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The student pilot reported that, during the landing roll, he applied brakes, but the airplane began to veer left.

He corrected with right rudder, but the airplane exited the runway to the left and nosed over.

The airplane sustained substantial damage to the left wing and rudder.

The student reported that there were no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The student pilot's failure to maintain directional control during the landing roll, which resulted in a runway excursion and nose-over.

The pilot reported that he was taking off in his tailwheel-equipped airplane on a turf runway with a gusty, left crosswind.

As the airplane accelerated, a gust of wind resulted in the airplane momentarily becoming airborne.

The airplane settled back to the runway in a left-wing-low attitude and the left main landing gear contacted brush on the left side of the runway.

The airplane ground-looped to the left, striking the right wing and right horizontal stabilizer on the runway.

The right wing, right horizontal stabilizer, and empennage sustained substantial damage.

The pilot indicated that there were no preaccident mechanical problems with the airplane.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane while taking off with a gusting crosswind.

On October 14, 2011, at 0857 universal coordinated time, a Piper PA-28-140 airplane, G-BBEF, impacted terrain near Petit-Beauregard, Fontaines-sur-Grandson, Switzerland.

The pilot and passenger were both fatally injured.

The airplane was destroyed.

The airplane was owned and operated by Flybpl.com, Garstang, United Kingdom, as a personal flight.

Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated with a visual flight rules flight plan.

The flight originated from Neuchâtel airport (LSGN), Switzerland, and was destined for the Amiens airport (LFAY), France.

The accident investigation is under the jurisdiction and control of the government of Switzerland.

This report is for information purposes only and contains only information released by or obtained from the government of Switzerland.

Further information pertaining to this accident may be obtained from: Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau – SwitzerlandAAIB – Aeropole 1Rte de MorensCH-1530 [email protected]

The pilot stated that the approach and landing were uneventful through touchdown.

He landed on the center of the runway, but the airplane started to drift to the left.

He added right rudder with some brake pressure, which slowed the drift to the left, but did not completely stop it.

He continued these inputs, but the left main tire caught a snow bank.

After traveling a few hundred feet, the airplane spun 90 degrees into the snowbank.

The operator reported that there were left tire skid marks as the airplane exited the runway, and opined that either the pilot or passenger had their foot on the left brake pedal.

The operator issued a new caution to all of its instructors and pilots regarding the use of brakes on touchdown and rollout and reminded them to brief all front seat passengers to keep their feet off the rudder and brake pedals.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:The pilot’s failure to maintain directional control during landing.

The instrument certified airplane climbed into instrument meteorological conditions about 30 seconds after takeoff.

Radar track data showed that the airplane entered a right turn shortly after takeoff and entered the cloud base.

The airplane remained in that right turn until it completed nearly 1-1/2 complete turns.

The airplane rolled out and subsequently climbed 1,500 feet over next 17 seconds.

The airspeed decreased to 50 knots and the airplane’s heading abruptly transitioned from the south to the north-northwest which could have represented an aerodynamic stall.

The airplane then descended before beginning another climb.

The airplane completed two additional descent and climb oscillations with minimum airspeeds of 60 knots and 50 knots, respectively.

Maximum pitch angles of 50 degrees nose up and nose down, and bank angles of 75 degrees were recorded during the flight.

The duration of the accident flight was approximately 4 minutes and 30 seconds.

The airplane impacted a wooded area located about 3 miles from the departure airport and was destroyed by impact forces and a postimpact fire.

An examination of the airframe and engine did not revealed preimpact anomalies.

No flight display and/or autopilot system faults were recorded during the accident flight.

Further review of the flight data did not reveal inconsistencies within the data itself.

The data indicated that the pilot initially engaged the autopilot about 5 seconds after lifting off when the airplane was approximately 61 feet above ground level.

The autopilot bugs were set to the assigned heading and initial altitude prior to takeoff.

However, after takeoff the pilot failed to properly engage the autopilot altitude preselect mode; the altitude hold mode was entered instead.

As a result, the altitude and vertical speed bug settings were reset automatically to maintain the airplane’s altitude.

At that point, the airplane’s altitude was above that specified by the autopilot bug.

Subsequent attempts to engage the vertical speed/altitude pre-select mode caused the system to begin a descent to intercept the inadvertent altitude set in the autopilot.

About 1 minute into the flight, the pilot reset the altitude bug above the airplane’s current altitude at that time.

The data suggests that the pilot never adequately regained control of the airplane.

The pilot purchased the accident airplane about 7 months prior to the accident.

He completed visual flight rules transition training at the time he took delivery of the airplane.

The training did not include an instrument proficiency check.

Prior to the transition training, the pilot reported a total flight time of 1,344 hours, which included 20 hours flight time and 4 hours instrument flight time within the one-year period preceding the training.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:The pilot’s failure to maintain control of the airplane while operating in instrument meteorological conditions due to spatial disorientation.

Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s inattention to basic aircraft control while attempting to program the autopilot system.

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn April 28, 2009, at 1615 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus SR22, N504MD, piloted by an instrument rated private pilot, was destroyed during a collision with trees and terrain near Mayfield Village, Ohio.

The flight was being conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan.

Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The pilot and sole passenger on-board sustained fatal injuries.

The cross-country business flight departed Cuyahoga County Airport (CGF), Cleveland, Ohio, at 1612, with an intended destination of Buffalo Niagara International Airport (BUF), Buffalo, New York.

The pilot and passenger flew from BUF to CGF earlier in the day, arriving at CGF about 1319.

According to personnel working at the fixed base operator (FBO) at the time, the pilot and passenger attended a meeting at the airport and then left the airport for approximately 1 hour, before returning for the accident flight.

The pilot requested that the airplane be fueled to capacity ("topped off") prior to departure and FBO personnel fueled the airplane with 40 gallons of aviation gasoline.

The CGF air traffic control tower (ATCT) issued a takeoff clearance for the flight from Runway 6 at 1611, instructing the pilot to fly the runway heading and climb to 3,000 feet mean sea level (msl).

The controller observed the airplane takeoff and enter the clouds.

Takeoff and initial climb appeared to be normal.

At 1612, the controller instructed the pilot to contact departure control.

The pilot acknowledged the instruction; however, the pilot never established communications with the departure controller.

At 1614, the pilot transmitted “were having trouble getting” on the CGF tower frequency.

At 1615, the pilot transmitted “having trouble mike delta.” There were no subsequent transmissions from the pilot.

At 1616, the departure controller relayed a low altitude alert in the blind to the accident flight.

Flight track data recovered from the on-board avionics indicated that the airplane entered a right turn shortly after takeoff.

It remained in that right turn until it completed nearly 1-1/2 complete turns; 540 degrees of heading change.

The airplane subsequently rolled out on a south heading, and began to climb from 1,200 feet msl to 2,700 feet msl over the next 17 seconds.

The airspeed decreased to 50 knots and the airplane’s heading transitioned from the south to the north-northwest.

The airplane subsequently descended to about 1,600 feet msl before beginning another climb.

Over the next 30 second time period, the altitude increased again to about 2,900 feet msl, and the airspeed decreased to about 60 knots.

At this point, the airplane’s heading transitioned from the east-northeast to the west-northwest.

The airplane subsequently entered a right turn ultimately reversing course.

It then climbed approximately 1,300 feet, to a maximum altitude of 3,200 feet msl before descending again.

The airspeed decreased to 50 knots during this time.

The final data point was recorded at 1615:44.

At that time, the airplane’s position was approximately 0.20 miles north of the accident site, at 2,000 feet msl.

(Detailed information regarding the airplane’s flight attitude is included later in this report.) A witness located 1/4 to 1/2 mile from the accident site reported that he was outside and heard the airplane for about 1 minute.

He noted that it “sounded like it was circling around and .

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doing tricks in the air.” However, he was unable to actually see the airplane.

About 20 seconds after the sound faded he heard a “boom.” At the time he thought it might have been thunder but later realized it was likely the impact.

A witness located in a nearby residential subdivision approximately one-tenth mile from the accident site, reported that the airplane flew over his car about 150 feet above ground level (agl).

He stated that it banked to the left and dove toward the ground.

He responded to the accident site; however, the airplane was engulfed in flames when he got there.

The accident site was located approximately 3 miles east of CGF in a wooded area adjacent to a church.

PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot, age 51, held a private pilot certificate with single-engine land, multi-engine land, and instrument airplane ratings.

He was issued a third-class airman medical certificate on June 27, 2007, with a limitation for corrective lenses.

On the application for that medical certificate, the pilot reported a total flight time of 1,350 hours, with 50 hours in the previous 6 months.

The pilot’s logbook was not available to the NTSB.

The pilot completed Cirrus Aircraft transition training at the time he took delivery of the accident airplane.

Records indicated that the pilot completed visual flight rules (VFR) transition training from October 6, 2008 through October 8, 2008.