleading partial disclosures constitute fraudulent misrepresentations only when the initial statement partially disclosed unfavorable information. Not so. "[A] statement that contains only favorable matters and omits all reference to unfavorable matters is as much a false representation as if all the facts stated were untrue." Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 529, Comment a, pp. 62-63 (1976).
Accord, Williston § 69:12, pp. 549-550 ("most popular" understanding is "that a misrepresentation is material if it concerns a matter to which a reasonable person would attach importance in determining his or her choice of action with respect to the transaction involved: which will induce action by a complaining party[,] knowledge of which would have induced the recipient to act differently" (footnote omitted)); id., at 550 (noting rule that "a misrepresentation is material if, had it not been made, the party complaining of fraud would not have taken the action alleged to have been induced by the misrepresentation"); Junius Constr. Co. v. Cohen, 257 N.Y. 393, 400, 178 N.E. 672, 674 (1931) (a misrepresentation is material if it "went to the very essence of the bargain"); cf. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16, 22, n. 5, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (relying on " 'natural tendency to influence' " standard and citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538 definition of materiality).
We reject Universal Health's assertion that materiality is too fact intensive for courts to dismiss False Claims Act cases on a motion to dismiss or at summary judgment. The standard for materiality that we have outlined is a familiar and rigorous one. And False Claims Act plaintiffs must also plead their claims with plausibility and particularity under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 9(b) by, for instance, pleading facts to support allegations of materiality.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
OPINION OF THE COURT
[563 U.S. 250]
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908), allows a federal court to hear a lawsuit for prospective relief against state officials brought by another agency of the same State.
I
A
The Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000 (DD Act), 114 Stat. 1677, 42 U.S.C. § 15001 et seq., offers States federal money to improve community services, such as medical care and job training, for individuals with developmental disabilities. See §§ 15023(a), 15024. As a condition of that funding, a State must establish a protection and advocacy (P) system “to protect and advocate the rights of individuals with developmental disabilities.” § 15043(a)(1). The P system receives separate federal funds, paid to it directly. § 15042(a) and (b). A second federal law, the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI Act), 100 Stat. 478, 42 U.S.C. § 10801 et seq., increases that separate funding and extends the mission of P systems to include the mentally ill. §§ 10802(2), 10803, 10827. At present, every State accepts funds under these statutes.
Under the DD and PAIMI Acts, a P system must have certain powers. The system “shall... have the authority to investigate incidents of abuse and neglect ... if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred.” § 15043(a)(2)(B); § 10805(a)(1)(A). Subject to certain statutory requirements, it must be given access to “all records” of individuals who
[563 U.S. 251]
may have been abused, see § 15043(a)(2)(I)(iii)(II); § 10805(a)(4)(B)(iii), as well as “other records that are relevant to conducting an investigation,” § 15043(a)(2)(J)(i). The Acts also require that a P system have authority to “pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies or approaches to ensure the protection of’ its charges. § 15043(a)(2)(A)(i); see § 10805(a)(1)(B). And in addition to pressing its own rights, a P system may “pursue administrative, legal, and other remedies on behalf of’ those it protects. § 10805(a)(1)(C); see § 15044(b).
A participating State is free to appoint either a state agency or a private nonprofit entity as its P system. § 15044(a); § 10805(c)(1)(B). But in either case, the designated entity must have certain structural features that ensure its independence from the State’s government. The DD Act prohibits the Governor from appointing more than one-third of the members of the system’s governing board, § 15044(a)(2), and restricts the State’s ability to impose hiring freezes or other measures that would impair the system’s ability to carry out its mission, § 15043(a)(2)(K). Once a State designates an entity as its P system, it may not change its selection without “good cause.” § 15043(a)(4)(A).
Virginia is one of just eight States that have designated a government entity as their P system. The Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy (VOPA) is an “independent state agency.” Va. Code Ann. § 51.5-39.2(A) (Lexis 2009). Its board consists of eleven “nonlegislative citizen members,” of whom only three are appointed by the Governor. § 51.5-39.2(B). The remaining eight are appointed by components of the legislature: five by the Speaker of the House of Delegates, and three by the Senate Committee on Rules. Ibid. VOPA itself nominates candidates for consideration, and the statute instructs the appointing officials that they “shall seriously consider the persons nominated and appoint such persons whenever feasible.” Ibid. Board members serve for fixed terms and are removable only by a court and only for
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specified reasons. See § 51.5-39.2(0 and (F); §24.2-233 and 234 (Lexis 2006).
VOPA enjoys authority to litigate free of executive-branch oversight. It operates independently of the Attorney General of Virginia and employs its own lawyers, who are statutorily authorized to sue on VOPA’s behalf. § 51.5—39.2(A); §2.2-510(5) (Lexis 2008). And Virginia law specifically empowers VOPA to “initiate any proceedings to secure the rights” of disabled individuals. § 51.5-39.2(A).
B
In 2006, VOPA opened an investigation into the deaths of two patients and injuries to a third at state-run mental hospitals. It asked respondents—state officials in charge of those institutions—to produce any records related to risk-management or mortality reviews conducted by the hospitals with respect to those patients. Respondents refused, asserting that the records were protected by a state-law privilege shielding medical peer-review materials from disclosure.
VOPA then brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that the DD and PAIMI Acts entitled it to the peer-review records, notwithstanding any state-law privilege that might apply. It sought a declaration that respondents’ refusal to produce the records violated the DD and PAIMI Acts, along with an injunction requiring respondents to provide access to the records and refrain in the future from interfering with VOPA’s right of access to them. Respondents moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that they are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The District Court denied the motion. In its view, the suit was permitted by the doctrine of Ex parte Young, which normally allows federal courts to award prospective relief against state officials for violations of federal law. Virginia v. Reinhard, 2008 WL 2795940, *6 (ED Va., July 18, 2008).
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The Court of Appeals reversed. Virginia v. Reinhard, 568 F.3d 110 (CA4 2009). Believing VOPA’s lawsuit to be an “intramural contest” that “encroaches more severely on the dignity and sovereignty of the states than an Ex parte Young action brought by a private plaintiff,” the Court of Appeals concluded it was not authorized by that case. Id., at 119-120 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We granted certiorari. 561 U.S. 1005, 130 S. Ct. 3493, 177 L. Ed. 2d 1054 (2010).
II
A
Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its consent. The language of the Eleventh Amendment only eliminates the basis for our judgment in the famous case of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L. Ed. 440 (1793), which involved a suit against a State by a noncitizen of the State. Since Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842 (1890), however, we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to confirm the structural understanding that States entered the Union with their sovereign immunity intact, unlimited by Article Ill’s jurisdictional grant. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 115 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1991); see Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984). Our cases hold that the States have retained their traditional immunity from suit, “except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional amendments.” Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 144 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1999). A State may waive its sovereign immunity at its pleasure, College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675-676, 119 S. Ct. 2219, 144 L. Ed. 2d 605 (1999), and in some circumstances Congress
[563 U.S. 254]
may abrogate it by appropriate legislation. But absent waiver or valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain a private person’s suit against a State.
B
In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714, we established an important limit on the sovereign-immunity principle. That case involved a challenge to a Minnesota law reducing the freight rates that railroads could charge. A railroad shareholder claimed that the new rates were unconstitutionally confiscatory, and obtained a federal injunction against Edward Young, the Attorney General of Minnesota, forbidding him in his official capacity to enforce the state law. Perkins v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 155 F. 445 (CC Minn. 1907). When Young violated the injunction by initiating an enforcement action in state court, the Circuit Court held him in contempt and committed him to federal custody. In his habeas corpus application in this Court, Young challenged his confinement by arguing that Minnesota’s sovereign immunity deprived the federal court of jurisdiction to enjoin him from performing his official duties.
We disagreed. We explained that [10] because an unconstitutional legislative enactment is “void,” a state official who enforces that law “comes into conflict with the superior authority of [the] Constitution,” and therefore is “stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.” 209 U.S., at 159-160, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714.
This doctrine has existed alongside our sovereign-immunity jurisprudence for more than a century, accepted as
[563 U.S. 255]
necessary to “permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S., at 105, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67. It rests on the premise—less delicately called a “fiction,” id., at 114, n. 25, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67—that when a federal court commands a state official to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law, he is not the State for sovereign-immunity purposes. The doctrine is limited to that precise situation, and does not apply “when ‘the state is the real, substantial party in interest,’ ” id., at 101, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S. Ct. 347, 89 L. Ed. 389 (1945)), as when the “ ‘judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with public administration,’ ” 465 U.S., at 101, n. 11, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (quoting Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620, 83 S. Ct. 999, 10 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1963)).
C
This case requires us to decide how to apply the Ex parte Young doctrine to a suit brought by an independent state agency claiming to possess federal rights. Although we have never encountered such a suit before, we are satisfied that entertaining VOPA’s action is consistent with our precedents and does not offend the distinctive interests protected by sovereign immunity.
1
In Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 122 S. Ct. 1753, 152 L. Ed. 2d 871 (2002), we held that “ [i]n determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’ ” Id., at 645, 122 S. Ct. 1753, 152 L. Ed. 2d 871 (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 138 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). There is no doubt VOPA’s suit satisfies that straightforward inquiry. It alleges that respondents’ refusal to produce the requested medical records violates federal law; and it seeks an injunction requiring the production of the records, which would
[563 U.S. 256]
prospectively abate the alleged violation. Respondents concede that were VOPA a private organization rather than a state agency, the doctrine would permit this action to proceed.
We see no reason for a different result here. Although respondents argue that VOPA’s status as a state agency changes the calculus, there is no warrant in our cases for making the validity of an Ex parte Young action turn on the identity of the plaintiff. To be sure, we have been willing to police abuses of the doctrine that threaten to evade sovereign immunity. To do otherwise “would be to adhere to an empty formalism.” Coeur d’Alene Tribe, supra, at 270, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 138 L. Ed. 2d 438. But (as the dissent concedes, post, at 273, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 697 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.)) the limits we have recognized reflect the principle that the “general criterion for determining when a suit is in fact against the sovereign is the effect of the relief sought,” Pennhurst, supra, at 107, 104 S. Ct. 900, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67, not who is bringing the lawsuit. Thus, Ex parte Young cannot be used to obtain an injunction requiring the payment of funds from the State’s
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treasury, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974); or an order for specific performance of a State’s contract, see id., at 666-667, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662; In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 8 S. Ct. 164, 31 L. Ed. 216 (1887).
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, on which respondents heavily rely, is an application of this principle. There we refused to allow an Indian Tribe to use Ex parte Young to obtain injunctive and declaratory relief establishing its exclusive right to the use and enjoyment of certain submerged lands in Idaho and the invalidity of all state statutes and regulations governing that land. 521 U.S., at 265, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 138 L. Ed. 2d 438. We determined that the suit was “the functional equivalent of’ “a quiet title suit against Idaho,” would “extinguish . . . the State’s control over a vast reach of lands and waters long deemed by the State to be an integral part of its territory,” and thus was barred by sovereign immunity. Id., at 282, 281, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 138 L. Ed. 2d 438.
Respondents have advanced no argument that the relief sought in this case threatens any similar invasion of Virginia’s sovereignty. Indeed, they concede that the very injunction VOPA requests could properly be awarded by a federal court at the instance of a private P system.
2
Respondents and the dissent argue that entertaining VOPA’s lawsuit in a federal forum would nevertheless infringe Virginia’s sovereign interests because it diminishes the dignity of a State for a federal court to adjudicate a dispute between its components. See Brief for Respondents 23-26; post, at 269-273, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 695-697 (arguing that “ ‘special sovereignty interests’ ” bar VOPA’s lawsuit (quoting Coeur d’Alene Tribe, supra, at 281, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 138 L. Ed. 2d 438)). We disagree. As an initial matter, we do not understand how a State’s stature could be diminished to any greater degree when its own agency polices its officers’ compliance with their federal obligations, than when a private person hales those officers into federal court for
[563 U.S. 258]
that same purpose—something everyone agrees is proper. And in this case, of course, VOPA’s power to sue state officials is a consequence of Virginia’s own decision to establish a public, rather than a private, P system. We fail to perceive what Eleventh Amendment indignity is visited on the Commonwealth when, by operation of its own laws, VOPAis admitted to federal court as a plaintiff.
But even if it were true that the State’s dignity were offended in some way by the maintenance of this action in federal court, that would not prove respondents’ case. Denial of sovereign immunity, to be sure, offends the dignity of a State; but not every offense to the dignity of a State constitutes a denial of sovereign immunity. The specific indignity against which sovereign immunity protects is the insult to a State of being haled into court without its consent. That effectively occurs, our cases reasonably conclude, when (for example) the object of the suit against a state officer is to reach funds in the state treasury or acquire state lands; it
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does not occur just because the suit happens to be brought by another state agency. Respondents’ asserted dignitary harm is simply unconnected to the sovereign-immunity interest.
The dissent complains that applying Ex parte Young to this lawsuit divides Virginia against itself, since the opposing parties are both creatures of the Commonwealth. Post, at 271-272, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 696-697. Even if that were a distinctive consequence of letting this suit proceed in federal court, it would have nothing to do with the concern of sovereign immunity—whether the suit is against an unconsenting State, rather than against its officers. But it is not a consequence of the federal nature of the forum. The same result will follow if the federal claim is sued upon in state court, as the dissent would require. There also, “[w]hatever the decision in the litigation, . . . [t]he Commonwealth will win[, a]nd the Commonwealth will lose.” Post, at 272, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 697. Nor would sending the matter to state court even avoid the prospect that “a federal judge will resolve which part of the Commonwealth will prevail,” ibid., since the state-court loser could always ask this Court to review the matter by certiorari. (Or is that appeal also to be disallowed on grounds of sovereign immunity? But see Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821).) And of course precisely the same thing would happen if respondents specifically waived their sovereign-immunity objections in this very case. Yet no one would contend that despite the waiver, sovereign immunity forbade the suit. So also here: If, by reason of Ex parte Young, there has been no violation of
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sovereign immunity, the prospect of a federal judge’s resolving VOPA’s dispute with respondents does not make it so.
We do not doubt, of course, that there are limits on the Federal Government’s power to affect the internal operations of a State. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 138 L. Ed. 2d 914 (1997) (Congress may not commandeer state officers); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 579, 31 S. Ct. 688, 55 L. Ed. 853 (1911) (Congress may not dictate a State’s capital). But those limits must be found in some textual provision or structural premise of the Constitution. Additional limits cannot be smuggled in under the Eleventh Amendment by barring a suit in federal court that does not violate the State’s sovereign immunity.
3
A weightier objection, perhaps, is the relative novelty of this lawsuit. Respondents rightly observe that federal courts have not often encountered lawsuits brought by state agencies against other state officials. That does give us pause. Lack of historical precedent can indicate a constitutional infirmity, see, e.g., Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505-506, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 177 L. Ed. 2d 706 (2010), and our sovereign-immunity decisions have traditionally warned against “ ‘anomalous and unheard-of proceedings or suits,’ ” Alden, 527 U.S., at 727, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 144 L. Ed. 2d 636 (quoting Hans, 134 U.S., at 18, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842).
Novelty, however, is often the consequence of past constitutional doubts, but we have no reason to believe that is the case here. In order to invoke the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity, a state agency needs two things: first, a federal right that it possesses against its parent State; and second, authority to sue other state officials to enforce that
[563 U.S. 261]
right, free from any internal veto wielded by the state government. These conditions will rarely coincide—and at least the latter of them cannot exist without the consent of the State that created the agency and defined its powers. See post, at 264, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 691-692 (Kennedy, J., concurring). We are unaware that the necessary conditions have ever presented themselves except in connection with the DD and PAIMI Acts, and the parties have referred us to no examples. Thus, the apparent novelty of this sort of suit does not at all suggest its unconstitutionality. In any event, we are satisfied, for the reasons we have explained, that—novelty notwithstanding—the principles undergird-ing the Ex pai'te Young doctrine support its application to actions of this kind.
Like the Court of Appeals, we are mindful of the central role autonomous States play in our federal system, and wary of approving new encroachments on their sovereignty. But we conclude no such encroachment is occasioned by straightforwardly applying Ex parte Young to allow this suit. It was Virginia law that created VOPA and gave it the power to sue state officials. In that circumstance, the Eleventh Amendment presents no obstacle to VOPA’s ability to invoke federal jurisdiction on the same terms as any other litigant.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
. The Eleventh Amendment reads as follows:
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.’’
. We have recognized that Congress may abrogate a State’s immunity when it acts under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1996), but not when it acts under its original Article I authority to regulate commerce, id., at 65-66, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252.
. The dissent is mistaken when it claims that applying the Verizon Maryland test would mean two of our cases were “wrongly decided.’’ Post, at 269, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 694 (opinion of Roberts, C. J.). We discuss the first of those cases, Coeur d’Alene Tribe, below. Infra, at 257, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 686. As for the second, Seminole T'ibe, supra, it is inapposite. The reason we refused to permit suit to proceed in that case was that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act created an alternative remedial scheme that would be undermined by permitting Ex parte Young suits; Congress, we said, had foreclosed recourse to the doctrine. See Seminole Tribe, supra, at 73-76, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252.
Respondents now argue—for the first time in this litigation—that the DD and PAIMI Acts have the same effect here. We reject that suggestion. The fact that the Federal Government can exercise oversight of a federal spending program and even withhold or withdraw funds—which are the chief statutory features respondents point to—does not demonstrate that Congress has “displayed an intent not to provide the ‘more complete and more immediate relief’ that would otherwise be available under Ex parte Young." Verizon Maryland, 535 U.S., at 647, 122 S. Ct. 1753, 152 L. Ed. 2d 871 (quoting Seminole Tribe, supra, at 75, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252).
. The dissent compares VOPA’s lawsuit to such indignities as “cannibalism” and “patricide,” since it is a greater “affront to someone’s dignity to be sued by a brother than to be sued by a stranger.” Post, at 274, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 698. We think the dissent’s principle of familial affront less than universally applicable, even with respect to real families, never mind governmental siblings. Most of us would probably prefer contesting a testamentary disposition with a relative to contesting it with a stranger. And confining one’s child to his room is called grounding, while confining a stranger’s child is called kidnaping. Jurisdiction over this case does not depend on which is the most apt comparison.
. The dissent accuses us of circular reasoning, because we “wrongly assum[e] [that] Virginia knew in advance the answer to the question presented in this case.” Ibid. That would be true if we were relying on the Commonwealth’s waiver of sovereign immunity. We are not. We rely upon Ex parte Young. We say that Virginia has only itself to blame for the position in which it finds itself, not because it consented to suit, but because it created a state entity to sue, instead of leaving the task to a private entity. It did not have to know that this would allow suit in federal court. Know or not know, Ex parte Young produces that result.
. The dissent agrees that because of the “ ‘constitutional plan,’ "post, at 272, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 697, n. 3 (quoting McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U.S. 18, 30, 110 S. Ct. 2238, 110 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1990)), this Court can adjudicate disputes between state agencies without offending sovereign immunity. But explaining away exceptions to its theory does not advance the ball. It has not demonstrated that sovereign immunity has anything at all to say about federal courts’ adjudicating interagency disputes.
. We have no occasion to pass on other questions of federalism lurking in this case, such as whether the DD or PAIMI Acts are a proper exercise of Congress’s enumerated powers. As Justice Kennedy observes, whether the Acts run afoul of some other constitutional provision (i.ebesides the Eleventh Amendment) “cannot be permitted to distort the antecedent question of jurisdiction.’’ Post, at 265, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 692 (concurring opinion).
. We think greatly exaggerated the dissent’s concern that, “[g]iven the number of state agencies across the country that enjoy independent litigating authority,’’ today’s decision “could potentially lead to all sorts of litigation in federal courts addressing internal state government disputes.’’ Post, at 275, 179 L. Ed. 2d, at 699. Such litigation cannot occur unless the state agency has been given a federal right of its own to vindicate (as VOPA alleges it has been given under the highly unusual statute at issue here).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
J
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Black
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision in these cases is whether Congress has prohibited the Tennessee Valley Authority from competing in the sale of electricity with respondent, the Kentucky Utilities Company, in two small villages in Claiborne County, Tennessee, and in a narrow corridor between the two villages and the Tennessee-Kentucky state boundary 16 miles away. By § 15d of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, as added by the 1959 amendments to that Act, Congress barred the TVA from expanding its sales outside “the area for which the Corporation [TVA] or its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July , 1957/’1 and our problem is therefore the narrow one of deciding whether these villages and the narrow corridor are part of an “area” for which TYA was the primary source of power on the crucial date. The difficulty lies in determining the location and extent of the “area” to which the statute refers. In June 1957, TVA supplied 62% of the power used in all of Claiborne County, and therefore if the entire county is an “area” within the meaning of the statute, TVA would have been the “primary” source of power, and its expansion into the two villages would be permissible. On the other hand, in the villages themselves, TVA supplied only 6% of the power in June 1957, while respondent supplied 94%; thus if the two villages either alone or with the corridor constitute an “area,” TVA would not have been the primary source of power, and it would be barred by § 15d from expanding into that area.
The question of statutory interpretation now before us arose in this way. TVA is the major supplier of electric power in Tennessee and in many adjoining areas- of Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Virginia, and Kentucky. Respondent, whose service area is centered in Kentucky, has long served customers in Tazewell and New Tazewell, the two villages within 16 miles of the Kentucky border in Claiborne County, Tennessee. The power lines of TVA distributors also crisscross Claiborne County, and TVA has therefore been- able to serve a small number of customers in the two villages, even though respondent was the predominant source of power. Because Kentucky Utilities’ retail rates for electricity in the two villages were approximately 2y2 times higher for typical consumers than the rates for TVA power, the value of residential and commercial properties served by TVA was substantially and uniformly higher than the value of similar properties served by respondent. This rate disparity created a seething discontent among residential and industrial consumers in the villages. Pointing out that they lived in the very heart of the TVA watershed and in immediate proximity to TVA’s large Norris Lake, these citizens contended that it was wholly unjust and inequitable to deny them the benefits and advantages of cheap TVA power. After complaints, planning, and consultations over a period of more than three years, the local governments engaged a contractor to build the facilities necessary to establish a municipal system linked to TVA’s cheap power. Kentucky Utilities’ customers immediately began to discontinue their service and become customers of the municipal system.
Kentucky Utilities then filed this suit against TVA, the mayors of the twb Tazewells, and the Powell Valley Electric Cooperative, a TVA distributor, charging them with conspiracy to destroy its Tazewell business and asking the court to enjoin TVA from supplying power to the new municipal system in alleged violation of § 15d. The District Court upheld the determination of the TVA Board of Directors that the two Tazewells were within TVA’s primary service “area” and dismissed the case, 237 F. Supp. 502 (1964), but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the two villages plus the corridor constituted an “area” and that TVA accordingly was barred from extending its service in the Tazewells. 375 F. 2d 403 (1966). We granted certiorari, 386 U. S. 980 (1967), to resolve this important question in the administration of the TVA Act. We reverse and agree with the District Court that the TVA Board properly determined the relevant service “area” to extend beyond the two Taze-wells and to include the entire county. TVA, as the primary power source within this area, could therefore properly make its low-cost power available to consumers in this entire county area including the two villages.
I.
Before discussing the merits, we shall briefly consider petitioners’ contention that the Kentucky Utilities Company lacks standing to challenge the legality of TVA’s activities. We agree with both the courts below that this contention is without merit. This Court has, it is true, repeatedly held that the economic injury which results from lawful competition cannot, in and of itself, ■confer standing on the injured business to question the legality of any aspect of its competitor’s operations. Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166 (1882); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464 (1938); Tennessee Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U. S. 118 (1939); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113 (1940). But competitive injury provided no basis for standing in the above cases simply because the statutory and constitutional requirements that the plaintiff sought to enforce were in no way concerned with protecting against competitive injury. In contrast, it has been the rule, at least since the Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258 (1924), that when the particular statutory provision invoked does reflect a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest, the injured competitor has standing to require compliance with that provision. See Alton R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 15, 19 (1942); Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U. S. 77, 83 (1958).
Petitioners concede, as of course they must, that one of the primary purposes of the area limitations in § 15d of the Act was to protect private utilities from TYA competition. This is evident from the provision itself and is amply supported by its legislative history. The provision grew out of TVA’s efforts to find some way to meet the cost of new facilities without dependence upon annual appropriations from Congress. In 1955 TVA began to seek authority to issue bonds to finance these expenditures. Although TVA spokesmen assured Congress that the objective was not territorial expansion but only improvement of facilities in TVA’s existing service area, many members of Congress were apprehensive and thought that if congressional budgetary control was to be weakened, some substitute to prevent territorial expansion should be found. A series of bills to give TVA borrowing power failed to pass. Several bills were then introduced combining the grant of borrowing power with various provisions to prohibit territorial expansion, and one of these bills was eventually-enacted as the TYA amendments of 1959. Although discussions of the territorial limitation mentioned a number of policy reasons for the restriction, it is clear and undisputed that protection of private utilities from TVA competition was almost universally regarded as the primary objective of the limitation. Since respondent is thus in the class which § 15d is designed to protect, it has standing under familiar judicial principles to bring this suit, see Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 309 (1944); cf. United States v. ICC, 337 U. S. 426, 433-434 (1949), and no explicit statutory provision is necessary to confer standing.
II.
Basic to our consideration of the merits of these cases is an appraisal of the significance of the TVA Board’s determination that all of Claiborne County, including the two Tazewells, constituted a single “area” in which TYA is the primary source of power. Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals gave no weight whatever to this determination and urge that the finding should instead have been treated like an administrative interpretation by an agency or executive officer, to be set aside only if it is not properly related to the purposes of the statute. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is not altogether clear in dealing with this question, however, and respondent has not attempted to argue here that the Court of Appeals could have decided the matter entirely on its own, without any consideration of the TVA Board’s finding. Rather, respondent appears to agree with petitioners that the determination of the TVA Board is entitled to acceptance unless it lies outside the range of permissible choices contemplated by the statute, and we think this is the proper rule. The initial determination as to the extent of the “area” under § 15d must be made by the TVA Board in every case, since TVA is required under the Act to make power available to public bodies and cooperatives within the permissible area. In making this determination as to the most appropriate boundaries for its service area, the TYA Board will normally evaluate the economic and engineering aspects of providing its service to the customers in question, especially in relation to the particular topography of the affected region. Given the innate and inevitable vagueness of the “area” concept and the complexity of the factors relevant to decision in this matter, we think it is more efficient, and thus more in line with the overall purposes of the Act, for the courts to take the TVA’s “area” determinations as their starting points and to set these determinations aside only when they lack reasonable support in relation to the statutory purpose of controlling, but not altogether prohibiting, territorial expansion. Cf. SEC v. New England Electric, 384 U. S. 176, 185 (1966); Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 109-110 (1904).
III.
Tested by this standard, we think the determination of the TVA Board with respect to Claiborne County should have been upheld by the court below. Neither the language of § 15d, its legislative history, nor any of the economic and technical circumstances of this particular locality suggest that the TVA Board’s determination here exceeded the outer boundaries of choice contemplated in the Act.
Certainly nothing in the language of § 15d (a) itself forecloses the TVA’s present decision. The second paragraph of that section reads:
“Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the Corporation or its distributors from, supplying electric power to any customer within any area in which the Corporation or its distributors had generally established electric service on July 1, 1957, and to which electric service was not being supplied from any other source on the effective date of this Act.”
In light of this provision, respondent argues that even within its “area,” TVA may not extend its services to new customers previously served by a private company. Literally, of course, this language does not establish such a rule. It simply states that when a customer is served by a private utility in this area of generally established service, an area perhaps broader than the “area” of primary service which is controlling under the first paragraph of § 15d (a), the Act may prevent TVA from supplying the customer; other parts of the subsection must be looked to for the actual prohibition. This literal reading, moreover, is the only' appropriate one in light of other provisions of the statute. The first paragraph of § 15d (a) authorizes TVA to provide power not only within its “area” but also within an additional region “extending not more than five miles around the periphery of such area.” This is followed by a proviso denying TVA the right to serve within this additional region any “municipality receiving electric service from another source on or after July 1, 1957.” Since the Act makes the existence of a private supplier an explicit bar to TVA expansion only within the additional region, we cannot read the statute as also making the existence of a private supplier, in and of itself, an automatic bar to expansion in the primary service “area.”
The parties have also called our attention to numerous incidents in the legislative history suggesting that Congress may have regarded the very villages involved in this case as either inside or outside of TVA’s service area. Petitioners note that maps placed before the congressional committees showed the Tazewells as within TVA’s primary service area. Respondent counters that one map submitted to the House Public Works Committee showed the Tazewells as within respondent’s service area. In addition, respondent notes that a “gentlemen’s agreement” between TVA and neighboring private utilities had placed the Tazewells within respondent’s area, and respondent refers to a number of statements indicating that various sponsors of the territorial limitations intended to enact the “gentlemen’s agreement” into law.
We do not find any of this information particularly helpful in resolving the question before us. The maps on which petitioners rely were large-scale representations of TYA’s entire multistate system, and they were submitted to various committees for general reference. Even if all these maps had placed the Tazewells in the same area, it would be artificial in the extreme to assume that Congress actually entertained any specific intention with respect to these small villages in one tiny portion of the county, the State and the map. With respect to the “gentlemen’s agreement,” it is undeniable that many members of Congress did hope to freeze completely the existing situation by enactment of the territorial limitation. Others, the majority of the Senate Public Works Committee in particular, undoubtedly sought to include language that would authorize adjustments and permit a certain amount of elasticity in the availability of TYA service. We think it is sufficient to note, without tracing all the changes in the wording of the territorial limitation, that the language of the Act in its final form is a compromise and that the views of those who sought the most restrictive wording cannot control interpretation of the compromise version.
Finally, we think that apart from the structure of the Act and its legislative history, the facts of the situation in Claiborne County, in Tennessee, and in Kentucky support rather than undercut the TVA Board’s determination. The parties place great stress on the question whether respondent’s service area should be characterized as a “peninsula” attached to its main region of service or as a mere “island” surrounded by TVA territory and therefore more properly subject to TVA intrusion. But we can attribute no controlling significance to such characterizations. The most isolated area of private service will necessarily be connected to the private company’s main area by at least one power fine such as the one present here, and the company may even, as here, serve scattered customers along the line — if indeed the region contains any customers to serve. At the same time a broad area served almost entirely by a private company and contiguous with its main service area may be crisscrossed by the lines of TVA distributors and TVA may even have scattered customers along these lines; the fact that the private company was thus surrounded by TVA might not under this statute justify TVA expansion into the “peninsula” or “island,” whatever it may be, served by private power. In the present cases respondent did serve a substantial number of customers in the corridor between the Tazewells and its main service area in Kentucky, but if a “peninsula,” it was at best a very narrow and tiny one in relation to the possible patterns of power distribution. TVA, on the other hand, served most of the rural areas in Claiborne County and had a substantial minority of the customers in the Tazewells themselves. Under these circumstances, the TVA Board could properly have concluded that the pattern of electric power distribution would be more sensible and efficient if TVA competed in the entire Tazewell municipal area as well as serving the relatively unprofitable rural customers, many of whom were rather close to respondent’s transmission line into the Tazewells. In addition, the Board could have considered the existence of its significant, though not primary, service in the Tazewells themselves as a compelling reason for including these villages in its “area,” since the factors supporting inclusion were in any event significant and since the great disparity of rates in the villages had resulted in significant economic dislocations.
Under all these circumstances we cannot say that the conclusion of the TYA Board in the present cases is incompatible with the “area” concept formulated in the Act. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm that of the District Court.
It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, § 15d (a), 73 Stat. 280, as amended, 73 Stat. 338, 16 U. S. C. §831n-4 (a). The full text of the relevant portion of § 15d (a) is as follows:
“Unless otherwise specifically authorized by Act of Congress the Corporation shall make no contracts for the sale or delivery of power which would have the effect of making the Corporation or its distributors, directly or indirectly, a source of power supply outside the area for which the Corporation or its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957, and such additional area extending not more than five miles around the periphery of such area as may be necessary to care for the growth of the Corporation and its distributors within said area: Provided, however, That such additional area shall not in any event increase by more than 2% per centum (or two thousand square miles, whichever is the lesser) the area for which the Corporation and its distributors were the primary source of power supply on July 1, 1957: And provided further, That no part of such additional area may be in a State not now served by the Corporation or its distributors or in a municipality receiving electric service from another source on or after July 1, 1957, and no more than five hundred square miles of such additional area may be in any one State now served by the Corporation or its distributors.
“Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the Corporation or its distributors from supplying electric power to any customer within any area in which the Corporation or its distributors had generally established electric service on July 1, 1957, and to which electric service was not being supplied from any other source on the effective date of this Act.”
For the owner of an electrically heated home, TVA power might cost $30.50 for a winter month as against $75.53 for the identical amount of power supplied by respondent.
S. 2373, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H. R. 4266, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
S. 1855, S. 1869, S. 1986, S. 2145, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. 931, H. R. 3460, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
One of the Senators active in framing the territorial limitation expressed concern over TVA’s powerful bargaining position with respect to its purchase of coal. See S. Rep. No. 470, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 54 (1959) (supplemental views of Senator Randolph).
See, e. g., id., at 9 (majority report); id., at 54-55 (supplemental views of Senator Randolph); 105 Cong. Rec. 13053 (July 9, 1959) (remarks of Senator Cooper); id., at 13054 (remarks of Senator Holland); id., at 13055 (remarks of Senator Kerr); id., at 13060-13061 (remarks of Senator Randolph); id., at 13061 (remarks of Senator Byrd); hearings on H. R. 3460 before House Committee on Public Works, March 10-11, 1959, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 110, 115 (testimony of Representative Vinson); id., at 122 (testimony of Representative Boykin).
Petitioners’ reliance on Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 96 U. S. App. D. C. 273, 225 F. 2d 924, cert. denied, 350 U. S. 884 (1955), is thus misplaced. The Court in McKay ruled that an explicit statutory provision was necessary to confer standing because of the “long established rule” that an injured competitor cannot sue to enforce statutory requirements not designed to protect competitors. In the case of statutes concerned with protecting competitive interests, the “long established rule” is of course precisely the opposite.
The Court of Appeals stated at one point:
“But, TVA argues, the 1959 Act must be read as committing to its Board of Directors authority to determine 'the area’ in which it was the primary source of power on that date. We find no words in the Act which directly or impliedly delegated to TVA’s Board such authority.” 375 F. 2d, at 412.
Later in its opinion, however, the court suggests that this statement was not intended to deny any role to the Board’s determination:
“We hold that the resolution of the TVA Board did not foreclose the testing of its validity by the District Judge or by this Court on this appeal.” 375 F. 2d, at 415.
See § 12 of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 48 Stat. 65, 16 U. S. C. § 831k.
It should be noted that the agency determination upon which the Court places so much weight was reached at a “special meeting” of the Board of Directors on August 26, 1964, more than eight months after respondent filed its complaint, and only three weeks before trial. One of the staff memoranda upon which the determination was based refers specifically to this litigation. One might have supposed that a determination which was made post litem, motam warranted at least cautious treatment.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Massachusetts courts in this case admitted into evidence affidavits reporting the results of forensic analysis which showed that material seized by the police and connected to the defendant was cocaine. The question presented is whether those affidavits are “testimonial,” rendering the affiants “witnesses” subject to the defendant’s right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.
I
In 2001, Boston police officers received a tip that a Kmart employee, Thomas Wright, was engaging in suspicious activity. The informant reported that Wright repeatedly received phone calls at work, after each of which he would be picked up in front of the store by a blue sedan, and would return to the store a short time later. The police set up surveillance in the Kmart parking lot and witnessed this precise sequence of events. When Wright got out of the car upon his return, one of the officers detained and searched him, finding four clear white plastic bags containing a substance resembling cocaine. The officer then signaled other officers on the scene to arrest the two men in the car — one of whom was petitioner Luis Melendez-Diaz. The officers placed all three men in a police cruiser.
During the short drive to the police station, the officers observed their passengers fidgeting and making furtive movements in the back of the car. After depositing the men at the station, they searched the police cruiser and found a plastic bag containing 19 smaller plastic bags hidden in the partition between the front and back seats. They submitted the seized evidence to a state laboratory required by law to conduct chemical analysis upon police request. Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 111, §12 (West 2006).
Melendez-Diaz was charged with distributing cocaine and with trafficking in cocaine in an amount between 14 and 28 grams. Ch. 94C, §§32A, 32E(b)(1). At trial, the prosecution placed into evidence the bags seized from Wright and from the police cruiser. It also submitted three “certificates of analysis” showing the results of the forensic analysis performed on the seized substances. The certificates reported the weight of the seized bags and stated that the bags “[h]a[ve] been examined with the following results: The substance was found to contain: Cocaine.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a, 26a, 28a. The certificates were sworn to before a notary public by analysts at the State Laboratory Institute of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, as required under Massachusetts law. Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 111, § 13.
Petitioner objected to the admission of the certificates, asserting that our Confrontation Clause decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004), required the analysts to testify in person. The objection was overruled, and the certificates were admitted pursuant to state law as “prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of the narcotic... analyzed.” Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 111, § 13.
The jury found Melendez-Diaz guilty. He appealed, contending, among other, things, that admission of the certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The Appeals Court of Massachusetts rejected the claim, affirmance order, 69 Mass. App. 1114, 870 N. E. 2d 676, 2007 WL 2189152, *4, n. 3 (July 31, 2007), relying on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Verde, 444 Mass. 279, 283-285, 827 N. E. 2d 701, 705-706 (2005), which held that the authors of certificates of forensic analysis are not subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Judicial Court denied review. 449 Mass. 1113, 874 N. E. 2d 407 (2007). We granted certiorari. 552 U. S. 1256 (2008).
II
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 403 (1965), provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” In Crawford, after reviewing the Clause’s historical underpinnings, we held that it guarantees a defendant’s right to confront those “who ‘bear testimony’ ” against him. 541 U. S., at 51. A witness’s testimony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id., at 54.
Our opinion described the class of testimonial statements covered by the Confrontation Clause as follows:
“Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist: ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent — that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; extrajudicial statements... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” Id., at 51-52 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
There is little doubt that the documents at issue in this case fall within the “core class of testimonial statements” thus described. Our description of that category mentions affidavits twice. See also White v. Illinois, 502 U. S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions”). The documents at issue here, while denominated by Massachusetts law “certificates,” are quite plainly affidavits: “declaration[s] of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.” Black’s Law Dictionary 62 (8th ed. 2004). They are incontrovertibly a “ ‘solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’ ” Crawford, supra, at 51 (quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). The fact in question is that the substance found in the possession of Melendez-Diaz and his codefendants was, as the prosecution claimed, cocaine — the precise testimony the analysts would be expected to provide if called at trial. The “certificates” are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing “precisely what a witness does on direct examination.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S. 813, 830 (2006) (emphasis deleted).
Here, moreover,, not only were the affidavits “ ‘made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,’” Crawford, supra, at 52, but under Massachusetts law the sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide “prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight” of the analyzed substance, Mass., Gen. Laws, ch. 111, §13. We can safely assume that the analysts were aware of the affidavits’ evidentiary purpose, since that purpose — as stated in the relevant state-law provision — was reprinted on the affidavits themselves. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a, 27a, 29a.
In short, under our decision in Crawford the analysts’ affidavits were testimonial statements, and the analysts were “witnesses” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Absent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to “‘be confronted with’ ” the analysts at trial. Crawford, supra, at 54.
III
Respondent and the dissent advance a potpourri of analytic arguments in an effort to avoid this rather straightforward application of our holding in Crawford. Before addressing them, however, we must assure the reader of the falsity of the dissent’s opening alarum that we are “sweeping] away an accepted rule governing the admission of scientific evidence” that has been “established for at least 90 years” and “extends across at least 35 States and six Federal Courts of Appeals.” Post, at 330.
The vast majority of the state-court cases the dissent cites in support of this claim come not from the last 90 years, but from the last 30, and not surprisingly nearly all of them rely on our decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980), or its since-rejected theory that unconfronted testimony was admissible as long as it bore indicia of reliability, id., at 66. See post, at 357-358. As for the six Federal Courts of Appeals cases cited by the dissent, five of them postdated and expressly relied on Roberts. See post, at 349-350. The sixth predated Roberts but relied entirely on the same erroneous theory. See Kay v. United States, 255 F. 2d 476, 480-481 (CA4 1958) (rejecting Confrontation Clause challenge “where there is reasonable necessity for [the evidence] and where... the evidence has those qualities of reliability and trustworthiness”).
A review of cases that predate the Roberts era yields a mixed picture. As the dissent notes, three State Supreme Court decisions from the early 20th century denied confrontation with respect to certificates of analysis regarding a substance’s alcohol content. See post, at 349 (citing cases from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia). But other state courts in the same era reached the opposite conclusion. See Torres v. State, 113 Tex. Crim. 1, 2-4, 18 S. W. 2d 179, 180 (1929); Volrich v. State, 4 Ohio L. Abs. 253 (App. 1925) (per curiam). At least this much is entirely clear: In faithfully applying Crawford to the facts of this case, we are not overruling 90 years of settled jurisprudence. It is the dissent that seeks to overturn precedent by resurrecting Roberts a mere five years after it was rejected in Crawford.
We turn now to the various legal arguments raised by respondent and the dissent.
A
Respondent first argues that the analysts are not subject to confrontation because they are not “accusatory” witnesses, in that they do not directly accuse petitioner of wrongdoing; rather, their testimony is inculpatory only when taken together with other evidence linking petitioner to the contraband. See Brief for Respondent 10. This finds no support in the text of the Sixth Amendment or in our case law.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” (Emphasis added.) To the extent the analysts were witnesses (a question resolved above), they certainly provided testimony against petitioner, proving one fact necessary for his conviction — that the substance he possessed was cocaine. The contrast between the text of the Confrontation Clause and the text of the adjacent Compulsory Process Clause confirms this analysis. While the Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses “against him,” the Compulsory Process Clause guarantees a defendant the right to call witnesses “in his favor.” U. S. Const., Arndt. 6. The text of the Amendment contemplates two classes of witnesses — those against the defendant and those in his favor. The prosecution must produce the former; the defendant may call the latter. Contrary to respondent’s assertion, there is not a third category of witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune from confrontation.
It is often, indeed perhaps usually, the ease that an adverse witness’s testimony, taken alone, will not suffice to convict. Yet respondent fails to cite a single case in which such testimony was admitted absent a defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine. Unsurprisingly, since such a holding would be contrary to longstanding case law. In Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47 (1899), the Court considered Kirby’s conviction for receiving stolen property, the evidence for which consisted, in part, of the records of conviction of three individuals who were found guilty of stealing the relevant property. Id., at 53. Though this evidence proved only that the property was stolen, and not that Kirby received it, the Court nevertheless ruled that admission of the records violated Kirby’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id., at 55. See also King v. Turner, 1 Mood. 347, 168 Eng. Rep. 1298 (1832) (confession by one defendant to having stolen certain goods could not be used as evidence against another defendant accused of receiving the stolen property).
B
Respondent and the dissent argue that the analysts should not be subject to confrontation because they are not “conventional” (or “typical” or “ordinary”) witnesses of the sort whose ex parte testimony was most notoriously used at the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. Post, at 343-345; Brief for Respondent 28. It is true, as the Court recognized in Crawford, that ex parte examinations of the sort used at Raleigh’s trial have “long been thought a paradigmatic confrontation violation.” 541 U. S., at 52. But the paradigmatic case identifies the core of the right to confrontation, not its limits. The right to confrontation was not invented in response to the use of the ex parte examinations in Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603). That use provoked such an outcry precisely because it flouted the deeply rooted common-law tradition “of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing.” Crawford, supra, at 43 (citing 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 373-374 (1768)). See also Crawford, supra, at 43-47.
In any case, the purported distinctions respondent and the dissent identify between this case and Sir Walter Raleigh’s “conventional” accusers do not survive scrutiny. The dissent first contends that a “conventional witness recalls events observed in the past, while an analyst’s report contains near-contemporaneous observations of the test.” Post, at 345. It is doubtful that the analyst’s reports, in this case could be characterized as reporting “near-contemporaneous observations”; the affidavits were completed almost a week after the tests were performed. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a-29a (the tests were performed on November 28, 2001, and the affidavits sworn on December 4, 2001). But regardless, the dissent misunderstands the role that “near-contemporaneity” has played in our case law. The dissent notes that that factor was given “substantial weight” in Davis, post, at 345, but in fact that decision disproves the dissent’s position. There the Court considered the admissibility of statements made to police officers responding to a report of a domestic disturbance. By the time officers arrived the assault had ended, but the victim’s statements — written and oral — were sufficiently close in time to the alleged assault that the trial court admitted her affidavit as a “present sense impression.” 547 U. S., at 820 (internal quotation marks omitted). Though the witness’s statements in Davis were “near-contemporaneous” to the events she reported, we nevertheless held that they could not.be admitted absent an opportunity to confront the witness. Id., at 830.
A second reason the dissent contends that the analysts are not “conventional witnesses” (and thus not subject to confrontation) is that they “observe[d] neither the crime nor any human action related to it.” Post, at 345. The dissent provides no authority for this particular limitation of the type of witnesses subject to confrontation. Nor is it conceivable that all witnesses who fit this description would be outside the scope of the Confrontation Clause. For example, is a police officer’s investigative report describing the crime scene admissible absent an opportunity to examine the officer? The dissent’s novel exception from coverage of the Confrontation Clause would exempt all expert witnesses — a hardly “unconventional” class of witnesses.
A third respect in which the dissent asserts that the analysts are not “conventional” witnesses and thus not subject to confrontation is that their statements were not provided in response to interrogation. Post, at 345-346. See also Brief for Respondent 29. As we have explained, “[t]he Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.” Davis, supra, at 822-823, n. 1. Respondent and the dissent cite no authority, and we are aware of none, holding that a person who volunteers his testimony is any less a “ 'witness against’ the defendant,” Brief for Respondent 26, than one who is responding to interrogation. In any event, the analysts’ affidavits in this case were presented in response to a police request. See Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 111, §§ 12-13. If an affidavit submitted in response to a police officer’s request to “write down what happened” suffices to trigger the Sixth Amendment’s protection (as it apparently does, see Davis, 547 U. S., at 819-820; id., at 840, n. 5 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)), then the analysts’ testimony should be subject to confrontation as well.
C
Respondent claims that there is a difference, for Confrontation Clause purposes, between testimony recounting historical events, which is “prone to distortion or manipulation,” and the testimony at issue here, which is the “resul[t] of neutral, scientific testing.” Brief for Respondent 29. Relatedly, respondent and the dissent argue that confrontation of forensic analysts would be of little value because “one would not reasonably expect a laboratory professional... to feel quite differently about the results of his scientific test by having to look at the defendant.” Id., at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted); see post, at 339.
This argument is little more than an invitation to return to our overruled decision in Roberts, 448 U. S. 56, which held that evidence with “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” was admissible notwithstanding the Confrontation Clause. Id., at 66. What we said in Crawford in response to that argument remains true:
“To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination....
“Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.” 541 U. S., at 61-62.
Respondent and the dissent may be right that there are other ways — and in some cases better ways — to challenge or verify the results of a forensic test. But the Constitution guarantees one way: confrontation. We do not have license to suspend the Confrontation Clause when a preferable trial strategy is available.
Nor is it evident that what respondent calls “neutral scientific testing” is as neutral or as reliable as respondent suggests. Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation. According to a recent study conducted under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, “[t]he majority of [laboratories producing forensic evidence] are administered by law enforcement agencies, such as police departments, where the laboratory administrator reports to the head of the agency.” National Research Council of the National Academies, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 183 (2009) (hereinafter National Academy Report). And “[b]ecause forensic scientists often are driven in their work by a need to answer a particular question related to the issues of a particular case, they sometimes face pressure to sacrifice appropriate methodology for the sake of expediency.” Id., at 23-24. A forensic analyst responding to a request from a law enforcement official may feel pressure — or have an incentive — to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution.
Confrontation,is one means of ensuring accurate forensic analysis. While it is true, as the dissent notes, that an honest analyst will not alter his testimony when forced to confront the defendant, post, at 339, the same cannot be said of the fraudulent analyst. See Brief for National Innocence Network as Amicus Curiae 15-17 (discussing cases of documented “drylabbing” where forensic analysts report results of tests that were never performed); National Academy Report 44-48 (discussing documented cases of fraud and error involving the use of forensic evidence). Like the eyewitness who has fabricated his account to the police, the analyst who provides false results may, under oath in open court, reconsider his false testimony. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U. S. 1012, 1019 (1988). And, of course, the prospect of confrontation will deter fraudulent analysis in the first place.
Confrontation is designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well. Serious deficiencies have been found in the forensic evidence used in criminal trials. One commentator asserts that “[t]he legal community now concedes, with varying degrees of urgency, that our system produces erroneous convictions based on discredited forensics.” Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 475, 491 (2006). One study of cases in which exonerating evidence resulted in the overturning of criminal convictions concluded that invalid forensic testimony contributed to the convictions in 60% of the cases. Garrett & Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1, 14 (2009). And the National Academy Report concluded:
“The forensic science system, encompassing both research and practice, has serious problems that can only be addressed by a national commitment to overhaul the current structure that supports the forensic science community in this country.” National Academy Report, at xx.
Like expert witnesses generally, an analyst’s lack of proper training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed in cross-examination.
This case is illustrative. The affidavits submitted by the analysts contained only the bare-bones statement that “[t]he substance was found to contain: Cocaine.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a, 26a, 28a. At the time of trial, petitioner did not know what tests the analysts performed, whether those tests were routine, and whether interpreting their results required the exercise of judgment or the use of skills that the analysts may not have possessed. While we still do not know the precise tests used by the analysts, we are told that the laboratories use “methodology recommended by the Scientific Working Group for the Analysis of Seized Drugs,” App. to Brief for Petitioner la-2a. At least some of that methodology requires the exercise of judgment and presents a risk of error that might be explored on cross-examination. See 2 P. Giannelli & E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence §23.03[c], pp. 532-533, and ch. 23A, p. 607 (4th ed. 2007) (identifying four “critical errors” that analysts may commit in interpreting the results of the commonly used gas chromatography/mass spectrometry analysis); Shellow, The Application of Daubert to the Identification of Drugs, 2 Shepard’s Expert & Scientific Evidence Quarterly 593, 600 (1995) (noting that while spectrometers may be equipped with computerized matching systems, “forensic analysts in crime laboratories typically do not utilize this feature of the instrument, but rely exclusively on their subjective judgment”).
The same is true of many of the other types of forensic evidence commonly used in criminal prosecutions. “[T]here is wide variability across forensic science disciplines with regard to techniques, methodologies, reliability, types and numbers of potential errors, research, general acceptability, and published material.” National Academy Report 6-7. See also id., at 138-139, 142-143, 154-155 (discussing problems of subjectivity, bias, and unreliability of common forensic tests such as latent fingerprint analysis, pattern/ impression analysis, and toolmark and firearms analysis). Contrary to respondent’s and the dissent’s suggestion, there is little reason to believe that confrontation will be useless in testing analysts’ honesty, proficiency, and methodology— the features that are commonly the focus in the cross-examination of experts.
D
Respondent argues that the analysts’ affidavits are admissible without confrontation because they are “akin to the types of official and business records admissible at common law.” Brief for Respondent 35. But the affidavits do not qualify as traditional official or business records, and even if they did, their authors would be subject to confrontation nonetheless.
Documents kept in the regular course of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their hearsay status. See Fed. Rule Evid. 803(6). But that is not the case if the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial. Our decision in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109 (1943), made that distinction clear. There we held that an accident report provided by an employee of a railroad company did not qualify as a business record because, although kept in the regular course of the railroad’s operations, it was “calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the business.” Id., at 114. The analysts’ certificates — like police reports generated by law enforcement officials — do not qualify as business or public records for precisely the same reason. See Rule 803(8) (defining public records as “excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel”).
Respondent seeks to rebut this limitation by noting that at common law the results of a coroner’s inquest were admissible without an opportunity for confrontation. But as we have previously noted, whatever the status of coroner’s reports at common law in England, they were not accorded any special status in American practice. See Crawford, 541 U. S., at 47, n. 2; Giles v. California, 554 U. S. 353, 399-400 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Note, Evidence — Official Records — Coroner’s Inquest, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 290 (1917).
The dissent identifies a single class of evidence which, though prepared for use at trial, was traditionally admissible: a clerk’s certificate authenticating an official record — or a copy thereof — for use as evidence. See post, at 347. But a clerk’s authority in that regard was narrowly circumscribed. He was permitted “to certify to the correctness of a copy of a record kept in his office,” but had “no authority to furnish, as evidence for the trial of a lawsuit, his interpretation of what the record contains or shows, or to certify to its substance or effect.” State v. Wilson, 141 La. 404, 409, 75 So. 95, 97 (1917). See also State v. Champion, 116 N. C. 987, 988-989, 21 S. E. 700, 700-701 (1895); 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence §1678 (3d ed. 1940). The dissent suggests that the fact that this exception was “‘narrowly circumscribed’” makes no difference. See post, at 348. To the contrary, it makes all the difference in the world. It shows that even the line of cases establishing the one narrow exception the dissent has been able to identify simultaneously vindicates the general rule applicable to the present case. A clerk could by affidavit authenticate or provide a copy of an otherwise admissible record, but could not do what the analysts did here: create a record for the sole purpose of providing evidence against a defendant.
Far more probative here are those cases in which the prosecution sought to admit into evidence a clerk’s certificate attesting to the fact that the clerk had searched for a particular relevant record and failed to find it. Like the testimony of the analysts in this case, the clerk’s statement would serve as substantive evidence against the defendant whose guilt depended on the nonexistence of the record for which the clerk searched. Although the clerk’s certificate would qualify as an official record under respondent’s definition — it was prepared by a public officer in the regular course of his official duties — and although the clerk was certainly not a “conventional witness” under the dissent’s approach, the clerk was nonetheless subject to confrontation. See People v. Bromwich, 200 N. Y. 385, 388-389, 93 N. E. 933, 934 (1911); People v. Goodrode, 132 Mich. 542, 547, 94 N. W. 14, 16 (1903); Wigmore, supra, § 1678.
Respondent also misunderstands the relationship between the business-and-official-records hearsay exceptions and the Confrontation Clause. As we stated in Crawford: “Most of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial — for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.” 541 U. S., at 56. Business and public records are generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules, but because — having been created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial — they are not testimonial. Whether or not they qualify as business or official records, the analysts’ statements here — prepared specifically for use at petitioner’s trial — were testimony against petitioner, and the analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.
E
Respondent asserts that we should find no Confrontation Clause violation in this case because petitioner had the ability to subpoena the analysts. But that power — whether pursuant to state law or the Compulsory Process Clause— is no substitute for the right of confrontation. Unlike the Confrontation Clause, those provisions are of no use to the defendant when the witness is unavailable or simply refuses to appear. See, e. g., Davis, 547 U. S., at 820 (“[The witness] was subpoenaed, but she did not appear at... trial”). Converting the prosecution’s duty under the Confrontation Clause into the defendant’s privilege under state law or the Compulsory Process Clause shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows from the State to the accused. More fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court. Its value to the defendant is not replaced by a system in which the prosecution presents its evidence via ex parte affidavits and waits for the defendant to subpoena the affiants if he chooses.
F
Finally, respondent asks us to relax the requirements of the Confrontation Clause to accommodate the “'necessities of trial and the adversary process.’ ” Brief for Respondent 59. It is not clear whence we would derive the authority to do so. The Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause — like those other constitutional provisions — is binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience.
We also doubt the accuracy of respondent’s and the dissent’s dire predictions. The dissent, respondent, and its amici highlight the substantial total number of controlled-substance analyses performed by state and federal laboratories in recent years. But only some of those tests are implicated in prosecutions, and only a small fraction of those cases actually proceed to trial. See Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae 7-8 (nearly 95% of convictions in state and federal courts are obtained via guilty plea).
Perhaps the best indication that the sky will not fall after today’s decision is that it has not done so already. Many States have already adopted the constitutional rule we announce today, while many others permit the defendant to assert (or forfeit by silence) his Confrontation Clause right after receiving notice of the prosecution’s intent to use a' forensic analyst’s report, id., at 13-15 (cataloging such state laws). Despite these widespread practices, there is no evidence that the criminal justice system has ground to a halt in the States that, one way or another, empower a defendant to insist upon the analyst’s appearance at trial. Indeed, in Massachusetts itself, a defendant may subpoena the analyst to appear at trial, see Brief for Respondent 57, and yet there is no indication that obstructionist defendants are abusing the privilege.
The dissent finds this evidence “far less reassuring than promised.” Post, at 356. But its doubts rest on two flawed premises. First, the dissent believes that those state statutes “requiring the defendant to give early notice of his intent to confront the analyst” are “burden-shifting statutes [that] may be invalidated by the Court’s reasoning.” Post, at 350, 356. That is not so. In their simplest form, notice- and-demand statutes require the prosecution to provide notice to the defendant of its intent to use an analyst’s report as evidence at trial, after which the defendant is given a period of time in which he may object to the admission of the evidence absent the analyst’s appearance live at trial. See, e. g., Ga. Code Ann. § 35-3-154.1 (2006); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 38.41, §4 (Vernon 2005); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2925.51(0 (Lexis 2006). Contrary to the dissent’s perception, these statutes shift no burden whatever. The defendant always has the burden of raising his Confrontation Clause objection; notice-and-demand statutes simply govern the time within which he must do so. States are free to adopt procedural rules governing objections. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 86-87 (1977). It is common to require a defendant to exercise his rights under the Compulsory Process Clause in advance of trial, announcing his intent to present certain witnesses. See Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 12.1(a), (e), 16(b)(1)(C); Comment, Alibi Notice Rules: The Preclusion Sanction as Procedural Default, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 254, 254-255, 281-285 (1984) (discussing and cataloging state notice-of-alibi rules); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 411 (1988); Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 81-82 (1970). There is no conceivable reason why he cannot similarly be compelled to exercise his Confrontation Clause rights before trial. See Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P. 3d 662, 670 (Colo. 2007) (discussing and approving Colorado’s notice-and-demand provision). Today’s decision will not disrupt criminal prosecutions in the many large States whose practice is already in accord with the Confrontation Clause.
Second, the dissent notes that several of the state-court
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA or Act) departs from the general rule that each party to a lawsuit pays his or her own legal fees. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 257 (1975). Relevant here, EAJA authorizes the payment of fees to a prevailing party in an action against the United States; the Government may defeat this entitlement by showing that its position in the underlying litigation “was substantially justified.” 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). In a further provision, § 2412(d)(1)(B), the Act prescribes the timing and content of applications seeking fees authorized by § 2412(d)(1)(A). Section 2412(d)(1)(B) specifies as the time for filing the application “within thirty days of final judgment in the action.” In the same sentence, the provision identifies the application’s contents, in particular, a showing that the applicant is a “prevailing party” who meets the financial eligibility condition (in this case, a net worth that “did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the... action was filed,” § 2412(d)(2)(B)); and a statement of the amount sought, with an accompanying itemization. The fee application instruction adds in the next sentence: “The [applicant] shall also allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified.”
Petitioner Randall C. Scarborough was the prevailing party in an action against the Department of Veterans Affairs for disability benefits. His counsel filed a timely application for fees showing Scarborough’s “eligibility] to receive an award” and “the amount sought, including [the required] itemized statement.” § 2412(d)(1)(B). But counsel failed initially to allege, in addition, that “the position of the United States was not substantially justified.” Pointing to that omission, the Government moved to dismiss the fee application. Scarborough’s counsel immediately filed an amended application adding that the Government’s opposition to the underlying claim for benefits “was not substantially justified.” In the interim between the initial filing and the amendment, however, the 30-day fee application filing period had expired. For that sole reason, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the application and the Federal Circuit affirmed that disposition.
Scarborough’s petition for certiorari presents this question: May a timely fee application, pursuant to § 2412(d), be amended after the 30-day filing period has run to cure an initial failure to allege that the Government’s position in the underlying litigation lacked substantial justification? We hold that a curative amendment is permissible and that Scarborough’s fee application, as amended, qualifies for consideration and determination on the merits.
I
A
Congress enacted EAJA, Pub. L. 96-481, Tit. II, 94 Stat. 2325, in 1980 “to eliminate the barriers that prohibit small businesses and individuals from securing vindication of their rights in civil actions and administrative proceedings brought by or against the Federal Government.” H. R. Rep. No. 96-1005, p. 9; see Congressional Findings and Purposes, 94 Stat. 2325, note following 5 U. S. C. § 504 (“It is the purpose of this title... to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action....”). Among other reforms, EAJA amended 28 U. S. C. §2412, which previously had authorized courts to award costs, but not attorney’s fees and expenses, to prevailing parties in civil litigation against the United States. EAJA added two new prescriptions to §2412 that expressly authorize attorney’s fee awards against the Federal Government. First, § 2412(b) made the United States liable for attorney’s fees and expenses “to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.” Second, § 2412(d) rendered the Government liable for a prevailing private party’s attorney’s fees and expenses in cases in which suit would lie only against the United States or an agency of the United States. This case concerns the construction of § 2412(d).
Congress initially adopted § 2412(d) for a trial period of three years, Pub. L. 96-481, § 204(c); in 1985, Congress substantially reenacted the measure, this time without a sunset provision, Pub. L. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183. See id., § 6(b)(2), 99 Stat. 186. Congress’ aim, in converting § 2412(d) from a temporary measure to a permanent one, was “to ensure that certain individuals, partnerships, corporations... or other organizations will not be deterred from seeking review of, or defending against, unjustified governmental action because of the expense involved.” H. R. Rep. No. 99-120, p. 4.
Section 2412(d) currently provides, in relevant part:
“(d)(1)(A) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a),[] incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort),... brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
“(B) A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney or expert witness... stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified.”
Section 2412(d)(1)(A) thus entitles a prevailing party to fees absent a showing by the Government that its position in the underlying litigation “was substantially justified,” while § 2412(d)(1)(B) sets a deadline of 30 days after final judgment for the filing of a fee application and directs that the application shall include: (1) a showing that the applicant is a prevailing party; (2) a showing that the applicant is eligible to receive an award (in Scarborough’s case, that the applicant’s “net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed,” § 2412(d)(2)(B)); and (3) a statement of the amount sought together with an itemized account of time expended and rates charged. The second sentence of § 2412(d)(1)(B) adds a fourth instruction, requiring the applicant simply to “allege” that the position of the United States was not substantially justified.
B
On July 9, 1999, petitioner Scarborough, a United States Navy veteran, prevailed before the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) on a claim for disability benefits. App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a-44a. Eleven days later, Scarborough’s counsel applied, on Scarborough’s behalf, for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to § 2412(d). App. 4-5. Scarborough himself would gain from any fee recovery because his lawyer’s statutory contingent fee, ordinarily 20% of the veteran’s past-due benefits, 38 U. S. C. § 5904(d)(1), would be reduced dollar for dollar by an EAJA award. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, 106 Stat. 4513, Fee Agreements, note following 28 U. S. C. §2412; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6.
The Clerk of the CAVC returned Scarborough’s initial fee application on the ground that it was filed too soon. App. 6-7. After the CAVC issued a judgment noting that the time for filing postdecision motions had expired, Scarborough’s counsel filed a second EAJA application (the one at issue here) setting forth, as did the first application, that Scarborough was the prevailing party in the underlying litigation; that his net worth did not exceed $2 million; and a description of work counsel performed for Scarborough since counsel’s retention in August 1998. Id., at 8-9. The application requested $19,333.75 in attorney’s fees and $117.80 in costs. Id., at 9. Scarborough’s applications, both the first and the second, failed to allege “that the position of the United States [in the underlying litigation] was not substantially justified,” § 2412(d)(1)(B). In all other respects, it is not here disputed, Scarborough’s filings met the § 2412(d)(1)(B) application-content requirements.
Again, the Clerk of the CAVC found the application premature, but this time retained it, unfiled, until the time to appeal the CAVC’s judgment had expired. The Clerk then filed the fee application and notified the respondent Secretary of Veterans Affairs that his response was due within 30 days. Id., at 10. After receiving and exhausting a 30-day extension of time to respond, the Secretary moved to dismiss the fee application. Id., at 2. The CAVC lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to award fees under § 2412(d), the Secretary maintained, because Scarborough’s counsel had failed to allege, within 30 days of the final judgment, “that the position of the United States was not substantially justified,” § 2412(d)(1)(B). CAVC Record, Doc. 12, pp. 4-5.
Scarborough’s counsel promptly filed an amendment to the fee application, stating in a new paragraph that “the government’s defense of the Appellant’s claim was not substantially justified.” App. 11. Simultaneously, Scarborough opposed the Secretary’s motion to dismiss, urging that the omission initially to plead “no substantial justification” could be cured by amendment and was not a jurisdictional defect. CAVC Record, Doc. 13, pp. 1-2. On June 14, 2000, the CAVC dismissed Scarborough’s fee application on the ground asserted by the Government. Scarborough v. West, 13 Vet. App. 530 (per curiam).
A year-and-a-half later, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. 273 F. 3d 1087 (2001). EAJA must be construed strictly in favor of the Government, the Court of Appeals stated, because the Act effects a partial waiver of sovereign immunity, rendering the United States liable for attorney’s fees when the Government otherwise would not be required to pay. Id., at 1089-1090. In the court’s view, “[t]he language of the EAJA statute is plain and unambiguous”; it requires a party seeking fees under § 2412(d) to submit an application, including all enumerated allegations, within the 30-day time, limit. Id., at 1090 (citing § 2412(d)(1)(B)). The court acknowledged that the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Eleventh Circuits read § 2412(d)(1)(B) to require only that the fee application be filed within 30 days; those Circuits allow later amendments to perfect the application-content specifications set out in § 2412(d)(1)(B). Id., at 1090-1091 (citing Dunn v. United States, 775 F. 2d 99, 104 (CA3 1985) (applicant need not submit within 30 days an itemized statement accounting for the amount sought), and Singleton v. Apfel, 231 F. 3d 853, 858 (CA11 2000) (applicant need not allege within 30 days that her net worth did not exceed $2 million or that the Government’s position was not substantially justified)).
The Federal Circuit also distinguished its own decision in Bazalo v. West, 150 F. 3d 1380 (1998), which had held that an applicant may supplement an EAJA application to cure an initial failure to show eligibility for fees. The applicant in Bazalo had failed to allege and establish, within the 30-day period, that he was a qualified “party” within the meaning of § 2412(d), i.e., that his “net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed,” § 2412(d)(2)(B). Id., at 1381. Bazalo differed from Scarborough’s case, the Court of Appeals said, because the Bazalo applicant had essentially complied with the basic pleading requirements and simply needed to “fles[h] out... the details.” 273 F. 3d, at 1092.
We granted Scarborough’s initial petition for a writ of cer-tiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case in light of this Court’s decision in Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U. S. 106 (2002). See 536 U. S. 920 (2002). Edelman concerned an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulation relating to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the regulation allowed amendment of an employment discrimination charge, timely filed with the EEOC, to add, after the filing deadline had passed, the required, but initially absent, verification. See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(b) (requiring charges to “be in writing under oath or affirmation”). We upheld the regulation. Title VII, we explained, in line with “a long history of practice,” 535 U. S., at 116, permitted “relation back” of a verification missing from an original filing, id., at 115-118.
On remand of Scarborough’s case to the same Federal Circuit panel, two of the three judges adhered to the panel’s unanimous earlier decision and distinguished Edelman. 319 F. 3d 1346 (2003). Unlike the civil rights statute in Edel-man, the Court of Appeals majority said, a “remedial scheme” in which laypersons often initiate the process, EAJA is directed to attorneys, who do not need “paternalistic protection.” 319 F. 3d, at 1353 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Federal Circuit’s majority further observed that the two requirements at issue in Edelman — the timely filing of a discrimination charge and the verification of that charge — appear in separaté statutory provisions. In contrast, EAJA’s 30-day filing deadline and the contents required for a fee application are detailed in the same statutory provision. 319 F. 3d, at 1353. The majority also distinguished Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U. S. 757 (2001), in which we held that a pro se litigant’s failure to hand sign a timely filed notice of appeal is a nonjurisdietional, and therefore curable, defect. This Court had noted in Becker, the Federal Circuit majority pointed out, that the timing and signature requirements there at issue were found in separate rules. See 319 F. 3d, at 1353. The Federal Circuit’s opinion next distinguished Edelman’s verification requirement and Becker’s signature requirement from EAJA’s no-substantial-justification-allegation requirement on this additional ground: “[The]... substantial justification [allegation] is not a pro forma requirement,” for it “requires an applicant to analyze the case record” and “is one portion of the basis of the award itself.” 319 F. 3d, at 1353. Reiterating that the no-substantial-justification allegation is “jurisdictional,” the Federal Circuit held that Scarborough’s “[n]oncompliance [was] fatal” and dismissed the application. Id., at 1355.
Chief Judge Mayer dissented. The no-substantial-justification allegation, he found, “is akin to the verification requirement of Edelman and the signature requirement of Becker.” Id., at 1356. In addition to the pathmarking Edelman and Becker decisions, he regarded this case as “substantially the same case as Bazalo. ” 319 F. 3d, at 1356. In light of EAJA’s purpose “to eliminate the financial disincentive for those who would defend against unjustified governmental action and thereby deter it,” Chief Judge Mayer concluded, “it is apparent that Congress did not intend the EAJA application process to be an additional deterrent to the vindication of rights because of a missing averment.” Ibid.
We granted certiorari, 539 U. S. 986 (2003), in view of the division of opinion among the Circuits on the question whether an EAJA application may be amended, outside the 30-day period, to allege that the Government’s position in the underlying litigation was not substantially justified, compare Singleton, 231 F. 3d 853, with 319 F. 3d 1346. We now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II
A
We clarify, first, that the question before us — whether Scarborough is time barred by § 2412(d)(1)(B) from gaining the fee award authorized by § 2412(d)(1)(A) — does not concern the federal courts’ “subject-matter jurisdiction.” Rather, it concerns a mode of relief (costs including legal fees) ancillary to the judgment of a court that has plenary “jurisdiction of [the civil] action” in which the fee application is made. See §§ 2412(b) and (d)(1)(A) (costs including fees awardable “in any civil action” brought against the United States “in any court having jurisdiction of [that] action”); 38 U. S. C. § 7252(a) (“The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals.”). More particularly, the current dispute between Scarborough and the Government presents a question of time. The issue is not whether, but when, §§ 2412(d)(1)(A) and (B) require a fee applicant to “allege that the position of the United States was not substantially justified.” As we recently observed:
“Courts, including this Court,... have more than occasionally [mis]used the term ‘jurisdictional’ to describe emphatic time prescriptions in [claim processing] rules.... Classifying time prescriptions, even rigid ones, under the heading ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ can be confounding. Clarity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the label ‘jurisdictional’ not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 454-455 (2004) (citation, some internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
In short, § 2412(d)(1)(B) does not describe what “classes of cases,” id., at 455, the CAVC is competent to adjudicate; instead, the section relates only to postjudgment proceedings auxiliary to cases already within that court’s adjudicatory authority. Accordingly, as Kontrick indicates, the provision’s 30-day deadline for fee applications and its application-content specifications are not properly typed “jurisdictional.”
B
We turn next to the reason why Congress required the fee applicant to “allege” that the Government’s position “was not substantially justified,” § 2412(d)(1)(B). Unlike the § 2412(d)(1)(B) prescriptions on what the applicant must show (his “prevailing party” status and “eligibility] to receive an award,” and “the amount sought, including an itemized statement” reporting “the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed”), the required “not substantially justified” allegation imposes no proof burden on the fee applicant. It is, as its text conveys, nothing more than an allegation or pleading requirement. The burden of establishing “that the position of the United States was substantially justified,” § 2412(d)(1)(A) indicates and courts uniformly have recognized, must be shouldered by the Government. See, e. g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U. S. 552, 567 (1988); id., at 575 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Davidson v. Veneman, 317 F. 3d 503, 506 (CA5 2003); Lauer v. Barnhart, 321 F. 3d 762, 764 (CA8 2003); Libas, Ltd. v. United States, 314 F. 3d 1362, 1365 (CA Fed. 2003). See also H. R. Rep. No. 96-1005, at 10 (“[T]he strong deterrents to contesting Government action that currently exis[t] require that the burden of proof rest with the Government.”).
Congress did not, however, want the “substantially justified” standard to “be read to raise a presumption that the Government position was not substantially justified simply because it lost the case....” Ibid. By allocating the burden of pleading “that the position of the United States was not substantially justified” — and that burden only — to the fee applicant, Congress apparently sought to dispel any assumption that the Government must pay fees each time it loses. Complementarily, the no-substantial-justification-allegation requirement serves to ward off irresponsible litigation, i. e., unreasonable or capricious fee-shifting demands. As counsel for the Government stated at oral argument, allocating the pleading burden to fee applicants obliges them “to examine the Government’s position and make a determination... whether it is substantially justified or not.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 31; see id., at 19 (petitioner recognizes that “the purpose of this allegation [is to make] a lawyer think twice”). So understood, the applicant’s burden to plead that the Government’s position “was not substantially justified” is'akin to the signature requirement in Becker and the oath or affirmation requirement in Edelman.
In Becker, a pro se litigant had typed, but had neglected to hand sign, his name, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a), on his timely filed notice of appeal. 532 U. S., at 760-761, 763; see supra, at 411-412. Although we called the rules on the timing and content of notices of appeal “linked jurisdictional provisions,” Becker, 532 U. S., at 765 (referring to Fed. Rules App. Proc. 3 and 4), we concluded that a litigant could add the signature required by Rule 11(a) even after the time for filing the notice had expired, 532 U. S., at 766-767. Rule 11(a), we observed, provides that “omission of the signature” on any “pleading, written motion, [or] other paper” may be “corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.” See 532 U. S., at 764. Permitting a late signature to perfect an appeal, we explained, was hardly pathbreaking, for “[o]ther opinions of this Court are in full harmony with the view that imperfections in noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment', to which appellate court.” Id., at 767-768 (citing Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 245, 248-249 (1992), and Foman v. Davis, 371 U. S. 178, 181 (1962)).
The next Term, in Edelman, we described our decision in Becker as having allowed “relation back” of the late signature to the timely filed notice of appeal. 535 U. S., at 116. Edelman involved an EEOC regulation permitting a Title VII discrimination charge timely filed with the agency to be amended, outside the charge-filing period, to include an omitted, but required, verification. Id., at 109; see supra, at 411. “There is no reason,” we observed in sustaining the regulation, “to think that relation back of the oath here is any less reasonable than relation back of the signature in Becker. Both are aimed at stemming the urge to litigate irresponsibly....” 535 U. S., at 116.
Becker and Edelman inform our judgment in this case. Like the signature and verification requirements, EAJA’s ten-word “not substantially justified” allegation is a “think twice” prescription that “stem[s] the urge to litigate irresponsibly,” Edelman, 535 U. S., at 116; at the same time, the allegation functions to shift the burden to the Government to prove that its position in the underlying litigation “was substantially justified,” § 2412(d)(1)(A). We note, too, that the allegation does not serve an essential notice-giving function; the Government is aware, from the moment a fee application is filed, that to defeat the application on the merits, it will have to prove its position “was substantially justified.” As Becker indicates, the lapse here “should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists about who is applying] [for fees], from what judgment, to which... court.” 532 U. S., at 767. Moreover, because Scarborough’s lawyer’s statutory contingent fee would be reduced dollar for dollar by an EAJA award, see 38 U. S. C. § 5904(d)(1); Fee Agreements, note following 28 U. S. C. § 2412, allowing the curative amendment benefits the complainant directly, and is not fairly described as simply a boon for his counsel. Permitting amendment thus advances Congress’ purpose, in enacting EAJA, to reduce the “emphasi[s], virtually to the exclusion of all other issues, [on] the cost of potential litigation” in a party’s decision whether to challenge unjust governmental action. H. R. Rep. No. 96-1005, at 7.
The Government, however, maintains that the relation-back regime, as now codified in Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is out of place in this context, for that Rule governs “pleadings,” a term that does not encompass fee applications. Brief for Respondent 21; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(c)(2) (permitting relation back of amendments to pleadings when “the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original [timely filed] pleading”). See also Rule 7(a) (enumerating permitted “pleadings”). Scarborough acknowledges that Rule 15(c) itself is directed to federal district court “pleadings,” but urges that this Court has approved application of the relation-back doctrine in analogous settings. Brief for Petitioner 28. Most recently, as just related, we applied the doctrine in Becker and Edelman to, respectively, a notice of appeal and an EEOC discrimination charge, neither of which is a “pleading” under the Federal Rules. As the Government concedes, moreover, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-36, “relation back” was not an invention of the federal rulemakers. We applied the doctrine well before 1938, the year the Federal Rules became effective. See, e. g., New York Central & Hudson River R. Co. v. Kinney, 260 U. S. 340, 346 (1922); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Renn, 241 U. S. 290, 293-294 (1916); Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U. S. 570, 575-576 (1913). With a view to then-existing practice, the original Rules Advisory Committee described “relation back” as “a well recognized doctrine.” Advisory Committee’s 1937 Note on Subd. (c) of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 686. Commentators have observed that the doctrine Rule 15(c) embraces “has its roots in the former federal equity practice and a number of state codes.” 6A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1496, p. 64 (2d ed. 1990).
The relation-back doctrine, we accordingly hold, properly guides our determination that Scarborough’s fee application could be amended, after the 30-day filing period, to include the “not substantially justified” allegation: The amended application “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth” in the initial application. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 15(c)(2). Just as failure initially to verify a charge or sign a “pleading, written motion, [or] other paper,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11(a), was not fatal to the petitioners’ cases in Edelman and Becker, so here, counsel’s initial omission of the assertion that the Government’s position lacked substantial justification is not beyond repair.
C
The Government insists most strenuously that §2412’s waiver of sovereign immunity from liability for fees is conditioned on the fee applicant’s meticulous compliance with each and every requirement of § 2412(d)(1)(B) within 30 days of final judgment. Brief for Respondent 18-19; Tr. of Oral Arg. 28, 31; see Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129, 137 (1991) (“EAJA renders the United States liable for attorney’s fees for which it would otherwise not be liable, and thus amounts to a partial waiver of sovereign immunity.”). In the Government’s view, a failure to allege that the position of the United States “was not substantially justified” before the 30-day clock has run is as fatal as an omission of any other § 2412(d)(1)(B) specification. Brief for Respondent 15; Tr. of Oral Arg. 45.
We observe, first, that the Federal Circuit’s reading of § 2412(d)(1)(B) is not as unyielding as the Government’s. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has held that a fee application may be amended, out of time, to show that the applicant “is eligible to receive an award,” § 2412(d)(1)(B). See Bazalo, 150 F. 3d, at 1383-1384 (amendment made after 30-day filing period cured failure initially to establish that fee applicant’s net worth did not exceed $2 million). As earlier noted, see supra, at 412, the dissenting judge in Scarborough’s case found Bazalo indistinguishable. 319 F. 3d, at 1355-1356 (opinion of Mayer, C. J.).
Our decisions in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 (1990), and Franconia Associates v. United States, 536 U. S. 129 (2002), are enlightening on this issue. Irwin involved an untimely filed Title VII employment discrimination complaint against the Government. Although the petitioner had missed the filing deadline, we held that Title VII’s statutory time limits are subject to equitable tolling, even against the Government. 498 U. S., at 95. Similarly, in Franconia, we rejected an “unduly restrictive” construction of the statute of limitations for claims filed against the United States under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491. See 536 U. S., at 145 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); ibid, (refusing to adopt “special accrual rule” for commencement of limitations period against the Government).
In those decisions, we recognized that “limitations principles should generally apply to the Government fin the same way that’ they apply to private parties.” Ibid, (quoting Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95). Once Congress waives sovereign immunity, we observed, judicial application of a time prescription to suits against the Government, in the same way the prescription is applicable to private suits, “amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver.” Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95. We further stated in Irwin that holding the Government responsible “is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative intent as well as a practically useful principle of interpretation.” Ibid.
The Government nevertheless maintains that Irwin and Franconia do not bear on this case, for “[§] 2412(d) authorizes fee awards against the government under rules that have no analogue in private litigation.” Brief for Respondent 39. But it is hardly clear that Irwin demands a precise private analogue. Litigation against the United States exists because Congress has enacted legislation creating rights against the Government, often in matters peculiar to the Government’s engagements with private persons — matters, such as the administration of benefit programs. Because many statutes that create claims for relief against the United States or its agencies apply only to Government defendants, Irwin’s reasoning would be diminished were it instructive only in situations with a readily identifiable private-litigation equivalent.
In any event, § 2412(d) is analogous to other fee-shifting provisions abrogating the general rule that each party to a lawsuit pays his own legal fees. The provision resembles “prevailing party” fee-shifting statutes that are applicable to suits between private litigants. See, e. g., 15 U. S. C. § 1692k(a)(3) (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act); 29 U. S. C. § 2617(a)(3) (Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993); 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(k) (Title VII); cf. Franconia, 536 U. S., at 145 (comparing Tucker Act statute of limitations to “contemporaneous state statutes of limitations applicable to suits between private parties [that] also tie the commencement of the limitations period to the date a claim ‘first accrues’”).
We note, finally, that the Government has never argued that it will be prejudiced if Scarborough’s “not substantially justified” allegation is permitted to relate back to his timely filed fee application. Moreover, a showing of prejudice should preclude operation of the relation-back doctrine in the first place. See Singleton, 231 F. 3d, at 858 (“The interests of the government and the courts will be served, however, if district courts are empowered to... outright deny a request to supplement [a fee application] if the government would be prejudiced.”). In addition, EAJA itself has a built-in check: Section 2412(d)(1)(A) disallows fees where “special circumstances make an award unjust.” See H. R. Rep. No. 96-1418, p. 11 (1980) (§2412(d)(l)(A)’s “safety valve” gives “the court discretion to deny awards where equitable considerations dictate an award should not be made”). Our conclusion that a timely filed EAJA fee application may be amended, out of time, to allege “that the position of the United States was
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
F
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
The joint motion for entry of stipulated judgment and decree, as modified, is granted.
STIPULATED JUDGMENT, AS MODIFIED
1. New Mexico has been in violation of Article IV(b) of the Canadian River Compact from 1987 to date.
2. Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the Decree entered in this case, New Mexico shall release from Ute Reservoir in 1993 sufficient water to result in an aggregate of not more than 200,000 acre-feet of conservation storage below Conchas Dam in New Mexico, including conservation storage in the other reservoirs subject to the limitation under Article IV(b) of the Canadian River Compact. The release of water from Ute Reservoir will be coordinated with Oklahoma and Texas and will be at the call of Texas.
3. New Mexico shall also release from Ute Reservoir an additional 25,000 acre-feet of storage below the Article IV(b) limitation. New Mexico shall operate Ute Reservoir through the year 2002 at or below the elevations set forth in the schedule below and in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 8 of the Decree entered in this case. The schedule includes annual adjustments for sediment accumulation in Ute Reservoir and assumes the other reservoirs subject to the Article IV(b) limitation maintain storage at their total capacity of 6,760 acre-feet. The schedule shall be adjusted by the parties to reflect additional amounts of water in conservation storage in any reservoir enlarged or constructed after 1992. Releases of water from Ute Reservoir will be coordinated with Oklahoma and Texas and will be at the call of Texas.
Ute Reservoir Operating Schedule
Reduced Corresponding Authorized Storage Reduced Year Elevation Amount Elevation
After release in 1993 3781.58 25,000 3777.86
1994 3781.66 25,000 3777.95
1995 3781.74 25,000 3778.04
1996 3781.83 25,000 3778.14
1997 3781.91 25,000 3778.23
1998 3781.99 20,000 3779.08
1999 3782.08 15,000 3779.91
2000 3782.16 6,250 3781.28
2001 3782.24 3,125 3781.80
Refilled in 2002 3782.32 -0- 3782.32
4. Within 75 days after entry of judgment New Mexico shall pay as attorney’s fees $200,000 to Texas and $200,000 to Oklahoma. The parties agree that such payments do not constitute and shall not be considered as an admission, express or implicit, that New Mexico has any liability to Texas or Oklahoma for attorney’s fees.
5. Oklahoma and Texas shall release New Mexico from all claims for equitable or legal relief, other than the relief embodied in the Decree of the parties, arising out of New Mexico’s violation of the Canadian River Compact during the years 1987 through the date this Stipulated Judgment is entered.
6. In the event of a conflict between this Judgment and the Decree entered in this case, the provisions of the Judgment shall control.
7. The costs of this case shall be equally divided among the parties.
DECREE, AS MODIFIED
1. Under Article IV(a) of the Canadian River Compact (Compact), New Mexico is permitted free and unrestricted use of the waters of the Canadian River and its tributaries in New Mexico above Conchas Dam, such use to be made above or at Conchas Dam, including diversions for use on the Tucumcari Project and the Bell Ranch and the on-project storage of return flow or operational waste from those two projects so long as the recaptured water does not include the mainstream or tributary flows of the Canadian River; provided that transfers of water rights from above Conchas Dam to locations below Conchas Dam shall be subject to the conservation storage limitation of Compact Article IV(b). Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to determine whether or not the place of use of water rights may be transferred to locations outside the Canadian River basin in New Mexico.
2. Under Compact Article IV(b), New Mexico is limited to storage of no more than 200,000 acre-feet of the waters of the Canadian River and its tributaries, regardless of point of origin, at any time in reservoirs in the Canadian River basin in New Mexico below Conchas Dam for any beneficial use, exclusive of water stored for the exempt purposes specified in Compact Article 11(d) and on-project storage of irrigation return flows or operational waste on the Tucumcari Project and Bell Ranch as provided for in Paragraph 1 of this Decree.
3. Quantities of water stored primarily for flood protection, power generation, or sediment control are not chargeable as conservation storage under the Compact even though incidental use is made of such waters for recreation, fish and wildlife, or other beneficial uses not expressly mentioned in the Compact. In situations where storage may be for multiple purposes, including both conservation storage and exempt storage, nothing in this Decree shall preclude the Canadian River Commission (Commission) from exempting an appropriate portion of such storage from chargeability as conservation storage.
4. Water stored at elevations below a dam’s lowest permanent outlet works is not chargeable as conservation storage under the Compact unless the primary use of that storage is for a nonexempt purpose, or unless other means, such as pumps, are utilized to discharge such storage volumes from the reservoir. No change in the location of a dam’s lowest permanent outlet works to a higher elevation shall provide the basis for a claim of exempt status for all water stored below the relocated outlet works without prior approval of the Commission, which shall not be unreasonably withheld. Water stored for nonexempt purposes behind a dam with capacity in excess of 100 acre-feet and with no outlet works is chargeable as conservation storage.
5. Future designation or redesignation of storage volumes for flood control, power production, or sediment control purposes must receive prior Commission approval to be exempt from chargeability as conservation storage, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.
6. All water stored in Ute Reservoir above elevation 3,725 feet is conservation storage; provided that at such time as the authorization and funding of the Eastern New Mexico Water Supply Project or other project results in changed circumstances at Ute Reservoir, New Mexico may seek exemption of a reasonable portion of such water from the Commission under Paragraph 5 of this Decree and, if an exemption is denied, may petition the Court for appropriate relief under Paragraph 11 of this Decree.
7. In 1988 there were 63 small reservoirs in New Mexico with capacities of 100 acre-feet or less with a total capacity of about 1,000 acre-feet, which the Commission has treated as de minimis by waiving storage volume reporting obligations. Water stored in these reservoirs or in similarly sized reservoirs in the future is not chargeable as conservation storage, unless otherwise determined by the Commission.
8. Based on the elevation-capacity relationship of Ute Reservoir effective January 1, 1993, and adjustments pursuant to Paragraph 9 of this Decree, New Mexico shall make and maintain appropriate releases of water from Ute Reservoir or other conservation storage facilities in excess of 100 acre-feet of capacity at the maximum rate consistent with safe operation of such reservoirs so that total conservation storage in the Canadian River basin below Conchas Dam in New Mexico is limited to no more than 200,000 acre-feet at any time; provided that operation of Ute Reservoir for the period 1993-2002 shall be pursuant to the schedule contained in the Judgment entered in this case; and provided that no violation of this paragraph will occur during any period in which the outlet works of Ute Reservoir are discharging water at the maximum safe discharge capacity (currently 350 cubic feet per second) following the first knowledge that the 1993-2002 schedule or the Article IV(b) limitation after 2002 probably would be exceeded; and provided further that Texas shall be notified by New Mexico prior to a release and may allow New Mexico to retain water in conservation storage in excess of the 1993-2002 schedule or the Article IV(b) limitation after 2002, subject to the call of Texas and subject to the provisions of Article V of the Compact. The outlet works of Ute Reservoir shall be maintained in good working order and shall not be modified to reduce the safe discharge capacity without prior approval of the Commission, which shall not be unreasonably withheld.
9. Sediment surveys of Ute Reservoir shall be conducted at least every 10 years by New Mexico, unless such requirement is waived by the Commission. Conservation storage in Ute Reservoir shall be determined from the most recent sediment survey and an annual estimate of the total additional sediment deposition in the reservoir using an annual average of sediment accumulation during the period between 1963 and the most recently completed survey.
10. Nothing in this Decree is intended to affect a State’s rights or obligations under the Compact, except as specifically addressed herein.
11. The Court retains jurisdiction of this suit for the purposes of any order, direction, or modification of this Decree, or any supplementary decree, that may at any time be deemed proper in relation to the subject matter in controversy; provided, that any party requesting the Court to exercise its jurisdiction under this paragraph or answering such request shall certify that it has attempted to negotiate in good faith with the other parties in an effort to resolve the dispute sought to be brought before the Court.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
K
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1981 petitioner Kraft General Foods, Inc. (Kraft), operated a unitary business throughout the United States and in several foreign countries. Because part of its business was conducted in Iowa, Kraft was subject to the Iowa Business Tax on Corporations. At issue in this case is Iowa’s inclusion in the tax base of the dividends that Kraft received from six subsidiaries, each of which was incorporated and conducted its business in a foreign country. While Iowa taxes the dividends that a corporation receives from its foreign subsidiaries, Iowa does not tax dividends received from domestic subsidiaries. The question presented is whether the disparate treatment of dividends from foreign and from domestic subsidiaries violates the Foreign Commerce Clause.
I
The Iowa statute uses the federal definition of “net income” with certain adjustments. For federal tax purposes, corporations are generally allowed a deduction for dividends received from domestic subsidiaries. As the earnings of the domestic subsidiaries, themselves, are subject to federal taxation, this deduction avoids a second federal tax on those earnings. The Federal Government generally does not tax the earnings of foreign subsidiaries, and the dividends paid by foreign subsidiaries are not deductible. The parent corporation, however, does receive a credit for the foreign taxes paid on the dividends and on the underlying foreign earnings. Like the deduction for domestic subsidiary dividends, the foreign tax credit is intended to mitigate multiple taxation of corporate earnings.
In following the federal scheme for the calculation of taxable income, Iowa allows a deduction 'for dividends received from domestic subsidiaries, but not for those received from foreign subsidiaries. Iowa does not directly tax the income of a subsidiary unless the subsidiary, itself, does business in Iowa. Thus, if a domestic subsidiary transacts business in Iowa, its income is taxed, but if it does not do business in Iowa, neither its income nor the dividends paid to its parent are taxed. In the ease of the foreign subsidiary doing business abroad, Iowa does not tax the corporate income,'but does tax the dividends paid to the parent. Unlike the Federal Government, Iowa does not allow a credit for taxes paid to foreign countries. See 465 N. W. 2d 664, 665 (Iowa 1991).
In computing its taxable income on its 1981 Iowa return, Kraft deducted foreign subsidiary dividends, notwithstanding contrary provisions of Iowa law. Respondent Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance (Iowa) assessed a defi-cieney. After its administrative protest was denied, Kraft challenged the assessment in Iowa courts, alleging that the disparate treatment of domestic and foreign subsidiary dividends violated the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution. The Iowa Supreme Court rejected the Commerce Clause claim because petitioner failed to demonstrate “that Iowa businesses receive a commercial advantage over foreign commerce due to Iowa’s taxing scheme.” Id., at 668. In considering Kraft’s challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, the court found that Iowa’s use of the federal formula for calculation of taxable income was convenient both for the taxpayer and for the State. Concluding that the Iowa statute was rationally related to the goal of administrative efficiency, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the statute did not violate equal protection. Id., at 669. We granted certiorari. 502 U. S. 1056 (1992).
II
The principal dispute between the parties concerns whether, on its face, the Iowa statute discriminates against foreign commerce. It is indisputable that the Iowa statute treats dividends received from foreign subsidiaries less favorably than dividends received from domestic subsidiaries. Iowa includes the former, but not the latter, in the calculation of taxable income. While admitting that the two kinds of dividends are treated differently, Iowa and its amici advance several arguments in support of the proposition that this differential treatment does not constitute prohibited discrimination against foreign commerce.
Amicus United States notes that a subsidiary’s place of incorporation does not necessarily correspond to the locus of its business operations. A domestic corporation might do business abroad, and its dividends might reflect earnings from its foreign activity. Conversely, a foreign corporation might do business in the United States, with its dividend payments reflecting domestic business operations. On this basis, the United States contends that the disparate treatment of dividends from foreign and domestic subsidiaries does not translate into discrimination based on the location or nature of business activity and is thus not prohibited by the Commerce Clause.
We recognize that the domicile of a corporation does not necessarily establish that it is engaged in either foreign or domestic commerce. In this case, however, it is stipulated that the foreign subsidiaries did, in fact, operate in foreign commerce and, further, that the decision to do business abroad through foreign subsidiaries is typically supported by legitimate business reasons. By its nature, a unitary business is characterized by a flow of value among its components. See Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S. 159, 178 (1983). The flow of value between Kraft and its foreign subsidiaries clearly constitutes foreign commerce; this flow includes the foreign subsidiary dividends, which, as Iowa acknowledges, themselves constitute foreign commerce.
Moreover, through the interplay of the federal and Iowa tax statutes, the applicability of the Iowa tax necessarily depends not only on the domicile of the subsidiary, but also on the location of the subsidiary’s business activities. The Federal Government generally taxes the income that a foreign corporation earns in the United States. To avoid multiple taxation, the Government allows a deduction for foreign subsidiary dividends that reflect such domestic earnings. In adopting the federal pattern, Iowa also allows a deduction for dividends received from a foreign subsidiary if the dividends reflect business activity in the United States. Accordingly, while the dividends of all domestic subsidiaries are excluded from the Iowa tax base, the dividends of foreign subsidiaries are excluded only to the extent they reflect domestic earnings. In sum, the only subsidiary dividend payments taxed by Iowa are those reflecting the foreign business activity of foreign subsidiaries. We do not think that this discriminatory treatment can be justified on the ground that some of the (untaxed) dividend payments from domestic subsidiaries also reflect foreign earnings.
In a related argument, Iowa and amicus United States assert that Kraft could conduct its foreign business through domestic subsidiaries instead of foreign subsidiaries or, alternatively, could set up a domestic company to hold the stock of the foreign subsidiaries and receive the foreign dividend payments. In either case, Kraft, itself, would receive no dividends from foreign subsidiaries and would thus avoid paying Iowa tax on income attributable to the foreign operations. Iowa and the United States contend that these alternatives further demonstrate that it is not foreign commerce, but, at most, a particular form of corporate organization that is burdened.
This argument is not persuasive. Whether or not the suggested methods of tax avoidance would be practical as a business matter, and whether or not they might generate adverse tax consequences in other jurisdictions, we do not think that a State can force a taxpayer to conduct its foreign business through a domestic subsidiary in order to avoid discriminatory taxation of foreign commerce. Cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U. S. 869, 878-879 (1985). We have previously found that the Commerce Clause is not violated when the differential tax treatment of two categories of companies "results solely from differences between the nature of their businesses, not from the location of their activities.” Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, N. J. Dept. of Treasury, 490 U. S. 66, 78 (1989). We find no authority for the different proposition advanced here that a tax that does discriminate against foreign commerce may be upheld if a taxpayer could avoid that discrimination by changing the domicile of the corporations through which it conducts its business. Our cases suggest the contrary. See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U. S. 388, 406 (1984); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 72 (1963).
Repeating the argument that prevailed in the Iowa Supreme Court, Iowa next insists that its tax system does not violate the Commerce Clause because it does not favor local interests. To the extent corporations do business in Iowa, an apportioned share of their entire corporate income is subject to Iowa tax. In the case of a foreign subsidiary doing business abroad, Iowa would tax the dividends paid to the domestic parent, but would not tax the subsidiary’s earnings. Summarizing this analysis, Iowa asserts: “More earnings of the domestic subsidiary, which has income producing activities in Iowa, than earnings of the foreign subsidiary, which has no Iowa activities, are included in the preapportioned net income base for the unitary business as a whole.” Brief for Respondent 19. Far from favoring local commerce, Iowa argues, the tax system places additional burdens on Iowa businesses.
We agree that the statute does not treat Iowa subsidiaries more favorably than subsidiaries located elsewhere. We are not persuaded, however, that such favoritism is an essential element of a violation of the Foreign Commerce Clause. In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U. S. 434 (1979), we concluded that the constitutional prohibition against state taxation of foreign commerce is broader than the protection afforded to interstate commerce, id., at 445-446, in part because matters of concern to the entire Nation are implicated, id., at 448-451. Like the Import-Export Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause recognizes that discriminatory treatment of foreign commerce may create problems, such as the potential for international retaliation, that concern the Nation as a whole. Id., at 450. So here, we think that a State’s preference for domestic commerce over foreign commerce is inconsistent with the Commerce Clause even if the State’s own economy is not a direct beneficiary of the discrimination. As the absence of local benefit does not eliminate the international implications of the discrimination, it cannot exempt such discrimination from Commerce Clause prohibitions.
Iowa and amicus United States also assert the stronger claim that Iowa’s tax system does not favor business activity in the United States generally over business activity abroad. If true, this would indeed suggest that the statute does not discriminate against foreign commerce. We are not convinced, however, that this description adequately characterizes the relevant features of the Iowa statute. It is true that if a subsidiary were located in another State, its earnings would be subject to taxation by the Federal Government and by the other State (assuming that the State was one of the great majority that impose a corporate income tax). This state and federal tax burden might exceed the sum of the foreign tax that a foreign subsidiary would pay and the tax that Iowa collects on dividends received from a foreign subsidiary. But whatever the tax burdens imposed by the Federal Government or by other States, the fact remains that Iowa imposes a burden on foreign subsidiaries that it does not impose on domestic subsidiaries. We have no reason to doubt the assertion of the United States that “[i]n evaluating the alleged facial discrimination effected by the Iowa tax, it is not proper to ignore the operation of other provisions of the same statute.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14, n. 19 (emphasis added). We find no authority, however, for the principle that discrimination against foreign commerce can be justified if the benefit to domestic subsidiaries might happen to be offset by other taxes imposed not by Iowa, but by other States and by the Federal Government.
Finally, Iowa insists that even if discrimination against foreign commerce does result, the statute is valid because it is intended to promote administrative convenience rather than economic protectionism. Iowa contends that the adoption of the federal definition of “taxable income,” which includes foreign subsidiary dividends, provides significant advantages both to the taxpayers and to the taxing authorities. Taxpayers may compute their Iowa tax easily based on their federal calculations, and the Iowa authorities may rely on federal regulations and interpretations and may take advantage of federal efforts to monitor taxpayer compliance. See 465 N. W. 2d, at 669.
We do not minimize the value of having state forms and auditing procedures replicate federal practice. Absent a compelling justification, however, a State may not advance its legitimate goals by means that facially discriminate against foreign commerce. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U. S. 617, 626-628 (1978); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 148, n. 19 (1986). In this instance, Iowa could enjoy substantially the same administrative benefits by utilizing the federal definition of taxable income, while making adjustments that avoid the discriminatory treatment of foreign subsidiary dividends. Many other States have adopted this approach. It is apparent, then, that this is not a case in which the State’s goals “cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.” New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 278 (1988). Even if such adjustments would diminish the administrative benefits of adopting federal definitions, this marginal loss in convenience would not constitute the kind of serious health and safety concern that we have sometimes found sufficient to justify discriminatory state legislation. Cf. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S., at 151; Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U. S. 941, 956-957 (1982).
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Iowa need not adopt the federal definition of taxable income. Nor, having chosen to follow the federal system in part, must Iowa duplicate that scheme in all respects. The adoption of the federal system in whole or in part, however, cannot shield a state tax statute from Commerce Clause scrutiny. The Iowa statute cannot withstand this scrutiny, for it facially discriminates against foreign commerce and therefore violates the Foreign Commerce Clause.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.'
Iowa Code §422.32 et seq. (1981).
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 29a. Kraft owned capital stock representing more than 80% of the voting power and of the total value of the subsidiaries. Ibid.
“The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations-” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8.
See Iowa Code §422.35 (1981).
See 26 U.S.C. §243.
See 465 N. W. 2d 664, 665 (Iowa 1991); B. Bittker & J. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders ¶ 5.05 (5th ed. 1987).
See 26 U. S. C. §§901, 902. Instead of taking the credit, the corporation may elect to deduct the foreign tax withheld on dividends from foreign subsidiaries. See § 164. The taxpayer may not take both the credit and the deduction. See § 275(a)(4). The credit is almost always more valuable to the taxpayer. See 3 B. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶ 69.14 (2d ed. 1991).
See United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 493 U. S. 132, 139 (1989); American Chicle Co. v. United States, 316 U. S. 450, 452 (1942); see also Bittker & Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders ¶ 17.11.
Iowa is not a State that taxes an apportioned share of the entire income of a unitary business, without regard for formal corporate lines. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37; cf. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U. S. 159, 164-169 (1983).
At oral argument, counsel for Kraft offered the following illustration: “If an Iowa parent company had a Kentucky subsidiary, [that] did all its business in Kentucky, and another subsidiary that did all its business in Germany, Iowa would not tax the income of either of those subsidiaries. If each paid a dividend to the Iowa parent, Iowa would tax the German dividends and would not tax the Kentucky dividends.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 47-48.
If in calculating its federal tax liability, a taxpayer elects to deduct foreign tax withheld on foreign subsidiary dividends, a taxpayer may also deduct these tax payments in calculating its Iowa taxes. Electing the deduction, then, allows the taxpayer to reduce, but not eliminate, the Iowa tax on foreign subsidiary dividends. In the relevant year, Kraft elected to take the foreign tax credit, see 465 N. W. 2d, at 666, and thus could not deduct the foreign taxes in computing its federal or Iowa taxable income, see n. 7, supra.
See 465 N. W. 2d, at 666.
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a.
“No state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U. S. Const., Arndt. 14, § 1.
The parties stipulated as follows:
“Domestic Corporations typically do business in foreign countries through corporations organized in the country in which they are doing business for a variety of reasons. Reasons include, but are not limited to, the requirements of the local country, a better ability to limit their liability in that country, the marketing advantage of being perceived by customers as a local company, greater ease in repatriating funds, greater ease in borrowing funds locally, and ability to own property and manufacture in that country.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 30a-31a.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 24,35.
See 26 U. S. C. §882.
See §246.
The dissent presents the example of a subsidiary incorporated in a foreign country, but engaged in business exclusively in the United States. The dissent doubts whether a dividend payment from such a subsidiary is properly characterized as "foreign commerce.” Post, at 85. As discussed above, however, a dividend payment from such a subsidiary would not be taxed by Iowa. Iowa taxes foreign subsidiary dividends only to the extent that they reflect foreign earnings. The dissent does not dispute that this kind of dividend payment does constitute "foreign commerce.” Post, at 84.
In Amerada Hess, we rejected the contention that a New Jersey tax violated the Commerce Clause because it “discriminate])!] against oil producers who market their oil in favor of independent retailers who do not produce oil.” 490 U. S., at 78.
“No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws . . . .” U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
Corporate income is taxed by 45 States and by the District of Columbia. See 1 J. Hellerstein, State Taxation: Corporate Income and Franchise Taxes ¶ 1.6 (1983).
If one were to compare the aggregate tax imposed by Iowa on a unitary business which included a subsidiary doing business throughout the United States (including Iowa) with the aggregate tax imposed by Iowa on a unitary business which included a foreign subsidiary doing business abroad, it would be difficult to say that Iowa discriminates against the business with the foreign subsidiary. Iowa would tax an apportioned share of the domestic subsidiary’s entire earnings, but would tax only the amount of the foreign subsidiary’s earnings paid as a dividend to the parent.
In considering claims of discriminatory taxation under the Commerce Clause, however, it is necessary to compare the taxpayers who are "most similarly situated.” Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64, 71 (1963). A corporation with a subsidiary doing business in Iowa is not situated similarly to a corporation with a subsidiary doing business abroad. In the former case, the Iowa operations of the subsidiary provide an independent basis for taxation not present in the case of the foreign subsidiary. A more appropriate comparison is between corporations whose subsidiaries do not do business in Iowa.
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 74a-75a.
Having concluded that the Iowa statute violates the Foreign Commerce Clause, we do not reach Kraft's challenge to the statute under the Equal Protection Clause.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Respondent was convicted in November 1974 by a New York state-court jury on two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder. After trial, respondent moved to vacate his conviction pursuant to §330.30 of the N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law (McKinney 1971) (CPL), and a hearing on his motion was held pursuant to CPL §330.40. The hearing was held before the justice who presided at respondent’s trial, and the motion to vacate was denied by him in an opinion concluding “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the events giving rise to the motion did not influence the verdict. People v. Phillips, 87 Misc. 2d 613, 614, 630, 384 N. Y. S. 2d 906, 907-908, 918 (1975). The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Judicial Department, affirmed the conviction without opinion. 52 App. Div. 2d 758, 384 N. Y. S. 2d 715 (1976). The New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. 39 N. Y. 2d 949, 352 N. E. 2d 894 (1976).
Some four years after the denial of leave to appeal by the Court of Appeals, respondent sought federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on the same ground which had been asserted in the state post-trial hearing. The District Court granted the writ, 485 F. Supp. 1365 (1980), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on a somewhat different ground. 632 F. 2d 1019 (1980). We granted certio-rari to consider the important questions of federal constitutional law in relation to federal habeas proceedings raised by these decisions. 450 U. S. 909 (1981). We now reverse.
I
A
Respondent’s original motion to vacate his conviction was based on the fact that a juror in respondent’s case, one John Dana Smith, submitted during the trial an application for employment as a major felony investigator in the District Attorney’s Office. Smith had learned of the position from a friend who had contacts within the office and who had inquired on Smith’s behalf without mentioning Smith’s name or the fact that he was a juror in respondent’s trial. When Smith’s application was received by the office, his name was placed on a list of applicants but he was not then contacted and was not known by the office to be a juror in respondent’s trial.
During later inquiry about the status of Smith’s application, the friend mentioned that Smith was a juror in respondent’s case. The attorney to whom the friend disclosed this fact promptly informed his superior, and his superior in turn informed the Assistant District Attorney in charge of hiring investigators. The following day, more than one week before the end of respondent’s trial, the assistant informed the two attorneys actually prosecuting respondent that one of the jurors had applied to the office for employment as an investigator.
The two prosecuting attorneys conferred about the application but concluded that, in view of Smith’s statements during voir dire, there was no need to inform the trial court or defense counsel of the application. They did instruct attorneys in the office not to contact Smith until after the trial had ended, and took steps to insure that they would learn no information about Smith that had not been revealed during voir dire. When the jury retired to deliberate on November 20th, three alternate jurors were available to substitute for Smith, and neither the trial court nor the defense counsel knew of his application. The jury returned its verdict on November 21st.
The District Attorney first learned of Smith’s application on December 4th. Five days later, after an investigation to verify the information, he informed the trial court and defense counsel of the application and the fact that its existence was known to attorneys in his office at some time before the conclusion of the trial. Respondent’s attorney then moved to set aside the verdict.
At the hearing before the trial judge, Justice Harold Birns, the prosecuting attorneys explained their decision not to disclose the application and Smith explained that he had seen nothing improper in submitting the application during the trial. Justice Bims, “[f]rom all the evidence adduced” at the hearing, 87 Mise. 2d, at 621, 384 N. Y. S. 2d, at 912, found that “Smith’s letter was indeed an indiscretion” but that it “in no way reflected a premature conclusion as to the [respondent’s] guilt, or prejudice against the [respondent], or an inability to consider the guilt or innocence of the [respondent] solely on the evidence.” Id., at 627, 384 N. Y. S. 2d, at 915. With respect to the conduct of the prosecuting attorneys, Justice Birns found “no evidence” suggesting “a sinister or dishonest motive with respect to Mr. Smith’s letter of application.” Id., at 618-619, 384 N. Y. S. 2d, at 910.
B
In his application for federal habeas relief, respondent contended that he had been denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by Smith’s conduct. The District Court found insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Smith was actually biased. 485 F. Supp., at 1371. Nonetheless, the court imputed bias to Smith because “the average man in Smith’s position would believe that the verdict of the jury would directly affect the evaluation of his job application.” Id., at 1371-1372. Accordingly, the court ordered respondent released unless the State granted him a new trial within 90 days.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed by a divided vote. The court noted that “it is at best difficult and perhaps impossible to learn from a juror’s own testimony after the verdict whether he was in fact ‘impartial,’” but the court did not consider whether Smith was actually or impliedly biased. 632 F. 2d, at 1022. Rather, the Court of Appeals affirmed respondent’s release simply because “the failure of the prosecutors to disclose their knowledge denied [respondent] due process.” Ibid. The court explained: “To condone the withholding by the prosecutor of information casting substantial doubt as to the impartiality of a juror, such as the fact that he has applied to the prosecutor for employment, would not be fair to a defendant and would ill serve to maintain public confidence in the judicial process.” Id., at 1023.
II
In argument before this Court, respondent has relied primarily on reasoning adopted by the District Court. He contends that a court cannot possibly ascertain the impartiality of a juror by relying solely upon the testimony of the juror in question. Given the human propensity for self-justification, respondent argues, the law must impute bias to jurors in Smith’s position. We disagree.
This Court has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias. For example, in Remmer v. United States, 347 U. S. 227 (1954), a juror in a federal criminal trial was approached by someone offering money in exchange for a favorable verdict. An FBI agent was assigned to investigate the attempted bribe, and the agent’s report was reviewed by the trial judge and the prosecutor without disclosure to defense counsel. When they learned of the incident after trial, the defense attorneys moved that the verdict be vacated, alleging that “they would have moved for a mistrial and requested that the juror in question be replaced by an alternate juror” had the incident been disclosed to them during trial. Id., at 229.
This Court recognized the seriousness not only of the attempted bribe, which it characterized as “presumptively prejudicial,” but also of the undisclosed investigation, which was “bound to impress the juror and [was] very apt to do so unduly.” Ibid. Despite this recognition, and a conviction that “[t]he integrity of jury proceedings must not be jeopardized by unauthorized invasions,” ibid., the Court did not require a new trial like that ordered in this case. Rather, the Court instructed the trial judge to “determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not [they were] prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate.” Id., at 230 (emphasis added). In other words, the Court ordered precisely the remedy which was accorded by Justice Bims in this case.
Even before the decision in Remmer, this Court confronted allegations of implied juror bias in Dennis v. United States, 339 U. S. 162 (1950). Dennis was convicted of criminal contempt for failure to appear before the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives. He argued that the jury which convicted him, composed primarily of employees of the United States Government, was inherently biased because such employees were subject to Executive Order No. 9835, 3 CFR 627 (1943-1948 Comp.), which provided for their discharge upon reasonable grounds for belief that they were disloyal to the Government. Dennis contended that such employees would not risk the charge of disloyalty or the termination of their employment which might result from a vote for acquittal. The Court rejected this claim of implied bias, noting that Dennis was “free to show the existence of actual bias” but had failed to do so. 339 U. S., at 167. The Court thus concluded: “A holding of implied bias to disqualify jurors because of their relationship with the Government is no longer permissible. . . . Preservation of the opportunity to prove actual bias is a guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury.” Id., at 171-172. See also Frazier v. United States, 335 U. S. 497 (1948); United States v. Wood, 299 U. S. 123 (1936).
Our decision last Term in Chandler v. Florida, 449 U. S. 560 (1981), also treated a claim of implied juror bias. Appellants in Chandler were convicted of various theft crimes at a jury trial which was partially televised under a new Canon of Judicial Ethics promulgated by the Florida Supreme Court. They claimed that the unusual publicity and sensational courtroom atmosphere created by televising the proceedings would influence the jurors and preclude a fair trial. Consistent with our previous decisions, we held that “the appropriate safeguard against such prejudice is the defendant’s right to demonstrate that the media’s coverage of his case — be it printed or broadcast — compromised the ability of the particular jury that heard the case to adjudicate fairly. ” Id., at 575. Because the appellants did “not [attempt] to show with any specificity that the presence of cameras impaired' the ability of the jurors to decide the case on only the evidence before them,” we refused to set aside their conviction. Id., at 581.
These cases demonstrate that due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable. The safeguards of juror impartiality, such as voir dire and protective instructions from the trial judge, are not infallible; it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen. Such determinations may properly be made at a hearing like that ordered in Remmer and held in this case.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals disregarded this doctrine: they held that a post-trial hearing comporting with our decisions in Remmer and other cases prosecuted in the federal courts was constitutionally insufficient in a state court under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It seems to us to follow “as the night the day” that if in the federal system a post-trial hearing such as that conducted here is sufficient to decide allegations of juror partiality, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot possibly require more of a state court system.
Of equal importance, this case is a federal habeas action in which Justice Birns’ findings are presumptively correct under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (d). We held last Term that federal courts in such proceedings must not disturb the findings of state courts unless the federal habeas court articulates some basis for disarming such findings of the statutory.presumption that they are correct and may be overcome only by convincing evidence. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U. S. 539, 551 (1981). Here neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals took issue with the findings of Justice Bims.
Ill
As already noted, the Court of Appeals did not rely upon the District Court’s imputation of bias. Indeed, it did not even reach the question of juror bias, holding instead that the prosecutors’ failure to disclose Smith’s application, without more, violated respondent’s right to due process of law. Respondent contends that the Court of Appeals thereby correctly preserved “the appearance of justice.” Brief for Respondent 7. This contention, too, runs contrary to our decided cases.
Past decisions of this Court demonstrate that the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963), for example, the prosecutor failed to disclose an admission by a participant in the murder which corroborated the defendant’s version of the crime. The Court held that a prosecutor’s suppression of requested evidence “violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id., at 87. Applying this standard, the Court found the undisclosed admission to be relevant to punishment and thus ordered that the defendant be resentenced. Since the admission was not material to guilt, however, the Court concluded that the trial itself complied with the requirements of due process despite the prosecutor’s wrongful suppression. The Court thus recognized that the aim of due process “is not punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.” Ibid.
This principle was reaffirmed in United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976). There, we held that a prosecutor must disclose unrequested evidence which would create a reasonable doubt of guilt that did not otherwise exist. Consistent with Brady, we focused not upon the prosecutor’s failure to disclose, but upon the effect of nondisclosure on the trial:
“Nor do we believe the constitutional obligation [to disclose unrequested information] is measured by the moral culpability, or willfulness, of the prosecutor. If evidence highly probative of innocence is in his file, he should be presumed to recognize its significance even if he has actually overlooked it. Conversely, if evidence actually has no probative significance at all, no purpose would be served by requiring a new trial simply because an inept prosecutor incorrectly believed he was suppressing a fact that would be vital to the defense. If the suppression of the evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.” 427 U. S., at 110 (footnote and citation omitted).
In light of this principle, it is evident that the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that prosecutorial misconduct alone requires a new trial. We do not condone the conduct of the prosecutors in this case. Nonetheless, as demonstrated in Part II of this opinion, Smith’s conduct did not impair his ability to render an impartial verdict. The trial judge expressly so found. 87 Mise. 2d, at 627, 384 N. Y. S. 2d, at 915.
Therefore, the prosecutors’ failure to disclose Smith’s job application, although requiring a post-trial hearing on juror bias, did not deprive respondent of the fair trial guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.
> h-H
A federally issued writ of habeas corpus, of course, reaches only convictions obtained in violation of some provision of the United States Constitution. As we said in Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U. S. 141, 146 (1973):
“Before a federal court may overturn a conviction resulting from a state trial ... it must be established not merely that the [State’s action] is undesirable, erroneous, or even ‘universally condemned,’ but that it violated some right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Absent such a constitutional violation, it was error for the lower courts in this case to order a new trial. Even if the Court of Appeals believed, as the respondent contends, that prosecutorial misbehavior would “reign unchecked” unless a new trial was ordered, it had no authority to act as it did. Federal courts hold no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U. S., at 570, 582-583; Cupp v. Naughten, supra, at 146. No such wrongs occurred here. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
Section 330.30 provides in pertinent part:
“At any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before sentence, the court may, upon motion of the defendant, set aside or modify the verdict or any part thereof upon the following grounds:
“2. That during the trial there occurred, out of the presence of the court, improper conduct by a juror, or improper conduct by another person in relation to a juror, which may have affected a substantial right of the defendant and which was not known to the defendant prior to the rendition of the verdict. . . .”
CPL § 330.40 provides that motions to set aside the verdict under CPL § 330.30 must be decided by hearing if they allege disputed facts sufficient to grant the motion. At the hearing, “the defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence every fact essential to support the motion.” CPL § 330.40(g).
Smith’s letter of application was addressed to the District Attorney and stated:
“I understand that a federally funded investigative unit is being formed in your office to investigate major felonies. I wish to apply for a position as an investigator.”
The letter did not mention that Smith was a juror in respondent’s trial. Appended to the letter was a resumé containing biographical information about Smith. People v. Phillips, 87 Misc. 2d 613, 616, 384 N. Y. S. 2d 906, 909 (1975).
The trial judge described the voir dire in respondent’s case as “ten days of meticulous examination.” Id., at 614, 384 N. Y. S. 2d, at 907. During his voir dire, Smith stated that he intended to pursue a career in law enforcement and that he had applied for employment with a federal drug enforcement agency. He also disclosed that his wife was interested in law enforcement, an interest which arose out of an incident in which she was assaulted and seriously injured. Smith stated that he had previously worked as a store detective for Bloomingdale’s Department Store, and, in that capacity, had made several arrests which led to contact with the District Attorney’s Office. In response to close inquiry by defense counsel, Smith declared his belief that he could be a fair and impartial juror in the case. This assurance apparently satisfied defense counsel, for Smith was permitted to take his seat among the jurors even though the defense had several unused peremptory challenges.
This conclusion was based upon the majority’s reading of our decision in United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (1976), a reading by which it concluded that due process is violated when the prosecutor’s actions treat a defendant unfairly or impugn the integrity of the judicial process, even if the defendant is not thereby prejudiced. 632 F. 2d 1019,1023 (1980). As will be seen in Part III of this opinion, the Court of Appeals misread Agio's.
Respondent may, of course, defend the judgment below on any ground which the law and the record permit, provided the asserted ground would not expand the relief which has been granted. United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U. S. 159, 166, n. 8 (1977); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 475, n. 6 (1970); Ryerson v. United States, 312 U. S. 405, 408 (1941).
Respondent correctly notes that determinations made in Remmer-type hearings will frequently turn upon testimony of the juror in question, but errs in contending that such evidence is inherently suspect. As we said in Dennis v. United States, 339 U. S. 162 (1950), “[o]ne may not know or altogether understand the imponderables which cause one to think what he thinks, but surely one who is trying as an honest man to live up to the sanctity of his oath is well qualified to say whether he has an unbiased mind in a certain matter.” Id., at 171. See also United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 366 (1852).
Tn connection with his argument that due process was denied by the prosecutors’ withholding of Smith’s application, respondent notes that had the prosecutors disclosed the application, the trial court could have replaced Smith with an alternate juror. Thus, respondent argues, not only was the prosecutors’ action itself a denial of due process, but it also prevented respondent from availing himself of the process available under New York law for correcting juror bias. See N. Y. CPL § 270.35 (McKinney 1971). This argument proves too much. If the hearing and determination to replace a juror during trial would have adequately protected respondent’s right to due process of law, and would not have been rendered impossible by necessary reliance on the juror’s own testimony, we see no reason why a post-trial hearing and determination would be any less protective or possible.
As we said of Brady in United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S., at 106: “[T]he confession could not have affected the outcome on the issue of guilt but could have affected Brady’s punishment. It was material on the latter issue but not on the former. And since it was not material on the issue of guilt, the entire trial was not lacking in due process.”
Even in cases of egregious prosecutorial misconduct, such as the knowing use of perjured testimony, we have required a new trial only when the tainted evidence was material to the case. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 154 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264, 272 (1959). This materiality requirement implicitly recognizes that the misconduct’s effect on the trial, not the blameworthiness of the prosecutor, is the crucial inquiry for due process purposes.
We note, of course, that nothing in this case suggests that the prosecutors’ conduct was undertaken in bad faith. As the trial court found, “there is no evidence which to any degree points to a conclusion that any member of the District Attorney’s staff, ... or any court officer, had a sinister or dishonest motive with respect to Mr. Smith’s letter of application, or sought to gain thereby an unfair advantage over the defendant.” 87 Mise. 2d, at 618-619, 384 N. Y. S. 2d, at 910.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
D
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Opinion of the Court by
Mr. Justice Stewart,
announced by Mr. Justice White.
This case comes to us on appeal from the Supreme Court of New Mexico. One of the appellants, Agnes K. Head, owns a newspaper in Hobbs, New. Mexico. The other appellant, Permian Basin Radio Corporation, owns and operates a radio station there. Hobbs is in the southeastern corner of the State, close, to the Texas border, and much of the area served by both the radio station and the newspaper lies m Texas; The appellants were enjoined from accepting or publishing .within the State of' New Mexico a Texas optometrist’s advertising found to be in violation of New Mexico law. The appellants claim that the state law, as applied, imposes an unlawful burden on interstate commerce. Permian also argues that regulation of advertising by radio has been preempted by the Communications Act of 1934. We noted probable jurisdiction, 371 U. S. 900, and invited the Solicitor General to express the Government’s views concerning the question of federal preemption. We have concluded that the judgment should be affirmed.
Section 67-7-13 of the New-Mexico Statutes Annotated deals generally with the practice of optometry. It prohibits several varieties of unauthorized practice, and forbids even licensed practitioners from employing certain sales techniques, such as house-to-house canvassing, peddling on streets or highways, or offering lenses and frames as premiums. It also prohibits:
“(m) Advertising by any means whatsoever the quotation of any prices or terms on eyeglasses, spectacles, lenses, frames or mountings, or which quotes discount to be offered on eyeglasses, spectacles, lenses, frames or mountings or which quotes 'moderate prices,’ 'low prices,’ 'lowest prices,’ 'guaranteed glasses,’ 'satisfaction guaranteed,’ or words of similar import.”
The purpose of this provision, according to the Supreme Court of New Mexico, is to “protect . . . citizens against the evils of price-advertising methods tending to satisfy the needs of their pocketbooks rather than the remedial requirements of their eyes.” 70 N. M. 90, 94, 370 P. 2d 811, 813. Similar laws have been enacted in many States to assure high standards of professional competence,
The facts stated in the complaint were not disputed. Appellants received and published advertisements from Abner Roberts, an optometrist who resided and conducted his business in the State of Texas, just a few miles east of Hobbs. In the words of the complaint, this advertising consisted of “the quotation of prices on eyeglasses and spectacles, and of the quotation o'f. discounts to be offered on eyeglasses and' spectacles.” The appellants conceded that the advertising violated § 67-7-13 (m). Finding the statute applicable and violated, the trial court enjoined each of the appellants “from accepting or publishing within the State of New Mexico advertising of any nature from Abner Roberts which quotes prices or terms on eyeglasses ... or which quotes moderate prices, low prices, lowest prices, guaranteed glasses, satisfaction guaranteed, or words of similar import . . . .” The Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed, ruling that the injunction did not unlawfully burden interstate commerce and that the State’s jurisdiction had not been ousted by federal legislation. 70 N. M. 90, 370 P. 2d 811.
I.
Without doubt, the appellants’ radio station and newspaper are engaged in interstate commerce, and the injunction in this case has unquestionably imposed some restraint upon that commerce. But these facts alone do not add up to an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. As we said in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, upholding the application of a Detroit smoke abatement ordinance to ships engaged in interstate and international commerce: “In determining whether the state has imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce, it must be borne in mind that the Constitution when ‘conferring upon Congress the regulation of commerce, . . . never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life, and safety of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the commerce of the country. Legislation, in a great variety of ways, may affect commerce and persons engaged in it without constituting a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution.’ Sherlock v. Ailing, 93 U. S. 99, 103; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503; The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352; Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Armburg, 285 U. S. 234; Collins v. American Buslines, Inc., 350 U. S. 528.” 362 U. S., 443-444.
Like the smoke abatement ordinance in the Huron-case, the statute here involved is a measure directly addressed to protection of the public health, and the statute thus falls within the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police power. The legitimacy of state legislation in this precise area has been expressly established. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483. A state law may not be struck down on the mere showing that its administration affects interstate commerce in some way. “State regulation, based on the police power, which does not discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its required uniformity, may constitutionally stand.” Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, supra, at 448.
It has not been suggested that, the statute, applicable alike to “any person” within the State of New Mexico, discriminates against interstate commerce as such. Nor can we find that the legislation impinges upon an area of interstate commerce which by its nature requires uniformity of regulation. The appellant's haye pointed to no regulations of other States imposing conflicting duties, nor can we readily imagine any. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U. S. 714. We hold that the New Mexico statute, as applied here to prevent the publication in New Mexico of the proscribed price advertising, does not impose a constitutionally prohibited burden upon interstate commerce.
II.
In dealing with the contention that New Mexico’s jurisdiction to regulate radio advertising has been preempted by the Federal Communications Act, we may begin by noting that the validity of this claim cannot be judged by reference to broad statements about the “comprehensive” nature of federal regulation under, the Federal Communications Act. “[T]he ‘question whether Congress and its commissions acting under it have so far exercised the exclusive jurisdiction that belongs to it as to exclude the State, must be answered by a judgment upon the particular case.’ Statements concerning the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ of Congress beg the only controversial question: whether Congress intended to make its jurisdiction exclusive.” California v. Zook, 336 U. S. 725, 731. Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1, 10-13. In areas of the law not inherently requiring national uniformity, our decisions are clear in requiring that state statutes, otherwise valid, must be upheld unless there is found “such actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot stand in the same area, [or] evidence of a congressional design to preempt the field.” Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 141.
The specific provisions of the federal statute chiefly relied upon to support Permian’s claim are those governing the granting, renewal, and revocation of broadcasting licenses. Under the broad standard of “public interest, convenience, and necessity,” the Federal Communications Commission may consider a wide variety of factors in passing upon the fitness of an applicant. It is argued that the content.of advertising is one of the factors which may be considered, and there is evidence that the Commission itself has on occasion so interpreted its authority. Further, the United States argues that the Commission has the authority to promulgate general regulations concerning the subject of advertising for the guidance of broadcasters. See Federal Communications Comm’n v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U. S. 284, 289-290. . This grant of federal power, it is argued, is sufficient to oust state regulation of radio advertising.
Assuming this to be a correct statement of the Commission’s authority, we are nevertheless not persuaded that the federal legislation in this field has excluded the application of a state law -of the kind here involved. The nature of the regulatory power given to the federal agency convinces us that Congress could not have intended its grant of authority to supplant all the detailed state regulation of professional advertising .practices, particularly when the grant of power to the Commission was accompanied by no substantive standard other than the “public interest, convenience, and necessity.” The Solicitor General has conceded that the power of license revocation is not a plausible, substitute for state law dealing with “traditional” torts or crimes committed through the use of radio. We can find no material difference with respect to the less “traditional” statutory violation here involved. In the absence of positive evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, we cannot believe Congress has ousted the States from an area of such fundamentally local concern.
Finally, there has been no showing of any conflict between this state law and the federal regulatory system, or that the state law stands as an obstacle to the full effectiveness, of the federal statute. No specific federal regulations even remotely in conflict with the New Mexico law have been called to our attention. The Commission itself has apparently viewed state regulation of advertising as complementing its regulatory function, rather than in any way conflicting with it. As in Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm’n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U. S. 714, at 724, we are satisfied that the state statute “at least so long as any power the [Commission] may have remains ‘dormant and unexercised,’ will not frustrate any part of the purpose of the federal legislation.”
Mr. Justice Douglas concurs in the result.
Affirmed.
48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq.
“(i) Either in person or by or through solicitors or agents giving or offering to .give to any person eyeglasses, spectacles or lenses, either with or without frames or mountings, as a premium or inducement for any subscription to any book, set of books, magazines, magazine, periodical or other publication, or as a premium or inducement for the purchase of any goods, wares or merchandise.
. . . . .
“(k) .The making of a house to house canvass either in person or through solicitors or associates for the purpose of selling, advertising or soliciting the sale of eyeglasses, spectacles, lenses, frames, mountings, eye examinations or optometrical services.
“(l) The peddling of eyeglasses, spectacles or lenses from house to house or on the streets or highways, notwithstanding any law for the licensing of peddlers.”
See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 72-815 (1957 Replacement); Cal. Bus. & Professions Code §3129; Del. Code Ann., Tit. 24, §2113; Fla. Stat. Ann. §§463.11, 463.14; Hawaii Rev. Laws § 68-9 (d) (1960 Supp.); Ind. Stat. Ann. §§ 63-1018a (e), 63-1019 (f) (1961); Ky. Rev. Stat. §320.300; La. Rev. Stat. §37:1063; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 14.648 (i) (1961 Supp.); Minn. Stat. Ann. §148.57 (3); Mo. Ann. Stat. §336.110; Mont. Rev. Codes §66-1302 (11); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-148; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 636:300 (10); N. J. Stat. Ann. §45:12-11 (h) (1962 Supp.); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 90-124 (9); N. Dak. Cent. Code §43-13-29; Okla. Stat. Ann., Tit. 59, §943; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 683.140 (6); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 63, § 237; R. I. Gen. Laws § 5-35-22; S. C. Code of Laws § 56-1075; S. Dak. Code §27.0707 (6) (1960 Supp.); Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-815; Va. Code §54-388, par. 2 (d).; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 18.53.140; W. Va. Code §2937 (1961); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 153.10.
The case is not one, therefore, in which the State seeks to justify a statute as a health measure on the attenuated theory that the economic well-being of a profession or industry will assure better performance in the public interest. See Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 522-523. Compare Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U. S. 608.
The appellants have argued that the decree below will have the effect of preventing communication between the Texas optometrist and Texas residents. A similar argument was rejected in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 106, which held valid a local ordinance prohibiting the display of advertising on trucks which also operated in other States.
E. g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 213 (“wide licensing and regulatory powers”), id., at 217 (“comprehensive powers to promote and realize the vast potentialities of radio”); Federal Communications Comm’n v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 137 (“unified and comprehensive regulatory system for the industry”).
It is to be noted that this case in no way involves the Commission’s jurisdiction over technical matters such as a frequency allocation, over which federal control is clearly exclusive. 47 U. S. C. § 301.
See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52.
See 47 U.S. C. §§303 (j), 307 (a), (d), 308 (a), 309 (a), and 312.
We have been cited to specific instances in which the content of advertising analogous to that involved in this case has been considered. See, e. g., Farmers & Bankers Life Ins. Co., 2 F. C. C. 455; WSBC, Inc., 2 F. C. C. 293; Oak Leaves Broadcasting Station, Inc., 2 F. C. C. 298. And see KFKB Broadcasting Assn. v. Federal Radio Comm’n, 60 App. D. C. 79, 47 F. 2d 670.
See Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Los Angeles, 280 U. S. 52, 68-70. Compare Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F. 2d 153, which held state censorship of motion pictures shown on television preempted by those provisions of the federal act expressly dealing with “'communications containing profane or obscene words, language, or meaning.” 47 U. S. C. §303 (m)(1)(D).
Our attention has been directed to the following statement of Commission policy:
“In those localities and states where the sale of alcoholic beverages is prohibited by local or state statutes, such advertising by radio in those areas would, of course, not be in the public interest, since adherence to the laws of the state in which a station is located, especially laws expressive of the public policy of the state or locality on subjects relative to health, safety, and morals, is an important aspect of operation in the public interest. Obviously, the same is true with respect to those areas .where advertising of alcoholic beverages is prohibited by law.” F. C. C. Letter to Sen. Edwin C. Johnson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, August 11, 1949, 5 Pike & Fischer Radio Reg. 593-594.
The appellants urge three additional grounds for reversal. Each may be disposed of briefly., First, both appellants urge that the state statute deprives them of property, in violation of the Due Process Clause. That claim is foreclosed by Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U. S. 483. See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726. The appellant Head claims that denial of her right to do business with Abner Roberts is a violation of her. privileges and immunities of national citizenship. But the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a naked right to conduct a business free of otherwise valid state regulation. ' Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 83,. 92-93. Finally,'it is contended that the injunction constitutes an invalid restraint upon freedom of speech protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. This argument was not made to the state courts, nor was it reserved in the notice of appeal to this Court. Under Rule 10, par. 2, of the Rules of this Court, “Only the questions set forth in the notice of appeal or fairly comprised therein will be considered by the court.” See also Rule 15, par. 1 (e)(1).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
J
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we are asked to decide the constitutionality of a recent amendment to New York State’s longstanding tax on securities transactions. Since 1905, New York has imposed a tax (transfer tax) on securities transactions, if part of the transaction occurs within the State. In 1968, the state legislature amended the transfer tax statute so that transactions involving an out-of-state sale are now taxed more heavily than most transactions involving a sale within the State. In 1972, appellants, six “regional” stock exchanges located outside New York, filed an action in state court against the State Tax Commission of New York and its members. The Exchanges’ complaint alleged that the 1968 amendment unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce by imposing a greater tax burden on securities transactions involving out-of-state sales than on transactions of the same magnitude involving in-state sales.' The State Supreme Court denied the Commission’s motion to dismiss the action and the Commission appealed. The Appellate Division reversed and ordered that the Commission’s motion be granted to the extent of entering a judgment declaring the 1968 amendment to be constitutional. 45 App. Div. 2d 365, 357 N. Y. S. 2d 116 (1974). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the order, 37 N. Y. 2d 535, 337 N. E. 2d 758 (1975), and we noted probable jurisdiction of the Exchanges’ appeal, 424 U. S. 964 (1976).
I
New York Tax Law § 270.1 (McKinney 1966) provides that “all sales, or agreements to sell, or memoranda of sales and all deliveries or transfers of shares or certificates of stock” in any foreign or domestic corporation are subject to the transfer tax. Administrative regulations promulgated with respect to the transfer tax provide that the tax applies if any one of the five taxable events occurs within New York, regardless of where the rest of the transaction takes place, and that if more than one taxable event occurs in the State, only one tax is payable on the entire transaction. 20 N. Y. C. R. R. 440.2 (1976). For transactions involving sales, the rate of tax depends on the selling price per share and the total tax liability is determined by the number of shares sold. N. Y. Tax Law § 270.2 (McKinney 1966). Thus, under the unamended version of § 270, a transaction involving a sale and a transfer of shares in New York was taxed the same as a transaction involving an in-state transfer but an out-of-state sale. In both instances, the occasion for the tax was the occurrence of at least one taxable event in the State, the rate of tax was based solely on the price of the securities, and the total tax was determined by the number of shares sold. The Exchanges do not challenge the constitutionality of § 270.
None of the States in which the appellant Exchanges are located taxes the sale or transfer of securities. During the 1960’s the New York Stock Exchange became concerned that the New York transfer tax created a competitive disadvantage for New York trading and was thus responsible for the growth of out-of-state exchanges. In response to this concern and fearful that the New York Stock Exchange would relocate outside New York, the legislature in 1968 enacted § 270-a to amend the transfer tax by providing for two deviations from the uniform application of § 270 when one of the taxable events, a sale, takes place in New York. First, transactions by nonresidents of New York are afforded a 50% reduction (“nonresident reduction”) in the rate of tax when the transaction involves an in-state sale. Taxable transactions by residents (regardless of where the sale is made) and by nonresidents selling outside the State do not benefit from the rate decrease. Second, § 270-a limits the total tax liability of any taxpayer (resident or nonresident) to $350 (maximum tax) for a single transaction when it involves a New York sale. If a sale is made out-of-State, the § 270 tax rate applies to an in-state transfer (or other taxable event) without limitation.
The reason for the enactment of § 270-a and the intended effect of the amendment are clear from tlie legislative history. With respect to the amendment, the legislature found:
“The securities industry, and particularly the stock exchanges located within the state have contributed importantly to the economy of the state and its recognition as the financial center of the world. The growth of exchanges in other regions of the country and the diversion of business to those exchanges of individuals who are nonresidents of the state of New York, requires recognition that the tax on transfers of stock imposed by article twelve of the tax law, is an important contributing element to the diversion of sales to other areas to the detriment of the economy of the state. Furthermore, in the case of transactions involving large blocks of stock, recognition must be given to the ease of completion of such sales outside the state of New York without the payment of any tax. In order to encourage the effecting by nonresidents of the state of New York of their sales within the state of New York and the retention within the state of New York of sales involving large blocks of stock, a separate classification of the tax on sales by nonresidents of the state of New York and a maximum tax for certain large block sales are desirable.” 1968 N. Y. Laws, c. 827, § 1.
In granting executive approval to § 270-a, then Governor Nelson Rockefeller confirmed that the purpose of the new law was to “provide long-term relief from some of the competitive pressures from outside the State.” The Governor announced that as a result of the transfer tax amendment the New York Stock Exchange intended to remain in New York.
Appellant Exchanges contend that the legislative history-states explicitly what is implicit in the operation of § 270-a: The amendment imposes an unequal tax burden on out-of-state sales in order to protect an in-state business. They argue that this discrimination is impermissible under the Commerce Clause. Appellees do not dispute the statements of the legislature and the Governor that § 270-a is a measure to reduce out-of-state competition with an in-state business. They agree, however, with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the legislature" has chosen a nondiscriminatory, and therefore constitutionally permissible, means of “encouraging” sales on the New York Stock Exchange. We hold that § 270-a discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.
II
As in Great A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U. S. 366 (1976), we begin with the principle that “[t]he very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade among the several States.” McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U. S. 327, 330 (1944). It is now established beyond dispute that “the Commerce Clause was not merely an authorization to Congress to enact laws for the protection and encouragement of commerce among the States, but by its own force created an area of trade free from interference by the States.... [T]he Commerce Clause even without implementing legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the power of the States.” Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946). The Commerce Clause does not, however, eclipse the reserved “power of the States to tax for the support of their own governments,” Gib bons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 199 (1824), or for other purposes, cf. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U. S. 42, 44-45 (1950); rather, the Clause is a limit on state power. Defining that limit has been the continuing task of this Court.
On various occasions when called upon to make the delicate adjustment between the national interest in free and open trade and the legitimate interest of the individual States in exercising their taxing powers, the Court has counseled that the result turns on the unique characteristics of the statute at issue and the particular circumstances in each case. E. g., Freeman v. Hewit, supra, at 252. This case-by-case approach has left “much room for controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the States in the exercise of their indispensable power of taxation.” Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U. S. 450, 457 (1959). Nevertheless, as observed by Mr. Justice Clark in the case just cited: “[Fjrom the quagmire there emerge... some firm peaks of decision which remain unquestioned.” Id., at 458. Among these is the fundamental principle that we find dispositive of the case now before us: No State, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may “impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce... by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business.” Ibid. See also Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S. 64 (1963); Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946); I. M. Darnell & Son v. Memphis, 208 U. S. 113 (1908); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 443 (1880); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1876). The prohibition against discriminatory treatment of interstate commerce follows inexorably from the basic purpose of the Clause. Permitting the individual States to enact laws that favor local enterprises at the expense of out-of-state businesses “would invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive” of the free trade which the Clause protects. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, 356 (1951).
Although apparently accepting the teaching of the prior cases, the Court of Appeals seemed to view § 270-a as “compensatory legislation” enacted to “neutralize” the competitive advantage § 270 conferred on stock exchanges outside New York. Thus, it analogized the New York statute to state use taxes which have survived Commerce Clause challenges. 37 N. Y. 2d, at 542, 337 N. E. 2d, at 762. The statute will not support this characterization.
Prior to the 1968 amendment, the New York transfer tax was neutral as to in-state and out-of-state sales. An in-state transfer or delivery of securities triggered the tax and the burden fell equally on all transactions regardless of the situs of sale. Thus, the choice of an exchange for the sale of securities that would be transferred or delivered in New York was not influenced by the transfer tax; wherever the sale was made, tax liability would arise. The flow of interstate commerce in securities was channeled neither into nor out of New York by the state tax.
Section 270-a upset this equilibrium.. After the amendment took effect, a nonresident contemplating the sale of securities that would be delivered or transferred in New York faced two possible tax burdens. If he elected to sell on an out-of-state exchange, the higher rates of § 270 applied without limitation on the total tax liability; if he sold the securities on a New York exchange, the one-half rate of § 270-a applied and then only up to a $350 tax liability. Similarly, residents engaging in large block transactions on the New York exchanges were subject to a maximum tax levy of $350; but if they sold out-of-State, their tax bill would be limited only by the number of shares sold. Thus, under § 270-a the choice of exchange by all nonresidents and by residents engaging in large transactions is not made solely on the basis of nontax criteria. Because of the delivery or transfer in New York, the seller cannot escape tax liability by selling out of State, but he can substantially reduce his liability by selling in State. The obvious effect of the tax is to extend a financial advantage to sales on the New York exchanges at the expense of the regional exchanges. Rather than “compensating” New York for a supposed competitive disadvantage resulting from § 270, the amendment forecloses tax-neutral decisions and creates both an advantage for the exchanges in New York and a discriminatory burden on commerce to its sister States.
Equal treatment of interstate commerce, lacking in § 270-a, has been the common theme running through the cases in which this Court has sustained “compensating,” state use taxes. In Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (1937), Washington imposed a 2% sales tax on all goods sold at retail in the State. Since the sales tax would have the effect of encouraging residents to purchase at out-of-state stores, Washington also imposed a 2% “compensating tax” on the use of goods within the State. The use tax did not apply, however, when the article had already been subjected to a tax equal to or greater than 2%. The effect of this constitutional tax system was nondiscriminatory treatment of in-state and out-of-state purchases:
“Equality exists when the chattel subjected to the use tax is bought in another state and then carried into Washington. It exists when the imported chattel is shipped from the state of origin under an order received directly from, the state of destination. In each situation the burden borne by the owner is balanced by an equal burden where the sale is strictly local.” Id., at 584.
A similar use-sales-tax structure was sustained in General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm’n, 322 U. S. 335 (1944), because the “tax [was] what it professes to be — a nondiscriminatory excise laid on all personal property” regardless of where the sale was made. Id., at 338. See also International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U. S. 340 (1944); Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U. S. 199, 204 (1961). In all the use tax cases, an individual faced with the choice of an in-state or out-of-state purchase could make that choice without regard to the tax consequences. If he purchased in State, he paid a sales tax; if he purchased out of State but carried the article back for use in State, he paid a use tax of the same amount. The taxes treated both transactions in the same manner.
Because it imposes a greater tax liability on out-of-state sales than on in-state sales, the New York transfer tax, as amended by § 270-a, falls short of the substantially evenhanded treatment demanded by the Commerce Clause. The extra tax burden on out-of-state sales created by § 270-a is not what the New York Court of Appeals holds it out to be; it neither compensates for a like burden on in-state sales, nor neutralizes an economic advantage previously enjoyed by the appellant Exchanges because of § 270.
III
The court below further attempted to save § 270-a from invalidation under the Commerce Clause by finding that the effect the amendment might have on sales by residents and nonresidents did not amount to unconstitutional discrimination. As to New York residents, the court found that the higher tax on large out-of-state sales would have no “practical” effect since “it is more than likely... that the sale would be made on a New York exchange in any event.” 37 N. Y. 2d, at 543, 337 N. E. 2d, at 762. As to the discriminatory tax burden on all out-of-state sales by nonresidents, the court observed that because New York sales by nonresidents also involve interstate commerce, § 270-a does not discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of intrastate commerce; rather, it discriminates between two kinds of interstate transactions. Ibid. Although it did not so state, the Court of Appeals apparently believed that such discrimination was permissible under the Commerce Clause. We disagree with the Court of Appeals with respect to both residents and nonresidents.
The maximum tax discrimination against out-of-state sales by residents is not triggered until the taxed transaction involves a substantial number of shares. Investors, institutional and individual, engaging in such large-block transactions can be expected to choose an exchange on the basis of services, prices, and other market conditions rather than geographical proximity. Even a small difference in price (of either the securities or the sales services) can, in a large sale, provide a substantial enough additional profit to outweigh whatever additional transaction costs might be incurred from trading on an out-of-state exchange. The New York Legislature, in its legislative findings in connection with § 270-a, recognized that securities transactions by residents were not being conducted only on the New York exchanges; it therefore considered the amendment necessary to “[retain] within the state of New York... sales involving large blocks of stock.” If, as the Court of Appeals assumed, it were “more than likely” that residents would sell in New York, there would have been no reason for the legislature to reduce the tax burden on in-state sales by residents in order to retain their sales in New York. Nor is the discriminatory burden of the maximum tax insubstantial. On a transaction of 30,000 shares selling at $20 or more, for example, the tax on an in-state sale is the maximum $350, while an out-of-state sale is taxed $1,500. The disparity between the two taxes increases with the number of shares sold. Such a large tax penalty for trading on out-of-state markets cannot be deemed to have no. practical effect on interstate commerce.
Both the maximum tax and the rate reduction provisions of § 270-a discriminate against out-of-state sales by nonresidents. The fact that this discrimination is in favor of nonresident, in-state sales which may also be considered as interstate commerce, see Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S., at 258-259, does not save § 270-a from the restrictions of the Commerce Clause. A State may no more use discriminatory taxes to assure that nonresidents direct their commerce to businesses within the State than to assure that residents trade only in intrastate commerce. As we stated at the outset, the fundamental purpose of the Clause is to assure that there be free trade among the several States. This free trade purpose is not confined to the freedom to trade with only one State; it is a freedom to trade with any State, to engage in commerce across all state boundaries.
There has been no prior occasion expressly to address the question whether a State may tax in a manner that discriminates between two types of interstate transactions in order to favor local commercial interests over out-of-state businesses, but the clear import of our Commerce Clause cases is that such discrimination is constitutionally impermissible. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S., at 443, held that no State, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may “build up its domestic commerce by means of unequal and oppressive burdens upon the industry and business of other States”; and in Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511 (1935), New York was prohibited from regulating the price of out-of-state milk purchases because the effect of that regulation would be “to suppress or mitigate the consequences of competition between the states.” Id., at 522. More recently, we noted that this “Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere. Even where the State is pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest, this particular burden on commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal.” Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 145 (1970). Cf. Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U. S., at 72-73.
Although the statutes at issue in those cases had the primary effect of prohibiting or discriminatorily burdening a resident’s purchase of out-of-state goods and services, the constitutional policy of free trade and competition that led to their demise is equally fatal to the New York transfer tax. New York’s discriminatory treatment of out-of-state sales is made possible only because some other taxable event (transfer, delivery, or agreement to sell) takes place in the State. Thus, the State is using its power to tax an in-state operation as a means of “requiring [other] business operations to be performed in the home State.” As a consequence, the flow of securities sales is diverted from the most economically efficient channels and directed to New York. This diversion of interstate commerce and diminution of free competition in securities sales are wholly inconsistent with the free trade purpose of the Commerce Clause.
IV
Our decision today does not prevent the States from structuring their tax systems to encourage the growth and development of intrastate commerce and industry. Nor do we hold that a State may not compete with other States for a share of interstate commerce; such competition lies at the heart of a free trade policy. We hold only that in the process of competition no State may discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or the business operations performed in any other State.
The judgment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Appellants are the Boston Stock Exchange, Detroit Stock Exchange, Pacific Coast Stock Exchange, Cincinnati Stock Exchange, Midwest Stock Exchange, and the PBW (Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington) Stock Exchange. The Exchanges provide facilities for their members to effect the purchase and sale of securities for their own accounts and the accounts of their customers.
In the courts below the Exchanges also contended that the amendment to the transfer tax was unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They have not brought those claims to this Court and we do not address them.
The Commission’s motion to dismiss was based on three grounds: (1) the state court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, (2) the Exchanges did not have standing to question the constitutionality of the statute, and (3) the complaint failed to state a cause of action. All three state courts agreed that there was jurisdiction and standing, but the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint on the merits because the statute was constitutional.
We agree, of course, that state courts of general jurisdiction have the power to decide cases involving federal constitutional rights where, as here, neither the Constitution nor statute withdraws such jurisdiction. We also agree that the Exchanges have standing under the two-part test of Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150 (1970). Appellants’ complaint alleged that a substantial portion of the transactions on their exchanges involved securities that are subject to the New York transfer tax, and that the higher tax on out-of-state sales of such securities diverted business from their facilities to exchanges in New York. This diversion was the express purpose of the challenged statute. See infra, at 325-328, and nn. 7, 10. The allegation establishes that the statute has caused them “injury in fact,” and that a case or controversy exists. 397 U. S., at 151-152. The Exchanges are asserting their right under the Commerce Clause’to engage in interstate commerce free of discriminatory taxes on their»business and they allege that the transfer tax indirectly infringes on that right. Thus, they are “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected... by the... constitutional guarantee in question.” Id., at 153. Moreover, the Exchanges brought this action also on behalf of their members. “[A]n association may have standing solely as the representative of its members... [if it] allege[s] that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 511 (1975). See also National Motor Freight Assn. v. United States, 372 U. S. 246 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 458-460 (1958). The Exchanges’ complaint alleged that their members traded on their own accounts in securities subject to the New York transfer tax. The members therefore suffer an actual injury within the zone of interests protected by the Commerce Clause, and the Exchanges satisfy the requirements for representational standing.
After the decision by the New York Court of Appeals in this case, § 21 (2) (d) of the Federal Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 became effective. This amendment provides that no State may tax a change in beneficial or record ownership of securities if the change is effected through the facilities of a registered clearing house of registered transfer agent unless the change would otherwise be taxable if the facilities were not physically located in the taxing State. §21 (2) (d), 89 Stát. 161, amending § 28 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78bb (d) (1970 ed., Supp. V). A transfer agent is defined in § 3 (6) of the 3975 amendments, 89 Stat. 100, amending § 3 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78e(a)(25) (1970 ed., Supp. V). Although the Senate Committee was unclear as to whether the New York transfer tax reached such changes in ownership, the Senate Report on the 1975 amendments indicates that § 21 (2) (d) was directed to New York’s transfer tax in particular, and in general to similar taxes being considered by other States. S. Rep. No. 94r-75, p. 60 (1975). See N. Y. Tax Law § 270.5(i)-(l) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
On December 1, 1975, counsel for the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance issued an.opinion that the 1975 amendments limited the types of taxable events covered by §270:
“[W]here the sole event in New York State is the delivery or transfer to or by a ‘registered clearing agency’ or a ‘registered transfer agent,’ as those terms are defined under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, there is no stock transfer tax due and owing on and after December 1, 1975. However, where a sale, agreement to sell, memorandum of sale or any other delivery or transfer takes place in New York State, the stock transfer tax due and owing thereon must be paid.” 2 CCH N. Y. Tax Rep. ¶ 57-101.605 (1976).
Although the new federal law may eliminate many transactions as taxable events under §270, the constitutional questions raised by the Exchanges on this appeal still apply to the transactions that are taxable under § 270 after the 1975 amendments.
The rates provided for in §270.2 range from 1.25 cents per share when the sale price of the security is_ less than $5 to the highest rate of 5 cents per share when the price is $20 or more. When no sale is involved, e. g., a gift, the rate is a constant 2.5 cents per share. In recent years, a 25% surcharge has been added to all transfer taxes. N. Y. Tax Law § 270-d (McKinney Supp. 1976).
Shortly after it was first enacted, the New York transfer tax was upheld against a challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment in New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152 (1907). The writ of error in Hatch did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute under the Commerce Clause, but both parties argued that issue before the Court. Id., at 157. In response to those arguments, Mr. Justice Holmes observed only that the particular transaction involved was intrastate and that therefore the tax as applied to the party before the Court, did not implicate the Commerce Clause. Id., a.t 161-162. As to the question of whether the statute should fall because it would also be applied to interstate transactions, the Court found that the seller lacked standing to raise that claim. The Commerce Clause question was thus left undecided. Id., at 160-161.
Thirty-three j-ears later, the New York Court of Appeals held, in a 4 — 3 decision, that the transfer tax did not violate the Commerce Clause. O’Kane v. State, 283 N. Y. 439, 28 N. E. 2d 905 (1940). The challenge there was to a tax levy “upon an agreement for the sale of shares of stock which are to be sold and delivered across State lines.” Id., at 442, 28 N. E. 2d, at 906. The state court expressly noted that the tax, as then applied, was “a non-discriminatory State tax,” and that “no discrimination was practiced on interstate commerce.” Id., at 444, 447, 28 N. E. 2d, at 907, 909. In the absence of discrimination, the tax was held not to be an undue burden on commerce.
In a public statement on the proposed amendment to § 270, the president of the New York Stock Exchange explained the competitive problems of his organization and urged that the transfer tax be amended to help solve them:
“[T]he stock transfer tax has been the subject of extensive study by the City, State and the securities industry. These studies indicate that the New York securities markets have experienced increasing competitive problems in recent years from regional stock exchanges located in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia and Boston. Some 88% of share trading on these exchanges is in New York Stock Exchange listed securities.
“From 1965 through 1967, the volume of trading on the regional exchanges increased by 73.2%. Regional ‘cross’ volume (a transaction on a regional exchange in which the broker finds both the buyer and seller) has increased by 202% in 1965-67. This indicates the loss of business by the New York markets to the regionals. As their volume continues to grow, a snowball effect develops. They become more competitive and are able to take more and more business away from New York. A loss of business to New York securities markets also means a loss of stock transfer tax revenue to New York City.
“... However, the existing law can be amended in such a way as to ease the competitive disadvantage of the tax on New York securities markets and still preserve the revenue from the tax.
“Competitive problems are particularly acute in two areas — non-resident investors and large block transactions.” Statement of Robert W. Haack, Mar. 4, 1968.
The Exchanges do not challenge New York’s authority to tax residents in a greater amount than nonresidents as long as the extent of the tax burden does not depend on an out-of-state sale.
The nonresident reduction and the maximum tax of § 270-a initially involved a smaller disparity between in-state and out-of-state sales. The gap was gradually increased until the current rates took effect on July 1, 1973.
The relevant provisions of N. Y. Tax Law § 270-a (McKinney Supp. 1976) are as follows:
“1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section two hundred seventy of this chapter on and after July first, nineteen hundred sixty-nine, the rates of tax set forth in paragraph (a) of this subdivision and the maximum amounts of tax set forth in subdivision two of this section shall apply, in the case of those sales made within this state subject to tax under section two hundred seventy and described in paragraph (a) of this subdivision and subdivision two of this section.
“(a) On such sales by a nonresident during the periods set forth in the following table, the rates of tax shall be the percentages, set forth in such table, of the rates of tax provided in section two hundred seventy of this article:
“2. Where any sale made within the state and subject to the tax imposed by this chapter relates to shares or certificates of the same class and issued by the same issuer the amount of tax upon any such single taxable sale shall not exceed, during the period beginning on July first, nineteen hundred sixty-nine and ending on June thirtieth, nineteen hundred seventy, the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars; during the period beginning on July first, nineteen hundred seventy and ending on June thirtieth, nineteen hundred seventy-one, the sum of one thousand two hundred fifty dollars; during the period beginning on July first, nineteen hundred seventy-one and ending on June thirtieth, nineteen hundred seventy-two, the sum of seven hundred fifty dollars; during the period beginning on July first, nineteen hundred seventy-two and ending on June thirtieth, nineteen hundred seventy-three, the sum of five hundred dollars; and on and after July first, nineteen hundred seventy-three, the sum of three hundred fifty dollars; provided, however, that sales made within this state by any member of a securities exchange or by any registered dealer, who is permitted or required pursuant to any rules and regulations promulgated by the tax commission pursuant to the provisions of section two hundred eighty-one-a of this chapter to pay the taxes imposed by this article without the use of the stamps prescribed by this article, pursuant to one or more orders placed with the same member of a securities exchange or the same registered dealer on one day, by the same person, each relating to shares or certificates of the same class and issued by the same issuer, all of which sales are executed on the same day (regardless of whether it be the day of the placing of the orders), shall, for the purposes of this subdivision two, be considered to constitute a single taxable sale.”
In his memorandum of approval of the transfer tax amendment, Governor Kockefeller explained the changing competitive patterns in the securities industry and acknowledged that § 270-a was a response to these changes:
“Since the stock transfer tax was enacted in 1905, there have been far reaching changes in the securities industry, but the stock transfer tax has not been revised to keep pace with those changes. The securities industry has grown from an essentially New York industry to one of national and international scope. While the bulle of stock transfers still funnels through New York, only twelve percent of the Nation’s investors are located in the State. At the same time, competition for the New York markets has been heightened by the rise of regional stock exchanges located outside the State where more than 90 percent of trading is in securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The development of modem telecommunications and electronic computer systems has, of course, greatly expanded the capacity of the regional exchanges to challenge the New York exchanges for business.
“The bill recognizes the changing character of the securities industry and the importance of its continued presence and strength for the future economic prosperity of the State and will provide long-term relief from some of the competitive pressures from outside the State.
“As a result of adoption of the revisions of the stock transfer tax contained in this bill, the New York Stock Exchange has announced that it intends to remain and expand in New York and is now studying sites for a new exchange building in downtown Manhattan.” Public Papers of Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller 553 (1968).
Of course, the unamended § 270 did discourage sales in New York when no other taxable event would occur in that State, since out-of-state sales would not be taxed at all while in-state sales would be taxed at the full rate. Section 270-a, however, does not neutralize this competitive disadvantage of the New York exchanges. Although the reduced tax of the amendment decreases the disincentive to trade out of State, to the extent that any tax is imposed on transactions involving only an in-state sale, sales in New York are discouraged. Had New York sought to eliminate the only competitive edge enjoyed by the regional exchanges as- a result of § 270, it could have done so without burdening commerce to its sister States by simply declaring that sales would not be a taxable event. Under that system, sellers who would not otherwise be liable for the tax would not incur liability by elect
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Ginsburg
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, and all but the final paragraph of Part IV, and an opinion with respect to Part II and the final paragraph of Part IV, in which The Chief Justice and Justice O’Con-nor join.
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD), 18 U. S. C. App. § 2, is a compact among 48 States, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Government. It enables a participating State to gain custody of a prisoner incarcerated in another jurisdiction, in order to try him on criminal charges. Article IV(c) of the IAD provides that trial of a transferred prisoner “shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving State, but for good cause shown in open court,... the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.” IAD Article V(c) states that when trial does not occur within the time prescribed, the charges shall be dismissed with prejudice.
The petitioner in this case, Orrin Scott Reed, was transferred in April 1983 from a federal prison in Indiana to state custody pursuant to an IAD request made by Indiana officials. Reed was tried in October of that year, following postponements made and explained in his presence in open court. Reed’s petition raises the question whether a state prisoner, asserting a violation of IAD Article IV(c)’s 120-day limitation, may enforce that speedy trial prescription in a federal habeas corpus action under 28 U. S. C. § 2254.
We hold that a state court’s failure to observe the 120-day rule of IAD Article IV(c) is not cognizable under §2254 when the defendant registered no objection to the trial date at the time it was set, and suffered no prejudice attributable to the delayed commencement. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
In December 1982, while petitioner Reed was serving time in a Terre Haute, Indiana, federal prison, the State of Indiana charged him with theft and habitual offender status. Indiana authorities lodged a detainer against Reed and, on April 27, 1983, took custody of him. The 120-day rule of IAD Article IV(c) thus instructed that, absent any continuance, Reed’s trial was to commence on or before August 25, 1983.
At two pretrial conferences, one on June 27, the other on August 1, the trial judge discussed with Reed (who chose to represent himself) and the prosecutor the number of days needed for the trial and the opening date. At the June 27 conference, the court set a July 18 deadline for submission of the many threshold motions Reed said he wished to file, and September 13 as the trial date. That trial date exceeded IAD Article IV(c)’s 120-day limit, but neither the prosecutor nor Reed called the IAD limit to the attention of the judge, and neither asked for a different trial date. Reed did indicate a preference for trial at a time when he would be out of jail on bond (or on his own recognizance); he informed the court that he would be released from federal custody two weeks before September 13, unless federal authorities revoked his “good days” credits, in which case he would be paroled on September 14. App. 39; see id., at 76.
At the August 1 pretrial conference, Reed noted his imminent release from federal custody and asked the court to set bond. Id., at 76-79. In response, the court set bond at $25,000. Also, because of a calendar conflict, the court reset the trial date to September 19. Id., at 79-81. Reed inquired about witness subpoenas and requested books on procedure, but again, he said nothing at the conference to alert the judge to Article IV(c)’s 120-day limit, nor did he express any other objection to the September 19 trial date.
Interspersed in Reed’s many written and oral pretrial motions are references to IAD provisions other than Article IV(c). See id., at 28-31, 44 (alleging illegality of transfer from federal to state custody without a pretransfer hearing); id., at 46 (asserting failure to provide hygienic care in violation of IAD Article V). Reed did refer to the IAD prescription on trial commencement in three of the written motions he filed during the 120-day period; indeed, one of these motions was filed on the very day of the August 1 pretrial conference. In none of the three motions, however, did Reed mention Article IV(c) or the September 13 trial date previously set. In contrast, on August 29, four days after the 120-day period expired, Reed presented a clear statement and citation. In a “Petition for Discharge,” he alleged that Indiana had failed to try him within 120 days of his transfer to state custody, and therefore had violated Article IV(c); consequently, he urged, the IAD mandated his immediate release. The trial judge denied the petition, explaining:
“Today is the first day I was aware that there was a 120 day limitation on the Detainer Act. The Court made its setting and while there has been a request for moving the trial forward, there has not been any speedy trial request filed, nor has there been anything in the nature of an objection to the trial setting, but only an urging that it be done within the guidelines that have been set out.” Id., at 113-114.
The morning trial was to commence, September 19, Reed filed a motion for continuance, saying he needed additional time for trial preparation. Id., at 128. A newspaper article published two days earlier had listed the names of persons called for jury duty and the 1954 to 1980 time frame of Reed’s alleged prior felony convictions. Concerned that the article might jeopardize the fairness of the trial, the judge offered Reed three options: (1) start the trial on schedule; (2) postpone it for one week; or (3) continue it to a late October date. Reed chose the third option, id., at 134, 142, and the trial began on October 18; the jury convicted Reed of theft, and found him a habitual offender. He received a sentence of 4 years in prison on the theft conviction, and 30 years on the habitual offender conviction, the terms to run consecutively.
The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. Reed v. State, 491 N. E. 2d 182 (1986). Concerning Reed’s objection that the trial commenced after the 120-day period specified in IAD Article IV(c), the Indiana Supreme Court stressed the timing of Reed’s pleas in court: Reed had vigorously urged at the August 1 pretrial conference other alleged IAD violations (particularly, his asserted right to a hearing in advance of the federal transfer to state custody), but he did not then object to the trial date. Id., at 184-185; see App. 67-74. “The relevant times when [Reed] should have objected were on June 27, 1983, the date the trial was set, and August 1,1983, the date the trial was reset,” the Indiana Supreme Court concluded. 491 N. E. 2d, at 185.
Reed unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief in the Indiana courts, and then petitioned under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 for a federal writ of habeas corpus. The District Court denied the petition. Examining the record, that court concluded that “a significant amount of the delay of trial is attributable to the many motions filed... by [Reed] or filed on [Reed’s] behalf”; delay chargeable to Reed, the court held, was excludable from the 120-day period. Reed v. Clark, Civ. No. S 90-226 (ND Ind., Sept. 21, 1990), App. 195-196.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Reed v. Clark, 984 F. 2d 209 (1993). Preliminarily, the Court of Appeals recognized that the IAD, although state law, is also a “law of the United States” within the meaning of § 2254(a). Id., at 210. Nonetheless, that court held collateral relief unavailable because Reed’s IAD speedy trial arguments and remedial contentions had been considered and rejected by the Indiana courts. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), the Court of Appeals concluded, “establishes the proper framework for evaluating claims under the IAD.” 984 F. 2d, at 213. In Stone, this Court held that the exclusionary rule, devised to promote police respect for the Fourth Amendment rights of suspects, should not be applied on collateral review unless the state court failed to consider the defendant’s arguments. We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. 963 (1993), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the availability of habeas review of IAD speedy trial claims.
II
A state prisoner may obtain federal habeas corpus relief “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Respondent Indiana initially argues that the IAD is a voluntary interstate agreement, not a “la[w]... of the United States” within the meaning of § 2254(a). Our precedent, however, has settled that issue: While the IAD is indeed state law, it is a law of the United States as well. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719 (1985) (§2254 case, holding that the IAD “is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the Compact Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 3, and thus is a federal law subject to federal construction”); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433,438-442 (1981) (“congressional consent transforms an interstate compact... into a law of the United States”).
The Court of Appeals recognized that the IAD is both a law of Indiana and a federal statute. 984 F. 2d, at 210. Adopting Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465 (1976), as its framework, however, that court held relief under § 2254 unavailable to Reed. 984 F. 2d, at 213. Stone holds that a federal court may not, under § 2254, consider a claim that evidence from an unconstitutional search was introduced at a state prisoner’s trial if the prisoner had “an opportunity for full and fair litigation of [the] claim in the state courts.” 428 U. S., at 469. Our opinion in Stone concentrated on “the nature and purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.” Id., at 481. The Court emphasized that its decision confined the exclusionary rule, not the scope of §2254 generally:
“Our decision today is not concerned with the scope of the habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims generally. We do reaffirm that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy rather than a personal constitutional right,... and we emphasize the minimal utility of the rule when sought to be applied to Fourth Amendment claims in a habeas corpus proceeding.” Id., at 495, n. 37 (emphasis in original).
We have “repeatedly declined to extend the rule in Stone beyond its original bounds.” Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 687 (1993) (holding that Stone does not apply to a state prisoner’s claim that his conviction rests on statements obtained in violation of the safeguards set out in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966)). Because precedent already in place suffices to resolve Reed’s case, we do not adopt the Seventh Circuit’s Stone-based rationale.
We have stated that habeas review is available to check violations of federal laws when the error qualifies as “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice [or] an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962); accord, United States v. Timmreck, 441 U. S. 780, 783 (1979); Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 346 (1974). The IAD's purpose — providing a nationally uniform means of transferring prisoners between jurisdictions — can be effectuated only by nationally uniform interpretation. See 984 F. 2d, at 214 (Ripple, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing in banc). Therefore, the argument that the compact would be undermined if a State’s courts resisted steadfast enforcement, with total insulation from §2254 review, is not without force. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S., at 526 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (institutional constraints preclude Supreme Court from overseeing adequately whether state courts have properly applied federal law). This case, however, gives us no cause to consider whether we would confront an omission of the kind contemplated in Hill, Timmreck, or Davis, if a state court, presented with a timely request to set a trial date within the IAD’s 120-day period, nonetheless refused to comply with Article IV(c).
When a defendant obscures Article IV(e)’s time prescription and avoids clear objection until the clock has run, cause for collateral review scarcely exists. An unwitting judicial slip of the kind involved here ranks with the nonconstitutional lapses we have held not cognizable in a postconviction proceeding. In Hill, for example, a federal prisoner sought collateral relief, under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, based on the trial court’s failure at sentencing to afford him an opportunity to make a statement and present information in mitigation of punishment, as required by Rule 32(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner, however, had not sought to assert his Rule 32(a) rights at the time of sentencing, a point we stressed:
“[W]e are not dealing here with a case where the defendant was affirmatively denied an opportunity to speak during the hearing at which his sentence was imposed. Nor is it suggested that in imposing the sentence the District Judge was either misinformed or uninformed as to any relevant circumstances. Indeed, there is no claim that the defendant would have had anything at all to say if he had been formally invited to speak.” 368 U. S., at 429.
“[W]hen all that is shown is a failure to comply with the formal requirements” of Rule 32(a), we held, “collateral relief is not available.” Ibid. But we left open the question whether “[collateral] relief would be available if a violation of Rule 32(a) occurred in the context of other aggravating circumstances.” Ibid.
Hill controlled our decision in United States v. Timmreck, 441 U. S. 780 (1979), where a federal prisoner sought collateral review, under § 2255, to set aside a conviction based on a guilty plea. The complainant in Timmreck alleged that the judge who accepted his plea failed to inform him, in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, that he faced a mandatory postincarceration special parole term. We rejected the collateral attack, observing that the violation of Rule 11 was technical, and did not “resul[t] in a ‘complete miscarriage of justice’ or in a proceeding ‘inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.’” Id., at 784, quoting Hill, 368 U. S., at 428. “As in Hill,” we found it unnecessary to consider whether “[postconviction] relief would be available if a violation of Rule 11 occurred in the context of other aggravating circumstances.” 441 U. S., at 784-785.
Reed’s case similarly lacks “aggravating circumstances” rendering “ ‘the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus... apparent.’ ” Hill, 368 U. S., at 428, quoting Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U. S. 19, 27 (1939). Reed had two clear chances to alert the trial judge in open court if he indeed wanted his trial to start on or before August 25,1993. He let both opportunities pass by. At the pretrial hearings at which the trial date was set and rescheduled, on June 27 and August 1, Reed not only failed to mention the 120-day limit; he indicated a preference for holding the trial after his release from federal imprisonment, which was due to occur after the 120 days expired. See supra, at 342. Then, on the 124th day, when it was no longer possible to meet Article IV(c)’s deadline, Reed produced his meticulously precise “Petition for Discharge.” See supra, at 344, and n. 4.
As the Court of Appeals observed, had Reed objected to the trial date on June 27 or August 1 “instead of burying his demand in a flood of other documents, the [trial] court could have complied with the IAD’s requirements.” 984 F. 2d, at 209-210. The Court of Appeals further elaborated:
“During the pretrial conference of August 1,1983, Reed presented several arguments based on the IAD, including claims that the federal government should have held a hearing before turning him over to the state and that his treatment in Indiana fell short of the state’s obligations under Art. V(d) and (h). Reed did not mention the fact that the date set for trial would fall outside the 120 days allowed by Art. IV(c). Courts often require litigants to flag important issues orally rather than bury vital (and easily addressed) problems in reams of paper, as Reed did. E. g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 30 (requiring a distinct objection to jury instructions); cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) (a district judge may require motions to be made orally). It would not have been difficult for the judge to advance the date of the trial or make a finding on the record of good cause, either of which would have satisfied Art. IV(c). Because the subject never came up, however, the trial judge overlooked the problem.” Id., at 213.
Reed regards the Court of Appeals’ description of his litigation conduct, even if true, as irrelevant. He maintains that the IAD dictates the result we must reach, for Article V(c) directs dismissal with prejudice when Article IV(c)’s time limit has passed. Article V(c) instructs only that “the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment... has been pending” — i e., the original trial court — shall dismiss the charges if trial does not commence within the time Article IV(c) prescribes. Article V(c) does not address the discrete question whether relief for violations of the IAD’s speedy trial provisions is available on collateral review. That matter is governed instead by the principles and precedent generally controlling availability of the great writ. See id., at 212. Referring to those guides, and particularly the Hill and Timmreck decisions, we conclude that a state court’s failure to observe the 120-day rule of IAD Article IV(c) is not cognizable under §2254 when the defendant registered no objection to the trial date at the time it was set, and suffered no prejudice attributable to the delayed commencement.
Ill
Reed argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the IAD’s speedy trial provision “effectuates a constitutional right,” the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial. Brief for Petitioner 26. Accordingly, he maintains, the alleged IAD violation should be treated as a constitutional violation or as a “fundamental defect” satisfying the Hill standard, not as a mere technical error. Reed’s argument is insubstantial for, as he concedes, his constitutional right to a speedy trial was in no way violated. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7.
Reed’s trial commenced 54 days after the 120-day period expired. He does not suggest that his ability to present a defense was prejudiced by the delay. Nor could he plausibly make such a claim. Indeed, asserting a need for more time to prepare for a trial that would be “fair and meaningful,” App. 128, Reed himself requested a delay beyond the scheduled September 19 opening. A showing of prejudice is required to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause, and that necessary ingredient is entirely missing here. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530 (1972) (four factors figure in the determination of Sixth Amendment speedy trial claims; one of the four is “prejudice to the defendant”).
IV
More strenuously, Reed argues that Hill and similar decisions establish a standard for federal prisoners seeking relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, not for state prisoners seeking relief under §2254. But it is scarcely doubted that, at least where mere statutory violations are at issue, “§2255 was intended to mirror §2254 in operative effect.” Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 344 (1974). Far from suggesting that the Hill standard is inapplicable to § 2254 cases, our decisions assume that Hill controls collateral review — under both §§2254 and 2255 — when a federal statute, but not the Constitution, is the basis for the postconviction attack. For example, in Stone v. Powell, a § 2254 case, we recalled “the established rule with respect to nonconstitutional claims” as follows: “[N]onconstitutional claims... can be raised on collateral review only if the alleged error constituted a ‘ “fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” 428 U. S., at 477, n. 10, quoting Davis, 417 U. S., at 346, quoting Hill, 368 U. S., at 428.
Reed nevertheless suggests that we invoked the fundamental defect standard in Hill and Timmreck for this sole reason: “So far as convictions obtained in the federal courts are concerned, the general rule is that the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed to do service for an appeal.” Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174, 178 (1947) (emphasis added). The same “general rule,” however, applies to § 2254. Where the petitioner — whether a state or federal prisoner — failed properly to raise his claim on direct review, the writ is available only if the petitioner establishes “cause” for the waiver and shows “actual prejudice resulting from the alleged... violation.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 84 (1977); id., at 87.
We see no reason to afford habeas review to a state prisoner like Reed, who let a time clock rim without alerting the trial court, yet deny collateral review to a federal prisoner similarly situated. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U. S. 536, 542 (1976) (“ ‘Plainly the interest in finality is the same with regard to both federal and state prisoners.... There is no reason to.... give greater preclusive effect to procedural defaults by federal defendants than to similar defaults by state defendants.’ ”) (quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 228 (1969)); see also United States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 167-168 (1982) (collateral review of procedurally defaulted claims is subject to same “cause and actual prejudice” standard, whether the claim is brought by a state prisoner under § 2254 or a federal prisoner under § 2255).
Reed contends that the scope of review should be broader under § 2254 than under § 2255, because state prisoners, unlike their federal counterparts, have “had no meaningful opportunity to have a federal court consider any federal claim.” Brief for Petitioner 34. But concern that state courts might be hostile to the federal law here at stake is muted by two considerations. First, we have reserved the question whether federal habeas review is available to check violations of the IAD’s speedy trial prescriptions when the state court disregards timely pleas for their application. See supra, at 349. Second, the IAD is both federal law.and the law of Indiana. Ind. Code §35-33-10-4 (1993). As the Court of Appeals noted: “We have no more reason to suppose that the Supreme Court of Indiana seeks to undermine the IAD than we have to suppose that it seeks to undermine any other law of Indiana.” 984 F. 2d, at 211.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
Justice Scalia,
with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join all the Court’s opinion except Part II, and the last paragraph of Part IV (which incorporates some of the analysis of Part II). I thus agree that the “fundamental defect” test of Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 428 (1962), is the appropriate standard for evaluating alleged statutory violations under both §§2254 and 2255, see ante, at 352-354, but I disagree with what seems to me (in Part II) too parsimonious an application of that standard.
I
This Court has long applied equitable limitations to narrow the broad sweep of federal habeas jurisdiction. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 715-721 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One class of those limitations consists of substantive restrictions upon the type of claim that will be entertained. Hill, for example, holds that the claim of a federal statutory violation will not be reviewed unless it alleges “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice [o]r an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” 368 U. S., at 428. Most statutory violations, at least when they do not occur “in the context of other aggravating circumstances,” are simply not important enough to invoke the extraordinary habeas jurisdiction. Id., at 429. See also United States v. Timmreck, 441 U. S. 780, 783-785 (1979).
Although Justice Ginsburg concludes that an unobjected-to violation of thé Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD), 18 U. S. C. App. § 2, is not “ ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice [or] an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure,’ ” she declines to decide whether that judgment would be altered “if a state court, presented with a timely request to set a trial date within the IAD’s 120-day period, nonetheless refused to comply with Article IV(c),” ante, at 348, 349. To avoid the latter question, she conducts an analysis of how petitioner waived his IAD rights. See ante, at 350-351. The issue thus avoided is not a constitutional one, and the avoiding of it (when the answer is so obvious) may invite a misunderstanding of the Hill test. The class of procedural rights that are not guaranteed by the Constitution (which includes the Due Process Clauses), but that nonetheless are inherently necessary to avoid “a complete miscarriage of justice,” or numbered among “the rudimentary demands of fair procedure,” is no doubt a small one, if it is indeed not a null set. The guarantee of trial within 120 days of interjurisdictional transfer unless good cause is shown — a provision with no application to prisoners involved with only a single jurisdiction or incarcerated in one of the two States that do not participate in the voluntary IAD compact — simply cannot be among that select class of statutory rights.
As for Hill and Timmreck’s reservation of the question whether habeas would be available “in the context of other aggravating circumstances,” that seems to me clearly a reference to circumstances that cause additional prejudice to the defendant, thereby elevating the error to a fundamental defect or a denial of rudimentary procedural requirements— not a reference to circumstances that make the trial judge’s behavior more willful or egregious. I thus think it wrong to suggest that if only petitioner had not waived his IAD speedy trial rights by failing to assert them in a timely fashion, “aggravating circumstances” might exist. See ante, at 349, 350-351. That says, in effect, that “aggravating circumstances” which can entitle a mere statutory violation to habeas review may consist of the mere fact that the statutory violation was not waived. Surely that sucks the life out of Hill Nor do I accept Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion that an interest in uniform interpretation of the IAD might counsel in favor of habeas review in a nonwaiver situation. See ante, at 348-349. I see no reason why this Court’s direct review of state and federal decisions will not suffice for that purpose, as it does in most other contexts. Cf. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 442 (1981). More importantly, however, federal habeas jurisdiction was not created with the intent, nor should we seek to give it the effect, of altering the fundamental disposition that this Court, and not individual federal district judges, has appellate jurisdiction, as to federal questions, over the supreme courts of the States.
If there was ever a technical rule, the IAD’s 120-day limit is one. I think we produce confusion by declining to state the obvious: that violation of that technicality, intentional or unintentional, neither produces nor is analogous to (1) lack of jurisdiction of the convicting court, (2) constitutional violation, or (3) miscarriage of justice or denial of rudimentary procedures. It is no basis for federal habeas relief.
II
In addition to substantive limitations on the equitable exercise of habeas jurisdiction, the Court has imposed procedural restrictions. For example, a habeas claim cognizable under § 2255 (the correlative of § 2254 for federal prisoners), such as a constitutional claim, will not be heard if it was procedurally defaulted below, absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice. See United States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152, 167-168 (1982). And claims will ordinarily not be entertained under § 2255 that have already been rejected on direct review. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 227, n. 8 (1969); see also Withrow, 507 U. S., at 720-721 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (collecting cases showing that lower courts have uniformly followed the Kaufman dictum). Together, these two rules mean that “a prior opportunity for full and fair litigation is normally dispositive of a federal prisoner’s habeas claim.” 507 U. S., at 721.
Although this procedural limitation has not been raised as a defense in the present case, I note my view that, at least where mere statutory violations are at issue, a prior opportunity for full and fair litigation precludes a state-prisoner petition no less than a federal-prisoner petition. As the Court today reaffirms, “ ‘§ 2255 was intended to mirror § 2254 in operative effect.’” Ante, at 353, quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333, 344 (1974). Cf. Frady, supra, at 166. Otherwise a prisoner, like petitioner, transferred from federal to state prison under the IAD would have three chances to raise his claim (state direct, state habeas, and § 2254) while a prisoner transferred from state to federal prison under the IAD would have only one. Since the present petitioner raised his IAD claim on direct appeal in the Indiana courts and on state habeas review, his federal habeas claim could have been rejected on the ground that the writ ordinarily will not be used to readjudicate fully litigated statutory claims.
Justice Blackmun,
with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter join, dissenting.
The federal habeas corpus statute allows a state prisoner to challenge his conviction on the ground that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(a). The Court acknowledges, as it must, that the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a “la[w]... of the United States” under this statute. See Carchman v. Nash, 473 U. S. 716, 719 (1985); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 438-442 (1981). In addition, respondents concede that a defendant tried in clear violation of the IAD’s 120-day limit would be held in custody in violation of a law of the United States. Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. Nevertheless, the Court appears to conclude that a violation of the IAD is simply not serious enough to warrant collateral relief, at least where the defendant fails to invoke his IAD rights according to the precise rules the Court announces for the first time today.
The Court purports to resolve this case by relying on “precedent already in place,” ante, at 348, referring to “principles and precedent generally controlling availability of the great writ,” ante, at 352. Our precedent, on its face, does not reach nearly so far, and its extension to this case is unwarranted under general habeas corpus principles. Most seriously, the Court disregards Congress’ unambiguous judgment about the severity of, and the necessary remedy for, a violation of the IAD time limits. I respectfully dissent.
I
The Court purports to resolve this issue by relying on the Hill-Timmreck line of cases. See Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424 (1962); Davis v. United States, 417 U. S. 333 (1974); United States v. Timmreck, 441 U. S. 780 (1979); see also Sunal v. Large, 332 U. S. 174 (1947); United States v. Frady, 456 U. S. 152 (1982). Despite the professed narrowness of the Court’s ultimate holding, however, its decision reflects certain assumptions about the nature of habeas review of state court judgments that do not withstand close analysis. Each of the cases relied on by the majority — Hill, Timmreck, and Davis — concerned a federal prisoner’s request under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 for collateral relief from alleged defects in his federal trial. Before today, this Court never had applied those precedents to bar review of a § 2254 petition. It does so now without a full discussion of, or appreciation for, the different policy concerns that should shape the exercise of federal courts’ discretion in § 2254 cases.
A
While there are stray remarks in our opinions suggesting that this Court has treated §§2254 and 2255 as equivalents, there are other indications to the contrary, see, e. g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U. S. 680, 715 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In any event, there are sound reasons to refrain from treating the two as identical.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this appeal is whether appellants had a constitutional right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the assistance of their own counsel in giving testimony as witnesses at a proceeding conducted by the Ohio State Fire Marshal to investigate the causes of a fire.
After a fire occurred on the premises of a corporation owned and operated by appellants, the Fire Marshal started an investigation into the causes of the fire and subpoenaed appellants to appear as witnesses. The Fire Marshal refused to permit appellants’ counsel to be present at the proceeding, relying on § 3737.13 of the Ohio Code, which provides that the “investigation may be private” and that he may “exclude from the place where [the] investigation is held all persons other than those required to be present . ...” Appellants declined to be sworn and to testify without the immediate presence of their counsel, who had accompanied them to the hearing. Their refusal was treated as a violation of § 3737.12, which provides that “No witness shall refuse to be sworn or refuse to testify . . . .” Section 3737.99 (A) provides that “Whoever violates section 3737.12 . . . may be summarily punished, by the officer concerned, by . . . commitment to the county jail until such person is willing to comply with the order of such officer.” The Fire Marshal accordingly committed appellants to the county jail until such time as they should be willing to testify. Appellants’ application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, and this denial was affirmed on appeal by the Ohio Court of Appeals and by the Ohio Supreme Court.
We postponed further consideration of the question of jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 351 U. S. 903. The Ohio Supreme Court construed § 3737.13 to authorize the Fire Marshal to exclude appellants’ counsel from the proceeding. Since appellants’ attack is on the constitutionality of that section, we have jurisdiction on appeal. 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (2).
We note at the outset that appellants explicitly disavow making any direct attack on the Fire Marshal’s power of summary punishment under § 3737.99 (A). They challenge not the validity of the procedure by which they were committed to jail, but the constitutional sufficiency of the grounds on which they were so committed. Their sole assertion is that the Fire Marshal’s authority to exclude counsel under § 3737.13 was unconstitutional because they had a right, under the Due Process Clause, to the assistance of their counsel in giving their testimony.
It is clear that a defendant in a state criminal trial has an unqualified right, under the Due Process Clause, to be heard through his own counsel. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U. S. 3. Prosecution of an individual differs widely from administrative investigation of incidents damaging to the economy or dangerous to the public. The proceeding before the Fire Marshal was not a criminal trial, nor was it an administrative proceeding that would in any way adjudicate appellants’ responsibilities for the fire. It was a proceeding solely to elicit facts relating to the causes and circumstances of the fire. The Fire Marshal’s duty was to “determine whether the fire was the result of carelessness or design,” and to arrest any person against whom there was sufficient evidence on which to base a charge of arson.
The fact that appellants were under a legal duty to speak and that their testimony might provide a basis for criminal charges against them does not mean that they had a constitutional right to the assistance of their counsel. Appellants here are witnesses from whom information was sought as to the cause of the fire. A witness before a grand jury cannot insist, as a matter of constitutional right, on being represented by his counsel, nor can a witness before other investigatory bodies. There is no more reason to allow the presence of counsel before a Fire Marshal trying in the public interest to determine the cause of a fire. Obviously in these situations evidence obtained may possibly lay a witness open to criminal charges. When such charges are made in a criminal proceeding, he then may demand the presence of his counsel for his defense. Until then his protection is the privilege against self-incrimination. U. S. Const., Amend. V; Ohio Const., Art. I, § 10. See Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 52. This is a privilege available in investigations as well as in prosecutions. See In re Groban, 164 Ohio St. 26, 28, 128 N. E. 2d 106, 108, and 99 Ohio App. 512, 515, 135 N. E. 2d 477, 479-480; McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U. S. 34, 40; Adams v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 179. We have no doubt that the privilege is available in Ohio against prosecutions as well as convictions reasonably feared. Cf. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 431. The mere fact that suspicion may be entertained of such a witness, as appellants believed existed here, though without allegation of facts to support such a belief, does not bar the taking of testimony in a private investigatory proceeding.
It may be that the number of people present in a grand jury proceeding gives greater assurance that improper use will not be made of the witness’ presence. We think, however, that the presumption of fair and orderly conduct by the state officials without coercion or distortion exists until challenged by facts to the contrary. Possibility of improper exercise of opportunity to examine is not in our judgment a sound reason to set aside a State’s procedure for fire prevention. As in similar situations, abuses may be corrected as they arise, for example, by excluding from subsequent prosecutions evidence improperly obtained.
Ohio, like many other States, maintains a division of the state government directed by the Fire Marshal for the prevention of fires and reduction of fire losses. Section 3737.13, which has been in effect since 1900, represents a determination by the Ohio Legislature that investigations conducted in private may be the most effective method of bringing to light facts concerning the origins of fires, and, in the long run, of reducing injuries and losses from fires caused by negligence or by design. We cannot say that this determination is unreasonable. The presence of advisors to witnesses might easily so far encumber an investigatory proceeding as to make it unworkable or unwieldy. And with so weighty a public interest as fire prevention to protect, we cannot hold that the balance has been set in such a way as to be contrary to “fundamental principles of liberty and justice.” Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 316. That is the test to measure the validity of a state statute under the Due Process Clause.
Appellants urge, however, that the Fire Marshal’s power to exclude counsel under § 3737.13 must be considered in the light of his power of summary punishment under § 3737.99 (A), and they would have us hold that, so considered, his power to exclude counsel was unconstitutional. We held in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, that a witness before a one-man grand jury, a judge, could not constitutionally be punished summarily for contempt of the grand jury without being allowed to be represented by his counsel. We see no relation between the premise that appellants could not be punished without representation by counsel and the conclusion that they could not be questioned without such representation. Section 3737.13 may contain a constitutional flaw if it should be construed to authorize the exclusion of counsel while the Fire Marshal determines that a witness has violated § 3737.12 and orders the witness committed. The sole assertion of a constitutional violation that appellants relied upon before the Ohio Supreme Court and the only one open on the record here — the authorization in § 3737.13 of the exclusion of counsel while a witness testifies — is not well founded. We hold that appellants had no constitutional right to be assisted by their counsel in giving testimony at the investigatory proceeding conducted by the Fire Marshal, and that § 3737.13, insofar as it authorizes the exclusion of counsel while a witness testifies, is not repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Affirmed.
Page’s Ohio Rev. Code, 1954, § 3737.13.
Appellants were released on bond and have never in fact been incarcerated.
In re Groban, 99 Ohio App. 512, 135 N. E. 2d 477; 164 Ohio St. 26, 128 N. E. 2d 106.
Page’s Ohio Rev. Code, 1954, §§ 3737.08, 3737.10.
In re Black, 47 F. 2d 542; accord, United States v. Blanton, 77 F. Supp. 812; see United States v. Scully, 225 F. 2d 113, 116.
Bowles v. Baer, 142 F. 2d 787; United States v. Levine, 127 F. Supp. 651. Note, Rights of Witnesses in Administrative Investigations, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1214, 1216-1217.
Cf. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422; Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486; Smith v. United States, 337 U. S. 137, 150; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 66-67.
See National Fire Protection Association Handbook of Fire Protection (10th ed. 1948) 41-45; Annual Report of the Division of [Ohio] State Fire Marshal for 1955.
Ohio Laws 1900, Senate Bill No. 51.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Involved in this case are 11 sales of concentrated phosphate made between 1961 and 1966 by appellee association. The phosphate was supplied by the association’s members, which are all producers of fertilizer, and was then shipped to the Republic of Korea under the United States foreign aid program. The Government, in a civil antitrust complaint filed on December 21, 1964, contended that the concerted activities of the association and its members in regard to these 11 sales violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 1. Appellees defended on the ground, inter alia, that their activities were exempted from antitrust liability by § 2 of the Webb-Pomerene Act, 40 Stat. 517 (1918), 15 U. S. C. § 62, as “act[s] done in the course of export trade.” The trial court held that the Webb-Pomerene Act did immunize appellees’ conduct, 273 F. Supp. 263 (1967), and dismissed the complaint. The Government perfected a direct appeal to this Court under the Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 29. Probable jurisdiction was noted, 390 ü. S. 1001 (1968).
I.
We are met at the outset with appellees’ contention that this case is now moot. Appellees’ argument rests on two events which occurred after the case had been submitted to the District Court. On January 1, 1967, the Agency for International Development (AID), the State Department agency in charge of the foreign aid program, amended its regulations to preclude Webb-Pomerene associations from bidding on certain procurement contracts whenever procurement was limited to United States suppliers. According to appellees, this new regulation made it uneconomical for the association to continue in operation, since a large proportion of AID-financed procurement is limited to American sources. Accordingly, on December 28, 1967, appellee association dissolved itself. The new regulation and the dissolution, we are told, moot this case.
Two factors make this argument untenable. First of all, the dissolved association was not the only defendant in this case. The Government sought injunctive relief against the association’s members as well; they were to be prohibited from forming any new export associations without court approval and from continuing in effect any prices jointly agreed upon. Therefore, even if dissolution would have made it impossible to frame effective relief were the association the only party, here there is no such difficulty. Secondly, the new AID regulation does not apply to all contracts on which the former members of the association might bid. Whenever foreign bidders are eligible, AID still permits American Webb-Pomerene associations to compete. In fact, foreign bidders were eligible in all 11 of the transactions which gave rise to this suit. Therefore, however much the new regulation may reduce the practical importance of this case, it does not completely remove the controversy. Absent the relief prayed for, appellees would be free to act in concert in certain situations where the Government contends they must compete.
The test for mootness in cases such as this is a stringent one. Mere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case; if it did, the courts would be compelled to leave “[t]he defendant . . . free to return to his old ways.” United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632 (1953); see, e. g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290 (1897). A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. But here we have only appellees’ own statement that it would be uneconomical for them to engage in any further joint operations. Such a statement, standing alone, cannot suffice to satisfy the heavy burden of persuasion which we have held rests upon those in appellees’ shoes. United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S., at 633. Of course it is still open to appellees to show, on remand, that the likelihood of further violations is sufficiently remote to make injunctive relief unnecessary. Id., at 633-636. This is a matter for the trial judge. But this case is not technically moot, an appeal has been properly taken, and we have no choice but to decide it.
II.
The 11 transactions involved in this case were not simple cash purchases by the Republic of Korea. Not only were they financed by the United States Government; AID retained effective control over them at every stage.
The transactions involved were controlled by an impressive network of international treaties and agreements, as well as by American statutes, regulations, and administrative procedures. The procurement process, as revealed by the stipulated record, was rather involved. It began when funds were appropriated by Congress. Those funds were allocated to various development programs by AID, in accordance with the provisions of the applicable statutes and AID’s assessments of its priorities. The money allocated to Korea by this process was not simply shipped to Seoul, to be used as Korea wished. In fact, most of it never left this country. In accordance with a series of agreements, Korea was authorized to request that the United States finance purchases of certain “eligible commodities.” A rather complicated “Procurement Authorization Application” was then prepared on an AID form for Korean signature. The application sets forth not only the goods to be purchased but also rather detailed specifications of quality, delivery plans, bidding procedures, and a statement explaining Korea’s need for the goods. Even though AID officials obviously must have participated in drafting these “requests,” AID was in no way obligated to approve them. The agreement with Korea specifically states that AID “may decline to finance any specific commodity or service when, in its judgment, such financing would be inconsistent with the purposes of this grant or of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.” When each transaction was approved, a “Procurement Authorization” was issued by AID; it was specifically made subject to detailed regulations which specify the procedures to be followed in awarding any contracts. It also contained an authorization to a specified American bank to pay for the goods to be procured.
After AID had in this way chosen what goods were to be purchased, either of two methods of procurement was used. In two cases, the Government itself let the contracts, through its General Services Administration. In the other nine cases, the formal act of letting the contracts was performed by the Office of Supply of the Republic of Korea (OSROK). In performing this task, the Koreans were subject to detailed regulation by AID. The invitation for bids even had to be submitted to AID so that it could be circulated in this country. All documents had to be in English, and criteria for selecting the winning contractors were carefully defined in advance. An abstract of bids received and a notice naming the contractor selected had to be sent to Washington. Finally, a letter of credit was issued, the supplier paid, and the payor bank reimbursed by the United States Treasury. The goods were shipped consigned to OSROK, but AID — as a last precaution — reserved the right to vest title in itself if “such action is necessary to assure compliance with the provisions or purposes of any act of Congress.” 22 CFR § 201.44 (1968).
We are asked to decide whether transactions of this sort constitute “act[s] done in the course of export trade,” within the meaning of the Webb-Pomerene exemption from the Sherman Act. Although the Webb-Pomerene Act has been on the statute books for a half century, this is the first time this Court has been called upon to interpret the meaning of the words “export trade.” Upon a full consideration of the language, the purpose, and the legislative history of the statute, we reverse the judgment below.
III.
The Webb-Pomerene Act was passed “to aid and encourage our manufacturers and producers to extend our foreign trade.” H. R. Rep. No. 1118, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1916). Congress felt that American firms needed the power to form joint export associations in order to compete with foreign cartels. But while Congress was willing to create an exemption from the antitrust laws to serve this narrow purpose, the exemption created was carefully hedged in to avoid substantial injury to domestic interests. Congress evidently made the economic judgment that joint export associations could increase American foreign trade without depriving American consumers of the main advantages of competition.
This reading of the Act is confirmed both by its structure and its legislative history. The Act itself contains a number of provisos obviously designed to protect domestic interests from the combinations Congress was authorizing. No act done by the export association could be “in restraint of trade within the United States/’ § 2, 15 U. S. C. § 62; the words “export trade” were to exclude, among other things, “selling for consumption . . . within the United States,” § 1, 15 U. S. C. § 61; and the association was forbidden to enter into any agreement “which artificially or intentionally enhances or depresses prices within the United States . . . , or which substantially lessens competition within the United States or otherwise restrains trade therein,” § 2, 15 U. S. C. § 62.
The legislative history is even more explicit. During the hearings on the bill, one Congressman, Charles C. Carlin of Virginia, stated clearly what was later to be one of the dominant themes of the floor debate. In a question addressed to the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, who was testifying in support of the bill, he said:
“I am frank to say that personally I have no sympathy with what a foreigner pays for our products; I would like to see the American manufacturers get the largest price possible, but if by indirection we are going to set up a system which is going to fix a higher price eventually at home, through a combination as suggested in this bill, I think you can very well see that such a system is a very dangerous one.” Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 16707, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1916).
The same theme was reiterated on the floor by the Act’s two main sponsors. Senator Pomerene said bluntly, “[W]e have not reached that high plane of business morals which will permit us to extend the same privileges to the peoples of the earth outside of the United States that we extend to those within the United States.” 55 Cong. Rec. 2787 (1917). And Congressman Webb declared, “I would be willing that there should be a combination between anybody or anything for the purpose of capturing the trade of the world, if they do not punish the people of the United States in doing it.” 55 Cong. Rec. 3580 (1917).
In this atmosphere, the Act was passed. It is clear what Congress was doing; it thought it could increase American exports by depriving foreigners of the benefits of competition among American firms, without in any significant way injuring American consumers. Cf. United States Alkali Export Assn. v. United States, 325 U. S. 196, 211 (1945). The validity of this economic judgment is not for us to question, but it is quite relevant in interpreting the language Congress chose. The question before us is whether Congress meant its exemption to insulate transactions initiated, controlled, and financed by the American Government, just because a foreign government is the nominal “purchaser.” We think it did not.
In interpreting the antitrust laws, we are not bound by formal conceptions of contract law. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U. S. 13 (1964). We must look at the economic reality of the relevant transactions. Here, although the fertilizer shipments were consigned to Korea and although in most cases Korea formally let the contracts, American participation was the overwhelmingly dominant feature. The burden of noncompetitive pricing fell, not on any foreign purchaser, but on the American taxpayer. The United States was, in essence, furnishing fertilizer to Korea. AID selected the commodity, determined the amount to be purchased, controlled the contracting process, and paid the bill. The foreign elements in the transactions were, by comparison, insignificant. It stretches neither the language nor the purpose of the Act to determine that such sales are not “exports.”
Appellees contend that a contrary result should be reached because they were competing for contracts with foreign suppliers. Evidently, it is their contention that they therefore fall within the class which Congress intended to allow to form export associations. But AID has already given American suppliers great competitive advantages in their battle with foreign firms. The governing statute requires a preference for American procurement. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 604, 75 Stat. 439, 22 U. S. C. § 2354. On none of the contracts involved here were any of the major trading nations of the world eligible to compete; procurement was limited essentially to the United States and the underdeveloped countries. To say that American producers need an additional stimulus to be able to compete strains credulity. The major impact of allowing the combination appellees desire would not be to encourage American exports; it would be to place the burden of noncompetitive pricing on the shoulders of the American taxpayer. But whatever the impact on exports might be, it is clear that the framers of the Webb-Pomerene Act did not intend that Americans should be deprived of the main benefits of competition among American firms. Since in all relevant aspects the transactions involved here were American, not Korean, we hold that they are not “export trade” within the meaning of the Webb-Pomerene Act. On remand, the District Court may decide the other issues relevant to a resolution of the controversy.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Harlan took no part in the decision of this case.
Appellee-members are American Cyanamid Co., W. It. Grace & Co., International Minerals & Chemical Corp., Tennessee Corp., and Mobil Oil Corp. Not all of these companies were members during the entire period involved in this case; the association was dissolved on December 28, 1967.
“Nothing contained in sections 1-7 of this title shall be construed as declaring to be illegal an association entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade and actually engaged solely in such export trade, or an agreement made or act done in the course of export trade by such association, provided such association, agreement, or act is not in restraint of trade within the United States, and is not in restraint of the export trade of any domestic competitor of such association: Provided, That such association does not, either in the United States or elsewhere, enter into any agreement, understanding, or conspiracy, or do any act which artificially or intentionally enhances or depresses prices within the United States of commodities of the class exported by such association, or which substantially lessens competition within the United States or otherwise restrains trade therein.''
Section 1 of the Act, 40 Stat. 516 (1918), 15 U. S. C. §61, defines “export trade” as “solely trade or commerce in goods, wares, or merchandise exported, or in the course of being exported from the United States or any Territory thereof to any foreign nation; but the words ‘export trade’ shall not be deemed to include the production, manufacture, or selling for consumption or for resale, within the United States or any Territory thereof, of such goods, wares, or merchandise, or any act in the course of such production, manufacture, or selling for consumption or for resale.”
31 Fed. Reg. 16693 (1966), codified as 22 CFR §§201.01 (v), 201.52 (a) (7), Appendix D (1968). The amended regulation applies only to certain specified commodities.
Motion to Affirm or Dismiss 5, 14-15.
See AID, Operations Report, Fiscal Year 1967, p. 74. The very large percentage of foreign aid procurement actually coming from American sources exceeds that required by regulation.
Appellees contend that economic factors dictated the dissolution, supra, n. 4, and the Government does not argue that the dissolution was related to the fact that a notice of appeal in this case was filed on November 9, 1967.
The Government evidently does not contest the "export” status of two fertilizer sales to Korea made in 1962. One was paid for by Korea’s own foreign exchange funds; the other was financed out of a special stabilization fund granted by the United States. The use of this latter fund was not as fully controlled as were the grants which financed the 11 purchases involved here.
This particular limitation to a specific list of commodities is contained in the record in a Program Assistance Grant Agreement, dated November 29, 1965. Appendix 108, 116. Although this agreement could not have applied to the earlier transactions involved here, the stipulated record contains only examples — and not a complete compilation — of all the documents involved. In any case, earlier agreements which are included in the record contain limitations which give the Government equivalent powers. See, e. g., Appendix 81.
These regulations are collected in 22 CFB, §201 (1968).
The Government raises no questions under any of the various provisos included in the Webb-Pomerene Act. Accordingly, we intimate no opinion about their scope.
There was a brief mention during the congressional debates of the existence of American loans to European nations whose purchasing power might be reduced by higher American export prices. See 55 Cong. Rec. 2789 (1917). Such an isolated statement cannot determine the meaning of a statute. But in any case, it is clear that America’s World War I loans bear little if any resemblance to the modern foreign aid program. Not only was it expected that they would be repaid, but also the loans were not made subject to the detailed American administrative control typical of today’s foreign aid program.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
H
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
Lawrence Nelson was convicted of one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base. See 21 U. S. C. § 846. The District Court calculated Nelson’s sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and imposed a sentence of 360 months in prison (the bottom of the range). During sentencing, the judge explained that under Fourth Circuit precedent, “ ‘the Guidelines are considered presumptively reasonable,’ ” so that “ ‘unless there’s a good reason in the [statutory sentencing] factors ..., the Guideline sentence is the reasonable sentence.’” Pet. for Cert. 10.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Nelson’s conviction and sentence. United States v. Nelson, 237 Fed. Appx. 819 (2007) (per curiam). It noted that within-Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable, and rejected Nelson’s argument that the District Court’s reliance on that presumption was error. Id., at 821.
Nelson filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. We granted the petition, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of Rita v. United States, 551 U. S. 338 (2007). Nelson v. United States, 552 U. S. 1163 (2008).
On remand and without further briefing, the Fourth Circuit again affirmed the sentence. 276 Fed. Appx. 331 (2008) (per curiam). The court acknowledged that under Rita, while courts of appeals “may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines,” 551 U. S., at 347, “the sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply,” id., at 351. Instead, the sentencing court must first calculate the Guidelines range, and then consider what sentence is appropriate for the individual defendant in light of the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a), explaining any variance from the former with reference to the latter. Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit upheld the sentence, finding that the District Court did not treat the Guidelines as “mandatory” but rather understood that they were only advisory. 276 Fed. Appx., at 333.
Nelson has again filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, reasserting, inter alia, essentially the same argument he made before us the first time: that the District Court’s statements clearly indicate that it impermissibly applied a presumption of reasonableness to his Guidelines range. The United States admits that the Fourth Circuit erred in rejecting that argument following our remand; we agree.
Our cases do not allow a sentencing court to presume that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range is reasonable. In Rita we said as much, in fairly explicit terms: “We repeat that the presumption before us is an appellate court presumption. . . . [T]he sentencing court does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should apply.” 551 U. S., at 351. And in Gall v. United States, 552 U. S. 38 (2007), we reiterated that district judges, in considering how the various statutory sentencing factors apply to an individual defendant, “may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.” Id., at 50.
In this case, the Court of Appeals quoted the above language from Rita but affirmed the sentence anyway after finding that the District Judge did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory. That is true, but beside the point. The Guidelines are not only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are also not to be presumed reasonable. We think it plain from the comments of the sentencing judge that he did apply a presumption of reasonableness to Nelson’s Guidelines range. Under our recent precedents, that constitutes error.
The petition for certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Reed
delivered the opinion of the Court.
These appeals, by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and by the intervenor, Regular Common Carrier Conference of American Trucking Associations, Inc., from the judgment of a three-judge federal district court setting aside two orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and entering a permanent injunction, raise questions similar to those discussed in No. 25, United States v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co., ante, p. 419, decided today. The questions relate to the power of the Commission to ban service practices theretofore permitted under certificates of public convenience and necessity previously issued to a common carrier by motor vehicle. The Commission acted under authority reserved in the certificate to impose additional restrictions to insure that the motor carrier’s operations will be auxiliary to or supplemental of the operations of its parent common carrier by rail.
The Texas and Pacific Motor Transport Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Texas and Pacific Railway, operating a system of regular routes for the carriage of freight, from New Orleans to El Paso, Texas, and Lovington, New Mexico, roughly paralleling the lines of the railway and its subsidiaries. Transport was organized in 1929 to provide a local pick-up and delivery service in connection with rail transportation between points on the lines of the railway. Its first over-the-road common-carrier operation, between Monahans, Texas, and Loving-ton, New Mexico, was inaugurated just before the effective date of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. It extended its operations by obtaining certificates of convenience and necessity from the Commission, both under § 213 of the 1935 Act, now § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, providing for acquisition of established rights by purchase from other carriers (“grandfather” rights); and under § 207 of the Interstate Commerce Act, providing for new operations.
Between July 1939 and November 1942, the Commission issued sixteen certificates to Transport, covering various segments of its presently operating routes. In all the certificates the Commission reserved the right to impose further restrictions in order to confine Transport’s operation to service “auxiliary to, or supplemental of, rail service.” This condition was expressed in either one of the two forms set out in the margin. In addition, each certificate contained one or more, usually more, further conditions: (1) That the service to be performed was to be “auxiliary to, or supplemental of” the rail service. (2) That only railway station points were to be served. (3) Either that (a) all shipments should be made on a through rail bill of lading, including a prior or subsequent rail movement; or (b) that no shipments should be made between certain “key points” on the rail line, or through more than one of them. And (4) that the contractual arrangements between Transport and Railway be subject to modification by the Commission.
The irregular incidence of these conditions in the certificates may be accounted for by the segmentary fashion in which Transport built up its system of routes, over a period of several years. They were not reconsidered as a group by the Commission until 1943, when, in response to a petition by Transport, to determine what modification should be made in its certificate No. MC-50544 (Sub-No. 11), particularly in regard to service for freight between El Paso and Sierra Blanca, Texas, for the Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company, it reopened nine of the certificate proceedings to consider whether Transport could join with other motor carriers in rates, some of which provided for substituting rail service for motor service. The Commission held that
“Since petitioner’s certificates limit the service to be performed to that which is auxiliary to or supplemental of the rail service of the railway [in some the limitation was by reservation], it is without authority to engage in operations unconnected with the rail service and, accordingly, may not properly be a party to tariffs containing all-motor or joint rates, nor participate in a directory providing for the substitution of train service for motor-vehicle service at its option. To the extent petitioner is performing or participating in all-motor movements on the bills of lading of a motor carrier and at all-motor rates, it is performing a motor service in competition with the rail service and the service of existing motor carriers; and, to the extent it is substituting rail service for motor-vehicle service, the rail service is auxiliary to or supplemental of the motor-vehicle service rather than the motor-vehicle service being auxiliary to or supplemental of rail service.”
The Commission did not issue any affirmative order, but directed Transport to modify its service in accordance with the findings, within a reasonable time.
Transport and Railway then petitioned jointly for reconsideration, or for further hearings, including hearings on certain other certificates; and, although the two petitioners later attempted to withdraw their petition on the ground that permission to file a joint tariff had been granted, the Commission nevertheless ordered that the proceedings be reopened in all sixteen certificates, and three Temporary Authorities, “solely to determine what, if any, changes or modifications should be made in the conditions contained in the outstanding certificates of public convenience and necessity . . . .”
After a hearing at which Transport and Railway appeared, but refused to introduce any evidence, and after oral argument on the examiner’s report, the Commission on January 22, 1948, ordered that all sixteen certificates be modified to include uniformly the substance of the five conditions set out above, specifically as follows:
“1. The service to be performed by applicant shall be limited to service which is auxiliary to, or supplemental of, the train service of The Texas and Pacific Railway Company, The Weatherford, Mineral Wells and Northwestern Railway Company, or Texas-New Mexico Railway Company, and, between El Paso and Sierra Blanca, Tex., the train service of Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company, hereinafter called the railways.
“2. Applicant shall not render any service to or from any point not a station on a rail line of the railways.
“3. No shipments shall be transported by applicant between any of the following points, or through, or to, or from, more than one of said points: New Orleans, Alexandria, and Shreveport, La., Tex-arkana, Tex.-Ark., Fort Worth-Dallas, (considered as one), Abilene, Monahans, and El Paso, Tex.
“4. All contractual arrangements between applicant and the railways shall be reported to us and shall be subject to revision if and as we find it to be necessary, in order that such arrangements shall be fair and equitable to the parties.
“5. Such further specific conditions as in the future we may find necessary to impose in order to insure that the service shall be auxiliary to, or supplemental of, the train service of the railways.”
The effect on appellee was to bar it from issuing its own bills of lading or performing all-motor service under all-motor local rates or all-motor joint rates with connecting motor carriers, or substituting rail service for motor service, and it could not be a party to such tariffs. Prior to these proceedings the appellee had issued its own bills of lading and participated in motor-carrier tariffs. The District Court found the value of the certificates, $65,000, would be destroyed and $240,000 annual revenue lost.
A petition for reconsideration of this order, and for oral argument before the entire Commission, was denied on May 9, 1949. Transport thereupon brought this suit in the Federal District Court, seeking to set aside the Commission’s orders of January 22, 1948, and May 9, 1949, and to enjoin their enforcement. In the District Court proceedings the Regular Common Carrier Conference of American Trucking Associations intervened on behalf of the Commission. After hearing, the District Court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and entered a judgment setting aside the Commission’s orders, and permanently enjoining it from imposing any condition on Transport’s certificates “in such manner as will prohibit petitioner from:
“a. Filing, publishing and maintaining common carrier motor rates as provided by statute in the case of common carrier motor carriers generally;
“b. Interchanging traffic with other .common carrier motor carriers on joint motor rates;
“c. Issuing its own bills of lading and tendering its service to the public generally on its own contracts of shipment;
“d. Transporting traffic to, through, from or between any so-called ‘key points’ on that part of its route covered by interstate certificates of public convenience and necessity, to which no ‘key point’ restriction attached on issuance of such certificates,
or in such manner as will restrict petitioner to ship on rail rates or on railroad bills of lading.”
From this judgment the Commission and the intervenor, Common Carrier Conference, appeal here.
The District Court, 87 F. Supp. 107, 112, reasoned that the operations of Transport were at all times and in all ways auxiliary to and supplemental of the rail operations and therefore could not be restricted as attempted. The connotation of auxiliary and supplementary to the trial court was only a restriction limiting service to rail points. Without dealing specifically with the reservation to impose further conditions restricting the motor carrier’s service to coordinated rail service, the District Court decided that the Commission’s order restricting the service could not be valid in view of § 216, Transportation Act of 1940, 49 Stat. 558, 54 Stat. 924. That section allows motor common carriers to establish through routes, joint rates, practices and division of charges with other carriers by motor, rail or water. It held, too, that the Commission’s action was in essence a revocation in part of a certificate and unlawful except under conditions prescribed by § 212, 49 Stat. 555, 54 Stat. 924, and unconstitutional because confiscatory.
Transport here supports the soundness of the reasons given by the three-judge District Court for its injunction and supplements them by contentions that the Commission’s order was without support in the evidence and that Transport was not accorded due process of law at the hearing of October 17, 1944, 47 M. C. C. 753, 755. In view of our decision of today upholding the Commission in No. 25, United States v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co., ante, p. 419, all reasons for affirming the judgment below may be promptly rejected.
So far as the above issues relied upon by the District Court for its injunction are concerned, they seem to have been resolved in favor of the Government by our opinion in the Rock Island case. This proceeding involves certificates for new routes under § 207. No such certificates or applications were in that case. The opinion, however, considered the Commission’s practice in § 207 proceedings and stated that it was the same as in §§ 5 and 213 acquisition proceedings. We now hold that the .same considerations justify the reservation in issue here. See n. 2, supra.
Transport’s position that the order in question was without support in the evidence is based on the theory that as evidence was taken in the original applications that resulted in the necessary findings under §§ 213 of the Motor Carrier Act and 5 of the Transportation Act of 1940 for certificates to railroad motor carrier affiliates, changes in practices cannot now be made without evidence that the formerly permitted practices had been inconsistent with the public interest and did unduly restrain competition. American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. United States, 326 U. S. 77, 86, and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 91.
The Louisville & Nashville case required a full hearing and the privilege of introducing testimony before the road’s rates were set aside as unreasonable. The Commission was taking the position that the Hepburn Act allowed it to set aside rates after a “hearing” without evidence. The American Trucking case dealt with the issuance of a series of certificates by the Commission to a railroad-affiliated motor carrier after refusal to admit evidence of the flow of truck traffic between various localities along the parent railroad, and of the effect of the existing and prospective railroad-affiliated motor carriers on the over-the-road carriers. On appeal from an affirmance by a district court, we reversed the Commission.
This situation, however, differs from those referred to by Transport in that the Commission has reopened the proceedings, after they were started by Transport for an interpretation of its right to file and maintain a motor common-carrier tariff. Hearings were had in 1942 at Dallas, at which appellee’s witnesses gave testimony as to the freight interchange between appellee and other motor carriers and the existence of tariffs, etc. After the report of the Commission referred to on pp. 454-455, Transport and the Texas and Pacific Railway petitioned for reconsideration by the Commission, setting out the facts of their current operations, and addressing themselves particularly to the elimination of the prior or subsequent rail-haul condition. Thereafter the proceedings were reopened to determine what changes or modifications should be made. Another hearing was held, October 17, 1944, and report made. At that hearing Transport appeared but refused to introduce evidence. The examiner examined an official of Transport as to the nature and extent of Transport’s operations. This evidence developed the fact that Transport operated both on motor-carrier and rail rates under its own bills of lading in full competition with other motor carriers. Thus there appears in the record adequate evidence of the circumstances of Transport’s operations.
Upon the due-process point we approve the ruling of the Commission. It follows:
“Applicant argues that the notice setting the proceedings for further hearing did not inform it or the other parties of the nature of the issues to be met, or give them sufficient time to prepare to meet the issues; and that the hearing, in view of the request for its cancellation, was in the nature of an ex parte proceeding. We are not impressed with applicant’s argument that it was unable to foresee the issues. The notice in question stated that the further hearing was for the purpose of determining what changes, if any, should be made in the conditions, and thus placed the conditions themselves in issue. One of these is condition 5 or 5A, which in itself was adequate notice to applicant and the other parties that the primary purpose of the further hearing would be to determine, as provided for in that condition, whether it is necessary to change or modify the existing conditions or to add others so as effectively to restrict applicant’s operations to service which is auxiliary to or supplemental of rail service. Applicant was given the opportunity of presenting evidence to show that no need exists for a change in its present conditions; however, not only did it choose not to offer such evidence, but it objected to the receipt of any evidence with respect thereto. In the circumstances, the examiner properly denied its motion to discontinue the further hearing and to withdraw its witness, and properly overruled its objection to the adduction of testimony through such witness.”
The judgment of the three-judge District Court is reversed and the proceedings remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Black, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Burton dissent.
Sixteen proceedings are covered by I. C. C. docket number MC-50544, and various subnumbers, set out in Appendix A to Texas & Pacific Motor Transport Co. Common Carrier Application, 47 M. C. C. 753, 764. Transport was also operating under certain temporary authorities, Nos. MC-50544 (Sub-Nos. 21-TA, 24 — TA, and 30-TA), which expired before the issuance of the Commission’s orders under consideration here.
“5. Such further specific conditions as we, in the future, may find it necessary to impose in order to restrict applicant’s operation to service which is auxiliary to, or supplemental of, rail service.
“5A. The authority herein granted shall be subject to such further limitations or restrictions as the Commission may hereafter find it necessary to impose in order to restrict applicant’s operation to service which is auxiliary to, or supplemental of, train service of the railway, and in order to insure that the service rendered shall not unduly restrain competition.” 47 M. C. C. 753,766.
“1. The service to be performed by applicant shall be limited to service which is auxiliary to, or supplemental .of, rail service of the Texas and Pacific Railway, or in certain cases of its subsidiary rail lines, (or of Texas-New Mexico Railway Company) herein called the railway.” Ibid.
“2. Applicant shall not serve, or interchange traffic at any point not a station on a rail line of the railway.” Ibid.
“3. Shipments transported by applicant shall be limited to those which it receives from or delivers to the railway under a through bill of lading covering, in addition to movement by applicant, a prior or subsequent movement by rail.
“3A. Shipments transported by applicant shall be limited to those which it receives from or delivers to the railway under a through bill of lading covering in addition to movement by applicant, a prior or subsequent movement by rail, and those which it transports as parts of through shipments prior or subsequent to movement by rail under appropriate transit rules.” Ibid.
“3B. No shipments shall be transported by applicant as a common carrier by motor vehicle between any of the following points or through, or to, or from more than one of said points: Fort Worth, Tex., and Texarkana, Tex.-Ark.
“3C. No shipments shall be transported by applicant between any of the following points or through, or to, or from more than one of said points: El Paso and Pecos, Tex.” Ibid.
“4. All contractual arrangements between applicant and the railway shall be reported to us and shall be subject to revision, if and as we find it to be necessary in order that such arrangements shall be fair and suitable to the parties.” Ibid.
41 M. C. C. 721,726.
47 M. C. C. 753, 763-764.
47 M. C. C. 753, 754, and Rules 30, 107 (a) and 107 (b) of Supp. No. 5 to I. C. C. Tariff Circular No. 20. See 41 M. C. C. 721, 726, excerpted at note 19, No. 25, United States v. Rock Island Motor Transit Co., decided today, ante, p. 419.
“Thus, while the Commission might prescribe the points to be served, it could not forbid the participation in joint rates and through routes for the simple reason that such a provision would be inconsistent with the wording of Sec. 216 of the Act.” 87 F. Supp. 107, 112.
Several Commission decisions on the general necessity of evidence to support rulings are added. Greyhound Corporation—Control, 50 M. C. C. 237, 242; Scannell—Control, 50 M. C. C. 535, 541; C. & D. Motor Delivery Company — Purchase—Hubert C. Elliott, 38 M. C. C. 547, 553; Joint N. E. Motor Carrier Assn., Inc. v. Rose and Welloff, 43 M. C. C. 487, 488. None bear on such a situation as this. They relate to restrictions on the issue or transfer of certificates and revocation.
47 M. C. C. 753,756.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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I
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Brennan
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The City of New York uses federal funds to pay the salaries of public employees who teach in parochial schools. In this companion case to School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, ante, p. 373, we determine whether this practice violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
hH
<C
The program at issue in this case, originally enacted as Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 authorizes the Secretary of Education to distribute financial assistance to local educational institutions to meet the needs of educationally deprived children from low-income families. The funds are to be appropriated in accordance with programs proposed by local educational agencies and approved by state educational agencies. 20 U. S. C. § 3805(a). “To the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency shall make provisions for including special educational services and arrangements ... in which such children can participate.” § 3806(a). The proposed programs must also meet the following statutory requirements: the children involved in the program must be educationally deprived, § 3804(a), the children must reside in areas comprising a high concentration of low-income families, § 3805(b), and the programs must supplement, not supplant, programs that would exist absent funding under Title I. § 3807(b).
Since 1966, the City of New York has provided instructional services funded by Title I to parochial school students on the premises of parochial schools. Of those students eligible to receive funds in 1981-1982, 13.2% were enrolled in private schools. Of that group, 84% were enrolled in schools affiliated with the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York and the Diocese of Brooklyn and 8% were enrolled in Hebrew day schools. With respect to the religious atmosphere of these schools, the Court of Appeals concluded that “the picture that emerges is of a system in which religious considerations play a key role in the selection of students and teachers, and which has as its substantial purpose the inculcation of religious values.” 739 F. 2d 48, 68 (CA2 1984).
The programs conducted at these schools include remedial reading, reading skills, remedial mathematics, English as a second language, and guidance services. These programs are carried out by regular employees of the public schools (teachers, guidance counselors, psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers) who have volunteered to teach in the parochial schools. The amount of time that each professional spends in the parochial school is determined by the number of students in the particular program and the needs of these students.
The City’s Bureau of Nonpublic School Reimbursement makes teacher assignments, and the instructors are supervised by field personnel, who attempt to pay at least one unannounced visit per month. The field supervisors, in turn, report to program coordinators, who also pay occasional unannounced supervisory visits to monitor Title I classes in the parochial schools. The professionals involved in the program are directed to avoid involvement with religious activities that are conducted within the private schools and to bar religious materials in their classrooms. All material and equipment used in the programs funded under Title I are supplied by the Government and are used only in those programs. The professional personnel are solely responsible for the selection of the students. Additionally, the professionals are informed that contact with private school personnel should be kept to a minimum. Finally, the administrators of the parochial schools are required to clear the classrooms used by the public school personnel of all religious symbols.
B
In 1978, six taxpayers commenced this action in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that the Title I program administered by the City of New York violates the Establishment Clause. These taxpayers, appellees in today’s case, sought to enjoin the further distribution of funds to programs involving instruction on the premises of parochial schools. Initially the case was held for the outcome of National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 1248 (SDNY 1980) (PEARL), which involved an identical challenge to the Title I program. When the District Court in PEARL affirmed the constitutionality of the Title I program, ibid., and this Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, 449 U. S. 808 (1980), the challenge of the present appellees was renewed. The District Court granted appellants’ motion for summary judgment based upon the evidentiary record developed in PEARL.
A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that
“[t]he Establishment Clause, as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Public Funds for Public Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29 (D. N. J. 1973), aff’d mem., 417 U. S. 961 . . . (1974); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 . . . (1975) (particularly Part V, pp. 367-72); and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229 . . . (1977), constitutes an insurmountable barrier to the use of federal funds to send public school teachers and other professionals into religious schools to carry on instruction, remedial or otherwise, or to provide clinical and guidance services of the sort at issue here.” 739 F. 2d, at 49-50.
We postponed probable jurisdiction. 469 U. S. 878 (1984). We conclude that jurisdiction by appeal does not properly lie. Treating the papers as a petition for a writ of certiorari, see 28 U. S. C. § 2103, we grant the petition and now affirm the judgment below.
II
In School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, ante, p. 373, the Court has today held unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause two remedial and enhancement programs operated by the Grand Rapids Public School District, in which classes were provided to private school children at public expense in classrooms located in and leased from the local private schools. The New York City programs challenged in this case are very similar to the programs we examined in Ball. In both cases, publicly funded instructors teach classes composed exclusively of private school students in private school buildings. In both cases, an overwhelming number of the participating private schools are religiously affiliated. In both cases, the publicly funded programs provide not only professional personnel, but also all materials and supplies necessary for the operation of the programs. Finally, the instructors in both cases are told that they are public school employees under the sole control of the public school system.
Appellants attempt to distinguish this case on the ground that the City of New York, unlike the Grand Rapids Public School District, has adopted a system for monitoring the religious content of publicly funded Title I classes in the religious schools. At best, the supervision in this case would assist in preventing the Title I program from being used, intentionally or unwittingly, to inculcate the religious beliefs of the surrounding parochial school. But appellants’ argument fails in any event, because the supervisory system established by the City of New York inevitably results in the excessive entanglement of church and state, an Establishment Clause concern distinct from that addressed by the effects doctrine. Even where state aid to parochial institutions does not have the primary effect of advancing religion, the provision of such aid may nonetheless violate the Establishment Clause owing to the nature of the interaction of church and state in the administration of that aid.
The principle that the state should not become too closely entangled with the church in the administration of assistance is rooted in two concerns. When the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in matters of religious significance, the freedom of religious belief of those who are not adherents of that denomination suffers, even when the governmental purpose underlying the involvement is largely secular. In addition, the freedom of even the adherents of the denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion into sacred matters. “[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.” McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 212 (1948).
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971), the Court held that the supervision necessary to ensure that teachers in parochial schools were not conveying religious messages to their students would constitute the excessive entanglement of church and state:
“A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church. ” Id., at 619.
Similarly, in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U. S. 349 (1975), we invalidated a state program that offered, inter alia, guidance, testing, and remedial and therapeutic services performed by public employees on the premises of the parochial schools. Id., at 352-353. As in Lemon, we observed that though a comprehensive system of supervision might conceivably prevent teachers from having the primary effect of advancing religion, such a system would inevitably lead to an unconstitutional administrative entanglement between church and state.
“The prophylactic contacts required to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role, the Court held [in Lemon], necessarily give rise to a constitutionally intolerable degree of entanglement between church and state. Id., at 619. The same excessive entanglement would be required for Pennsylvania to be ‘certain,’ as it must be, that . . . personnel do not advance the religious mission of the church-related schools in which they serve. Public Funds for Public Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29, 40-41, aff’d, 417 U. S. 961.” 421 U. S., at 370.
In Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board, 426 U. S. 736 (1976), the Court sustained state programs of aid to religiously affiliated institutions of higher learning. The State allowed the grants to be used for any nonsectarian purpose. The Court upheld the grants on the ground that the institutions were not “‘pervasively sectarian,”’ id., at 758-759, and therefore a system of supervision was unnecessary to ensure that the grants were not being used to effect a religious end. In so holding, the Court identified “what is crucial to a non-entangling aid program: the ability of the State to identify and subsidize separate secular functions carried out at the school, without on-the-site inspections being necessary to prevent diversion of the funds to sectarian purposes.” Id., at 765. Similarly, in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971), the Court upheld one-time grants to sectarian institutions because ongoing supervision was not required. See also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U. S. 734 (1973).
As the Court of Appeals recognized, the elementary and secondary schools here are far different from the colleges at issue in Roemer, Hunt, and Tilton. 739 F. 2d; at 68-70. Unlike the colleges, which were found not to be “pervasively sectarian,” many of the schools involved in this case are the same sectarian schools which had “ ‘as a substantial purpose the inculcation of religious values’ ” in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 768 (1973), quoting Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655, 663 (SDNY 1972). Moreover, our holding in Meek invalidating instructional services much like those at issue in this case rested on the ground that the publicly funded teachers were “performing important educational services in schools in which education is an integral part of the dominant sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly maintained.” Meek, supra, at 371. The court below found that the schools involved in this case were “well within this characterization.” 739 F. 2d, at 70. Unlike the schools in Roemer, many of the schools here receive funds and report back to their affiliated church, require attendance at church religious exercises, begin the schoolday or class period with prayer, and grant preference in admission to members of the sponsoring denominations. 739 F. 2d, at 70. In addition, the Catholic schools at issue here, which constitute the vast majority of the aided schools, are under the general supervision and control of the local parish. Ibid.
The critical elements of the entanglement proscribed in Lemon and Meek are thus present in this case. First, as noted above, the aid is provided in a pervasively sectarian environment. Second, because assistance is provided in the form of teachers, ongoing inspection is required to ensure the absence of a religious message. Compare Lemon, supra, at 619, with Tilton, supra, at 688, and Roemer, supra, at 765. In short, the scope and duration of New York City’s Title I program would require a permanent and pervasive state presence in the sectarian schools receiving aid.
This pervasive monitoring by public authorities in the sectarian schools infringes precisely those Establishment Clause values at the root of the prohibition of excessive entanglement. Agents of the city must visit and inspect the religious school regularly, alert for the subtle or overt presence of religious matter in Title I classes. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S., at 619 (“What would appear to some to be essential to good citizenship might well for others border on or constitute instruction in religion”). In addition, the religious school must obey these same agents when they make determinations as to what is and what is not a “religious symbol” and thus off limits in a Title I classroom. In short, the religious school, which has as a primary purpose the advancement and preservation of a particular religion must endure the ongoing presence of state personnel whose primary purpose is to monitor teachers and students in an attempt to guard against the infiltration of religious thought.
The administrative cooperation that is required to maintain the educational program at issue here entangles church and state in still another way that infringes interests at the heart of the Establishment Clause. Administrative personnel of the public and parochial school systems must work together in resolving matters related to schedules, classroom assignments, problems that arise in the implementation of the program, requests for additional services, and the dissemination of information regarding the program. Furthermore, the program necessitates “frequent contacts between the regular and the remedial teachers (or other professionals), in which each side reports on individual student needs, problems encountered, and results achieved.” 739 F. 2d, at 65.
We have long recognized that underlying the Establishment Clause is “the objective ... to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [church or state] into the precincts of the other.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 614. See also McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S., at 212. Although “[separation in this context cannot mean absence of all contact,” Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U. S. 664, 676 (1970), the detailed monitoring and close administrative contact required to maintain New York City’s Title I program can only produce “a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize.” Id., at 674. The numerous judgments that must be made by agents of the city concern matters that may be subtle and controversial, yet may be of deep religious significance to the controlling denominations. As government agents must make these judgments, the dangers of political divisiveness along religious lines increase. At the same time, “[t]he picture of state inspectors prowling the halls of parochial schools and auditing classroom instruction surely raises more than an imagined specter of governmental ‘secularization of a creed.’” Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, at 650 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
Ill
Despite the well-intentioned efforts taken by the City of New York, the program remains constitutionally flawed owing to the nature of the aid, to the institution receiving the aid, and to the constitutional principles that they implicate— that neither the State nor Federal Government shall promote or hinder a particular faith or faith generally through the advancement of benefits or through the excessive entanglement of church and state in the administration of those benefits.
Affirmed.
[For dissenting opinion of Justice White, see ante, p. 400.]
Title I, 92 Stat. 2153, was codified at 20 U. S. C. § 2701 et seq. Section 2701 provided:
“In recognition of the special educational needs of children of low-income families and the impact that concentrations of low-income families have on the ability of local educational agencies to support adequate educational programs, the Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of the United States to provide financial assistance (as set forth in the following parts of this subchapter) to local educational agencies serving areas with concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and improve their educational programs by various means (including preschool programs) which contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived children.”
Effective October 1, 1982, Title I was superseded by Chapter I of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, 95 Stat. 464, 20 U. S. C. § 3801 et seq. See 20 U. S. C. § 3801 (current Chapter I analogue of § 2701). The provisions concerning the participation of children in private schools under Chapter I are virtually identical to those in Title I. Compare 20 U. S. C. §2740 (former Title I provision) with 20 U. S. C. § 3806 (current Chapter I provision). For the sake of convenience, we will adopt the usage of the parties and continue to refer to the program as “Title I.”
The statute provides:
“A local educational agency may receive a grant under this subchapter for any fiscal year if it has on file with the State educational agency an application which describes the programs and projects to be conducted with such assistance for a period of not more than three years, and such application has been approved by the State educational agency.”
See also 20 U. S. C. § 2731 (former Title I analogue).
In Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U. S. 402 (1974), we addressed the question whether this provision requires the assignment of publicly employed teachers to provide instruction during regular school hours in parochial schools. We held that Title I mandated that private school students receive services comparable to, but not identical to, the Title I services received by public school students. Id., at 420-421. Therefore, the statute would permit, but not require, that on-site services be provided in the parochial schools. In reaching this conclusion as a matter of statutory interpretation, we explicitly noted that “we intimate no view as to the Establishment Clause effect of any particular program.” Id., at 426. Wheeler thus provides no authority for the constitutionality of the program before us today.
The statute provides:
“Each State and local educational agency shall use the payments under this subehapter for programs and projects (including the acquisition of equipment and, where necessary, the construction of school facilities) which are designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived children.”
The statute provides:
“The application described in subsection (a) of this section shall be approved if . . . the programs and projects described—
“(1)(A) are conducted in attendance areas of such agency having the highest concentration of low-income children . . . .”
The statute provides:
“A local educational agency may use funds received under this subehapter only so as to supplement and, to the extent practical, increase the level of funds that would, in the absence of such Federal funds, be made available from non-Federal sources for the education of pupils participating in programs and projects assisted under this subehapter, and in no case may such funds be so used as to supplant such funds from such non-Federal sources. In order to demonstrate compliance with this subsection a local education agency shall not be required to provide services under this subehapter outside the regular classroom or school program.”
The Court of Appeals held that the plan adopted and administered by the City of New York violates the Establishment Clause. 739 P. 2d 48, 72 (1984). Appeals from this ruling were taken pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. An appeal under § 1252, however, may be taken only from an interlocutory or final judgment that has held an Act of Congress unconstitutional as applied (“i. e., that the section, by its own terms, infringed constitutional freedoms in the circumstances of that particular case”) or as a whole. United States v. Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc., 404 U. S. 561, 563-565 (1972). Because the ruling appealed from is not such a judgment, the appeals must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Ibid.
As we have in comparable cases, we shall continue in this opinion to refer to the parties as appellants and appellees in order to minimize confusion. See, e. g., Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U. S. 84, 90, n. 4 (1978).
Appellants suggest that the degree of sectarianism differs from school to school. This has little bearing on our analysis. As Judge Friendly, writing for the court below, noted: “It may well be that the degree of sectarianism in Catholic schools in, for example, black neighborhoods, with considerable proportions of non-Catholic pupils and teachers, is relatively low; by the same token, in other schools it may be relatively high. Yet . . . enforcement of the Establishment Clause does not rest on means or medians. If any significant number of the Title I schools create the risks described in Meek, Meek applies. It would be simply incredible, and the affidavits do not aver, that all, or almost all, New York City’s parochial schools receiving Title I aid have . . . abandoned ‘the religious mission that is the only reason for the schools’ existence.’” 739 F. 2d, at 70 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 650 (1971) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
C
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In No. 83-1075, we granted certiorari to decide whether § 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, as incorporated in Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act, •exempts from disclosure only those sources of intelligence information to which the Central Intelligence Agency had to guarantee confidentiality in order to obtain the information. In No. 83-1249, the cross-petition, we granted certiorari to decide whether the Freedom of Information Act requires the Agency to disclose the institutional affiliations of persons whose identities are exempt from disclosure as “intelligence sources.”
1 — 4
Between 1953 and 1966, the Central Intelligence Agency financed a wide-ranging project, code-named MKULTRA, concerned with “the research and development of chemical, biological, and radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control human behavior.” The program consisted of some 149 subprojects which the Agency-contracted out to various universities, research foundations, and similar institutions. At least 80 institutions and 185 private researchers participated. Because the Agency funded MKULTRA indirectly, many of the participating individuals were unaware that they were dealing with the Agency.
MKULTRA was established to counter perceived Soviet and Chinese advances in brainwashing and interrogation techniques. Over the years the program included various medical and psychological experiments, some of which led to untoward results. These aspects of MKULTRA surfaced publicly during the 1970’s and became the subject of executive and congressional investigations.
On August 22, 1977, John C. Sims, an attorney, and Sidney M. Wolfe, M.D., the director of the Public Citizen Health Research Group, filed a request with the Central Intelligence Agency seeking certain information about MKULTRA. Respondents invoked the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U. S. C. § 552. Specifically, respondents sought the grant proposals and contracts awarded under the MKULTRA program and the names of the institutions and individuals that had performed research.
Pursuant to respondents’ request, the Agency made available to respondents all of the MKULTRA grant proposals and contracts. Citing Exemption 3 of the FOIA, 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(3)(B), however, the Agency declined to disclose the names of all individual researchers and 21 institutions. Exemption 3 provides that an agency need not disclose “matters that are... specifically exempted from disclosure by statute... provided that such statute... refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.” Ibid. The Agency relied on § 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 498, 50 U. S. C. § 403(d)(3), which states that
“the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.”
Dissatisfied with the Agency’s limited disclosure, respondents filed suit under the FOIA, 5 U. S. C. § 552(a)(4)(B), in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. That court ordered disclosure of the withheld names, holding that the MKULTRA researchers and affiliated institutions were not “intelligence sources” within the meaning of § 102(d)(3). 479 F. Supp. 84 (1979).
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals concluded, as had the District Court, that § 102(d)(3) qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3 of the FOIA. The court held, however, that the District Court’s analysis of that statute under the FOIA lacked a coherent definition of “intelligence sources.” Accordingly, it remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the following definition:
“[A]n ‘intelligence source’ is a person or institution that provides, has provided, or has been engaged to provide the CIA with information of a kind the Agency needs to perform its intelligence function effectively, yet could not reasonably expect to obtain without guaranteeing the confidentiality of those who provide it.” 206 U. S. App. D. C. 157, 166, 642 F. 2d 562, 571 (1980).
On remand, the District Court applied this definition and ordered the Agency to disclose the names of 47 researchers and the institutions with which they had been affiliated. The court rejected respondents’ contention that the MKULTRA research was not needed to perform the Agency’s intelligence function, explaining that
“[i]n view of the agency’s concern that potential foreign enemies could be engaged in similar research and the desire to take effective counter-measures,... [the Agency] could reasonably determine that this research was needed for its intelligence function.” App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 83-1075, pp. 22a-23a.
The court then turned to the question whether the Agency could show, as the Court of Appeals’ definition requires, that it could not reasonably have expected to obtain the information supplied by the MKULTRA sources without guaranteeing confidentiality to them. The court concluded that the Agency’s policy of considering its relationships with MKULTRA researchers as confidential was not sufficient to satisfy the Court of Appeals’ definition because “the chief desire for confidentiality was on the part of the CIA.” Id., at 24a. The court recognized that some of the researchers had sought, and received, express guarantees of confidentiality from the Agency, and as to those held that their identities need not be disclosed. The court also exempted other researchers from disclosure on the ground that their work for the Agency, apart from MKULTRA, required that their identities remain secret in order not to compromise the Agency’s intelligence networks in foreign countries. Id., at 26a-27a, 30a-31a. Finally, the court held that there was no need to disclose the institutional affiliations of the individual researchers whose identities were exempt from disclosure; this withholding was justified by the need to eliminate the unnecessary risk that such intelligence sources would be identified indirectly. Id., at 27a, 34a.
Both the Agency and respondents appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed that part of the District Court’s judgment exempting from disclosure the institutional affiliations of individual researchers found to be intelligence sources. However, it reversed the District Court’s ruling with respect to which individual researchers satisfied “the need-for-confidentiality” aspect of its formulation of exempt “intelligence sources.” 228 U. S. App. D. C. 269, 275, 709 F. 2d 95, 101 (1983).
At the outset, the court rejected the suggestion that it reconsider the definition of “intelligence sources.” Id., at 271, 709 F. 2d, at 97. The court then criticized the District Court for focusing its inquiry on whether the Agency had in fact promised confidentiality to individual researchers. The court held that the District Court’s decision automatically to exempt from disclosure those researchers to whom confidentiality had been promised was erroneous; it directed the District Court on remand to focus its inquiry on whether the Agency offered sufficient proof that it needed to cloak its efforts in confidentiality in order to obtain the type of information provided by the researcher. Only upon such a showing would the individual qualify as an “intelligence source” exempt from disclosure under the FOIA.
We granted certiorari, 465 U. S. 1078 (1984) and 467 U. S. 1240 (1984). We now reverse in part and affirm in part.
t — I
No. 83-1075
A
The mandate of the FOIA calls for broad disclosure of Government records. Congress recognized, however, that public disclosure is not always in the public interest and thus provided that agency records may be withheld from disclosure under any of the nine exemptions defined in 5 U. S. C. § 552(b). Under Exemption 3 disclosure need not be made as to information “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute” if the statute affords the agency no discretion on disclosure, § 552(b)(3)(A), establishes particular criteria for withholding the information, or refers to the particular types of material to be withheld, § 552(b)(3)(B).
The question in No. 83-1075 is twofold: first, does § 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 constitute a statutory exemption to disclosure within the meaning of Exemption 3; and second, are the MKULTRA researchers included within § 102(d)(3)’s protection of “intelligence sources.”
B
Congress has made the Director of Central Intelligence “responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.” 50 U. S. C. §403(d)(3). As part of its postwar reorganization of the national defense system, Congress chartered the Agency with the responsibility of coordinating intelligence activities relating to national security. In order to carry out its mission, the Agency was expressly entrusted with protecting the heart of all intelligence operations — “sources and methods.”
Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, which calls for the Director of Central Intelligence to protect “intelligence sources and methods,” clearly “refers to particular types of matters,” 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(3)(B), and thus qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3. The “plain meaning” of the relevant statutory provisions is sufficient to resolve the question, see, e. g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U. S. 70, 75 (1984); United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U. S. 792, 798 (1984). Moreover, the legislative history of the FOIA confirms that Congress intended § 102(d)(3) to be a withholding statute under Exemption 3. Indeed, this is the uniform view among other federal courts.
Our conclusion that § 102(d)(3) qualifies as a withholding statute under Exemption 3 is only the first step of the inquiry. Agency records are protected under § 102(d)(3) only to the extent they contain “intelligence sources and methods” or if disclosure would reveal otherwise protected information.
C
Respondents contend that the Court of Appeals’ definition of “intelligence sources,” focusing on the need to guarantee confidentiality in order to obtain the type of information desired, draws the proper line with respect to intelligence sources deserving exemption from the FOIA. The plain meaning of the statutory language, as well as the legislative history of the National Security Act, however, indicates that Congress vested in the Director of Central Intelligence very broad authority to protect all sources of intelligence information from disclosure. The Court of Appeals’ narrowing of this authority not only contravenes the express intention of Congress, but also overlooks the practical necessities of modem intelligence gathering — the very reason Congress entrusted this Agency with sweeping power to protect its “intelligence sources and methods.”
We begin with the language of § 102(d)(3). Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U. S. 345, 356 (1982); Steadman v. SEC, 450 U. S. 91, 97 (1981). Section 102(d)(3) specifically authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence to protect “intelligence sources and methods” from disclosure. Plainly the broad sweep of this statutory language comports with the nature of the Agency’s unique responsibilities. To keep informed of other nations’ activities bearing on our national security the Agency must rely on a host of sources. At the same time, the Director must have the authority to shield those Agency activities and sources from any disclosures that would unnecessarily compromise the Agency’s efforts.
The “plain meaning” of § 102(d)(3) may not be squared with any limiting definition that goes beyond the requirement that the information fall within the Agency’s mandate to conduct foreign intelligence. Section 102(d)(3) does not state, as the Court of Appeals’ view suggests, that the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized to protect intelligence sources only if such protection is needed to obtain information that otherwise could not be acquired. Nor did Congress state that only confidential or nonpublic intelligence sources are protected. Section 102(d)(3) contains no such limiting language. Congress simply and pointedly protected all sources of intelligence that provide, or are engaged to provide, information the Agency needs to perform its statutory duties with respect to foreign intelligence. The plain statutory language is not to be ignored. Weber Aircraft Corp., supra, at 798.
The legislative history of § 102(d)(3) also makes clear that Congress intended to give the Director of Central Intelligence broad power to protect the secrecy and integrity of the intelligence process. The reasons are too obvious to call for enlarged discussion; without such protections the Agency would be virtually impotent.
Enacted shortly after World War II, § 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 established the Agency and empowered it, among other things, “to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security.” 50 U. S. C. § 403(d)(3). The tragedy of Pearl Harbor and the reported deficiencies in American intelligence during the course of the war convinced the Congress that the country’s ability to gather and analyze intelligence, in peacetime as well as in war, must be improved. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 961, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-4 (1947); S. Rep. No. 239, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1947).
Congress knew quite well that the Agency would gather intelligence from almost an infinite variety of diverse sources. Indeed, one of the primary reasons for creating the Agency was Congress’ recognition that our Government would have to shepherd and analyze a “mass of information” in order to safeguard national security in the postwar world. See ibid. Witnesses with broad experience in the intelligence field testified before Congress concerning the practical realities of intelligence work. Fleet Admiral Nimitz, for example, explained that “intelligence is a composite of authenticated and evaluated information covering not only the armed forces establishment of a possible enemy, but also his industrial capacity, racial traits, religious beliefs, and other related aspects.” National Defense Establishment: Hearings on S. 758 before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 132 (1947) (Senate Hearings). General Vandenberg, then the Director of the Central Intelligence Group, the Agency’s immediate predecessor, emphasized that “foreign intelligence [gathering] consists of securing all possible data pertaining to foreign governments or the national defense and security of the United States.” Id., at 497.
Witnesses spoke of the extraordinary diversity of intelligence sources. Allen Dulles, for example, the Agency’s third Director, shattered the myth of the classic “secret agent” as the typical intelligence source, and explained that “American businessmen and American professors and Americans of all types and descriptions who travel around the world are one of the greatest repositories of intelligence that we have.” National Security Act of 1947: Hearings on H. R. 2319 before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 22 (1947) (Closed House Hearings). In a similar vein, General Van-denberg spoke of “the great open sources of information upon which roughly 80 percent of intelligence should be based,” and identified such sources as “books, magazines, technical and scientific surveys, photographs, commercial analyses, newspapers, and radio broadcasts, and general information from people with knowledge of affairs abroad.” Senate Hearings, at 492.
Congress was also well aware of the importance of secrecy in the intelligence field. Both General Vandenberg and Allen Dulles testified about the grim consequences facing intelligence sources whose identities became known. See Closed House Hearings, at 10-11, 20. Moreover, Dulles explained that even American citizens who freely supply intelligence information “close up like a clam” unless they can hold the Government “responsible to keep the complete security of the information they turn over.” Id., at 22. Congress was plainly alert to the need for maintaining confidentiality — both Houses went into executive session to consider the legislation creating the Agency — a rare practice for congressional sessions. See n. 15, supra.
Against this background highlighting the requirements of effective intelligence operations, Congress expressly made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for “protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.” This language stemmed from President Truman’s Directive of January 22, 1946, 11 Fed. Reg. 1337, in which he established the National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group, the Agency’s predecessors. These institutions were charged with “assuring] the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security,” ibid., and accordingly made “responsible for fully protecting intelligence sources and methods,” id., at 1339. The fact that the mandate of § 102(d)(3) derives from this Presidential Directive reinforces our reading of the legislative history that Congress gave the Agency broad power to control the disclosure of intelligence sources.
Ill
A
Applying the definition of “intelligence sources” fashioned by the Congress in § 102(d)(3), we hold that the Director of Central Intelligence was well within his statutory authority to withhold the names of the MKULTRA researchers from disclosure under the FOIA. The District Court specifically ruled that the Agency “could reasonably determine that this research was needed for its intelligence function,” and the Court of Appeals did not question this ruling. Indeed, the record shows that the MKULTRA research was related to the Agency’s intelligence-gathering function in part because it revealed information about the ability of foreign governments to use drugs and other biological, chemical, or physical agents in warfare or intelligence operations against adversaries. During the height of the cold war period, the Agency was concerned, not without reason, that other countries were charting new advances in brainwashing and interrogation techniques.
Consistent with its responsibility to maintain national security, the Agency reasonably determined that major research efforts were necessary in order to keep informed of our potential adversaries’ perceived threat. We thus conclude that MKULTRA researchers are “intelligence sources” within the broad meaning of § 102(d)(3) because these persons provided, or were engaged to provide, information the Agency needs to fulfill its statutory obligations with respect to foreign intelligence.
Respondents’ belated effort to question the Agency’s authority to engage scientists and academic researchers as intelligence sources must fail. The legislative history of § 102(d)(3) indicates that Congress was well aware that the Agency would call on a wide range and variety of sources to provide intelligence. Moreover, the record developed in this case confirms the obvious importance of scientists and other researchers as American intelligence sources. Notable examples include those scientists and researchers who pioneered the use of radar during World War II as well as the group which took part in the secret development of nuclear weapons in the Manhattan Project. See App. 43; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 83-1075, p. 88a.
B
The Court of Appeals narrowed the Director’s authority under § 102(d)(3) to withhold only those “intelligence sources” who supplied the Agency with information unattainable without guaranteeing confidentiality. That crabbed reading of the statute contravenes the express language of § 102(d)(3), the statute’s legislative history, and the harsh realities of the present day. The dangerous consequences of that narrowing of the statute suggest why Congress chose to vest the Director of Central Intelligence with the broad discretion to safeguard the Agency’s sources and methods of operation.
The Court of Appeals underestimated the importance of providing intelligence sources with an assurance of confidentiality that is as absolute as possible. Under the court’s approach, the Agency would be forced to disclose a source whenever a court determines, after the fact, that the Agency could have obtained the kind of information supplied without promising confidentiality. This forced disclosure of the identities of its intelligence sources could well have a devastating impact on the Agency’s ability to carry out its mission. “The Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service.” Snepp v. United States, 444 U. S. 507, 509, n. 3 (1980) (per curiam). See Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 307 (1981). If potentially valuable intelligence sources come to think that the Agency will be unable to maintain the confidentiality of its relationship to them, many could well refuse to supply information to the Agency in the first place.
Even a small chance that some court will order disclosure of a source’s identity could well impair intelligence gathering and cause sources to “close up like a clam.” To induce some sources to cooperate, the Government must tender as absolute an assurance of confidentiality as it possibly can. “The continued availability of [intelligence] sources depends upon the CIA’s ability to guarantee the security of information that might compromise them and even endanger [their] personal safety.” Snepp v. United States, supra, at 512.
We seriously doubt whether a potential intelligence source will rest assured knowing that judges, who have little or no background in the delicate business of intelligence gathering, will order his identity revealed only after examining the facts of the case to determine whether the Agency actually needed to promise confidentiality in order to obtain the information. An intelligence source will “not be concerned with the underlying rationale for disclosure of” his cooperation if it was secured “under assurances of confidentiality.” Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U. S., at 361. Moreover, a court’s decision whether an intelligence source will be harmed if his identity is revealed will often require complex political, historical, and psychological judgments. See, e. g., Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 578 F. Supp. 704 (DC 1983). There is no reason for a potential intelligence source, whose welfare and safety may be at stake, to have great confidence in the ability of judges to make those judgments correctly.
The Court of Appeals also failed to recognize that when Congress protected “intelligence sources” from disclosure, it was not simply protecting sources of secret intelligence information. As noted above, Congress was well aware that secret agents as depicted in novels and the media are not the typical intelligence source; many important sources provide intelligence information that members of the public could also obtain. Under the Court of Appeals’ approach, the Agency could not withhold the identity of a source of intelligence if that information is also publicly available. This analysis ignores the realities of intelligence work, which often involves seemingly innocuous sources as well as unsuspecting individuals who provide valuable intelligence information.
Disclosure of the subject matter of the Agency’s research efforts and inquiries may compromise the Agency’s ability to gather intelligence as much as disclosure of the identities of intelligence sources. A foreign government can learn a great deal about the Agency’s activities by knowing the public sources of information that interest the Agency. The inquiries pursued by the Agency can often tell our adversaries something that is of value to them. See 228 U. S. App. D. C., at 277, 709 F. 2d, at 103 (Bork, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For example, disclosure of the fact that the Agency subscribes to an obscure but publicly available Eastern European technical journal could thwart the Agency’s efforts to exploit its value as a source of intelligence information. Similarly, had foreign governments learned the Agency was using certain public journals and ongoing open research projects in its MKULTRA research of “brainwashing” and possible countermeasures, they might have been able to infer both the general nature of the project and the general scope that the Agency’s inquiry was taking.
C
The “statutory mandate” of § 102(d)(3) is clear: Congress gave the Director wide-ranging authority to “protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.” Snepp v. United States, supra, at 509, n. 3. An intelligence source provides, or is engaged to provide, information the Agency needs to fulfill its statutory obligations. The record establishes that the MKULTRA researchers did in fact provide the Agency with information related to the Agency’s intelligence function. We therefore hold that the Director was authorized to withhold the identities of these researchers from disclosure under the FOIA.
M <
No. 83-1249
The cross-petition, No. 83-1249, calls for decision on whether the District Court and the Court of Appeals eor-rectly ruled that the Director of Central Intelligence need not disclose the institutional affiliations of the MKULTRA researchers previously held to be “intelligence sources.” Our conclusion that the MKULTRA researchers are protected from disclosure under § 102(d)(3) renders unnecessary any extended discussion of this discrete issue.
In exercising the authority granted by Congress in § 102(d)(3), the Director must, of course, do more than simply withhold the names of intelligence sources. Such withholding, standing alone, does not carry out the mandate of Congress. Foreign intelligence services have an interest in knowing what is being studied and researched by our agencies dealing with national security and by whom it is being done. Foreign intelligence services have both the capacity to gather and analyze any information that is in the public domain and the substantial expertise in deducing the identities of intelligence sources from seemingly unimportant details.
In this context, the very nature of the intelligence apparatus of any country is to try to find out the concerns of others; bits and pieces of data “may aid in piecing together bits of other information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself.” Halperin v. CIA, 203 U. S. App. D. C. 110, 116, 629 F. 2d 144, 150 (1980). Thus,
“ ‘[w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper context.’” Halkin v. Helms, 194 U. S. App. D. C. 82, 90, 598 F. 2d 1, 9 (1978), quoting United States v. Marchetti, 466 F. 2d 1309, 1318 (CA4), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1063 (1972).
Accordingly, the Director, in exercising his authority under § 102(d)(3), has power to withhold superficially innocuous information on the ground that it might enable an observer to discover the identity of an intelligence source. See, e. g., Gardels v. CIA, 223 U. S. App. D. C. 88, 91-92, 689 F. 2d 1100, 1103-1104 (1982); Halperin v. CIA, supra, at 113, 629 F. 2d, at 147.
Here the Director concluded that disclosure of the institutional affiliations of the MKULTRA researchers could lead to identifying the researchers themselves and thus the disclosure posed an unacceptable risk of revealing protected “intelligence sources.” The decisions of the Director, who must of course be familiar with “the whole picture,” as judges are not, are worthy of great deference given the magnitude of the national security interests and potential risks at stake. It is conceivable that the mere explanation of why information must be withheld can convey valuable information to a foreign intelligence agency.
The District Court, in a ruling affirmed by the Court of Appeals, permitted the Director to withhold the institutional affiliations of the researchers whose identities were exempt from disclosure on the ground that disclosure of “the identities of the institutions... might lead to the indirect disclosure of” individual researchers. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 83-1075, p. 27a. This conclusion is supported by the record. The Director reasonably concluded that an observer who is knowledgeable about a particular intelligence research project, like MKULTRA, could, upon learning that research was performed at a certain institution, often deduce the identities of the individual researchers who are protected “intelligence sources.” The FOIA does not require disclosure under such circumstances.
Respondents contend that because the Agency has already revealed the names of many of the institutions at which MKULTRA research was performed, the Agency is somehow estopped from withholding the names of others. This suggestion overlooks the political realities of intelligence operations in which, among other things, our Government may choose to release information deliberately to “send a message” to allies or adversaries. Congress did not mandate the withholding of information that may reveal the identity of an intelligence source; it made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible only for protecting against unauthorized disclosures.
The national interest sometimes makes it advisable, or even imperative, to disclose information that may lead to the identity of intelligence sources. And it is the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence, not that of the judiciary, to weigh the variety of complex and subtle factors in determining whether disclosure of information may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising the Agency’s intelligence-gathering process. Here Admiral Turner, as Director, decided that the benefits of disclosing the identities of institutions that had no objection to disclosure outweighed the costs of doing so. But Congress, in § 102(d)(3), entrusted this discretionary authority to the Director, and the fact that Admiral Turner made that determination in 1978 does not bind his successors to make the same determination, in a different context, with respect to institutions requesting that their identities not be disclosed. See, e. g., Salisbury v. United States, 223 U. S. App. D. C. 243, 248, 690 F. 2d 966, 971 (1982).
V
We hold that the Director of Central Intelligence properly invoked § 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 to withhold disclosure of the identities of the individual MKULTRA researchers as protected “intelligence sources.” We also hold that the FOIA does not require the Director to disclose the institutional affiliations of the exempt researchers in light of the record which supports the Agency’s determination that such disclosure would lead to an unacceptable risk of disclosing the sources’ identities.
Accordingly, we reverse that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals regarding the disclosure of the individual researchers and affirm that part of the judgment pertaining to disclosure of the researchers’ institutional affiliations.
It is so ordered.
Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, S. Rep. No. 94-755, Book I, p. 389 (1976) (footnote omitted) (Final Report). MKULTRA began with a proposal from Richard Helms, then the Agency’s Assistant Deputy Director for Plans. Helms outlined a special funding mechanism for highly sensitive Agency research and development projects that would study the use of biological and chemical materials in altering human behavior. MKULTRA was approved by Allen Dulles, then the Director of Central Intelligence, on April 13, 1963.
Several MKULTRA subprojects involved experiments where researchers surreptitiously administered dangerous drugs, such as LSD, to unwitting human subjects. At least two persons died as a result of MKULTRA experiments, and others may have suffered impaired health because of the testing. See id., at 392-403. This type of experimentation is now expressly forbidden by Executive Order. Exec. Order No. 12333, §2.10, 3 CFR 213 (1982).
See generally Final Report, at 385-422, 471-472; Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States 226-228 (June 1975); Project MKULTRA, the CIA’s Program of Research in Behavioral Modification: Joint Hearings before the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Human Drug Testing by the CIA, 1977: Hearings on S. 1893 before the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
An internal Agency report by its Inspector General had documented the controversial aspects of the MKULTRA project in 1963. See Report of Inspection of MKULTRA (July 26, 1963).
Sims and Wolfe are the respondents in No. 83-1075 and the cross-petitioners in No. 83-1249. In order to avoid confusion, we refer to Sims and Wolfe as respondents throughout this opinion.
Twenty years after the conception of the MKULTRA project, all known files pertaining to MKULTRA were ordered destroyed. Final Report, at 389-390, 403-405. In 1977, the Agency located some 8,000 pages of previously undisclosed MKULTRA documents. These consisted mostly of financial records that had inadvertently survived the 1973 records destruction. Upon this discovery, Agency Director Stansfield Turner notified the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and later testified at a joint hearing before the Select Committee and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Resources of the Senate Committee on Human Resources. Although the Joint Committee was given a complete list of the MKULTRA researchers and institutions, the Committee honored the Agency’s request to treat the names as confidential. Respondents sought the surviving MKULTRA records that would provide this information.
The Agency also cited Exemption 6, 5 U. S. C. § 552(b)(6), which insulates from disclosure “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” This claim, rejected by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, is no longer at issue.
The Agency tried to contact each institution involved in MKULTRA to ask permission to disclose its identity; it released the names of the 59 institutions that had consented. Evidently, the Agency made no parallel effort to contact the 185 individual researchers. See n. 22, infra.
Judge Bork wrote a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He criticized the majority’s narrow definition of “intelligence sources,” urging in particular that there is “no reason to think that section 403(d)(3) was meant to protect sources of information only if secrecy was needed in order to obtain the information.” 228 U. S. App. D. C., at 277, 709 F. 2d, at 103. He noted that “[i]t seems far more in keeping with the broad language and purpose of [§ 403(d)(3)] to conclude that it authorizes the nondisclosure of a source of information whenever disclosure might lead to discovery of what subjects were of interest to the CIA.” Ibid. He also took issue with the majority’s conclusion that the FOIA sometimes requires the Agency to break a promise of confidentiality it has given to an intelligence source. This is “not an honorable way for the government of the United States to behave,” and would produce “pernicious results.” Id., at 276-277, 709 F. 2d, at 102-103.
The Court has consistently recognized this principle. See, e. g., Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U. S. 345, 352 (1982); NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U. S. 214, 220 (1978); EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 80 (1973).
See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 961, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1947); S. Rep. No. 239, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1947).
See H. R. Rep. No. 94-880, pt. 2, p. 15, n. 2 (1976). See also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1380, p. 12 (1974); S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1200, p. 12 (1974); S. Rep. No. 93-854, p. 16 (1974). For a thorough review of the relevant background, see DeLaurentiis v. Haig, 686 F
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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E
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari, 414 U. S. 1091 (1973), to resolve a conflict in the Circuits concerning whether, in sentencing a youth offender under other applicable penal statutes, § 5010 (d) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U. S. C. § 5005 et seq., requires a federal district court first to make an explicit finding, supported by reasons on the record, that the offender would not benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c) of § 5010. The Court of Appeals held that such a finding may be implied from the record, 484 F. 2d 849 (CA7 1973). Three Circuits have taken that position, and three Circuits have required an explicit finding accompanied by supporting reasons. We conclude that while an express finding of no benefit must be made on the record, the Act does not require that it be accompanied by supporting reasons. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.
I
On October 19, 1971, a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs made arrangements with petitioner’s codefendant, whose case is not before this Court, to purchase approximately 1,000 tablets of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) the following day. At the appointed hour on October 20, 1971, the undercover agent was shown approximately 1,000 LSD tablets in the possession of petitioner’s co-defendant, who transferred the tablets to the agent. The exhibition and transfer took place in an automobile being driven by petitioner. After the tablets were transferred to the agent but before money had changed hands, petitioner and his codefendant were arrested. The complaint upon which the arrest warrant for petitioner issued charged him with knowingly and intentionally possessing approximately 1,000 tablets of LSD, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §2 and 21 U. S. C. § 844 (a). Subsequent to petitioner’s release on his own recognizance, his counsel informed the District Court that petitioner intended to plead guilty to the charge, and requested the completion of a presentence report prior to the plea, as authorized by Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32 (c).
On February 14, 1972, proceedings were had in the District Court upon the filing of an information, arraignment, plea, and sentence. The Government filed a one-count information charging petitioner and his co-defendant with a misdemeanor offense under 18 U. S. C. §2 and 21 U. S. C. §844 (a). The Government informed the court that the maximum sentence petitioner and his codefendant, who were first offenders under § 844 (a), could receive was one year in prison, a fine of $5,000, or both; the court was also advised that since petitioner might have been under the age of 26, see n. 9, infra, he “may also be subject to the Federal Youth Corrections Act.” App. 6. Petitioner, who was 19 years old at the time of the proceeding and had had no prior criminal record, pleaded guilty, as did his code-fendant. After inquiry as prescribed by Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11 to determine whether there was a basis in fact for petitioner’s guilty plea, and whether it was entered voluntarily with understanding of its nature and consequences, the District Court accepted the plea.
Since petitioner desired to be sentenced at this proceeding, the District Court recessed to consider the pre-sentence report, which petitioner’s counsel had already read. After recess and before sentencing, petitioner was given his right to allocution, and petitioner’s counsel requested the court that petitioner “be placed... on probation under the Youth Corrections Act.” App. 13. See n. 4, supra. Petitioner then received a split sentence which remitted him to the custody of the Attorney General for one year, to serve 90 days’ confinement “in a jail-type' or treatment” institution, although the judgment mentions only a “jail-type” institution; the execution of the remainder of the sentence was suspended and petitioner was placed on probation for two years upon release from custody. 18 U. S. C. § 3651. At no time during the proceeding, including sentencing, did the District Court make any reference to the Federal Youth Corrections Act.
On May 1, 1972, after having filed numerous other post-conviction motions for relief, petitioner filed the motion at issue here, seeking relief pursuant to Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 32 (d) and 35, and 28 U. S. C. § 2255, on two grounds. The first alleged that his guilty plea was not made understanding^; that issue is not before us. See n. 5, supra. The second alleged that the District Court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence given because the court failed to make a finding that petitioner would not derive benefit from treatment under § 5010 (b) or (c), as assertedly required by § 5010 (d). See n. 4, supra. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing to consider this motion, as well as other motions pending at that time. All were denied without opinion. The District Court stated at the post-conviction hearing that the Act did not require an affirmative finding that petitioner would not benefit from treatment thereunder before the court could sentence him under other applicable penalty provisions; the court concluded that in committing petitioner for one year under a split sentence “the [District] Court impliedly [held] the Youth Corrections Act not applicable.” App. 45.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the view that trial judges must make an explicit finding that youth offenders would not benefit from treatment under the Act. The Court of Appeals held that such a determination may be implied from the record as a whole and that the imposition of the split sentence upon petitioner after his counsel had raised the possibility of sentencing under that Act satisfied § 5010 (d). 484 F. 2d, at 851.
II
The Federal Youth Corrections Act
The sole issue in this case is the validity of the sentence imposed by the District Court. Petitioner contends that before any adult sentence may be imposed § 5010 (d) requires, first, that the sentencing judge find explicitly that the convicted defendant would receive no benefit from treatment under the Act and, second, that the sentencing judge must explain the reasons for his finding. We begin with the general proposition that once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end. Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386, 393 (1958); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736, 741 (1948); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299, 305 (1932). Our task, therefore, is to determine whether the sentence imposed here was permitted under § 5010 (d) of the Act.
The Federal Youth Corrections Act has been accurately described as the most comprehensive federal statute concerned with sentencing. United States v. Coefield, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 205, 209, 476 F. 2d 1152, 1156 (1973). The Act is in substantial part an outgrowth of recommendations made by the Judicial Conference of the United States more than 30 years ago. The principles and procedures contained in the Conference recommendations were in turn largely based on those developed since 1894 for a system of treatment of young offenders in England, known as the Borstal system. See Criminal Justice Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58, and Criminal Justice Act of 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 39. Statistics available at the time of the Conference study revealed the two principal motivating factors behind the enactment of the Act: first, the period of life between 16 and 22 years of age was found to be the time when special factors operated to produce habitual criminals. Secónd, then-existing methods of treating criminally inclined youths were found inadequate in avoiding recidivism. H. R. Rep. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1950) (hereinafter H. R. Rep. No. 2979). The Act was thus designed to provide a better method for treating young offenders convicted in federal courts in that vulnerable age bracket, to rehabilitate them and restore normal behavior patterns. Ibid.
To accomplish this objective, federal district judges were given two new alternatives to add to the array of sentencing options previously available to them, see n. 9, infra: first, they were enabled to commit an eligible offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment under the Act. 18 U. S. C. §§ 5010 (b) and (c). Second, if they believed an offender did not need commitment, they were authorized to place him on probation under the Act. 18 U. S. C. § 5010 (a). If the sentencing court chose the first alternative, the youth offender would be committed to the program of treatment created by the Act.
The objective of these options represented a departure from traditional sentencing, and focused primarily on correction and rehabilitation. All persons under 22 years of age at the time of conviction were made eligible for probation or treatment under the Act, the latter defined as “corrective and preventive guidance and training designed to protect the public by correcting [their] antisocial tendencies.” 18 U. S. C. §§ 5006 (e) and (g). To implement the program of treatment for youth offenders committed under the Act, a Youth Correction Division was created under the Board of Parole which, in conjunction with the Bureau of Prisons and the Probation Service, operates to provide the unique features of the Act’s program. 18 U. S. C. § 5005.
An important element of the program was that once a person was committed for treatment under the Act, the execution of sentence was. to fit the person, not the crime for which he was convicted. Classification agencies were to be established by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to receive and study the person committed and make recommendations to the Director as to appropriate treatment. 18 U. S. C. §§ 5014, 5015. Further, the range of treatment available was made broad to provide maximum flexibility. The Director was authorized both to adapt numerous public facilities, and to contract with public or private agencies, in order to provide institutional treatment which the Director could vary according to the committed person’s progress or lack of it. 18 U. S. C. §§ 5011, 5015. An integral part of the treatment program was the segregation of the committed persons, insofar as practicable, so as to place them with those similarly committed, to avoid the influence of association with the more hardened inmates serving traditional criminal sentences. 18 ü. S. C. §5011.
In addition to institutional treatment, the Division was empowered to order conditional release under supervision at any time of those committed under the Act, with federal probation officers providing the supervision. 18 U. S. C. §§ 5007, 5017, 5019. Conditional release was mandatory after a period of time fixed by the statutory formula. 18 U. S. C. § 5017. See n. 4, supra. The Division was further authorized to order the unconditional discharge of committed persons after a fixed period of treatment, and was required unconditionally to discharge them within a period also fixed by statutory formula. 18 U. S. C. § 5017. A powerful tool available to the Division was its discretion to discharge committed persons unconditionally before it was required to do so, for upon such discharge the conviction upon which the sentence rested would be automatically set aside. 18 U. S. C. § 5021 (a). See n. 5, supra. Similarly, if the sentencing judge chose the second alternative created by the Act, i. e., placement of the youth offender on probation under its provisions, the judge himself could exercise his discretion to discharge the offender from probation unconditionally. 18 U. S. C. § 5021 (b). See n. 6, supra. This, too, would result in the automatic setting aside of the offender’s conviction. 18 U. S. C. § 5021 (b).
The foregoing describes the new options of treatment and probation made available to the federal sentencing court under the Act. Our concern is not with the operation of these alternatives, but with the decision of the court to employ them, for the Act also preserved the power of trial judges to sentence youth offenders under “any other applicable penalty provision.” It is to the question of when a judge may sentence a youth offender outside the Act that we now turn.
Ill
Sentencing Discretion Under the Act (A)
The language affecting the sentencing role of the judge under the Act is found in § 5010 (d), which tells us:
“If the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence the youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision.”
Our concern is with the effect of the requirement of a “no benefit” finding on the judge’s sentencing discretion.
The legislative history clearly indicates that the Act was meant to enlarge, not restrict, the sentencing options of federal trial courts in order to permit them to sentence youth offenders for rehabilitation of a special sort.
“The proposed legislation is designed to make available for the discretionary use of the Federal judges a system for the sentencing and treatment of [youth offenders] that will promote the rehabilitation of those who in the opinion of the sentencing judge show promise of becoming useful citizens....” H. R. Rep. No. 2979, p. 1. (Emphasis added.)
“The purpose of the proposed legislation is to provide a new alternative sentencing and treatment procedure for [youth offenders].” S. Rep. No. 1180, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1949) (hereinafter S. Rep. No. 1180). (Emphasis added.)
Thus, apart from the discretion vested in administrative agencies for treatment of those committed under the Act, as described in Part II, the Act was intended to broaden the scope of judicial sentencing discretion to include the alternatives of treatment or probation thereunder.
The Act was a product of studies made by a committee of federal judges under the auspices of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The views of the sponsors as to the effect of the Act on the sentencing discretion of the trial courts are thus of particular importance, and they uniformly support the view that the Act was intended to preserve the unfettered sentencing discretion of federal district judges. Most pertinent is the statement made by the Chairman of the Judicial Conference special committee appointed to study punishment for crime, see n. 8, supra, Chief Judge John J. Parker, who testified before the Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which conducted the only hearings held on the bill (S. 2609) enacted as the Federal Youth Corrections Act. Judge Parker stated:
“[T]he act... does not interfere with the power of the judge [with respect to sentencing youth offenders] but gives him merely an alternative method of treatment of those people.... He may still give the youthful offender the punishment prescribed by existing statutes, there is nothing in the bill that prevents that. All that the bill does is to provide that if in his judgment and discretion, he thinks that the offender before the court is one that can be treated with advantage under this bill, he can sentence him under this bill instead of under the existing law.
. I do not see any possible objection [to the Act]. They say that there are some of these fellows that ought to be given serious punishment notwithstanding their being young and it [the Act] does not prevent their being given serious punishment. Nothing prevents a man from getting 25 years punishment if he deserves it. Nothing prevents his being executed if he deserves such sentence.” Hearings on S. 1114 and S. 2609 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 43-44 (1949) (hereinafter Hearings).
To the same effect is the statement made by Circuit Judge Orie L. Phillips, the Chairman of the Conference subcommittee which gave particular attention to the treatment of youth offenders. See n. 8, supra. In response to the statement of Senator Kilgore, sponsor of S. 2609, that the bill “takes nothing” (in terms of sentencing) “away from the court,” Judge Phillips replied: “That is correct; it is purely optional.” Hearings 69. Earlier Judge Phillips had said of the bill: “That is merely a flexibility and it is not a command that he send the boys up,” to which Senator Kilgore replied: “I agree with you on that....” Id., at 67. To the extent other testimony and the debates addressed the question of sentencing discretion under the Act, they in-invariably reflected the same view, as did the House Report, quoted above, and the Department of Justice, which recommended enactment of S. 2609 and noted that the bill “would not deprive the court of any of its present functions as to sentencing.” S. Rep. No. 1180, pp. 10-11. The Senate Report’s language was identical to that of the Department of Justice. Id., at 1. The legislative history of the Act confirms the conclusion that Congress did not intend to alter or circumscribe the sentencing discretion of federal district judges by requiring that any substantive standard be met before the imposition of sentence. There is virtual unanimity of opinion in the legislative history that the Act was intended to increase the sentencing options of federal trial judges, rather than to limit the exercise of their discretion whether to employ the newly created options.
To construe § 5010 (d)’s requirement of a “no benefit” finding to circumscribe that discretion would be incompatible with a clear congressional intent; such a construction would also be at odds with traditional sentencing doctrine. The intent of Congress was in accord with long-established authority in the United States vesting the sentencing function exclusively in the trial court.
“If there is one rule in the federal criminal practice which is firmly established, it is that the appellate court has no control over a sentence which is within the limits allowed by a statute.” Gurera v. United States, 40 F. 2d 338, 340-341 (CA8 1930).
See Gore v. United States, 357 U. S. 386 (1958); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736 (1948); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (1932).
The statutes referred to in this line of cases established a permissible range within which sentences could be imposed; if a judge imposed a sentence within that range, his exercise of discretion as to where within the permissible range sentence should be fixed was not subject to challenge. The authority to sentence a youth offender under “any other applicable penalty provision” is expressly reserved to federal trial courts by § 5010 (d), and thus is within the permissible range of sentences which may be imposed under the Act. The “no benefit” finding required by the Act is not to be read as a substantive standard which must be satisfied to support a sentence outside the Act, for such a reading would subject the sentence to appellate review even though the sentence was permitted by the Act's terms, thereby limiting the sentencing court's discretion. We will not assume Congress to have intended such a departure from well-established doctrine without a clear expression to disavow it. As our review has shown, the exclusive sentencing power of district judges was acknowledged, and Congress' intention to affirm that power was clearly indicated.
From our conclusion that a finding of “no- benefit” was not intended to constitute a substantive standard, it follows that a sentence outside the Act need not be accompanied by a statement of reasons why the court chose such a sentence. The only purpose of such a requirement would be to facilitate appellate supervision of, and thus to limit, the trial court’s sentencing discretion. In short, we hold that the discretion vested in a district judge under § 5010 (d) is essentially the same as the traditional discretion vested in the court, for example, to impose the minimum sentence on a first offender or a larger sentence on a recidivist. If the failure of a court to sentence a particular youth offender under the Act appears “too harsh, the remedy must be afforded by act of Congress, not by judicial legislation under the guise of construction,” Block-burger, supra, at 305, since “[wjhatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment... [t]hese are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.” Gore, supra, at 393.
(B)
Although the Act was not in any way intended to circumscribe the discretion of sentencing courts, it did provide a new sentencing alternative designed to prevent youthful offenders from continuing their involvement in criminal conduct after the expiration of their sentence. In the novelty of the treatment option made available, and the importance of the objective it was to serve, lies the purpose of § 5010 (d)’s requirement that the court find “no benefit” before imposing a sentence other than one under § 5010 (b) or (c).
Although well-established doctrine bars review of the exercise of sentencing discretion, limited review is available when sentencing discretion is not exercised at all. Yates v. United States, 356 U. S. 363, 366-367 (1958) ; United States v. Daniels, 446 F. 2d 967, 972 (CA6 1971); United States v. Williams, 407 F. 2d 940, 945 (CA4 1969). See also n. 7, supra. The requirement of the “no benefit” finding was designed to insure that the sentencing judge exercised his discretion in choosing not to commit a youth offender to treatment under the Act. Such a finding would make unmistakably clear that the sentencing judge was not only aware of the existence of the new Act, but also knew that the youth offender before him was eligible because of his age for the treatment it provided to accomplish its important purpose.
“Appellate modification of a statutorily-authorized sentence... is an entirely different matter than the careful scrutiny of the judicial process by which the particular punishment was determined. Rather than an unjustified incursion into the province of the sentencing judge, this latter responsibility is, on the contrary, a necessary incident of what has always been appropriate appellate review of criminal cases.” United States v. Hartford, 489 F. 2d 652, 654 (CA5 1974). (Emphasis in original.)
Once it is made clear that the sentencing judge has considered the option of treatment under the Act and rejected it, however, no appellate review is warranted.
The question whether the finding of “no benefit” must be explicit or whether it may be implicit in the record of a particular case is answered by the manifest desire of Congress to assure that treatment under the Act be considered by the court as one option whenever the youth offender is eligible for it. If the finding may be implied from the record, appellate courts must go on to determine what constitutes a sufficient showing of the requisite implication. To hold that a “no benefit” finding is implicit each time a sentence under the Act is not chosen would render § 5010 (d) nugatory; to hold that something more is necessary to support the inference that must be found in the record would create an ad hoc rule. Appellate courts should not be subject to the burden of case-by-case examination of the record to make sure that the sentencing judge considered the treatment option made available by the Act. Literal compliance with the Act can be satisfied by any expression that makes clear the sentencing judge considered the alternative of sentencing under the Act and decided that the youth offender would not derive benefit from treatment under the Act.
This case provides an example of the problems arising when the required finding is left to implication. Counsel’s references to the Act followed by the District Court’s sentence indeed afford support for the argument that, by implication, the options of the Act were considered and rejected. However at the post-conviction hearing the District Court found from the record of the sentencing hearing the implication that the Act was “not applicable.” It is thus unclear whether this meant the court believed petitioner to be legally ineligible for treatment under the Act — which would be error — or whether, realizing he was eligible, nevertheless deliberately opted to sentence him as an adult. An explicit finding that petitioner would not have benefited from treatment under the Act would have removed all doubt concerning whether the enlarged discretion Congress provided to sentencing courts was indeed exercised.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the end that the District Court conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Williams v. United States, 476 F. 2d 970 (CA3 1973); Cox v. United States, 473 F. 2d 334 (CA4 1973) (en banc); United States v. Jarratt, 471 F. 2d 226 (CA9 1972), cert. denied, 411 U. S. 969 (1973); cf. United States v. Walker, 469 F. 2d 1377 (CA1 1972).
Brooks v. United States, 497 F. 2d 1059 (CA6 1974); United States v. Kaylor, 491 F. 2d 1133 (CA2 1974) (en banc); United States v. Coefield, 155 U. S. App. D. C. 205, 476 F. 2d 1152 (1973) (en banc); cf. United States v. Schenker, 486 F. 2d 318 (CA5 1973); see also Small v. United States, 304 A. 2d 641 (DC Ct. App. 1973).
Title 18 U. S. C. § 2 made petitioner punishable as a principal for any offense against the United States committed by his codefendant. Title 21 U. S. C. § 844 (a) makes punishable the knowing or intentional possession of a controlled substance such as LSD when not obtained pursuant to a valid prescription or order, or as otherwise authorized by law.
The sentencing provisions of the Act, 18 U. S. C. § 5010, are as follows:
“(a) If the court is of the opinion that the youth offender does not need commitment, it may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the youth offender on probation.
“(b) If the court shall find that a convicted person is a youth offender, and the offense is punishable by imprisonment under applicable provisions of law other than this subsection, the court may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter until discharged by the Division as provided in section 5017 (c) of this chapter; or
“(c) If the court shall find that the youth offender may not be able to derive maximum benefit from treatment by the Division prior to the expiration of six years from the date of conviction it may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter for any further period that may be authorized by law for the offense or offenses of which he stands convicted or until discharged by the Division as provided in section 5017 (d) of this chapter.
“ (d) If the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence the youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision.
“(e) If the Court desires additional information as to whether a youth offender will derive benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c) it may order that he be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for observation and study at an appropriate classification center or agency. Within sixty days from the date of the order, or such additional period as the court may grant, the Division shall report to the court its findings.”
The release of youth offenders committed under § 5010 is governed by 18 U. S. C. § 5017, which provides in part:
“(a)' The Division may at any time after reasonable notice to the Direétor release conditionally under supervision a committed youth offender. When, in the judgment of the Director, a committed youth offender should be released conditionally under supervision he shall so report and recommend to the Division.
“(b) The Division may discharge a committed youth offender unconditionally at the expiration of one year from the date of conditional release.
“(c) A youth offender committed under section 5010 (b) of this chapter shall be released conditionally under supervision on or before the expiration of four years from the date of his conviction and shall be discharged unconditionally on or before six years from the date of his conviction.
“(d) A youth offender committed under section 5010 (c) of this chapter shall be released conditionally under supervision not later than two years before the expiration of the term imposed by the court. He may be discharged unconditionally at the expiration of not less than one year from the date of his conditional release. He shall be discharged unconditionally on or before the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed, computed uninterruptedly from the date of conviction.”
Although petitioner’s complaint here is that he was not sentenced under the Act, following his conviction he challenged the validity of his plea in part on the ground that he was not informed that under the Act he could have received a sentence of incarceration and supervision up to a period of six years, 18 U. S. C. §§ 5010 (b) and 5017 (c), see n. 4, swpra, in asserted violation of Rule 11. The District Court denied relief on this ground; that ruling has not been challenged.
There is no contention made that the District Court could not place petitioner on probation under 18 U. S. C. § 3651, as opposed to probation under the Act, 18 U. S. C. § 5010 (a). See United States v. Kurzyna, 485 F. 2d 517 (CA2 1973). Petitioner was released from confinement to probation on May 11, 1972, with the special condition that his probation terminate May 11, 1974. Although by now petitioner may have fully served his sentence, including probation, he still suffers the disabilities accompanying a criminal misdemeanor conviction under 21 U. S. C. § 844 (a). While the provision under which he was sentenced to probation, 18 U. S. C. § 3651, does not provide for relief from these disabilities, the Act does so in 18 U. S. C. § 5021, by its provision for setting aside the conviction of a youth offender:
“(a) Upon the unconditional discharge by the division of a committed youth offender before the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed upon him, the conviction shall be automatically set aside and the division shall issue to the youth offender a certificate to that effect.
“(b) Where a youth offender has been placed on probation by the court, the court may thereafter, in its discretion, unconditionally discharge such youth offender from probation prior to the expiration of the maximum period of probation theretofore fixed by the court, which discharge shall automatically set aside the conviction, and the court shall issue to the youth offender a certificate to that effect.”
Despite the expiration of petitioner’s sentence, then, he may still receive the benefit of 18 U. S. C. § 5021 if he is resentenced under the Act. To be eligible to have his conviction set aside under the Act, petitioner would have to be committed under § 5010 (b) or (c), or placed on probation under § 5010 (a), and achieve the early discharge required by § 5021 (a) or (b). While this might require the imposition of a longer sentence than he originally received, petitioner represents through counsel that he would voluntarily seek re-sentencing which would place him back on probation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8, 16-18. The District Court would then be able, as a matter of discretion, to provide the requisite early unconditional discharge. 18 U. S. C. §5021 (b).
There is no contention here that the District Court relied upon improper or inaccurate information. United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443 (1972). Petitioner contends he was denied due process because he was deprived of his claimed right to be sentenced under the Act, without a reasoned explanation on the record for the asserted deprivation. We need not address this contention, for it was not raised before the District Court, the Court of Appeals, or in the questions presented in the petition for certiorari. Phillips Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U. S. 376, 386 n. 12 (1960); Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128, 129-130 (1964); Radio Officers’ Union v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 17, 37 n. 35 (1954).
In 1941 Mr. Chief Justice Stone requested the Judicial Conference to study the general subject of punishment for crime. The Chief Justice appointed four federal courts of appeals judges and three district judges to the committee which undertook the study. A subcommittee gave particular attention to the treatment of youth offenders. The committee made a report to the Judicial Conference in 1942, and developed a draft of an act to provide a correctional system for adult and youth offenders. The report as adopted by the Conference was first presented to Congress in 1943. The recommendations regarding youth offenders were largely adopted by Congress in 1949 in the bill which became the Federal Youth Corrections Act in 1950.
The Act is ordinarily not applied to convicted persons under the age of 18, who are eligible for sentencing under the provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U. S. C. § 5031 et seq. And certain multiple offenders in the District of Columbia are, despite their qualifying age, barred from sentencing under the Act. D. C. Code Ann. § 22-3202 (d) (1). By contrast, convicted persons between the ages of 22 and 26, termed “young adult” offenders, may be sentenced for treatment under the Act if “the court finds that there is reasonable groun[d) to believe that the defendant will benefit from” treatment under the Act. 18 U. S. C. § 4209. Of course, adult offenders are eligible for sentencing only under statutory provisions different from those available for juveniles, youth offenders, and young adult offenders.
In 1952, Congress amended § 5024 of the Act, and added §§ 5025 and 5026, in order to extend the Act’s coverage to youth offenders convicted in the District of Columbia. 66 Stat. 45. In 1967, Congress further amended these sections, withdrawing from the Bureau of Prisons and the Youth Correction Division control of District of Columbia youth offenders during their commitment and after their release. Control during these periods was instead given to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia, who could in turn delegate this authority to the D. C. Department of Corrections, in order to provide continuity of treatment.
11 In recognition of the difficulty of ascertaining whether, and if so which type of, treatment under the Act would benefit a youth offender, the Act also permits the sentencing court to commit the offender to one of the above classification agencies where, following observation and
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
B
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sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Chief Justice Burger
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, III-A, III-C, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-B and III-B, in which Justice White, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O’Connor joined.
> We granted certiorari to decide whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was violated when a federal defendant was given a greater sentence after retrial following a successful appeal than he had been given after his original conviction because the sentencing court considered an intervening criminal conviction for acts committed prior to the original sentencing.
I
Petitioner, an attorney, was indicted on four counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1341. Prior to trial on these charges, he was indicted, tried, and convicted of the unrelated offense of knowingly and willfully making false statements in a passport application, in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1542. At the sentencing hearing following petitioner’s first conviction, the Government advised the court that charges were then pending against petitioner for mail fraud and that petitioner previously had been convicted for failure to file a tax return. Petitioner’s counsel replied that it would be inappropriate for the court to consider the pending mail fraud charges in its sentencing on the passport conviction because petitioner had yet to respond to the charges.
The District Court Judge informed the parties that he would not consider the pending mail fraud charge in sentencing petitioner. The judge explained that he always considered prior convictions when sentencing a defendant but that he did not consider pending charges: “[I]f judges at the time of considering prior convictions also consider pending cases . . . then if that pending case resulted in a conviction, one of the sentences would inevitably have been a pyramided sentence.” App. 26. Following this colloquy, the judge sentenced petitioner on the passport offense to two years of imprisonment, all but six months of which he suspended in favor of three years of probation.
Thereafter, pursuant to negotiations between petitioner and the Government, the Government dismissed the mail fraud indictment and substituted a one-count information charging petitioner with possession of counterfeit certificates of deposit, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §480. Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to this charge before another Federal District Court Judge in the Southern District of Florida and was sentenced to two years’ probation. App. to Brief for Petitioner 3-15.
The Court of Appeals for what was then the Fifth Circuit subsequently reversed petitioner’s first conviction on grounds not material here and remanded for a new trial. 641 F. 2d 326 (1981). Petitioner was retried on .that charge and was again convicted. The presiding judge at the second trial was the same judge who had presided at petitioner’s first trial on the passport offense and sentenced petitioner to the 2-year partially suspended sentence, with probation. This time, the judge sentenced petitioner to two years of imprisonment, none of which was suspended. The judge explained to petitioner and counsel for the Government that he was imposing a greater sentence because of petitioner’s intervening conviction for possession of counterfeit certificates of deposit:
“[Wjhen I imposed sentence the first time, the only conviction on [petitioner’s] record in this Court’s eyes, this Court’s consideration, was failure to file income tax returns, nothing else. I did not consider then and I don’t in other cases either, pending matters because that would result in a pyramiding of sentences. At this time, he comes before me with two convictions. Last time, he came before me with one conviction.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-42.
The judge rejected an argument by petitioner’s counsel that because the conduct underlying the conviction for possession of counterfeit certificates of deposit occurred prior to petitioner’s original sentencing on the passport conviction, petitioner could not, under North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U. S. 711 (1969), receive a sentence greater than that received for the original conviction.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that petitioner’s increased sentence “was based on objective, factual new evidence not previously considered, that it was neither motivated by judicial vindictiveness nor reasonably perceivable as having been so motivated . . . .” 700 F. 2d 663, 670 (1983). It held that the District Court
“followed precisely the procedural steps of [North Carolina v. ] Pearce, affirmatively stating on the record his reason for enhancing the sentence, basing that reason on objective information concerning identifiable conduct of the defendant, and making the factual data on which his action was based part of the record so that its constitutional legitimacy [could] be fully reviewed on appeal.” Id., at 667.
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner’s argument that his sentence could not be increased after retrial based on the intervening counterfeiting conviction because the counterfeiting offense itself was not “conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing,” see Pearce, supra, at 726. The Court of Appeals read Pearce to be concerned only with “vindictive sentencing, not defendant misbehavior between trials.” The Court of Appeals noted that there was “no evidence whatsoever” that petitioner’s sentence was increased out of vindictiveness. The court expressly declined to follow the contrary holdings of the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits that an enhanced sentence must be based upon conduct of the defendant occurring after the original sentencing. See United States v. Markus, 603 F. 2d 409 (CA2 1979); United States v. Williams, 651 F. 2d 644 (CA9 1981).
We granted certiorari, 464 U. S. 932 (1983), to resolve the conflict among the Circuits as to the meaning of this Court’s holding in Pearce.
II
A
It is now well established that a judge or other sentencing authority is to be accorded very wide discretion in determining an appropriate sentence. The sentencing court or jury must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant, given the crime committed. Justice Black made this point when, writing for the Court in Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 247 (1949), he observed that
“[h]ighly relevant — if not essential — to [the] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.”
Allowing consideration of such a breadth of information ensures that the punishment will suit not merely the offense but the individual defendant. Ibid.
In Pearce, supra, however, the Court recognized at least one limitation on the discretion of the sentencing authority where a sentence is increased after reconviction following a successful appeal. Two separate cases were before the Court in Pearce. In both cases, the defendants successfully appealed their original convictions and on retrial received greater sentences than they had received originally. The Court held that neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause barred imposition of the greater sentences after the reconvictions of the defendants. However, it held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevented increased sentences actually motivated by vindictive retaliation by the judge: “Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.” 395 U. S., at 725. Because fear of such vindictiveness might chill a defendant’s decision to appeal or to attack his conviction collaterally, the Court went on to say that “due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.” Ibid, (footnote omitted).
To prevent actual vindictiveness from entering into a decision and allay any fear on the part of a defendant that an increased sentence is in fact the product of vindictiveness, the Court fashioned what in essence is a “prophylactic rule,” see Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U. S. 104, 116 (1972), that “whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear.” 395 U. S., at 726. This rule has been read to “[apply] a presumption of vindictiveness, which may be overcome only by objective information in the record justifying the increased sentence.” United States v. Goodwin, 457 U. S. 368, 374 (1982). The rationale for requiring that “the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based” be made part of the record, of course, is that the “constitutional legitimacy,” of the enhanced sentence may thereby be readily assessed on appeal. Ibid.
In Pearce, the State had offered “no evidence” whatever to justify respondent Rice’s increased sentence; it had not even “attempted to explain or justify” the greater penalty. 395 U. S., at 726. Similarly, the State had advanced no reason for Pearce’s sentence “beyond the naked power to impose it,” ibid. Finding the record barren of any evidence to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness and support the increased sentences in either of the two cases in Pearce, the Court affirmed the judgments granting relief.
B
In only one other circumstance has the Court identified a need to indulge a presumption of vindictiveness of the kind imposed in Pearce. In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21 (1974), Perry, while in state prison, was involved in a fight with a fellow inmate, and was charged with the misdemeanor offense of assault with a deadly weapon. He was convicted in the State’s District Court Division and sentenced to a 6-month prison term to run consecutively to the term he was then serving. He appealed to the County Superior Court, where, under applicable state law, he had a right to a trial de novo.
After Perry filed his notice of appeal, but before trial, the prosecutor obtained an indictment against Perry for the felony offense of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflict serious bodily injury. Perry pleaded guilty to the felony offense and was sentenced to a term of five to seven years’ imprisonment to run consecutively with the sentence he was then serving. The effect of this was to increase Perry’s sentence by the 17 months that he had already served under the sentence imposed by the District Court Division.
We held that the indictment for the felony offense was impermissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating that “the opportunities for vindictiveness in this situation are such as to impel the conclusion that due process of law requires a rule analogous to that of the Pearce case.” Id., at 27. The prosecutor, we noted, “clearly has a considerable stake in discouraging convicted misdemeanants from appealing and . . . obtaining a trial de novo . . . .” Ibid.
Although there was no affirmative evidence tendered that the prosecutor brought the felony charge in bad faith, we agreed that, because the record was devoid of any explanation for the new indictment, relief should be granted. Consistent with Pearce, however, we explicitly observed that a different disposition would have been called for had the State advanced a legitimate non vindictive justification for the greater charge. 417 U. S., at 29, n. 7. This acknowledgment, of course, was no more than a reaffirmation that Pearce established a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness, not an absolute prohibition on enhancement of sentence.
Because of its “severity,” see Goodwin, supra, at 373, the Court has been chary about extending the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness when the likelihood of vindictiveness is not as pronounced as in Pearce and Blackledge. This reluctance is understandable for, as we have noted, operation of the presumption often “block[s] a legitimate response to criminal conduct.” 457 U. S., at 373. In the four following cases, we expressly declined invitations to extend the presumption.
We saw no need for application of the presumption in the context of Kentucky’s two-tier trial system. Colten v. Kentucky, supra. Under Kentucky law, a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor in the inferior court had the right to a trial de novo in a court of general jurisdiction. We rejected the contention in Colten that the de novo tribunal was constitutionally prohibited from imposing a greater sentence than that imposed in the original trial. We held that “[t]he possibility of vindictiveness, found to exist in Pearce, [was] not inherent in the Kentucky two-tier system.” Id., at 116. While we believed that the prophylactic rule was unnecessary, we left open the possibility that a defendant might prove actual vindictiveness and thereby establish a due process violation; we held only that the Kentucky trial de novo system “as such” was not unconstitutional. Id., at 119.
Similarly, in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. S. 17 (1973), we rejected the need for the prophylactic Pearce presumption because we perceived as “de minimis” the possibility that an increased sentence by a jury upon reconviction after a new trial would be motivated by vindictiveness. Not only was the second jury in Chaffin unaware of the prior conviction, but in contrast to the judge and the prosecutor in Pearce and Blackledge, it was thought unlikely that a jury would consider itself to have a “personal stake” in a prior conviction or a “motivation to engage in self-vindication.” 412 U. S., at 27. We emphasized in Chaffin that
“Pearce was not written with a view to protecting against the mere possibility that, once the slate is wiped clean and the prosecution begins anew, a fresh sentence may be higher for some valid reason associated with the need for flexibility and discretion in the sentencing process.” Id., at 25.
Pearce, we explained, was only “premised on the apparent need to guard against vindictiveness in the resentencing process.” 412 U. S., at 25 (emphasis in original). Consequently, as in Colten, we noted that jury sentencing used as a means of “punishing or penalizing the assertion of protected rights” might violate due process. 412 U. S., at 32, n. 20.
In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357 (1978), we held that due process is not implicated when a prosecutor threatens to seek conviction on a greater offense if the defendant does not plead guilty and in fact does so when the defendant proceeds to trial. We declined to characterize this conduct as “punishment or retaliation” offensive to due process, id., at 363, instead noting that such was a mere byproduct of the “‘give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.”’ Id., at 362 (quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790, 809 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting). As in Colten and Chaffin, we did not rule out, however, the possibility that a defendant could establish a due process violation by proof of actual vindictiveness. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U. S., at 380, n. 12.
Most recently, we held in United States v. Goodwin, supra, that the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness is unwarranted where a prosecutor adds a felony charge before trial to a defendant’s misdemeanor charge after the defendant demands a jury trial on the misdemeanor charge. We thought it highly unlikely “that a prosecutor would respond to a defendant’s pretrial demand for a jury trial by bringing charges not in the public interest.” 457 U. S., at 384. Consistent with our earlier cases, we again explicitly recognized “the possibility that a defendant in an appropriate case might prove objectively that the prosecutor’s charging decision was motivated by a desire to punish him for doing something that the law plainly allowed him to do.” Ibid, (footnote omitted).
If it was not clear from the Court’s holding in Pearce, it is clear from our subsequent cases applying Pearce that due process does not in any sense forbid enhanced sentences or charges, but only enhancement motivated by actual vindictiveness toward the defendant for having exercised guaranteed rights. In Pearce and in Blackledge, the Court “presumed” that the increased sentence and charge were the products of actual vindictiveness aroused by the defendants’ appeals. It held that the defendants’ right to due process was violated not because the sentence and charge were enhanced, but because there was no evidence introduced to rebut the presumption that actual vindictiveness was behind the increases; in other words, by operation of law, the increases were deemed motivated by vindictiveness. In Colten, Chaffin, Bordenkircher, and Goodwin, on the other hand — where the presumption was held not to apply — we made clear that a due process violation could be established only by proof of actual vindictiveness.
In sum, where the presumption applies, the sentencing authority or the prosecutor must rebut the presumption that an increased sentence or charge resulted from vindictiveness; where the presumption does not apply, the defendant must affirmatively prove actual vindictiveness.
HH HH HH
A
Here, petitioner in effect received a greater sentence of confinement following retrial than he had originally received. This was sufficient to engage the presumption of Pearce. In sharp contrast to Pearce and Blackledge, however, the trial judge here carefully explained his reasons for imposing the greater sentence. The care with which the trial judge approached the resentencing is clear from the record, and it bears repeating:
“[WJhen I imposed sentence the first time, the only conviction on [petitioner’s] record in this Court’s eyes, this Court’s consideration, was failure to file income tax returns, nothing else. I did not consider then and I don’t in other cases either, pending matters because that would result in a pyramiding of sentences. At this time he comes before me with two convictions. Last time, he came before me with one conviction.”
Consideration of a criminal conviction obtained in the interim between an original sentencing and a sentencing after retrial is manifestly legitimate. This amply rebuts any presumption of vindictiveness. Here, the trial judge’s justification is plain even from the record of petitioner’s first sentencing proceeding; the judge informed the parties that, although he did not consider pending charges when sentencing a defendant, he always took into account prior criminal convictions. This, of course, was proper; indeed, failure to do so would have been inappropriate.
Petitioner does not charge that the judge was vindictive. Rather, he argues that any consideration of his intervening conviction was foreclosed by the plain language of Pearce. Petitioner points to the passage in Pearce stating that the reasons posited by a court for increasing a defendant’s sentence on retrial “must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.” 395 U. S., at 726 (emphasis added). His contention is that the “conduct” for which he was convicted, i. e., possession of counterfeit certificates of deposit, occurred prior to the time of his original sentencing proceeding and thus could not be considered by the trial judge.
Pearce is not without its ambiguities; the passage recited by petitioner, for example, is said by petitioner to conflict with the following language in the same section of the opinion:
“A man who is retried after his first conviction has been set aside may be acquitted. If convicted, he may receive a shorter sentence, he may receive the same sentence, or he may receive a longer sentence than the one originally imposed. . . .
“. . . A trial judge is not constitutionally precluded, in other words, from imposing a new sentence, whether greater or less than the original sentence, in the light of events subsequent to the first trial that may have thrown new light upon the defendant’s ‘life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities.’ Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 245. Such information may come to the judge’s attention from evidence adduced at the second trial itself, from a new presentence investigation, from the defendant’s prison record, or possibly from other sources.” Id., at 722-723 (emphasis added).
B
In addition, two of the separate opinions in Pearce suggest that the Court did not intend to confine the sentencing authority’s consideration to “conduct” occurring subsequent to the first sentencing proceeding. Justice Douglas characterized the Court’s holding as allowing a greater sentence to be justified by “events subsequent to the first trial,” and by “information that has developed after the initial trial.” Id., at 736, and n. 6 (concurring opinion). Justice Black did not refer to a temporal limitation on the information that could be considered. He appeared to believe that the sole requirement imposed by the majority was that the “state courts articulate their reasons for imposing particular sentences.” Id., at 741 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).
C
We find it unnecessary, however, to reconcile these apparent ambiguities. In the two cases before the Court in Pearce there was no asserted explanation or justification for the heightened sentence. This case, on the other hand, squarely presents the question of the scope of information that may be relied upon by a sentencing authority to justify an increased sentence after retrial.
We conclude that any language in Pearce suggesting that an intervening conviction for an offense committed prior to the original sentencing may not be considered upon sentencing after retrial, is inconsistent with the Pearce opinion as a whole. There is no logical support for a distinction between “events” and “conduct” of the defendant occurring after the initial sentencing insofar as the kind of information that may be relied upon to show a nonvindictive motive is concerned. This is clear from Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241 (1949), which provides that the underlying philosophy of modern sentencing is to take into account the person as well as the crime by considering “information concerning every aspect of a defendant’s life.” Id., at 250.
Even without a limitation on the type of factual information that may be considered, the requirement that the sentencing authority or prosecutor detail the reasons for an increased sentence or charge enables appellate courts to ensure that a nonvindictive rationale supports the increase. A contrary conclusion would result in the needless exclusion of relevant sentencing information from the very authority in whom the sentencing power is vested. The response of the Court of Appeals to petitioner’s argument was entirely correct: “No reason exists for applying a phrase in the Pearce guidelines to circumstances bearing no relation to the purpose of those guidelines.” 700 F. 2d, at 668.
HH <1
We hold that after retrial and conviction following a defendant’s successful appeal, a sentencing authority may justify an increased sentence by affirmatively identifying relevant conduct or events that occurred subsequent to the original sentencing proceedings. 395 U. S., at 726.
Affirmed.
The Government argues that the “temporal limitation” imposed by Pearce on information that may be considered by a sentencing authority is unnecessary to advance the policies underlying that decision. However, the question whether an increased sentence can be justified by reference to an event or conduct occurring before the original sentencing is not presented in this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
D
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Thomas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Schmuck v. United States, 489 U. S. 705 (1989), we held that a defendant who requests a jury instruction on a lesser offense under Rule 81(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure must demonstrate that “the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense.” Id., at 716. This ease requires us to apply this elements test to the offenses described by 18 U. S. C. §§ 2113(a) and (b) (1994 ed. and Supp. IV). The former punishes “[wjhoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes... from the person or presence of another... any... thing of value belonging to, or in the... possession of, any bank....” The latter, which entails less severe penalties, punishes, inter alia, “[wjhoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any... thing of value exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the... possession of, any bank....” We hold that § 2113(b) requires an element not required by § 2113(a) — three in fact — and therefore is not a lesser included offense of § 2113(a). Petitioner is accordingly prohibited as a matter of law from obtaining a lesser included offense instruction on the offense described by § 2113(b).
f — I
On September 9, 1997, petitioner Floyd J. Carter donned a ski mask and entered the Collective Federal Savings Bank in Hamilton Township, New Jersey. Carter confronted a customer who was exiting the bank and pushed her back inside. She screamed, startling others in the bank. Undeterred, Carter ran into the bank and leaped over the customer service counter and through one of the teller windows. One of the tellers rushed into the manager’s office. Meanwhile, Carter opened several teller drawers and emptied the money into a bag. After having removed almost $16,000 in currency, Carter jumped back over the counter and fled from the scene. Later that day, the police apprehended him.
A grand jury indicted Carter, charging him with violating § 2113(a). While not contesting the basic facts of the episode, Carter pleaded not guilty on the theory that he had not taken the bank’s money “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” as § 2113(a) requires. Before trial, Carter moved that the court instruct the jury on the offense described by § 2113(b) as a lesser included offense of the offense described by § 2113(a). The District Court, relying on United States v. Mosley, 126 F. 3d 200 (CA3 1997), denied the motion in a preliminary ruling. At the close of the Government’s ease, the District Court denied Carter’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and indicated that the preliminary ruling denying the lesser included offense instruction would stand. The jury, instructed on § 2113(a) alone, returned a guilty verdiet, and the District Court entered judgment pursuant to that verdiet.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion, relying on its earlier decision in Mosley. Judgment order reported at 185 F. 3d 863 (1999). While the Ninth Circuit agrees with the Third that a lesser offense instruction is precluded in this context, see United States v. Gregory, 891 F. 2d 732, 734 (CA9 1989), other Circuits have held to the contrary, see United States v. Walker, 75 F. 3d 178, 180 (CA4 1996); United States v. Brittain, 41 F. 3d 1409, 1410 (CA10 1994). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 528 U. S. 1060 (1999), and now affirm.
II
In Schmuck, supra, we were called upon to interpret Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e)’s provision that “[t]he defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged.” We held that this provision requires application of an elements test, under which “one offense is not ‘necessarily included’ in another unless the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense.” 489 U. S., at 716. The elements test requires “a textual comparison of criminal statutes,” an approach that, we explained, lends itself to “certain and predictable” outcomes. Id., at 720.
Applying the test, we held that the offense of tampering with an odometer, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1984 and 1990e(a) (1982 ed.), is not a lesser included offense of mail fraud, 18 U. S. C. §1341. We explained that mail fraud requires two elements — (1) having devised or intending to devise a scheme to defraud (or to perform specified fraudulent acts), and (2) use of the mail for the purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, the scheme (or specified fraudulent acts). The lesser offense of odometer tampering, however, requires the element of knowingly and willfully causing an odometer to be altered, an element that is absent from the offense of mail fraud. Accordingly, the elements of odometer tampering are not a subset of the elements of mail fraud, and a defendant charged with the latter is not entitled to an instruction on the former under Rule 31(e). Schmuck, supra, at 721-722.
Turning to the instant ease, the Government contends that three elements required by §2113(b)’s first paragraph are not required by § 2113(a): (1) specific intent to steal; (2) asportation; and (3) valuation exceeding $1,000. The statute provides:
Ҥ2113. Bank robbery and incidental crimes
“(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association...
“Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
“(b) Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; or
‘Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value not exceeding $1,000 belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”
A “textual comparison” of the elements of these offenses suggests that the Government is correct. First, whereas subsection (b) requires that the defendant act “with intent to steal or purloin,” subsection (a) contains no similar requirement. Second, whereas subsection (b) requires that the defendant “tak[e] and carr[y] away” the property, subsection (a) only requires that the defendant “tak[e]” the property. Third, whereas the first paragraph of subsection (b) requires that the property have a “value exceeding $1,000,” subsection (a) contains no valuation requirement. These extra clauses in subsection (b) “cannot be regarded as mere surplusage; [they] mea[n] something.” Potter v. United States, 155 U. S. 438, 446 (1894).
Carter urges that the foregoing application of Schmuck’s elements test is too rigid and submits that ordinary principles of statutory interpretation are relevant to the Schmuck inquiry. We do not dispute the latter proposition. The Schmuck test, after all, requires an exercise in statutory interpretation before the comparison of elements may be made, and it is only sensible that normal principles of statutory construction apply. We disagree, however, with petitioner’s conclusion that such principles counsel a departure in this ease from what is indicated by a straightforward reading of the text.
Ill
We begin with the arguments pertinent to the general relationship between §§ 2118(a) and (b). Carter first contends that the structure of §2113 supports the view that subsection (b) is a lesser included offense of subsection (a). He points to subsection (c) of §2118, which imposes criminal liability on a person who knowingly “receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of, any property or money or other thing of value which has been taken or stolen from a bank... in violation of subsection (b).” (Emphasis added.) It would be anomalous, posits Carter, for subsection (e) to apply — as its text plainly provides — only to the fence who receives property from a violator of subsection (b) but not to the fence who receives property from a violator of subsection (a). The anomaly disappears, he concludes, only if subsection (b) is always violated when subsection (a) is violated — i. e., only if subsection (b) is a lesser included offense of subsection (a).
But Carter’s anomaly — even if it truly exists — is only an anomaly. Petitioner does not claim, and we tend to doubt, that it rises to the level of absurdity. Cf. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 509-511 (1989); id., at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). For example, it may be that violators of subsection (a) generally act alone, while violators of subsection (b) are commonly assisted by fences. In such a state of affairs, a sensible Congress may have thought it necessary to punish only the fences of property taken in violation of subsection (b). Or Congress may have thought that a defendant who violates subsection (a) usually — if not inevitably — also violates subsection (b), so that the fence may be punished by reference to that latter violation. In any event, nothing in subsection (c) purports to redefine the elements required by the text of subsections (a) and (b).
Carter’s second argument is more substantial. He submits that, insofar as subsections (a) and (b) are similar to the common-law crimes of robbery and larceny, we must assume that subsections (a) and (b) require the same elements as their common-law predecessors, at least absent Congress’ affirmative indication (whether in text or legislative history) of an intent to displace the common-law scheme. While we (and the Government) agree that the statutory crimes at issue here bear a close resemblance to the common-law crimes of robbery and larceny, see Brief for United States 29 (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *229, *232); accord, post, at 278-279, that observation is beside the point. The canon on imputing common-law meaning applies only when Congress makes use of a statutory term with established meaning at common law, and Carter does not point to any such term in the text of the statute.
This limited scope of the canon on imputing common-law meaning has long been understood. In Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246 (1952), for example, we articulated the canon in this way:
“[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.” Id., at 263 (emphasis added).
In other words, a “duster of ideas” from the common law should be imported into statutory text only when Congress employs a common-law term, and not when, as here, Congress simply describes an offense analogous to a common-law crime without using common-law terms.
We made this clear in United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482 (1997). At issue was whether 18 U. S. C. § 1014 — which punishes a person who “knowingly makes any false statement or report... for the purpose of influencing in any way the action” of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insured bank “upon any application, advance,... commitment, or loan” — requires proof of the materiality of the “false statement.” The defendants contended that since materiality was a required element of “false statement”-type offenses at common law, it must also be required by § 1014. Although Justice Stevens in dissent thought the argument to be meritorious, we rejected it:
‘‘[Fjundamentally, we disagree with our colleague’s apparent view that any term that is an element of a common-law crime carries with it every other aspect of that common-law crime when the term is used in a statute. Justice Stevens seems to assume that because ‘false statement’ is an element of perjury, and perjury criminalizes only material statements, a statute criminalizing ‘false statements’ covers only material statements. By a parity of reasoning, because common-law perjury involved statements under oath, a statute criminalizing a false statement would reach only statements under oath. It is impossible to believe that Congress intended to impose such restrictions sub silentio, however, and so our rule on imputing common-law meaning to statutory terms does not sweep so broadly.” 519 U. S., at 492, n. 10 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
Similarly, in United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407 (1957), we declined to look to the analogous common-law crime because the statutory term at issue — “stolen”—had no meaning at common law. See id., at 411-412 (“[WJhile ‘stolen’ is constantly identified with larceny, the term was never at common law equated or exclusively dedicated to larceny” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
By contrast, we have not hesitated to turn to the common law for guidance when the relevant statutory text does contain a term with an established meaning at common law. In Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1 (1999), for example, we addressed whether materiality is required by federal statutes punishing a “scheme or artifice to defraud.” Id., at 20, and 20-21, nn. 3-4 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§1341, 1343, 1344). Unlike the statute in Wells, which contained no common-law term, these statutes did include a common-law term— “defraud.” 527 U. S., at 22. Because common-law fraud required proof of materiality, we applied the canon to hold that these federal statutes implicitly contain a materiality requirement as well. Id., at 23. Similarly, in Evans v. United States, 504 U. S. 255, 261-264 (1992), we observed that “extortion” in 18 U. S. C. § 1951 was a common-law term, and proceeded to interpret this term by reference to its meaning at common law.
Here, it is undisputed that “robbery” and “larceny” are terms with established meanings at common law. But neither term appears in the text of § 2113(a) or § 2113(b). While the term “robbery” does appear in §2113’s title, the title of a statute “ ‘[is] of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase’” in the statute itself. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212 (1998) (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528-529 (1947) (modifications in original)). And Carter does not claim that this title illuminates any such ambiguous language. Accordingly, the canon on imputing common-law meaning has no bearing on this ease.
<
We turn now to Carter’s more specific arguments concerning the “extra” elements of § 2113(b). While conceding the absence of three of §2113(b)’s requirements from the text of § 2113(a) — (1) “intent to steal or purloin”; (2) “takes and carries away,” i. e., asportation; and (3) “value exceeding $1,000” (first paragraph) — Carter claims that the first two should be deemed implicit in § 2113(a), and that the third is not an element at all.
A
As to “intent to steal or purloin,” it will be recalled that the text of subsection (b) requires a specific “intent to steal or purloin,” whereas subsection (a) contains no explicit mens rea requirement of any kind. Carter nevertheless argues that such a specific intent requirement must be deemed implicitly present in § 2113(a) by virtue of “our cases interpreting criminal statutes to include broadly applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its tei’ms does not contain them.” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994). Properly applied to §2113, however, the presumption in favor of scienter demands only that we read subsection (a) as requiring proof of general intent — that is, that the defendant possessed knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime (here, the taking of property of another by force and violence or intimidation).
Before explaining why this is so under our cases, an example, United States v. Lewis, 628 F. 2d 1276, 1279 (CA10 1980), cert, denied, 450 U. S. 924 (1981), will help to make the distinction between “general” and “specific” intent less esoteric. In Lewis, a person entered a bank and took money from a teller at gunpoint, but deliberately failed to make a quick getaway from the bank in the hope of being arrested so that he would be returned to prison and treated for alcoholism. Though this defendant knowingly engaged in the acts of using force and taking money (satisfying “general intent”), he did not intend permanently to deprive the bank of its possession of the money (failing to satisfy “specific intent”). See generally 1W. LaPave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.5, p. 315 (1986) (distinguishing general from specific intent).
The presumption in favor of scienter requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea which is necessary to separate wrongful conduct from “otherwise innocent conduct.” X-Citement Video, supra, at 72. In Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600 (1994), for example, to avoid criminalizing the innocent activity of gun ownership, we interpreted a federal firearms statute to require proof that the defendant knew that the weapon he possessed had the characteristics bringing it within the scope of the statute. Id., at 611-612. See also, e. g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419, 426 (1985); Morissette, 342 U. S., at 270-271. By contrast, some situations may call for implying a specific intent requirement into statutory text. Suppose, for example, a statute identical to § 2113(b) but without the words “intent to steal or purloin.” Such a statute would run the risk of punishing seemingly innocent conduct in the case of a defendant who peaceably takes money believing it to be his. Reading the statute to require that the defendant possess general intent with respect to the actus reus — i. e., that he know that he is physically taking the money — would fail to protect the innocent actor. The statute therefore would need to be read to require not only general intent, but also specific intent — i. e., that the defendant take the money with “intent to steal or purloin.”
In this case, as in Staples, a general intent requirement suffices to separate wrongful from “otherwise innocent” conduct. Section 2113(a) certainly should not be interpreted to apply to the hypothetical person who engages in forceful taking of money while sleepwalking (innocent, if aberrant activity), but this result is accomplished simply by requiring, as Staples did, general intent — i. e., proof of knowledge with respect to the actus reus of the crime. And once this mental state and actus reus are shown, the concerns underlying the presumption in favor of scienter are fully satisfied, for a forceful taking — even by a defendant who takes under a good-faith claim of right — falls outside the realm of the “otherwise innocent.” Thus, the presumption in favor of scienter does not justify reading a specific intent requirement — “intent to steal or purloin” — into § 2113(a).
Independent of his reliance upon the presumption in favor of scienter, Carter argues that the legislative history of § 2113 supports the notion that an “intent to steal” requirement should be read into § 2113(a). Carter points out that, in 1934, Congress enacted what is now § 2113(a), but with the adverb “feloniously” (which all agree is equivalent to “intent to steal”) modifying the verb “takes.” Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 304, §2(a), 48 Stat. 783. In 1937, Congress added what is now § 2113(b). Act of Aug. 24, 1937, ch. 747, 50 Stat. 749. Finally, in 1948, Congress made two changes to §2113, deleting “feloniously” from what is now § 2113(a) and dividing the “robbery” and “larceny” offenses into their own separate subsections. 62 Stat. 796.
Carter concludes that the 1948 deletion of “feloniously” was merely a stylistic change, and that Congress had no intention, in deleting that word, to drop the requirement that the defendant “feloniously” take the property — that is, with intent to steal. Such reasoning, however, misunderstands our approach to statutory interpretation. In analyzing a statute, we begin by examining the text, see, e. g., Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 475 (1992), not by "psychoanalyzing those who enacted it,” Bank One Chicago, N. A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U. S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). While “feloniously” no doubt would be sufficient to convey a specific intent requirement akin to the one spelled out in subsection (b), the word simply does not appear in subsection (a).
Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, post, at 283-284, this reading is not a fanciful one. The absence of a specific intent requirement from subsection (a), for example, permits the statute to reach eases like Lewis, see supra, at 268, where an ex-convict robs a bank because he wants to be apprehended and returned to prison. (The Government represents that indictments on this same fact pattern (which invariably plead out and hence do not result in reported decisions) are brought “as often as every year,” Brief for United States 22, n. 13.) It can hardly be said, therefore, that it would have been absurd to delete “feloniously” in order to reach such defendants. And once we have made that determination, our inquiry into legislative motivation is at an end. Cf. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S., at 510-511.
B
Turning to the second element in dispute, it will be recalled that, whereas subsection (b) requires that the defendant “tak[e] and earr[y) away the property,” subsection (a) requires only that the defendant “tak[e]” the property. Carter contends that the “takes” in subsection (a) is equivalent to “takes and carries away” in subsection (b). While Carter seems to acknowledge that the argument is at war with the text of the statute, he urges that text should not be dispositive here because nothing in the evolution of § 2113(a) suggests that Congress sought to discard the asportation requirement from that subsection.
But, again, our inquiry focuses on an analysis of the textual product of Congress’ efforts, not on speculation as to the internal thought processes of its Members. Congress is certainly free to outlaw bank theft that does not involve aspor-tation, and it hardly would have been absurd for Congress to do so, since the taking-without-asportation scenario is no imagined hypothetical. See, e. g., State v. Boyle, 970 S. W. 2d 835, 836, 838-839 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (construing state statutory codification of common-law robbery to apply to defendant who, after taking money by threat of force, dropped the money on the spot). Indeed, a leading treatise applauds the deletion of the asportation requirement from the elements of robbery. See 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 8.11, at 439. No doubt the common law’s decision to require asportation also has its virtues. But Congress adopted a different view in § 2113(a), and it is not for us to question that choice.
C
There remains the requirement in §2113(b)’s first paragraph that the property taken have a “value exceeding $1,000” — a requirement notably absent from § 2113(a). Carter, shifting gears from his previous arguments, concedes the textual point but claims that the valuation requirement does not affect the Schmuck elements analysis because it is a sentencing factor, not an element. We disagree. The structure of subsection (b) strongly suggests that its two paragraphs — the first of which requires that the property taken have “value exceeding $1,000,” the second of which refers to property of “value not exceeding $1,000” — describe distinct offenses. Each begins with the word “[w]hoever,” proceeds to describe identically (apart from- the differing valuation requirements) the elements of the offense, and concludes by stating the prescribed punishment. That these provisions “stand on their own grammatical feet” strongly suggests that Congress intended the valuation requirement to be an element of each paragraph’s offense, rather than a sentencing factor of some base § 2113(b) offense. Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227, 234 (1999). Even aside from the statute’s structure, the “steeply higher penalties” — an enhancement from a 1-year to a 10-year maximum penalty on proof of valuation exceeding $1,000 — leads us to conclude that the valuation requirement is an element of the first paragraph of subsection (b). See Castillo v. United States, ante, at 127; Jones, 526 U. S., at 233. Finally, the constitutional questions that would be raised by interpreting the valuation requirement to be a sentencing factor persuade us to adopt the view that the valuation requirement is an element. See id., at 239-252.
The dissent agrees that the valuation requirement of subsection (b)’s first paragraph is an element, but nonetheless would hold that subsection (b) is a lesser included offense of subsection (a). Post, at 287-289. The dissent reasons that the “value not exceeding $1,000” component of §2113(b)’s second paragraph is not an element of the offense described in that paragraph. Hence, the matter of value does not prevent §2113(b)’s second paragraph from being a lesser included offense of § 2113(a). And if a defendant wishes to receive an instruction on the first paragraph of § 2113(b) — which entails more severe penalties than the second paragraph, but is a more realistic option from the jury’s standpoint in a case such as this one where the value of the property clearly exceeds $1,000 — the dissent sees no reason to bar him from making that election, even though the “value exceeding $1,000” element of §2113(b)’s first paragraph is clearly absent from § 2118(a).
This novel maneuver creates a problem, however. Since subsection (a) contains no valuation requirement, a defendant indicted for violating that subsection who requests an instruction under subsection (b)’s first paragraph would effectively “waive... his [Fifth Amendment] right to notice by indictment of the ‘value exceeding $1,000’ element.” Post, at 289. But this same course would not be available to the prosecutor who seeks the insurance policy of a lesser included offense instruction under that same paragraph after determining that his case may have fallen short of proving the elements of subsection (a). For, whatever authority defense counsel may possess to waive a defendant’s constitutional rights, see generally New York v. Hill, 528 U. S. 110 (2000), a prosecutor has no such power. Thus, the prosecutor would be disabled from obtaining a lesser included offense instruction under Rule 31(c), a result plainly contrary to Schmuck, in which we explicitly rejected an interpretive approach to the Rule that would have permitted “the defendant, by in effect waiving his right to notice,... [to] obtain a lesser [included] offense instruction in circumstances where the constitutional restraint of notice to the defendant would prevent the prosecutor from seeking an identical instruction,” 489 U. S., at 718.
* * *
We hold that § 2113(b) is not a lesser included offense of § 2113(a), and therefore that petitioner is not entitled to a jury instruction on § 2113(b). The judgment of the Third Circuit is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
We granted certiorari in Mosley to address the issue that we resolve today, Mosley v. United States, 523 U. S. 1019 (1997), but dismissed the petition in that case upon the death of the petitioner, 525 U. S. 120 (1998) (per curiam).
By “lesser offense,” Schmuck meant lesser in terms of magnitude of punishment. When the elements of such a “lesser offense” are a subset of the elements of the charged offense, the “lesser offense” attains the status of a “lesser included offense.”
A defendant must also satisfy the “independent prerequisite... that the evidence at trial... be such that a jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense, yet acquit him of the greater.” Schmuck, 489 U. S., at 716, n. 8 (citing Keeble v. United States, 412 U. S. 205, 208 (1973)). In light of our holding that petitioner fails to satisfy the elements test, we need not address the latter requirement in this case.
The dissent claims that our decision in United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482 (1997), is not in point because we went on in Wells to discuss the evolution of the statute (specifically, a recodification of numerous sections), which revealed Congress’ apparent eare in retaining a materiality requirement in certain sections while omitting it in others, such as the one before us in Wells. According to the dissent, a similar statutory evolution is not present here. See post, at 286. But, even assuming the dissent is correct in this latter regard, the holding in Wells simply cannot be deemed to rest on our discussion of the statute’s evolution. Rather, we characterized that discussion as supporting a result we had already reached on textual grounds. See 519 U. S., at 492 (“Statutory history confirms the natural reading”).
Congress could have simply punished “robbery” or “larceny” as some States have done (and as Congress itself has done elsewhere, see, e. g., 18 U. S. C. §§2112, 2114, 2115), thereby leaving the definition of these terms to the common law, but Congress instead followed the more prevalent legislative practice of spelling out elements of these crimes. See 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §8.11, p. 438, n. 6 (1986).
This interpretive principle exists quite apart from the canon on imputing common-law meaning. See, e. g., X-Citement Video, 513 U. S., at 70 (applying presumption in favor of scienter to statute proscribing the shipping or receiving of visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, without first inquiring as to the existence of a common-law antecedent to this offense); Staples v. United States, 511 U. S. 600 (1994) (similar).
The dissent claims that the Lewis court determined that the jury could have found specific intent to steal on the facts presented, and thus disputes our characterization of the case as illustrating a situation where a defendant acts only with general intent. Post, at 283-284 (citing Lewis, 628 F. 2d, at 1279). The dissent fails to acknowledge, however, that the Lewis court made this determination only because some evidence suggested that, if the defendant had not been arrested, he would have kept the stolen money. Ibid. The Lewis court, implicitly acknowledging the possibility that some defendant (if not Lewis) might unconditionally intend to turn himself in after completing a bank theft, proceeded to hold, in the alternative, that § 2113(a) covers a defendant who acts only with general intent. See ibid.
Numerous Courts of Appeals agree. While holding that § 2113(a)’s version of bank robbery is not a specific intent crime, these courts have construed the statute to contain a general intent requirement. See United States v. Gonyea, 140 F. 3d 649, 653-654, and n. 10 (CA6 1998) (collecting cases).
Relatedly, Carter argues that, even if a sensible Congress might have deleted “feloniously,” the 1948 Congress did not adequately explain an intention to do so in the legislative history to the 1948 Act. He points to the House Report, which states that Congress intended only to make “changes in phraseology.” H. R. Rep. No. 304,80th Cong., 1st Sess., A135 (1947). Carter further suggests that the phraseology concern with “felo-niously” was that Congress in the 1948 codification generally desired to delete references to felonies and misdemeanors in "view of the statutory definition of those terms in the former 18 U. S. C. § 1. Carter fails, however, to acknowledge that the House Report does not give that reason for the deletion of “feloniously” from §2113, even though it explicitly does so in connection with the simultaneous elimination of similar language from other sections. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 304, supra, at A
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
In Davis v. United States, post, p. 927, we today denied the- petition for certiorari. The sole question raised there (but not passed upon by the Court of Appeals because not necessary to its disposition) involved petitioners’ claim that conferences between petitioners and their counsel were surreptitiously overheard and intercepted by law enforcement officials through concealed monitorial devices built into the jail where petitioners were being held for federal authorities. The Solicitor General did not deny the existence of the devices but said that there were no recordings of the conversations in question. He pointed out that since the case has been remanded by the Court of Appeals for a new trial on other grounds, a full exploration of this question could be made on retrial. In the light of these representations we denied the petition for certiorari so that the question might be fully explored at the new trial, as suggested by the Solicitor General.
In the instant case, Black v. United States, the petition for rehearing now raises a similar question and while Davis v. United States, supra, is not controlling, its relation is obvious. In Black the Solicitor General advised the Court voluntarily on May 24, 1966, after the petition for certiorari had been denied, 384 U. S. 927, but before an application for rehearing had been filed, that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in a matter unrelated to this case, on February 7, 1963, installed a listening device in petitioner’s hotel suite in Washington, D. C. The device monitored and taped conversations held in the hotel suite during the period the offense was being investigated and beginning some two months before and continuing until about one month after the evidence in this case was presented to the Grand Jury. During that period, “the monitoring agents,” the Solicitor General advised, “overheard, among other conversations, exchanges between petitioner and the attorney who was then representing him [Black]” in this case. In a supplemental memorandum filed July 13, 1966, the Solicitor General, in response to an inquiry by the Court, stated that the recordings of such interceptions had been erased from the tapes but that notes summarizing and sometimes quoting the conversations intercepted were available, and that reports and memoranda concerning the same had been made. “Neither the reports nor the memoranda,” he reported, “were seen by attorneys of the Tax Division responsible for the prosecution of” this case until January 1964, when in preparing for trial they were included in material transmitted to them; the reports and memo-randa of the intercepted conversations were examined by the Tax Division attorneys and retained by them until April 15, 1964, when petitioner’s trial began; and the attorneys never realized until April 21, 1966, that any conversations between Black and his attorney had been overheard and included in the transcriptions.
The Solicitor General advised further that the “Tax Division attorneys found nothing in the F. B. I. reports or memoranda which they considered relevant to the tax evasion case.” He suggests that the judgment be vacated and remanded to the District Court in which the “relevant materials would be produced and the court would determine, upon an adversary hearing, whether petitioner’s conviction should stand.” We have sometimes used this technique in federal criminal cases, United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 355 U. S. 233. However, its use has never been automatic. Indeed, in Remmer v. United States, 347 U. S. 227, we found it necessary, despite the hearing in the District Court, to subsequently order a new trial on the merits, 350 U. S. 377. There are other complicating factors here that were not present in Remmer. There the judge had been informed of the alleged jury tampering, but here neither the judge, the petitioner nor his counsel knew of the action of the federal agents. Moreover, the Solicitor General advises that the Tax Division attorneys did not know at the time of the trial that conversations between Black and his attorney were included in the transcriptions. In view of these facts it appears that justice'requires that a new trial be held so as to afford the petitioner an opportunity to protect himself from the use of evidence that might be otherwise inadmissible.
This Court has never been disposed to vacate convictions without adequate justification, but, under the circumstances presented by the Solicitor Ceneral in this case we believe that a new trial must be held. This will give the parties an opportunity to present the relevant evidence and permit the trial judge to decide the questions involved. It will also permit the removal of any doubt as to Black’s receiving a fair trial with full consideration being, given to the new evidence reported to us by the Solicitor General.
The petition for rehearing is therefore granted, the order denying certiorari vacated, certiorari granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals vacated and the cause remanded to the District Court for a new trial.
Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Fortas took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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A
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Douglas
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit brought by the United States in the District Court to prevent and restrain appellees from violating §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 50 Stat. 693, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2. The District Court, finding there was no violation of the Act in any of the respects charged in the complaint, dismissed the complaint on the merits. 68 F. Supp. 180. The case is here by appeal under § 2 of the Expediting Act of February 11, 1903, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 29, and § 238 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of February 13,1925, 43 Stat. 936, 938, 28 U. S. C. § 345.
The appellees are four affiliated corporations and two individuals who are associated with them as stockholders and officers. The corporations operate (or own stock in corporations which operate) moving picture theatres in Oklahoma, Texas, and New Mexico. With minor exceptions, the theatres which each corporation owns do not compete with those of its affiliates but are in separate towns. In April, 1939, when the complaint was filed, the corporate appellees had interests in theatres in 85 towns. In 32 of those towns there were competing the-atres. Fifty-three of the towns (62 per cent) were closed towns, i. e. towns in which there were no competing the-atres. Five years earlier the corporate appellees had theatres in approximately 37 towns, 18 of which were competitive and 19 of which (51 per cent) were closed. It was during that five-year period that the acts and practices occurred which, according to the allegations of the complaint, constitute violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
Prior to the 1938-1939 season these exhibitors used a common agent to negotiate with the distributors for films for the entire circuit. Beginning with the 1938-1939 season one agent negotiated for the circuit represented by two of the corporate appellees, and another agent negotiated for the circuit represented by the other two corporate appellees. A master agreement was usually executed with each distributor covering films to be released by the distributor during an entire season. There were variations among the master agreements. But in the main they provided as follows: (a) They lumped together towns in which the appellees had no competition and towns in which there were competing theatres, (b) They generally licensed the first-run exhibition in practically all of the theatres in which appel-lees had a substantial interest of substantially all of the films to be released by the distributor during the period of a year. (c) They specified the towns for which second runs were licensed for exhibition by appellees, the second-run rental sometimes being included in the first-run rental, (d) The rental specified often was the total minimum required to be paid (in equal weekly or quarterly installments) by the circuit as a whole for use. of the films throughout the circuit, the appellees subsequently allocating the rental among the theatres where the films were exhibited, (e) Films could be played out of the order of their release, so that a specified film need not be played in a particular theatre at any specified time.
The complaint charged that certain exclusive privileges which these agreements granted the appellee exhibitors over their competitors unreasonably restrained competition by preventing their competitors from obtaining enough first- or second-run films from the distributors to operate successfully. The exclusive privileges charged as violations were preemption in the selection of films and the receipt of clearances over competing theatres. It also charged that the use of the buying power of the entire circuit in acquiring those exclusive privileges violated the Act.
The District Court found no conspiracy between the appellee exhibitors or between them and the distributors, which violated the Act. It found that the agreements under which films were distributed were not in restraint of trade; that the appellees did not monopolize or attempt to monopolize the licensing or supply of film for first run or for any subsequent run; that the appellees did not conspire to compel the distributors to grant them the exclusive privilege of selecting films before the films were made available to any competing exhibitor; that there was no agreement between defendants and distributors granting defendants unreasonable clearances; that the appellees did not compel or attempt to compel distributors to grant them privileges not granted their competitors or which gave them any substantial advantage over their competitors ; and that appellees did not condition the licensing of films in any competitive situation on the licensing of such films in a non-competitive situation, or vice versa.
The appellant introduced evidence designed to show the effect of the master agreements in some twenty-odd competitive situations. The District Court made detailed findings on this phase of the case to the effect that difficulties which competitors had in getting desirable films after appellee exhibitors entered their towns, the inroads appellees made on the business of competitors, and the purchases by appellees of their competitors were not the result of threats or coercion nor the result of an unlawful conspiracy, but solely the consequence of lawful competitive practices.
In United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, a group of affiliated exhibitors, such as we have in the present case, were found to have violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by the pooling of their buying power and the negotiation of master agreements similar to those we have here. A difference between that case and the present one, which the District Court deemed to be vital, was that in the former the buying power was used for the avowed purpose of eliminating competition and of acquiring a monopoly of theatres in the several towns, while no such purpose was found to exist here. To be more specific, the defendants in the former case through the pooling of their buying power increased their leverage over their competitive situations by insisting that they be given monopoly rights in towns where they had competition, else they would give a distributor no business in their closed towns.
It is, however, not always necessary to find a specific intent to restrain trade or to build a monopoly in order to find that the anti-trust laws have been violated. It is sufficient that a restraint of trade or monopoly results as the consequence of a defendant’s conduct or business arrangements. United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 543; United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265, 275. To require a greater showing would cripple the Act. As stated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 432, “no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing.” Specific intent in the sense in which the common law used the term is necessary only where the acts fall short of the results condemned by the Act. The classical statement is that of Mr. Justice Holmes speaking for the Court in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396:
“Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the law seeks to prevent — for instance, the monopoly — but require further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that it will happen. Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Massachusetts, 267, 272. But when that intent and the consequent dangerous probability exist, this statute, like many others and like the common law in some cases, directs itself against that dangerous probability as well as against the completed result.”
And see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra, pp. 431-432. And so, even if we accept the District Court’s findings that appellees had no intent or purpose unreasonably to restrain trade or to monopolize, we are left with the question whether a necessary and direct result of the master agreements was the restraining or monopolizing of trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
Anyone who owns and operates the single theatre in a town, or who acquires the exclusive right to exhibit a film, has a monopoly in the popular sense. But he usually does not violate § 2 of the Sherman Act unless he has acquired or maintained his strategic position, or sought to expand his monopoly, or expanded it by means of those restraints of trade which are cognizable under § 1. For those things which are condemned by § 2 are in large measure merely the end products of conduct which violates § 1. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 61. But that is not always true. Section 1 covers contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade. Section 2 is not restricted to conspiracies or combinations to monopolize but also makes it a crime for any person to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize any part of interstate or foreign trade or commerce. So it is that monopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned under § 2 even though it remains unexercised. For § 2 of the Act is aimed, inter alia, at the acquisition or retention of effective market control. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 428, 429. Hence the existence of power “to exclude competition when it is desired to do so” is itself a violation of § 2, provided it is coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that power. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 809, 811, 814. It is indeed “unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market.” International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 396. The anti-trust laws are as much violated by the prevention of competition as by its destruction. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra. It follows a fortiori that the use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is unlawful.
A man with a monopoly of theatres in any one town commands the entrance for all films into that area. If he uses that strategic position to acquire exclusive privileges in a city where he has competitors, he is employing his monopoly power as a trade weapon against his competitors. It may be a feeble, ineffective weapon where he has only one closed or monopoly town. But as those towns increase in number throughout a region, his monopoly power in them may be used with crushing effect on competitors in other places. He need not be as crass as the exhibitors in United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., supra, in order to make his monopoly power effective in his competitive situations. Though he makes no threat to withhold the business of his closed or monopoly towns unless the distributors give him the exclusive film rights in the towns where he has competitors, the effect is likely to be the same where the two are joined. When the buying power of the entire circuit is used to negotiate films for his competitive as well as his closed towns, he is using monopoly power to expand his empire. And even if we assume that a specific intent to accomplish that result is absent, he is chargeable in legal contemplation with that purpose since the end result is the necessary and direct consequence of what he did. United States v. Patten, supra, p. 543.
The consequence of such a use of monopoly power is that films are licensed on a non-competitive basis in what would otherwise be competitive situations. That is the effect whether one exhibitor makes the bargain with the distributor or whether two or more exhibitors lump together their buying power, as appellees did here. It is in either case a misuse of monopoly power under the Sherman Act. If monopoly power can be used to beget monopoly, the Act becomes a feeble instrument indeed. Large-scale buying is not, of course, unlawful per se. It may yield price or other lawful advantages to the buyer. It may not, however, be used to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize interstate trade or commerce. Nor, as we hold in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., post, p. 131, may it be used to stifle competition by denying competitors less favorably situated access to the market.
Appellees were concededly using their circuit buying power to obtain films. Their closed towns were linked with their competitive towns. No effort of concealment was made as evidenced by the fact that the rental specified was at times the total minimum amount required to be paid by the circuit as a whole. Monopoly rights in the form of certain exclusive privileges were bargained for and obtained. These exclusive privileges, being acquired by the use of monopoly power, were unlawfully acquired. The appellees, having combined with each other and with the distributors to obtain those monopoly rights, formed a conspiracy in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Act. It is plain from the course of business that the commerce affected was interstate. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., supra, pp. 180, 183-184.
What effect these practices actually had on the competitors of appellee exhibitors or on the growth of the Griffith circuit we do not know. The District Court, having started with the assumption that the use of circuit buying power was wholly lawful, naturally attributed no evil to it and thus treated the master agreements as legitimate weapons of competition. Since it found that no competitors were driven out of business, or acquired by appellees, or impeded in their business by threats or coercion, it concluded that appellees had not violated the Sherman Act in any of the ways charged in the complaint. These findings are plainly inadequate if we start, as we must, from the premise that the circuit buying power was unlawfully employed. On the record as we read it, it cannot be doubted that the monopoly power of appellees had some effect on their competitors and on the growth of the Griffith circuit. Its extent must be determined on a remand of the cause. We remit to the District Court not only that problem but also the fashioning of a decree which will undo as near as may be the wrongs that were done and prevent their recurrence in the future. See United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., supra, pp. 189-190; Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, post, p. 110; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., post, p. 131.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissents, substantially for the reasons set forth in the opinion of the District Court, 68 F. Supp. 180.
Mr. Justice Murphy and Mr. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Griffith Amusement Co., Consolidated Theatres, Inc., R. E. Griffith Theatres, Inc., Westex Theatres, Inc., H. J. Griffith, and L. C. Griffith. R. E. Griffith, a brother of H. J. and L. C. Griffith, was a defendant, but died while the suit was pending in the District Court and the action was not revived against his estate or personal representative.
The circuit includes the four corporate appellees and their affiliated exhibitors. When less than the full ownership of a theatre was acquired, the contract would provide that the buying and booking of films was exclusively in the hands of the Griffith interests. ■
The agreement negotiated by the common agent would be executed between a distributor and each of the corporate appellees or between a distributor and an individual exhibitor.
There were a few franchise agreements covering films to be released by a distributor during a term of years, usually for three years and in one instance for five years.
The theatres of appellees in Oklahoma City were second, not first, run theatres.
The privilege was frequently conditioned on the playing of, or paying for, a designated quantity of the film obligation during stated portions of the season.
Those are the eight major film distributors who originally were defendants. The charge that these distributors conspired with each other was eliminated from the complaint and they were dismissed as defendants by stipulation or on motion of appellant. But the charge that each of the distributors had conspired with the appellee exhibitors was retained.
Section 1 provides: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. . . .”
Section 2 provides: “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”
So also a conspiracy to monopolize violates § 2 even though monopoly power was never acquired. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 789.
It was said in United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 451, that mere size is not outlawed by § 2. But size is of course an earmark of monopoly power. Moreover, as stated by Justice Cardozo, speaking for the Court in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 116, “size carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is proved to have been utilized in the past.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
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H
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sc_issuearea
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What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Claiming to have been expelled from membership in the International Association of Machinists and its Local No. 68 in violation of his rights under the constitution and by-laws of the unions, respondent, a marine machinist, brought this suit against the International and Local, together with their officers, in a Superior Court in California for restoration of his membership in the unions and for damages due to his illegal expulsion. The case was tried to the court, and, on the basis of the pleadings, evidence, and argument of counsel, detailed findings of fact were made, conclusions of law drawn, and a judgment entered ordering the reinstatement of respondent and awarding him damages for lost wages as well as for physical and mental suffering. The judgment was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal, 142 Cal. App. 2d 207, 298 P. 2d 92, and the Supreme Court of California denied a petition for hearing. We brought the case here, 352 U. S. 966, since it presented another important question concerning the extent to which the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 141-188, has excluded the exercise of state power.
The crux of the claim sustained by the California court was that under California law membership in a labor union constitutes a contract between the member and the union, the terms of which are governed by the constitution and by-laws of the union, and that state law provides, through mandatory reinstatement and damages, a remedy for breach of such contract through wrongful expulsion. This contractual conception of the relation between a member and his union widely prevails in this country and has recently been adopted by the House of Lords in Bonsor v. Musicians’ Union, [1956] A. C. 104. It has been the law of California for at least half a century. See Dingwall v. Amalgamated Assn. of Street R. Employees, 4 Cal. App. 565, 88 P. 597. Though an unincorporated association, a labor union is for many purposes given the rights and subjected to the obligations of a legal entity. See United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 383-392; United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694, 701-703.
That the power of California to afford the remedy of reinstatement for the wrongful expulsion of a union member has not been displaced by the Taft-Hartley Act is admitted by petitioners. Quite properly they do not attack so much of the judgment as orders respondent’s reinstatement. As Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485, could not avoid deciding, the Taft-Hartley Act undoubtedly carries implications of exclusive federal authority. Congress withdrew from the States much that had theretofore rested with them. But the other half of what was pronounced in Garner — that the Act “leaves much to the states” — is no less important. See 346 U. S., at 488. The statutory implications concerning what has been taken from the States and what has been left to them are of a Delphic nature, to be translated into concreteness by the process of litigating elucidation. See Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468, 474-477.
Since we deal with implications to be drawn from the Taft-Hartley Act for the avoidance of conflicts between enforcement of federal policy by the National Labor Relations Board and the exertion of state power, it might be abstractly justifiable, as a matter of wooden logic, to suggest that an action in a state court by a member of a union for restoration of his membership rights is precluded. In such a suit there may be embedded circumstances that could constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b) (2) of the Act. In the judgment of the Board, expulsion from a union, taken in connection with other circumstances established in a particular case, might constitute an attempt to cause an employer to “discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership . . . 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. §158 (b)(2). But the protection of union members in their rights as members from arbitrary conduct by unions and union officers has not been undertaken by federal law, and indeed the assertion of any such power has been expressly denied. The proviso to § 8 (b)(1) of the Act states that “this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein . . . .” 61 Stat. 141, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (b) (1). The present controversy is precisely one that gives legal efficacy under state law to the rules prescribed by a labor organization for “retention of membership therein.” Thus, to preclude a state court from exerting its traditional jurisdiction to determine and enforce the rights of union membership would in many cases leave an unjustly ousted member without remedy for the restoration of his important union rights. Such a drastic result, on the remote possibility of some entanglement with the Board’s enforcement of the national policy, would require a more compelling indication of congressional will than can be found in the interstices of the Taft-Hartley Act. See United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U. S. 656.
Although petitioners do not claim that the state court lacked jurisdiction to order respondent’s reinstatement, they do contend that it was without power to fill out this remedy by an award of damages for loss of wages and suffering resulting from the breach of contract. No radiation of the Taft-Hartley Act requires us thus to mutilate the comprehensive relief of equity and reach such an incongruous adjustment of federal-state relations touching the regulation of labor. The National Labor Relations Board could not have given respondent the relief that California gave him according to its local law of contracts and damages. Although, if the unions’ conduct constituted an unfair labor practice, the Board might possibly have been empowered to award back pay, in no event could it mulct in damages for mental or physical suffering. And the possibility of partial relief from the Board does not, in such a case as is here presented, deprive a party of available state remedies for all damages suffered. See International Union, United Automobile Workers v. Russell, post, p. 634.
If, as we held in the Laburnum case, certain state causes of action sounding in tort are not displaced simply because there may be an argumentative coincidence in the facts adducible in the tort action and a plausible proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board, a state remedy for breach of contract also ought not be displaced by such evidentiary coincidence when the possibility of conflict with federal policy is similarly remote. The possibility of conflict from the court’s award of damages in the present case is no greater than from its order that respondent be restored to membership. In either case the potential conflict is too contingent, too remotely related to the public interest expressed in the Taft-Hartley Act, to justify depriving state courts of jurisdiction to vindicate the personal rights of an ousted union member. This is emphasized by the fact that the subject matter of the litigation in the present case, as the parties and the court conceived it, was the breach of a contract governing the relations between respondent and his unions. The suit did not purport to remedy or regulate union conduct on the ground that it was designed to bring about employer discrimination against an employee, the evil the Board is concerned to strike at as an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b)(2). This important distinction between the purposes of federal and state regulation has been aptly described: “Although even these state court decisions may lead to possible conflict between the federal labor board and state courts they do not present potentialities of conflicts in kind or degree which require a hands-off directive to the states. A state court decision requiring restoration of membership requires consideration of and judgment upon matters wholly outside the scope of the National Labor Relations Board’s determination with reference to employer discrimination after union ouster from membership. The state court proceedings deal with arbitrariness and misconduct vis-a-vis the individual union members and the union; the Board proceeding, looking principally to the nexus between union action and employer discrimination, examines the ouster from membership in entirely different terms.” Isaacson, Labor Relations Law: Federal versus State Jurisdiction, 42 A. B. A. J. 415, 483.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
Me. Justice Black took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
“In determining the question of whether the exclusive jurisdiction to grant damages in a case of this kind lies in the Labor Relations Board, it is first necessary to determine the character of the pleadings and issues in this case. The petition alleged a breach of contract between the union and plaintiff, one of its members. ... It took the form of a petition for writ of mandate because damages alone would not be adequate to restore to petitioner the things of value he had lost by reason of the breach. No charge of 'unfair labor practices’ appears in the petition. The answer to the petition denied its allegations and challenged the jurisdiction of the court, but said nothing about unfair labor practices. The evidence adduced at the trial showed that plaintiff, because of his loss of membership, was unable to obtain employment and was thereby damaged. However, this damage was not charged nor treated as the result of an unfair labor practice but as a result of the breach of contract. Thus the question of unfair labor practice was not raised nor was any finding on the subject requested of, or made by, the court.” 142 Cal. App. 2d 207, 217, 298 P. 2d 92, 99.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
J
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether the United States, as the second mortagee of real estate judicially foreclosed in a proceeding to which the United States was made a party under 28 U. S. C. § 2410, can redeem within one year from the date of sale pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2410 (c), despite a conflicting state statute giving the mortgagor the exclusive right to redeem within that period.
The facts are not in dispute and, insofar as here pertinent, may be summarized as follows. Appellee John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. held a note for $25,000, secured by a mortgage on certain Kansas real estate. The note was in default and the insurance company instituted proceedings in the District Court of Edwards County, Kansas, seeking a declaration that its mortgage constituted a first lien on the property and asking foreclosure to satisfy this lien. An agency of the United States, the .Farmers’ Home Administration, held four notes executed by the mortgagors against whom the insurance company was proceeding and one of these notes, in the face amount of $10,565, was secured by a mortgage on the property securing appellee’s note. It is undisputed that the United States’ secured note was junior in priority to that held by appellee. However, under Kansas law, a senior lienor must join junior lienors in the foreclosure proceeding in order to cut off the junior liens. Motor Equipment Co. v. Winters, 146 Kan. 127, 69 P. 2d 23. And the only way in which the United States can be joined in its capacity as junior lienor is pursuant to the terms of 28 U. S. C. § 2410, since the United States has not otherwise waived sovereign immunity in this type of situation. Consequently, appellee insurance company joined the United States and the United States cross petitioned for an adjudication that it held a second lien on the property, inferior only to appellee’s lien, in the amount owed on all four notes. The Kansas District Court held that appellee enjoyed a first lien entitling it to a judgment of $26,944.78 and that the United States held a second lien by virtue of its secured note, entitling it to $10,402.61. The court ordered both liens foreclosed. At the foreclosure sale, the insurance company bought in the property in the amount of its own'judgment. The United States did not bid and the sale was confirmed by the District Court on February 5, 1958. Four months later — on June 5, 1958 — the United States instituted proceedings to redeem the property pursuant to the terms of 28 U. S. C. § 2410 (c)-. This section specifies that, when the United States is joined in a foreclosure proceeding under § 2410— in particular § 2410 (a) — and a sale is held to satisfy a lien prior to that of the United States, “the United States shall have one year from the date of sale within which to redeem.” Although the United States satisfied the procedural requirements of Kansas law, Kan. Gen. Stat., 1949, § 60-3451, its tender was refused and, consequently, it moved the court to compel the clerk to issue it a redemption certificate. The District Court denied relief and the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the United States’ action was barred by the provisions of state law granting the mortgagor the exclusive right to redeem his property during a period of twelve months following the date of a foreclosure sale.
The pertinent Kansas law provides that the mortgagor shall have the exclusive right of redemption for twelve months following the date of sale; thereafter, if the mortgagor has not redeemed, the lien creditors enjoy a three-month period during which they, or the mortgagor, may redeem. Kan. Gen. Stat., 1949, § 60-3440. If the mortgagor redeems at any time, all redemption rights are cut off. Sigler v. Phares, 105 Kan. 116, 181 P. 628. In this case, the mortgagors redeemed within twelve months of the date of sale but subsequent to the attempt of the United States to redeem.
The narrow question for our decision is whether that part of § 2410 (c) which grants the United States a right to redeem applies to the present situation. If it does, then the inconsistent provisions of state law must fall under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. U. S. Const., Art. VI.
On analysis, the question is not only narrow but also susceptible to rapid solution, since the plain language of § 2410 (c) reveals no impediment to its applicability once resort is had to § 2410 (a). Moreover, an examination of the legislative history of § 2410 shows that Congress considered the redemption provision of § 2410 (c) an important and integral feature of § 2410. The pertinent excerpts reveal that Congress feared a situation where the United States, as junior lienor, would find its lien dissolved pursuant to § 2410 without having had a chance to protect its right to any amount the foreclosed property might be worth in excess of the senior lien. As Congress recognized, one method of protection for junior lienors is to bid competitively at the foreclosure sale, thereby preventing property worth more than the amount due on the senior lien from being sold at a discount. However, it was noted that, barring special circumstances, the United States could not pursue this procedure únless it first secured an appropriation from Congress and, thus, the one-year period of redemption was inserted to afford the United States sufficient time to secure an appropriation and protect its interests. The protective nature of the redemption proviso in § 2410 (c) was recognized in United States v. Brosnan, 363 U. S. 237, 246, where this Court stated that “the Government is guaranteed a one-year right to redeem if the plaintiff proceeds under § 2410 . . . ." This proposition is in line with the well-settled rule that Congress may impose conditions upon a waiver of the Government’s immunity from suit. See e. g., Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 276, where we added that these protective conditions “must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.”
Appellees concede, as they must, that § 2410 was man-datorily applicable to the present situation since Kansas law required joinder of the United States and the United States can only be joined pursuant to § 2410. However, they would have us find a superseding congressional intent to afford the United States a right of redemption only when no such right is granted under state law; when some privileges of redemption are given by the State to junior lienors, although of lesser magnitude than that provided in § 2410 (c), then the federal right is no longer pertinent. The short answer to this contention is that no indication of such a limitation appears in the body of the statute— which specifies that the United States “shall” have one year to redeem — or in its legislative history. See Soriano v. United States, supra.
Appellees also press upon us the fact that the federal agency here concerned, the Farmers' Home Administration, could have protected its junior lien without insisting on a right to redeem under § 2410, since 7 U. S. C. (1952 ed.) § 1025 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture, who supervises the Farmers' Home Administration, to bid at foreclosure sales. But the significance of this section and its effect on § 2410 is not clear. Concededly, if there were some indication in § 1025 that the power of the Secretary of Agriculture is limited to bidding at the foreclosure sale, then we would be faced with a problem of resolving the two statutes. Cf. United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60. However, there is no conflict, either express or implied, between § 1025 and § 2410. In effect, appellees would have us read § 2410 as authorizing redemption “except where another federal statute authorizes the particular agency concerned to bid at foreclosure sales.” The only support for such an interpretation is the fact that some federal agencies are authorized to bid at foreclosure sales. We think that the logical connection is insufficient to support such a violent graft on the language of the statute.
Appellees advance several other contentions which require only brief discussion. They argue, citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U. S. 126, that the United States, by seeking affirmative relief in a state court, subjects itself to all the incidents of state law which govern other suitors. See Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1112. However, we need go no farther than the Guaranty Trust case to uncover one of the several special rules which favor the United States in preference to other plaintiffs — the rule that the United States is not subject to local statutes of limitations. See United States v. Summerlin, 310 U. S. 414. Other such rules, applicable in both federal and state courts, can be found in 28 U. S. C. §§ 2404, 2405, 2407, 2408, 2413. Furthermore, the present proceedings were not initiated by the United States but by appellee insurance company when it joined the United States pursuant to § 2410.
Appellees also point to the first sentence of § 2410 (c)— “[a] judicial sale in such action or suit shall have the same effect respecting the discharge of the property from liens . . . held by the United States as may be provided ... by the local law of the place where the property is situated.” The contention is that this sentence governs all the succeeding language in § 2410 (c). However, this construction would render the suceeding language nugatory. The more rational interpretation is that the propositions following the first sentence in § 2410 (c) were designed as qualifications on the first sentence. This thesis gains force from the fact that the sentence setting out the United States’ redemption privilege in § 2410 (c) previously was preceded by the words “And provided further.” 46 Stat. 1529. This phrase was eliminated in the 1948 revision of the Federal Judicial Code but the Reviser’s Note indicates that no substantive changes were' intended. 28 U. S. C. A. § 2410.
Therefore, the judgment of the' Supreme Court of Kansas must be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to order the issuance of a certificate of redemption to the United States in accordance with its tender made in the District Court. However, in case the mortgagors wish to redeem in turn from the United States — a procedure in which the United States has acquiesced — we intimate no opinion as to the amount due the United States. The question whether the United States is entitled to payment of its claims in full upon redemption by the mortgagors or only to such debts as have been declared liens by the state courts is one to be decided according to Kansas law. Cf. First National Bank & Trust Co. v. MacCarvie, 22 N. J. 539, 547, 126 A. 2d 880, 885.
Reversed and remanded.
“Actions affecting property on which United States has lien, “(a) Under the conditions prescribed in this section and section 1444 of this title for the protection of the United States, the United States may be named a party in any civil action or suit in any district court, or in any State court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, to quiet title to or for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien upon real or personal property on which the United States has or claims a mortgage or other lien.
“(b) The complaint shall set forth with particularity the nature of the interest or lien of the United States. In actions in the State courts service upon the United States shall be made by serving the process of the court with a copy of the complaint upon the United States attorney for the district in which the action is brought or upon an assistant United States attorney or clerical employee designated by the United States attorney in writing filed with the clerk of the court in which the action is brought and by sending copies of the process and complaint, by registered mail, to the Attorney General of the United States at Washington, District of Columbia. In such actions the United States may appear and answer, plead or demur within sixty days after such service or such further time as the court may allow.
“(c) A judicial sale in such action or suit shall have the same effect respecting the discharge of the property from liens and encumbrances held by the United States as may be provided with respect to such matters by the local law of the place where the property is situated. A sale to satisfy a lien inferior to one of the United States, shall be made subject to and without disturbing the lien of the United States, unless the United States consents that the property may be sold free of its lien and the proceeds divided as the parties may be entitled. Where a sale of real estate is made to satisfy a lien prior to that of the United States, the United States shall have one year from the date of sale within which to redeem. In any case where the debt owing the United States is due, the United States may ask, by way of affirmative relief, for the foreclosure of its own lien and where property is sold to satisfy a first lien held by the United States, the United States may bid at the sale such sum, not exceeding the amount of its claim with expenses of sale, as may be directed by the head of the department or agency of the United States which has charge of the administration of the laws in respect of which the claim of the United States arises.”
Judgment for $2,642.39 was entered in favor of the United States on the three unsecured notes. While the United States sought to include these notes in its second lien on the property, the court decreed that this lien extended only to the amount of the secured note.
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hetzel, 185 Kan. 274, 341 P. 2d 1002.
From the fifteenth to and including the eighteenth month, the mortgagor resumes enjoyment of the exclusive right to redeem. Kan. Gen. Stat., 1949, § 60-3439. Upon the expiration of eighteen months without redemption, the purchaser’s certificate of title becomes absolute. Kan. Gen. Stat., 1949, § 60-3438.
Appellees argue briefly that Congress does not have the power to establish rules governing state-created property rights, citing United States v. Bess, 357 U. S. 51. This contention was raised and rejected in United States v. Brosnan, 363 U. S. 237, 240-241.
Initial concern was expressed by Representative Bloom in a colloquy reported at 72 Cong. Ree. 3120-3121. Despite the apprehension expressed in this exchange, the bill that eventually became § 2410 passed the House with no provision to protect the United States’ rights as junior lienor. The Senate, however, added a new section authorizing the United States to bid at the foreclosure sale and a delay of the sale until the completion of the next succeeding session of Congress so as to allow the Government time to obtain a congressional appropriation with which to make its bid. S. Rep. No. 351, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2.
This addition was stricken by the Conference Committee and the redemption provision now in § 2410 (c) was substituted. In rejecting the Senate proposal for protecting the rights of the United States as a junior lien holder, the Conference Committee concluded that a federal redemption provision was a more effective method for protecting those rights. It stated:
“The Senate amendment contains a clause allowing the court to stay proceedings on sale until the expiration of the next session of Congress. This was no doubt intended to allow Congress to appropriate money to enable the United States, if a junior lien holder, to bid enough at the sale to take care of prior liens and thus protect its own. In place of that the substitute bill provides that if a junior lien holder, the United States shall have a year in which to redeem. That does away with any necessity for a delay of sale.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 2722, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 4.
“The Secretary is authorized and empowered to bid for and purchase at any foreclosure or other sale, or otherwise to acquire property pledged or mortgaged or conveyed to secure any loan or other indebtedness owing to or acquired by the Secretary under sections 1001-1005d, 1007, and 1008-1029 of this title; to accept title to any property so purchased or acquired; to operate for a period not in excess of one year from the date of acquisition, or lease such property for such period as may be deemed necessary to protect the investment therein; and to sell or otherwise dispose of such property in a manner consistent with the provisions of section 1017 of this title.”
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
L
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Justice Souter
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title 28 U. S. C. § 1407(a) authorizes the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer civil actions with common issues of fact “to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings,” but imposes a duty on the Panel to remand any such action to the original district “at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings.” Ibid. The issue here is whether a district court conducting such “pretrial proceedings” may invoke § 1404(a) to assign a transferred case to itself for trial. We hold it has no such authority.
I
In 1992, petitioners, Lexecon Inc., a law and economics consulting firm, and one of its principals (collectively, Lexe-con), brought this diversity action in the Northern District of Illinois against respondents, the law firms of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Leraeh (Milberg) and Cotehett, Illston & Pitre (Cotehett), claiming malicious prosecution, abuse of process, tortious interference, commercial disparagement, and defamation. The suit arose out of the firms’ conduct as counsel in a prior class action brought against Charles Keat-ing and the American Continental Corporation for violations of the securities and racketeering laws. Lexecon also was a defendant, charged with giving federal and state banking regulators inaccurate and misleading reports about the financial condition of the American Continental Corporation and its subsidiary Lincoln Savings and Loan. Along with other actions arising out of the failure of Lincoln Savings, the ease against Lexecon was transferred under § 1407(a) for pretrial proceedings before Judge Bilby in the District of Arizona, where the matters so consolidated were known as the Lincoln Savings litigation. Before those proceedings were over, the class-action plaintiffs and Lexecon reached what they termed a “resolution,” under which the claims against Lexecon were dismissed in August 1992.
Lexecon then filed this ease in the Northern District of Illinois charging that the prior class action terminated in its favor when the respondent law firms’ clients voluntarily dismissed their claims against Lexecon as meritless, amounting to nothing more, according to Lexecon, than a vendetta. When these allegations came to the attention of Judge Bilby, he issued an order stating his understanding of the terms of the resolution agreement between Lexecon and the class-action plaintiffs. 102 F. 3d 1524, 1529, and n. 2 (CA9 1996). Judge Bilby’s characterization of the agreement being markedly at odds with the allegations in the instant action, Lexe-eon appealed his order to the Ninth Circuit.
Milberg, joined by Cotehett, then filed a motion under § 1407(a) with the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation seeking transfer of this ease to Judge Bilby for consolidation with the Lincoln Savings litigation. Although the judge entered a recusal because of the order he had taken it upon himself to issue, the law firms nonetheless renewed their motion for a § 1407(a) transfer.
The Panel ordered a transfer in early June 1993 and assigned the case to Judge Roll, noting that Lexecon’s claims “share questions of fact with an as yet unapproved settlement involving Touche Ross, Lexecon, Inc. and the investor plaintiffs in the Lincoln Savings investor class actions in MDL-834.” App. 18. The Panel observed that “i) a massive document depository is located in the District of Arizona and ii) the Ninth Circuit has before it an appeal of an order [describing the terms of Lexecon’s dismissal from the Lincoln Savings litigation] in MDL-834 which may be relevant to the Lexecon claims.” Ibid. Prior to any dispositive action on Lexecon’s instant claims in the District of Arizona, the Ninth Circuit appeal mentioned by the Panel was dismissed, and the document depository was closed down.
In November 1993, Judge Roll dismissed Lexeeon’s state-law malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims, applying a “heightened pleading standard,” 845 F. Supp. 1377, 1383 (Ariz. 1993). Although the law firms then moved for summary judgment on the claims remaining, the judge deferred action pending completion of discovery, during which time the remaining parties to the Lincoln Savings litigation reached a final settlement, on which judgment was entered in March 1994.
In August 1994, Lexecon moved that the District Court refer the ease back to the Panel for remand to the Northern District of Illinois, thus heeding the point of Multidistrict Litigation Rule 14(d), which provides that “[t]he Panel is reluctant to order remand absent a suggestion of remand from the transferee district court.” The law firms opposed a remand because discovery was still incomplete and filed a coun-termotion under § 1404(a) requesting the District of Arizona to “transfer” the case to itself for trial. Judge Roll deferred decision on these motions as well.
In November 1994, Lexecon again asked the District Court to request the Panel to remand the ease to the Northern District of Illinois. Again the law firms objected and requested a § 1404 transfer, and Judge Roll deferred ruling once more. On April 24, 1995, however, he granted summary judgment in favor of the law firms on all remaining claims except one in defamation brought against Milberg, and at the same time he dismissed Milberg’s counterclaims. 884 P. Supp. 1388, 1397 (Ariz. 1995). Cotchett then made a request for judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Lexecon objected to the exercise of Rule 54(b) discretion, but did not contest the authority of the District Court in Arizona to enter a final judgment in Cotehett’s favor. On June 7, 1995, the court granted respondent Cotehett’s Rule 54(b) request.
In the meantime, the Arizona court had granted the law firms’ § 1404(a) motions to assign the case to itself for trial, and simultaneously had denied Lexecon’s motions to request the Panel to remand under § 1407(a). Lexecon sought immediate review of these last two rulings by filing a petition for mandamus in the Ninth Circuit. After argument, a majority of the Circuit panel, over the dissent of Judge Kozinski, denied Lexeeon’s requests to vacate the self-assignment order and require remand to the Northern District of Illinois. The Circuit so ruled even though the majority was “not prepared to say that [Lexecon’s] contentions lack merit” and went so far as to note the conflict between “what appears to be a clear statutory mandate [of § 1407 and § 1404]” and Multidistriet Litigation Rule 14(b), which explicitly authorizes a transferee court to assign an action to itself for trial. Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss, No. 95-70380 (CA9, July 21,1995), p. 4. The majority simply left that issue for another day, relying on its assumption that Lexecon would have an opportunity to obtain relief from the transfer order on direct appeal: “[tjhe transfer order can be appealed immediately along with other issues in the event the petitioners lose on the merits [at trial].” Id., at p. 3.
Trial on the surviving defamation claim then went forward in the District of Arizona, ending in judgment for Milberg, from which Lexecon appealed to the Ninth Circuit. It again appealed the denial of its motion for a suggestion that the Panel-remand the matter to the Northern District of Illinois, and it challenged the dismissal of its claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, and the entry of final judgment in favor of Cotehett. Lexecon took no exception to the Arizona court’s jurisdiction (as distinct from venue) and pursued no claim of error in the conduct of the trial.
A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying on the Panel’s Rule 14 and appellate and District Court decisions in support of the District Court’s refusal to support remand under § 1407(a) and its decision to assign the case to itself under § 1404(a). 102 F. 3d, at 1532-1535. While the majority indicated that permitting the transferee court to assign a ease to itself upon completion of its pretrial work was not only consistent with the statutory language but conducive to efficiency, Judge Kozinski again dissented, relying on the texts of §§ 1407(a) and 1404(a) and a presumption in favor of a plaintiff’s choice of forum. We granted certiorari, 520 U. S. 1227 (1997), to decide whether § 1407(a) does permit a transferee court to entertain a § 1404(a) transfer motion to keep the ease for trial.
II
A
In defending the Ninth Circuit majority, Milberg may claim ostensible support from two quarters. First, the Panel has itself sanctioned such assignments in a rule issued in reliance on its rulemaking authority under 28 U. S. C. § 1407(f). The Panel’s Rule 14(b) provides that “[e]ach transferred action that has not been terminated in the transferee district court shall be remanded by the Panel to the transferor district for trial, unless ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the transferee or other district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. §1406.” Thus, out of the 39,228 cases transferred under § 1407 and terminated as of September 30, 1995, 279 of the 3,787 ultimately requiring trial were retained by the courts to which the Panel had transferred them. Administrative Office of the United States, L. Meeham, Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 1995 Report of the Director 32. Although the Panel’s rule and the practice of self-assignment have not gone without challenge, see, e. g., 15 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3866, p. 619 (2d ed. 1986) (hereinafter Wright, Miller, & Cooper); Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 779, 809 (1985); Levy, Complex Multidistriet Litigation and the Federal Courts, 40 Ford. L. Rev. 41, 64-65 (1972), federal courts have treated such transfers with approval, beginning with the Second Circuit’s decision in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F. 2d 122, 124-125 (1971) (per curiam) (upholding MDL Rule 15(d), the precursor to Rule 14(b)). See, e. g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685 F. 2d 810, 820, and n. 7 (CA3 1982); In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport, 737 F. Supp. 391, 393-394 (ED Mich. 1989); In re Viatron Computer Sys. Corp., 86 F. R. D. 431, 432 (Mass. 1980).
The second source of ostensible authority for Milberg’s espousal of the self-assignment power here is a portion of text of the multidistrict litigation statute itself:
“When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.” 28 U.S. C. § 1407(a).
Although the statute limits a transferee court’s authority to the conduct of “coordinated or consolidated” proceedings and to those that are “pretrial,” these limitations alone raise no obvious bar to a transferee’s retention of a case under § 1404. If “consolidated” proceedings alone were authorized, there would be an argument that self-assignment of one or some cases out of many was not contemplated, but because the proceedings need only be “coordinated,” no such narrow limitation is apparent. While it is certainly true that the instant case was not “consolidated” with any other for the purpose literally of litigating identical issues on common evidence, it is fair to say that proceedings to resolve pretrial matters were “coordinated” with the conduct of earlier cases sharing the common core of the Lincoln Savings debacle, if only by being brought before judges in a district where much of the evidence was to be found and overlapping issues had been considered. Judge Bilby’s recusal following his decision to respond to Lexecoris Illinois pleadings may have limited the prospects for coordination, but it surely did not eliminate them. Hence, the requirement that a transferee court conduct “coordinated or consolidated” proceedings did not preclude the transferee Arizona court from ruling on a motion (like the § 1404 request) that affects only one of the cases before it.
Likewise, at first blush, the statutory limitation to “pretrial” proceedings suggests no reason that a § 1407 transferor court could not entertain a § 1404(a) motion. Section 1404(a) authorizes a district court to transfer a ease in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses. See § 1404(a). Such transfer requests are typically resolved prior to discovery, see Wright, Miller, & Cooper § 3866, at 620, and thus are classic “pretrial” motions.
Beyond this point, however, the textual pointers reverse direction, for § 1407 not only authorizes the Panel to transfer for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings, but obligates the Panel to remand any pending case to its originating court when, at the latest, those pretrial proceedings have run their course.
“Each action so transferred shall he remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated.” § 1407(a) (proviso without application here omitted).
The Panel’s instruction comes in terms of the mandatory “shall,” which normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion. Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U. S. 482, 485 (1947). In the absence of any indication that there might be circumstances in which a transferred ease would be neither “terminated” nor subject to the remand obligation, then, the statutory instruction stands flatly at odds with reading the phrase “coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings” so broadly as to reach its literal limits, allowing a transferee court’s self-assignment to trump the provision imposing the Panel’s remand duty. If we do our job of reading the statute whole, we have to give effect to this plain command, see Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U. S. 469, 476 (1992), even if doing that will reverse the longstanding practice under the statute and the rule, see Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U. S. 291, 300 (1995) (“ ‘Age is no antidote to clear inconsistency with a statute’” (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 122 (1994))).
As the Ninth Circuit panel majority saw it, however, the inconsistency between an expansive view of “coordinated or consolidated pretrial” proceedings and the uncompromising terms of the Panel’s remand obligation disappeared as merely an apparent conflict, not a real one. The “focus” of § 1407 was said to be constituting the Panel and defining its authority, not circumscribing the powers of district courts under § 1404(a). 102 F. 3d, at 1533. Milberg presses this point in observing that § 1407(a) does not, indeed, even apply to transferee courts, being concerned solely with the Panel’s duties, whereas § 1407(b), addressed to the transferee courts, says nothing about the Panel’s obligation to remand. But this analysis fails to persuade, for the very reason that it rejects that central tenet of interpretation, that a statute is to be considered in all its parts when construing any one of them. To emphasize that § 1407(b) says nothing about the Panel’s obligation when addressing a transferee court’s powers is simply to ignore the necessary consequence of self-assignment by a transferee court: it conclusively thwarts the Panel’s capacity to obey the unconditional command of § 1407(a).
A like use of blinders underlies the Circuit majority’s conclusion that the Panel was not even authorized to remand the ease under its Rule 14(c), the terms of which condition the remand responsibility on a suggestion of the transferee court, a motion filed directly with the Panel, or the Panel’s sua sponte decision to remand. None of these conditions was fulfilled, according to the Court of Appeals, which particularly faulted Lexecon for failing to file a remand motion directly with the Panel, as distinct from the transferee court. This analysis, too, is unpersuasive; it just ignores the fact that the statute places an obligation on the Panel to remand no later than the conclusion of pretrial proceedings in the transferee court, and no exercise in rulemaking can read that obligation out of the statute. See 28 U. S. C. § 1407(f) (express requirement that rules be consistent with statute).
B
Milberg proffers two further arguments for overlooking the tension between a broad reading of a court’s pretrial authority and the Panel’s remand obligation. First, it relies on a subtle reading of the provision of § 1407(a) limiting the Panel’s remand obligation to eases not “previously terminated” during the pretrial period. To be sure, this exception to the Panel’s remand obligation indicates that the Panel is not meant to issue ceremonial remand orders in eases already concluded by summary judgment, say, or dismissal. But according to Milberg, the imperative to remand is also inapplicable to cases self-assigned -under § 1404, because the self-assignment “terminates” the case insofar as its venue depends on § 1407. When the § 1407 character of the action disappears, Milberg argues, the strictures of § 1407 fall away as well, relieving the Panel of any further duty in the case. The trouble with this creative argument, though, is that the statute manifests no such subtlety. Section 1407(a) speaks not in terms of imbuing transferred actions with some new and distinctive venue character, but simply in terms of “civil actions” or “actions.” It says that such an action, not its acquired personality, must be terminated before the Panel is excused from ordering remand. The language is straightforward, and with a straightforward application ready to hand, statutory interpretation has no business getting metaphysical.
Second, Milberg tries to draw an inference in its favor from the one subsection of §1407 that does authorize the Panel to transfer a ease for trial as well as pretrial proceedings. Subsection (h) provides that,
“[notwithstanding the provisions of section 1404 or subsection (f) of this section, the judicial panel on multi-district litigation may consolidate and transfer with or without the consent of the parties, for both pretrial purposes and for trial, any action brought under section 4C of the Clayton Act.”
Milberg fastens on the introductory language explicitly overriding the “provisions of section 1404 or subsection (f),” which would otherwise, respectively, limit a district court to transferring a case “to any other district or division where it might have been brought,” § 1404(a), and limit the Panel to prescribing rules “not inconsistent with Acts of Congress,” § 1407(f). On Milberg’s reasoning, these overrides are required because the cited provisions would otherwise conflict with the remainder of subsection (h) authorizing the Panel to order trial of certain Clayton Act cases in the transferee court. The argument then runs that since there is no override of subsection (a) of § 1407, subsection (a) must be consistent with a transfer for trial as well as pretrial matters. This reasoning is fallacious, however. Subsections (a) and (h) are independent sources of transfer authority in the Panel; each is apparently written to stand on its own feet. Subsection (h) need not exclude the application of subsection (a), because nothing in (a) would by its terms limit any provision of (h).
Subsection (h) is not merely valueless to Milberg, however; it is ammunition for Lexecon. For the one point that subsection (h) does demonstrate is that Congress knew how to distinguish between trial assignments and pretrial proceedings in cases subject to § 1407. Although the enactment of subsection (a), Act of Apr. 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 109, preceded the enactment of subsection (h), Act of Sept. 80, 1976, § 80S, 90 Stat. 1394, 1396, the fact that the later section distinguishes trial assignments from pretrial proceedings generally is certainly some confirmation for our conclusion, on independent grounds, that the subjects of pretrial proceedings in subsections (a) and (b) do not include self-assignment orders.
C
There is, finally, nothing left of Milberg’s position beyond an appeal to legislative history, some of which turns out to ignore the question before us, and some of which may support Lexeeon. Milberg cites a House Report on the bill that became § 1407, which addresses the question of trial transfer in multidistrict litigation cases by saying that, “[o]f course, 28 U. S. C. 1404, providing for changes of venue generally, is available in those instances where transfer of a case for all purposes is desirable.” H. R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4 (1968) (hereinafter H. R. Rep.), cited in Brief for Respondents Milberg et al. 25. But the question is not whether a change of venue may be ordered in a case consolidated under § 1407(a); on any view of § 1407(a), if an order may be made under § 1404(a), it may be made after remand of the ease to the originating district court. The relevant question for our purposes is whether a transferee court, and not a transferor court, may grant such a motion, and on this point, the language cited by Milberg provides no guidance.
If it has anything to say to us here, the legislative history tends to confirm that self-assignment is beyond the scope of the transferee court’s authority. The same House Report that spoke of the continued vitality of § 1404 in § 1407 eases also said this:
“The proposed statute affects only the pretrial stages in multidistrict litigation. It would not affect the place of trial in any case or exclude the possibility of transfer under other Federal statutes.
“The subsection requires that transferred cases be remanded to the originating district at the close of coordinated pretrial proceedings. The bill does not, therefore, include the trial of cases in the consolidated proceedings.” H. R. Rep., at 3-4.
The comments of the bill's sponsors further suggest that application of § 1407 (before the addition of subsection (h)) would not affect the place of trial. See, e. g., Multidistrict Litigation: Hearings on S. 3815 and S. 159 before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 110 (1967) (Sen. Tydings) (“[W]hen the deposition and discovery is completed, then the original litigation is remanded to the transferor district for the trial”). Both the House and the Senate Reports stated that Congress would have to amend the statute if it determined that multidistrict litigation eases should be consolidated for trial. S. Rep. No. 454, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5 (1967).
D
In sum, none of the arguments raised can unsettle the straightforward language imposing the Panel’s responsibility to remand, which bars recognizing any self-assignment power in a transferee court and consequently entails the invalidity of the Panel’s Rule 14(b). See 28 U. S. C. § 1407(f). Milberg may or may not be correct that permitting transferee courts to make self-assignments would be more desirable than preserving a plaintiff’s choice of venue (to the degree that § 1407(a) does so), but the proper venue for resolving that issue remains the floor of Congress. See Am- chem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U. S. 591, 628-629 (1997); Finley v. United States, 490 U. S. 545, 556 (1989).
III
The remaining question goes to the remedy, which Milberg argues may be omitted under the harmless-error doctrine. Milberg posits a distinction between a first category of eases erroneously litigated in a district in which (absent waiver) venue may never be laid under the governing statute, see Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 346 U. S. 338, 340 (1953), and a second category, in which the plaintiff might originally have chosen to litigate in the trial forum to which it was unwillingly and erroneously carried, as by a transfer under § 1404. In the first, reversal is necessary; in the second, af-firmance is possible if no independent and substantial right was violated in a trial whose venue was determined by a discretionary decision. Since Lexeeon could have brought suit in the Arizona district consistently with the general venue requirements of 28- U. S. C. § 1391, and since the transfer for trial was made on the authority of § 1404(a), Milberg argues, this ease falls within the second category and should escape reversal because none of Lexecon’s substantial rights was prejudicially affected, see §2111. Assuming the distinction may be drawn, however, we think this ease bears closer analogy to those in the first category, in which reversal with new trial is required because venue is precluded by the governing statute.
Milberg’s argument assumes the only kind of statute entitled to respect in accordance with its uncompromising terms is a statute that categorically limits a plaintiff’s initial choice of forum. But there is no apparent reason why courts should not be equally bound by a venue statute that just as categorically limits the authority of courts (and special panels) to override a plaintiffs choice. If the former statute creates interests too substantial to be denied without a remedy, the latter statute ought to be recognized as creating interests equally substantial. In each instance the substan-tiality of the protected interest is attested by a congressional judgment that in the circumstances described in the statute no discretion is to be left to a court faced with an objection to a statutory violation. To render relief discretionary in either instance would be to allow uncorrected defiance of a categorical congressional judgment to become its own justification. Accordingly, just as we agree with Milberg that the strict limitation on venue under, say, § 1391(a) (diversity action “may ... be brought only...”) is sufficient to establish the substantial character of any violation, Brief for Respondents Milberg et al. 43 (citing Olberding, supra), the equally strict remand requirement contained in § 1407 should suffice to establish the substantial significance of any denial of a plaintiff’s right to a remand once the pretrial stage has been completed.
Nor is Milberg correct that our recent decision in Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U. S. 61 (1996), is to the contrary. In that case, which got no new trial, the jurisdictional defect (a lack of complete diversity) had been cured by subsequent events. While the statutory error (failure to comply with the § 1441(a) requirement that the ease be fit for federal adjudication when the removal petition is filed) “remained in the unerasable history of the case,” id., at 73, in the sense that it had not been cured within the statutory period, it had otherwise been cured by the time judgment was entered. The instant ease is different from that one, inasmuch as there was no continuing defiance of the congressional condition in Caterpillar, but merely an untimely compliance. It was on this understanding that we held that considerations of “finality, efficiency, and economy” trumped the error, id., at 75. After Caterpillar, therefore, since removal is permissible only where original jurisdiction exists at the time of removal or at the time of the entry of final judgment, the condition contained in the removal statute retains significance. But the § 1407(a) mandate would lose all meaning if a party who continuously objected to an uneorrected categorical violation of the mandate could obtain no relief at the end of the day.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the ease is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Justice Scaua joins this opinion, except as to Part II-C.
The Ninth Circuit stopped short of expressly inferring a waiver from Lexecon’s failure to file a motion for remand directly with the Panel, and any inference of waiver would surely have been unsound. Although the Panel’s Rule 14(e)(i) does authorize a party to file such a motion, Rule 14(d) comes close to saying that only under extraordinary circumstances will such a motion be granted without a suggestion of remand by the transferee court. (The Rule reads: “The Panel is reluctant to order remand absent a suggestion of remand from the transferee district court.”) Therefore, even if a party may waive the § 1407 remand requirement by failing to request remand from the transferor court, see 28 U. S. C. § 1406(b), Rule 14(d) precludes an inference of waiver from mere failure to request remand from the Panel.
In this ease, moreover, one can say categorically that a motion before the Panel would have failed; the transferee court denied Lexecon’s motion for a remand suggestion simultaneously with an order assigning the case to itself for trial, thus exercising the authority that the Panel’s Rule 14(b) expressly purported to recognize. Under the Panel’s own rules, in sum, Lexecon never had a chance to waive a thing.
It is well to note the limitations of a related argument. It may be tempting to say that the incompatibility of a self-assignment under § 1404(a) with the Panel’s mandate is confirmed by the authority of a trans-feror court to assign a case to a § 1407(a) transferee district for trial if that would be appropriate following pretrial proceedings under § 1407(a). But there is one circumstance in which a transferor court would be unable to do that. As noted, transfers under §1407 are not limited by general venue statutes; those under § 1404 are.
See n. 2, supra.
Because we find that the statutory language of §1407 precludes a transferee court from granting any § 1404(a) motion, we have no need to address the question whether § 1404(a) permits self-transfer given that the statute explicitly provides for transfer only “to any other district.” 28 U. S. C. § 1404(a).
In its brief to this Court, Milberg suggests that any decision rejecting multidistrict litigation courts' practice of ruling on § 1404 transfer motions should be applied only prospectively under Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 97, 106-107 (1971). Because this argument was not presented below, see Brief for Milberg Defendants in No. 95-16403 et al. (CA9), or to this Court when Milberg opposed petitioners’ petition for certiorari, see Brief in Opposition for Respondents Milberg et al., it is unnecessary for us to consider it here.
Milberg's brief also argues that petitioners are not entitled to relief because the only claim that survived for trial should have been dismissed during pretrial proceedings. We do not address the propriety of the District Court’s decision to allow this claim to go forward; the issue falls outside the question on which we granted certiorari. See this Court’s Rule 14.1(a) (“Only the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court”).
Although Cotehett’s request for an order of dismissal under Rule 54(b) was not granted until after the Arizona court had assigned the case to itself for trial, there is no reason to reconsider that dismissal order. It was perfectly proper as a pretrial order and, for that matter, was merely the formal reflection of the Arizona court’s decision on the merits of the claims that had been resolved prior to that court’s decision on the § 1404 transfer.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
What follows is an opinion from the Supreme Court of the United States. Your task is to determine the issue area of the Court's decision. Determine the issue area on the basis of the Court's own statements as to what the case is about. Focus on the subject matter of the controversy rather than its legal basis. In specifying the issue in a legacy case, choose the one that best accords with what today's Court would consider it to be. Choose among the following issue areas: "Criminal Procedure" encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime, except for the due process rights of prisoners. "Civil rights" includes non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. "First Amendment encompasses the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that it need not involve the interpretation and application of a provision of the First Amendment. For example, if the case only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "Due process" is limited to non-criminal guarantees. "Privacy" concerns libel, comity, abortion, contraceptives, right to die, and Freedom of Information Act and related federal or state statutes or regulations. "Attorneys" includes attorneys' compensation and licenses, along with trhose of governmental officials and employees. "Unions" encompass those issues involving labor union activity. "Economic activity" is largely commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers. "Judicial power" concerns the exercise of the judiciary's own power. "Federalism" pertains to conflicts and other relationships between the federal government and the states, except for those between the federal and state courts. "Federal taxation" concerns the Internal Revenue Code and related statutes. "Private law" relates to disputes between private persons involving real and personal property, contracts, evidence, civil procedure, torts, wills and trusts, and commercial transactions. Prior to the passage of the Judges' Bill of 1925 much of the Court's cases concerned such issues. Use "Miscellaneous" for legislative veto and executive authority vis-a-vis congress or the states.
Per Curiam.
The record in this case leaves us uncertain whether petitioner’s claim to the protection of the Due Process Clause .of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was passed upon by the Court of Appeals of Alabama. 38 Ala. App. 143, 88 So. 2d 199. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cause to that court in order that it may pass upon this claim. Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551.
Question: What is the issue area of the decision?
A. Criminal Procedure
B. Civil Rights
C. First Amendment
D. Due Process
E. Privacy
F. Attorneys
G. Unions
H. Economic Activity
I. Judicial Power
J. Federalism
K. Interstate Relations
L. Federal Taxation
M. Miscellaneous
N. Private Action
Answer:
|
I
|
sc_issuearea
|
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