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Speech by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the mid-term review of the 2008 Monetary Policy Statement, Gaborone, 24 July 2008.
Linah K Mohohlo: Monetary policy framework and objectives in Botswana Speech by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the mid-term review of the 2008 Monetary Policy Statement, Gaborone, 24 July 2008. * * * Introduction This year, the mid-term review of the 2008 Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) has more significance, given the changes to the monetary policy framework announced earlier this year in February. You will agree that it is time that we follow up and provide further information and explanation. Since the new framework was announced, the worst of the financial market crisis that developed in the last months of 2007 may have passed. But aftershocks continue, and the current consensus is that the worst is over. However, concerns about the health of the world economy have multiplied, as slower growth in many economies has coincided with the unrelenting increase in the price of oil and food. The scale of these challenges and the policy choices are abundantly clear, albeit onerous in the short term. You are aware that many central banks have already acted decisively against the risks of inflation by tightening monetary policy. Botswana does not have any major influence on global monetary conditions. Nevertheless, the Bank of Botswana remains responsible for preserving monetary and financial stability in the country, and this requires a clear and measured response that is relevant to Botswana’s specific situation. Monetary policy framework and objectives The changes made to the monetary policy framework are meant to enhance policy formulation in support of the objective of achieving a sustainable, low and predictable level of inflation. Additional factors are now considered more systematically to assess the future path of inflation, indicators of domestic demand and inflation expectations. This assessment involves both statistical and expert analysis and, in view of improved analytical capacity, the Bank decided to discontinue the use of the rate of growth of commercial bank credit as an intermediate target. Furthermore, in recognition of the fact that monetary policy is inherently forward-looking, and can realistically be successful in the medium term, the Bank now only specifies a mediumterm inflation objective (3-6 percent) and reviews inflation projections regularly. Inflation in the first half of 2008 In the first half of 2008, inflation continued the trend that commenced last October; it rose from 8.1 percent in December 2007 to 14.5 percent in June 2008, which is far above the Bank’s medium-term inflation objective range of 3-6 percent. Both measures of core inflation (16 percent trimmed mean and exclusion method) also registered an upward trend. Rising inflation, both domestically and elsewhere, is attributable mainly to the international price of oil-based products and food. In Botswana, inflation for the category of the consumer price index that includes petrol rose from 2.9 percent in September 2007 to 56.1 percent last month in June, accounting for about three-quarters of the total increase in headline inflation. Food price inflation has remained more stable but high, while for most other items inflation has remained much lower and generally within the medium-term objective. In June, there was some indication of a more widespread acceleration of prices which could, in turn, indicate the emergence of second-round effects. Pressures from domestic demand abound, as indicated by growth rates of credit and government expenditure, as well as strong output expansion. The real growth of GDP in 2006/07 is estimated at 6 percent, while more recent estimates indicate that economic growth excluding mining and government accelerated further in the second half of 2007. Monetary policy implementation in the first half of 2008 For the first four months of 2008, the Bank Rate, which had last been changed in June 2007, was at 14.5 percent. At the time, while a short-term deterioration in the outlook for inflation was anticipated, the medium-term projection indicated a sustained improvement. It was also appreciated that there were upside risks arising from the escalating food, fuel and other administered prices, as well as the impact of a wage-induced increase in demand. Hence the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee concluded that the bias was towards monetary policy tightening going forward. Subsequently, it was clear from the Bank’s analysis that the outlook for inflation had deteriorated, with revised forecasts estimating annual inflation to peak at a higher level than previously indicated. Hence the successive increases of 50 basis points each in May and June brought the Bank Rate to 15.5 percent. It is widely believed that interest rates have only a limited influence on domestic demand in Botswana, as borrowers appear not to respond to interest rate changes. This is based primarily on the observation that growth in bank lending has remained high, despite high interest rates. This argument is weak in several respects, as it does not acknowledge factors such as income growth and the broadening reach of the banking sector, both of which should be expected to encourage more borrowing. Even if borrowing was unresponsive to interest rate changes, it goes without saying that increased costs of borrowing must be accommodated elsewhere in household budgets. Therefore, there has to be an impact in terms of dampening demand overall. Inflation outlook in the medium term (2008-2010) Inflation outlook in the medium term is influenced by domestic economic activity, imported inflation and international economic and financial developments. For instance, in South Africa, there are upside risks to inflation due to the increase in food, oil and electricity prices and the forecast depreciation of the rand against international currencies. Hence inflation in South Africa is projected to remain above the upper end of the South African Reserve Bank’s 3-6 percent target to the end of 2009, thus necessitating the maintenance of the current tight monetary policy stance. The situation in Botswana’s other trading partner countries (SDR countries) is also characterised by high inflation and, in some cases, the threat of recession looms large. Domestically, output growth is expected to remain above the long-term trend, and this means that Botswana is not currently facing the dilemma that policy tightening is unduly restricting economic growth. The balance of risks, which the generally tight monetary conditions aim to moderate, is towards domestic demand adding to inflationary pressures. To the extent that the current monetary policy stance is maintained, inflation is expected to reach the Bank’s objective range by the end of 2009, all things being equal. The rate of crawl of the exchange rate is not expected to result in a substantial nominal exchange rate adjustment during 2008. This should not add significantly to inflationary pressures, especially in an environment of a relatively restrictive monetary policy. The latest Business Expectations Survey points to a deterioration in inflation expectations, and this underscores the importance of staying the course in fighting inflation. Monetary policy stance Against this background, there is a need to maintain the current restrictive monetary policy stance going forward, in order to restrain second-round effects and refocus inflation expectations. Otherwise a vicious circle of mounting pressures could make inflation increasingly hard to control, thus requiring more severe policy measures at a later stage. I hasten to add that the Bank recognises the need to balance the trade-off between the need to control inflationary pressures and the desire to support output expansion; to this end, the impact of the current policy stance on economic growth will be monitored carefully. It is important to stress that monetary policy is not by itself sufficient to attain price stability. Complementary fiscal policy and the implementation of structural reforms, such as skills development, that can yield significant productivity gains, are also critical, as they help to enhance the resilience of the economy. I thank you for your attention.
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Remarks by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana and a member of the African Progess Panel (APP), on behalf of the APP Chairman at the meeting on "The financial crisis: impact on Africa", Tunis, Tunisia, 12 November 2008.
Linah K Mohohlo: The financial crisis – impact on Africa Remarks by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana and a member of the African Progess Panel (APP), on behalf of the APP Chairman at the meeting on “The financial crisis: impact on Africa”, Tunis, Tunisia, 12 November 2008. * * * I wish to begin by tendering profound apologies from the Chairman of the Africa Progress Panel, Mr Kofi Annan, who is unable to be a part of this meeting due to overlapping commitments. He is particularly disappointed by his inability to attend as today’s meeting is taking place partly as a result of conversations between him and the President of the African Development Bank (ADB), Dr Kaberuka. I have, therefore, been asked and accepted to speak on his behalf and on behalf of the other members of the Africa Progress Panel. 1 For those who may not know, the Africa Progress Panel exists to monitor, encourage and support African countries and their development partners in taking specific steps to advance social, economic and political progress in Africa. In this context, this meeting is both significant and timely, and President Kaberuka deserves commendation for taking the initiative to get us together. The Africa Progress Panel welcomes, in particular, the collaborative approach being taken by the ADB, the African Union and the Economic Commission for Africa. This will underpin the meeting’s capacity to provide input for upcoming critical events, such as the G20 meeting that is tenable in Washington DC on November 15, and the Doha meeting on International Finance scheduled for the end of November. To that end, the Africa Progress Panel would be delighted if this meeting resulted in a “Tunis Communiqué” which would provide guidance on how the global financial crisis can be managed in a manner supportive of progress in Africa and its achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. It is to be hoped that such a communiqué would recognise the Africa Progress Panel’s main concerns. First, it is worth noting that when crises of the nature currently unfolding occur, it is always the least responsible that are usually the worst affected and the least able to cope. In other words, it is the poor who end up paying the heaviest price for the mess they had no hand in creating. Hence we must encourage a stronger and shared understanding, in both Africa and in global fora, of how the financial meltdown might affect our continent. At the same time, we must recognise that the impact will vary according to the specific circumstances of each region and country. One thing for sure is that the current financial crisis is unprecedented in modern times for its scale and catastrophic dimensions, and its full impact has yet to unfold. Another defining feature of the crisis has been the pace and dynamism of its development, often in unexpected directions. It is less than two months since the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, but it is not much of an exaggeration to say that this seems like a life time away. Africa had initially appeared relatively insulated, both for its financial system and economic development more widely. But the continent can no longer be lulled by any sense of security that this is a crisis only for the developed world, and its banks in particular. Globalisation has many benefits, but there are associated risks and, as the International Monetary Fund has repeatedly come up with lower forecasts for global economic growth, it is increasingly clear that developing economies will feel the chill of the looming recession. The commodities boom has come to an abrupt halt, and this is of particular concern to many African economies given the negativeimpact of reduced trade on Balance of Payments. Panel Members: Mr Kofi Annan (Chair), Mr Tony Blair, Mr Michel Camdessus, Mr Peter Eigen, Mr Bob Geldof, Ms Graça Machel, Ms Linah Mohohlo, Gen Olusegun Obasanjo, Mr Robert Rubin, Mr Tidjane Thiam, Prof Muhammad Yunus, Mr Michael Keating (Director). Slowing world demand also undermines African countries’ efforts towards diversifying economies away from primary sectors. As we are witnessing in Botswana, even when investors wish to proceed with new developments, they are increasingly constrained by lack of access to credit. The so-called “flight to quality” where risk averse investors concentrate their investments in the short end of the yield curve, can destabilise financial flows. In the face of global financial markets, Africa’s banking practices as well as related regulatory and oversight regimes cannot continue to remain local and, in many instances, ineffective. Needless to add, investing foreign exchange reserves in volatile markets is an additional challenge which requires the establishment of prudent investment policies and guidelines, depending on whether the reserves are the minimum necessary for short-term import cover, or represent an accumulated stock of national savings (e.g. Sovereign Wealth Funds). It is also important to ensure that Africa’s interests and priorities are represented in the review or design of any new global financial architecture relating to, for example, the role of the Bretton Wood Institutions. We must also ensure that the financial crisis is not used as a pretext for relaxing or abandoning the hard-won commitments by Africa and its development partners, at least in four main areas: - sustainable economic growth, including food security, climate change, infrastructure and/or trade; - social development, notably health, education and the more important gender issues; - good governance, and its associated financial and political accountability; and - financing for development, including levels of development aid. The Africa Progress Panel believes that the growing sense of mutual accountability between Africa and its partners, whether traditional or new, needs to be encouraged and supported. While it would be unwise to make any predictions, the election of Mr Barack Obama bodes well for not only the maintenance but also, it is to be hoped, the further evolution of commitments to Africa by the United States of America. However, we should be aware that both Africa’s traditional and new partners are under enormous pressure to cut expenditure, and this makes aid levels highly vulnerable. Therefore, we should do everything possible to encourage them to live up to their commitments by, among others, reaffirming our side of the bargain. Notably, this involves committing to the maintenance of fiscal and broad macroeconomic discipline, investing domestic resources with a view to achieving specific human development objectives, and strengthening political accountability at national and regional levels. To this end, the Chairman and members of the Africa Progress Panel would like to support, in any way we can, the ADB President, Dr Kaberuka, the Chairman of the African Union Commission and the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa as they ensure that Africa’s interests are well understood and represented in critical discussions, some of which will take place in the next few months. African leaders are encouraged to network among themselves to forge a common position on these issues, in the best interests of the continent and its populace. On behalf of Chairman Kofi Annan and other members of the Africa Progress Panel, I thank you for your attention.
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Speech by Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, Gaborone, 23 February 2009.
Linah K Mohohlo: 2009 Monetary Policy Statement Speech by Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, Gaborone, 23 February 2009. * * * Honourable Speaker of National Assembly Honourable Minister of Finance & Development Planning & your Colleagues in Cabinet & Parliament Your Excellencies, Members of the Diplomatic Corps Chairman of the House of Chiefs PSP, Senior Government Officials & Heads of Parastatal Organisations Members of the Board of the Bank of Botswana Members of the Banking Fraternity, representatives of the wider financial sector & Captains of Industry Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen Good evening. By way of introduction, I welcome you to this ceremony, marking the launching of the Monetary Policy Statement for 2009. As you know, the Monetary Policy Statement is a means through which the Bank informs the nation and other stakeholders about the monetary policy framework and its implementation. In doing so, we seek to reinforce the credibility of the Bank’s determination to anchor expectations of low, predictable and sustainable level of inflation. This is the primary objective of the Bank, and rightly so. I hasten to stress that the focus on controlling inflation should, in no way, be taken to imply that other considerations concerning the health of the domestic economy are ignored. As always, on this occasion the Bank reviews economic and inflation developments in the past year, and explains the actions taken in response to those developments. This includes an assessment of the success or otherwise of meeting the medium-term inflation objective. The Statement also updates the economic and financial outlook, and proposes a possible strategy for addressing the challenges in the period ahead. You may recall that, last year, the Bank introduced important modifications to the policy strategy, which reinforced then medium-term as the time horizon in which to meet the inflation objective. This approach is based on more rigorous inflation forecasting. Before I delve into the main business of this evening, I feel it is always useful, even for those who regularly attend this event, to highlight the other core functions of the Bank, in addition to keeping inflation in check. The other major function of the Bank is to provide financial and economic advice to the Government, which is done through regular consultations with the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. It is, of course, appropriate that, in most cases, this advice is provided on a privileged and confidential basis. The supervision and regulation of the banking sector, which is essential for maintaining a sound, stable and efficient financial system, is another critical function of the Bank. Prudential supervision and monitoring of licensed financial institutions ensure that they comply with the regulations designed to protect the interests of customers and the financial system for the benefit of the economy as a whole. The Bank is also responsible for designing, printing and distributing currency to the wider economy to facilitate payment for transactions, usage as a unit of account and store of value. Related to this function is ensuring that Botswana has a secure and efficient payments and settlement system, which is critical for the stability of the financial sector and its ability to promote economic activity. Moreover, as Banker to the Government and commercial banks, the Bank of Botswana serves as the lender of last resort. Yet another important function of the Bank is operating a foreign exchange market with commercial banks, so that residents can engage in transactions with the rest of the world. The Bank also manages the exchange rate in order to ensure international competitiveness of domestic exports, by stabilising the real effective exchange rate through a crawl of the nominal effective exchange rate. When domestic inflation is higher than the forecast inflation of trading partner countries, a downward crawl is implemented; the reverse is true when the inflation objective is lower than forecast trading partner countries’ inflation. Last but not least, the Bank is responsible for investing a portfolio of the country’s foreign exchange reserves, which is a major part of the country’s wealth. This involves buying and selling a wide range of investment instruments in international financial and capital markets, while strictly observing acceptable risk parameters. In carrying out all these functions, which contribute to the sound economic and financial wellbeing of the country, the Bank is committed to maintaining the highest level of corporate governance and professional excellence. Before I share with you a summary of this year’s Monetary Policy Statement, I wish to make some observations on the rapidly unfolding global financial and economic crisis. This is a matter of national importance and, inevitably, it forms a backdrop for the review of monetary policy; it also has an impact on the policy strategy in the period ahead. The Bank has been monitoring the deteriorating outlook for the world economy since the emergence of the crisis in late 2007, and we have willingly shared our thoughts at regular economic briefings and in the Bank’s publications; please be assured that this process will continue in the course of this year. Crises have been, and will continue to be a feature of the global economy. Almost 250 years ago, Adam Smith, who is known as the father of capitalism, wrote perceptively about the dangers of speculative excess. Indeed in a system that encourages dynamic development, imbalances requiring correction are inevitable; but the severity of the current economic slowdown is the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s, in part because of globalisation of national economies. That is why the International Labour Organisation has warned that some 50 million jobs worldwide could be lost; that is why all countries including Botswana are affected; and that is why the responses have to be coordinated, to some extent. It is now widely acknowledged that the current crisis can be attributed to three major factors. First, the sharp rise in commodity prices, especially oil and food, was always likely to put a brake on economic expansion. Second, the uneven global growth resulted in unsustainable huge deficits in some countries and corresponding chronic surpluses in others. Therefore, painful adjustment was inevitable. Third, risk management in financial sectors of major economies was lax, so much so that some of the most respected names in banking accumulated large volumes of non-performing assets. These factors were also substantially interlinked. The virtual disregard for prudential lending by the financial sector led to the emergence of unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances and rising commodity prices. Central Banks, too, were on the wrong side of the action, as their formulation and implementation of monetary policy paid insufficient attention to the risks of over-valuation of assets, particularly in the housing market(s). In the event, the consequences have been traumatic, especially since September 2008, when the global banking system risked collapse starting with the erstwhile US headquartered Lehman Brothers. Although this has been averted through unprecedented action by governments and central banks, the subsequent curtailment of lending has aggravated economic slowdown. The seriousness of the “credit crunch” is such that the International Monetary Fund has revised its economic growth forecast for 2009 repeatedly, from 3.8 percent to only 0.5 percent. The economies of advanced countries are forecast to shrink by an average of 2 percent this year. For sub-Saharan Africa, the 2009 outlook has fallen from 6.8 percent to 3.5 percent, and the volume of global trade is expected to fall for the first time since the early 1980s. To address the problems, many central banks have reduced interest rates to historic levels, while governments have undertaken unprecedented spending and financial support of private sector entities. It is not surprising, therefore, that the G20 and similar groupings are considering proposals to coordinate revisions to financial sector regulation. So far, efforts to stabilise the banking system have not resulted in a resumption of bank lending; for this reason, it is feared that economic recovery may take longer, possibly way into 2010. There is also concern that countries will increasingly resort to protectionist trade policies, a trend that would be self-defeating since no economy can resolve its problems in isolation. Fortunately, commercial banks in Botswana are not yet impaired by the impact of the “credit crunch” that is afflicting other countries. Bank deposits far exceed loans; and banks have generally avoided accumulating unmanageable risk. In this connection, it is worth mentioning that Batswana should learn from the mistakes of over-borrowing, the dire consequences of which have hit households elsewhere in the world very hard. Nevertheless, the Bank of Botswana is monitoring possible situations of exposure to offshore parent financial institutions on an ongoing basis. While the domestic financial sector is, to some extent untroubled, international diamond markets have deteriorated rapidly and unexpectedly. As highlighted by the Honourable Minister of Finance and Development Planning in this year’s budget speech, this development has adversely affected government revenue. As at the end of January 2009, which is three months after diamond exports were seriously curtailed, the foreign exchange reserves amounted to 69.7 billion Pula (provisionally), which is a 19 percent growth from the December 2007 level of 58.5 billion Pula. When the effect of the Pula depreciation is excluded, the reserves fell by 6.4 percent in terms of Special Drawing Right (SDR) and by approximately 12 percent in US dollar terms. The decrease in reserves was due to the fall in equity market prices, a slowdown in diamond export receipts and payments for government and other transactions. The pressure on the reserves is expected to continue during 2009, although at the level equivalent to 27 months of import cover, they should remain relatively adequate. I believe it should take little persuasion to acknowledge that managing the country’s reserves prudently has served the country well, given the current severe financial and capital markets difficulties. I now turn to the core business of this evening’s event: the Bank’s monetary policy framework and strategy for 2009. As I said earlier, last year’s modifications to the framework focused on the medium-term, a period considered appropriate for monetary policy to take effect and anchor the inflation objective, based on rigorous inflation forecasting that is now taking root at the Bank. For the sake of emphasis, the Bank’s monetary policy objective is to achieve a sustainable, low and predictable level of inflation within a range of 3-6 percent over the medium term. Maintaining inflation within this range supports broader national objectives of sustainable economic growth and development, through promoting savings mobilisation and productive investment, as well as sustaining international competitiveness of domestic producers. However, the process of keeping inflation in check is not in one direction; for instance, sustained periods of low or rapidly falling inflation could indicate subdued economic activity; in which case, monetary policy would need to be eased to stimulate economic growth, without re-igniting inflationary pressures. It is well known that Botswana’s inflation is affected by domestic demand conditions and other factors such as foreign inflation, the exchange rate, as well as changes in administered prices and taxes. Public expectations of rising or falling inflation also influence pricing behaviour of businesses and wage adjustments. The Bank then responds by adjusting the Bank Rate and conducting open market operations to affect demand conditions in the economy and, ultimately, the rate of price changes. Therefore, the Bank estimates the impact of various factors in forecasting inflation over the medium term which, in turn, informs monetary policy. I wish to stress that, in this regard, the Bank’s response to inflation forecasting is not mechanical; rather, it takes account of expert judgement and supplementary analysis. For more information, I suggest you read the technical annex to this year’s Monetary Policy Statement, copies of which will be made available at the end of my remarks. With respect to inflation trends and related developments in 2008, you will recall that, for the first half of the year, global inflation was mostly driven by the steep increase in oil and food prices; the same applied to Botswana. To put the situation in perspective, global inflation increased from 4.3 percent in 2007 to 6.4 percent in 2008; this affected the outlook for global economic growth, which slowed from 5.2 percent to 3.4 percent. As a result, international oil prices fell sharply in the latter half of the year, especially following the escalation of the global financial and economic crisis in September. The combined effect was that, thereafter, international inflation began to decline. Here at home, inflation rose during most of 2008, and far exceeded the medium-term inflation objective of 3-6 percent at 15.1 percent in August, before declining to 13.7 percent at year-end. Although the average trade-weighted inflation in Botswana’s trading partner countries was unchanged between 2007 and 2008 at 6.5 percent, inflation in South Africa rose from an average of 6.5 percent in 2007 to 11.3 percent in 2008, and was well above the target range of 3-6 percent. Successive increases in fuel prices contributed about 4.4 percentage points to domestic inflation between February and June 2008, but this was virtually reversed following fuel price reductions. Since August, inflation has fallen by less than expected due to a further increase in food prices and lingering second-round effects arising from the earlier period of oil price increases. Bilateral exchange rates too had an impact on inflation in the year to December 2008. The Pula depreciated by about 20 percent against the Special Drawing Right (SDR), but it appreciated by 10 percent against the rand. There was also rapid growth in government expenditure, which had accommodated the sharp increase in prices. With the higher development spending and the increase in civil service emoluments, it is estimated that fiscal year 2008/2009 will see government expenditure rising by approximately 43 percent over that of 2007/2008, which is triple the estimated initial spending increase of 14.7 percent. In turn, the higher government expenditure and personal incomes led to an increase in private sector spending and credit. In the event, credit rose by about 32 percent in the year to September 2008, before slowing to 28 percent in December. Household borrowing increased by approximately 22 percent, while credit expansion to businesses more than doubled at 37 percent, thus reflecting the robust growth in the non-mining private sector during most of 2008. On the whole, however, overall GDP growth slowed due to the fall in mining output, a trend that continued into the first quarter of 2008/2009. It is against this background that the conduct of monetary policy in 2008 took account of various factors that influenced prices. For this reason, monetary policy action was not expected to have an immediate impact on inflation. Instead (and this is key), the policy focused on containing second-round price increases arising from the shock of food and oil prices; it also focused on keeping inflation expectations anchored around the price stability objective in the medium-term. Accordingly, as inflation rose in the first half of the year, the Bank Rate was increased by half a percentage point each in May and June 2008 to 15.5 percent. With improvement in the inflation outlook, the Bank Rate was reduced by the same magnitude to 15 percent in December. Correspondingly and as appropriate, commercial bank prime lending interest rates mirrored the Bank Rate adjustments; in addition, the management of excess bank liquidity reinforced the policy stance. Nevertheless, high inflation resulted in lower real interest rates, some of which, unfortunately, became negative in real terms. With respect to the Bank’s outlook for inflation for this year and a reasonable period ahead, both domestic and global inflation is expected to abate, as a result of lower economic activity and subdued demand. Commodity prices, including the cost of oil, are likely to be low, and world inflation is forecast to decrease from 6.4 percent in 2008 to 3.1 percent in 2009. In South Africa, inflation is expected to decline to 5.5 percent in 2009, and fall within the 3-6 percent target range. Therefore, foreign prices will dampen domestic inflation. Since the Bank’s inflation objective is 3-6 percent and trading partner countries’ inflation is forecast at 3-5 percent, the downward crawl of the Pula should be marginal in 2009, and the real effective exchange rate should be stable. Overall, economic performance is expected to slacken significantly, due to the depressed mining activity. It is also anticipated that despite the decline in government revenue, due to a fall in mining production, public spending will increase in support of economic growth. Nevertheless, it is estimated that output will be below trend, particularly in the short term. This should put downward pressure on inflation. In this environment, it is unlikely that increased government spending will be inflationary, particularly in the absence of a public sector wage increase. However, it is worth mentioning that any large increase in administered prices, such as electricity tariffs and Botswana Housing Corporation rentals, would be inflationary. Be that as it may, the probability is that price increases will be subdued in 2009 compared to 2008. It is, therefore, anticipated that, by the end of the year, inflation will be closer to, if not within, the medium-term objective range of 3-6 percent. Honoured Guests: You may very well ask: What about the monetary policy stance in 2009 in the circumstances! Well, we at the Bank consider that monetary policy action this year will take into consideration the following scenarios: first, the increase in government spending is unlikely to be inflationary; second, the exchange rate is expected to be stable; and third, it is hoped the inflation trend will continue to be downward. These developments suggest that there is scope for easing monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion, in order to address the imminent decline in economic activity. It is also important to entrench expectations of low and sustainable inflation by containing the secondary effects of any transitory price shocks. Furthermore, care will have to be taken to ensure that the foreign exchange reserves remain sustainable. Distinguished Ladies & Gentlemen: Let me conclude by reiterating that monetary policy in 2008 was conducted in conditions of international volatility of unprecedented dimensions. Accelerating inflation in the first half of the year was replaced by the spectre of financial meltdown and global recession, and as a small open economy, this situation presented enormous challenges for Botswana in 2008 and will continue to do so this year. Fortunately, the task of meeting the inflation challenge has been made easier by the adoption of a more comprehensive medium-term framework for policy implementation, which has been made possible by ongoing capacity building in inflation forecasting. Once again, I would like to reassure you, and all stakeholders, that the Bank of Botswana is committed to the maintenance of medium-term price stability due to its benefits for the country as a whole. In this regard, the key lesson from the current difficult international situation is that it pays to be prudent in financial and economic management. Otherwise, the Government would not have been able to accumulate savings in the form of foreign exchange reserves, which should enable the country to weather the unfolding storm. Honourable Speaker, Honourable Ministers, Honourable Members of Parliament, Your Excellencies Members of the Diplomatic Corps, Distinguished Guests, that prudence; that strategy; will continue to guide the conduct of monetary policy this year and in the period ahead. I thank you for your attention.
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Address by Mrs Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the Global Expo Botswana 2009, Gaborone, 4 November 2009.
Linah K Mohohlo: Global economic developments impacting Botswana Address by Mrs Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the Global Expo Botswana 2009, Gaborone, 4 November 2009. * * * It is my honour and privilege to be a part of the festivities marking the 2009 Global Expo Botswana, which is the country’s premier international business-to-business exhibition. At the outset, let me extend a special welcome to exhibitors and visitors from overseas and those from sister countries in the region. Please feel at home in our midst. This year’s Expo comes at an opportune time when the state of the global economy is on a stabilization phase, and, therefore, calling for closer economic, trade and entrepreneurial interaction in order to sustain recovery. At this moment of optimism in the global recovery, this year’s Global Expo assumes greater importance more than ever before. The Expo presents an opportunity for exploring new avenues for investment and trade, so that we can continue to uplift and improve our collective standard of living. It is, therefore, my hope and desire that potential investors will seek opportunities for investment on their own or by partnering with their domestic counterparts. At the same time, domestic entrepreneurs should be able to widen their horizon and acquire new ways of doing business; they should learn from their foreign and domestic counterparts and develop market networks. It is also my desire that you will in, the end, develop life-long personal friendships that will enrich your experiences as individuals and families. I find it appropriate, therefore, that the theme for Global Expo Botswana 2009 is “Unlocking Opportunities in the Current Global Recession”. This theme calls on us to reflect on the current weak global economy, it call on us to reflect on the lessons learned as well as on emerging trends; it also affords us the opportunity to prevent history from repeating itself from an economic perspective, here at home and globally. As part of addressing the theme, I believe it is relevant that I highlight some global economic developments, as they impact on our economy. Since last year, the world economy has experienced the worst recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Although the immediate cause of the economic recession was the 2007 collapse of the mortgage market in the United States of America, its depth and spread reflected deeper global economic and trade imbalances that had not been addressed. The recession was particularly severe in advanced economies which, as a group, are forecast to decline by an overall 3.4 percent this year. Fortunately, the emerging and developing economies are expected to register a growth rate of 1.7 percent in 2009; this is, nonetheless, a much slower rate of expansion compared to the 6 percent achieved the previous year. The global recession has severely affected international trade. According to the International Monetary Fund, the volume of trade will decline by a steep 11.9 percent this year. The reason for this is simple. Rapid economic growth in many countries, especially during the last two decades since the end of the cold war, depended on export performance. When the importing countries began to experience an economic downturn, their demand for exports declined at a faster rate than the slowdown on growth. That is why there is now a global consensus that at a time of economic recession, all efforts should be made to Bencourage, and not restrict, trade so that countries can bail each other out. Global Expo Botswana answers this call. The good news is that, while it has been severe, the recession has been less deep and lasted a shorter period than many had initially feared. This fortunate outcome is due to the unprecedented coordination of fiscal and monetary policies that were put in place by all the major economies. It is now clear that these efforts have begun to bear fruit, to the extent that a 3.1 percent global economic expansion is forecast for next year. Such is the optimism for global recovery that policy makers are now discussing how best to wind-down the stimulus packages, as the international economy progressively returns to more normal performance. In fact, countries that were moderately in recession – Australia and Norway – have begun to tighten monetary policy. France and Germany have realised positive economic growth for almost two successive quarters. Similarly, the world’s largest economy, the United States of America, grew at an estimated annualised 3.5 percent in the third quarter of 2009, a significantly faster rate than expected, and it was the first economic expansion in two years. Thanks to China for continuing on its robust economic growth path. All these economic expansion statistics are encouraging, even for the domestic economy, as luxury sectors such as diamond mining and tourism should derive benefit. Unfortunately, the United Kingdom continues to experience constraints to economic recovery, but it is expected to be out of the woods in due course. With respect to developments in the domestic economy, you are aware that Botswana did not escape the effects of the global recession. However, the on-going global economic recovery has led to a rebound of economic activity, particularly in the third quarter, compared to the first half of the year, when there was no diamond production. In addition to the beneficial effect of the on-going recovery of the world economy, government spending and the easing of monetary policy contributed to a strong expansion of the non-mining sector, which enabled the overall economy to grow by 1.3 percent in the third quarter of this year. This suggests that the underlying trend in economic activity remains positive, partly because the Government was able to implement a fiscal stimulus by drawing on the savings that were accumulated when revenues were buoyant. As a result of the world economic upturn, diamond production has resumed in response to a steady revival of overseas demand for rough diamonds; and it is expected that this trend will continue in the second half of the year. The resumption of diamond exports has also led to surpluses in the current account of the balance of payments in recent months, so much so that the foreign exchange reserves are now increasing after months of consistent decline. As intimated earlier, the Bank of Botswana lent support to the domestic economic recovery by easing monetary policy. To this end, the Bank Rate was reduced from 15.5 percent in December 2008 to the current level of 11 percent. It is important to emphasise that the Bank remains vigilant in monitoring inflation trends, to ensure that the medium term inflation objective of 3–6 percent is adhered to, despite some transient spikes in prices, which pushed inflation to 7 percent in September. After all it is the Bank’s policy to stabilise inflation at a low and sustainable level in order to promote long-term economic growth and diversification. Needless to add, the world economy remains fragile. For a strong rebound in economic activity to be sustained, there is need to learn from the current crisis and to take corrective measures, if we are to avoid a recurrence of the recent economic and financial turmoil. At a global level, there is discussion of the need to create a new economic order. Towards this end, the G20 is no longer an obscure talking shop for finance ministers and central bank governors of advanced economies. Although there is practically no developing country participation, we should take comfort from the fact that it has now been transformed into a serious forum for world leaders to take collective global decisions. It is also expected to assume the responsibility for policy coordination, a role that has, until now, been played by the G8. After years of virtually fruitless discussions, there are now signs of progress in the long overdue reforms to the governance and functions of the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. However, less progress has been made on reforms of the regulation and supervision of financial institutions. And yet, there is a need to curb the excessive risk-taking by these institutions. After all, it was their behaviour which threatened the collapse of the global financial system in 2008, that then triggered the recession. Similarly, there is little sign of reviving the global trading system under the Doha Round of trade talks. And yet it is clear that even-handed trade relations that could emerge through these negotiations could boost world trade and fulfill the G20 commitment to discourage countries from pursuing policies that restrict trading through protectionist measures. Here at home, one of the main lessons derived from the global financial turmoil and economic recession is that reliance on the one dominant sector is far from safe. Clearly a concerted effort towards diversifying the economy is even more urgent, and the Government needs to partner with the private sector in this endeavour. Many of the building blocks are already in place for diversified investment and development. We have macroeconomic stability; we have strong and robust structures for sound policy formulation; we have no exchange controls; and the banking system is stable, soundly managed and offers diverse products. These positive attributes have been consistently recognised by the sovereign credit rating agencies and other international organisations. At international level, the country scores highly in indicators of international competitiveness, such as The Heritage Foundation’s “economic freedom”, the World Bank’s “ease of doing business”, the World Economic Forum’s “global competitiveness“, and Transparency International’s “corruption perception index”. As you will readily agree, despite these impressive scores, there remain challenges in attracting foreign direct investment outside the mining sector. Therefore, the time has come to address the remaining constraints to broadbased investment. In particular, the cost of doing business in Botswana is high compared to other landlocked countries. Businesses should lobby for necessary changes that reduce production costs, but not seek generous subsidies or clamour for imposition of additional obstacles that favour a particular interest group. Equally important, businesses should not always look up to the Government for solutions to their problems, as such an approach tends to entrench a culture of dependency. All-in-all, business should embrace the benefits that accrue from increased productivity in a global economic environment. It is only this path that will sustain our country’s long-run broad-based economic and social prosperity. I had the pleasure of touring the exhibits earlier today, and was very impressed by the wide range of products on display. I am also encouraged that, despite the current difficult economic conditions, organisers are optimistic that transactions will surpass last year’s fifty million Pula mark by an estimated ten million Pula. This suggests a rebound of consumer confidence in the region. Of equal importance, the organisers have appropriately arranged an investment forum, buyer-seller meetings, and several workshops. These events will contribute significantly to the achievement of the objectives of Global Expo Botswana 2009. I would like to take this opportunity to encourage exhibitors and visitors to patronise and participate in the events. I also wish to encourage members of the public to patronise the exhibition especially on Saturday when, I am reliably informed, there will be cultural performances, various delicious cuisines and other complementary activities that will, no doubt, make Global Expo Botswana 2009 a memorable experience. Director of Ceremonies, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to conclude by wishing all exhibitors and visitors fruitful business negotiations in the next four days of the Exposition. I also commend the organisers for a sterling job in putting together this event; you make the city of Gaborone and the country proud. The Acting President, Honourable Ministers, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, it is now my honour and privilege to declare Global Expo Botswana 2009 officially open. I thank you for your attention.
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Speech by Mrs Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the launch of the Monetary Policy Statement for 2010, Gaborone, 25 February 2010.
Linah K Mohohlo: 2010 Monetary Policy Statement Speech by Mrs Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the launch of the Monetary Policy Statement for 2010, Gaborone, 25 February 2010. * * * Once again, it is my pleasure to welcome you to the launch of the Monetary Policy Statement for 2010. As you are aware, the Statement is the principal means through which the Bank informs the nation and other stakeholders about the monetary policy framework and its implementation. This is done in order to foster policy credibility and anchor public expectations of a low, predictable and sustainable level of inflation. The Statement also reviews current economic trends; it evaluates policy implementation in the past year, and attempts to foresee prospective developments that may influence the inflation outlook. In this way, the validity of the policy framework can be assessed objectively, and the Bank’s consequent policy intentions for the coming year can be appreciated. You will recall that two years ago, the Bank adopted a new forward-looking monetary policy framework which rightly expects policy effectiveness in the medium-term. The framework is based on a model of inflation forecasting which incorporates a wider set of economic indicators. Indeed, with the benefit of continuous technical refinements, the actual domestic inflation has broadly been in line with the model projections. Before I present the Monetary Policy Statement for 2010, I consider it useful to restate the other core functions of the Bank which, when taken together, provide synergies for monetary policy, for the promotion and maintenance of monetary stability, and for the efficiency of the payments system as well as the soundness of the financial sector. In addition to the formulation and implementation of monetary policy, the regulation and supervision of banks, is another critical function of the Bank. The Bank is also responsible for designing, producing and issuing currency, which is a means of payment for transactions and a store of value. Towards this end, you will recall that, in August last year, the Bank launched a new family of banknotes to replace those that had been in use for many years. The banknotes are more fortified against counterfeiting; they update the country’s special characteristics and celebrate our heritage. Yet another key function of the Bank is the management and investment of the foreign exchange reserves, which are a major part of the nation’s wealth. Due to the global financial and economic crisis, this particular area of the Bank’s responsibilities has recently come under close scrutiny. I wish to take this opportunity, therefore, to reassure the nation that, despite the turmoil in major financial and capital markets, the Bank’s prudent investment policy and strategy have served the country well. The purchasing power of the reserves has been maintained and, despite very low export receipts and the high import bill, the reserves remain relatively sizeable at approximately USD9 billion (P59 billion), which is equivalent to 20 months of imports of goods and services. The Bank is also the banker to the Government and commercial banks, for which it serves as the lender of last resort. In addition, as economic and financial advisor to the Government, the Bank worked very closely with the authorities throughout the year in addressing the challenging external and domestic macroeconomic environment. Honoured Guests: I now return to the main agenda of this evening, which is the anticipated direction of the Bank’s monetary policy stance during 2010. As I mentioned earlier, the Bank’s monetary policy objective is to achieve price stability, as defined by a sustainable, low and predictable level of inflation. This objective is set as a medium-term inflation objective range of 3–6 percent. In order to attain price stability within this parameter, the Bank uses interest rates and open market operations to affect demand and supply conditions in the economy and ultimately the rate of price changes. You will know that low inflation contributes towards the broader national objective of sustainable economic growth by making saving attractive and investment return predictable, while fostering international competitiveness of domestic producers. In addition, maintaining the purchasing power of money by controlling inflation contributes to the welfare of all economic agents, particularly households. Apart from interest rates and credit availability, domestic demand and economic activity are also influenced by other factors, especially fiscal policy as well as trade and exchange rate developments. Excessive domestic demand in relation to available goods and services contributes to inflationary pressures; so too do foreign inflation, changes in administered prices (such as government levies and utility tariffs) and public expectations about the future level and direction of inflation. In its application, however, monetary policy responds to a sustained deviation of the inflation forecast from the objective range in the medium-term. The Bank’s responses are based on an assessment of the factors that impact on inflation, including public expectations which could, in turn, be influenced by monetary policy. For example, interest rates would be increased to pre-empt a potential rise in inflation and the consequent erosion of incomes and financial savings. Conversely, the Bank would reduce interest rates in the event of sustained low or rapidly falling inflation. In particular, the Bank’s reactions are informed by the performance of the economy in relation to potential output. A sustained level of economic performance above a production trend or potential tends to be inflationary and could suggest the need to raise interest rates to dampen inflationary pressures, while economic performance below output trend could require a reduction of interest rates to stimulate economic activity. However, this policy response is not mechanical; it takes account of expert judgement and supplementary analysis in order to accommodate other factors that may not be fully incorporated in the forecasting model. At the regular meetings of the Monetary Policy Committee, economic developments and key indicators of the inflation outlook are monitored and reviewed, so that a timely policy response can be taken, if necessary. After each Committee meeting, the decisions, the reasons for those decisions and the inflation outlook are disseminated to the public through press releases. This approach helps to influence inflation expectations and contributes towards fostering policy credibility, which is critical in achieving long-term price stability. Distinguished Ladies & Gentlemen: It will come as no surprise to you that this year’s Monetary Policy Statement is launched in a substantially different global and domestic macroeconomic environment than was the case last year. Twelve months ago, I had little good news to report. We had foreseen a difficult 2009 due to the unfolding global economic downturn. Botswana’s diamond mines had temporarily halted production as the full force of the global recession descended on the country. A substantial portion of my remarks at the time was devoted to assessing the impact of the crisis on the domestic economy. We saw no end to the economic recession, as forecasts for global growth were repeatedly revised downwards. As the year progressed, diamond exports had slowed to a trickle, and impacted negatively on government revenue, the Balance of Payments and the foreign exchange reserves. In the circumstances, work on the tenth National Development Plan had to be postponed so that the budget could be re-worked to ensure the maintenance of long-term fiscal sustainability. That was then. As we meet today, the picture is considerably more positive, despite uncertainties and challenges posed by the fragile economic recovery in many parts of the world, particularly in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain (the so called PIIGS). The International Monetary Fund has forecast global output to expand by 3.9 percent this year. This performance reflects the resilience of key emerging economies, and the impact of the stimulus packages that were implemented in most advanced economies. In fact, the challenge for monetary policy makers in major industrial countries is to design and implement a proper winding down of the stimulus packages that have supported economic recovery, while avoiding generating inflationary pressures. This process will need to be gradual and internationally coordinated within a transparent framework. Be that as it may, it is recognised that low interest rates and large budget deficits are likely to be maintained during the course of 2010 and beyond. This policy posture is intended to sustain economic recovery that remains sluggish and fragile; it will also help to reduce the risk of the so-called “double dip” recession. Besides the improved world economic growth, global inflation decreased from 6.3 percent in 2008 to 2.7 percent in 2009. In the four SDR countries – United States of America, Euro zone, Japan and United Kingdom – average inflation was zero. Low inflation was due to a fall in international commodity prices and subdued demand. The resulting low capacity utilisation and high unemployment exerted downward pressure on wages and other prices. In other instances, some developed economies, such as Japan, a fall in prices or deflation is once more a matter of major policy concern. The overall trade-weighted average inflation of Botswana’s trading partner countries slowed down from 6.1 percent in 2008 to 4.4 percent in December 2009. In South Africa, inflation decreased from 9.5 percent in 2008, and ended 2009 at 6.3 percent, just outside the country’s medium term target range of 3–6 percent. Here at home, inflation progressively fell in 2009 and was within the 3–6 percent objective range by the middle of the year. In fact, largely due to base effects of earlier price shocks, inflation reached 5 percent in November 2009, the lowest in decades. Thereafter, inflation rose largely due to the winding down of the favourable base effects arising from previous fuel price reductions. By the end of the year, inflation had risen to 5.8 percent, down from 13.7 percent in December 2008, before increasing further to 6.1 percent last month. Both measures of core inflation (the 16 percent trimmed mean measure and the one derived when administered prices are excluded) showed similar sharp declines during 2009; this was additional evidence of the generalised easing of inflationary pressures. Due to the impact of the global slowdown on demand for diamonds and other minerals, the lower mining production in the first three quarters of 2009 resulted in overall output decreasing by 6.7 percent. In contrast, non-mining output rose by 12.4 percent, reflecting the support extended by the Government’s spending programme, which also contributed to some recovery in business confidence last year. However, as indicated by significantly low growth rates of commercial bank credit, demand remained subdued for both businesses and households. Households were also affected by generally low wage increases, and a salary freeze for civil servants. Although the annual growth rate of government expenditure slowed significantly in 2009, it was still higher than initially budgeted. As highlighted in the recent Budget Speech, government expenditure for fiscal year 2009/10 is projected to grow by 15.5 percent compared to the original budget growth rate of 5.3 percent, which to a large extent, reflected the impact of the sizeable supplementary budget that was approved in December 2009. In order to ease expenditure constraints and finance the larger budget deficit for the fiscal year 2009/10 that is projected at P13.5 billion or 15.1 percent of GDP, the Government borrowed from the African Development Bank and World Bank. A further deficit of a similar magnitude – P12.1 billion or 12.2 percent of GDP – is forecast for the fiscal year 2010/11, and the Government’s objective of restoring fiscal balance, through a combination of robust revenue growth and rigorous expenditure control, is expected in 2012/13. Honoured Guests: I wish to emphasise that, while the large deficits in the current economic environment has been appropriate unavoidable and, to a certain extent, affordable, it is essential that the fiscal consolidation required for long-term budget sustainability is achieved going forward. It is urgent that there is increased vigilance in all aspects of macroeconomic management including policy reforms, in order to energise the country’s performance in a competitive global environment. This has been underscored by the sovereign credit rating agencies when they recently announced Botswana’s relatively intact sovereign credit ratings for 2009 of “A minus” for Standard and Poor’s and “A” for Moody’s Investors Service. More importantly, despite the marginal downward revision by Standard and Poor’s, Botswana’s ratings remain firmly in the Investment Grade, and are still the highest in Africa. It was, however, against the background of lacklustre economic fundamentals that monetary policy was conducted in 2009. In light of the positive inflation outlook and low inflation, the Bank loosened monetary policy throughout the year. The Bank Rate was reduced on five occasions by a cumulative 5 percentage points to 10 percent, and commercial bank lending rates were correspondingly reduced. This policy stance complemented the economic stimulus provided by the Government’s expansionary fiscal policy. Looking ahead, the global economic outlook is projected to improve significantly as more economies continue to emerge from recession. However, as mentioned earlier, economic recovery in developed economies is slow and, in most cases, fragile, while concerns about the build-up of government debt are growing. Furthermore, high unemployment and low growth in household incomes will contribute to weak demand. In the circumstances, global inflationary pressures are expected to remain low. However, there are risks to the inflation outlook due to uncertainty about international oil and commodity prices that tend to accompany an economic recovery. For this reason, global inflation is forecast to increase from 2.7 percent in 2009 to 3.8 percent in 2010, while inflation in SDR countries is expected to increase from zero in 2009 to 1.5 percent this year. In contrast, South Africa’s headline inflation is forecast to fall from 6.3 percent in 2009 to 5.8 percent this year, in which case it will move towards the inflation target range of 3–6 percent. In Botswana, expectations are that the exchange rate influence on import prices will be minimal. The Bank’s inflation objective range of 3–6 percent is very close to the forecast trading partner countries’ inflation range of 3–5 percent. This means that the downward crawl of the nominal effective exchange rate that is required for maintaining a competitive real effective exchange rate should be small in 2010. Overall, the effect of imported inflation on domestic inflation transmitted through foreign price increases is also expected to be minimal. Although the domestic economy is expected to grow in 2010, total output is projected to remain below trend in the medium-term, due to the lingering effects of the global recession and the planned cuts in government expenditure. In addition, growth in household disposable income and, consequently, demand for domestic goods and services, is likely to be sluggish due to the continuing wage freeze for civil servants, the planned increase in value added tax, other government levies and utility tariffs. Moreover, the improvement in business confidence that may have taken place so far due to the increase in government spending, could be dampened by the planned expenditure cuts. So far, on the basis of available information, inflation will rise modestly in the short-term, largely as a result of the increase in value added tax, but it will subsequently stabilise around the Bank’s medium-term objective range of 3–6 percent next year. Therefore, Honourable Ministers, Distinguished Ladies & Gentlemen, the outlook for inflation and output suggests a largely neutral monetary policy stance in the medium term. With prospects for low and stable inflation, and in an environment in which the Government’s contribution to economic activity is constrained by limited revenue, it is of paramount importance that coordinated and complementary monetary and fiscal policies remain the order of the day, in the best interest of sustainable economic growth. It should be pointed out that the projected short-term increase in inflation implies a need to keep inflationary expectations in check. Needless to add, uncertainties cannot be ruled out. Accordingly, therefore, as events unfold during the course of the year, the Bank will respond appropriately and timely to attain price stability and to ensure that inflation remains within the medium-term objective range of 3–6 percent, without undermining sustainable economic growth. Distinguished Guests, Ladies & Gentlemen: This concludes my Statement, and I thank you for your attention. Please enjoy the rest of the evening.
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Keynote address by Mrs Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the Botswana Institute of Accountants 6th Biennial International Conference, Gabarone, 3 June 2010.
Linah K Mohohlo: Governance beyond the financial crisis Keynote address by Mrs Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the Botswana Institute of Accountants 6th Biennial International Conference, Gabarone, 3 June 2010. * * * President of the Botswana Institute of Accountants, Mr Dixon-Warren, Deputy President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, England & Wales, Mr Parrit CEO of the Eastern, Central and Southern African Federation of Accountants, Mr Ncube, Chief Executive Officer, BIA, Mr Majinda Heads of Private and Parastatal Organisations, Distinguished Men & Women of the Accounting Fraternity, Ladies and Gentlemen I wish to thank the Botswana Institute of Accountants for the honour bestowed on me as I officiate at the opening of this 6th Biennial International Conference. I extend a warm welcome to all the guests and delegates and, for those from places afar, I implore you to feel at home in the City of Gaborone. I am informed that this Conference coincides with the 20th Anniversary of the Institute, which will be celebrated tomorrow. Allow me, therefore, to take this opportunity to congratulate the Institute for almost coming of age at 20. You need not be reminded that with the maturity that goes with a two decade lifespan, comes increased responsibility for the greater good of all concerned and for the country. As I share some thoughts with you on the Conference theme of “Governance beyond the Financial Crisis”, I will highlight the importance of good governance, using as a backdrop, the recent experience of the global financial crisis, which was a prelude to the economic recession from which the world is cautiously recovering. I will point to the lessons derived from the crises and highlight some remedial reforms, and the expected role of the accounting profession in this endeavour. I will then make reference to the governance framework that has continued to stand the country in good stead. Before I delve into the conference theme, I wish to hazard some notable observations about the accountancy profession. As you are aware, accountants can be the butt of many a joke and often disparagingly referred to as “bean counters” or “number crunchers”. In my view, which I believe is shared by many, accountants are a lot more than that. Accounting professionals are increasingly taking on responsibilities beyond their traditional role. As technology continues to make accounting procedures more efficient, these responsibilities include line management, business strategy, workplace productivity, revenue and profit maximization, and related others. This means accountants need a far wider set of skills. This evolution comes as demand for professionals with broad based business skills and industry knowledge is rising. On top of this, interpersonal and communication skills are becoming a key advantage as businesses rely more on interdepartmental cooperation that involves all business competencies to be strategically aligned to maximise output. In many instances, an accountant has to manage these processes with senior and middle management. Therefore, although the appointment of an accounting professional is possibly the single most important decision towards ensuring business sustainability, increasingly, recruitment agencies tend to look beyond accounting qualifications. Those who have invested in their careers, developed critical business, communication and strategic skills, will stand tall in what is becoming a highly competitive environment. Accountants can no longer be grey people who remain behind closed doors lacking in social skills. They are going to have to be seen and heard as they earn their keep along with professionals of other disciplines. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, The theme of the Conference – Governance beyond the Financial Crisis – is timely since most countries, Botswana included, are recovering from the effects of the global financial crisis, which precipitated the deepest recession in a generation. The theme speaks to the need for introspection; more importantly, it calls for exchange of views on the lapses in governance that originated from a few market players, particularly in the US. It is now well known that the first sign of a progressive buildup of gross disregard of the basics of good governance in the US was the asset bubble that was fueled by the virtual absence of risk management and personal financial prudence. There was also lack of transparency, accountability and supervisory oversight standards. It was forgotten that what is legal is not necessarily ethical. The asset bubble gave rise to high commodity prices with consequences for global inflation in the first half of 2008. When the bubble burst, it resulted in the financial collapse of major multinational financial institutions; then came the credit crunch and a crush in share prices; economic recession was upon us; and there was a sharp drop in international trade, that was followed by a deterioration of government finances and job losses. The consequent painful experience has given rise to an opportunity to seek remedies and avoid the possibility of a double dip recession. I am encouraged that the accounting fraternity, which had a fair share of the blame for the recent global financial and economic misery, is also alive to the need for corrective action. I have no doubt that your deliberations at this conference will advance the debate on the role that your noble profession can play in enhancing good governance in the period ahead. Work on the redesign of the global financial architecture and inclusive governance of world affairs is in progress at various fora, including at the World Economic Forum, G20 and at specialised professional bodies such as the Botswana Institute of Accountants. A common theme running through the various efforts that are expected to eventually coalesce is that “Governance beyond the Financial Crisis” should, at a minimum, enhance transparency of institutional functioning at Board and management levels, as well as at operational and technical levels. Furthermore, accountability should be the order of the day and, in particular, the hierarchy of responsibilities and roles of institutional structures should be clearly defined. This arrangement should eventually reinforce checks and balances as part of risk mitigation; it should prevent a potential conflict of interests, while ensuring fulfillment of fiduciary responsibilities and avoiding dereliction of duty. In the end, however, transparency and accountability must be buttressed by a set of institutional values and ethical codes of conduct, such as honesty, selflessness and integrity of the highest order. The importance of this Conference and its theme lie in the fact that they are part of the bigger picture of national and international efforts towards putting in place a new and more robust global financial architecture. I have no doubt that you will share views on how you can become agents of transformation. At national and international levels, each one of you is called upon to meet high standards of technical competence. You are called upon to adhere to strict and uncompromising ethical standards, adopt a broad institutional and/or corporate perspective in your work, advise on policy and operational issues, and play custodial and trusteeship roles that demand moral courage. You are challenged to be world class technical experts in financial analysis and to communicate your findings and their implications. You are also challenged to keep abreast with changes in your profession, such as the international accounting and financial reporting standards, and advise your principals in a timely manner. The benchmarks for excellence in all these areas are set by international technical standards and evolving best practices. Of all the professions, yours is no stranger to the need for lifelong learning as you update your professional skills. You are more keenly aware than most of yesterday’s expertise and knowledge is today’s ignorance. Going forward, you are called upon to get more involved in cross-cutting issues of good governance and economic development. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen; Now that I have dwelt on the desirability and virtues of good governance, and the expanded role of the accounting profession in strengthening good governance, let’s examine how the domestic governance framework benefited the country and the domestic banking sector generally at the time of the global recession. Without fear of being contradicted, I can confirm that the domestic banking system escaped the first round of the direct adverse effects on asset quality at the time of the international financial crisis. The reason for this can be found in the robustness of the regulatory and supervisory framework. For instance, Board and senior management of banks are vetted before appointment, and care is taken to ensure that appropriate decision-making structures and related committees are in place, including adequate risk management and mitigation strategies. The regulatory framework also ensures that lending practices are devoid of conflict of interests; and consultations are undertaken with external auditors in a bid to ascertain operational and financial propriety. Without the rigorous enforcement of strict regulatory requirements, the banking sector would have been saddled with unbearable problems of, among others, nonperforming assets. The less-than-severe impact of the global recession on the country’s economy vindicated the importance of good economic and financial governance over the years. Without the careful and prudent budgetary and overall management of the country’s resources, it would not have been possible to implement the fiscal stimulus that moderated the severity of job losses. Over time, Botswana has been able to avoid the so-called “resource-curse”; this is the inverse relationship between the vastness of resource endowments and a country’s level of socio-economic prosperity. Inflation has, by and large, been relatively low and well managed; thanks to the benign inflationary environment at a global level. Honoured Guests, I conclude by underscoring the importance of the need to redouble efforts in strengthening the existing governance infrastructure and redressing the inadequacies. History must not be allowed to repeat itself so far as the ravages of the financial and economic crises are concerned. Needless to add, the accounting profession has a lot to offer in this endeavour. Indeed government entities and the corporate world need accounting skills more and more each passing day. I have no doubt that you will respond with added enthusiasm and renewed sense of duty. It is now my honour to declare the 6th Biennial International Conference of the Botswana Institute of Accountants officially open. I wish you fruitful deliberations, and I thank you for your attention.
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Speech by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, to the Association of Certified Chartered Accountants, Gaborone, 17 September 2010.
Linah K Mohohlo: Post-recession role of accountants in business Speech by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, to the Association of Certified Chartered Accountants, Gaborone, 17 September 2010. * * * I would like to begin by thanking the Country Manager of Botswana’s Association of Certified Chartered Accountants, Ms Gwen Sabarwal, for inviting me to be a part of the Association’s Gala Dinner for 2010. I am informed that it is the Association’s tradition on this occasion to invite a notable person in the community to speak on some issue of topical interest. It humbles me, therefore, that I have been considered worthy of the platform for this year’s event. You will agree that this time round, for me, any topical issue is bound to be coloured by, and related to, the recent global financial meltdown and related deepest economic recession since the great depression of the 1930s. The causes of the difficult economic episode are now common knowledge, with sources from private and public sectors at individual and collective levels, in areas of public policy, corporate strategy and business operations. In other words, all professions, including accountancy, contributed directly or indirectly to the economic meltdown. Now, everyone is looking through the rear view mirror while at the same time focussing on the road ahead. Before delving more on the issues, I would like to commend your Association (Ms Sabarwal) for the commitment to training accountants in Botswana over the years. It is encouraging to learn that, since 1990, two years following the enactment of the relevant legislation, the membership of the Association of Certified Chartered Accountants in Botswana has grown to more than 350, and the student in-take has continued to increase. It is also encouraging to observe that the more than 96 percent membership retention level you have so far achieved is fairly comparable internationally. This should provide confidence that you will reach your 2010/2011 retention target of 98 percent with relative ease. However, I happen to know that there is a big deficit in the supply of accountants in Botswana. Apparently the demand in the market is about 3 000, while the supply is just over 1 000, the lion’s share of which are expatriates. I have no doubt that your Association shares this concern, given the fact that the shortage of professionals in accounting and related disciplines can only raise costs and, therefore, be unaffordable for many small and medium size enterprises. It could constrain business performance and deprive the economy generally of needed guidance in business governance, ethics, strategy and planning, with possible adverse consequences on sustenance of economic diversification and a relatively high growth rate for the economy. It is my hope, therefore, that steps will be taken to redress the situation, and this could include deliberate public policy intervention. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, the theme I was requested to address is Accountants for Business. I believe this broad theme is currently guiding your exchange of views in your profession and, as a matter of fact, it will be addressed further at the World Congress of Accountants that is tenable in Malaysia next month. For this evening, I have chosen to put a slant to the topic and speak on The Post-Recession Role of Accountants in Business. In this case, the word “business” is broadly and loosely intended to mean institutions (corporate or non-corporate, private or public) that are engaged in production of goods and/or services. Although the global economic recession, from which we are slowly emerging, was, by and large, the result of a wide-ranging systems failure, I will confine my remarks to some of the lapses of the accounting profession that contributed to the economic meltdown. I will also highlight some lessons learned and some on-going remedial measures that should prevent a recurrence. I will then raise the issue of the need to increase the supply and quality of accountants in Botswana and urge you to be actively engaged in the area of accounting principles and reporting. This will be my main message, but at the end of my remarks, I will digress only a little and share with you some issues of public interest that fall within the purview of the mandate of the Bank, and in which accountants are undoubtedly interested. It is now clear that the financial crisis and economic recession were the result of cumulative lapses in good corporate governance, particularly with respect to transparency in management, policy formulation and operational procedures. This includes a clear hierarchy of institutional structures such as boards, management and stakeholders, with well defined functional responsibilities to ensure accountability in organisations. There were lapses in enforcing checks and balances, prevention of conflicts of interest and adherence to fiduciary responsibility. Above all, in many instances, there was a lack of honesty, selflessness, integrity, openness, ethical conduct and responsible corporate citizenry. By and large, accountants and other professionals at various levels of responsibility, and in a good number of financial and non-financial businesses, disregarded these cardinal guiding principles of good corporate governance and conveniently forgot that what is legal is not necessarily ethical. In the end, the financial and economic structure could not bear the weight of accumulated lapses; so, it collapsed. While all this is now water under the bridge, it has been recognised in some quarters that the International Accounting Standards contributed more than their fair share to the financial crisis. It is pointed out that one new standard abandoned the traditional prudent principle of historical asset valuation and replaced it with a highly subjective and pro-cyclical “fair value” concept. As a result, brokers, analysts and investment bankers abused the standard. The upward movement of stock prices immediately inflated balance sheets which, in turn, further inflated the asset price and, when the economic downturn set in, the bubble eventually burst. It was known that the paper profits resulting from inflated asset book values could not be realised; and yet banks and other non-bank institutions took inordinate debt issuance risks. In addition, the “fair-value” principle was not much understood by the market, and was not transparent. In the event, balance sheets were hardly a useful basis for decision-making by economic agents. The far reaching economic and social consequences of this accounting practice are now a matter of record. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, it has been said that war is too serious a business to be left to the generals only. Likewise, it is now widely recognised that accounting is too important a profession to be left to accountants only. Indeed the United States of America and the European Union recently took measures to “soften” or dilute, as it were, the deleterious effects of “fair-value” accounting practice in financial institutions. Another emerging change is the call for more disclosures in accounting standards with which those of us outside the profession are grappling, obviously with the helping hand of accountants. Long gone are the days when accountants confined themselves to the boring ivory tower of “number crunching” or, as at times pejoratively referred to, “bean counting”. In fact, it has been said that accounting has now entered a golden age; an age of the changing role of the accountant; an age of wide-ranging roles that include professional business advice, planning, reporting, identification of value drivers and risk mitigation. In particular, it is increasingly desirable that the International Accounting Standards should incorporate disclosures of payments to governments by companies in the extraction of natural resources, especially those in the oil, gas and timber sectors. This needs to be done in both the public and private sectors to ensure that maximum revenue and other benefits accrue to the societies in which these companies operate. More generally, the accounting profession has cross-cutting socio-economic responsibility in a variety of ways including governance, business ethics, banking regulations and supervision, as well as financial stability. In this respect, climate change and its effects have opened up new horizons in which accountants can be involved in a wide range of socio-economic issues. It is my hope that accountants from developing countries will take the lead in putting in place the necessary accounting and reporting standards on costing and financing of the mitigation of adverse socio-economic effects of climate change. These were agreed on at last year’s United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. You will agree that this is a multidisciplinary area which, I believe, will involve close consultations between your profession as accountants and other disciplines. Here at home, the Financial Reporting Bill that was passed by Parliament recently, and awaiting Presidential approval, will contribute considerably in widening the scope for the responsibilities of the accounting profession. Similarly, when the Botswana Accounting Oversight Authority is put in place, it should strengthen the professional accountability and ethical conduct of accountants. As a related matter, Ladies and Gentlemen, you will know that, in a bid to circumvent a possible repeat of the recent financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision reached a landmark decision on September 12, 2010. This is known as Basel III, and it translates into a more than doubling of the common equity component of capital for global banks, from the current 2 percent to 4.5 percent, plus a new buffer of a further 2.5 percent, to reach a floor of 7 percent. The effective implementation of this new capital adequacy requirement is the period 2013–2019, and it is meant to make banks resilient to financial shocks and ensure a more healthy banking sector worldwide. Any bank capital falling within the buffer zone will face restrictions on paying dividends and discretionary bonuses. We await more of these proclamations and transformations going forward as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision continues to be hard at work. As a matter of fact, the Basel Committee is catching up with Botswana’s regulatory framework on this matter. It should be of interest that the Bank of Botswana has, for more than 10 years now, insisted that domestic banks should maintain a capital adequacy ratio of 15 percent, which is more than double the new Basel Committee’s minimum requirement. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that, throughout the financial crisis, the domestic banking sector remained well capitalised, sound and profitable. While on the subject of the domestic banking sector, let me digress a bit into an example of the Bank of Botswana’s accountability to stakeholders on delivery of all its mandates, which include monetary policy, the objective of which is to maintain low, predictable and sustainable level of inflation. In meeting the inflation objective the Bank absorbs the banking system’s excess funds by issuing Bank of Botswana Certificates, thus containing undesirable credit growth and determining the appropriate level of the Bank Rate. There is no doubt that not issuing central bank paper in the form of Bank of Botswana Certificates to absorb excess liquidity in the banking system would be inflationary and destabilising to the economy. And yet there is a view in some quarters that the cost of absorbing excess liquidity is too high, and banks would do the right thing if left to themselves; that somehow, the Bank is enriching commercial banks. The Bank of course disagrees with these views. In fact, the “leave-banksand-their-excess-funds-alone” view runs counter to experience world-wide. On the contrary, banks cannot be left to accumulate excess money and be expected to do the right thing. In fact, it would be the height of irresponsibility if the Bank were not to intervene in the face of the continuing excess liquidity that is exclusively in the banking system. Indeed accountants, such as yourselves, would be concerned about unhealthy balance sheets resulting from, among others, the vagaries of what would no doubt be runaway inflation, as was the case for several years before BoBCs were introduced in 1991. With respect to the Banks’ responsibility of reigning in inflation by managing banking system liquidity and credit expansion, there is the related need for banks to encourage financial saving. It is well known that bank lending and investment which are a basis for the country’s development cannot increase without attracting a faster rate of accumulating savings. The Bank is concerned that household voluntary savings rates are low, while borrowing levels are high compared to countries at a similar level of development. Commercial banks must, therefore, seriously consider developing savings products that offer attractive deposit interest rates, in their own long-term interest, rather than concentrating on short-term gains by maintaining wide spreads between lending and deposit interest rates and, at the same time, charging exorbitantly for the services rendered. Rest assured, this and other related matters are receiving the Bank’s active attention. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, we await the next course of the meal to be served, and I do not want to frustrate your appetite further. This, therefore, concludes my submissions. Please accept my best wishes for a pleasant and relaxing evening. I thank you for your attention.
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Acceptance remarks by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, for the OMFIF (Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum) "Lifetime Achievement Award", Pretoria, 23 August 2011.
Linah K Mohohlo: Economic understanding and integration, plus transparency and discipline in economic policy Acceptance remarks by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, for the OMFIF (Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum) “Lifetime Achievement Award”, Pretoria, 23 August 2011. * * * It is an honour and privilege to receive the Lifetime Achievement Award from the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum. You will agree that what we think of ourselves may be important, but it is encouraging when observers’ thoughts of ourselves are positive. In the circumstances, I am humbled by the generous gesture of the Forum, an organisation which has now attained international stature and influence in advancing the cause of prudential management of international finance. I accept the Award with humility. I accept it on my own behalf and on behalf of colleagues at the Bank of Botswana and counterparts elsewhere; because without their support over the years, this Award would not have been within reach. I would like to take this opportunity to say a few words on the two broad areas contained in the Award citation: first, the importance of supporting “economic understanding and Integration”; second, the importance of “transparency and discipline in economic policy”. With respect to economic integration, its potential benefits are obvious. Integration enables a pooling of resources to improve infrastructure, to facilitate the movement of people, goods and services, to align regulations, and to create opportunities and incentives for investors, all of which together, accelerate economic development. This has been demonstrated by the single European market, the current problems of the euro zone notwithstanding, and there is no reason why economic integration cannot also benefit Africa. However, enthusiasm for integration, especially at the political level, has not always been accompanied by the necessary understanding of demands and sacrifices. This includes difficult political decisions and economic trade-offs in establishing mechanisms for effective alignment of national economic ambitions with common objectives. Indeed, the current European experience provides a salutary warning; the ongoing efforts to save the viability of the euro is a reminder that enthusiasm for a political agenda can obscure key economic issues. We should be grateful, therefore, that in the face of pressure to accelerate Africa’s integration process, some enlightened minds have advised caution, taking the view that good intentions are not enough. Agreements on an ambitious timetable for milestone events, such as the formal establishment of some additional pan-African institutions, are no substitute for adequately addressing the imperatives of economic integration. Similarly, there can be no dispute as to the importance of transparency and discipline in economic policy. It is noteworthy that lack of transparency in key areas contributed to the recent global financial crisis. Thanks to discernible improvements in economic governance and policy making in some parts of the continent, some African economies were generally resilient during the economic recession. Be that as it may, the pursuit of sound policies remains a challenge due, in part, to the difficult international environment and adverse weather conditions. As for my country Botswana, you will know that its rapid economic transformation from a poor undeveloped country, dependent on cattle farming, subsistence agriculture and migrant workers’ remittances, to a middle-income economy, is itself the result of a consistent commitment to transparency and discipline in economic policy. The discovery of diamond BIS central bankers’ speeches deposits, immediately following independence from Great Britain, clearly played a pivotal role in the transformation, but the role of minerals is only part of the story. As history has repeatedly shown, no matter how rich the endowment, natural resources cannot, on their own, develop a country in the absence of appropriate and effective institutions. Nor should it be forgotten that Botswana’s commitment to prudent macroeconomic policies covered not only the years of diamond-generated budgetary and balance of payments surpluses; it was maintained during difficult times, which include the early years of independence and, more recently, the global financial crisis and economic recession. While the strength of Botswana’s economic performance has been widely recognised, there can be no room for complacency if this success is to be sustained. After all, the global economic recovery is still weak, uncertainties abound, and Botswana remains exposed to the vagaries of commodity markets. In such an environment, it is imperative not only to maintain macroeconomic stability, but also to take further steps to improve the business environment so that more non-mining businesses can be attracted and can ultimately flourish. Up to this point, the country has emerged from the economic recession in not-so-bad a shape, and its sovereign credit ratings are so far largely unchanged. That said, there is nothing miraculous about Botswana’s economic performance. In fact, other African countries have increasingly been able to adopt similar, if not better, macroeconomic policies, and the benefits are self-evident. As far as my employer, the Bank of Botswana, is concerned, it has continued to contribute to the country’s economic development since its founding in 1975, by seeking to align fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies. This is facilitated by regular consultations between the Government and the Bank, accompanied by operational and policy transparency through, among other avenues, periodic economic briefings. When I joined the Bank shortly after its establishment, I did not envisage that, 23 years later in 1999, I would head it as Governor and Board Chairman. Nor did I know that during my tenure, I would be involved in what I consider a professionally fulfilling wide range of activities at regional and international levels. Over time, I have learned the importance of the Bank continuously adapting to evolving circumstances. Indeed, the Bank is much changed from when it was first established. While still operating under broadly the same mandate of promoting monetary stability and maintaining a sound financial system, the governing legislation has been subject to a number of reviews; and there have been several reorganisations to accommodate the evolving nature of responsibilities. Monetary policy implementation is now benchmarked against international practice, and the policies and guidelines for managing the foreign exchange reserves are regularly revisited. Banking regulation and supervision are increasingly risk based and, accordingly, financial stability has also assumed centre stage. In all these endeavours, I counted and continue to rely on the support of structures at home and abroad; this includes colleagues, counterparts and bilateral establishments, such as the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum. Director of Ceremonies, Chairman of the OMFIF Advisory Board, Co-Chairpersons of OMFIF, the Forum’s Award Jury, fellow Governors, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I end by reiterating my eternal gratitude for the generous acknowledgement of my work, as evidenced by the conferment on me of the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum’s Lifetime Achievement Award. I embrace it. Thank you for your attention. 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Remarks by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the National Launch of the World Economic Forum 2011/12 Global Competitiveness Report, Gaborone, 7 September 2011.
Linah K Mohohlo: The World Economic Forum 2011/12 Global Competitiveness Report Remarks by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the National Launch of the World Economic Forum 2011/12 Global Competitiveness Report, Gaborone, 7 September 2011. * * * It is an honour and privilege for me to be an integral part of the launch of the Global Competitiveness Report for the period 2011/12, as compiled by the World Economic Forum (WEF), in cooperation with national stakeholders. For Botswana, the launch is spearheaded by the Botswana National Productivity Centre (BNPC), which has the responsibility not only for conducting the Executive Opinion Survey that provides much of the data, but also for organising the national launch, more or less in tandem with global launches. I would like to take this opportunity to commend the BNPC, for successfully hosting this annual event for several years. As a matter of fact, on this occasion, BNPC has broadened the scope of activities by convening a workshop. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen: You will know that Botswana is cited as one of the most competitive economies in Africa, but, as I will outline shortly, this year’s Report makes sobering reading, given the worrying indications that previous advantages continue to be eroded as we are failing to make headway in key areas on which future economic development will increasingly depend. The theme for this year’s Global Competitiveness Report is “Setting the Foundation for Strong Productivity”. I consider this is a timely theme at a time when future prospects for the world economy appear increasingly uncertain. This is reflected in major challenges facing policy makers, as economic conditions have deteriorated in recent months. Although these conditions differ widely across regional and national economies as circumstances vary, I believe the Report is right to stress the need for policy makers not to lose sight of the longterm fundamentals that underpin successful economic development, even in the face of a myriad of shorter term political pressures. For this reason, the emphasis on productivity, as the foundation of sustainable economic growth prosperity, is to be welcomed. The World Economic Forum can itself be regarded as a case study of the benefits of productivity, not measured merely in terms of effort and hard work, but also in terms of its effective deployment of resources to meet the ever changing requirements of its growing number of clients. The Forum is of special professional interest to me, as I have been privileged to work closely with it for a good number of years, including presiding over some of its major proceedings. I can, therefore, attest to its evolution; and here follows a snapshot of it. The World Economic Forum was established in 1971 in Switzerland. It initially focused on the needs of European business leaders, but it now has a truly global outreach, encompassing both the private and public sectors in more than 140 countries. The Forum has encouraged pursuit of appropriate economic, fiscal, trade and social policies by bringing together major corporate and political leaders, NGOs, multilateral financial institutions and social observers. The Forum’s annual meeting, that takes place in Davos (Switzerland) is, of course, the most well-known and well attended gathering; the regional meetings also have increasingly high profiles. Furthermore, the Forum facilitates policy discussions through a wide-ranging research programme that includes reports and surveys covering a variety of topical issues such as economic growth, environment, finance, technology, health and social development. Among these, the Global Competitiveness Report is the best known, having been first published in 1979, at which time there was a coverage of only 16 countries. This has successfully given birth to a growing family of related reports that focus on specific regions, sectors and issues. BIS central bankers’ speeches The objective of these reports is to provide a benchmarking tool for policy-makers and business leaders, and the principal means of doing this is through rankings of participating countries according to a range of relevant criteria, which are aggregated into an overall index. In this case, the Global Competitive Index (GCI) looks at a wide range of factors that contribute to performance of key pillars. The pillars are institutional effectiveness, infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and education, markets for goods, services and labour, financial development, technology, as well as innovation. Information from the Executive Opinion Survey is supplemented with a range of measurable factors. Similar methodologies are employed in other rankings such as the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business and in Transparency International’s reports on corruption. There are also similarities with the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). I hasten to stress that these various products, which often overlap in their coverage, should be seen as complementing, rather than competing with, each other. Indeed, in calculating its rankings, the World Economic Forum makes significant use of data collected by the World Bank. I now turn to the overall results of this year’s Report as drawn from the information contained therein. As I highlight my impressions of the main issues, I know you will appreciate that my condensed remarks should not be taken as a substitute for a thorough review of the Report. I, therefore, commend it to you. The Report began to include an Index in 2006, at which point it covered 122 countries, out of which Botswana was ranked 57th. For my purposes this morning, I will use, as my base, the 2008 rankings, when Botswana attained a modest improvement of 56 out of 134 countries. Since then, the story has been one of overall decline, to the extent that, out of 142 countries covered in the 2011/12 Report, Botswana is ranked 80th. Clearly this is not good news, and it is incumbent on all of us to arrest the situation before it degenerates. It is disappointing that we also show signs of slippage among a group of middle income economies that are classified by the World Economic Forum as making transition from resource dependency towards development that is based more on factors related to efficiency and productivity. Due to their similarities, these economies are close competitors in the global export market and in attracting foreign direct investment. They face similar global challenges, and have a similar set of policy tools for addressing economic stabilisation and structural reforms on their path to the next level of development. In this group of 24 countries, Botswana features in the top 10 in less than half of the major categories. I need not remind you that Botswana is currently emerging from an economic downturn that has underscored the need to diversify the economy away from the dominant mining sector. The fact is that we cannot afford any more economic performance slippages. Let me highlight some of the key features of the country’s performance. My first observation is that, despite the dramatic headline fall, it is remarkable that little has changed in the period under review. For half of the 12 pillars covered by the index, movement is less than five positions in either direction in the three-year period to 2011/12, which is of relatively little importance when considering a cumulative fall of 24 places; this is the difference between the 2008/09 overall ranking of 56 and that of 2011/12 (rank 80). We can, however, derive confidence in the strength of Botswana’s “public institutions” and “relative sophistication of the financial sector”, both of which remain ranked in the top 50. At the same time, it is a matter of concern that the country continues to make only slow progress in areas such as “innovation” and “business sophistication”, both of which are expected to be key to meeting future developmental objectives. Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that, even when the changes have been significant, they are not all negative. In particular, it is encouraging that there is significant progress in the “goods market efficiency” category, where the rank has improved markedly, from position 93 in 2008 to 68, although it is a deterioration from last year’s rank of 58. This can be seen as a reflection of the early gains from recent initiatives to improve the business climate. Since BIS central bankers’ speeches these reforms remain work-in-progress, we should be able to maintain momentum so that further advances can be anticipated with some degree of confidence. The Report further indicates that the decline in the overall ranking is concentrated in five areas. These are: infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary education, labour market efficiency, and technological readiness. I have decided to focus on only three of these pillars, in part because the lacklustre rankings are glaring for the three-year period to-date. First, “infrastructure”: the steep decline from 52 in 2008/09 to 92 is worrying, especially at a time when government spending in this particular area has been so extensive. Hopefully, this investment will soon bear fruit when the beneficial externalities of upgraded roads and improved electricity supply unfold. Nevertheless, this serves as a timely reminder of the importance of both investment and adequate provision for maintenance. This includes a contribution by both the public and private sectors, and is especially important if we are to overcome the constraints associated with land-locked economies. Second, “macroeconomic environment”: the decline in the ranking is even more pronounced than that of “infrastructure”, from 22 in 2008/09 to 82. I would, however, suggest that this probably exaggerates any underlying deterioration. I have reason to believe that this assessment is driven largely, if not entirely, by recent trends in the fiscal budget which, as you very well know, has registered substantial deficits in recent years, and this is coupled with an accumulation of public debt. We can take comfort in the fact that the Government has initiated a medium-term programme of fiscal consolidation which, all things equal, should help reverse the deficit. Indeed the relatively small decline from last year’s ranking of 74 indicates that this may already be taking effect. It might further be suggested that the way the index is constructed, using annual data rather than period averages, may make it overly sensitive to short term volatility, which is not, in itself, necessarily a sign of deterioration. However, the 2008/09 high ranking of 22 is unlikely to be regained while significant public debt remains outstanding. Indeed the country’s sovereign credit ratings have been experiencing downward pressure for more or less similar reasons, as they can no longer rely on the strength of the government balance sheet. Third, “technological readiness”: the current ranking of 101 compares with 89 of three years ago, which was itself a deterioration from the 2007/08 rank of 71. The slower rate of decline from last year’s 99 (to 101) is clearly related to the importance of internet access and usage, where the country has been lagging behind. The importance of usage cannot be overemphasized; after all, the Government has recently made a significant investment in improving available internet bandwidth, but this has yet to be translated into widespread uptake, especially among households. Finding ways to effectively bridge the digital divide is increasingly recognised as having potential for improving opportunities for low income households. In addition, this is an area which is extremely dynamic and improved rankings can only be maintained by a business environment that facilitates continuous improvement. The rest of the decline in the country’s overall competitiveness is accounted for by the very low and deteriorating rankings in “health and education”, at 112 in 2008/09 and now 120. I will not comment further on this aspect of the rankings, not because I do not attach importance to these issues, but because they are so important as to merit a separate analysis. Distinguished guests: As I approach the end of my remarks, I submit that, overall, the World Economic Forum’s 2011/12 Global Competitiveness Report features large movements in a few categories, and these movements can be associated with specific circumstances at a given point in time and, in some instances, there may already be indications of future improvements. To this end, the headline movement of the overall index could be seen as exaggerated. But I should stress that this should not be taken as an excuse for continued complacency. As it will become clear in the more detailed presentations, the overall assessment portrays a situation characterised by drift and little change. BIS central bankers’ speeches Similar sentiments have emerged from other reports, such as those of the World Bank and more detailed sectoral reviews undertaken by the World Economic Forum. A case can be made that Botswana’s policy tools have become either blunt or outdated or both, compared to those of other countries in its league. For an open economy such as that of Botswana, benchmarking performance against peer countries is an unavoidable imperative. Indeed it must be recognised that increased dynamism of many of these peer countries risks leaving Botswana behind as it may not be easy to catch up. It is, therefore, encouraging that several initiatives are in place to improve the country’s competitiveness going forward. The implementation of the Competition Law that was passed in 2009 and the formation of the Competition Commission will discourage complacency in the private sector. There are also complementary efforts of the Human Resource Development Council and the Labour Market Observatory in improving labour skills. For its part, the Bank of Botswana is reviewing a recent study which proposed further reforms to enhance the efficiency and broaden activities of the financial sector. It is also hoped that the more open and consultative approach, such as that of “Pitso” will result in improvements to respective policies. These developments provide cautious grounds for optimism. But more remains to be done, and this may require the Government to take tough decisions in order to make Botswana genuinely business-friendly. The Global Competitiveness Report also contains a ranking of factors that businesses in each country perceive as most problematic. I have yet to see what this year’s Report has to say on this, but I do not expect any surprises. There is also the question of attitudes, which I have deliberately left unexplored. What I know is that for the last four years at least, the most common concern among Botswana businesses was “poor work ethic in the national labour force”, closely followed, in some cases, by “an inadequately educated workforce”. So it is not hard to see where the main problems lie. But this is not just a matter that affects workers, the education system and policymakers; it is as much a responsibility of supervisors, managers and, ultimately, chief executive officers and corporate boards, to accept that there is a problem, and then set out to redress it. You will readily agree that Government policy can only do so much in such crucial areas. More broadly, I wish to add that a lingering culture of entitlement among businesses, and to some extent individuals too, can further undermine progress. Surely, we can all earn our keep. Directors of Ceremonies, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen: This concludes my remarks. It is now my privilege to declare the World Economic Forum’s 2011/12 Global Competitiveness Report duly launched. I wish you fruitful deliberations at the workshop, and thank you most sincerely for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches
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Remarks by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the launch of the Monetary Policy Statement for 2012, Gaborone, 20 February 2012.
Linah K Mohohlo: Botswana’s Monetary Policy Statement for 2012 Remarks by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the launch of the Monetary Policy Statement for 2012, Gaborone, 20 February 2012. * * * I welcome you to the launch of the Monetary Policy Statement for 2012, which is the 15th in a series since the inaugural launch in 1998. The Monetary Policy Statement and its mid-term review are of central importance to the Bank, as they are a vehicle for conveying to stakeholders all pertinent information relating to the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. Those familiar with the contents of past years’ Statements will recall that they contain analysis of recent and prospective economic developments, here at home and abroad, which enable stakeholders to objectively assess the Bank’s policy stance and how such policy is derived from the framework. It also explains the manner in which monetary policy is conducted. This information helps to foster policy credibility; it also helps to anchor public expectations of the Bank’s commitment to maintaining a low, predictable and sustainable level of inflation. Stakeholders then use the information on inflation expectations and other factors in their saving and investment decisions, the choices which are indispensable for sustainable economic growth. Since saving and investment decisions require medium- to long-term perspectives on a broad range of economic factors that include inflation expectations, and the effect of anti-inflation monetary policy also takes a while, the inflation objectives are expected to be achieved over the medium–term horizon. For this morning’s business, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I will highlight the key elements of the Monetary Policy Statement for 2012. These are: the monetary policy framework and objectives; inflation trends; and the conduct of monetary policy in 2011. I will also outline the inflation outlook and the monetary policy stance for this year. The details are in the bound copies of the Monetary Policy Statement, which you will receive at the end of the proceedings. As a prelude to outlining the main contents of the Monetary Policy Statement, I believe it is essential to put it in perspective by briefly restating the key functions of the Bank. Although they are subject to periodic review, the statutory objectives remain unchanged. They include ensuring that commercial and other banks, which are under the regulatory and supervisory purview of the Bank, are sound and well managed. After all, they serve as conduits for payments and transmission of monetary policy. It is also the Bank’s business to ensure that the payments system, a part of which is the effective management of the national currency, is efficient and secure. Capacity in this area is continuously enhanced to respond to broader issues of financial stability, which have become important in the current environment of heightened uncertainty over the health of the global financial system. The Bank also provides both banking services and the lender of last resort facility to commercial banks. Similarly, the Bank is banker to the Government, which it also serves as economic and financial advisor. Furthermore, much of the country’s financial assets is managed by the Bank in the form of foreign exchange reserves. The reserves are invested in international financial and capital markets which, as we speak, are in turmoil due, largely, to the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. This turbulence is compounded by the consequent downgrading of sovereign credit ratings of a number of industrial countries which, hitherto, enjoyed high investment grade ratings. Despite these developments, I wish to reassure you and other stakeholders that the management of reserves will continue to be guided by the Bank’s well established investment policies and guidelines, as periodically reviewed. In this respect, the level of reserves as of the end of January 2012 was approximately 60 billion Pula (or 8 billion USD), BIS central bankers’ speeches which is equivalent to 18 months of imports, an improvement over last year’s 15 months import cover. Speaking of sovereign credit ratings, Botswana’s ratings, as awarded by the two main international sovereign credit rating agencies, Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s, continue to be of the investment grade “A”, and compare favourably with those of other countries in its league. I hasten to add that, despite this good standing, Botswana’s credit ratings remain vulnerable to the vagaries of international financial and capital markets and other global economic factors over which the country has little or no control. On our part, however, it is very important to return to the erstwhile fiscal rectitude and sustainability, enhance productivity and expand the economic base, in order to withstand external shocks. Honoured Guests: I now turn to the subject of Monetary Policy, and wish to suggest that the importance of effectively formulating and implementing monetary policy is well known and self-evident. It goes without saying that a low, predictable and sustainable level of inflation contributes to the attainment of the broader national objective of a stable and sustained economic growth. Price stability also fosters international competitiveness of domestic producers by stabilising the trade-weighted exchange rate (also known as the real effective exchange rate), in conjunction with the crawling of the nominal trade-weighted exchange rate (also referred to as the nominal effective exchange rate). It is gratifying, therefore, that the Bank’s biannual Business Expectations Surveys continue to indicate broad-based support for the inflation objective and the exchange rate regime. In pursuit of price stability, the Bank uses interest rates and open market operations to influence demand and supply conditions in the economy and, ultimately, the rate of price increases. The timing and size of any interest rate change is derived from the monetary policy framework, which incorporates an assessment of prospective domestic and external economic developments that influence price movements. On the basis of the framework, the Bank forecasts inflation in the medium-term; it is this inflation forecast which, in turn, informs the monetary policy response. In this case, monetary policy is adjusted to address a sustained deviation of the medium-term inflation forecast from the medium-term inflation objective range. Even so, a change is undertaken when it is considered that the underlying inflationary factors can be influenced by monetary policy. It is the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank which considers these factors and decides on the direction of monetary policy. As you will have observed, the outcome of the Committee’s deliberations is disseminated through the media to stakeholders, in order to help anchor inflation expectations and buttress policy credibility, which is critical in achieving long-term price stability. Let me now highlight the economic and financial developments of 2011, as background for the policy posture of the period. From a global standpoint, there was upward pressure on inflation in the first half of 2011, particularly in emerging market economies, due to an increase in commodity prices, especially for oil and food products. The increase in the price of oil was worsened by political and social conflict in the Middle East and North Africa. However, inflation slowed down as the year came to an end, due to a slack in global demand and economic activity. The trade-weighted average inflation for Botswana’s trading partner countries increased, from 2.8 percent in 2010 to 4.8 percent at the end of 2011. The SDR countries, which are the United Kingdom, United States of America, Japan and Euro area, experienced a significant increase in prices; the average inflation rose from 1.8 percent in 2010 to 2.9 percent in December 2011. In South Africa, headline inflation increased markedly, from 3.5 percent in December 2010 to 6.1 percent by the end of 2011, slightly breaching the upper end of the medium-term target range of 3 – 6 percent. This was attributable, in large part, to an increase in the price of food. BIS central bankers’ speeches As anticipated in last year’s Monetary Policy Statement, domestic inflation was above the medium-term objective range of 3 – 6 percent throughout 2011, due mainly to higher food prices. Other causes of rampant inflation included the increase in administered prices for fuel, public transport and electricity. Inflation then rose from 7.4 percent in December 2010 to 8.5 percent in the first quarter of 2011, as a result of the increase in private school fees and petrol prices. After easing slightly to 7.9 percent in June 2011 following the reduction of telephone tariffs, inflation resumed its upward trend and reached 9.2 percent at the end of last year, in response to the upward adjustment of fuel prices and transport fares, as well as the increase in the cost of food, health services and household durables. All measures of inflation went up last year. When administered prices are excluded, inflation rose, although at a slower rate, from 7.1 percent in December 2010 to 7.5 percent by year-end; similarly, the trimmed (16 percent) mean measure of core inflation increased from 7.7 percent to 8.5 percent. The effect of demand on inflation was limited since economic activity remained below long-term levels. Furthermore, the modest public service salary increase of September 2011 meant that household demand remained constrained. In addition, government expenditure growth was similarly tight with a view to balancing the budget by fiscal year 2012/13, the objective of which has been more than attained in view of the budgeted small surplus. Nevertheless, faster credit expansion helped to stabilise aggregate demand. For instance, bank lending to businesses increased by 41 percent last year, compared to only 11.3 percent the previous year; and credit to households rose by 15.8 percent in 2011, which is higher than the 12.5 percent growth rate of the previous year. Overall, the annual growth in private sector credit more than doubled in 2011, from 11.9 percent to 26.4 percent. Besides the domestic and external inflation environment of 2011, monetary policy was conducted against the background of global economic instability and uncertainty, to which I referred earlier. Oil prices were volatile, the Euro area sovereign debt crisis worsened and this created turmoil in major financial markets, which brought about fears of renewed banking crisis. Most industrial economies experienced persistent high levels of unemployment which, together with fiscal restraint, constrained demand. Moreover, supply disruptions caused by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan in March 2011 also adversely affected global production. Overall, and despite higher output growth rates in emerging economies, global growth was dampened and the trend was economic slowdown in the second half of the year. Although global inflation went up in 2011, it did not present a medium-term threat to the need for monetary policy to address the slowing economic activity; neither did it present a threat to the need to address persistent high unemployment and idle capacity in major economies. As a result, most developed countries’ central banks, including the United States Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of England, maintained low policy interest rates throughout 2011. This was complemented by other measures such as adding liquidity to the banking system, which is referred to as quantitative easing. Towards the end of the year, the European Central Bank reversed the earlier increase in interest rates and also introduced quantitative easing, in an effort to stabilise financial markets. Similarly, some emerging market economies (notably those of Brazil and China) that had earlier increased interest rates also loosened monetary policy by year-end. India was the exception in this respect, as monetary policy was tightened. Here at home, the conduct of monetary policy was guided by a positive medium-term inflation outlook that reflected a low level of domestic demand and benign external influence on inflation. In the circumstances, the Bank Rate was maintained at 9.5 percent in 2011. The commercial banks’ prime lending rate was also unchanged at 11 percent. However, the Bank implemented two measures. First, the primary reserve requirement for commercial banks was increased from 6.5 percent to 10 percent with effect from July 2011, in order to reduce the amount of liquidity that is absorbed by Bank of Botswana Certificates. BIS central bankers’ speeches Second, four months later in November 2011, the maximum issuance of Bank of Botswana Certificates to absorb excess liquidity was limited to P10 billion. The reduction of Bank of Botswana Certificates issuance is intended to encourage banks to actively seek and finance bankable projects that would contribute towards economic diversification; it would undoubtedly also contribute to their bottom lines. Distinguished Guests: It follows that the outlook for domestic inflation is predicated on expectations of slower global output growth. Indeed as the impact of the Euro area sovereign debt crisis worsened, the forecast for global output for 2012 was reduced from 3.8 percent to 3.3 percent. Furthermore, despite recent encouraging indicators, the pace of economic recovery in the US continues to be constrained by failure to agree on the necessary fiscal policy measures. In contrast, economic activity in emerging market economies is expected to remain buoyant, particularly in China and India, although these countries’ economies are also vulnerable to any major global economic slowdown. The forecast overall slow global economic expansion clouds prospects for trade; it also reduces the threat of inflation in emerging market economies, and dampens the impact of an increase in commodity and food prices. Therefore, although there are underlying inflation pressures in emerging market countries due to relatively buoyant economic activity, overall global inflation is projected to decline from 4.6 percent in 2011 to 3.4 percent in 2012. As a result, monetary policy is expected to be generally accommodative in these countries. With respect to SDR countries, inflation is forecast to decline from 2.9 percent in 2011 to 1.8 percent this year. In South Africa, headline inflation is projected to increase only slightly, from about 5 percent in 2011 to 5.8 percent. All in all, it is expected that the effect of external price developments on domestic inflation will be negligible. Given that the Bank’s medium-term inflation objective range is still 3 – 6 percent, and the forecast average inflation range for trading partner countries is 3 – 5 percent, it follows that the nominal effective exchange rate will crawl down only minimally in 2012, in order to stabilise the real effective exchange rate. This will continue to support international competitiveness of domestic industries, as a contribution to economic diversification. Moderate output expansion is projected for the domestic economy, with non–mining output remaining below potential. Mining production is expected to be maintained at current levels, although this is subject to sustained global demand. There are expectations that, in the course of the year, some new mining ventures could commence operations and, if that were to be the case, there would be a boost to total mining output. However, non-mining sector performance could be weighed down by the limited domestic fiscal stimulus, as nominal government expenditure is only budgeted to increase marginally (0.1 percent) in 2012/13 and nominal personal incomes will continue to be sluggish. This outlook was also reflected in the fall in business confidence indicated in the recent (September 2011) Business Expectations Survey. Although pressures on inflation arising from domestic demand are expected to be limited and the impact of foreign price developments are likely to be minimal this year, prices could go up due to an increase in the international cost of food that would exceed current projections. Inflation may also rise in the event of any substantial upward adjustment in administered prices and government levies. In this respect, I wish to state the obvious, and that is, while the reasons for increasing utility tariffs are understandable, large adjustments increase inflation which, in turn, erodes living standards and well-being of households. It is for this reason that service providers are encouraged to make every effort to contain costs by enhancing efficiency, in order to minimise the adverse impact on consumers. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen: BIS central bankers’ speeches So far as the monetary policy stance for 2012 is concerned, domestic inflation is forecast to remain above the medium-term objective range in the short-term, as the impact of the recent cost increase tapers off gradually. However, it is anticipated that inflation will converge to the medium-term objective range of 3 – 6 percent in the second half of 2012, due to the dampening effect of underlying domestic and international economic prospects. Therefore, the prospects for a low, predictable and sustainable inflation in the medium-term will give rise to the conditions that would permit a counter-cyclical accommodative monetary policy, which would cushion the contractionary impact of restrained fiscal policy on economic activity. It should be stressed, however, that, in order to avoid an entrenchment of persistently high inflation, the Bank’s monetary policy stance will continue to be guided by the extent to which short-term price developments generate medium-term inflation expectations. More generally, and as expected, the Bank will respond in a timely manner to any sustained deviation of the medium-term inflation forecast from the medium-term inflation objective range of 3 – 6 percent, without undermining the much needed sustainable economic growth. Honourable Minister of Finance and Development Planning and your Cabinet Colleagues, Honourable Members of Parliament, Your Excellencies Members of the Diplomatic Corps, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, this concludes my submission of the Monetary Policy Statement for 2012. I thank you most sincerely for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches
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Speech by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the Gala Dinner of the SWIFT 2013 Africa Regional Conference, Gaborone, 22 May 2013.
Linah K Mohohlo: The role of information technology in domestic economic development and regional integration – opportunities and related challenges Speech by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the Gala Dinner of the SWIFT 2013 Africa Regional Conference, Gaborone, 22 May 2013. * * * On behalf of the Board and all staff of the Bank, I would like to welcome you, not only to Gaborone and to Botswana, but to this Gala Dinner as well, an event at which we need to relax, mingle and get to know each other less formally. In his opening remarks yesterday, the Honourable Minister highlighted the importance of this Conference to the development and economic integration process of Africa. Taking cue from this, you have since deliberated on several issues that are fundamental to these developments, which include payments systems, financial inclusion, cross-border payments, as well as information and communication technology (ICT). This evening, I will share with you some observations on the subject of “The Role of Information Technology in Economic Development and Regional Integration: Opportunities and Related Challenges”. By now, you can hardly have failed to notice the impact of the continuing ICT revolution in transforming the daily lives of most people: both rich and poor, young and old. Contrary to widely-held expectations, ICT has proved to be an effective agent for narrowing, not widening, the digital divide. But the sheer dynamism of this revolution brings not only evolving opportunities, but also challenges, particularly perhaps for traditionally conservative bodies such as central banks. It is now clear that ICT-driven financial transactions can be the impetus for the next stage of domestic socio-economic development and should, therefore, be fully harnessed in promoting regional economic integration. It goes without saying that, if the benefits of ICT are to be realised, members of the public, financial sectors of respective countries and all stakeholders must be fully on board; they need to embrace its use and ensure that it is not subverted or abused. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen: The path to regional and, ultimately, continental economic development and integration is complex; it requires purposeful and resolute determination, the preconditions of which include meaningful economic integration, harmonisation of fiscal and monetary policies and convergence of banking policies and systems. With respect to the last of these, you will agree that coordination in harnessing the potential of ICT-based financial transactions infrastructure is critical for progress in driving forward the process of development and integration. Many in Africa share a common experience of inadequate infrastructure, whether it be for transport, communication, or making payments. Until we are personally inconvenienced, it is easy to forget the problems this can cause. But we need to change the current situation where, in far too many respects, the continent remains more directly linked with developed countries than with its constituent nations. It is not unusual to have better flight connections between African countries by first going to Europe. Indeed, not so long ago, intra-continental telephone communications were routed through London, Paris, Madrid or Lisbon. I am reminded of the observation made yesterday at the first plenary session that to a large extent, the priority of domestic rail and road infrastructure is outward linkages to seaports, rather than to neighbouring countries. Some rivers marking national boundaries still have no bridges; and to all of this must be added the problems caused by visa applications, customs controls and overly zealous officials manning our borders. BIS central bankers’ speeches Evidently, the bottlenecks are further compounded by weak, or even non-existent, direct cross-border payments infrastructure between countries. In fact, as already pointed out, it is quicker to effect payments to Europe, North America and other developed markets than across borders within Africa. This is either because, the impressive recent growth of panAfrican banking groups notwithstanding, many of our banks and financial institutions are mostly of European or North American parentage; or it is due to better technological linkages with the developed world. It is pleasing, however, that efforts to redress this infrastructure deficit are at last gathering much-needed momentum, whether it be through established institutions such as the African Development Bank, institutions-in-waiting such as the proposed BRICS development bank, or through funding by way of private capital markets. Furthermore, advances in ICT abound across the continent, with levels of connectivity heading steadily, rapidly even, in the right direction. Indeed, ICT is key to social and economic connectivity, as it renders payments more efficient and cheaper at all levels: domestic, regional, Pan-African and global. This is of particular benefit in the African context where banks continue to be spread thinly across people’s settlements, particularly in rural areas. In this case, cellular phone networks are enabling previously excluded segments of society to access basic financial services, mainly through money transfer facilities, but increasingly through other features associated with traditional banking. In Botswana, we are making discernable progress (although we can increase the pace); we are in the process of modernising the payments system. We have now electronically automated the Clearing House, and this has reduced the cheque clearing period to only a few days. The objective is to reduce the clearing period further to one day when the cheque imaging and truncation technology is in place. Furthermore, large value payments (that is, those in excess of half a million Pula) are made electronically, in this way benefiting government and large corporations, given improved speed and security, as the risk of fraud is reduced. The Real Time Gross Settlement system has also been in operation for a good number of years (at least 7 years). A platform of Visa International called Visanet provides a national net settlement service for all participating banks. Internet banking, using a desktop computer, is complimented by mobile phone transactions for paying utility bills, money transfers and managing bank accounts. Many pensioners and beneficiaries of government social security programmes are able to access their entitlements through smart card technology that is operated by local shops and businesses, irrespective of their place of abode. As a result of these ICT-driven infrastructure improvements, people located in areas far away from developed parts of the country now have access to financial services. The time saved in long distance travel to go to banks and/or pay bills is significant. More broadly, the much needed financial inclusion is being facilitated by affording and extending basic services of money transfer, payments and safe- keeping to those living in all but the most remote communities. This is most important in our society where the extended family remains of central importance. It is particularly gratifying for those of us with long enough memories to recall the effort that was previously required to effect even the most basic transaction from such locations. Cross-border payments have also been facilitated. In the SADC region, the payments integration project is well underway, and the SADC Integration Regional Electronic Settlement System (SIRESS for short) is expected to be commissioned later this year. Just as for infrastructure for domestic financial transactions, the prerequisite for effective cross-border payment systems is that they must be safe and secure. To echo the sentiments made by the Honourable Minister yesterday, this means an effective legal and regulatory framework is indispensible in each jurisdiction, in order to satisfy the much needed legal legitimacy of electronic signatures, as well as other identification and evidential information. BIS central bankers’ speeches I trust SWIFT would want to be associated with these developments (advanced ones and those not so advanced). It is important that Africa receives, from SWIFT, the much needed support so the continent is able to leap-frog into transactions that no longer depend on faceto-face exchanges of cash, particularly in view of the limited bank branch network. Given my vantage point, I have observed that the reaction of governments and central banks to the rapid spread and increase in usage of electronic financial services, particularly through cellular phones, has been mixed. There are those who wish to push for across-the-board regulation, and others who favour a more selective, or “light-touch”, approach in order not to be seen to discourage innovation of new platforms and business models. The emerging view is that any regulation, oversight and supervision should focus on each specific service, rather than adopt a one-size-fits-all approach. In other words, a bouquet of oversight regulatory and supervisory instruments will need to be selectively and judiciously brought to bear on ICT-based financial services. Indeed, there are elements to which commercial law and consumer protection regulations should apply; while those that are potentially of systemic importance to the financial sector will fall under the prudential ambit and appear on the supervisory radar. In view of the evolving nature of technology and its application, it is imperative that establishing the appropriate balance between vigilance, adaptation and learning through experience is the order of the day. Needless to say, central banks play a key role in selecting the appropriate colours and scents for this bouquet; what is critical is to learn to be adaptable and, if necessary, creative, without losing sight of the core responsibilities. Honoured Guests: I conclude by acknowledging our collective indebtedness to SWIFT and technology solution companies for playing their part in researching and developing technology and its software, in the best interests of enhancing the development and expansion of the financial sector. In turn, this smooths trade relations by expediting cross-border payments, thus enhancing regional and continental economic integration. Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen: This brings me to the end of my remarks. I wish you fruitful deliberations of what is left of your daunting programme. I also wish you a safe return home. I hope you will take with you pleasant memories of your brief stay in Gaborone. Better still I hope you are seriously considering the Honourable Minister’s invitation to familiarise yourselves with our city and its surroundings. For those able to spare a little time, please visit at least one of the unique tourist attractions for which the country is renowned. As the brand goes: Botswana is our pride; please make it your destination. Please enjoy the dinner and the rest of the evening. I thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches
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Keynote speech by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the official launch of Bank of India (Botswana) Limited, Gaborone, 9 August 2013.
Linah K Mohohlo: Developing and diversifying Botswana’s banking sector Keynote speech by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the official launch of Bank of India (Botswana) Limited, Gaborone, 9 August 2013. * * * I would like to thank the Managing Director of the Bank of India, Mr Mishra, together with the Board and Management of Bank of India (Botswana) Limited for inviting me to launch the opening of the bank’s subsidiary in Botswana. I wish to recognise the presence of His Excellency, the High Commissioner of India to Botswana, Mr Chandra, and extend a warm welcome to Botswana to two distinguished guests from India, the Chairperson and Managing Director of the bank, Mrs Viyalakshmi Iyer, and the Head of the bank’s International Division, Mr Narayanan. I can assure you that the Bank of Botswana, and significant others in the country, couldn’t be more grateful that you chose Botswana as the preferred destination for your business expansion. You are, therefore, warmly welcome to Botswana’s banking sector, which has come a long way from the 1950s when there were only two banks in the country. The country is now home to 13 licensed banks from which we deservedly expect to have an even more diversified banking product range and improved service delivery. I now know that the new bank is a wholly owned subsidiary of Bank of India, which is headquartered back home in India. The parent bank was incorporated in 1906 in Mumbai (India) and is majority-owned by the Government of India. It is a well-established international banking group with over 4 000 branches in India and 52 operations in 20 other countries. Botswana is now home to the 53rd overseas centre of the bank. The many years of accumulated experience of the parent bank puts the Botswana subsidiary at an advantage from which to leverage the managerial, operational and technical expertise. The subsidiary bank should also have at its disposal the technological infrastructure and financial resources of the parent bank. It, therefore, comes as no surprise that the Bank of India (Botswana) Limited, intends to provide a full range of commercial banking services that will cater for all sectors of the economy, with particular focus on the Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) and the mining sector. As we are all aware, SMMEs play a critical role in contributing to economic growth, employment generation and poverty reduction, especially in developing economies; Botswana is no exception. Indeed it is these small enterprises which ultimately grow into big businesses which, in Botswana’s case, would be a welcome development for the economic diversification drive. As a way of making effective inroads into the competitive business environment, the new bank is advised to attract and employ qualified citizen staff, in order to tap into their knowledge of the local market and business contacts. It is also important that your staff should be trained and exposed to relevant work processes on an ongoing basis. I can assure you that the fruits of investing in human capital will be as bountiful as they are elsewhere in the competitive parts of the globe. As all banks in Botswana are constantly reminded, the success or otherwise of any institution is reflective of the quality of its personnel. As a matter of fact, relative competitiveness of the parent Bank of India is testimony to the fact that India’s financial institutions have some of the most highly trained and competent experts, a large number of whom work at institutions of note internationally. Similarly, it is hoped that the enlightened competent, efficient and effective staff of the Bank of India in Botswana, including the local Board, will be given the space to exercise and discharge their respective responsibilities in an appropriate manner. They should have the necessary authority to make independent judgments on adjusting business strategies and BIS central bankers’ speeches operations in line with local market conditions and national aspirations. In other words, the local oversight responsibilities should not be undermined or weakened. While the parent bank has the overall responsibility for major strategic and policy decisions affecting the group, it is crucial that, within this hierarchical structure, important business decisions relating to the day-to-day operations of a subsidiary bank are made and tailored to the needs of Botswana. Routine referrals for decision-making to the regional office or headquarters can only undermine the subsidiary’s course. Unnecessary referrals could also have the potential to deny the bank the opportunity to make timely and proactive business decisions that could grow the bank’s operations and ensure that it is able to compete favourably in the local market. In this connection, you should be able to take advantage of the relocation of some functions of the Diamond Trading Centre International from London to Gaborone, in the fullness of time, as this will generate downstream business activities associated with the beneficiation of rough diamonds. As indicated in your bank’s business agenda, it is Botswana’s expectation that you will have an important role in contributing to the national policy on economic diversification, by supporting the diamond and related business ventures. Honoured Guests, the entry of another bank in the Botswana’s financial sector can only heighten expectations of better and cost effective service delivery as the sector responds to the needs of the economy. We are, however, aware that the realisation of this goal still faces some challenges. To begin with, and as eloquently highlighted by His Honour the Vice President earlier this week, there is public concern (some would say outcry) about bank charges that are out of sync with the quality of service. The insidious effect of these high charges is that they impede progress towards financial inclusion; they also discourage saving and the all-important activity of financial intermediation. This is against the backdrop of research which has shown that, in Sub-Saharan Africa, 27 percent of men and 22 percent of women have access to financial services; this includes bank accounts, credit and insurance. These very low financial inclusion ratios are less than half of those of developed countries, where 92 percent of men and 87 percent of women have access to financial services. I trust that the entry of the Bank of India into the country’s banking sector will contribute positively to the country’s efforts to enhance access to financial services by all segments of the population. Please allow me to sing from the same hymn book with His Honour the Vice President again, when he expressed the expectation that, as primary operators of the payments system, banks need to put in place modern banking and payments technologies to enhance the efficiency and timeliness of the clearing and settlement systems. The Bank of Botswana is confident that the entry of the Bank of India (Botswana) Limited to the Botswana clearing system, will provide the added impetus to the Cheque Imaging and Truncation project, the objective of which is, among others, to reduce the cheque clearance cycle. Time is of the essence in this respect. Furthermore, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, you will agree that it’s about time the country had a well-developed and functioning interbank market which would provide an enabling environment for funds of any quantum to flow between and among banks on the one hand, and their customers on other hand; and at the same time lending a hand to the monetary policy transmission mechanism. So far, the Bank of Botswana efforts of fostering the development of an efficient inter-bank market have not yet borne desirable fruit. These efforts are frustrated, in part, by the conduct of some major banks which discriminate against other licensed commercial banks for no apparent sound reasons. This unjustified conduct does not distinguish between inter-bank and other forms of lending activities. It is also anti-competitive and constitutes unwarranted BIS central bankers’ speeches discriminatory practice. All banks in Botswana will know that time is not on our side in this respect too. The practice must be nipped in the bud. The banking sector also faces the challenge of imperfections in attracting long-term funds from institutional investors. There are cases where these market imperfections have resulted in financial deals for long-term deposit placements at great cost to some banking institutions, mainly because related contracts contain terms and conditions that are patently unfair and asymmetrical. Invariably, this practice unduly raises the cost of banking services to customers in general. The Bank of Botswana expects to work with all interested parties, if need be, to rid the market of such near unethical business conduct. Not all is lost, however; it is encouraging that, in some quarters, discernible improvements are evident in containing the level of bank charges. There is also progress in the direction of diversification of banking products on offer. I hasten to add that the concern about the exorbitant charges should not be construed to mean that bank profitability is frowned upon. On the contrary; the Bank of Botswana and the country take pride in having a profitable, well capitalised and regulated banking sector which operates in a safe and sound environment, even in the face of the ravages of the global financial crisis and economic recession in some parts of the world. Indeed the sector can still be relatively profitable within the strictures of prudential standards on safe and responsible lending, without having to unnecessarily impose high charges for the services rendered. Honoured guests, you will recall that one of the major lessons from the recent global financial crisis is that unsound banking systems and imprudent credit underwriting standards can undermine macroeconomic stability. It is very important, therefore, that we need to guard our own banking sector jealously and vigilantly so that it can continue to be healthy, sound and well run, and ultimately develop into one of the engines of sustainable economic growth and development for the country. Speaking of the need for prudent banking, I wish to stress the importance of banks continuing to play a proactive role in preventing opportunities for financial fraud and other forms of crime that can only tarnish the integrity and reputation of the country’s financial sector. Among other initiatives, banks must ensure that their internal control environment is up to standard and effective; for example, compliance with “Know-Your-Customer” (KYC) requirements must be up to date. Indeed, Botswana banks have vested interest in ensuring effective compliance with both the spirit and principles of the global standards on anti-money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Director of Ceremonies, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, as I come to the end of my remarks, I wish to reiterate my commendation of the Board, management and staff of Bank of India for bringing additional banking services and facilities to Botswana. I invite the bank and its personnel to settle in well and relatively quickly, and make your presence felt in the Botswana banking sector; in which case, it would not be unreasonable to expect expansion of the bank’s operations to other parts of the country sooner rather than later. Please rest assured of the Bank of Botswana’s support, at all times, in more ways than one, including through regulation and supervision. I know I am speaking to the converted as I remind you of the merits of maintaining cordial working relations with relevant organs of the banking sector, particularly the regulator. It does make life easier. Your Excellency, the High Commissioner of India to Botswana, honoured guests, distinguished ladies and gentlemen; this concludes my remarks. It is now my distinct privilege and honour to declare the Bank of India’s presence in Botswana officially launched. I thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches
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Welcome remarks by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the official launch of the new coin, Gaborone, 27 February 2014.
Linah K Mohohlo: Official launch of new Botswana coins Welcome remarks by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the official launch of the new coin, Gaborone, 27 February 2014. * * * On behalf of the Board and staff of the Bank, I welcome you, Sir, Your Excellency The President and all invited guests, first, to the Bank’s impressive premises; second, and more fittingly, to this event, the proceedings of which will culminate in the official launch of the new family of Botswana coin. I wish to acknowledge the presence of Your Lordship the Chief Justice Rre Dibotelo, and Your Excellency the former President, Sir Ketumile. The Honourable Minister of Finance and Development Planning, Rre Matambo, and your Honourable Cabinet Colleagues, the Honourable Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, Members of the Diplomatic Corps, Chief Executive Officers of banks and other financial institutions, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen – your presence too is acknowledged. Your Excellency, as and when we have the opportunity to host you in the Bank’s premises, as is the case this morning, we feel distinctively honoured. It is all the more so when we are privileged to host you on this particularly special day, February 27. Happy birthday Your Excellency, and many happy returns. I take pride in paving the way for you, Sir, to launch the new family of coin and declare them legal tender in Botswana, so that they can be available for public use in daily transactions. Indeed, the public and business community are anxiously looking forward to the new coins. I have only a few remarks to make before I make way for appropriate officiation. In line with international best practice, the Bank embarked on a comprehensive review of the denominations, composition, form and design of the country’s currency some years back. Once the Honourable Minister of Finance and Development Planning had given the go ahead, in line with the relevant Section of the Bank of Botswana Act (Section 24 (2)), the first step of this exercise involved a renewal of all banknotes in 2009, which resulted in the issuance of the Pula banknotes currently in circulation. Now we have a new set of coin, soon to be launched, the make-up and denomination of which I leave for His Excellency The President to speak to. In fact, Your Excellency’s input and guidance in this respect, have been invaluable. Since the launch of the family of banknotes in 2009, currency in circulation has increased by 35 percent. This is attributable mainly to the P200 banknote, which is an indication of its popularity. In fact, by the end of 2013, the P200 banknote accounted for approximately 60 percent of all the paper money in circulation. As a related matter, the management of all currency is now conducted on these premises called the Cash Management Centre. This facility assures efficient handling and delivery of quality service to commercial banks, and generally enhances efficiency in the national cash management cycle. Although banknotes and coin continue to be a major medium of exchange in Botswana, non-cash transactions, especially electronic transfers, have gained considerable ground. The result is that the average monthly cheque payments have declined by over 50 percent to about P3 billion in the five years to 2013. In the same period, congestion at banking halls for cash withdrawal has been eased, due to the increasing number and usage of Automated Teller Machines (ATMs). Equally important, the value of average monthly ATM withdrawals has increased by about 50 percent to P1.3 billion. BIS central bankers’ speeches In the not-too-distant future, the efficiency of the national payments system will be enhanced by the introduction of the cheque imaging and truncation system, which will reduce the cheque clearing cycle. Furthermore, both the Accountant General’s Office and the Botswana Unified Revenue Service will be connected to the Bank of Botswana through the electronic Botswana Interbank Settlement System. This will greatly improve the speed, security and efficiency of government payment transactions, as well as those of the Botswana Unified Revenue Service. Director of Ceremonies, Distinguished Guests: There is one last piece of noteworthy information obtained from institutional memory that I would like to share with you. That is, since Botswana withdrew from the Rand Monetary Area and introduced its own currency in 1976, it is the first time that a sitting President will, by the end of this ceremony, have coincidentally presided over the renewal of all of the country’s banknotes and coin. Congratulations are in order, Sir. Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen: It is now my pleasant duty and honour to invite you to the podium, Sir, Your Excellency The President, so you could deliver your address and ultimately launch the country’s new family of coin, and, at the same time, declare the new coin legal tender in Botswana. Your Excellency, Sir. BIS central bankers’ speeches
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Remarks by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the launch of the Monetary Policy Statement for 2014, Gaborone, 28 February 2014.
Linah K Mohohlo: Botswana’s Monetary Policy Statement for 2014 Remarks by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the launch of the Monetary Policy Statement for 2014, Gaborone, 28 February 2014. * * * I wish to welcome you to the launch of the Monetary Policy Statement for 2014, which is by now well-known to be the premier event for the Bank. The Statement informs stakeholders how one of the Bank’s key functions is discharged, and that is the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. The Statement is issued each year because the Bank attaches importance to the need for transparency and accountability in the discharge of this key mandate. That is why your dedicated patronage on this occasion is sincerely valued and appreciated. As has been regularly explained, the principal objective of monetary policy is to achieve sustainable, low and predictable level of inflation and, at the same time, ensuring that the economy is financially stable. This is due to the fact that sustainably low inflation and a conducive financial environment support economic growth by fostering savings and productive investment, while promoting the competitiveness of domestic producers and contributing towards a more equitable income distribution. This is the seventeenth year since the Bank has issued the annual Monetary Policy Statement; and perhaps this year’s Statement is of particular interest. It is the first time that the launch takes place in circumstances in which inflation has been comfortably within the Bank’s medium-term objective range for a sustained period. This outcome has afforded the Bank the scope to ease monetary policy in the course of 2013. I will have more to say about this shortly. While this is, without a doubt, a positive development, it does not suggest a time for complacency with respect to the Bank’s approach to monetary policy. On the contrary, the early weeks of 2014 have reminded us of the considerable uncertainty that continues to surround prospects for the global economy, and the vulnerability of emerging markets to related risks is turning out to be particularly acute. Therefore, the vigilance of the Bank, through the work of the Monetary Policy Committee and supporting structures remains undiminished. As I intimated earlier, one of the core functions of the Bank is conducting monetary policy. Indeed, the framework through which the Bank carries out this function is now widelyknown; you can bear testimony to the fact that any adjustment to policy is communicated to the public immediately after each meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee. The policy framework is forecast-based, with a medium-term outlook that primarily guides the Bank’s response to anticipated movements in inflation, while taking account of prospects for economic growth. Central to the forecast is an assessment of the prevailing gap between long-term trend output and actual output as a leading indicator of inflation. It is recognised that other factors also contribute to inflation. These other factors include foreign inflation, exchange rate movements, changes in domestic administered prices and taxes, as well as expectations of future price movements. Therefore, it is essential that policy credibility is underpinned by rigorous analysis of economic and financial developments, and by an assessment of future trends and associated risks, with a focus on anticipated price changes and their implications for the medium-term inflation outlook. There is also a consideration of relevant indicators of financial stability in the domestic economy. All these considerations will form the basis for the formulation and implementation of monetary policy in 2014. BIS central bankers’ speeches Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen: I now wish to highlight inflation trends and other economic developments of the past year. You may recall that global output growth slowed marginally in 2013, from 3.1 percent in 2012 to an estimated 3 percent, resulting in modest inflationary pressures, as capacity utilisation and high unemployment in major economies persisted. With respect to commodities, international oil prices were stable because of the emergence of new sources of supply and the easing of geopolitical tensions in some oil producing regions. The increase in food prices was also restrained due to ample grain production. Consequently, global inflation decreased from 4 percent in 2012 to 3.8 percent in 2013. Average inflation for Botswana’s trading partner countries declined from 4 percent in 2012 to 3.4 percent last year. The countries the currencies of which comprise the Special Drawing Rights (that is, the United States of America, Eurozone, Japan and the United Kingdom) also experienced a decline in inflation, from an average of 1.9 percent to 1.3 percent in the same period, mostly due to weak economic activity, lower food inflation and the moderation in international oil prices. Price movements in South Africa followed the same trend; they slowed down from 5.7 percent in 2012 to 5.4 percent in 2013, in this way, remaining within the medium-term target range of 3–6 percent. In Botswana, inflation maintained a downward trend too, moving within the Bank’s mediumterm objective range by June 2013. By the end of the year, inflation had declined to 4.1 percent, compared to 7.4 percent in December 2012. In the event, price increases were subdued across a broad range of goods and services, including food. In fact, commodity groups representing about 90 percent of goods and services in the Consumer Price Index basket were within the objective range. Overall, inflation excluding administered prices decreased from 6.8 percent in December 2012 to 4.7 percent in December 2013, while the 16 percent trimmed mean measure of core inflation fell from 7.1 percent to 4 percent. The sustained decline in inflation was due to a dissipation of the impact of the increase in administered prices effected in 2012. The moderate increase in prices was also indicative of benign domestic demand pressures. The impact of government spending on economic activity was small in the context of fiscal consolidation measures, with annual government expenditure growth limited to only 2 percent. To some extent, demand was supported by continued growth in commercial bank credit, especially to households, which went up at a faster rate, from 21 percent in December 2012 to 24.2 percent by the end of 2013. It was observed that growth in household credit was led by mortgage lending, which grew by 43.3 percent. The continued rapid expansion in household credit also reflected, in part, some improvements in financial services provision and financial inclusion. Nevertheless, the level of household debt, which is dominated by personal loans, in an environment of slow growth in incomes, is a cause for concern. While current indicators, such as low default ratios, suggest that widespread default risks are not imminent, the related emerging debt repayment burden for households warrants close attention. In contrast, there was a marked deceleration in the growth of business credit, from 26.8 percent in December 2012 to only 4.6 percent in December 2013. The slowdown in the growth of business credit is reflected in virtually all economic sectors, and is in line with the moderation of growth in economic activity. For instance, the annual growth in non-mining GDP slowed to 5.1 percent in the twelve months to September 2013, compared to 8 percent a year earlier. Honoured Guests: Implementation of monetary policy in the past year posed an interesting challenge. From a global perspective, there was sluggish demand, weak economic activity, lacklustre financial intermediation and benign inflationary pressures. All the same, there was positive sentiment BIS central bankers’ speeches flowing from faster output growth and decreasing unemployment rates in the United States of America and United Kingdom; the euro area too emerged from recession. Output expansion in emerging market economies remained robust and spurred global economic performance. Monetary policy in major economies carried the burden of supporting economic recovery as fiscal austerity programmes remained in place. It was mostly accommodative and involved maintenance and, in some instances, reduction of the already low policy interest rates. Some of the major central banks used forward guidance to indicate thresholds for unemployment and growth; this was adopted with a view to guiding market interest rates in the medium term and to foster investment and demand. In contrast, the more imminent threat of rising inflation in emerging market economies resulted in some policy tightening. Here at home, monetary policy was conducted principally through open market operations to absorb excess liquidity from the banking system and maintain market interest rates at required levels. The Monetary Policy Committee continued to assess the impact of economic and financial developments on inflation prospects. The effect of credit growth on the quality of banks’ assets, the growing burden of household debt and the potential for asset price bubbles were also kept under review. The result was the reduction of the Bank Rate by a cumulative 2 percentage points to 7.5 percent during the year, against the background of, among others, below-trend GDP growth and a positive outlook for inflation in the medium term. Accordingly, commercial banks reduced their prime lending interest rates by the same magnitude to 9 percent, with corresponding movements in most other market interest rates. As a related matter, and in a bid to reward depositors, commercial banks have been advised to publish and offer to customers their 91-day deposit products. These products pay an interest rate that is, at a minimum, 3.5 percentage points below the Bank Rate. Longer dated deposits are expected to attract commensurately higher interest rates. In terms of the outlook for inflation, the global economy is projected to grow by 3.7 percent in 2014. This compares with the estimated growth of 3 percent for 2013. The recent upward revision to the forecast reflects improving sentiment for global economic prospects. There are some risks to the forecast, however, which relate to a potential reversal of capital flows that could follow the ongoing wind-down of asset purchases in the United States of America. This could undermine growth prospects for emerging market economies, which have been a major source of global economic growth. Global inflation is projected to maintain the 2013 level of 3.8 percent. This is against the background of stable commodity prices, subdued output growth and persistence of spare capacity, as well as high unemployment rates in major economies. There may, however, be upward pressure on inflation in some emerging market economies, given robust economic activity and lower unemployment rates. Monetary policy in major economies is expected to focus on maintaining an accommodative stance, providing liquidity and fostering resilience of the financial sector. In contrast, emerging economies are likely to have a bias towards policy tightening, in response to emerging global risks of capital outflows to industrialised economies, and the need to focus on structural weaknesses of their respective domestic economies. The domestic economy is forecast to grow by 5.1 percent in 2014, compared to last year’s GDP growth of 5.4 percent. Demand will be supported by the growth in government expenditure, for which budgetary allocations for the 2014/15 fiscal year have increased by 8.5 percent, with the bulk of the additional spending concentrated in the recurrent budget. Business confidence remains muted, but the recent successful transfer of diamond aggregation and sales functions from the De Beers London office to Botswana should serve to boost domestic economic activity. On the exchange rate front, I wish to submit that the crawling band exchange rate policy has continued to serve the purpose for which it was established, which is to render domestic industries internationally competitive and contribute towards macroeconomic stability and BIS central bankers’ speeches economic diversification. You will, by now, know that the parameters of the exchange rate policy were recently made public by the Honourable Minister of Finance and Development Planning. Indeed for 2014, the Pula basket weights are 55 percent for the South African rand and 45 percent for the Special Drawing Rights. The Pula will crawl downward by 0.16 percent, given that the inflation objective range of 3–6 percent is marginally higher than the projected average inflation range of trading partner countries of 3–4 percent. Overall, it is expected that pressure on inflation from domestic demand will be low in 2014, as will the impact of foreign price developments. Therefore, inflation is projected to remain within the medium-term objective range of 3–6 percent. This means there will be further scope for monetary policy to support economic activity through the current accommodative policy stance, while maintaining price stability. As usual, the Bank will respond appropriately to any sustained deviation of the inflation forecast from the objective range and to any emerging threat to financial stability, where the causal factors can be influenced by monetary policy action. Be that as it may, any upward adjustment in administered prices and government levies or any increase in international food and oil prices beyond current forecasts will present upside risks to the inflation outlook. Furthermore, any substantial civil service wage increase could also generate inflationary pressures through higher demand and inflation expectations. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen: I conclude by reiterating that the domestic economy is expected to be characterised by an environment of benign inflationary developments in 2014. The Bank’s formulation and implementation of monetary policy will focus on entrenching expectations of low and sustainable inflation in the medium term, through timely responses to price developments, while ensuring that credit and other market developments are consistent with lasting financial stability. I thank you for your attention. Copies of the detailed Monetary Policy Statement are in the foyer of the Auditorium; please obtain a copy so you can read it at your leisure. BIS central bankers’ speeches
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Speech by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the press briefing on banks' liquidity condition, Gaborone, 26 March 2015.
Linah K Mohohlo: Liquidity conditions in Botswana banks Speech by Ms Linah K Mohohlo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the press briefing on banks’ liquidity condition, Gaborone, 26 March 2015. * * * I welcome you to this press briefing, the purpose of which is to provide clarity on liquidity at commercial banks. This is in response to some recent articles in the local media which suggest that, among others, banks in Botswana are in financial difficulties and their customers face a “credit crunch”. The Bank of Botswana welcomes informed reporting of topical banking/financial issues and, in this spirit, has endeavoured to provide timely and informative responses to questionnaires received on the matter. As you will be aware, I took advantage of the National Business Conference in Maun in November last year and addressed the issue of commercial bank liquidity in some detail. Given continued interest on the subject, we have considered that a further engagement with the media is advisable. I will share with you salient points on this important matter and respond to questions thereafter. I would like to underscore an important fact, and that is, the banking sector in Botswana is sound and profitable. Profitability has of course declined as expenses increased faster than income, and the situation varies from bank to bank. In the 12 months period to January 2015, the aggregate industry balance sheet grew healthily by 11 percent, with deposits growing by 7 percent and credit growing by 13 percent. A tightening of bank liquidity has been evident. What is key is that all banks continue to comply with the necessary requirements such as the statutory liquid asset requirements. Recent economic and market developments have had no adverse impact on levels of capital in the banking industry, with the aggregate Capital Adequacy Ratio at 19 percent as at January 2015, and above the prudential limit of 15 percent. In the past five years, excess liquidity in the banking system, as represented by outstanding Bank of Botswana Certificates (BoBCs), has declined from P17.7 billion as at end-2010 to P4.6 billion in February 2015. The main cause was the Bank of Botswana’s phased reduction of the excess money that is continuously mopped by way of auctioning of BoBCs. The cap for this excess money is currently P5 billion and it was put in place to encourage productive lending by banks as well as to moderate the cost of mopping up excess liquidity. In turn, this resulted in a period of rapid credit growth by commercial banks, compared to a slower increase in deposits; thus resulting in a sharp increase in the intermediation ratio, which is simply a ratio of bank loans to deposits. This ratio increased from 53.1 percent at the end of 2010 to 87.6 percent in a period of four years to the end of 2014. In essence, funds previously held in BoBCs have been diverted to loans by banks and more than doubled – growing by 104.3 percent, from P22.1 billion in December 2010 to P45.2 billion in January 2015. These funds have been effectively absorbed by the economy, to the benefit of businesses and households. Deposits increased at a slower pace of 31.7 percent from P40.4 billion to P53.2 billion in the same four-year period. The slower growth in deposits is possibly due to, among others, sluggish growth in incomes, inadequate financial inclusion, more streamlined procedures for government funding of parastatals and very low interest rates paid by banks on deposits. As funds available for lending become exhausted, it is inevitable that credit expansion would slow down. However, credit has continued to grow at a robust pace, as evidenced by the January 2015 annual growth rate of 13 percent, which is higher than nominal economic growth. In situations of tighter liquidity, banks tend to tighten lending criteria, while taking BIS central bankers’ speeches measures to boost deposits. Even then, current developments do not suggest that new lending will cease completely, as growth in deposits remains positive. It is indeed imperative that banks undertake measures to attract deposits, and focus on productive use of more limited funds available for lending. More emphasis on deposit mobilisation and improved financial inclusion would be steps in the right direction towards a more mature banking sector. There are also complementary measures that the Bank of Botswana stands ready to undertake in support of banks as they review their operations in an environment of reduced liquidity. These include a reduction of the Primary Reserve Requirement and enhanced access to Bank of Botswana lending facilities. It is with this in mind that I wish to take this opportunity to inform you and, through you, all stakeholders that the Bank of Botswana has decided to reduce the Primary Reserve Requirement for banks from the current 10 percent to 5 percent, with effect from April 1, 2015. This will release a total of P2.3 billion to augment the banks’ loanable funds. Thank you for your attention. BIS central bankers’ speeches
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Christmas message by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the Staff Christmas Party, Gaborone, 16 December 2016.
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Speech by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the launch of the 2017 Monetary Policy Statement, Gaborone, 27 February 2017.
BANK OF BOTSWANA 2017 MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT by Moses D Pelaelo Governor February 27, 2017 Introduction It is indeed a great pleasure and honour to welcome all of you, on behalf of the Board, management and staff of the Bank, to the launch of the 2017 Monetary Policy Statement. This is an important and priority occasion in the annual calendar of events for the Bank. We are therefore most grateful to all of you, Distinguished Guests, for gracing the occasion with your presence this morning. The launch and dissemination of the Monetary Policy Statement is consistent with the key governance imperatives of transparency and accountability in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. The Statement seeks to promote an understanding of the conduct of monetary policy and its objectives and, accordingly, guide the public’s formation of expectations. It is on this occasion, that the Bank reports on inflation trajectory and policy performance as articulated in the previous year’s Statement; outline and convey the Bank’s perspective on economic and other policy developments; and, in turn, how the Bank intends to respond and implement monetary policy. Esteemed Guests, I would like to start with recognition of the immense contribution of the past leadership of the Bank in the design and shaping of the current monetary policy framework, and in particular, my predecessor, former Governor, Ms Linah Mohohlo. She presided over important innovations that helped engender policy credibility and performance in meeting the inflation objective as well as fostering effectiveness and stability of the banking system. As you would be aware, inflation in Botswana has been, since June 2013, either within or below the desired objective range. This is the single most important contribution to demand management and macroeconomic stability that you can ask of your Central Bank. Indeed, the Bank’s primary statutory mandate is to maintain price stability. Along with this mandate, the Bank is responsible for promotion of a safe and sound financial system as well as efficient payments infrastructure. Price stability, which is defined as low, stable and predictable level of inflation, fosters mobilisation of savings, productive investment, prudent allocation of credit and international competitiveness of domestic firms. In turn, a sound and stable financial system is potentially more effective in policy transmission and facilitating economic activity through the provision of liquidity and risk mitigation. Therefore, Honourable Minister, let me reaffirm that the Bank’s mandate is aligned to, and supports, the national objective of sustainable economic growth. Improvement to the Monetary Policy Framework Distinguished Guests, I will now mention some of the important elements of the evolution of the monetary policy framework, over the past two decades. First, is the clarity and definition of the inflation objective performance and horizon. identification Second, of the development medium-term of supporting infrastructure and internal capacity to operate the forecasting and policy analysis system that guides monetary policy decisions. Third, the Bank formalised the institutional arrangements, in the form of a Monetary Policy Committee whose regular meetings are followed by a Press Release, as well as publication of the Annual Monetary Policy Statement and Mid-Term Review. In addition, changes in the exchange rate policy framework also helped enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy. In particular, the adoption of the crawling band exchange rate framework since 2005 and, later, public disclosure of the weights of the constituent currencies in the Pula basket as well as the rate of crawl, has supported the Bank’s focus on the inflation objective. This transparency in the management of the exchange rate helps to anchor policy credibility and predictability and, therefore, informs expectations and economic decisions. As the Bank continues to focus on refining and making improvements, it has been the intention to enhance transparency and interaction with the market, as circumstances would be propitious, with a view to further buttressing policy transmission and credibility. In this regard, the Bank will, henceforth, pre3 announce the dates for the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meetings for the ensuing half year; and, convene a Media Briefing following each meeting of the MPC to announce the policy decision. I hasten to add, Distinguished Guests, that these initiatives are premised on availability, and should be a catalyst for development, of an appropriate market infrastructure and expertise, such as informed and robust market analysis and strong financial journalism, as well as organised debt and credit markets. Honourable Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, my message today also addresses three other areas. First, I will briefly examine global trends that have influenced inflation in Botswana; second, I will highlight the conduct of monetary policy, both internationally and here at home; and, finally, I will provide the medium-term inflation outlook and, consequently, the likely policy stance. External Economic Developments Looking back, it is estimated that global output growth was 3.1 percent in 2016, compared to 3.2 percent in 2015, and weaker than the projection of 3.4 percent early in the year. The lower growth rate resulted from subdued economic activity in both advanced and emerging market economies, while low commodity prices continued to weigh down on economic performance in commodity exporting countries. International oil prices, however, recovered during 2016, partly in response to the agreement by major producers to reduce production; therefore, potentially generating upward pressure on inflation. Following a generalised decrease in the previous two years, global food prices also increased in 2016. Due to these factors, global inflation increased slightly from 2.8 percent in 2015 to 2.9 percent in 2016, but much lower than the forecast of 3.4 percent at the beginning of the year. As regards Botswana’s trading partner countries, inflation remained low in the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) countries (comprising the United States of America, euro zone, China, Japan and the United Kingdom). Average inflation for these countries increased from 0.7 percent to 1.7 percent in the same period. In contrast, inflation in South Africa breached the upper end of the target range, peaking at 6.8 percent, mainly because of weakness of the South African rand and food price pressures. Overall, average inflation for the trading partner countries increased from 2.8 percent to 4.2 percent during 2016. Domestic Inflation In Botswana, inflation was low and stable, and fluctuated around the lower end of the desired objective range of 3 percent, hence broadly consistent with projections for the year. Inflation reached a record low of 2.6 percent in August 2016. The low rate of annual price increase was generalised across most categories of goods and services. However, food price inflation increased from 0.7 percent in 2015 to 3.9 percent in 2016. Also, the reduction of 3.3 percent in fuel prices in 2016 was small compared to a 15.7 percent decrease in the prior year. In addition to benign external price developments, modest inflation in Botswana was also indicative of subdued domestic demand, against the background of sluggish economic activity and restrained growth in personal incomes. Among the influences on domestic demand are growth in government expenditure, wages and credit. Taking these three elements in turn, government expenditure increased by 9.7 percent in 2016, virtually the same rate of expansion as in the previous year. It should be recognised, in this respect, that the short-term impact of government spending on domestic demand is moderated to the extent that a significant component involves infrastructure and capacity development. In the context of Botswana, this type of spending tends to be import intensive and, also, the economic benefits of such public investments are derived in the medium to long term. Turning to wage developments, it is notable that government recurrent expenditure included a 3 percent salary increase for the public service, which, as a matter of practice, guided parastatal and private sector wage adjustments. Thus, in 2016, wages increased, generally, by 5.2 percent, therefore, with a modest impact on demand and inflation. On credit developments, growth in commercial bank credit fell from 7.1 percent in 2015 to 6.2 percent in 2016 in the context of subdued economic activity and restrained growth in personal incomes, which influenced both the demand and supply side. The Bank also recognises challenges in the transmission of the prevailing policy rates to lower lending interest rates. The challenges relate partly to structural issues, such as uncertainty about sustainability of funding sources and associated balance sheet restructuring as well as tighter lending criteria by banks. Against this background, the annual expansion in lending to households fell from 12.8 percent to 7.6 percent and included lower growth for personal loans and mortgages. In contrast, growth in business credit increased to 4.2 percent, from a contraction of 0.3 percent in 2015, but with varying performance across sectors. Overall, the moderate increase in bank lending supports economic activity and it is broadly consistent with growth of nominal GDP. Monetary Policy Implementation in 2016 Honourable Minister and Esteemed Guests: Monetary policy was predominantly accommodative in advanced economies, with low levels of interest rates; in some instances, interest rates are negative, while liquidity support to the financial sector was maintained. In this regard, notable developments include the reduction of interest rates in the United Kingdom aimed at mitigating the adverse impact of the decision to leave the European Union (Brexit) and the second increase in interest rates in the United States of America since 2008, given progress in attaining full employment and price stability. For emerging market economies, the direction of policy changes was mixed, invariably reflecting differing macroeconomic circumstances. Closer to home, the South African Reserve Bank increased the policy rate by 75 basis points to 7 percent during 2016 in order to anchor inflation expectations around the country’s target range of 3 – 6 percent. Domestic Monetary Policy Implementation For its part, the Bank continues to conduct monetary policy through a forecast-based policy framework that informs the appropriate response to deviations of inflation from the desired objective range. The analysis also involves assessment of divergence of actual output (GDP) from potential output (technically known as the “output gap”), which is the primary indicator of the direction of future inflation. The forecast incorporates projections of foreign inflation, exchange rate movements and changes in domestic administered prices and taxes. In addition, the Bank undertakes a careful evaluation of risks associated with the projected outlook. In determining the appropriate policy response, the inflation forecast is considered alongside indicators of financial stability and economic activity, including relevant information from the Business Expectations Survey conducted biannually by the Bank. Monetary policy during 2016 was conducted in an environment of below-trend economic activity and a positive medium-term inflation outlook, providing scope for policy easing. Indeed, the Bank Rate was reduced further by half a percentage point to 5.5 percent in August. Accordingly, commercial banks also reduced the prime lending rate by half a percentage point to 7 percent. Nevertheless, there was a build-up of excess liquidity in the banking system as commercial bank credit expansion slowed relative to the increase in deposits. Monetary policy was implemented with a view to encourage productive commercial bank lending and market efficiency, as well as ensuring costeffective absorption of excess liquidity in the banking system, through a limited issuance of Bank of Botswana Certificates (BoBCs). This was balanced with the need to keep money market interest rates aligned with the monetary policy stance, a consideration that allowed for some flexibility in the issuance of BoBCs. Honoured Guests, as in the previous years, monetary policy was also implemented in a way that safeguards the stability of the financial system. Notably, the slower household credit growth was in line with modest increase in personal incomes, while the restrained expansion in mortgage lending was also consistent with a weaker residential property market. In this respect, the ratio of non-performing loans to total credit was modest at just under 5 percent. Overall, the banking system satisfied, and in most cases, significantly exceeded the minimum prudential requirements, which is indicative of a generally healthy, sound and stable financial system. Economic Outlook and Projections Now looking ahead, the global economy is expected to grow by 3.4 percent in 2017. The projected improvement is premised on anticipated stronger emerging market economies, including a recovery from recession in Brazil and Russia. In advanced economies, growth is expected to be supported by relatively low oil prices, improving labour markets and possible fiscal stimulus in the United States of America. Nonetheless, global economic performance is subject to uncertainty of the policy environment associated with the potential for inward-looking and protectionist trade policies as well as geopolitical tensions. Other downside risks emanate from persistence of tight financing conditions in some key markets and subdued commodity prices. Global inflation is forecast to be 3.3 percent in 2017 as advanced economies reflate to achieve the desired targets and as the effect of the earlier decrease in energy prices dissipates. In emerging market economies, inflation is expected to moderate as the effect of previous currency depreciation tapers off in 2017. In this environment, it is anticipated that monetary policy will remain accommodative in most economies, complemented by measures aimed at facilitating effective financial intermediation and fostering resilience of the financial sector to support economic activity. Domestic Economy As the Honourable Minister indicated in the 2017/18 Budget Speech, the domestic economy is forecast to grow by 4.2 percent, an improvement from the estimated 2.9 percent for 2016. Furthermore, the budgeted 6.5 percent expansion in government spending, in 2017/18, should continue to be supportive of domestic demand. Government spending comprises elements that generate both short-term growth supporting demand and expansion of productive capacity which, potentially, should sustain future growth prospects. The exchange rate policy will continue to complement the monetary policy framework and it augurs well for maintenance of international competitiveness of domestic industries and macroeconomic stability. As announced at the beginning of the year and consistent with Botswana’s trade pattern, the weights of the constituent currencies in the Pula basket were adjusted from 50 percent each to 45 percent for the South African rand and 55 percent for the SDR. Also, effective January 1 this year, the Bank is implementing a modest upward rate of crawl of 0.26 percent for the nominal effective exchange rate, lower than the 0.38 percent in 2016. The upward crawl reflects the achievement in maintaining domestic inflation at a rate lower than the average for the trading partner countries. Overall, both external and domestic pressures on inflation are expected to be benign, and it is projected that inflation will remain within the 3 – 6 percent objective range in the medium-term, although, in the near-term, it is expected to rise modestly. This forecast takes into account possible increase in some administered prices, the impact of which, however, is not expected to result in short-term inflation over-shooting the upper boundary of the objective range of 3 – 6 percent. Having said so, it is worth underscoring the point that any upward adjustment in these prices that is substantially beyond current projections presents upside risks to the inflation outlook. In contrast, downside risks to inflation arise from the expected restrained growth in global economic activity and the tendency of technological progress to result in lower prices as well as a possible decline in commodity prices. Conclusion and Monetary Policy Stance Distinguished Guests, as I conclude my remarks, I would like to restate that current projections, based on available data, suggest that inflation in Botswana will, in the medium-term, remain within the Bank’s objective range of 3 – 6 percent. This positive medium-term outlook for inflation is in the context of anticipated higher GDP growth in 2017 and a sound and stable financial system. Therefore, prospective developments augur well for maintenance of an accommodative monetary policy that supports productive lending to businesses and households. The Bank’s implementation of monetary policy will continue to focus on entrenching expectations of low, predictable and sustainable inflation, through timely responses to price developments; while, at the same time, taking due care to ensure that policy decisions are consistent with enduring financial stability and supportive of sustainable economic growth. Honourable Minister and Distinguished Guests, it is important to note that the continuing success in containing inflation within the desired 3 – 6 percent medium-term inflation objective, to which the Bank remains fully committed, must, in the end, involve the cooperation of all key players in the economy, namely, Government, parastatals and the private sector, for the good of the country as a whole. Let me also take this opportunity to remind the Media about the scheduled Press Briefing, to be held tomorrow morning at 1130 in the Bank, after the first MPC meeting of the year. The Briefing will cover both this Monetary Policy Statement and announcement of the Monetary Policy Committee decision. Honourable Minister, Distinguished Guests; I thank you for your kind attention.
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Keynote address by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the 25th anniversary gala dinner of Stanbic Bank Botswana Limited, Gaborone, 23 March 2017.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS AT THE 25th ANNIVERSARY GALA DINNER OF STANBIC BANK BOTSWANA LIMITED by Moses D Pelaelo Governor March 23, 2017 It is an honour and, indeed, I am most grateful to the Board and Management of Stanbic Bank Botswana Limited for the invitation to officiate at this Gala Dinner, celebrating “25 Years of Stanbic Bank Moving Forward”. This event marks a significant milestone in the history of the bank in Botswana, more so coming shortly after the commemoration of the Bank of Botswana’s 40th Anniversary on March 31, 2016 and the 50th Anniversary of our country’s Independence, on September 30, 2016. Distinguished guests, allow me to start by thanking, in particular, Standard Bank Group Chief Executive, Mr Sim Tshabalala; Chairman of the Board of Stanbic Bank Botswana Limited, Mr Craig Granville; Chief Executive, Mr Leina Gabaraane, and the entire management and staff of Stanbic Bank for ensuring that we are here, today, celebrating the Silver Jubilee of Stanbic Bank Botswana Limited. The efficiency, effectiveness and safe conduct of banking operations cannot and ought not be taken for granted because, as many would know, banks are accident-prone entities. It is for this reason that the Board, Management and Staff of the Bank of Botswana congratulate you, Mr Gabaraane, your Board and the entire team, for the many achievements of your bank to this day and, thus far, having conducted the affairs of the bank in a prudent, sound and sustainable manner. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, the first part of my remarks this evening will highlight the accomplishments of Stanbic Bank Botswana Limited over the last 25 years in the areas of governance, financial performance, innovation and corporate social responsibility. Thereafter, I will offer a few perspectives on expectations relating to banking sector regulatory compliance and the role of banks in policy implementation. The entry of Stanbic Bank into the Botswana financial sector should be placed in the context of the major financial sector reforms undertaken in the early 1990s. These reforms were informed by the report entitled “Botswana - Financial Policies for Diversified Growth”, derived from a study by Government with the assistance of the World Bank. The key elements of these reforms included deregulation of interest rates, adoption and use of indirect instruments of monetary policy, introduction of the Bank of Botswana Certificates to influence liquidity in the banking system and manage short-term interest rates, liberalisation of banking licensing requirements to spur competition in the financial sector and enhanced prudential supervision of banks. Hitherto, there were only three commercial banks operating in Botswana. In 1991, two additional commercial banks were licensed, namely, ANZ Grindlays Botswana Limited and Zimbank Botswana Limited. A year later, in 1992, the Bank of Botswana granted UnionBank Botswana Limited, a subsidiary of Standard Bank of South Africa, a banking licence, making it the sixth licensed commercial bank in the country. Shortly thereafter, in the same year, UnionBank merged with ANZ Grindlays, each with an initial capital of P10 million, to form the bank we know today as Stanbic Bank Botswana Limited. Director of Ceremonies, today, 25 years on, Stanbic Bank is ranked 4th among the 10 commercial banks operating in the country, in terms of staffing, branch network, capital and deposit liabilities. From a modest beginning, with only 24 employees in 1993, Stanbic Bank currently employs over 600 staff members across 10 branches, and serves in excess of 80 000 retail and business customers. The bank asset base has grown significantly, from P138 million in 1993 to P12 billion as at December 31, 2016. During the same period, the bank has also consistently made profits; with its net income after tax increasing from P2.2 million in 1993 to P192 million in 2016. At present, Stanbic Bank is regarded as one of the systemically important domestic banks operating in Botswana, with a 15 percent market share of total banking industry assets and deposits. Distinguished Guests, Stanbic Bank offers a wide range of traditional and innovative corporate, retail and investment products and services including, more recently, like some of its peers, the introduction of on-line and mobile banking services. I have no doubt that these technology-based platforms, products and services will enable Stanbic Bank to continue to be a significant player in the industry and broader economy, as well as adapt to the emergence of financial technology (Fintech) operators for the benefit of customers and the economy at large. Somewhat uniquely, while embracing technology-based banking, Stanbic Bank continues to reinforce its position in corporate and investment banking. Amongst other Awards in the recent past, it was named the best investment bank in Botswana in the 2016 Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) Finance African Banking Awards. Congratulations, once again. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, another highlight is the evolution of leadership and governance at Stanbic Bank. Notably, the Chief Executive position was localised in 2008 with the appointment of Mr Gabaraane, while the majority of the bank’s Board members (six out of 10) and 80 percent of the senior management staff of the bank are citizens. These are significant developments in two respects: first, they reflect the attention given to staff development and enhancement of relevant skills across the spectrum of banking operations; and, second, the alignment of leadership, management and operational processes to the local context, in order to better serve the domestic economy. I can confidently state that, based on the latest statutory returns submitted monthly and quarterly to the Bank of Botswana, the bank is solvent, profitable, well governed and prudently run, in the main, by Batswana. Director of Ceremonies, in the area of corporate social responsibility, Stanbic Bank has a long-standing relationship with the Cheshire Foundation; it donated therapeutic equipment to the Rehabilitation Centres; mosquito nets to the Ministry of Health to fight malaria; and a mobile clinic for the Shakawe community and surrounding areas. I am informed that the bank also supports vulnerable groups, such as orphans and underprivileged children, through various initiatives, including a partnership with SOS Children’s Village, St Peters Day Care Centre, Metsimotlhabe Recreational Centre and Kagisano Women’s Shelter, as well as promoting culture, arts, health and wellness. Distinguished Guests, there is, however, one missing part of this good story, namely that, unlike its peers, Stanbic Bank is not listed on the Botswana Stock Exchange. To be clear, the Bank of Botswana does not prescribe that the shares of banks operating in Botswana be listed on the domestic stock exchange. This is consistent with accepted best practice and governance norms that the Board and Management of individual firms should be allowed to determine the appropriate capital structure and economic capital management for a bank, subject, of course, to meeting the minimum thresholds for prudential regulatory capital adequacy requirements. That said, the non-existence of Stanbic Bank on the domestic bourse could be misinterpreted to mean lack of long-term commitment and willingness to have the Botswana public participate in the ownership of the bank. This point assumes particular significance in the context of a country where all the 10 licensed commercial banks are subsidiaries of foreign-owned entities. Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, Stanbic Bank is a wholly owned subsidiary of Standard Bank Group, the largest PanAfrican banking group by assets amounting R1.95 trillion; equivalent to approximately P1.6 trillion or 154.5 billion US dollars. Therefore, Stanbic Bank Botswana is supported by a strong parent and a well-recognised franchise, regionally and globally. presents both opportunities and challenges. As This regards opportunities, the Standard Bank Group is a Pan-African bank that also has significant representation in other international markets. This places the Group in an advantageous position to fill the gap that may be left by some of the global banks as they decide to move out from certain markets, a process euphemistically referred to as “regulatory deconsolidation” or “global de-risking” and, in certain cases, withdrawal of correspondent banking services, for a variety of reasons. In contrast to such disengagement, as we witnessed recently, Stanbic Bank played a leading role in the syndicated facility for the financing of the Morupule Power Station project. I hasten to add that, as an internationally active financial conglomerate, with appropriate risk management and governance structures, resources and expertise, Standard Bank Group is well positioned to support regional businesses and infrastructure projects through the provision of long-term finance. Distinguished Guests, this leads me to my second sub-theme; and I wish to offer some thoughts on ‘Moving Forward’ in the next 25 years and beyond, with a special focus on the Bank of Botswana’s expectations regarding Stanbic Bank and other banks from a policy and regulatory perspective. The global, regional and domestic economies are projected to grow modestly in the years ahead, constrained by a number of factors, including policy uncertainty, change of growth models in China, low commodity prices, slowdown in global trade and potential event risks emanating, especially, from the Brexit negotiation process and some European countries electoral outcomes in 2017. Distinguished Guests, notwithstanding the foregoing, the agenda for transformation of Botswana’s economy, from a resource-based to a well-diversified economy, supported by good public infrastructure, a sound macroeconomic environment and a vibrant financial sector, must continue. As indicated in the 2012 - 2016 Botswana Financial Sector Development Strategy, “a healthy and vibrant financial sector is crucial for the future of Botswana. Financial institutions and markets safeguard savings, provide the financing required for a growing private sector, and make an important and growing direct contribution to employment and economic growth”. It is in this context that the presence of Stanbic Bank and its parent bank, Standard Bank Group, in banking, insurance and other forms of financial services in Botswana becomes critically important. Distinguished Guests, banks are, by definition, risk traders and, invariably, should be compensated for taking such risks. However, in the context of economies, such as Botswana, there is a tendency for some large banking groups to engage in some form of “cherrypicking” of best corporates and wealthy customers for credit support to the exclusion of SMMEs, non-salaried persons, low income groups and other underserved segments of society. In order to continue to contribute positively to sustainable economic development, the Botswana banking system should be more inclusive. Banks ought to invest more in risk management infrastructure (staff and systems) to be able to tap into new resources and opportunities, including identifying and funding bankable projects originating from low-income groups and small enterprises, and, I must add, in a safe and prudent manner. In the long-term, failure to do so could marginalise banks, as we know them today, as fintechs and block chain technologies increasingly satisfy the demand for financial services in more innovative and cost-effective ways. According to the World Economic Forum Global Competiveness Report of 2016/17, the Botswana financial sector’s overall ranking is 66 out of 138 countries, representing a slight deterioration from a ranking of 63 in 2015/16. According to the Report, “this is largely due to weak performance in the soundness of banks, (ranked 68), and ease of access to loans, (ranked 69)”; these aspects were ranked and 56, respectively, in the 2015/16 Global Competitiveness Index”. It is also a matter of public policy concern that the ratio of private sector credit to GDP has increased only marginally, from 25 percent in 2011 to 31.8 percent in 2016. Furthermore, the proportion of mortgage loans to total GDP has been, on average 5.2 percent in the last five years. This compares, for example, with a ratio of 69.3 percent for Norway, 67.6 percent for the United Kingdom and 84.3 percent for Sweden. Overall, therefore, these particular financial indicators for Botswana are below international norms and suggest that it may be true that lack of cost-effective access to appropriate finance and credit is a constraining factor towards a more diversified economy. Distinguished Guests, post the global financial crisis, the Financial Stability Board and other international standards-setting bodies have been spearheading regulatory reforms aimed at enhancing the resilience of banking systems, globally. In this regard, the Bank of Botswana has demonstrated foresight with respect to the minimum prudential capital requirements for banks, which has been set at 15 percent of risk-weighted assets, compared to the international benchmark of 8 percent, since 1997. As some will be aware, effective January 1, 2016, the Bank of Botswana implemented those elements of the revised International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Measurement and Capital Standards, called Basel II, deemed relevant and proportionate to the nature of the risk profile of banks, as well as the structure and the needs of the Botswana economy. Furthermore, the Bank of Botswana is, along with other stakeholders, taking steps to strengthen the framework for banking sector safety nets and system-wide crisis management. This project requires all systemically important domestic banks to develop recovery plans in conjunction with their parent banks. Distinguished Guests, the Bank of Botswana recently issued a guidance note on cybercrime risk, imploring banks to put in place effective risk management systems and maintain sound internal controls, specifically designed to counter the growth of increasingly sophisticated cyber-attacks and other forms of financial crimes. Furthermore, there continues to be a worrisome upward trend of cases of fraud, in the form of identity theft, scanning and cloning of bankcards and unauthorised cash withdrawals from Automated Teller Machines (ATMS) by individuals and organised crime syndicates. Cybercrime, fraud and other forms of criminal activities, including money laundering and the financing of terrorism, impose heavy financial and economic costs on society as banks, customers and regulators have to allocate large amounts of resources on preventive measures. Moreover, these forms of crime have the potential to undermine public confidence and trust in the banking system. Given the nature of these operational risks, there is a need for sound leadership and governance of banks, both individually and on a consolidated basis. For banking regulators and supervisors, these developments call for smarter and more responsive supervisory frameworks, as well as effective collaboration, cooperation and communication across jurisdictions. Distinguished Guests, despite these challenges, banking institutions, such as Standard Bank Group and its subsidiaries, in Botswana and elsewhere, should remain strong, continuously evolving operating environments, agile in decision making and adapting as necessary to provide the much-needed financial resources for economic development and job creation. There is no doubt, in my mind, that technology is the future of banking, particularly in a sparsely populated country such as Botswana. However, weak, ineffective and inappropriate governance and risk management infrastructure may compromise the safe conduct of banking business. You will agree that for a large Pan-African bank, such as Standard Bank Group, any deficiencies, in this regard, could be far reaching, and have an adverse impact on business and economic performance in several countries, including those that are anchors of regional growth. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, as I mentioned recently at the launch of the 2017 Monetary Policy Statement, the Bank of Botswana’s primary objective is to achieve price stability and safeguard the stability of the financial system. I also indicated that a sound and stable financial system is potentially more effective in policy transmission. Put slightly differently, banks in distress, as well as unsound and imprudent behaviour, can undermine transmission of monetary policy signals, macroeconomic stability and economic performance. To be absolutely clear, however, let me note that the Botswana banking system, of which Stanbic Bank is a significant player, complies satisfactorily with the minimum prudential requirements, which is indicative of a generally healthy, sound and stable financial system. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, effective monetary policy transmission is also premised on wider financial inclusion. Therefore, the leadership of the financial sector and policy and regulatory authorities need to continue to work together to broaden financial inclusion, and bring more unbanked enterprises and households into a bankable population. It is only when there is a formal economic relationship between a great majority of businesses and individuals and the banks that changes in interest rates, for example, can affect saving and borrowing decisions on a large scale and, therefore, have the anticipated effect on price developments, economic activity and employment creation. From the Bank of Botswana’s perspective, it is important that the formulation of monetary policy and effective discharge of the central bank’s primary mandate are not constrained by perennial concerns about the health of banks; and, in turn, that banks are not so encumbered by internal weaknesses that they are unable to respond to, and effect, changes in the Bank Rate, that is, implement a policy decision. As I conclude, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish once again, to recognise the role of Stanbic Bank in supporting economic development through involvement in savings mobilisation, prudent lending, provision of payments and risk mitigation, as well as participation in community initiatives in Botswana. Honourable Cabinet Ministers, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish Stanbic Bank prosperity as it moves forward and, together with other players in the financial sector, foster economic activity and wealth creation in Botswana. I thank you for your kind attention.
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Keynote speech by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the official launch of Bank Gaborone Maun branch, Gaborone, 11 September 2017.
OFFICIAL LAUNCH OF BANK GABORONE MAUN BRANCH Keynote Speech by Moses D Pelaelo Governor, Bank of Botsw ana September 11, 2017 Good morning and thank you all for being part of the official opening of the Maun branch of Bank Gaborone. Today marks yet another important milestone in the history of Bank Gaborone in Botsw ana. Last year, on March 22, the bank opened its doors to the residents of Palapye, that w as just tw o years after the opening of the Kang branch (in 2014) in Kgalagadi North, w here, by the w ay, to date, Bank Gaborone is the only bank in that village. It is, therefore, commendable that in a period of three years, Bank Gaborone has added three new branches, to take the total to 9 and 17 Automated Teller Machines (ATMs). This becomes even more significant if w e consider the fact that Bank Gaborone started its operations in Botsw ana in 2006 and, in a relatively short period of 11 years, it has expanded its netw ork of branches, comparable in number to, or even, surpassing some of the older banks in the country. The bank also provides electronic banking services, w hich further extends its coverage and footprint. I should also recognise that , Bank Gaborone employs 261 people, mostly Batsw ana, hence, contributing to the economic and social w ell-being of the employees and their families. Distinguished Guests, w hat I have just said about Bank Gaborone, demonstrates a clear commitment and contribution to Botsw ana’ s financial inclusion agenda. The strategy of expanding the branch netw ork beyond cities, potentially opens up access to banking services to a greater number of individuals and businesses, including small and medium scale enterprises and, indeed, the informal sector. By so doing, Bank Gaborone is adding to the inputs and resources needed to enhance productivity of economic pursuits, and for the community to harness and profit from business opportunities. The extended outreach of financial services being undertaken by Bank Gaborone accords w ell w ith the nation’ s Financial Sector Development St rategy and, ultimately, contributes to the aspiration of inclusive economic grow th. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, as you may be aw are, Bank Gaborone is a member of the Capricorn Group - a financial services group w ith its roots in Namibia, offering banking, insurance and asset management services in Botsw ana, Namibia and Zambia. In Botsw ana, the bank’ s financial position has grow n steadily since commencement of operations, in 2006. Total assets increased from P268 million in June 2007 to P4.6 billion in June 2017; lending increased from P197 million to P3.2 billion in June 2017; w hile deposits grew from P188 million to P3.9 billion in June 2017. The bank has, therefore, in a relatively short period, mobilised approximately P4 billion w orth of financial resources. These resources have been productively employed and distributed, in the form of loans and other credit facilities, to support real economic activity in diverse sectors across Botsw ana, including consumption spending. As a regional bank and being relatively new , it is expected that the bank and its design of products w ill continue to be w ell aligned to contemporary domestic market requirements. Notably, for the area around Maun, this branch of Bank Gaborone is invariably expected to support the various facets and business value chains in the tourism and agricultural sectors associated w ith this region. In this w ay, Bank Gaborone w ould be contribut ing to sustainable economic activity and inclusive grow th in this part of Botsw ana. It is w orth pointing out that the tourism industry, of w hich Maun is a significant player, accounted for 3.9 percent of the country’ s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2016, through industries such as hotels, restaurants, travel agents, airlines and other passenger t ransportation services. The same industries contributed 2.6 percent to total employment in 2016. It is therefore expected that the provision of additional or enhanced financial services, in the form of transactional accounts, savings products, credit ext ension, payments and other banking services offered by Bank Gaborone, as w ell as other players of course, should help sustain the contribution of the tourism sector to GDP. In turn, this should foster economic diversification and broad-based private sector development, both of w hich are critical for endurable economic grow th and raising living standards of our people. To the Maun residents and North West community, in general, w e should recognise that the Maun branch of Bank Gaborone is a business that needs a good and durable customer base in order for it to be profitable and sustainable. Therefore, you are all encouraged to use the branch and, of course, all other licensed banks in your area, to save money and undertake other financial transactions. Similarly, it is my expectation that Bank Gaborone w ill take full advantage of the Botsw ana payments and other public infrastructure, partnership w ith mobile operators and other Electronic Payments Systems, to enhance financial inclusion; and this includes providing the much-needed support for the informal businesses in Botsw ana in general and Maun, in particular. Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, In addition to w hat I have just said, I w ish to implore the Maun community to engage banks w ith viable borrow ing proposals that are sustainable and can yield positive returns. Equally, important, and having obtained loans and other credit facilities, borrow ers should honour their obligations by adhering to the repayment programme agreed w ith banks. Distinguished Guests, I am making this point because the Bank of Botsw ana is concerned about the recent observed upw ard trend in non-performing loans. While this trend could be, in part, due to sluggish global economic activity and idiosyncratic business performance and environment, there is some evidence of lack of financial discipline on the part of some individuals and poor management practices by some businesses. There is also an undesirable creeping culture, on the part of some customers of banks, of failing to repay their obligations to banks according to the agreed schedule. Let me, therefore, take this opportunity to remind you, Distinguished Guests that, in the main, banks in Botsw ana are funded mainly by depositors/savers’ funds. Therefore the Board and management of a bank have a fiduciary duty and responsibility to ensure that the lending and credit underw riting standards are sound; the bank is managed in a safe and prudent manner, to safeguard depositors’ funds and ensure that these borrow ed funds are not lost through uncollectable loans. In this context, I should therefore caution that, w here a borrow er is in default, the bank is entitled to institute law ful, procedural and ethical recovery procedures including attachment and liquidation of property pledged as collateral to recover its money. Moreover, providing for a loss or w riting off a loan in the bank’ s books, as a non-bankable asset, does not extinguish the debt the customer ow es to the bank. In this case, the bank is only being prudent and adhering to sound accounting and international financial reporting standards. defaulting customer continues to be obliged to repay. The In this context, let us alw ays remember that a safe, sound and stable banking system is a necessary condition for sustainable economic development. Director of Ceremonies, Distinguished Guests, I am reliably informed that Bank Gaborone, w hich identifies w ith the mission statement: “ to make banking a rew arding experience for all stakeholders” , has a strong customerfocus orientation that should make it a good business partner. I am also aw are that customers have demonstrated their confidence in the bank’ s service delivery by voting it the “ Best Bank in Customer Care” , during a customer service survey carried out by KPM G in 2013 and 2016. This is commendable and trust that the Maun community w ill soon have a reason to validate these accolades. In terms of Corporate Social Responsibility, Bank Gaborone qualifies to be called a good corporate citizen, as evidenced by its participation in charitable activities, including Financial Literacy Programme, through w hich the bank educates Batsw ana on financial matters. Other Corporate Social Responsibility initiatives include support for youth football development; involvement in the Diabetes Apple Project and Journey of Hope for raising breast cancer aw areness; and sponsoring Lady Khama Charitable Trust, UB Foundation and Kang Primary School. Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to comment on a few other issues of topical interest . First, the status of liquidity in the banking system; one of the key economic functions of a bank is to manage and provide liquidity to firms and other economic entities. As many of you w ill be aw are, liquidity and maturity transformation is the essence of banking. In this regard, banks should ensure that, at all times, they have adequate funds, including contingency funding sources, to meet their financial obligations. These obligations typically include customer w ithdraw als and draw dow n of loan facilities, as w ell as the capacity to accommodate grow th and profit opportunities, such as new credit requirements by their clients. Therefore, liquidity is a critical and integral component of a bank’ s operations, strategy and governance framew ork. Consistent w ith our principal objectives, as the central bank and regulatory authority, namely, “ to promote and maintain monetary mechanism and stability, the an liquidity, efficient solvency payments and proper functioning of a soundly based f inancial system” , the Bank of Botsw ana monitors banks on an ongoing basis to ensure that they continually meet the minimum prudential thresholds, in this case, liquidity ratios; and that there is no constraint to transmission of the monetary policy stance. It is for this reason that , the Bank of Botsw ana stands ready to inject and/or w ithdraw liquidity from the banking system and, also, provide overnight credit facilities to solvent banks, if needed, to meet temporary liquidity shortfalls. These form of support by central banks is common across the w orld, as it is central to the primary objective of “ fostering monetary, credit and financial conditions conducive to the orderly, balanced and sustainable economic development” of the country. As regards the current status and health of the banking system, I can report that banks have sufficient liquidity, totalling approximately P19 billion, inclusive of Bank of Botsw ana Certificates and balances held abroad, both of w hich could be liquidated in case of need, w ith minimal capital loss, to finance any effective and viable demand for credit. How ever, it should be noted that the distribution of liquidity amongst banks w ill vary from time to time. Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, the second issue relates to the conduct of banks in accepting foreign currency international denominated norms, and deposits. as is Consistent the case in w ith many jurisdictions, Botsw ana’ s banking and other law s permit non-residents to open accounts in local banks. I should note here that, similarly, Botsw ana residents do open and operate accounts in other countries, subject to compliance w ith Botsw ana tax and other applicable law s. How ever, there is a legal requirement to declare any cross-border transfers, including cash in any currency equivalent to P10 000 and above. In opening accounts and accepting deposits by foreigners (non-resident accounts), the local banks are doing so in compliance w ith Botsw ana law s. Banks are, how ever, required to consistently undertake effective due diligence, including strict application of the Know Your Customer procedures for any such transactions and/or customers. These include obtaining customer identity documents, residence status, address, business location and sources of income; this is done at account opening and on an ongoing basis. Banks also need to ensure that any cross-border cash deposits and similar inw ard transfers are supported by duly completed and valid documents, w hen processing such transactions. It is also important to indicate that banks have a screening process to ensure that entities and individuals on the International Sanctions Lists do not use the Botsw ana banking system as a conduit for illegal activities and other forms of financial crime. Banks also routinely monitor accounts for suspicious activity and file Suspicious Transactions Reports (STR) w ith the Financial Intelligence Agency. While it is not evidence of illegality, the Report triggers appropriate steps, including follow up action by relevant authorities, such as the Bank of Botsw ana, NonBank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority and other law enforcement agencies. Having said that, I can confirm that both the Financial Intelligence Agency and the Bank of Botsw ana continue to monitor and enforce, in line w ith their respective mandate, local banks' compliance w ith applicable law s, business conduct requirements, as w ell as the Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism protocols. This leads me to the third topical issue, namely, cybercrime and related other financial crimes. Distinguished Guests, technology is the future of banking and many of us w elcome the benefits of new information and communication technologies, in various facets of our lives, including enhanced cost-effective access to financial services and the associated convenience of conducting banking and other transactions. How ever, in as much as these technologies increase efficiencies and bring other economic benefits, the speed, scale and the cost of any fraudulent activity perpetrated through these channels can be enormous, ruining the lives of many and causing major harm to institutions and society, in general. These financial crimes can take many forms including unauthorised cash w ithdraw als from customers’ bank accounts at Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), identity theft, scanning and cloning of bank cards, disruption or compromising business processes, internal fraud and, more broadly, cyber-crime. If not properly mitigated, these crimes can discourage members of entrusting their savings w ith the public from banks and this could undermine public confidence and trust in the banking system. Consequently, w e need to be on guard, as institutions, businesses and individuals to mitigate cybercrime and other forms of financial crime risks. The National Banking Week message by the Bank of Botsw ana, in 2011, articulated the issue w ell as follow s that; “ combating fraud is an on-going shared responsibility by all interested parties; it requires the involvement of the Bank of Botsw ana, banks and the vigilance of members of the public. Vigilance is all the more important as the banking system diversifies and competition intensifies by w ay of new entrants to the market, increased branch netw ork, new products, and progressive globalisation of banking services” . I trust, in closing, that the presence of Bank Gaborone here in Maun, w ill add value to the community and the broader region, by expanding banking services and that there w ill be a mutually rew arding and enduring bank-customer relationship. Mr Coetzee, once again, and through you, I w ould like to thank the Board, Management and staff of Bank Gaborone, for inviting me to be part of this occasion. I w ish Bank Gaborone every success and hope that it w ill continue to grow and expand its services across the country. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, it is now my honour and privilege to declare the Maun Branch of Bank Gaborone officially open. I thank you for your kind attention.
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Keynote speech by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the official opening of First National Bank of Botswana Limited, Mochudi Branch, Mochudi, 19 September 2017.
OFFICIAL OPENING OF FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOTSWANA LIMITED - MOCHUDI BRANCH Keynote Speech by Moses D Pelaelo Governor, Bank of Botswana September 19, 2017 It is with great pleasure that I join you for the official opening of the Mochudi branch of First National Bank of Botswana (FNB). My team and I are particularly delighted because this is the first branch of the bank in the Kgatleng District. This is indeed a positive response to what the Bank of Botswana has been urging all banks to do, specifically to have a physical presence in all major villages of Botswana including Mochudi. I am assured that the branch is well equipped, to the same standard as is the case with other FNB branches, with modern service facilities, most notably platforms that harness the beneficial features of new information and communication technologies. Through the branch facility and electronic platforms for conducting banking business, FNB, and other banks, offer choice and added convenience to customers; this, again is a welcome development. The widening, deepening and modernisation of financial services, and the related facilities fulfil the nation’s Financial Sector Development Strategy and contribute to both financial inclusion and inclusive economic growth. Distinguished Guests, First National Bank of Botswana Limited is a subsidiary and member of the FirstRand Group, which is a South African Johannesburg financial Stock services Group listed Exchange, offering banking, management and insurance services. on the asset The FirstRand Group has a presence in 8 countries in Africa, namely, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland and Tanzania. As at June 30, 2017, the FirstRand Group had assets amounting to R1.15 trillion, with market capitalisation of R251.5 billion. The Group is, therefore, wellendowed to support the domestic and regional resource needs, with respect to a broad range of financial services. These include participation in mobilisation of large-scale finance and funding of businesses, industrial developments and infrastructure projects. It is also well placed to support sustained operation, expansion and further investment in the local subsidiary, to the benefit of the domestic economy. In Botswana, the Group offers a variety of financial services through its three brands, namely, FNB, the retail bank, Wesbank, for financing of moveable assets, notably motor vehicles and finance leases for equipment; and RMB in supporting corporates to access investment banking products and services including working capital and trade finance, private equity and global market services. Since commencement of operations in Botswana in 1991, FNB has grown substantially, initially through the acquisition of Bank of Credit and Commerce Botswana Limited in 1992, Financial Services Company of Botswana Limited in 1993 and Zimbank Botswana Limited in 1994. More recently, in the past five years, FNB has grown organically to be the largest bank in the country. The bank’s total assets increased from P13.9 billion in December 2011 to P23.6 billion in June 2017. In the same period, loans and advances rose from P8.3 billion to P15.6 billion, while deposits grew from P11.8 billion to P18.7 billion. The bank employs a total of 1 269 staff members, most of whom are Batswana; it has a network of 23 branches, 150 cash dispensing Automated Teller Machines, 51 Automated Teller Machines that have deposit taking capabilities, 25 Slimline Automated Teller Machines and 5 600 point of sales machines in retail outlets all over the country. Overall, in the 26 years of existence and operations in the country, FNB has grown in both size and range of products and services offered. With particular reference to this Mochudi branch, located here at the Pilane Crossing Mall, the bank adds to the opportunities for enhancing access to financial services, notably saving channels, providing financial resources to its customers, ease of transacting, convenient payment and related advisory services. The branch potentially extends the support to economic activity in the local community and neighbouring areas, and should serve the needs of local industry, businesses, agricultural pursuits and households, including the informal sector. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, FNB Botswana has embarked on a number of beneficial Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives through the FNB Foundation and its Staff Volunteer Programme. The focus of these initiatives is on education; healthcare; skills development; vocational training; support for disadvantaged and handicapped people; arts and culture development; and sports and recreation. Many of the community projects that the Staff Volunteer Programme supports involve infrastructure upgrades, such as the renovation of nursery schools, classrooms and primary healthcare clinics. I am reliably informed that, here in the Kgatleng District, the FNB Foundation has changed many lives through partnering with Community Development Organisations, such as the Motswedi Rehabilitation Centre, Bakgatla Bolokang Matshelo, Mochudi Resource Centre for the Blind, Stepping Stones, and Pudologong Rehabilitation Centre. Through the Foundation, more than 10 000 pairs of school shoes have been donated to deserving pupils. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, let me turn to some general, but topical financial sector development issues. I recently made reference to a worrisome trend of nonperforming bank loans; a point that, for emphasis, I would like to reiterate here. Non-performing loans, or NPLs, as a proportion of total loans and advances have been on an upward trajectory since 2014; the industry’s NPLs rose from 3.6 percent in December 2014 to 3.9 percent in 2015 and 4.9 percent in December 2016. As at July 31, 2017, the NPLs had increased further to 5.9 percent of total bank loans. The trend is a cause for concern. This is despite the fact that these levels of NPLs are relatively low, by international norms, especially in the context of prudent and sound accounting practices as well as the quality and level of capital in the banking system. Nonetheless, I should emphasise that the concern is not with respect to the level or growth of credit in the economy. In fact, the current Private Sector Credit to GDP, of about 30 percent, is low by international standards, suggesting that there is greater scope for the banking sector to perform better in mobilising resources to support economic activity through credit provision. Broadly, growth in credit that is commensurate with rate of increase in economic activity and incomes should be sustainable. Indeed, affordable credit, when put to good use, is beneficial for economic activity, investment, wealth creation and, ultimately, increase in living standards. The challenge arises when there is high leverage, or over-indebtedness, relative to incomes, and where there is weak financial management. A combination of these factors, as well as subdued economic growth, can undermine the ability to repay bank loans. If left unchecked, unsustainable personal indebtedness not only leads to financial ruin but threatens the safety and soundness of banks and, by extension, depositors’ funds. It is, therefore, critically important to expand financial education and literacy. Distinguished Guests, it is for this reason that the Bank of Botswana and the commercial banks continue to engage in public education on financial matters through various platforms. Furthermore, the Bank of Botswana will continue to emphasise the role of banks and other lenders in the country of instilling financial discipline, as well as promote ‘truth-in-lending” through greater transparency of credit terms and the true cost of borrowing over the life of a loan facility. Furthermore, concerted efforts are required to educate the public, in particular, consumers of financial services with respect to borrowing and debt management. I, therefore, call upon other key stakeholders, including schools, NGOs, trade and credit unions, social clubs, consumer watch dogs and professional counsellors to intensify public education on financial matters. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, on a related matter, please allow me to implore you to be on guard and vigilant with respect to the mushrooming of illegal deposit taking activities in the form of pyramid schemes. I thought it would be appropriate, to use this forum to appeal to Batswana and to you all, Distinguished Guests, that you should neither participate nor peddle any of these “get rich quick” schemes. These can only lead to financial ruin, resulting from loss of hard-earned money and sources of livelihood. I urge you to be suspicious and stay away from anybody offering exceptional returns. The general guide is that, in any country, returns or rate of profit on any investment should be around the general level of interest rates, the growth rate of the economy or the average return of the companies listed on the stock exchange. Anything substantially higher is either too risky to be worthwhile or fraud. As they say, ‘if something sounds too good to be true, it probably is too good to be true’. Unfortunately, even the educated, professionals and people who should be financially literate and, I may add, some in the financial sector, are gullible and do fall prey to these illegal and unfair trading schemes. While it is difficult for the Bank of Botswana to recommend where to look for advice if confronted by a tricky financial investment situation, and you are unsure; you may wish to consider the general guide I have just highlighted. Director of Ceremonies, Distinguished Guests, a formal, sound and well-regulated financial sector is the foundation of effective intermediation, productive use of financial resources and, in turn, reasonable returns for savers and investors. In this respect, successful and sustainable banks are essential for the development of well-functioning money and capital markets. This is particularly so in Botswana where the banking sector is a substantial component of the financial system. Moreover, banks also benefit as deeper and more efficient markets provide alternatives for sources and placement of funds as well as more effective liquidity management. This includes the interbank market, through which banks lend to one another, typically on a short-term basis. In turn, this improves the overall allocation of financial resources, including real returns to depositors and investors, and the channelling of funds to productive use in diverse areas of economic activity. Director of Ceremonies, in this context, it is a matter of public policy concern that money and capital markets in Botswana are in a rudimentary state of development. As a result, there is a limited range of instruments and relatively low turnover and activity in the various markets, more so in relation to instruments for risk-sharing, distribution and mitigation. This tends to result in volatility of both prices and volumes, and limits the choice of instruments necessary for efficient financial and business management. For the banks, in particular, a diverse source of funds that includes a large number of retail depositors and structured long-term funds represents stable funding. This facilitates maturity transformation and support for the range of financial resource requirements of businesses, including infrastructure and utilities projects, as well as households. Regarding the short-term interbank market, it is important that banks, although competitors, operate in a collaborative spirit to address any structural impediments to this lack of development and low efficiency, with a view to improving the flow of liquidity and its management in the banking system. The central bank should only be required to provide or absorb liquidity in the market after mutually beneficial trading opportunities among banks are exhausted. The Bank of Botswana already facilitates such collaboration through industry-wide fora that address issues of mutual concern related to market development in order to foster enhanced and effective support for real economic activity. It is, therefore, important that banks strive for constructive engagement, in this regard, in order to achieve the best outcomes in terms of effective policy transmission and enhanced contribution by the financial system to economic performance. Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, as I conclude, let me thank the Chief Executive Officer, Mr Bogatsu, the Board, Management and staff of FNBB, for inviting me to be part of this occasion. I wish the bank well and look forward to many more invitations for the opening of FNBB delivery channels or yet another “brick and mortar” branch, especially in major villages, such as Mochudi and, of course, the rural areas. To Bakgatla, Dikgosi tsame, Member of Parliament for Mochudi West, District Commissioner, Council Chairman and Council Secretary, Honourable Councillors, the entire district leadership and all Distinguished Guests, in addition to the other banks, there is now a branch of FNB Botswana near you; patronize it; and do not give Mr Bogatsu and his team an excuse to close the branch, shortly after its opening, on account that it is not profitable. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, with those few remarks, it is now my singular honour and privilege to declare the First National Bank of Botswana Mochudi branch, officially open. I thank you for your kind attention.
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Keynote address by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the 7th Annual National Asset Liability Management Africa Conference, Cape Town, 2 November 2017.
7TH ANNUAL NATIONAL ASSET LIABILITY MANAGEMENT AFRICA CONFERENCE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS Keynote Address by Moses D Pelaelo Governor, Bank of Botswana November 2, 2017 Introduction It is indeed an honour and pleasure to have the opportunity to speak to this gathering this morning. I wish to start by thanking the organisers and, in particular, the Chairman, former Deputy Governor at the Bank of Botswana, Mr Oduetse Motshidisi, for the invitation to this Conference held in this beautiful city of Cape Town. As many of you would be aware, while it is true that the primary mandate of any central bank is price stability, Governors have a myriad of responsibilities on a daily basis. Beyond the preoccupation with the core mandate of monetary and financial stability, many central banks, including my own, the Bank of Botswana, have responsibility for the regulation and supervision of the banking sector; promotion of an efficient payments system; currency management; and, also, the management of foreign exchange reserves, as well as the closely related roles of economic and financial adviser to Government. Equally important are considerations such as broader financial sector development issues including financial inclusion, consumer protection and financial literacy. My comments today will reflect these mixed perspectives. This Conference is being held in the shadow of the tenth anniversary of the onset of the Global Financial Crisis and subsequent "Great Recession". Unsurprisingly, the causes and lessons of the Crisis have been a major topic of discussion in recent months. This meeting is, therefore, taking place at possibly the most opportune time in the history of global finance. In the aftermath of this difficult episode, the world should come out the wiser. At its recent meeting in Berlin, Germany, the Financial Stability Board Plenary observed that the international post-crisis policy reform agenda was nearly complete and that, going forward, the priority will be placed on monitoring and publicly reporting on its 24 member jurisdictions’ implementation of the agreed reforms. Similarly, the recently-concluded annual Meetings of the IMF and World Bank Group noted signs of sustained global recovery, albeit not yet complete, with below-target inflation and weak wage growth in several advanced countries, while output growth remains below potential in many cases. At the same time, it is important not to lose sight of some megatrends, in demography and technology, for example, that also have a profound impact on economic developments and, more specifically, global and domestic financial markets. In this regard, I note that 2017 is also the tenth anniversary of the iPhone, and we all know the profound impact of that development. What I wish to emphasise here is not only the importance of technological progress, but also the inherent unpredictability associated with such developments. I am informed that when the iPhone was introduced it was envisaged as little more than a combination of the mobile phone and the iPod, with a camera added. As a reflection of the random path of technological developments, the world of apps on which we increasingly depend was not central to the original concept. Also, among today’s generation of "new ideas", it seems to be the potential impact of blockchain or Distributed Ledger Technology that is attracting most attention. However, as the example of the iPhone demonstrates, the future path of its development is far from clear. The coincidence of these two tenth anniversaries is of particular relevance for global financial markets. The vulnerabilities exposed by the Crisis, and the responses they engendered, must be viewed in the context of dynamic developments in information technology. This is in terms of both emerging opportunities and accompanying threats. Here, Distributed Ledger Tech3 nology is a prominent example, not least because the technology has become intertwined with the controversial issue of cryptocurrencies. This is unfortunate, given that central banks and regulators, rightly in my view, are increasingly circumspect about digital currencies. It would be regrettable, however, if this stifled development of the underlying technology. Distributed Ledger Technology has already demonstrated sufficient potential, albeit still lacking in maturity, as the basis for more secure and efficient payments systems to attract the interest of several central banks. Another matter of serious concern in today’s financial world and markets is cybercrime. Cybercrime is not the focus for this discussion; it is, however, a major challenge of the modern age and should never be far from our thoughts. I would like to take this opportunity to appeal for concerted cooperative and collective action in meeting this challenge. In this respect, it is welcome that more than 70 percent of members of the Financial Stability Board intend to introduce new initiatives to boost cyber security in the coming year. It is to be hoped that others will follow their example. Distinguished Ladies and Gentleman, I now wish to focus my remarks on three broad areas. First, a brief look at the domestic economy of Botswana, including the capacity to generate external foreign exchange reserves. This will highlight the growth of the domestic financial sector and the impact of the global financial crisis on the economy. Second, from the global perspective, I will consider recent developments in financial markets and the associated policy challenges; in particular, the extended period of low yields together with heightened risks, including geopolitical risks. Again, this has major implications for effective asset/liability management. Before concluding, I will give some consideration to the emerging challenges, where the increasingly optimistic outlook for the global economy has encouraged talk of policy "normalisation". The Botswana Economy In the five decades since Independence, in 1966, Botswana’s economy has grown rapidly, from one of the poorest in the world to an upper-middle-income country with a per capita income of approximately seven thousand US dollars. Central to this growth has been relatively strong institutions and governance, healthy fiscal position and external balance sheet, low public debt burden and the prudent management of mineral revenues. From the mid-eighties, persistent twin fiscal and balance of payments surpluses led to rapid growth of foreign exchange reserves that, at their peak, were equivalent to almost three years of import cover. In turn, this allowed the authorities to move relatively quickly to open the economy, includ5 ing the abolition of foreign exchange controls by 1999. Since 2001, both S&P Global Ratings and Moody’s Investors Service have consistently assigned Botswana the highest, investment grade, sovereign ratings in Africa. On October 27, 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed the country’s ratings of A-/A-2 for short- and long-term foreign and domestic-currency denominated debt, while revising the outlook from negative to stable. The revision of the outlook is significant as it reflects expected stable economic growth at a time when many Sub-Saharan African countries face relatively weak growth and shrinking fiscal space. This has been a remarkably resilient development model, in combination with the Government’s consistently prudent approach to fiscal management and sustainable budgeting. However, beginning in the 2000s and, in particular, since the global financial crisis, the twin surpluses have not been so reliable, with recurring fiscal and external deficits. This has implications for the management of the Government’s net asset position, including balancing options for taking on more public debt vis-àvis drawing on the accumulated national savings. The structural transformation of the economy is also an important consideration. In the past, the model whereby foreign exchange reserves were held pending opportunities for their productive deployment in funding public infrastructure was clearly appropriate. But now, with relatively low returns on such investments, the holding of financial reserves as a sustainable source of income for both current and future generations is increasingly important. The financial sector, too, has expanded rapidly, both in size and the range of services. In 2016, the financial and business services sector accounted for 13.6 percent of GDP, dwarfing most other non-mining private sector activity; for example, manufacturing accounted for only 5.2 percent. Over the past ten years, cumulative growth of the financial sector, in real terms, has been almost exactly 100 percent, compared to 52 percent for the economy as a whole. A major driving force in this development has been the rapid growth of the domestic pension fund industry. In the early 2000s, the Government took a decision to effectively privatise a large portion of the foreign exchange reserves through the establishment of a defined contribution pension fund scheme for the public service. Despite its openness, the impact of the global financial crisis on the Botswana economy was relatively mild. The main negative shock was to the mining sector, but the transmission to the rest of the economy was muted, helped by government drawing on its financial savings to maintain public spending. For the financial sector, the predominantly "plain vanilla" characteristics and limited international linkages provided a shield against the worst effects, buttressed further by effective regulation and prudential supervision. There is no room for complacency, however, as the interconnectedness of Africa with global financial markets continues to develop, encouraged by the search for yield and ample market liquidity resulting from an extended period of ultra-loose monetary policy. More generally, for the "Africa Rising" narrative to regain the much-needed momentum requires sustained recovery in global commodities markets. At the same time, increasingly stringent global regulatory requirements, especially on market conduct and financial crimes, notably the anti-money laundering and combatting of the financing of terrorism regimes, have created challenges. In this regard, a number of countries in the region have been subjected to enhanced due diligence by correspondent banks and, in general, negative perceptions among counterparties towards doing business with African banks. In response to the latter, it is clearly necessary for countries to do everything in their power to ensure that the Know Your Customer, and the Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting of the Financing of Terrorism regulations in their jurisdictions are of the highest possible standards. Adoption and effective implementation of such standards is also supportive of development of the regional markets. Developments in Global Markets and Economic Policy Uncertainty The extended low interest rate environment, resulting in meagre returns on international investments, was in large part the consequence of central banks’ use of "unconventional" policies, such as quantitative easing and negative interest rates. But a long-term trend decline in the "neutral" rate of interest that balances economic activity also appears to have contributed. The resulting "search for yield" has driven important developments in the asset management industry. Traditionally conservative funds (including those under the custody of central banks) have had to face up to the need to balance a cautious approach to taking on more risk with moving away from comfort zones based on high-quality fixed income debt instruments and listed equities in liquid major markets. In such circumstances, the traditional guiding mantra of "safety, liquidity, return" needs recalibration in order to retain its operational relevance. It appears that the greatest challenge has been to balance the increasingly positive signs of global economic recovery, with uncertainty driven by geopolitical event risks. It is perhaps tempting to suggest that this has receded somewhat after a series of elections across Europe where the rise of populist parties appeared to have been halted, if not fully rebuffed. This may be too optimistic, however, as indicated by the recent Aus9 trian elections or, perhaps, the unfolding consequences of events in Spain; the direction of Brexit or the Trump administration are also still very much unknown. The cumulative chances of a highly-unpleasant surprise from further “Black Swan” events are surely not negligible. The question would be how do investors position themselves against these risks? Looking more closely at equities markets, in particular in the United States, there could be a legitimate concern that the current optimism is bordering on irrational exuberance shutting out evident political risk. It is of course not difficult to cite plausible reasons why equities markets should be buoyant: earnings growth, good exposure to emerging markets, low bond market yields and the prospects of tax reform, among others. However, on their own, these factors do not seem to justify market valuations where cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratios are at levels that fall short only of the peaks before the dotcom bubble burst in 2000 and the Great Crash in 1929. Interest in the next market crash has been heightened by another recent anniversary: Black Monday, on October 19, 1987. Technological developments over the intervening years are, once again, a key factor and a cause for both concern and comfort. For example, there is uncertainty about how markets increasingly driven by passive funds would respond in times of stress. When investors are increasingly hard-wired into follow10 ing the herd, the risk of herd-mentality sweeping the markets is likely to be amplified. On the other hand, it can be reasonably argued that improved information flows, increased diversity of investors and interconnectedness of global markets will help prevent market drift and misalignment leading to a crash. Overall, we simply do not know the likely balance of risks. In terms of major developments in recent years that impact on financial markets, I cannot fail to note the relentless rise of China, now surely a major global player, and with the power of the current leadership amply demonstrated at the just-ended congress of the ruling Communist Party. Beyond the raw strength of the world’s second largest economy, with its growth still close to 7 percent per annum, China is the technological leader in key emerging fields such as cashless payments. On the other hand, risks remain pronounced, reflecting issues of transparency, the challenging transition to a consumption-led economy based on inclusive growth and its financial system. Its emerging status as both a source of and destination for investment is also well known. But China remains something of an enigma to investors, who must aim to chart a prudent path between the opportunities and challenges. Moreover, with its currency now included in the Special Drawing Rights of the IMF, and as Renminbi assets increasingly gain acceptance as part of mainstream benchmark indices, this is a challenge that is increasingly difficult to avoid. The Emerging Challenges of "Policy" Normalisation As I mentioned earlier, the recent IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings noted improved global growth, spread broadly over both developed and emerging economies, as well as reduced market turbulence. Importantly, growth in world trade has also resumed after a period of stagnation. Moreover, it was pleasing that this optimism was tempered by realism, including warnings of continuing underlying risk from several quarters. Equally important was the call to use this window of opportunity, of the relatively benign prevailing conditions, to "fix the roof", including undertaking the much-needed structural reforms. In particular, in many countries debt remains at worrying high levels, with potentially negative consequences for continued financial stability. Nonetheless, this "recovery" phase poses a new range of challenges to policymakers, with significant implications for developments in the global financial markets. Here I shall briefly mention a few. First, what will constitute the new normal for monetary policy is far from obvious. Recent pronouncements by leading central bankers have hardly provided much light in this respect, reflecting, in part, the fear that clarity will result in further market "tantrums". More fundamentally, although I would stop short at la12 belling this, like the Financial Times, a "crisis of confidence" for central banks, there is a need for a frank discussion on the robustness of the models used to guide monetary policy decisions. In particular, whether the long-standing reliance on the Philips Curve paradigm is still justified; but also the need to effectively integrate financial indicators into the modeling process. Second, the role of fiscal policy requires careful consideration. At least with hindsight, it does seem that there is a strong case that the retreat to unswerving fiscal austerity added to the negative impact of the 2007-08 global crisis. However, the underlying reasons for fiscal caution still resonate. This dilemma was well summarised in the recent communique from the IMF, which noted that "Fiscal policy should be used flexibly and be growth-friendly, while enhancing resilience, avoiding procyclicality, and ensuring that public debt as a share of Gross Domestic Product is on a sustainable path". This is a tricky combination of requirements to meet simultaneously. In terms of major policy issues, the need for financial sector reforms and smart regulation is also significant. At the epicentre of the global financial crisis were deregulation, weaknesses in banking system governance structures and erosion of fiduciary responsibility and trust. The lesson to be learned, in this regard, is that strong micro-foundations of a financial system, es13 pecially banks, are of crucial importance at both national and international levels. That is why, for example, the Financial Stability Board was established; banking supervisory and regulatory regimes strengthened in many jurisdictions; and capital adequacy and liquidity requirements extensively reviewed. But, as I indicated earlier, the Financial Stability Board recognises that, while the policy design is nearly complete and the new rule books are in place, this is not sufficient. Hence, it is necessary to now turn towards effective implementation. In the context of an integrated and globalised financial system, this requires effective coordination, collaboration and communication, not only among the 24 member jurisdictions of the Financial Stability Board, but also by including more effectively countries such as ours in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the unintended consequences of the global reform agenda, such as the global de-risking and withdrawal of correspondent banking relationships, requires urgent attention. I should mention that, in my capacity as Co-Chairperson of the Financial Stability Board Regional Consultative Group for Sub-Saharan Africa, I hope to have greater focus on these issues. Conclusion Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, in concluding, I remind you that the saying "may you live in interesting times" is reputedly an old Chinese curse. To the extent that the past decade has certainly been "interesting", the continued challenge to pol14 icymakers is to make life at least a little bit boring, while not repeating the mistakes of the past. On a more positive note, despite the recent pushback by the supporters of economic nationalism, the fundamental driving forces of globalisation are not reversible. Nor is it desirable that they should be, given the extent to which they have contributed to global poverty reduction. However, the globalised economy is a source of not just tremendous opportunities, even for conservative investors, but additional risks and associated costs of mitigation. These include the potential for various levels of contagion, as indicated by both the experience of the global financial crisis and the rise of cybercrime which, as I indicated my remarks, is an increasingly global phenomenon. No central bank Governor, wealth or fund manager can afford to act as if they are immune from such risks. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you for your kind attention.
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Speech by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the Kgori Capital Business Club seminar, Gaborone, 3 October 2017.
KGORI CAPITAL BUSINESS CLUB SEMINAR THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATION IN MACROECONOMIC POLICY MANAGEMENT by Moses D Pelaelo Governor, Bank of Botsw ana October 3, 2017 Director of Ceremonies I am pleased and indeed it is an honour to be part of this important information sharing and empow ering Seminar, organised by the Kgori Business Press Club. The initiative for this forum resonates w ith the Bank’ s desire to contribute to the development of informed financial and economic journalism as a means of improving transmission of market information, as w ell as incisive commentary on policy analysis and decisions. For a number of reasons, a central bank needs information to continually interact to stakeholders. Such and disseminate interactions and communication clarify the Bank’ s role and, therefore, reinforces the effectiveness w ith w hich it discharges its mandate of ensuring price stability, sound financial and w ell- functioning payments systems and, more broadly, financial stability. Director of Ceremonies, the subject of my remarks this morning is ‘The Importance of Communication in Macroeconomic Policy Management.’ For this purpose, let me distil macroeconomic policy into three distinct elements, namely fiscal policy, monetary policy and exchange rate policy; and for convenience add financial sector policies in order to complete the interactive and inherent relationships involved. Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, you w ill appreciate that individually and together, these policies are intended to affect the behaviour of economic agents, w hich is, their response in terms of the supply and demand factors of economic activity. At a broad level, this entails decisions to invest, save, consume, and/or trade across borders. In this regard, the relative incentives across sectors and industries engendered by the various policies and instruments w ill have an impact on the rate of economic grow th, in other w ords, the pace of increase in national w ealth and living standards. Evidence from the 2007/08 global financial and economic crisis indicates that if not w ell managed and coordinated, macroeconomic and financial policies also have the potential to undermine economic grow th. At this point, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, let me take a moment to illustrate the influence of the various policies and related instruments on real economic activity: Starting w ith Fiscal Policy - In a situation of slow economic grow th, fiscal policy might involve increase in expenditure or reduction in taxes by Government to stimulate activity. In the event, spending by government and low er taxes generate an increase in demand, including consumption, providing an incentive for businesses to invest and increase operations to meet the higher demand; thus making positive contribution to economic grow th. Monetary Policy – With regard to monetary policy, again assuming a need to support grow th, a reduction of interest rates by the central bank, in the right level of doses, w ill low er the cost of finance, therefore, potentially leading to higher demand by consumers and investment by businesses, ultimately raising the overall rate of economic grow th. Exchange Rate Policy – A discretionary devaluation or maintenance of an undervalued exchange rate could be undertaken in order to enhance the competitiveness of the domestic industry in external markets and against imports. This is relevant for supporting sustainable industrialisation and diversifying sources of grow th, and may similarly raise overall rate of economic grow th. Financial Policies – In this area, a sound, stable and inclusive financial sector not only facilitates the conduct of transactions and payments, but it is also the conduit through w hich macroeconomic policies are transmitted to real economic activity. Thus, there is need for continuous attention to ensure the developmental aspects, as w ell as integrity, safety, stability and a w ell-functioning financial sector to support sustainable and inclusive economic grow th. Distinguished Guests, I now to turn to the role of communication in ensuring ultimate efficacy of the various policies or actions and decisions. Efficacy or potency in this regard w ould mean policy action having the desired or intended outcome. In the examples given above, this w ould mean higher rates of economic grow th w ith respect to fiscal and monetary policies and a faster pace of industrialisation arising from the exchange rate policy. Going back in history, there w as a time w hen policymaking w as shrouded in secrecy, w ith policy framew ork and actions designed to surprise the market; the language of policy makers w as coloured by obfuscation and ambiguity in order to generate uncertainty. In particular, a mystique surrounded central banks. The former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank (FED) Allan Greenspan even said in 1987, “ Since I have become a central banker, I have learned to mumble w ith great incoherence. If I seem unduly clear to you, you must have misunderstood w hat I said” . Indeed, in a Speech in 2014, the President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, pointed out that there w as a time w hen the FED w ould not even publish its interest rate decisions. At the time the FED w ould let the outside w orld derive the interest decisions from the market reaction; it w as only in 1994 that the FED decided to make its interest rate decisions public in real time. No doubt things have changed and economic policy making now involves phrases such as “ forw ard guidance” as a real policy tool designed to enable markets and the public to anticipate the direction, magnitude and timing of policy action. And in this regard, the manner and w ording of communication becomes crucial. Therefore, I w ill argue that communication is an instrument of macroeconomic policy, w ithout w hich the desired outcomes w ould not be realised or w ould be realised only sluggishly. There are tw o related dimensions to this. First is, economic and policy aw areness that helps the public and economic agents to anticipate policy action; the so called expectations. Second is the direct relaying of information on policy action and the intended outcome. In both these cases, three pillars support effective communication. On one side is the policy institutions, in the middle, a vibrant and know ledgeable media, w hile an economically aw are, participative and responsive market and economic agents are the third pillar. That said, in order for the communication tool to be effective in macroeconomic policy formulation, the institutions and framew orks for policy need to have sufficient integrity. In turn, integrity is derived from clarity w ith respect to governance, policy setting, operational and accountability framew orks, as w ell as transparency and consistency. Regarding general aw areness and understanding of economic and financial matters, w e need to appreciate that, generally, economies are characterised by business cycles of varying lengths and intensity, driven by various factors. While, there is no time to go into details, the message I am relaying is that the various macroeconomic policies are programmed to respond to such cycles. Therefore, economic aw areness entails understanding the state of the economy, the current cycle, the direction or momentum, and, therefore, anticipate policy direction. Thus, in terms of macroeconomic indicators, an up-cycle is normally characterised by acceleration in economic grow th and credit demand, and an increase in inflation. In this instance, a w ellinformed market and public w ill anticipate that the next set of policies w ould be contractionary. The converse is true, w here sustained low and falling inflation, depressed economic grow th and credit demand should engender expectations of expansionary or accommodative monetary policies. Therefore, in this environment of w ell-informed expectations and trust in the stabilising capacity and potency of instruments arsenal of the authorities, there is less risk of market overreaction to the path of economic indicators. Indeed, economic agents might take stabilising and policy reinforcing decisions. Consequently, once a policy-setting institution has built up integrity and reputation, markets and economic agents generate belief and respond accordingly because the institution consistently does w hat it says it w ill do in given circumstances. I w ill now illustrate, and indeed reinforce, how communication is evolving w ith respect to tw o areas of macroeconomic policy formulation in Botsw ana. You w ill appreciate, that in the areas of monetary policy and exchange rate policy, there is ongoing improvements and clarity relating to institutional setting, policy framew ork and parameters, instruments and decision-making cycles and dissemination platforms. In my view such developments have greatly improved understanding and efficacy of these policies. Regarding monetary policy, the Bank of Botsw ana has now entrenched a price stability objective of 3 – 6 percent, w here the institutional set-up entails six pre-announced meetings in a year, of the Monetary Policy Committee that assess developments, economic outlook and make a policy decision. A media briefing, and a Statement announcing the policy decision and related background information follow each meeting. The annual Monetary Policy Statement and its Mid-term Review serve as the anchor for dissemination of the monetary policy framew ork, policy analysis and guide for expectations on economic and policy outcomes. In this regard, aw areness of institutional arrangements for consistency, promote necessary the the policy framew ork, decision-making integrity and and transparency that foster efficacy of monetary policy. In essence, economic agents are able to anticipate, as w ell as respond to policy action. In addition, markets are more aligned to the policy stance. We, therefore, view the maintenance of a transparent and accountable monetary policy and the related communication contributing to sustained attainment strategies, of the as inflation objective. The exchange rate policy is also much more transparent. It is now clear to the market that w e have a fixed exchange rate, albeit in a craw ling band arrangement, pegged 55 percent to the SDR and 45 percent to the South African rand. It is also know n that the exchange rate is continuously adjusted using an annual rate of craw l based on the difference in the projected inflation of the trading partner countries and Botsw ana’ s inflation objective; this rate of craw l is public know ledge, typically announced at the beginning of the year. Such transparency has removed uncertainty in the management of the exchange rate. Thus, economic agents can use market information and forecasts w ith respect to the freely traded currencies (that constitute the Pula basket) and inflation, to anticipate the Pula exchange rate. In this regard, certainty about the policy path helps to anchor economic decisions in a manner desired by policy action, and that is supportive of industrialisation and economic grow th objectives. Distinguished Ladies and gentlemen, effective communication also entails common understanding and usage of language. In this regard, there is need, on the part of policy-setting institutions, for consistency in definitions, in the meanings of adjectives attributed to magnitudes of changes and movements in economic indicators, as w ell as the w ording/interpretation of policy action (or non-action). To the extent that such common language is accepted and used by the media, policy analysts and commentators, it becomes a tool in policy formulation that has an intended impact on economic decision making. How ever, on the other hand, misreporting, either deliberately or due to lack of understanding of some key concepts, could cause unnecessary confusion in the market and, therefore, be detrimental to the implementation of these macroeconomic policies. Communication also entails proper identification of spokespersons for the policy setting institution and matters on w hich they are responsible. A proper arrangement in this regard, promotes credibility and effectiveness of policy communication. For example, the Governor of the central bank is normally and appropriately the singular voice on monetary policy, w hile the Minister responsible for finance or treasury, is the singular voice on fiscal policy. In concluding, I w ant to point out that, dissemination platforms are also an important component of policy effectiveness, and determine the reach and credibility of macroeconomic policy. For the Bank, w e find high-level gatherings such as the launch of the Monetary Policy Statement, Economic Briefings follow ing publication of the Annual report, as w ell as media briefings follow ing Monetary Policy Committee meetings, to be very important. These facilitate both information dissemination, exchange of ideas, as w ell as feedback and evaluation of their performance. Extensive use of the w ebsite also allow s for w ider and continuous access to information and external contributions and commentary. The Bank also finds that research and publications, as w ell as participation in w orkshops and seminars, help to project the quality and content of the Bank’ s w ork, w hich also engenders credibility and integrity of the sources of policy analysis and decisions. Ladies and gentlemen, allow me to end here and I w ould be happy to continue the dialogue as you make observations, comments and ask questions.
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Keynote address by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the inaugural Banking and Wealth Expo, organised by the Bankers' Association of Botswana, Gaborone, 16 November 2017.
BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF BOTSWANA BANKING AND WEALTH EXPO Keynote Address by Moses D Pelaelo Governor, Bank of Botswana November 16, 2017 Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, it is indeed an honour and great pleasure for the Bank of Botswana to co-host this Executive Networking Dinner as part of the events of the inaugural Banking and Wealth Expo organised by the Bankers Association of Botswana. In line with the theme of the Expo, “Bridging the Inclusion Gap through Financial Literacy”, my remarks this evening will focus on four areas, namely, (a) importance of financial inclusion, especially for inclusive economic growth (b) financial literacy as an essential ingredient for inclusive financial sector; (c) impact of financial sector regulation and (d) the role of sound and stable macroeconomic environment, with emphasis on price stability. As His Honour the Vice President indicated, in his official opening remarks yesterday, financial inclusion has been identified as one of the key strategic priorities for financial sector development in Botswana. In this regard, a number of related initiatives form part of key policy documents such as National Development Plans, and the Financial Sector Development Strategy (2012 - 2016). Distinguished Guests, the basic elements of financial inclusion can be summarised as a state in which individuals and businesses have access to a full suite of quality financial services, at affordable prices, provided by a range of financial institutions, in a stable competitive market, in a convenient manner, with respect and dignity, to financially capable clients. In this way, households and businesses, regardless of income level, are able to have access to and can effectively use appropriate financial services, to meet their needs. Therefore, an indicator of financial inclusion would be the proportion of firms and individuals using financial products and services. These typically include transactions, payments, savings and insurance provided in a responsible and sustainable manner. The Alliance for Financial Inclusion, which is the world’s leading organisation on financial inclusion policy and related regulation, estimates that about 2 billion adults, globally, that is, more than half of the total adult population of the world, do not have an account in a formal financial institution. About 90 percent of these unbanked adults are in developing countries. However, the good news is that, according to the 2015 Bill Gates Annual Letter, it is estimated that by 2030, about 2 billion people who do not have bank accounts today, will be storing money and making payments with their mobile phones. It is anticipated that, by then, mobile money providers will be offering the full range of financial services, including interest-bearing accounts, credit and insurance. Research by the World Bank, conducted in 137 countries from 2005 to 2011, observes that lack of access to finance constitutes a major problem for households and acts as a barrier to the growth of small enterprises. It is therefore evident that financial inclusion empowers poor households and small enterprises by bringing them into the mainstream economy thereby reducing extreme levels of poverty and inequality. There is also evidence, based on a number of research work, that financial inclusion promotes economic development, especially for women, and that financially empowered women are more likely to improve social welfare. Overall, women’s financial exclusion limits the growth-promoting potential of finance and it may also prove costly in terms of elevated risks to financial stability. Distinguished Guests, in recognition of this developmental impact, financial inclusion is becoming a global priority for policy makers, regulators and development agencies. Among others, financial inclusion has been identified as an enabler for seven of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals. In this regard, the World Bank Group considers financial inclusion as a key enabler in reducing extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity, and has, therefore, put forward an ambitious global goal to attain universal financial access by 2020. Furthermore, the G20 has committed to advancing financial inclusion worldwide. Distinguished guests, one area in Botswana where there has been a significant impact, and continues to provide a huge potential, is the nondiscretionary savings, in the form of defined contribution pension schemes. It is notable that the Pension Fund industry in Botswana has grown substantially in the last two decades, mostly driven by establishment of the Botswana Public Officers Pension Fund in 2001. As at the end of 2016, pension funds assets amounted to P75 billion or 44 percent of national income (nominal GDP) compared to total banking assets of P81 billion. In this regard, the pension industry was a major driving force behind the cumulative expansion of the financial sector in the past ten years; 100 percent growth in real terms, compared to 52 percent for the economy as a whole. However, the main beneficiaries and industry customers continue to be the long-term employed, to the exclusion of the traditionally disadvantaged cohorts. Therefore, national policy and the financial sector should increasingly find solutions to provide wider coverage for retirement funds to include the self-employed and younger generation. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, let me now to turn to financial literacy as a key component of financial inclusion. Experience has shown that low levels of financial literacy and capability in developing countries form a significant barrier to accessing and effectively using financial services. Financial literacy is the acquisition of knowledge on financial products and services; while financial capability refers to the application of the financial knowledge gained into desirable financial behaviour. Without financial capabilities, a financially literate individual may not increase savings and investment or reduce debt and risky financial behaviour. Therefore, financial institutions have to re-direct their financial inclusion strategies to incorporate enhancement of the financial capabilities of their customers. It is in this regard that financial capability is an integral part of financial inclusion; hence, effective empowerment strategies for financial capability need to focus on providing practical, easy-to-understand and impartial advice so that consumers can make informed decisions. As you would be aware, in general, the rate of financial inclusion is relatively low in sub-Saharan Africa and other the emerging market economies. For example, according to the 2014 Finscope Survey, more that 68 percent of the adult population in Botswana have access to financial services; this compares with 58 percent in Namibia, 70.3 percent for South Africa; 39 percent in Mexico and 53 percent in India. Overall, the average financial inclusion measures for South Asia and Latin America as well as the Caribbean are lower than those for Botswana at 46.6 percent and 51.4 percent, respectively. In contrast, financial inclusion is high in the developed countries. According to the World Bank, 94 percent of adults in 35 high income Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries had access to financial services in 2015. Ladies and Gentlemen, as in other countries, the main policy objective of the financial inclusion agenda in Botswana is to improve household welfare, increase economic efficiency and support inclusive and sustainable economic growth. In this regard, advances in technology, have engendered an increase in opportunities and scaling up of financial inclusion. Thus, modern communications infrastructure, particularly mobile money and advances in the payment systems and platforms, play a significant role in financial inclusion. Thus, the availability of userfriendly and cost-effective information and communication products and platforms play an important role in broadening safe and secure access to financial services. Notably, we have seen a significant increase in the number and functionality of automated teller machines, including deposit-taking machines; mobile money remittances and payments service; internet and web-based access and transacting; and the promotion of card payments. These platforms augur well for enhanced financial inclusion. Notwithstanding, I wish to implore banks to move at a measured pace, taking into account the resilience of public infrastructure and other development needs, in transitioning from brick and mortar banking branches to e-channels. There is anecdotal evidence which suggests, for various reasons, such as, cultural, literacy and human psychology factors, that customers, even in this digital age, need physical access and engagement with a human being and not “Siri” to access financial services, to understand and resolve account queries. I am well aware and commend financial institutions engaged in various financial literacy programmes that also reach out to school going children, in the form of booklets, drama and radio quizzes on financial products and services. In this regard, it is equally important to engage customers on ways and means for optimising the benefits of digital and electronic platforms, but also highlighting the associated risks and mitigation measures. It is worth mentioning that banks need to practice, at all times, acceptable market conduct through increased transparency, fair pricing, quick and timely resolution of both failed transactions and fraud incidents. Distinguished Guests, in line with the 2012 - 2016 Financial Sector Development Strategy, a number of initiatives are underway to enhance cost-effective access to finance, including the establishment of a robust and effective credit information system as well as promulgation of electronic payments services regulations. Also, as announced by the Minister of Finance and Economic Development in the 2015 Budget Speech, Government has adopted Making Access Possible approaches to financial inclusion. This is a multi-country initiative to support financial inclusion using a process of evidence-based country diagnostic and stakeholder dialogue. Some of the Making Access Possible priorities include, improving the payments eco-system, both domestic and crossborder transactions, facilitating low cost, accessible savings products through the use of mobile savings accounts and less onerous Know Your Customer requirements for low risk savings accounts. I will now address financial regulation as a perceived barrier to financial inclusion. Distinguished guests, the domestic regulatory framework is gradually being modernised to keep pace with financial innovation. I must admit that, given the dynamic, evolving and innovative financial sector, it is always going to be a challenge to come with smart and cost-effective regulations. This challenge is even greater for digital finance, which is currently and prospectively, the main conduit of the financial inclusion, especially in a sparsely populated country like Botswana. It is generally accepted that rigid and excessive regulation can be an obstacle to financial inclusion. Therefore, the Bank and other domestic financial sector supervisors endeavour to regularly review and amend, where necessary, those provisions of the law that can impede effective access to finance. The immediate regulatory issues are the provisions relating to the sharing of customer creditworthiness information, both positive and negative data, know your customer requirements and the Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting of the Financing of Terrorism protocols. The Banking Act confidentiality provisions are also being reviewed to allow for the sharing of customer creditworthiness information and to facilitate the establishment of credit bureaux. As regards the anti-money laundering and combatting the financing of terrorism measures, much as both the Financial Intelligence Agency and the Bank of Botswana subscribe to a risk-based approach and seek to avoid undue regulatory burden, it is equally important to safeguard the integrity and overall stability of the country financial system by implementing and adhering to the international standards on AML-CFT matters. Moreover, there is need to guard against the impact of de-risking and loss of correspondent banking relationships that could be detrimental to trade, procurement, financing and payments arrangements. Distinguished guests, the Bank of Botswana, as a primary partner in the evolution of the financial landscape, is committed to ensuring that there exists an enabling environment for enhanced financial inclusion of the unbanked members of our society. For the Bank, greater financial inclusion enhances the potency of its policies and functions. In particular, given that monetary policy is transmitted by the financial sector, it has a greater and wider effect when a greater part of the population and businesses use financial services and products. For example, an individual or business that use the financial system to save or borrow is affected by a change in interest rates; therefore, their reactions in that regard, collectively affects the rate of increase in prices and economic activity. It is, therefore, notable that the key mandates of the Bank collectively relate to protecting the intrinsic value of the national currency; and that achievement of the Bank’s objectives promotes financial inclusion, literacy and capability. In particular, the Bank has responsibility for issuance of good quality banknotes and coin, while pursuing stability with respect to domestic prices, the exchange rate and the financial sector. To the extent that these objectives are met, the Bank helps to minimise erosion of the purchasing power of the currency, while ensuring that it remains integral to storage of value, monetary valuations, means of payment, and access to foreign currencies as needed, as well as credibility of the domestic financial system. In the horizon, there are issues of digital currencies and block chain technologies. While Distributed Ledger Technologies, albeit not yet mature, offer hope and opportunities for enhancing the efficiency and resilience of the payment infrastructure, for central banks, digital currencies are not yet convincing and, in my view, rightly remain an area for other stakeholders. This is not to suggest that these developments are not keenly watched and monitored. The Bank has also entrenched a transparent and, I would say, effective policy framework for management of inflation and related expectations that has so far been successful. Since 2013, inflation has been within and, at times, even below the objective range of 3 – 6 percent. In this environment, there is scope for affordable access to financial resources, their productive deployment and greater opportunities for generating real returns. The transparency of the exchange rate framework and absence of exchange controls removes uncertainty and encourages use of various platforms for financial inclusion, as well as informed decision-making and planning by economic agents. Effective supervision of the banking sector and oversight of the payments system and related infrastructure also contributes to financial inclusion. In particular, this is to the extent that policy, legislative and regulatory developments embrace advances in the provision of financial services, new technology and payments methods, while ensuring that integrity, resilience and stability of the financial system is maintained. In this regard, there is continuing patronage and growth in usage of the financial sector and related services, as evidenced by the sustained expansion of financial services and increasing share in GDP. In concluding, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, a stable macroeconomic environment, characterised by low and predictable levels of inflation, safe, sound and inclusive financial sector, supportive regulatory environment and well-informed consumers of financial services is positive for wealth creation and preservation, as well as inclusive growth. I thank you for your kind attention.
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Keynote address by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the Botswana Institute of Bankers' 2017 Graduation and Awards Ceremony, Gaborone, 22 November 2017.
BOTSWANA INSTITUTE OF BANKERS’ 2017 GRADUATION AND AWARDS CEREMONY Keynote Address by Moses D Pelaelo Governor, Bank of Botswana November 22, 2017 I am most delighted and wish to thank the Chairman of Council of the Botswana Institute of Bankers and, through you Mr Jaco Viljoen, the Managing Director of Capital Bank, and your fellow Council Members, for the invitation to be the Keynote Speaker at this 2017 Graduation and Awards Ceremony. At the onset, I congratulate the 2017 Graduants and Award Winners for this important milestone and achievement. I can imagine that there were many challenges on the way, including juggling one’s studies with other social obligations, such as family and job obligations. As one motivational speaker said, “it is not your aptitude, but your attitude that determines your altitude”. Congratulations to you all, Class of 2017! Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, banking is an evolving industry, which provides opportunities for personal and professional growth, while its services and products have important and increasing linkages with other areas of economic activity. Most significantly, in the context of today’s ceremony, professional bankers are a key input to economic development and wealth creation in terms of providing resources and informed advice and guidance with respect to investment channels and options. Membership of this esteemed profession by knowledgeable, skilled and passionate individuals also enables them to contribute to its growth. In this regard, therefore, let me commend many Batswana, including these Graduants, who continue to invest their time and resources on selfdevelopment, and, ultimately, rise to positions of higher responsibility, in both the banking and the broader financial sector in Botswana. To a great extent, this ascendency to senior management positions is a vote of confidence on the domestic banking sector and its ability to produce quality leaders. To you Class of 2017, I have no doubt that you too aspire to assume key roles in the financial sector in order to better serve your institutions at higher levels and, ultimately, serve the country. The journey has just begun. However, this is a journey to be continued, both in terms of continuing engagement in selfdevelopment and, of course, career progression. Along this path, we should always remember that banking and, more broadly, finance is a business of trust. The bankers, in particular, have a fiduciary responsibility and duty to protect the integrity and reputation of the banking system, to underwrite continuing public trust and confidence in the financial system. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, the Bank of Botswana is proud to be associated with the Botswana Institute of Bankers, as its founding member. You will recall that the Institute was established in 1991 as a not-for-profit organisation, with a mandate to promote banking as a career and an accredited profession in Botswana, through provision of quality and relevant knowledge and skills in banking and finance and, I should add, fostering ethical conduct of banking business. Today marks the 23rd Graduation and Awards ceremony for Associate Diploma II graduates. I am advised that since inception, the Institute has awarded 842 Certificates and 535 Associate Diplomas. This evening, there will be awards of 18 Associate Banking Diplomas and, in total 30 outstanding individuals recognised. This serves as a testimony to the fact that the Institute continues to be relevant in enhancing the level of skills and excellence, as well as promoting professionalism in the banking sector. The contribution of the Institute to development of human resources for the banking industry indeed deserves commendation and recognition. It is nevertheless important to implore the Institute to continue to transform and align its mandate to the needs of the industry in order to better meet the expectations of the more discerning customer and market place. For that to happen, the Institute needs to be dynamic and innovative, interact meaningfully with similar institutions for benchmarking, and explore opportunities for collaboration and strategic partnerships with other professional organisations, academic institutions and industry leaders. In as much as I recognise this progress, Botswana cannot afford to continue to have banking practices and products that are “behind the curve” compared to regional and global developments. The industry will need to invest in people, systems processes, and including risk management infrastructure to meet today’s challenges. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, this is particularly important in the context of dynamic changes in demography, technology, competitive landscape and prolonged low global interest rate environment, all which have had a profound impact on business models for banking. As an example, technology is the future of banking, and the industry needs highly skilled and innovative staff to keep pace with financial technology, such as Fintech, blockchain and cryptocurrencies. In the circumstances, the need for an institution, such as the Botswana Institute of Bankers, is all the more important. Evidently, banking has already come a long way, and we should all prepare for the future armed with knowledge, relevant skills and appropriate behaviours. It should also be a motivation that the current and prospective banking environment is leveraged on interestingly challenging, complex and digital banking systems. Concomitant with these developments, both globally and here at home, digitalisation and financial integration require that we all exercise increased diligence, prudence and ethical conduct. This is because, desirable as technological innovation is, it also encapsulates risk and possibilities to contaminate the industry and profession with bad behaviour and harmful activities. There was a time when the main threats to banks were robberies and insider collusion relating to stealing of the physical cash. These days, harmful activities, fraud and theft are perpetrated through cyber-crime, infiltration of systems and unauthorised access to information and identity records. The “thieves” are likely to be behind the counter, and through the mobile phones and computer systems. Therefore, the modern banker has to be alive to these possibilities and also able to harness the necessary resources and mitigation strategies to forestall such harmful activities. In addition, bankers need to be able to respond meaningfully and offer timely redress in the event of customers’ accounts and information being compromised through no fault of their own. Ineptitude and failure to handle such operational risk issues diligently could weaken public confidence in the banking system and undermine the financial inclusion agenda and the very essence of banking, which is to facilitate intermediation for productive use of financial resources, as well as certainty of payments. Furthermore, the adverse effects of such illegal activities could impose a heavy financial burden on the public as banks commit resources to preventive measures; and often the costs of such are passed on to customers. Distinguished Guests, the Bank of Botswana will continue to play its role in encouraging and promoting professionalism, honesty, integrity and ethics in banking. The fabric and foundation of banking is trust and trustworthy bankers. This is important as good governance is a key pillar for the promotion and maintenance of a safe and sound financial system; one that is run by fit and proper and competent leadership, management and staff. At the same time, there is need to enhance transparency in banking to instil confidence in the financial system. In this context, the Financial Stability Board Working Group on governance frameworks is working on proposals to strengthen governance frameworks to mitigate what is called “misconduct risk”, addressing information gaps and due diligence in employment of individuals with a history of misconduct; and mapping responsibilities to senior personnel to strengthen governance of misconduct risk in financial institutions; as well as to address cultural risks that drive misconduct. Once concluded, the tendency of “rolling bad apples” in the financial sector will be stopped and there will be no place to hide for dishonest and unethical people. Let me underscore that the success of a well-diversified economy depends on an inclusive, well managed, prudently run and efficient financial sector. To this end, the Bank of Botswana continues to foster the development of policies designed to enhance and align skills to the needs of the domestic market. It is vital that banks, which are the bedrock of the financial sector, fully commit to the effective implementation of the human development strategies aimed at increasing the supply of professional bankers. The existing and continually evolving training opportunities should be geared towards enhancing efficiencies in the banking sector. Needless to say, effectiveness and development of the Institute is significant both in content and technicality, to adequately equip bank employees and ground them in the pre-requisites of what is required to be an effective and professional banker. Distinguished, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to take this opportunity to remind all of us here, once again, of the importance of adhering to codes of ethics and professionalism in the delivery of banking services. This is important as banks are invariably the principal pillars for commerce, savings mobilisation and payments infrastructure and, in general, socio-economic development. In concluding, Council Chairman, Council members, Executive Director, and Distinguished Guests once again, congratulations to the Graduants and Award Winners on their achievement. It takes determination to start, and commitment to finish. This evening represents a mark of personal growth and I have every confidence that the success in your Botswana Institute of Bankers studies offers an opportunity for your professional growth in the banking industry. I thank you for your kind attention.
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Welcome remarks by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the visit of Mr Tao Zhang, Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, to Botswana, Gaborone, 25 July 2018.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND DEPUTY MANAGING DIRECTOR, MR TAO ZHANG, VISIT TO BOTSWANA Welcome Remarks by Moses D Pelaelo Governor, Bank of Botswana July 25, 2018 Distinguished Guests, I am privileged to welcome you to this special dinner, hosted by the Bank of Botswana, in honour of our esteemed guest, the Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Mr Tao Zhang. On behalf of the Board, Management and Staff of the Bank, we very much appreciate your honouring the invitation and your presence tonight. Thanks to you all. In welcoming the Deputy Managing Director, I wish to observe that, coincidentally, his visit to Botswana comes shortly after the conclusion of the annual Article IV Consultation that took place just over a month ago. It is also two weeks after the Workshop on Fintech, Payments and Financial Inclusion, jointly organised by the Bank of Botswana, the International Monetary Fund and the Bank of Canada. Thus, the visit reinforces the beneficial relationship between Botswana and the International Monetary Fund. Mr Zhang is accompanied by his Advisor, Mr Steven Allen Barnett, Mr Enrique Gelbard, the Mission Chief for Botswana’s IMF Article IV consultations, who is quite familiar to several of us; and Mr Abdulqafar Abdullahi, Advisor to the Executive Director for the Africa Group 1 Constituency at the IMF, to which Botswana belongs. Tonight Mr Zhang will address the global, regional and Botswana connections with respect to economic and policy developments. Previously, in 2007, the then Deputy Managing Director, Mr Takatoshi Kato, while visiting Botswana dealt with challenges and opportunities for growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, with special focus on Botswana. In 2011, Mr Naoyuki Shinohara discussed challenges relating to the management of natural resources and developmental opportunities in Botswana. In 2016, Mr Zhang’s immediate predecessor, Mr Min Zhu, eloquently articulated technological progress and evolving industry arrangements that nations, such as Botswana, can harness to take development to the next level. Honourable Minister, Distinguished Guests, given the high level attention given to Botswana by the IMF, it is fitting to briefly highlight the benefits of being a member and working with the IMF since 1968. First, the capacity of the IMF to analyse global developments and potential transmission channels and spillover to various regions and countries is key to timely responses to harness opportunities and/or mitigate risks. Second, the regular consultations, on the main through the Article IV Missions, enables dialogue with local stakeholders in the policy arena, industry, as well as economic analysts and civil society. This enables an understanding of the unique situation of Botswana and the interaction with global and regional developments; thus, structural evolution and trends, developmental aspirations and needs that inform policy priorities and key data trends. In turn, such exchange of information enables evaluation of prospects and policy options, going forward. Third, the Bank, as well as institutions such as the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority and Statistics Botswana, benefit from targeted technical assistance and skills development provided by the IMF from the headquarters in Washington DC or through the Regional Technical Assistance Centres, such as AFRITAC South based in Mauritius, to which Botswana is affiliated. This technical assistance enables improvements in areas such as legislation, macroeconomic policy frameworks and formulation, regulatory approaches, as well as structuring and governance of institutions as necessary. In addition to improving operational competencies, access to training and skills development also encompasses interaction with other practitioners globally to share experiences. Distinguished Guests, it is clear, therefore, that the IMF facilitates access to resources that members can opt to tap into subject to evaluation and assessment of their needs. In this regard, sustained judicious and prudent management of resources and the economy, as is the case in Botswana, enables a wider range of choices and options with respect to policies, prioritisation of resource allocation, as well as the timing of implementation to achieve the desired objectives. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, you will be aware that Botswana desires to transit from upper middle income status to high income status, and globally this transition is judged to be challenging, as it requires substantial structural transformation and shifts in growth strategies and policies. For Botswana, it is estimated that this requires annual GDP growth rates of 8 percent over a six year period to leap from the current per capita income of just under USD8 000 per annum to above USD12 000. As a country, in the recent years, we noted challenges of slower growth rates compared to when we graduated from low-income status, slower than desired rate of economic diversification, as well as relatively high level of unemployment. In this respect, it is expected that, going forward, our relationship with the IMF will focus on drawing on their expertise and sharing of experience of other countries to support transformation policies and strategies to enable Botswana to fulfil its aspirations for a high-income status on a sustainable basis. Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you for your kind attention.
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Welcome remarks by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the 2018 National Business Conference Dinner, Gaborone, 9 September 2018.
2018 NATIONAL BUSINESS CONFERENCE DINNER Transition to High Income Status – The Role of Monetary Policy and Communication Welcome Remarks by Moses D Pelaelo Governor, Bank of Botswana September 9, 2018 Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, good evening. It is my honour to welcome you to this Dinner hosted by the Bank of Botswana on the eve of the National Business Conference here in the City of Francistown. On behalf of the Board, Management and Staff of the Bank and on my own, I thank you all for honouring the invitation; your presence here tonight is valued and highly appreciated. Role of National Business Conference and Theme The Bank of Botswana is privileged and accepts the honour to host this Welcome Dinner to the 15th National Business Conference, organised by Business Botswana, in collaboration with the Government under the theme, “Breaking through to a High-Income Botswana - The Role of the Private Sector in Charting the Path”. This should provide an opportunity to evaluate prospects for Botswana, with respect to structural transformation, policies, strategies and, especially, implementation frameworks that would enhance international competitiveness of local firms and support the transition to high-income status in line with Vision 2036. I am reliably informed that, His Excellency the President of the Republic of Botswana, Mr Mokgweetsi Eric Keabetswe Masisi will, in addition to performing the official opening, actively participate in this Conference and, in particular, share his thoughts on the growth of business in Botswana in one of the sessions, tomorrow. Background and Broad Structural Issues Distinguished guests, it is common cause that the economy of Botswana has, over the last 52 years, recorded impressive growth and structural transformation, leading to the country attaining upper middle income status, currently with a per capita annual income of approximately USD 8 000. Similarly, over the years, the country has enjoyed relatively sound and stable macroeconomic and financial conditions. Despite episodes of terms-of-trade shocks and volatile commodity prices during this period, the economy has been largely characterised by relatively low and predictable levels of inflation; balance of payments surpluses; substantial foreign exchange reserves; stable real effective exchange rate; low public debt; and continued pursuance of prudent fiscal policies. However, as we are well aware, in the last decade or so the country’s growth momentum seems to have lost steam. Evidently, this is constrained by several factors including the narrow economic base, high levels of unemployment, insufficient innovation and private investment spending, infrastructure constraints, thin and fragmented markets as well as low level of financial sector development and, relative to other upper middle-income countries, less inclusive growth. Distinguished Guests, the IMF Executive Board, on August 31, 2018, completed the 2018 Article IV Consultation with Botswana, and as usual, the Botswana authorities were commended for a track record of sound policies that has supported strong growth and macroeconomic stability. However, it is considered opportune to leverage on the favourable prospects to accelerate implementation of structural reforms to unlock the country’s growth potential. The specific areas highlighted by the IMF include preserving priority infrastructure and social spending, restructuring and privatisation of parastatals, promotion of private sector development and economic diversification, sustained efforts to improve the business climate, including facilitating foreign direct investment as well as skills and realignment of education policies to eliminate existing skills mismatches. The Bank’s Role in Supporting Economic Activity and Growth As a contribution to the theme of this National Business Conference my remarks, this evening, will focus on the role of monetary policy and communication in transiting to high-income status and, also, take the opportunity to launch the Bank’s maiden Monetary Policy Report. Therefore, in a broad sense, the intent is to project the relevance and role of the Bank of Botswana in contributing to the journey towards highincome status for Botswana. To give perspective, you will be aware, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, that the Bank exists to protect the value of the local currency, the Pula and thebe, through currency management operations, monetary policy, exchange rate management, regulation and supervision of relevant financial institutions and facilitating sound payments and settlement frameworks. Essentially, the Bank promotes the desire and willingness to hold the local currency, as well as to transact and save locally in Pula premised on the quality and durability of the banknotes and coin; stable, predictable domestic price changes; safety and soundness of the financial system and reliable payment infrastructure. Inevitably, where central banks fail to achieve these outcomes, or are constrained by political interference, economic performance and development suffer considerably; recent examples include Venezuela and Zimbabwe. Overall, by fostering appropriate conditions, the Bank of Botswana has, throughout its 43 years of existence, contributed to stability of the macroeconomic environment and financial system, as well as integrity and reliability of payments and settlement platforms; therefore, enabling economic activity, as manifested in the ability to transact and access financial services. Distinguished Guests, we are, however, collectively looking ahead and, in this regard, there are several aspects of mandates and operations of the Bank that require modernisation and upgrading in order to remain relevant and contribute to national development aspirations and objectives. Indeed, monetary policy and the various instruments, including communication, can only be effective if undertaken alongside improvements in other operations of the Bank and policy transmission channels. AlIow me to highlight four relevant areas in this regard. Modernisation and Adaptation of the Bank’s Functions First, there is a need to adapt to changing domestic and global conditions and, also, to ensure that the Bank of Botswana is appropriately positioned to adequately address new developments and related challenges. Some of these include fintechs, digital currencies and similar innovations as well as adopt best practice, to sustain national development. In this regard, there is ongoing review of the Bank of Botswana Act, the Banking Act and proposals to promulgate a national payments law. The intention is to enhance operational capability, predictability and integrity of policy and regulatory frameworks, as well as to clarify institutional relationships and promote accountability and transparency. Furthermore, one of the key lessons from the 2008/9 global financial crisis is the need for joint, speedy and coordinated response, by all relevant stakeholders, to any substantial systemic risks emanating from any parts of the financial sector. As part of the broader financial development architecture, there is a need to re-configure institutional arrangements for the financial sector oversight to achieve greater focus on macro-prudential dimensions of financial stability policy and financial safety nets. The recent establishment of the Financial Stability Council is a significant step towards protecting the viability, integrity and sustainability of relationships and cross-holding of exposures within the financial sector and with other economic sectors. As I mentioned, this enables coordinated and decisive response when needed; ultimately safety of savings and investments and prospects for attracting more. Also, one of the key tenets, in this respect, include the need for legislation for the establishment of a deposit protection scheme, to further encourage patronage of the domestic financial system, in particular broader financial inclusion. Monetary Policy Framework Distinguished Guests, the second area of continuing improvement that I want to highlight relates to the role of the monetary policy framework in facilitating a conducive environment for private businesses to thrive. Broadly, an appropriate policy framework should encompass definition and clarity of objectives and instruments, understanding and calibration of transmission channels and, therefore, predictability and, in turn, accountability. It is for these reasons that the Bank’s primary mandate of price stability, is clearly defined as a sustainable level of annual inflation that is within the medium-term objective range of 3 – 6 percent. The policy is also formulated with a view to safeguarding the stability of the financial system. In essence, protection of the value of the Pula and integrity and safety of channels and platforms for holding money and transacting in local currency. Let me, once again, underscore the point that low and predictable level of inflation and a conducive financial environment foster savings mobilisation, productive investment and international competitiveness of domestic producers which, in turn, contribute towards the broader national objectives of sustainable economic development and employment creation. Equally important is a sound and stable financial system particularly the banking sub-sector, as it serves as the main transmission channel for monetary policy signals and facilitating economic activity through the provision of liquidity and risk mitigation. It is also apparent to the markets and general public that the key instruments of policy are the Bank Rate and the Bank of Botswana Certificates. The former relates to the cost of money and decisions to save or borrow, while the latter influences the quantity of loanable funds in the banking system. In both cases, the operation of these instruments affects prospects for demand and, in turn, its influence on the rate of price changes, with the Bank’s focus being to maintain inflation within the defined objective range of 3 – 6 percent. The policy is predictable in the sense that the Bank publishes the medium term inflation outlook, which informs the policy response. For example, a forecast for sustained inflation above the objective would imply an increase in interest rates and tightening of financing conditions, to help moderate inflation. On the other hand, sustained lower inflation than the objective range implies subdued economic performance and would require reduction in interest rates to raise demand and stimulate economic activity. However, for policy transmission to be effective it requires a sound and responsive banking system. Thus, banks should cut interest rates and increase lending when the Bank Rate is reduced, and accordingly raise them when monetary policy is tightened and not be constrained by internal and structural weaknesses. In this regard, the Bank is always available to provide liquidity to the banking system and to solvent individual banks, as needed, to ensure market sustainability and appropriate policy transmission. Market Development and Financial Inclusion Aligned thereto is the third developmental area, which is the Bank’s role in promoting the growth, spread and deepening of money and capital markets and, also, financial inclusion. The development of a wide range of money and capital markets institutions and instruments enables substitution and access to a variety of purpose-fit saving and investment channels as monetary policy and conditions change; therefore sustained effectiveness of policy transmission in affecting market activity. A diverse and deep market also allows banks to better manage liquidity positions, hence the ability to effectively transmit policy. In addition, with enhanced financial inclusion, changes in monetary policy are more effective as a greater number of businesses, institutions and households, hold and have exposures that are directly affected by the direction and level of interest rates and availability of loanable funds and market liquidity. Communication Distinguished Guests, the fourth area of focus for the Bank, as we look ahead, is communication. The Bank considers and uses communication as a direct, practical and potent instrument of policy. It is, therefore, important that in order to generate the desired response, communication is recognised and acknowledged by the market and general public as a policy instrument. However, this is to the extent that such communication is backed by durable integrity and reliability of the Bank of Botswana, premised on predictability and transparency. Public trust and reputation of the Bank are essential elements for policy effectiveness. Central banks such as the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve demonstrate such effectiveness where, for example, issuance of forward guidance statements (without immediate actual change in interest rates), generate market reaction; thus change in economic behaviour and activity. More generally, communication works best in an environment of economic and policy awareness by the public as well as informed policy and market analysis and commentary. The combination of economic developments and dissemination of policy analysis and economic projections by the Bank helps the public and economic agents to anticipate policy action; the so-called expectations. For example, expectations about future inflation and, therefore, interest rates, are a key determinant in formulating investment and consumption decisions, hence economic activity. Communication also facilitates accountability and various platforms and media are used in this regard. Overall, increased transparency and communication, regarding the policy framework, objectives and strategy, as well as decisions and progress in meeting the objectives of the Bank can contribute to desired market responses and policy effectiveness. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, at the launch of the Bank’s Monetary Policy Statement, in February this year, I outlined the refinements that the Bank continues to make to the monetary policy framework relating to communication. I indicated that, the more recent innovations that started in 2017 included the pre-announcement of the dates for the Monetary Policy Committee meetings for the year ahead and media briefings that follow each meeting to announce and engage on the policy decision. I also indicated that, going forward and in an effort to further improve on communication and transparency on economic and policy analysis and implementation, the Bank will publish four Monetary Policy Reports each calendar year, including the Monetary Policy Statement. I am happy to announce that tonight the Bank is launching the first Monetary Policy Report to be published on the Bank’s website tomorrow morning. The Report is also available on the Bank of Botswana branded memory sticks that will be distributed to the invited guests tonight. There is also a limited number of hard copies. The Report will be the main medium through which the Bank will inform the public about the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. It serves to meet the public’s expectation of a transparent and accountable central bank in fulfilling the monetary policy mandate. The Monetary Policy Reports in April, August and October will be preceded by the Monetary Policy Statement in February each year. Distinguished Guests, as I conclude, I would like to assure you that the Bank’s implementation of monetary policy will continue to focus on entrenching expectations of low, predictable and sustainable inflation, through timely responses to price developments. At the same time, the Bank will contribute to effective oversight of the financial system to ensure sustained financial stability and integrity of the payments system, while promoting market development and financial inclusion; as a growth imperative and also important for policy transmission. Essentially, this is the enduring contribution of the Bank to an enabling environment for private sector growth and greater participation in economic activity; therefore, enhanced prospects for economic diversification efforts, employment creation, inclusive growth, and transition to high-income status. Let me wish you a fruitful conference and deliberations for the next two days. Please enjoy your dinner. However, to conclude the formal proceedings, allow me to call upon the Director of Research and Financial Stability Department, Dr Tshokologo Alex Kganetsano to present a brief outline of the Monetary Policy Report and also highlight its relevance in influencing expectations and economic activity. I thank you for your kind attention.
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Official remarks by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the Botswana Stock Exchange Opening Bell Ceremony, Gaborone, 1 November 2018.
BOTSWANA STOCK EXCHANGE OPENING BELL CEREMONY Official Remarks by Moses D Pelaelo Governor, Bank of Botswana November 1, 2018 Distinguished Guests, it is my great pleasure and honour to have been able to accept the invitation from the Chief Executive Officer of Botswana Stock Exchange Limited (BSEL), Mr Thapelo Tsheole, to make a few remarks on the occasion of today’s event, marking the sixth “Opening Bell” ceremony. Let me start by acknowledging the important symbolism surrounding the “opening bell” ceremony. This refers to the signal that a stock exchange is open for business. A bell itself is only used in a few instances, notably in New York, where the current practice of ringing the bell at the start and close of each day’s trading dates back to 1895, initially using a Chinese gong. But the phrase is used more generically across exchanges and, needless to say, among financial journalists. The use of a bell is, of course, most appropriate in the environment, typically hectic, of “open outcry” trading where the volume of the bell is an effective means of directing proceedings. In other words, the bell was necessary as a form of regulation, albeit self-regulation. This traditional system of trading has been largely overtaken by more efficient technologies, first by telephonic and then electronic trading systems. The New York Stock Exchange still conducts a small proportion of trades (although typically high-value) through floor traders. In Europe, the famous “ring” London Metal Exchange (LME) remains a bastion of the tradition; although it too has recently been experimenting with the use of more modern systems. Director of Ceremonies, the rapid advances in technology, more so in financial services, appears inexorable; indeed, this has long been the case. Today, the power of the internet; super computers, social media and “big data”; as well as the potential opportunities offered by new technologies, such as block chain, dominate financial news and public discourse. But innovation and disruptive technologies have been a recurring feature of progress and development for centuries. For financial services, it is progress in communications technology, including the collation, storage and transfer of information, that has often been the key. examples in this regard, including: There are many  The origins of iconic City of London institutions such as Lloyds and the London Metal Exchange coffee houses where like-minded patrons gathered to share news;  “Cable”, the colloquial term used by currency traders for the United States dollar-sterling exchange rate; it relates to a nineteenth century undersea communications cable used to transmit key financial information across the Atlantic Ocean; and  American Express, the financial services multinational, began as an express mail business. Recognising the historical context, it should be little surprise that financial and communications regulators must in many cases operate in tandem, while adopting smart and costeffective ways to deal with risks. Today, given the current, dizzying, pace of ICT development, it is more crucial than ever that central banks and financial sector regulators are alive to these trends. This adds a further dimension to the challenge, in both developing and developed economies, of finding the right balance between being, on the one hand, a prudential regulator and, on the other, development. a facilitator for market The latter goal is something to which the Bank of Botswana is unreservedly committed. As I have observed elsewhere, informed repeatedly research has indicated a causal connection between financial sector development, economic growth and poverty reduction. However, in many Sub- Saharan African countries, Botswana included, financial systems remain mostly small, fragmented and un-diversified, providing only limited services to an exclusive section of the population at a relatively high cost. Equally, while Botswana’s financial sector is comparable in size to other countries in the region; it remains relatively smaller and less developed compared to that of its middle-income peers. Notwithstanding, during the past ten years, Botswana financial sector has expanded rapidly, both in size and the range of services covered. In this period, cumulative growth of the financial sector, in real terms, has been almost exactly 100 percent, compared to 52 percent for the economy as a whole. A major driving force in this development has been the rapid growth of the domestic pension fund industry. Indeed the role played by the financial sector in supporting inclusive and sustainable economic growth was the central theme of the 2017 Bank of Botswana Annual Report. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, in broad terms, how should we go about addressing this challenge? Here, I start by making an obvious, but nonetheless important, point. A well-functioning, liquid and regulated market is good for development. It gives both investors and consumers confidence that their interests are protected in an industry where information asymmetries remain a chronic problem. At the same time, regulation can help confer legitimacy on regulated service providers. As central bank Governor, I should also extend this point further. The sustainable development of financial markets is supported by macroeconomic and financial stability. Botswana has been lauded for its strong macroeconomic environment, a position which was recently reaffirmed by the 2018 Global Competitiveness Index. The macroeconomic environment was the best performing pillar for Botswana, with the country ranked first, globally, supported by a public debt to GDP ratio of 15.6 percent and inflation of just about 3 percent. To further support financial markets development, the Bank has recently initiated important changes in the communication of monetary policy, including the launch of the inaugural Monetary Policy Report (MPR) on September 9, 2018 at National Business Conference in Francistown. And on Monday, this week, the Bank published the second MPR following the Monetary Policy Committee meeting of October 22, 2018. But, important as these developments are, neither observations address the key issue. That is, how can central banks deal with the problem developments in financial that, services at that some are point, otherwise legitimate and desirable may be held back, discouraged, or even halted by over-, or outdated, regulation? Here, I would highlight two distinct risks that must be addressed:  First, the nexus between prudence and innovation may prove to be a challenge and too often financial sector regulators favour the status quo which, in turn, almost inevitably works to frustrate radical, but beneficial innovation. Moreover, this risk may be amplified by lack of appreciation for trends in modern technologies;  Second, there is also a danger that the regulators overcompensate against this risk, by adopting too lax an approach, and welcoming all kinds of start-up entities so as not to stifle innovation. This may be aggravated in cases where more than one regulator has an interest, a situation which calls for greater collaboration, proper coordination and effective communication. Navigating these risks remains work in progress, with central banks across the world adopting a wide variety of approaches. From my perspective key elements of a robust approach by central banks should include the following six elements: First: clear leadership, guidance and consultation on the desirable direction for the development of the financial sector, including reforms to the regulatory environment. For this reason, the Bank of Botswana strongly advocates the updating of the Financial Sector Development Strategy, which is now two years past its end date of 2016. In terms of consultation, the Banking Committee, Botswana Financial Markets Committee and the recently established Financial Stability Council, provide important channels for consultation. Second: leadership through advocacy and by example. The Bank is keenly aware that key legislation is out of date or missing. Regulations to support the growth of electronic payments have been finalised, while both the Bank of Botswana Act and Banking Act are in the process of revision. The Bank is also providing strong support for key developmental initiatives, including the development of the government bond market, within the established parameters of fiscal discipline, both through more active primary issuance and supporting the secondary market through establishment of a Central Securities Depository. Third: as I have already indicated, central banks should invest time and resources to have necessary awareness in developments in ICT. Here, the subject of distributed ledger technologies (DLT), fintechs and crypto-assets comes to mind. Fourth: where practicable, there should be some scope for easing the burden of regulations to allow innovations to be tested. Here, a particularly promising approach is the use of so-called regulatory “sandboxes” and other proof of concept frameworks, adopted by many jurisdictions including Singapore, Indonesia, Canada and, nearer home, in South Africa, where the South African Reserve Bank, working alongside commercial banks, recently successfully led the "Khokha" project to test the viability of DLT for processing wholesale interbank payments. Such sandboxes allow smallscale experiments under live conditions while being exempt from some legal requirements to keep down start-up costs and remove constraints on innovation. Fifth: in scrutinising innovations in financial services, a simple five-fold test should be applied: is it a solution to a real economic problem, in a cost-effective way; does it offer a better service; is it faster; does it democratise access (improves financial inclusion); and, are there serious negative side effects? Many recent developments, notably the use of mobile payments systems, would pass these tests with flying colours. In contrast, despite the headlines and the hype they generate, the so-called crypto-currencies, such as bitcoin and ethereum, at least at their present state of development, would fail on all counts. For example, these crypto assets cannot serve as a reliable unit of account, trusted store of value or universally accepted means of payment. By the way, Bitcoin turns 10 today. In conclusion, Paul Volcker, the former Chairman of the United States Federal Reserve, once famously said that the ATM was the only really useful financial innovation in banking. This was undoubtedly going too far: as I have already made clear, many Fintech innovations hold tremendous promise for improved security and speed of transactions and, importantly, financial inclusion. But it makes the point that central bankers have conservatism, and with it scepticism, ingrained in our DNA. This is how it should be. Not least, together with our co-regulators, Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority, the Financial Intelligence Agency and Botswana Communications Regulatory Authority, we act and serve public interest; collectively and in our respective statutory roles, are responsible for alleviating system-wide risks that are not always so readily appreciated by individual operators. As a case in point, measures to combat money laundering and other forms of financial crimes are undoubtedly inconvenient at the individual level. But this would be nothing compared to the inconveniences that would be experienced if international sanctions were imposed against Botswana for falling short of the required minimum standards on anti-money laundering and the combatting of the financing of terrorism. That said, central bankers must also do their part to avoid the risk of what might be termed “reckless conservatism”, and embrace opportunities that not only meet customer needs but also, in many instances, reduce systemic risks. Chairman of BSEL, Director of Ceremonies and Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you for your kind attention.
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Keynote address by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the Launch of the ABSA Africa Financial Markets Index, Gaborone, 9 November 2018.
LAUNCH OF THE ABSA AFRICA FINANCIAL MARKETS INDEX Keynote Address by Moses D Pelaelo Governor, Bank of Botswana November 9, 2018 I am delighted to be able to join you this morning to mark the official launch in Botswana of the ABSA Africa Financial Markets Index. It is even more of a pleasure to give the keynote address in the wake of the news that, in the 2018 update of the Index, the rank of Botswana has moved from third to second among the 20 countries covered in the Index. Director of Ceremonies, I would like to preface my remarks by observing that, not so long ago, the “Africa rising” narrative was somewhat eclipsed by what one respectable magazine described as the “hopeless continent of Africa”, a label that was later retracted as inaccurate and inappropriate. And rightly so! The fact is that, despite a number of development challenges and pockets of civil strife and political unrest in parts of the continent, Africa has remained largely resilient. This is in the context of an increasingly competitive and interconnected global economy in which both developed and developing countries continue to be challenged by relatively low rates of economic growth, unsustainable levels of public debt, as well as rising trade and socio-political tensions. It is all the more impressive, therefore, that the broader trajectory in Africa is one of progressive entrenchment of the democratic dispensation, adherence to the rule of law, and sound economic reforms, with laudable returns in some cases, in terms of overall economic performance. According to the 2018 World Investment Report by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), since 2010 FDI in Africa has averaged approximately USD 50 billion per annum. That the continent is increasingly regarded as an attractive investment destination is itself part of the new reality. But the on-going transformation of Africa is taking place in a broader new global reality; that is, one of increased economic interconnectedness in which there is a relative shift in the centre of gravity of economic power towards emerging markets. This shift brings with it increased opportunities for a more equitable sharing of the benefits of global wealth and income. That said, investor interest in Africa remains unduly cautious and heavily focussed on specific sectors, typically commodityrelated, in a few countries. The same UNCTAD report indicates that, in 2017, FDI flows into Africa fell by 21 percent compared to the previous year. Thus, there is a need to re-double efforts to not only make investors aware of the myriad opportunities in the continent of Africa but also provide tangible reassurance that levels of idiosyncratic risk are no longer prohibitive. To this end, as I speak, the inaugural African Investment Forum organised by the African Development Bank has reached its final day nearby in Johannesburg. The event has the explicit aim of moving beyond talking about investment in Africa to providing a setting for moving specific projects towards bankable deals. It is also from this perspective that I welcome the ABSA Africa Financial Markets Index, as a practical tool that supports market development and, by extension, further improvement in the investment environment. But, before sharing some thoughts on the role of financial market indices, let me, very briefly, enunciate the key characteristics of a wellfunctioning financial sector. Distinguished Guests, well-functioning financial markets should foster savings mobilisation and investments in a cost-effective manner, channelling surplus funds to their most productive uses, hence contributing to economic growth. They should inspire investor confidence; have breadth and depth in terms of product offerings, as well as liquidity. But more importantly, good governance and accountability structures, buttressed by a sound regulatory framework, good accounting and auditing standards, as well as efficient and independent judiciary are essential to embed public trust and investor confidence. In this way, developed financial markets facilitate the financial interactions of households, corporations, financial institutions, and governments. Such markets provide a pool of savings that can be tapped into for funding investments by businesses and, also, offer a stable source of funding for governments that can be used to undertake infrastructure development. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that countries with well-developed financial markets gain significantly from increased FDI. Of equal importance, studies concur that a developed financial sector can also create opportunities for financial inclusion, especially embracing SMMEs and the undeserved segments of the population. In turn, this supports economic diversification, enables economic agents to pool and offset risks, and encourages savings and wealth creation, thereby contributing to inclusive growth and improved living standards. Various indicators or sets of indicators have been used to measure financial development. The World Bank has developed a comprehensive conceptual framework to capture the multifaceted nature of the modern financial system. The framework has four dimensions that reflect the essential characteristics of a good and well-functioning financial system that is: depth, access, efficiency and stability. Staff of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have built on the World Bank framework by developing indices to measure the level of development of financial institutions and markets in terms of depth, access and efficiency, thus expanding the range of indicators used to assess financial development. These multidimensional indices capture the fact that financial services are provided by multiple financial institutions offering a wide array of products and services. The Africa Financial Markets Index is a valuable addition to this earlier work, where the ABSA Banking Group has partnered with the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF), an independent think tank for central banking, economic policy and public investment. This is with the explicit objective of providing a toolkit for countries seeking to strengthen their financial markets infrastructure. The Bank of Botswana was fortunate to be represented at the original launch of the Index in Washington DC during the 2017 Annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank. As already mentioned, the official launch in Botswana comes shortly after the release of the first annual update of the index. This is itself an important event, as it is through such regular updates that progress can be monitored. It is also to be welcomed that the coverage of the index has already increased, from the original 17 countries, to 20 in the 2018 update. As already explained, the Index ranks the maturity, openness and accessibility of financial markets in Africa based on both qualitative and quantitative criteria, focussing on six fundamental pillars for financial market performance. The 2018 update also pays special attention to policies for enhancing market growth, including financial inclusion and investor education. Most of the surveyed countries are implementing, or preparing to implement national policy frameworks for financial market development. The Index will, therefore, help provide them with valuable insights and tools to improve the state of their financial infrastructure and markets. As Maria Ramos, Chief Executive of the ABSA Group, has correctly observed, the index facilitates a meaningful debate about the maturity and accessibility of Africa’s financial markets, thus helping policymakers, investors, regulators and other market participants to identify the areas and initiatives which will drive the most significant improvements. In as much as I fully concur with the above observations, I should inject a note of caution at this point. In conducting the meaningful debate that Ms Ramos refers to, we should not just highlight the successes, but give equal weight to areas where more progress needs to be made. In this respect, the report highlights continuing room for improvement in several areas. These include, for many countries, the capacity of domestic investors, which hinders the development of new financial products and markets; and the need for further improvements in market infrastructure and regulatory frameworks. Similarly, while we should celebrate the improvement in the ranking of Botswana from third to second in the 2018 index, ranked only behind South Africa and ahead of continental heavyweights such as Nigeria, there is no room for complacency. There is considerable work to be done if we are to develop a truly world class financial sector in Botswana. To put this in perspective, while the ABSA Index ranks Botswana second in Africa, in the latest update of the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index, the country’s financial sector is ranked only 69th out of 140 countries. Thus, while the overall score of 65 percent is encouraging, the Index rightly highlights areas where there is considerable scope for further improvement, for example, low levels of interbank foreign exchange trading, very low bond market and equity turnover and limited product diversity. Similar observations were made in the 2017 Bank of Botswana Annual Report Theme Chapter, which focussed on the importance of financial sector development for inclusive and sustainable economic growth. To some extent, these deficiencies reflect structural factors including the relatively small market size and limited need for government borrowing. But there is also scope for beneficial policy intervention with the relevant sectoral regulators working in partnership with market participants. At this point, let me once again assure you of the Bank of Botswana’s wholehearted commitment to supporting financial sector development in the country. First and foremost, this comes from a relentless and consistent focus on the core mandate of the central bank, namely, maintenance of price stability, thus contributing to broader macroeconomic stability for durable and sustainable growth; second, establishing structures that promote financial stability; and, third, adoption of a regulatory framework that balances prudential requirements with allowing sufficient scope for innovation. And, above all, recognition that "once inflation enters through the door, public confidence and trust in the national currency will escape through the other"! At the recent sixth Botswana Stock Exchange Opening Bell Ceremony, I provided some details on the specific initiatives that the Bank is undertaking to spur the development of the government bond market and stimulate the interbank market, as well as on-going efforts to modernise both the central bank and banking laws. It suffices to conclude these remarks by, once more, underscoring the importance of trust, governance and transparency as the bedrock and essential preconditions for a sound and sustainable financial sector. At the heart of any financial system is public trust; regulation can help confer legitimacy on regulated service providers, but the value of this support is quickly eroded if the underlying integrity of governance structures is not well-entrenched. I do not need to remind you of the details of recent events in Botswana that have severely tested this core principle while, more broadly, in countries such as South Africa and the United Kingdom, the competence and integrity of the accounting profession is once more under intense public scrutiny. To their credit, in each case, the concerned regulators in Botswana have acted without fear or favour in addressing the challenges. The regulatory structure has been tested and not found wanting, and this is gratifying. But poor governance has a corrosive effect that, left unchecked, could undermine public confidence and trust in financial institutions and financial markets, however notwithstanding carefully these designed. governance I related trust that, challenges, Botswana will continue to make progress, cementing its lofty position in the continental rankings. I thank you for your kind attention, and look forward to the next update of the ABSA Africa Financial Markets Index.
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Keynote speech by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the official launch of BBS Limited Palapye Branch, Palapye, 26 November 2018.
OFFICIAL LAUNCH OF BBS LIMITED PALAPYE BRANCH Keynote Speech by Moses D Pelaelo Governor, Bank of Botswana November 26, 2018 It is an honour and a great pleasure to join you here this morning for the official opening of Botswana Building Society Limited (BBS), Palapye Branch. Palapye is evidently one of the fastest growing villages in the country. Growth, in this instance, is a function of response to economic opportunities, including actual and potential demand for services. I have no doubt that the decision by Botswana Building Society to establish a physical presence here is similarly a realisation of the potential to serve the proximate community, generate business returns and be part of the Palapye growth narrative. Distinguished Guests, by way of background, the Botswana Building Society is an offshoot of United Building Society of South Africa, which started operations in Botswana in November 1971. It subsequently transformed to Botswana Building Society in December 1976, with a primary mandate to provide housing finance against immovable urban property, later extended, in 1986, to cover rural areas, and indeed commercial loans. The latest transformation, from a friendly, mutual society to a public limited company, incorporated in April 2018, is of great significance in many respects. First, it allows broader scope for consideration of strategy, sustainable funding and provision of a wider array of services by Botswana Building Society. In this regard, there is greater potential to respond to economic opportunities, drive operational excellence and capacity to meet diverse customer needs; thus enhance the value of services to customers, as well as prospects for sustainable returns and growth. Second, Botswana Building Society recently placed its shares on the Serala platform, which is for unlisted equities, at the Botswana Stock Exchange and has shares of over P564 million. This development provides yet another opportunity for ownership and strategic control of a home-grown, prudently managed and profitable financial institution by Batswana. The expectation of Bank of Botswana is that this transformation and growth will be prudently managed and achieved in an environment of sound operations, to ensure durable and beneficial impact on the economy. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, it is fitting to recognise the growth and impact of Botswana Building Society on the economic landscape and as part of the financial sector of this country. Taking the twenty years to 2017, the assets of Botswana Building Society have increased at an average annual rate of 13.9 percent. This compares with an annual growth rate of 16.2 percent for commercial banks and 12.3 percent average annual increase in nominal GDP. This suggests a meaningful contribution to the economic and financial development of the country. Dissecting further, the average annual growth in residential mortgage loans was 14.2 percent, compared to 21.8 percent for commercial banks. Another interesting comparison is that outstanding residential mortgages by Botswana Building Society as at the end of June 2018 amounted to P2.9 billion, constituting 31 percent of the total of P9.3 billion for the commercial banks, which for the individual banks, ranged from a smallest value of P2.3 million to the largest amount of P3.2 billion. Distinguished Guests, this represents some of the relevant information that should inform prospective growth areas, strategic initiatives, and resource requirements of Botswana Building Society, going forward. Interestingly, Botswana Building Society Limited is reportedly making efforts to enhance its service offering and, therefore, potentially greater impact on society and the economy. In this regard, I wish to underscore that, to ensure an enduring and mutually rewarding relationship, businesses need to treat customers with respect and dignity. To this end, it is pleasing that Botswana Building Society Limited has, as its motto, “we know you better”, which I suppose means, a moral and corporate commitment that BBS staff will give you the respect and service quality that you deserve, here in Palapye. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, let me now turn to expectations on closing existing gaps with respect to housing finance, resource mobilisation and impact on welfare and sustained increase in incomes. First, it is germane to acknowledge the low level of housing finance in Botswana relative to the size of the economy. For example, residential mortgage lending amounts to 21.6 percent of total bank lending (including statutory banks); 14 percent of total assets of banks; and only 6.9 percent of GDP. Compared to more mature housing markets, these figures are very low. For example, the respective ratios for the United Kingdom are, 70.8 percent of total banking lending; 36.6 percent of total banking assets and 52.7 percent of GDP. This demonstrates the gap in development and the opportunities. Significantly, growth in this area represents an important source of future income growth and wealth generation. This is in several respects. For individuals, this relates to the opportunity to invest earnings meaningfully, use of the value of houses to generate other economic activities and sources of income, and potential for increase in wealth over time, as well as serving as a potent hedge against inflation. For the broader economy, there are benefits in terms of a continuous build-up of the volume and variety of stock of housing, alongside growth in the population and incomes. Potentially, this could also have significant distributional effects and, if housing credit is more inclusive, it can reduce income inequality. Furthermore, developed economies, with well-functioning financial systems, such as the United States of America, attest to the fact that citizens can access, in a disciplined and beneficial manner, the so-called “excess equity” in their mortgaged properties and use their houses as ATMs! Moreover, with unconstrained growth in mortgage finance and housing, there are incidental economic opportunities relating to the construction industry and related services, thus contributing to economic diversification. Distinguished Guests, the second point is that such prospects, however, need support in terms of a land tenure policy that facilitates the use of the various forms of land and real estate across the country to secure mortgage financing. This helps in terms of both financing and marketability of land and property countrywide, with the attendant economic opportunities. Therefore, the Administration, Improvement of Land Procedures and Systems (LAPCAS) project, that should ease constraints to using land acquired under different tenures as collateral for mortgages, is a welcome development. In this regard, it is our expectation that BBS and, of course other financial institutions in this country, will respond positively in providing affordable credit that the average household in Botswana can access. The third dimension, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, is that the supporting services need to be robust and sound. Among others, this relates to professionalism around property valuations to ensure that the resultant loan financing is aligned to housing market realities; thus safeguarding the interests of both the financier and the customer; respectively, as well as the soundness of financial institutions and welfare of households. Going forward, the development of a credible property price index and enhancement of sharing of credit information through well-organised credit bureaux would be helpful. Therefore, we agree with the observation made by the Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, in their 9th Edition of The Housing Finance Yearbook, that “a combination of a good macroeconomic environment, sound policy, better data and increased access to affordable credit” should spur the development of a vibrant housing market to the benefit of a large segment of the population. Fourth, appropriately structured resource mobilisation is key to successful provision of housing finance and related services. Given that housing finance is inherently long-term in nature and that there is an imperative for further growth in Botswana, it should be supported by a large pool of stable deposits and/or investments. This is afforded by attracting a range of small to large deposits, with associated transactional and return incentives. The point here is that active deposit mobilisation is critical for availing funds that can be deployed to support housing finance without undermining the viability of the financial institution. In addition, a robust capital market that facilitates seamless raising of long-term funds, including corporate bonds to suit various needs, is also needed. It is accepted that, as a matter of prudence, we should not burden short-term finance or worsen the structural maturity mismatches widely prevalent in the country’s financial system. Moreover, there is a need to invest in capacity to develop derivative instruments that facilitate risk sharing, as well as transformation and trading of assets and liabilities; thus alleviate constraints to mortgage financing. Regrettably, in this regard, the Botswana financial system is way behind the curve and, despite banking industry outcry about tight market liquidity in recent years, there is not much evidence of any innovative and structured products, such as mortgage-backed securities, negotiable certificates of deposit or credit default swaps. For its part, the Bank of Botswana has entrenched a largely credible monetary policy framework, with inflation sustained within the objective range of 3 – 6 percent and allowing for maintenance of relatively low interest rates. Furthermore, effective regulatory oversight and prudently managed financial institutions continue to contribute to maintenance of a sound and stable financial system. In this regard, well-anchored expectations, premised on a credible policy framework, supports determination of term structure of interest rates, relevant for both resource mobilisation and pricing of long-term loans. The policy environment is, therefore, conducive for orderly and effective intermediation and productive use of financial resources; and in the context of the theme of my message today, affordable cost of housing finance. Distinguished Guests, the fifth point, I want to highlight is the importance of presence of institutions and access to services, as demonstrated by the opening of the Palapye Branch of Botswana Building Society. Geographical spread of financial institutions allows for proximate access to financial services, in terms of both acquaintance and usage. This augurs well for financial inclusion. Thus, when people know about the existence and benefits of services and facilities, and when these are accessible in a convenient and cost-effective manner, they are more likely to use such services. Increasingly, “virtual” presence and access enabled by digital channels has become a viable platform for access to services and needs to be harnessed accordingly. Overall, presence and accessibility enhance prospects for mobilisation of financial resources, and effective demand for housing finance and other beneficial loan products; ultimately leading to increase in social welfare, as well as the broadening and growth of economic activity. I should, therefore, acknowledge that, currently, Botswana Building Society has offices and branches in Francistown, Gaborone, Kasane, Lobatse, Maun, Selibe Phikwe, Serowe; and now Palapye, in addition to twelve automated teller machines (ATMs) countrywide. More significantly, BBS has and continues to invest in various corporate social responsibility projects worth millions of Pula. Among these projects are a school library in Letswai Primary School in Zutshwa; computer labs at Marapong and Mowana Primary Schools in the Central and North East Districts, respectively, as well as building new ablution facilities and upgrading old ones at Molapowabojang Primary School. These investments in educational facilities will go a long way in contributing towards good education for our children and this is to be applauded. On that note, let me conclude by indicating that it is my expectation that patronage and use of financial services will increase because of this new branch. Thus, with relevant business strategies by Botswana Building Society, as well as facilitative policy environment, this branch will foster and sustain financial inclusion and, in turn, the attendant benefits of productive saving and use of finance, access to payments services, and broadly, enhanced economic activity. I implore you all, Palapye residents, the surrounding areas and beyond, to use BBS and other financial institutions in your area, to save; to access and use credit wisely, for the benefit of your families and sustainable development of the country. It is now my honour and privilege to declare the BBS Limited Palapye Branch officially open. I thank you for your kind attention.
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Opening remarks by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the official launch of the Financial Stability Council and signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, Gaborone, 26 February 2019.
OFFICIAL LAUNCH OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY COUNCIL AND SIGNING OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING Opening Remarks by Moses D Pelaelo Governor, Bank of Botswana February 26, 2019 Good morning and welcome to the Signing Ceremony for launch of the Financial Stability Council. Ladies and gentlemen, as I look back, the launch is the culmination of several significant steps and consultations. Among these are: first, the initial assessment by the Bank of the need and prospective role of a Financial Stability Council, articulated in the Monetary Policy Statement; second, consultations by officials within the auspices of the Bank of Botswana/Ministry of Finance and Economic Development Working Group, and also involving the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority and the Financial Intelligence Agency; third, approval for Honourable establishment of the Council Minister Finance and of by the Economic Development obtained in April 2018; and fourth an inaugural meeting to consider an outline of the Macroprudential Policy Framework and review of the draft Memorandum of Understanding in September 2018. The Financial Stability Council comprises the leadership of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MFED), the Bank of Botswana (the Bank), Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority (NBFIRA), and Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA), institutions that are involved in developing legislation and regulations, policymaking and supervision with respect to the whole or facets of the financial sector. It is acknowledged that the respective institutions have unique statutory mandates, objectives, oversight frameworks and operational spheres, albeit mostly related. In this regard, the Financial Stability Council is not established to usurp or dilute the role of the respective institutions, which is neither feasible nor desirable. Rather it is to share information and where, desirable, facilitate collective and coordinated approach to financial sector monitoring resolution. frameworks and crisis Ladies and gentlemen, to reiterate, as indicated in the 2018 Monetary Policy Statement, coordinated oversight is necessary because while the relevant institutions are distinctly and individually supervised at a micro level, the financial system encompasses interconnected relationships and activities and is subject to common and transferable risks. Therefore, the Council is designed to foster collaboration and coordination in the four areas of: sharing of data and information for purposes of monitoring and risk assessment; overseeing and guiding macro-prudential policy framework and implementation; regular briefings, consultations and policy review with respect to relevant developments; and structured and coordinated response to any financial system imbalances and resolution as may be necessary. Today’s signing of the Memorandum of Understanding by the respective institutions, therefore, represents an undertaking to collectively safeguard the continuing soundness and integrity of the financial system. Moreover, going forward, it also facilitates the development of mechanisms and channels for sharing of data and consultation. The thought process for establishment of a Financial Stability Council also involves consideration of a robust legislative backing for the work of the Council and this will accordingly be facilitated in the revised Bank of Botswana Act; consultations between the Bank and MFED on the review are at an advanced stage. Colleagues, before concluding let me highlight the more urgent work programme for the Council in the short to medium term. First, is publication of the Financial Stability Report, as an anchor publication, providing accountability in the areas of assessment of financial stability risks and mitigation measures. Second is agreement on a Macroprudential Policy Framework that is relevant for Botswana, in terms of risk mitigation, as well as recognising the gaps in financial inclusion and development. Third, there is a specific need to address the challenges arising from implementation of the Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism protocols and requirements. Fourth and related, thereto, is the requirement to decisively address the incipient misconduct and governance challenges in the financial sector, deriving from greed and/or misunderstanding or incompetence with respect to fiduciary responsibilities, as well as opportunistic crime and fraud. Fifth, consultation during 2019 will also involve consideration of a deposit protection scheme for the country, to guarantee access to deposits up to a specified threshold, in the event of bank failure. Lastly, cooperation and collaboration among the Council members would be critical in the timely update and renewal of legislation and policies to retain and improve effectiveness of supervision, monitoring and guidance for the financial sector. I thank you for your attention and I now call upon Council members to comment, before we proceed to sign the MoU.
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Speech by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the launch of Botswana's 2019 Monetary Policy Statement, Gaborone, 25 February 2019.
BANK OF BOTSWANA 2019 MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT by Moses D Pelaelo Governor February 25, 2019 Introduction Distinguished Guests, I am honoured to welcome you, on behalf of the Board, Management and Staff of the Bank, to the launch of the 2019 Monetary Policy Statement. This is an important occasion in the Bank’s annual calendar of events. We are therefore most grateful to you, Honourable Ministers and our Distinguished Guests, for having made the time to attend today’s event. The launch and dissemination of the Monetary Policy Statement are key elements of good governance, transparency and accountability in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. This is intended to promote an understanding of the conduct of monetary policy and its objectives and, accordingly, guide the public’s inflation expectations towards convergence with the Bank’s inflation objective; enhancing the prospects for sustainable maintenance of low, stable and predictable inflation. Specifically, the Bank uses the Monetary Policy Statement to report on the inflation trajectory and policy performance in the past year; to outline and convey its prognosis of economic and other policy developments going forward; and, in turn, the prospective monetary policy response and implementation in the ensuing year. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, the Bank’s monetary policy objective is to achieve price stability, defined as low, stable and predictable level of inflation that is within 3 – 6 percent. Monetary policy formulation is also aligned to safeguarding the stability of the financial system. In this regard, price stability and conducive monetary and financial conditions foster mobilisation of savings, productive investment, prudent allocation of credit and international competitiveness of domestic firms. In turn, a sound and stable financial system is critical for effective transmission of monetary policy signals, facilitating the flow of funds and liquidity, as well as risk mitigation in support of economic activity. Overall, therefore, the conduct of monetary policy and attention to financial stability supports the national objectives of employment creation and sustainable economic growth. Improvements to the Monetary Policy Framework Distinguished Guests, you will recall that when launching the 2018 Monetary Policy Statement, I shared with you the prospective refinements and improvements to the monetary policy framework due for implementation in 2018. Notable in this regard, was the publication of Monetary Policy Reports to further improve on communication of economic and policy developments. I am pleased to report that, for the first time, the Bank published two Monetary Policy Reports in August and October 2018. Going forward, the Bank will, in addition to this February Monetary Policy Statement, publish three Monetary Policy Reports in April, August and October, within seven days following the respective Monetary Policy Committee meetings. For the June and December Monetary Policy Committee meetings, detailed Press Releases will be issued. This is to provide a continuous comprehensive update on inflationary developments as well as a context to policy decisions. I must, however, emphasise that all the six meetings of the Monetary Policy Committee in a year are important and involve a careful consideration of any of the three likely outcomes and policy signals: that is, either to increase, decrease or maintain the level of the policy interest rate, which is currently the Bank Rate. I am also pleased to announce that, the Honourable Minister of Finance and Economic Development approved the establishment of the Financial Stability Council (the Council) for Botswana in April 2018. A Memorandum of Understanding between the four constituent members of the Council, namely, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development; Bank of Botswana; NonBank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority; and the Financial Intelligence Agency, will be signed tomorrow, after the first Monetary Policy Committee Meeting of the year. The formation of the Council is a significant step towards facilitating collaboration, cooperation and communication amongst the four government agencies for the purpose of implementing macroprudential policy. The other important facet relates to national contingency planning for a financial sector crisis, anchored on proactive macro-prudential assessments, stress testing and a deeper understanding of cross-sectoral interactions of firms and financial markets. Given the nature and construct of financial intermediation and, in particular, the structure of balance sheets of banks, things will and often go wrong. For these reasons, the strengthening of financial sector safety nets, encompassing effective crisis management, recovery and resolution plans as well as a proposal for the establishment of a deposit insurance scheme in Botswana, will form part of the agenda of the Financial Stability Council in 2019. On this breath, the Bank of Botswana is gravely concerned by the incipient personal greed and reported governance failures in some segments of the financial sector, which has the potential to erode fiduciary responsibilities and, consequently, undermine public confidence in financial markets. I can assure you, Honourable Minister, and indeed the international community that, for its part, the Bank will do all that is necessary, in collaboration with all key stakeholders, to preserve the integrity, safety and soundness of the financial system. This will include working tirelessly to support Government actions and programmes, coordinated by the Financial Intelligence Agency, in continuing to build a robust and sustainable Anti-Money Laundering and the Combating of the Financing of Terrorism architecture for this country. Honourable Minister, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, the Bank evaluates monetary policy implementation framework on a regular basis for effectiveness, and introduces refinements where necessary. In this respect, during this year, the Bank will adopt what is known as “Reserves Averaging” in the determination of Primary Reserves Requirement for banks and also shorten the maturity of the 14-day BoBCs to seven days. Under “reserves averaging”, commercial banks do not have to meet the primary reserve requirement daily but, rather, fulfil this statutory requirement on an average basis over the maintenance period, in our case, a calendar month. Reserves averaging, which is used in some jurisdictions, has been shown to improve liquidity management by commercial banks, foster more effective resource allocation through the interbank market and reduce the demand for excess reserves held for precautionary purposes. The reduction of the maturity period of the primary Open Market Operations tool, namely, the 14-day Bank of Botswana Certificates (BoBCs), to seven days, should enable shorter and simpler forecasting horizon for liquidity management by both the Bank of Botswana and commercial banks, with more accurate outcomes. In turn, it is expected to provide a solid basis for the starting point of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, supporting the extension of the policy signal along the yield curve. These enhancements require input and cooperation from commercial banks and, in that regard, consultations with the banks will commence shortly, with a view to ensure implementation of these measures within a short period of time. In addition, during the coming months, the Bank will consult the market on further possible changes to monetary operations and the “anchor policy rate”; for example, whether the Bank Rate or the BoBC rate is the more proximate to market considerations for policy transmission purposes. The objective of these refinements is to enhance the potency of the policy rate in the transmission of monetary policy signals as well as its influence on subsequent market reaction and posture. Furthermore, there is need to spur the development and efficacy of the money markets, for the purposes of effective policy transmission, as well as management, access and flow of liquidity among the commercial banks. It is envisaged that these consultations will be completed by the middle of the year. Distinguished Guests, alongside these measures, designed to ensure better structural alignment of short-term market rates and desirable policy transmission, any notional ceiling on the issuance of BoBCs will be lifted. This approach allows greater scope and flexibility for unconstrained and, therefore, effective liquidity absorption by the central bank in response to market developments. In addition to these anticipated changes to monetary operations, the Business Expectations Survey which, hitherto, was conducted half-yearly, will be undertaken on a quarterly basis. I must heartily thank those businesses that dutifully participate in the Business Expectations Survey and wish to appreciate their invaluable support and input into the analysis of economic developments and policy responses. I encourage those that are sometimes reluctant to participate, to join us in facilitating comprehensive and informed data and policy analysis. Honourable Minister, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me, at this juncture, to address three other areas, namely, global trends that have influenced inflation in Botswana; highlights of the conduct of monetary policy, both internationally and here at home; and, finally, provide the medium-term inflation outlook and, consequently, offering a view on the likely future policy stance in 2019. External Economic Developments in 2018 Global GDP is estimated to have increased by 3.7 percent in 2018, compared to 3.8 percent in 2017, with mixed performance across countries and regions. Among the advanced economies, growth strengthened in the USA, influenced by fiscal stimulus and stronger consumer demand. In contrast, performance faltered in the euro area, the UK and Japan. This was affected, in the main, by policy uncertainty, adverse impact of rising protectionist sentiments on global trade and constraints to implementation of structural and policy reforms. For the emerging market economies, output expansion remained strong, although slowing slightly, in the context of waning financial markets sentiment, trade policy uncertainty, weaker external demand and concerns about China’s economic outlook. Global inflation rose from 3.2 percent in 2017 to 3.8 percent in 2018, mainly due to the increase in international oil prices during most of 2018, which, however, was moderated by the decrease in international food prices. In particular, inflation was subdued in the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) countries, easing slightly from 1.8 percent in December 2017 to 1.7 percent in December 2018. Inflation in South Africa also decreased from 4.7 percent in December 2017 to 4.5 percent in December 2018. Overall, average inflation for the trading partner countries fell from 3.1 percent to 3 percent in the same period. Domestic Economic Developments in 2018 Domestic output is estimated to have expanded by 5.1 percent in the twelve months to September 2018, compared to lower growth of 2.4 percent in the year to September 2017. This expansion was mainly driven by sustained improvement in nonmining GDP growth and the recovery in mining output. Inflation was low and stable, and fluctuated around the lower end of the objective range of 3 - 6 percent for most of 2018; and the outcome was broadly consistent with projections for the year. The low rate of annual price increase was mostly due to the decrease in food inflation. Food price inflation decreased from 1.1 percent in 2017 to a negative 0.2 percent in 2018. However, fuel prices increased significantly by 16.1 percent during 2018, due to upward adjustments in May, October and November. This compares to a relatively smaller increase of 9.5 percent in 2017. Overall, the increase in administered prices (including fuel prices, public transport fares, as well as electricity tariffs) added 1.86 percentage points to inflation in 2018. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, the overall modest increase in prices in Botswana was in the context of subdued domestic demand pressures, as a result of the restrained growth in personal incomes and largely stable foreign inflation. Monetary policy was, therefore, conducted against the background of below-trend economic activity and a positive medium-term outlook for inflation and moderate fiscal expansion. Government expenditure grew by 6.6 percent in 2018 compared to a contraction of 6.3 percent in the prior year. It should be recognised, in this respect, that beyond the increase in wages, the short-term impact of government spending on domestic demand is moderated to the extent that a significant component involves infrastructure and capacity development. In the context of Botswana, this type of spending tends to be import intensive and the economic benefits of such public investments are derived in the medium to long term. Regarding wage developments, it is notable that government recurrent expenditure included a 3 percent salary increase with effect from April 1, 2018. However, nominal national wages increased by 2.3 percent, on average, which was below the average inflation rate for the period. These developments suggest a modest impact on domestic demand and inflation. On credit developments, growth in commercial bank credit accelerated from 5.6 percent in 2017 to 7.7 percent in 2018 and included a faster increase in lending to businesses, from 3.2 percent in 2017 to 10 percent in 2018. For households, annual credit expansion fell from 7.2 percent in 2017 to 6.2 percent in 2018, in the context of restrained growth in personal incomes. This included a 7 percent increase in personal loans and 4.9 percent for mortgages, compared to respective growth rates of 9.2 percent and 4.8 percent in 2017. Overall, the rate of credit growth continued to be supportive of economic activity, with minimal risk to financial stability. Global Monetary Policy Implementation in 2018 Honourable Minister and Esteemed Guests, monetary policy implementation in 2018 varied at the global level, in response to diverse economic performance and inflation developments across countries and regions. It was, however, generally amply accommodative, with low levels of interest rates and continued liquidity support to the financial sector in the euro area and Japan. However, policy rates were increased in the United States of America towards normalisation and, in the United Kingdom, in order to get inflation back to target. Monetary policy implementation was also mixed in the emerging market economies, with policy decisions mainly driven by the need to support economic activity. Closer to home, the South African Reserve Bank initially reduced the repo rate to 6.5 percent in March but later increased it to 6.75 percent in November 2018 due to elevated upside risks to the mediumterm inflation outlook. Domestic Monetary Policy Implementation in 2018 For its part, the Bank of Botswana continues to conduct monetary policy through a forecast-based policy framework that informs the appropriate response to deviations of inflation from the desired objective range. The analysis also involves assessment of divergence of actual output (GDP) from potential output (technically known as the “output gap”), which is the primary indicator of the direction of future inflation. The forecast incorporates projections of foreign inflation, exchange rate movements and changes in domestic administered prices and taxes. In addition, the Bank undertakes a careful evaluation of risks associated with the projected outlook. In determining the appropriate policy response, the inflation forecast is considered alongside indicators of financial stability and economic activity, including relevant information from the Business Expectations Surveys. As I indicated earlier, monetary policy during 2018 was conducted in an environment of below-trend economic activity and a favourable developments medium-term provided inflation outlook. for maintaining scope These an accommodative monetary policy stance in support of stronger output growth. Therefore, the Bank Rate was unchanged at 5 percent in 2018. Consequently, the prime lending rate of commercial banks was maintained at 6.5 percent, while the deposit rates were, similarly, virtually stable. Monetary policy was implemented with a view to sustain productive commercial bank lending and monetary operations conducted to ensure alignment of market interest rates with the monetary policy stance. Consequently, given the increase in liquidity that needed to be sterilised, outstanding BoBCs amounted to P8.2 billion in December 2018, an increase from P6.3 billion in December 2017. BoBC yields increased modestly in 2018, reflecting a continuing process of normalisation in the money market interest rate structure. Global Economic Prospects in 2019 Looking ahead, while global growth remains strong, the pace is moderating. The global economy is expected to grow by 3.5 percent in 2019, lower than estimated expansion of 3.7 percent in 2018. The projected lower growth is premised on anticipated slower expansion in advanced economies, mostly reflecting subdued performance in the euro area. The US GDP growth is forecast to decline from 2.9 percent in 2018 to 2.5 percent in 2019, as the impact of the fiscal stimulus dissipates. Growth in emerging market and developing economies is projected at 4.5 percent in 2019, slightly lower than the 4.6 percent in 2018. Overall, risks to the global economic activity are skewed to the downside, with prospects for escalation of trade tensions, tightening financial conditions, a no-deal Brexit and relatively weaker growth in China presenting key risks to the outlook. Global inflationary pressures are forecast to be modest in the short to medium term, reflecting below-potential output. In this environment, it is anticipated that monetary policy will remain accommodative in most economies, complemented by measures aimed at facilitating financial intermediation, while fostering resilience of the financial sector, to support growth in economic activity. It is, therefore, notable, that the earlier anticipated monetary policy normalisation (or increase of interest rates) in the advanced countries is being re-assessed and restrained with the advent of generalised weaker economic performance and heightened policy uncertainty. Domestic Economic Prospects Distinguished Guests, as the Honourable Minister of Finance and Economic Development indicated in the 2019/20 Budget Speech, the domestic economy is forecast to grow by 4.2 percent in 2019, slightly lower than the estimate of 4.5 percent for 2018. The main factors expected to support growth in economic activity include conducive financing conditions associated with an accommodative monetary policy stance and a sound financial environment. The budgeted 3.6 percent expansion in government spending in 2019/20 and the implementation of initiatives such as the doing business reforms, are expected to further support growth in economic activity and employment creation. The crawling band exchange rate policy framework has served the country well and will continue to complement monetary policy. This bodes well for maintenance of international competitiveness of domestic industries and macroeconomic stability. As announced at the beginning of the year and broadly consistent with Botswana’s trade pattern, the weights of the constituent currencies in the Pula Basket were maintained at 45 percent for the South African rand and 55 percent for the SDR. An annual upward rate of crawl of 0.3 percent of the nominal effective exchange rate is also being implemented in 2019, in order to stabilise the real effective exchange rate. Overall, both external and domestic pressures on inflation are expected to be benign, and it is projected that inflation will remain within the 3 – 6 percent objective range in the short to medium term. This forecast incorporates the estimated impact of the increase in public service salaries and prospects for continued accommodative monetary conditions. Having said that, it is worth underscoring the point that any upward adjustment in administered prices and government levies and/or taxes and any increase in international commodity prices that is substantially beyond current projections present upside risks to the inflation outlook. In contrast, downside risks to inflation arise from the restrained growth in global economic activity, the tendency of the ongoing technological progress to lower costs and the reduction in commodity prices. Monetary Policy Stance Distinguished Guests, based on available data, the current projections suggest that domestic inflation will, in the mediumterm, remain within the Bank’s objective range of 3 – 6 percent. This favourable medium-term outlook for inflation is in the context of moderate growth in economic activity and a sound and stable financial system. Therefore, prospective developments augur well for maintenance of an accommodative monetary policy that supports productive lending to businesses and to households, for welfare enhancements that also drive economic activity. The Bank’s implementation of monetary policy will continue to focus on entrenching expectations of low, predictable and sustainable inflation, through timely responses to price developments; while at the same time, taking due care to ensure that policy decisions are consistent with ensuring financial stability and supportive of sustainable economic growth and employment creation. Conclusion Honourable Minister and Distinguished Guests, as I conclude, it is important to note that the continuing success in containing inflation within the desired 3 – 6 percent medium-term inflation objective, to which the Bank remains fully committed, must in the end, involve the cooperation of all key players in the economy, including Government, parastatals and the private sector. I thank you for your kind attention.
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Welcome remarks by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the 2019 Media Economic Briefing, Gaborone, 21 May 2019.
BANK OF BOTSWANA 2019 Media Economic Briefing - Welcome Remarks by Moses D Pelaelo Governor May 21, 2019 Let me thank you, Distinguished Members of the Media, for honouring the Bank’s invitation to today’s Economic Briefing, which also marks the launch of the 2018 Bank of Botswana Annual Report. As I have repeatedly indicated, the Bank of Botswana values greatly the critical role played by the Media in the dissemination of financial, economic and other information to the nation; it is, therefore, not a coincidence that this economic briefing comes immediately after the briefing of His Excellency The President and Members of the Cabinet. The Annual Report is published in compliance with the Bank of Botswana Act and, as a statutory requirement, contains a report on the Bank’s operations and audited financial statements, that is to say, it is the primary vehicle for accountability to the nation on the operations and financial performance of the Bank. In addition to the statutory aspects of the report, it is a tradition that the Annual Report also includes a review of economic developments and outlook, as well as a theme topic section. The review provides an analytical content and explanations for economic developments and prospects, as well as background to policy conduct and operations by the Bank. In particular, this is with respect to monetary and exchange rate policies, financial stability, banking sector regulation, currency management, payments infrastructure and the management of foreign exchange reserves. The successive theme topics contribute to national economic policy analysis and evaluation and, hence, the requisite response and transformation needed to sustain the desired level of inclusive and diversified growth of the economy. Distinguish Ladies and Gentlemen, the Bank’s financial performance and operations in 2018 is against the background of moderation in the pace of global economic growth, associated with slack in growth of demand in an environment of policy uncertainty induced by increasingly inward looking policies, heightened trade and geopolitical tensions, lack of progress on Brexit and adverse climate. Meanwhile, in the region and domestically, prospects for growth and transformation continue to be adversely affected by both the inadequate pace and lack of traction of structural and policy reforms. Distinguished Members of the Media, you will note that the combination of international developments and the domestic context affect the immediate as well as the medium- to long-term outcomes. The first presentation this morning will relate more to the immediate outcomes, being the report on the Bank’s Operations and Financial Statements by the Chief Financial Officer, Mr Daniel Loeto. Mr Loeto will, among others, highlight the performance of the foreign exchange reserves that, in turn, have a major impact on the Bank’s financial performance and resulting revenues to government, and identify the various influences. At this stage, I will just preface his detailed explanations by indicating that the significant influences include, an environment of low global interest rates, volatile valuations of assets traded in global markets and currencies, trade and capital flows, government operations and fiscal balances as well as changes in the Bank’s investment guidelines and associated portfolio rebalancing. Distinguished Media Practitioners, as you would be aware, the Bank of Botswana is one of the few central banks in the world whose financial statements are prepared and audited in accordance with international reporting and auditing standards. I also wish to add that, the Bank’s financial statements, as has been the norm over the 43 years of the Bank’s existence, have obtained a clean audit report that confirm appropriate maintenance of accounts, existence of sound risk management and internal control environment and, in general, effective governance structures at the Bank of Botswana. In this respect, I would like to assure the nation and other stakeholders globally, that contrary to some unfortunate and inaccurate reporting by some in the Media, that there is no single Thebe that is not fully accounted for by the Bank of Botswana. For the record, kindly note that, the Bank of Botswana is not audited by the Auditor General; the Bank of Botswana is a separate legal entity, a central bank, audited by an independent statutory public audit firm appointed in accordance with the provisions of Section 67 of the Bank of Botswana Act. These public audit firms are subject to rotation rules, of both the lead engagement partner and the audit firm itself, after a prescribed period of time in accordance with international best practice. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen of the Media, you will also hear from the Director of Research and Financial Stability, Dr Tshokologo Alex Kganetsano, who will lay out the outcomes and explanations for economic developments in 2018, as well as prospects going forward. He will specifically discuss output, inflation, credit and interest rates, exchange rates, as well as the main components of the balance of payments and their impact on the nation’s foreign exchange reserves. Following the review of economic developments, Dr Kganetsano will summarise the theme topic for 2018, which is “Financing Strategies for Industrialisation and Transition to High Income Status”. He will explain that this theme topic is a sequel to the 2016 and 2017 ones; intended to complement and further enrich the policy analysis and prospects for success of the national industrialisation strategy. This is through highlighting areas for improvement, especially relating to funding and related institutional governance and operational effectiveness necessary for beneficial mobilisation and harnessing of financial resources using, where relevant, cross-country examples, such as Brazil, Singapore and the Republic of Korea. You may recall that, last year I alluded to disharmony or misaligned nexus between a stable macroeconomic environment and weak economic outcomes; specifically insufficient growth rates, high unemployment levels and income inequality, and the resulting slow pace towards attainment of the high-income status. Let me bring to your attention a recent study by the International Monetary Fund on “Growth in Southern Africa: Issues and Reform Options”; it is not contained in the Annual Report; but pertinent for public discourse on the “middle-income” trap. The study identified three factors that continue to detract from growth prospects and transition to high-income status. First, the lacklustre relative export performance and shrinking tradeable sector. In contrast to countries that attained middle-income status rapidly (in Latin America and South-East Asia, for example), for Botswana, over the last few years, the private tradeable sector declined as a share of the country’s GDP. The second factor relates to the low and declining total factor productivity encompassing land, capital and labour. The third one is the relatively large public sector, including state-owned enterprises, with the resulting sub-optimal delivery of services and utilities, compared to middle-income peers. In their respective country assessments, the rating agencies, Moody’s and S & P Global Ratings, also emphasise this last point, namely, the need for a dynamic and expanded role of the private sector in the economy, to achieve economic diversification and inclusive growth. The combination of these factors contributes to declining competitiveness in the country, in terms of access to infrastructure and utilities, skills and, ultimately, tradeable goods and services. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen of the Media, while the analysis is obviously relative and involves country rankings, the Bank suggests that the study provides relevant issues for consideration of policy responses. Notably, this is in the areas relating to the balance between inward versus outward-looking industrialisation options, land economy and management, governance and accountability frameworks of institutions, domestic resources mobilisation and allocative efficiency, capital markets development and skills transformation, among others. I suggest that, to sustain medium to long-term prospects for the economy, diversified and inclusive growth and transition to high-income status, policy should focus on raising potential growth through structural and fiscal reforms, while maintaining sound macroeconomic policy frameworks and a stable financial sector, as well as rebuilding buffers to boost resilience. The 2018 theme topic is, therefore, a contribution in this regard. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me to introduce to you my colleagues here in the room and, thereafter, call upon the Chief Financial Officer, Mr Daniel Loeto to kick-start the presentations. I thank you for you kind attention.
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Welcome remarks by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at a conference, Gaborone, 24 June 2019.
BALANCING FINTECH OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS: IMPLEMENTING THE BALI FINTECH AGENDA Welcome Remarks by Moses D Pelaelo Governor June 24, 2019 It is with great pleasure and honour to warmly welcome you all to this small but vibrant city of Gaborone; the capital of Botswana, ranked the 48th largest country in the world (approximately the size of France, Kenya, Madagascar or Texas) but with a population of just over 2.3 million people – Our Pride, Your Destination. Allow me to extend a special welcome to the delegates, moderators and other resource persons to this important and timely two-day high-level conference on Balancing Fintech Opportunities and Risks: Implementing the Bali Fintech Agenda. While encouraging you to work very hard over the next one and half days, those from outside Botswana please do not forget that, once back home, you will be invariably asked about the City of Gaborone’s landscape of shopping malls and other social amenities. I have no doubt that it will be an incomplete story and a big disappointment if all you can say is that the Conference was successful. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to start, first, by acknowledging the presence of the Honourable Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Mr Kenneth Matambo, who has kindly agreed to perform the official opening of this Conference. In many respects, Honourable Minister Matambo leads the infusion and integration of modern technology in the provision of financial and government services. He has also lived through and witnessed the evolution from brick and mortar as well as paper to virtual and digital channels, both as a professional in various positions in the Public Service of this country and as a consumer of services. It is, therefore, fitting that he will perform the official opening of this Conference and give insights and inspiration on prospects for Fintech and its potential impact on the development agenda of our region. Second, we are also pleased to have amongst us the First Alternate Executive Director for Africa Group I Constituency at the International Monetary Fund, Ms Ita Mannathoko who, incidentally, is a Botswana citizen; Deputy Director, Monetary and Capital Markets Department at the IMF, Mr Aditya Narain; Division Chief in the African Department of the IMF who is also the Mission Chief for Botswana, Mr Papa N’Diaye, together with all the staff of the Fund and the World Bank Group here present. Let me say to you, individually and collectively, that your participation in this Conference is highly appreciated. We look forward to your wise counsel, guidance and infusion of expertise during the Conference. Third, I wish to welcome and appreciate the efforts of those that will moderate and lead the discussions during the Conference. I expect that their preparatory work, effective leadership of sessions, and animated dialogue on the relevant issues will stimulate and contribute to beneficial sharing of expertise and perspectives on both the benefits and challenges of harnessing Fintech. To all delegates, local and from outside Botswana, I have no doubt that the diversity in this room will surely enrich and add to the value and benefit of the Conference in terms of both inputs into the deliberations and implementable takeaways for policy and regulation, as well as ideas for innovation, with respect to business development and service provision. Indeed, the idea of the Conference is to propagate and entrench, globally, the broad themes of the Bali Fintech Agenda, which you will get to hear about over the next one and half days. For this reason, similar conferences, led by the International Monetary Fund, are being held in other regions. The cross-participation by policymakers, regulators and private sector practitioners in these conferences also enriches networking and the sharing of ideas; thus a common view, globally, about the prospects for Fintech and, where there are potential systemic and global challenges, inculcate forward-looking preparations for both localised and coordinated, cross-border mitigation approaches. In this regard, I wish to note that, as a practical approach, the SADC region has established a Fintech regional monitoring group comprising representatives from the respective central banks. This is intended to build institutional knowledge of Fintech developments on an ongoing basis and, therefore, continually provide the SADC Committee of Central Bank Governors with a comprehensive picture of existing and emerging technologies, the application and market penetration of these technologies, as well as the attendant risks. We, therefore, look forward to hearing your thoughts on the broad range of areas that are relevant for balancing Fintech opportunities and risks. I acknowledge and fully appreciate, in this respect, that the effort by the International Monetary Fund to lead the integration of Fintech into the global development and policy agenda provides for a useful, knowledgeable and accessible partner to support the domestication of this agenda. Having said that, I take it you will agree with me that, while policy and regulation can guide and safeguard, at the end of the day, the more impactful and beneficial aspect of Fintech should be on private business activity and associated adoption by customers, such that there are clear benefits in terms of productivity social and welfare enhancement. Even then, conferences, such as this one, are valuable for policy makers to reflect on prospective opportunities and vulnerabilities and to deliberate on responsive growth strategies. Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, for this purpose, there is no better qualified person than the distinguished Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Honourable Matambo to break the ground for this Conference and lead us in navigating the linkages between Fintech evolution, economic growth dynamics and benefit risk equation. Please joining me in welcoming, most warmly, Honourable Minister Kenneth Matambo to officially open the Conference. Thank you for your kind attention. Minister Matambo Sir!
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Speech by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the launch of Botswana's 2020 Monetary Policy Statement, Gaborone, 25 February 2020.
BANK OF BOTSWANA 2020 MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT by Moses D Pelaelo Governor February 25, 2020 Introduction Distinguished Guests, on behalf of the Board, Management and Staff of the Bank, I am honoured and most delighted to welcome you to the launch of the 2020 Monetary Policy Statement. I extend a special word of welcome to the Guest of Honour, Honourable Minister of Finance and Economic Development, his Cabinet colleagues, Members of Parliament and all Distinguished Guests attending this event for the first time. We are most grateful to you all for having made the time to attend the launch. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, the publication and launch of the Monetary Policy Statement is an important event in the Bank’s calendar of events, for a good public policy reason. It is a key aspect accountability in monetary policy. of good the governance, formulation and transparency and implementation of Through the Statement, the Bank seeks to promote an understanding of the monetary policy framework and its objectives. This helps to guide the public’s inflation expectations towards convergence with the Bank’s inflation objective and, therefore, enhancing prospects for sustained maintenance of low, stable and predictable inflation. Specifically, the Bank uses the Monetary Policy Statement as an instrument to report on the inflation trajectory and policy performance in the past year; to outline and convey its prognosis of economic and other policy developments going forward; and, in turn, the prospective monetary policy response in the year ahead. Background and Context In essence, the Statement commits the Bank with respect to its role in contributing to macroeconomic stability. In this regard, it is propitious that the 2020 launch of the Monetary Policy Statement follows a Budget Speech that proposes a new direction for policy and economic management. In addition, and coincidentally, the Bank, in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund and other development partners, recently concluded a workshop in Kasane on “fostering diversification to escape the middle-income trap” for Botswana. The Workshop benefitted from contributions by representatives of countries, such as Chile, Costa Rica, Estonia, Mauritius and South Korea, which are considered to have been successful in advancing export and economic diversification. Distinguished Guests, there are common themes that emerge from both the recent Budget Speech and the Kasane Workshop; and to which the Bank is also fully aligned. First, that Botswana faces challenges of inclusive growth and evident structural transition, from historically higher growth rates of early years of its development to the current modest and inadequate levels to propel the economy to high-income status by 2036. This is reflected by, or indeed because of, weak traction of export-led industrialisation strategy with a shrinking tradable sector and, in general, narrow economic base, high unemployment rates, as well as relatively high levels of poverty and income inequality, even as levels of incomes and prosperity are increasing somewhat. Clearly, this situation requires urgent attention if the aspirations espoused in Vision 2036 and the desire to transit to high-income status are to be realised. Second, is the need for structural reforms and transformation to improve productivity, ease of doing business, policy transmission and impact, institutional performance and leadership accountability, as well as the economic benefit of spending on infrastructure development and social services. Third, is the imperative to improve on implementation of reforms and initiatives through timely evaluation of the impact and outcomes of the reforms as well as performance of responsible entities. Fourth, it is critical to maintain macroeconomic balance, some aspects of which fall within the Bank’s statutory mandate and, therefore, covered in the Monetary Policy Statement. These relate to stability with respect to prices (inflation), the exchange rate and the financial sector. The other element of macroeconomic stability is fiscal sustainability, which was eloquently covered by the Honourable Minister in his maiden Budget Speech. It would be remiss for me, however, if I do not mention that, while Botswana is ranked 91 out of 141 by the World Economic Forum 2019 Global Competitiveness Report, it is ranked number 1, with 32 other countries, on the macroeconomic stability pillar. Honourable Minister and Distinguished Guests, the reason for this background is to highlight the fact that the Bank is alive to the development aspirations of the country and related challenges. Furthermore, within the confines of its role and mandate, the Bank contributes to efforts to address the constraints to diversification and inclusive economic growth. In essence, by focusing and consistently delivering on its specific roles, the Bank contributes to maintenance of a conducive macroeconomic environment for structural reforms and transformation initiatives to gain traction, potentially leading to higher rates of growth needed to elevate the economy to high income status. Policy Track Record Honourable Minister, as we come to the end of the second decade of the third millennium, it is important to reflect on the Bank’s contribution, thus far, to macroeconomic stability. After all, a key role for a central bank, by which it is ultimately judged, is the extent to which it succeeds in preservation of the value and integrity of the national currency, Pula and thebe. Notably, the evolution of the monetary policy framework from the early 2000s has resulted in beneficial transition from high and volatile to the current low, stable and predictable inflation. Similarly, the adoption of the crawling band exchange rate regime in 2005 and the subsequent public announcement of its key parameters, the coefficients of the basket currencies and the annual rate of crawl, have contributed to stability of the inflation-adjusted exchange rate. It was also key to the success in achieving the inflation objective. In addition, there has been, broadly, sound and effective banking supervision as well as beneficial collaboration by the various regulatory authorities that has contributed to stability of the financial sector, its growth and enhanced support for broader economic activity. developments is A a major lesson reinforcement of learnt from these the position that transparency, consistency and predictability of the policy framework are essential ingredients for sustainable growth objectives and public confidence. Distinguished Guests, I have to admit, however, that the levels of development of money and capital markets in Botswana need to be raised significantly. This is with a view to improve on transmission and potency of macroeconomic policies and to have a greater impact on economic activity. As of 2017, the composite financial index for Botswana (encompassing access, efficiency and depth) was two thirds that of Namibia, and a third and a quarter, respectively, of that for South Africa and Singapore. Therefore, this is one of the areas to attend to in the transformation agenda. Within such composite measures, Botswana falls short of international norms by nearly every metric and compares unfavourably with peer upper-middle income countries. The nascent development of the interbank market and stock exchange are good examples in this regard. Of particular concern is the paucity of supply of high-quality corporate debt instruments, fragmented credit markets and low level of development of the government bond market. This situation presents undue constraints and risks to long-term infrastructure financing, fiscal sustainability and, more broadly, a headwind to capital markets development. In other countries, a vibrant and highly liquid government securities market provides a source of funding for government spending, including local authorities and other public sector entities. This option is currently limited in Botswana and, therefore, its development offers a viable avenue for cost-effective domestic resource mobilisation for long-term investment and funding of government projects. Going forward, therefore, policy consultations, involving the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and the Bank, are focussed on designing a transparent and more frequent issuance of a sufficient quantum of domestic government securities in a predictable arrangement that, hopefully, will attract a larger pool of participants and support deficit financing, with lower risks. This would be premised on the adoption of a strong governance architecture around public debt management, underpinned by the country’s well-established track record of prudent fiscal policy and strong institutions. Furthermore, given the vulnerability of Botswana to trade shocks, climate change and consequent prolonged droughts, there is need to maintain sufficient fiscal and external buffers. This means building sufficient resilience to afford the fiscal space to undertake countercyclical stabilisation when necessary. The contribution of the Bank, in this regard, is through continued judicious management of the foreign exchange reserves to preserve capital, generate returns for organic growth, and to ensure availability of foreign exchange, necessary for uninterrupted economic activity. Monetary Policy Framework Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, the objective of the Bank’s monetary policy is to achieve price stability, defined as a low, stable and predictable level of inflation within 3 – 6 percent, in the medium term. Monetary policy formulation is also aligned to safeguarding stability of the financial system. In this regard, price stability as well as conducive monetary and financial conditions foster mobilisation of savings, productive investment, prudent allocation of credit and international competitiveness of domestic firms. In turn, a sound and stable financial system is critical for effective transmission of monetary policy signals, facilitating the flow of funds and liquidity, as well as risk mitigation in support of economic activity. Overall, therefore, the conduct of monetary policy and attention to financial stability support the national objectives of employment creation and sustainable economic growth. Price and financial stability also help to preserve the value of incomes and long-term savings, especially for low income earners and pensioners, with less opportunity or wherewithal to protect their incomes or generate wealth by other means. At this juncture I will, in turn, address three areas, namely, global trends that have influenced inflation in Botswana; highlights of the conduct of monetary policy, both internationally and here at home; and, finally, provide the medium-term inflation outlook and outline the likely policy stance in 2020. External Economic Developments in 2019 Global GDP growth declined to an estimated 2.9 percent in 2019 compared to 3.6 percent in 2018. The slowdown was widespread across countries and regions. Global economic performance and sentiments were negatively affected by trade tensions between the US and China, as well as uncertain prospects for Brexit. In the circumstances, global inflation eased from 3.6 percent in 2018 to 3.4 percent in 2019. Inflation was subdued in the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) countries, increasing slightly from 1.7 percent in December 2018 to 2 percent in December 2019. In South Africa, inflation decreased from 4.5 percent in December 2018 to 4 percent in December 2019. Therefore, average inflation for the trading partner countries was constant at 2.9 percent in both 2018 and 2019. Domestic Economic Developments in 2019 Domestic output expansion is estimated at 3.7 percent in the twelve months to September 2019, compared to 5 percent in the year to September 2018. The lower increase in output is attributable to, in the main, weaker performance of the mining sector. Growth in non-mining GDP also slowed, from 5.1 percent in the year to September 2018 to 4 percent in the corresponding period ending September 2019. Inflation was below the lower bound of the objective range of 3 - 6 percent for most of 2019; and the outcome was broadly consistent with earlier projections. Average inflation decreased from 3.2 percent in 2018 to 2.8 percent in 2019, largely because of base effects. This is because the increase in some administered prices in 2018 was not repeated in 2019. Overall, low inflation in Botswana was in the context of moderate domestic demand pressures and benign foreign inflation. I hasten to mention that food prices reversed the 0.4 percent decrease in 2018 to a 3 percent increase in 2019. The subdued pressure on inflation is also apparent from belowtrend economic activity, signified by a negative output gap, as the economy continues to operate below potential. However, Government expenditure grew by 15.4 percent in 2019 compared to an increase of 6.6 percent in the prior year. Within this, personal emoluments rose by 14.4 percent, following the April 2019 public sector salary increase, and this would have been replicated by other major employers. Nevertheless, the impact on inflation was muted. It should be recognised, in this respect, that there is significant externalisation of spending by both government and the private sector, including ready availability of imports, hence moderate impact of increased government expenditure and wages on domestic prices. The other point to highlight is that the short-term impact of government spending on domestic demand is moderated to the extent that a significant component involves infrastructure and capacity development. For Botswana, this type of spending tends to be import intensive. Therefore, the economic benefits of such public investments are derived in the medium to long term. At the same time, the recent labour force survey results, by Statistics Botswana, for the third quarter of 2019, indicate an unemployment rate of 20.7 percent. This reinforces the assessment of below-potential performance of the economy, modest aggregate demand and, consequently, subdued pressures on inflation. Distinguished Guests, the other component of demand, growth in commercial bank credit, eased marginally from 7.7 percent in 2018 to 7.6 percent in 2019, driven by a deceleration in lending to businesses, from 10 percent growth in 2018 to a contraction of 1.7 percent in 2019. For households, annual credit growth increased from 6.2 percent in 2018 to 13.8 percent in 2019, in the context of the increase in public sector wages. Likewise, faster growth was recorded for personal loans, while the increase in mortgage loans was smaller in 2019 compared to 2018. Overall, the rate of credit growth continued to be supportive of economic activity, with minimal risk to financial stability. Global Monetary Policy Implementation in 2019 Honourable Minister and Esteemed Guests, monetary policy implementation in 2019 was mixed at the global level, in response to weak economic performance and restrained inflation across countries and regions. It was, however, generally accommodative, with low levels of interest rates and continued liquidity support to the financial sector in some of the major economies. Most central banks in the emerging market economies reduced their policy rates, given the need to support economic activity. For example, closer to home, the South African Reserve Bank reduced the repo rate by 25 basis points to 6.5 percent in July 2019, and further to 6.25 percent in January 2020. Domestic Monetary Policy Implementation in 2019 For its part, the Bank of Botswana continues to conduct monetary policy through a forecast-based policy framework, and that informs the response to deviations of inflation from the objective range, in a forward-looking manner. The analysis also involves assessment of divergence of actual output from potential output (the output gap), a primary indicator of the direction of future inflation. The forecast incorporates projections of foreign inflation, exchange rates and changes in domestic administered prices and taxes. In addition, the Bank evaluates the risks associated with the projected outlook. In determining the appropriate policy response, the inflation forecast is considered alongside indicators of financial stability and economic activity, including relevant information from the quarterly Business Expectations Surveys. In 2019, monetary policy was conducted in an environment of below-trend economic activity and a favourable medium-term inflation outlook; therefore, providing scope for maintaining an accommodative monetary policy stance in support of stronger output growth. Hence, the Bank Rate was reduced by 25 basis points, from 5 percent to 4.75 percent in August 2019. Consequently, the prime lending rate of commercial banks declined from 6.5 percent to 6.25 percent. Deposit interest rates generally increased despite the high levels of market liquidity. This seemingly paradoxical outcome can be explained by the funding structure of banks, characterised by competition for corporate and other volatile institutional deposits that are important for several of the commercial banks. The increase in market liquidity that needed to be sterilised resulted in outstanding Bank of Botswana Certificates (BoBCs) of P8.6 billion in December 2019, an increase from P8.2 billion in December 2018. BoBC yields decreased following the reduction of the Bank Rate. Distinguished Guests, as I indicated last year, the Bank continuously evaluates monetary policy framework for effectiveness and, where appropriate, makes changes. In 2019, the Bank introduced the 7-day BoBC as the main instrument for conducting monetary operations, replacing the then 14-day paper, together with what we called ‘reserves averaging’ in the determination of the Primary Reserves Requirement for banks. This was with a view to improving the efficiency of liquidity management and policy transmission. Both measures were welcomed by the market, with a positive effect as expected; that is, better liquidity management by both the Bank and the commercial banks. Over time this is expected to reduce demand for excess reserves held for precautionary purposes; therefore, freeing up additional resources for productive lending by banks. I am also pleased to report that the Financial Stability Council (FSC), whose primary mandate is to coordinate macro-prudential policy analysis and respond to threats to financial stability, was launched in February 2019. As indicated, the Council comprises the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Bank of Botswana, Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority and the Financial Intelligence Agency. The Council commenced work and achieved three important milestones. First, is the publication of the maiden Financial Stability Report in September 2019. The Report concluded that the Botswana financial sector was sound, stable and resilient, even looking ahead. However, there is a continuing need to address market conduct and governance in some segments of the industry. Furthermore, there are outstanding matters relating to effective compliance with the anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism requirements. Notwithstanding, significant progress continue to be made for the country to be removed from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey listing by December 2020. Second, the framework for Council adopted Botswana, a which macroprudential outlines the policy analytical framework and tools to be deployed to mitigate systemic risk. Third, consultations were initiated on prospects for establishing a Deposit Protection Fund. The Fund would provide insurance and a mechanism for paying out a predetermined amount of customer deposits in the event of a bank failure. It will, therefore, be complementary to the existing framework of banking regulations, minimum prudential standards, ongoing supervision and resolution frameworks. Subject to the outcome of the industry consultations, the Financial Stability Council will seek authority for promulgation of the law to establish the Fund. Global Economic Prospects in 2020 Honourable Minister and Distinguished Guests, now looking ahead, the global economy is expected to grow by 3.3 percent in 2020, higher than the estimated expansion of 2.9 percent in 2019. The projection is premised on anticipated recovery of the underperforming emerging market economies. Overall, risks to the global economic activity are, however, skewed to the downside. The key risks to the outlook include continuance of geopolitical tensions, uncertain trade relations, social unrest in some jurisdictions, as well as the adverse impact of Covid-19. Global inflationary pressures are forecast to be modest in the short to medium term given below-potential output. In this environment, monetary policy will remain accommodative in most economies, complemented by measures aimed at facilitating financial intermediation, while fostering resilience of the financial sector, to support growth in economic activity. Domestic Economic Prospects in 2020 Distinguished Guests, the domestic economy is forecast to grow by 4.4 percent in 2020, higher than the estimate of 3.6 percent for 2019. The improvement is premised on conducive financing conditions associated with accommodative monetary policy and a sound financial environment. The implementation of ease of doing business reforms and concerted efforts towards economic transformation should also be positive for economic activity. The crawling band exchange rate policy has served the country well and will continue to complement monetary policy. This bodes well for maintenance of international competitiveness of domestic industries and macroeconomic stability. As announced at the beginning of the year and broadly consistent with Botswana’s trade pattern, the weights of the constituent currencies in the Pula Basket are 45 percent for the South African rand and 55 percent for the SDR. A downward rate of crawl of 1.51 percent of the nominal effective exchange rate is also being implemented in 2020. With low inflation, the policy framework allows flexibility to further loosen real monetary conditions through a downward crawl to enhance competitiveness of the domestic industry and support economic growth. Overall, both external and domestic pressures on inflation are expected to be benign, and it is projected that inflation will revert to within the Bank’s 3 – 6 percent medium-term objective range from the second quarter of 2020. The forecast incorporates a possible hike in water and electricity tariffs, as well as the announced increase in public service salaries in the 2020/21 financial year. Furthermore, it takes into account the small impact of the 1.51 percent downward rate of crawl on import prices. Having said that, I should be quick to caution that any upward adjustment in administered prices and government levies and/or taxes and any increase in international commodity prices that is substantially beyond current projections present upside risks to the inflation outlook. In contrast, downside risks to inflation arise from prospects of weak global economic activity, the tendency of the ongoing technological progress to lower costs and prices as well as a possible fall in international commodity prices. Monetary Policy Stance Distinguished Guests, based on available data, the current projections suggest that domestic inflation will, in the short term, revert to and remain within the Bank’s medium-term objective range of 3 – 6 percent. This favourable medium-term outlook for inflation is in the context of moderate growth in economic activity and a sound and stable financial system. Therefore, prospective developments augur well for maintenance of an accommodative monetary policy that supports productive lending to businesses and households, resulting in welfare enhancements that also drive economic activity. The implementation of monetary policy will continue to focus on entrenching expectations of low, predictable and sustainable inflation, through timely responses to price developments; while at the same time, taking due care to ensure that policy decisions are consistent with durable financial stability and support sustainable economic growth and employment creation. Conclusion Honourable Minister and Distinguished Guests, I wish to conclude by underscoring that the continuing success in achieving price and financial stability, to which the Bank remains fully committed must, in the end, involve the cooperation of all key players in the economy, including Government, parastatals and the private sector. The other point to conclude with is that, given that monetary and fiscal policies are expansionary for longer, immediate and effective implementation of transformation initiatives and structural reforms (so-called policy rotation) would raise prospects for faster growth and economic diversification, needed to attain high-income status within the Vision 2036 period. Honourable Minsters, Distinguished Guests, it is worth reminding us all, that, in as much as prices matter, ultimately, total factor productivity, global competitiveness of domestically produced goods and services as well as innovation and environmentally sound policies are critical for greater prosperity and social welfare. Furthermore, nothing that I have said today suggest, in any way, that, aggregate demand management is easy, however one is well informed. On the contrary, central banks across the globe are subject to intense and often critical scrutiny, especially at periods such as now of “low inflation and for long” with the likely danger of build-up of global financial vulnerabilities. All I have tried to do, today, is to share with you the likely considerations that would guide monetary policy decisions in 2020, putting these in the wider context of challenges facing not just the domestic but also the global economy. The Speaker of the National Assembly, Honourable Ministers, Honourable Members of Parliament, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you for your kind attention.
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Welcome remarks by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the 2020 Media Economic Briefing, Gaborone, 14 July 2020.
BANK OF BOTSWANA 2020 MEDIA ECONOMIC Briefing - Welcome Remarks by Moses D Pelaelo Governor July 14, 2020 at 09:00 hrs Good morning. Distinguished, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Media, once again, it is my pleasure, on behalf of the Board, management and staff of the Bank of Botswana, to welcome you to this economic briefing marking the launch and dissemination of the 2019 Bank of Botswana Annual Report, in fulfilment of the Bank’s accountability to its key stakeholders, in this instance, members of the fourth estate, Media Practitioners. I also want to take this opportunity to recognise and appreciate your continuing coverage of the Bank’s events, including joining us this morning for this economic briefing, notwithstanding the COVID-19 pandemic constraints and related challenges. Communication is increasingly becoming key in our policy “tool-kit”, being a means to meet public expectations of a transparent and accountable central bank as well as anchoring policy credibility. The Bank continues to explore ways and means to increase channels for sharing information with the public, on various aspects of its operations. Therefore, in addition to the revamping of the Bank’s website in 2019, other platforms, such as social media, are under consideration. To recap, Distinguished Members of the Media, the Annual Report is published in compliance with the Bank of Botswana Act and, as a statutory requirement, contains a report on the Bank’s operations and audited financial statements; therefore, the Annual Report is the primary vehicle for accountability to the nation on the operations and financial performance of the Bank. Also, as a statutory requirement, the Bank publishes a monthly Statement of Financial Position in the Government Gazette and submits an annual Banking Supervision Report to the Minster of Finance and Economic Development by June 30, each year. I am happy to confirm that these statutory requirements have been consistently adhered to throughout the existence of the Bank. The economic briefing this morning has three parts. First, Chief Financial Officer, Mr Daniel Loeto, will provide highlights of the Bank’s financial performance and operations in 2019 and updates, where relevant. Second, it is a tradition that the Annual Report also includes a review of economic developments and outlook. The review provides an analytical context and explanations for economic developments and prospects, as well as background to policy conduct and operations by the Bank. Tshokologo Alex This will be presented by Dr Kganetsano, Director, Research and Financial Stability Department. Dr Kganetsano’s presentation will include an overview of structural features of the Botswana economy, including the related challenges of slow progress on economic diversification, evidenced by continuing over-reliance on a single commodity for exports, government revenues and growth. Notwithstanding the current environment of extreme volatility and uncertainty in global economy and markets, the presentation will also cover economic outlook for 2020 and prospects for recovery in 2021. It suffices for me to indicate that the locomotives of the Botswana’s economic growth performance, namely, the diamond revenues and catalytical role of the government activities, would be severely constrained by macroeconomic the COVID-19 pandemic amidst shock which, according to a many commentators, is estimated to likely lead the global, regional and domestic economy into a recession of uncertain magnitude and duration; most likely not experienced since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The third presentation will be a summary of the theme topic for the 2019 Annual Report, on “Central Bank Governance and Functions in Pursuit of Price and Financial Stability” by Deputy Director in the Research and Financial Stability Department, Mr Innocent Molalapata. This theme topic is intended to explain the role of central banks in the economic management of any country, evolving institutional structures, mandates and objectives. Among others, Mr Molalapata will highlight the importance and linkages of the triad of central bank operational autonomy, transparency and accountability in facilitating effective discharge of the central bank mandates and maintenance of macroeconomic stability, attainment of inclusive and sustainable economic growth. He will also reinforce the need for central bank adaptability in an environment of fast and disruptive developments in financial technology, aligned to the nation’s aspirations for digital transformation and knowledge-based economy. Distinguished Members of the Media, in tying together the various strands out of the presentations to be delivered by my colleagues this morning, some key messages become apparent, clearly suggesting that the current growth model for Botswana will, going forward, be difficult to sustain. First, that a key driver of economic and welfare prospects for Botswana, namely, the export potential has, over the last few years, faltered and shrunk as a proportion of GDP; therefore there is an urgent need for rejuvenation by redesigning the country’s industrial policies to promote exports and, given the size of the domestic market, to grow the private sector through a better integration into regional and global value chains. Second and related thereto is that, despite the large public investment in infrastructure and related social spending by Government, as well as policy output dedicated to the economic diversification efforts, the narrow economic base persists, with limited success on economic diversification. This will require development of the non-tradeable sector and address gaps in the quality of the regulatory frameworks, human capital competitiveness. and innovation to boost global The third aspect relates to prospective transition to structural fiscal and balance of payments deficits and the consequent decline of the official foreign exchange reserves. In this regard, and with an eye on slowing the depletion of external and fiscal buffers, there is need to enhance domestic resource mobilisation, by broadening the tax base, increase the progressivity of the personal income tax, streamlining and rationalisation of distortionary subsidies and VAT exemptions. Furthermore, and with the right governance architecture, there is considerable scope for enhanced and more optimal domestic borrowing programme to tap into resources accumulated by the retirement funds, annuity providers infrastructure and financing other and institutional increasing the funds for productive capacity of the economy. Having said the above, I am not inviting you, the Media, to discuss with the Bank fiscal policy options; this is the preserve of elected government, and, in this regard, led by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. However, I can say, without risking any transgression into the fiscal policy space that, subject to the effectiveness of the policy responses and the success of the transformation agenda, the issues I outlined above have the potential to undermine the resilience of the economy to any future economic shocks including the effects of climate change, prolonged droughts and water scarcity, as well as erosion of macroeconomic policy discretion hitherto provided by strong fiscal and external buffers. It is, therefore, important to reinforce the focus on the Vision 2036 aspirations to achieve high-income status and inclusive diversified growth. The thrust required is to galvanise efforts towards structural and economic transformation as well as harnessing opportunities enabled by the fourth industrial revolution by upscaling investment on digital infrastructure, adoption of ICT and digital skills. Global competitiveness reports suggest that Botswana lags peer countries in this regard. This speaks to the need for accelerated digital transformation and pace of eGovernment agenda to increase efficiency, the result of which should be easing of policy implementation constraints and focusing resources on more impactful programmes. Comparative country studies and experiences suggest that deliberate promotion of large-scale industries and dedicated implementation of industrialisation policies would be instrumental to successful escape from the middle-income trap and transition to high-income status. In addition, and coincidentally, in February this year, the Bank, in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund and other development partners, concluded a workshop in Kasane on “Fostering Diversification to Escape the Middle-income Trap” for Botswana. The Workshop benefitted from contributions by representatives of countries such as Chile, Costa Rica, Estonia, Mauritius and South Korea, which are considered to have been successful in advancing export and economic diversification. These countries made progress towards high levels of income by implementing outward-looking policies and fostering the growth of competitive product markets. The Bank of Botswana remains fully aligned to the long-term economic objectives of the country, and focussed on its mandate to contribute to macroeconomic stability, financial sector development and, also, financial inclusion to support broad-based, durable economic development. The envisaged modernisation of the Bank of Botswana Act and the institutional governance arrangements should help strengthen the Bank’s performance and roles in this regard. As Mr Molalapata will ably demonstrate, an effective central bank is key to durable and sustainable economic performance and, for Botswana, prospects for transition to high-income status. Distinguished Guests, in this instance, an effective central bank is defined as having de jure operational autonomy, transparent and accountable. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen of the Media, following the presentations, as always, the Bank benefits immensely from your observations, questions and comments on these various subjects. At this stage, allow me to introduce my colleagues here in the Auditorium and then call upon the Chief Financial Officer, Mr Loeto, to kick-start the presentations. I thank you very much for your kind attention.
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Welcome remarks by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the workshop on "Fostering diversification to escape the middle-income trap", Kasane, 6 February 2020.
Botswana: Fostering Diversification to Escape the Middle-Income Trap February 6 – 7, 2020 Kasane, Hotel Cresta Mowana Lodge Protocol Distinguished Guests, it is an honour and privilege to welcome you to Botswana; this time to Kasane, a tourist town located in a pristine natural environment that includes the Chobe National Park, with abundant flora and fauna and the confluence of two of the greatest rivers in the region, if not Africa, the Chobe and Zambezi rivers. It also happens to be located virtually at the point where four countries meet, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, while Angola is not very far off. In addition, barely a 100 kilometres away is the majestic Victoria Falls. Thus, the geography and natural environment are just what is needed, and fitting for our agenda in the next two days, being proximate to, and illuminating, the economic potential for Botswana and the region, not least the attraction of tourists and employment potential, but also enhanced regional trade. Honoured Guests, I wish to recognise the efforts of our partners in arranging this closed workshop on Fostering Diversification to Escape the Middle-Income Trap for Botswana. Notable, in this regard, is the role of the International Monetary Fund, represented today by the Deputy Managing Director, Mr Tao Zhang and his colleagues (particularly, the Article IV Consultation Mission Chief for Botswana, Mr Papa N’Diaye). In this regard, the identification and securing of facilitators and speakers and related logistical arrangements is an immense contribution to the successful conduct of this workshop. The partnership and contribution of the European Union Delegation and the United Kingdom Department for International Development is also significant. This is with respect to both the logistical support (transport and accommodation) and, especially, in looking forward to the potential impact of their continued involvement on the quality, pace and effectiveness of the transformation agenda at various levels, including political influence and leadership, policy development and technical support. May I also warmly acknowledge the presence and sacrifice made by the various speakers and contributors, several of them coming from very far; we look forward to hearing their insights and sharing of experiences, not only in this workshop, but hopefully also being the start of networks for ongoing consultations and benchmarking arrangements. Distinguished Guests, the workshop comes at the right time for Botswana, and derives from an assessment of economic performance of the country and consequent need for urgent discussion on transformation approaches to address the seemingly intractable challenges and, indeed to help transition the country to high-income status. As indicated in the programme, the line-up of speakers and roundtable discussions will articulate the history and impact of policy development and industrialisation efforts; the challenges Botswana faces; the consequences of not reforming or not responding appropriately; narrate the experiences of more successful jurisdictions in transiting to high-income status; and put forward, for evaluation, initiatives and agenda for transformation. Fortunately, it is propitious that the workshop is held in the same week that the first Budget Speech of the 12th Parliament was delivered by the Honourable Minister of Finance and Economic Development; thus an opportunity to examine prospective initiatives coming from this workshop alongside the most recent policy pronouncements by the Government. For my role this morning, allow me to perhaps preface and anticipate what is to come during the workshop by highlighting a few areas that could be top of our minds as we appraise prospects for transformation. First, given the challenges the country faces, there is a need to acknowledge and embrace the transformation aspirations of the Government, including the transition to a knowledgebased economy, cluster industrialisation approach and highincome status. In this regard, national policy dialogue and agenda should be on identification, prioritisation and sequencing of reforms, as well as urgent development of effective implementation frameworks and approaches. Overall, policies and their implementation, institutional energy and social engagement should focus sufficiently on attainment of the Vision 2036 aspirations. Second, is to highlight the misaligned nexus between macroeconomic stability, economic growth and development outcomes (economic diversification, inclusive growth, employment, in equality and poverty reduction). Here, we need to also recognise that, while previously all elements of macroeconomic stability were well anchored, the recent past clearly shows a transition to structural government budget deficits and resultant deterioration of fiscal buffers. Therefore, while the economic benefits from macroeconomic stability remain sub-optimal and there is need for substantial improvement, it is now also necessary to urgently address sustainability of the fiscal position and evaluate opportunities to rationalise the role of Government and domestic resource mobilisation and funding options. Third, and related to the first two (that is, identification of new sources of growth and impact on fiscal position) is the demonstrable nearing of the end of the diamond era, because of the combination of exhaustion of the mineral resource, increasing relative costs of production, changing lifestyles and consumer choices, including the impact of synthetic diamonds. The fourth point relates to prospective changes in regional and indeed international trade arrangements. In this regard, a more immediate policy assignment is to evaluate prospects for the Southern African Customs Union and the African Continental Free Trade Area, in order to appreciate the potential adverse developments for Botswana and also to identify opportunities that may be harnessed for prospective positive impact on the domestic economy. Fifth, is the evident climate change involving unreliable and unpredictable weather patterns, that is having a broad-based impact on economic performance in various sectors and areas, prospects for macroeconomic and financial stability and socialisation. Therefore, the requirement for appropriate policy responses and recognition of its relevance in the policy and transformation agenda, which might also involve adjusting to new global standards and prescriptions, business models and investment constraints or guidelines. Ladies and gentlemen, I hope that I have given you a flavour of some of the relevant issues for fostering diversification in Botswana to escape the middle-income trap and reinforced the urgent need to reform and implement transformational policies. Given the context that I have illuminated, it is evident that prospects for Botswana are currently predominantly unfavourable and not sufficiently aligned when assessed against the development aspirations of inclusive growth and transition to high income status. The positive note is that, I am confident, on account of the combined expertise and experience of delegates, that we will have frank, insightful and fruitful discussions, assessments and suggestions over the next two days, interspersed with a refreshing social programme. Therefore, there is a reason to look forward optimistically to rich and strong proposals on practical strategies for transformation of our economy. I thank you.
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Welcome remarks by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the 2020 Media Economic Briefing, Gaborone, 29 June 2021.
Moses D Pelaelo: Welcome remarks - 2021 Media Economic Briefing Welcome remarks by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the 2020 Media Economic Briefing, Gaborone, 29 June 2021. * * * Good morning; it is a pleasure to welcome you, Distinguished members of the Press to this annual economic briefing, which also serves as the launch and dissemination of the contents of the 2020 Bank of Botswana Annual Report. This started with a briefing of His Excellency The President and Cabinet yesterday. In this regard, the dissemination of the Bank’s Annual Report is the primary vehicle for accountability to the nation on the operations and financial performance of the Bank of Botswana. As we are all aware, the Covid-19 pandemic is still with us with devasting impact on the economy and social welfare. While some advanced economies are at advanced stages of reopening as a result of access to vaccines and successful rollout of vaccination programmes. Regrettably, in other parts of the world including in our region and here at home, we have witnessed a resurgence of infections and, consequently, a surge in COVID-19 active cases. In this regard, besides potential adverse impact on economic growth profile and estimates for 2021, I have to acknowledge the challenging effect of COVID-19 on work arrangements, where given the status of the Bank as a key national institution and an essential services provider, mainly currency and related security operations as well as domestic and international payments, we had to readjust resource deployment to ensure business continuity and uninterrupted service to the nation, while attending to staff welfare and strict observance of the disease containment protocols. As my colleagues will indicate in their presentations, the Bank also made the requisite policy adjustments, that is, monetary and exchange rate policy, financial sector policies and injection of liquidity into the banking system, including working with the banking industry to be fully aligned on the measures designed to address the national economic challenges occasioned by the COVID19 pandemic. Together with coordinated fiscal and government response measures, these interventions helped with stabilisation and, more significantly, preparing the country’s economy for strong, durable and sustainable recovery. In addition to the immediate responses to the shock occasioned by the pandemic, the Bank continues to focus on long-term prospects for the economy, that is, inclusive, sustainable growth and transition to high income status as well as attainment of the Vision 2036 aspirations. Therefore, while COVID-19 pandemic may, potentially, have damaged the country’s productive capacity in sectors such as, for example, tourism and related hospitality industries, there is limited window of opportunity to build economic resilience underpinned by embracing of innovation and technology upgrade; entrenchment of policy and institutional arrangements necessary for durable welfare enhancements and improvements in livelihoods. I will shortly sketch out elements of this in my remarks, while my colleagues will, in their presentations, address the details. We have three presentations this morning, namely, the highlights of the Bank’s financial position and performance in 2020 and updates, where relevant by Chief Financial Officer, Mr Daniel Loeto. Mr Loeto will indicate that the Bank recorded net income of P8.8 billion in 2020, of which P2.9 billion was net distributable income paid to Government. This will be followed by a review of performance and outlook for the foreign exchange reserves by Director of Financial Markets Department, Mr Lesego Castor Moseki. Mr Moseki will show that notwithstanding the near collapse of commodity prices in 2020 (notably diamonds) as well as net capital outflows, the country relied on accumulated government savings and relatively strong external position to 1/3 BIS central bankers' speeches supply the economy with foreign exchange. While the country is exploring external borrowing as one of the options for financing the “twin deficits”, that is trade and fiscal deficits, it is doing so in an orderly and coordinated manner, in the context of a prudent and sound debt management strategy. The third presentation by Dr Lesedi Says Senatla, Director, Research and Financial Stability Department will review economic developments in 2020 and provide relevant updates under the theme topic, “The Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on Botswana Economy, Policy Responses and Opportunities”. Admittedly, it is early days to provide conclusive empirical evidence on the extent of the damage done by COVID-19 pandemic and the necessary containment measures on the economy and society in general given the continuing uncertainty and paucity of data in some areas. Aligned to the key lessons that you will hear from the presentations by my colleagues, allow me to rehash and reinforce some of the key messages from the previous economic briefings. I believe that these should continue to underpin the thought processes around policy and institutional reforms as well as economic transformation; as recently announced by His Excellency, The President, “the Reset Agenda” or “Reinventing Government” as one American President once put it. In this respect, it is significant that both the internal and external assessments, for example, by the sovereign credit rating agencies (S&P Global Ratings and Moody’s Investor’s Service), as well as the recent IMF Article IV Missions, converge: one, on the evaluation and prognosis of the country’s recent economic performance and challenges; and two, on the reforms and innovation needed for structural adjustment, economic transformation and a return to faster rates of economic growth, this time in a more inclusive economy. I will briefly summarise four of these issues. First, Botswana’s economy is at a critical juncture where mineralled and public sector-led growth model can no longer generate sufficient growth, at least an average of 8 percent per annum over the next 15 years, to address the current development imperatives. Furthermore, a key driver of economic and welfare prospects for Botswana, namely, the export potential has, over the last few years, faltered and shrunk as a proportion of GDP; therefore, there is an urgent need to diversify sources of growth, including redesigning the country’s industrial and trade policies to promote exports in non-traditional sectors, attraction of foreign direct investment specifically targeted and linked to integration into regional and global production value chains; and strengthening export and investment promotion agencies. This requires a transition towards sufficient scale of industrialisation to generate diversified economic base and exports as well as better articulation of import substitution with performance incentives, the goal being to enhance international competitiveness of domestic firms and fostering productivity gains. Comparative country studies and experiences suggest that deliberate promotion of largescale industries and dedicated implementation of industrialisation policies are instrumental to a successful escape from the middle-income trap and transition to highincome status. The second aspect relates to prospective transition to structural fiscal deficits and depletion of the official foreign exchange reserves. In this regard, and with an eye on slowing the depletion of external and fiscal buffers, there is need to enhance domestic resource mobilisation, by broadening the tax base and coverage, streamlining incentives and rationalisation of distortionary subsidies. The country needs to grow a vibrant middle-class; and have more tax-paying citizens by investing more on innovation, empowerment and home ownership. The third aspect relates to financial deepening and inclusion. This requires sustained financial sector focus and dedication to the transformation and development agenda involving both the private and development finance institutions in financing infrastructure, green economy, digital and outward-looking industrialisation. This also requires clarity of roles of development finance 2/3 BIS central bankers' speeches institutions, namely, BDC, NDB, CEDA and BSB, with respect to alignment of their respective mandates to strategic sectors. Furthermore, a sustained focus on the development of the domestic capital market, underpinned by the right governance architecture and macroeconomic stability, is critical to internally orientate and tap into resources accumulated by pension funds, annuity providers and other institutional funds, the bulk of which are currently invested offshore in search of yield. As at February 2021, pension funds assets amounted to P106.1 billion, of which P68.3 billion or 64.4 percent of the total were invested offshore. As at that date, this was more than the official foreign exchange reserves at P55.8 billion. In this regard, the “reset agenda” needs to continue to prioritise sufficient and diversified mobilisation of financial resources by Government for funding infrastructure and cost-effective and, increasingly digital provision of services while ensuring budget sustainability and rebuilding of fiscal and external buffers which, hitherto, anchored the country’s economic resilience. In this regard, the Bank is fully aligned to, and agrees with the multi-pronged financing strategy adopted by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development for financing National Development Plan 11. Given the prevailing low interest rates environment and relatively low public debt matrices, it is indeed propitious to access global credit markets for funding growth-friendly and capacity building infrastructure, health eco-systems and rebuilding of the external buffers in readiness for the next negative external shocks including droughts. Fourth, with respect to the Vision 2036 aspirations, notably to achieve high-income status and inclusive diversified growth, a sustained focus on structural and economic transformation remains necessary. This requires harnessing opportunities offered by ICT as a singular sectoral growth area as well as an effective and influencer of economic activity. The country will need to continue to upscale investment on digital infrastructure to improve availability and affordability of IT equipment, internet and development of a critical mass of digital skills. At this juncture, I would like to ask the Chief Financial Officer, Mr Daniel Loeto to kickstart the Economic Briefing with a presentation on financial performance and highlights of the Bank’s operations in 2020, with updates where appropriate. 3/3 BIS central bankers' speeches
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Remarks by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the commemoration of the acquisition of African Banking Corporation of Botswana Limited by Access Bank plc, Gaborone, 7 October 2021.
BANK OF BOTSWANA BOTSWANA STOCK EXCHANGE OPENING BELL CEREMONY COMMEMORATION OF THE ACQUISITION OF AFRICAN BANKING CORPORATION OF BOTSWANA LIMITED BY ACCESS BANK PLC REMARKS by Moses D Pelaelo Governor October 7, 2021 Director of Ceremonies, I am delighted to join the Honourable Minister in acknowledging today’s two-themed momentous occasion of, one, continuing the tradition of monthly recognition and promotion of capital market activity through the symbolic ringing of the bell to mark the start of share trading, and, two, the coming into the Botswana banking sector and market of Access Bank PLC, through the acquisition of the majority shareholding in African Banking Corporation of Botswana Limited (BancABC). I will, therefore, complement the Honourable Minister’s insightful observations by projecting a central bank and regulatory perspective on some key aspects. Distinguished Guests, while the Bank of Botswana has clear mandates as enshrined in Section 4 of the Bank of Botswana Act, I will, for the purposes of today’s event, distill and project three aspects deriving from those mandates. These are the interrelated roles relating to sectoral regulation and supervision; promoting financial sector development and inclusion; and safeguarding financial stability. Regulation and Supervision of the Banking Sector First, it is important to appreciate that the coming into the market by a new entity, especially an internationally-active banking group, such as Access Bank PLC, requires careful and extensive evaluation that involves several elements. These include evaluation of the ownership and governance structures and scale of operations; financial strength and performance; strategic intent, market, and developmental impact; business conduct, reputation, and integrity issues; as reflected in performance and strategic direction. context, the “supervisory risk-perimeter” In this takes a consolidated view of the banking group, not only to identify sources of strength, but also likely sources of adverse impact on financial condition, reputation and overall safety and soundness of the financial system. Moreover, this evaluation also entails consultations, confirmations, and validations with the home supervisor, in this case, the Central Bank of Nigeria, through which we also make a judgement on effectiveness of supervision (of a large pan-African bank with multi-jurisdictional presence) and prospects for continuing supervisory collaboration, as well as jurisdictional facilitation of support to the foreign subsidiary. Honourable Minister, and Distinguished Guests, I can confirm that in all these aspects the assessment was positive, leading to the Bank of Botswana Board concluding that Access Bank PLC met the licensing and prudential requirements to be licensed as a bank in Botswana, hence the approval, in principle, of the acquisition of 78.15 percent of ABCH shares in BancABC, in March 2021. Promoting Financial Sector Development and Inclusion Turning to the promotion of financial sector development and inclusion, the Bank of Botswana recognises, Distinguished Guests, that in the first instance, the licensing requirements and ongoing prudential supervision are meant to allow those that meet the criteria and operate prudently to pursue their business and profit/return interests and aspirations freely, albeit within a regulated environment that safeguards safety of deposits and integrity and stability of the broader financial system. However, at the same time, the activities and operations of banks play an important role in promoting and fostering economic development, financial discipline and innovation. In this regard, going back to economic history, a preeminent father of the economics profession, Adam Smith in his classic/seminal works, “An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of Wealth of Nations”, alluded to “the invisible hand”, a concept that describes unseen market forces of supply and demand, leading to the unintended greater social benefits and public good as a result of individuals acting in their selfinterest. Hence, the need, as promoted by the Bank of Botswana, to accentuate the developmental role of banks in the interest of economic prospects and welfare improvements for society. Therefore, where opportune and prudent, the Bank will continue to implore banks, including Access Bank, into active participation and contribution to the national development and transformation agenda. Distinguished Guests, I have, therefore, in my engagement with the leadership of the incoming bank highlighted the pertinent and immediate developmental issues for Botswana, where I observed a positive response by Access Bank, supported by a demonstrable track record in markets in which it currently operates. The overriding issue for Botswana is financial inclusion generally, where it is expected that Access Bank PLC will add to vibrancy of market competition and broader coverage in attracting customers, diversity of products and services, quality of service provision and related cost rationalisation, for the benefit of both its investors and customers. Beyond this generalisation, there are specific areas of need where the Bank of Botswana has observed what I would call “cherry-picking” of easier to deal with customers and sectors and eschewing of some areas of greater need where the developmental impact can be larger and more pervasive. Here I am referring to support for small and medium scale enterprises (SMMEs), owner-occupied residential mortgages and project financing. Needless to state, banking, by definition, is the business of trust and risktrading, of course in a prudent, safe and sound manner. In terms of potential impact, there is evidence, globally, that SMMEs are the lifeblood of any economy and are responsible for much of employment creation, innovation and economic growth, broadly. This is more so in our continent, Africa. Access to mortgage finance and house ownership adds to economic freedom and security and has great potential to unleash wealth-enhancing possibilities in several directions. The current estimated 15 percent share of mortgages in total commercial bank loans in Botswana (very low compared to peer upper middle-income economies) need to improve markedly, which will go a long way towards helping the economy to realise its potential. The other area is an increasing need to complement government efforts in funding infrastructure development and this includes active engagement in fostering the development of the bond market or, more broadly, capital markets, where Access Bank PLC has the experience of operating in other African markets and emerging economies. This, combined with medium- to long-term project financing, would help build the nation’s productive capacity and therefore attract investment and stimulate innovation and more vibrant and efficient production of goods and provision of services. Channelling back credit in this direction should, therefore, generate more business for you, Access Bank PLC, in Botswana. Honourable Minister and Distinguished Ladies & Gentlemen this plea for enhanced funding of productive domestic economic activity is against the background of ample domestically mobilised financial resources, especially by the pension fund industry. A substantial part of these resources is, for prudence and optimisation purposes, rightly invested abroad to preserve capital and generate return, given the domestic constraints. However, I suggest that the banking industry, the broader financial sector and local industry need to actively engage and innovate around finding local opportunities for productive domestic deployment of these resources. This would massively impact domestic economic activity, employment creation and enhanced inclusivity. In the area of digitalisation, an aspect of the so-called “new normal”, I also appreciate that Access Bank PLC is active in deployment of digital channels that affords financial inclusion and promotes enhanced access to payments platforms, funds transfer and remittances, which, as well as being convenient, help promote economic activity and potential for increasing innovation, efficiency and business development. Honourable Minister and Distinguished Guests, it is notable that, Botswana now has a majority of regional banks or panAfrican banks. aspirations. This is fitting for regional integration However, the immediate practicality is the potential to facilitate regional trade, which by extension, implies a larger market and improvement of prospects for industrialisation, economic diversification and inclusive growth, particularly given trade facilitation afforded by the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement, as well as the support provided by the regional economic communities such as SADC. The expectation is that the appreciation and knowledge of the African context and institutions by the panAfrican banks would enable easier and productive engagement of the banks with local businesses. Given what I have said about areas of financing need, digitalisation and trade opportunities, it is fitting to, therefore, introduce Access Bank PLC to Botswana’s Economic Recovery and Transformation Plan (ERTP). I look forward to your active participation alongside your competitors in this national development and economic transformation effort, intended to accelerate economic diversification and inclusive growth and help to transition the country to high-income status by 2036. At a high level, the critical elements include promoting export-led growth involving integration of the domestic industry into the global value chains (incidentally your presence in Botswana is exactly that); harnessing of information and communications technology, digitalisation, for the purposes of efficiently and competitively driving economic activity industries/businesses; and for growth of new promoting enhanced use and productivity of domestically mobilised financial resources and therefore generate higher levels of industrialisation; fostering infrastructure development and efficiency of provision of government services for greater impact on private sector operations. I believe, Mr Wigwe, that these are well aligned to your strategic intent for the Botswana market and that you are well endowed to be part of this, especially as I believe you have aspirations to improve on the current position of the bank, of a P9.1 billion asset base (as at August 31, 2021) and 5th largest bank in the Botswana market. Operating Environment, Strong Banks and Financial Stability Honourable Minister and Distinguished Guests, what I have spelt out is only possible in a stable and conducive operating environment. From the side of Government and the Bank, I can confidently state that Botswana offers a well-developed public infrastructure, encompassing a liberal business operating environment, legal protection and respect for property rights, efficient and independent judiciary and, in general, macroeconomic stability, as the credit rating institutions (Moody’s and S&P Global Ratings) would say, anchored on strong institutions and predictable policies, including successful monetary policy and stable financial conditions. Added to this is a strong, effective and responsive regulatory framework for the banking industry and financial sector, broadly. Indeed, both the Bank of Botswana Act and the Banking Act are at advanced stages of review to modernise and align these laws to best international standards and practices. The expectation is that Access Bank will, as an individual entity, continue to be well governed, operate in a sound manner and adhere to the prudential requirements and regulatory guidelines and therefore contribute to enduring strength and stability of the banking system and the broader financial sector. In addition to the prudential and conduct aspects, there are national requirements and preferences regarding localisation of resource procurement, including staff of the bank (without undermining the group-wide staff and leadership development interests) and maintenance of good labour practices, as well as the general attention to staff welfare. In this regard, let me add that it would be difficult for Access Bank to achieve its strategic goals if policy making and decision making are overly centralised in Lagos or some foreign capital without the benefit of the local board and Botswana citizens playing a meaningful role in executive leadership in core banking areas such as credit underwriting, treasury or risk management. Above all, of course, a banking licence bestows upon the Board and Management of Access Bank PLC a huge fiduciary responsibility – which requires a high standard of ethical conduct and integrity. Again, we are well aware that public trust is the single most important asset of a bank. Therefore, Honourable Minister, the nexus of individual bank strength and compliance and a conducive operating environment makes for financial stability, which has several benefits. Among these are, first, sustained capability of individual institutions to play their roles of financial intermediation, risk mitigation, continuity of efficient payments and beneficial innovation, profitably, to the greater benefit of society. Second, a stable financial system and prudently managed banks facilitate effective policy transmission and therefore good prospects for countercyclical or policy measures to have the desired impact on the economy. Third, stability engenders system integrity and, therefore, patronage of the sector with all the resultant and incidental developmental and welfare-enhancing benefits for society. Thus, the focus of the Bank of Botswana in ensuring viability and soundness of individual banks and integrity and stability of the financial system (including the payments system). As I conclude my remarks, let me appreciate the role of the Botswana Stock Exchange in being integral to resource mobilisation, where the floatation and trading of shares signal economic and return prospects and accordingly channel funds to those. In addition, the payments settlement function of the stock exchange is not only facilitative, but also engenders confidence and patronage of the stock exchange. In these respects, I applaud the visible and relentless promotion of the Botswana Stock Exchange and the opportunities it affords. Well done Mr Tsheole. Honourable Minister, Distinguished Guests, I thank you for your kind attention.
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Speech by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the launch of Botswana's 2021 Monetary Policy Statement, virtual, 23 February 2021.
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Keynote speech by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the Official opening of Botswana Savings Bank Limited Hukuntsi branch, Hukuntsi, 30 November 2020.
OFFICIAL OPENING OF BOTSWANA SAVINGS BANK LIMITED HUKUNTSI BRANCH Keynote Speech By Moses D Pelaelo Governor, Bank of Botswana November 30, 2020 Salutations It is with great pleasure and honour for my delegation and I to be joining the Hukuntsi community and the Managing Director of Botswana Savings Bank (BSB) and his staff for the official opening of a branch here in Hukuntsi. Director of Ceremonies, let me mention that I gladly accepted the invitation from the Managing Director, Mr Marumuloa, to perform the official opening because of the significance of this occasion to the people of this region, which extends beyond the narrow confines of a bank branch building. First, it is important to acknowledge that, save for the Botswana Postal Services, this is the first permanent physical branch of any bank in Hukuntsi and the surrounding Matsha villages. Hitherto, notwithstanding its population, geographic size, proximity to wildlife conservation areas, importance of cattle farming, as well hosting many Government and subdistrict facilities, the entire Kgalagadi North constituency had only one bank branch in Kang and two ATMs providing financial services. Therefore, the opening of this branch is expected to make a huge beneficial impact to the inhabitants of the area, many of whom have historically had little or no access to formal financial services. Second, the opening of a BSB branch in this area within two weeks of that of the Palapye one by the Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Honourable Dr Thapelo Matsheka, is a clear demonstration of commitment and forward-looking business strategy on the part of BSB towards expansion and provision of convenient access to banking services in towns and villages, while meeting commercial objectives. Third, the development we are celebrating today is fully aligned and resonates well with the Government strategy on financial inclusion. The strategy, Making Access Possible, is designed in recognition that cost-effective access to financial services by all citizens is positive for financial sector development and inclusive economic growth. Access to banking and financial services eases the ability to meaningfully pursue economic activities that are desirable for individual welfare enhancement, employment creation, raising living standards, and, hence, sustainable national economic development. As you would be aware, financial inclusion is part of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals number 8 on Decent Work and Economic Growth. Financial inclusion and value addition Director of Ceremonies, financial inclusion has, at a minimum, four elements, namely, access to a savings account, credit, insurance, and facilitation of payments at reasonable cost and minimal impediments. The ultimate objective is for such access to add economic value in terms of increase in welfare and living standards for the individual, the community and the broader economy. To illustrate, first, savings products entail value addition in terms of safety of funds; possibility to earn interest income and protection against value erosion; and the saved funds are available for lending to others for productive use, based on properly assessed credit worthiness and prospects for a positive return. Second, credit eases the financial constraints and, used appropriately, it creates additional value in many respects. As examples, a shop owner is able to get credit to buy stock, serve the community, earn a profit and pay back the bank; a good cattle farmer can get credit to buy a pedigree bull, breed and sell higher value cattle and repay the bank loan; a young engineer, after a few years of working, is able to borrow to build a house and repay the loan from future earnings, over a period of time, as she progresses in life (technically referred to as consumption smoothing); a young public officer may see an opportunity to pursue higher education after working hours and borrow for this purpose, potentially improving his/her livelihood. Ladies and gentlemen, examples are abound. In the process all these generate added income and welfare for the borrowers, the bank and savers, as well as employment, for the store owner, farm workers, builders, teachers and so on. Third, insurance is obtained for the purpose of mitigating risks. It enables unconstrained pursuit of economic activity and productive use of resources premised on the knowledge that related and incidental risks are covered; and that there will be compensation for the insured losses. Examples of insurable risks are also many such as risks of fire, accidents, theft, etc, as well as mortgage protection, life assurance and medical insurance. Fourth, the facilitation of payments eases the conduct of trade and person to person transfer of funds and affords convenience. Therefore, it has a positive influence on the decision to pursue economic activity. This is particularly pertinent in the advent of new technology and payments platforms. Director of Ceremonies and Distinguished Guests, from the perspective of what I just said, it is evident that being financially excluded or lack of convenient access to financial services could otherwise be debilitating and constrain development and growth. That is, even with an abundance of resources in terms of land, livestock, labour, skills and ability, as well as public infrastructure and services, their productivity and benefit to society will be suboptimal in the absence of cost-effective access to financial services. Financial technology Traditionally, the key elements of financial inclusion and access have been anchored on physical presence of institutions (brick and mortar), such as the branch that is being opened today; payments instruments such as cheques and banknotes and coin; paper statements of account, passbooks and agreements; as well as personal contact between a customer and a bank official. While these channels and instruments remain relevant and important in many respects, the advent of technology, electronic means of payments, mobile money and other digital platforms offers greater opportunities for more efficient, adaptive and sustainable means for provision of financial services, particularly in the context of low-population density countries, such as Botswana. I, therefore, wish to take this opportunity to implore the Hukuntsi community to adapt and embrace these new normal in order to enter or retain the financial inclusion status. There are several reasons for this. The first is that the traditional approaches will, over time, likely to disappear due to lack of patronage and support, as the demand and supply of new approaches accelerate and become the new normal. Second, digital and mobile banking affords greater convenience for managing and executing payments and concurrent linkages to other services, including instant remittances. For example, the ability to order and pay remotely for plumbing, veterinary and other services in Hukuntsi while you are in Gaborone; access account information and pay for utilities while sitting at home or as you travel (the so called 24/7 access). Once you are digitally-connected, it becomes possible to transact everywhere, anytime and subject to adherence to advised protocols, in a safe and secure manner. Third, the backbone service infrastructure, including access to government services, utilities and enabling platforms to access and/or purchase basic goods and services are fast becoming electronic and digital. As it has always been, financial inclusion stimulates economic inclusion; but now the combination includes digital inclusion (connectivity). Significantly, digital, electronic and mobile phone services transcend the traditional barriers to access and financial inclusion (that is, distance, physical infrastructure, population density, education and income levels). In this context, it is true that the future of finance is technology. Director of Ceremonies, at this juncture, it is pertinent to highlight some of the undesirable aspects that come with digitilisation and financial technology that the community should be aware of. This includes the susceptibility to cybercrime, card fraud and identity theft. In this instance, such crime can happen with speed, with wider reach and impact, resulting in financial loss, disable key processes and, potentially, reduce public trust in the banking system. Customers, therefore, need to be vigilant in safeguarding their personal and account access credentials and in responding to unsolicited offers and requests for personal information. Such vigilance and risk awareness are attributes of financial inclusion. Enabling Factors for Financial Inclusion Distinguished Guests, the broadening of access to financial services or financial inclusion is, however, not in a vacuum. To be meaningful and effective, there should be some key enabling factors. While not exhaustive, I will highlight four of these. Infrastructure and government services The first of this is the provision of infrastructure and key services to enable uninterrupted functioning of financial services to meet service level assurances by banks/vendors and expectations of customers. In the modern day, this involves 24/7 availability of, and access to, internet, WiFi and mobile connectivity. In addition, there is need for adaptability in the provision of government services; for example, the introduction of biometric identification (Electronic/Digital Omang) could potentially generate a leap in the provision of financial services and management of important safeguards and risks, as well as adherence to the Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements. Similarly, digital records and access with respect to ownership of assets, such as land, property and livestock, would complement access to financial services. Financial sector policies, regulation, macroeconomic and financial stability The second relates to the cluster of financial sector policies, maintenance of macroeconomic and financial stability and effective regulation and oversight. A conducive environment in this regard catalyses the growth and patronage of financial services. For example, the policy posture in Botswana is to promote financial development and inclusion, involving financial technology and digitalisation in order to accelerate economic development. For such a policy posture to be effective, macroeconomic and financial stability are essential to safeguard deposits, integrity of the financial system, minimise value erosion and to promote productive investments. In addition, effective regulation fosters sound governance, as well as prudent and beneficial operations of financial institutions and, therefore, maintenance of trust; hence greater use of financial services. Role of banks beyond products A third aspect is the value added by banks or specifically bankers beyond “cold” availing of savings, loan and insurance products and payments platforms. Ideally, bankers are partners in ensuring optimum benefits from the products they offer (including maximising benefits and minimising costs). This is through the advice they give customers, monitoring of performance of accounts and funded projects, as well as customer counselling and taking corrective action to address emerging account maintenance challenges. In so doing bankers help sustain value addition and productivity of financial resources and services towards welfare enhancement and positive impact on overall economic growth. I implore bankers to (and indeed trust they will) prioritise and elevate these roles in their operations, which to date appear to be peripheral, in order to amplify the impact of their products and services on welfare, livelihoods and economic performance, broadly. Financial literacy and discipline A fourth factor in ensuring meaningful financial inclusion is financial literacy and discipline at the individual or customer level. This entails knowledge of banking products, their value in terms of impact on welfare, related costs and risks. It also involves understanding and execution of responsibilities such as repayment of loans in accordance with the agreed terms, good conduct and honesty in handling financial matters. Ultimately the backbone of financial discipline is reasonable spending that is aligned to one’s income. Notably, it is also financial discipline and good conduct of accounts that contribute to soundness of a bank, financial stability and prospects for monetary policy undertaken by the Bank of Botswana and government programmes to have a meaningful impact on welfare and economic activity. Inversely, financial indiscipline, such as borrowing from multiple sources and overindebtedness has the potential to undermine macroeconomic stability and, more broadly, the safety and soundness of banks. Distinguished Guests, against this background, it is appropriate that Botswana Savings Bank has responded positively to the need to extend the reach of financial services to an otherwise underserved part of the country. This is within its mandate. Botswana Savings Bank, a wholly owned Botswana Government entity, was established by an Act of Parliament in 1992, with the mandate to mobilise affordable financial services, mostly savings, and grant loans on commercial terms and provide efficient banking and financial services to meet the needs of the rural and urban dwellers in Botswana. In fulfilment of this mandate, the bank has three standalone branches in Gaborone, Francistown and Palapye. It has four co-branded branches (with BotswanaPost) in RailPark Mall (Gaborone), Mahalapye, Serowe and here in Hukuntsi. BSB also delivers banking services and products through the BotswanaPost network of one hundred and twenty-four offices country wide. It also has thirteen automated teller machines (ATMs) across the country. In the fifteen years between 2005 and 2020 (September), the value of BSB’s assets has increased almost ten times; from P255 million in 2005 to P2.4 billion, with a staff complement of one hundred and ninety-six (196). I also note that, fittingly, Botswana Savings Bank annually commemorates a World Savings Day in order to sensitise the nation about the importance of savings. In addition, the bank plays a part in corporate social responsibility initiatives including donating computers to various schools, installation of geysers at Lehututu Junior Secondary School and donating an assembly shelter at Lecha Assembly Area at Mphinyane Primary School at Hubona village. These corporate social responsibility programmes make the bank visible and help project the value of its services to the community. For this, I commend the Board and Management of BSB; and encourage them to continue investing in the communities where they operate or reside; and please do whatever you can to look after the environment. Distinguished Guests, as I conclude, I take the opportunity to express sincere gratitude to the Board and Management of BSB for having responded positively to the Government’s desire and objective to expand financial service to previously unbanked communities. We thank you Rre Marumuloa and your team for this foresight, innovation and dynamism as you continue to expand the footprint of the bank, making access to financial services possible; not only physically, but digitally as well. I, therefore, encourage the local communities to take advantage of proximity of the bank and availability of its digital platforms to make use of the financial services the bank is offering, now and in the future. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, it is now my pleasure and privilege to declare the BSB Hukuntsi branch officially open. I thank you all for your kind attention and for being part of this important occasion.
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Keynote speech by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the official opening of the Shakawe Branch of Absa Bank Botswana Limited (Absa Bank), Shakawe, 3 February 2022.
OFFICIAL OPENING OF ABSA BANK BOTSWANA LIMITED SHAKAWE BRANCH Keynote Speech by Moses D Pelaelo Governor, Bank of Botswana February 3, 2022 Director of Ceremonies, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure and, indeed, an honour for me to have been invited to be part of this evening’s ceremony marking the of cial opening and launch of the Shakawe Branch of Absa Bank Botswana Limited (Absa Bank). For the reasons that should be obvious to many, this is an invitation that the Head of Banking Supervision Department, Mr Godfrey Ngidi and I could not decline. Therefore, my colleagues and I would like to thank you, the Managing Director and, through you, the Board of Absa Bank for inviting us to join you and the people of Shakawe on the occasion of the of cial opening of this beautiful branch. Director of Ceremonies, let me indicate, at the outset, that today’s event, is of major signi cance in a myriad of ways. First and foremost, I can imagine that it responds to a major aspiration of the people of the North West region of Botswana, the Okavango Sub-District in particular, which has been and continues to be comparatively underbanked, even if acknowledging that Absa Bank has three branches and eight ATMs in the North West District; second, the opportunity to project the potential fi fi fi fi fi economic bene ts emanating from broadening of access to nancial services in this region and, third and more broadly, what Absa has done is aligned to public policy objectives of growing a more inclusive nancial sector. As many of us would be aware, the Okavango region is an important hub for Botswana tourism activity, encompassing linkages with the global economy, with wide geographical coverage and, therefore, large distances between any concentration of facilities and service points. Furthermore, it has the potential and conditions to make leaps in economic activity; thus, in some way contributing to the rates of economic growth needed to propel the Botswana economy to highincome status by 2036. In the circumstances, any improvement in the provision of nancial services (number and channels of delivery) becomes a key ingredient in unlocking or increasing the economic value that is inherent in the unique features of the Okavango region. Let me also acknowledge that, indeed, as an important infrastructure development, the Mohembo Bridge would similarly have a large positive impact on economic activity and welfare in the region. For Absa Bank, I believe, therefore, that the reason to establish a physical presence here is a realisation of the business potential of serving the proximate community and generating investment returns while being participant in the growth path of the North West region of Botswana. Notably, the physical presence also facilitates the delivery of banking services through information technology-based platforms and resultant wider adaptation by the community, a contribution to the Government’s digitisation agenda. fi fi Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, the unique features of the North West region and the potential impact of enhanced provision of nancial services and supportive infrastructure, generally, provide interesting background, and anchor to the theme of my key message today, which is “Broadening Access to Cost-Effective Banking Services, Especially by Rural Cohorts and Tourist Areas of Botswana”. Considering this theme, I wish to illuminate ve aspects that I view as immediately relevant to linking infrastructure and service enhancements to aspirations for faster and inclusive economic growth and high-income status for Botswana. First, is the scope and bene ts of economic inclusion. I am deliberately being broad because, while, as Governor of the central bank, it is easier for me, and mandate speci c, to talk about nancial inclusion, I do recognise that it is just one facet of inclusion and sometimes it cannot happen without the other enablers; for example, education or nancial literacy, access to infrastructure and utilities and deliberate strategic focus by policy makers and service providers. Ladies and Gentlemen, the essence of nancial and economic inclusion, generally is to empower communities, individuals and businesses to pursue economic activity in a productive manner, recognising and harnessing effectively the available resources. For nancial services, this includes access to savings products that offers safety of money and, also, enhances the time value of savings through returns or minimising the erosion of value due to in ation. These resources (deposits) are available to create additional value through lending to others; that is credit extension, which enables immediate access to the requisite amount or ow of funds to fi fi fl fi fi fi fi fi fi fl implementation of business ideas, innovation, and viability of economic activity, as well as, for individuals, consumption smoothing over a lifecycle. Also, there is access to insurance products for risk mitigation and compensation in the event of an adverse event occurring; and facilitation of payments through various platforms that are relevant and practical for the community and link well with the global community. The second order effect of enhanced access to nancial services is, therefore, a structural shift to higher economic and growth potential for the region (for both individuals and businesses) and, thus enhanced contribution to national economic prospects. In the context of today’s theme, where the economic essence of being rural does not connote backwardness, but involves a transition to encompass meaningful alternative economic activity that entails income earning opportunities, impactful production and employment creation. In the eld of economic studies, this will be de ned as a shift in the production frontier. For example, while still producing sh, it is with better methods/equipment, knowledge, larger production, trade with the rest of the world, it is sustainable and renewable, and positively impacts social welfare, over the long-term. As a third element, the prospective transition and structural shift of economic activity would ideally be more aligned to global production and performance attributes in terms of value chains, expectations on quality, standards and productivity. This, therefore, underpins prospects for maintenance and expansion of external markets, including tourism fi fi fi fi fi nance projects, asset acquisition, working capital, facilitating timely services, agriculture and other industries, resonating very well with the export-oriented development strategy that anchors the nation’s Economic Recovery and Transformation Plan and the Vision 2036 growth trajectory objectives. Enhanced access to nancial services, therefore, plays a key role in this regard. I am pleased, in this regard, to observe that in the advent of the COVID-19 challenges, Absa, together with other banks participated meaningfully in alleviating the adverse impact. For example, Absa helped 48 businesses through their restructuring of loan facilities amounting to P419 million. In addition, Absa bank participated in the Government COVID-19 Loan Guarantee Scheme (administered by BECI) introduced to support eligible businesses with access to credit from banks to shore up business operations, whereby up to now, it has supported eight businesses with loans amounting to P41.5 million. For emphasis, and to broaden this to the national context, I need to observe that, indeed, in the long-term and especially as diamond revenues decline, COVID-19 pandemic has illuminated the realisation that, the current development model, primarily based on government spending, is likely to be constrained by scal sustainability realities, reinforcing the need for a more dynamic private sector and, therefore, the imperative to promote entrepreneurship, self-employment and diversi ed sources of income. Again nance, in this regard, would be critical. fi fi fi fi Distinguished Guests, as a fourth element, in the modern day, progression with respect to nancial/economic inclusion, shift in the growth potential, and bene cial global linkages has to involve internet connectivity and digitisation. Therefore, I note with satisfaction, the shift towards provision of banking services by Absa bank through digital platforms. This eases the conduct of transactions and processing, especially in a geographically dispersed and thinly populated area, such as the Okavango region. It should also address the hitherto apparent diminution of services as public servants and other service providers occasionally depart from their stations here in Shakawe to travel long distances for banking services in Gumare and/or even as far as Maun. However, for such transition to be effective, it requires adaptation by customers, a secure environment and maintenance of process integrity, as well as availability of connectivity and continuous functionality of infrastructure and facilities. This is important for both domestic and customer service processes and for integrity and sustainability of global value chain and markets linkages. Again, in this instance, I recognise the positive response by banks, including Absa bank, in reducing transaction charges for use of electronic and digital banking services in order to sustain access and use of services, as well as ease the transition to digital platforms at a time when movements were restricted, and social distancing enforced to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. fi fi I would also like to highlight, as the fth area, the customer relationships that are important for safe, sound and sustainable banking arrangements. These include measured pace of the transition to digital platforms that takes into account customer capabilities and preferences, availability of backbone infrastructure and connectivity. I must be quick to indicate, Managing Director and Chairman of ABSA that this movement towards digital platforms should not result in abrupt closure of brick-andmortar branches without providing more cost-effective alternative channels for maintenance of high-quality banking services. Indeed, there is need for continued maintenance of functionality, resilience and uptime of electronic services, both for customer convenience and system integrity (24/7 availability as promised). There is also a need for compliance with respect to business conduct and fair practices, as well as disclosure requirements, know-yourcustomer, AML/CFT and general due diligence. All these issues are important to promote patronage of banking services, access to correspondent banking and external customers for businesses. Lastly, Distinguished Guests, as I have previously indicated in other fora, the Bank and public policy generally acknowledge that participation in the formal nancial sector by a greater number of businesses and individuals enhances the potency of macroeconomic policies. This is because banks are an important channel through which monetary policy is transmitted. For example, monetary policy action, involving upward or downward adjustment of interest rates, will affect saving and borrowing decisions of those that use banks and other nancial institutions; and fi fi fi growth and speed of change in prices. A greater use of the formal nancial sector also feeds information necessary for monitoring and, where needed, initiatives and responsive action for developmental purposes and for mitigating risks and maintenance of nancial stability. In a nutshell, this is what a central bank does; formulate and implement monetary policy. Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, assuming what I have just highlighted represents a terrain map or strategic touch points for Absa bank, the expectation is that, as part of a regional and well-established brand, it will in the instance of this branch, deploy its range of resources to maintain alignment of its products and services to the speci c needs of the local community, of Shakawe and the wider Okavango region, with a potential positive impact on national economic prospects. The immediate and obvious areas relate to tourism, agriculture and sheries. In all these cases, especially for the latter two (in line with the second order impact I highlighted earlier), there are opportunities for scaling up the quantum and quality of production and to expand market opportunities. In addition, to the business side, other products for individuals, such as nancing education and housing, remain relevant for welfare enhancements for the community. The other moral imperative, Madam Managing Director, is to kick-out unscrupulous money lenders and other unfair trading practices that are often prevalent where there are inadequate and inef cient banking services. fi fi fi fl fi fi fi ultimately such decisions, collectively, in uence the rate of economic Director of Ceremonies, Distinguished Guests, as some would be aware, Absa bank, formerly Barclays Bank of Botswana Limited, changed its name in 2019 following a “purchase and assumption transaction” by Absa Bank Group of South Africa, acquiring majority shares held by Barclays Africa Group Limited in Barclays Bank of Botswana Limited. The bank is growing; and to-date, remains sound. As an illustration, as at December 31, 2021, Absa Bank had a total network of 34 branches and 114 intelligent automated teller machines (ATM) and employed 1049 people; its deposit base increased from P9.1 billion in 2011 to P16.4 billion in 2021. Meanwhile, the total assets grew by 89 percent, from P11.4 billion to P21.5 billion between 2011 and 2021. Ladies and Gentlemen, I need to highlight also that Absa Bank is not new in Shakawe; the bank rst opened a branch in Shakawe in 2007, temporarily closed it for business in August 2018 to upgrade it and nd a place where it could conveniently and satisfactorily serve customers. The re-opening of the branch in a new location, which offers more convenience and improved services to customers is indeed testimony to the commitment by Absa Bank to serve the people of Shakawe, which is over 1100 kilometres from its head of ce in Gaborone. There could be no better indication by Absa Bank of its determination to share with the Botswana Government the responsibility to provide nancial services, economic infrastructure and facilities widely in the country. In a way, this is a demonstration of the bank’s “trademark” Africanacity, which embeds such values as “we engage communities to bring people’s possibilities to life” and “we are bold enough to change course”. fi fi fi fi Director of Ceremonies, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, the new branch of Absa Bank, being launched today is, inevitably, more modern, convenient and links well and securely with digital and electronic platforms and options provided by the bank, thus contributing to the enhanced range and quality of services for customers. Board Chairman and Managing Director, I commend you; the decision to open a brick-and-mortar branch in this region augurs well for complementarity of physical presence and digital delivery, measured transition aligned to the pace of customer adaptation and availability of infrastructure and connectivity. For customers and the community in general, I wish to observe that the advent of technology, electronic means of payments, mobile money and other digital platforms offer greater opportunities for ef cient, adaptive and sustainable means for provision of nancial services, particularly in the context of low population density countries, such as Botswana. It is, therefore, advisable to adapt and embrace the modern ways of accessing banking services in order to be nancially included. The reasons for this are that the traditional approaches will, over time, most likely disappear owing to lack of patronage and support, as the demand and supply of new approaches accelerate and become the new normal; digital and mobile banking afford greater convenience for managing and executing payments and concurrent linkages to other services, at a lower cost than the traditional methods; and the backbone service infrastructure, including access to government services, utilities and enabling platforms to access or purchase basic goods and services are fast becoming electronic and digital. Bagaetsho, it is also tting to fi fi fi fi re ect that the use of banking services also entails responsibility on the part of bank customers. These include nancial discipline in maintenance of accounts and honouring nancial obligations according to the agreed terms, as well as adhering to information security requirements when transacting online. Director of Ceremonies, it would be remiss of me to conclude my speech without highlighting the important and far-reaching social responsibility initiatives undertaken by Absa Bank. These include the Hackathon and Incubation Programme, which aims to mobilise youth innovators and connect them with established market players and industry experts for mentorship and information sharing; the ready-to-work programme, which is geared towards empowering the youth on nancial management, entrepreneurship and employability; nancial assistance to excelling university students, through the Absa F G Mogae Scholarship; as well as participating in the Women in Business Webinars, that are dedicated to empowerment of existing and aspiring women entrepreneurs. Ladies and Gentlemen, as I conclude, I take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to the Board and Management of Absa Bank for continuing to be aligned to the development aspirations of the country through fostering of nancial inclusion, availing products that propel a shift in the production frontier, facilitating digitisation and access to external markets (trade facilitation). I therefore encourage the Shakawe and wider Okavango community to take advantage of proximity of the bank and availability of its products to enhance productive participation in economic activity and increase in their welfare. fi fi fi fi fi fl Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is now my pleasure and privilege to declare the Absa Bank Shakawe branch of cially open. I thank you all for your kind attention and for being part of this momentous occasion. fi
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Speech by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the launch of Botswana's 2022 Monetary Policy Statement, Gaborone, 23 February 2022.
BANK OF BOTSWANA 2022 MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT by Moses D Pelaelo Governor February 23, 2022 Introduction On behalf of the Board, Management and Staff of the Bank of Botswana, I am honoured and most delighted to present the 2022 Monetary Policy Statement. I extend a special word of welcome to the Guest of Honour, Honourable Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Ms Peggy Onkutlwile Serame, who, while a veteran of economic policy making in this country, is attending this Launch for the first time in this capacity. Honourable Minister, I speak on behalf of the Board and the entire staff of the Bank of Botswana, joining the Nation in congratulating you for being the first woman to be at the helm of financial and economic policy management of this Republic as the Minister responsible for finance and economic development. This is particularly significant given that, you assume this role at a time when COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated Botswana’s economic challenges, and when, in many respects, the economy of Botswana is at crossroads. Nevertheless, we at the Bank of Botswana are confident that the roadmap towards the attainment of Vision 2036 growth aspirations and the structural reforms agenda, aimed at transformation of the current growth model towards a more diversified, export and private sector-led, inclusive and resilient economy, is the answer and key to reigniting productivity and export competitiveness. Once again, congratulations, Honourable Minister and thank you very much for gracing this occasion. Monetary Policy Statement Accountability Themes Honourable Minister and Distinguished Guests, the publication and launch of the Monetary Policy Statement is an essential element of good governance, transparency and accountability in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy, to anchor policy predictability and credibility. The important tenets, in this regard, are in five buckets. The first bucket is articulation of the policy framework, encompassing the three elements of objective, instruments, and operations. The second bucket is about evaluation of progress on policy performance and impact of the monetary policy framework, that is, with respect to the immediately preceding period, longterm track record and prospects, going forward. The third bucket and related to the foregoing, comprises consideration of capabilities and resources that influence policy effectiveness and impact; the key ones being institutional arrangements, analytical and forecasting integrity, market behaviour, responses, and ingenuity to innovate for policy transmission purposes. The fourth bucket is assessment of the global, regional and domestic environment, including emerging trends, scenarios, risks, events and policy response alternatives to be addressed or considered. The fifth bucket is the requirement for clear articulation of prospective developments (for example, influences on price developments) that monetary policy need to pursue and the instruments to be deployed within the policy horizon, to entrench public expectations of low, predictable, and sustainable inflation in the medium term. In this regard, consistent with its primary mandate, the Bank contributes to the maintenance of conducive monetary, credit and financial environment to foster an orderly, durable and balanced economic development and, more specifically, supportive of broader macroeconomic stability. Factors Affecting Monetary Policy Formulation in 2022 Honourable Minister, I will shortly outline the policy framework and some significant reforms to monetary operations aligned to aspects of these prefacing statements. However, before I do that, l wish to briefly expand on some of the themes I just highlighted as they are critical to the approach to monetary policy formulation and implementation and, also, the rationale and motivation for the operational reforms I will announce today. First, is that the progressive response to the COVID-19 pandemic appears to have transitioned, or is transitioning, from curtailment of economic activity to growth areas that address the endemic disease situation, for our purposes, health and wellness economics, sectoral realignments, and digitisation, among others; hence the prognosis for positive economic growth prospects, across the globe, going forward. Second, however, are mainly transitional supply-driven, and commodity price increases (some associated with intractable geopolitical tensions) that translate into high inflation. For several countries, inflation has multiplied by factors of two to three within a relatively short space of time; thereby, threatening macroeconomic stability and adversely impacting standards of living. These “cost-push” factors, volatile markets and nascent recovery demand conditions present real challenge for policy making and forward guidance. Therefore, third, a quicker transition to monetary policy tightening and unwinding of liquidity support measures in many countries, even as fiscal policy remains expansionary, a manifestation of policy rotation; and by the way, this is not necessarily a policy misalignment between fiscal and monetary policies. For emerging markets and developing economies, this policy normalisation, especially by major central banks in developed markets, could lead to undesirable reversal of capital flows, deterioration of debt metrics and foreign exchange constraints and related currency depreciation; in this regard, restraining policy space. Fourth, is the focus on opportunities and traction of transformation and policy reforms geared towards long term sustainable and impactful policy making and inclusive economic growth. For Botswana, these cover the range of reforms articulated in the Reset Agenda and Economic Recovery and Transformation Plan (ETRP). In the context of the Bank of Botswana, the ongoing legislative review proposes changes to institutional arrangements at the Bank, including a provision for a statutory Monetary Policy Committee that will have external members. Similarly, in addition to a statutory Financial Stability Council, the proposed amendments to both the Bank of Botswana Act and the Banking Act are designed to strengthen institutional and legal capacity for coordinated and effective resolution of any potential systemic financial sector imbalances. As I indicated at the previous launches of the Monetary Policy Statement, the operational reforms (I will shortly announce) are intended to enhance policy transmission and effectiveness, as well as fostering the development of capital markets, particularly the market for government securities. Distinguished Guests, the objective of the Bank’s monetary policy is to achieve price stability, defined as a low, stable and predictable level of inflation within the 3 – 6 percent objective range, in the medium term. What this means is this: in the context of the economy of Botswana, given its structure and level of development, and in order to achieve durable, sustainable and inclusive economic growth, price increases should not persist below 3 percent or above 6 percent. Monetary policy formulation also considers safeguarding the stability of the financial system. A sound and stable financial system is critical for effective transmission of monetary policy signals, facilitating the flow of funds and liquidity, as well as risk mitigation in support of economic activity. In this regard, price stability, as well as conducive monetary and financial conditions, foster effective mobilisation of savings, productive investment, prudent allocation of credit and international competitiveness of domestic firms. Overall, therefore, the conduct of monetary policy as well as sustained focus on financial stability, support the national policy objectives of employment creation and sustainable economic growth. Price and financial stability also help to preserve the value of incomes and long-term savings, especially for low-income earners and pensioners, with less opportunity or other means to protect the erosion of the purchasing power of their incomes or financial wealth. In essence, the Monetary Policy Statement commits the Bank with respect to its role in contributing to macroeconomic stability and prudent policy making. Hence, the requisite need to respond in a properly calibrated and timely manner to sustained high level of inflation and threats to financial stability. Overall, while pursuing its policy objectives and mandates, the Bank is committed to ensuring that macroeconomic policies are aligned and, accordingly, the policy choices and responses to promote price and financial stability are undertaken in the broader context and interest of fostering inclusive economic development and a building a broad-based, resilient economy. Honourable Minister, Distinguished Guests, against the backdrop of this outline of the monetary framework and objectives, I will now address, in turn, first, the global trends that have influenced inflation in Botswana; second, I will report on the conduct of monetary policy in 2021, internationally and here at home; and third, the medium-term inflation outlook and the likely policy stance in 2022. I will, thereafter, outline the reforms to monetary operations I alluded to earlier. External Economic Developments in 2021 The global economic performance and sentiment strengthened in 2021, amid improving demand resulting from the easing of the pandemic containment measures and consequent opening of economies. The reopening of economies was made possible by the effective roll-out of the COVID-19 vaccination programmes, especially in advanced economies, even as there was uneven distribution and supply of vaccines across the globe. The global economy is estimated to have expanded by 5.9 percent in 2021 from a contraction of 3.1 percent in 2020. However, the pandemic took a turn for the worst in some parts of the world in the second half of the year, with emergence of the new variants, Delta and later in the year, Omicron. Given the economic recovery that involved imbalance between demand and supply and a surge in commodity prices, inflation increased globally, from an average of 3.2 percent in 2020 to 4.3 percent in 2021; and from 0.5 percent to 5.1 percent for the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) countries and, regionally, from 3.1 percent to 5.9 percent in South Africa. Consequently, the weighted average inflation for Botswana’s trading partner countries increased from 1.7 percent in 2020 to 5.5 percent in 2021. Domestic Economic Developments in 2021 For Botswana, Gross Domestic Product is estimated to have expanded by 8.6 percent in the twelve months to September 2021, compared to a contraction of 7.3 percent in the year to September 2020. This was made possible by a combination of lesser movement restrictions in 2021 compared to 2020, on the back of effective disease containment measures including vaccination programmes; continuing adaptation of economic activity to the COVID-19 environment, accommodative monetary policy and supportive financial conditions. Domestic inflation was above the objective range of 3 – 6 percent for most of 2021, with average inflation increasing from 1.9 percent in 2020 to 6.7 percent in 2021, largely because of the increase in levies and taxes as well as administered prices during the year and associated secondround effects. Demand conditions and as, indicated by a negative output gap (the difference between actual and potential output for the economy), were modest and non-inflationary. Indeed, the recent labour force survey results by Statistics Botswana, which reports an unemployment rate of 26 percent, affirms the below-trend output growth. Furthermore, Government expenditure increased marginally by 0.1 percent in the first eleven months of 2021 compared to a decrease of 0.8 percent in the prior year. Within this, public sector personal emoluments rose by 4.4 percent. The other main driver of demand, growth in commercial bank credit, increased from 4.5 percent in 2020 to 5.1 percent in 2021, as both demand and supply improved due to increased economic activity and prospects. Lending to businesses increased by 2.7 percent in 2021, following a 0.5 percent decrease in 2020. For households, annual credit growth decelerated from 7.3 percent in 2020 to 6.4 percent in 2021, reflecting lower rates of increase in personal and motor vehicle loans. Global Monetary Policy Implementation in 2021 Honourable Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen, monetary policy implementation in 2021 was generally accommodative at the global level, characterised by maintenance of relatively low policy rates, following the aggressive reduction of interest rates in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, some central banks, particularly in emerging market economies, increased their policy rates in 2021 responding to the rising inflationary pressures. Moreover, some central banks in the advanced economies signalled that they would tighten policy rates, going forward, to control inflation and, in some cases, taper the asset purchase programmes introduced in 2020 to support the financial sector. Closer to home, the South African Reserve Bank increased the repo rate by 25 basis points to 3.75 percent in 2021 and, by another 25 basis points to 4 percent in January this year, to counter perceived upside risks to the inflation outlook. Domestic Monetary Policy Implementation in 2021 For its part, the Bank of Botswana continues to conduct monetary policy through a forecast-based policy framework that responds to sustained deviations of inflation from the objective range. The analysis also involves assessment of divergence of actual output from potential output (the output gap), a primary indicator of the direction of future inflation. The forecast incorporates projections of foreign inflation, exchange rates and changes in domestic administered prices and taxes. In addition, the Bank evaluates the risks associated with the projected outlook. In determining response, the inflation forecast the is appropriate considered policy alongside indicators of financial stability and economic activity, including relevant information from the quarterly Business Expectations Survey. Monetary policy in 2021 was conducted in an environment of below-trend economic activity and a favourable medium-term inflation outlook. The increase in inflation was judged to be transitory, of short-term duration and propelled by factors that, except for secondary effects and expectations, monetary policy would have no direct influence. There was, therefore, scope for maintaining an accommodative monetary policy stance in support of stronger output growth. Hence, the Bank Rate was maintained at 3.75 percent, following a cumulative 100 basis points reduction in 2020 to support economic activity that was adversely affected by the COVID-19 containment measures. Consequently, the prime lending rate of commercial banks remained at 5.25 percent. Deposit interest rates generally increased, indicating competition for corporate deposits that are volatile and form an important component of the deposit base for many of the commercial banks. Outstanding Bank of Botswana Certificates (BoBCs) amounted to P2.3 billion in December 2021, a decrease from P7.8 billion in December 2020, representing a decline in excess liquidity, albeit partly a manifestation of a switch by banks to holding government securities. Foreign exchange sales or externalisation of funds also contributed to the reduction in liquidity in the banking system. Distinguished Guests, the assessment of financial stability, as contained in the October 2021 Financial Stability Report shows that, despite the adverse effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the domestic financial system continues to be resilient, characterised by strong capital and liquidity buffers, moderate profitability, generalised institutional strength and good business performance across the industry, as well as being adaptive and innovative. Therefore, the provision of essential financial services in a safe, sound and efficient manner, was sustained during 2021. The enduring stability of the financial system was supported by sound macroeconomic environment, efficient and robust market infrastructure, prudently managed banks, and effective regulation and supervision. Therefore, the financial sector continues to be well-placed and resourced to support economic activity in the recovery phase of the economy. Global Economic Prospects in 2022 Honourable Minister, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, now looking ahead, that is, prospective economic developments in 2022. Global economic growth is expected to moderate to 4.4 percent in 2022, from 5.9 percent in 2021. However, growth prospects are uneven across regions and reflect uncertain COVID-19 profile and response measures (restrictions and vaccine rollouts), speed and scale of monetary policy tightening and withdrawal of policy stimulus, as well as geopolitical tensions. Regarding price developments, global inflation is expected to remain elevated in 2022, influenced by prolonged supply chain disruptions, anticipated increase in energy prices and improved global demand conditions as most countries progressively deploy effective COVID-19 vaccines and economies reopen. In this environment, it is anticipated that monetary policy will likely tighten in most economies to control inflationary pressures resulting from pandemic-induced and persistent supply and demand mismatches. Domestic Economic Prospects in 2022 Honourable Minister, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, the domestic economy is forecast to grow by 4.3 percent in 2022, driven mainly by the continuing recovery of mining activity and improvement in global output. The positive growth prospects are also premised on conducive financing conditions associated with accommodative monetary policy and sound financial environment. In addition, the effective implementation of the ERTP, underpin impetus for positive economic prospects. Honourable Minister, regarding inflation, the immediate backdrop is that inflation is worryingly high, having risen progressively since the second quarter of 2021, culminating in a reading of 10.6 percent for January 2022. At this level, there is a risk of self-fulfilling expectations of sustained high inflation as manifested in inflation-indexed contract price adjustments, agitation for higher transport fares, negotiations for wage and salary increases, a rise in house rentals and general price increases for goods and services. To mitigate against this, let me state that inflation is forecast to start moderating from the second quarter of 2022 and, subject to current projections remaining valid, revert to within the Bank’s 3 – 6 percent medium-term objective range from the third quarter of 2022. To be absolutely clear, this projected trajectory for inflation is premised on the following. First, the 2 percentage points increase in VAT was a once-off event and will, therefore, fall off from the inflation calculation in 2022. Second, the increase in administered prices announced or estimated for 2022 are no higher than those for 2021 and, therefore, should not result in an acceleration in inflation. Third, domestic aggregate demand remains modest relative to supply. Associated thereto, the projected economic growth, of 4.3 percent in 2022, is below growth potential; and, therefore, output gap remains negative, hence non-inflationary. Fourth, while global inflation is similarly rising, the projected trading partner inflation is within the Bank’s objective range of 3 – 6 percent. Notwithstanding, I should be quick to point out that the risks to the inflation outcome are skewed to the upside. Notably, as I have just indicated, this relates to second round effects and expectations; larger increase in commodity prices (especially energy prices) than currently incorporated in the inflation forecast, particularly emanating from current geopolitical tensions, as the talk of a possible war in Europe intensifies; short-term unintended consequences of import restrictions; and persistence of supply and logistical constraints due to lags in production. Against these, are the downside risks to inflation which include, weaker economic activity than projected, reemergence of virulent COVID-19 variants (winter months are coming) and resultant restrictions on economic activity, and lower international commodity prices than currently projected. 2022 Monetary Policy Stance and reforms to monetary operations Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, as currently projected, the medium-term outlook for inflation remains favourable and is in the context of moderate growth in economic activity and dissipation of the effects of increase in administered prices and modest impact of external price developments. Ordinarily, this should augur well for maintenance of accommodative monetary policy that supports productive lending to businesses and households. However, given the significant upside risks to the inflation outlook in the short-term and possibility of elevated inflation expectations, the policy posture may need to be calibrated to respond, in an appropriate, timely and measured manner, to price developments in 2022. Turning to exchange rate policy implementation, as announced at the beginning of the year and broadly consistent with Botswana’s trade pattern, the weights of the constituent currencies in the Pula Basket are 45 percent for the South African rand and 55 percent for the SDR. A downward rate of crawl of 2.87 percent of the nominal effective exchange rate is also being implemented in 2022, which entails marginal inflationary pressures as the Pula exchange rate depreciates through the downward crawl. Nevertheless, the overriding focus is on maintaining global competitiveness of the domestic industry and support economic growth through maintenance of a stable real effective exchange rate (the composite Pula exchange rate adjusted for inflation differentials). Here, let me point out that, the exchange rate policy framework is anchored on strong performance and adequacy of the foreign exchange reserves, which have improved slightly from P53.4 billion or 10.1 months of import cover in December 2020 to P57.1 billion or 10.8 months of import cover in December 2021, partly due to recovery in domestic economic performance, as driven by improvement in external demand. Therefore, to the extent that sustainability of the current exchange framework continues to be supported by an adequate level of foreign exchange reserves, the inherent flexibility imbedded in a crawling band exchange rate regime, facilitates adjustments of the rate of crawl of the Pula exchange necessary to generate competitiveness of the improvements domestic in industry, international as may be warranted. Honourable Minister and Esteemed Guests, as indicated earlier, the Bank continuously evaluates monetary policy implementation framework for effectiveness, as may be necessary. In this respect, during this year, the Bank will introduce further improvements and changes to monetary policy operations with three main objectives. First, and foremost, to enhance potency of monetary policy transmission and desired market response to adjustments to monetary policy and operations. Second, to designate an anchor policy rate capable of affecting liquidity management decisions of banks, and thus providing a direct link to policy changes. Third, to achieve an interest rate structure that fosters an active interbank market that also projects the policy stance and desired impact of monetary operations on economywide interest rates. Honourable Minister, these refinements are intended to enhance financial intermediation, reduce costs of monetary operations and improve effectiveness of communicating monetary policy signals. Furthermore, the Bank expects that successful anchoring of these short-term market interest rates to the desired policy stance should also help in the determination of the yield curve for government securities (that is, the cost of financing of budget deficits and infrastructure projects). In this regard, the Bank will, in the first half of 2022, introduce the reforms to the monetary policy framework as follows: first, the Bank will adopt and designate the yield on the main monetary operations instrument (currently the 7-day BoBCs) as the anchor policy interest rate; it will be called Monetary Policy Rate; replacing the Bank Rate. Second, the auction format for the main monetary operations instrument (the BoBCs) will be changed from the current multiple price system to a fixed rate full allotment system. Third, an interest rate corridor, with a 200-basis points margin, will be established comprising a new Standing Deposit Facility at the Bank of Botswana at 100 basis points below the Monetary Policy Rate and a Standing Credit Facility at 100 basis points above the Monetary Policy Rate. The decision to want to use both the Standing Deposit Facility and the Standing Credit Facility will be at the discretion of individual clearing banks, that is, banks permitted to have accounts at the central bank. Fourth, the current intra-day and overnight Credit Facility is retained to accommodate end of day settlement of positions (non-discretionary), currently set at 3.75 percent. Fifth, the Bank will, on a less frequent basis (two to three times within the Primary Reserves Averaging maintenance period), depending on the liquidity situation, undertake liquidity absorption or injection at the policy rate. Sixth, the Bank will introduce a one-month paper (BoBC), auctioned once a month, that will help address some of the structural liquidity positions and support the construction of the short-end of the yield curve, especially since government treasury bills are not issued for this tenor. Finally, in order to foster the development of a competitive financial sector, the Bank considers it prudent to allow commercial banks to independently determine their own Prime Lending Rates (PLR). However, to ensure an orderly and smooth transition as well as treatment of pricing of existing financial contracts and other products linked to industry prime lending rate, the current PLR of 5.25 percent should not be changed by any bank except in the event of an adjustment by the Monetary Policy Committee of the signalling policy rate, as I indicated to be called the Monetary Policy Rate. Given the scale of the reforms, the Bank will henceforth engage the relevant stakeholder community to ensure a smooth transition and implementation of these monetary operations reforms towards the intended objectives. Moreover, as well as embedding the operational processes around these reforms, the Bank will continue to project its communication capabilities and instruments to convey the messages relating to economic and financial developments; the main drivers of inflation and anticipated profile and trajectory, including estimation of the difference between potential and actual output; and how this evaluation informs the rationale for monetary policy action or posture. Conclusion As I conclude, Honourable Minister and Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to underscore that success in achieving price and financial stability, to which the Bank remains fully committed, calls for the cooperation of all key players in the economy. This time around, let me single out banks as key transmitters of monetary policy impulse and with responsibility for ensuring smooth implementation of the monetary operations reforms I have just announced. In addition, in a period of elevated inflation, all other stakeholders, are expected to moderate their inflation expectations in deference to the regular communication by the Bank on inflation profile. Market analysts and the media would be particularly helpful in this regard. To summarise, while I have said so many words in the past half hour or so, the overriding message is that the Bank stands ready, as always, to play its part in contributing to monetary and financial conditions necessary for sustainable economic growth and welfare enhancement. Honourable Minister, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you for your kind attention.
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Speech by Mr Cornelius K Dekop, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the launch of Botswana's 2024 Monetary Policy Statement, Gaborone, 21 February 2024.
MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT | 2024 MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 STRATEGIC INTENT STATEMENTS VISION The Bank aspires to be a world-class central bank with the highest standards of corporate governance and professional excellence. MISSION The mission of the Bank is to contribute to the sound economic and financial well-being of the country. The Bank seeks to promote and maintain: • • • • • monetary stability; a safe, sound and stable financial system; an efficient payments mechanism; public confidence in the national currency; sound international financial relations; and to provide: - efficient banking services to its various clients; and - sound economic and financial advice to Government MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT Mr Cornelius K. Dekop Governor February 21, 2024 17938, Khama Crescent, Gaborone, Botswana Tel: 360 6000| Website: www.bankofbotswana.bw MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 i MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 ii TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction.……………………………………………………………………………..…….1 2. Monetary Policy Framework …………………………………………………………..…….2 3. Implementation of Monetary Policy and Related Economic Developments in 2023 .………………………………………………………………………………………...3 Box 1: The Pula Exchange Rate Framework Explained…………………………………10 4. Output and Inflation Outlook..…………………………………………………………...…18 5. The 2024 Monetary Policy Stance………………………………………………………....21 6. Conclusion..……………………………………………………………………………….....22 APPENDIX...………………………………………………………………………………….23 Table A1: 2023 Monetary Policy Decisions……………………………………………….23 Table A2: Credit to the Private Sector by Banks (Percent of GDP)….…………………25 MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 iii 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 The Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) is published at the beginning of the year to inform stakeholders about the framework for the formulation and implementation of monetary policy by the Bank of Botswana (the Bank). In this regard, the Bank, through the MPS, reviews inflation trends, outlook, as well as policy performance and articulates the policy choices for the ensuing year. The MPS, together with the subsequent Monetary Policy Reports (MPRs) published during the year, and the Media Briefings after each Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting, also serve to fulfill the public’s expectation of a transparent and accountable central bank in pursuit of the monetary policy mandate, as enshrined in the Bank of Botswana (Amendment) Act, 2022. 1.2 The 2024 MPS, therefore, reports on the previous year’s economic and policy developments and evaluates the determinants of changes in the level of prices and their impact on inflation in Botswana. In turn, there is an assessment of economic and financial developments that are likely to influence the inflation path in the medium term and the Bank’s policy choices in 2024. Thus, price developments and policy options are evaluated in the context of a forward-looking monetary policy framework, that entails policy responses to projected deviation of inflation from the Bank’s medium-term inflation objective range of 3 – 6 percent or any anticipated adverse impact on financial stability. In this respect, the MPS promotes an understanding of prospective conduct of monetary policy to anchor and align public expectations to the objective of a low, predictable and sustainable level of inflation. 1.3 In 2023, the global economy continued to recover from the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war. In addition, global economic performance was adversely affected by the impact of high inflation on the cost of living; the increase in the debt burden, due to the resultant high interest rates; reduction of fiscal support; and extreme weather events. Consequently, growth remained low and uneven across countries and regions. Thus, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s January 2024 World Economic Outlook (WEO) Update, global economic growth is estimated to have expanded by 3.1 percent in 2023, lower than the 3.5 percent in 2022. The subdued growth was more pronounced in advanced economies (particularly in the euro area and United Kingdom (UK), than in emerging market and developing economies. Meanwhile, global inflation is estimated to have decreased from 8.7 percent in 2022 to 6.8 percent in 20231, consistent with the slowdown in economic activity. 1.4 In Botswana, the Ministry of Finance estimates the economy to have expanded by 3.2 percent in 2023, a slowdown from 5.5 percent in 20222. Inflation has generally been on a downward trajectory since September 2022 and was mostly within the objective range from May 2023, averaging 5.2 percent in 20233. Contributing to lower inflation were the dissipating impact of the increase in prices controlled by government (administered prices) in 2022 (base effects); downward adjustment of domestic fuel prices in 2023; the decrease in foreign prices, particularly food and fuel, thus a decline in trading partner countries’ inflation. Going forward, inflation is forecast to remain within the Bank’s 3 – 6 percent objective range into the medium term and risks to the inflation outlook are assessed to be balanced. ________________________ In advanced economies, inflation decreased from 7.3 percent in 2022 to 4.6 percent in 2023, and from 9.8 percent to 8.4 percent for emerging market economies in the same period. According to data published by Statistics Botswana, real gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 3.6 percent in the twelve months to September 2023, compared to a growth of 5.6 percent in the year to September 2022. Inflation was above the objective range in January 2023 (9.3 percent), February 2023 (9.1 percent), March 2023 (9.9 percent), April 2023 (7.9 percent), and was below the objective range in July (1.5 percent) and August 2023 (1.2 percent). MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 1.5 The Bank eased monetary policy at the end of 2023 in view of projections for inflation remaining within the objective range of 3 – 6 percent, and closer to the 4.5 percent mid-point, into the medium term, and the associated indications of entrenched expectations of lower levels of inflation. The Monetary Policy Rate (MoPR), which is the yield on the 7-day Bank of Botswana Certificate (BoBC), was, therefore, reduced by 25 basis points to 2.4 percent in December 2023, following a cumulative 151 basis points policy rate increase in 2022. 1.6 Regarding exchange rate policy, the Pula basket comprised 45 percent South African rand and 55 percent Special Drawing Rights (SDR) and an annual downward rate of crawl of 1.51 percent of the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) was implemented during 2023. On the other hand, the real effective exchange rate (REER) depreciated by 1.8 percent in 2023, due to the depreciation (rate of crawl) of the NEER (1.5 percent), and a negative inflation differential between Botswana and trading partner countries. 2. MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK 2.1 The primary objective of the Bank’s monetary policy is to achieve price stability, which is defined as a sustainable level of inflation that is within the mediumterm objective range of 3 – 6 percent. Subject to attaining its primary mandate, the Bank shall contribute to the stability of the financial system and maintain a stable, sound and competitive market-based financial system. A low and predictable level of inflation and conducive monetary and financial conditions foster effective savings mobilisation, productive investment and international competitiveness of domestic producers, which, in turn, contribute towards the broader national objectives of sustainable economic development and employment creation. 2.2 The monetary policy framework is forecast-based, with the medium-term outlook guiding the Bank’s response to projected movements in inflation, while considering developments relating to stability of the financial system and prospects for economic growth. To this end, in formulating an appropriate policy stance, the Bank factors in projections of real monetary conditions4, relevant domestic and international economic and financial developments, and their impact on the output gap5 and, ultimately, inflation. 2.3 The Bank recognises the importance of communication in sustaining and reinforcing transparency, predictability and accountability with respect to the policy framework and actions; thus, fostering market participation, influencing expectations, policy credibility and, consequently, effective policy transmission. In this regard, besides the MPS, which is published in February, the Bank publishes three MPRs annually, following the April, August and October MPC meetings. Furthermore, the Bank publishes MPC meeting dates for the year ahead and the Governor delivers a statement at a Media Briefing, which is circulated to media houses, after each meeting of the MPC to disseminate the Bank’s policy stance and allow for the engagement with the media. ________________________ The real monetary conditions index (RMCI), which reflects the state of real monetary conditions, measures the relative looseness or tightness of monetary conditions and gauges the likely effect that monetary policy has on the economy through changes in the exchange rate and interest rates. The RMCI combines, through a weighted average, deviations of the real exchange rate and real interest rate from their respective trend values. The output gap refers to the difference between actual output and long-term trend output (as an indicator of the productive capacity of the economy). A negative (positive) output gap means that the actual level of output for a given period is below (above) the trend level for that period, thus indicating that the economy is operating below (above) its estimated potential. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 2.4 Monetary policy formulation and conduct entails determination of the MoPR, the Standing Credit Facility (SCF) and the Standing Deposit Facility (SDF) - the latter two, constituting the Interest Rate Corridor - at each of the six MPC meetings during the year. In turn, the MoPR (yield on the 7-day BoBCs) is used to conduct monetary operations, and banks also accessing the Standing Credit and Deposit facilities at their discretion, in addition to the interbank market. 3. IMPLEMENTATION OF MONETARY POLICY AND RELATED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN 2023 (a) External Developments 3.1 At the global level, many central banks continued to tighten monetary policy to tame inflationary pressures and anchor inflation expectations. In view of moderating inflationary pressures, most central banks that tightened monetary policy, raised policy interest rates by a lesser magnitude in 2023 compared to 2022. Thus, policymakers focused on reining in inflation towards their respective targets (Appendix, Table A1). Furthermore, in advanced countries, central banks continued with tapering the asset purchase programmes that were introduced in 2020 to support the financial sector and, in some instances, these have been completed (Appendix, Table A1). However, some central banks decreased their policy rates to stimulate economic activity amid the uncertainty, for example, China and Brazil, while some left the policy rates unchanged in 2023. 3.2 Overall, in 2023, global growth remained low but uneven across countries and regions. Global GDP is estimated to have expanded by 3.1 percent in 2023, lower than the 3.5 percent in 2022 (Table 3.1). For advanced economies, economic growth slowed from 2.6 percent in 2022 to 1.6 percent in 2023, mostly due to subdued economic activity in the euro area and UK because of high inflation, which continued to restrain household spending. Furthermore, output expansion in 2023 was also restrained due to supply chain constraints. Meanwhile, growth in economic activity in emerging market and developing economies remained restrained at 4.1 percent in 2023 as in 2022, due to negative spillover effects from the Russia-Ukraine war and continued withdrawal of fiscal support. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 Table 3.1: Real GDP Growth Rates (Percent) Estimates Projections Global 3.5 3.1 3.1 3.2 Advanced economies 2.6 1.6 1.5 1.8 USA 1.9 2.5 2.1 1.7 Euro area 3.4 0.5 0.9 1.7 UK 4.3 0.5 0.6 1.6 Japan 1.0 1.9 0.9 0.8 EMDEs 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 China 3.0 5.2 4.6 4.1 Brazil 3.0 3.1 1.7 1.9 India 7.2 6.7 6.5 6.5 Russia -1.2 3.0 2.6 1.1 South Africa 1.9 0.6 1.0 1.3 Botswana 5.5 3.2 4.1 (4.2) 4.3 (5.4) Source: Note: IMF WEO Update January 2024 and Ministry of Finance (MoF) for Botswana. EMDEs stands for emerging market and developing economies, while figures in parentheses are forecasts by the MoF. 3.3 Global inflation is estimated to have decreased from 8.7 percent in 2022 to 6.8 percent in 2023, mainly due to relatively lower food and oil prices, monetary policy tightening, and squeezing of household budgets (reduced demand). The decrease in oil prices was mainly driven by restrained demand resulting from continued interest rate hikes by most central banks, particularly in advanced economies, and subdued economic activity in China, the world’s largest crude oil importer. Furthermore, the increase in shale oil inventories in the US exerted downward pressure on oil prices. Thus, the price of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) reference crude oil basket, Brent crude and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) decreased by 16.7 percent, 16.8 percent and 17.3 percent to an average of USD83.10 per barrel, USD82.95 per barrel and USD77.93 per barrel, respectively, in 2023 (Chart 3.1). 3.4 Similarly, international food prices declined by 13.7 percent in 2023, reversing the 13.3 percent increase in 2022 (Chart 3.2), driven by lower prices of vegetable oils, cereals, dairy products and meat. The decrease was attributable to among others, the Black Sea grains export deal between Ukraine, Russia, Turkey and the United Nations which, however, ended on July 17, 2023, as well as modest demand due to global economic slowdown and easing of international oil prices, an input in food production. Moreover, the slowdown in food prices was underpinned by increased seasonal supply from some commodity exporting countries6. Overall, international oil and food prices exerted downward pressure on domestic inflation in 2023. ________________________ Generally, there was increased seasonal supply of maize from Brazil and the US, vegetable oil from the US and South Asia, as well as meat from Australia. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 3.5 Inflation in the SDR countries (USA, UK, Japan, Eurozone and China) fell significantly from 6.9 percent in December 2022 to 2.8 percent in December 2023. Similarly, headline inflation in South Africa decreased from 7.2 percent in December 2022 to 5.1 percent in December 2023 (averaging 6 percent in 2023) and reverted to within the country’s target range of 3 – 6 percent in June 2023. Consequently, the trade weighted average inflation7 for Botswana’s trading partner countries decreased from 7.1 percent in December 2022 to 3.8 percent in December 2023 (Chart 3.3). Chart 3.2: Food Price Index OPEC BRENT WTI Source: OPEC and US Energy Information Administration. Apr Jul Oct Apr Jul Oct Apr Jul Oct Apr Jul Oct Apr Jul Oct Index (2014-2016=100) Apr Jul Oct Apr Jul Oct Apr Jul Oct Apr July Oct Apr July Oct USD per barrel Chart 3.1: Oil Prices (Monthly Averages) Source: Food and Agriculture Organization. Chart 3.3: Botswana and Trading Partners Inflation (January 2019 - December 2023) Percent Nov Jul Sep Mar May Nov Jul Sep Mar SDR countries May Sep Nov Jul Mar Botswana May Nov Jul South Africa Sep Mar May Nov Jul Sep Mar May -2 Trading partners Source: Statistics Botswana and Bloomberg. (b) Monetary Policy Implementation in Botswana 3.6 During 2023, monetary policy in Botswana was conducted in the context of projected lower inflation in the short to medium term, associated with dissipating impact of the increase in administered prices in 2022 (base effects), impact of the reduction in fuel prices during the year, subdued domestic demand and declining inflation in the trading partner countries, while the economy operated below potential. These conditions ________________________ The trade-weighted average inflation comprises South Africa’s headline inflation and average SDR countries’ inflation. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 provided scope for an accommodative monetary policy in support of stronger output growth. Hence, the MoPR was reduced by 25 basis points to 2.4 percent in December 2023, following a cumulative 151 basis points policy rate increase in 2022. Consequently, the prime lending rate (PLR) of commercial banks declined from 6.76 percent in December 2022 to 6.51 percent in December 2023 (Chart 3.4)8 . However, deposit interest rates generally increased (Chart 3.5) mainly because of competition for corporate deposits that are volatile and form an important component of the deposit base for many of the commercial banks. Chart 3.4: Interest Rates (January 2016 - December 2023) Percent Source: Note: 3-Month BoBC Rate Bank Rate 14-Day BoBC Rate 7-Day BoBC rate (MoPR) Prime Lending Rate 1-month BoBC Rate Oct-23 Oct-22 Jan-23 Apr-23 Jul-23 Oct-21 Jan-22 Apr-22 Jul-22 Jan-21 Apr-21 Jul-21 Oct-20 Oct-19 Jan-20 Apr-20 Jul-20 Oct-18 Jan-19 Apr-19 Jul-19 Oct-17 Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-16 Jan-17 Apr-17 Jul-17 Jan-16 Apr-16 Jul-16 Bank of Botswana and commercial banks. The 7‑day BoBC was introduced on April 30, 2019, replacing the 14‑day BoBC, while the issuance of the 91‑day BoBC rate was discontinued in October 2020. Chart 3.5: 32-88 day, 91-day, Fixed up to 12 months and Fixed over 12 months Deposit Rates Percent Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov 32-88 day Fixed up to 12 months 91-day Fixed over 12 months ________________________ Notwithstanding the decision to allow banks to set their own PLRs, there continues to be a common PLR. However, effective lending rates linked to the PLR may vary across banks, based on products and customer profiles. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 3.7 Open market operations continued to be the main liquidity management tool in the domestic market, as well as in implementing decisions of the MPC. This entailed the use of BoBCs to mop-up excess liquidity9 in order to maintain interest rates that are consistent with the monetary policy stance. Open market operations, in 2023, were conducted in an environment of increased market liquidity, supported mainly by government spending and repatriation of pension funds to align to the new pension fund rules10. Outstanding BoBCs amounted to P6 billion in December 2023, an increase from P3.275 billion in December 2022, due to an increase in liquidity resulting mainly from government spending. With the expansionary budget announced in February 2024, liquidity is expected to increase further. 3.8 The Bank evaluates its monetary policy implementation framework on a regular basis for effectiveness, with a view to introduce refinements where necessary. In this regard, the 2022 monetary operations reforms (see page 3 of the 2023 MPS for details) are now embedded in the Bank’s monetary policy operations. There has been some noticeable improvement in policy transmission while the interest rate structure is operating as expected. In addition, the interbank market rate consistently trades within the interest rate corridor, although it tends to trade closer to the floor (SDF Rate) of the interest rate corridor due to structural excess liquidity in the market. However, the funding structure of banks, which is uneven across individual banks and mostly dominated by large mobile corporate deposits and those managed by asset managers, has the effect of raising wholesale deposit rates and suppressing interest rates on retail savings deposits. 3.9 With effect from April 1, 2023, commercial banks were allowed to independently determine their own PLRs. This move is expected to contribute positively to banking sector developments through promoting competition within the banking industry. Commercial banks report their PLRs to the Bank where a market average is published to the market for transparency and to promote competition. It is, however, worth noting that all commercial banks have maintained their PLRs at MoPR plus 411 basis points. As a result, the average PLR was 6.51 percent in December 2023. 3.10 Meanwhile, use of the Primary Reserve Requirement Averaging (PRRA) for management of liquidity by banks is not universal. While there are banks that actively use the averaging tool, others prefer to maintain full adherence throughout. 3.11 The yield curve, anchored on the 7-day BoBCs rate, is upward sloping, albeit steeper at the shorter end (transition from the one-month BoBCs to the 3-month Treasury Bills (T-Bills). The government securities market improved in 2023 with less upward pressure on yields than in the past, with noticeable improvement in the uptake of government securities at auctions. A comparison of BoBC, T-Bill and Government bond yields (yield curve) as at the end of December 2022 and December 2023 indicates that yields generally decreased across the maturity spectrum. The improvement in the inflation trajectory also helped in keeping yields relatively lower. The institutional and operational changes, including enhanced transparency and market innovations appear to be contributing to the improvement. Specifically, the Government Annual Borrowing Plan and Issuance Calendar were launched and published in June, while switch auctions11 were introduced to manage liquidity and refinancing risk. The decrease in the yields was also on the back of increased liquidity in the market emanating from government spending and the decline in the inflation rate (Chart 3.6). ________________________ Excess liquidity in the banking sector is defined here as the sum of commercial banks’ overnight deposits at the central bank (current account), commercial banks’ deposits in the SDF, money absorbed through BoBCs, outstanding reverse repos less repos, SCF and the Credit Facility. This is ‘excess’ in the sense that it is the net liquidity that the central bank has to absorb (take out of the system), over and above the structural liquidity that is held by the banks in the Primary Reserve Requirement accounts. Following the changes in the Retirement Funds Act (2022), the pensions domestic investment limits shall be increased up to fifty (50) percent of asset values in a gradual approach over a five‑year period (until December 2027). A Bond switch operation is a liquidity management tool where existing holders of a particular bond are invited to voluntarily surrender part or their entire existing bond (source bond) to the issuer in exchange for another preferred bond (destination bond) by the same issuer. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 Chart 3.6: Yield Curves for December 30, 2022 and December 29, 2023 Yield (Percent) 10 11 15 16 21 22 Years to Maturity December 29, 2023 Yield Curve Source: 3.12 December 30, 2022 Yield Curve Bank of Botswana. In a continuing effort to promote the use and effectiveness of the interbank market, the Bank signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Front Clear, a financial markets development company, to address obstacles in the money market. Some of the impediments to interbank activity relate to the lack of legal certainty on the enforceability of international standards, such as the Global Master Repurchase Agreements and International Swaps and Derivatives Agreements, as well as the netting protocols in the Botswana market. Addressing these obstacles should enhance a more participatory interbank market and secondary bond market, thereby, contributing to a holistic development of the money and interbank market and, by extension, the capital market. (c) Implementation of Exchange Rate Policy 3.13 Implementation of the exchange rate policy in 2023 was in line with the objective of maintaining a stable and competitive inflation-adjusted trade-weighted exchange rate of the Pula (See Box 1 for more details). For 2023, the Pula basket weights were maintained at 45 percent South African rand and 55 percent for the SDR, depicting Botswana’s trade pattern. A downward rate of crawl of 1.51 percent per annum was adopted, based on the projected differential between Botswana’s inflation rate and that of its trading partner countries, and with a view to promoting Botswana produced goods’ competitiveness, domestically and internationally. 3.14 Consequently, the trade weighted NEER of the Pula depreciated by the same magnitude in 2023. Meanwhile, the REER depreciated by 1.8 percent in 2023, due to the depreciation (rate of crawl) of the NEER (1.5 percent), and a lower inflation in Botswana (3.5 percent) than the average for the trading partner countries (3.8 percent), suggesting a gain in international competitiveness of domestic firms. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 Chart 3.7: Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates (January 2019 - December 2023) Index (December 2018 = 100) NEER Source: 3.15 Oct Jul Apr Oct Jul Apr Oct Jul Apr Oct Jul Apr Oct Jul Apr REER Bank of Botswana. The current exchange rate policy framework is anchored on a strong performance of foreign exchange reserves, which improved from P54.5 billion (representing 7.6 months of import cover) in December 2022 to P65.7 billion (representing 9.1 months of import cover) in November 2023, due to a more favourable diamond export market and higher Southern African Customs Union revenue. The economic disturbances generated by the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia-Ukraine war demonstrated the importance of maintaining adequate levels of foreign exchange reserves to support the economy, undertake economic stabilisation and maintain policy discretion, including with respect to the exchange rate. Moreover, the exchange rate policy framework encompasses an inherent flexibility that enables adjustments that may be necessary to generate improvements in international competitiveness of the domestic industry. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 BOX 1: THE PULA EXCHANGE RATE FRAMEWORK EXPLAINED These are additional notes to the Press Release on Pula Exchange Rate, of December 28, 2023, issued by the Ministry of Finance. Definition of Exchange Rate The exchange rate of a currency is how much one currency can be bought for each unit of another currency or, put differently, the rate at which domestic currency can be converted into a foreign currency or vice versa. Exchange Rate Policy Frameworks The exchange rate policy framework refers to the manner in which a country manages its own currency in relation to foreign currencies and the foreign exchange market. Exchange rate policy frameworks range from flexible to fixed and variations in between. In a flexible exchange rate framework, the exchange rate is freely determined by the market on the basis of demand and supply, and sentiments about the economy. In a fixed exchange rate regime, the domestic currency is linked to another currency or a basket (combination) of other currencies. In between flexible and fixed exchange rates, there is a range of, usually managed, exchange rate frameworks, such as a crawling band or peg. Botswana’s Exchange Rate Policy Framework Since 2005, Botswana adopted and implemented a crawling peg exchange rate policy framework that has three key attributes. First, the Pula is fixed to a basket of foreign currencies, namely the SDR (comprising, the US dollar, British pound, euro, Japanese yen and Chinese Renminbi) and the South African rand. Second, is the weight of these currencies in the Pula basket (proportions that each of these currencies contribute to the value of the Pula). Third, is the annual rate of crawl, which is the amount (rate) at which the exchange rate is allowed to gradually depreciate or appreciate. This amount reflects the inflation differential between Botswana and its trading partner countries. For example, 1.51 percent downward crawl for 2023; from the downward rate of crawl of 2.87 percent from May 2020 – December 2022). Botswana’s Exchange Rate Policy Objective The policy objective is to maintain price competitiveness of local producers for similar products, in both the domestic and international markets by equalising the exchange rate-adjusted prices. In general, this is done through adjusting the nominal Pula exchange rate by an amount that is equal to the differences in inflation between Botswana and the trading partner countries. That is, the rate of crawl. For example, if a bag of potatoes is currently P100 in Botswana and R130 in South Africa at an exchange rate of P1 = R1.30, and assuming transport costs are not embedded in the pricing, Botswana’s producers face similar market price as South African producers and, therefore, competitive. If, however, inflation in Botswana rises to be 5 percentage points higher than in South Africa, Botswana producers will be disadvantaged as it would be cheaper to purchase the same bag of potatoes in South Africa, holding all other things constant. Therefore, the Pula exchange rate needs to adjust downward by 5 percent (rate of crawl) to maintain competitiveness of producers in Botswana; technically, maintenance of a stable real effective exchange rate (REER). The exchange rate and competitiveness also have to relate to countries that Botswana trades with, in terms of goods and services, but also the flow of investments. It has been determined that these are mostly South Africa and the SDR countries (the USA, UK, euro area, China and Japan). This explains the fixing of the Pula to currencies of these countries. The 45 percent South African rand and 55 percent SDR proportions are based on observed historical trade pattern and are also reviewed semi-annually. In addition, the fixing to a basket rather than a single currency helps to moderate volatility of the Pula against any single currency. This explains why during the times when the South African rand and other currencies are volatile, the Pula remains relatively stable. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 2024 Pula Exchange Rate Parameters In the context of Botswana’s crawling band exchange rate arrangement for the Pula, the Ministry of Finance in conjunction with the Bank of Botswana, reviews the parameters for the Pula exchange rate semi-annually; being the currencies in the Pula basket and their weights, as well as the rate of crawl. This is done to assess the alignment of the Pula exchange rate with the policy objective of maintaining a stable and competitive REER of the Pula; that is, retaining competitiveness of Botswana producers against imports and exports in international markets, thus promoting growth prospects. For 2024, it was determined that inflation in Botswana would be on average 1.2 percent higher than in the trading partner countries, suggesting maintenance of a downward rate of crawl of 1.51 percent for 2024. The annual downward crawl would be implemented through small daily adjustments that would equal 1.51 percent over twelve months. It was also determined that the trade patterns remain largely unchanged and, therefore, maintained at 55 percent SDR and 45 percent South African rand. The Benefits of the Crawling Band Framework for Botswana The benefits of the current crawling band framework are therefore as follows: (a) it affords flexibility for adjustments to address deterioration in international price competitiveness of the domestic industry; (b) any adjustment is gradual and, therefore, not disruptive nor destabilising; (c) the rate of adjustment is preannounced and retained for a year and, therefore, enables planning for economic decisions; (d) the framework is broadly in alignment with the price stability objective (inflation objective inherent in the monetary policy framework; (e) and the basket composition moderates fluctuations of the Pula exchange rate against any individual currency. In contrast, alternative arrangements could have disadvantages as follows: (a) With a small undiversified economy such as Botswana with irregular and lumpy foreign exchange flows, a floating exchange rate regime would imply large exchange rate fluctuations that could be debilitating to price determination and economic activity. In addition, there could be sustained movement of the exchange rate, especially appreciation, that can undermine competitiveness of the non-mining sector and, therefore, diversification efforts; (b) as demonstrated in the past, a fixed hard peg would often require adjustments that are large and discrete with a destabilising disruptive impact. For example, a large devaluation with significant inflationary impact; and (c) a peg to a single currency would imply the Pula being subject to fluctuations and shocks to the currency to which it is pegged and, in turn, policy responses that may be inimical or inconsistent with the needs of the domestic economy at the time. Limits of Exchange Rate Adjustments on Industry Competitiveness While there are short-term benefits of deliberate exchange rate adjustments to maintain price competitiveness, for it to have the desired long-term impact there should be adequate production capacity and productivity improvements by the domestic industry. In addition, for government institutions, there should be effective implementation of plans and programmes. Overall, therefore, there is need for generalised entrenchment and traction of structural transformation and policy reforms as being fundamental to industrialisation and productivity improvements that would enhance competitiveness of domestic producers in a low inflation environment. It is recognised that, in the main, sustained (need for) downward adjustment of the currency is a reflection of weak production capacity and productivity of the economy; and is also inflationary (ultimately affecting price competitiveness). Transparency and Market Information The announcements of the Pula exchange rate parameters and any adjustments are intended to enhance transparency and integrity of the framework. In this regard, knowledge of the Pula basket weights, and rate of crawl enable the market and the general public to plan for investments and transactions on the basis of publicly available information that can be used as an input to any economic decisions. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 (d) Fiscal Policy 3.16 Botswana's 2023/24 fiscal budget aimed to drive sustainable domestic economic growth while managing both domestic and international challenges. The revised overall budget deficit as announced in the 2024/25 Budget Speech, is a deficit of P7.1 billion (2.6 percent of GDP), down slightly from the P7.6 billion (3.6 percent of GDP) in the original budget. Total expenditure in the revised budget of 2023/24 Public Spending includes the 5 percent salary increment for public service employees effected in April 2023, which supported households’ income. Specific to development spending, the budget was used to fill infrastructure gaps (implementation of delayed projects from the previous financial year) in order to unlock economic growth. Consequently, the projection for expenditure and net lending has been revised upwards by 1.6 percent to P88.8 billion, which is equivalent to 31.8 percent of GDP (slightly above the fiscal rule limiting total expenditure to 30 percent of GDP). Despite the expansionary fiscal policy, demand pressures were subdued, hence inflation was generally within the objective range. 3.17 Additionally, the Government continued commitment to restoration of budget sustainability through additional measures aimed at rebuilding fiscal buffers by mobilising domestic revenue sources, such as introduction of electronic billing platforms to improve value added tax compliance, implementation of Debt Recovery Strategy and strengthening of the Tax Audit function and capacity of the Large Taxpayers Unit. In terms of debt sustainability, Botswana’s debt levels have been relatively low by international standards hence debt servicing is not yet a challenge for the Country. For example, Government and Government-guaranteed debt is expected to remain below 25 percent of GDP in the 2023/24 financial year. However, the government is still committed to monitoring of the medium-term debt risk and capacity to repay. (e) Employment and Wage Developments 3.18 According to Statistics Botswana’s quarterly labour force survey, the unemployment rate was 25.9 percent in the third quarter of 2023, compared to 25.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 202212 (youth unemployment rate rose to 34.4 percent from 33.5 percent). The survey also indicates that formal sector employment increased by 0.9 percent to 490 625, from 486 376 in the review period. 3.19 Regarding other indicators, the survey indicates that Government continued to be the single largest employer, with employment in public administration constituting 18.3 percent of total formal sector employment. In this regard, personal emoluments constitute the largest share (above 50 percent) of the government recurrent budget, and about 13 percent of GDP. Meanwhile, the formal sector average earnings per month were estimated at P7 396 for citizens, P15 863 for non-citizens and P7 692 for all employees in the third quarter of 2023. The average monthly earnings for all employees are estimated to have increased by 13.1 percent or P889 from P6 803 estimated for the fourth quarter of 2022, therefore, higher than the change in the consumer price index (general prices) and the inflation objective. (f) 3.20 Credit and Financial Stability Review Annual growth in commercial bank credit accelerated to 7.1 percent in December 2023, from 5.8 percent in December 2022 (Chart 3.8). The faster growth in commercial bank credit was, in part, associated with the increase in loan uptake by businesses, mainly attributable to acquisition of new loans and increased credit utilisation by some companies during the period under review. Notably, credit to businesses grew, annually, by 11.4 percent in 2023, from the 8.6 percent increase in 2022. The improvement in the uptake of credit to businesses was in the form of utilisation of overdraft facilities and loans extended to some companies in the transport and communications, as well as tourism and hotels industries. Furthermore, there was increased utilisation of credit facilities by parastatals (Chart 3.9). Meanwhile, credit to businesses excluding parastatals grew by 5.2 percent in December 2023, compared to the 8.9 percent increase in December 2022. ________________________ Statistics Botswana did not conduct any Labour Force Survey in the third quarter of 2022. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 Chart 3.8: Year-on-Year Commercial Banks' Growth in Total Credit Percent Businesses Sep-23 Dec-23 Jun-23 Mar-23 Dec-22 Jun-22 Sep-22 Mar-22 Dec-21 Jun-21 Sep-21 Mar-21 Dec-20 Jun-20 Households Sep-20 Mar-20 Dec-19 Sep-19 Jun-19 Mar-19 Dec-18 Sep-18 Jun-18 -10 Mar-18 -5 Total Credit Source: Commercial banks. Chart 3.9: Annual Growth of Commercial Banks Business Credit by Industry 150.0 Percent 100.0 50.0 st at e Re al E Pa ra st at als Fi na nc e n ica tio m Co Tr an sp or t& au r an t s m un an d Ba rs W at er ns tru ct io n & Co El ec tri cit y Tr ad e, Re st -100.0 M M in an in g uf ac tu rin g -50.0 Ag r icu ltu re 0.0 Source: Commercial banks. 3.21 For households, annual credit growth accelerated from 4.5 percent in 2022 to 5 percent in 2023. The higher credit growth was mainly attributable to a higher rate of increase in property and motor vehicles loans. Conversely, annual growth fell with respect to personal unsecured and credit card-based loans. Thus, the share of mortgages in total household credit increased from 26.8 percent in December 2022 to 27.6 percent in December 2023, while that for motor vehicles increased from 4 percent to 4.3 percent in the same period. Meanwhile, the share of credit card exposures in total household credit was unchanged at 1.5 percent in the same period. Overall, it is assessed that modest increase in lending to households reflects the impact of the 2022 policy tightening on credit demand as borrowing became more costly, as well as restricted supply of loan facilities by banks to guard against possible defaults, therefore, a balanced response to market conditions. 3.22 In general, credit growth continues to be supportive of economic activity although the amount of credit relative to the size of the economy remains comparatively low by global standards. Commercial bank credit to GDP ratio increased slightly (Table 3.2) in 2023 reflecting faster credit growth relative to output growth but remains MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 comparatively low relative to financial inclusion and development needs, as well as global trends (Appendix, Table A2). In this context, there continues to be scope for prudent credit extension to enhance support for economic activity. The assessment of vulnerabilities and risks to financial stability, as measured by the credit-to-GDP gap (Chart 3.10), also shows that the modest rate of credit growth is commensurate with the rate of increase in GDP; hence signifying that the current level of credit relative to economic activity is sustainable and poses limited risk. Table 3.2: Commercial Bank Credit-to-GDP Ratio Percent of GDP Total Commercial Bank Credit Business Parastatals Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Construction Trade Transport and Communications Finance and Business Services Real Estate Households Retail Credit3 Mortgage 38.2 13.3 1.0 0.8 0.3 0.9 0.5 2.8 0.3 3.1 2.6 25.0 19.1 5.9 33.1 11.2 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.4 2.3 0.2 3.0 2.3 21.9 16.9 5.1 30.4 10.5 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.4 2.2 0.2 2.7 2.2 20.2 14.7 5.4 30.1 10.5 1.1 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.3 2.0 0.3 2.6 2.2 19.5 13.9 5.6 Source: Commercial banks, Statistics Botswana and Bank of Botswana calculations. Notes: 1. Although not shown in the table, electricity, and water, other and non‑resident sub‑sectors are included in the business credit to GDP ratio. 2. Data covering the twelve months to September 2023. 3. Includes motor vehicle, personal and credit card loans. -2 -4 -6 -8 Actual Credit-to-GDP Trend Gap (RHS) Source: Bank of Botswana. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 Percent 20 018 20 Q1 20 Q2 20 Q3 20 Q4 20 Q1 20 Q2 20 Q3 20 Q4 20 Q1 20 Q2 20 Q3 20 Q4 20 Q1 20 Q2 20 Q3 20 Q4 20 Q1 20 Q2 Q Percent Chart 3.10 : Aggregate Credit to GDP Gap 3.23 The increase in credit was partly supported by the 11.2 percent expansion in deposits at commercial banks in 2023, accelerating from 7.8 percent growth in the prior year (Chart 3.11). Within this, the household deposits increased by 11.3 percent following a contraction of 8.2 percent in 2022, while business deposits (excluding parastatals) increased by 6.1 percent from the 11.5 percent increase during the same period. By component, current account deposits increased by 24.6 percent, while interest bearing deposits increased by 4.4 percent in 2023. Deposits in foreign currency accounts increased by 14.5 percent in the same period. Given the slower increase in bank lending than the growth in bank deposits, the financial intermediation ratio fell slightly from 79.1 percent in 2022 to 77.5 percent in 2023, signalling the underutilisation of deposits in an environment of subdued economic activity. Chart 3.11: Annual Growth in Business and Household Deposits at Commercial Banks Percent -5 -10 Business Nov Sep July Mar May Sep Nov July Mar May Nov Households Jul Sep May Mar Nov Jul Sep Mar May Sep Nov Jul Mar May -15 Total Source: Commercial banks. 3.24 Overall, vulnerabilities and risks to financial stability emanating from credit developments and monetary policy posture remain contained, as reported in the published October 2023 Financial Stability Report. The enduring stability of the financial system is supported by sound macroeconomic environment, efficient and robust market infrastructures, prudently managed banks, as well as effective regulation and supervision. While economic performance is constrained by subdued global economic growth and, so far, modest traction of economic structural and policy reforms, the domestic financial system remains resilient, robust, safe, sound, and unconstrained in providing, innovating, and growing the range of financial services to support the economy and that it is well supported by macroeconomic policies and regulatory frameworks. 3.25 Banks’ asset quality was good in 2023, characterised by relatively low and stable credit default rates as the ratio of nonperforming loans (NPLs) to total credit decreased slightly from 3.8 percent in 2022 to 3.7 percent at the end of 2023. Nevertheless, there continues to be a risk to asset quality associated with the high proportion of the relatively more expensive unsecured lending (at 68.1 percent of household credit as at December 2023) in total commercial bank credit (44.4 percent). This profile of assets potentially exposes the household sector to any sudden and sharp increase in borrowing costs, as well as loss of employment. The risks are, however, moderated to the extent that credit is widely distributed to many employees in different sectors of the economy, a large proportion of which are in the public sector. Moreover, the extension of credit to salaried individuals enables proper credit evaluation using ascertained income as the basis for determining repayment capacity. Furthermore, credit risk is mitigated in cases of loans that are protected by insurance for loss of employment. Overall, the capital, asset quality, liquidity and profitability levels that meet prudential requirements indicate a generally sound and stable banking system (Table 3.3). MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 Table 3.3: Selected Performance Indicators of the Banking Sector Capital Adequacy (Percent) Core Capital to Unimpaired Capital Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets1 Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR)2 Asset Quality (Percent) NPLs to Gross Loans NPLs Net of Specific Provisions to Unimpaired Capital Specific Provisions to NPLs Liquidity (Percent) Liquid Assets to Deposits (Liquidity Ratio)3 Advances to Deposits (Intermediation Ratio) Profitability/Efficiency (Percent) Return on Average Assets (ROAA) Return on Equity (ROE) Cost to Income 3.26 June 68.4 12.0 18.8 Sep 66.5 11.8 18.6 Dec 65.2 12.9 19.8 June 68.2 13.1 20.0 Sep 62.7 12.8 19.8 Dec 66.7 12.7 19.7 4.0 3.4 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.7 8.8 56.2 8.5 55.1 8.6 51.0 8.9 49.7 9.7 47.8 8.6 51.1 17.4 18.3 16.0 18.1 17.8 20.1 82.3 79.8 80.5 82.5 81.5 78.6 2.0 26.8 60.3 2.1 26.1 57.2 3.0 30.1 57.0 2.3 26.2 56.7 2.3 26.3 56.3 2.3 27.0 56.7 Source: 1. 2. 3. Bank of Botswana. Prudential lower limit is 7.5 percent – Basel II/III. Prudential lower limit is 12.5 percent. The minimum statutory requirement is 10 percent (g) Output and Price Developments According to Statistics Botswana, real GDP in Botswana grew by 3.6 percent in the twelve months to September 2023, compared to an increase of 5.6 percent in the year to September 2022. The slower growth is attributable to the deceleration in production of both the mining (mostly diamond mining) and the non-mining sectors. Mining output increased by 3.9 percent in the year ending September 2023, a notable deceleration from 9.3 percent in the corresponding period in 2022. This was due to a slower growth in output of most subsectors, led by mining of diamonds, which declined to 3.7 percent in the year to September 2023, compared to 8.9 percent expansion in the previous twelvemonth period on account of lower output at Orapa Mine because of planned maintenance in the third quarter of 2023. Non-mining GDP grew by 3.5 percent in the year to September 2023, compared to a higher rate of 4.6 percent in the corresponding period in 2022. The decrease in output growth was due to contraction in diamond traders sector on account of a weaker market for sectoral output. Furthermore, the deceleration in output growth for some sectors, namely, manufacturing, agriculture, water and electricity, information and communication technology, and wholesale and retail also contributed to overall deceleration in the non-mining sector output growth. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 Mining GDP Non Mining GDP Q3 2023Q1 Q3 2022Q1 Q3 2021Q1 Q3 2020Q1 Q3 2019Q1 Q3 2018Q1 Q3 2017Q1 Q3 30.0 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 -5.0 -10.0 -15.0 -20.0 -25.0 -30.0 2016Q1 Percent Chart 3.12: Annual Real GDP Growth Rates (2016Q1-2023Q3) Total GDP Source: Statistics Botswana and Bank of Botswana calculations. 3.27 Inflation fell in 2023, reverting to within the Bank’s medium-term objective range of 3 – 6 percent in May 2023, for the first time since May 2021 (Chart 3.13) and breached the lower bound temporarily in July and August 2023. Thus, inflation averaged 5.2 percent in 2023, significantly lower than 12.1 percent in 2022. The low inflation in 2023 was against the background of subdued domestic demand, base effects associated with upward adjustment of administered prices in 2022, reduction in domestic fuel prices, the decrease in trading partner countries’ inflation, higher appreciation of the Pula against the South African rand and the restrained growth in food prices. Food price inflation decreased significantly from 16.9 percent in December 2022 to 6.1 percent in December 2023, in the context of significant price decreases for bread and cereals, oils, vegetables and mineral waters, soft drinks, juices, as well as fruits and vegetables. Regarding core inflation measures, the 16 percent trimmed mean inflation decreased from 11.2 percent in December 2022 to 3.3 percent in December 2023, while inflation excluding administered prices decreased from 8.7 percent to 4.4 percent in the same period. -2 Percent -10 Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Percent Chart 3.13: Headline, Food and Fuel Inflation (January 2019 - December 2023) Food Inflation Headline Inflation -30 Fuel Inflation (RHS) Source: Statistics Botswana. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 4. OUTPUT AND INFLATION OUTLOOK (a) Global Economic Prospects 4.1 The IMF’s January 2024 WEO Update anticipates global economic growth to remain subdued at 3.1 percent in 2024, unchanged from 2023, and lower than the historical (2000 - 2019) annual average of 3.8 percent, against the backdrop of continued challenging prospects for advanced economies. The challenges are partly because of lower consumer demand associated with higher borrowing costs resulting from monetary policy tightening, fiscal consolidation amid high debt, the Russia-Ukraine war, low underlying productivity growth and extreme weather conditions. However, the forecast for 2024 is 0.2 percentage point higher than the October 2023 WEO projection, due to stronger-than-earlier forecast performance for China, the US and large emerging market and developing economies. 4.2 Overall, risks to the global economic outlook are assessed to be broadly balanced. Upside risks include possibility of stronger-than-expected global growth that could arise from lower inflation, slower-than-assumed withdrawal of fiscal support, stronger structural reform momentum and faster economic recovery in China. On the downside, new commodity price spikes from geopolitical shocks including the continued Houthi militants’ attacks in the Red Sea, as well as supply disruptions or more persistent underlying inflation could prolong tight monetary conditions. Moreover, the possibility of systemic debt distress in emerging market countries due to a combination of higher borrowing costs and weaker growth could result in lower growth. 4.3 Growth in advanced economies is projected to decline slightly from the expansion of 1.6 percent in 2023 to 1.5 percent in 2024, mostly due to maintenance of tight monetary policy and less favourable credit conditions. Growth in the euro area is forecast to increase from 0.5 percent in 2023 to 0.9 percent in 2024, resulting from improved domestic demand as consumers start to recover purchasing power amid lower commodity prices. Furthermore, growth for the UK economy is forecast to increase slightly from 0.5 percent in 2023 to 0.6 percent in 2024, against the backdrop of easing inflationary pressures and, resultant, anticipated lower interest rates. Meanwhile, it is expected that fiscal and monetary policy tailwinds will stimulate strong productivity and growth for the UK economy in 2024. In the US, GDP expansion is forecast to slow down from 2.5 percent in 2023 to 2.1 percent in 2024, reflecting the lagged effects of monetary policy tightening, gradual fiscal tightening, as well as weaker consumer spending resulting from limited capacity to add more debt in 2024. 4.4 For emerging market and developing economies, growth is expected to remain at 4.1 percent in 2024 as in 2023. Growth in India is expected to remain strong at 6.5 percent in 2024, an upward revision of 0.2 percentage points from the October 2023 projection, resulting from resilience in domestic demand. Meanwhile, output growth in China is projected to slow down from 5.2 percent in 2023 to 4.6 percent in 2024, largely due to a slump in the real estate market and stagnant consumption. 4.5 Global inflationary pressures are projected to reduce in 2024, supported by the effect of monetary policy tightening in 2023 on consumption and investment, squeezing of household budgets, as well as anticipated lower commodity prices. Thus, inflation for advanced economies is forecast to ease from 4.6 percent in 2023 to 2.6 percent in 2024, while for emerging market economies, it is forecast to decrease from 8.4 percent to 8.1 percent in the same period. Consequently, global inflation is expected to ease from 6.8 percent in 2023 to 5.8 percent in 2024. 4.6 Inflation in Botswana is forecast to be higher than in the trading partner countries for 2024; therefore, requiring a downward rate of crawl of the Pula exchange rate (NEER) to maintain stability of the REER. Moreover, there continues to be a need to support economic activity, in particular, international competitiveness of the domestic industry. Against this background, an annual downward rate of crawl of 1.51 percent of the NEER was maintained for 2024. It was also determined that the trade pattern remained MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 largely unchanged and, therefore, the Pula basket weights were maintained at 45 percent for the South African rand and 55 percent for the SDR. (b) Domestic Economic Prospects 4.7 Botswana real GDP is projected to expand by 4.2 percent in 2024, from an estimated 3.2 percent in 202313. It is anticipated that the performance of the non-mining sectors will improve, underpinned by, among others, improvements in electricity and water supply, as well as Finance, Insurance and Pension Funds sectors (Chart 4.1). It is anticipated that effective implementation of the economic transformation reforms and stimulative government expenditure indicated in the 2024/25 Budget, alongside the April 2023 – March 2025 Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) would be supportive of economic activity, through facilitating expansion of productive capacity, accelerating economic transformation and enhancing economic resilience. Monetary policy also remains largely accommodative, given the projections for inflation remaining within the Bank’s 3 – 6 percent objective range, therefore, conducive for financing of economic activity facilitated by economic transformation and policy reforms. However, given the downside risks to global economic activity, weaker global demand and adverse impact of the Russia-Ukraine war, the growth trajectory remains uncertain. 4.8 As announced in the 2024/2025 Budget Speech, the Government continues to run budget deficits during the TNDP, financed through fiscal savings, special funds proceeds, draw-down on reserves and domestic borrowing. In this regard, domestic borrowing will entail the issuance of new instruments, such as inflation linked bonds and green bonds among others, contributing to development of the capital market. Chart 4.1: Botswana Non-Mining Output Gap (September 2023 - December 2025) 2025:4 2025:3 2025:2 2025:1 2024:4 2024:3 2023:4 2023:3 -4 2024:2 -2 2024:1 Percent Source: Bank of Botswana. 4.9 Inflation is forecast to remain within the Bank’s 3 – 6 percent objective range into the medium term (Chart 4.2). The projection takes into account the base effects associated with the adjustment of administered prices in 2023, downward adjustment of domestic fuel prices on December 21, 2023, maintenance of a negative rate of crawl for 2024 of 1.51 percent, the projected appreciation of the Pula against the South African rand, as well as the downward revision of forecasts for international commodity prices and trading partner countries’ inflation. Moreover, according to the December 2023 Business Expectations Survey, the business community expects inflation to remain within the Bank’s objective range in 2024, implying that inflation expectations are well anchored. ________________________ The growth figure for 2023 was revised downwards from the earlier projection of 3.8 percent, due to weak mining activity. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 4.10 Overall, risks to the inflation outlook are assessed to be balanced. Inflation could be higher than projected if international commodity prices increase beyond current forecasts, supply and logistical constraints persist and the reversal of global economic integration (geo-economic fragmentation) escalates. Furthermore, possible upward adjustment in administered prices that is not factored in the current projection, the likely impact of the announced upward adjustment in minimum wages and public servants’ salaries in February and April 2024, respectively, and any increase in domestic food prices due to the projected El Niño conditions in Southern Africa, may lead to higher inflation. 4.11 However, inflation could be lower than currently anticipated because of the possibility of both weaker domestic and global economic activity and disinflationary effects of higher monetary policy rates globally, as well as any decrease in international commodity prices. Chart 4.2: Annual Headline Inflation Forecasts for the Medium Term (September 2023 - December 2025) Percent 2025:4 2025:3 2025:2 2025:1 2024:4 2024:3 2024:2 2024:1 2023:4 2023:3 Source: Bank of Botswana. Chart 4.3: Domestic Fuel and Food Inflation Forecasts for the Medium Term (September 2023 - December 2025) Percent -5 -10 -15 Food Inflation 2025:4 2025:3 2025:2 2025:1 2024:4 2024:3 2024:2 2024:1 2023:4 2023:3 -20 Fuel Inflation Source: Bank of Botswana. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 5. 2024 MONETARY POLICY STANCE 5.1 An evaluation of the determinants of inflation and factors affecting financial stability suggests that the level of inflation will remain within the objective range in the short-tomedium term, reflective of the moderation in international commodity prices and expected subdued global economic activity, as well as well anchored inflation expectations. Furthermore, the current levels of credit growth to both businesses and households are considered sustainable. Overall, the recent and prospective developments for both domestic and external economic activity suggest that the prevailing accommodative monetary policy stance is consistent with inflation remaining within the Bank’s 3 – 6 percent objective range in the short-to-medium term. In the context of projected higher inflation in Botswana than in the trading partner countries and the economy operating below potential in the short term, the assessment is that a measured depreciation of the Pula against trading partners is consistent with maintenance of domestic industry competitiveness and positive for growth prospects; hence implementation of the exchange rate policy will entail a 1.51 percent downward rate of crawl in 2024. 5.2 The Bank will continue to respond appropriately to changes in banking system liquidity conditions through relevant instruments. Overall, the Bank encourages prudent management, investment and productive allocation of financial resources, with a view to promoting growth-supporting intermediation and durable financial stability. In this regard, for effective policy transmission, the Bank guides the determination of the level and direction of market interest rates that are consistent with the monetary policy stance. The Bank also promotes the effectiveness of the interbank market to address liquidity positions of individual banks. In addition, the Bank contributes to financial stability through prudential and market conduct supervision of commercial and statutory banks and promotes, as well as participates in, coordinated regulation of the broader financial system. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 6. CONCLUSION 5.1 Domestic inflation averaged 5.2 percent in 2023, thus within the Bank’s objective range of 3 – 6 percent in 2023, mainly reflecting the downward adjustments in domestic fuel prices, subdued domestic demand, reduction in trading partner countries’ inflation and the appreciation of the Pula against the South African rand. Meanwhile, global inflation is forecast to decrease in 2024, reflecting the tight monetary policy in 2023, as well as expected lower commodity prices. 5.2 It is projected that inflation in Botswana will remain within the objective range into the medium term, mainly on account of the dissipating impact of the earlier increases in administered prices, the recent downward adjustments in domestic fuel prices, the projected appreciation of the Pula against the South African rand and the expected decrease in international commodity prices and trading partner countries’ inflation. The Bank’s formulation and implementation of monetary policy will focus on entrenching expectations of low, predictable and sustainable inflation, through timely response to price developments, while ensuring that credit and other market developments are in line with durable stability of the financial system. The Bank remains committed to monitoring economic and financial developments with a view to ensuring price and financial stability, without undermining sustainable economic growth. 5.3 Broadly, the Bank contributes to macroeconomic stability and policy congruence through the pursuit and attainment of its primary objectives and coordination with relevant institutions with respect to price and financial stability, as well as stability of the inflation-adjusted trade-weighted exchange rate. By focusing and delivering on its specific roles, the Bank contributes to the maintenance of a conducive environment for structural reforms and transformation initiatives to gain traction, potentially leading to higher rates of growth needed to transition the economy to high income status. Given that both monetary policy and fiscal policy are expansionary, immediate implementation of transformation initiatives and structural reforms are expected to raise prospects for faster growth and economic diversification. Against this background, enhanced productivity/innovation (including greater production capacity) of industry and effectiveness of support institutions and service providers would help improve growth prospects for the economy in an environment of price and financial stability. It is observed, in this regard, that effective implementation, value recognition, user benefit and, overall, traction and longterm impact of conducive macroeconomic policies, economic transformation and policy reforms are premised on mindset change that discerns and harnesses the economic and welfare opportunities. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 APPENDIX Table A1: 2023 Monetary Policy Decisions Central Bank United States Federal Reserve Bank of England Policy Rate as at December Inflation Target (%) 5.25 – 5.5 percent 5.25 percent Policy Change from Previous Year Asset Purchase Programmes Likely Policy Decision in 2024 The FOMC continued to reduce its holdings of treasury securities, agency debt and mortgage-backed securities. Given that the FOMC expects inflation to be closer to the 2 percent target in 2026, rates are expected to remain higher for longer. The Fed is prepared to adjust the stance of monetary policy as appropriate if risks emerge that could impede the attainment of the Committee’s goals. The MPC decided to reduce the stock of UK government bond purchases held for monetary policy purposes by £100 billion over the 12-month period from October 2023 to September 2024. The first auction of the annual programme took place on October, 2 2023. Further tightening of the Bank Rate would be required if inflationary pressures persist Increased by 100 basis points Increased by 175 basis points On November, 1 2023, the total stock of assets was £751 billion, comprising £750 billion of UK government bond purchases and £0.6 billion of sterling non‐financial investment‐grade corporate bond purchases. As banks are repaying the amounts borrowed under the targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs), the ECB will regularly assess how targeted lending operations and their ongoing repayment are contributing to its monetary policy stance. European Central Bank14 4.50 percent Increased by 200 basis points Monitoring current market tensions closely and ready to respond as necessary to preserve price stability and maintain financial stability in the region. Likely to maintain policy stance. The Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme, introduced in 2020, will be reinvested into the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under the programme until at least the end of 2024. In any case, the future roll-off of the PEPP portfolio will be managed to avoid interference with the appropriate monetary policy stance. Net purchases under the asset purchase programme (APP) are declining at a measured and predictable pace, as the Eurosystem no longer reinvests the principal payments from maturing securities. ________________________ The ECB has three key policy rates. These are the interest rate on the main refinancing operations, as well as the interest rates on the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility. The interest rate presented above is on the main refinancing operations. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 Central Bank Bank of Japan Policy Rate as at December -0.1 percent Inflation Target (%) Policy Change from Previous Year No change Asset Purchase Programmes Likely Policy Decision in 2024 Continued purchasing exchangetraded funds (ETFs) and Japan real estate investment trusts (J-REITs) as necessary with upper limits of about 12 trillion yen and about 180 billion yen, respectively, on annual paces of increase in their amounts outstanding. Will not hesitate to take additional easing measures if necessary; it also expects short- and long-term policy interest rates to remain at their present or lower levels The Bank will continue to purchase a necessary amount of Japanese Government Bond (JGBs) without setting an upper limit so that 10year JGB yields will remain at around zero percent. Bank of Botswana South African Reserve Bank People’s Bank of China Central Bank of Brazil 2.40 percent 8.25 percent 3.45 percent 12.25 percent Reserve Bank of India 6.50 percent Central Bank of Russia percent 3-6 Decreased by 25 basis points 3-6 Increased by 125 basis points Not applicable No indication of the direction of policy, as decisions will be data dependent Maintain an accommodative monetary policy stance Not applicable Decreased by 20 basis points 4.5 ± 1.5 Decreased by 150 basis points 4±2 Increased by 25 basis points Not applicable Increased by 750 basis points Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable The Peoples’s Bank of China (PBOC) is committed to keeping liquidity adequate at a reasonable level, keep credit growing reasonably at a stable pace, and ensure that the growth of money supply and the aggregate financing to the real economy are generally in line with the nominal GDP growth. Given this commitment, the PoBC is likely to keep the Loan Prime Rate (LPR) low until the economy has recovered The inflation profile gives confidence to gradually ease monetary policy Reserve Bank of India (RBI) remains focused on withdrawal of accommodative policy to ensure that inflation remains within the target going forward, while supporting growth, and is prepared to undertake policy responses, should the situation so warrant Increase the policy rate if inflationary pressures persist Source: Surveyed central banks’ websites MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 Table A2: Credit to Private Sector by Banks (Percent of GDP) United States of America 53.9 50.4 51.7 United Kingdom 146.4 138.0 129.6 India 54.6 50.4 … China 269.2 230.0 298.0 Singapore 130.6 129.5 128.9 Chile 88.2 80.7 83.0 Rwanda 24.9 25.3 22.8 Mauritius 91.8 86.4 72.3 Namibia 60.5 58.0 52.6 Kenya 32.1 31.1 31.5 South Africa 61.9 57.9 58.7 Botswana 39.6 34.5 29.8 Source: Notes: World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 1. Domestic credit to the private sector by banks refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by other depository corporations (deposit taking corporations except central banks), such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries, these claims include credit to public enterprises. 2. Data for 2023 is not available. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 NOTE MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 NOTE MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING DATES FOR 2024 Date Venue February 21 - 22 Bank of Botswana April 25 - 26 Bank of Botswana June 12 - 13 Bank of Botswana August 21 - 22 Bank of Botswana October 30 - 31 Bank of Botswana December 4 - 5 Bank of Botswana MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024 Website: www.bankofbotswana.bw | Email: [email protected] | Tel: 360 6000 MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2024
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Speech by Mr Moses D Pelaelo, Governor of the Bank of Botswana, at the launch of Botswana's 2023 Monetary Policy Statement, Gaborone, 22 February 2023.
| 2023 STRATEGIC INTENT STATEMENTS VISION The Bank aspires to be a world-class central bank with the highest standards of corporate governance and professional excellence. MISSION The mission of the Bank is to contribute to the sound economic and financial well-being of the country. The Bank seeks to promote and maintain: • monetary stability; • safe, sound and stable financial system; • efficient payment mechanism; • public confidence in the national currency; • sound international financial relations; and to provide: − efficient banking services to its various clients; and − sound economic and financial advice to Government. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT Moses D Pelaelo Governor February 22, 2023 17938 Khama Crescent, Gaborone; Tel: (267) 360-6000; Facsimile: (267) 390-9016 Website: www.bankofbotswana.bw MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 i MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 ii TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction............................................................................................................... 2 2. Monetary Policy Framework..................................................................................... 2 3. Implementation of Monetary Policy and Related Economic Developments in 2022.............................................................................................. 4 Box 1: The Pula Exchange Rate Framework Explained........................................ 11 4. Output and Inflation Outlook ................................................................................. 21 5. The 2023 Monetary Policy Stance and the Bank of Botswana (Amendment) Act, 2022.......................................................................................... 25 6. Conclusion.............................................................................................................. 27 APPENDIX............................................................................................................... 28 Table A1: 2022 Monetary Policy Decisions............................................................ 28 Table A2: Credit to the Private Sector by Banks (Percent of GDP)...................... 31 MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 iii 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 The Monetary Policy Statement (MPS) is published at the beginning of the year to inform stakeholders about the framework for the formulation and implementation of monetary policy by the Bank of Botswana (the Bank). In this regard, the Bank, through the MPS, reviews inflation trends and policy performance and articulates the policy choices for the ensuing year. The MPS, together with the quarterly Monetary Policy Reports and the Press Conferences after each Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting, also serve to fulfil the public’s expectation of a transparent and accountable central bank in pursuit of the monetary policy mandate, as enshrined in the Bank of Botswana Act (CAP 55:01). There are six MPC meetings a year. 1.2 The 2023 MPS, therefore, reports on the previous year’s economic and policy developments and evaluates the determinants of changes in the level of prices and their impact on inflation in Botswana. In turn, there is an assessment of economic and financial developments that are likely to influence the inflation path in the medium term and the Bank’s policy choices in 2023. These assessments are anchored on a robust Forecasting and Policy Analysis System. Thus, price developments and policy options are evaluated in the context of a forward-looking monetary policy framework, that entails policy responses to projected deviation of inflation from the Bank’s mediumterm inflation objective range of 3 – 6 percent or any anticipated adverse impact on financial stability. In this respect, the MPS promotes an understanding of prospective conduct of monetary policy during the course of the year in order to anchor public expectations to the objective of a low, predictable and sustainable level of inflation. 1.3 In 2022, global economic performance and sentiment were negatively affected mostly by the ripple effects of the Russia-Ukraine war, global monetary policy tightening and the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly zero-COVID policies and lockdowns in China. In addition to the adverse impact on global economic activity, the war resulted in significantly elevated commodity prices and, therefore, inflationary pressures. In response, there was generalised aggressive increase in policy interest rates and, hence, tightening of financial conditions. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s January 2023 World Economic Outlook (WEO) Update, global inflation increased from 4.7 percent in 2021 to 8.8 percent in 20221, while the global economy is estimated to have expanded by 3.4 percent in 2022, lower than the 6.2 percent growth in 2021. Meanwhile, the continued roll-out of effective COVID-19 vaccinations in both advanced and emerging economies helped contain the spread of the virus and led to further relaxation of COVID-19 control measures, which offset some of the negative shocks experienced during the year. 1.4 In Botswana, real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 6.4 percent in the twelve months to September 2022, compared to a growth of 8.9 percent in the year to September 2021. Inflation remained above the Bank’s medium-term objective range in 2022, averaging 12.2 percent in 2022.2 Contributing to high inflation were the upward adjustments in administered prices and associated second-round effects; modest ________________________ In advanced economies, inflation increased from 3.1 percent in 2021 to 7.3 percent in 2022, and from 5.9 percent to 9.9 percent for emerging market economies in the same period. Inflation breached the objective range in May 2021 (6.2 percent), and has remained above it since, and was 12.4 percent in December 2022. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 recovery in domestic demand resulting from the easing of containment measures due to deployment of effective COVID-19 vaccines; and the increase in foreign prices, particularly food and fuel prices, due to supply disruptions caused by the RussiaUkraine war; as well as the resultant elevated inflation expectations. 1.5 The Bank tightened the monetary policy stance during 2022 in view of projections of inflation likely to remain above the 3 – 6 percent objective range in the mediumterm, and the associated indications of entrenched expectations for higher levels of inflation. The Monetary Policy Rate (MoPR)3 was, therefore, increased by a cumulative 151 basis points to 2.65 percent in 2022 to anchor expectations for the desired low levels of inflation. Inflation peaked at 14.6 percent in August 2022 and, in general, has been on a downward trajectory since September 2022. Inflation is forecast to continue trending downwards and to revert to within the Bank’s 3 – 6 percent medium-term objective range in the second quarter of 2024. This outlook is subject to significant upside risks, including the continuing adverse impact of the Russia-Ukraine war, COVID-19 pandemic, constrained supply relative to demand, global tightening of monetary policy to tame persistent inflationary pressures and, domestically, regular annual adjustments of administered prices, as well as prospective fiscal developments, namely implementation of potentially expansionary two-year Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP) and the reversion of the Value Added Tax (VAT) to 14 percent on expiry of the temporary relief measures that had been in place since August 2022. These risks are, however, moderated by the possibility of weak domestic and global economic activity, as well as restrained commodity prices. 1.6 The annual downward rate of crawl of the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) of the Pula was maintained at 2.87 percent during 2022, as well as the Pula basket weights of 45 percent for the South African rand and 55 percent for the Special Drawing Rights (SDR). Consequently, the trade weighted NEER of the Pula depreciated in line with the downward rate of crawl in 2022. On the other hand, the real effective exchange rate (REER) appreciated by 2.1 percent in 2022, because of a higher positive inflation differential between Botswana and trading partner countries than the downward rate of crawl. 2. MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK 2.1 The primary objective of the Bank’s monetary policy is to achieve price stability, which is defined as a sustainable level of inflation that is within the medium-term objective range of 3 – 6 percent. Subject to attaining its primary mandate, the Bank shall contribute to the stability of the financial system and foster and maintain a stable, sound and competitive market-based financial system. A low and predictable level of inflation, along with conducive monetary and financial conditions foster effective savings mobilisation, productive investment and international competitiveness of domestic producers which, in turn, contribute to the broader national objectives of sustainable economic development and employment creation. 2.2 The monetary policy framework is forecast-based, with the medium-term outlook guiding the Bank’s response to projected movements in inflation, while considering ________________________ In April 2022, the Bank introduced reforms to the monetary operations framework and adopted the yield on the 7-day Bank of Botswana Certificates (BoBCs) as the new policy rate (in place of the Bank Rate), known as the MoPR. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 prospects for economic growth and developments relating to stability of the financial system. To this end, in formulating an appropriate policy stance, the Bank factors in projections of real monetary conditions4, relevant domestic and international economic and financial developments, and their impact on the output gap5 and, ultimately, inflation. 2.3 The Bank recognises the importance of communication in sustaining and reinforcing transparency, predictability and accountability with respect to the policy framework and actions; thus, fostering market participation, influencing expectations, policy credibility and, consequently, effective policy transmission. In that regard, besides the MPS, which is published in February each year, the Bank publishes three editions of Monetary Policy Reports, following the April, August and October MPC meetings. Furthermore, the Bank publishes a calendar of MPC meetings for the ensuing year and the Governor addresses a Press Conference and a Press Statement is issued after each meeting of the MPC, to disseminate the Bank’s policy stance and allow for engagement with the media. Reforms to Monetary Operations in 2022 2.4 The Bank continuously evaluates its monetary policy implementation framework aimed at strengthening the monetary policy transmission mechanism. In this respect, and as announced in the 2022 Monetary Policy Statement, the Bank introduced some reforms to the monetary policy operations in April 2022. These included, in the main, the discontinuation of the Bank Rate as the main anchor policy rate and the transition to the MoPR, which is an instrument-based policy rate (7-day BoBCs yield) for effective monetary policy transmission. 2.5 The transition also marked the introduction of an interest rate corridor with a 200-basis points width, comprising the Standing Deposit Facility (SDF) at 100 basis points below the MoPR and the Standing Credit Facility (SCF) at 100 basis points above the MoPR. The SDF and SCF serve as the floor and ceiling of the interest rate corridor, respectively, and commercial banks use both facilities at their own discretion for their daily liquidity management. The interest rate corridor is intended to help ensure that money market interest rates move within a reasonably close range around the MoPR and the close relationship between the policy rate and market interest rate provides the fundamental basis for effective monetary policy transmission. In addition, the reforms allow for the conduct of fine tuning operations (repos and reverse repos) which are to be issued infrequently during a primary reserve maintenance period at the discretion of the Bank upon evaluation of the general market liquidity. If offered, the fine tuning operations are conducted at the MoPR. Furthermore, the Bank introduced a 1-month BoBC in June 2022 for structural liquidity management and price discovery purposes, while the Prime Lending Rate has been liberalised, to be determined by the individual banks effective April 1, 2023. The Bank continues to analyse and monitor the impact of these reforms, with a special focus on their impact on the potency and effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. ________________________ The real monetary conditions index (RMCI), which reflects the state of real monetary conditions, measures the relative looseness or tightness of monetary conditions and gauges the likely effect that monetary policy has on the economy through changes in the exchange rate and interest rates. The RMCI combines, through a weighted average, deviations of the real exchange rate and real interest rate from their respective trend values. The output gap refers to the difference between actual output and long-term trend output (as an indicator of the productive capacity of the economy). A negative (positive) output gap means that the actual level of output for a given period is below (above) the trend level for that period, thus indicating that the economy is operating below (above) its estimated potential. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 3. IMPLEMENTATION OF MONETARY POLICY AND RELATED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN 2022 (a) External Developments 3.1 At the global level, many central banks, in both advanced and emerging market economies, aggressively tightened monetary policy to tame inflationary pressures and anchor inflation expectations. Accordingly, most central banks raised their policy rates from record lows to combat elevated inflationary pressures associated with higher food and fuel prices resulting from the Russia-Ukraine war, as well as supply and demand imbalances related to the COVID-19 pandemic (Appendix, Table A1). Thus, policymakers focused on reining in inflation towards their respective targets. Furthermore, in advanced countries, central banks continued with tapering the asset purchase programmes that were introduced in 2020 to support the financial sector and, in some instances, these have been completed (Appendix, Table A1). However, some central banks decreased their policy rates to stimulate economic activity amid the crisis, for example, China and Russia. 3.2 Overall, multiple shocks in 2022 resulted in lower global economic performance, thus generalised deceleration in the rate of output growth, across countries and regions. The adverse effects and influences included the negative spillovers from the RussiaUkraine war, continued supply disruptions, elevated commodity prices, and increase in COVID-19 infections in India and China during the year, as well as the unwinding of monetary and fiscal policy support that was implemented to cushion the economies from the COVID-19 pandemic. In the circumstances, global GDP for 2022 is estimated to have expanded by 3.4 percent, from a higher rate of 6.2 percent in 2021 (Table 3.1). Table 3.1: Real GDP Growth Rates (Percent) Category Global Advanced economies US Euro area UK Japan EMDEs China Brazil India Russia South Africa Botswana Estimates 6.2 3.4 5.4 2.7 5.9 2.0 5.3 3.5 7.6 4.1 2.1 1.4 6.7 3.9 8.4 3.0 5.0 3.1 8.7 6.8 4.7 -2.2 4.9 2.6 11.8 4.1 (6.7) Projections 2.9 1.2 1.4 0.7 -0.6 1.8 4.0 5.2 1.2 6.1 0.3 1.2 4.0 (4.0) 3.1 1.4 1.0 1.6 0.9 0.9 4.2 4.5 1.5 6.8 2.1 1.3 4.0 (5.1) Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) Update January 2023 and Ministry of Finance (MoF) for Botswana. Note: EMDEs stands for emerging market and developing economies; figures in parentheses are forecasts by MoF. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 In 2022, global inflation increased, partly due to the rise in commodity prices, particularly food and oil, improved global economic demand as most economies continued to administer effective COVID-19 vaccines and eased movement restrictions, while supply constraints persisted. Global inflation is estimated to have increased from 4.7 percent in 2021 to 8.8 percent in 2022. The increase in oil prices was mainly a result of the Russia-Ukraine war and the consequent sanctions imposed on Russia by major European countries and the US. There was also upward pressure on oil prices emanating from political unrest in some producer countries, for example, Libya; failure by some members of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to increase output or meet their daily production quotas; continued drawdown of oil inventories; and global shortages of natural gas and coal that increased the demand for oil as a substitute. Thus, the price of the OPEC reference crude oil basket, Brent crude and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) increased by 7.1 percent, 8.9 percent and 7 percent to an average of USD76.68 per barrel, USD80.90 per barrel and USD76.52 per barrel in 2022, respectively (Chart 3.1). Chart 3.1: Oil Prices (Monthly Averages) Index (2014-2016=100) USD per barrel Chart 3.2: Food Price Index Apr Jul Oct Apr Jul Oct Apr Jul Oct Apr Jul Oct OPEC BRENT Apr Jul Oct Apr Jul Oct Apr Jul Oct Apr Jul Oct 3.3 WTI Source: OPEC and US Energy Information Administration. Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation. 3.4 Similarly, international food prices increased by 16 percent in 2022 compared to an expansion of 28.1 percent in 2021 (Chart 3.2), driven by a significant rise in prices of dairy, cereals and vegetable oils. The increase in the price of vegetable oils and cereals was due to the negative supply shocks associated with the Russia-Ukraine war, given that the two economies are the world’s largest exporters of grains (wheat and maize) and sunflower oil, respectively, as well as bad weather conditions in Argentina, which significantly lowered crop yields. Prices of dairy products also rose mainly because of high input costs resulting from supply chain disruptions, labour shortages, the rise in the cost of production, particularly livestock feeds and oil prices. Overall, higher international oil and food prices exerted significant upward pressure on domestic inflation in 2022. 3.5 Inflation in the SDR countries (USA, UK, Japan, Eurozone and China) rose significantly from 5.1 percent in December 2021 to 6.9 percent in December 2022. Similarly, headline inflation in South Africa increased from 5.9 percent in December 2021 to 7.2 percent in December 2022 (averaging 6.9 percent for the year) and breached the country’s target range of 3 – 6 percent in May 2022. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 3.6 Consequently, the trade-weighted average inflation6 for Botswana’s trading partner countries increased from 5.5 percent in December 2021 to 7.1 percent in December 2022 (Chart 3.3). Chart 3.3: Botswana and International Inflation (January 2016 - December 2022) Percent Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov -2 South Africa Botswana SDR countries Trading partners Source: Statistics Botswana and Bloomberg. (b) 3.7 Monetary Policy Implementation in Botswana During 2022, monetary policy in Botswana was conducted in the context of projected elevated inflation associated with upward adjustment of administered prices, a modest recovery in domestic demand resulting from the easing of containment measures due to deployment of effective COVID-19 vaccines and projected relatively high foreign prices in the short term. In response, the monetary policy stance was contractionary to support the attainment of the Bank’s price stability objective of 3 – 6 percent in the medium term. Hence, MoPR was increased by a cumulative 1.51 percentage points to 2.65 percent in 2022. Consequently, the prime lending rate of commercial banks increased from 5.25 percent to 6.76 percent in the same period, while deposit interest rates also generally increased (Charts 3.4 and 3.5). Chart 3.4: Interest Rates (January 2016 - December 2022) 3-Month BoBC Rate 14-Day BoBC Rate Prime Lending Rate Oct-22 Jul-22 Apr-22 Jan-22 Jul-21 Oct-21 Apr-21 Jan-21 Jul-20 Oct-20 Apr-20 Jan-20 Jul-19 Oct-19 Apr-19 Jan-19 Jul-18 Oct-18 Apr-18 Jan-18 Jul-17 Oct-17 Apr-17 Jan-17 Jul-16 Oct-16 Apr-16 Jan-16 Percent Bank Rate 7-Day BoBC rate (MoPR) 1-Month BoBC Rate Source: Bank of Botswana and commercial banks. Note: The 7-day BoBC was introduced on April 30, 2019, replacing the 14-day BoBC, while issuance of the 91-day BoBC was discontinued in October 2020. The 7-day BoBC yield replaced the Bank Rate as the policy rate on April 28, 2022, while the 1-month BoBC was introduced on June 28, 2022. ________________________ The trade-weighted average inflation comprises South Africa’s headline inflation and average SDR countries’ inflation. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 5.0 Chart 3.5: 32-88 day, 91-day, Fixed up to 12 months and Fixed over 12 months Deposit Rates 4.5 4.0 Percent 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.0 Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep 0.5 32-88 day 91-day Fixed up to 12 months Fixed over 12 months Source: Commercial banks. 3.8 Open market operations remained the main liquidity management tool in the domestic market, as well as in implementing decisions of the MPC. This entailed the use of BoBCs to mop-up excess liquidity7 in order to maintain interest rates that are consistent with the monetary policy stance. 3.9 Open market operations were conducted in an environment of modest recovery in market liquidity, supported mainly by government spending. The relief measures introduced by the Bank in April 2020 to help alleviate any adverse impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy and financial markets remained in place in 2022. Given that these measures were temporary and aimed at addressing any negative impact on the economy of an unfolding pandemic, and that the COVID-19 profile has generally improved, the measures were reviewed with effect from January 1, 2023, as follows: (i) Overnight Borrowing through the Credit Facility The punitive interest rate for involuntary access to the Credit Facility (CF) by commercial banks to meet overnight settlement obligations is set at 8 percentage points above the prevailing MoPR. This facility is different from the other overnight facilities offered by the Bank, such as the Standing Credit Facility, accessed at the discretion of an individual bank, and the repurchase agreements (repos), offered at the discretion of the Bank of Botswana. The CF is automatically availed to a bank that is overdrawn at the close of each business day, hence the punitive interest rate since banks are not, by law, permitted to overdraw the settlement accounts held at the Bank of Botswana. The facility is also used for intraday temporary funding without attracting any charges, except that, at the close of any trading day, the settlement accounts with the Bank of Botswana must have positive balances. ________________________ Excess liquidity in the banking sector is defined here as the sum of commercial banks’ overnight deposits at the central bank (current account), commercial banks’ deposits in the Standing Deposit Facility (SDF), money absorbed through BoBCs, outstanding reverse repos less repos, Standing Credit Facility (SCF) and the credit facility. This is ‘excess’ in the sense that it is the net liquidity that the central bank has to absorb (take out of the system), over and above the structural liquidity that is held by the banks in the Primary Reserve Requirement accounts. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 (ii) Repurchase Agreement Maturity The maturity of repos and reverse repos facility has been reduced from 92 days to overnight and, consistent with the announced monetary operations reforms, the Bank’s participation in the repo market will be minimal for fine-tuning purposes. (iii) Collateral Pool The dispensation to include all securities listed on the Botswana Stock Exchange Limited (BSEL) in the pool of eligible collateral for credit facilities provided to banks by the Bank is maintained, first and primarily, for liquidity management purposes and, second, to further deepen the domestic financial markets. This is subject to acceptable collateral margin and/or haircuts, as may be announced from time to time by the Bank of Botswana. 3.10 Meanwhile, commercial banks continue to actively use Primary Reserve Requirement Averaging (PRRA) as a tool for effective management of liquidity. Thus, most banks draw down their Primary Reserve Requirement (PRR) accounts to smoothen their liquidity requirements over the reserve averaging period. However, a few banks still prefer to continuously maintain the required balance instead of using the PRR account for liquidity management. Outstanding BoBCs amounted to P3.275 billion in December 2022, an increase from P2.3 billion in December 2021, reflecting an increase in liquidity resulting mainly from government spending. The stop-out yield for the 7-day BoBC increased significantly from 1.10 percent in December 2021 to 2.65 percent in December 2022, reflecting the upward adjustment in the MoPR in 2022. However, due to the larger increase in inflation compared to nominal interest rates between December 2021 and December 2022, the real rate of interest for the 7-day BoBC decreased from -6.99 percent to -8.51 percent. The yield on the 1-month BoBC increased from 2.34 percent when it was introduced in June 2022 to 3.18 percent in December 2022. 3.11 A comparison of Treasury Bills (T-Bills), Government bonds and BoBC yields as at the end of December 2021 and December 2022 indicates that yields generally increased across the maturity spectrum. Yields increased more at the shorter end of the curve, mainly because of the increase in the MoPR in 2022, amidst elevated inflation levels. They increased marginally at the longer end of the curve, a reflection of relatively slow response to policy changes by longer-dated instruments or expectations that inflation will be contained in the long term (Chart 3.6). MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 Chart 3.6: Yield curves for December 31, 2021 and December 30, 2022 Yield (Percert) 1 2 4 5 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Years to Maturity December 31, 2021 Yield Curve December 30, 2022 Yield Curve Source: Bank of Botswana. (c) Implementation of Exchange Rate Policy 3.12 Implementation of the exchange rate policy in 2022 was in line with the objective of maintaining a stable inflation-adjusted trade-weighted exchange rate of the Pula. This entailed the Pula basket weights of 45 percent for the South African rand and 55 percent for the SDR, as well as an annual downward rate of crawl of 2.87 percent, which were maintained in the context of weak economic activity and largely unchanged trade pattern. It was assessed that the economy would benefit from a measured depreciation of the Pula against trading partners in order to support domestic industry competitiveness, given the continuing adverse impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the economy and the unfavourable inflation differential. 3.13 Consequently, the trade-weighted NEER of the Pula depreciated in line with the downward rate of crawl in 2022. Meanwhile, the REER appreciated by 2.1 percent in 2022 (Chart 3.7), because of a higher positive inflation differential between Botswana and the trading partner countries than the downward rate of crawl, suggesting a loss of international competitiveness of domestic firms. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 Chart 3.7: Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates (January 2016 - December 2022) NEER Nov Apr Aug Jul Oct Apr Jul Oct Apr Oct Jul Apr Oct Jul Apr Jul Oct Apr Jul Oct Apr Index (December 2018=100) REER Source: Bank of Botswana. 3.14 The current exchange rate policy framework is anchored to a strong performance of foreign exchange reserves, which have improved from P56 billion and 9.1 months of import cover in December 2021 to P59.6 billion and 9.7 months of import cover in November 2022, due to the recovery in domestic economic performance, driven by improvement in external demand. The economic disturbances generated by the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia-Ukraine war demonstrated the importance of maintaining adequate levels of foreign exchange reserves in supporting the economy, as well as the flexibility inherent in the exchange rate framework in facilitating adjustments necessary to generate improvements in international competitiveness of the domestic industry. 3.15 Box 1 below explains the current exchange rate policy framework and the Pula exchange rate parameters for 2023, which were announced in December 2022. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 BOX 1: THE PULA EXCHANGE RATE FRAMEWORK EXPLAINED These are additional notes to the Press Release on Pula Exchange Rate, of December 22, 2022, issued by the Ministry of Finance. Definition of Exchange Rate The exchange rate of a currency is how much one currency can be bought for each unit of another currency or, put differently, the rate at which domestic currency can be converted into a foreign currency or vice versa. Exchange Rate Policy Frameworks The exchange rate policy framework refers to the manner in which a country manages its own currency in relation to foreign currencies and the foreign exchange market. Exchange rate policy frameworks range from flexible to fixed and variations in between. In a flexible exchange rate framework, the exchange rate is freely determined by the market on the basis of demand and sentiments about the economy. In a fixed exchange rate regime, the domestic currency is linked to another currency or a basket (combination) of other currencies. In between flexible and fixed exchange rates, there is a range of, usually managed, exchange rate frameworks, such as a crawling band or peg. Botswana’s Exchange Rate Policy Framework Since 2005, Botswana adopted and implemented a crawling peg exchange rate policy framework that has three key attributes. First, the Pula is fixed to a basket of foreign currencies, namely the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) and the South African rand. The SDR comprises the US dollar, British pound, euro, Japanese yen and Chinese renminbi. Second, is the weight of these currencies in the Pula basket (proportions that each of these currencies contribute to the value of the Pula). Currently, the Pula exchange rate is constituted by 55 percent SDR and 45 percent South African rand. Third, is the annual rate of crawl, which is the amount (rate) at which the exchange rate is allowed to gradually depreciate or appreciate. This amount reflects the projected inflation differential between Botswana and its trading partner countries. For example, 1.51 percent downward crawl for 2023; from the downward rate of crawl of 2.87 percent from May 2020-December 2022. Botswana’s Exchange Rate Policy Objective The policy objective is to maintain price competitiveness of local producers for similar products, in both the domestic and international markets by equalising the exchange rate-adjusted prices. In general, this is done through adjusting the nominal Pula exchange rate by an amount that is equal to the differences in projected inflation between Botswana and the trading partner countries. That is, the rate of crawl. For example, if a bag of potatoes is currently P100 in Botswana and R130 in South Africa at an exchange rate of P1 = R1.30, and assuming transport costs are not embedded in the pricing, Botswana’s producers face similar market price as South African producers and, therefore, MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 competitive. If, however, inflation in Botswana rises to be 5 percentage points higher than in South Africa, Botswana producers will be disadvantaged as it would be cheaper to purchase the same bag of potatoes in South Africa, holding all other things constant. Therefore, the Pula exchange rate needs to adjust downward by 5 percent (rate of crawl) to maintain competitiveness of producers in Botswana; technically, maintenance of a stable real effective exchange rate (REER). The exchange rate and competitiveness also have to relate to countries that Botswana trades with, in terms of goods and services, but also the flow of investments. It has been determined that these are mostly South Africa and the SDR countries (the USA, UK, euro area, China and Japan). This explains the fixing of the Pula to currencies of these countries. The 45 percent South African rand and 55 percent SDR proportions are based on observed historical trade pattern and are also subject to annual review. In addition, the fixing to a basket rather than a single currency helps to moderate volatility of the Pula against any single currency. This explains why during the times when the South African rand and other currencies are volatile, the Pula remains relatively stable. 2023 Pula Exchange Rate Parameters In the context of Botswana’s crawling band exchange rate arrangement for the Pula, the Ministry of Finance in conjunction with the Bank of Botswana, reviews the parameters for the Pula exchange rate twice in a year; being the currencies in the Pula basket and their weights, as well as the rate of crawl. This is done to assess alignment of the Pula exchange rate with the policy objective of maintaining a stable and competitive real effective exchange rate of the Pula; that is, retaining competitiveness of Botswana producers against imports and exports in international markets. For 2023, it was determined that inflation in Botswana would be on average 1.51 percentage points higher than in the trading partner countries and, therefore, a 1.51 percent annual downward crawl would be implemented through small daily adjustments that would equal 1.51 percent over twelve months. It was also determined that the trade patterns remain largely unchanged and, therefore, maintained at 55 percent SDR and 45 percent South African rand. The Benefits of the Crawling Band Framework for Botswana The benefits of the current crawling band framework are therefore as follows: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) it affords flexibility for adjustments to address deterioration in international price competitiveness of the domestic industry; any adjustment is gradual and, therefore, not disruptive nor destablising; the rate of adjustment is preannounced and retained for a year and, therefore, enables planning for economic decisions; the framework is broadly in alignment with the price stability objective (inflation objective inherent in the monetary policy framework; and the basket composition moderates fluctuations of the Pula exchange rate against any individual currency. In contrast, alternative arrangements could have disadvantages as follows: (a) With a small undiversified economy such as Botswana with irregular and lumpy foreign exchange flows, a floating exchange rate regime would imply large exchange rate fluctuations that could be debilitating to price determination and economic activity. In addition, there could be sustained movement of the exchange rate, especially MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 (b) (c) appreciation, that can undermine competitiveness of the non-mining sector and, therefore, diversification efforts; as demonstrated in the past, a fixed hard peg would often require adjustments that are large and discrete with a destabilising disruptive impact. For example, a large devaluation with significant inflationary impact; and a peg to a single currency would imply the Pula being subject to fluctuations and shocks to the currency to which it is pegged and, in turn, policy responses that may be inimical or inconsistent with the needs of the domestic economy at the time. Limits of Exchange Rate Adjustments on Industry Competitiveness While there are short-term benefits of deliberate exchange rate adjustments to maintain price competitiveness, for it to have the desired long-term impact there should be adequate production capacity and productivity improvements by the domestic industry. In addition, for government institutions, there should be effective implementation of plans and programmes. Overall, therefore, there is need for generalised entrenchment and traction of structural transformation and policy reforms as being fundamental to industrialisation and productivity improvements that would enhance competitiveness of domestic producers in a low inflation environment. It is recognised that, in the main, sustained (need for) downward adjustment of the currency is a reflection of weak production capacity and productivity of the economy; and is also inflationary (ultimately affecting price competitiveness). Transparency and Market Information The announcements of the Pula exchange rate parameters and any adjustments are intended to enhance transparency and integrity of the framework. In this regard, knowledge of the Pula basket weights, and rate of crawl enable the market and the general public to plan for investments and transactions on the basis of publicly available information that can be used as an input to any economic decisions. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 (d) Fiscal Policy 3.16 Government expenditure and net lending increased by 10.1 percent in the seven months (of the 2022/23 fiscal year) to October 2022 compared to an expansion of 4.4 percent in the corresponding period in 2021. Recurrent expenditure increased by 8.5 percent, while development expenditure rose by 17.9 percent in the seven months to October 2022. Overall spending included the 5 percent salary increment for public service employees effected in April 2022. Specific to development spending, the expansion was attributable to the resumption of some development projects that had been halted in the advent of the COVID-19 containment measures implemented in 2020. 3.17 The relatively high increase in revenue (23.8 percent), compared to overall spending, resulted in a net surplus of P4.8 billion in the seven months to October 2022, compared to a smaller surplus of P1.2 billion in the corresponding period in 2021. The revised estimate for the 2022/23 overall balance, announced in the February 2023 Budget Speech, is a deficit of P4.9 billion (2 percent of GDP), up from a much smaller deficit of P127.9 million (0.1 percent of GDP) in the final budget for 2021/22. This will result from the projected total revenue and grants of P71.5 billion and total expenditures and net lending of P76.4 billion, which compare with total revenue and grants amounting to P68.6 billion and total public expenditure of P68.7 billion, in 2021/22. (e) Employment and Wage Developments 3.18 According to Statistics Botswana’s Quarterly Labour Force Survey, the unemployment rate was 25.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2022, compared to 26 percent in the fourth quarter of 2021 (youth unemployment rate also declined to 33.5 percent from 34.4 percent). The survey also indicates that formal sector employment declined by 1.6 percent in the review period. 3.19 Regarding other indicators, the survey showed that Government continued to be the single largest employer, with employment in public administration constituting 26.9 percent of total formal sector employment. In this regard, personal emoluments constitute the largest share (above 40 percent) of the government recurrent spending of the 2022/23 revised budget, about 10 percent of GDP. Meanwhile, formal sector average earnings per month were estimated at P6 578 for citizens, P12 111 for noncitizens and P6 803 for all employees in the fourth quarter of 2022, compared with P6 219 for citizens, P9 275 for non-citizens and P6 299 for all employees estimated for the fourth quarter of 2021. The average monthly earnings for all employees are, therefore, estimated to have increased by 8 percent or P504 between the fourth quarter of 2021 and the fourth quarter of 2022. In this regard, the average growth in monthly wages is less than the inflation rate and, hence, does not add to inflationary pressures. (f) 3.20 Credit and Financial Stability Review Annual growth in commercial bank credit accelerated to 6.2 percent in 2022, from 5.1 percent in 2021 (Chart 3.8). The faster growth in commercial bank credit was, in part, associated with the increase in loan uptake by businesses in the period under review, as the economy opened, following the end of the State of Public Emergency MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 in September 2021. The impact of the increase in the MoPR was countered by the utilisation of credit facilities by businesses aiming to increase activity or augment inventory/supply shortages in order to meet demand, during the continued recovery following relaxation of the COVID-19 restrictive measures. Business sector credit grew, annually, by 8.9 percent in 2022, from 2.7 percent increase in December 2021. Meanwhile, credit to businesses excluding parastatals increased by 9.2 percent during 2022, compared to an annual expansion of 4.1 percent in 2021. The improvement in the allocation of credit to businesses was in the form of utilisation of overdraft facilities and loans extended to some companies in the agriculture, electricity and water, mining, transport and communication, as well as in real estate industries. Furthermore, there was increased use of credit facilities by parastatals (Chart 3.9). Chart 3.8: Commercial Bank Credit Annual Growth Rates (January 2016 - December 2022) Percent -10 Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov -5 Total Credit House Credit Business Credit Source: Commercial banks. Chart 3.9: Annual Growth of Commercial Bank Business Credit by Industry Tr an sp or t& es ,R de ta Es al Re at st ra Pa te als e nc Fi na nd ta an ur ta Tr a El -50 Ba rs Co m m un ica tio ns io n tru Co ns W at & y cit ec tri ct er g tu ac uf an M -30 rin g in in M Ag ric -10 re ul tu Percent Source: Commercial banks. 3.21 For households, annual credit growth decelerated from 6.4 percent in 2021 to 4.8 percent in 2022. The lower credit growth was mainly attributable to the slower rate of increase in personal unsecured lending and property loans during the period under review, a possible reflection of the effects of the policy tightening in the second and third quarters of 2022 by the Bank of Botswana, which had a dampening effect on demand. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 Banks also likely restricted credit supply in an attempt to guard against increase in default rates as the cost of credit becomes expensive. The share of mortgages in total household credit decreased from 23.1 percent to 22.3 percent in the same period. Meanwhile, the growth rate for credit extended to motor vehicle and for credit card balances was higher in the same period. 3.22 In general, the rate of increase of credit continues to be supportive of economic activity, although remaining comparatively low by global standards (Appendix, Table A2). Commercial bank credit to GDP ratio increased slightly (Table 3.2) in 2022, reflecting faster credit growth relative to output growth, but remains comparatively low relative to financial inclusion and development needs, as well as global trends. In this context, there continues to be scope for prudent credit extension to enhance support for economic activity. The assessment of vulnerabilities and risks to financial stability, as measured by the credit-to-GDP gap (Chart 3.10), also shows that the modest credit growth is commensurate with the rate of increase in GDP; hence signifying that the current level of credit relative to economic activity is sustainable and poses limited risk of overheating of the economy arising from excessive credit growth. Table 3.2: Commercial Bank Credit-to-GDP Ratio Percent of GDP 33.1 Total Commercial Bank Credit 35.2 38.2 Business 12.8 13.3 11.2 12.6 Parastatals 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.3 Agriculture 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.7 Mining 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 Manufacturing 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.9 Construction 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.5 Trade 2.5 2.8 2.3 2.4 Transport and Communications 36.5 0.4 2.6 0.3 0.2 0.3 Finance and Business Services Real Estate 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.4 Households 3.1 3.0 2.8 22.2 25.0 21.9 23.8 Retail Credit3 16.7 19.1 16.9 18.3 Mortgage 5.5 5.9 5.1 5.6 Source: Commercial banks, Statistics Botswana and Bank of Botswana calculations. Notes: 1. Although not shown in the table, electricity and water, other and nonresident subsectors are included in the business credit-to-GDP ratio. 2. Data covering the twelve months to September 2022. 3. Includes motor vehicle, personal and credit card loans. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 Chart 3.10 Aggregate Credit to GDP Gap Percent Percent -2 -4 -6 20 18 20 Q1 Q2 20 Q3 Q 20 4 20 Q1 Q2 20 Q3 20 Q4 20 Q1 Q2 Q3 Actual Credit -to-GDP Trend Gap (RHS) Source: Bank of Botswana 3.23 The rate of growth of household deposits decreased to 8.4 percent in December 2022, compared to 15.8 percent in December 2021, while business deposits (excluding parastatals) increased by 11.1 percent from 3 percent during the same period. Overall, total deposits at commercial banks increased by 7.8 percent, compared to 4.7 percent growth in the prior year (Chart 3.11). Given the slower increase in bank lending than the increase in bank deposits, the financial intermediation ratio slightly decreased from 81.7 percent in December 2021 to 80.5 percent in December 2022, signalling the underutilisation of deposits as borrowing costs were elevated following monetary policy tightening by the Bank and in an environment of subdued economic activity. Chart 3.11: Annual Growth in Business and Household Deposits at Commercial Banks Percent -5 Business Dec Sep Jun Mar Dec Sep Jun Mar Dec Households Jun Sep Mar Dec Jun Sep Mar Dec Sep Jun Mar -10 Total Source: Commercial banks 3.24 Overall, notwithstanding the challenges caused by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, vulnerabilities that could elevate risks to financial stability remain contained, as reported in the published October 2022 Financial Stability Report. In particular, the financial sector was assessed to be resilient and characterised by strong capital MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 and liquidity buffers, moderate profitability as well as being adaptive and innovative. The enduring stability of the financial system is supported by sound macroeconomic environment, efficient and robust market infrastructure, prudently managed banks, and effective regulation and supervision. While economic performance is constrained by the lingering impact of COVID-19 and the fallout from the Russia-Ukraine war, proactive policy actions, including the prevailing accommodative real monetary conditions, and expansionary fiscal policy support, continue to anchor the soundness of the financial sector. 3.25 Banks’ asset quality was assessed to be good in 2022, characterised by a decline in credit default rates as the ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total bank credit fell to 3.8 percent in November 2022, from 4.1 percent in November 2021. Nevertheless, there continues to be a risk to asset quality associated with the high proportion of the relatively more expensive unsecured lending (at 71.9 percent of household credit in November 2022) in commercial bank credit. This profile of assets potentially exposes the household sector to any sudden and sharp increase in borrowing costs or loss of employment. The risks are, however, moderated to the extent that credit is widely distributed to many employees in different sectors of the economy, a large proportion of whom are in the public sector. Moreover, the extension of credit to salaried individuals enables proper credit evaluation using ascertained sources of income as the basis for determining repayment capacity. Furthermore, credit risk is mitigated in cases of loans that are protected by insurance for loss of employment. Overall, the capital, asset quality, liquidity and profitability levels that meet prudential requirements indicate a generally sound and stable banking system (Table 3.3). Table 3.3: Selected Performance Indicators of the Banking Sector Capital Adequacy (Percent) Dec Dec Mar June Sep Nov Core Capital to Unimpaired Capital 68.0 64.8 67.0 68.4 66.5 66.0 Tier 1 Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets1 13.5 12.0 12.5 12.0 11.8 12.1 Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 19.7 18.5 19.4 18.8 18.6 19.1 NPLs to Gross Loans 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.4 3.8 NPLs Net of Specific Provisions to Unimpaired Capital 7.4 9.2 8.7 8.8 8.5 8.1 Specific Provisions to NPLs 62.8 45.7 57.6 56.2 55.1 54.4 Liquid Assets to Deposits (Liquidity Ratio)3 21.4 16.6 16.6 17.4 18.3 17.1 Advances to Deposits (Intermediation Ratio) 81.4 81.9 82.3 82.3 79.8 80.4 Return on Average Assets (ROAA) 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 Return on Equity (ROE) 15.1 19.2 21.7 26.8 26.1 … Cost to Income 64.9 63.3 60.5 60.3 57.2 56.7 Asset Quality (Percent) Liquidity (Percent) Profitability/Efficiency (Percent) Source: 1. 2. 3. Bank of Botswana. Prudential lower limit is 7.5 percent – Basel II/III. Prudential lower limit is 12.5 percent. The minimum statutory requirement is 10 percent. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 3.26 Growth in broad money supply (M2) was 10 percent in the year to October 2022, compared to 3.9 percent in the corresponding period in 2021. The growth of money supply resulted from an increase in credit to the private and parastatals sectors to fund growth enhancing opportunities. Meanwhile, there was, in part, an offsetting effect from the increase in net foreign assets and public sector deposits at the Bank of Botswana. By component, current account (transferable) deposits increased by 10.1 percent, while interest bearing deposits increased by 10.5 percent in the year to October 2022. Deposits in foreign currency accounts increased by 38.2 percent in the same period. The ratio of money supply to GDP (a measure of financial deepening) decreased to 42.4 percent in the year to September 2022, compared to 48.7 percent in 2021, signalling shortage of liquidity in the economy (in the prevalence of COVID-19 base effects). (g) 3.27 Output and Price Developments Real GDP in Botswana grew by 6.4 percent in the twelve months to September 2022 compared to a growth of 8.9 percent in the year to September 2021. The slowdown in output growth is attributable to the deceleration in production of both the mining and non-mining sectors. It is worth noting that the high growth rate in the year ending September 2021 was mainly due to economic recovery from the low base associated with the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic containment measures which were more stringent in 2020. Mining output grew by 9.2 percent in the year ending in September 2022, a notable deceleration from 15.8 percent in the corresponding period in 2021. This was due to a slower growth in output of most sub sectors, led by the mining of diamonds, which declined to 9 percent in the year to September 2022, compared to a growth of 16.3 percent in the previous twelve month period. Non-mining GDP grew by 5.7 percent in the year to September 2022, compared to a higher growth of 7.2 percent in the corresponding period in 2021, due to the deceleration of output growth for most sectors, namely, construction; wholesale and retail; diamond traders; transport and storage; information and communication technology; real estate activities; professional, scientific and technical activities; administrative and support activities; human health and social work; and other services. Meanwhile, year on year, GDP increased by 6.3 percent in the third quarter of 2022, a slowdown from a higher growth of 8.9 percent in the corresponding period in 2021.8 ________________________ The 6.3 percent annual growth reported in the economic briefing release by Statistics Botswana (SB) is calculated based on quarterly output compared to the corresponding period the previous year. Thus, SB reports year-on-year growth based on quarterly GDP. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 Mining GDP Non Mining Q3 Q2 Q4 2022Q1 Q3 Q2 2021Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q4 2020Q1 Q3 Q2 2019Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q4 2018Q1 Q3 Q2 2017Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 2016Q1 Percent Chart 3.12: Annual Real GDP Growth Rate (2016Q1-2022Q3) -5 -10 -15 -20 -30 Total GDP Source: Statistics Botswana and Bank of botswana calculations. 3.28 Inflation was above the Bank’s inflation objective range of 3 – 6 percent in 2022, against the background of improved domestic demand, upward adjustment in administered prices, as well as higher foreign inflation. 3.29 Inflation increased significantly from an average of 6.7 percent in 2021 to an average of 12.2 percent in 2022, thus remaining above the Bank’s 3 – 6 percent objective range since May 2021 (Chart 3.13). The high inflation in 2022 was mainly due to significant upward adjustment of administered prices, which added 5.2 percentage points to inflation during the year and associated second-round effects. However, inflation generally trended downwards from September 2022 and was 12.4 percent in December 2022, higher than the 8.7 percent in December 2021. Food price inflation also increased from 7.2 percent in December 2021 to 16.9 percent in December 2022, in the context of significant domestic price increases for bread and cereals, oils and vegetables. Regarding core inflation measures, the 16 percent trimmed mean inflation9 increased from 8 percent in December 2021 to 11.2 percent in December 2022, while inflation excluding administered prices increased from 7.1 percent to 8.7 percent in the same period. Chart 3.13: Botswana Inflation (January 2016 - December 2022) Percent CPI Inflation Trimmed Mean Core Oct Jul Apr Oct Jul Apr Oct Jul Apr Oct Jul Apr Oct Jul Apr Oct Jul Apr Oct Jul Apr Core by Exclusion Source: Statistics Botswana ________________________ Removes 8 percent (by weight) of the commodity sub-groups with the largest price changes at each of the ends of an ordered series of price changes in any given month. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 Percent Percent Chart 3.14: Headline, Food and Fuel Inflation (January 2016-December 2022) -10 Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov Mar May Jul Sep Nov -2 Food Inflation Headline Inflation -20 Fuel Inflation(RHS) Source: Statistics Botswana 4. OUTPUT AND INFLATION OUTLOOK (a) Global Economic Prospects 4.1 The January 2023 WEO Update anticipates a moderation in global economic growth, from 3.4 percent in 2022 to 2.9 percent in 2023, against the backdrop of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and tightening financial conditions in most regions; more aggressively in advanced economies, to contain elevated inflationary pressures. The slowdown in output growth is also consistent with challenging prospects for advanced economies, in part, due to lower consumer demand associated with higher inflation and borrowing costs which have significantly eroded purchasing power. However, the growth forecast for 2023 is 0.2 percentage points higher than the October 2022 projection, largely due to positive surprises and greater-than-expected resilience in numerous economies, as well as the reopening of Chinese economy in January 2023. Overall, risks to the global economic outlook are assessed to be on the downside. These include the possibility of China’s economy stalling, likely escalation of RussiaUkraine war and stagflation. The resurgence of COVID-19 and possible debt distress could also slow down global economic activity. Nonetheless, the global economy is not expected to fall into recession in 2023. 4.2 Growth in advanced economies is projected to decline from the expansion of 2.7 percent in 2022 to 1.2 percent in 2023, mostly reflecting macroeconomic effects of elevated inflationary pressures and sharp tightening of global financial conditions, as well as weaker consumer demand and erosion of purchasing power. Meanwhile, about 90 percent of advanced economies are projected to experience a decline in growth in 2023. Among these economies is the US, which is expected to experience a slower growth of 1.4 percent in 2023 from 2 percent in 2022, reflecting lower consumer demand because of higher interest rates. Furthermore, the rate of output expansion in the euro area is forecast to decline from 3.5 percent in 2022 to 0.7 percent in 2023, reflecting the spill-over effects from the Russia-Ukraine war, with expected slowdown in economic activity among the bloc’s largest economies. In the UK, economic activity MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 is projected to contract by 0.6 percent in 2023, from an estimated growth of 4.1 percent in 2022, as elevated inflation continues to reduce purchasing power, and tighter fiscal and monetary policies actions take a toll on spending and investments. 4.3 For emerging market and developing economies, growth is expected to rise slightly from 3.9 percent in 2022 to 4 percent in 2023. The higher growth projection for 2023 is mainly due to upward revisions of large economies, particularly Russia and China. Output growth in China is projected to increase in 2023, largely due to the re-opening of the economy. However, about half of the emerging markets countries are expected to experience lower growth in 2023, reflecting less favourable external conditions, and the distress associated with aggressive tightening of financial conditions and monetary policy in advanced economies. 4.4 Global inflationary pressures are projected to moderate in 2023, although remaining high, due to rapid monetary policy tightening, squeezing of household budgets and waning COVID-19 pandemic-related fiscal support. Moreover, the projected disinflation emanates from expected lower commodity prices. Thus, inflation for advanced economies is forecast to decrease from 7.3 percent in 2022 to 4.6 percent in 2023, while for emerging market economies, it is forecast to decrease from 9.9 percent to 8.1 percent. Consequently, global inflation is expected to ease from 8.8 percent to 6.6 percent in the same period. However, prolonged supply chain disruptions due to both the pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war may persist for a while, thus keeping prices higher than expected. 4.5 Inflation is forecast to average 4.4 percent and 5.4 percent in the SDR countries and South Africa, respectively, in 2023. Therefore, average inflation for trading partner countries is forecast at 4.8 percent, which is 3 percentage points lower than the 7.8 percent average forecast inflation for Botswana in 2023; an inflation differential requiring a downward rate of crawl of the Pula exchange rate (NEER) to maintain stability of the REER. Moreover, there continues to be a need to support economic activity, in particular, international competitiveness of the domestic industry. Against this background, an annual downward rate of crawl of 1.51 percent of the NEER is being implemented for 2023. The Pula basket weights were maintained at 45 percent for the South African rand and 55 percent for the SDR. (b) Domestic Economic Prospects 4.6 Domestically, real GDP is projected to expand by 4 percent in 2023, from an estimated expansion of 6.7 percent in 2022, as growth in the mining sector moderates. However, it is anticipated that performance of the non mining sectors will improve, underpinned by, among others, improvements in electricity and water supply, as well as finance, insurance and pension funds sectors. Furthermore, Government interventions to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, including the implementation of the Economic Recovery and Transformation Plan and the TNDP, are anticipated to restore economic activity and improve incomes, facilitate expansion of productive capacity, accelerate economic transformation and build economic resilience. However, given the downside risks to global economic activity, including the possible resurgence of COVID-19, weaker global demand and adverse impact of the Russia-Ukraine war, the growth trajectory remains uncertain. Although improving, the non-mining output is expected to continue operating below potential in 2023 (Chart 4.1). 4.7 As announced in the 2023 Budget Speech, Government continues to run a budget deficit during the first year of the two-year TNDP, to be financed through both domestic and external borrowing, as well as drawing from the Government Investment Account. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 Domestic borrowing will entail the issuance of Government debt securities in the form of bonds and Treasury Bills, while external borrowing will be in the form of loans from bilateral and multilateral official financial institutions. Chart 4.1: Botswana Non-Mining Output Gap (September 2022 - December 2024) Percent -2 2024:4 2024:3 2024:2 2024:1 2023:4 2023:3 2023:2 2023:1 2022:4 2022:3 -4 Source: Bank of Botswana. 4.8 Inflation has generally been on a downward trend since September 2022. It is projected that the downward trend will be sustained and that inflation will revert to within the Bank’s 3 – 6 percent medium-term objective range in the second quarter of 2024 (Chart 4.2), mainly on account of the dissipating impact of the earlier increases in administered prices, the recent reduction in domestic fuel prices10, the expected decrease in international commodity prices and implementation of a smaller downward annual rate of crawl for the Pula exchange rate. 4.9 The projection also considers the anticipated increase in economic activity supported by both fiscal policy and relatively accommodative monetary conditions; the impact of the recent increase in private school fees in January 2023; the impact of the price increase in Kgalagadi Breweries Limited (KBL) products effective February 1, 2022; the expected upward adjustment of Botswana Housing Corporation (BHC) rentals and electricity tariffs in April 2023 and April 202411; as well as the possibility of higher prices due to resumption of the 14 percent VAT following implementation of the Government’s temporary inflation relief measures introduced on August 1, 2022. 4.10 Overall, risks to the inflation outlook are assessed to be skewed to the upside. These risks include the potential increase in international commodity prices beyond current forecasts; persistence of supply and logistical constraints due to lags in production; the adverse economic and price effects of the protracted Russia-Ukraine war; the uncertain COVID-19 profile; and ongoing tension between China and the United Sates over South China Sea and Taiwan. On the domestic front, the risks for higher ________________________ The recent decrease in domestic fuel prices on December 22, 2022 and January 13, 2023, is anticipated to reduce inflation by approximately 0.83 percentage points in the first quarter of 2023. The increase in private school fees is envisaged to have a net impact of approximately 0.02 percentage points, while the price increase in KBL’s products will add approximately 0.81 percentage points to inflation in the first quarter of 2023. The increase in BHC rentals and electricity tariffs is expected to add approximately 0.21 percentage points and 0.3 percentage points, respectively, to inflation in the second quarter of 2023 and 2024. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 inflation than currently projected relate to possible annual adjustments in administered prices not included in the forecast; short term consequences of import restrictions; prospective fiscal developments, namely implementation of potentially expansionary two-year TNDP; the possibility of a higher than projected impact of the resumption of the 14 percent VAT (from 12 percent) in the second quarter of 2023; upward pressure on wages across the country emanating from the 5 percent increase in public service salaries effective April 1, 2023; and entrenched expectations for higher inflation which could lead to higher general price adjustments. There is also a likelihood of an upward adjustment in domestic fuel prices, in response to any increase in international oil prices. 4.11 These risks are, however, moderated by the possibility of weaker-than-anticipated domestic and global economic activity due to geo political tensions and possible restrictions in response to any emergence of new COVID-19 variants. Lower international commodity prices than currently projected could also result in lower inflation, as would capacity constraints in project implementation. Meanwhile, according to the December 2022 Bank’s Business Expectations Survey, the business community expects inflation to remain above the Bank’s objective range in 2023. 2024:4 2024:3 2024:2 2024:1 2023:4 2023:3 2023:2 2023:1 2022:4 2022:3 Percent Chart 4.2: Annual Headline Inflation Forecasts for the Medium Term (September 2022 - December 2024) Source: Bank of Botswana. Chart 4.3: Domestic Fuel and Food Inflation Forecasts for the Medium Term (September 2022 - December 2024) Percent -5 Food Inflation 2024:4 2024:3 2024:2 2024:1 2023:4 2023:3 2023:2 2023:1 2022:4 -25 2022:3 -15 Fuel Inflation Source: Bank of Botswana. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 5. THE 2023 MONETARY POLICY STANCE AND THE BANK OF BOTSWANA (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2022 5.1 An evaluation of the determinants of inflation and factors affecting financial stability suggests that the level of inflation will be within the objective range in the medium term, reflective of the moderation in international commodity prices and expected slowdown in global economic activity. Furthermore, the current levels of credit growth to both businesses and households are considered sustainable and aligned to growth in nominal GDP and/or incomes. Overall, the recent and prospective developments for both domestic (disinflationary inflation outlook and a stable financial environment) and external economic activity suggest that the prevailing accommodative monetary policy stance is consistent with inflation reverting to within the Bank’s 3 – 6 percent objective range in the medium term. In the context of the economy operating below potential in the short-to-medium term, the assessment is that the economy could benefit from a measured depreciation of the Pula against trading partners to support domestic industry competitiveness; hence implementation of the exchange rate policy will entail a 1.51 percent downward rate of crawl in 2023. 5.2 The Bank will continue to respond appropriately to changes in the banking system liquidity conditions through relevant instruments. Overall, the Bank encourages prudent management, investment and productive allocation of financial resources, with a view to promoting growth-supporting intermediation and durable financial stability. In this regard, for effective policy transmission, the Bank guides the determination of the level and direction of market interest rates that are consistent with the monetary policy stance. The Bank also promotes effectiveness of the interbank market in addressing liquidity positions of individual banks. In addition, the Bank contributes to financial stability through prudential and market conduct supervision of commercial and statutory banks and promotes, as well as participates in, coordinated regulation of the broader financial system. 5.3 The Bank evaluates its monetary policy implementation framework on a regular basis for effectiveness, with a view to introducing refinements where necessary. In this regard, the reforms to monetary operations introduced in 2022 are expected to enhance monetary policy transmission by inducing the desired market response to monetary policy and monetary operations adjustments. In particular, designation of the MoPR as the anchor policy rate enables direct linkage to liquidity management decisions and determination of interbank market interest rates by commercial banks, hence ultimate transmission of any policy changes to the rest of the economy as desired. In addition, the freeing up of the Prime Lending Rates (PLR) to be independently determined by individual commercial banks should facilitate market competition and fair pricing of credit and other lending products. The Bank will, nevertheless, monitor implementation of this dispensation and enforce good business conduct and alignment with the desired outcome. 5.4 In July 2022, the Parliament passed the Bank of Botswana (Amendment) Act, 2022 (the Act), which introduces new provisions to enhance the Bank’s powers to achieve the price and financial stability mandates. The Bank will, therefore, implement the following amendments in 2023: MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 (a) adopt the ranked dual mandate for the Bank. Section 4 (2) of the Act incorporates a financial stability mandate for the Bank in addition to the primary mandate of maintenance of domestic price stability. Under the new legislation, the primary objective of the Bank shall be to achieve and maintain domestic price stability. Subject to attaining its primary mandate, the Bank shall contribute to the stability of the financial system and foster and maintain a stable, sound and competitive market-based financial system; (b) explicit designation of the inflation objective by Government and, thereafter, operational independence in pursuit of its primary objectives, and in the performance of its functions under the Act. That is, going forward and once the new Act is operational, the medium-term inflation objective will be determined by the Minister; and the new statutory MPC will have de jure operational autonomy to conduct monetary policy as appropriate to achieve the inflation objective determined by the Minister; (c) change the composition of the MPC. The amended Act (Section 19 B) adds diversity to the composition of the MPC, which shall comprise nine members, four of which shall be independent external members. The five internal members shall be Governor (who shall be the Chairman), the two Deputy Governors, head of department responsible for economic research and head of department responsible for treasury operations. The four external members shall be appointed by the Minister, to be independent persons, not representing any sector of the economy and who are not employees of the Bank, with knowledge and experience relevant to the functions of the MPC; (d) establish a Statutory Financial Stability Council. The amended Act (Section 54 B) establishes a statutory body to be known as a Financial Stability Council (FSC), which shall be responsible for preserving the stability of the financial system; ensuring cooperation between members with respect to the assessment of the build-up of economic and financial sector systemic risks in Botswana; developing coordinated policy responses to risks including crisis management; and making recommendations, issuing warnings or opinions addressed to regulatory bodies regarding financial institutions. The FSC shall comprise the Governor, who shall be the Chairman, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry responsible for Finance, Chief Executive Officer of the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Regulatory Authority, Director of the Deposit Insurance Scheme, and the Director General of the Financial Intelligence Agency;12 and (e) establish a Deposit Insurance Scheme. Section 43 A of the amended Act provides for the establishment of a Deposit Insurance Scheme to provide insurance against loss of part or all insured customer deposits in a bank. The Deposit Insurance Scheme shall be established and operate in a manner that will contribute to the stability of the financial system in Botswana and minimise exposure to loss for customers. ________________________ Currently, and prior to commencement of the Bank of Botswana (Amendment) Act, the Financial Stability Council is not a statutory body and is established by a memorandum of understanding between participating institutions. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 6. CONCLUSION 6.1 Domestic inflation was above the Bank’s objective range of 3 – 6 percent in 2022, averaging 12.2 percent, mainly reflecting upward adjustments in administered prices and higher imported inflation. Meanwhile, global inflation is forecast to decrease in 2023, although remaining high, due to aggressive monetary policy tightening across the regions. 6.2 It is projected that inflation in Botswana will revert to within the objective range in the second quarter of 2024, mainly on account of the dissipating impact of the earlier increases in administered prices, the recent reduction in domestic fuel prices, the expected decrease in international commodity prices and implementation of a smaller downward annual rate of crawl for the Pula exchange rate. The Bank’s formulation and implementation of monetary policy will focus on entrenching expectations of low, predictable and sustainable inflation, through timely response to price developments, while ensuring that credit and other market developments are in line with durable stability of the financial system. The Bank remains committed to monitoring economic and financial developments with a view to ensuring price and financial stability, without undermining sustainable economic growth. 6.3 Broadly, the Bank contributes to macroeconomic stability and policy congruence through the pursuit and attainment of its primary objectives and coordination with relevant institutions with respect to price and financial stability, as well as stability of the inflation-adjusted trade-weighted exchange rate. By focusing and delivering on its specific roles, the Bank contributes to maintenance of a conducive environment for structural reforms and transformation initiatives to gain traction, potentially leading to higher rates of economic growth needed for transition to a high-income status. Given that monetary policy is accommodative (as indicated by negative real interest rates and therefore supportive real monetary conditions) and fiscal policy is expansionary, immediate implementation of transformation initiatives and structural reforms are expected to raise prospects for faster growth and economic diversification. Against this background, enhanced productivity/innovation (including greater production capacity) of industry and effectiveness of support institutions and service providers would help improve growth prospects for the economy in an environment of price and financial stability. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 APPENDIX Table A1: 2022 Monetary Policy Decisions Central Bank United States Federal Reserve Bank of England Policy Rate as at December 4.25 – 4.50 percent Policy Change from Previous Year Increased by 425 basis points Increased by 325 3.50 percent basis points Asset Purchase Programmes Likely Policy Decision in 2023 ● At the June 2022 Federal Open ● Market Committee (FOMC) meeting: reduced the size of the Fed’s balance sheet holdings of Treasury securities by USD30 billion; holdings of agency mortgage-backed securities by USD17.5 billion monthly. ● From September 2022, the Fed doubled the pace of monthly reductions of its holdings of treasury securities by USD60 billion, as well as agency debt and mortgage-backed securities by USD35 billion. Increase policy rate in 2023, in order to attain a stance that is sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to the 2 percent target over time. Also, continue to reduce its holdings of treasury securities, agency debt and mortgage-backed securities. ● Began tapering its asset ● Further increases in the Bank holdings of UK government and Rate may be warranted, but by a corporate bonds financed by lower magnitude than currently. the issuance of BoE reserves by ceasing to reinvest in maturing assets in February 2022. ● In addition, to reverse the quantitative easing, the BoE started selling some of the £895 billion UK government and corporate bonds. The aim was to reduce asset holdings by £80 billion over a period of twelve months. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 Central Bank European Central Bank13 Policy Rate as at December Policy Change from Previous Year Increased by 250 2.50 percent basis points Asset Purchase Programmes Likely Policy Decision in 2023 ● Recalibrated targeted longer- ● term refinancing operations (TLTROs) rate by linking it to the average deposit facility rate or the average rate on the main ● refinancing operations for the remaining maturity of respective TLTRO III, to accelerate tightening of monetary policy and normalise financing conditions and reduce bank’s balance sheet. ● The Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme, introduced in 2020, was conducted at a lower pace in January 2022 and purchases discontinued at the end of March 2022, only reivestments of redemptions on maturing assests purchased under the programe to run until the end of 2024. ● Net purchases under the asset purchase programme (APP) continued in 2022, but was revised upwards to a monthly pace of €90 billion in the second quarter of 2022, to cushion the economy against uncertainities associated with the RussiaUkraine war. The APP was concluded in the third quarter of 2022, there were no more net purchases, only reivestments of redemptions until early 2023. Further interest rates increases are possible and will be based on the evolving inflation and economy dynamics. The APP is expected to decline at a measured and predictable pace as the ECB will no longer reinvest all of the principal from maturing securities. An initial prediction states that it will decline by an average of €15 billion per month until the third quarter of 2023 and its subsequent decline will be determined over time ________________________ The ECB has three key policy rates. These are the interest rate on the main refinancing operations, as well as the interest rates on the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility. The interest rate presented above is on the main refinancing operations. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 Central Bank Policy Rate as at December Policy Change from Previous Year Bank of Japan -0.1 percent No change Bank of Botswana Increased by 151 2.65 percent basis points South African Reserve Bank Increased by 325 7.00 percent basis points People’s Bank of China Central Bank of Brazil Asset Purchase Programmes Likely Policy Decision in 2023 ● Continued buying risky assets, ● such as exchange traded funds at an annual pace of ¥12 trillion and Japanese real estate trust funds (J-REIT) at an annual pace of ¥180 billion to cap upward pressure on yields resulting from global swings. ● In June 2022, the BoJ defended its ceiling on the 10-year Japanese Government bonds (JBGs) by buying over ¥16 trillion worth of bonds. ● Purchased Commercial Paper (CP) and corporate bonds with an upper limit on the amount outstanding of about ¥20 trillion in total, until the end of March 2022. Will not hesitate to take additional easing measures if necessary; it also expects shortand long-term policy interest rates to remain at their present or lower levels. Not applicable ● Increase in 2023 Not applicable Decreased 3.65 percent by 15 basis Not applicable points 13.75 percent Increased by 450 basis points Reserve Bank of India Increased by 225 6.25 percent basis points Central Bank of Russia Decreased by 100 basis points 7.5 percent ● No indication of the direction of policy. Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable ● Maintain an accommodative monetary policy stance. Indicated that policy tightening across the globe is limiting China’s room for further monetary policy easing. ● Reinforces that future monetary policy steps can be adjusted and will not hesitate to resume the tightening cycle if the disinflationary process does not proceed as expected. ● Increase in 2023 likely, but no indication on the magnitude. RBI remains focused on withdrawal of accommodative measures to ensure that inflation remains within the target going forward, while supporting growth. ● No indication of the direction of policy; will continue to use the latest data to adapt monetary policy in future meetings. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 Table A2: Credit to Private Sector by Banks (Percent of GDP) United States of America 52.2 52.2 54.3 United Kingdom 133.7 132.3 146.6 India 50.3 50.8 54.7 China 157.8 165.4 182.9 Singapore 117.7 119.7 130.6 Chile 82.1 87.2 88.7 Rwanda 21.4 21.4 25.0 Mauritius 75.3 78.1 91.9 Namibia 81.7 91.2 97.6 Kenya 31.2 30.8 32.1 South Africa 59.9 60.4 62.0 Botswana 34.7 36.0 39.8 Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Notes: 1. Domestic credit to the private sector by banks refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by other depository corporations (deposit taking corporations except central banks), such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries, these claims include credit to public enterprises. 2. Data for 2021 and 2022 is not available. MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 NOTE MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 NOTE MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT FEBRUARY 2023 MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING DATES FOR 2023 Date Venue February 22 - 23 Bank of Botswana April 27 - 28 Bank of Botswana June 14 - 15 Bank of Botswana August 23 - 24 Bank of Botswana October 25 - 26 Bank of Botswana December 6 - 7 Bank of Botswana Private Bag 154, Gaborone, Botswana Tel: (267) 3606000 Fax: (267) 3901100 Email: [email protected] www.bankofbotswana.bw
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Translated excerpts of a speech given by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr. Yasuo Matsushita, at the Research Institute of Japan in Tokyo on 06/11/96.
Mr. Matsushita considers the role of monetary policy in Japan Translated excerpts of a speech given by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr. Yasuo Matsushita, at the Research Institute of Japan in Tokyo on 06/11/96. I. Introduction I am greatly honored to have been invited by the Research Institute of Japan to address this distinguished audience. Today, I would first like to discuss the Bank of Japan’s views on recent economic developments in Japan and the thinking behind the Bank’s current monetary policy. Then, I would like to review some of the basic issues related to monetary policy management, such as the significance of price stability, which is the objective of monetary policy, and the points for consideration in achieving it. There has been much debate since the beginning of this year about Japan’s central bank system, and the Central Bank Study Group, an advisory panel to the Prime Minister, is planning to publish a report in the near future. I myself have, on several occasions, addressed the basic issues involved, such as the status of the central bank within the framework of a democratic society, and the role of the central bank in maintaining financial system stability.1 As my previous speeches focused on the institutional framework of central banking, there has not been an opportunity to discuss the Bank of Japan’s views on the central bank’s policy management. I have thus selected monetary policy as the theme of today’s speech. However, there is another reason. Over the past decade, it seems that a new thinking has been developing among the industrialized countries regarding monetary and fiscal policy management, or more broadly, the economic policy management of a country. This has prompted heated discussions in various countries in recent years on monetary policy and central banking, and this new thinking will be of great significance in contemplating the future framework of the Japanese economy. I would therefore like to examine the role of monetary policy, bearing in mind this new thinking on economic policy management. II. Domestic Economic Conditions and Current Monetary Policy A. Domestic Economic Conditions I would like to begin by reviewing domestic economic conditions. In spring 1995, the recovery of the Japanese economy came to a pause and, at one time, there were even concerns about a deflationary spiral. In view of these economic developments, substantial monetary easing and large-scale fiscal policy measures were implemented. Since the beginning of this year, the economy has once again been on a recovery path, owing to the permeation of policy effects and the depreciation of the yen. The Bank currently judges that a moderate economic recovery continues, but there are concerns as to why the economy has not shown a recovery that is any stronger than “moderate” for nearly a year. This slow recovery can be explained by the tug-of-war between the forces encouraging recovery and the structural adjustment pressures constraining recovery. Therefore, 1For details, see previous speeches entitled "The role of the Central Bank" and "Recent Monetary and Economic Conditions and Issues facing the Japanese Financial System", given on 14/06/96 and 03/04/96, respectively. Both speeches are included in the August 1996 issue of the Bank of Japan Quarterly Bulletin. to predict future economic developments, we must first understand how these two factors are at work in the economy. One of the forces encouraging recovery is the permeation of policy effects. For example, there is no doubt that the decline in interest rates has been contributing significantly to the recovery in housing and business fixed investments. At the same time, fiscal expenditures have underpinned domestic aggregate demand. However, forces encouraging economic recovery are not limited to the supporting policy measures. As the economy follows a recovery path supported by policy effects, a larger number of firms with improving profits have begun to show a more positive stance toward business fixed investment and employment. As a result, the risk of a deflationary spiral, which was an issue of concern last year, has been practically eliminated. It can thus be said that the cyclical forces of the economy based on domestic private demand have been slowly but steadily at work for the past year. However, the factors that constrain economic recovery have also been persistent. For example, while business fixed investment continues to recover owing to progress in capital stock adjustment, it has not yet gained the full momentum seen in past economic recoveries. This is because firms, in spite of improved profits, have given priority to repaying debts in order to improve their balance sheets, or have limited their gross fixed investment to the amount of cash flow generated from depreciation of existing facilities. Intensified competition with other Asian countries, which has brought changes to the international environment, is also affecting the Japanese economy in various ways. The inflow of low-priced goods from other Asian countries, for example, seriously affects firms producing competing products. Furthermore, the relocation of production bases overseas by Japanese manufacturers not only decreases domestic business fixed investment by those manufacturers, but also restrains the investment by their domestic subcontractors, due to decrease in orders. It seems that management of firms have not been able to dispel uncertainties over the future, as the path toward a new industrial structure remains obscure under the current circumstances. B. Structural Adjustment Pressures The Japanese economy is thus faced with two types of adjustment pressures: pressures for balance-sheet adjustment in the corporate sector; and pressures for structural adjustment of the industries created by the intensifying competition with other Asian countries. These are the factors that have caused the pace of economic recovery to remain moderate. These two adjustment pressures are, however, significantly different in nature. Adjustment of balance sheets is about reducing debts which accumulated during the “bubble” period, in other words, disposing of the burdens from the past. To that extent, this adjustment is regrettably of a negative nature. In order to reduce the burdens, it will be necessary to enhance the functions of the capital markets to strengthen firms’ capital bases, and to revitalize the real estate market to facilitate the liquidation of firms’ real estate holdings. Ultimately, however, it is only increase in profits that provides the funds necessary to write off latent losses on real estate and repay accumulated loans. In other words, the burdens from the past need to be reduced gradually with each year’s income arising from economic activity. In this regard, although it may sound paradoxical, revitalizing economic activity and boosting corporate profits, or more fundamentally, supporting the recovery of the economy will be important preconditions for the smooth progress of balance-sheet adjustment. Realizing a recovery of the economy encumbered with impaired balance sheets, therefore, requires a stronger policy support than otherwise. This is one of the reasons why the Bank has implemented substantial monetary easing measures to date. As a result, the economy has resumed recovery, although moderate, and corporate profits have been increasing. Accordingly, balance sheets have also been improving gradually. Regarding debt servicing ability, the ratio of firms’ long-term debts to cash flow has been declining slowly for the past two years, after rising rapidly during the “bubble” period. It can be said that firms’ balance sheets have, in general, begun to show steady improvement, although differences remain between individual sectors and firms. While the balance-sheet adjustment is an attempt to recover from a negative situation, structural adjustment of the industries in response to a new global economic environment is essentially a positive challenge in that the restructuring process itself introduces the possibility of creating renewed economic development. The increasing supply capacity of other East Asian economies and their transition to market economies have intensified competition facing Japan’s labor-intensive sectors. At the same time, however, these factors have expanded markets and business opportunities for the Japanese economy. Therefore, if the Japanese economy can adapt itself successfully to this new international division of labor, these developments should bring significant benefits to the Japanese economy in the long run. In fact, a careful look at the Japanese economy will reveal indications of such positive industrial restructuring. The change in Japan’s trade structure is one example. Until a decade ago, the top five imports were mostly fuels and raw materials, usually crude oil, wood, petroleum products, coal, and natural gas, although the order varied from year to year. In 1995, however, while crude oil maintained its top position, the other four major imports were office machinery, electronic parts, automobiles, and wood. The share of manufactured goods in Japan’s total imports has doubled from 30 to 60 percent over the decade. This change by itself would merely suggest that the manufacturing sector, which had long been Japan’s mainstay, now faces severer competition with imported goods. What is notable is that the composition of exports has also changed significantly during the same period. Automobiles, ships, and household electric appliances such as television sets and radios used to appear at the top of the list of export items. In 1995, however, while automobiles stayed as the number one import, electronic parts, office machinery, automobile parts, and scientific and optical apparatus ranked second to fifth, indicating that capital goods and parts have replaced consumer durables. As labor-intensive sectors such as the consumer durables industry grow in other East Asian economies, exports of labor-intensive products from Japan have been declining, while those of capital-intensive products with higher value added, such as capital goods and related parts, have been increasing. This is a typical illustration of the Japanese economy’s strong ability to adapt to changes in the global environment. The emergence and expansion of new leading industries in Japan are also indications of industrial restructuring. The mobile telecommunications market, for example, has grown rapidly to a ¥3.5 trillion market and the business fixed investment of this industry has expanded to almost ¥2 trillion, which is equivalent to the sum of business fixed investment by the automobile and iron-and-steel industries. Furthermore, in these three years when economic recovery has been unable to obtain a firm footing, some industries achieved earnings growth comparable to or even exceeding that attained in the three years during the economic boom of the latter half of the 1980s: namely, the electrical and precision machinery industries, which have succeeded in adjusting to the new international division of labor; and the pulp and paper industry in the raw materials sector, which has been able to benefit from the increased volume of information processed and distributed in today’s technological age. I have so far emphasized the brighter side of the domestic economy with the hope of further encouraging the efforts of domestic industries, but reality is obviously not so simple. During periods of transition of industrial structure, the contrast between the bright and dark sides tends to become stronger. Focusing on the dark side, the mismatch between labor supply and demand has become greater, and restructuring burdens have been particularly heavy on small and medium-sized firms. Looking back at the postwar period, the Japanese economy successfully underwent several major changes in the industrial structure and shifts in leading industries. There is no doubt that during the periods of transition, management of firms faced great uncertainties about the future, and that it was extremely difficult to accurately predict which would be the growth industries in the coming years. However, during the era of high economic growth, the rapid expansion of the economy absorbed the negative impact arising from the structural adjustment of the industries. The main difficulty that the current economy faces seems to lie not in the industrial restructuring itself, but in the fact that the current economic growth is not strong enough to provide a similar “shock absorber” effect. For this reason the implementation of structural policy, such as deregulation, has become an urgent issue. In order to promote industrial restructuring, it is necessary to create new investment opportunities and to encourage unrestricted and creative business activity through deregulation. It is also important to increase labor mobility and facilitate land transactions. C. Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy Management In order for the Japanese economy to be put firmly on a self-sustaining recovery path in the face of reduced fiscal support, it will be necessary for the structural adjustment to continue to progress and for the virtuous circle between production, income, and expenditure to gain further strength. In this respect, firms have been responding steadily to the structural adjustment pressures. The decline in net exports, which had been a drag on economic recovery, has been slowing recently. In addition, inventory adjustment, which has been under way in certain sectors since this spring, has virtually been completed in the iron-and steel-industry. In light of these facts, it is most likely that production will be further revitalized, strengthening the virtuous circle of the economy led by expanded private demand. However, this remains to be seen. In view of this economic situation, the Bank will continue, in the management of current monetary policy, to monitor monetary and economic developments closely, placing emphasis on further strengthening the foundation for an economic recovery. And to repeat my earlier point, it is also important to carry out structural reforms including drastic deregulation. In this respect, I hope that the new administration will continue to exercise strong leadership. III. New Thinking on Economic Policy Management The industrialized countries today attach more importance to structural policies, such as the strengthening of the competitiveness of domestic industries and the improvement of market infrastructure. In addition, these countries are making steady efforts to promote fiscal consolidation, to reform their central bank systems, and more broadly, to review national economic policy management and its framework. This common trend among the industrialized countries is closely related to the recent changes in the global economy. The collapse of the former socialist bloc, for example, demonstrated the superiority of a market economy over a government-controlled economy: that is, the superiority of a decentralized economy over a centrally-planned economy. In addition, the transition to a market economy and the progress of industrialization of these former socialist countries and the developing Asian countries have stimulated the industrialized countries to strengthen the competitiveness of their economies. Furthermore, past experiences of economic fluctuations, such as inflation and the asset-price “bubble”, and the concurrent accumulation of budget deficits have prompted countries to closely re-examine fundamental thinking on economic policy and the underlying economic theories. This year happens to be the 50th year since the death of John Maynard Keynes. There have recently been renewed discussions on the evaluating of Keynes’ theories and Keynesian economics, which in many respects formed the basis of postwar economic policies. The approaches currently adopted by various countries in addressing economic policies have several points in common. The first point is the growing emphasis placed on improving the supply side of the economy. The conventional approach to economic policy emphasizes the control of aggregate demand through monetary and fiscal policies, and this remains dominant when seeking short-term adjustments of the economy. At the same time, however, there is a growing perception that the driving force of long-term economic growth owes much to firms’ efforts to improve their productivity. It is thus necessary to strengthen the supply side of the economy by promoting the introduction of new technology and by improving infrastructures such as transportation and telecommunications. In fiscal policy management, greater importance is being attached to the details of fiscal expenditures from the viewpoint of evaluating the contribution of each portion to the improvement of economic infrastructures, rather than to their effects in generating additional demand. There is also a stronger awareness that, in the medium to long term, it is more desirable to curtail inefficient fiscal expenditures thereby reducing budget deficits and to utilize economic resources more efficiently in the private sector. All this reflects the growing emphasis on the supply side of the economy. The second point in common in the approaches to addressing economic policies is the emphasis placed on the utilization of the market mechanism. Related to the first point, it can be said that this emphasis calls for fully utilizing the inherent forces of the market mechanism of promoting greater economic efficiency and of inducing technological innovation, in order to achieve higher productivity. The global trend toward deregulation and promotion of market competition obviously originates in this common thinking. The effectiveness of the market mechanism is not limited to revitalization of industries and improvement of financial markets. For example, in Europe, there is a growing understanding that the main cause of the high unemployment rate, which has persisted for some time, is the lack of mobility in the labor markets. The solution to the problem, therefore, is considered to lie in facilitating the mobility in the labor markets so as to efficiently adjust labor market conditions. The third common element is the growing emphasis placed on the public’s expectations regarding future developments and its confidence in economic policies. For example, the effectiveness of fiscal policy depends significantly on the public’s views on the controllability of the fiscal deficits in the future. In the European countries and the United States, there is a growing perception that doubts about a government’s ability to control budget deficits could bring about an unfavorable rise in long-term interest rates. This is one of the major reasons why fiscal consolidation is considered to be an important task. It has also become clear that changes in expectations regarding price and interest rate developments significantly influence the effectiveness of monetary policy. There is a theory which even suggests that discretionary economic policy would not have any effect if people always had rational expectations about the future. While this may be an extreme example, in general it has come to be considered that the efficacy of economic policy cannot be discussed without taking into account its effects on people’s expectations. These recent changes in the thinking on economic policy naturally have a close bearing on the fundamental thinking about central banking and monetary policy management. For example, even when implementing short-term demand management policy, it is necessary to ensure that the policy is compatible with the objective of price stability -- the medium to long-term objective of monetary policy and a precondition for the smooth functioning of the market mechanism. It is also necessary to ensure that the public’s confidence in monetary policy be strengthened by clearly establishing the independence and accountability of the central bank. Bearing these points in mind, I would now like to move on to the other theme of today’s speech, the fundamental issues concerning monetary policy management. IV. The Basic Thinking on Monetary Policy Management A. Price Stability and the Central Bank Most people agree that the objective of monetary policy is the maintenance of price stability. I would like to explain why it is that this particular economic policy objective, among others, is assigned to monetary policy. Price stability, in this context, is not necessarily the stability of prices of individual goods and services, in other words, the stability of relative prices of individual items. In fact, fluctuation of relative prices in response to changes in the supply and demand conditions reflects the most basic principle of the market mechanism. Central banks aim at achieving the stability of prices in general by taking the prices of individual items in their totality. If prices in general increase, that is, if inflation occurs, the amount of goods that can be purchased for ¥10,000 will decrease, which means that the value of ¥10,000 will decline. It can thus be said that “prices in general” is another way of expressing “currency value”. The maintenance of price stability naturally becomes one of the most important missions of the central bank as the issuer of the currency, together with the mission of maintaining the stability of the financial system. Moreover, in the long run, it is the monetary policy of the central bank that is able to most effectively achieve stability of prices in general. It is true that prices, in the short term, fluctuate due to various factors: overseas market prices, such as crude oil prices; or the supply and demand conditions of particular goods. However, from a longer-term perspective, prices in general are determined by the amount of money relative to the amount of traded goods and services. For this reason inflation is often said to be a monetary phenomenon, and the task of achieving price stability is necessarily assigned to monetary policy. This then explains why the monetary policy of the central bank is so vital and why the central bank is called the guardian of the currency. There is a question of how asset prices, such as land prices and stock prices, may be considered in the management of monetary policy. The Bank believes that it is unsuitable to consider asset prices in the same way as it does the prices of ordinary goods and services. For example, land is not produced by everyday economic activity. In addition, land prices are determined in part by the perception of earnings that will be generated from the land, in other words, by the projection of economic activity and prices. Asset prices are therefore different in nature from the prices of goods and services that are produced daily through economic activity and consumed. It is also apparent, however, from the bitter experiences of the “bubble” economy that major fluctuations in asset prices are related to large swings in the economy. Therefore, the Bank believes that in order to ensure price stability in the medium to long term, due attention must be paid to asset-price developments. Later, I would like to discuss in more detail the meaning of price stability in the medium to long term. B. The Significance of Price Stability Let me now consider the significance of price stability. It seems self-evident that inflation and deflation are not desirable. As large fluctuations in prices are usually accompanied by economic overheating or recession, the stabilization of prices will lead to a stable economy. Furthermore, price fluctuations lead to an uneven distribution of income and assets, thereby threatening the stability of people’s everyday lives. In addition to the above, I would like to stress that the stability of prices in general is the most important precondition for the smooth functioning of the market mechanism. The market mechanism adjusts production and demand according to the signals sent by the changes in relative prices. Once inflation or deflation occurs, it becomes extremely difficult to read the signals received from the changes in individual prices, and as a result, the price mechanism ceases to function properly. This is because it becomes impossible to distinguish whether changes in individual prices reflect shifts in relative prices or in prices in general. It is as if there is no reliable yardstick for economic activity. Under such circumstances, firms trying to formulate future business plans based on their estimation of profitability of investments, and households making plans for savings and consumption face growing uncertainties, and this impedes economic development. In the past, some argued that inflation is desirable to a certain extent in order to further stimulate economic growth, or that firms’ activities would become more vigorous under inflation. The 50 years of postwar experience and the evolution of economic theories, however, have forced serious reconsideration of this argument. There is every likelihood that a mild inflation will eventually lead to full-scale inflation. In addition, once inflation takes root, the achievements of business activity are masked by nominal increases in profits, and accordingly, technological innovation and improvement in productivity are likely to be discouraged. Actual examples demonstrate that, from a longer-term perspective, countries with stable prices tend to enjoy higher economic growth. For these reasons, the current emphasis is on the significance of price stability, which is in line with the global trend in economic policy management placing stronger emphasis on the supply side of the economy and on the utilization of the market mechanism. C. The Meaning of Price Stability and Assessment Criteria How can price stability be defined? This remains a difficult question as it is not easy to draw a line between acceptable and an unacceptable rate of price increase. In theory, zero inflation would be desirable. If prices are to be the yardstick for economic activity, zero inflation allows the yardstick to be reliable and unchanging, and in addition avoids the adverse effects of price fluctuations on income distribution. I said that this is true “in theory” for several reasons. First, there are limitations to the accuracy of price statistics in that it is difficult to exclude price increases arising from improvements in product quality or to reflect changes in the market share of products. As the statistics become biased due to such technical limitations, some argue that it is undesirable to aim at zero inflation based on a specific price indicator. In addition, if there is a downward rigidity in certain prices and wages due to business practices and contractual constraints, the cost of achieving zero inflation could become substantial. In view of the significance of price stability as discussed earlier, a more practical criterion would be the sustainability of price stability in the medium to long term. This is because prices serve as a yardstick not only for deciding current production and consumption, but also for deciding the activities that lead to future economic developments, such as business fixed investment and savings. The perception that prices influence future developments has led to an increasing tendency to view price stability as being the state in which firms and households need not consider prospective price fluctuations in their economic decision-making. Even when price indexes remain stable during a certain period, price stability in the medium to long term could be at risk if the economy is overheating and creating potential upward pressures on prices. Monetary policy must thus be managed not only to minimize current fluctuations in prices, but also to contain the potential risk of price fluctuations in the future. This is why price stability is said to be a medium to long-term objective of monetary policy. The maintenance of price stability does not conflict with the achievement of stable economic growth and employment conditions. For example, measures to prevent overheating (or recession) of the economy can at the same time contain inflation (or avoid deflation), and provide medium to long-term price stability; and this price stability, in turn, is a prerequisite for achieving sustainable growth of the economy, as I mentioned earlier. D. Features of Monetary Policy I would now like to examine the important elements in managing monetary policy. There are two features of monetary policy that differentiate it from other economic policies. The first feature is that monetary policy uses market-oriented measures to transmit policy effects to market participants and therefore the efficacy of monetary policy depends on the market’s reaction to the measures taken by the central bank. In this respect, monetary policy differs significantly in nature from the government’s economic policy, which aims to achieve its objectives through administrative means such as laws and regulations. Specifically, monetary policy affects the supply and demand of funds in the financial markets through the implementation of the Bank’s daily operations, such as bill and bond transactions. The mechanism is initiated in changes made to the money market interest rates, or in technical terms, changes to the overnight rates in the interbank market, which can be referred to as the wholesale market for cash and reserves. Changes in these rates affect other short-term interest rates and longer-term rates through arbitrage in the markets, which in turn influence changes in the deposit and lending rates offered by banks. These changes in interest rates as a whole then influence the economic activities of the corporate and household sectors. With the completion of the deregulation of interest rates, use of the market mechanism is currently the most effective way of transmitting policy effects throughout the financial markets and the economy. However, in order to effectively utilize this mechanism, public and market confidence in monetary policy is of decisive importance. Unless the policy intentions of the central bank are fully understood and considered to be credible, the effects of interest rate policies will not permeate adequately, and market interest rates may fluctuate independently of the intentions of the central bank, affected by unnecessary conjecture and rumors. The second distinct feature of monetary policy is that considerable time is required before its effects materialize, in other words, there is a long time lag before policy effects permeate throughout the economy. The mechanism through which changes in interest rates are transmitted to economic activity is complicated. Interest rate changes may have a relatively rapid influence on firms planning to make an investment in the near future. Theoretically, the effect of interest rate changes should be swiftly transmitted to fluctuations in asset prices. On the other hand, it takes a considerable time for the effects of interest rate changes to appear in actual corporate profits and household income levels. One reason is that there are various types of borrowing and investment with short and long maturities. As new interest rates are applied to these instruments only at the time of maturity, considerable time is required before the overall interest rate level changes and before the new level takes effect throughout the economy. In addition, changes in corporate profits and income levels will only bring about a gradual change in the confidence of firms and households in their investment and consumption, and after some delay in time, new decisions will be made on investment and consumption. Further time is then needed before these decisions materialize as actual spending. It has been said that pre-emptive policy responses are necessary to ensure price stability. This is because, as mentioned earlier, price stability must be achieved in the medium to long term, and because there will always be a considerable time lag before policy effects permeate throughout the economy. As this time lag in permeation of policy effects has become more widely recognized, greater emphasis has come to be placed in the management of monetary policy on assessing the potential risks in the economy, to enable pre-emptive policy responses. E. Considerations in Monetary Policy Management The requirements for monetary policy are thus “maintenance of market confidence” and “pre-emptive response”. It is, however, extremely difficult to achieve these two requirements simultaneously. Let me explain how the two requirements conflict. In order to make timely policy responses, it will be necessary for the central bank to act based on its projections of the economic and price situations one or two years ahead. However, considering the difficulty of accurately predicting economic developments, such action may not necessarily result in market confidence in the Bank’s policy. Nevertheless, it would be impossible to act pre-emptively if the Bank waited until a consensus was reached on future economic developments and desirable policy actions. It is no exaggeration to say that the key to monetary policy management is in finding how these two requirements can be fulfilled simultaneously. Central banks have tried to meet the two requirements through various techniques. For example, many central banks in the past adopted “money supply targeting”, in which monetary policy is aimed at achieving an intermediate target of money supply growth. This is a method based on the causality that fluctuations in money supply influence real economic activity with some time lag. However, it has been pointed out that financial innovations have made it difficult to discern the relationship between money supply and economic activity, and that although the relationship between the two is stable in the long term, it may be unsteady in the short term. Accordingly, many of the central banks which set a money supply target today mainly use it as a general guideline for monetary policy or refer to it as one of the major indicators in making policy decisions, rather than attempting to adhere rigidly to it. Some central banks now adopt “inflation targeting”, in which a certain target range is set for the inflation rate. This method aims to secure the confidence of the market by declaring beforehand the central bank’s commitment to a specific target. For those central banks employing inflation targeting, another challenge besides setting the target range is devising how to take appropriate, individual policy actions under the price target. Countries with high inflation rates have succeeded in containing these rates by employing inflation targeting. However, the fact that the method has been effective in curbing a high inflation rate does not necessarily indicate that it will also be effective in sustaining already stable prices. Recently, some academics in the United States have suggested evaluating the potential risks of price and economic fluctuations based on such concepts as the output gap and - 10 - the expected inflation rate, and then utilizing these evaluations as guidelines in managing monetary policy. Unfortunately, it is difficult to establish rules or other convenient guidelines which are by themselves sufficient to ensure an optimal policy response. It is for this reason that the Bank of Japan has never adopted stringent targeting or specific rules to date, but instead has consistently emphasized the judgement of the overall economic conditions and has made efforts to improve underlying research and analytical skills. Learning from the bitter experiences of the emergence and the bursting of the “bubble” economy, the Bank attaches utmost importance to realizing price stability and thereby economic stability in the long run, and, to this end, identifying and assessing the potential risks within the economy. The Bank has also been making increased efforts to explain its actions and policy in detail in order to gain the better understanding of the public. One of the aims of last year’s series of monetary easing measures was to eliminate the possibility of a deflationary spiral, in other words, a potential risk of excessive price declines. The Bank also made efforts to provide a clearer explanation of the details of policies implemented and the thinking behind these policies. Announcements of the Bank’s stance on money market operations and improvements in the monthly and annual reports of the Policy Board are results of these efforts. The Bank intends to continue investigating ways of fulfilling simultaneously the two requirements of pre-emptive policy responses and of the maintenance of market confidence, by learning from theoretical and empirical studies and from the experiences of other central banks. I would like to emphasize that, in order to maintain market confidence in the central bank which is an essential task for achieving price stability in the medium to long term, the institutional independence of the central bank becomes very important. Accordingly, it will be necessary to enhance the transparency of policy decisions and to establish a framework to ensure the Bank’s accountability. V. Conclusion The review of the central bank system in Japan is likely to develop into a revision of the Bank of Japan Law after the Central Bank Study Group submits its report. When seen from the vantage point of reconsidering the broad framework of economic policy, I believe that the revision of the Bank of Japan Law is significant not only to the Bank of Japan itself or to the financial sector, but also to the overall economy. Now that Japan’s industries are making steady efforts to adapt to a new era, it is also required that the economic policy management of Japan be reformed to suit the times. The Bank of Japan Law is to be reviewed as the first concrete step in the reform process of Japan’s economic policy management. The law, stipulated in 1942, has been one of the rules and regulations constituting the basis of the old regime which has affected the country’s economic policy management for the past 50 years. This is why much international attention is now focused on the reform of the central bank system in Japan. In order for the central bank to achieve its missions, improvement of the institutional framework is necessary, but what is more important is that the Bank manages its policy and operations with due responsibility. We at the Bank are very conscious of this and will exert ourselves to the utmost to ensure that the Bank fulfills its responsibilities amid the ongoing globalization and shifts to market-oriented economies. I would like to conclude by expressing my hope for your continued support and understanding.
bank of japan
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BANK OF JAPAN, MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, 20/12/96.
Bank of Japan's December review of monetary and economic trends in Japan BANK OF JAPAN, MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, 20/12/96. A moderate economic recovery continues in Japan, as private demand shows increasing firmness. With respect to final demand, public sector investment has peaked, but housing investment has remained at a high level because of low interest rates. The decline in net exports has paused. Business fixed investment is increasing steadily and a moderate increase also continues in personal consumption. Meanwhile, inventories on the whole are at appropriate levels. In these circumstances, industrial production growth is somewhat accelerating and corporate sentiment is improving gradually. Labor market conditions have improved on the whole, although the unemployment rate has remained at a high level. Meanwhile, the decline in prices is slowing gradually and monetary aggregates continue to grow at 3.0 - 4.0 per cent. With regard to personal consumption, growth in sales of electrical appliances has been high, particularly in personal computers and cellular phones, and passenger car sales (excluding compact cars) have recently increased significantly. Outlays for travel have remained firm and sales at department stores and supermarkets are increasing at a moderate pace. Among leading indicators of business fixed investment, machinery orders are increasing steadily albeit with some quarterly fluctuations. After the decline in the third quarter 1996, they are expected to increase significantly in the fourth quarter. Construction floor area has also picked up moderately. According to the Bank of Japan’s Tankan -- Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan of November 1996, business fixed investment plans of principal manufacturing firms for fiscal 1996 continued to increase at the same pace as those for fiscal 1995, while those of non-manufacturing firms turned to increase for the first time in five years. As a result, business fixed investment of principal firms overall is expected to expand at a faster pace than in fiscal 1995. Business fixed investment plans of small firms (all industries) were revised upwards substantially from the August Tankan, marginally exceeding the level of the previous year for the first time in five years. This shows that the recovery in business fixed investment is spreading across a wider spectrum of industries and corporate sizes. With respect to housing investment, housing starts have continued to grow reflecting low interest rates and reasonable housing prices. It recorded a seasonally-adjusted annual rate of 1.82 million starts in October 1996, the highest level since November 1973, partly reflecting the increase in orders in September 1996 before the expected rise in the consumption tax. Regarding public-sector investment, the volume of public works contracted has, since spring 1996, stayed virtually unchanged from the level of the previous year as orders included in the economic policy package of September 1995 subsided. Public works activities such as shipments of related goods increased until summer 1996, reflecting time lags between the order and actual implementation of public works. Recently, however, they have also peaked out. Real exports have shown a moderate increase as the effects of the yen’s depreciation since summer 1995 have gradually become apparent after a time lag. Meanwhile, real imports have continued to rise, in part supported by structural elements, e.g., the increased supply capacity of Asian economies. However, the tempo of increase has somewhat slowed, which also reflects the depreciation of the yen. Thus, both the real trade surplus and the nominal current account surplus declined rapidly until the first half of 1996 but have been rising since summer 1996. Industrial production increased steadily in the third quarter 1996 by an annual rate of about 6 per cent and also rose significantly in October. These increases reflect the progress in inventory adjustments and the continued increase in shipments of capital goods, which is closely related to business fixed investment. They also reflect higher growth in domestic sales and exports of passenger cars which have a large influence on production activities. Industrial production is expected to increase by an annual rate of about 10 per cent in the fourth quarter 1996 on the whole. The Tankan of November 1996 shows that the corporate profits of principal firms in both the manufacturing (excluding petroleum refining) and non-manufacturing sectors are forecast to continue increasing in fiscal 1996. Profit levels have risen particularly for manufacturing firms; the current profit-to-sales ratio is expected to reach over 4 per cent for the first time in five years. In these circumstances, business confidence of principal manufacturing firms improved moderately and is forecast to continue its upward trend. In the assembly industry in particular, the percentage differential between firms responding "favorable" and "unfavorable" has turned positive for the first time since February 1992. For non-manufacturing firms, business confidence has strengthened but it is forecast to weaken somewhat in the near future. On average, business confidence of non-manufacturing firms is on an upward trend. Small firms in both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors are expected to show continuing growth in profits in fiscal 1996. However, while business confidence of manufacturing firms continues to improve moderately, that of non-manufacturing firms remains virtually unchanged partly as a result of uncertainties about the outlook for public-sector investment. Labor market conditions have improved somewhat on the whole. Although the unemployment rate remains at a high level and employment growth is weak, overtime working hours have increased, and the ratio of job offers to job applications has continued its gradual rise. With respect to price developments, domestic wholesale prices (adjusted for seasonal electricity rates) seem to have stopped declining although downward pressures from competition with imports remain strong. This development was supported by the yen’s depreciation to date, the rise in crude oil prices and the improvement in domestic supply and demand conditions, particularly in construction-related goods. Corporate service prices have declined, particularly in rents and leasing charges, but the year-to-year decrease has become smaller. Consumer prices (nationwide, excluding perishables) have stayed slightly above the previous year’s level as commodity prices have continued to fall gradually and service prices have risen somewhat. Growth in monetary aggregates, measured in terms of the year-to-year growth rate of M2 +CDs average outstanding, has remained at 3.0 - 4.0 per cent, albeit with some fluctuations. Regarding money market rates, the overnight call rate (uncollateralized) on the whole has stayed below the official discount rate of 0.5 per cent. The 3-month CD rate has moved at around 0.5 per cent. Meanwhile, with regard to the market’s interest rate expectations, 3-month Euro-yen futures declined at a somewhat brisk pace between the second half of July and autumn 1996, and have moved at around 0.7 - 0.9 per cent since September 1996. As the market’s expectations of higher interest rates receded, the long-term government bond yield has declined since mid-July 1996, and recorded a historical low of 2.34 per cent in early December. Recently, it has been moving at around 2.4 per cent. With respect to bank lending rates, the short-term prime lending rate has remained at a record low level of 1.625 per cent since September 1995. The long-term prime lending rate was lowered by a total of 0.8 percentage points in September, October, and December to reach a record low of 2.5 per cent, reflecting developments in long-term market rates. In these circumstances, short-term and long-term average contracted interest rates on new loans and discounts have moved at record low levels. On the stock exchange, the Nikkei 225 Stock Average had remained virtually unchanged since summer 1996 at around ¥20,000 - 21,000, varying across firms. Recently, however, it has weakened somewhat. In the foreign exchange market, the yen’s appreciation reversed its course and depreciated against the U.S. dollar between summer 1995 and autumn 1996. Since early 1996, the yen has continued to depreciate and has recently moved at around ¥114. Meanwhile, the yen depreciated temporarily against the deutsche mark in October and November 1996, and has recently moved at around ¥72 - 73.
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BANK OF JAPAN, QUARTERLY BULLETIN, February 1997 (advance summary).
Bank of Japan presents its quarterly economic outlook for winter 1997 BANK OF JAPAN, QUARTERLY BULLETIN, February 1997 (advance summary). 1. A moderate economic recovery continues in Japan as private demand shows increasing firmness. Among final demand items, public-sector investment has begun to decrease while net exports have started to rise. Housing investment has remained at a high level and business fixed investment is also increasing steadily. While the increase in personal consumption has been moderate on the whole, passenger car sales have recently increased at a faster pace. Meanwhile, inventories are generally at appropriate levels. In these circumstances, industrial production is increasing and recently, in particular, the pace of growth has accelerated to some extent. Labor market conditions have continued to improve moderately. Prices have stopped declining on the whole. Domestic wholesale prices (adjusted for seasonal electricity rates) have almost stopped declining, reflecting the depreciation of the yen and the rise in oil prices to date as well as the moderate improvement in domestic supply and demand conditions, particularly in construction goods. The year-to-year decline in corporate service prices is narrowing gradually. Consumer prices (nationwide, excluding perishables) are marginally above the previous year’s level. Land prices continue to weaken on the whole, but there are some signs of improvement in the supply and demand conditions. On the balance of payments, the real trade surplus has recently started to increase and the nominal current account surplus is also rising moderately. 2. In the financial markets, the overnight call rate (uncollateralized) has stayed slightly below the official discount rate, and the 3-month CD rate has remained at 0.50 - 0.55 per cent since autumn 1996. The long-term government bond yield has been declining since July 1996, and it marked a record low of 2.3 - 2.4 per cent in early December and has recently remained at around 2.4 per cent. Stock prices have declined substantially since the end of 1996. The yen has been depreciating since the end of 1996, particularly against the U.S. dollar. Meanwhile, growth in lending by private financial institutions has continued to be slow, owing both to weak corporate demand for new funds and to an increase in capital market financing. Monetary aggregates in terms of M2 + CDs average outstanding, however, have continued to grow at over 3.0 per cent. 3. To gauge future developments of Japan’s economy in the context of individual components of final demand, public-sector investment is expected to show further declines in the coming months. Net exports are likely to continue to increase for some time despite the increase in imports caused by structural factors, as the effects of the yen’s depreciation since 1995 manifest themselves. As for the growth momentum of domestic private demand, corporate profits are increasing reflecting such factors as the depreciation of the yen and the rise in production. The recovery in corporate profits is gradually spreading to the whole corporate sector, including small firms. Reflecting conditions conducive to business fixed investment, such as the increase in corporate profits and progress in capital stock adjustments, business fixed investment on the whole is expected to continue a steady recovery for some time despite the influence of the slowdown in the market expansion in the mobile telecommunications industry. With respect to the household sector, housing investment is unlikely to show significant declines under the generally easy monetary conditions. Personal consumption on average is expected to continue its moderate recovery, reflecting the rise in household incomes and strong demand in areas such as passenger cars and information-related products, although the consumption tax rate hike will exert some negative influences on consumption growth. However, growth in business fixed investment is still checked as balance-sheet adjustment pressures remain strong. Also, the gains in household incomes are expected to be restrained to some extent as many firms still judge their work force to be excessive. 4. Turning to the outlook on prices, the deceleration in the declining tempo is expected to become more evident. Factors contributing to this include the rise in import prices to date owing to the effects of the yen’s depreciation and the rise in crude oil prices, as well as an improvement in domestic supply and demand conditions. However, prices are unlikely to follow a clear upward trend for some time because of the modest pace of improvements in supply and demand conditions and the intense global competition, but the influence of the accelerated rise in import prices requires careful monitoring. 5. In sum, recovery in private demand shows increasing firmness with a strengthened virtuous cycle that involves production growth. Net exports, which had been exerting a downward pressure on the economy until the middle of 1996, are beginning to support income formation mainly reflecting the yen’s depreciation to date. Considering that the restraining effects from fiscal policy on the economy are likely to strengthen, and that a setback in demand is expected following the surge in anticipation of the consumption tax rate hike, Japan’s economic growth is expected to slow down temporarily in the first half of fiscal 1997. Judging from the above developments, however, the economic recovery on the whole will most likely continue in the future. At the same time, there remain factors, such as balance-sheet adjustment pressures, which tend to keep private demand from gaining strength. Also, the influence of the recent plunge in stock prices on corporate sentiment requires careful scrutiny. In these circumstances, it is essential to promote necessary adjustments by such means as a swift implementation of effective reforms in Japan s economic structure. This is an important ingredient in the efforts to strengthen the basis for medium-term growth in Japan’s economy.
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BANK OF JAPAN, MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, 18/2/97.
Bank of Japan’s February review of monetary and economic trends in Japan BANK OF JAPAN, MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, 18/2/97. A moderate economic recovery continues in Japan as private demand shows increasing firmness. With respect to final demand, public-sector investment has decreased while net exports are on an increasing trend. Housing investment has remained at a high level and business fixed investment is increasing steadily. While growth in personal consumption has been moderate on the whole, passenger car sales, which have a strong influence on production, have accelerated significantly. Meanwhile, inventories on the whole are at appropriate levels. In these circumstances, industrial production has recently increased at a somewhat fast pace and labor market conditions have continued to improve moderately. Meanwhile, prices have stopped declining, and monetary aggregates continue to grow at 3.0 - 4.0 per cent. With regard to personal consumption, sales at department stores and supermarkets are improving moderately, albeit with some fluctuations. Outlays for travel have remained firm. Growth in sales of electrical appliances has become somewhat moderate as the pace of expansion in personal computers and cellular telephones decelerated. Passenger car sales have recorded buoyant two-digit growth year-to-year for four consecutive months since October 1996. Among leading indicators of business fixed investment, machinery orders are increasing steadily on average, although they are expected to show a decline in the first quarter of 1997 as a reaction to the large increase recorded in the fourth quarter of 1996 in both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. Construction floor area has also continued to pick up moderately. With respect to housing investment, housing starts have remained strong reflecting low interest rates and reasonable housing prices. They recorded a high seasonally-adjusted annual rate of over 1.7 million starts in the fourth quarter of 1996, partly reflecting the rise in orders ahead of the consumption tax rate hike. Regarding public-sector investment, public works contracted showing developments in orders have decreased significantly since autumn 1996 compared to the high level recorded in the previous year which reflected the large economic stimulus package. As for actual implementation of public works, with a time lag after orders, the seasonally adjusted level of shipments of related goods has been decreasing since autumn 1996 after having increased until the summer. Real exports have recently shown an increasing trend as the effects of the yen’s depreciation since summer 1995 have gradually permeated. Meanwhile, the increase in real imports has slowed, also reflecting the depreciation of the yen. As a result, the real trade surplus turned to an increase in autumn 1996. The nominal current account surplus is also beginning to rise, although the pace of increase is slower than that of the real trade surplus, partly because the rise in oil prices is pushing up import volume. Industrial production has increased significantly by an annual rate of over 10 per cent quarter-to-quarter in the fourth quarter of 1996. This increase was caused by the rise in final demand, particularly in demand conducive to production, such as passenger car sales, machinery orders, and net exports, in addition to the completion of inventory adjustments. Industrial production is expected to continue increasing significantly in January and February 1997, reflecting the rise in demand ahead of the consumption tax rate hike. Labor market conditions have continued to improve moderately on the whole. Although the unemployment rate remains at a high level and employment growth has been moderate, overtime working hours have significantly exceeded the level of the previous year in line with production growth, and the ratio of job offers to job applications has continued its rise. With respect to price developments, domestic wholesale prices (adjusted for seasonal electricity rates) have stopped declining, although downward pressures such as from competition with imports and technological innovation in, e.g., electrical machinery, remain strong. This development has been supported by the yen’s depreciation to date, the rise in crude oil prices and the moderate improvement in domestic supply and demand conditions. Corporate service prices have declined, particularly in rents and leasing charges, but the year-to-year decrease has become smaller. Consumer prices (nationwide, excluding perishables) have exceeded the level of the previous year, as the decline in commodity prices has slowed against the background of the yen’ depreciation and the halt in the decline in domestic wholesale prices. Growth in monetary aggregates, measured in terms of the year-to-year growth rate of M2 + CDs average outstanding, has remained stable on the whole at 3.0 - 4.0 per cent. Although lending by private financial institutions has been weak, that by public financial institutions has been firm. Regarding money market rates, the overnight call rate (uncollateralized) on the whole has stayed somewhat below the official discount rate of 0.5 per cent. The 3-month CD rate has moved at 0.50 - 0.55 per cent. Meanwhile, with regard to the market ’s interest rate expectations, 3-month Euro-yen futures are showing relatively minor movements after declining at a brisk pace between summer and autumn 1996. In these circumstances, the long-term government bond yield had been declining since summer 1996, and has recently moved at around 2.4 per cent. With respect to bank lending rates, the short-term prime lending rate has remained at a record low level of 1.625 per cent since September 1995. The long-term prime lending rate was lowered three times by a total of 0.8 percentage points since September 1996 in response to the developments in the long-term interest rates, and has been moving at the record low of 2.5 per cent since December. In these circumstances, short-term and long-term average contracted interest rates on new loans and discounts have moved at around record low levels. On the stock exchange, the Nikkei 225 stock average plummeted between the end of 1996 and early 1997 reflecting market’s uncertainties about Japan’s economic outlook and balance-sheet problems. It became stable in late January 1997 and has recently stayed around ¥18,000 - 19,000. In the foreign exchange market, the yen depreciated moderately on the whole against the U.S. dollar in 1996, but the pace of depreciation has accelerated since the end of 1996. The yen has recently moved at around ¥123 - 124 to the U.S. dollar. Meanwhile, the yen has been relatively stable against the deutsche mark at around ¥73 - 74.
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BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 28/2/97.
Summary of an article entitled Risk Disclosure by Financial Institutions published in the Bank of Japan Quarterly Bulletin of February 1997 BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 28/2/97. Introduction Public disclosure by financial institutions has long provided information about business performance through the publication of financial statements. In recent years, however, a number of financial institutions have come to focus on disclosure of a wider range of information, including their management policies. This is partly attributable to the expansion of derivatives transactions, which has made risk management techniques increasingly important in the management of financial institutions, and which has thereby encouraged financial institutions to improve such techniques. Accordingly, individual financial institutions have been motivated to reveal voluntarily their risk exposures and risk management methods in order to win a favorable assessment from market participants. Disclosure thus brings into play a check mechanism inherent in financial markets (hereafter referred to as the market check mechanism) that disciplines management of financial institutions, and thereby helps to enhance the efficiency and transparency of the markets and to stabilize the financial system. This report examines the disclosure of information on risks of financial institutions, with an overview of the current practices and future issues. It is intended to serve market participants, the beneficiaries of the information disclosed.
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BANK OF JAPAN, MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, 18/3/97.
Bank of Japan’s March review of monetary and economic trends in Japan BANK OF JAPAN, MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, 18/3/97. A moderate economic recovery continues in Japan as private demand shows increasing firmness. With respect to final demand, public-sector investment has decreased while net exports have continued on an increasing trend. Housing investment has remained at a high level and business fixed investment is increasing steadily. A moderate recovery in personal consumption has continued on the whole, while passenger car sales have increased significantly. Meanwhile, inventories on the whole are at appropriate levels. Reflecting these developments, industrial production has shown a steady increase and labor conditions on the whole have continued to improve moderately. Meanwhile, prices have stopped declining, and monetary aggregates have continued to grow at 3.0 - 4.0 per cent. With regard to personal consumption, sales at department stores and supermarkets are improving moderately, albeit with some fluctuations owing to such factors as weather conditions. Outlays for travel have continued to increase. Sales of electrical appliances are increasing on the whole, although the pace of growth in personal computers and cellular telephones has decelerated. Passenger car sales have recorded buoyant two-digit growth year-toyear for five consecutive months since October 1996. Among leading indicators of business fixed investment, machinery orders have increased steadily on average. They rose significantly in the fourth quarter 1996 and showed a marginal decline in January 1997 from the average of the fourth quarter. Construction floor area has also continued to pick up moderately. With respect to housing investment, housing starts in terms of the seasonallyadjusted annual rate have continued to be at a high level, although they have decreased for three consecutive months owing to the reversal of the rise in demand ahead of the consumption tax rate hike. Regarding public-sector investment, public works contracted showing developments in orders have decreased significantly since the end of 1996 compared to the high level recorded in the previous year, which reflected the large economic stimulus package. As for actual implementation of public works, with a time lag after orders, the seasonally-adjusted level of shipments of public-related goods increased until summer 1996, but has been decreasing since autumn 1996. Real exports are on an increasing trend reflecting the moderate expansion of overseas economies and the effects of the yen’s depreciation since summer 1995. Although real imports are increasing, reflecting such elements as the rise in domestic demand, the recent pace of increase has been moderate, a reflection of the depreciation of the yen to date. As a result, the real trade surplus turned to an increase in the second half of 1996. The nominal current-account surplus, however, is increasing at a much slower pace compared to the real trade surplus owing to the fluctuations in the income account and the hike in crude oil prices. Industrial production showed a significant increase in January 1997 after it increased by a seasonally-adjusted annual rate of over 10 per cent in the fourth quarter 1996. This increase was caused by the rise in final demand, particularly in those items conducive to production, such as passenger car sales, machinery investment, and net exports, under the circumstance in which inventories has been at appropriate levels. Although industrial production is expected to decline in February and March, the figure for the first quarter 1997 on average is also expected to show a steady increase. Labor market conditions have continued to improve moderately on the whole. Although the unemployment rate remains at a high level and employment growth has been moderate, growth in nominal wages has accelerated, reflecting the increase in production and corporate profits. The ratio of job offers to job applications has continued to improve. With respect to price developments, domestic wholesale prices (adjusted for seasonal electricity rates) have stopped declining, although downward pressures such as from competition with imports and technological innovation in, e.g., electrical machinery, remain strong. This development has been supported by the yen’s depreciation to date, the hike in crude oil prices and the moderate improvement in domestic supply and demand conditions. Corporate service prices have declined, particularly in rents and leasing charges, but the year-to-year decrease has become smaller. Consumer prices (nationwide, excluding perishables) have somewhat exceeded the level of the previous year, as the decline in commodity prices has slowed against the background of the yen’s depreciation and the halt in the decline in domestic wholesale prices. Growth in monetary aggregates, measured in terms of the year-to-year growth rate of M2 + CDs average outstanding, has continued at 3.0 - 4.0 per cent, as corporate demand for funds has been increasing at a moderate pace. Regarding money market rates, the overnight call rate (uncollateralized), together with the 3-month CD rate, has moved at a low level albeit with small fluctuations. Meanwhile, 3-month Euro-yen futures have shown relatively minor movements at around 0.7 - 0.8 per cent after market’s expectations for higher interest rates receded at a brisk pace between summer and autumn 1996. In these circumstances, the long-term government bond yield has moved at about 2.3 - 2.4 per cent since the end of November 1996, but has recently declined to reach a record low of around 2.2 per cent. With respect to bank lending rates, the short-term prime lending rate has remained at a record low level of 1.625 per cent since September 1995. The long-term prime lending rate was lowered three times by a total of 0.8 percentage points since September 1996 in response to developments in the long-term interest rates, and has been moving at the record low of 2.5 per cent since December 1996. In these circumstances, short-term and long-term average contracted interest rates on new loans and discounts have moved at near record low levels. On the stock exchange, the Nikkei 225 stock average plummeted temporarily between the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997, reflecting the market’s concerns about Japan’s economic outlook and balance-sheet problems. It has since picked up somewhat. In the foreign exchange market, the yen depreciated to reach ¥124 - 125 against the U.S. dollar temporarily in February 1997 owing to such factors as the interest rate differentials between Japan and the United States. Recently, the yen has moved at around ¥122 - 123 as concerns about the rapid appreciation of the U.S. dollar strengthened somewhat in the market. Meanwhile, the yen has been appreciating against the deutsche mark since mid-February and recently moved at around ¥72 - 73.
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Speech given by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr Yasuo Matsushita, at the Keizai Club in Tokio on 4/2/97.
Mr Matsushita comments on recent monetary and economic conditions in Japan Speech given by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr Yasuo Matsushita, at the Keizai Club in Tokio on 4/2/97. I. Introduction I truly appreciate this opportunity to address this distinguished audience at the invitation of the Keizai Club. Over the past several years, the Japanese economy has had to overcome the aftereffects of the bursting of the economic “bubble” while facing the weighty challenge of establishing an economic structure suitable for the new era. Although there were concerns about a deflationary spiral at one time, the economy has been recovering moderately since the beginning of 1996 partly due to strong monetary and fiscal support. Recently, this economic recovery has gradually firmed, offering signs that progress has been made toward establishing this suitable economic structure. However, since the beginning of the year, stock prices have fallen significantly, suggesting that market participants remain cautious about the economic outlook. With this in mind, I would like to discuss the Bank of Japan’s thinking on the recent economic developments and monetary policy management, together with the Bank’s views on the uncertain factors regarding the economic outlook. II. Domestic Economic Condition With regard to the domestic economic condition, the Bank of Japan’s judgment is that a moderate economic recovery continues, and that the economic recovery is gradually becoming firmer. When considering the strength of an economic recovery, the Bank pays attention to the positive interactions between production and private demand. Specifically, attention is given to whether the increase in production is leading to an expansion of business fixed investment through improved corporate profits, and whether this increased production is followed by a recovery in personal consumption through increased income. Looking back on the economic developments in Japan over the past year from a viewpoint of determining the strength of the recovery, the growth of aggregate demand, including public and housing investments, accelerated in the first half of 1996, and accordingly, market expectations of an economic recovery strengthened and long- term interest rates showed a temporary rise. However, no significant improvement was seen in production, as the increase in final demand was partly offset by inventory adjustment and by an increase in imports. As a result, a virtuous circle of demand, production, and income was not confirmed. This situation, however, appears to have changed somewhat in the latter half of 1996. Firstly, the decline in external demand, which had been a constraining factor of the economic recovery, halted in autumn 1996, mainly due to the increase in exports that followed a depreciation of the yen. Recently, there has been an upward trend in external demand. In addition, inventory adjustment in some raw materials and semiconductor industries was almost completed. As a result, production, which had remained sluggish in the first half of 1996, started to grow at an accelerating pace, reflecting fully the increase in final demand. Notably, the firm recovery in production is now generating a recovery in private demand, including business fixed investment and personal consumption. Reflecting improvements in corporate sales and profits, the recovery in business fixed investment is spreading to a wider range of industries and to smaller firms than previously observed. Indeed, according to the results of the November 1996 “TANKAN -- Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan,” business fixed investment for the smaller firms, which had been slow to improve, is expected to show a year-to-year increase in fiscal 1996 for the first time in five years. Growth of personal consumption, the other mainstay of private demand, leveled off at one time in summer 1996, but resumed later in autumn, especially in consumer durables such as automobiles. The contributing factor to the moderate but steady recovery in personal consumption has been the improved income reflecting the favorable changes in employment conditions and wages that followed the increase in production. It must be borne in mind that the increase in demand ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate scheduled for fiscal 1997 is contributing to the improvement in economic indicators, as in housing investment, and therefore these improvements need to be seen in this light. There has, however, recently been a notable change in economic developments compared to the first half of 1996. Despite a gradual decrease in public-sector investment from the latter half of 1996, the virtuous circle -- in which increased production leads to increased private demand through improved corporate profits and employment income -- has clearly begun to operate. III. Uncertain Factors Regarding the Economic Outlook A. Views of Financial Market Participants Turning from the Bank of Japan’s views on the current domestic economy, the issue of concern now is the future development of the economy. Revitalization of economic activity usually brings about increases in corporate profits and employment income, which lead to improvements in business fixed investment and personal consumption. These improvements in turn lead to a further expansion in economic activity. However, developments in financial markets, such as stock prices and long- term interest rates, suggest that despite the increasing strength of the economic recovery, market participants remain cautious about the economic outlook. Various causes are cited for the significant fall in stock prices since the beginning of the year: renewed concern about the nonperforming-loan problem; uncertainty over the social and economic systems in Japan as a whole; and pressures to decrease the differential between domestic and international stock prices in terms of various measures of evaluation, such as the price/earnings ratio. It is extremely difficult to assess each factor and to specify the cause of the uncertainty. Still, the overall trend in the financial markets over the past several months clearly indicates that market participants have a cautious outlook on the economy, as shown by the slowdown in growth or even a decline in stock prices since autumn 1996, and by the concurrent decline in long-term interest rates. Cautiousness on the part of the market participants reflects the fact that they are strongly aware of the following three issues: (1) effects of the anticipated fiscal tightening in the next fiscal year; (2) structural adjustment pressures facing Japanese industry; and (3) balance-sheet adjustment of firms and the nonperforming- loan problem of financial institutions, both of which are burdens created by the economic “bubble” and its burst. Before explaining the Bank of Japan’s views on these issues, I would like to emphasize that my talk today is not intended to draw specific conclusions or to assess the levels of stock prices and interest rates. This requires careful analysis and is an issue on which a central bank governor should refrain from comment. Rather, I would like to give you an idea of how the Bank examines these issues. B. Effects of Fiscal Tightening The first issue that I would like to discuss is the influence of fiscal tightening -such as reduction in public-sector investment, rise in the consumption tax rate, and termination of special tax reduction -- on the economy for the next fiscal year. Public-sector investment began to decline in autumn 1996, after having continued to expand until mid-1996 as a result of the economic measures introduced in autumn 1995. Although there may be a slight temporary increase in public-sector investment reflecting the implementation of the supplementary budget for the current fiscal year, the declining trend is expected to continue for some time. In addition, an increase in the consumption tax rate and the termination of the special tax reduction is scheduled for fiscal 1997. It is important to mention here that the influence of fiscal tightening on the economy may vary significantly depending on the prevailing economic conditions, such as corporate profits and employment income development, as well as on the confidence that the corporate and household sectors have in the economy. Furthermore, this influence can differ substantially depending on how the public’s expectations of the future economy change in response to reduced fiscal expenditures and tax increases, and how market interest rates respond to any reduction in the budget deficit. The effects on the economy of a reduction of public-sector investment or a budget deficit have been debated by academics. The simplest Keynesian view is that reduced public-sector investment cumulatively acts to restrain private demand through multiplier effects. Some argue that a decrease in the budget deficit will lower interest rates and the yen’s foreign exchange value, thus offsetting the negative effects on the economy. Some even hold that because the public behave rationally with anticipation of future tax increases or reductions, neither a decrease nor an increase in the budget deficit will have any effect on the economy. The influence of a reduced budget deficit on the economy may thus be complex and diverse, once the movement of market interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and the public’s expectations are taken into account. It is natural to assume that in reality, the impact of reduced fiscal expenditures on the economy cannot be denied, although the influence is unlikely to reach the extent estimated by simply multiplying the nominal value of the reduction by a multiplier. To underline the argument I just made, the economic mechanism does not work on the basis of simple addition and subtraction, but rather involves dynamic interactions of many factors which incorporates the public’s expectations. After all, the effects of fiscal tightening are an empirical issue for which conclusions cannot be reached in advance, and therefore, it is very difficult to accurately predict future developments at this stage. Bearing this in mind, it is necessary to view carefully the effects of fiscal tightening on the economy as a whole. C. Progress in the Structural Adjustment of Industries Let me now turn to the next issue of the structural adjustment of industries, which is a medium- to long-term issue for the Japanese economy. One of the changes in the environment surrounding the Japanese economy in the past several years has been that a wider range of industries have come to face severe international competition due to the increasing supply capacity of other East Asian countries. The weakening of international competitiveness made it difficult for some industries and firms to continue domestic production of some of their conventional products. This forced them to relocate their production bases overseas while shifting their domestic production to new products for which they have a comparative advantage. This is not the first time that the Japanese economy has faced structural adjustment pressures. In fact, it successfully confronted the challenge several times in the past. However, the adjustment this time has inevitably involved greater pains than in the past, due to the after-effects of the bursting of the economic “bubble.” Furthermore, as relocation overseas took place prior to a shift to new products, structural adjustment significantly constrained domestic production and, as a result, investment and employment were also limited. The negative impact was particularly substantial for the smaller firms, as many of them manufactured labor-intensive products and were subcontractors to the large firms which relocated their production bases overseas. The key factors we should keep in mind in projecting future developments in the Japanese economy are therefore the progress in the structural adjustment of industries, that is, the emergence of new products or industries that will promote future economic growth. A careful look at individual industries reveals some positive signs. In production, for example, an increasing number of firms and industries are shifting to goods with international competitiveness. More specifically, the production of producer goods and capital goods that are capital-intensive and technology-intensive has been increasing while the production of labor-intensive consumer goods has been declining. These changes are also reflected in imports and exports of goods. Recently, exports of consumer goods, mainly household electric appliances such as television sets and radios, have been decreasing while their imports have been increasing, and exports of capital goods and parts such as electronic machinery and automobile parts have been increasing significantly. Notable as these changes may be, one cannot simply add up these microeconomic developments to obtain a comprehensive evaluation of how successfully the Japanese economy as a whole is undergoing the structural adjustment of industries. Rather, the progress in structural adjustment should be reflected most evidently in the revitalization of forward-looking business activity. If this were the case, the stance taken by firms toward fixed investment and employment should provide a measure of the progress in macroeconomic structural adjustment. In this respect, business fixed investment by large firms began to recover in fiscal 1995 well ahead of small and medium-sized firms. Investment by smaller firms, which had been more susceptible to structural adjustment pressures, has also finally begun to show a recovery. Although the recovery is extremely moderate, this resumption of investment by smaller firms, an activity that lays the foundation for the future, may be considered as evidence of progress in structural adjustment as it indicates that these firms are starting to have a clear idea about the new direction of their business. Progress is also reflected in the business fixed investment of various industries. Namely, investment has been increasing in capital- and production-goods related sectors, where high growth in production has been recorded. There has also been a rapid expansion of investment in a new industry of mobile telecommunications. Business fixed investment for development of new products and new businesses also seems to be increasing gradually. With regard to employment, structural adjustment pressures are persistent in some indicators such as the high unemployment rate. However, based on the most recent changes in employment indicators and the microeconomic information on firms, labor market conditions are seen to be improving gradually, indicating steady progress in industrial restructuring. For example, recent numbers of new job offers are significantly higher than those in the previous year. Business surveys indicate that an increasing number of firms plan, for the first time in many years, to increase the number of new graduates hired in the next fiscal year. Results of the November TANKAN also indicate that more than half of the smaller firms surveyed feel that they are shorthanded. Furthermore, labor market conditions in each sector indicate that employment has decreased significantly in sectors where imports have been making inroads -- such as the electrical machinery and textiles industries -- while employment has increased in new sectors such as telecommunications. These changes indicate a gradual shift of labor between sectors. In sum, although pressures for the structural adjustment of industries remain, it can be said that structural adjustment has progressed significantly as reflected in the recent recovery in business fixed investment and employment. D. Balance-Sheet Adjustment The third issue to be discussed is that of balance-sheet adjustment. There are two aspects to this issue: the improvement of the financial condition of firms and the disposal of nonperforming loans of financial institutions. With regard to the balance-sheet adjustment of Japanese firms, there have been serious efforts by firms to reduce their liabilities since the bursting of the economic “bubble.” Despite these efforts, the mismatch between assets and liabilities expanded in many sectors until 1994 or 1995 due to the continued decline in real estate prices. While the decline in asset prices has slowed since 1995, liabilities have decreased owing to the recovery in corporate profits which followed firms’ restructuring efforts and lower interest rates. Several indicators, such as the ratio of long-term debts to assets at market value, reveal that balance-sheet adjustment pressures are persistent. In particular, small and medium-sized firms still need to make substantial efforts to complete their adjustment. As I have just mentioned, however, the improvement of firms’ balance sheets has doubtlessly been making moderate but steady progress in general, and thus, constraints imposed by the adjustment pressures on economic recovery should continue to be gradually alleviated. Regarding the nonperforming-loan problem of financial institutions, the total amount of nonperforming loans of the financial institutions was approximately 29 trillion yen as of the end of September 1996, according to the data published by the Ministry of Finance. Of this total, the estimated amount of problem loans to be disposed of, not including those already covered by collateral and provisions, is estimated at approximately 7 trillion yen. Both of these figures have decreased by approximately 10 trillion yen from the previous year, and thus, in general, it can be said that steady progress has been made in solving this particular problem. The amount of nonperforming loans that need to be disposed of, however, remains large. The Bank of Japan will continue to strongly encourage financial institutions to dispose of the remaining nonperforming loans expeditiously and to exert themselves to the utmost to (1) restore their capital bases which have been impaired in the process of disposing of nonperforming loans; (2) strengthen their profitability through restructuring; and (3) enhance their internal risk management. In relation to the economy, an issue of concern is whether the decline in the intermediary functions of those financial institutions burdened with nonperforming loans is constraining economic recovery. While it may certainly be true that financial institutions have imposed stricter screening criteria for lending following the experiences of the economic “bubble” period, most financial institutions now maintain a policy of actively increasing loans of reliable quality while, or rather for the purpose of, disposing of nonperforming loans. In fact, the lending attitude of financial institutions, as seen from the point of view of the firms, has become less severe and lending rates have stayed at a historically low level. It is, therefore, difficult to assume that the severer lending attitude of the financial institutions is hampering the recovery in business fixed investment. IV. Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy Management A. Economic Outlook I have so far discussed such issues as the effects of fiscal tightening and the current situation of structural adjustment, both considered to be the major factors contributing to the cautious economic outlook in financial markets. Among these, developments of structural adjustment may be summarized as follows: (1) both the structural adjustment of industries and balance-sheet adjustment are still in progress and therefore the pace of economic recovery is likely to remain moderate for some time; (2) however, as industrial restructuring and balancesheet adjustment are making steady progress, albeit moderate, its constraining effects on economic recovery are likely to gradually ease. Therefore, the most important issue in considering the economic outlook is whether the increase in private demand can overcome the downward pressures from fiscal tightening and whether it is possible, as a result, to lead the economy on to a path of selfsustained recovery. As I mentioned earlier, economic recovery has been recently gaining strength. If this recovery is analyzed in terms of the level of economic activity, namely the output gap, it can be noted that capacity utilization has been rising steadily reflecting the recent recovery in production, and has recovered to the same level as that of four years ago. Furthermore, the results of the November TANKAN indicated that the excessive production capacity and employment perceived by surveyed firms have gradually fallen to the same level as in 1987, at which time the economy was recovering from the recession caused by the appreciation of the yen. While the profit-to-sales ratio of smaller firms has not yet recovered to the average level of the past, the ratio of large firms has already reached a relatively high level. Judging overall, it can be said that the current level of economic activity in Japan is approaching the same point where the strength of the recovery began to firm in past business cycles. This level of economic activity will provide a basis for the virtuous circle of the economy, one that is led by expanded private demand, to gain further strength. In other words, if the recent economic recovery continues for some time, increased production will further improve corporate profits and employment income, which in turn are likely to lead to increases in business fixed investment and personal consumption. If this virtuous circle gains stronger momentum, there will be a higher possibility of the strengthened virtuous circle absorbing the downward pressures from prospective fiscal tightening. A temporary slowdown in economic recovery seems inevitable as downward pressures from fiscal tightening will be strong during the first half of fiscal 1997 and as a reaction to the increase in demand ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate scheduled for April 1997 is expected. However, the recovery trend of the economy is likely to be sustained on account of the strengthening recovery in private demand. I indicated earlier, however, that it is necessary to consider the effects of fiscal tightening carefully. Business sentiment and consumer confidence are also becoming important factors for a further increase in private demand. The corporate and household sectors will plan their activities and put them into action in the form of production, investment, and consumption, taking into account the fiscal 1997 budget and the actual placement of public work orders. Therefore, in predicting future economic developments, it is important to closely examine various macro- and micro-economic data and not only the economic indicators that will be released in the future, but also firms’ business plans and signals sent by financial markets. Meanwhile, it is expected that prices will cease to decline due firstly to the rise in import prices reflecting the yen’s depreciation and higher crude oil prices, and secondly to the improvement in domestic supply and demand conditions. However, when considering the fact that the improvement in supply and demand conditions is expected to be moderate for now and that the pressures of global competition will persist, there is only a limited possibility that domestic prices will follow a clear upward trend. Yet, as foreign exchange rates have recently shown rather rapid movements, it is necessary to cautiously monitor the effects of such a development on the domestic economy. While refraining from making any comments on the recent foreign exchange rate levels and movements, the Bank’s fundamental thinking is that it is desirable for exchange rates to be stable and determined in accordance with the real economic conditions of each country. Based on this thinking, the Bank of Japan will continue to carefully monitor foreign exchange rate developments and their effects on the Japanese economy. B. Monetary Policy Management In the management of current monetary policy, the Bank of Japan will continue to monitor economic developments closely, placing emphasis on further strengthening the foundation of an economic recovery. In April 1997, the consumption tax rate will be raised from 3 percent to 5 percent. Therefore, I would also like to discuss how the Bank of Japan views the possible effects of this tax rate rise on prices, in the context of managing monetary policy. Specifically, the issue here is what monetary policy measures should be taken in light of the price hikes due to the rise in the tax rate. I would first like to point out that the price hikes caused by the rise in the consumption tax rate is different in nature from the ordinary rise in prices, that is inflation. Generally, inflation is generated in the mechanism of economic cycles as a result of, for example, tightening of supply and demand conditions for labor or products, or excessive supply of money. In turn, inflation affects economic activity in various ways. In contrast, price hikes due to a rise in the consumption tax rate are equivalent to a once only rewriting of all the old price tags on April 1. There are no relevant changes in economic activity, such as a tightening of supply and demand conditions, an increase in wages, or excessive money supply. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to formulate monetary policy against such superficial changes in prices. Although this represents the fundamental thinking of the Bank, it does not mean that the central bank is indifferent to the rise in the consumption tax rate. If the rise triggers price hikes taking advantage of the tax rate rise, or if overall inflationary expectations are heightened, then the risk of a genuine inflation will arise. In particular, this risk cannot be disregarded when the supply and demand conditions for products are fairly tight. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to the inflationary expectations and possible over-reactions caused by the rise in the consumption tax rate rather than paying attention to the previously-mentioned superficial hikes in prices. In summary, in order to promote a smooth structural adjustment, to bring about a strengthening of the economic recovery, and to encourage the renewed development of the Japanese economy, the implementation of a drastic structural reform, including effective deregulation, is indispensable. In this respect, I hope that the government will continue to exercise strong leadership and earnest efforts will continue to be made by various parties. V. Financial System Reform and Revision of the Bank of Japan Law A. Financial System Reform I would like to use the remaining time to discuss financial system reform and the revision of the Bank of Japan Law. The important challenge for Japan today is to vigorously promote structural reform as discussed above, and this also applies to the reform of the financial markets and of the financial system. Financial markets worldwide have experienced significant changes in recent years amid rapid financial and economic globalization and technological innovation. New financial instruments such as derivatives and securitized products have been developed in succession to provide firms and households with diverse means of risk-hedging, investment, and financing. At the same time, profit opportunities for financial institutions have expanded in various fields. It seems that it is now time for the market participants to select the market, rather than the markets selecting the participants. Countries are vying with each other to reform their financial markets, based on a growing worldwide perception that the financial services sector will show rapid growth and create numerous employment opportunities into the twenty-first century. Each country is thus striving to make their own markets attractive to participants. Japan, too, has engaged in the review of regulations and systems to promote financial deregulation. However, reform has been gradual and financial institutions have tended to deal with it cautiously due to the severe challenge they have had to face after the bursting of the economic “bubble.” As a result, the Tokyo market has fallen far behind the New York and London markets in terms of its ability to develop financial instruments that incorporate new techniques. In recognition of this, Prime Minister Hashimoto proposed the “Big Bang” deregulation package for Japan. I understand that the purpose of this financial reform package is to revitalize the Tokyo market as a free and active global market. The Bank believes that the aims of this reform package are most appropriate and as a central bank, intends to contribute to the achievement of its goals. In carrying out the reform, it is especially important that the three basic principles of freedom, fairness, and globalization are strictly followed, and that the pace of the reform is not relaxed. The “Big Bang” package aims to realize and complete all reforms by the year 2001, immediately implementing any measures on which study has been concluded. However, this should not mean that the process of market reform become unduly gradual or slow, as this may jeopardize the consistency of the reform, or result in only an easier part of the reform being implemented. For example, one deregulation measure included in the “Big Bang” package and highly valued by the Bank is the fundamental revision of the Foreign Exchange Control Law. If deregulation in other areas proceeds too slowly, the effects of the new Foreign Exchange Control Law might encourage financial transactions to shift to overseas markets and might then lead to the hollowing-out of the Tokyo market. In order to avoid such a turn of events, it is most important to bring about concrete measures within the shortest possible time to maintain the coherence of the deregulation as a whole. B. Revision of the Bank of Japan Law Lastly, I would like to discuss the revision of the Bank of Japan Law. The revision of the Bank of Japan Law is now in the final stage of deliberation by the Financial System Research Council, an advisory committee to the Minister of Finance, following discussions last year by the Central Bank Study Group, an advisory panel to the Prime Minister. The Bank has made public its views on the Bank of Japan Law revision at a press conference held at the end of 1996 and on other occasions. To summarize, (1) the Bank holds that the basic views stated by the Central Bank Study Group -- that is, ensuring central bank independence and enhancing transparency -- should be clearly stated in the law; and (2) the Bank believes that further deliberations should be conducted on several issues regarding the relationship between the government and the central bank, on which the Central Bank Study Group was unable to reach conclusions, so as to duly reflect the two concepts of independence and transparency. - 10 - Fortunately, the Bank’s views appear to be adequately shared by the members of the Financial System Research Council. I would therefore like to discuss today the significance of the revision of the Bank of Japan Law to the Japanese economy as a whole. First, this revision of the central bank system is a response to the global trend of changes, including financial and economic globalization and marketization, which have been driven by progress in financial innovation. On various occasions in the past, I have discussed how in the new financial environment, markets around the world respond instantaneously to various information and they also respond to changes in the expectations of market participants as the participants process such information. The “Big Bang” package is likely to promote this tendency through increased efficiency and globalization of the markets. Under such circumstances, if the role and responsibility of the central bank in charge of monetary policy management are not made clear, or if both domestic and overseas understanding of the central bank’s monetary policy management is insufficient, a country’s monetary policy intentions may not permeate sufficiently throughout the market. In addition, irrelevant information may disrupt the markets. The idea of entrusting the responsibility of ensuring price stability with the central bank, an establishment detached from short-term interests, is a wisdom acquired from the history of battles against inflation. The recent strengthening of central bank independence and the growing demand for transparency of monetary policy management around the world reflect the stronger emphasis on the status and responsibility of central banks to meet the new challenges presented by the global changes in the financial markets. Second, in order for the financial markets or the financial system of a country to function efficiently and stably, appropriate policy and operational management by the central bank, which rests at the core of the financial system, is indispensable. The Japanese financial system is a mechanism for intermediating savings and investments by the efficient allocation of funds by means of a currency called the “yen.” In order for this mechanism to function properly, (1) the value of money -- in other words, domestic prices -- must be stable; (2) the mechanism for settling transactions by means of money must be efficient and convenient; and (3) private financial institutions, as the members of the financial system, as well as the central bank must be sound and reliable. The maintenance of these three conditions -- that is, price stability, stable operations of the payment and settlement systems, and the resulting soundness of the financial system -- is the important responsibility of the central bank, an institution which has a primary role in the issuance and circulation of the “yen.” The central bank system is thus an important component of the financial system infrastructure of Japan. Therefore, in order to win domestic and overseas confidence in the Japanese financial markets and to maintain and improve the international competitiveness of these markets, it is essential that the central bank system is able to win domestic and overseas confidence, and that the market environment is improved through such efforts as the “Big Bang” reform package. Third, many of the issues raised regarding the revision of the Bank of Japan Law can also be applied to economic structural reform and to administrative reform in Japan. - 11 - The Bank of Japan has urged that (1) its organizational objectives and roles be clarified; and (2) the management of policy and operations be founded on a mechanism which allows the market participants and other third parties to monitor ex post facto whether the Bank is discharging its responsibility appropriately, rather than be part of a mechanism that attaches importance to advance coordination with the government. This argument applies not only to the central bank. In fact, it may be applied generally to the question of what the economic and financial systems should be or what the role of government administration should take to meet the challenges of a new era. The Japanese economy today is required to function within a mechanism under which any institution is responsible for its own course of action and then the market and the public examine and evaluate the actions taken, instead of within a system governed by advance examination based on administrative supervision and regulations. Such reforms will fundamentally change the economic and social structures of Japan, making them more consistent with global standards. The old methodology of carrying out reforms within the conventional framework and ways of thinking must be changed. It is necessary to consider how the distinctive systems and ways of thinking in Japan could be changed from a perspective of global standards. The issue of the revision of the Bank of Japan Law has drawn attention overseas along with the “Big Bang” package of financial reforms. This is because the revision of the Law is regarded as a test case of whether or not Japan can change itself. To repeat my earlier point, the Bank of Japan strongly hopes that the two concepts put forward by the Central Bank Study Group -- that is, ensuring central bank independence and enhancing transparency -- will be clearly reflected in the revised Bank of Japan Law. I wish to make clear that the revision of the Law is not an issue that solely concerns the Bank of Japan, the monetary authorities, and the financial community, but is an issue closely related to the future course of the Japanese economy as a whole. It is very important for the Bank of Japan to prove its ability to reform itself and to win domestic and overseas confidence through constant efforts toward appropriate policy and operational management. As part of such efforts, the Bank last year announced plans for the revision of policy and operational management, including the holding of regular meetings of the Policy Board for monetary policy decisions and the disclosure of the summary of those meetings. We at the Bank are determined to further promote vigorously institutional and operational reform. I would like to conclude by asking for your continued understanding and support. I am most grateful for the kind attention you have given me today.
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Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr. Yasuo Matsushita, held at the Japan Center for Economic Research on 28/2/97.
Mr. Matsushita discusses payment and settlement systems with regard to current issues in Japan Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr. Yasuo Matsushita, held at the Japan Center for Economic Research on 28/2/97. I. Introduction I am greatly honored to have been invited by the Japan Center for Economic Research to address this distinguished audience. I wish to take this opportunity to first briefly discuss the recent monetary and economic conditions, and then address the current issues regarding the payment and settlement systems in Japan. There have not been many opportunities to discuss payment and settlement on occasions such as this, despite the fact that they are important to all the economic activities of households and firms, and that as a central bank, we are very much involved in the developments in this area. I have not addressed this area partly due to its technical nature, but recently several developments have attracted much attention to the payment and settlement issues in Japan, as in other countries: specifically, pilot projects of electronic money products and the Bank’s plans to abolish the designated-time settlement mode to make real-time gross settlement the only way of settlement on the Bank of Japan Financial Network System (BOJ-NET). The role of the central bank in ensuring a smooth and stable operation of payment and settlement systems has become clearly recognized through the deliberations on the revision of the Bank of Japan Law that have been taking place since last year. The “Report on the Revision of the Bank of Japan Law,” released recently by the Financial System Research Council, an advisory committee to the Minister of Finance, states one of the objectives of the Bank of Japan to be “to ensure smooth fund settlement among financial institutions, thereby contributing to the maintenance of an orderly financial system." I wish therefore to discuss today the current issues regarding the payment and settlement systems in Japan and also refer to the role of the central bank in those systems, bearing in mind the domestic and overseas trend in these areas. II. Domestic Monetary and Economic Conditions I would like to start by reviewing the recent economic condition and the thinking behind the Bank’s current monetary policy management. With regard to the domestic economic condition, the Bank of Japan judges that a moderate economic recovery continues and that the recovery is gradually becoming firmer. A notable change in the economic condition since the latter half of 1996 is that the decline in external demand, which had been a factor constraining the economic recovery, halted in autumn 1996 following the depreciation of the yen. Recently there has been an upward trend in external demand. In addition, inventory adjustment in some raw materials and semiconductor industries had almost reached completion by the end of 1996. As a result, production has started to grow at an accelerating pace, reflecting fully the increase in final demand. Personal consumption continues to grow moderately but steadily, supported by the buoyant sales of passenger cars, and the recovery in business fixed investment is spreading to a wider range of industries and to smaller firms than previously observed, reflecting improvements in corporate sales and profits. It should be borne in mind that increase in demand ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate scheduled for fiscal 1997 is contributing to the recent improvement in economic indicators, as in housing investment, and these improvements need to be seen in this light. However, despite a gradual decrease in public-sector investment from the latter half of 1996, the virtuous circle - in which increased production leads to a recovery in business fixed investment and personal consumption through improved corporate profits and employment income - is gradually becoming more apparent. This improvement is encouraging. In contrast to these recent improvements in economic indicators, the beginning of the year saw a significant fall in stock prices and this, together with the decline in long-term interest rates in the financial markets, indicates that the confidence of the market participants in the economic outlook is still slow to improve. Various causes can be considered for the market’s uncertainty as to future developments in the economy. While the renewed concern over the nonperforming-loan problem of financial institutions may be one important factor, the strong awareness of the effects of the anticipated fiscal tightening in the next fiscal year is also significant. From spring to summer this year, a temporary slowdown in economic recovery seems inevitable due to a reaction to the boost in demand that is occurring ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate. However, given the strengthening of the virtuous circle, it is more likely than before that the recovery trend of the economy will be sustained. In addition, stock prices appear to have stabilized. Therefore, in considering whether the economy can overcome the effects of fiscal tightening to sustain the trend of recovery, it is important to examine macroand micro-economic data, including the economic indicators that will be released in the future, signals from financial markets, and firms’ business plans for the next fiscal year. I will now turn to the environment surrounding domestic prices. The depreciation of the yen has continued since the beginning of the year, and a rise in the consumption tax rate is planned for April. The raising of the tax rate will be passed on to product prices, pushing up the price index accordingly. However, as long as the price hike does not surpass the increase caused by the raising of the consumption tax rate, the price rise will only reflect a single price adjustment, and will not indicate any fundamental change in the situation underlying prices. Therefore it would not be appropriate to formulate monetary policy to counter such superficial changes in price indexes. From the viewpoint of monetary policy management, that is, the viewpoint of ensuring stable economic development through price stability, the issue of concern is whether the rise in the tax rate will trigger price hikes that take advantage of the increase or will lead to inflationary expectations, which in turn might bring about price rises beyond the immediate effects of the tax rate increase. Whether such a general price increase will occur depends on various factors, including the prevailing domestic supply and demand conditions and consumer confidence. It is thus necessary to pay attention to the inflationary expectations and the possible negative developments, including overreaction by consumers, resulting from the rise in the consumption tax rate, rather than focusing attention on the superficial hikes in prices. Although the decline in prices began to slow from the end of 1996, there is only a limited possibility that domestic prices will take a clear upward path given that improvement in the supply and demand conditions in the domestic economy is expected to remain moderate for now. However, in view of the accelerating rise in import prices reflecting the yen’s depreciation and higher crude oil prices since the latter half of 1996, together with the strengthening of the recovery in private demand, it remains necessary to pay careful attention to the developments in domestic prices. In the management of current monetary policy, the Bank of Japan will continue to monitor economic developments closely, placing emphasis on further strengthening the foundation of an economic recovery. III. Current Issues Regarding the Payment and Settlement Systems in Japan A. Payment and Settlement Systems in Japan I would now like to move on to the main theme of today’s speech: payment and settlement systems. The expression “payment and settlement systems” may sound somewhat technical and may indeed be unfamiliar to you. In a market economy, however, every economic activity conducted by firms and households - be it production or consumption - is concluded with settlement. Payment and settlement systems, or mechanisms for clearing and settling payments, are therefore used directly or indirectly by every economic entity. People may not be conscious of the functions of the systems when they operate smoothly and efficiently. However, once a problem arises, great difficulties are encountered. The means of payment used by firms and households vary from cash - that is, banknotes and coins - to checks and bills, funds transfers between bank accounts, and credit cards. When payment is made by cash, settlement is final there and then. However, when payment is made by other means such as checks or bills, the mere handing over of the checks and bills will not complete the settlement of the transaction. When a check is drawn, for example, settlement is final only when the check is collected and the stated amount of money is transferred from the deposit money in the bank account of the payer to the bank account of the payee. If such transfers are not effected between accounts for some reason, for example, there are insufficient funds in the payer’s account, the transaction will remain unsettled. When the payer and the payee hold accounts at different banks, interbank settlement is needed, and settlement will be completed only after the corresponding debit and credit entries are made to the current accounts held by each bank with the Bank of Japan. Although various means of payment are available to firms and households, settlement is ultimately made either by a handing over of cash issued by the Bank of Japan or by a transfer of funds between bank accounts using deposit money, which are liabilities of private financial institutions. “Money” in a modern society therefore comprises cash and deposit money, and is reliant on the confidence of the public that bank deposits can be converted into cash at any time. When a large number of relatively small-value payments, such as those using checks and bills, need to be settled between banks, they are not settled one at a time between the accounts held by the banks at the Bank of Japan. Rather, payment instruments such as checks and bills are collected and exchanged at clearing houses, where the credit and debit positions of each bank are calculated, and then the net positions are settled between the BOJ accounts. This calculation process is called clearing, and is operated by private institutions. Specifically, there are three major private clearing systems in Japan: the bill and check-clearing system; the Zengin Data Telecommunications System (Zengin System) for funds transfers between bank accounts and for credit card payments; and the Foreign Exchange Yen Clearing System for yen payments arising from foreign exchange and Euro-yen transactions. BOJ accounts are used to settle the net positions resulting from various clearing systems, as well as to directly settle large-value interbank funds transactions, such as call-money transactions, which do not go through clearing processes. The value of funds transfers at the Bank of Japan totals approximately ¥300 trillion per day, which is equivalent to approximately 60 percent of Japan’s annual GDP. B. The Role of the Central Bank in Payment and Settlement Systems Bank of Japan thus plays an important role in both the settlement made by cash and the settlement made by deposit money. The duty of central banks is to issue and control money - that is, to ensure the public’s confidence in the holding and the using of money. To this end, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the value of money must be stable - that is, price stability must be maintained; and (2) the circulation of money and the functioning of payment and settlement systems must be stable and efficient. If it were not possible to use cash and deposits as desired for settlements, people would not be able to hold money with confidence. The mission of central banks, therefore, is to make the currencies they issue more convenient to use and to thereby enable firms and households to confidently engage in daily transactions and funds settlements. Bank of Japan thus plays a vital role in the settlement process in Japan as a whole. Bank of Japan serves two specific functions in securing the stability and efficiency of the country’s payment and settlement systems: (1) providing the means of settlement to the public; and (2) attending to the smooth execution of payments and settlements in Japan. As a provider of the means of settlement, the Bank issues Bank of Japan notes and ensures their smooth circulation. As I mentioned earlier, cash payments immediately complete the settlement of a transaction by delivering a means of payment directly to the counterparty. This on-the-spot completion of settlement, whereby the payee is able to secure the monetary value received, is described as “settlement with finality.” In order to maintain the finality of cash payments, it is essential to secure the confidence of the people in the soundness of the central bank’s assets, which underpins the value of the banknotes. The Bank thus pays close attention to the soundness of its assets. Furthermore, any circulation of counterfeit notes would undermine people’s confidence in holding money. To prevent such an occurrence, the Bank examines the authenticity of the large volumes of banknotes that are returned to the Bank of Japan every day from financial institutions. Careful attention is also paid to the cleanness of each of the banknotes in circulation. The Bank also exerts itself to the utmost to improve anti-counterfeiting measures, and has recently been engaged in joint research with overseas central banks on the prevention of banknote counterfeiting using color copiers. Through such efforts, the Bank aims to preclude the circulation of counterfeits. The Bank also provides current accounts at the Bank as another means of settlement. The Bank offers accounts to private financial institutions, and the funds in these accounts, or deposit money, are equivalent to banknotes in their function as a means of settlement with finality. In order to improve the safety and efficiency of settlements using these BOJ accounts, the Bank has made various efforts, including the introduction of the BOJ-NET the Bank of Japan Financial Network System, which is an on-line system for funds transfers among the current accounts held by private financial institutions with the Bank of Japan. The Bank intends to further improve the system in cooperation with those concerned by making realtime gross settlement the only settlement mode, which I shall discuss in detail later. The second function of the Bank of Japan with regard to the payment and settlement systems is to attend to the safety and efficiency of payments and settlements in Japan, and to provide adequate liquidity when necessary. As I mentioned earlier, the important tasks of the Bank include ensuring a smooth supply of banknotes throughout the country, and monitoring the stability of daily settlements across the BOJ accounts. In addition, the Bank, in coordination with the operators of the private clearing systems such as the bill and check clearing, plays an important role in preventing any troubles in the systems or participants from jeopardizing the entire payment and settlement systems in Japan. In any settlement system, there is the risk that a failure of one bank to meet its obligations will trigger a chain reaction of defaults, eventually paralyzing the entire system. In addition, both payment and settlement systems and individual banks constituting the systems are supported by the market’s confidence. As this confidence is in large part a psychological factor, a failure of a single bank could lead to a run on deposits at other banks. Such risk is referred to as systemic risk. Materialization of systemic risk will disrupt not only settlements between banks but also those between firms and households, having a profound impact on the economy and on the society as a whole. Such systemic risk inherent in the network of settlements is what differentiates the banking sector from other industrial sectors. The role of the central bank is to constantly monitor the institutional framework and the operation of payment and settlement systems, working in coordination with the parties concerned to thereby prevent the materialization of systemic risk. The central bank must also ensure that the system can be provided the funds to break the chain reaction of defaults should some emergency occur. Another important task of the central bank is to attend to the soundness of the private financial institutions, which are the participants in the payment and settlement systems and which settle the payments between firms and households. To summarize these roles, an important mission of the central bank is to maintain the safety and efficiency of the entire settlement process, a process which involves (1) private financial institutions which accept the deposits of firms and households; (2) private clearing organizations processing interbank payments; and (3) the central bank which discharges interbank settlement obligations resulting from private-sector clearing systems. C. Measures to Improve the Safety of Payment and Settlement Systems Payment and settlement systems have not necessarily been an issue of public interest reflecting the general perception that these systems are mechanical processing units for discharging obligations by inputting transaction data. The fact that there had been no financial institution failures until recently and that payments have been settled safely may have supported this perception. However, financial institutions have actually failed and the speed at which systemic risk is transmitted within and beyond international borders has increased significantly owing to technological innovations in finance and telecommunications, and financial globalization. Under these circumstances, it is inappropriate to view payment and settlement systems as merely mechanical processing units. These systems must be resilient against systemic risk, and the establishing of such systems is an extremely important challenge for both the private financial institutions and for the central bank. It becomes apparent that various incidents and studies have raised the awareness of the need to improve the safety of payment and settlement systems among private financial institutions and central banks both in Japan and abroad. In various countries, new safety standards have been applied to private clearing systems. These standards include limits on each participant’s net debit position and collateral requirements to ensure the provision of adequate backup liquidity in the event of an inability to settle by the participant having the largest single net-debit position. These standards were devised by the central banks of the Group of Ten countries as minimum standards to be satisfied by cross-border and multi-currency netting schemes, and are referred to as the Lamfalussy standards, after the chairman of the committee on this study. As these standards can apply to domestic clearing systems, they are being used recently in many countries as guidelines for improving the integrity of private clearing systems. In Japan, it has recently been decided to enhance the safety measures of the Foreign Exchange Yen Clearing System so as to satisfy the Lamfalussy standards. The Bank will continue to actively support the initiatives to improve the safety of the payment and settlement systems. D. Improving the Safety of the Central Bank’s Settlement System Real-Time Gross Settlement The need to improve safety applies not only to private clearing systems but also to the settlement systems operated by central banks. In this regard, an increasing number of central banks have been adopting real-time gross settlement for current account settlements at the central bank. Real-time gross settlement - called RTGS for short - is a system in which the central bank processes and effects every payment instruction sent by private financial institutions in real time and on an order-by-order basis. Most central banks, including the Bank of Japan, have typically conducted interbank settlements on a designated-time basis rather than by RTGS. In the conventional designated-time settlement, payment instructions are accumulated until designated settlement times instead of each one being settled immediately. At the designated time - at present, 9 a.m., 1 p.m., 3 p.m., and 5 p.m. in Japan - the net settlement position of each financial institution is computed and its account is credited or debited simultaneously. In designated-time settlement, financial institutions need only the funds equivalent to their net debit positions at the time of settlement, and thus, it is an efficient system from the viewpoint of fund management. However, if a single financial institution in the system were to fail to meet its obligations, all payments would inevitably be suspended, in order that all the payment instructions sent or received by that financial institution could be revoked to recompute the settlement obligations of each financial institution. In addition, such failure could create a shortage of funds at the financial institutions which had planned to make payments with the funds they had expected to receive from the failed financial institution. This may lead to a series of liquidity shortages or defaults - that is, the materialization of systemic risk. The effects of this risk could be grave, considering that the amount of funds handled by the central bank’s settlement system is substantial. With RTGS, the smooth execution of settlements solely depends on the ability of the parties concerned to meet their obligations, as every payment instruction is processed in real time on an order-by-order basis. Therefore, even if a bank were to suddenly become unable to settle, disruption to the system would be limited: suspension of the operation of the entire settlement system, which can occur under designated-time settlement, can be avoided. The introduction of RTGS in many countries around the world, including some Asian countries, is a result of the efforts of central banks to improve their settlement systems to contain systemic risk. Against this background, the Bank of Japan also decided at the end of 1996 to make RTGS the only mode of settlement via BOJ accounts. Specifically, by the end of the year 2000, the Bank plans to abolish designated-time settlement and make all funds transfers on the basis of RTGS. This may require market participants to establish new transaction and settlement practices. To ensure the smooth operation of RTGS, the Bank intends to directly supply intraday liquidity, which is indispensable for smooth settlements, to cover liquidity shortages that might arise in the system despite the efforts of participant financial institutions. Last December, the Bank announced its policy to realize RTGS as the only settlement mode on the BOJ-NET with some specific proposals for design features and requested comments from the public. The Bank was fortunate to receive many valuable comments and recognized the increasing awareness of settlement risk among market participants. The Bank believes that it has been able to gain strong support from the private financial institutions for RTGS, and plans to publish in the near future its policies along with the comments received. The Bank strongly hopes to receive constructive opinions and suggestions in deciding the details of the design of the system. The Bank will also solicit views from a broad range of market participants whenever making a major change in the operation of the Bank’s settlement system, as a change in the system could have a significant impact on the market practices and the daily business of the financial institutions participating in the system. It should be noted that realization of RTGS does not necessarily mean the elimination of all the risks in payment and settlement systems. Moreover, RTGS on the BOJNET will produce the desired effects only when the safety of the private clearing systems connected to the Bank’s system is ensured. To illustrate this point, suppose that the private financial institutions, for some reason, switched from direct settlements via BOJ accounts to indirect settlements using private clearing systems given the introduction of RTGS. The total amount of risks in the payment and settlement systems as a whole would not decrease if there were inadequate management of risks in the private systems. In this respect, it is indispensable for the private financial institutions, the private clearing organizations, and the central bank to work together to enhance the efficiency and safety of the payment and settlement systems in Japan. Such efforts of the private sector and the central bank to improve the infrastructure for settlements will also contribute to the strengthening of the global competitiveness of Japan’s financial markets, which is indeed the aim of the Japanese “Big Bang” deregulation package proposed by Prime Minister Hashimoto. E. Improvement in Securities Settlement Systems In addition to the safety of funds settlements, much attention has been paid globally to the safety of settlements of securities such as government securities and stocks. Although I do not have enough time today to discuss this issue in detail, the established guidelines for risk management in securities settlements are the recommendations set out in 1989 by the Group of Thirty, an international group of experts in finance. In accordance with the recommendations, significant progress has been made recently in Japan toward improving the settlement systems for securities. For the settlement of Japanese government securities (JGS), for example, an on-line network and delivery-versuspayment system have been established. Delivery versus payment, known as DVP, is a mechanism which links the delivery of JGS with the corresponding funds transfer so that both are executed simultaneously. In such a way, a failure to collect payments or receive securities can be avoided. In addition, rolling settlement was introduced in October 1996. Here, settlements are made on every business day for the contracts that were agreed on a specific number of business days previous to that settlement date (currently seven days). This replaces the prior arrangement where contracts made over a certain period were accumulated before they were settled on one of the six designated settlement days of each month (the 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th, 25th, and the last day of the month). The system will be improved further in April 1997 to complete settlement on the third business day after the date of contract. Regarding settlement of corporate bonds, which may be familiar to many of you here, delivery of bonds has conventionally been made by a document called registration certificate and the corresponding payment has been settled separately through clearing of bills. At the end of 1997, however, on-line delivery of corporate bonds will be brought into effect. A delivery-versus-payment service is also envisioned for the future by connecting the settlement system for corporate bonds with the BOJ-NET. Various efforts are thus under way in Japan to enhance the safety of securities settlements. However, much remains to be improved. A large volume of stocks and other securities continues to be delivered physically, and DVP systems are yet to be established for such securities. Furthermore, the lag between the contract and the settlement, that is, the final transfers of securities and funds, needs to be shortened for various securities. In this respect, the Bank intends to contribute actively and expects further efforts on the part of the private sector. F. Developments in Electronic Money I would now like to briefly discuss the developments in electronic money, which might become a popular means of settlement in the future. The term electronic money is used to refer to payment mechanisms in which electronic records of funds are stored in devices such as IC cards - with microprocessor chip (integrated circuits) embedded - or in computer networks and then transferred safely from one customer to another. Many pilot projects are under way in various countries, making use of the recent technological innovations in IC cards and computer networks as well as in such security features as encryption. In Japan as well, financial institutions and firms have begun various projects individually or jointly. For example, some banks are individually using IC-card based electronic money on trial within certain buildings in Tokyo. A joint project by a credit card company and several banks on card-based electronic money is also being planned for summer 1998 in a certain area of Tokyo. It is said to be of the largest one of its kind in the world, involving approximately 1,000 stores and 100,000 cards. When electronic money products become prevalent, they may be used as new means of settlement replacing cash and deposits. People may settle various retail transactions by transferring the electronic values between IC cards or on networks instead of banknotes and coins. To prepare for this possibility, central banks are keenly interested in the soundness and the implications of electronic money developments. From this viewpoint, the central banks of the Group of Ten countries have been studying various aspects of electronic money: security features to prevent fraud and counterfeiting, implications for the effectiveness of the central bank’s monetary policy, and the stability of payment and settlement systems. At present, however, it is very difficult to project how electronic money technology will develop, to what extent electronic money products will be used by the public as a substitute for cash or deposit money, and at what pace these developments will proceed. The pace of the developments will depend on how the reliability of electronic money products is secured and how conveniently these products are utilized. Under these circumstances, it is not easy to reach a verdict on the various relevant issues, nor would it be appropriate to jump to conclusions. Developers and operators of electronic money schemes can be expected to exercise ingenuity on such aspects as security and legal matters, and the innovative capabilities of the private sector should not be discouraged. The basic stance that the Bank should maintain at present is to be flexible to the various possibilities concerning the future course of development in electronic money. Regarding the implications of the development of electronic money on monetary policy, monetary policy will, in theory, continue to be effective, provided that the situation does not become one where electronic money extensively substitutes not only for cash as a means of retail payment but also for deposit money for large-value transfers. Although the spread of electronic money products might affect the stability of monetary indicators, this will be adequately managed by identifying the amount outstanding of electronic money issued and by devising monetary policy management. Therefore, I wish to state that the Bank of Japan does not intend to put a brake on the development and introduction of electronic money in consideration of its effects on monetary policy. Maintaining this stance, the Bank intends to continue research on electronic money while observing the developments in the private sector in Japan and abroad. It will release the results of the research, as it has done in the past, wishing to support the efforts of the private sector. G. The Necessity of Risk Management by Individual Financial Institutions I have so far discussed the developments regarding payment and settlement systems to contain systemic risk. It is obvious, however, that establishing an appropriate system structure alone is not enough to secure the safety of the systems. It is also important for the system participants, or individual financial institutions, to improve risk control measures by establishing a system for identifying and managing settlement risk. In a modern society, monetary systems, as mentioned earlier, are based on the public’s confidence in: (1) cash issued by the central bank; and (2) deposit money offered by private financial institutions. In order for monetary systems to function smoothly, it is necessary for the financial system as a whole to function with stability and, to that end, financial institutions themselves need to be responsible for securing sound management, including management of settlement risk. It is evident that financial institutions should manage their risks rigorously. Compared to credit and interest rate risks, settlement risk tends to cause greater losses and disruptions once it materializes, and yet they are difficult to identify and manage. In fact, settlement risk constantly fluctuates significantly, and thus identification and management of the risk require comprehensive understanding of technical details related to processing. For example, it is necessary to know how the payment and settlement systems of different currencies work, and what risks arise from time lags. Such information and skills cannot be acquired overnight. However, in view of the impact settlement risk could have on financial institutions, it - 10 - is indispensable to establish a system which makes possible the identification and measurement of settlement risk and the immediate reduction of risk following decisions by the management. I would like to emphasize that a financial institution equipped with an efficient risk management system will be able to acquire new business opportunities in the area of payment and settlement services. In fact, many European and U.S. financial institutions are creating and offering new business out of settlement operations. They are putting in large amounts of resources to establish adequate internal risk management, and are developing safe and efficient settlement services to provide to financial institutions and other customers. The fact that such operations are viable as business is an indication that European and U.S. financial institutions and firms actively use new innovative payment and settlement services to realize safe and efficient settlements. IV. Conclusion In summarizing today’s discussion on payment and settlement systems, I would like to address the basic issues from a somewhat different point of view. Firstly, payment and settlement systems play an extremely important role in the economy as an infrastructure supporting all economic activities, although this is rarely acknowledged in our daily lives. When firms purchase raw materials and sell products, or when households receive wages and salaries, purchase goods, and remit money, all these activities are based on the assumption that payments and settlements of money are effected smoothly - in a manner that people would not even be conscious of it. To satisfy this requirement, modern society has developed a complex and precise mechanism comprising the central bank and the private sector. The expressions “financial institutions” and “financial system” may generally bring to mind the function of intermediating savings and investment through the borrowing and lending of money. Providing safe and efficient settlement services, however, is an equally important function that the central bank and the private financial institutions serve. Secondly, efforts to further improve the utility and safety of the settlement systems are becoming all the more important as economic transactions become increasingly complex and globalized and as technological innovations in finance including the payment and settlement systems progress. The Lamfalussy standards, RTGS, and the recommendations of the Group of Thirty are indeed part of such efforts. As technology continues to progress, however, there is no final goal for the development of payment and settlement systems. In addition, financial globalization is intensifying cross-border linkages, with settlement troubles in one country affecting the settlement systems of other countries. It is therefore important for the private sector and central banks to work together to improve the payment and settlement systems by reviewing the safety standards as necessary from a global perspective. We at the Bank of Japan shall continue our efforts to enhance the safety and efficiency of the BOJ-NET, and shall support the efforts of the private sector to improve their systems. Thirdly, it is important to ensure the soundness of the financial system in a broader sense. As I mentioned repeatedly, the functioning of modern monetary systems has its foundations in the public’s confidence in the central bank and the private financial institutions. In order for monetary systems to function properly, the entire financial system needs to operate with stability. Sound management founded on the responsibility of the financial institutions is fundamental in establishing the confidence in private financial institutions. It is necessary for - 11 - the central bank to function as the lender of last resort should a trouble which emerged in one part of the settlement system be anticipated to spread throughout the entire system - although it is important to contain such risks in advance, sometimes it may unfortunately become impossible to prevent an incident from having impact on the entire system - so that people’s everyday lives will not be seriously affected. In order to prevent the materialization of systemic risk, it is essential for the central bank to assess, through regular on-site examinations and daily monitoring, whether the soundness of individual financial institutions is secured, whether there is excessive concentration of risks in the financial system as a whole, and whether the series of transactions between financial institutions is being settled smoothly. In summary, payment and settlement systems are vital to every economic entity including the firms and individuals represented here. As the central bank, one of whose missions is to secure the soundness of the financial system, the Bank of Japan will continue its efforts to improve the safety and efficiency of Japan’s payment and settlement systems. In this regard, your suggestions and comments will be extremely valuable. Thank you very much for your kind attention. This article is excerpted and translated from a speech given by Yasuo Matsushita, Governor of the Bank of Japan, to the Japan Center for Economic Research in Tokyo on February 28, 1997.
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BANK OF JAPAN, QUARTERLY BULLETIN, May 1997 (advance summary).
Bank of Japan presents its quarterly economic outlook for spring 1997 BANK OF JAPAN, QUARTERLY BULLETIN, May 1997 (advance summary). 1. Japan’s economy continues on a recovery trend despite some fluctuations caused by the rise in the consumption tax rate, with private demand showing underlying firmness. Among final demand items, public-sector investment has decreased, and housing investment has declined reflecting the reversal in the stepped-up demand which took place ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate. However, net exports have continued on an increasing trend, and business fixed investment has been rising steadily. Personal consumption is on a moderate recovery trend. Meanwhile, inventories are generally at appropriate levels. In these circumstances, industrial production has been strengthening since autumn 1996. Labor market conditions have been improving moderately on the whole. Prices have stopped declining. Domestic wholesale prices (adjusted for seasonal electricity rates) increased in early April 1997 reflecting the rise in the consumption tax rate. However, the downward pressures remain strong on those such as electrical machinery. Despite these pressures, domestic wholesale prices have remained unchanged or have increased marginally. This reflects the yen’s depreciation and the higher oil prices to date, as well as the moderate improvement in domestic supply and demand conditions. The year-to-year declines in corporate service prices are narrowing, and consumer prices (nationwide, excluding perishables) are marginally above the previous year’s level. With respect to commercial land prices, prices of large and well-located land suited for major developments have stopped declining, while those of land less suited for use have continued to decline. As for residential land, prices have gradually stopped declining. On the balance of payments, the real trade surplus has been on an increasing trend, and the nominal current-account surplus has also increased, albeit very moderately. 2. In the financial markets, the overnight call rate (uncollateralized) rose temporarily around the fiscal year-end, but has since declined to the level slightly below the official discount rate of 0.5 per cent. The 3-month CD rate has continued at around 0.50 - 0.55 per cent except for the fiscal year-end. The long-term government bond yield has been declining since summer 1996, and has recently moved at a low level of 2.1 - 2.2 per cent. Stock prices plummeted between the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997, and have recently stayed at somewhat over ¥18,000. On the foreign exchange market, the yen has been depreciating against the U.S. dollar since mid-1995, and has recently moved at around ¥125 - 126. Lending by private financial institutions has continued to be lackluster. Growth in monetary aggregates has continued at around 3.0 - 4.0 per cent, but it has declined somewhat compared to summer 1996. 3. Looking at individual components of final demand, public-sector investment is expected to follow a declining trend, although it may be supported for the time being by implementation of the government’s supplementary budget for fiscal 1996. While both exports and imports will expand reflecting the progress in international division of labor, net exports are expected to continue increasing owing partly to the yen’s depreciation since mid1995. With respect to the growth of domestic private demand, corporate profits of large manufacturing firms are improving steadily, helped partly by the positive effects on export prices and export volume stimulated by the yen’s depreciation. Recovery in corporate profits has spread to nonmanufacturing firms which are closely related to business activities, as well as to small manufacturing firms. Business fixed investment is thus expected to increase steadily in months ahead, mainly reflecting 1) this improvement in corporate profits, 2) the progress in capital stock adjustments, and 3) the rise in information-related investment. However, the pace of growth in business fixed investment is unlikely to accelerate significantly as balance-sheet adjustment pressures, for one, remain strong. With respect to the household sector, growth in compensation of employees has been accelerating, mainly in bonus payments and overtime payments. Although the negative impact of the rise in the consumption tax rate is yet uncertain, consumer confidence will strengthen if growth continues to spread from the corporate sector to the household sector. Personal consumption will thus continue to recover, despite the reversal in the stepped-up demand that occurred prior to the rise in the consumption tax rate. Meanwhile, any drastic decline in housing investment is unlikely given present low interest rates, albeit with some reversal of the demand that peaked before the rise in the consumption tax rate. 4. Turning to the outlook on prices, there is potential upward pressure on prices reflecting the yen’s depreciation, but they are expected to remain stable for some time. This is because, 1) crude oil prices have begun to weaken, 2) the recovery in domestic supply and demand conditions has been moderate, and 3) there remains a strong downward pressure on prices owing to technological innovations, particularly in electrical machinery. However, price differentials between home and abroad have narrowed, and the general sense of weak supply and demand conditions for products has receded. Thus, the Bank will monitor more closely future developments in domestic and overseas supply and demand conditions, as well as in the foreign exchange market. 5. In sum, private demand has firmed in a virtuous cycle as growth in production is accompanied by growth in incomes, supported partly by the yen’s depreciation which augmented corporate profits and net exports. Thus, although economic growth will slow down temporarily in the first half of fiscal 1997 with the reversal in the stepped-up demand ahead of the rise in the consumption tax, chances are improving that economic recovery turns out to be sustainable. However, the extent of the negative effects caused by the rise in the consumption tax rate, including the reversal in the stepped-up demand, has yet to be confirmed. Also, balance-sheet adjustment pressures may continue to restrain the economic recovery. In these circumstances, promoting effective reforms of Japan’s economic structure is an important ingredient in the efforts to strengthen the basis for recovery in private demand as well as the basis for a medium to long-term growth in Japan’s economy.
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BANK OF JAPAN, MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, 20/5/97.
Bank of Japan’s May review of monetary and economic trends in Japan BANK OF JAPAN, MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, 20/5/97. Japan’s economy continues on a moderate recovery trend despite some fluctuations caused by the rise in the consumption tax rate, with private demand showing underlying firmness. With respect to final demand, public-sector investment has decreased, and housing investment has declined, reflecting the reversal in the stepped-up demand which took place ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate. However, net exports have continued to rise and business fixed investment is increasing steadily. Despite the reversal in the stepped-up demand caused by the consumption tax rate hike, the recovery in personal consumption has not been hindered, given the moderate but firm recovery in labor market conditions and income formation. In these circumstances, industrial production has been firm to recover the level of inventories which declined owing to the temporary surge in demand ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate. Meanwhile, prices have stopped declining, and growth in monetary aggregates has continued at around 3.0 per cent. With regard to personal consumption, outlays for travel have continued to increase moderately. With respect to goods, sales particularly in expensive goods surged in March 1997 ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate, followed by a decline in April as its reaction. Passenger-car sales recorded buoyant two-digit growth year-to-year for six consecutive months between October 1996 and March 1997, but showed a two-digit decline year-to-year in April. Although sales of electrical appliances, as well as sales at department stores and supermarkets, rose significantly in March 1997, April figures available for department stores in Tokyo are significantly below the previous year’s level. However, the recovery trend in personal consumption do not seem to have been hindered, as labor market conditions as well as household income formation are improving steadily, albeit moderately. Among leading indicators of business fixed investment, machinery orders have increased steadily. Construction floor area has also continued to recover moderately. With respect to housing investment, housing starts in terms of the seasonally-adjusted annual rate reached a significantly high level in the fourth quarter 1996, partly reflecting the stepped-up demand ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate. Later, they declined as the surge in demand reversed. Regarding public-sector investment, the amount of public works contracted has quite recently picked up somewhat, reflecting orders included in the supplementary budget for fiscal 1996. However, public-sector investment has been on a declining trend since spring 1996 when orders from the large economic stimulus package peaked out. Real exports are increasing, reflecting the moderate expansion of overseas economies and the effects of the yen’s depreciation between mid-1995 and April 1997 . Real imports have also continued to increase, reflecting such elements as the rise in domestic demand. However, growth has been moderate compared to that in exports against the background of the narrowing price differentials between home and abroad caused by the yen’s depreciation. Reflecting these developments in exports and imports, the real trade surplus has been rising since the second half of 1996. The nominal current-account surplus is also increasing, but its increase has been more moderate owing to rising crude oil prices until early 1997 and fluctuations in the income account. Industrial production increased at a significant pace in the fourth quarter 1996 and the first quarter 1997. Industrial production in April and May is expected to remain virtually unchanged at the level recorded in the first quarter 1997 despite the reversal in the surge in final demand. This has partly been supported by the recovery in inventories from the low level at the end of March 1997 created by the temporary surge in demand ahead of the consumption tax hike. Labor market conditions have continued to improve moderately on the whole. Although the unemployment rate remains at a high level and employment growth has been moderate, growth in nominal wages has been accelerating somewhat, reflecting the increase in production and corporate profits. The ratio of job offers to job applications has continued to improve. Prices have stopped declining. Domestic wholesale prices (adjusted for seasonal electricity rates) rose by almost 2 per cent in April 1997, as the rise in the consumption tax rate was almost fully passed on to prices. Downward pressures remain strong, including those from technological innovation, such as in electrical machinery, but domestic wholesale prices have remained unchanged or have risen marginally. This reflects the yen’s depreciation and higher oil prices to date, as well as the moderate improvement in domestic supply and demand conditions. The year-to-year declines in corporate service prices are narrowing steadily, mainly owing to the improvement in supply and demand conditions, although leasing charges continue to decline. In consumer prices (nationwide, excluding perishables), overall consumer prices are marginally above the previous year’s level mainly because the year-to-year declines in goods prices have slowed. Growth in monetary aggregates, measured in terms of the year-to-year growth rate of M2 + CDs average outstanding, has slowed somewhat compared to that in summer 1996, reflecting the shift of assets to those outside M2 + CDs. Recently, M2 + CDs average outstanding grew at around 3 per cent on the whole. Regarding money market rates, the overnight call rate (uncollateralized) has moved at a level slightly below the official discount rate. The 3-month CD rate has stayed at around 0.55 per cent. Meanwhile, the long-term government bond yield declined to a record low of below 2.1 per cent in early April 1997. However, it recently rose to around 2.5 per cent as market uncertainties about the economic outlook and about Japanese financial institutions have gradually subsided in line with developments in the stock market. With respect to bank lending rates, the short-term prime lending rate has remained at a record low level of 1.625 per cent since September 1995. The long-term prime lending rate had been moving at the record low of 2.5 per cent since December 1996. Reflecting movements in long-term interest rates, however, it was raised by 0.6 percentage points to 3.1 per cent in May 1997. On the stock exchange, the Nikkei 225 stock average has been rising since the second half of April 1997, reflecting the fact that market uncertainties about the economic outlook and about Japanese financial institutions have gradually subsided, and the strong U.S. stock prices. In early May, it recovered to above ¥20,000 for the first time in four and a half months, and has recently continued to move at around ¥20,000. In the foreign exchange market, the yen depreciated between April and early May to around ¥126 - 127 to the U.S. dollar. However, the yen’s depreciation was later reversed rapidly, as concerns about the appreciation of the U.S. dollar strengthened, and as the differential in interest rates between Japan and the United States narrowed somewhat. The yen has recently moved at around ¥116 - 117 to the U.S. dollar. Meanwhile, the yen has appreciated against the deutsche mark and recently has moved at around ¥68.
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BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 30/5/97.
Bank of Japan presents the summary of an article published in the May edition of its Quarterly Bulletin BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 30/5/97. Checklist for Risk Management (Revised Edition) The English version of the Checklist published in the May 1997 issue of the Bank of Japan Quarterly Bulletin includes specific sample questions in addition to check points that were provisionally published in the November 1996 issue. The original Checklist written in Japanese has precedence over this English version. I. Objectives The Bank Supervision Department of the Bank of Japan initially compiled the Checklist for Risk Management (hereafter referred to as the former Checklist) in December 1987 to assist examiners in assessing the adequacy of risk management at individual banks during onsite examinations. The former Checklist was distributed to financial institutions under the Bank’s supervision as a reference for checking and strengthening their risk management systems. Amid the progress in financial liberalization and innovation that has taken place during the past several years, financial institutions have expanded the scope of their business activities, and this has enabled them to pursue higher returns by taking on risks freely while giving consideration to market rules. At the same time, this has led to a better understanding by financial institutions of the importance of maintaining the balance between risk and return by adequately assessing and controlling risk exposure. As a result, financial institutions are taking the initiative in strengthening and upgrading their risk management systems in order to secure financial safety and soundness. With these changes in the environment surrounding financial institutions, the Bank of Japan has recognized the increased importance of adequately assessing any future threats to the safety and soundness of financial institutions. This implies nothing more than further strengthening and promotion of the same kind of examination focused on risk management as in the past. With this aim, the Bank Supervision Department has comprehensively revised the former Checklist (hereafter referred to as the new Checklist). Like its predecessor, the new Checklist has been distributed to all banks subject to the Bank of Japan’s supervision, as it is intended to assist banks in reviewing and strengthening their risk management systems based on the principle of self-responsibility, while serving as a guideline for bank examiners. As this revised document includes some points that will be equally useful to those financial institutions not subject to the Bank’s supervision (such as some shinkin banks, credit cooperatives, agricultural cooperatives, and labor credit associations) and business enterprises, the new Checklist is presented in the Quarterly Bulletin. II. Major Features The most prominent feature of the new Checklist is the change in categorization. In view of the transformation of risk management emphasis from heightening recognition of risks in the former Checklist to the recent actual control of risks, the overall structure of the Checklist has been altered from the eight categories by type of risk in the former Checklist (credit risk, interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, liquidity risk, operations risk, electronic data processing [EDP] risk, systemic risk, and management risk) to four categories by type of operation (management and internal controls, lending operations, market operations and asset and liability management [ALM], and business operations and EDP). The Checklist has also been revised to reflect the important points in risk management acquired during the Bank’s past on-site examinations, while giving due consideration to the various reports and guidelines of international organizations and foreign financial authorities, and to trading practices in Japan. Concretely, the section on management and internal controls emphasizes basic management policy and strategy concerning risk management, while including items regarding legal compliance and countermeasures against disasters. This section is given the highest priority in the new Checklist. Second, against the background of the increase in nonperforming assets accompanying the bursting of the “bubble” economy, the section on lending operations has been strengthened to reflect points important in the evaluation of creditworthiness and avoidance of credit concentration. At the same time, this section promotes comprehensive management of domestic, overseas, on-balance-sheet, and off-balance-sheet transactions, and includes general remarks foreseeing the introduction of a loan grading and review system, further contributing to the continued enhancement of risk management as a whole. Third, the section on market operations and ALM has been expanded in content, as this section is the most strongly influenced by the progress in financial liberalization and innovation, namely, the rapid growth in derivatives transactions and the greater impact of ALM skills on profit/loss of financial institutions. This section incorporates numerous concepts from the Checklist for Risk Management on Derivatives Transactions, which was compiled and issued in April 1995, and reflects new risk management techniques and lessons learned from some of the recent financial incidents. Fourth, with the development of EDP at financial institutions, more weight has been put on EDP in the section on business operations and EDP. Furthermore, to reinforce the importance of the accuracy of individual offices’ work, this section has given as comprehensive a treatment as possible to such issues as new types of transactions accompanying progress in information technology (i.e., fund transactions using customers’ computer terminals).
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Speech given by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr. Yasuo Matsushita, at the Kisaragi-kai Meeting in Tokyo on 14/4/97.
Mr. Matsushita comments on recent monetary and economic conditions in Japan and the reform of the financial markets Speech given by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr. Yasuo Matsushita, at the Kisaragi-kai Meeting in Tokyo on 14/4/97. I. Introduction I am greatly honored to have been invited today to address this distinguished audience. I would like to take this opportunity to first discuss recent monetary and economic conditions in Japan and issues regarding the financial system. I would then like to discuss the Bank of Japan’s views on financial market reform in Japan, the subject of heated discussion since Prime Minister Hashimoto proposed the “Big Bang” deregulation package for Japan on November 11, 1996. The financial markets constitute the infrastructure supporting a nation’s economy, and thus their efficient and stable functioning is essential to the promotion of unhindered economic growth in the long term. Accordingly, market reform has become an urgent issue in Japan, as the financial markets seem to be losing international competitiveness. However, various arguments are being heard on the pace and the potential side effects of the reform. Bearing these arguments in mind, I wish to return to the basics of market reform and discuss why a reform is currently needed in Japan and the approach to be taken in promoting the reform. II. Recent Monetary and Economic Conditions in Japan A. The Strength of Economic Recovery I would like to start by examining the strength of the self-sustained economic recovery over the past several years. According to the Economic Planning Agency, the current economic recovery began in October 1993, and has continued for about three and a half years. The recovery, however, has not been constant, and therefore, many people may not have been able to appreciate the true strength of the recovery. In fact, the growth rate of the economy remained low at around 1 percent even after 1993, and there were concerns about the occurrence of a deflationary spiral at one time in 1995. This extremely slow pace of economic recovery was due to the fact that the Japanese economy had to overcome various structural adjustment pressures - that is, pressures to reduce the burdens created by the bursting of the economic “bubble” and pressures to adapt to a new global economic environment. Since 1996, however, the recovery in real economic activity has finally become evident. Looking at GDP growth in 1996, the contribution of fiscal expenditures, which had been large at the beginning of the year, gradually decreased. At the same time, the pace of decline in net exports (exports in excess of imports) slowed, and domestic private demand, such as business fixed investment and personal consumption, showed steady growth. Owing mostly to the increase in domestic private demand, GDP in the fourth quarter of 1996 grew by 2.9 percent over the same period of the previous year, despite the negative contribution by public works. The key to the realization of a self-sustained economic recovery is the sustainability of recovery in domestic private demand. In this respect, there have been concerns that the recovery in business fixed investment might be due in large part to the temporary increase in investment in the telecommunications industry. Equally, there have been concerns that growth in housing investment and personal consumption might have been caused mainly by the boost in demand ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate in fiscal 1997. -2These issues must be examined from various points of view when judging the economic outlook for the current fiscal year. I would, however, like to emphasize here that a virtuous circle of demand, production, and income has gradually come into operation from the latter half of 1996. During the first half of 1996, increase in demand did not bring about significant improvement in production, as the increase was offset by growth in imports and inventory adjustment. In the latter half of the year, however, the decline in external demand halted due to the depreciation of the yen, and, in addition, inventory adjustment progressed. As a result, the increase in final demand was reflected fully in production growth. In fact, the year-to-year growth rate of production improved from less than 1 percent in the first half of 1996 to 4.4 percent in the latter half of 1996, a level consistent with the growth in demand. The increase in production appears to have led to a recovery in business fixed investment and employment in the latter half of 1996, through increased corporate profits. This virtuous circle of demand, production, and income brightens the prospects for a sustained recovery in domestic private demand. The strength of recovery, however, is different in each economic sector. According to the results of the March 1997 “Tankan - Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan,” while increased corporate profits have been stimulating increases in business fixed investment, they have not to the same extent led to increased consumption through improved employment and wage conditions. In addition, while business fixed investment by large firms continues to increase, recovery in the levels of investment by smaller firms has not yet gained strength. While several factors remain uncertain, the Bank of Japan judges that the economic recovery has gradually been firming since autumn 1996, on the basis of the developments in the economic growth rate and its determining factors, and the strengthening of the virtuous circle. B. Future Economic and Price Developments, and Monetary Policy Management The Bank will pay close attention to whether the self-sustained recovery of private demand from fiscal 1996 will further strengthen, leading to a firm recovery of the economy despite the downward pressures of fiscal tightening. The developments in the financial markets indicate considerable concern on the part of market participants as to the firmness of economic recovery. Long-term interest rates continued to decline from autumn 1996 and have recently been at a historic low of 2.1 to 2.2 percent. Stock prices fell sharply at the beginning of the year with no significant improvement thereafter. The results of the March 1997 Tankan also indicated that while firms were confident about their business outlook in terms of expected sales and profits, they had little expectation of an improvement in business conditions in the second quarter. The low level of confidence in the economic outlook may be attributed to a variety of causes. The renewed concern over the nonperforming-loan problem of financial institutions and its effects on the economy may be one factor. With regard to economic developments in the short-term, however, the most significant factors are likely to be the concerns over the downward pressures of fiscal tightening. The Bank has not yet detected any clear signs of such downward pressures, and intends to continue examining the possible effects of fiscal tightening. There appear to be, however, several good reasons not to be too pessimistic. Regarding fiscal tightening, public works are not to be cut drastically in the new fiscal year, but rather, have already been reduced gradually from the latter half of 1996. Despite the decline in public works, domestic private demand has continued to expand, supported in part by the improvement in external demand. -3With regard to the rise in the consumption tax rate, it may have two different types of impact: (1) in the short term, the rise may induce an increase in demand ahead of its implementation and a subsequent reaction after the rate change; and (2) in the longer term, it may fundamentally affect consumer behavior. As to the short-term influence, this may have made a certain contribution to the recent improvement in economic indicators such as increased automobile sales and department store sales. From April, therefore, it is likely that there will be some reaction against the increase. From the viewpoint of achieving a self-sustained economic recovery, however, what matters is how the increase in the consumption tax rate will fundamentally change consumer behavior through a decline in the purchasing power of households. The degree of the change will depend largely on consumer confidence and wage conditions. In this respect, the recent improvement in employment and wage conditions, though modest, is encouraging. Nevertheless, a temporary slowdown in economic recovery is likely as the various effects of fiscal tightening will be seen most strongly between now and summer. The Bank, however, is also of the view that the current trend of recovery is likely to be maintained owing to the recent strengthening of the virtuous circle in the economy. In this respect, the Bank will continue to monitor closely economic developments, especially consumer behavior. Turning to recent price developments, it has become increasingly clear that prices have stopped declining since the end of 1996, following an improvement in the domestic supply and demand conditions and a rise in import prices. While the decline in crude oil prices makes it unlikely that import prices will rise further, putting additional upward pressures on domestic prices, the Bank will continue to monitor price developments closely, including the effects of the depreciation of the yen. If I should mention one point about the recent foreign exchange developments, it is that the Bank’s thinking is based on the Group of Seven agreement that exchange rates should reflect economic fundamentals and that excess volatility is undesirable. While refraining from commenting on specific exchange rate levels, the Bank will continue to carefully watch foreign exchange rate developments, which have recently shown rather rapid movements. Returning to the subject of prices, the raising of the consumption tax rate in April will be reflected in product prices, pushing up the price index accordingly. It would not be appropriate to formulate monetary policy against such a one-time, superficial price adjustment. The issue of concern is whether the rise in the tax rate will trigger price hikes taking advantage of the rise or will lead to inflationary expectations, which in turn might bring about price rises beyond the immediate effects of the tax rate increase. The Bank will also continue to monitor price developments carefully from this viewpoint, with particular attention given to the underlying domestic supply and demand conditions and consumer confidence. In the management of current monetary policy, the Bank of Japan will continue to monitor economic developments closely, placing emphasis on further strengthening the foundation for economic recovery. III. Issues Regarding the Financial System I would now like to move on to the issues regarding the financial system. From the end of fiscal 1996 to the beginning of fiscal 1997, a number of banks announced their intention to front-load their schedule of writing off nonperforming loans and to revise their business results for fiscal 1996 downward accordingly. On April 1, Nippon Credit Bank announced a comprehensive restructuring package, and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Hokkaido Bank announced their plan to merge in pursuit of more efficient management. These developments indicate the determination of Japanese financial institutions to adapt to the far-reaching reform of Japan’s financial system, which I will discuss later, while continuing to strive to promptly resolve their nonperforming loans. -4I would therefore like to discuss the implications that the decisions of Nippon Credit Bank and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank may have for Japan’s financial system as a whole and for the nonperforming-loan problem with which the system is burdened. Let me first explain the circumstances which led these banks to take such drastic actions. In recent years, significant progress has been made in the disposal of nonperforming loans by major financial institutions including city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks. As a result of active provisioning and write-offs, in fact, most banks already have a clear prospect of completing the disposal within a year or two. Nippon Credit Bank and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, however, have tended to fall behind others due to the large amount of nonperforming loans they hold relative to their financial strength. Needless to say, it has been believed that both banks could dispose of the nonperforming loans over an extended period of time. However, with the financial markets about to undergo a drastic change, financial institutions that will require time to solve their nonperforming loan problem will unavoidably be placed under serious constraints as they try to survive the reform. With this in mind, domestic and overseas market participants have begun to scrutinize the financial conditions of Japanese financial institutions with increasing severity since the beginning of the year. In this context, the two banks were urged to set forth restructuring plans which are comprehensive enough to remove the sources of uncertainty in the market. Nippon Credit Bank announced a plan which includes thorough restructuring, comprehensive disposal of nonperforming loans, and reinforcement of the capital base. Private financial institutions which have direct capital or business interest in Nippon Credit Bank have been asked to participate in the capital subscription to the bank. The capital which cannot be obtained from private financial institutions will be supplemented by the New Financial Stabilization Fund through the underwriting of preferred shares. This will be carried out using the outstanding amount which has been contributed to the Fund by the Bank of Japan. In this respect, the restructuring plan of Nippon Credit Bank involves public support. We at the Bank believe that Nippon Credit Bank is by no means insolvent, and that it is fully capable of reconstructing its financial position. We have at the same time determined that the entire financial system might be adversely influenced should the implementation of the comprehensive measures to solve the financial problems of Nippon Credit Bank be delayed, and should market confidence in the bank not be maintained or restored. Based on this judgment and in light of the objective of the Fund - which is to “enhance the stability of and global confidence in our country’s financial system” - the Bank deemed it appropriate to utilize the New Financial Stabilization Fund to reinforce the capital base of Nippon Credit Bank. Meanwhile, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank announced a plan to merge with Hokkaido Bank, also based in the Hokkaido region, with a view to becoming a so-called super-regional bank with a stable customer base in the Hokkaido region and with operations in a geographically larger area in the rest of Japan. As part of the planned merger, they announced a management strategy to strengthen the financial base, improve customer services, and thus contribute to invigorating the regional economy. Although the cases of Nippon Credit Bank and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank are different, one involving public support and the other a commercial solution, the approaches taken by the two banks in coping with their problems have points in common. First, both banks are to implement far-reaching restructuring measures in terms of their operation, personnel, and branches, which are unprecedented for major Japanese banks. The plans adopted by the two banks would be comparable to the drastic restructuring measures adopted by U.S. commercial banks in the latter half of the 1980s and in the early 1990s to solve their management problems. Second, both banks plan to withdraw from overseas operations. Nippon Credit Bank subsequently announced an agreement on business collaboration with Bankers Trust of the United States. -5We at the Bank are strongly encouraged by these initiatives because they indicate a significant shift from the conventional strategy pursued to date by major Japanese banks, and will contribute significantly to the smooth implementation of the two banks’ restructuring packages. The common aspects of the two cases illustrate the determination of Japanese financial institutions to renovate themselves in order to adapt positively to the changing financial environment. As I shall discuss later, the Japanese financial system is undergoing a drastic change in preparation for the 21st century. These two cases reflect the fact that managements are seriously reconsidering their strategies, freeing themselves from their traditional way of thinking, through identifying areas of comparative advantage and improving customer services. The measures taken by the two banks represent significant steps toward the resolution of nonperforming loans. The disposal of nonperforming loans by Nippon Credit Bank will reach a level comparable to other major banks. In addition, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Hokkaido Bank will be able to complete the disposal of their nonperforming loans much faster than they would have separately, for the merger will greatly enhance efficiency through such measures as reorganization and consolidation of branch network and elimination of redundant investment. The decisions of the two banks are thus expected to contribute significantly to removing uncertainties from, and ensuring domestic and international confidence in the Japanese financial system. At the same time, the Bank believes that the proposed measures are of great significance in the sense that they represent voluntary action taken by financial institutions in preparation for the fundamental reform of the Japanese financial system. IV. Financial Market Reform A. The Necessity for Market Reform I would now like to move on to the other theme of my speech, financial market reform in Japan. Specific measures of the Big Bang deregulation package for Japan are currently under deliberation in the relevant councils. I would therefore like to discuss the fundamental points of this issue, such as why a reform of the financial markets and the financial system is currently needed, and the approach to be taken in promoting the reform. Today, financial innovations are in progress around the world, and new financial instruments and transactions are being developed one after another. At the same time, however, the Japanese financial markets seem to be losing international competitiveness. This is the main reason the markets need to be reformed. Failure to heighten competitiveness would result in the hollowing out of the Japanese financial markets, eventually threatening the sound development of the Japanese economy. Since the 1980s, Japan has gradually deregulated the financial sector. Interest rates on deposits have been liberalized, and banks and securities companies have been permitted to enter into each other’s fields of business through subsidiaries. During this period, however, the Tokyo market has fallen far behind the New York and London markets in its ability to develop diverse financial instruments and services. This is partly because Japanese financial institutions had to divert much of their energy to the disposal of nonperforming loans, a burden created by the bursting of the economic “bubble.” It is also attributable to the conventional frameworks of the Japanese financial markets and the financial system, which have been left unchanged despite the rapidly changing financial environment, making it difficult to develop and introduce new financial instruments and services. Globally, the most conspicuous change in the financial markets in recent years has been the rapid progress in financial innovations, reflecting the development of computer and communications technology. New financial instruments such as derivatives and securitization have made it possible to unbundle risks - namely, credit risk, interest rate risk, and foreign exchange risk - of conventional -6financial instruments such as loans and bonds, and trade these risks individually or as various combinations of risks. The risks traded through the new financial instruments are no different from those originally incorporated in the conventional financial products. However, the range of services that financial institutions can provide has expanded significantly as it has become possible to trade only the risks without paying for or delivering the underlying asset. Conventional financial services, for example, focused on the flow of funds, that is, investment and financing, of firms and households. In comparison, recent financial services place greater emphasis on analyzing the overall risks of the assets and liabilities of firms to hedge those risks or to take new risks. The services can thus be elaborately tailored to the specific financial conditions of individual customers. In other words, it has become possible for firms and households to manage their portfolios efficiently and more flexibly by utilizing custom-made services based on advice from financial institutions. The words derivatives and securitization may sound irrelevant to households, but they have in fact increased opportunities for households to efficiently manage their assets and liabilities, by expanding the range of assets in which pension trusts and investment trusts can be invested indirectly through institutional investors, and by increasing the range of instruments which can be accessed directly by households. Along with the progress in financial innovations, advances in computer and communications technology are further promoting financial globalization. Today, firms and institutional investors around the world are not only transferring funds frequently across borders, but are also accessing financial markets worldwide on a daily basis in pursuit of the best means to control risk. In terms of technical capability at least, by utilizing computer networks, even firms that are small in scale can solicit funds directly from overseas investors and individuals can deal directly with overseas financial institutions. Availability of diverse financial services to meet the potential needs of firms and households provides the basis for revitalizing the financial sector as a growth industry. Countries around the world have recognized the financial sector as a high growth industry, and for this reason they have been vying with each other in the reform of their domestic financial markets. The Big Bang implemented in the United Kingdom in the mid-1980s was in fact aimed at strengthening the financial sector as the leading industry of the country’s economy by attracting back to London financial transactions that had shifted to the United States. The development and introduction of diverse financial services is becoming increasingly important in Japan as well, given the changes in the flow of capital in Japan and abroad. With the accumulation of personal assets and the need to prepare for the aging of society, there is a growing demand in the household sector for diversification of assets and risks, while the corporate sector is waiting for the emergence of venture businesses to lead growth industries and the establishment of new channels to facilitate the supply of capital to such businesses. There is concern, however, as to whether the Japanese financial markets have the capacity to create financial services and instruments which can satisfy the various needs of the corporate and household sectors. The conventional framework of the Japanese financial system has divided the industry by type of business, entrusted each type of business to specialized financial institutions, and prohibited institutions from entering into other types of business. The majority opinion is that this institutional segmentation of financial businesses was effective in supplying capital to priority industries during the postwar reconstruction period and the era of high economic growth. With the rapidly expanding scope of financial services and the diversifying needs of users, however, the appropriateness of such segmentation has come into question. It must indeed be thoroughly examined whether it is impeding the provision of efficient financial services and the introduction of new financial technology, and whether it is restricting market competition. -7It is also important to review the institutional frameworks of the legal, tax, and accounting systems to make them suitable for the financial services of the new era. If the institutional frameworks are not improved, even transactions between residents may shift to overseas markets due to the exercise of choice by market participants. This may be called “transactions flight” rather than “capital flight.” As the financial markets constitute the infrastructure supporting the economic activity of a country, hollowing out of the markets must be prevented. B. The Basic Approach to Market Reform As I have explained, market reform should not be conducted as a mere deregulation process. Rather, it should be promoted from the viewpoint of creating an internationally competitive market and making the market attractive to domestic and overseas participants. In doing so, it must be remembered that countries around the world are also striving to attract domestic and cross-border financial transactions to their own markets by enhancing their international competitiveness. That is to say, while the systems of various countries differ significantly, each country is reviewing its existing system on a continuous basis in pursuit of improved efficiency. Therefore, if we simply consider the present New York and London markets as our goal, we might find ourselves trailing behind those markets by the time reform in Japan is realized. In other words, it is most important to try to be one or two steps ahead of the times as we rebuild Japan’s financial markets. The frame of reference in these efforts is to fully utilize the creativity of the private sector, or in other words, to maximize the functioning of the market mechanism. In fact, the driving force for the development of the New York and London markets has been the innovative strength of the market mechanism. It is therefore important that existing regulations be reviewed and abolished as much as possible while placing stronger emphasis on market participants’ self-responsibility and on honoring market discipline. It is essential that a framework be built in which diverse financial services are made available to the public, enabling them to choose the most efficient products or products that sufficiently meet their various needs. Such a framework will not only promote greater efficiency of the entire financial system by drawing out innovative ideas through competition, but should also contribute to the stability of the financial system by putting to work the check mechanism inherent in markets. When we look back at the Japanese financial markets from this perspective, we see that every attempt to introduce a new financial product, such as commercial paper or securitized instruments, required a lengthy process before the product could actually be launched. This was because there was always heated debate about whether the new product could be construed as a negotiable security under the Securities Exchange Act of 1948, in order to determine which type of financial institution, that is, securities companies or banks, would handle the product. Another feature of the Japanese financial markets has been the restrictions or conditions imposed to limit the risk carried by securities traded on the capital market, that is, those imposed on the investment instruments of institutional investors and on the corporate issuers of negotiable securities. Examples are the restrictions on equity investment by investment trusts and pension funds and the qualification criteria for corporate bond issues, which were abolished at the end of 1995. This feature, however, seems to have constrained the basic function of the capital market which is to realize efficient transfers of business risks based on the price mechanism and has consequently restricted access to the capital market. Such features of the Japanese financial markets had the aim of protecting investors, which was realized by making specific institutions responsible for specific financial instruments, and then regulating and supervising the institutions responsible for handling the financial products. Should this remain unchanged, however, new financial instruments may not be introduced expeditiously and the functions of the capital market may not be fully utilized, further weakening the international competitiveness of the Japanese markets. In addition, if regulations continue to severely restrict the activities of the institutions offering financial products, this may leave little room for the financial -8institutions to exercise creativity and, in the end, even discourage them from doing so. In practice, the regulations were applied with a certain degree of flexibility to avoid impairment of market functions. In order to strengthen the competitiveness of the Japanese markets, however, it is essential to resolutely relax or remove existing regulations to allow the private sector to fully exercise its creativity. It then becomes important that market participants be held responsible for their own actions and market discipline be respected, and also that comprehensive rules be made that are applied to the entire market to ensure the adequate functioning of the market mechanism. Such market rules can be summarized conceptually in the following two categories. The first type is rules that financial businesses in general - for example, banks, securities companies, insurance companies, and investment trusts - must observe in their transactions with customers. These include rules that provide for adequate explanation of the risks involved in a certain product in accordance with the customer’s level of knowledge and experience, or for a strict separation of the customers’ assets from the institution’s assets. The second type is rules pertaining to disclosure and those that prohibit unfair trades. The basis of investor protection is to disclose information that enables investors to make rational decisions about investment. With such disclosure, all responsibility for the investment decisions will lie with the investors. It is thus necessary to enhance public disclosure, while considering for which instruments investor protection should be provided. Besides these two types of rules, prudential regulations will need to be imposed on banks which participate in the settlement system. This is because failure of one bank might trigger the materialization of systemic risk, disrupting the entire financial system. However, if the prudential regulations are applied too rigorously, banks may be put at a major disadvantage vis-à-vis other financial institutions. Therefore, banking regulations are now being reviewed so that they encourage further efforts by banks themselves. These rules and regulations should not control the details of the actions of financial institutions. Instead, their aim is to guarantee free and self-reliant behavior of financial institutions within the minimum necessary framework. Relaxation or removal of all unnecessary regulations within that framework should promote competition among financial institutions, improving the quality of financial services available to users in Japan and abroad. C. The Future of the Japanese Financial Markets Before concluding, I would also like to discuss the Bank’s views regarding the future of Japan’s markets, about which questions are often raised. First of all, in light of the experience of the Big Bang in the United Kingdom, some anticipate that when the market reform is accomplished, Japanese financial institutions might end up being acquired by foreign interests. It is extremely difficult to forecast whether this will happen in Japan and to what extent it will occur. However, whoever will be the providers of financial services, what is most important is to establish financial markets which efficiently supply diverse financial services to the people and which thereby provide the foundation for the sound development of the national economy. Even if attempts are made to protect domestic financial institutions by means of market regulation, the cost of that protection will have to be borne by the people, if the financial institutions lack international competitiveness. This would reduce the international competitiveness of Japanese firms and, in the end, might only shackle the economic development of Japan. Following the Big Bang in the United Kingdom, the London market grew once again and consolidated its status as a global market. It is true that in the process, capital of various origins found its way into British financial institutions. This, however, occurred because the London market had the capacity to create new financial techniques, and obviously the subsequent revitalization of the market has contributed to the development of the British economy. -9In the end, financial institutions seem to have no choice but to reinforce their financial strength and enhance their competitiveness to survive tough competition. I strongly expect that financial institutions in Japan will further strengthen their competitiveness through efforts to reform themselves, and I am convinced that they remain full of determination in this respect. Another concern in Japan has been that if deregulation proceeds further, many of the small and medium-sized financial institutions will find their business base taken over by the larger institutions. Looking at the situation in Europe and the United States, however, I feel that there is a tendency for financial institutions to become specialized in the present financial environment. While it is true that some financial institutions might seek to provide comprehensive financial services, they will not be able to survive the severe competition by merely expanding the scale and scope of their operations. Those institutions will also have to develop areas or niches in which they can be competitive to secure the base for their existence. It is thus strongly expected that each financial institution will advance its know-how and expertise in its particular areas of strength so as to provide quality financial services. While market reform in Japan will thus intensify competition among financial institutions, I am of the view that it will not directly cause the small and medium-sized financial institutions to lose their business bases. V. Conclusion The reform of the financial markets involves numerous issues besides relaxation and removal of existing regulations and improvement of the institutional framework of the legal, tax, and accounting systems. Review of public financing and adequate regulation and supervision, for example, are important considerations. The revision of the Bank of Japan Law should also be perceived as part of the process of reform of the Japanese financial markets and the financial system. With regard to the revision of the Bank of Japan Law, a bill to amend the entire Law was submitted to the Diet in March following intense deliberations by the Central Bank Study Group, an advisory panel to the Prime Minister, and by the Financial System Research Council, an advisory committee to the Minister of Finance. The bill aims at establishing a new central bank system founded on the two basic principles of independence and transparency. Underlying the amendment proposal is the perception that in order to improve the efficacy and flexibility of monetary policy amid the changes occurring in the global environment surrounding the Japanese financial markets, which I have discussed today, the legislation based on which the Bank of Japan operates must be appropriate for a central bank in the new age. I strongly hope that the bill will have a smooth passage following Diet deliberations. At the same time, we at the Bank of Japan are determined to strengthen our efforts to reform the Bank to ensure appropriate policy and operational management. In closing, I would like to ask for your continued understanding and cooperation.
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BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 20/6/97.
Bank of Japan’s June review of monetary and economic trends in Japan BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 20/6/97. Japan’s economy continues on a moderate recovery trend on the whole. While declines in demand have been widely observed in reaction to the stepped-up demand prior to the rise in the consumption tax rate, production and income have been firm. With respect to final demand, public-sector investment has been decreasing, and housing investment has been somewhat lackluster, mainly in reaction to stepped-up demand ahead of the consumption tax hike. However, net exports have continued to rise and business fixed investment is increasing steadily. Although personal consumption has declined in reaction to stepped-up demand, the recovery trend of personal consumption does not seem to have been hindered, under the improvement in labor market conditions and income formation. In these circumstances, industrial production has been firm, partly supported by the rebuilding of inventories which had fallen below appropriate levels owing to the temporary surge in demand ahead of the consumption tax hike. Meanwhile, prices have remained virtually unchanged, excluding the influence of the consumption tax hike. The growth of monetary aggregates has continued at around 3.0 per cent year to year. With regard to personal consumption, outlays for travel have continued on a moderately increasing trend. With respect to goods, sales, particularly of expensive items, have been declining since April following increased demand prior to the consumption tax hike. Passenger-car sales recorded buoyant double-digit growth year to year for six consecutive months from October 1996 to March 1997, but marked double-digit declines year to year in April and May. Sales of electrical appliances, as well as sales at department stores and supermarkets, fell significantly below the previous year’s level in April. May figures available for department stores in Tokyo also show negative growth year to year, although with a smaller decline compared to that in April. However, the recovery trend in personal consumption does not seem to have been hindered, as labor market conditions as well as income formation are improving steadily, albeit moderately. Among leading indicators of business fixed investment, machinery orders have been on a steadily increasing trend, despite some large fluctuations particularly in the nonmanufacturing sector. Construction floor area has also continued to recover moderately. With respect to housing investment, housing starts in terms of the seasonally-adjusted annual rate reached a significantly high level in the fourth quarter 1996, partly reflecting the stepped-up demand ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate. Later, they declined in reaction and recorded a level somewhat below 1.5 million starts in both March and April 1997. Regarding public-sector investment, the amount of public works contracted has recently picked up somewhat, owing to orders included in the supplementary budget for fiscal 1996. However, public-sector investment has followed a declining trend since spring 1996 when orders from the large economic stimulus package peaked. Real exports are increasing, reflecting steady overseas demand and the yen’s depreciation to date. Real imports have also continued to increase, owing to such elements as the rise in domestic demand. However, the pace of growth has been moderate against the background of significantly narrowing price differentials between Japan and abroad. Mirroring these developments in exports and imports, the real trade surplus has been rising since the second half of 1996. The nominal current-account surplus is also increasing, but the increase has remained moderate because of the rise in crude oil prices until early 1997 and also movements in the income account. Industrial production posted high growth in the fourth quarter 1996 and the first quarter 1997, and, in the second quarter 1997 is expected to decrease in reaction to the surge in final demand prior to the consumption tax hike. Supported by stimulative factors, however, such as the rebuilding of inventories which had declined at the end of March 1997 and the increase in exports, production has been firm and the decline so far has been small. Labor market conditions have continued to improve moderately on the whole. Although the unemployment rate remains at a high level and employment growth has been moderate, the growth in nominal wages has been on an increasing trend, reflecting the rise in production and corporate profits. Prices rose in April 1997 reflecting the hike in the consumption tax. Excluding this factor, however, they remained virtually unchanged on the whole. Although downward pressure remains strong, including that from technological innovation in electrical machinery, domestic wholesale prices (adjusted for seasonal electricity rates) have remained virtually unchanged. This reflects the moderate improvement in domestic supply and demand conditions. The year-to-year declines in corporate service prices are narrowing steadily on the whole, partly owing to the improvement in supply and demand conditions, particularly in real estate and information service industries, although leasing charges continue to decline. Consumer prices (nationwide, excluding perishables) overall are marginally above the previous year’s level mainly because year-to-year declines in goods prices have slowed. The growth in monetary aggregates, measured in terms of the year-to-year growth of M2 + CDs average outstanding, has slowed somewhat compared to summer 1996, reflecting a shift of assets to those outside M2 + CDs. Recently, M2 + CDs average outstanding has been growing at around 3 per cent on the whole. Regarding money market rates, the overnight call rate (uncollateralized) has moved at a level slightly below the official discount rate with some fluctuations. The 3-month CD rate has stayed at around 0.6 per cent. Meanwhile, the long-term government bond yield declined in early April to a record low of below 2.1 per cent, but began to rise in late April in line with the recovery in stock prices and reached 2.65 - 2.70 per cent in late May. It has recently declined again and has moved at around 2.4 per cent. With respect to bank lending rates, the short-term prime lending rate has remained at a record low level of 1.625 per cent since September 1995. The long-term prime lending rate declined to a record low of 2.5 per cent in December 1996. It was raised by 0.6 percentage points in May, and then lowered by 0.2 percentage points in June to 2.9 per cent. In these circumstances, short- and long-term contracted interest rates on new loans and discounts (up to April) have moved at record low levels. On the stock exchange, the Nikkei 225 stock average began to recover in the second half of April 1997, reflecting the fact that market uncertainties about the economic outlook and about the Japanese financial system had gradually subsided. Recently, it has been moving at over ¥20,000. In the foreign exchange market, the yen depreciated in early May to ¥127-128 to the U.S. dollar. However, the yen’s depreciation reversed rapidly, particularly in the first half of May, as concern about the appreciation of the U.S. dollar strengthened, and as interest rate differentials between Japan and the United States narrowed somewhat. The yen has recently moved at around ¥113-114 to the U.S. dollar. Meanwhile, the yen has also been appreciating against the Deutsche mark since May and has recently moved at around ¥65-66.
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BANK OF JAPAN, QUARTERLY BULLETIN, August 1997 (advance summary).
Bank of Japan presents its quarterly economic outlook for summer 1997 BANK OF JAPAN, QUARTERLY BULLETIN, August 1997 (advance summary). 1. Japan’s economy continues on a moderate recovery trend. Production and income are showing underlying firmness despite the continued reaction to the temporary surge in demand ahead of the consumption tax hike. Among final demand items, public-sector investment has been on a decreasing trend, and housing investment has been somewhat lackluster, particularly as a result of the reaction to the rise in demand ahead of the consumption tax hike. On the other hand, net exports have recently increased significantly and business fixed investment has been rising steadily. Despite the continued decline in demand which followed the rise ahead of the consumption tax hike, particularly in consumer durables, the recovery trend in personal consumption does not seem to have been hindered. In these circumstances, industrial production has been firm and the growth in employees’ income has been rising steadily, albeit moderately. Price indices were pushed up in April 1997 by the consumption tax hike, but excluding this factor, prices have been stable. Both quarter-to-quarter and year-to-year changes in domestic wholesale prices (adjusted for seasonal electricity rates) have been near zero, and the year-to-year declines in corporate service prices have narrowed. The year-to-year rises in consumer prices (nationwide, excluding perishables) are widening somewhat, albeit by a small margin. Changes in commercial land prices have varied by type, and residential land prices have virtually stopped declining. 2. In the financial markets, the overnight call rate (uncollateralized) stayed slightly below the official discount rate of 0.5 per cent. The long-term government bond yield rebounded to near 2.7 per cent in late May, as market uncertainties about the economic outlook and the Japanese financial system gradually subsided after the second half of April. However, it declined to around 2.2 - 2.3 per cent. Stock prices rose to ¥20,000 - 21,000 in May and June 1997, and have recently been fluctuating without showing clear direction. In the foreign exchange market, the yen reached ¥127 to the U.S. dollar in early May, but later appreciated and has recently moved at around ¥113 - 116 to the U.S. dollar. With respect to the fund-raising activities by firms, growth in bank lending continues to be lackluster but fund-raising through the capital market has been high, particularly in straight bonds. Growth in monetary aggregates in terms of M2 + CDs year-to-year average outstanding has continued at around 3.0 per cent. 3. Looking at individual components of final demand, public-sector investment will be supported by implementation of public works included in the government’s supplementary budget for fiscal 1996 for the time being, but it is expected to follow a declining trend. Net exports, on the other hand, are likely to continue to be steady even after the recent large increase. This reflects the robust increase in overseas demand, and the recovery in the price competitiveness of Japan’s manufacturing industry supported by the yen’s depreciation until early spring. In these circumstances, corporate profits on the whole are expected to continue improving in fiscal 1997 although with varied strength across sectors. Business fixed investment is also expected to continue increasing, mainly reflecting 1) increases in corporate profits, 2) further progress in capital stock adjustments, and 3) the rise in information-related investment. However, because of the remaining balance-sheet adjustment pressures and the absence of leading industries, the increase in business fixed investment is unlikely to gather significant momentum for the time being. The growth in the employees’ income has been rising gradually owing to the increase in bonus payments and the moderate recovery in employment growth, reflecting the improvement in the labor market conditions. This shows that the recovery in the business sector has spread to the household sector. Thus, recovery in personal consumption is expected to continue after the reaction to the rise in demand ahead of the consumption tax hike subsides in the near future. However, the pace of recovery is likely to be moderate considering the increases in the tax burden, such as the rise in the consumption tax. Meanwhile, housing investment, which is in a generally favorable environment including low interest rates, is expected to recover somewhat in the second half of fiscal 1997, although it has recently been weak reflecting the reaction to the surge in demand ahead of the consumption tax hike. 4. With respect to price developments, the downward pressure on domestic prices from the increase in manufactured imports has weakened, as the rise in import penetration rate has paused. On the other hand, the upward pressure on import costs from materials prices has also subsided owing to the decline in crude oil prices since spring 1997 and the appreciation of the yen. Thus, import prices are not exerting significant upward nor downward pressure on domestic prices. Meanwhile, final demand will continue to recover on the whole, but the output gap is unlikely to narrow significantly as the pace of recovery in final demand is expected to be moderate. In these circumstances, prices are expected to be stable for some time. 5. In sum, the positive cycle among production, income and expenditure continues steadily and is reflected in the improvement in corporate profits and the rise in employees’ income. Thus, despite the restraining pressures from fiscal policies, including the consumption tax hike and the decline in public-sector investment, Japan’s economy is expected to continue its recovery, supported by the yen’s depreciation until early spring and the expansion of information-related demand. However, the economic recovery is unlikely to gather significant momentum, as a result of fragility in some sectors, as well as the continued balancesheet adjustment pressure. In these circumstances, building an economic environment which increases the confidence of the private sector is vital to strengthening the economic recovery. In this process, effective structural reforms to draw out the dynamism inherent in the economy continue to be essential in addition to appropriate macroeconomic policies.
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BANK OF JAPAN, ANNUAL REVIEW 1997.
Bank of Japan’s summary of the annual review of monetary and economic developments in fiscal 1996 BANK OF JAPAN, ANNUAL REVIEW 1997. Overview Japan’s economy followed a moderate recovery trend in fiscal 1996. The pace of recovery began to accelerate at the end of 1995, aided by substantially stimulative monetary and fiscal policy measures, and the recovery continued in fiscal 1996. In the second half of the fiscal year, the economic recovery firmed, particularly in private demand, driven in part by the depreciation of the yen since the previous year. With respect to final demand in the first half of fiscal 1996, net exports declined sharply, reflecting such factors as the appreciation of the yen until the middle of 1995 and the increase in imports of manufactured goods from Japanese affiliates overseas. However, the economic recovery was underpinned by policy-related demand factors, such as the increase in public-sector investment reflecting the economic stimulus package of autumn 1995, and the high level of housing investment induced by low interest rates. In the middle of fiscal 1996, public-sector investment began to decline gradually from its peak, while net exports, which had been restraining the economic recovery, started to rise, partly reflecting the depreciation of the yen. Regarding private demand, business fixed investment increased steadily throughout the fiscal year, reflecting recovery in corporate profits, progress in stock adjustments, and a rise in autonomous investment, such as in information technology, and the increase spread across industries from large manufacturing firms to small nonmanufacturing firms. Personal consumption followed a moderate recovery trend in line with a recovery in compensation of employees despite fluctuations caused by factors such as the weather. From autumn 1996, automobile sales, which have a large influence on production, accelerated. Housing investment remained high, owing both to the increase in demand ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate, implemented in April 1997, and to low interest rates. Industrial production remained virtually unchanged until the middle of 1996, reflecting the decrease in net exports, and adjustments in the excessive inventories of some producer goods. However, growth in production has gradually gathered pace since the middle of the year, as private demand has increased steadily, net exports have begun to increase, and the increase in final demand has led more directly to a rise in production because of progress in inventory adjustments. At the end of the fiscal year, both industrial production and shipments recovered to the levels recorded at the previous peak in the economic cycle reflecting the increase in demand before the rise in the consumption tax rate. In these circumstances, corporate profits continued to recover primarily among large manufacturing firms, driven in part by a rise in profits of processing industries reflecting the depreciation of the yen and the success of corporate restructuring efforts. Business confidence also improved gradually, according to the Bank of Japan’s “Tankan—Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan.” The improvement in profits of large manufacturing firms was reflected in an increase in their expenditures, which in turn contributed to a recovery in the business conditions of corporate service industries and small manufacturing firms. As for labor market conditions, the unemployment rate remained high and growth in the number of the regularly employed stagnated owing to persistent adjustment pressures on personnel expenses in the corporate sector. However, overtime working hours and the number of new job offers increased steadily, reflecting production growth and improvements in corporate profits, and compensation of employees rose gradually, particularly in special cash earnings. In sum, the overall labor market conditions followed a recovery trend. While substantially stimulative monetary and fiscal policy measures in fiscal 1995 continued to underpin economic recovery in early fiscal 1996, a positive cycle of demand, production, and income began to operate, underpinning the economic recovery throughout fiscal 1996. That is, an increase in final demand pushed up production and led to an improvement in corporate profits, particularly among large manufacturing firms. This in turn led to an improvement in profits and a rise in compensation of employees among nonmanufacturing firms and small firms, thereby expanding expenditures. During the second half of fiscal 1996, the recovery in private demand firmed, reflecting the positive effects of the depreciation of the yen on corporate profits, despite a decrease in public-sector investment. In other words, although the pace of the economic recovery remained moderate, a recovery led by policy demand is gradually shifting toward one led by private demand. Although Japan’s economy bottomed out at the end of 1993, the pace of recovery remains relatively moderate, owing to various structural adjustment pressures on industries. These include (1) pressures for the industrial structure to change in response to global competition resulting from the expansion of supply capacity in Asian countries, and to the constant appreciation of the yen until the middle of 1995; and (2) balance-sheet adjustment pressures owing to the sharp and significant decline in asset prices since the bursting of the economic “bubble” in the late 1980s. Steady progress has been made in dealing with the pressures for the industrial structure to change, as reflected in (1) a significant improvement in corporate profits, particularly among large manufacturing firms, resulting from the successful restructuring efforts and the depreciation of the yen from the middle of 1995; (2) progress in the reorganization of the international production system as seen in the shift in Japan’s exports and production toward more capital- and technology-intensive goods; and (3) increased business fixed investment in new sectors owing to technological innovations and deregulation in information and communications industries. With regard to balance-sheet adjustments, strong adjustment pressures remained throughout fiscal 1996, as seen in the persistently high level of the ratio of debts to assets, especially among small nonmanufacturing firms. In fiscal 1996, weakening of prices came to a halt. Domestic wholesale prices followed a downward trend until the middle of 1996, but in the second half of fiscal 1996 they virtually stopped declining, owing to a moderate improvement in domestic supply and demand conditions, as well as a rise in import prices reflecting the depreciation of the yen and the rise in crude oil prices. In March 1997, the year-to-year change shifted from decline to increase. Although corporate service prices continued to decline compared to the level of the previous year, reflecting the decrease in leasing prices and real estate rents, the year-to-year declines were smaller in the second half of fiscal 1996, due to a recovery in demand for services following the improvement in corporate profits. Consumer prices (nationwide, excluding perishables) also increased by a slightly wider margin from the previous year owing to a smaller decline in commodity prices as a result of the depreciation of the yen, and the halt in the decline in domestic wholesale prices, as well as a gradual increase in service prices. While prices seemed to have stopped declining, the increase in import prices from the depreciation of the yen and higher crude oil prices had little impact on domestic prices, as there remained persistent downward pressures on prices from imports of manufactured goods, particularly final goods, and technological innovations. As for commercial land, prices for large and well-located plots of land suitable for development virtually stopped declining owing mainly to the gradual progress in stock adjustment for office space. However, the prices of smaller plots of land with limited commercial value continued to decline. The recent development in commercial land prices thus indicates a distinct splitting into two groups. Meanwhile, residential land prices are bottoming out, reflecting the high level of residential housing construction. The cyclical momentum for economic recovery gathered strength in fiscal 1996. However, the pace of the recovery remained moderate owing to continued structural adjustment pressures, including the balance-sheet problems. Although weakening of prices had come to a halt by the second half of fiscal 1996, prices were unlikely to follow an upward trend. Against the background of these economic and price conditions, the Bank of Japan maintained an easy monetary policy, keeping the official discount rate at its September 1995 level of 0.5 percent to establish a solid foundation for the economic recovery. As for financial developments, the overnight call rate (uncollateralized) remained on average slightly below the official discount rate following monetary adjustments by the Bank of Japan. Long-term interest rates continued to rise with some fluctuations in the first half of 1996, but fell sharply in the second half. Interest rates on short-term instruments, namely 3-month certificate of deposit (CD) rates, followed a similar trend, although with smaller fluctuations than those in long-term interest rates. Stock prices continued to rise during the first half of 1996, but began to weaken in the summer, and fell sharply from the end of the year. The year-to-year growth rate of M2+CDs, a representative indicator of monetary aggregates, generally remained around 3.0-4.0 percent, but declined slightly in the second half of the fiscal year, partly due to the slow growth in funding in the private sector. Despite the firm recovery of the real economy, particularly in the private sector during the second half of fiscal 1996, the financial markets during this period adopted a more cautious stance. This was because (1) the financial markets reacted in anticipation of the fiscal tightening measures—such as the rise in the consumption tax rate and the termination of special tax reductions in fiscal 1997—and this had restraining effects on economic conditions; and (2) there was renewed awareness that various adjustment pressures, especially balance-sheet adjustment pressures, remained strong among small nonmanufacturing firms and financial institutions. Under these circumstances, the cyclical developments of the economic recovery were not immediately reflected in financial indicators through the confidence of market participants. Meanwhile, significant progress was made in fiscal 1996 in the solution of the jusen (housing loan companies) problem, and steady progress was also made in solving the problem of nonperforming assets of financial institutions, including improvements in the framework for the resolution of failed financial institutions. With respect to the outlook, the probability that Japan’s economy will continue to recover is rising, although the pace of recovery may decelerate temporarily. This expectation is based on the fact that the positive cycle of production and consumption has not been deterred by the reaction to the increase in demand ahead of the consumption tax rate rise. Despite the continued economic recovery, the private sector has not gained sufficient confidence in its future growth, reflecting persistent uncertainty about structural adjustments. Under the structural adjustment pressures, expected growth rates are unlikely to rise at the same pace in different industries and firms. However, from a long-term perspective, the establishment of a new industrial structure based on the principle of comparative advantage can be expected to enhance growth by promoting the efficiency of resource allocation. In order for Japan’s economy to achieve sustainable growth, it is vital to create investment opportunities and raise expected growth rates of economic entities through effective reforms of the economic structure. Such efforts are essential in adapting to the medium- to long-term changes in economic environment, including increasing global competitive pressures, and the further aging of the population, and in maintaining Japan’s economic strength. Considering the important role that the financial sector must play in the reforms of the economic structure, it will be necessary to continue implementing measures to stabilize the Japanese financial system, and increase domestic and overseas confidence in the system. At the same time, the financial system must be reorganized to enhance its functions and competitiveness, by improving the infrastructure in order to promote competition in accordance with the Japanese “Big Bang” deregulation package.
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BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 29/8/97.
Bank of Japan presents summaries of articles published in the August edition of its Quarterly Bulletin BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 29/8/97. Revision of Japan’s Flow of Funds Accounts Introduction Bank of Japan compiled the first flow of funds accounts in 1958, covering data for the years from 1954 to 1957. Since then, the flow of funds accounts have been used extensively, for example, as a source for producing the capital finance account of the national accounts, and as the only statistical material that provides an overall picture of Japan’s financial structure. However, the present flow of funds accounts require improvement in many respects. For example, although the framework of the flow of funds accounts basically conforms to that of the System of National Accounts established in 1968 by the United Nations (hereafter, 1968 SNA), various inconsistencies remain between the two due to inadequate availability of data. This results in various limitations when one tries to obtain a combined picture of real economic activity and financial activity using the flow of funds accounts and the national accounts. It should also be noted that the 1968 SNA itself does not fully reflect the changes in economic and financial structures that have occurred in the years since it was established. In 1993, therefore, the Statistical Commission under the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (hereafter, ECOSOC Statistical Commission) adopted a draft amendment to the SNA (1993 SNA) with a view to creating a framework that better reflects the recent economic and financial environment. Further, in response to increasing demand for internationally standardized financial statistics, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), at the behest of the ECOSOC Statistical Commission, is preparing a Manual on Monetary and Financial Statistics (hereafter, the IMF Manual) to supplement the 1993 SNA. A number of countries have initiated reviews of their flow of funds accounts in accordance with these developments. Statistics that provide a highly reliable overview of financial activities are indispensable for tracing changes in the financial structure, for examining the roles of each economic sector, and for considering the implications of these factors for the real economy. Such statistics are also useful in considering various issues concerning financial systems. If these statistics are compiled in accordance with international standards, international comparability of these statistics will be improved. It is for these reasons that the Bank is revising Japan’s flow of funds accounts. In doing so, the Bank has decided to make public its basic thinking underlying the revision, together with the outline of the revision, to thereby seek the users’ opinions, which the Bank believes is invaluable for the improvement of the statistics. This paper describes the revision in some detail, including changes in sectoral classification and expansion of transaction categories, and explains the new types of information obtainable from the revised flow of funds accounts. Improvement of statistics often involves a trade-off between users’ convenience and reporting burden. Improvement of the flow of funds accounts is no exception. Although the intention is to make full use of existing statistics in producing the accounts, the reporting burden may be increased in some areas. This paper will also be useful in evaluating the costs and benefits involved in the revision of the flow of funds accounts. The Framework for Restructuring the BOJ-NET Funds Transfer System Introduction In December 1996, the Bank of Japan published a consultation paper that outlined its plans to restructure the funds transfer system of the Bank of Japan Financial Network System (BOJ-NET). The Bank plans to abolish designated-time settlement and make real-time gross settlement (RTGS) the only settlement mode by the end of the year 2000. The paper also drafted the main features of RTGS after the restructuring, and the Bank requested comments and suggestions from current account holders with the Bank of Japan (BOJ account holders), the operators of private clearing systems, and other interested parties. Overall, the Bank’s proposal was strongly supported, and the Bank received a number of constructive comments and suggestions on its proposal. On the basis of its December proposal and the comments and suggestions received, the Bank released on April 1, 1997 a framework for abolishing designated-time settlement and making RTGS the only settlement mode in the BOJ-NET funds transfer system.
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BANK OF JAPAN, MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, 26/8/97.
Bank of Japan’s August review of monetary and economic trends in Japan BANK OF JAPAN, MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, 26/8/97. Japan’s economy continues on a moderate recovery trend. Production and income are showing firmness although the effects of the consumption tax hike remain. With respect to final demand, public-sector investment has been on a decreasing trend, and housing investment has declined. Meanwhile, net exports have recently been on an increasing trend, and business fixed investment has been rising steadily. Despite the continued influence of the consumption tax hike, the recovery trend of personal consumption does not seem to have been hindered given the improvement in labor market conditions and income formation. Industrial production has been firm. Meanwhile, prices have remained stable on the whole, and the growth of monetary aggregates has continued at around 3.0 per cent year to year. With regard to personal consumption, outlays for travel have continued to increase moderately. However, passenger-car sales marked the fourth month of consecutive decline year to year from April and sales of electrical appliances are also negative year to year. Sales at department stores and supermarkets continued to be below the previous year’s level. These reflect some temporary factors, such as the typhoons which hit Japan in June and July, in addition to the continued reaction to the surge in demand ahead of the consumption tax hike. However, given that labor market conditions as well as income formation are improving steadily, albeit moderately, the recovery trend in personal consumption does not seem to have been hindered. Among leading indicators of business fixed investment, machinery orders have been increasing steadily, although at a somewhat slower pace compared to the sharp rise in the second half of 1996. The increase in the construction floor area has recently been weak, but it is following a moderate recovery trend. With respect to housing investment, housing starts in terms of the seasonallyadjusted annual rate reached a substantially high level in the fourth quarter 1996, partly reflecting the stepped-up demand ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate. Later, they declined in reaction. Housing starts recorded around 1.5 million in spring 1997, but fell to 1.34 million in June, the lowest level recorded since January 1993. Regarding public-sector investment, the amount of public works contracted has recently picked up somewhat from the level recorded in early 1997 owing to orders included in the supplementary budget for fiscal 1996. However, public-sector investment has been following a declining trend on average, reflecting the restrained budget for fiscal 1997. Against the background of the steady overseas demand and the yen’s depreciation to date, real exports stayed firm in July after having increased significantly in the second quarter reflecting some additional temporary factors. Real imports had been stagnant since April, but rose in July reflecting the rise in imports of foodstuffs and airplanes, in addition to the increasing trend of information-related goods. As a result, the real trade surplus stopped rising in July after the significant increase in the second quarter. The nominal current-account surplus showed a large expansion in the second quarter 1997, partly reflecting the decline in crude oil prices since early 1997. Industrial production in the second quarter has been firm and remained virtually unchanged after recording high growth during the second half of 1996 and the first quarter 1997. Despite the decline in demand following the surge ahead of the consumption tax hike, factors such as the substantial increase in exports and the rebuilding of inventories have supported production. Production is expected to increase slightly in July and August compared to the second quarter. Meanwhile, inventories are at appropriate levels on the whole, despite some accumulation in industries such as in automobiles. Labor market conditions have continued to improve on the whole. Although the unemployment rate remains at a high level, the growth in nominal wages has been increasing and the year-to-year employment growth has started to gather pace, albeit gradually, reflecting the increase in production and corporate profits. Prices remained stable on the whole, excluding the effect of the consumption tax hike. Although downward pressures remain, including that from the decline in import prices, as well as that from technological innovation in electrical machinery, domestic wholesale prices (adjusted for seasonal electricity rates) have remained virtually unchanged. This reflects the moderate improvement in overall domestic supply and demand conditions. The year-to-year declines in corporate service prices are narrowing steadily on the whole, partly owing to the improvement in supply and demand conditions, particularly for real estate rents and information services, although leasing charges continue to decline. Consumer prices (nationwide, excluding perishables) overall are marginally above the previous year’s level mainly because the year-toyear declines in goods prices have narrowed. The growth in monetary aggregates, measured in terms of the year-to-year growth of M2 + CDs average outstanding, has been growing at around 3 per cent. Regarding money market rates, the overnight call rate (uncollateralized) has moved at a level slightly below the official discount rate. The 3-month CD rate has stayed at around 0.55 - 0.60 per cent. Meanwhile, the long-term government bond yield rose to 2.65 2.70 per cent in late May. Later, it started to decline as the market confirmed the moderate pace of the economic recovery, and reached a historically low level below 2.1 per cent in mid August. With respect to bank lending rates, the short-term prime lending rate has remained at a record low level of 1.625 per cent since September 1995. The long-term prime lending rate was raised by 0.6 percentage points in May, and was then lowered by 0.2 percentage points both in June and July to 2.7 per cent. (The record low level is 2.5 per cent.) In these circumstances, short and long-term contracted interest rates on new loans and discounts (up to June) have moved at record low levels. On the stock exchange, the Nikkei 225 stock average moved at around ¥20,000 - 21,000 between May and July 1997, but later declined, reflecting such factors as the fall in U.S. stock prices. Recently, it has been moving at around ¥19,000. In the foreign exchange market, the yen appreciated to ¥110 to the U.S. dollar in the first half of June. The yen later depreciated slightly, and has recently stayed at around ¥115 - 120. Meanwhile, the yen has also been appreciating against the Deutsche Mark since May, and recently has moved at around ¥63 - 65.
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Speech given by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr. Yasuo Matsushita, to the Yomiuri International Economic Society in Tokyo on 27/6/97.
Mr. Matsushita reports on a new framework of monetary policy under the new Bank of Japan Law Speech given by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr. Yasuo Matsushita, to the Yomiuri International Economic Society in Tokyo on 27/6/97. I. Introduction As you are all aware, the Diet passed the new Bank of Japan Law on June 11, which will come into effect on April 1, 1998. It has been the perennial wish of the Bank of Japan to revise the current Bank of Japan Law, which was legislated during World War II, to accommodate the significant changes that have occurred in the economic and financial environment and to make the Law able to withstand future changes in the environment. Revision of the Law was also indispensable for rebuilding the entire Japanese financial system so as to meet global standards. This revision built on the two principles of independence and transparency is thus a notable step in the 115 years of the Bank’s history and also for reforming the financial system of Japan. The Bank of Japan Law holds great significance as one of the basic laws governing Japan’s economic and financial activities. Looking back, this important revision was achieved in approximately one year from the start of discussions in spring 1996 owing to the support and efforts of many people, including Prime Minister Hashimoto, Finance Minister Mitsuzuka, and other government officials, members of parliament, and members of the Advisory Group on the Central Bank (an advisory panel to the Prime Minister) and the Financial System Research Council (an advisory committee to the Minister of Finance). Many words of encouragement as well as criticism were heard from the financial and business circles and the general public, including perhaps some of you who are here today. I would like to take this opportunity to express, on behalf of the Bank, our heartfelt gratitude to all. Naturally, the reform of the Bank of Japan is not consummated merely by the revision of the Law. We at the Bank of Japan believe it essential that we continue our efforts to conduct appropriate policy and operational management, cognizant of the responsibilities entrusted to us by the people. We are determined to promote, in line with the aim of the revision of the Law, wide-ranging reforms to further improve the transparency of policy management and the efficiency of the Bank’s operational management. Today, I would first like to discuss recent monetary and economic conditions and the Bank’s current monetary policy management. I will then explain the new framework of monetary policy under the new Law and how the Bank intends to manage monetary policy. II. Recent Monetary and Economic Conditions and Monetary Policy Management A. Recent economic and price developments and monetary policy management I would like to start with the recent domestic economic condition. Japan’s economy is currently at a phase in which the downward pressures of fiscal tightening appear strongest, with personal consumption and housing investment declining in reaction to the stepped-up demand before the consumption tax rate was raised. However, in view of the firm developments in production and improvements in corporate profits and household income, the Bank judges that the economy continues to follow a moderate recovery trend. The results of the June Tankan—Short-term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan, which were released two days ago, for the most part confirmed this view. The question is whether the virtuous circle of demand, production, and income, which has been developing steadily, will keep its momentum and whether, as a result, the economy will gain further momentum for a self-sustained recovery despite the downward pressures of fiscal tightening. The key to this will be developments in business fixed investment and personal consumption, which, according to the Tankan results and other indicators, can be analyzed as follows. Firms’ projections of revenues and profits and their plans for fixed investment indicate that recovery in business conditions will remain moderate for smaller firms, especially for those in the non-manufacturing sector. However, for firms as a whole, revenues and profits continue to be on an upward trend, especially for major firms, supported by increasing exports and buoyant demand for information technology-related goods and services. Fixed investment plans are also being revised upward. If this trend continues, the recovery in business conditions can be expected to spread to smaller firms. Employment and income are showing moderate but steady improvement, and bonus payments in summer 1997 are likely to enjoy a sizable rise. While personal consumption will inevitably be affected by the rise in the consumption tax rate and by the discontinuation of the special tax reduction, it is unlikely that the trend of recovery will be hampered considering the improvements in the income environment. Thus, the virtuous circle, generated by a recovery in private demand, is still at work. The Bank is, therefore, of the view that the current slowdown in demand will only be temporary and that it is likely that the economic recovery will continue. It is, however, necessary to continue to monitor closely consumer behavior and business activity. Prices remained virtually unchanged in April and May after the immediate effects of the rise in the consumption tax rate are discounted. The Bank will continue to monitor price developments closely, but expects prices to remain stable for some time, reflecting the recent appreciation of the yen and stabilized crude oil prices. In the management of current monetary policy, the Bank will continue to monitor economic developments closely, placing emphasis on further strengthening the foundations of the economic recovery. B. The thinking behind the Bank’s easy stance of monetary policy I have heard various questions and criticisms with regard to the easy stance of monetary policy, which the Bank has continued with a view to strengthening the foundations of the economic recovery. Therefore, I would next like to share with you the thinking behind the current stance of monetary policy. First, there is the question of why the Bank has not changed its policy stance since 1995, when it lowered the official discount rate to 0.5 percent, despite a gradual recovery of the economy. Indeed, compared to 1995, concern about a deflationary spiral has subsided and economic activity has improved significantly. The purpose of the drastic monetary easing measures was to prevent an occurrence of a deflationary spiral, to strengthen the confidence of firms and households in the economic outlook, and to thereby place the Japanese economy on a path of self-sustained recovery. As you are aware, the Japanese economy is faced with the medium to long-term challenges of overcoming the after-effects of the bursting of the economic “bubble” and reforming its industrial structure. The economy has therefore had to achieve a recovery while addressing these weighty challenges. Further, since the latter half of 1996, measures for fiscal consolidation have been implemented, including a reducing of public-sector investment and a raising of the consumption tax rate. In order for the economy to attain noninflationary, sustainable growth under such circumstances, the forces of the self-sustained recovery achieved in the private sector need to be further strengthened. It is therefore the Bank’s judgment that, at this point, it is necessary to monitor economic developments carefully bearing this in mind. Second, there has been criticism that, from the viewpoint of income distribution, the current low interest rates are putting the general public at a disadvantage. The Bank is fully aware of the difficult situation faced by those households which depend heavily on interest income. However, various types of income, whether it be wages, interest, or pensions, are distributed from the total output produced by economic activity. Therefore, without growth of the total output, sources of such income will not be generated. If the policy interest rate is raised before economic activity is sufficiently revitalized and, as a result, the economy is adversely affected, long-term interest rates may actually decline. It will then be difficult to say how the average level of short and long-term deposit interest rates will be affected. What I wish to emphasize is that in order for the overall level of interest rates to rise, there must have been the requisite improvement in the economic activity. Third, there have been concerns that low interest rates may encourage an outflow of domestic funds. In discussing this point, it must be remembered that the relationship between cross-border interest rate differentials and capital flows under the present floating exchange rate system differs from that under the fixed exchange rate system. Under the latter, there is no foreign exchange risk. Therefore, funds tend to flow to economies with higher interest rates. This is precisely why, under that system, strict regulation of capital flows was necessary. Under the floating exchange rate system, however, such capital flows do not necessarily occur. Even if one attempts to profit from a differential between domestic and overseas interest rates, the profit can be wiped out instantly with even a slight shift in the exchange rate. For example, if overseas interest rates rise, widening interest rate differentials, capital outflows may initially occur, causing the foreign currency to appreciate and the domestic currency to depreciate. After some time, however, expectations will emerge that the value of the foreign currency will start to decline. At that point, the benefits of investing in the foreign currency will have decreased significantly. Thus, when foreign exchange risk is taken into consideration, a situation in which the expected rate of return on foreign currency investment is substantially higher than that on domestic investment cannot be sustained. Under the floating exchange rate system, therefore, exchange rate fluctuations will apply the brakes to any one-sided capital flow. The long-term interest rate differential between Japan and the United States has been around 2 to 4 percent in recent years, and has widened in this time. It is true that during this time investment in foreign bonds has increased. Yet this has not depleted funds in Japan or caused domestic interest rates to remain at a high level. With global capital flows as active as they are today, the mechanism of the floating exchange rate system will function only more expeditiously. In other words, the speed of market adjustments has accelerated. What is critical in these circumstances is the occurrence of a capital flight, which may be triggered by a loss of market confidence in a country’s economic policy management resulting from an inflation or recession in that country. In order to prevent this from occurring in Japan today, it is essential to strengthen the foundations of the economic recovery and to achieve noninflationary, sustainable growth. In this connection, some argue that the revision of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, together with the low interest rates, may accelerate capital outflow. The Bank intends to monitor carefully the effects of the revision on the markets. However, as I have just explained, the Bank believes that there is little possibility of a disruptive capital outflow occurring simply as a result of the interest rate differentials between Japan and abroad. Rather, a more serious problem to consider would be the emergence of a “transaction flight.” Should market participants decide for certain reasons that overseas markets are more attractive and beneficial to the conducting of transactions, even financial and capital transactions between residents, which have conventionally been conducted in Japan—for example, securities transactions between domestic firms and households—may shift overseas. Although this will not induce an outflow of capital, transactions will be carried out abroad and the subsequent business opportunities will be transferred overseas. Should this trend continue, it might lead to a hollowing out of Japan’s financial markets. This is why the “Big Bang” deregulation package must be implemented apace with the revision of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, to enhance the attractiveness of domestic financial markets and services. III. The New Framework of Monetary Policy under the New Bank of Japan Law To summarize what I have said so far, the Bank of Japan is managing monetary policy with a view to placing the Japanese economy on a path of noninflationary, sustainable growth. While this has always been the objective of monetary policy under the current Bank of Japan Law, it is stipulated more explicitly by the new Law, which will come into effect on April 1, 1998. Various revisions have also been incorporated in the new Law to ensure the achievement of this objective. I would, therefore, like to discuss the new framework of monetary policy under the new Bank of Japan Law and how we intend to make use of the new framework, firstly with regard to the objectives, secondly the instruments, and finally the management of monetary policy, including the decision-making procedures. A. Monetary Policy Objectives 1. Price stability I would first like to discuss the objectives of monetary policy. The new Bank of Japan Law stipulates that the objective of monetary policy is “to contribute to the sound development of the national economy through the pursuit of price stability.” The sound development of the national economy is a common objective of all economic policies. As the objective of monetary policy is to contribute to the achievement of this ultimate objective through price stability, its direct objective will be to ensure price stability. Price stability, together with the stability of the financial system, is a precondition for money to smoothly perform its intrinsic functions. As the issuer and controller of money, maintenance of price stability is an inherent role of the central bank. It is, however, not easy to define price stability. There are diverse types of price indicators: for example, the Consumer Price Index, Wholesale Price Indexes, and the GDP deflator. Each of these has its limitation, such as the range of items covered or the timing of release. Further, many studies have been conducted more recently on the possibility that these indicators offer a substantially biased measurement of prices. Even with a perfectly reliable price indicator, there will still be disparate views regarding what specific percentage of price increases would be acceptable. Thus, it is difficult to define specifically what is meant by price stability. We at the Bank will continue to study this issue, including the interpretation of price indices. It becomes clearer, however, if the matter is considered from the viewpoint of the implications of price stability for economic activity. “Prices”, sometimes referred to as “prices in general”, are the average level of the prices of individual goods and services, and serve as a tool to measure the relative rise or fall in the price of individual goods and services. Therefore, if prices in general were to fluctuate significantly, firms and households would not be able to conduct efficient investment and consumption activity. For example, in an inflationary economy, even if the price of a firm’s product rises, the firm will not be able to judge whether this will bring about increased earnings in the future, or whether it merely reflects a rise in prices in general with the price increase being offset by an increase in wages and cost of raw materials. In such an economy, firms will, in the long term, inevitably become cautious with their investments. Furthermore, when there are concerns about inflation, people will tend to curtail their spending. The same situation may arise in the case of a deflationary economy. One possible example was the Japanese economy in 1995, when there were concerns about a deflationary spiral. This line of thinking leads to the conclusion that ensuring price stability means maintaining a situation in which firms and households need not be concerned about a continuing rise or fall in prices in the future when planning their investment and consumption. 2. The relationship between price stability and the economy Having defined price stability, there may still be questions about the relationship between price stability and other important policy objectives or economic variables. For example, should we not care about the economy and economic growth as long as prices remain stable? What is the relationship between prices and foreign exchange rates or asset prices? First, with regard to the relationship between prices and the economy, it is true that in the short term, it seems as if higher economic growth could be realized if a certain level of price increase were allowed. However, it has recently been proved both theoretically and empirically that this effect will only be temporary. If such a process is repeated, the economy may well fall into an intractable situation of stagflation, in which the economy falls back into a recession but high inflation remains. This was the economic disease that plagued the industrialized countries of Europe and the United States from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. In the light of that experience, there is a common understanding today that price stability is a precondition for sustainable economic growth. Second, how are foreign exchange rates and asset prices to be considered in the context of monetary policy management? They are important factors that require due attention. However, if their stability is made a direct objective of monetary policy, the stability of the domestic economy and of prices in general may be undermined. This is because land prices and exchange rates reflect certain factors which prices in general do not. Specifically, land prices incorporate changes in the productivity of land and in the expected rate of return. Exchange rates, in the long term, are adjusted by the market mechanism in accordance with the differentials between domestic and overseas inflation rates, or in other words, changes in the purchasing power parities. Any attempt to control such factors forcibly through macroeconomic policies will most likely cause distortions in other sectors of the economy. Needless to say, fluctuations in exchange rates and asset prices will affect the economy in various ways. It has been a valuable lesson of the bubble economy that significant fluctuations in asset prices may be a sign of some irregularities in economic activity or excessive expectations of economic entities. Therefore, while it would not be appropriate to attempt any rigid control of asset prices and exchange rates, the Bank will pay due attention to developments in them in managing monetary policy aimed at achieving the objective of price stability. B. Monetary policy instruments Let me next discuss the instruments of monetary policy under the new Bank of Japan Law. Economic textbooks often refer to (1) the official discount rate, (2) open market operations, and (3) reserve requirements as the three major monetary policy instruments. These are in fact the means with which the Bank of Japan implements monetary policy, and this will remain unchanged under the new Law. The revised Law, however, incorporates the following changes. First, the new Law explicitly stipulates that “guidelines for money market control through various measures such as buying and selling of bills or bonds”—that is, the Bank’s basic policy for open market operations, or in other words, the Bank’s policy for the guiding of money market rates—are to be decided by the Bank of Japan’s Policy Board, while in the current Law, there is no explicit stipulation concerning such policy. Second, while the current Law stipulates that determination and altering of reserve requirements must be approved by the Minister of Finance, the new Law abolishes this approval system. With these changes, all three instruments of monetary policy—including official discount rate policy, which is already stipulated by the current Law as a matter for decision by the Policy Board——will be spelt out explicitly as matters to be decided by the Policy Board. Reserve requirements have been altered less frequently as the means of open market operations developed. I would therefore like to discuss in detail the historical background and the Bank’s view of official discount rate changes and of the guiding of money market rates, with emphasis on how the Bank will utilize these two means of implementing monetary policy. 1. Relationship between official discount rate changes and the guiding of money market rates For many years, monetary policy was in most cases implemented in Japan by changing the official discount rate. This was because the financial markets were not sufficiently developed and, under these circumstances, deposit interest rates and lending rates were linked to the official discount rate. The situation changed gradually from the 1980s. The financial markets began to grow both in quality and quantity, with massive issuance of government securities and introduction of new financial instruments such as certificates of deposit (CDs) and commercial paper (CP). As a result, interest rates started to fluctuate freely reflecting the supply and demand conditions for funds, and accordingly, an environment was established in which the effects of monetary policy would permeate via market interest rates. In response to such changes in the financial markets, the Bank has devised various changes to its monetary policy management. For example, in the buying and selling of bills and bonds, the Bank abolished the system of conducting operations at the rate quoted by the Bank, and adopted a more transparent bidding system. The Bank also improved the efficiency of its market operations by shortening the lag between the announcement of operations and the settlement of funds. In 1991, the Bank abolished window guidance, a method in which the Bank gave direct guidance to financial institutions regarding the amount by which they increased their lendings, and provided for an environment in which the functions of interest rates could be used to influence the behavior of financial institutions. In addition, in 1994, deregulation of deposit interest rates was completed. This meant that the official discount rate no longer performed the role of directly bringing changes to deposit interest rates and lending rates, and instead, the significance of the guiding of money market rates increased. Consequently, on March 31, 1995, the Bank introduced a new system to utilize the guiding of money market rates as a means of monetary policy which is, by itself, as significant as the official discount rate. This is a system whereby the Bank publicly announces its policy for market operations after it has been approved by the Policy Board. The policy is stated with regard to the guiding level of overnight call money rates, the Bank’s target rate in market operations. For example, the Bank might state that it “expects that the call money rate will remain on average slightly below the official discount rate.” While this method of monetary policy implementation had already taken root in the United States, it was the first attempt for Japan back in March 1995. At the time of this first attempt, it so happened that Germany had lowered its official discount rate a day earlier, and it cannot be denied that the market could not quite understand and assimilate the Bank’s policy intention. The Bank’s use of the guiding of money market rates, however, has gradually gained understanding and has taken root in Japan as well. In fact, when the Bank encouraged a decline in the market rates on July 7, 1995, the policy intent permeated smoothly through the market without causing any confusion. The provision of the new Law stating that the policy for the guiding of money market rates be determined by the Policy Board reinforces the recent emphasis placed by the Bank on the market mechanism. What significance, then, will the official discount rate have in this age of marketization? Central banks overseas hold various views as to the relationship between official discount rate changes and the guiding of money market rates, and it is difficult to arrive at a single conclusion. However, examples overseas suggest that official discount rate changes continue to play an important role even in this age of economic and financial marketization and interest rate liberalization. Their function is to communicate plainly to everybody the changes in monetary policy. In order to maintain the efficacy of monetary policy amid the progress of marketization, it becomes even more necessary to win public understanding of and confidence in the central bank’s economic outlook and the thinking behind its monetary policy management. In this regard, the easy-to-understand announcement effects of the official discount rate are valuable for monetary policy management based on the functioning of the market mechanism. I am sometimes asked which of the two would be employed first, the guiding of money market rates or official discount rate change. However, there is no fixed rule as to which should be implemented first. In some cases, the Bank may change the level it has set for the guiding of money market rates several times before changing the official discount rate, and in other cases, the Bank may first strongly indicate its policy intention by changing the official discount rate, and then guide the money market rates accordingly. For the reasons I have just explained, the Bank believes it necessary to make effective use of both official discount rate changes and the guiding of money market rates. C. Monetary policy management 1. Strengthening of the functions of the Policy Board I would now like to discuss monetary policy management, focusing on the decision-making process of monetary policy. The new Bank of Japan Law incorporates major revisions aimed at strengthening the functions of the Policy Board, the Bank of Japan’s highest decision-making body. First, the composition of the Board is altered significantly. The current Policy Board consists of seven members: the Governor of the Bank of Japan, four appointed members, and two government members without voting rights, representing the Ministry of Finance and the Economic Planning Agency. The new Policy Board, however, will consist of nine members: the Governor and the two Deputy Governors of the Bank of Japan and six deliberative members. The main features of the changes are that, first, there will be no government members on the Board. Second, while the current appointed members must be selected from each of the four fields of city banking, regional banking, commerce and industry, and agriculture, the new deliberative members can be selected from among a much broader population, without any restriction on the fields they represent, so long as they are experts, including those on economy or finance. Third, in order to ensure interactive linkage between monetary policy decision-making and the Bank’s business operations, the number of members from the management of the Bank is increased from one to three. A balance is to be struck, however, by appointing six deliberative members so that the three members from the management will not constitute the majority. Also, the powers of the Policy Board, which remained somewhat ambiguous under the current Law, are clarified. One example is the explicit stipulation of the three instruments of monetary policy as matters for decision by the Policy Board, which I discussed earlier. In addition to these revisions, we at the Bank will do our best to ensure that the Policy Board can fully function. For example, meetings of the executive are currently organized at the Bank of Japan pursuant to the Bank’s by-laws. The meetings are attended by the Governor, the Deputy Governor, and the Executive Directors, and, as the executive body of the Bank, meets to discuss important matters related to the Bank’s daily business operations and to deliberate on matters on which it needs to consult with the Policy Board. The meetings thus by no means represent decision-making opportunities. However, the holding of the meetings has invited criticism that the Bank perhaps has two decision-making processes. Under the new Law, therefore, the meetings will be abolished to prevent any misunderstanding regarding the procedures of monetary policy decision-making. As a result, meetings of the executive will not deliberate on monetary control issues before they are discussed by the Policy Board. The entire procedure related to monetary policy, from judging the economic and financial conditions to policy decision-making, will be concentrated at the Policy Board. 2. Holding of regular Policy Board meetings on monetary control matters With the powers of the Policy Board strengthened in this manner, the new Law provides for regular meetings of the Policy Board on monetary control matters as well as disclosure of summaries of discussions and transcripts (detailed records of discussions) of the meetings. The main aim of holding regular Policy Board meetings on monetary control matters is to ensure the stability of the financial markets. Currently, the Policy Board meets every Tuesday and Friday. However, the holding of ad hoc meetings means that there is the possibility that policy changes might be made at any time. That being the case, the markets inevitably become overly sensitive to various kinds of information, such as daily movements in economic indicators and individual statements by relevant people. In fact, on quite a few occasions, one piece of information has triggered speculation over monetary policy changes, leading to market disruption. It is indeed an intrinsic function of the financial markets to assimilate various kinds of information and to reflect them in the formation of interest rates. In order for this function to be played out in the most stable and efficient manner, however, it is important that undue speculation and market disruption be avoided. This will also be conducive to improving the efficacy of monetary policy. - 10 - The new system of holding regular Board meetings on monetary control matters and of announcing the schedule of such meetings in advance has been devised based on such considerations. In determining the frequency of these regular meetings, due thought must be given to ensuring the timeliness of policy implementation as well as market stabilization. Although there is no need to preclude the possibility of ad hoc meetings, monetary policy decisions should in principle be made at the regular meetings in keeping with the purpose of the new system. If we look at the practices of other countries, the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee meets the least often at eight times a year, the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England once a month, and the Central Bank Council of the German Bundesbank twice a month. The Bank will continue to study how best to run the Board meetings by considering such examples overseas and the aim of the new system. If I may add a word here, Policy Board meetings other than the regular meetings on monetary control matters will be held as necessary. Apart from determination of monetary policy, the Policy Board will also discuss and decide on a number of matters, such as issues related to the financial and payments systems as well as those related to the operational and organizational management of the Bank. The Policy Board currently meets twice weekly, and it is likely to meet frequently under the new Law as well. What is of special note in the new system is that, while Policy Board meetings will be held frequently, the opportunities to hold intensive discussions and decide on monetary control matters are specified. 3. Disclosure of summaries of discussions and transcripts of Policy Board meetings I would now like to explain the new disclosure system of summaries of discussions and transcripts of the regular Policy Board meetings on monetary control matters. One of the main principles underlying the revision of the Bank of Japan Law is improvement of the transparency of monetary policy. To this end, the new Law provides for the disclosure of the summaries of discussions and the transcripts of the regular Policy Board meetings on monetary control matters. Disclosure of the summaries of discussions is aimed at gaining more fully the understanding and confidence of the market and the public regarding the Bank’s basic thinking underlying its monetary policy. The Bank, therefore, intends to prepare accurate and clear-cut summaries of the Board’s discussions on monetary and economic conditions and on monetary policy. The difficult issue is the timing of disclosure. Considering the purpose of the disclosure, it is desirable that the summaries of discussions be disclosed at the earliest possible moment. Yet, it would only be counterproductive should the disclosure invite market speculation or disruption. For example, let us assume that at a meeting held at the beginning of a month, heated discussions are held on the projected movement of an indicator which is to be released at the end of the month. If the summary of such discussions were disclosed before the release of the indicator, it might heighten speculation over future policy management. However, the summary should not be made ambiguous with the intention of avoiding such speculation. Therefore, the Bank will have to consider the earliest disclosure that will not undermine market stability. In the United States, the summary of discussions is disclosed approximately one to one and a half months after the meeting, and in the United Kingdom, within six weeks. These - 11 - timings probably reflect the central banks’ desire to avoid undue speculation over discussions and policy decisions at future meetings. The transcripts of discussions at the meetings will have a somewhat different role from the summaries, although both are meant to enhance the transparency of monetary policy. While the summaries of discussions seek to promote better understanding of current policy management, the transcripts are a tool to enable a detailed review at a later date, as necessary, of the Policy Board’s policy management at a certain point in time. On the one hand, due attention must be given to ensuring that the disclosure of the transcripts does not hamper free and frank discussions at Policy Board meetings. On the other hand, however, if the disclosure is overly delayed, the significance of the disclosure may be greatly reduced. With these points in mind, the Bank intends to establish an effective disclosure system that makes the Bank sufficiently accountable to the public. The Bank has, to date, endeavored to explain as clearly as possible the basic thinking behind its monetary policy management at regular press conferences, before the Diet, in publications, in speeches, and at various other opportunities. Disclosure of the transcripts and the summaries of discussions of the Policy Board are added to these measures under the new Law, and this will equip the Bank of Japan with means that go beyond global standards to ensure the transparency of monetary policy. We at the Bank intend to make effective use of these means to win even greater public understanding of and confidence in the Bank’s policy management. 4. Relationship between the central bank and the Government Lastly, I would like to discuss the relationship between the Bank of Japan and the Government. The new Law allows Government representatives to attend Policy Board meetings on monetary control matters and to express their views when necessary. It also grants the Government representatives the right to make policy proposals regarding monetary control matters, including requests to postpone the Board’s vote on policies. Some suggest that these provisions will constrain the independence of the central bank. We at the Bank, however, do not take that view. First of all, the monetary policy of the Bank of Japan is designed to contribute to the sound development of the national economy in conjunction with the economic policy of the Government. The Bank therefore needs to ensure adequate communication with the Government in managing monetary policy, although the policy must be decided by the Bank on its own responsibility and judgment. What is important is that the relationship between the Bank and the Government in the determination of monetary policy be clear and transparent, and therefore under the new system, the Government’s views and the discussions and votes on Government proposals will be disclosed in the summaries of discussions. In addition, although the Government representatives have the right to “request” a postponement of the Board’s vote, they do not have the right to “instruct.” Whether to postpone the vote on policies as requested will be determined by a vote by the Policy Board. This new system is designed carefully from the viewpoint of ensuring the autonomy of the central bank in monetary policy management while also ensuring adequate communication between the Bank and the Government. We at the Bank intend to establish a clear, transparent, and constructive relationship with the Government to serve the purpose of the - 12 - new system, believing that such a relationship will not interfere with the central bank’s autonomy. IV. Conclusion I hope that I have been able to make clear how specifically the two main principles of the new Bank of Japan Law, independence and transparency, will be embedded in the new central bank system. As I stated at the outset, the Bank intends to implement all possible measures as part of the Bank’s self-reform even before the new Law is effected, to accommodate the aims of the new Law. The Bank is currently studying a concrete mechanism for holding regular Policy Board meetings on monetary control matters and for disclosing the summaries of discussions at those meetings, which will be implemented as soon as preparations are completed. I wish to conclude by asking for your continued understanding and support.
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BANK OF JAPAN, MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, 22/9/97.
Bank of Japan’s September review of monetary and economic trends in Japan BANK OF JAPAN, MONTHLY ECONOMIC REVIEW, 22/9/97. The consumption tax hike continues to have an impact on Japan’s economy. Production has stayed virtually unchanged. The moderate economic recovery in Japan has not been undermined, however, given the continued improvement in income and expenditure which is centered on the business sector. With respect to final demand, public-sector investment has been on a decreasing trend, and housing investment has recently declined significantly. On the other hand, the increasing trend in net exports has continued, and business fixed investment has been rising steadily, particularly in machinery investment, against the background of the recovery in corporate profits. Meanwhile, economic indicators for personal consumption have recently been lackluster on the whole, reflecting the continued influence of the consumption tax hike. However, labor market conditions and income formation have been improving, albeit moderately. In these circumstances, industrial production has stayed virtually unchanged. Prices have remained stable on the whole, and the growth of monetary aggregates has continued at around 3.0 per cent year to year. With regard to personal consumption, outlays for travel have continued to increase moderately. With respect to goods, however, sales of passenger cars, electrical appliances, as well as sales at department stores and supermarkets have been below the previous year’s level since April, reflecting the continued effects of the consumption tax hike. Among leading indicators of business fixed investment, machinery orders have been increasing steadily, although at a somewhat slower pace compared to the sharp rise in the second half of 1996. The increase in construction floor area has recently been weak, but it is basically following a moderate recovery trend. With respect to housing investment, housing starts in terms of the seasonally-adjusted annual rate have continued to decline following the surge in demand in the second half of 1996 ahead of the consumption tax hike. Housing starts had stayed at around 1.5 million since spring 1997, but declined to 1.34 million in June and to 1.24 million in July, the lowest level recorded since September 1985. Regarding public-sector investment, the amount of public works contracted peaked as orders included in the supplementary budget for fiscal 1996 were concluded, and the amount has followed a decreasing trend, reflecting the restrained budget for fiscal 1997. Against the background of steady overseas demand and the yen’s depreciation to date, real exports have stayed firm since July after having increased significantly in the second quarter. Real imports, on the other hand, have been stagnant on average. As a result, the real trade surplus has been increasing with some fluctuations. The nominal current-account surplus has also been expanding significantly since April 1997, partly reflecting the decline in crude oil prices since early 1997. After recording high growth during the second half of 1996 and the first quarter 1997, industrial production in the second quarter remained virtually unchanged as the decline in demand following the surge ahead of the consumption tax hike was offset by factors such as the substantial increase in exports and the rebuilding of inventories. Production in the third quarter is expected to remain mostly unchanged from the second quarter. This is because a minor production cutback is expected in the transportation machinery industry where inventories have accumulated, while production will continue a steady increase in the electrical machinery industry. Inventories are at appropriate levels on the whole, except for the transportation machinery industry. -2With respect to labor market conditions, the unemployment rate remains at a high level, and the increase in overtime working hours has slowed somewhat, reflecting developments in production. However, year-to-year growth in nominal wages and employment has been moderate but steady, reflecting the increase in corporate profits. Thus, labor market conditions and income formation continue to improve moderately on the whole. Prices remained stable on the whole, excluding the effect of the consumption tax hike. Domestic wholesale prices (adjusted for seasonal electricity rates) have remained virtually unchanged. This is because overall domestic supply and demand conditions have improved moderately, except for some construction goods, while import prices have declined. The year-to-year declines in corporate service prices are narrowing steadily on the whole, partly owing to the improvement in supply and demand conditions, particularly for real estate rents and information services, although leasing charges continue to decline. Consumer prices (nationwide, excluding perishables) overall are stable, marginally above the previous year’s level, mainly because the year-to-year declines in goods prices have narrowed. The growth in monetary aggregates, measured in terms of the year-to-year growth of M2 + CDs average outstanding, has continued at around 3 per cent. Regarding money market rates, the overnight call rate (uncollateralized) has moved at a level slightly below the official discount rate. The 3-month CD rate has stayed at around 0.55 per cent. Meanwhile, the long-term government bond yield has been declining since the end of May as the market confirmed the moderate pace of the economic recovery, and reached below 2.0 per cent in early September. Recently, it has moved at a record low level of around 1.95 per cent. With respect to bank lending rates, the short-term prime lending rate has remained at a record low level of 1.625 per cent since September 1995. The long-term prime lending rate was lowered by 0.2 percentage points each in June, July and September and has again reached the record low level of 2.5 per cent. In these circumstances, short- and long-term contracted interest rates for new loans and discounts (up to July) have moved at record low levels. On the stock exchange, the Nikkei 225 stock average moved at around ¥20,000 21,000 between May and July 1997, but later declined, partly reflecting the fall in U.S. stock prices. It fell below ¥18,000 in early September, and has recently been moving at around ¥18,000. In the foreign exchange market, the yen appreciated to ¥110 to the U.S. dollar in the first half of June. However, the yen later reversed its course and depreciated, with some fluctuations, and has recently moved at around ¥120. Meanwhile, the yen had also been appreciating against the Deutsche Mark since May, but recently depreciated somewhat to ¥67 - 69.
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BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 26/11/97.
Bank of Japan’s November review of monetary and economic trends in Japan BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 26/11/97. Japan’s economic growth is decelerating further. Although corporate profits, employment and income conditions continue to improve moderately, weak household expenditures since April have gradually begun to affect production, and corporate sentiment is also weakening. With respect to final demand, public-sector investment has been decreasing, and housing investment has also dropped significantly. Personal consumption has continued to be weak on the whole, although the impact of the consumption tax hike has gradually begun to subside. On the other hand, net exports have continued to increase and business fixed investment has been rising moderately against the background of the increase in corporate profits. Excessive inventories are seen in some industries. Owing to weak final demand and inventory adjustments, industrial production has recently declined somewhat. The pace of improvement in employment and income conditions has slowed somewhat. Prices have remained stable on the whole, with the exception of wholesale prices which have declined somewhat. The growth of monetary aggregates has recently slowed. Personal consumption has continued to be weak on the whole. Outlays for travel have been increasing moderately, and there are some signs in the sales of goods which suggest that the impact of the consumption tax hike has gradually begun to subside. However, sales at department stores and supermarkets have been below the previous year’s level, while passenger car sales have fallen below the level recorded in the second half of fiscal 1996 when sales surged, and have not even recovered the levels recorded before then. Among leading indicators of business fixed investment, machinery orders have continued on an increasing trend since early 1997 after having surged in the second half of 1996. Recently, however, orders from non-manufacturing firms have been weak. Construction floor area has followed a moderate recovery trend, albeit with some fluctuations. With respect to housing investment, housing starts in terms of the seasonally-adjusted annual rate declined in July to 1.24 million, the lowest level since September 1985, following the surge in demand in the second half of 1996 ahead of the consumption tax hike. Housing starts have since remained weak at around 1.3 - 1.35 million. Regarding public-sector investment, the amount of public works contracted has followed a decreasing trend reflecting the restrained budget for fiscal 1997. Against the background of steady overseas demand and the yen’s depreciation to date, real exports remained high in the third quarter 1997, although they decreased somewhat from the second quarter when exports showed a significant rise. Real exports rose again in October. Real imports, on the other hand, have remained virtually unchanged on average. As a result, the real trade surplus has been increasing with some fluctuations. Reflecting these developments in exports and imports, the nominal current-account surplus has also been expanding significantly since April 1997. Industrial production has recently been somewhat weak. Production in the third quarter 1997 remained virtually unchanged on the whole. This is because production has been cut back mainly in the industries with excessive inventories, such as consumer durables and construction-related goods, although production of electrical machinery continued to increase, reflecting steady exports. Production in October and November is expected to decrease as a result of inventory adjustment pressures. With respect to labor market conditions, the unemployment rate has remained at a high level, and the ratio of job offers to job applications has recently eased somewhat. Growth in overtime working hours and nominal wages has slowed slightly reflecting weak production. However, year-to-year employment growth has been moderate but steady. Thus, employment and income conditions continue to improve moderately on the whole, but the pace of recovery has slowed somewhat. Prices remained stable on the whole, excluding the effect of the consumption tax hike. Domestic wholesale prices (adjusted for seasonal electricity rates) have declined to some extent as domestic demand and supply conditions started to ease, particularly in construction-related goods. The year-to-year declines in corporate service prices on the whole have been narrowing further owing to the improvement in supply and demand conditions, particularly for real estate rents and information services, although leasing charges continue declining. Consumer prices (nationwide, excluding perishables) rose year to year in September, reflecting the temporary factor; i.e., a rise in medical charges which resulted from medical insurance reform. Excluding this, however, consumer prices have remained stable at a level slightly above that of the previous year. Monetary aggregates, measured in terms of year-to-year growth of M2 + CDs average outstanding, declined somewhat in October to 2.7 per cent. Regarding money market rates, the overnight call rate (uncollateralized) has moved at a level slightly below the official discount rate. The 3-month CD rate has stayed at around 0.50 - 0.55 per cent. Against the background of uncertainties about future economic growth, the long-term government bond yield had been declining since the end of May and reached the record low of 1.5 - 1.6 per cent at the end of October, but recently rose to 1.6 - 1.8 per cent. With respect to bank lending rates, the short-term prime lending rate has remained at a record low level of 1.625 per cent since September 1995. The long-term prime lending rate has been lowered since June and reached a record low of 2.3 per cent in October. In these circumstances, short- and long-term contracted interest rates for new loans and discounts (up to September) have stayed at record low levels. On the stock exchange, the Nikkei 225 stock average has been declining since August, partly reflecting uncertainties about future economic growth and the fall in U.S. stock prices, and fell below ¥18,000 in early September. It dropped further after late October as a result of the precipitous decline in Hong Kong stock prices and temporarily reached around ¥15,000, but has recently recovered to around ¥16,000. In the foreign exchange market, the yen moved at around ¥119-123 to the U.S. dollar between September and October. However, the yen later depreciated in early November, owing to growing concerns about future economic growth, as well as the fall in stock prices. Recently, it has moved at around ¥125-128. Meanwhile, the yen started to depreciate against the Deutsche Mark, after having peaked at around ¥62 in mid-August, and has recently moved at around ¥7174.
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BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 28/11/97.
Bank of Japan presents summaries of articles published in the November edition of its Quarterly Bulletin BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 28/11/97. Flow of Funds in Japan, 1996 Summary In 1996, the gross amounts of fund-raising and financial investment by the domestic nonfinancial sector (comprising the corporate business, personal, and public sectors) during the year both decreased from the previous year, remaining at low levels compared with the past. The sector’s fund-raising through borrowing declined, while funds raised through government bond issues reached a record high. As for financial investment, there was a larger net redemption of securities (excluding investment trusts) than in 1995, and the net investment in insurance products narrowed significantly. In the corporate business sector, the financial surplus marked a record high. This was because (1) cash flow improved in excess of the continued growth in fixed investment, due mainly to a recovery in sales; and (2) interest payments decreased, reflecting low interest rates. The sector’s fund-raising was at its lowest level since 1956 -- the third year of compilation of the flow of funds accounts -- primarily on account of a net decline in loans, which was more significant than the previous year, particularly in those from private financial institutions. At the same time, financial investment also declined from the previous year. Such overall sluggishness of fund-raising and financial investment activities can be attributed to the persisting balance-sheet adjustment pressure. In the personal sector, the financial surplus narrowed, the ratio of financial surplus to nominal GDP marking a record low. This was because (1) consumption expenditures increased by a larger margin than the improvement in employees’ income; and (2) housing investment increased due to the effects of low interest rates and a surge in demand ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate in fiscal 1997. Both fund-raising and financial investment fell below the previous year’s levels, with conspicuous declines in investments in long-term assets such as insurance, securities, and trusts. The outstanding amount of financial assets in the personal sector reached ¥1,200 trillion for the first time at the end of 1996. In the public sector, a large financial deficit remained, due to expanded public-sector investment during the first half of the year. Fund-raising through government bond issues, almost all of which were purchased by the financial sector, marked a record high. Profits and Balance-Sheet Developments of Japanese Banks in Fiscal 1996 Overview Operating profits1 of Japanese banks2 in fiscal 1996 amounted to ¥6.4 trillion, 5 percent lower than in the previous year. This decline reflects a decrease in the net bond-related 1 “Operating profits” signifies earnings from core banking operations, arrived at by subtracting “general loan-loss provisions,” “ general and administrative expenses” and “expenses for debenture issuance” from the total of “net interest income” (e.g., interest received/paid) for loans and profits and in the net interest income of city banks. Excluding a temporary factor3 which contributed to an increase in profits on trust accounts, the decline in operating profits from the previous year was about 10 percent. Loan write-offs and loan-loss provisions4 marked approximately ¥7.6 trillion (including trust accounts), which is the second highest level following fiscal 1995 when the jusen (housing loan companies) were liquidated. This suggests that most banks continued to give high priority to solving the problem of nonperforming loans. Net stock-related profits5 were no more than about ¥1.0 trillion, approximately ¥2.9 trillion lower than the fiscal 1995 level, due to substantial stock write-downs resulting from the fall in stock prices. This reflects the fact that banks’ balance sheets have become more exposed to volatility in stock prices because of a rise in the book values of stocks which resulted from recent cross transactions -- sets of purchases and sales transactions on the same stocks in order to acquire unrealized capital gain. As the loan write-offs and loan-loss provisions virtually matched the total of operating profits and stock-related profits, recurring profits and net income reached close to zero levels, although this represented an improvement from the previous year. On the Relationship between Monetary Aggregates and Economic Activities in Japan: A Study Focusing on Long-Term Equilibrium Relationships Introduction This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between monetary aggregates and economic activities in Japan using actual data and focusing on long-term equilibrium relationships. Long-term time-series data from the 1960s to 1996 are used in the analysis in order to observe long-term relationships between the most commonly used monetary aggregate, M2+CDs, and macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP, rather than limiting the analysis to short-term relationships during the past year or two.1 In addition to long-term relationships, the discounts, deposits and securities), “net fee and commission income” (e.g., fees and commissions received/paid) and “net other operating income” (e.g., net profits related to bonds and foreign exchange). 2 “Japanese banks” or “banks” in this article refers to “All Banks,” comprising the member banks of the Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan, which consists of city banks, long-term credit banks, seven trust banks (excluding foreign-owned trust banks and trust banks that started business after October 1993), the 64 member banks of the Regional Banks Association of Japan (hereafter referred to as regional banks), and the 65 member banks of the Second Association of Regional Banks (hereafter referred to as regional banks II). However, calculated figures exclude data for Hyogo Bank (the present Midori Bank), Taiheiyo Bank (the present Wakashio Bank), and Hanwa Bank. 3 Specifically, the temporary factor here refers to profits resulting from withdrawals from special reserve funds held by trust banks. The withdrawal profit resulted from a revision of a government ordinance that reduced the ratio of funds to set aside for the special reserve funds (from 3 percent of principal to 0.5 percent of principal). These are accumulated to provide for situations in which the value of a loan trust falls below the value of the principal. The trust banks applied part of the profit to write off nonperforming loans in trusts, and the remainder to be accounted as trust fees and be registered in the banking accounts as net fee and commission income. 4 This includes not only loan write-offs, but also transfers to special loan-loss accounts (provisions), losses from the sales of nonperforming loans to the Cooperative Credit Purchasing Company (CCPC), and renunciations of claims. 5 Stock-related profits/losses are calculated by subtracting from “gains on stock-selling operations” the sum of “losses from stock-selling operations” and “stock write-downs”. 1 Note that the sample period includes the period when M2+CDs underwent large fluctuations, i.e. from the latter half of the 1980s to the early 1990s. stability of the money demand function and also the lead/lag relationships between monetary aggregates and other macroeconomic indicators are tested. The conclusions of the paper can be summarized as follows. (1) When developments in M2+CDs and other macroeconomic indicators are viewed in the long term, fluctuations in nominal M2+CDs have a relatively stable relationship with movements in nominal GDP. This can also be confirmed by applying an econometric technique called “cointegration analysis”, which suggests that there is a long-term equilibrium relationship between the two. On the other hand, the relationship between M2+CDs and prices -- which along with real GDP make up nominal GDP -- has changed since the latter half of the 1980s, in the sense that fluctuations in prices have clearly diminished relative to those of M2+CDs. (2) A relatively stable money demand function can be estimated, based on the above long-term equilibrium relationship and incorporating factors for short-term fluctuations. At least in the sample period, the mechanism of short-term fluctuations has been relatively stable in M2+CDs, GDP, interest rates, and asset factors, as represented by the money demand function. (3) An analysis in terms of lagged cross correlation on the lead/lag relationships between M2+CDs and other macroeconomic variables reveals that M2+CDs basically leads nominal and real GDP, domestic private demand, and prices. However, there are differences in results across sample periods that cannot be ignored. (4) Similar analyses are conducted, from the standpoints of conclusions (1)- above, on selected monetary and credit aggregates other than M2+CDs, and on monetary aggregates obtained by partially changing the components of M1 and M2+CDs. The results show that these aggregates did not have more stable relationships with macroeconomic indicators than did M2+CDs. (5) The above results suggest that, in analyzing monetary aggregates, it would be effective to use the long-term equilibrium relationship between M2+CDs and GDP as well as the money demand function incorporating the relationship. In interpreting the empirical results using the statistical techniques, however, it is necessary to bear in mind the following limitations: (a) Long-term equilibrium relationships indicate only the average relationship in the long run, and hence considerable deviations from equilibrium values may arise in the short term; and (b) There still remains a possibility that the long-term equilibrium relationships or money demand functions derived from the previously observed data may change, as a result of a large shift of funds caused by deregulation and other structural changes in the financial markets in the future. Checklist for the Year 2000 Problem Introduction The Bank Supervision Department of the Bank of Japan compiled the following checklist (the original is in Japanese) to assist bank examiners in assessing the adequacy of financial institutions’ risk management framework for addressing the Year 2000 problem (hereinafter simply “the Problem”).1 On August 19, 1997, the checklist was also distributed to financial institutions to help them in their own evaluation of their action plans. The checklist emphasizes the significance of each financial institution’s understanding and awareness of the Problem, and calls for the commitment of each institution, including the top management, to its action plans. In proceeding with the action plans, each institution is advised to fully assess the effects of the Problem, carefully arrange the scheduling of the plans, and complete renovation and testing prior to the implementation of the action plans. The checklist also stresses the importance of other matters including (1) the monitoring of the progress as to the implementation of the action plans, (2) the scrutiny of legal responsibilities of outside vendors, and (3) the establishment of contingency plans. 1 Many computer operating systems and applications use six-digit codes for dates -- date fields -- comprising two digits for the year, two digits for the month, and two digits for the day (for example, December 31, 1999 reads 991231). With such a coding system, the code for the year 2000 will be “00,” which may be interpreted as the year 1900, not 2000. This will cause errors in date-sensitive calculations and other issues. Such problems are referred to as the Year 2000 problem. If measures are not taken to address the problem, normal operations of financial institutions will be disrupted, which would lead to disturbances in payment and settlement systems nationwide, the effects of which may spread to other industries. * * * NB This Review is available on the BIS Worldwide Web site (http://www.bis.org) __________________________
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Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr. Yasuo Matsushita, to the Research Institute of Japan in Tokyo on 5/11/97.
Mr. Matsushita discusses recent monetary and economic conditions in Japan and comments on the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy management Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr. Yasuo Matsushita, to the Research Institute of Japan in Tokyo on 5/11/97. I. Introduction It is a great honor to be invited by the Research Institute of Japan to address this distinguished audience. It has been one year since I last attended this gathering in November 1996. Looking back at the economic developments in Japan over the past year, economic growth temporarily accelerated from the latter half of 1996 through the spring of 1997, helped to some extent by increased demand ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate in fiscal 1997. Since April this year, however, economic growth has been decelerating partly reflecting the lingering effects of the rise in the consumption tax rate. During this period, business sentiment seems to have become more cautious. Today, I would like to give views of the Bank of Japan on the present condition of and on the outlook for the Japanese economy. I will also discuss the Bank’s thinking behind its monetary policy management. I would then like to use the remaining time to discuss the Bank’s views on some of the comments and questions the Bank has been receiving recently concerning the prolonged easy money policy, by which the official discount rate has been maintained at 0.5 percent for more than two years. Through my explanation, I hope to gain your better understanding on the Bank’s aims in its monetary policy management. II. Recent Monetary and Economic Conditions and the Bank’s Monetary Policy Management A. The Present Condition of and the Outlook for the Domestic Economy Let me first discuss the domestic economic condition. Japan’s economic growth has been decelerating since April 1997 partly reflecting the impact of the rise in the consumption tax rate that took place that month. In addition to the continuing decrease in public investment since autumn 1996, household spending such as personal consumption and housing investment has also dropped significantly since April 1997. As regards personal consumption, outlays on services such as those provided by the travel industry have been increasing moderately. However, outlays on goods have remained sluggish, as indicated by the sales of automobiles and household electric appliances as well as department store and chain store sales, although there are signs of a slight recovery. In addition, housing investment in terms of housing starts has declined more recently to 1.3 million from the 1.6 million per annum level that existed until spring 1997. Several factors are responsible for such declines in household spending. The first is the strong and persistent reaction to the significantly increased demand ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate. The increase in sales in the consumer goods- and housing-related industries from the latter half of 1996 had been taken as a strong indication of a sustainable recovery. In hindsight, those sales in fact included a significant amount of demand for household spending that would most likely have taken place later this year had the hike in the tax rate not been scheduled. The second factor, which to some extent had been anticipated, is the slowdown in the growth of real disposable income of households -- nominal income less tax payments and income erosion due to inflation -- following the rise in the consumption tax rate and the discontinuation of the special tax reduction. In addition, it seems undeniable that consumer confidence has weakened somewhat. This decline in household expenditure since spring 1997, which was greater than had initially been anticipated, created excess inventories in certain sectors of consumer goods- and housing-related industries. These sectors have been required to reduce excess inventories since summer 1997 and, as a result, industrial production has leveled off. These developments in household expenditure and industrial production have resulted in a more cautious business sentiment. The question is whether these developments in household expenditure and industrial production will undermine the momentum of economic recovery, or in other words, whether the declining personal consumption and housing investment will affect other demand items such as business fixed investment, thereby placing further downside pressure on the economy. The answer lies in the current strength of the self-sustained recovery in the private sector, and this is precisely what the Bank has carefully attended to over the past two years. As this is the most important factor when judging the outlook for the economy, I would like to give the Bank’s views in some detail. I will start off by discussing what is meant by the momentum of a self-sustained economic recovery, and then move on to the Bank’s assessment of the present force of the self-sustained recovery as compared to that in 1995, when the Bank lowered the official discount rate to 0.5 percent. Lastly, I will use these points to examine the actual developments in demand and production, and assess the outlook for the economy. The strength of self-sustained recovery of the private sector can be considered as the strength of the cyclical force inherent in the private sector. With this force, a build up of economic activity should lead to improved business sentiment, which, in turn, should lead to increased earnings and income. The rises in earnings and income should eventually encourage sustained growth in business fixed investment and personal consumption, respectively. When the strength of the self-sustained recovery, or the momentum of this cyclical force, is very weak, there is a risk that private-sector activity might begin to decline, particularly if unable to absorb the negative impact of such exogenous factors as external demand and fiscal policy. However, when there is a reasonable measure of strength in the self-sustained recovery, the inherent force can be expected to withstand the negative impact and put the economy back on the recovery path, despite being temporarily decelerated. In this case, the negative impact is contained and the private sector’s economic outlook and investment attitude remain firm. As the pressures created by those exogenous factors subsequently subside, economic recovery should gradually become apparent. I will now turn to my second point, that is, assessment of the strength of Japan’s self-sustained recovery. The Japanese economy began to recover in late 1993 from a recession that followed the collapse of the “bubble” economy. In early 1995, however, the recovery paused, and there were even concerns about the occurrence of a deflationary spiral. In view of these circumstances, drastic monetary and fiscal policy measures were adopted. While the halt was directly attributable to the negative effects of the rapid appreciation of the yen, it was also due to the fact that the strength of the self-sustained recovery in the private sector was yet too weak to overcome the downward pressures from outside the private sector. It is true that the economy had been on a recovery trend since late 1993. However, we at the Bank judge that because firms’ profitability as well as capacity utilization had remained at a low level, the shock of a sudden appreciation of the yen applied the brakes to the economic recovery. The important issue now is how much strength there is in the recent economic recovery in Japan. Balance-sheet adjustment and adjustment of industrial structure are still in process. This being the case, we at the Bank do not believe that the self-sustained economic recovery has gained sufficient strength. This is precisely why we have maintained the official discount rate at a low level since September 1995. In the course of the gradual economic recovery over the past two years, however, the level of economic activity has doubtlessly been rising steadily, gradually adding to the strength of the self-sustained economic recovery. Specifically, there has been some progress in balance-sheet adjustment and industrial restructuring as corporate profits continued to increase. The manufacturing sector, especially large manufacturers, have achieved a higher than average level of profitability, although the profitability of the nonmanufacturing sector remains low. According to the results of the “Tankan -- Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan”, firms feel that there have been declines in the excessiveness of production capacity and employment. This implies that while business fixed investment increased over the past two years, excessive accumulation of capital stock has been avoided. Judging from these points, the force of the self-sustained economic recovery has clearly strengthened compared to 1995, at which time there were concerns about a deflationary spiral. Thirdly, I would like to discuss the outlook for demand, production, and income based on the aforementioned assessment of the self-sustained economic recovery. As for final demand, personal consumption and housing investment continue to be sluggish in general and public investment is expected to follow a declining trend. Employment, however, continues to be on a trend of gradual recovery. Firms plan to increase the number of newly hired graduates in fiscal 1998 for the second consecutive year. Although the growth of the household sector’s real disposable income is expected to slow, any substantial income erosion should be avoided owing to the increase in employment. Therefore, provided that there is no serious deterioration of consumer confidence, personal consumption should gradually move toward recovery as the initial impact of the rise in the consumption tax rate diminishes. Meanwhile, net exports and business fixed investment continue to increase. Exports have increased significantly since the latter half of 1996, reflecting the depreciation of the yen until spring 1997. Imports, after having increased rapidly until mid-1996 due partly to a growth in imports from the overseas subsidiaries of Japanese manufacturers, have leveled off recently reflecting the depreciation of the yen. Under these circumstances, the key issue for the time being is how the recent currency and financial instability in Southeast Asia will affect Japan’s exports and imports and its economy as a whole. In view of the progress in the horizontal division of labor and expansion of trade and capital transactions between Japan and other Asian countries, this matter requires due attention. If we take a look at Japan’s trade with Asian countries, Japan’s exports to Thailand have decreased significantly. However, there have not been any notable declines in exports to other neighboring countries. In addition, Japan’s other export markets such as the United States maintain solid economic growth. On the foreign exchange market, the yen has appreciated against Southeast Asian currencies following their shift to a floating exchange rate system. However, the yen has, overall, remained in a stable range reflecting a gradual depreciation against the U.S. dollar. Thus, Japan’s export environment as a whole continues to be favorable, and the currency and financial instability in Southeast Asia has, so far, not affected the fundamental trend of Japan’s exports in any significant way. In addition, Southeast Asian countries have been adopting various measures, some of which are internationally coordinated. On November 1, it was announced that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international organizations have agreed on a financial package for Indonesia. In the foreign exchange markets, the monetary authorities of Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia have confirmed that they will cooperate to stabilize the Indonesian currency. The Bank of Japan strongly hopes that these and similar measures taken by other countries will soon restore monetary and financial stability in these countries and encourage a smooth economic adjustment. The Bank will continue to observe developments carefully. With regard to business fixed investment, this is likely to continue to expand as a whole against the backdrop of sustained growth in corporate profits. Firms’ projections of earnings in fiscal 1997 indicate that smaller nonmanufacturing firms anticipate a decline in profits for the first time in four years, strongly affected by a decline in public investment and in personal consumption. In the manufacturing sector, however, both large and smaller firms expect a continued rise in earnings and profits partly supported by solid export performance. In addition, large nonmanufacturing firms project sustained growth in profits following the favorable results in the manufacturing sector. Some of these profitable firms recently revised their earnings outlook downward because of the recent deceleration in domestic demand. However, on the whole, earnings and profits remain on an upward trend. Against the backdrop of such developments in profits, overall investment plans in fiscal 1997 seem to be firm, especially in the manufacturing sector, although business fixed investment of smaller firms in the nonmanufacturing sector is expected to remain at a low level. In view of the aforementioned profit trend, the positive outlook for returns on investment, and the strong demand for information-related investment, it is fair to expect that business fixed investment will continue to increase. As I have discussed, the Bank believes that the trend of economic recovery has not been undermined on account of gradual improvements in corporate profits, employment, and income. The Bank, therefore, expects that as personal consumption recovers, inventory adjustment will progress and the economy will resume a gradual recovery. However, it is apparent that the virtuous circle in which increased production leads to larger income, which in turn stimulates spending, has weakened due in part to the effects of fiscal tightening. Should recovery in household expenditure be delayed, thus prolonging economic deceleration, the strength of the self-sustained economic recovery might be impaired. Bearing this possibility in mind, the Bank will watch cautiously economic developments in the coming days, including such points as the pace of recovery in personal consumption, progress in inventory adjustment, and developments in business and household confidence. B. Recent Monetary Condition Looking at the recent monetary condition in Japan, stock prices dropped sharply at the end of October amid a worldwide decline in stock markets triggered by the Hong Kong market. The impact on the prices seems to have subsided in the markets, however, owing to rebounds in the Southeast Asian markets. The Bank has been informed that Sanyo Securities has decided to take legal measures to liquidate its affiliated entities, and that due to losses on credits extended to these affiliates, it has become difficult for Sanyo Securities to continue ordinary business. On November 3, Sanyo Securities filed with the Tokyo District Court an application for the commencement of reorganization proceedings. In response to the application, the District Court has issued an asset preservation order halting the company’s repayment activities, but has allowed for exceptions with regard to such activities as return of customer property. The Bank has been informed that customer property, including cash deposited by customers, will be protected and that the property will be returned swiftly with the support and cooperation of relevant parties, including the Securities Deposit Compensation Fund (a fund established for compensating customers’ losses in the event of a failure of a member securities company) and the main banks of Sanyo Securities. While the Bank regrets the failure of Sanyo Securities, the Bank acknowledges it crucial that investors be protected and the stability of the securities market be secured through the efforts of relevant parties in order to maintain confidence in the Japanese financial system at home and abroad. If I may now turn to developments in lending by financial institutions, there have recently been views that financial institutions may have become too cautious with their lending, and this as a result may be constraining the economic activity of private businesses. I would like to briefly discuss the Bank’s present views on this point. It is true that an increasing number of financial institutions are strengthening risk management and attaching more importance to profitability in order to improve the soundness and efficiency of their management and operations. More specifically, they are revising their screening systems to assess more rigorously the creditworthiness of borrowers. They are also establishing lending rate structures that adequately reflect creditworthiness. These efforts are essential to financial institutions if they are to accommodate themselves to the ongoing financial globalization and deregulation over the long run. However, it may appear to firms that financial institutions have significantly shifted their lending attitude, or have suddenly adopted a very strict lending policy. Having said that, financial institutions maintain a positive lending stance toward firms showing sound business performance. In fact, the Tankan survey indicates that while an increasing number of firms in certain sectors feel that the lending attitude has become “severe”, more firms feel that the attitude remains “accommodative”. The average lending rates of financial institutions have been linked to market rates at historically low levels. In view of these circumstances, it is fair to assume that the recent slow growth in lending by financial institutions is due to weak demand for funds arising against the background of decelerating domestic demand. Therefore, the Bank considers that the lending attitude of financial institutions is, at the moment, not constraining business activity, nor militating against the economy. The Bank will continue to monitor carefully the lending activity of financial institutions focusing on (1) whether the stance of financial institutions is reaching a point where even firms maintaining sound management find it difficult to borrow; and (2) whether squeezed lending is leading to a general rise in interest rates. C. Monetary Policy Management After the effects of the rise in the consumption tax rate are excluded, prices can be seen to have remained generally stable and are expected to remains so for some time. In managing monetary policy under such a monetary and economic situation, the Bank believes it appropriate to continue to watch developments carefully with an emphasis being placed on further strengthening the foundation of the economic recovery. III. Bank’s Thinking Behind Its Continued Easy Stance of Monetary Policy A. The Effects of Monetary Easing I would like to use the remaining time to discuss the Bank’s views on some of the comments and questions the Bank has been receiving in relation to the prolonged low level of interest rates. First, there have been questions about the effects of monetary easing -- that is, although low interest rates are conducive to improving corporate profits, it seems that businesses are simply using those earnings to repay their debts, and therefore, the desired effects of stimulating economic activity, such as increasing investment, have not been achieved. Some even say that the low interest rates are only delaying the structural adjustment of the Japanese economy. If we take a look at the actual figures of corporate profits and business fixed investment, cash flow of firms -- hat is, retained earnings plus depreciation -- increased by approximately ¥7 trillion in the two years since fiscal 1995, when the official discount rate was lowered to 0.5 percent. Business fixed investment also increased by approximately ¥7 trillion, commensurate with the growth in corporate profits. During this two-year period, the low interest rates have helped to improve the profitability of investment and to support corporate profits. Therefore, the Bank believes that low interest rates have had the effect of generating an appropriate increase in business fixed investment. It should be noted, however, that in past phases of economic recovery, firms borrowed from financial institutions to expand their business fixed investment in addition to using their cash flow. This time, however, few firms have increased bank lending or issued bonds for this purpose. Rather, in quite a few cases, firms have used the increase in profits to repay their debt. Thus, there has been no significant acceleration of business fixed investment when compared to past recovery phases. One factor behind this seems to be the various structural adjustment pressures that the Japanese economy faces today, notably persistent balance-sheet adjustment pressures. As you are aware, many firms borrowed actively from financial institutions during the economic “bubble” period to engage in large-scale real-estate investment or securities investment. Following the bursting of the economic “bubble”, prices of real estate and stocks plunged. The borrowings, however, remained. Thus, on corporate balance sheets, there was a significant depreciation of assets at market value while liabilities remained unchanged. This resulted in a decrease in the net worth of firms -- that is, assets less liabilities -- and this in turn has limited the business risks that these firms can take on. Firms in this situation can rarely conduct active investment in plant and equipment that leads to the expansion of their business activity. This situation is often referred to as the “balance-sheet problem”. When we look at the relationship between balance sheets and business fixed investment by sector and by the size of firm, large manufacturers are faced with only limited balance-sheet adjustment pressures since they did not take on large debts during the “bubble” period. These large manufacturing firms saw an early recovery in profits following the collapse of the economic “bubble”, and in fact, have been investing significant amounts in plant and equipment since fiscal 1995. Smaller firms, however, especially those in the nonmanufacturing sector, continue to suffer heavy balance-sheet adjustment pressures, having borrowed heavily from financial institutions during the “bubble” period to invest in real estate. The ratio of financial liabilities to assets at market value of smaller nonmanufacturing firms remains at a high level. As these firms have been most strongly affected by industrial restructuring, their profits as a whole have been slow to recover. As a result, their business fixed investment has shown little signs of improvement. Yet, it cannot be said that low interest rates have proved ineffective to alleviate firms’ balance-sheet problems. The only ways to alleviate the balance-sheet adjustment pressures is for firms to increase profits, and low interest rates have contributed broadly to improving firms’ profits. With increased profits, firms can repay borrowings and thereby recover their net worth. Also, a forecasted rise in a firm’s profits would facilitate the raising of capital by that firm. Thus, increasing profits is most effective in improving the financial strength of a firm, and the repayment of debt is an important process in allowing a firm to prepare for future business activity. Although in the current phase of economic recovery, low interest rates have not yet triggered any significant rise in business fixed investment in the smaller nonmanufacturing firms, these rates have steadily contributed to establishing the foundation of the recovery by helping to improve firms’ financial strength. Including such indirect effects, the Bank believes that the low interest rates have in fact been firmly supporting the recovery of economic activity in the corporate sector. I would now like to go on to another often raised question about whether low interest rates are delaying the structural adjustment. It is true that there may be firms that are managing to survive despite a deteriorating business performance, owing to lower interest rates alleviating the burden of paying interest. My view, however, is that structural adjustment of the economy is achieved not just through natural selection of firms, where those with extremely poor business performance are weeded out. Rather, I believe that it is achieved when the large number of firms with high growth potentials enhance their activities. Therefore, in order to promote structural adjustment, it is most important to pursue effective deregulation. Monetary policy, by nature, is not aimed at promoting structural adjustment. It is to be managed in accordance with economic and price developments with the aim of achieving noninflationary, sustainable growth. However, monetary policy can realize a stable macroeconomic environment, that in turn would facilitate structural adjustment. This is because firms can confidently undergo forward-looking business transformation only when there is a stable macroeconomic environment. Also, as I have already stated, monetary easing has been contributing to the balance-sheet adjustment of firms. The Bank believes that if interest rates were to be raised before economic activity has sufficiently firmed, it may affect not only troubled firms but also growing businesses. In view of the fundamentally weak earnings structure of venture businesses, which are expected to be the driving force of the structural reform, it can easily be imagined that an untimely raising of interest rates would make the progress of industrial restructuring even more difficult. In other words, although monetary easing is not directly aimed at promoting structural adjustment, by providing a stable macroeconomic environment, it does support the management efforts of many firms with high growth potentials and thereby contributes to laying the foundation for structural adjustment. I very much hope to gain your understanding on the importance of this point. B. Monetary Easing and Income Distribution Another set of comments and questions that the Bank often receives in relation to the low level of interest rates concerns the issue of income distribution. There have been comments that low interest rates are sacrificing the household sector, or that they are aimed solely at supporting the profits of financial institutions. As I have spoken on this subject on various occasions already, I will give only a brief explanation of the Bank’s views. Monetary easing would have the impact of reducing interest earning on deposits and bonds while lowering interest payments on mortgage loans and other liabilities. As the household sector holds a larger amount of financial assets than financial liabilities, lower interest rates would in fact to reduce the net interest income. It would not be appropriate, however, to judge the effects of monetary easing based simply on the interest income. Lower interest rates stimulate economic activity by improving returns on investment, increasing corporate profits, and supporting asset prices. This in turn leads to an increase in employment and in employees’ income to thereby bring about a favorable impact on the household sector as a whole. In fact, in the two years since fiscal 1995, when the series of monetary easing measures was implemented, employees’ income has increased steadily, and this increase has significantly exceeded the net decrease in interest income. This implies that the monetary easing, by stimulating economic activity, has had favorable effects on the entire household sector. In reality, there are various types of households, and the Bank is fully aware that the situation has been extremely difficult for those households that are heavily dependent on interest income. However, I would like to emphasize that monetary policy should be managed from a macroeconomic perspective for the purpose of achieving a self-sustained economic recovery. When a self-sustained recovery is realized, benefits will accrue broadly to all sectors, including the household sector. In relation to the profits of financial institutions, monetary easing was not implemented for the purpose of increasing financial institutions’ earnings and the Bank has absolutely no intention of managing monetary policy to aid financial institutions. The misunderstanding over the Bank’s intentions seems to derive from the fact that operating profits of financial institutions tend to increase when interest rates decline. For example, in fiscal 1995, when there was a sharp decline in interest rates, operating profits of financial institutions rose significantly. This is partly due to the fact that when interest rates decline, the prices of their bond-holdings rise, and therefore, their profits on sales tend to increase. It is also due to the fact that lower interest rates are reflected immediately on the liability side, whereas their effects appear more slowly on the asset side, since the average length of maturity of assets, such as loans, tends to be longer than the average length of maturity of liabilities such as deposits. However, these effects are only temporary. For example, once the effects of lower interest rates have worked their way through, sale of bonds will no longer generate new profits. Moreover, if interest rates begin to rise, the sale of bonds will start creating losses. In addition, maturity gap between assets and liabilities will cause profits to decline from the following accounting term reflecting declines in the returns on interest-earning assets, which follow the fall in the cost of financing liabilities. In fact, the operating profits of financial institutions, after rising significantly in fiscal 1995, leveled off in fiscal 1996. In fiscal 1997, they are likely to register a substantial decline as the effects of reduced interest rates will have diminished. In the meantime, the net interest margin of financial institutions -- that is, the differential between financing costs and investment returns -- remains at a level equal to the average since the latter half of the 1980s. In other words, the decline in deposit interest rates has not permanently widened the interest margin for financial institutions, which is only the intermediate stage in the permeation of monetary-easing effects. Rather, the decline has subsequently lead to lower lending rates. Through these channels, the effects of monetary easing have been permeating steadily through the entire Japanese economy. As I have explained, monetary policy is not aimed at supporting financial institutions, and it is not possible to control the earnings of financial institutions by means of monetary policy over an extended period. I would once again like to emphasize that monetary policy is to be managed in accordance with the overall economic condition for the purpose of ensuring price stability. C. Monetary Policy Management from a Medium to Long-Term Perspective I would like to turn to a third set of comments and questions received by the Bank related to its monetary policy management. It is a question of whether the official discount rate should have been raised sometime between 1996 and early 1997, when the economy was recovering. Monetary policy should, by its very nature, be monitored over a long period of time. In addition, I believe it is not appropriate for the Bank, which is in charge of monetary policy management, to give its own assessment casually. Today, therefore, I would like to - 10 - explain the basic thinking underlying the Bank’s monetary policy management, including that on the recent interest-rate policy. The drastic monetary easing measures the Bank implemented in September 1995 -- including the lowering of the official discount rate to 0.5 percent -- was aimed at preventing the occurrence of a deflationary spiral and was intended to place the Japanese economy on a path of self-sustained recovery by strengthening corporate and household confidence in the economy. Since the beginning of 1996, the Japanese economy has recovered moderately. In the course of the recovery, the concern for a possible deflationary spiral has been gradually dispelled, and the confidence of the corporate and household sectors has been gradually regained. Looking back, it appears that the recovery in early 1996 was supported significantly by the series of monetary easing measures and government economic packages adopted in autumn 1995. It also cannot be denied that the growth rate from the second half of 1996 through spring 1997 was boosted by a significant step-up in demand ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate. Under these circumstances, it was too soon to conclude that the private sector had gained sufficient strength to achieve a self-sustained recovery on its own while dealing with the impact of fiscal tightening. If the monetary support were to have been discontinued before the economy had gained adequate strength, it would have become more difficult to attain a self-sustained recovery. This is precisely why the Bank has maintained its easy stance of monetary policy since September 1995. In connection with the Bank’s current stance of monetary policy management, I would like to mention another important point. The Bank aims to achieve price stability and thereby noninflationary, sustainable economic growth over a medium to long term. Accordingly, it is necessary to predict economic developments and to take fully into consideration the time required for monetary policy effects to spread throughout the economy when managing monetary policy. Were we to implement monetary policy merely to respond to the immediate economic condition, it may only amplify economic fluctuations. For example, when the Bank takes monetary policy measures in response to immediate improvements in economic activity, this action could carry two conceivable risks. The first is the risk that at the time the economic upturn is confirmed, prices may already have started to rise. Considering the time necessary for monetary policy effects to permeate throughout the economy, the central bank must act more pre-emptively, as it is too late to take action after price rises have been confirmed. The other is the risk that the strength of recovery is insufficient although economic activity may have started to improve. Monetary tightening under such circumstances may impair the force of recovery that had at last started to grow. In other words, monetary tightening at this time will be premature. Thus, it is extremely important that monetary policy be managed from a medium to long-term perspective. With this in mind, the Bank, in its management of monetary policy, has emphasized accurate prediction of economic and price developments rather than the economic condition at the time. Further, in accurately predicting these developments, the Bank has focused on the strength of the self-sustained recovery in the private sector. This does not mean, however, that the Bank is not carefully monitoring the potential risks arising from the prolonged easing of monetary policy. It is particularly important for the Bank to constantly verify that the low interest rates are not expanding the potential risk of inflation. In the past, there were times when the effects of monetary easing amplified rapidly, increasing abruptly the risk of inflation. In view of the time needed for monetary policy effects to permeate, the task of assessing potential risk cannot be neglected. - 11 - As I stated earlier, the Bank judges that there is no large risk of inflation at the moment. We at the Bank continue to seek appropriate policy decisions from a medium to long-term perspective by accurately identifying the risk of price movements. IV. Conclusion I very much hope that my discussion today has helped you understand the key points in the Bank’s monetary policy management. The Bank will continue to make the utmost effort to manage monetary policy properly to achieve price stability. If I may add to what I have said with regard to the monetary and economic conditions in Japan, the Bank believes it is important to strengthen corporate and household confidence in the economy in order to gain a clearer outlook for economic recovery. The recent cautious business sentiment seems to reflect the concerns held by firms over the ongoing structural adjustment, the completion of which is taking longer than expected. This being the case, I believe the important challenge for the Japanese economy continues to be the implementation of structural measures including deregulation and liquidation of real estate.
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BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 22/12/97.
Bank of Japan’s December review of monetary and economic trends in Japan BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 22/12/97. Japan’s economic growth has stalled. Weak household expenditures have gradually affected production, employment and income. Corporate sentiment is also deteriorating. With respect to final demand, net exports have continued to increase and business fixed investment has been rising moderately, particularly in the manufacturing sector. Meanwhile, public-sector investment has been decreasing, and housing investment has also continued to be weak. Personal consumption has continued to stagnate, reflecting weakening consumer confidence. Industrial production has been on a slightly declining trend because inventory adjustment pressure has spread gradually reflecting weak final demand. The pace of improvement in employment and income conditions has been slowing. Prices have remained stable on the whole, with the exception of wholesale prices which have declined somewhat. Monetary aggregates continue to grow at around 3 per cent. Personal consumption has continued to stagnate. Although outlays for travel have been increasing moderately, passenger car sales have fallen significantly below the level recorded in the second half of fiscal 1996 when sales surged, and have not even recovered the levels recorded before then. The recovery in sales of household electrical appliances has paused and sales at department stores and supermarkets have remained below the previous year’s level. Among leading indicators of business fixed investment, machinery orders continued to increase since early 1997 after having surged in the second half of 1996. Recently, orders from nonmanufacturing firms have been weak, however. Construction floor area has followed a moderate recovery trend, albeit with some fluctuations. According to the Bank of Japan’s Tankan -- Short-term Economic Survey of Enterprises of December, investment growth in the principal nonmanufacturing firms for fiscal 1997 is projected to be lower than that in fiscal 1996, while growth in the principal manufacturing firms is planned to be higher than that in the previous fiscal year. This makes the growth of investment plans in principal firms overall the same as the previous year. Meanwhile, overall investment plans by small firms in fiscal 1997 are lower than those for fiscal 1996. This is because investment plans of nonmanufacturing firms fell significantly below the previous year, although plans of manufacturing firms at this time of the fiscal year grew at a somewhat higher pace compared to fiscal 1996. With respect to housing investment, housing starts in terms of the seasonally-adjusted annual rate declined in July to 1.24 million, the lowest level since September 1985, following the surge in demand in the second half of 1996 ahead of the consumption tax hike. Housing starts have since remained weak at around 1.3 - 1.4 million. Regarding public-sector investment, the amount of public works contracted has followed a decreasing trend reflecting the restrained budget for fiscal 1997. Real exports have continued to rise since the second quarter 1997 against the background of steady overseas demand and the yen’s depreciation to date. Real imports, on the other hand, have remained virtually unchanged, partly owing to weak domestic demand. Meanwhile, the impact of the turmoil in the East Asian economies has been limited, although some exports to Asia have declined. As a result, the real trade surplus has been increasing with some fluctuations. Reflecting these developments, the nominal current-account surplus has also been expanding significantly since April 1997. Industrial production remained virtually unchanged in the third quarter 1997. Production in the fourth quarter is expected to decrease on the whole. This is because inventory adjustment which has derived from weak domestic sales, began to spread from consumer durables and construction-related goods to materials. Meanwhile, the December Tankan shows that the increasing trend in current profits is expected to continue for the large manufacturing firms (excluding petroleum refinery) in fiscal 1997, while those in the nonmanufacturing sector (excluding electricity and gas) are projected to decline. Forecasts of current profit growth in both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sector have been revised downwards since the September survey. In these circumstances, the business confidence DI for current conditions and on the outlook for principal firms in the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors have both deteriorated. Current profits of small firms in both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sector are expected to decline in fiscal 1997. The business confidence DI has also deteriorated in most industries. With respect to labor market conditions, the unemployment rate has remained at a high level, and the ratio of job offers to job applications has recently eased. In October 1997, overtime working hours fell below the previous year’s level for the first time since August 1994, and the growth in employment and nominal wages has recently been slowing gradually, reflecting weak production. Thus, the pace of recovery in employment and income conditions has slowed. Prices remained stable on the whole. Domestic wholesale prices have declined to some extent, partly owing to inventory adjustments. The corporate service prices on the whole have remained virtually unchanged from the previous year’s level. This is because supply and demand conditions in real estate rents and information service prices have improved, although leasing charges have continued to decline. Consumer prices (nationwide, excluding perishables) have remained stable at a level slightly above that of the previous year excluding the institutional factors, such as the medical insurance system reform. The growth in monetary aggregates, measured in terms of year-to-year growth of M2 + CDs average outstanding, was 2.9 per cent in October and 3.2 in November. Regarding money market rates, the overnight call rate (uncollateralized) had moved at a level slightly below the official discount rate, and the 3-month CD rate had stayed at around 0.50 - 0.60 per cent since summer 1997. However, as the market participants became cautious following the failures of some financial institutions in November, the overnight call rate (uncollateralized) rose to around 0.65 in late November, and the 3-month CD rate to around 0.85 per cent in early December. In reaction to this, the Bank continued to provide the market with ample liquidity. As a result, the overnight call rate has gradually recovered its stability. Longer term money market rates, on the other hand, have remained high, partly reflecting the Japan premium in overseas markets. The long-term government bond yield fluctuated at around 1.6 - 1.8 per cent during November against the background of uncertainties about future economic growth and anticipation of the economic stimulus package. In early December, it reached the record low level of 1.5 - 1.6 per cent, and has recently recovered to 1.6 - 1.8 per cent. With respect to bank lending rates, the short-term prime lending rate has remained at a record low level of 1.625 per cent since September 1995. The long-term prime lending rate has been at a record low of 2.3 per cent since October 1997. In these circumstances, short and long-term contracted interest rates for new loans and discounts (up to October) have stayed at record low levels. According to the December Tankan, both principal and small firms started to feel that the lending attitude of financial institutions have become more severe. Among small firms in particular, the difference between the total number of those which feel that the lending attitude is easy and those which feel that it is severe (easy minus severe) has reached a negative figure. Against the background of uncertainties about economic growth and about the stability of the financial system, the Nikkei 225 stock average has declined to ¥15,000 by mid-November, with the additional impact from the precipitous decline in Hong Kong stock prices in late October. It has since shown wide fluctuations between ¥15, 000 and ¥17,000. In the foreign exchange market, the yen had moved at around ¥119 - 123 to the U.S. dollar until October. However, the yen began to depreciate in November and temporarily declined to ¥131- 132 in mid-December. It then recovered and has recently moved at around ¥127 - 130. Meanwhile, the yen started to depreciate against the Deutsche Mark after having peaked at around ¥62 in mid-August, and has recently moved at around ¥71 - 74.
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BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 6/2/98.
The Bank of Japan’s January report of recent economic and financial developments BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 6/2/98. Summary Japan’s economic growth remains stagnant. Sluggish domestic demand, especially household expenditures, has been exerting negative influence upon production, employment and income. Corporate sentiment has also weakened. With respect to final demand, net exports have continued to increase, and business investment has been rising moderately, mainly in the manufacturing sector. Meanwhile, private consumption has continued to stagnate, reflecting cautious household sentiment that has persisted even after the rebound of the front-loading expansion of spending prior to the consumption tax hike had subsided. Housing investment has continued to be weak and public-sector investment has been decreasing. Reflecting the weak final demand, inventory adjustment pressures have been spreading, and industrial production has been on a slightly declining trend. The pace of improvement in employment and income conditions has also been slowing. Thus, the positive growth cycle of production, income, and expenditures has stalled. As regards the outlook of the economy, external demand is expected to continue upholding the economic growth, and the special tax-cut measures announced in December 1997 are expected to have positive effects on household spending. Overall, however, the economy is likely to remain stagnant for a while, due to the intensifying pressures of inventory adjustment, the continued decline in public-sector investment, and the anticipated deceleration in business fixed investment. Given the slowdown in the pace of growth, the economy is considered to be vulnerable to further negative impacts. In these circumstances, the possibility of the emergence of further downside risks should be carefully observed, such as prolonged and intensified adjustments in the Asian economies, more restrictive lending stance of financial institutions impeding corporate finance, or further deterioration of confidence in the corporate and household sectors. With regard to prices, wholesale prices have declined reflecting a slack in the supply and demand conditions of goods. Meanwhile, consumer prices have remained at a level slightly above that of the previous year when observed excluding the effects of institutional changes such as the rise in the consumption tax rate. Thus, prices on the whole remained stable. Prices are likely to be steady in the immediate future, since downward pressures on prices are not as significant as was the case in 1995, when the yen’s appreciation induced a penetration of imports, which then directly dampened prices of import-competing domestic final goods, arousing concerns for a deflationary spiral in the economy. However, conditions which may affect price developments, including the slack in supply and demand conditions in the Asian economies, should be carefully examined, since the output gap in the domestic economy is unlikely to diminish for a while. Financial markets have shown the following developments. Yields on TBs and long-term government bonds have been at around their lowest levels. Interest rates of term instruments in money markets and yields on corporate bonds and bank debentures, on the other hand, have risen and remained high due to the more cautious attitude of market participants toward credit and liquidity risks following the failure of some financial institutions. Stock prices have been low as the confidence in corporate profit growth continued to be weak and uncertainty over the financial system mounted. In the foreign exchange markets, the yen appreciated against the Asian currencies, while it depreciated against the US dollar. With respect to growth in monetary aggregates, the underlying trend of lendings by private financial institutions has remained almost unchanged, and the year-to-year changes in average outstanding of M2+CDs have continued to be at around 3 percent. Lending attitudes of fnancial institutions, however, are becoming increasingly cautious as capital adequacy constraints have become more binding due to the fall in stock prices and the yen. Moreover, higher market interest rates are gradually pressuring lending rates to rise since December 1997. There is, therefore, a need to carefully monitor the developments in the financial markets and their influences on the real economy.
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Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr. Yasuo Matsushita, to the Japan National Press Club in Tokyo on 12/12/97.
Mr. Matsushita reports on recent financial and economic conditions in Japan Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr. Yasuo Matsushita, to the Japan National Press Club in Tokyo on 12/12/97. I. Introduction I truly appreciate this opportunity to address this distinguished audience at the Japan National Press Club. The circumstances of the Japanese economy and financial system have increased in severity in the past six months. The economy has not shown any definite signs of recovery since its reaction to the rise in the consumption tax rate in April 1997. Rather, economic recovery appears to be decelerating. The currencies and financial markets of South-East Asian countries, which have been the high-growth area, have been in turmoil since summer of 1997, and an adverse impact on the Japanese economy has been anticipated. In addition, recent successive failures of large Japanese financial institutions have once again aroused concern about the stability of Japan’s financial system in Japan and abroad. Thus, it is not easy to judge where the Japanese economy is headed and to draw up a prescription for each problem. In such a situation, it is important that the circumstances be analyzed carefully so as to perceive the underlying mechanism. This is because developments in the economy and the markets -even, or particularly, when they suggest confusion or disruption -- often provide important indications or warnings that lead to a better solution of the problem. Today, I would like to discuss and explain the Bank’s thinking on three topics: issues concerning Japan’s financial system, the turmoil in the Asian currencies and financial markets, and the domestic economic situation. These are three independent issues that in a way are closely correlated. I would like to explain them with a view to clarifying the underlying mechanism. II. Issues Regarding Japan’s Financial System A. Resolution of Failed Financial Institutions I would like to start with issues regarding Japan’s financial system. The successive failures of Japanese financial institutions since the fall of 1997 have once again emphasized domestically and internationally the severity of the situation facing the Japanese financial system, temporarily increasing the tension in the financial markets. First, I would like to explain the measures the Bank has taken to deal with this situation and the thinking behind them. When a financial institution fails, the most important task is to contain systemic risk. In other words, it is crucial to prevent the failure from affecting other financial institutions or the markets as a whole, disrupting the entire financial system, through widespread anxiety of depositors and market participants or through a chain reaction of defaults. In order to contain systemic risk, two requirements must be satisfied. First, it must be ensured that smooth repayment of deposits be made by the failed financial institution. Second, it is important to avert liquidity contraction to ensure the stability of the entire financial system. Failure of financial institutions causes market participants to become overly cautious, making it difficult for transactions to come to terms. As a result, upward pressures tend to be placed on interest rates. Therefore, -2in order for these two requirements to be satisfied, the Bank took decisive measures in response to the financial institution failures. To meet the first requirement, the Bank extended special loans as necessary to several failed institutions -- for example, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities -- under Article 25 of the Bank of Japan Law, without requiring the usual collateral. The Bank has committed itself to providing funds for the purpose of ensuring the stability of the financial system only in cases where all of the following four conditions are met: (1) there is a strong possibility that systemic risk -- a risk that failure of one financial institution to settle transactions with another may trigger a chain reaction of defaults -- will materialize, and that as a result, confidence in other sound financial institutions will be undermined, or that runs on deposits will occur; (2) credit extension by the Bank is indispensable, as there are no other sources of funds; (3) measures are taken to prevent moral hazard; and (4) the financial soundness of the Bank will not be threatened. In the cases of the recent financial institution failures, the Bank judged it appropriate to extend special loans after thoroughly examining these four points. While the Bank had previously extended special loans to depository institutions, the loan extension to Yamaichi Securities should be regarded as an extraordinary measure. This is because the failure of a non-depository financial institution such as a securities company differs in several ways from the failure of a depository institution. Customers of a securities company conduct stock and bond transactions through the securities company, and are not in a creditor-debtor relationship with the company. They do deposit money and securities with a securities company, but unlike bank deposits, these are not means of payment. Accordingly, it is usually unlikely that the failure of a securities company would directly give rise to systemic risk. Yamaichi Securities’ decision to close down its business, however, is significant in that the company is one of Japan’s four largest securities companies. Furthermore, considering the fact that the Japanese financial system is being viewed more critically and that Yamaichi conducted a wide range of business in domestic and overseas markets and had a large number of customers, any difficulties in returning customers’ assets or in settling outstanding transactions in the process of closing down the company were quite likely to lead to withdrawal of customer assets from other securities companies or disrupt market transactions. If no measures had been taken to prevent such a situation, the credibility of the Japanese financial system could have been seriously eroded and disruptions could have been caused in domestic and overseas financial markets, in the end seriously affecting overall economic activity in Japan. Against this backdrop, the Bank decided to provide Yamaichi with necessary liquidity under Article 25 of the Bank of Japan Law in order to minimize the adverse impact of the closing down of the company’s business on the domestic and overseas financial markets as well as the Japanese economy. The Bank’s measures had their intended effect: payment and settlement were executed smoothly by the failed institutions, and thus the materialization of systemic risk was avoided. However, the failures of large depository institutions and a securities company made the behavior of market participants very cautious, and as a result, it became difficult for transactions to come to terms, placing upward pressures on market interest rates. Therefore, to fulfil the second requirement in containing systemic risk, the Bank exerted itself to its utmost to avoid declines in market liquidity through market operations. The Bank utilized various market operations means to provide sufficient liquidity in the markets, to thereby support smooth market transactions and stable formation of market interest rates. -3Since September 1995, the Bank has conducted market operations in order to maintain the uncollateralized overnight call money rate at a level on average slightly below the official discount rate. However, demand for funds in the market heightened following the series of financial institution failures, and at the end of November 1997, the call money rate rose far above this targeted level. The Bank therefore made continuous efforts to supply sufficient liquidity to the market, and as a result the rate has recently declined to the targeted level. Rates on longer-term money market instruments, however, especially 1-month rates on end-of-year funds, remain high due to a rise in the “Japan premium” -- the extra funding cost that Japanese banks have to pay compared to leading U.S. and European banks due to a decline in their creditworthiness in international markets. The Bank would like to emphasize that it will continue to take a firm stance in its market operations toward the end of the year to ensure the stability of money market rates. The Bank, in cooperation with the government, will continue to commit itself to maintaining the stability of the financial system, and strongly hopes that the public and market participants will act calmly. B. The Implications of Recent Financial Institution Failures Significant progress has been made toward the solution of the nonperforming-loan problem, and it can be said that the recent failures of financial institutions occurred amid this notable progress. Therefore, these failures can be considered to have important implications for the strengthening of Japan’s financial system and for the restoring of domestic and international confidence in the system. The disclosed amount of total nonperforming loans held by the Japanese depository institutions decreased from ¥38 trillion as of the end of March 1995 to ¥28 trillion as of the end of March 1997. Of this, the amount that needs to be disposed of, or those not covered by collateral or loan loss reserves, has been reduced from the ¥18 trillion in 1993 to ¥4.5 trillion. While this amount is still substantial, it is fair to say that there has been steady progress in the disposal of nonperforming loans. A matter of concern is that the pace of disposal differs among financial institutions. For example, some financial institutions have completed removal of nonperforming loans from their balance sheets. Many other institutions seem to be planning to record net losses for the accounting term ending in March 1998 to dispose of a considerable amount of nonperforming loans. The overall progress in solving the nonperforming-loan problem, together with enhanced disclosure practices, has sharpened the contrast between institutions that are being prompt in dealing with their problem and those that lag behind. Under such circumstances, there seem to be two requirements in restoring confidence in Japan’s financial system at home and abroad. First, it is necessary for financial institutions to further improve disclosure and thereby enhance the transparency of their management. Depositors, creditors, and other market participants are scrutinizing the financial conditions of Japanese financial institutions with increasing severity, and the scheduled introduction of Prompt Corrective Action in April 1998 and the implementation of the Japanese “Big Bang” deregulation measures are likely to encourage such tendency. Therefore, it is vital that individual financial institutions accelerate the disposal of nonperforming loans and the implementation of restructuring measures to ensure the market’s confidence. As for the disclosure of nonperforming loans held by financial institutions, a uniform standard has been established based on a recommendation by the Financial System Research Council to allow comparison between financial institutions, and the range of disclosure has been expanded in line -4with this standard. To increase the transparency of financial institution management and to thereby strengthen the market’s confidence, however, it is essential that institutions expand the range of disclosure on their own initiative, not only with respect to nonperforming loans but also to the implementation of their restructuring measures, and thereby provide the market with a convincing explanation of how they intend to improve, or how they have improved, their financial strength. Second, the recent series of financial institution failures has highlighted the importance of preventing the surfacing of systemic risk and of thereby ensuring the stability of the entire financial system. It must be remembered that in the financial system, an appropriate balance must be struck between the need to draw out the dynamism of the market mechanism and the need to ensure the stability of the system. As I stated earlier, the financial strength of financial institutions is being more severely examined in anticipation of the implementation of the Japanese “Big Bang”. To maintain the stability of the financial system under these circumstances, it is extremely important to ensure that even if the market were to pass a hard judgment on an institution, this would not shake the entire financial system. In this regard, the provision of emergency liquidity for preventing any serious disturbance from occurring in the system, which I mentioned earlier, is the responsibility of the central bank as the “lender of last resort”. When the failed institution has a negative net worth, there is the problem of how to dispose of the ultimate losses. However, credit extension by the Bank is aimed solely at providing temporary liquidity, and not at making up for losses. Therefore, it is required that a loss-covering scheme be in place before swift repayment of deposits can be made and resolution of the failed institution be carried out smoothly. The deposit insurance system is one of the frameworks made available for such schemes, and various measures have been taken to enhance the functions of the Deposit Insurance Corporation. There could be cases, however, where losses are too large for this system to bear. In such cases overseas, public funds have been used subject to certain conditions to solve the problem. In view of those examples abroad and the current situation of Japan’s financial system, an argument has been put forward that public funds should be utilized for the early and fundamental solution of the nonperforming loan problem, triggering serious debate in the Government and Diet. The Bank considers the argument to carry great significance for the domestic financial system, and therefore hopes that a national consensus on the matter will be reached through wide discussions. The global and domestic conditions facing Japan’s financial system are becoming increasingly harsh, as represented by the expansion of the “Japan premium” in international financial markets. Thus, Japan’s financial system is at a critical juncture that will determine whether it can restore domestic and international confidence, with financial institutions further enhancing disclosure and accelerating the disposal of nonperforming loans, and the authorities ensuring the stability of the financial system. III. Financial Conditions in Asia and Their Impact on the Japanese Economy A. The Background of the Turmoil in Asian Financial Markets Let me next discuss the recent developments in other Asian economies. In this section, I will refer to Asian economies on the basis of excluding that of Japan. To confront the turmoil in the Asian financial markets which started in summer 1997, various measures have been taken -- each country -5has been adjusting its macroeconomic policy and setting out measures to stabilize the financial system, and international assistance has been provided under the leadership of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, instability remains in the financial and foreign exchange markets of these countries, and uncertainty prevails as to how their economies will evolve under the various economic measures. Today, therefore, I would like to examine the background of the Asian turmoil and its possible impact on the Japanese economy. First, I would like to emphasize that it is not appropriate to perceive the currency turbulence in Asian countries as having been caused by speculative attacks by global investors on specific currencies and financial markets, and to emphasize the instability of international financial markets. Turmoil in the international financial and foreign exchange markets has occurred several times in the past: the demise of the postwar fixed exchange-rate system, established by the IMF in the 1970s; and the currency crises in the European Monetary System in 1992 and in Mexico in 1994. In all the above cases, before the turbulence arose in the markets, there had been for some time a gap between the exchange rate of the country’s currency and the real economic condition of the country, with that gap expanding gradually preceding the turbulence. Immediate adjustment of the foreign exchange rate is inevitable once market participants detect the situation. In the adjustment process, the exchange rate may overshoot, giving the impression that the market is in disruption. However, it is important that the grounds for such large fluctuations be clearly identified, or otherwise, the warning signals sent out by the market, which are pointing to the expanding gap in this case, will be overlooked. With the emergence of the Asian currency turmoil, some have questioned the previous achievements of East Asian economies. This view also seems to be rather extreme. It appears that the potential growth rate of East Asia remains high, supported by its high-quality labor, high savings rate, and solid market and industry infrastructures. Although East Asian economies will face adjustment pressures in the short term, they can be expected to establish a foundation for further growth by carrying out various structural reforms based on their recent experiences. What, then, can be considered to be the background of the recent turmoil in Asian currencies? While Asian countries differ from each other in many ways, one common factor is that most Asian currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollar, and under the peg, large amounts of foreign funds flowed in during the 1990s. This in turn led to excessive financial and investment activities, overheating of the economy, and accordingly, deterioration in the external balance. It cannot be denied that there was a sense of euphoria, or an overexpectation of economic growth, in East Asia. When there is an influx of abundant funds based on such expectations, upward pressure is exerted on the foreign exchange rate of the country’s currency. To maintain the pegged exchange rates, countries were under pressure to ease money to lower domestic interest rates or at least avoid monetary tightening. Such policy response fuelled financial and investment activities, and this may have upheld the euphoria for a certain period of time. Inflation rates in Asian countries rose due to overheated economic activity, and under their fixed exchange rate system, their currencies became overvalued. Consequently, the international competitiveness of these economies declined gradually and current account deficits expanded. The deficits in the current accounts were not a problem as long as they were financed by foreign capital. However, as soon as market participants began to doubt the sustainability of the external imbalance and the economic boom in the area, foreign funds were abruptly withdrawn from the countries, putting severe pressures on foreign exchange rates and stock prices. Against this backdrop, many countries were compelled to abandon their exchange rate pegs to the U.S. dollar and adopt a floating rate system. -6Several important lessons can be drawn from this experience with regard to ensuring the stability of international financial markets. Obviously, preventing an overheating of economic and financial activities through proper macroeconomic policies is the most important prerequisite for securing the stability of one’s own economy as well as the international financial markets. It is equally important to ensure flexible foreign exchange developments, promote information disclosure to allow the market mechanism to check the appropriateness of economic policies, and establish a sound financial system by, for example, reviewing the framework of financial institution supervision. Based on these lessons, East Asian countries have embarked on the restoration of their economies and financial systems with international support. The Bank of Japan, too, continues to play an appropriate role in the framework in which the IMF takes the initiative. In terms of cooperation among Asian central banks, the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) was established in 1991. The governors’ meeting has taken place annually since 1996; the first being held in Tokyo and the second in Shanghai. Taking the opportunity of such meetings, the Bank intends to strengthen its ties with other Asian central banks by exchanging views and extending technical assistance in various fields. B. Impact on the Japanese Economy Next, I would like to discuss the impact of developments in the Asian economies on that of Japan. The economic relations between Japan and other Asian countries have been intensifying, and the region is now the largest trade partner of Japan. Of Japan’s total exports, those to Asia’s Newly Industrializing Economies (Asian NIEs) and the member countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) account for about 35 percent, exceeding the share of exports to the United States and to the European Union, 30 percent and 15 percent respectively. As for Japan’s imports, the share of imports from Asian NIEs and ASEAN countries has grown to almost 20 percent, approaching the 22 percent from the United States, which holds the largest share. Accordingly, it is inevitable that the depreciation of the currencies and the economic slowdown due to the implementation of adjustment measures in these countries will affect the real economy of Japan. At present, demand in other regions such as China, the United States, and Europe is firm, and the average exchange rate of the yen (weighted by the value of trade with each country) remains stable. Thus, the export environment is not significantly deteriorating as a whole. However, exports to Asia, especially to Thailand and the Republic of Korea, have started decreasing. Furthermore, slowdown of economic growth in East Asian countries is bringing about a fall in international commodities prices, especially those of raw materials. This is beginning to affect the profits of materials manufacturers in Japan, and as a result, some of these firms are planning to curtail production. Thus, careful observation of economic trends including these kinds of indirect impact is necessary. In addition to developments in the real economy, the problem of nonperforming loans is surfacing in the Asian countries, although the degree differs from country to country. According to statistics compiled by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the total credit exposure of Japanese banks to Asian countries amounts to US $270 billion, which accounts for about 30 percent of the total exposure of world’s financial institutions to Asia. However, these figures include Japanese banks’ credits to Asian branches and affiliates of Japanese, U.S., and European financial institutions. Furthermore, a large portion of business credits of -7Japanese banks are extended to Japanese affiliates with a guarantee given by their parent companies. According to the Bank’s survey, Japanese banks’ credit exposure to non-Japanese firms and local banks in Asia appears to be around 30 to 40 percent of the total credit exposure reported in the BIS statistics. Moreover, most of such credit is loans to sound major banks and firms and project finances, which are unlikely to turn into nonperforming loans. As discussed above, the impact of the currency and financial turmoil in Asia on the real economy and financial market of Japan has been limited to date. However, the economic situation in this region remains unstable. Therefore, the degree of economic slowdown and developments in the nonperforming-loan problem in these countries must continue to be monitored. IV. Recent Financial and Economic Conditions and Monetary Policy Management in Japan A. Domestic Financial and Economic Conditions I would now like to move on to today’s last topic -- the recent economic situation in Japan. The decelerating trend of Japan’s economic growth since April 1997 has been intensifying recently. In final demand, exports and business fixed investment continue to be on an upward trend, supporting economic activity. However, household spending such as personal consumption and housing investment, which fell substantially following the rise in the consumption tax rate in April 1997, is recovering only at a very slow pace. In personal consumption, outlays on services such as travel services have shown a moderate increase, while outlays on goods, as indicated by sales of automobiles and household electric appliances as well as department store sales, have remained sluggish. In addition, housing starts have declined more recently to 1.3 million from the 1.5 million per annum level prevailing until spring 1997. With such weakness in final demand, inventory adjustment pressures remain in the consumer durables- and construction-related industries, and thus industrial production has been declining slightly. Such developments seem to be gradually affecting employment and income. However, this year’s temporary economic slowdown is inevitable in that the economy is at a phase in which the downward pressures of fiscal tightening appear most strongly. The concern is how these developments will affect the momentum of the self-sustained economic recovery in 1998. At present, corporate profits and employment income, which form the basis of the self-sustained recovery, continue to be on an upward trend. Therefore, it is unlikely that the economy has entered a recession. However, there is some weakening of the virtuous circle of production, income, and expenditure, and if this trend continues, it may undermine the strength of the self-sustained recovery. The Bank will therefore continue closely to monitor the pace of recovery in consumption, progress in inventory adjustment, and developments in household and corporate sentiment. Meanwhile, prices have remained stable on the whole. Domestic wholesale prices have continued to decline slowly, particularly those of construction materials. Consumer prices, after excluding the effect of the rise in the consumption tax rate, have been at a level slightly above that of the previous year, and corporate service prices remain at the previous year’s level. In view of such economic and price conditions, the Bank is determined to observe developments carefully in managing monetary policy, placing emphasis on strengthening the foundation of the economic recovery. In the conduct of market operations, the Bank intends to continue supplying sufficient liquidity to the financial market, to thereby ensure smooth transactions and stability of market interest rates. -8B. Lending Attitude of Financial Institutions With regard to the recent financial situation, there have been various discussions concerning the cautious lending attitude of financial institutions. Today, financial institutions are faced with many challenging management issues, such as expeditious disposal of nonperforming loans, as well as implementation of measures to deal with the Japanese “Big Bang” financial reform and with the introduction of Prompt Corrective Action. Therefore, with a view to enhancing the soundness and efficiency of management, an increasing number of financial institutions are strengthening their risk management and attaching more importance to profitability in their extension of loans. These efforts by financial institutions are indispensable for strengthening Japan’s financial system. However, it is a matter of concern whether the cautious lending attitude of financial institutions has reached the point where it hinders the recovery of the economy as a whole. To date, partly because of weak corporate demand for funds, there has been neither any significant shortage of funds in corporate financing nor an overall rise in lending rates due to a squeeze in lending. Therefore, the Bank believes that the cautious lending attitude of financial institutions is not hampering economic recovery at present. However, risk management systems of financial institutions are being further reinforced. In addition, the influence of developments in financial markets, such as low stock prices and the rise in the “Japan premium”, on financial institutions’ lending activity requires due attention. While the current lending activity of financial institutions is not hampering economic recovery, it is not positively contributing to the recovery as it did during past periods of monetary easing. This fact offers a significant point for discussion when considering the interaction between financial activity and real economic activity, because the expected role of financial institutions goes beyond merely responding passively to corporate demand for funds. Financial institutions are expected to actively support forward-looking business activities -- for example, by helping corporations find new business opportunities and accepting financial risks when new businesses are started. In fact, such functions of financial institutions played a significant role in promoting economic recovery in the past. While it is true that financial institutions went too far in these activities, leading to the emergence of the economic “bubble”, it is also undeniable that in the present phase of economic recovery financial support for economic activity has been weak. In order to ensure economic recovery, it is important to strengthen the functions of financial institutions and the financial market, thereby restoring a strong and efficient financial system. I would like to point out that the cautious lending attitude of financial institutions, causing the so-called “credit crunch”, should therefore be discussed in connection with the issue of strengthening the financial system. C. The Significance of Stronger Confidence in the Economy The Bank’s primary concern regarding the economy is the fact that the confidence of firms and households in the Japanese economy and its outlook seems to be deteriorating. It is very difficult to measure accurately the level of confidence of economic entities. However, the financial and asset markets offer some important information. Asset values, for example, reflect the expectations of market participants as to the future profits which may be earned by holding such assets. How, then, should we see the recent low level of stock prices? Corporate profits are at a significantly higher level today compared with those in 1995, when there were concerns about a deflationary spiral. However, stock prices are close to the 1995 level. This suggests that confidence in the economy has weakened compared with that in 1995. Under such circumstances, firms and financial -9institutions would be inclined to hold back from forward-looking activities that involve risks. Weakened confidence would also reduce the effects of monetary easing. However, it seems unnatural to assume that the potential growth rate of the Japanese economy in the medium to long term has declined significantly in the past two years. In 1995, for example, there were strong concerns over the future of Japanese industry, due to increasing competition with other Asian economies and anxiety over a hollowing-out of industry, but Japanese firms are responding by building new global networks of production and parts procurement, utilizing the new international division of labor. Also, with the depreciation of the yen, apprehension about the international competitiveness of Japanese industry seems to have receded considerably. In view of these conditions, the weakening confidence in the economy that is reflected in the low stock prices must be attributable to some other factor. A clue in finding the answer is the fact that the “outlook for the economy” does not reflect only the estimated potential growth rate, but also uncertainty regarding its realization. For example, even when similar levels of profit growth are expected, stock prices will decline when there is greater uncertainty about the realization of the expected profit growth, in other words, when the risk premium expands. The same phenomenon can be observed in the economy as a whole. Uncertainty regarding future developments significantly undermines confidence in the economy. Thus, it can be said that the present weakness of confidence in the economy is related to the fact that the Japanese economy is at a critical phase of various structural reforms, including financial system reforms. There are many uncertainties surrounding economic entities -- such as the developments in the financial system, the progress of structural reform of the economy such as deregulation, and issues regarding public pensions, which have a substantial impact on household income. Therefore, the important issue now is to clarify the outlook for each of these factors, including the prospect of additional burdens and costs. I mentioned earlier that confidence in the economic outlook is based on two factors, namely, expected growth and risk premiums. It is quite difficult to boost the potential growth rate or expectation of growth through economic policy in the short term. However, it is possible to reduce uncertainty about the economy, and this is an effective and credible method of reinforcing confidence in a market economy. In this regard, making steady progress in structural reforms such as deregulation and ensuring the stability of the financial system are significant. If these efforts can reduce uncertainty about economic and financial developments, then the present monetary easing will be more effective in stimulating economic activity, strengthening the force of the virtuous circle in the economy.
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BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 27/2/98.
Bank of Japan presents summaries of articles in the February edition of its Quarterly Bulletin BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 27/2/98. Response to the Disclosure Framework for Securities Settlement Systems: The-BOJ-NET JGB Services Introduction This document provides answers to the “Disclosure Framework for Securities Settlement Systems”, a survey questionnaire drawn up by a joint working group of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) of the Bank for International Settlements, and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). The Securities Settlement System (SSS) here is the “Bank of Japan Financial Network System (BOJ-NET) JGB Services”, which is the Japanese government bonds (JGB) settlement system in Japan. The answers as prepared by the operator of the system, the Bank of Japan, are intended to help current and future participants in the settlement system to appropriately understand and assess the risks associated with it. The answers provide basic information about the BOJ-NET JGB Services as they were in October 1997 (when the answers were prepared). The BOJ-NET funds transfer system is also referred to where necessary. Please note that the answers are intended to provide a general explanation, and the information may not apply to every individual case. Utilization of Financial Institutions’ Self-Assessment in Enhancing Credit Risk Management Summary The government’s Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) measures to be implemented from April 1998 require financial institutions to conduct adequate assessment of their assets and to calculate appropriate ”loan-loss write-offs and provisions” based on their own internal rules and referring to guidelines of the authorities. The Japanese “Big Bang” reform package is expected to be conducted by the year 2001. Given these situations, large financial institutions in Japan are making great efforts to enhance credit risk management. Medium and small-sized financial institutions are on their way to establish basic credit risk management systems under the PCA measures. Since information derived from self-assessment can be useful in a wide range of activities from strengthening risk management systems to formulating business strategy large differentials in business management are likely to arise among financial institutions depending on the utilization of this valuable information. The Bank of Japan introduced the Tracing Method of asset assessment and loan losses in order to support financial institutions to maximize the use of their own assessments as a management tool. The Tracing Method is used to observe changes in the condition of individual assets in a time series and is one way to utilize financial institutions’ self-assessment of assets. The Bank conducted a follow-up analysis in the recent on-site examination to analyze how many of the loans classified in the previous examination (1993-94) were later “written off and others” in relation to financial losses (“others” are defined as specific loan-loss provisions, losses from support by renunciation of claims, and losses from sales of nonperforming loans to the Cooperative Credit Purchasing Company [CCPC]). These empirical studies using the Tracing Method suggest the following four points of importance for enhancing credit risk management. (1) Importance of strengthening the early warning functions It is vital to control loans classified as “substandard” (S) because the likelihood of loan losses in terms of “write-offs and others” reaching a substantial size in the long term may vary substantially depending on the adequacy of the long-term management of this classification of loans. (2) Importance of utilizing statistical methods which cover the life-span of loans For example, for loans classified as (S), there is a tendency for the loan-loss ratio to rise after the third year following the assessment. (3) Importance of avoiding loan concentration Financial institutions with highly concentrated loans in terms of industry had higher loan-loss ratios, while institutions with diversified loan portfolios had relatively low ratios. (4) Importance of gathering financial institutions’ own default data for risk quantification The estimated losses may be understated when only publicly disclosed bankruptcy data are used since losses incurred through loans against “de facto bankrupt borrowers” and recipients of financial support are not covered in such data. The latter type of losses accounts for a significant share of outstanding losses. The Tracing Method covers all these data and enhances establishment of financial institutions’ own default data for credit risk quantification. On our part, the Bank of Japan will continue to check and monitor the credit risk management systems at financial institutions on the off-site basis and also during the on-site examination in a more risk-focused, seamless and flexible manner, taking individual institutions’ circumstances into consideration. In addition, the Bank will continue to research methods of quantifying credit risks as well as conducting follow-up analysis of the Tracing Method, in line with the worldwide trend to further enhance credit risk management. Revision of the Wholesale Price Indexes to 1995 Base Introduction The Wholesale Price Indexes (WPI) system is one of the three sets of price index statistics presently compiled by the Bank of Japan, along with the Corporate Service Price Index (CSPI) and the Input-Output Price Indexes of Manufacturing Industry by Sector (IOPI). Each has different coverage and purposes. The WPI provides a measure of average changes in the prices of goods in inter-enterprise transactions. It functions as (1) an economic indicator; (2) a barometer of the purchasing power of the currency; and (3) a deflator. A base-year revision of the WPI from the 1990 base to 1995 has been conducted to incorporate changes in Japan’s economic and trade structures.1 While the basic framework of the index system remains unchanged by the revision, the selected commodities (i.e., the smallest unit of commodities for which indexes, calculated based on sample prices, are published) have been revised and expanded in order to further increase the precision of the index. This paper outlines the details involved in the revision of the WPI to the 1995 base, figures on the new base having been released in December 1997. ______________________ 1 A base-year revision of the WPI, involving the updating of the base year for both indexes and weight calculation, is conducted every five years based on a recommendation made by the Statistics Council in March 1981. In the revision to the 1995 base, indexes were recalculated from the 1990 average = 100 base to the 1995 average = 100 base, and the weights used in the calculation of indexes were updated based on 1995 data from such sources as the Census of Manufactures” of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Trade Statistics of the Ministry of Finance. The framework of the index system is also reviewed as necessary at the time of the base-year revision.
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Bank of Japan communication, 13/4/98.
The Bank of Japan’s April report of recent economic and financial developments Bank of Japan communication, 13/4/98. Japan’s economy remains stagnant reflecting weak domestic demand, such as household expenditures. In addition, corporate sentiment has been deteriorating across industries, indicating strong downward pressures on economic activities. With respect to final demand, growth in net exports, which had been underpinning the economy, has slowed and business fixed investment seems to have started declining. Private consumption has continued to stagnate despite the implementation of the special tax-cut measures. Housing investment has also continued to be weak and public-sector investment is on a decreasing trend. Against the background of significant accumulation of inventories reflecting weak final demand, industrial production has continued to decline. Consequently, negative impacts on corporate profits as well as on employment and income conditions have been intensifying, and are leading to a further deterioration of domestic demand. As regards the outlook for the economy, growth in net exports is unlikely to be strong enough to prevent the deterioration of the economy, partly reflecting further adjustments in other Asian economies. Business fixed investment will continue to decrease due mainly to the decline in corporate profits and is likely to enter an adjustment phase. With regard to private consumption, distinctive recovery can not be expected against the background of the weakening of income formation, although consumer confidence may cease to wane. Downward pressures on economic activities, particularly on production, are likely to continue to be strong for the time being, because the level of inventories is high and a conspicuous recovery in domestic private demand is unlikely. However, following the implementation of measures to stabilize the financial system and the special tax-cut measures, additional economic stimulus package is now being discussed. The details of the package and their effects on corporate and household confidence should be carefully monitored. With regard to prices, wholesale prices have continued to decline reflecting weak supply and demand conditions of goods in domestic and overseas markets. The year-to-year increase in consumer prices (excluding the effects of institutional changes such as the rise in the consumption tax rate) has been declining close to zero . As for the future, prices overall are likely to soften reflecting the continuous expansion of the output gap in the domestic economy and the decline in overseas commodity prices. These price developments, which might have further negative impacts on corporate activities, may require close monitoring. Financial markets have shown the following developments. In the money markets, interest rates on term instruments and the so-called “Japan premium” declined substantially from the end of February through the middle of March and have generally remained steady thereafter. This reflects the Bank of Japan’s ample provision of funds through contracts that mature after the fiscal year-end as well as the progress in implementing the financial-system stabilization measures. It should be noted, however, that the levels of the above rates and premium are still high compared with those prevailing before autumn 1997, which can be attributed to the continuing cautious attitudes of market participants toward credit risk. Meanwhile, with the releases of weak economic indicators, long-term government bond yields have fluctuated in a historically low range and stock prices have been declining since the end of March. With respect to monetary aggregates, the growth in money stock continued to be rather high in February due to the substantial shift of funds away from investment trusts. Meanwhile, private bank lending remains sluggish. However, with an increase in corporate financing via the capital market, a substantial fall in overall corporate fund-raising seems to have been avoided. Banks remain cautious in extending loans with a view to improving their mediumterm profitability and financial soundness. Fund-raising costs of firms continued to be high according to their credit standing. In such circumstances, some firms, especially small and medium-sized firms, have been facing difficult financing conditions and this effect on the economy continues to warrant a careful monitoring.
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Bank of Japan communication, 21/5/98.
Bank of Japan’s May report of recent economic and financial developments1 Bank of Japan communication, 21/5/98. The Bank’s view2 Japan’s economy remains stagnant with continued strong downward pressures on economic activities. With respect to final demand, public-sector investment seems to have bottomed out. However, growth in net exports has virtually peaked out as exports to other Asian countries decline. Business fixed investment has been on the decline. Private consumption shows no sign of recovery although the deterioration has slowed. Housing investment remains weak. Against the background of weak final demand, inventories have accumulated further and industrial production continues to decline. As a result, not only corporate profits but also employment and income conditions have worsened significantly. The above indicates that production, income, and expenditure show negative interactions with one another. In these circumstances, the economic stimulus package was decided, and the fiscal 1998 supplementary budget bill was submitted to the Diet. These measures are expected to boost demand through additional fiscal expenditure and special income tax-reduction and thereby alleviate the downward pressures on the economy. In order for the Japanese economy to resume a self-sustained recovery, improvements in corporate and household confidence are vital. Hence, the overall economic activity and the effects of the economic stimulus measures should be carefully monitored. With regard to prices, wholesale prices continue to fall, and the year-to-year increase in consumer prices (excluding the effects of institutional changes such as the rise in the consumption tax rate) has been declining close to zero. As for the future, the downward pressure on domestic prices, induced by the decline in import prices including overseas commodity prices, is weakening. Also, the expansion in the output gap in the economy is expected to slow as the economic stimulus package is implemented. In the immediate future, however, prices are likely to weaken reflecting the present high inventory level and the relatively large output gap. In the financial markets, both long and short-term interest rates followed a declining trend with the releases of weak economic indicators. Yields on long-term government bonds have recorded a historical low and stock prices remain soft. The yield differential between bonds issued by the private sector and those by the government, as well as the so-called “Japan premium”, has remained at the relatively high level and shown no significant decrease, indicating the continuing cautious attitudes of market participants toward credit risk. With respect to monetary aggregates, the growth in M2+CDs, which had picked up from the end of 1997, slowed in March and April. Also, the growth in broadly-defined liquidity has been declining since the middle of 1997. 1 This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on May 19, 1998. 2 The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on May 19, as the basis of monetary policy decisions. Private bank lending remains sluggish. Although corporate financing via the capital markets and government financial institutions continues to expand, the increase in overall corporate financing seems to indicate a clear slowdown under the stagnant economic conditions. Banks remain cautious in extending loans with a view to improving their medium-term profitability and financial soundness. In the capital markets, the difference in fund-raising costs of firms has remained relatively large according to their creditworthiness. In such circumstances, some firms, especially small and medium-sized firms, have been facing difficult financing conditions and this influence on the economy continues to warrant a careful monitoring. * * * NB This BIS Review is available on the BIS World Wide Web site (http://www.bis.org). _____________________________
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BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 16/6/98.
Bank of Japan’s June report of recent economic and financial developments in Japan BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, 16/6/98. The Bank’s View1 Final demand remains weak and production continues to decline in Japan. As a consequence, employment and income conditions have recently shown a significant deterioration. With respect to final demand, public-sector investment seems to have bottomed out. Growth in net exports, however, has virtually peaked out as exports to other Asian countries declined. Business fixed investment continues to be on the decline. Private consumption shows little sign of recovery, although the deterioration has slowed. Housing investment has decreased further. Against the background of weak final demand, inventories have accumulated further and industrial production continues to decrease. As a result, corporate profits have worsened, and employment and income conditions have deteriorated evidently, as seen recently in the rapid rise of the unemployment rate. As for the outlook of the economy, the implementation of the supplementary budget for fiscal 1998 is assumed to boost demand through additional public works and special income tax-reduction, and cease the negative interactions of production, income, and expenditure. However, such positive effects of the fiscal policy may be weakened, if the ongoing rapid deterioration in employment and income conditions further dampens the overall economic activities. Therefore, the overall economic activities, including corporate and household confidence, should be carefully monitored. With regard to prices, wholesale prices continue to fall and consumer prices (excluding the effects of institutional changes) have declined slightly below the previous year’s level. With respect to the factors affecting the outlook, the downward pressure on domestic prices induced by the decline in import prices including overseas commodity prices has already weakened. Also, the expansion in the output gap in the economy is expected to slow in line with the implementation of the economic stimulus package. However, reflecting the present high inventory level and the relatively large output gap, prices are likely to be weak for some time. There may also be additional downward pressures if domestic demand weakens further. As for financial markets, rates on term instruments (for both spots and futures) have been generally steady in the money markets. Yields on long-term government bonds recorded historical lows from late April to early June with the releases of weak economic indicators, and are recently showing a slight turnaround. Stock prices have been slightly declining, indicating the weak market sentiment on the economy. Market concern towards credit risk remains strong, and the yield differential between bonds issued by the private sector and those by the government has been significant since the end of last year. With respect to monetary aggregates, growth in M2+CDs has been slowing and private bank lending remains sluggish. This reveals the fall in credit demand following stagnant economic conditions as well as the continued cautious lending attitudes of private banks. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on June 12, as the basis of monetary policy decisions. Meanwhile, some firms, especially small and medium-sized firms, have been facing difficult financing conditions in terms of both funds availability and fund-raising costs. This influence on the overall economy continues to warrant a careful monitoring.
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Bank of Japan communication, 21/7/98.
Bank of Japan’s July report of recent economic and financial developments1 Bank of Japan communication, 21/7/98. The Bank’s View2 Final demand remains weak and production has declined significantly. Employment and income conditions continue to deteriorate, and corporate sentiment is weakening further. As a whole, Japan’s economic conditions have deteriorated. With respect to final demand, public-sector investment seems to have bottomed out. Net exports, which decreased temporarily in the first quarter of 1998, have resumed to increase mainly due to a sharp decline in imports. Business fixed investment, however, has decreased significantly, and housing investment remains weak. Private consumption has shown little sign of recovery, although the deterioration has stopped. Against the background of weak final demand, the level of inventories remains high, and the decline in industrial production is accelerating. As a result, corporate profits have further decreased, and employment and income conditions have deteriorated conspicuously as seen in the fall in wages below the previous year’s level. Although the above indicates negative interactions of production, income, and expenditure, a further deterioration in the economy is expected to cease as the effects of the comprehensive economic stimulus package, including additional public works and the special income tax reduction, become full scale. However, given the current considerably low level of economic activities, the positive influence of the package on private demand will likely be limited, and the economy’s immediate transition to a self-sustained recovery is hardly expected. In these circumstances, measures to rebuild the stability of the financial system have been devised, and the reform of the taxation system is expected to be discussed actively. The materialization of these policies along with the effects on corporate and household sentiment should be carefully monitored. With regard to prices, wholesale prices continue to fall, and consumer prices (excluding the effects of institutional changes) have declined slightly below the previous year’s level. With respect to the factors affecting the outlook, the downward pressure on domestic prices induced by the decline in import prices is weakening. In addition, the expansion in the output gap in the economy is expected to slow in line with the implementation of the comprehensive economic stimulus package. Nevertheless, reflecting the present large output gap, the downward pressure from domestic factors is unlikely to weaken considerably, and hence, prices are likely to be weak for some time. As for financial markets, stock prices and yields on long-term government bonds have rebounded since mid-June 1998. This may be attributed to a slight recovery in market sentiment, although still weak, responding to the announcement of the Comprehensive Plan for Financial Revitalization, the so-called Total Plan, and to the emergence of expectations for permanent tax cut. In money markets, with the heightened awareness toward financial problems at a bank, concerns over credit risks of financial institutions strengthened once again, and upward pressure on interest rates suddenly mounted toward the end of June. However, with the ample provision of funds by the Bank of Japan and the announcement of the Total Plan, market anxieties settled down, and the upward pressure on interest rates gradually eased. With respect to monetary aggregates, growth in M2+CDs has been slowing, reflecting the sluggish private bank lending. These developments appear to strongly reflect the further decline in credit This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on July 16, 1998. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on July 16, as the basis of monetary policy decisions. -2demand of private firms with the worsening of overall economic activities, and the continued cautious attitudes of private banks in extending loans. Meanwhile, some firms, especially small and medium-sized firms, have been facing difficult financing conditions in terms of both funds availability and fund-raising costs. This influence on the overall economy continues to warrant careful monitoring.
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Bank of Japan communication, 8/98.
Bank of Japan’s August report of recent economic and financial developments Bank of Japan communication, XX/8/98. The Bank’s View1 Japan’s economic conditions continue to deteriorate. With respect to final demand, public investment seems to have bottomed out. Net exports have resumed to increase mainly due to a decline in imports. However, business fixed investment has been decreasing significantly, and housing investment has weakened further. Private consumption has not yet shown a resumption. Against this background of weak final demand, substantial production cutbacks continue. As a result, inventories have decreased somewhat, but the level is still high. With the decline in expenditure and production, corporate profits continue to decrease, and employee income remains below the previous year’s level. In addition, the ratio of job offers to applications has dropped to a historically low level, and the unemployment rate has increased further. As a whole, employment and income conditions have worsened. Although the above indicates a continued negative interactions of production, income, and expenditure, a further deterioration in the economy is expected to cease gradually from the effects of the comprehensive economic stimulus package including additional public works and the special income tax reduction. Given the current considerably low level of economic activities, however, the positive influence of the package on private demand will likely be limited, and the economy’s immediate transition to a self-sustained recovery is hardly expected. In these circumstances, the relevant bills have been submitted to the Diet to rebuild the stability of the financial system. Moreover, the new administration is planning to launch new economic stimulus measures, including additional public investment in the supplementary budget for fiscal 1998 and the reduction in personal income taxes and corporate taxes. The materialization of these policies along with their effects on corporate and household sentiment should be carefully monitored. With regard to prices, wholesale prices are on a downtrend, and consumer prices (excluding the effects of institutional changes2) remain below the previous year’s level. With respect to the factors affecting the outlook, the downward pressure on domestic prices induced by the decline in import prices is weakening. In addition, the expansion in the output gap in the economy is expected to slow in line with the implementation of the comprehensive economic stimulus package. Nevertheless, reflecting the present large output gap, the downward pressure from domestic factors is unlikely to weaken considerably, and hence, prices are likely to be weak for some time. As for financial markets, yields on long-term government bonds and stock prices rose toward mid-July 1998 reflecting growing anticipation for permanent tax cut. However, they have declined since then as a wait-and-see posture has prevailed among market participants with the growing attention to the concrete measures of the new administration’s economic policies. Meanwhile, Euro-yen interest rates and the Japan premium indicate strong market concerns regarding credit risks of financial institutions and liquidity risks at end-September 1998, the end of the first half of fiscal 1998. With respect to monetary aggregates, growth in M2+CDs has been slowing, reflecting the sluggish private bank lending. These developments basically reflect the further decline in the credit demand of private firms with the worsening of overall economic activities, along with the continued cautious lending stance of private banks. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on August 11, as the basis of monetary policy decisions. The rise in medical service charges due to the medical insurance system reform of September 1997. Meanwhile, some firms, especially small and medium-sized firms, have been facing difficult financing conditions in terms of both funds availability and fund-raising costs. This influence on the overall economy continues to warrant careful monitoring.
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Bank of Japan communication, 31/8/98.
Bank of Japan presents the summary of an article published in the August edition of its Quarterly Bulletin Bank of Japan communication, 31/8/98. Release of a Reference Wholesale Price Index Using a Geometric Mean Formula Introduction In recent years, concern about the accuracy of price statistics has risen in industrialized countries where the statistical bias in price indexes seems to have grown significantly while actual prices have generally been stable.1 The Bank of Japan has worked to improve the accuracy of its Wholesale Price Index (WPI) over the years, but many problems remain to be solved.2 One such issue is the formula used for calculating the index. Recently, the Bank decided to publish a reference WPI using a geometric mean formula (WPI-UGM) in addition to the conventional index using arithmetic mean method (Laspeyres index). Although the new formula may not succeed in removing the bias in the current index, the Bank considers that by publishing more data, it can provide users with more information about the possible measurement bias in the present WPI. In the United States, a report titled “Toward a More Accurate Measure of the Cost of Living” was submitted to a Senate Committee in December 1996 by the Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index (Boskin Commission). This report triggered a series of controversies over the accuracy of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Chairman Alan Greenspan of the Federal Reserve Board has frequently made references to this issue. In Germany, the Bundesbank published a discussion paper in March 1998 titled “Problems of Inflation Measurement in Germany: Non-Technical Summary” (Hoffmann [1998]). In Japan, too, a paper was published concerning the problem of CPI measurement errors (in Japanese, Shiratsuka [1995]). In general, problems with the accuracy of price indexes can result from (1) factors relating to the formulae used to calculate indexes, as discussed in this paper; (2) failure to adapt statistical samples properly to reflect changes in consumer preferences and distribution channels; and (3) failure to make appropriate adjustments for changes in quality of goods and services. In order to deal with (2) and (3), the Bank revises the weights of goods based on expenditure on individual items (expenditure shares) every five years, reviews and replaces individual items in the basket when necessary, and makes an adjustment for quality changes between old and new items at the same time. Quality adjustment for such goods as personal computers is made by applying an econometric method known as the “hedonic regression method.”
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BANK OF JAPAN COMMUNICATION, the Bank of Japan Annual Review 1998.
Bank of Japan’s annual review of monetary and economic developments BANK OF JAPAN COMMUNICATION, the Bank of Japan Annual Review 1998. Annual Review of Monetary and Economic Developments in Fiscal 1997 Summary Japan’s economic growth slowed during fiscal 1997.1 The economy, which had been on a recovery path, began to decelerate with the turn of the new fiscal year in April 1997, and became increasingly sluggish toward the end of the fiscal year. Final demand deteriorated toward the end of fiscal 1997. Until recently, net exports generally followed an upward trend and underpinned Japanese economic activities. In detail, real exports expanded, reflecting firm business conditions overseas - particularly in Europe and the United States - and also by the depreciation of the yen, while real imports remained virtually unchanged. However, net exports peaked out toward the end of fiscal 1997, owing to a decrease in exports to other Asian countries against the background of the ongoing economic adjustments in the region. Meanwhile, public-sector investment basically trended downward because of tight budgets at both the central and the local government levels. Business fixed investment maintained a gradual increase during the first half of fiscal 1997, particularly in the manufacturing industry. However, in the second half of the fiscal year, it seemed to have peaked out reflecting factors such as deterioration in corporate profits. Private consumption and housing investment were depressed from April 1997 mainly in reaction to the surge in demand ahead of the rise in the consumption tax rate from 3 to 5 percent.2 The stagnation became evident from autumn 1997 partly against the background of the deterioration in household confidence despite a moderate recovery temporarily observed around summer 1997. The stagnation in final demand adversely affected production, corporate profits, and employment condition. Accumulation of inventories was followed by an adjustment in production, resulting in a decrease in output in the last two quarters of fiscal 1997. Inventories in final-demand goods, including construction goods and consumer durables, began to accumulate in spring 1997, and this development expanded to producer goods in autumn 1997. Corporate profits plunged in the second half of fiscal 1997 resulting in a turn to decline for the fiscal year as a whole. Profits declined even at large manufacturing firms that had maintained steady growth up until that time. Under these circumstances, corporate sentiment worsened rapidly across a wide range of firms especially during the second half of the fiscal year, as indicated by the Bank’s Tankan - Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan and other statistics. Labor market conditions deteriorated in fiscal 1997. The number of new job offers turned to a decline particularly in the manufacturing and construction industries. The unemployment rate reached and remained around a historically high level in line with the increase in involuntary unemployment. In the meantime, the growth in wages and salaries, particularly overtime compensation and bonuses, decelerated, reflecting reduced production and worsening corporate profits. Consequently, the positive cycle of production, income, and expenditures that had supported the economic recovery during fiscal 1996 weakened from the beginning of fiscal 1997, exerting downward pressure on the overall Japanese economy. With respect to final demand components, the primary factor that weakened this positive cycle was the sluggishness of household expenditures. Fiscal year starting in April and ending in March. The consumption tax rate was raised on April 1, 1997. Household expenditures began to show a clear downward trend in early autumn 1997 despite a slight rebound in summer 1997 after fluctuations resulted from the rise in the consumption tax rate in April 1997. The decline in real disposable income due to the rise in the consumption tax rate and the discontinuation of the special income tax reduction can be cited as a factor behind the sluggish household expenditures. In the past, when constraints on household income intensified, a mechanism often functioned whereby growth in expenditures was maintained by the increase in the households’ propensity to consume (the ratio of expenditures to household income). This time, however, household expenditures were restrained reflecting cautious household sentiment, and this added to the sluggishness in final demand, leading to excessive inventory and its adjustment in the corporate sector. This development worsened labor market and income conditions in the household sector. It is difficult to quantify and verify the factors that have weakened household confidence. However, it is likely that the following factors contributed: (1) mounting anxiety regarding the future employment and income conditions as a result of a series of large financial institution failures; and (2) growing uncertainty regarding the future burden on households amid the recent active debate on the budget deficit and the reform of national pension systems. The stagnation of household expenditures also affected corporate sentiment and business fixed investment through the sluggish domestic final demand and deteriorating corporate profits due to inventory adjustment. Prior to the collapse of the “bubble” economy, brief periods of stagnant domestic demand were overcome through (1) active export drives by firms especially in manufacturing industry, which compensated for the weak domestic demand; and (2) an improvement in cash flow as a result of monetary easing and the positive lending attitude of financial institutions, which facilitated corporate financing and business fixed investment especially in nonmanufacturing industry. However, after autumn 1997, business conditions became severe due to the economic turmoil in other Asian economies, especially in Korea and the ASEAN nations, and the cautious lending attitude of financial institutions, due in part to weak stock prices and market concerns regarding credit risk.3 In addition to the weak household expenditures, various strong and persistent structural adjustment pressures on the economy can be cited as another fundamental factor in the economic stagnation. With such pressures, the economy, unable to resume a self-sustained recovery which started in fiscal 1996, stagnated, a result that was triggered directly by factors such as fiscal restraint and cautious household sentiment. The attitude toward expenditure and investment at large manufacturing firms facing so-called “mega-competition” remained selective. Nonmanufacturing firms were pressed to boost their productivity - which was said to be behind that of the manufacturing sector - amid the ongoing deregulation in addition to the balance-sheet adjustment following the collapse of the “bubble” economy. Turning to the industrial structure, the Japanese economy seemed to be still in the process of transition. There appeared to be no leading industry raising productivity and thereby creating additional employment, while in some industries employment adjustment pressure was intensifying. Prices (excluding the effects from the rise in the consumption tax rate) remained stable on the whole during fiscal 1997, although they softened slightly during the second half.4 Import prices rose sharply in 1996 but turned to a decline in the first half of 1997 reflecting the fluctuations in crude oil prices and the exchange rate of the yen. The prices remained relatively stable until the end of 1997, but began to trend downward once again reflecting the weakening of international commodity prices due to the economic crisis in Asian economies. Domestic wholesale prices seemed to be bottoming out during the second half of 1996 and the first half of 1997. Prices then softened from summer 1997, reflecting the weakening market conditions in materials-related ASEAN comprises Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Price data presented in this report exclude the effects of the rise of the consumption tax rate from 3 to 5 percent effective from April 1, 1997. goods due to stagnant domestic final demand and the accumulation of inventories, in addition to the fall in import prices. Corporate service prices in fiscal 1997 narrowed their rate of decline following the ongoing downward trend and have recently moved around zero compared to the level of a year earlier. Consumer prices (nationwide, excluding perishables) increased at a slightly higher rate during the first half of fiscal 1997. This is because commodity prices declined more slowly as a result of a decelerated influx of low-priced foreign goods. In the second half of fiscal 1997, however, the softening of commodity prices reflecting the decline in domestic wholesale prices dampened the increase. Furthermore, the 12-month increase in consumer prices has recently fallen almost to zero, excluding the effects of the rise in medical service charges caused by the medical insurance system reform of September 1997. With respect to factors affecting prices, the price decline phase of the second half of fiscal 1997 differed from that of around 1994-1995. During the 1994-1995 period, downward pressure on the overall prices of import-competing domestic goods intensified owing to the rapid increase in the penetration ratio of imports, particularly in manufactured goods. This occurred against the background of the industrialization of Asian countries other than Japan and the continued appreciation of the yen. On the other hand, in the second half of fiscal 1997, downward pressure on overall prices resulted mainly from the stagnant domestic final demand. There did exist downward pressure on domestic wholesale prices caused by the drop in import prices, owing to the price declines in international commodity markets triggered by the crisis in Asian economies. However, the penetration ratio of imports did not increase since the value of the yen was significantly lower on the whole than it was in 1994-1995. As for the effects of price declines on corporate activities, the decline in the prices of crude oil and other raw materials in international commodity markets in the second half of 1997 worked rather favorably for Japanese firms by improving their terms of trade, unlike the first period during which the import penetration ratio of final goods increased. It should be noted, however, that there were signs of a squeeze on corporate profits as unit labor costs and labor’s relative share in income distribution increased against the background of the exceptionally low nominal GDP growth rate, and the expansion of the domestic output gap accelerated due to the stagnation of final demand. It therefore became important to carefully monitor the effects of the sluggish domestic demand on corporate activities and employment conditions. As for land prices, commercial land prices generally showed a smaller decline as a clear distinction in profitability existed between land whose price had stopped falling and land whose value continued to fall from fiscal 1996 through the first half of fiscal 1997. Meanwhile, residential land prices virtually stopped declining. In the second half of fiscal 1997, however, commercial and residential land prices both began to weaken slightly once again, reflecting the stagnant economy. As for financial developments, while the Bank maintained its easy stance in monetary policy, some disturbances occurred in the financial system. Causes of the disturbances included the further drop in stock prices affected by a number of failures of banks and securities companies in November against the background of the prolongation of the efforts to dispose of nonperforming loans. As a result, there were some unstable developments in the market such as the rise in some interest rates reflecting pressure coming from intensified market concerns over credit and liquidity risks. Around the fiscal year-end, however, the market gradually regained stability as a result of an ample supply of funds injected by the Bank and implementation of financial system stabilization measures involving the use of public funds worth ¥30 trillion. Developments in market interest rates showed that both short and long-term interest rates increased slightly for a while after the beginning of the fiscal year and then turned to a decline through the summer, as the outlook for the economy became increasingly unclear. Then, in November 1997, market awareness of credit risk heightened sharply with a number of failures of banks and securities companies. Fund-raising costs of private-sector institutions - namely, interest rates on CDs and CP in the markets, and corporate bond yields in the capital markets - increased reflecting the expansion of the risk premium. On the other hand, yields on safer assets such as government bonds declined. The difference between rates offered in the interbank market also expanded according to banks’ creditworthiness, and the so-called “Japan premium” was imposed on Japanese banks in overseas markets. In response to such a rapid rise in interest rates, the Bank provided ample funds to the market in an effort to stabilize interest rates through various operations including the new bond-borrowing (“repo”) operations introduced in late November. As a result, the overnight call rate (uncollateralized, weighted average) regained stability at the end of November and interest rates on term instruments began to decline from late February. Yields on long-term government bonds, on the other hand, declined to a historical low of 1.49 percent in late March reflecting releases of weak economic indicators. During the same period, stock prices (Nikkei 225 Stock Average) fell around early January once marking ¥14,664, reflecting the cautious economic outlook and mounting uncertainty about the future. Stock prices later rebounded with fluctuations and recovered to ¥16,527 at the end of March 1998, reflecting implementation of the government’s stimulus measures including the use of public funds. Financial indicators such as monetary aggregates and lending also showed erratic movements after November 1997 reflecting intensified awareness of credit and liquidity risks among firms and households. The growth of M2+CDs, a representative indicator of monetary aggregates in Japan, remained stable at around the annual growth rate of 3 percent until early autumn, but rose sharply after November, marking an annual increase of 5 percent in February 1998, the first time in the approximately seven years.5 This reflected the shift of funds into M2+CDs from financial assets outside M2+CDs such as investment trusts, and also the buildup of corporate deposits as firms deposited the funds raised in advance by bonds and CP to secure liquid funds. From early March, however, the annual growth in M2+CDs fell slightly. Meanwhile, private-sector financial institutions showed stronger movement to reduce risk assets including lending in the second half of fiscal 1997, as capital constraints were intensified by the fall in stock prices just when risk management was being strengthened prior to the introduction of the Prompt Corrective Action. Nevertheless, a massive reduction in lending did not occur with a slight pickup in stock prices and the decisions on the injection of public funds toward the end of the fiscal year. The amount outstanding of private bank lending, however, decreased substantially after March, partly due to loan write-offs and liquidation. With respect to corporate financing, a rapid contraction in overall fund-raising by firms did not occur owing partly to the increase in fund-raising in the capital markets by firms with good business performances. However, from a microeconomic perspective, the unbalanced allocation of funds among firms intensified. In particular, firms with low ratings and small firms that are usually unable to access the capital market were considered to have experienced tighter financial conditions partly due to deteriorating business performances reflecting the staggering economy. As for lending by private-sector financial institutions, the lending attitude became increasingly restrictive due partly to intensified constraints on capital in view of capital adequacy requirements, and as a result exerted downward pressures on the economy through its effects on corporate sentiment and firms’ investment and spending activities. The significant influence of financial factors on the economy was one of the characteristics of the economic developments in fiscal 1997. M2+CDs = cash currency in circulation + deposit money + quasi-money + certificates of deposit. (Cash currency in circulation = the amount of bank notes issued and coins in circulation - the amount of cash currency held by financial institutions surveyed. Deposit money = the total of demand deposits among private and public deposits with financial institutions surveyed - the checks and bills held by these institutions. Quasi-money = the total of private deposits, public deposits less demand deposits with financial institutions surveyed. Certificates of deposit = those of private corporations, individuals and the public with financial institutions surveyed.) In the “Annual Review of Monetary and Economic Developments in Fiscal 1996,” the Bank pointed out that the momentum of the economic recovery firmed gradually during fiscal 1996, but this was not necessarily accompanied by an improvement in private-sector confidence.6 In fiscal 1997, in addition to the fiscal drag, the Japanese economy experienced diverse negative impacts such as failures in the financial system and the financial and economic crises in Asian economies. Thus, the recovery which had been proceeding since the end of 1993 was interrupted. It cannot be denied that economic entities’ confidence was damaged further. Results of various business surveys indicated that the recovery of economic entities’ confidence was further delayed. Factors behind the weak recovery in the private sector’s confidence were anxiety and uncertainty regarding the economic and social systems of the country, in addition to factors related to persistent aftereffects of the collapse of the “bubble” economy such as the financial institutions’ nonperforming-loan problem. The anxiety related to whether the current systems can adapt to the major structural changes facing the Japanese economy - such as intensified global competition and demographic changes in Japan toward fewer children and an increasing aged population - and the growing uncertainty caused by the unclear direction of future economic developments. In light of the above, there are several issues which must be dealt with for the Japanese economy to regain a self-sustaining growth. First, the critical task for the Japanese economy to be dealt with without delay is to avoid falling into a deflationary spiral induced by decrease in demand. In view of this aim, the government set out a comprehensive economic package on April 24, 1998 including special income tax reductions. Expeditious implementation of these measures and significant results are expected. The second task is to solve various problems that surfaced after the bursting of the economic “bubble” as quickly as possible and to restructure and enhance the mechanism of Japan’s financial system. During fiscal 1997, the government implemented measures to stabilize the Japanese financial system, which included the use of public funds. In addition, the recently announced comprehensive economic stimulus package incorporated measures to enhance asset securitization and real estate liquidation, and a systematic framework for the disposal of nonperforming loans was consolidated. Also, the Japanese “Big Bang” financial deregulation is being implemented beginning with the amendment of the law on foreign exchange and foreign trade, which came into effect on April 1, 1998. Under these circumstances, it is imperative for financial institutions to dispose expeditiously of their nonperforming loans as well as to reallocate their resources, in order to efficiently provide financial services that meet the needs of firms and households. Along with the efforts to review and to improve the indirect financing system, it is necessary to reinforce direct financing through the expansion of risk capital offered in the capital markets, thereby encouraging the optimal allocation of funds in the economy. Thus, the infrastructure for corporate accounting, disclosure of information, the system of taxation for financial services, and payment and settlement systems must be reviewed and improved expeditiously. The third task is to make steady progress in the reform of Japan’s economic structure through measures such as deregulation and revision of the taxation system. The relaxation and abolition of various economic regulations would bring about higher productivity and economic growth rates in the long run by creating demand and promoting effective resource allocation among industries and firms. Also, a revision of the taxation system aimed at improving the return on investment and supporting the optimal allocation of capital should have positive effects on the overall economy. Restructuring of other economic systems is also required in order to smoothly shift resources. For example, the current employment system should be reviewed to promote mobility in the labor market. In addition, while efforts should be made to achieve greater efficiency in the public For details, see “Annual Review of Monetary and Economic Developments in Fiscal 1996” in the Bank of Japan’s Annual Review 1997. sector, a nationwide consensus regarding the direction of the social security system reform should be reached as quickly as possible to ease the deep-rooted concerns in the household sector over the future burden of social security costs. The diverse events that the Japanese economy experienced in fiscal 1997 demonstrated the importance of influencing expectations of various economic entities and to gain confidence among market participants in managing economic policy. In this regard, policy makers should strive to reduce the uncertainty concerning the outlook for the economy through improved transparency and consistency in their policy, while initiating effective measures in order to support economic activities of private-sector entities.
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BANK OF JAPAN COMMUNICATION, 11/9/98.
Bank of Japan’s September report of Recent Economic and Financial Developments BANK OF JAPAN COMMUNICATION, 11/9/98. The Bank’s View Japan’s economic conditions continue to deteriorate. With respect to final demand, public investment seems to have bottomed out. Net exports (exports minus imports) are increasing mainly due to a decline in imports. However, business fixed investment has been decreasing significantly, and housing investment has declined further. Private consumption has not yet shown a recovery despite the special income tax reduction. Against this background of weak final demand, production has been reduced substantially. As a result, some industries have shown improvements in inventory adjustments, but the level of inventories is still high as a whole. With the decline in expenditure and production, corporate profits continue to decrease, and the decline of employee income is accelerating somewhat. In addition, the ratio of job offers to applications records a historically low level, and the unemployment rate remains at a high level. As a whole, the employment and income conditions have deteriorated further. As the above indicates, there are continued negative interactions of production, income, and expenditure. Given the current considerably low level of economic activities, the economy is unlikely to transit immediately to a self-sustained recovery led by private demand, although a further deterioration in the economy is expected to cease gradually from the effects of the comprehensive economic stimulus package. Additionally, attention should be paid to possible negative effects on the real economy from financial developments including the recent fall in stock prices. In these circumstances, the cabinet approved a guideline on budget requests by ministries for fiscal 1999. This guideline intends to stimulate the economy by allocating ¥4 trillion to the special budgetary provision on the condition that the Fiscal Structural Reform Act is suspended. In addition, the bills to rebuild the stability of the financial system are being deliberated at the Diet, and the reduction exceeding ¥6 trillion in personal income taxes and corporate taxes is expected to be discussed in detail. The materialization of these policies along with their effects on corporate and household sentiment should be carefully monitored. With regard to prices, wholesale prices are on a downtrend, and consumer prices are lowering below the previous year’s level. With respect to the outlook, the downward pressure from domestic factors is unlikely to weaken considerably reflecting the already large output gap, despite the expected effects of the comprehensive economic stimulus package. Hence, prices are likely to be weak for some time. In the financial markets, stock prices dropped considerably in late August and still remain unstable, due to the heightened uncertainty over the problems with the financial system and the worldwide stock market plunge triggered by Russia’s financial crisis. Meanwhile, interest rate spreads, such as the rate differential between Euro-yen deposits and treasury bills, the Japan premium, and the yield differential between private and government bonds, expanded against the background of intensified market concern toward credit risks of Japanese financial institutions. Nevertheless, both long- and short-term interest rates declined slightly as a whole, which seemingly indicates that some market participants anticipated additional monetary easing. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on September 9, as the basis of monetary policy decisions. With respect to corporate finance, some firms are moving to resume securing on-hand liquidity against the cautious lending stance of private banks, although credit demand for real economic activities remains sluggish. Consequently, the issuance of corporate bonds and commercial paper continues to increase, and the private bank lending, measured by annual percent changes, has escaped further decline so far. In addition, the growth of money stock appears to hold back its recent decelerating trend. However, some firms, especially small and medium-sized ones, continue to face a severe environment in terms of both funds availability and fund-raising costs. This influence on the economy continues to warrant careful monitoring.
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BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, October 1998.
Bank of Japan’s monthly report of recent economic and financial developments1 BANK OF JAPAN, COMMUNICATION, October 1998. The Bank’s View2 Japan’s economic conditions still continue to deteriorate. With respect to final demand, public investment has bottomed out. Net exports (exports minus imports) are basically increasing mainly due to a decline in imports. Business fixed investment, however, has been decreasing significantly partly because of financial constraints, and housing investment has declined further. Private consumption has not yet shown a recovery despite the special income tax reduction. Against this background of weak final demand, production has been reduced substantially. As a result, some industries have shown improvements in inventory adjustments, but the level of inventories is still high as a whole. With the decline in expenditure and production, corporate profits are worsening rapidly. Furthermore, the employment and income conditions have deteriorated further as the unemployment rate marked a historical high and the decline in employee income has accelerated. In these circumstances, corporate perceptions of business conditions have worsened substantially and consumer sentiment has become cautious. As the above indicates, there remain continued negative interactions of production, income, and expenditure. With the effects of the comprehensive economic stimulus package and the recent monetary easing, the deterioration of the economy is expected to moderate gradually toward the second half of fiscal 1998. Nevertheless, the economy is hardly expected to recover immediately, judged from the strong negative interactions mentioned above and the financial constraints such as financial institutions’ cautious lending stance due to the nonperforming-loan problem. In these circumstances, there is an immediate need to rebuild the stability of the financial system. In this regard, bills related to financial revitalization have been legislated, and a bill related to bank recapitalization, including policy measures to strengthen banks’ capital base through injecting public funds, has passed the House of Representatives of the Diet. It is desirable that functions of and confidence in Japan’s financial system be restored based on these schemes. Furthermore, the government is devising plans for economic recovery, including reduction in personal income taxes and corporate taxes as well as additional public investment. It is important to materialize these measures promptly, in such a way that they not only have sizable direct effects on the economy but also contribute to restore corporate and household confidence. With regard to prices, wholesale prices are on a downtrend reflecting the expanding output gap, and consumer prices have fallen below the previous year’s level. With respect to the outlook, given the persistently strong negative interactions of production, income, and expenditure, the expansion in the output gap seems unlikely to cease despite the expected effects of the comprehensive economic stimulus package. Furthermore, the continued decline in wages and the recent appreciation of the yen may exert downward pressure on prices. Hence, prices are likely to be on a downtrend for some time. In the financial markets, responding to the further monetary easing by the Bank of Japan on September 9, short-term interest rates declined as a whole after mid-September. However, since the end of September, the Japan premium has expanded and interest rates on Euro-yen deposits This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on October 13, 1998. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on October 13, as the basis of monetary policy decisions. have rebounded slightly reflecting intensified market concern toward Japanese financial institutions’ funding in foreign currencies over the year-end. In the meantime, due to heightened uncertainty over the economic outlook, long-term interest rates declined considerably. Stock prices continued a downtrend reflecting the concern over the worldwide stock market plunge, the further deterioration in economic indicators, and the persistent uncertainty over the resolution of the problems with Japan’s financial system. In October, stock prices recorded historically low levels since the bursting of the economic “bubble”. Meanwhile, in early October, the yen surged against the dollar with the emerged uncertainty over the outlook of the US economy. With regard to corporate finance, while funding needs for real economic activities seem to be decreasing, some firms, especially large ones, are seeking to secure ample on-hand liquidity to prepare for unexpected situations. Reflecting such increase in credit demand, the growth rate in M2+CD has slightly recovered since the summer of 1998. However, Japanese financial institutions have become more cautious in extending loans, facing up severe fund-raising environments and deteriorating business conditions of borrower companies. While especially large firms are steadily increasing the issuance of commercial paper and corporate bonds, small and medium-sized firms and relatively low-rated ones continue to face difficult conditions for fund-raising in capital markets. The influence of these severe financial conditions on business activities and on the economy continues to warrant careful monitoring.
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Bank of Japan, Communication, 1/12/98.
Bank of Japan presents summaries of articles published in the November edition of its Quarterly Bulletin Bank of Japan, Communication, 1/12/98. Profits and Balance-Sheet Developments of Japanese Banks in Fiscal 1997 Overview Operating profits of Japanese banks in fiscal 1997 amounted to ¥5.4 trillion, down by 14% from the previous fiscal year.1 This decrease was primarily due to the following factors: (1) the disappearance of a temporary increase in trust fees (income) of trust banks in fiscal 1996; (2) the modest fall in net interest income on domestic operations due mainly to narrowing interest margins; and (3) the slight decrease in gross profits on international operations as a result of the expansion of the “Japan premium” and the downsizing of overseas branches and subsidiaries.2 Transfer to the special loan-loss provisions (SLP) and loan write-offs including those in trust accounts3 amounted to ¥13.3 trillion, which is almost the same figure as the peak recorded in fiscal 1995.4 Due to a considerable amount of transfer to the SLP and loan write-offs, both recurring losses (¥5.2 trillion) and net losses (¥4.8 trillion) marked record highs.5 Risk-based capital adequacy ratios at end-March 1998 at many banks exceeded those at endMarch 1997. This improvement was due mainly to banks’ efforts to reduce their risk-adjusted “Japanese banks” refers to All Banks, comprising the member banks of the Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan (Zenginkyo), which consists of 10 city banks, three long-term credit banks, seven trust banks (excluding foreign-owned trust banks and trust banks that started business after October 1993), the 64 member banks of the Regional Banks Association of Japan (referred to as regional banks), and the 64 member banks of the Second Association of Regional Banks (excluding Hanwa Bank, which was liquidated in January 1998; referred to as regional banks II). Figures in this report exclude data for Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Tokuyo City Bank, and Kyoto Kyoei Bank. “Operating profits” signifies earnings from core banking operations and is calculated by subtracting “transfer to the allowance for possible loan losses,” “general and administrative expenses,” and “debenture issuance expenses” from the sum of “net interest income” (the excess of interest income on such items as loans and securities over interest expenses on such debts as deposits and debentures), “net fees and commissions” (net income on fees and commissions received/paid on funds transfers and other service transactions), “net trading revenue” (applied to banks with trading accounts; gains/losses on transactions for trading purposes such as trading-related derivative transactions and gains/losses on year-end valuation at market or fair value), and “net other operating income” (e.g. net gains related to bond and foreign currency transactions). The temporary increase refers to profits resulting from the write-back of the special reserve funds held by trust banks. Special reserve funds are accumulated to provide for situations in which the value of a loan trust falls below the amount of the principal. The ratio of required reserve funds to the amount of the principal was lowered from 3% to 0.5% by a revision of a government ordinance. Trust banks wrote off nonperforming loans in trust accounts, using part of the temporary profits in trust fees. The remainder of the profits was accounted as trust fees included in net fees and commissions in banking accounts. In accordance with the Loan Trust Law and the Trust Business Law, trust banks guarantee the principals of banking-type trusts (loan trusts and jointly managed money trusts). Therefore, loan write-offs in trust accounts are included in the total figures of transfer to the SLP and loan write-offs. The amount includes loan write-offs, transfer to the SLP, losses from the sales of nonperforming loans to the Cooperative Credit Purchasing Company (CCPC), and other renunciations of claims. Reflecting the fact that banks began to be allowed to value listed stocks at cost, losses from stock write-downs declined significantly. As a result, net stock-related gains increased to ¥2.9 trillion, three times higher than those in the previous fiscal year. Net stock-related gains/losses are calculated by subtracting the sum of losses from stock selling operations and stock write-downs from gains on stock selling operations. –2– assets and various measures taken by the government in December 1997 to stabilize the Japanese financial system. Although several years have elapsed since the bursting of the economic “bubble”, transfer to the SLP and loan write-offs reached levels as high as the peak recorded in fiscal 1995. This reflected the emergence of large corporate bankruptcies and the introduction of a new self-assessment system on banks’ asset quality to primarily determine appropriate loan-loss provisioning and loan write-offs under the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) directives. One of the key policies for Japanese banks will be to remove nonperforming loans from their balance sheets by such means as selling collateral real estate, in addition to steadily disposing of nonperforming loans and disclosing further information about their business. These efforts could moderate serious impacts of fluctuations in collateral real estate prices on the asset quality of Japanese banks, and thus ensure the reliability of the information included in their balance sheets, and finally restore market confidence in their soundness. In addition, the sales of collateral real estate enable banks to plan flexible management strategies; and reinvestment of the cash inflow from the sales will improve banks’ profitability. * * * Checklist for Risk Management (Revised 1998 Edition) Objectives of the Checklist The Bank Supervision Department of the Bank of Japan initially compiled the Checklist for Risk Management (hereafter: the Checklist) in December 1987. To provide examiners with guidance in reviewing the adequacy of risk management at individual banks during on-site examinations, the Bank completely revised the Checklist in May 1996, and it was distributed to financial institutions under the Bank’s supervision as well as to various other financial institutions in the belief that it could serve as a reference as they undertake initiatives to check and strengthen their risk management systems. Over the two years since the last revision, major revisions of institutional systems have been undertaken in Japan reflecting drastic changes in the financial and social environment, and in order to deal with the deterioration in business performance of Japanese financial institutions. Furthermore, consensus has been reached and various reports have been released relating to risk management in the international arena such as that of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, against the background of steady progress in financial deregulation and refinement of risk management skills. Meanwhile, as part of the review of its bank supervision functions accompanying the enactment of the Bank of Japan Law of 1997, the Bank Supervision Department revised and expanded the 1996 edition of the Checklist for Risk Management, and distributed the revised 1998 edition of the Checklist to financial institutions under the Bank’s supervision and various other financial institutions on June 19. With a view to securing transparency of bank supervision, the revised 1998 edition of the Checklist has been made generally available as much of it should be useful to nondepository financial institutions not directly subject to the Checklist (securities companies, tanshi companies, etc.), depository financial institutions not under the Bank’s supervision (some –3– shinkin banks, credit cooperatives, agricultural cooperatives, labor credit associations, etc.) and nonfinancial business firms.6 Major Features of the Revised 1998 Edition The new edition of the Checklist for Risk Management has been revised and expanded to reflect developments in the financial conditions and institutional reforms in Japan since the previous revision (May 1996), as well as international discussions regarding risk management. In compiling this edition, the Bank also considered and applied experience gained using the previous editions of the Checklist and opinions and comments gathered from financial institutions under the Bank’s supervision. The overall framework in the new edition is unchanged from the 1996 edition. The Checklist is categorized by type of operation (I. Management and Internal Controls, II. Lending Operations, III. Market Operations and Asset and Liability Management [ALM], and IV. Business Operations and Electronic Data Processing [EDP]). The sample questions for examining the progress in risk management of financial institutions under each checkpoint are organized starting from basic matters and progressing to technical details. Like its predecessor, the revised 1998 edition includes some items which even banks with advanced risk management skills require more time to achieve. The Checklist is therefore not a minimum standard by which all banks must abide; rather, it is meant to be used flexibly by as many financial institutions as possible as a guideline for their business operations. Concretely, items related to legal compliance have been largely expanded in Section I (Management and Internal Controls) to include important points such as whether the management fully recognizes the importance of legal compliance and takes the lead in establishing compliance awareness within the financial institution, and whether there is a systematic framework with concrete procedures for implementing legal compliance and whether it functions adequately. In its revision of Section I, the Bank considered and included the aims set forth in the “Framework for the Evaluation of the Internal Control Systems” released by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. In Section II (Lending Operations), a new item regarding financial institutions’ self-assessment of assets has been added in response to the introduction of the self-assessment system. Necessary amendments have been made in Section III (Market Operations and ALM) to deal with the inclusion of the trading account, with due consideration given to the “Principles for the Management of Interest Rate Risk” released by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. Application of the Checklist in the Bank’s Examinations of Risk Management The Bank’s examinations review both the strength of financial institutions and their risk management ability, which prevents the emergence of losses and sustains their soundness. The Checklist for Risk Management is used as a handbook by examiners when assessing the risk management capability of financial institutions. Simultaneously, with a view to smoothly carrying out our on-site examination of risk management and to have a sufficient exchange of opinions with the subject financial institution, the Bank requests the institutions concerned to evaluate their abilities using the Checklist at each examination. The full text of this article is available on the Bank of Japan website at www.boj.or.jp/en/index.htm. –4– Needless to say, financial institutions must take the initiative in establishing their own risk management system based on their own judgment, hence the actual system will differ according to the individual institution’s management strategy and business performance. In this sense, the Bank does not intend to apply the Checklist uniformly to all financial institutions, but will utilize it giving full consideration to the situation of each bank. * * * Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Markets Turnover Survey (April 1998) Outline of Survey In April 1998, the Bank of Japan conducted the Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Markets Turnover Survey. This survey is conducted once every three years by the central banks or monetary authorities of participating countries and regions, and is coordinated by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).7 The April 1998 survey was conducted by the central banks or monetary authorities of 43 countries and regions, which collected the data from approximately 3,200 reporting institutions in total.8 The Bank of Japan obtained the data from 255 Japanese banks, 101 foreign banks, 3 Japanese securities companies, 6 foreign securities companies, and 10 FX brokers.9 The BIS will aggregate and publish the data collected from participating central banks or monetary authorities on a global basis. In this survey, the foreign exchange transactions are classified into three instrument types, and derivatives activities are classified into five instrument types.10 Transactions of each type of instrument are further broken down by currency or currency pairs, category of counterparties, and location of counterparties (local or cross-border). The daily volume of turnover is adjusted for the local double-counting of transactions between The first survey coordinated by the BIS started in 1986 for foreign exchange activity, and the derivatives section was added to the survey in 1995. Participating countries and regions are as follows (the 26 countries and regions that participated in the previous survey are underlined): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Foreign exchange brokers are to report only foreign exchange transactions (including cross-currency swaps and FX options), and securities companies are to report only derivatives activities. Classification of transactions: Foreign exchange activities: Spot, outright forwards, foreign exchange swaps Derivatives activities: Interest rate-related derivatives: forward rate agreements (FRAs), interest rate swaps (IR swaps), interest rate options (IR options) Foreign exchange-related derivatives: cross-currency swaps, foreign exchange options (FX options) –5– two reporting institutions in Japan. Meanwhile, double-counting of cross-border transactions between two reporting institutions will be adjusted by the BIS. Thus, a simple aggregation of the results of all participating countries and regions will not be equivalent to the global statistics released by the BIS. * * * Regular Derivatives Market Statistics in Japan (Yoshikuni Statistics) (end-June 1998) Outline of Survey The central banks of the G-10 countries11 and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) have combined efforts to introduce new global derivatives market statistics based on the “Proposals for Improving Global Derivatives Market Statistics (Yoshikuni Report)” published by the BIS in July 1996. The data were first collected at end-June 1998. In this paper, the Bank of Japan releases the results of this first Regular Derivatives Market Statistics pertaining to Japan.12 The BIS will later publish the global results of outstanding derivatives positions of the reporting institutions. The aim of the BIS in implementing a survey on global derivatives markets is to increase market transparency and to facilitate monitoring by central banks of these markets in regard to the macroeconomic and macroprudential concerns through two reporting frameworks, the first being semiannual statistics on derivatives outstanding covering only primary dealers, and the second being triennial statistics on derivatives turnover and outstanding covering a wider range of dealers. This first release of the Regular Derivatives Market Statistics corresponds to the first, while the April 1995 Central Bank Survey of Derivatives Market Statistics13 and the succeeding April 1998 Derivatives Market Turnover Survey – whose results in Japan are also published at the same time – correspond to the second. The survey is based on the voluntary cooperation of reporting institutions, and 18 primary dealers participated from Japan (out of 75 institutions globally). The survey consists of data on consolidated outstanding derivatives positions (notional amounts, gross positive and negative market values) of the reporting institutions, broken down by four risk factors (foreign exchange, interest rate, equity, and commodity), instrument, currency, counterparty type, and maturity. The main features of the survey results for Japan are summarized in the following annex. For more details, please refer to the Bank of Japan website at www.boj.or.jp/en/index.htm. * * * Responses to Comments on the Proposed Revision of the Flow of Funds Accounts: The Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The results were released on September 30, 1998. For the results of the April 1995 survey in Japan, please refer to “Results of the Survey of Derivatives Market Activity in Japan” in the May 1996 issue of the Bank of Japan Quarterly Bulletin. –6– Bank of Japan’s Final Decisions on the Revision Introduction The Bank of Japan compiled the flow of funds accounts (hereafter: FFA) first in 1958, covering data for the years from 1954 to 1957. Since 1996, it has been conducting a study aimed at the comprehensive revision of the FFA. Based on this study, the Bank made provisional proposals on details of the revision in early 1997, inviting users of the statistics to submit their views and suggestions to the Bank.14 The comments submitted were generally in favor of the revision. They also indicated that users hoped to employ the new FFA as a tool for monitoring the effects of financial system reform (the so-called Japanese “Big Bang”) and the continuing internationalization of the financial market. With regard to the details of the proposed revision, some comments supported the Bank’s approach, while others suggested alternatives relating to such aspects as sectoral and transaction classifications, and the methods and format used for publishing the FFA. Substantial progress has been made with regard to the detailed treatment of Japan’s national accounts and the availability of data, both of which were not entirely clear when the provisional proposals for the revision were drafted. In conducting the study on the details of the revision since mid-1997, the Bank has kept these developments in mind and examined whether the comments submitted meet such criteria as (1) appropriateness of statistical treatment and datarecording methods; and (2) the usefulness of revisions based on those comments. The Bank has also reviewed issues that were still undecided in the provisional proposals. The Bank’s final decisions made through the above process are shown in tables, and this paper tries to explain the thinking behind them.15 Based on these final decisions, the Bank is now in the process of compiling the new statistics with a view to publishing them in 1999. * * * Year 2000 Readiness in the Financial Industry in Japan Introduction With less than one and a half years before the year 2000, various industries in Japan are currently making a wide range of efforts to address the “Year 2000 problem”. The Year 2000 problem arises because many computers and application programs recognize the year by the last two digits instead of four. On January 1, 2000, those computers and application programs will represent the year as “00” and may assume the year to be 1900 instead of 2000. This can lead to incorrect processing of date-sensitive calculations by computers, which may cause disruptions in computer systems. For details, refer to “Revision of Japan’s Flow of Funds Accounts” in the August 1997 issue of the Bank of Japan Quarterly Bulletin. In addition to the points covered in this paper, numerous minor changes were made from the provisional proposals. This paper covers only the major points, and detailed explanations of individual sectors and transaction classifications will be provided separately. –7– If computer disruptions materialize, the adverse effects on financial institutions will be substantial because financial institutions rely heavily on computers, for example, host computers for the main accounting systems and information systems, and decentralized systems (i.e. local area networks [LANs] and personal computers [PCs]). If a financial institution fails to achieve Year 2000 readiness, it may not be able to confirm or manage settlement dates or transaction data, calculate interest rates or carry out accounting procedures, which can be a potential threat to its fundamental business of taking deposits, extending loans, and carrying out settlements. There is a possible systemic risk if one financial institution or one payment and settlement system fails to achieve Year 2000 readiness. Banks and securities companies are mutually connected through various payment and settlement systems for settling transactions. If a financial institution fails to achieve Year 2000 readiness, the computer disruption could be passed on to other ones through their interdependence in financial transactions and settlement. If a computer failure due to a lack of Year 2000 readiness materializes in a settlement system, not only financial institutions but also end-users or customers will be affected because they may not be able to withdraw or transfer funds through cash dispenser (CD) and automated teller machine (ATM) networks. The Year 2000 problem could seriously affect the business of individual financial institutions as well as the stability of payment and settlement systems. The Bank of Japan, with the cooperation of market participants, is therefore promoting Year 2000 readiness of individual financial institutions and payment and settlement systems. This paper discusses how Japan’s financial sector is addressing key issues of the Year 2000 problem and provides information on its progress in achieving Year 2000 readiness.16 After an overview of the results of the Year 2000 problem survey of financial institutions conducted by the Bank of Japan in June 1998, the paper presents (1) plans for external tests of payment and settlement systems; (2) global initiatives taken by international organizations including the Bank for International Settlements (BIS); and (3) an upcoming issue. The paper focuses exclusively on the preparations being made by financial institutions and payment and settlement systems for the Year 2000 problem. It does not deal with preparations made by social infrastructures, such as telecommunications or utilities that support computer system operations, nor does it cover Year 2000 preparations of companies supplying host computers and software, although these deserve careful attention of financial institutions. * * * This paper was originally published in the form of a brochure on August 14, 1998. For inquiries regarding the brochure, please contact the Financial and Payment System Office (tel: +81-3-3279-1111 [x2954], fax: +81-3-5255-6752) or the Bank Supervision Department (tel: +81-3-3279-1111 [x6442], fax: +81-3-5255-6755), Bank of Japan, at 2-1-1, Hongoku-cho, Nihonbashi, Chuo-ku, Tokyo 103-8660, Japan.
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Bank of Japan, Communication, 17/12/98.
Bank of Japan’s monthly report of recent economic and financial developments1 Bank of Japan, Communication, 17/12/98. The Bank’s View2 The economic deterioration in Japan has moderated somewhat, mainly as a result of the increase in public investment. With respect to final demand, business fixed investment has been declining significantly, and housing investment continues to be sluggish. Private consumption, as a whole, shows some weakness. Meanwhile, net exports (exports minus imports) are basically on an upward trend, and public investment has started to increase considerably. Reflecting this development of final demand and some progress in inventory adjustments, especially in those of durable goods, the decline in production has been slowing. Corporate profits continue to worsen, and employment and household income conditions have deteriorated as the ratio of job offers to applications has recorded a historical low and winter bonuses are expected to decrease. Financial conditions are improving in some firms with the effects of the policy measures taken by the government and the Bank. Nonetheless, firms apparently cannot remove their anxiety about fund-raising conditions. Consequently, corporate and household sentiment remains cautious, and a recovery has not been observed in private demand. With the implementation of the government’s comprehensive economic stimulus package and recently launched emergency economic measures, the economy is likely to be underpinned mainly by public investment towards [= during?]the first half of fiscal 1999. Furthermore, the Bank’s monetary and financial measures and the government’s measures to alleviate the credit crunch are expected to take effect gradually. Nevertheless, an immediate self-sustained recovery in private demand is hardly expected since corporate profits and household income are deteriorating and the constraints from corporate finance are likely to persist for some time, owing to cautious lending attitudes of private banks. Moreover, attention should be paid to the effects of the appreciation of the yen since early autumn and the uncertainty in financial and economic developments abroad. To lead Japan’s economy into a steady recovery, it is important to prepare an environment where firms and households can regain confidence in Japan’s economic future by, for instance, promptly restoring the stability of the financial system. With regard to prices, reflecting the expansion in the output gap, wholesale prices are on a downtrend, and corporate service prices are weakening. Consumer prices have increased slightly above the previous year’s level, owing to the rise in prices of perishables. Excluding this effect, however, consumer prices basically continue to be weak. As for the outlook, the economic deterioration is likely to moderate, mainly as a result of the increase in public investment. Nonetheless, distinct narrowing in the output gap is hardly expected for the time being as private demand remains sluggish. Furthermore, the continued decline in wages and the appreciation of the yen since early autumn are likely to exert downward pressure on prices. Hence, the decline in prices, especially in wholesale prices, may somewhat accelerate in the future. This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on December 15, 1998. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on December 15, as the basis of monetary policy decisions. Turning to the financial markets, Japanese banks are successfully raising foreign currency funds necessary to cover a huge shortage at the year-end. Reflecting this, the Japan premium and Euroyen rates have peaked out, and the market’s anxiety, which had previously intensified, is gradually settling down. In the meantime, market interest rates on instruments maturing after the fiscal year-end (March 1999) are on an upward trend, suggesting continued concern of market participants over liquidity risk. Yields on long-term government bonds have rebounded since late November. Although stock prices considerably recovered after hitting the recent bottom in October, they have recently softened again. The yield spread (the government bond yield minus the expected earnings on stocks) remains extremely small or negative, reflecting market participants’ continued cautious outlook on the future of the economy. With regard to corporate finance, firms are further seeking to secure ample on-hand liquidity in fear of more difficulties in raising funds, especially toward the end of this fiscal year when the large-scale redemption of corporate bonds is scheduled. Meanwhile, private banks are continuing their cautious lending stance. In these circumstances, various policy measures seem to have prevented serious credit shrinkage: the enhancement of [the ?]credit guarantee system[s ?] contributed to a recent increase in loans to small and medium-sized firms; and the Bank announced the introduction of new measures, in addition to the continued ample supply of funds, to facilitate firms’ financing activities. Fundamentally, however, firms are still under severe fund-raising conditions. How corporate financing conditions towards the year-end and the fiscal year-end develop, and how such developments influence business activities and the whole economy, continues to warrant careful monitoring.
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Bank of Japan, Communication, 21/1/99.
Bank of Japan’s monthly report of recent economic and financial developments Bank of Japan, Communication, 21/1/99. The Bank’s View The economic deterioration in Japan is easing gradually mainly due to the increase in public investment. With respect to final demand, business fixed investment has been declining significantly, and housing investment continues to be sluggish. Private consumption, as a whole, remains stagnant. Meanwhile, net exports (exports minus imports) are basically increasing at a moderate pace, and public investment has turned to follow a distinct upward trend. Reflecting this development of final demand and the progress in inventory adjustments, the decline in production is slowing. Corporate profits continue to worsen. Employment and household income conditions have deteriorated as the unemployment rate has reached a new historical high, the ratio of job offers to applications remains at its lowest ever level, and winter bonuses have decreased significantly. Financial conditions are improving with the effects of the policy measures taken by the government and the Bank. Nonetheless, firms apparently cannot eliminate their anxiety about the availability of funds toward the end of fiscal 1998. Consequently, corporate and household sentiment remains cautious, and a recovery has not yet been observed in private demand. As for future developments, the increase in public investment is likely to underpin the economy toward the first half of fiscal 1999 with the implementation of the government’s economic measures. Furthermore, the Bank’s monetary and financial measures and the government’s measures to alleviate the credit crunch will remain in effect. Nevertheless, an immediate selfsustained recovery in private demand is hardly expected since corporate profits and household income are deteriorating and the constraints from corporate finance are likely to persist for some time due to the cautious lending attitudes of private banks. Moreover, attention should be paid to the effects of the continued appreciation of the yen since autumn 1998, and to the uncertainty in financial and economic developments abroad. To lead Japan’s economy into a steady recovery, it is important to prepare an environment where firms and households can regain confidence in Japan’s economic future by, for instance, promptly restoring the stability of the financial system. With regard to prices, reflecting the large output gap, domestic wholesale prices are on a downtrend, and corporate service prices are weakening. Consumer prices have increased above the previous year’s level due to the rise in prices of perishables. Excluding this effect, however, consumer prices basically continue to be weak. As for the outlook, the economic deterioration is likely to continue easing mainly due to the increase in public investment. Nonetheless, distinct narrowing in the output gap is hardly expected for the time being as private demand remains sluggish. Furthermore, the decline in wages and the appreciation of the yen since autumn 1998 are likely to continue exerting downward pressure on prices. Hence, the decline in prices may somewhat accelerate in the future. In the financial markets, a slight increase was observed in the Japan premium and Euro-yen interest rates both on three-month contracts, as these contracts mature beyond the fiscal year-end in March. In general, however, the premium is smaller and the This report is based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on January 19, 1999. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on January 19, as the basis of monetary policy decisions. –2– Euro-yen rates are lower than those on contracts maturing beyond the end of accounting terms in 1998. Between mid-December and early January, yields on Japanese government bonds rose further to reveal the market concern over the deterioration in the supply-demand balance due to the planned massive issuance. Stock prices weakened, reacting to the appreciation of the yen and the rise in the long-term interest rates. Although such movements in these markets appear to have reversed, the ensuing developments and their economic consequences require close attention. With regard to corporate finance, credit demand for economic activities seems to remain weak, although firms, particularly large ones, are further seeking to secure ample on-hand liquidity. Meanwhile, private banks are keeping their cautious lending stance as they face the worsening performance of borrower companies. However, the enhanced credit guarantee system has been actively utilized. Such government policy measures and the Bank’s new measures to facilitate firms’ financing activities have presumably contributed to easing the once seriously tightened credit conditions. Nevertheless, firms, especially those with low credit standings, are still subject to severe fundraising conditions. How corporate financing conditions develop and how such developments influence business activities and the economy as a whole continues to warrant careful monitoring. ***
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Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr Masaru Hayami, at the Kisaragi-kai meeting in Tokyo on 22/12/98.
Mr Hayami outlines recent economic conditions in Japan and gives his thoughts on the role of a central bank and its balance sheet Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr Masaru Hayami, at the Kisaragi-kai meeting in Tokyo on 22/12/98. I. Introduction I am truly honored to have this opportunity to speak to you. I will begin with a brief outline of recent economic and financial developments in Japan and then give my thoughts on today’s topic, the role and balance sheet of a central bank. II. Economic Conditions and Monetary Policy Management A. Current Economic and Financial Conditions Japan’s economy still remains in a severe situation. Recently, however, the pace of economic deterioration has moderated somewhat, thanks to increased public investment and exports. The decline in production has decelerated, reflecting some progress in inventory adjustment. With regard to financial developments, the temporary increase in concern over corporate fund-raising toward the year-end has eased gradually, on account of the government’s expansion of credit guarantee system and the Bank’s introduction of new market operations measures and lending facilities. Thus, there have been some bright signs for Japan’s economy. However, it is still unclear at this stage whether these suggest an escape from the current vicious circle, or just a pause before further hardship. The results of the December Tankan——Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan——published in mid-December showed that the majority of firms still had a cautious view of the economic outlook. The key to economic recovery lies in whether private demand can lead to a self-sustained recovery of the economy while the public sector is underpinning it. However, given the continued deterioration in corporate profits as well as employment and income conditions, developments in business fixed investment and private consumption require close attention. Prices continue to be weak, reflecting a widening output gap in the economy. Therefore, it needs to be carefully watched whether or not the implementation of the emergency economic package and other measures will have the intended effect of improving business and household confidence. In the financial markets, concern over credit and liquidity risks continues to exist. One manifestation of this is the market interest rates on instruments maturing after the fiscal year-end in March 1999, which are likely to remain high. Under these circumstances, the Bank will maintain the current decisive easy stance of monetary policy, and continue to do its best to support economic activity and financial stability. B. The Bank of Japan’s Balance Sheet The failure of some financial institutions in autumn 1997 was followed by increased anxiety about the stability of the financial system, which has had a dampening influence on economic activity. The Bank has responded to this situation by implementing a variety of monetary policy measures, including an additional lowering of the target call rate on September 9, 1998 and continued provision of ample liquidity under the relaxed policy stance. –2– The Bank has also taken the following measures in its money market operations. First, the Bank has injected large amounts of longer-term funds to ease the upward pressure on market interest rates maturing beyond the end of the semiannual accounting term in September and the end of the calendar year in 1998. This has caused the Bank’s balance sheet to expand by about 40 percent over the year. Second, the Bank has adopted some new measures to facilitate corporate financing, such as increasing commercial paper (CP) repo operations and introducing a temporary lending facility in November 1998. As a result, there has been a continuing rise in the proportion of private-sector debt to the asset account on the Bank’s balance sheet. Third, as part of its efforts to maintain financial stability, the Bank has expanded special lending since 1997 under Article 38 of the Bank of Japan Law of 1997. The function of these loans, which is to provide emergency liquidity to ensure financial system stability, has recently been taken over by loans to the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC). The Bank’s balance sheet has thus changed dramatically over the past year. The change is a reflection of the Bank’s constant efforts to combat the economic downturn and the increasing uncertainty about financial stability. However, the expansion of the balance sheet has also given rise to a significant number of questions and criticisms focusing on a perceived threat to the financial soundness of the Bank. I would therefore like to devote the rest of my speech to a fairly detailed examination of the Bank’s role and its approach to provision of credit, in light of the changes in the Bank’s balance sheet. III. Extension of Credit by the Bank of Japan A. The Role of a Central Bank and Its Balance Sheet Before explaining why the soundness of the Bank’s balance sheet has become an issue, I need to refer to the mission of a central bank. In brief, the mission of the Bank of Japan, the central bank of Japan, is to issue banknotes, ensure the functions of the currency, and contribute to the sound development of the Japanese economy. Perhaps “ensuring the functions of the currency” sounds a little too abstract. Specifically, the Bank must first ensure the stability of the currency’s value, and second maintain an appropriate framework for its circulation. Referring to these two requirements, the role of a central bank is often defined as maintenance of price stability and financial system stability. On a day-to-day level, the Bank seeks to fulfil its mission by engaging in banking activities that are similar to those of commercial banks. When the economy is experiencing inflation or deflation, the Bank tries to restore and maintain a non-inflationary and nondeflationary situation——that is, a situation of price stability——by influencing the quantity of money in circulation and the levels of various interest rates. The Bank achieves this objective by influencing interest rates in the financial markets. And this is done basically by supplying or absorbing the appropriate amount of funds through the purchase or sale of financial assets. Such activity by the central bank is called “market operations.” The same is true of the Bank’s activities to maintain an orderly financial system. When the stability of the financial system is at risk due, say, to failure of a commercial bank, the Bank of Japan acts decisively to minimize the ensuing disturbance by injecting funds into the system. The principal tool the Bank employs in such cases is lending. As with commercial banks, the activities of the Bank are clearly reflected in its assets and liabilities shown on its balance sheet. For instance, when the Bank drastically eases money in order to avert deflation, as is the case at present, the Bank increases provision of funds in the –3– markets by increasing its purchase of financial assets. This naturally causes the Bank’s balance sheet to expand. The key question is whether or not people will trust their central bank and be willing to hold the country’s currency (including banknotes, which bear no interest). This depends on whether or not the central bank’s behavior has measured up to the expectations of the people, and whether or not it continues to do so. One source of clues for making such a judgment is the balance sheet, and it is therefore natural that people in Japan and abroad take a keen interest in the Bank’s balance sheet. The Bank’s balance sheet can be discussed from various perspectives. From the viewpoint of people’s confidence in a central bank, it is most important that the financial assets the Bank holds are adequate to secure the banknotes issued. This adequacy, I believe, involves two specific points. First, the Bank’s assets must be sound and its financial base must be solid— —the latter means that the Bank must have a sufficient capital base——in order for the Bank to continue to act decisively as a central bank in total independence of intervention by a third party. Second, the Bank must have a sufficiently liquid asset portfolio to flexibly inject or withdraw funds as necessary. I believe that the Bank’s balance sheet has also attracted growing attention in other countries. Some observers have expressed concern over the expansion of the Bank’s balance sheet as a sign of deterioration in its assets. This may be because a rapid growth of the balance sheet is associated in people’s minds with an increase in nonperforming assets that need to be disposed of at a substantial loss. But as I stated at the beginning of my speech, setting aside technical factors, the recent expansion of the Bank’s balance sheet is primarily the result of active provision of liquidity under the easing policy. Nevertheless, mere suspicion about an erosion of asset quality can be a serious problem if it undermines people’s confidence in the central bank and, in turn, in the national economy. Such loss of confidence could, for example, result in Japan’s commercial banks and firms paying an unnecessary premium when raising funds in other countries. That is why the Bank recognizes the need to be vigilant against deterioration in its assets. The Policy Board, the Bank’s decision-making body, constantly deliberates whether the various measures implemented to fulfil the Bank’s mission could jeopardize the Bank’s credibility because of the resulting changes in its balance sheet. B. Three Key Principles of the Bank of Japan’s Portfolio Selection I will next talk about the philosophy that guides the Bank in portfolio selection——in other words, the key principles in selecting a central bank’s portfolio. There are three. The first principle is to maintain the soundness of the Bank’s assets. In other words, assets and collateral held by the Bank must be of high quality. The Bank has devised a number of methods to achieve this. When supplying funds to financial institutions through loans, the Bank acquires financial assets that are trustworthy as collateral. When providing funds through market operations, it purchases financial assets from financial institutions or other sellers based on repurchase (gensaki or repo) agreements. The only exception to this rule for market operations is when the Bank makes outright purchases of government bonds. Thus, the credits provided by the Bank are secured by the creditworthiness of plural entities: not only by the creditworthiness of financial institutions to which the Bank lends directly, but also by that of the government or the entities in the non-banking private sector, which are the issuers of the debt instruments. This approach is common among central banks. At the Bank of Japan, it is called “the double-name principle.” –4– Where the collateral for the Bank’s loans and the financial assets purchased in market operations are issued by such entities as private-sector firms, the Bank assesses the eligibility of these assets according to its own criteria——that is, its internal ratings——and reviews it at least once a year. If a firm’s financial performance deteriorated, the financial debt of this firm would no longer be acceptable as collateral or as an instrument of market operations, even if it had once been deemed to be suitable for such purposes. Of course, these measures alone are not enough. The double-name principle might reduce the probability of defaults, but taking a firm’s debt as collateral is not sufficient if the firm’s creditworthiness is bolstered by the support of the commercial bank to which the Bank of Japan is lending. Nor is it desirable for the Bank’s assets and collateral to be concentrated in the liabilities of firms in a particular industry. The Bank pays careful attention not only to the soundness of individual assets but the entire portfolio, ensuring that its assets and collateral are not exposed to linkages of risk or excessive risk concentration. The second principle is to maintain neutrality with respect to resource allocation. If the Bank held an excessive quantity of certain types of financial assets, price making and resource allocation in the market might be distorted. In view of its role in the economy, the Bank should do its best to minimize such influences. The supply of funds by the Bank of Japan in the context of monetary policy management is aimed at influencing the overall level of market interest rates. Furthermore, provision of funds for the purpose of maintaining an orderly financial system is aimed solely at containing systemic risk and preventing disruption of the entire financial system. The third principle is to maintain liquid assets. The assets of the Bank must be such as can be liquidated at reasonable cost whenever necessary. This is so that the Bank is ready to respond to any sudden policy decisions. In the management of monetary policy, if the Bank is to control interest rates in rapidly moving financial markets, it must be able to acquire or liquidate financial assets instantly in order to supply or absorb funds. The same principle applies to its provision of funds to maintain an orderly financial system. Asset liquidity is vital to the Bank’s capacity to make flexible policy responses while maintaining the Bank’s financial soundness. Bearing in mind these three principles that guide the Bank in its selection of assets and collateral, the Bank has made great efforts to adopt new market operations measures and review collateral requirements to accommodate current policy agenda. One example of this is introduction of new market operations tools to contribute indirectly to the development of financial markets. Another is the Bank’s “New Measures for Money Market Operations in Response to the Recent Situations in Corporate Financing Activities,” decided on November 13, 1998. As stated in the press release, the aim of these measures is to contribute to facilitating corporate financing activities by devising new methods of market operations and lending. IV. Some Related Issues Having outlined the Bank’s principles, I would now like to examine its approach in more specific terms by addressing some frequently asked questions relating to the balance sheet. A. Government Debt or Private-Sector Debt? The first question is whether a central bank should primarily hold safe assets such as government debt. Some believe that holding private-sector debt reduces the quality of the Bank of Japan’s assets, and that the Bank should buy more government bonds. In fact, the Bank already holds a very substantial amount of government securities. Its holding at the end of November 1998, including short-term securities (financing bills, or FBs), –5– amounted to approximately \52 trillion. This, together with the government securities worth about \5 trillion borrowed through repo operations, accounted for approximately two thirds of total assets. However, such a high ratio is not typical of central banks. In fact, the only central bank having a higher proportion of government securities in its portfolio is the Federal Reserve of the United States. The central banks in continental Europe primarily purchase private-sector debt such as bills and deeds in providing liquidity, and therefore government securities comprise a smaller proportion of their portfolio. The European Central Bank (ECB), which will administer a common monetary policy for the countries participating in the European Monetary Union from January 1999, will also accept both government securities and corporate-sector debt as eligible assets. Historically, the concept of a central bank dates from when the Bank of England evolved from a commercial bank into a central bank. The traditional activities of central banks have included provision of funds through the rediscounting of bills discounted by commercial banks. Thus, they have long successfully employed corporate-sector debt as collateral for supplying funds by adequately managing the risks involved, although this has not always been easy. Before large-scale issuance of government bonds began in Japan, the Bank of Japan in fact made active use of corporate-sector debt, especially bills, in providing funds. The important issue in the portfolio selection of a central bank is not the choice between government and private-sector debt, but rather the avoidance of distortions in resource allocation in the respective financial markets. Based on this principle, the Bank intends to make greater use of selected, sound private-sector debt as market operations instruments or as collateral when it deems this necessary to achieve current policy objectives, such as the development of new markets. B. Transaction Counterparties The second question is whether the central bank should make direct contact only with the banking sector, and influence the economy indirectly. Some argue that direct contact with the corporate sector is undesirable in that it creates a potential for arbitrary behavior by the central bank, or for the prolongation of the life of inefficient firms. This is a matter of principle of whether a central bank should limit its counterparties to banks, or whether it should also deal with the non-banking sector. The concern seems to have originated in the Bank’s active use of private-sector debt through such means as expansion of CP repo operations, which may have given the impression that the Bank is excessively involved in corporate fund-raising. But this concern appears to contain a slight misunderstanding. Although the Bank is indeed buying CP——which is a form of corporate-sector debt——through market operations, it buys the CP from financial institutions including banks, and therefore the counterparties in its operations have not changed. Furthermore, the Bank does not specify the individual CP issues to be submitted, but rather the counterparty financial institutions offer issues of their choice from among those deemed eligible by the Bank. Purchasing CP is no different from providing commercial banks with loans on bills in the sense that the Bank supplies funds to commercial banks by refinancing corporate debt. However, it merits consideration whether participation in market operations and other Bank transactions should be made open to non-bank entities. If we look at examples overseas, it appears that the ECB will carry out its market operations only with banks. In the United States, however, the Federal Reserve conducts market operations with so-called primary securities dealers, many of which are securities companies that do not have accounts at Federal Reserve –6– banks. A key point in considering this counterparty issue is whether the emphasis is on interbank transactions or open market transactions. If a central bank primarily conducts interbank transactions, the counterparty will naturally be the banking sector. Yet it seems that the global trend is a growing preference by central banks for open market transactions. In Japan, the Bank selects counterparties according to its own eligibility criteria from among banks, securities companies, tanshi companies (money market broker-cum-dealers), and other institutions that have accounts with the Bank. In the final analysis, I think that the rational solution to this issue is not to restrict counterparties to banks, but choose them from a wider range of entities in order to achieve swift and certain permeation of policy effects and adequate control of counterparty risk, while taking into account such factors as changes in the financial structure. It is certainly essential that the money market, where the central bank makes transactions, be sufficiently developed in both qualitative and quantitative terms. In this regard, Japan will soon have a fully fledged FB market with the introduction of a public auction system for FB issues. As such open market transactions expand, leading to diversification of financial services providers, the Bank will review its selection of counterparties in the Bank’s market operations. C. Corporate Bonds and Equities The third question is whether the Bank should purchase corporate bonds and equities in view of the critical state of the Japanese economy. This argument is based on the fact that the stock market was at one time supported by the public sector’s purchase of equities. It is also the view of the advocates of such intervention that, if the Bank is concerned about risks, it can ask for government guarantees. First of all, I would like to emphasize that a central bank can create liquidity but not capital. There is intrinsically a definite limit to the extent to which a central bank can take on private-sector risk. Assuming such risk and compromising the quality of its assets might impair the Bank’s credibility, which is needed to fulfil its mission. This is why the Bank of Japan Law of 1997, like the previous law, does not allow the Bank to buy equities, which are subject to large credit and price volatility risks. Accordingly, the Bank cannot purchase equities and judges that it should not provide funds in a manner that would involve a similar degree of risk. For the same reason, it also believes that it is inappropriate for the Bank to purchase corporate bonds outright and hold them until maturity. Placement of government guarantees is not a perfect solution. Although this would reduce credit risks, purchase of corporate bonds and equities yet involves another problem——it might lead to the long-term fixing of assets on the Bank’s balance sheet. For example, loans extended to the DIC are increasing rapidly, but the Bank cannot justify extending them for a longer term than necessary just because they are government guaranteed. The prolonged holding of such assets would reduce the Bank’s flexibility in money market operations. Moreover, if the balance sheet were left expanded, it would arouse concern about a decline in asset quality. In any event, the outcome would be an impairment of Japan’s credibility, which would force Japanese banks and firms to pay unnecessarily high financing costs overseas. In view of the current state of Japan’s financial system, the Bank is prepared to provide the DIC with necessary liquidity in order for the corporation to perform its role effectively. However, I believe that the DIC should subsequently secure longer-term funds by swiftly replacing the Bank’s loans with government-secured bond issues or commercial bank loans. The Bank must always be ready to carry out flexible money market operations and serve the function –7– of the lender of last resort whenever necessary. And for this, it is essential that the Bank avoid fixing the massive loans to the DIC on its balance sheet. V. Rebuilding Japan’s Economy and Financial System I hope my remarks today have been able to clarify some of the issues concerning the Bank’s balance sheet. Before ending my speech, since the end of 1998 is only a week away, I would like to discuss Japan’s policy agenda for the new year and emphasize the Bank’s commitment to it. The most important task for 1999, given the current state of the Japanese economy, will be to rebuild the economy and the financial system. The role of the Bank will be to work relentlessly to (1) support the rebuilding of the Japanese economy by maintaining the current easy stance on monetary policy; and (2) continue to supply sufficient liquidity to ensure the stability of the financial system. The fundamental problem confronting the Japanese economy is not a shortage of liquidity, but a shortage of capital and reluctance to take the risks that would help economic expansion. The cure for these, as I have stated many times, is firstly to strengthen the capital base of financial institutions and restore their financial intermediary functions, and secondly to act promptly to create in the capital market an environment that makes it easier for investors to take risks. As an essential first step toward improvement in these two areas, household and business confidence must be restored. In the currency field, January will see the debut of the “euro”. As a result, the world will have three major currency areas——those of the dollar, the euro, and the yen——each backed by its own giant economic sphere. Overcoming the aforementioned problems is a prerequisite to making the yen more usable and reliable internationally, enhancing its integrity. This is an extremely important step in accomplishing further development of the Japanese economy by utilizing the world’s capital and innovative management techniques. To repeat, the priorities in 1999 will be to rebuild Japan’s economy and financial system, and thereby lay the foundation for a globally credible yen. The Bank of Japan is determined to support these efforts through its monetary policy and financial system policy. * * *
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Bank of Japan, Communication, 16/02/99.
Bank of Japan’s monthly report of recent economic and financial developments1 Bank of Japan, Communication, 16/02/99. The Bank’s View2 The economic deterioration in Japan has become moderate against the background of the increase in public investment. Business fixed investment has been declining significantly. As for housing investment, housing starts are bottoming out but remain at a low level. Recovery in private consumption has been weak on the whole, although partial improvement in sales of goods has been observed. Meanwhile, net exports (exports minus imports) basically remain on a gradually increasing trend, and public investment is increasing considerably. Reflecting this development of final demand and the continued progress in inventory adjustments, industrial production, which had been on a downtrend, is leveling off. Corporate profits continue to decline. Employment and household income conditions are still deteriorating as the unemployment rate is at a historically high level, and winter bonuses have decreased significantly. Conditions in corporate finance are currently improving, but firms apparently cannot remove their anxiety about the availability of funds in the future. Consequently, corporate and household sentiment remains cautious, and a recovery has not yet been observed in private demand. As for the future developments, the increase in public investment is likely to underpin the economy toward the first half of fiscal 1999 with the implementation of the government’s economic measures. Furthermore, the Bank’s monetary and financial measures and the government’s measures to alleviate the credit crunch will continue to be in effect. Nevertheless, an immediate self-sustained recovery in private demand is hardly expected, since corporate profits and household income are still deteriorating and the constraints from corporate finance are likely to persist for some time due to cautious lending attitudes of private banks. Moreover, attention should be paid to (1) the effects of the continued appreciation of the yen since autumn 1998; (2) those of the recent rise in long-term interest rates; and (3) the uncertainty in financial and economic developments abroad. To lead Japan’s economy into a steady recovery, it is important to prepare an environment where firms and households can regain confidence in Japan’s economic future by, for instance, promptly restoring the stability of the financial system. With regard to prices, reflecting the large output gap, domestic wholesale prices are on a downtrend, and corporate service prices are weakening. Consumer prices have increased above the previous year’s level due to the rise in prices of perishables. Excluding this temporary effect, consumer prices basically remain weak. As for the outlook, although public investment is expected to increase, distinct narrowing in the output gap is hardly expected toward the first half of 1999, as private demand is likely to remain sluggish. Furthermore, the decline in wages and the appreciation of the yen since autumn 1998 are likely to continue exerting downward pressure on prices. Hence, prices are expected to remain on a downtrend. This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on February 12, 1999. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on February 12, as the basis of monetary policy decisions. In the financial markets, the Japan premium and Euro-yen interest rates (both on three-month contracts) remain stable despite the approach of the fiscal year-end. This reflects the abatement of the market’s anxiety about liquidity and credit risks of Japanese banks against the background of the Bank of Japan’s maintenance of a decisive stance on easy monetary policy as well as the formulation of the framework to restore the stability of Japan’s financial system. Yields on Japanese government bonds have risen again reflecting the market’s concern over the prospective expansion of fiscal deficits. In the foreign exchange market, the trend has been toward a higher yen. Stock prices continue to be weak. Considering that these developments can be a hindrance to an economic recovery, their ensuing developments require close attention. With regard to corporate finance, credit demand for economic activities remains weak, as a result of the significant decrease in business fixed investment. Firms’ moves to increase their on-hand liquidity in the face of difficult fund-raising conditions are gradually settling down. Although private banks have basically retained their cautious lending stance, they continue to actively utilize the credit guarantee system. As a result, the previously tightened credit conditions are easing somewhat. Nevertheless, private banks and capital market participants are still cautious of corporate credit risk, and thus firms with relatively low credit ratings remain under severe fund-raising conditions. The situation continues to warrant careful monitoring, particularly with regard to how corporate finance develops toward the end of the fiscal year. * * *
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Bank of Japan, Communication, 16 March 1999.
Bank of Japan’s March report of recent economic and financial developments1 Bank of Japan, Communication, 16 March 1999. The Bank’s View2 Japan’s economy, at present, appears to have stopped deteriorating. With the increase in public investment underpinning final demand, inventory adjustment has made further progress and production has stopped decreasing. With regard to final demand, business fixed investment has been declining significantly. Recovery in private consumption continues to be weak on the whole, although partial improvement in sales of goods has been observed. Housing investment remains at a low level but has obviously bottomed out. Net exports (exports minus imports) are leveling off, and public investment is growing considerably. Reflecting this development of final demand and further progress in inventory adjustment, industrial production has stopped decreasing. However, corporate profits have been declining, and employment and household income conditions continue to deteriorate. Although conditions in corporate finance are improving, firms apparently cannot remove their concern about the availability of funds in the future. Consequently, corporate and household sentiment remains cautious. As for the outlook, with the progress in inventory adjustment gradually paving the way for a recovery in production, the government’s economic measures and the monetary easing by the Bank would underpin the economy. In addition, measures to restore the stability of the Japanese financial system – especially the injection of public funds into banks – are expected to exert positive effects on the economy gradually. With respect to corporate activities, however, large firms in particular appear to take steps to full-scale restructuring over fiscal 1999, facing the continued decline in profits and the remaining concern about their financing. In the short run, such corporate restructuring may reduce fixed investment and discourage household expenditure through the resulting deterioration in employment and income conditions. Under such circumstances, it is still difficult to expect an immediate, selfsustained recovery in private demand. Overall economic developments require careful monitoring in consideration of the above points. With regard to prices, reflecting the large output gap, domestic wholesale prices are on a downtrend, and corporate service prices are weakening. Consumer prices basically remain weak. In relation to price developments in the future, distinct narrowing in the output gap is unlikely for the time being even though the economy appears to have stopped deteriorating. Furthermore, the decline in wages and the appreciation of the yen since autumn 1998 are likely to continue exerting downward pressure on prices. Hence, prices are expected to remain on a downtrend. In the financial markets, the additional monetary easing by the Bank on February 12 has lowered interest rates both on overnight call money and term instruments. In addition, the markets’ anxiety about liquidity and credit risks of Japanese banks seems to have subsided – This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on March 12, 1999. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on March 12, as the basis of monetary policy decisions. as reflected in a rapid contraction in the Japan premium – partly due to the progress in preparation for public funds injection. Meanwhile, the amount outstanding of funds in the call money market has decreased, partly because some institutional investors have shifted a part of their funds from the market to ordinary deposits. The shrinkage of the market has not led to any difficulty in funds settlement. However, close attention should be paid to developments in the flow of funds as unexpected changes may occur. Long-term interest rates have, amid nervous market sentiment, declined following the fall in short-term rates. Stock prices have turned to be firm against the background of the recent depreciation of the yen and the rise in U.S. stock prices. With regard to corporate finance, credit demand for economic activities such as fixed investment remains weak. Firms’ moves to increase their on-hand liquidity in the face of difficult fund-raising conditions are settling down. Meanwhile, private banks have basically retained their cautious lending stance, facing the worsening performance of borrower companies. However, severity in their fund-raising conditions has been alleviated, and their insufficient capital base is about to be increased. Under these circumstances, banks continue to actively utilize the credit guarantee system. As a result, the previously tightened credit conditions are easing somewhat. Nevertheless, the market is still cautious of credit risk, and thus firms with relatively low credit ratings seem to remain under severe fund-raising conditions. The situation continues to warrant careful monitoring, particularly with regard to how corporate finance develops toward the turn of the fiscal year.
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Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr Masaru Hayami, at the Research Institute of Japan in Tokyo on 18 March 1999.
Mr Hayami reports on recent monetary and economic conditions in Japan and elucidates progress toward the reconstruction of Japan’s financial system Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr Masaru Hayami, at the Research Institute of Japan in Tokyo on 18 March 1999. I. Introduction1 It is a great honor to be invited to the Research Institute of Japan and have the opportunity to speak to you. I will begin with a brief outline of recent monetary policy management and then give my thoughts on today’s topic, the progress toward the revitalization of Japan’s financial system. II. Recent Monetary Policy Management Monetary Easing in February 1999 On February 12, the Bank of Japan decided to conduct a further monetary easing. The new guideline for the Bank’s money market operations is to “encourage the uncollateralized overnight call rate to move as low as possible” while giving due consideration to avoiding excessive volatility in the markets. Let me review the economic situation at the time of the decision. The pace of economic deterioration had been moderating since last autumn, supported by the increase in public investment. However, economic activities in the private sector remained sluggish, and business and consumer sentiment was persistently weak. Moreover, the rise in long-term interest rates and the appreciation of the yen against the U.S. dollar since the end of last year had added to the downside risk to the economy. There was concern that, if these trends continued, the economic deterioration would not come to a halt, possibly accelerating once again in the future. In light of these developments, the Bank judged that it would be appropriate to give maximum support to economic activity through monetary policy. There have been some changes in the financial market since the monetary easing. The overnight call rate has fallen, recently to close to zero percent, reflecting the Bank’s provision of ample funds to the market. Money market interest rates on instruments with relatively long maturities, such as one month and three months, have also declined considerably. In addition, long-term interest rates have marked a clear decline, although the monetary easing was probably not the only factor involved. The yen has generally followed a downward trend. Stock prices, as measured by the Nikkei 225 Stock Average, have recovered to around \16,000. We believe that, if these trends in the financial markets continue, they will influence the economy positively through an improvement in returns on investment, a further alleviation of the fund-raising conditions of financial institutions and firms, and a recovery in business and household confidence. Concurrently, measures such as the injection of public funds into major banks are likely to further advance the reconstruction of Japan’s financial system. Also, the effects of the emergency economic package are expected to come out more fully. I strongly hope that the Bank’s latest monetary easing, combined with these policy measures, will give substantial support to economic activity. Given the recent drop in the overnight call rate to close to zero, some market participants have come to think that the Bank of Japan has decided to employ an approach different from past easings, a socalled quantitative monetary expansion. What I would like to emphasize is that interest rates and quantity of money are like two sides of the same coin. It is only natural for the Bank to expect the This article is excerpted and translated from the speech given in Japanese. latest monetary easing to lead to an increase in money stock and other monetary aggregates through changes in the behavior of financial institutions and in demand for funds. And this is nothing more than the normal transmission that the Bank expected with any interest rate cut in the past. The Bank’s intention has merely been to carry out money market operations in accordance with the current monetary policy guideline decided by the Policy Board, which states that the Bank should encourage the uncollateralized overnight call rate to “move as low as possible.” Of course, the Bank will continue to closely study other possible ways of managing monetary policy. I would like to emphasize, however, that at present the target of policy management is, as it has always been, the overnight call rate, and that the Bank’s aim now is to bring this rate down to as low a level as possible. In inducing declines in the overnight call rate, the Bank is giving, and will continue to give, due consideration to the maintenance of market functions. The recent decline in the overnight call rate has encouraged institutional investors to shift part of their funds to ordinary deposits at banks, thereby causing an approximately 20 percent decrease in the outstanding transaction volume of the call money market. Fortunately, this contraction of the call money market has not hindered smooth settlement of funds. However, considering the recent big changes in the flow of funds, it will be necessary for the Bank to carefully monitor market developments to make sure that they do not impair the proper functioning of the money market. Problems Associated with Government Bond Operations by a Central Bank — Underwriting and Increasing of Outright Purchases A number of people have suggested that the Bank underwrite Japanese government bonds (JGBs) or increase its outright purchase of JGBs in easing monetary policy. As I have repeatedly stated, however, it is totally unacceptable for a central bank to adopt measures that could lead to unlimited financing of the fiscal deficit or ones that could be interpreted as such. As you know, the Bank’s basic stance on the outright purchase of JGBs is to keep the amount of operations roughly in line with the long-term trend in increase in banknotes. At present, such operations are carried out twice a month, each in the amount of \200 billion. If the Bank were to change its stance and expand the outright purchase of JGBs without limit, it could very well result in the loss of fiscal discipline, just as could happen with the Bank’s underwriting of JGBs. If a central bank made unlimited purchases of JGBs, the government would of course have no difficulty in funding its fiscal deficit no matter how massive. This would encourage both the public and private sectors to rely on greater-than-necessary stimulative measures financed by a large-scale issuance of JGBs even at the slightest sign of weakness in the economic outlook. Should such massive JGB issuance continue, Japan’s economy would only end up having a massive fiscal deficit and an extremely weak supply side in the private sector. Various shocks are inherent in an economy. Even though there is no need at the moment to consider the risk of inflation, we cannot rule out the possibility of some kind of a “demand shock” occurring over the longer term, such as a plunge of the yen and a tightening of global market conditions. If such a shock hits the economy when the supply side of the economy is feeble, firms will be apt to seek desperately the few skilled workers capable of handling new technology, rush to secure rare materials, or race to invest in plants and equipment in order to seize suddenly appearing business opportunities. Supply shortage, by fueling such a nervous psychology, might intensify inflationary pressure even before economic conditions improve noticeably. To contain such inflationary pressure, it would be necessary to drastically tighten monetary policy. As a result, the economy would be forced to go through severe adjustments. The risk of inflation causing a wide swing of the economy can only materialize in the distant future, but the Bank of Japan, being responsible for maintaining price stability, must always be fully alert to such a risk. It is this strong commitment to maintaining price stability over time that makes monetary policy that could lead to the loss of fiscal discipline unacceptable. It may be argued that the Bank should disregard the possibility of future inflation at such a time when Japan’s economy is plagued by the risk of deflation. On this point, I would like to stress that the Bank of Japan shares the view that inflation is not at all an immediate threat. We are fully aware that the top priority for Japan’s economy at present is to dispel the deflationary psychology. It is precisely for this purpose that the Bank further relaxed its monetary policy in February, and the Bank believes that as of now it has taken all necessary measures. The Bank is also determined to maintain an easy monetary policy stance until the economy gets back on a steady recovery path. In doing so, the Bank of Japan will avoid employing monetary policy measures that might encourage unwarranted expansion of the fiscal deficit, with unwelcome results of some kind in the future. Instead, the Bank will underpin economic activity on the monetary front while maintaining the discipline of a central bank at all times. The reason independence is essential to a central bank is that it is expected to act constantly with a view to stabilizing even the future value of money, not being swayed by short-sighted concerns. The Bank believes that what it should do now is to provide the market with ample funds and, at the same time, take great care to avoid the risk of future inflation. The Importance of Structural Reform What needs to be done for Japan’s economy today is to strengthen the supply side of the economy by restoring the productivity of the private sector, which declined after the collapse of the “bubble.” This should be achieved while monetary and fiscal policies are underpinning the economy, which means that the time limit may not be so far away. If policies to stimulate aggregate demand continued to be implemented without any progress in structural reforms that should renew the private sector, Japan’s economy would become increasingly inefficient and its productivity would decline further. Such an economy would be vulnerable to shocks that could lead to vicious inflation. In order to achieve sustainable economic growth without people anticipating inflation, the private sector should be continually revitalized through innovations and expansion of business frontiers. One obvious example of this is the U.S. economy, which has enjoyed eight years of uninterrupted expansion. Firms in various industries are becoming increasingly decisive in disposing of the “negative legacies” inherited from the “bubble” economy in their accounting-year-end settlement in March 1999. These moves can be taken as indicating firms’ determination to launch drastic restructuring, and the Bank considers them as a necessary step for reviving the economy. If these efforts to part from the past are accompanied by moves to enhance future activity, it should lead to the ideal picture, in which both structural adjustment of industry and an overall economic recovery are achieved smoothly. The problem, as things stand today, is the persistence of the risk that the rapid disposal of “negative legacies” will proceed in the absence of sufficient constructive moves, strengthening the deflationary tone of the economy. However, various efforts are starting to be made by firms and the government toward structural reform, and I hope such efforts will gradually bear fruit. The dynamic process of divesting the economy of its old systems and giving birth to new ones unavoidably involves great uncertainties. Therefore, it is also essential to reconstruct Japan’s financial system as promptly as possible to support the activities of firms facing this dynamic process. Bearing in mind the significance of financial system reconstruction, I would now like to talk about the Bank’s thoughts on this issue. III. Progress Toward the Reconstruction of Japan’s Financial System A. The Current Condition of Japan’s Financial System It has been approximately nine years since Japanese stock prices peaked in late 1989 and approximately seven years since land prices began to fall. Meanwhile, a vast amount of money has been used to tackle the nonperforming-loan problem of financial institutions. It is truly regrettable that this problem has not been completely resolved as yet. Today, the linkage between financial markets in Japan and abroad has strengthened significantly due to the unprecedentedly rapid globalization and computerization of financial services. Therefore, once a shock arises in one market, there is very serious risk that it will infect other markets. This is precisely why not only Japan but also other countries desire an early solution of Japan’s nonperforming-loan problem and the restoration of the credibility of Japan’s financial system. Needless to say, the parties concerned have made very great efforts to resolve the problem. In fact, with the enactment of the Financial Function Reconstruction Law and the Financial Function Early Strengthening Law of 1998, great progress has been made in establishing an institutional framework. The stage is now set for the actual task of unflinchingly cleaning up the nonperforming loans. I have repeatedly stressed the need for enhancing the capital base of Japanese financial institutions, based on my thinking that the fundamental issue behind the deterioration in the credibility of individual institutions and the financial system as a whole is insufficient capital. In this regard, I truly appreciate the government’s decision to inject large amounts of public funds into major banks as a significant step toward restoring the credibility of financial institutions. This alone, however, is not enough to solve the problem. The Bank strongly hopes and expects that financial institutions will continue to do their utmost to remove nonperforming loans from their balance sheets and also to restructure their businesses within the context of the restructuring of the entire financial sector. In the past several years, the United States and Europe have witnessed large-scale mergers and business tie-ups of financial institutions, which illustrate the dynamic competition in the global financial market. There have been mergers and alliances across business and national boundaries in efforts to respond to European unification or to enter new business areas. Meanwhile, similar moves in Japan have been limited. However, the very recent trend toward diverse alliances and reorganizations, which was in part triggered by the injection of public funds, merits attention. It is clear that financial services are becoming greatly diversified driven by deregulation and innovation in information technology. Under these circumstances, the management of financial institutions is required more than ever to establish effective strategies for selection of areas in which they can find comparative advantage and invest management resources, and for efficient supplementation of their weak business areas. In order to achieve corporate objectives, it may be more effective in certain instances not to limit alliance partners to Japanese institutions. These considerations, in my view, should lead to still greater reorganization of the global financial community. B. Lessons Learned from Experience One of the most important issues for Japan today is how to establish an efficient and stable financial system that can fully perform financial intermediation as well as other functions required in the 21st century. Japan is still in the process of resolving the nonperforming-loan problem. Therefore, the lessons that will ultimately be learned from it is not yet known. Nevertheless, I believe it is meaningful to go over the lessons we have learned to date from our experiences in order to successfully build a new financial system. In my view, we have learned that Japan should have reviewed its principles to place emphasis on risk management and should have utilized the market mechanism much sooner than it actually did, in response to the changes in the conditions surrounding financial industry. Now, in order to catch up with the rest of the world, Japan needs to accelerate this review of principles. The first concrete factor behind the delay in the review of principles was the inadequacy of the risk management systems of Japanese financial institutions. During the “bubble” economy in the late 1980s, Japanese financial institutions expanded their lending in pursuit of larger profits without satisfactory risk management systems. In retrospect, the insufficient scrutiny of the possibility of land price declines and concentration of loan exposure to the real estate-related industry were manifestations of the absence of basic credit risk management. During this period, major financial institutions overseas were in fierce competition to improve their risk management techniques not only for credit risk but also for market risk. The great damage Japanese financial institutions suffered after the collapse of the “bubble” economy merely exposed their inadequate risk management. The second factor was the ineffectiveness of the market’s checks and balances, or put another way, the deficiency of a system that should encourage the working of this mechanism. One reason for this was the extremely cautious stance of the parties concerned toward disclosure. For example, the prevalent view until not so long ago was that disclosing the amount of nonperforming loans required careful consideration because it might destabilize the financial system. The accounting system and accounting practices have also tended to obscure the actual business condition of financial institutions. These increased the opaqueness of management of financial institutions and, contrary to the expectations of the parties concerned, spurred the deterioration in the credibility of Japan’s financial system as a whole. The third factor was the monetary authorities’ insufficient response to the changes in the financial markets. We had historically relied on detailed regulations and one-on-one guidance to financial institutions in maintaining the stability of the financial system. It is true that these methods had worked for a long time. However, it also seems that they allowed Japanese financial institutions to be indifferent to risk management and to their own responsibilities, and encouraged their “do-aseveryone-else-does” philosophy. Under this so-called “convoy system,” Japanese financial institutions offered very similar financial services. It is a fact that there was little incentive to differentiate themselves from their rivals. There was no competition, and even if a financial institution developed a new product, the regulatory system tended to prevent the innovator profiting as he deserved. The conventional principles might have remained viable, had the financial industry remained static. However, innovation in financial technologies has been dramatic. It is no longer possible for a fine-meshed net of regulations to keep up with the rapidly evolving financial transactions and markets, and to ensure unaided the soundness of financial institutions. This is why it is necessary to establish new principles based on self-responsibility and on the market mechanism. C. Establishment of New Principles 1. Issues toward April 2001 At present, the Japanese government provides a comprehensive safety net to the financial system effective until March 31, 2001. The safely net is composed of (1) a framework to recapitalize financial institutions with public funds; (2) full protection of deposits and other financial institution liabilities; and (3) a scheme to establish bridge banks or temporarily nationalize troubled banks. These measures are essential given the current severe situation of the Japanese financial system. However, we believe that unnecessary prolongation of these measures will be inappropriate, because they have the potential of causing (1) an increase in social cost, including the amount of public funds used; moral hazard on the part of depositors and financial institutions; and (3) further delays in solving the nonperforming-loan problem. Moreover, they are totally incompatible with the principles of Japan’s financial “Big Bang,” which are “free, fair, and global.” I do not mean to say that from April 1, 2001 onward resolution of financial institution failures should in every case involve execution of the so-called “payoff,” that is, payment of deposit insurance benefits. What is important as we move toward April 2001 is for individual financial institutions to improve the quality of their balance sheets and strengthen their capital base. At the same time, we must design and build a safety net based on the new principles of financial business, which I will discuss in more detail later, and also on the lessons learned from past examples of financial institution failures. The scheme should incur the minimum social and economic costs, be able to promptly solve problems, and fit the financial system of the 21st century. 2. Emphasis on risk management The foremost among the new principles is to place emphasis on risk management. As suggested by the expansion of derivatives transactions, financial transactions are sure to continue to undergo rapid changes. Especially for major banks that are exposed to keen competition in international financial markets, adequate risk management will require constant efforts to keep up with financial innovation. Needless to say, the management of financial institutions needs to fully understand the substance and nature of the information derived from the risk management system, and effectively use the information in making its management decisions. 3. Utilization of the market mechanism The second is to utilize the checks and balances of the market and to build into the financial system a mechanism that ensures the system’s stability. A prerequisite for this is disclosure of more information to the market, which means more transparent financial institution management. In this regard, it is most important to revise the accounting system. Assessment criteria for nonperforming loans and standards for loan write-offs and loan-loss provisioning are now under review. At the same time, vigorous preparations must also be made for mark-to-market accounting, which is soon to be introduced. The new accounting system is expected to increase the transparency of the balance sheet of financial institutions. Furthermore, it is expected to make financial institutions aware of the risks they are taking by helping them better understand their own financial condition. For greater transparency of financial institution management, as the Bank has been stressing for some time now, voluntary expansion of the scope of disclosure of an institution’s financial condition is also important. Enhanced disclosure may at times mean forcing financial institutions to reveal their unsolved problems. Even so, past experiences teach us that it is more effective in securing the trust of the market to honestly admit the existence of problems and declare how such problems will be solved than to conceal such information. It is also important for the management to explain in its own words the management policy in order to win the trust of the market. Financial institutions should consider disclosure not as a duty but as an opportunity to earn a good reputation with the public, and make active use of such opportunities. Once a pioneering financial institution makes such disclosure, others will follow suit or even improve the content of the disclosure. This will unleash a dynamic competitive process. Utilization of the market mechanism and increased sophistication of risk management will provide a means of detecting a deterioration in the health of financial institutions. It will therefore not only reduce the cost of regulating and supervising financial institutions but should also lessen the burden on the safety net by preventing failures. D. Response of the Bank of Japan The Bank of Japan believes that it has done its best to counter financial institutions’ nonperformingloan problem within the existing institutional frameworks by, among other things, fulfilling its role as the lender of last resort. However, the Bank needs to continue to examine unceasingly the role a central bank should play based on its experiences in battling the present financial crisis. 1. The failure of Nippon Credit Bank From this perspective, the first incident we should examine carefully, I believe, is the case of Nippon Credit Bank. The temporary nationalization of this failed bank is likely to cause the Bank of Japan to lose the \80 billion it subscribed to the bank’s capital through the New Financial Stabilization Fund. In April 1997, when Nippon Credit Bank drew up its restructuring plan, there was no safety net with which to deal with its management problems. Nor was there a consensus that bank debentures could be protected by the deposit insurance system. Accordingly, there was a strong concern that, if the bank failed, it would seriously disrupt the financial system at home and abroad. The Bank of Japan therefore made a difficult decision to use the New Financial Stabilization Fund. I believe that this was the only choice the Bank had to safeguard the financial system. Unfortunately, subsequent developments have made it quite probable that the money subscribed by the Bank of Japan could be lost. The Bank regards this as a grave situation. Based on this experience, the Bank believes that it has to further clarify its policy on the provision of funds for the purpose of maintaining an orderly financial system. Specifically, the Bank will have to define in more detail the criteria for assessing the fulfilment of the existing four conditions for funds provision: (1) there is a threat of systemic risk materializing; (2) there is no alternative to the provision of central bank funds; (3) appropriate measures will be taken to prevent moral hazard; and (4) the financial soundness of the Bank of Japan will not be impaired. Now that a safety net, including a scheme to enhance the capital base of institutions with public funds, is in place, the Bank of Japan should be even more discreet in its capital subscription, or the provision of risk capital. The Bank has learned valuable lessons from the disturbances in the financial system associated with the birth and collapse of the “bubble” economy and from its own responses to the disturbances, including the failure of Nippon Credit Bank. These lessons will always be remembered by the Bank of Japan and referred to in making decisions in the future. I believe this is a responsibility assigned to us by the new Bank of Japan Law, which came into effect in April 1998. 2. Review of the Bank’s on-site examination and off-site monitoring of financial institutions Given the changing environment surrounding the financial industry and the Bank’s experiences in dealing with financial institution failures, the Bank recognizes the need to review its on-site examination and off-site monitoring of financial institutions from a broad perspective. It cannot be denied that examinations and monitoring by the Bank during the “bubble” period were not fully successful in accurately grasping the financial condition of financial institutions or, based on their findings, in prompting the Bank to take necessary steps to warn other parties of the situation. A central bank implements its policy through banking transactions. Therefore, its on-site examinations and off-site monitoring, which are designed to accurately grasp the financial condition of individual transaction counterparties, are important starting points for execution of its policy. They are also essential in order for the Bank to accurately identify the risks in the overall financial system and the possibility of their materialization, and thereby prevent disruptions in the financial system. In conducting on-site examinations, we will continue to place emphasis on the assessment of the financial strength and risk management systems of institutions. In addition, with a view to adapting to the changing environment surrounding financial institution management, the Bank will become more flexible in determining the frequency of examinations and will carry out “targeted examination,” which focuses on specific areas of business and management. The Bank also intends to follow the condition of financial institutions on a continuous basis through a closer integration of on-site examinations and daily off-site monitoring. The Bank believes that the integration should also reduce the regulatory burden on financial institutions. The Bank will also make public as far as possible the findings of its research and studies on the overall financial system based on the information obtained through examinations and daily monitoring. By doing so, we hope to assist the advancement of financial institutions’ risk management techniques. 3. Loans to the Deposit Insurance Corporation Now, I would like to add a word on the Bank of Japan’s lending to the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC). The Bank’s lending to the DIC has increased significantly reflecting the massive funding needs of the DIC in proceeding with the resolution of the nonperforming-loan problem of financial institutions. Moreover, it has become very likely that this loan exposure will be fixed for an extended period of time. The very function of a central bank is to implement monetary policy through the purchase and sale of short-term, liquid financial assets. A sizable increase in fixed assets might not only cause concern about a deterioration in the central bank’s assets but also become a great impediment to the execution of monetary policy and money market operations. The Bank therefore regards the problem to be a very serious one. It is extremely unusual by international standards for a central bank to provide funds to facilitate the operation of the deposit insurance system. In fact, there has been no such case in the major industrialized countries. Therefore, the Bank of Japan believes that the DIC, in raising funds, should first turn to the private sector and, for example, issue bonds, limiting its borrowing from the Bank of Japan to a bare minimum. Needless to say, given the present condition of the Japanese financial system, the Bank of Japan will not hesitate to provide short-term funds necessary for the smooth operation of the DIC. However, for the reasons I have just described, I wish to stress that the DIC should first seek to raise funds through means other than Bank of Japan loans, and make it clear that central bank money can be used only as temporary bridge funds. In order to avoid taking on long-term fixed assets, the Bank of Japan is deliberating whether to review the lending rate applied to the DIC, which to date has been the same as the official discount rate, to reflect the lending rates charged by private financial institutions. Conclusion The Japanese financial system has been in an unprecedented crisis. This can be viewed as a painful process of transformation of the financial sector from a heavily protected to a competitive industry that generates new know-how and income. The path of this transformation will not be smooth. However, emerging moves on the part of financial institutions to undertake decisive restructuring and reorganization, and the fact that these institutions still possess sufficient potential in terms of management resources, including human resources, firmly convince me that it will not be too long before they revive as a fully competitive industry, in terms of quality rather than quantity, and driven by foresight rather than hindsight.
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Bank of Japan, Communication, 20 May 1999.
Bank of Japan’s May report of recent economic and financial developments1 Bank of Japan, Communication, 20 May 1999. The Bank’s View2 Japan’s economy, at present, has stopped deteriorating, but clear signs of recovery have not been observed yet. With regard to final demand, business fixed investment has been on a downward trend, and recovery in private consumption continues to be weak on the whole. Net exports (exports minus imports) are leveling off. Meanwhile, housing investment has been recovering. Public works seem to be increasing rapidly against the background of the large increase in orders in early spring. Reflecting such developments in final demand and continued progress in inventory adjustment, industrial production has stopped decreasing. The deterioration in corporate and consumer sentiment seems to have ceased due to this economic situation as well as the improvements in the financial environment, including the subsidence of the public’s anxiety about the stability of Japan’s financial system and the recovery in stock prices. However, corporate profits remain weak, and employment and household income conditions are deteriorating as the unemployment rate has been marking a historical high. Conditions in corporate finance continue to improve, but firms’ concern about the availability of funds in the future has not completely disappeared yet. As for the outlook, with the progress in inventory adjustment gradually paving the way for a recovery in production, the government’s economic measures and the monetary easing by the Bank will continue to underpin the economy. Improvements in the financial environment are also expected to exert positive effects on the economy gradually. With respect to corporate activities, however, firms have started taking steps toward full-scale restructuring, facing the continued decline in profits. Although such corporate restructuring is expected to improve productivity, it may, in the short run, reduce fixed investment and discourage household expenditure through the resulting deterioration in employment and income conditions. Under such circumstances, it is still difficult to expect an immediate self-sustained recovery in private demand. Overall economic developments require careful monitoring in consideration of the above points. It is also important to promote structural reform, while preparing an environment that facilitates such reform, in order to assure the economy’s sustained growth in the medium term. With regard to prices, reflecting the large output gap, domestic wholesale prices are on a downtrend, and corporate service prices are weakening. Import prices are rising due to the bottoming out of international commodity prices such as crude oil prices. Consumer prices remain weak. In relation to price developments in the future, distinct narrowing in the output gap is still unlikely for the time being even though the economy has stopped deteriorating. This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on May 18, 1999. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on May 18 as the basis of monetary policy decisions. Furthermore, the decline in wages is likely to continue exerting downward pressure on prices. Under such circumstances, prices are expected to remain weak. In the financial markets, the overnight call rate has stayed at nearly zero, and confidence about the availability of liquidity is growing among many financial institutions. Interest rates on term instruments are declining further, reflecting the market’s view that monetary easing will continue for some time. Moreover, the Japan premium has almost disappeared. Long-term interest rates, on the whole, have declined against the background of no clear signs of economic recovery and the decline in term interest rates. Stock prices have been firm reacting to the further rise in U.S. stock prices since March. The amount outstanding of funds in the call money market has been gradually decreasing. To date, this has not led to any difficulty in funds settlement, but close attention should be paid to future market developments. With regard to corporate finance, credit demand for economic activities such as fixed investment remains weak. Firms’ moves to increase their on-hand liquidity in the face of difficult fund-raising conditions are settling down. As a result, credit demand in the private sector has weakened further. Private banks have basically retained their cautious lending attitude. However, they are no longer constrained by severe fund-raising conditions and insufficient capital base. Under these circumstances, major banks have started to extend loans more actively than before, especially for projects involving relatively small credit risks, and their lending stance is gradually becoming positive. As a result of these developments, credit conditions, which tightened previously, have eased somewhat. The situation continues to warrant careful monitoring on the extent to which private banks will ease their lending stance, and how this change will affect firms’ propensity to invest.
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Bank of Japan, Communication, 16 June 1999.
The Bank of Japan’s June report on recent economic and financial developments Bank of Japan, Communication, 16 June 1999. The Bank’s View2 Japan’s economy, at present, has stopped deteriorating, but clear signs of recovery have not been observed yet. With regard to final demand, business fixed investment has basically been on a downward trend, although there was a slight improvement in early 1999. Recovery in private consumption continues to be weak on the whole. Net exports (exports minus imports) are decreasing slightly at present, due mainly to an increase in imports. Meanwhile, housing investment has been recovering. Public works seem to be increasing rapidly against the background of the surge in orders in early spring. Reflecting such developments in final demand and continued progress in inventory adjustment, industrial production has stopped decreasing. The deterioration in corporate and consumer sentiment seems to have ceased due to this economic situation and the effects of measures taken to restore the stability of Japan’s financial system. However, corporate profits remain weak, and employment and household income conditions are deteriorating as the unemployment rate remains historically high and wages continue to be below the previous year’s level. In corporate finance, firms’ concern about the availability of funds in the future has subsided, but has not completely disappeared yet. As for the outlook, with the progress in inventory adjustment gradually paving the way for a recovery in production, the government’s economic measures and the monetary easing by the Bank will continue to underpin the economy. Improvements in the financial environment, such as alleviation of concern about Japan’s financial system, are also expected to exert positive effects on the economy gradually. Moreover, the recovery of overseas economies, especially of Asian economies, is likely to have a positive effect on domestic production. With respect to corporate activities, however, firms have started taking steps toward full-scale restructuring, facing the continued decline in profits. Although such corporate restructuring is expected to improve productivity, it may, in the short run, reduce fixed investment and This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on June 14, 1999. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on June 14 as the basis of monetary policy decisions. discourage household expenditure through the resulting deterioration in employment and income conditions. Under such circumstances, it is still difficult to expect an immediate selfsustained recovery in private demand. Overall economic developments require careful monitoring in consideration of the above points. It is also important to promote structural reform in order to assure the economy’s sustained growth in the medium term. With regard to prices, import prices continue to rise due to the bottoming out of international commodity prices such as crude oil prices. The pace of decline in domestic wholesale prices is slowing due to a rise in prices of some products closely related to international commodities, such as those of petroleum products. On the other hand, corporate service prices continue to decline. Consumer prices remain weak. In relation to price developments in the future, there is a possibility that prices overall, which have been on a downtrend, will temporarily level off reflecting the rise in import prices. However, distinct narrowing in the output gap is unlikely for the time being even though the economy has stopped deteriorating, and wages continue to decline. Thus, downward pressure on prices is expected to remain. In the financial market, the overnight call rate has stayed at nearly zero, and many financial institutions have become confident about the availability of liquidity. Interest rates on term instruments have declined further, reflecting the market’s view that monetary easing will continue for some time. The Japan premium has almost disappeared. Furthermore, the yield spread between government bonds and private bonds––bank debentures and corporate bonds– –has narrowed. Yields on long-term government bonds have risen since late May to the current level of around 1.6-1.7 percent. Stock prices, which had generally been in the range of 16,000-17,000 yen, have recently risen and exceeded 17,000 yen. The amount outstanding of funds in the call money market has continued to decrease. To date, this has not led to any difficulty in funds settlement, but close attention should be paid to future market developments. With regard to corporate finance, private banks have basically retained their cautious lending attitude. However, constraint that had been caused by severe fund-raising conditions and insufficient capital base has eased considerably. Under these circumstances, major banks have gradually become more active than before in extending loans, especially for projects involving relatively small credit risks. However, credit demand for economic activities such as business fixed investment remains weak. In addition, firms’ moves to increase their on-hand liquidity are apparently settling down. As a result, credit demand in the private sector has weakened further. Money stock (M2+CDs) has recently been showing a slightly higher year-to-year growth rate, mainly because firms’ curtailment of on-hand liquidity has been less significant than that of the same period in the previous year. In these financial environments, credit conditions, which had tightened previously, have eased somewhat. The following continue to warrant careful monitoring: how actively investors will take risks; how far private banks will ease their lending stance; and how these changes will affect firms’ propensity to invest.
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Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr Masaru Hayami, at the Japan National Press Club in Tokyo on 22 June 1999.
Mr Hayami discusses the Bank of Japan’s thinking behind the current zero interest rate policy Speech by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr Masaru Hayami, at the Japan National Press Club in Tokyo on 22 June 1999. I. Introduction Four months have passed since February when the Bank of Japan launched its so-called zero interest rate policy, and my speech today explains our thinking behind this historically unprecedented policy. At the outset, it should be pointed out that all decisions regarding the Bank’s policies, including the present zero interest rate policy, are made after deep and wide-ranging discussions by the Policy Board. For example, as can be seen in the recent minutes of Monetary Policy Meetings, when the Policy Board decided upon a zero interest rate policy, it gave serious consideration to such policy alternatives as quantitative monetary easing and inflation targeting. For details of these discussions, the minutes of Monetary Policy Meetings are available. II. Zero Interest Rate Policy A. Elements of the Zero Interest Rate Policy The so-called zero interest rate policy comprises three elements. First, to encourage the unsecured overnight call rate to move as low as possible by providing ample funds. Second, to pay due consideration to maintaining the proper functioning of the market so as to avoid disturbance in the short-term money market. And third, to continue with the current policy until deflationary concerns subside. Of these three, the first element is a specific directive to guide the interest rate down to around zero. Like the central bank in the US and elsewhere, daily monetary control in Japan is conducted through guiding the shortest inter-bank rate, namely the unsecured overnight call rate. Up to last February when the Bank decided on the zero interest rate policy, the target for guiding the unsecured overnight call rate had already been as low as 0.25 percent, which had left hardly any room for further reduction. Under such circumstances, a view was expressed at the Monetary Policy Meeting on February 12 that for further monetary easing quantitative targeting might be more effective. The majority view, however, was that the demand for monetary base fluctuated widely depending on money market developments and that its relationship with the real economy was not stable. After thorough discussion, it was decided to make the maximum use of the remaining room for the further reduction of interest rates by eliminating the de facto floor for the call rate. Interest rates and the quantity of money are two sides of the same coin. A reduction of interest rates to zero accompanies simultaneous quantitative easing on a massive scale, which expressed by the phrase “provide ample liquidity.” The second policy element is to pay due consideration to maintaining the proper functioning of the market. This means the careful and cautious guidance of interest rates while keeping a close watch on the behavior of market participants and the functioning of the market after the lower limit for the call rate has been removed. Since the call market is an important market where all transactions in Japan are finally settled, the central bank should at all cost avoid any disruption. In guiding interest rates down to zero the Bank was navigating uncharted waters and hence in the process had to pay particular attention to the effects of the policy change. Since the decision on February 12, the Bank gradually and cautiously encouraged the fall in the call rate while carefully monitoring market developments. By April the unsecured overnight call rate had declined to 0.03 percent and has remained stable since then. This call rate of 0.03 percent can be regarded as the de facto zero interest rate taking into consideration transaction fees. A conspicuous change in the market structure during this period was the downsizing of the call market from 35 trillion yen to 20 trillion yen, or a decline of approximately 40 percent. The downsizing itself is a result of the large decline in the need for fund-raising in the call market and, in a sense, is a natural reaction of the market mechanism to the ample provision of funds. The question is whether such downsizing has made transactions in the market less smooth. So far we have not observed any problems, but we will maintain a close watch on the impact of our zero interest rate policy on the market function. With respect to the third policy element that the Bank will continue with the current policy until deflationary concerns subside, this is not in the February 12 decision, but is an expression of the current stance of the Bank’s monetary policy based on the majority opinion of the Policy Board. Needless to say, the objective of monetary policy is to contribute to the sound development of the national economy through the pursuit of price stability. In other words, the Bank aims at achieving a situation which is neither deflationary nor inflationary. Therefore, as long as deflationary concerns linger, the Bank should continue with its current monetary easing to achieve price stability and economic recovery. In making clear its stance, the Bank sought to explain to the market, as well as to the public, the objective of its monetary policy in the context of current economic conditions so as to maintain the credibility of monetary policy. Particularly in view of the instability in the financial market that we have experienced from time to time since last year, we thought it necessary to restate the objective of monetary policy to secure market stability. In fact, since I referred to this objective in April, the downward trend has permeated from shorter to longer term interest rates. B. Effects of the Zero Interest Rate Policy Since April, the unsecured overnight call rate, the direct target of the Bank’s monetary policy operations, has remained stable at around 0.03 percent, or virtually at zero percent. Interest rates on longer terms have also declined sharply in the short-term money market. As a result, a sense of relief regarding fund availability has spread among financial institutions. Also, concern overseas about the availability of funds to Japanese banks has receded significantly, the effect of which has manifested itself in the almost complete disappearance of the Japan premium since March. The permeation of monetary easing seems to have induced liquidity to flow into longer term debt and equities, having a favorable effect on long-term interest rates and stock prices. Against this background, tightness in corporate funding has eased considerably. Last year, the turmoil in international financial markets and the failure of several Japanese financial institutions impaired the proper functioning of domestic financial markets, making it difficult for even blue-chip companies to raise funds in the market. Financial institutions were obliged to assume a strict attitude toward lending because of not only the constraint on their capital position but also difficulties in their fund raising. All this has changed considerably since early spring, and we can now safely say that the financial environment as a whole has improved significantly. It appears that the zero interest rate policy has begun to exert a beneficial influence on strengthening the forces for economic recovery from the monetary side. What are the reasons for this? Simply stated, the monetary easing in February was to reduce the targeted call rate by some 0.25 percent, which was the same as the policy change on September 9 last year in terms of the size of reduction in the call rate. Nevertheless, the effects seem to have perhaps been much larger than generally expected. One of the reasons for the larger than expected effects is that the zero interest rate policy benefited from the synergy of such favorable factors as an improvement in the international environment surrounding Japan. Last summer, the economic crisis in Russia and the collapse of a major hedge fund in the US triggered considerable tension in international capital markets. The increase in the Japan premium was caused not only by domestic factors but also by such international factors. Fortunately, the tension in international financial markets began to lessen from around the end of last year. On the domestic front, measures to restore Japan’s financial system, such as the injection of capital using public funds and the introduction of a special credit guarantee system for small and medium-sized firms substantially contributed to easing tightness in the financial market and corporate funding. In addition to the favorable turn of events, a strong resolve expressed by the Bank to avoid deflation by implementing the zero interest rate policy was a significant contributing factor. The zero interest rate policy not only had such an effect but also helped to revive, to some extent, the weakened financial intermediation function in Japan as observed last year. To elucidate the point, let me first describe a ‘liquidity effect’ of the zero interest rate policy. Whatever the level may be, a reduction in interest rates requires a corresponding increase in liquidity. Reducing the interest rate down to zero means that the central bank will provide enough liquidity so that all the demand for short-term funds will be met in the market. Under such circumstances, the market will reach a stage where there is hardly any liquidity risk for market participants. As was mentioned previously, concern about liquidity increased substantially in Japan’s financial markets last year. The zero interest rate policy played a significant role in completely turning around the situation which could be labeled ‘liquidity evaporation.’ The zero interest rate policy also had the effect of encouraging risk taking by market participants. Whether indirect financing like bank lending or direct financing, the essence of financial intermediation lies in taking future risks. When financial institutions become excessively cautious, as was the case last year, they will not take even normal risks and the financial intermediation function to support economic activity weakens considerably. As a consequence of the latest decline in interest rates, institutional investors have gradually become more active in investing in securities with longer maturities or those carrying some credit risk such as CP and corporate bonds. Of course, excesses must be avoided and we intend to carefully monitor market developments. In contrast, as regards bank lending, we cannot yet say that a recovery has been seen. Needless to say, we also intend to closely monitor any changes in the attitude of banks toward lending and how such changes might affect corporate funding and investment behavior. III. Discussions on Zero Interest Rate Policy A. Zero Interest Rate Policy and Quantitative Easing We recognize there are opinions that it is not enough just to continue the current policy and that the Bank of Japan should pursue quantitative easing or inflation targeting, or increase the purchase of government bonds to prevent a rise in long-term interest rates. Regarding quantitative easing, it should be noted that both a reduction in interest rates and quantitative easing are expressions of monetary easing, only from a different point of view. One cannot increase quantity while keeping interest rates constant, and conversely, one cannot reduce interest rates while keeping quantity constant. Interest rates and the quantity of money should be treated as inseparable. The zero interest rate policy is to encourage the unsecured overnight call rate to move as low as possible by providing ample funds. In this sense, the Bank has already effected sufficient quantitative easing because interest rates have declined to virtually zero. For example, at present the required reserves for financial institutions amount to some 4 trillion yen per day, but the Bank has been providing more liquidity than the required amount. Recently, we offered to supply funds to the market through our daily operations, but there was not enough demand. The Bank tried to provide additional liquidity, but the market responded “enough.” This evidences, in our view, the abundance of liquidity in the market. Another example. For the past three years, money supply has increased by 60 trillion yen, which is more than ten times the 5 trillion yen increase in nominal GDP. As a result, the ratio of money supply to nominal GDP, Marshallian k, which shows how much money is circulating compared with economic activity, has rapidly risen. The pace of rise matches or exceeds that experienced in the high inflation period of excess liquidity in the 1970s and the bubble period of the 1980s. As such, current monetary policy has already had a significant easing effect from the quantitative aspect. When quantitative easing is discussed, it sometimes specifically refers to measures which set some numerical targets for quantitative indicators such as money supply. Since interest rates and the quantity of money are two sides of the same coin, the argument can be rephrased as the following technical question: “For monetary easing, is it better to focus mainly on the quantity of money or interest rates as an operational target?” For example, in an economy where inflationary expectations fluctuate significantly due to such external shocks as an oil crisis, nominal and real interest rates diverge. Thus, focusing only on interest rates runs the risk of making a mistake regarding the degree of monetary easing and tightening. Under such circumstances, it is better to conduct monetary operations guided by quantitative targets such as money supply. Conversely, in an economy where demand for money greatly fluctuates, setting a quantitative target becomes rather dangerous. Until the latter half of last year, the monetary base, which is the sum of currency in circulation and reserve deposits, had exhibited a high growth rate of about 10 percent on a year-on-year basis. This was because, against the background of anxiety regarding financial system instability, the financial, household, and corporate sectors held a huge amount of liquidity either in the form of cash or deposits with the Bank of Japan. If the Bank had adopted quantitative targeting under such a situation, it would have meant a tightening of monetary policy which would have been contrary to its policy stance. There are many other issues to be examined such as the relationship between quantitative indicators and the real economy, the Bank’s controllability of such indicators, and the effect of targeting on financial system stability. These issues have been taken up for active discussion by the Policy Board. One Board member even made a specific proposal for quantitative targeting. However, the majority opinion of the Policy Board to date is that it is more appropriate to effect monetary easing by using interest rates as an operational target rather than setting quantitative targets. B. Zero Interest Rate Policy and Inflation Targeting The Bank of Japan Law explicitly stipulates that monetary policy aims at price stability. Hence from the viewpoint of pursuing price stability, there would be no conflict between our current conduct of monetary policy and inflation targeting. The difference boils down to whether or not to set a specific numerical target such as a 1 percent increase in CPI. Since the central bank aims at price stability over the medium to long term, it needs to make a manifold analysis of various factors affecting price developments, such as the risk of future price changes, to come to a judgment. It is dangerous to stick to a specific figure for a specific price indicator as a target. For example, even if a specific target were set, it does not necessarily follow that a policy response would not be required until the actual price index exceeded the target. Depending on the speed of price changes and tightness of supply and demand conditions, there might be a situation where an appropriate policy response would be called for before the price index reached the target. The currently prevailing argument for inflation targeting includes dissipating the current excessive deflationary expectations of the public by raising their inflationary expectations. Can we really raise inflationary expectations just by announcing an inflation target? Even if we can, there is the danger that long-term interest rates may rise to the point where they have an adverse impact on the economy. What is the significance of setting numerical targets, be it money supply or inflation, for monetary policy? The answer is to prevent market participants from engaging in unnecessary speculation by clearly showing the Bank’s commitment to its policy objective. If so, without entering the tricky area of setting specific and concrete targets, the Bank can incorporate the usefulness embodied in inflation targeting by making explicit the key elements of monetary policy conduct. It was this line of thinking that was behind the Bank’s explicit announcement that it would “continue with the current policy until deflationary concerns subside.” C. Underwriting and the Outright Purchase of Government Bonds by the Bank Behind the request that the Bank underwrites government bonds, there seems to be the intention that the Bank, through underwriting, should ensure the smooth issuance of government bonds, thereby containing a rise in long-term interest rates. If this is the case, then the Bank holds firm against complying with such a request. Once a central bank engages in the automatic financing of a fiscal deficit, sooner or later the time will come when it cannot put a brake on money expansion, thereby inducing vicious inflation. This is one valuable lesson that we have learned from history and constitutes the main reason why the underwriting of long-term government bonds is prohibited not only in Japan but also in other industrialized countries. An increase in the outright purchase of long-term government bonds eventually leads to the same situation as in underwriting. Over time, long-term interest rates are determined reflecting the views of market participants on the future state of the economy and prices. If the Bank were to prevent long-term interest rates from rising despite market pressures, it would have no choice but to increase the purchase of government bonds. Then, inflationary expectations would intensify, putting further pressures on long-term interest rates. Such a vicious circle would repeat itself and the amount of government bonds that had to be purchased would increase infinitely. This would eventually be the same as the underwriting of government bonds. If a limit on either the amount or the period is set for the underwriting or the outright purchase of government bonds, can we obtain favorable results while avoiding the vicious circle? The answer is “no” if we consider the mechanism of financial markets and the behavior of market participants. Even if the amount or the period is limited, market participants will always think about what is ahead when they act. It is natural for investors who want to purchase ten-year government bonds to think about ten years ahead. Therefore, once market participants anticipate a rise in long-term interest rates after the pre-determined underwriting or outright purchase is completed, long-term interest rates will in fact rise immediately, not in the distant future. Furthermore, if market participants perceive that a brake has been released in seeing the central bank begin monetizing the fiscal deficit by even a limited amount, there is a risk that the market would become concerned with vicious inflation and loss of fiscal discipline. Given that globalization will continue and that investors worldwide are interested in Japanese government bonds for portfolio management purposes, we should be very careful about our policy operations, while keeping in mind such a market response. The issue will come to be a matter of confidence in the yen and the Bank’s conduct of monetary policy, and eventually confidence in the Japanese economy itself. Confidence would most likely be eroded if the Bank succumbed to the request for the underwriting or increase in the outright purchase of government bonds, with or without a limit on the amount or the period. Let me turn to the difference between the outright purchase of long-term government bonds currently conducted by the Bank and the recent request to underwrite or increase the outright purchase of government bonds. Our current long-term government bond purchase operations are a way to smoothly provide the long-term funds necessary for sustainable growth of the economy. They are neither aimed at the smooth issuance of government bonds nor for supporting their prices. The Bank makes it a rule to purchase long-term government bonds in the amount roughly consistent with the trend growth rate of banknote issuance over the medium term. By adopting such a rule, the Bank tries not to directly affect long-term interest rates. The Bank will continue to hold firm to the posture that it will not purchase long-term government bonds for smooth issuance or price maintenance purposes. Relating to this discussion, there are suggestions that the Bank should effect quantitative easing through the purchase of government bonds. In response to these suggestions, monetary easing has already permeated the market and the Bank has sufficient operational tools to effect monetary easing. The Bank does not have to resort to an increase in the purchase of government bonds in the conduct of its current monetary policy. Since the Bank is providing ample liquidity to the market, related anxiety has almost disappeared in financial markets. However, many investors and financial institutions seem to be experiencing a hard time finding good borrowers and profitable investments. For the whole economy the savings and investment balance is tilted toward huge net savings. Under such circumstances, if the yield on government bonds records a large increase over a sustained period, it will most likely signal either that views on the economy are turning favorable or that the market is warning against an increase in the budget deficit. In the case of the former, it indicates economic recovery and we welcome this development while staying alert to whether there is any overreaction in the market. In the case of the latter, we should use it as an opportunity to review the costs and benefits regarding the widening of the budget deficit in the context of future economic developments. D. Reforming the Government Bond Market Even if the Bank does not underwrite or increase the purchase of government bonds, it does not mean that the government bond market is not important. In fact, the government bond market has become increasingly important. The Bank has long been working actively on the issue of reforming the Japanese government bond market, and it will continue to make the utmost efforts toward that end. For the Bank, the government bond market is an important market in which its operations, such as repos and short-term government bond operations, are conducted. In addition, the Bank conducts various businesses from the issuance to the redemption of government bonds on behalf of the government, not to mention running the government bond settlement system. From such a standpoint, we have taken a great interest and devoted much effort in improving the functions of the government bond market. In preparation for the introduction of real time gross settlement by the end of 2000, the Bank has been working hard on upgrading computer systems, and, at the same time, formulating new market practices together with market participants. In general, financial assets with low liquidity which are traded by a small number of investors in the market tend to show excess price volatility. Therefore, making the government bond market more liquid and convenient for many diversified investors is essential to improve functions of both the primary and secondary markets. The importance of reforming the government bond market does not stop here. A highly liquid government bond market in which the market mechanism functions efficiently forms a basis for developing other financial markets. In this regard, we should not underwrite government bonds and contain their prices against market pressures. Rather, we think it important, through improving the functioning of the government bond market, to strengthen financial markets which are the basic infrastructure of our national economy. We expect that the issues regarding fiscal management and the government bond market will continue to be discussed in various fora, including the Diet. The Bank stands ready to make a contribution by, for example, stating its views. IV. Current Situation and Prospects for the Japanese Economy A. Current Situation While the Japanese economy has stopped deteriorating, there are not yet clear signs of a recovery. There are four reasons behind the halt in deterioration and which can be summarized as follows: First, an increase in policy-driven demand such as public investment and housing investment has been observed. Second, under the continued expansion of the US economy, the economic environment overseas has been improving as a whole as illustrated by the gradual recovery of Asian economies and the rebound of international commodity prices. Third, as a result of such developments in final demand together with the cautious attitude of firms toward production, inventory adjustment has progressed. Judging from current inventories, it appears that conditions are being laid for production to increase once final demand picks up. Fourth, against the background of our zero interest rate policy and the injection of capital into major banks using public funds, the financial environment has turned favorable. B. Prospects Though the Japanese economy has stopped deteriorating, we cannot yet foresee an autonomous recovery. There are three reasons for this. The first is that the present halt in the deterioration of the economy is basically supported by policy-driven demand like public investment, and private demand, which is the engine for an autonomous recovery, still remains weak. Considering that future demand prospects are uncertain and that balance sheet adjustment is needed to improve soundness and efficiency, particularly among large firms, business fixed investment will very likely further decline in fiscal 1999. In view of the increasing severity of the employment and income environment reflecting aggressive corporate restructuring, it seems difficult to expect any rapid recovery of private consumption from the current situation. The second reason is that we still need time to carefully monitor how an improvement in the financial environment affects the real economy. It is true that the attitude of financial institutions toward lending has become less strict compared with a while ago, but their balance sheet adjustments and strengthening of risk management systems have not yet reached a stage where they will actively seek loans that carry larger credit risk. Stock prices have been partly supported by such outside factors as rising US stock prices. To ensure the continued improvement of the financial environment and subsequently of the real economy which leads to a virtuous circle between finance and the economy, it is necessary for firms to restructure themselves in a forward-looking manner and to consolidate their business in such a way that will gain the confidence of the market. The third reason, which relates to the weakness of private demand pointed out earlier, is the persisting pressure of structural adjustment. Needless to say, changes in industrial structure are inevitable for the Japanese economy to become more efficient. Among these changes, employment is one of the most serious problems during the transitional period. In this regard, we welcome the government’s initiative to create an employment policy framework which is consistent with the direction of structural reform. Nevertheless, it should be noted that, at least for a short period, there is a possibility of increased downward pressure on the economy from the employment side. Bearing these reasons in mind, the present situation does not warrant an autonomous recovery of the economy led by private demand in the latter half of this fiscal year when public investment is expected to taper off. Thus, potential downward pressure on prices appears to remain, and it is our judgment that the economy has not yet reached the stage where deflationary concerns have been dispelled. V. Conclusion At the present moment, with prolonged worries regarding financial system stability at last subsiding, the Japanese economy stands at an important crossroads. If it can overcome such problems as the changes in industrial structure and unemployment, then an autonomous recovery can be realized. In this regard, we are well aware that monetary policy plays an important role. Based on such recognition, the Bank has committed itself to maintaining its monetary easing policy until deflationary worries subside. Needless to say, monetary policy alone cannot solve all problems. We should thoroughly recognize that the current zero interest rate policy is an unusual and emergency measure for a central bank and also that we should not indefinitely pursue an expansionary fiscal policy centering on public investment. To truly revitalize the Japanese economy we must forcefully promote structural reform to strengthen the supply side, while sustaining the economy through an aggregate demand policy. There are various aspects to structural reform, the main purpose of which is to garner the intrinsic potential power of the economy and to raise the medium-term expected growth rate. To these ends, competitive dynamism should be fully utilized. It is thus necessary to create a competitive market environment which encourages firms to boldly pursue technological innovation and explore new business areas. In addition, to take advantage of new investment opportunities, it is essential to have efficient and well-functioning financial markets which enable savings to be smoothly channeled to investment through various financial instruments. If the changes in industrial structure and reform of the financial system progress and public expectations for growth become more optimistic, our monetary easing policy to date will become even more effective.
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Speech by Mr Yutaka Yamaguchi, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Japan at the Japan Center for Economic Research in Tokyo on 13 July 1999.
Mr Yamaguchi discusses the role of central banks in international finance Speech by Mr Yutaka Yamaguchi, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Japan at the Japan Center for Economic Research in Tokyo on 13 July 1999. Introduction Today, I would like to discuss the role of central banks in international finance. The reasons why I chose this subject, and not the Japanese economy or its financial system, or the monetary policy of the Bank of Japan, are twofold. The first and foremost is that responding to the changes in the international financial markets has become a very important issue to the future of the Japanese economy, as evident from the financial crises involving the emerging economies since Thailand in the summer of 1997. The other reason is because we feel that the international activities of the Bank of Japan is not well understood, relative to the contributions the Bank has made so far. In the next hour or so, I would begin with some salient features of recent international financial crises and the roles of central banks therein. This would be followed by a discussion of the activities of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), which I have had the pleasure of chairing since last May. Finally, I would conclude my remarks today by briefly explaining the role of the Bank of Japan in international finance. The changing nature of international financial crises International financial crises in the 1990s Let me begin by laying down some observations on the changes in the phenomena we call international financial crises. In the discussion of “international financial crises,” we can, of course, begin by arguing what is a “crisis” and whether a crisis becomes “international.” Let us, however, leave such question of exact definitions aside and look at those financial crises that had international repercussions. Such international financial crises are not something new. The British suffered a severe attack on the Sterling in 1967. The US dollar’s convertibility to gold was suspended in 1971, with serious international consequences. The mounting debt borne by the developing countries was a serious concern during the 1980s. We can conclude that the international financial markets had suffered a number of shocks or crises in the past, and thus, crises have been recurrent. However, if we look back on more recent crises, the Japanese bubble and its aftermath in the 1990s, the Nordic banking crises in the first half of this decade, the attack on the ERM in 1992, the Mexican crisis of 1994–95, and the turmoil in the emerging market economies beginning with east Asia in the summer of 1997 and followed by Russia and Brazil, it seems that the nature of crises has been changing, from what we had experienced in the 1960s to 1980s as we approach the next millennium. The most evident features are that we are experiencing more frequent crises, and when crises occur, their effects are severer and global. In this respect, I would like to draw your attention to the following four aspects. Macroeconomic imbalances and the malfunctioning of credit allocation systems The first point is that many international financial crises follow a period of unprecedented boom, and is the result of or is aggravated by interactions between macroeconomic imbalances and the malfunctioning of the banking or the credit allocation system. When an economy enters into an unsustainable economic boom, expectations of strong growth in the demand of goods and services becomes predominant. Investments are planned and conducted to fill these expected demands, and this, in turn, increases actual demand. Such a cycle will also result in an expansion in credit, which supports the investment boom. For example, in Japan during the bubble years, we have seen sizable expansion of credit in the form of increases in bank lending and issuances in the capital markets. Meanwhile, in the case of the Asian economies, bank lending from developed countries increased at an annual rate of 19 per cent in the years between 1990 and 1996 (27 per cent per annum in the last three years). Unfortunately, such a virtuous cycle cannot be maintained forever, and when it stops, investments quickly turn into excess capacity and the recouping of capital becomes impossible. In the course of this process, a large part of financial assets turn into non-performing assets. If the volumes are large enough to impair the functioning of the financial system, the whole macroeconomy will stagnate. In this way, the interaction between macroeconomic imbalances and the malfunctioning of the financial system leads to financial crises. This relationship is often described by central banks as the interaction between monetary and financial stability; the macroeconomic stability, i.e. noninflationary sustainable growth and the stability of financial system are interdependent. Our experiences of recent financial crises underscore the importance of such interaction Volatility of short-term capital flows The second point, which is closely related with the first, is the deepening of crises by sudden changes in short-term capital flows. As I have mentioned already, bank credit to the Asian countries expanded significantly in the years preceding the crisis. During the same period from 1990 to 1996, the share of credit maturing in less than one year has increased by more than 10 percentage points, from 52 per cent to 63 per cent. Short term extensions of credit do not cause problems if they are rolled over. However, when the borrower can no longer roll over its debt, and funds begin to flow outwards, the borrower quickly faces severe liquidity problems. The Asian crises showed us that the disruptions in the economies and financial markets in these circumstances could be very serious. In a number of cases, they could be far more serious than adjustments that would have been warranted to correct the macroeconomic imbalances that existed before the crisis. In this context, while the merits of capital inflows should also be fully recognized, the volatility of short term capital flows is an important issue in dealing with international financial crises. International contagion of crises My third observation is that there seems to be more international transmission of financial crises. For example, when the Latin American debt problem deepened in the 1980s, effects on other continents were muted and Asia did not suffer serious financial crises. The situation was similar during the Mexican crisis of 1994–95. However, in the most recent financial crisis beginning in 1997, the wave of disruptions reached many emerging market economies, sometimes quickly, and in other cases slowly. The transmission mechanism was not singular: rapid declines in credit extensions to the region by developed countries were significant in some cases, whereas in others it was the proxy hedge (i.e. hedging by selling other currencies with similar risk characteristics) or purely psychological transmissions of bearish sentiments. It might be said that the crisis that began in Asia swept around the world to end, seemingly, upon reaching Brazil. In the past, we have seen contagion of financial crisis within a region where there are significant interactions in terms of trade and investment flows and/or the economic structure is similar. Contagion to other regions of the globe is a new phenomenon not observed in the 1970s or 1980s. More diverse manifestation of crises Finally, I should point out that financial crises are now manifesting themselves in diverse ways. A classic financial crisis is when the financial system is strained by funding problems, for example when bank after bank is hit by depositor runs. Of course, in the most recent crisis involving the emerging market economies, many countries, such as Thailand, Korea, Russia and Brazil, suffered quintessential foreign currency funding problems. Meanwhile, we saw another type of crisis: if a classic financial crisis is precipitated by bank runs, the new type of crisis results from impairment of market functioning and such crisis could be termed a “market run.” When Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) almost collapsed last autumn, liquidity dried up in many markets of the developed countries as many market participants dumped their assets in “fire sales” and flight to quality became ever more pronounced. If we recognize that an important function of financial markets is to price financial assets and transfer risks at that price, i.e. “price discovery,” the impairment of such a function is threatening to market participants. Why are international crises becoming more pronounced? Having said that the four features of recent international financial crises are the interactions between macroeconomic imbalances and the functioning of the financial system, the volatility of short-term capital flows, international contagion, and diversity in the manifestation of crises, I would like to spend some time to discuss why these changes might have occurred. I do not have a definite answer, but I agree with many experts who point out that financial innovation and globalization, enabled by advances in information technology, had a role. For example, cross-border flows of capital have increased more than threefold in the last ten years. What strikes us more is that the cross-border transfer of risks increased rapidly through derivatives transactions. As a hypothetical case, if we think of an investment in a bond denominated in Thai baht issued by a Thai firm, the investor faces various risks: foreign exchange risk, credit risk of the firm, interest rate risk, etc. Derivatives enable investors to unbundle these risks packaged in a bond into component risks – e.g. the risk that the credit standing of the issuing firm or the Thai baht exchange rate falls below a certain threshold – and transfer and/or assume them at will. Financial innovation has enabled market participants to engage in these operations at significantly lower costs, and this has resulted in an expansion of transaction volumes. The expansion in transaction volumes draws the attention of market participants to the need of more harmonized rules underlying financial transactions – payment and settlement systems and accounting standards – and encourages reforms therein. These reforms push the rules in the direction of standardization, which in turn, lower the costs of transactions and leads to a further increase in transaction volumes. Such globalizing financial marketplace facilitates a further division of labor: the development of risk appraisal services, investment funds, including hedge funds, tailored to suit diverse risk appetites should be understood in this context. Accordingly, risk evaluation and risk taking become more specialized and tightly focused. This could result in a particular type of risk being singled out and transferred when crises or imbalances become apparent. In the example of a Thai firm issuing bonds denominated in Thai baht, investors in the bonds could guard against the depreciation of the baht by efficiently hedging the foreign exchange risk with derivatives, which is likely to result in higher pressures of selling baht hedges. It is, however, not fair to emphasize only the deepening of crises as a result of financial innovation and globalization. In the case of East Asian countries, their incredible economic growth during the 1980s and up to the recent crisis was the result of their taking advantage of capital inflows from abroad. Capital inflows not only supplemented domestic investment funds, but also facilitated the transfer of industrial technology and know-how. In this context, derivatives enabled the unbundling of various risks embedded in economic transactions and the transfer of risks to other market participants. Such opportunities should have mitigated the perception of high risks associated with investments in emerging market economies and stimulated investments. Meanwhile, in a broader context, market discipline is also enforced through global market activities. Those that succeed in maintaining sound economic performance through determined efforts of restructuring, be they firms, financial institutions, or sovereign states, would be rewarded by the markets in the form of narrower credit spreads and thus lower funding costs. Market discipline stemming from the global capital market, therefore, is a driving force of robust economic growth in the long run. Financial innovation and the globalization of financial markets, like any change, have both positive and negative effects: although positive effects may materialize in the long run, some disruptions may be expected in the short run. This means that our goal should be to devise plans to take the greatest advantage of financial innovation and globalization and implement them as well as possible. In other words, it is becoming important for each market participant, including firms, financial institutions and sovereign states, to recognize the role of market discipline, and, at the same time, lay down rules and practices that are compatible with the globalizing markets. Central banks and international financial crises In the international financial community, governments, central banks, financial institutions, and the academia are now engaged in a hot debate over the reform of international financial system, including exchange rate regimes and short term capital flows. The purpose of such discussions is to prevent a resurgence of international financial crises, and they are founded on the recognition that the nature of international financial crises may be changing, as I have just noted. In the next few minutes, I will carve out a niche in this very broad debate, and try to explain the roles that central banks could play with regard to international financial crises. From this perspective, the most important responsibility for central banks is to maintain the stability of their own macroeconomy. More precisely, central banks are expected to maintain sustainable growth under stable prices. Putting one’s house in order is the starting point. Unfortunately, however, implementing the correct policies to maintain the stability of the domestic economy and financial system alone does not guarantee a stable international financial system. The discussions on international financial architecture, which I have just referred to, seem to underscore the fact that efforts to maintain the functioning of international financial markets or the international financial system are just as important. Monitoring the state of the international financial system First and foremost, central banks should strengthen their ability to understand the risks and vulnerabilities in the international financial system. More simply, central banks should enhance their monitoring abilities. As mentioned a little earlier, a period of strong growth may sow the seeds of the next crisis by allowing excesses in consumption and investment. In fact, if we look back after the fact, we can often find signs warning of “bubbles” or excesses. For example, before 1997, i.e. before the Asian crisis, the BIS Banking Statistics indicated that banks in the developed countries were increasing their short-term foreign currency lending to the Asian countries. The increase in short-term foreign currency liabilities is likely to leave a country prone to a rapid outflow of capital and hence could lead to foreign currency liquidity problems. The reason why such warning signs were overlooked or ignored seems to be associated with national confidence. Past financial bubbles seem to be inevitably associated with such confidence shared by the general public. In Asia, there was the talk of the Asian miracle. A little earlier, during the Japanese bubble years, the oft-cited phrase “the largest creditor country” was an indication of such confidence. When the mood of a country is upbeat, the recognition of risks – even severe downside risks – are not easily acknowledged. Even if it were possible to identify such risks, it would have been extremely difficult to take the necessary corrective actions, either at the micro level (strengthening risk management) or at the macro level (tightening monetary policy). Even if such risks are initially contained through appropriate corrective measures, market participants’ risk appetite may be so strong as to eventually render those corrective measures ineffective, and lead to a bubble. There is no panacea which quickly dissipates macroeconomic risks. Nevertheless, it is extremely important for central banks to understand the risk factors and consciously analyze what could happen if there are significant changes in those risk factors. As a result of the most recent financial crisis, it became widely recognized that private financial institutions perform stress tests to identify vulnerabilities in their own portfolios. Stress tests may seem to be technical, but they are not. They are actually fundamentally judgmental processes for the management of financial institutions where various scenarios are employed to identify risks that endanger the existence of each institution. Likewise, it has become apparent that central banks should also adopt a similar approach – in effect stress testing at the macro level. By this, I am not arguing that central banks can always make the right judgment concerning risks to the macroeconomy. Nevertheless, I can stress that it is the raison d’être for central banks to identify risks that would endanger the policy objectives that are conferred upon them, namely the stability of the macroeconomy (sustainable growth under price stability) and the financial system. I should say, therefore, that in this globalizing world, it is becoming ever more important for central banks to make joint efforts to understand the risks in the global financial markets. Policy recommendations for a more robust international financial system Secondly, even if central banks could understand the conditions of the international financial system in extreme detail, they would probably not be able to prevent every financial crisis. This means that, central banks should contribute to the strengthening of the international financial system – building a system that could withstand crises and stress that are facts of life – through appropriate policy recommendations. I have used the word policy recommendations, because central banks do not usually have direct authority to make rules or supervise the international financial markets or their participants. For example, in the recent debate over how to deal with institutional investors including hedge funds, most central banks do not have any rule-making or supervisory authority over them. In such cases, the central banks look to other authorities to make and implement proper policy responses. There are also areas where no regulator or supervisor has formal authority, and the authorities are presently discussing how and whether to fill such gaps. However, stemming from central banks’ status as being players in markets, central banks have a strong interest in improving the functioning of markets. Accordingly, central banks could adopt a constructive approach: to analyze the global financial markets and make policy recommendations, which are to be implemented through dialogs with market participants and supervisory authorities. Along with such efforts, central banks must not neglect to improve their own operations, such as payment and settlement services, which can be modified through their own initiatives in response to the globalization of financial markets. Responses to international financial crises Third, but not the least, central banks must consider appropriate responses to international financial crises once they happen. In many cases international crises involve rapid depreciation of currencies or depletion of foreign exchange reserves, and manifest themselves as near or actual defaults of governments or private market participants. In such instances, extension of assistance from international financial institutions or governments could result in moral hazard, just like the domestic context, so it should not be too readily extended. The recent emphasis of debate on private sector involvement has sprung from this context. Nevertheless, if the effects on the international financial system would have been deemed to be severe in the absence of public sector involvement, public assistance had been granted. While such direct assistance has been the domain of IMF and national governments, central banks have been more concerned with maintaining the stability of the international financial system through maintaining the stability of domestic financial systems. Central banks are “in the market,” so to speak. As a result, they are able to collect up-to-date information on ever changing market conditions. In this context, central banks occasionally function as the lender of the last resort, in response to systemic risks posed by funding problems at private financial institutions. Of course, central banks must be careful so as not to create moral hazard. Meanwhile, when disruptions in international financial markets could affect the domestic financial markets or the domestic economy through global linkages between markets, central banks may consider lowering interest rates and supplying ample liquidity. For example, when the Federal Reserve lowered its federal fund rates three times last autumn, as the US financial markets became unsettled following the Russian crisis, the reason behind the move was to cushion the effects on prospective economic growth of increasing weakness in foreign economies and of less accommodative financial conditions domestically. Committee on the Global Financial System An international forum for central banks The three elements of the role of central banks in international finance, which I have just mentioned, understanding markets, formulating policy recommendations for strengthening the financial system, and containing crises when they happen, have always been played by central banks in order to maintain the stability of the domestic financial system. As a result, central banks tend to share a common framework, which facilitates exchanges of information and views. This common framework is further strengthened through central banks’ interactions with the markets – markets that are globalizing – in their day to day operations. There are many channels for such exchanges, and one of the most important is through the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Many of you would probably know that the BIS is a unique international organization owned by central banks of more than forty countries. Many committees of central banks meet at the BIS, led by the Governors of the Central Banks of the Group of Ten Countries (G10 Governors). The activities of the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, and the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, in particular, are closely interconnected. Today, I would like to outline the activities of the CGFS, which I am involved in, and which is closely related to the theme of my discussion on the roles of central banks in international finance. Monitoring of international financial markets The activities of the CGFS can be grouped into three areas: The first is to conduct comprehensive monitoring of the global financial market. This corresponds to the accurate appraisal of risks in the global market, which I stressed just a few minutes ago. At the quarterly meetings of the Committee, we focus on various risk factors and discuss what could be the risks that central banks should be most aware of. Diverse issues are taken up, but much attention has been paid to the origins and effects of the recent wave of financial crises beginning in Asia. For example, why were the “Asian Tiger Economies” suddenly faced with currency crises? What were the risks posed by the devaluation of the Thai baht to her Asian neighbors and to other emerging market economies? Why does the devaluation by Brazil not seem to have had great effects at least in the short run? We have also examined issues involving the developed countries such as the market trends in the run up to and after the introduction of the euro at the beginning of this year, and the inherent risks in the rising US equity markets. The Y2K risk premia observed in many markets for transactions over this year’s end is also an issue that we have focused on. Furthermore, as a longer term issue, we have looked at the restructuring of the international banking industry, which is the reflection of changing nature of banking business. There is no standard methodology for such monitoring exercises, but one aspect that the Committee is now particularly interested in is how to understand “positions” in the marketplace. For example, in the case of market turmoil involving LTCM, it is said that there were considerable arbitrage positions involving bonds of developed countries and emerging market economies: buying emerging market bonds and selling developed country bonds with the expectation that the spreads between the two classes of bonds should narrow. The speculation that this huge overhang of positions would be unwound was behind the disruptions we saw following the Russian default and huge losses at hedge funds. Of course, there are as many purchasers as sellers in the market, and all positions sum to zero. Nevertheless, the reaction of the market following a shock is dependent on who holds the positions, how concentrated the positions are, whether positions are correlated, etc. Paying attention to positions, therefore, is based on a view of the economy or the market that the positions are no less important factors in causing large market fluctuations than macroeconomic fundamentals. The CGFS also shares such views. Improving the functioning of markets The second element of the work program of the CGFS is longer term research with a view to improving market functioning. This begins with studies involving actual market practices: what sort of transactions are conducted day to day, how such transactions are executed and settled, what are the problems experienced by market participants, etc. Such information constitutes a part of understanding the markets and is also very important as input into crisis management. The third area of the Committee’s activities is closely related to, in fact based on, such research: examining alternate policy responses and the elaboration of corresponding policy recommendations to promote the development of well-functioning and robust financial markets and systems. Needless to say, these policy recommendations are shaped by past events and experiences in the international financial markets and driven by the keen interests of the Committee to prevent another disruption in market functions. In this context, the most important activity of the Committee is its efforts to improve the transparency of markets through improvements in disclosure and statistics. Substantial improvements of market transparency would lead market participants to closely evaluate and select their counterparties and hopefully market equilibrium would be achieved to a certain extent. Central banks have long attached great importance to such mechanisms in the market that imposes self-discipline. From this long line of work, I would like to draw your attention to the Committee’s publication of a report titled “Review of the Disclosure Template Regarding the Authorities’ Foreign Currency Liquidity Position” last autumn. This report is based on our recognition that one of the reasons for the deepening of the Asian crisis may have been the lack of transparency in the levels of official foreign exchange reserves: for example, Thai and Korean monetary authorities had conducted support operations of their currencies in the forward markets or assisted the foreign currency funding of domestic banks by depositing foreign currency at those banks. As a result of such operations, the actual amount of foreign reserves available to the authorities had substantially declined, but it was not reflected in official statistics on foreign exchange reserves. Accordingly, the Report recommends that public authorities disclose a more comprehensive, detailed and timely information on their foreign currency liquidity positions: e.g. the disclosure of potential drain on foreign exchange reserves through forward and options transactions, and the amount of foreign exchange reserves deposited at domestic banks, every month with one month timeliness. This initiative by the central banks was taken up by the IMF and incorporated in the Special Data Dissemination Standards, with which many countries, including Japan, are committed to comply. Something that is as important as, if not more than, disclosure by public authorities is disclosure by private market participants themselves. In this regard, we should not forget what happened to LTCM last autumn. As we all know, LTCM was not able to fund itself when markets moved against its huge leveraged positions. If counterparties to LTCM had been able to find out that LTCM was holding some extreme positions through disclosures or macro statistics, market discipline might have been able to appraise the levels of position taking. In order for market participants to accurately measure various risks – market risk, credit risk, liquidity risk, etc. – improvements in disclosure and macro statistics are two sides of the same coin, and the CGFS has pursued both issues. As to disclosure by private market participants, the Committee published the Fisher Report in fall 1994, advocating that disclosure needs to evolve from one based on financial statements to one providing information more accurately reflecting the risk profiles, including results of risk management model calculations. In the Report, it was noted that since individual market participants should wish to be correctly evaluated by the market, they should have the incentive to enhance disclosure, and a competitive mechanism to improve disclosure might be at work. However, as I have just pointed out, in the recent international financial crisis, one problem was that only insufficient information was provided to market participants. If so, it becomes necessary to examine why the competitive enhancement of disclosure did not materialize and what could we do to make it work. The Committee, with inputs from market participants, is spending considerable efforts, with an aim to devise a framework to enhance disclosure. Along with these efforts to improve disclosure by the public sector and private market participants, the CGFS is expending considerable resources to improve statistics on international financial markets. For example, the BIS and national central banks, following a recommendation in a 1995 report by the Committee, launched a comprehensive market survey of global derivatives markets, the first in 1995 and the second in 1998. Another product is a more regular statistics based on a survey of major derivatives dealers covering more than 80% of global markets in derivatives (“Yoshikuni Statistics”), which was first published in December last year. In addition, there have been constant upgrades to existing BIS Banking Statistics: for example, the publication of the BIS Semiannual Consolidated International Banking Statistics, which is now watched closely as a leading indicator of country risk, is now approximately two months earlier than in the past. The CGFS is further looking into any gaps in statistics that may be filled. As I have mentioned, in addition to improving market transparency, there is another distinct group of work in the activities of the CGFS. International financial crises are the consequences of market participants’ taking and unwinding of positions. The Committee has studied such dynamics of markets and published recommendations based on its findings. One such example is the publication of a report titled “Market Liquidity: Research Findings and Selected Policy Responses” in May this year. Market liquidity is admittedly an elusive concept and is difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, market participants and authorities are making their day to day decision on the assumption that market is always liquid. One example is the risk management models, which is rapidly gaining acceptance. Such models assume that assets and liabilities can always be liquidated in the market immediately at prevailing market prices, i.e. the existence of market liquidity. If this assumption does not hold, the result could be unexpectedly large losses, or worse, bankruptcy of some market participants. This illustrates that maintaining the liquidity of markets would play an important role in upholding the stability of the financial system. The Report, from a conceptual viewpoint, identifies the determinants of market liquidity according to product design, market microstructure and the behavior of market participants, with a strong focus on the liquidity of the government securities market, which is one of the core financial markets. Of the policy implications that are pointed out in the Report, the effects on market liquidity of the issuing maturity and lot of government bonds and taxes offer valuable insights into how we can enhance liquidity in the market of Japanese government securities. Concerning these recent activities of the CGFS, it should be recognized that the Committee is not working in a vacuum. In order to better play the role of central banks in international financial crises, be it the understanding of risks, developing robust systems, or containing crises, the CGFS should work in concert with other fora. For example, of the other Basel-based G10 committees, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision pays attention to issues involving regulation and supervision of individual banks. The Committee on Payment and Settlement System (CPSS) focuses on the stability and efficiency of the payment and settlement systems, which are the infrastructure of financial systems. Compared with these two committees, the orientation of CGFS is on markets. In any case, the activities of these and other fora should become more important as financial markets are further globalized. This April, the Financial Stability Forum, established to strengthen cooperation among the Group of Seven countries and various international organizations with a view to enhancing international financial stability, held its first meeting. The Chairman of the CGFS was asked to participate in this new forum along with the Chair of the Basle Committee, the CPSS, IOSCO (International Organization of Securities Commissions) and IAIS (International Organization of Insurance Supervisors). This, I believe, means that the CGFS is expected to make contributions from its market-oriented perspective. Role of the Bank of Japan in international finance Finally, I would like to briefly describe the role of the Bank of Japan in international finance. In the new Bank of Japan Law, effective since April last year, provisions that allow the Bank to conduct activities related to international finance based on its judgments have been stipulated reflecting the globalization of finance. The Bank performs many functions: e.g. intervening in foreign exchange markets as an agent of the Finance Minister, providing services to foreign central banks and international organizations wishing to invest in yen. In addition, the Bank is actively engaged in activities related to international finance through channels other than the BIS, including the G7, G10, IMF, etc. In the remaining minutes I would like to take up, from this broad spectrum, a few issues that are related to the role of our Bank with respect to international financial crises. Understanding developments in international financial markets First, let me explain the monitoring activities of the Bank of Japan with respect to international financial markets. The Bank is closely following developments in international financial markets in addition to its monitoring of the domestic economy and financial markets, and the outputs of such monitoring is reflected in the Bank’s policy decisions involving both monetary and prudential policy. For example, the international effects of the Russian crisis of August last year was profound, and concerns about the repercussions of such effects on the Japanese economy were factored into the decision to lower the target money market rates in September last year. Another example involves the effects of the Asian crisis on the funding operations of Japanese banks. Japanese banks had been burdened with non-performing assets, and the Bank of Japan was concerned with the additional impacts of the crisis on banks – the possibility of further deterioration of their assets or potentially severer credit evaluation towards Japanese banks which could cause difficulties in their foreign currency funding. The Bank of Japan carefully monitored the international financial markets by closely contacting domestic banks and overseas authorities, facilitating the funding operations of Japanese banks in the domestic markets – I will elaborate on this point later. Fortunately, the tensions in the international financial markets began to ease in the latter half of October last year, and in line with this, the external pressures on Japanese financial markets also declined rapidly. As the domestic and the overseas financial markets move more and more towards convergence, the Bank of Japan intends to enhance its monitoring activities further, particularly on the Asian economies and financial markets. Contributions to international rulemaking My second point involves contributions to policy formulation at the international level. One implication of the globalization of financial markets is that we can no longer be self-sufficient in the rules related to financial transactions. The trend is the application of internationally developed rules in the domestic sphere. The Basle Accord of 1988 was probably a landmark in this context. Since globalization is inevitable, the Bank of Japan must contribute to enhancing the stability of the international financial system through making efforts towards designing and implementing rules that it sees most appropriate. Of course, such rules are not under the sole jurisdiction of central banks, but we are aiming to make contributions from the perspective of central banks. The active participation of the Bank in various fora which I have just mentioned – Basel-based committees, EMEAP (Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks), fora in which governments are also members, etc. – is based on this judgment. In addition, various technical assistance, including those in the area of payment and settlement systems, provided by our Bank to central banks of the emerging market economies should also contribute to enhancing the stability of the international financial system. Containing crises relating to international finance As my final point on the role of the Bank of Japan, I would like to discuss the Bank’s role in containing crises relating to international finance. Once a crisis develops and its possible threats to international finance becomes more than negligible, potential use of multilateral or bilateral liquidity support becomes an issue. A typical situation is when credit needs to be extended to countries facing crises. In such cases, support packages have usually been arranged by the IMF. Central banks’ involvement is characterized by their nature as a provider of short-term liquidity, and the Bank of Japan has cooperated in international financial support by, for example, sharing responsibilities in BIS bridge loans. Moreover, developments in international finance are affecting Japanese financial markets. For example, since the summer of 1998, the worries about the Japanese financial system were heightened, following events such as rumors over the financial health of the Long Term Credit Bank. This was compounded with concerns over credit crunch in the international financial market stemming from the Russian crisis and problems at some US hedge funds, with the result that many Japanese banks experienced difficulties in securing foreign currency funding. Under such circumstances, the so-called “Japan premium” – the extra risk premium charged to Japanese financial institutions reflecting market participants’ heightened concerns over their creditworthiness – increased significantly. At the same time, Japanese banks entered into swap transactions to obtain much needed foreign currency funding – such transactions are, from the viewpoint of Japanese banks, exchange of yen funds for dollar funds for a certain period. These operations by banks put significant upward pressures on short-term domestic money market rates. In response, the Bank of Japan conducted money market operations to provide year-end funding earlier than usual to mitigate funding problems at Japanese banks. Meanwhile, foreign banks, which had entered into currency swap transactions with Japanese banks, needed investment instruments for the yen they acquired. During the financial crises, credit risk-free instruments were sought, and the choice of foreign banks was Japanese government short-term financing bills (FBs) and the bills drawn by the Bank of Japan. Bank of Japan bills were originally intended to serve as instruments to absorb excess reserves in the interbank market, but foreign banks regarded them as favorable investment instruments. In retrospect, there might have even been periods when the Bank’s bills played a large role in inducing foreign banks to enter into currency swap transactions. In effect, an overview of the monetary flows at the time suggests that the provision of year-end funding and the issuance of short-term bills by the Bank of Japan to stabilize the domestic financial markets worked to recycle liquidity between Japanese and foreign banks, and facilitated the foreign currency funding of Japanese banks. I might add that, although often overlooked, it is important to note that these operations can only be effective when the assets of the Bank of Japan is sound and the bills issued are risk-free. The Bank’s effectiveness, especially during crises, as experienced during the unprecedented period of concurrent crises in the domestic and overseas financial markets recently, relies on the soundness of the Bank’s balance sheet. This is one reason why the Bank is, as it should be, sensitive about maintaining the quality of its assets. Today, I have had the pleasure of speaking to you on the role of central banks in international finance. As a final note I would like to stress that globalization affects not only financial institutions and nonfinancial firms but also central banks as well. Due to limitation over time, I could not touch upon profound changes in the banking services provided by central banks, for example, in the area of payments and settlements. The changes that we are experiencing now – financial innovation and globalization of financial markets – may be a radical change equivalent to the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century. Just as the 18th-century Britons probably did not recognize that they were in the midst of such a revolution, we may be unknowingly in the midst of a watershed event. The introduction of the euro in Europe and serious discussions on the pros and cons of dollarization in some Latin American countries seem to be very symbolic, as the new millennium is dawning. If I draw upon the remarks that Nobel laureate Hicks made almost thirty years ago, central banks may no longer be at the center and become local banks as a result of globalization. In order for central banks to continue making their contributions to the stability of the economy and the financial system, they must review their policies and operations in accordance with the ongoing globalization. The Bank of Japan is also determined to tackle such challenges ahead.
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Speech given by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr Masaru Hayami, at the Kisaragi-kai meeting on 27 July 1999.
Mr Hayami discusses the challenges for the Japanese economy Speech given by the Governor of the Bank of Japan, Mr Masaru Hayami, at the Kisaragi-kai meeting on 27 July 1999. * I. * * Introduction It is a great privilege to be invited to the Kisaragi-Kai meeting to make a speech in front of this distinguished audience. First, I will make use of this opportunity to discuss the current state of the Japanese economy. Then I will move on to the main theme – structural problems that have to be faced in revitalizing the economy. I hope that my view will give you some perspectives for the future. II. Recent Developments in the Economy and the Outlook Let me begin with the Bank of Japan’s view on the current state of the Japanese economy and the outlook: Japan’s economy, at present, has stopped deteriorating, and corporate sentiment has improved slightly, however, clear signs of a self-sustained recovery in private demand have not been observed yet. The following factors have combined to keep the Japanese economy from a further deterioration. First, active fiscal policy has been stimulating public investments as well as housing investments. Second, private firms have been reducing their inventories successfully helped to some extent by the development of final demand. Third, financial conditions are improving, as a result of the Bank of Japan’s zero interest rate policy and the injection of public funds into major commercial banks. The buoyancy in the stock market since early spring and the improvements in corporate sector confidence shown in the Tankan, are based on the increased anticipation of better business and financial conditions in the future, as well as the current improvements in final demand, output, and inventories. It is, however, uncertain at this stage whether the Japanese economy, is on the way to a self-sustained recovery as anticipated above. The reasons can be summarized as follows. To begin with, I will address two factors that will have a negative effect on the future of the economy. First, the stimulus effects of public investment will fade out eventually. Second, the corporate restructuring efforts of individual firms will expose the macro economy to downside pressures. This is an example where what are rational strategies from the viewpoint of individual firms may have undesirable effects on the economy as a whole. With corporate restructuring, workers faced with harsh income conditions, reduce consumption spending, while firms save the resulting cash or make debt repayments, instead of reinvesting. This “paradox of thrift” may drive our economy into shrinkage. Of course, there are factors that will work positively on the economy. The point is, however, whether these factors are strong enough to outweigh the negative ones mentioned above. Let me discuss the positive factors in detail. First, corporate restructuring may bring about a recovery in corporate profits – and may push up stock prices in anticipation of such a recovery. For the recent corporate restructuring to have a positive effect, the profits recovery should boost firms’ spending sufficiently to outweigh workers’ saving. The second positive factor is that the effects of the government’s various measures to ensure the stability of the financial system and the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy to ease financial conditions are permeating throughout the economy, improving household and corporate sector confidence somewhat. Furthermore, there is a possibility that this improved confidence will stimulate the spending attitude of consumers and firms. In fact, household consumption has held steady even amid the harsh income conditions. However, corporate expenditure is still weak, as is obvious from the Tankan survey on business fixed investment plans. While financial institutions are improving their skill in risk management and striving for adequate lending margins, bank loans have not increased while demand for fund raising remains weak. The third positive factor is a recovery in overseas economies, especially in Asia. Although China’s economy is decelerating somewhat, Korea is now on a recovery trend. Thailand and the Philippines as well as Malaysia and Singapore are bottoming out gradually. These developments will facilitate Japanese exports and production. The above arguments make obvious the following fact: if foreign economic factors are not considered, the recovery of the Japanese economy depends largely on when corporate behavior becomes active. The recent improvements in corporate sector confidence are good signs for the economy, but other economic indicators and fixed investment plans show no significant signs of economic recovery. Our judgment is that it is too early to say that the Japanese economy is on the way to a self-sustained recovery. Therefore, the downward pressure on prices will remain, although prices have been stable recently. It is in view of such economic conditions as those described above that the Bank of Japan will maintain the current monetary easing stance and continue to firmly support economic activities until deflationary concerns subside. III. Contained Dynamism of the Japanese Economy A caveat regarding fiscal and monetary policies is that they are effective in managing the economy in the short run, but are not a panacea for all of the problems the Japanese economy faces. This last decade of the 20th century has seen the Japanese economy experience its lowest growth since the end of the Second World War. Despite several economic stimulus measures from both the monetary and fiscal side, the response of the economy has been generally slow and we have yet to confirm any clear revival of economic dynamism led by private demand. Taking into account the weakness of private demand over the past ten years, it is perhaps natural to think that there might be something “structural” which has contained economic dynamism. If this is the case, it is difficult to expect a long-lasting recovery, if any, based solely on macroeconomic stimulus measures. Hence, to restore vitality to the Japanese economy in the medium term, painstaking efforts must be made to resolve each structural problem so as to enable the nation’s economic potential to fully blossom. And such efforts are also necessary if both monetary and fiscal policy are to have their full effect. Since many structural problems stem from the supply side of the economy, resolving them requires that we send the appropriate signal and give the right incentives to the public. As evidenced by Reaganomics in the U.S. and Thatcherism in the U.K., supply-side policies would most likely be accompanied by various pains and require a long period until reforms take root among the public and bear real fruit. It is indeed for this reason that we need to reach an early consensus as to the nature of the structural problems in Japan and thus come up with the right prescriptions. Some say that structural problems encompass a variety of issues, not only economic ones but also demographic, educational, and environmental ones. But, today, I will focus on three economic issues which are interrelated and have a particularly strong impact on Japan’s macroeconomic performance: first, the delay in cleaning up the balance sheet of firms; second, changes in economic growth mechanisms under globalization; and third, the imbalance between savings and investment. IV. Delay in Cleaning Up the Balance Sheets of Firms The most immediate lingering structural problem is that we have not yet completed the disposal of assets and liabilities that ballooned during the bubble period. In the wake of the bursting of the bubble, we first saw the collapse of firms which had expanded their liabilities based on aggressive management plans, and then the accumulation of non-performing assets on the part of financial institutions. This, in turn, reduced the risk-taking ability of financial institutions by eroding their capital position, resulting in impairing the smooth circulation of money in the economy. In addition, a loss of credibility in the financial system triggered by the collapse of some financial institutions worried depositors and financial markets alike, and seems to have contributed to the economic deterioration witnessed during 1997 and 1998 through a worsening of household and corporate sector confidence. The disposal of the non-performing assets of financial institutions has made considerable progress, at least from the accounting viewpoint, thanks to efforts on the part of financial institutions as well as capital injection into major banks using public funds. Needless to say, financial institutions must make further efforts, including the removal of non-performing assets from their balance sheets. It should be noted that balance sheet erosion is not limited to firms which have already gone bankrupt and the financial institutions which extended loans to them. Although not on the verge of suspending business, not a few firms misjudged demand during the bubble period and made large fixed investments or launched new businesses which turned out to be totally unprofitable. These firms have only just been managing to repay the debt while suffering from worsening asset efficiency and a high debt ratio. The often heard cases of “excess capacity” and “excess debt” have been partly attributed to the business cycle, but fundamentally they should be interpreted in this context of the debt overhang from the bubble period. There is little doubt that the delay in cleaning up corporate balance sheets lies behind the slow recovery of fixed investments despite extremely low interest rates. Indeed, there are cases where financial institutions have been obliged to be cautious in extending additional loans to firms lagging in improving their financial condition, even if they have new projects which are expected to be profitable. It is pointed out that this is partly because financial technology is not well developed in separating the risk related to a firm from that related to a project which the firm undertakes like in project finance. It thus seems unlikely that the Japanese economy will regain dynamism without an improvement in the balance sheets of the corporate sector. V. The U.S. Experience – A Case of “Creative Destruction” Often asked questions include: “How can the corporate sector scrap unprofitable businesses and obsolete equipment?” “Once the corporate sector has downsized unprofitable sectors, how will it lead to revitalization of the whole economy?” To answer these questions, it is perhaps instructive to look at the past 20 years’ experience of the U.S. The U.S. faced such problems as dwindling productivity growth during the 1970s and 1980s and balance sheet adjustment from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. In solving these problems, the U.S. government, particularly since the Reagan administration, has played a supporting role by promoting deregulation which has led to intensified competition and industrial revitalization. In the private sector, U.S. firms reviewed their production and management processes, and made necessary strategic adjustments, which has been labeled “re-engineering”. Therefore, to look at developments in the U.S. is useful in considering not only the balance sheet problem but also the kind of structural adjustment which is conducive to increasing productivity and restoring economic dynamism to the Japanese economy. Economic recovery in the U.S. since March 1991 has often been labeled a “jobless recovery” because it was not initially accompanied by a significant increase in employment and private consumption. However, this gradually changed to a full-fledged recovery with an increase in both fixed investment and employment, resulting in more than eight years of expansion until now. There are, admittedly, various views with respect to the future of the U.S. economy, but it deserves attention that the Schumpeterian process of “constructive destruction” has often been cited to have played an important role in its success to date. It should be noted that under such slogans as “re-engineering” and “strengthening core competence,” many U.S. firms have sold off or scrapped unprofitable sectors and concentrated management resources on profitable ones while taking full advantage of information technology. Such efforts have been responsible for a rise in their stock prices and laid the ground for further expansion in business areas where they had advantages via such methods as mergers and acquisitions. At the same time, many new firms specializing in “high technology” have grown rapidly with the spread of the Internet against the backdrop of across-the-board large increases in investment in information technology to improve management efficiency. In addition, it helped the economy that those who lost jobs due to corporate downsizing were smoothly reallocated to such growth areas as software and other services, including medical and nursing care, in a highly mobile labor market. With all these factors combined, industrial structure in the U.S. has dramatically changed over the past 10 years. The 50 years’ history of U.S. industry since the Second World War shows that the companies in major industries remained more or less the same during the 1950s and 1970s, including the “Big Three in the automobile industry,” and the big oil and steel companies. However, when comparing the 1990s with the 1970s, a number of firms specializing in “high technology,” which were not even established 20 years ago, are now listed among the major firms representing U.S. industry. This simple fact is deemed symbolic of the process of “creative destruction”. What about the situation in Japan? In the 1950s and the 1960s, the textile industry and heavy industries such as steel and chemicals developed as leading industries. In the 1970s, the rise of the automobile and electronics industries substantially changed the lineup of major firms. However, since the 1970s, there have been no substantial changes. I hasten to add that I am not saying that the Japanese economy cannot grow unless new firms are created. There is no doubt that many existing major firms are actively pursuing the development of new technology. Indeed, in this context, we can find examples of major firms in the U.S. which have undergone a dramatic transformation from what they were 20 years ago. Having said this, recalling Shumpeter’s belief that the function of an entrepreneur in the true sense is not so much to manage as to create a company, I cannot help but feel slightly disappointed that we have not yet seen the creation of many new companies which can lead the Japanese economy. A main driving force behind the buoyant development of the U.S. economy has been revitalization through intensified competition, and, if I may add another factor, “a culture of risk taking”. In Japan, while existing firms should concentrate their management resources on business areas where they have a comparative advantage, new industries or groups of new firms should emerge to create jobs, thereby achieving growth balancing the old and new. What is important in the process is that capital stock such as equipment and technology and management resources such as human resources be liquidated and reallocated to be fully utilized in growing new business areas. VI. Changes in the Economic Growth Mechanism under Globalization The second structural problem Japan has to face is that as globalization progresses and the shareholdings of foreign investors increase, Japanese corporate managers have come to pursue higher rates of return rather than expansion. At the same time, rates of return in those industries which had been protected by regulations have been forced to decline. Together, these developments have put heavy adjustment pressure on the existing industrial structure. A. Management Pursuing Higher Rates of Return A recent survey by the Economic Planning Agency shows that Japanese corporate managers have clearly changed to now emphasize higher rates of return. Since economic stagnation continues and hardly any increase in sales is expected, it is natural for corporate managers to pursue both higher return on assets (ROA) and higher return on equity (ROE). In addition, major Japanese firms used to rely on unrealized gains on shares as a buffer for the unexpected, and were able to remain profitable on the whole even if substantial losses were incurred in some areas. But, with the stagnant economy and sluggish stock prices, it became difficult to continue to depend on such unrealized gains, and this also seems to be partly responsible for the recent change in attitude of corporate managers who now emphasize rates of return over the short term. The data show that the ROA of Japanese firms was an average 7.8 percent during the 1980s, but declined to 5.1 percent in the 1990s.1 While this was partly due to the business cycle factor, it is true that the profitability of Japanese firms has been on a declining trend. B. Changes in Economic Growth Mechanisms One factor behind the declining profitability of Japanese firms is that their balance sheets still carry a huge amount of assets, either idle or underutilized, which is the negative legacy of the bubble period. A second factor is that since Japanese firms have long adopted a management style with an emphasis on maintaining employment, labor’s relative share inevitably rose during the long recession, thereby squeezing capital’s relative share, which translates into declining profitability. And, a third factor is that as the economy becomes more globalized, those Japanese industries, which had hitherto been protected by various measures such as regulations, are now forced to accept a declining rate of return, leading to the imminent need for large-scale adjustment of their industrial structure. Given the efforts made by firms, the first two factors may be mended over time. The third factor, however, seems to stem from the substantial and irreversible structural changes that the Japanese economy is currently experiencing. Let me elucidate on this third factor. Looking at the Japanese economy from a long-term perspective, we observe the following pattern. There is no doubt that the automobile and electronics industries have been one of the engines supporting post-war economic development because of the rapid increase in their productivity. By exposing themselves to international competition from an early stage, these industries have remained at the highest technological level globally and enjoyed high profitability through exports. Wages in these industries were raised in line with increased productivity. And, such an increase in wages permeated to other domestic industries with lower productivity, thereby improving the standard of living for the nation as a whole. If industries with low productivity try to pay the same wage as those with high productivity, the prices of products and services in these industries inevitably have to be raised. The existence of various regulations and traditional business practices have contributed to making such price increases possible without much difficulty. As the economy became further globalized in the 1990s, the traditional pattern has undergone a tremendous change. What triggered the change was that firms in leading industries have expanded production overseas and conducted operations on a global scale while paying close attention to the difference in costs at home and abroad. As a result, Japanese workers who had enjoyed high wages when compared internationally have become exposed, directly or indirectly, to global competition. In addition, globalized firms which focus on cost performance have pressured their domestic subcontractors and service providers to reduce their prices, thereby threatening the profitability of domestic industries which had not been operating in a competitive environment. Furthermore, with the increase in travel overseas, Japanese consumers have become conscious of the difference between domestic prices and those abroad. These factors, combined with the progress of deregulation, have created a situation where domestic industries which used to be protected from competition find it increasingly difficult to secure profits just by raising prices as they used to do. Thus, the traditional growth mechanism whereby even low productivity industries could maintain a certain level of profitability has apparently become unsustainable. Since the trend toward globalization is irreversible, it seems that time alone will not resolve this third factor responsible for declining profitability. Hence, it should be regarded as one of the most difficult structural problems facing the Japanese economy. In the U.S., such factors as technological innovation in telecommunications and intensified competition stemming from deregulation are said to have played an important role in improving productivity. Crucial for Japan’s economic future is how to raise the productivity of industries which have not operated in a competitive environment. The process Based on “Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry, Quarterly” compiled by the Ministry of Finance. of “creative destruction” is deemed unavoidable to a certain extent. In this regard, we need to carefully monitor what happens to employment in the process. VII. Savings and Investment Imbalance and Shortage of Risk Capital As may have become already clear, keys to restoring dynamism to the Japanese economy are the growth of new industries and firms as well as the simultaneous revitalization of investment. In this context, one might well ask why a country with one of the highest per capita GDP figures in the world and ample household savings totaling 1,300 trillion yen finds it difficult to revitalize domestic investment. This brings us to the third structural problem: the savings and investment imbalance. A. Decline in Capital Productivity It is rather ironic that as economic globalization progresses and cross-border capital movements become free, Japan has become an increasingly uncomfortable place for capital to stay because of its high level of capital accumulation. With slow growth in the labor force, Japan has accumulated capital through aggressive fixed investment since the high growth period, which substantially raised the amount of fixed assets per unit of labor. In fact, in the incessant pursuit of economic development since the end of the Second World War, Japan has become a capital rich country, even more so than the U.S. We should be proud of the fact that, through such capital accumulation, Japan’s per capita GDP is among the highest in the world. At the same time, we should be mindful of the fact that the amount of fixed assets necessary to produce the same GDP has been increasing, that is, the productivity of capital has been declining. Declining productivity of capital means that the expected return has been declining, which is consistent with the downward trend of ROA. From an investor’s viewpoint, this is the same as saying that capital is not efficiently employed in Japan, which might make investors both at home and abroad hesitate to invest in Japanese companies. Hence, if Japan increases investments only in existing areas to raise labor productivity, it will lead to a further deterioration in capital efficiency. Therefore, Japanese firms are currently facing a difficult challenge to expeditiously dispose of the negative legacy from the bubble period while at the same time exploring new business areas with high profitability and reallocating such resources as capital and labor to them. B. High Savings Ratio The imbalance between savings and investment is not a problem stemming exclusively from the investment side. The household savings ratio (on SNA basis) was more than 20 percent in the mid-1970s, but declined to around 10 to 15 percent by the end of the 1980s. The future prediction at that time was generally based on the following life-cycle hypothesis: When Japan becomes an aging society in the 1990s, older generations will reduce their savings and the household savings ratio will further decline, eventually resulting in the disappearance of Japan’s huge current account surplus. However, the reality is that the savings ratio stopped declining in the 1990s and the prediction at that time has turned out to be wide of the mark. It does not seem plausible to argue that a high savings ratio, that is, lower consumption than otherwise, is entirely due to national traits of the Japanese who regard savings a virtue. For example, surveys by the Prime Minister’s Office and the Bank of Japan suggest that many older people are concerned about their future livelihood and that they have reduced expenditures because of rising uncertainty regarding the pension and social welfare system. An increase in such uncertainty is also seen among younger generations. People, young and old alike, seem to have been cutting back on expenditures and increasing savings in self-defense to prepare for future uncertainty. One could say that we are caught in a “double savings” situation: In an aging society with a declining birth rate, older generations are saving more from their pensions in preparation for future nursing care needs, while younger generations are actively saving in fear of receiving less from their pensions in the future. Thus, if the household sector considers it necessary to save more and domestic investments are losing attractiveness, the economy will inevitably see an expansion of the fiscal deficit and current account surplus. To avoid such a situation, it is important to give the public a clear image of the future framework of the pension system so as to reduce uncertainty as well as to establish a social framework for looking after the elderly. In view of the fact that caring for the aged can be a business opportunity in the U.S. and Europe, we should make good use of private sector vitality to create businesses in such areas as social welfare. C. Shortage of Risk Capital In addition to the high savings ratio, another marked characteristic of household savings behavior in Japan is the high proportion of savings held in low risk assets such as bank deposits and postal savings. A comparison of the composition of household assets between Japan and the U.S. according to flow of funds accounts statistics shows that: cash and deposits comprise 55 percent of total assets in Japan, but only 11 percent in the U.S.; and, while the figure for stocks is 7 percent in Japan, it is 43 percent in the U.S. These figures vividly highlight the difference in risk-taking attitude of the household sector between Japan and the U.S. It seems that U.S. capital markets, which tend to promote venture businesses, are supported by such household behavior to no small extent. In Japan, despite the strong propensity for safe assets, it cannot be denied that how to make firms and financial products attractive for investment purposes will warrant study. I stated earlier that capital productivity in Japan is low and thus not attractive for either domestic or foreign investors. This refers only to the overall trend of the economy thus far. If we closely examine each individual firm and project, there must potentially be many investment opportunities with an appropriate combination of risk and return. There should not be much difference between Japan and abroad in that even a small firm will be able to become a big success if it takes advantage of technological innovation in telecommunications and deregulation. In fact, we may detect some seeds of new business opportunities in the recent buoyancy of the stock market. To germinate such seeds, it is deemed necessary to encourage new entry to the market through deregulation which leads to intensified competition and the revitalization of industries, and to create a variety of financial products through which the abundant savings of the household sector can be smoothly channeled as risk capital to investments in new businesses. VIII. Concluding Remarks The Japanese economy now stands at a crossroads as to whether it can move onto a self-sustained recovery path. Needless to say, a stable macroeconomic environment is important for the smooth progress of structural adjustment. We are fully aware that monetary policy is expected to play an important role under such circumstances. With these considerations in mind, we will maintain current monetary easing until deflationary worries subside. Having said this, the three structural problems discussed here are determined by supply-side factors, and cannot be dealt with only by demand stimulus measures from the monetary and fiscal side. For example, in addressing the corporate balance sheet problem, to what extent firms tackle the allocation of management resources will depend critically on the way corporate governance is being implemented. Regarding the changes in growth mechanisms under globalization, whether new firms emerge to bring innovation to the productivity of existing domestic-oriented industries will depend on how regulations and traditional transaction practices change and how the capital market functions. As to the savings and investment imbalance and the provision of risk capital, much may depend on the future of pension, insurance, and taxation systems. Since these supply-side measures work on the incentives of firms and households, it thus often takes time for effects to materialize unlike measures working on the demand side. Even if it takes time, I am not pessimistic about the future of the Japanese economy. We should be proud of Japan’s high quality labor force, technology, and managerial ability which enabled the post- war economic recovery. Such economic potential is still intact. I believe that dynamism will be restored to the Japanese economy if, with appropriate supply-side prescriptions, industries revitalize themselves through the transformation of existing firms or the creation of new ones in a competitive framework conducive to increasing risk-taking activity. In fact, the government has been examining various measures to tackle unemployment and industrial revitalization. And, in the private sector, we can observe some signs of future changes such as the increase in business affiliations and mergers and the review of business areas. By promoting structural change, the Japanese economy will undoubtedly exhibit the potential to transform itself into an economy with vitality and high productivity. In coming up with specific supply-side prescriptions, cooperation between the private sector and the government is essential in discussing such problems as how to guide incentives for firms and households in a desirable direction and how to minimize moral hazard. I sincerely hope that my speech today will contribute to discussion on the very important problem of structural reform.
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Bank of Japan, Communication, 17 August 1999.
Bank of Japan’s August report of recent economic and financial developments1 Bank of Japan, Communication, 17 August 1999. * * * The Bank’s view2 Japan’s economy, at present, has stopped deteriorating, and corporate sentiment has seen a slight improvement recently. However, clear signs of a self-sustained recovery in private demand have not been observed yet. With regard to final demand, business fixed investment has been on a downward trend. Recovery in private consumption continues to be weak on the whole. Net exports (exports minus imports) are sluggish at present due to an increase in imports. Meanwhile, housing investment has continued to recover, and public works have been rising. Reflecting such developments in final demand and continued progress in inventory adjustment, industrial production has stopped decreasing. In addition, corporate and consumer sentiment has seen an improvement due to the effects of measures taken to restore the stability of Japan’s financial system and the continued monetary easing by the Bank. The improvement in corporate sentiment, however, has not necessarily stimulated business activities, because firms strongly feel that they have excess capacity and employees and their profits remain weak. Meanwhile, the improvement in consumer sentiment is underpinning household expenditure even under the worsening employment and income conditions, but is not strong enough to push up overall private consumption. As for the outlook, with the progress in inventory adjustment gradually paving the way for a recovery in production, improvements in the overall financial environment partly due to the monetary easing by the Bank, along with a series of economic measures taken by the government, are expected to continue underpinning the economy. Moreover, the recovery of overseas economies, especially of Asian economies, is likely to have a positive impact on domestic production. Nevertheless, under cautious sales plans, firms are implementing further restructuring to improve their profitability. Although such corporate restructuring is expected to improve productivity, it is likely, in the short run, to reduce fixed investment and discourage household expenditure through the resulting deterioration in employment and income conditions. Under such circumstances, it is still difficult to expect an immediate selfsustained recovery in private demand. Overall economic developments require careful monitoring in consideration of the above points. It is also important to promote structural reform in order to assure the economy’s sustained growth in the medium term. With regard to prices, import prices continue to rise due to the increase in international commodity prices such as crude oil prices. Domestic wholesale prices are leveling off due to the progress in inventory adjustment as well as an increase in prices of some products closely related to international commodities, such as those of petroleum products. Consumer prices are also leveling out. On the other hand, corporate service prices continue to decline. For a while, movements of overall prices are likely to be flat, as import prices are rising and the decline in domestic commodity prices has come to a halt reflecting the progress in inventory adjustment. However, distinct narrowing in the output gap is This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on August 13, 1999. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on August 13 as the basis of monetary policy decisions. unlikely for the time being even though the economy has stopped deteriorating, and wages continue to decline. Thus, downward pressure on prices is expected to remain. In the financial market, the overnight call rate has stayed at nearly zero, and financial institutions have been confident about the availability of overnight funds. Interest rates on term instruments slightly increased from the middle of June but then fell back, and have recently been steady. However, those on instruments maturing beyond the year-end are relatively high partly due to market participants’ concern over the Year 2000 problem. The Japan premium has continued to be nearly zero. Yields on long-term government bonds fell to the level of 1.6 percent in the middle of July, but have slightly increased to 1.8-1.9 percent. The yield spread between government bonds and private bonds, especially corporate bonds with relatively low credit ratings, has narrowed further. Stock prices fell in late July against the background of the appreciation of the yen and the recent weak tone in U.S. stock prices. The current level is around 17,000-17,500 yen. The amount outstanding of funds in the call money market has remained generally stable since the middle of June. To date, this has not led to any difficulty in funds settlement, but close attention should be paid to future market developments. With regard to corporate finance, private banks have basically retained their cautious lending attitude. However, constraint that had been caused by severe fund-raising conditions and insufficient capital base has eased considerably. Under these circumstances, major banks have gradually become more active than before in extending loans, while carefully evaluating the credit risks involved. However, credit demand for economic activities such as business fixed investment remains weak. In addition, firms’ moves to increase their on-hand liquidity have settled down. As a result, credit demand in the private sector has continued to be weak, and thus private banks’ lending has remained sluggish. Furthermore, the pace of issuance of corporate bonds and CP has generally been slowing. Money stock (M2+CDs) has recently shown a year-to-year increase of over 4 percent partly due to an increase in fiscal expenditure. In this financial environment, credit conditions have eased somewhat. The following continue to warrant careful monitoring: how actively investors will take risks; how far private banks will ease their lending stance; and how these changes will affect economic activities.
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Bank of Japan, Communication, 13 September 1999.
Bank of Japan’s September report of recent economic and financial developments1 Bank of Japan, Communication, 13 September 1999. * * * The Bank’s View2 Japan’s economy has stopped deteriorating, and there are some activities improving such as exports and production. However, clear signs of a self-sustained recovery in private demand have not yet been observed. With regard to final demand, business fixed investment has been on a downward trend. Recovery in private consumption continues to be weak on the whole. Housing investment, which had been recovering, has recently peaked out. Meanwhile, public works have been rising, and net exports (exports minus imports) have started growing due to an increase in exports. Reflecting such developments in final demand and continued progress in inventory adjustment, industrial production is turning to an increase. Against this background, corporate and consumer sentiment has seen an improvement. The improvement in corporate sentiment, however, has not necessarily stimulated business activities, because firms strongly feel that they have excess capacity and employees and their profits remain weak. Meanwhile, the improvement in consumer sentiment is underpinning household expenditure even under the worsening employment and income conditions, but is not strong enough to push up overall private consumption. As for the outlook, improvements in the overall financial environment partly due to the monetary easing by the Bank, along with a series of economic measures taken by the government, are expected to continue underpinning the economy. Moreover, the positive impact on domestic production of the recovery of overseas economies, especially of Asian economies, is likely to continue for some time. By contrast, leading indicators suggest a high probability of a moderate decrease in housing investment from this autumn. In addition, under cautious sales plans, firms are implementing further restructuring to improve their profitability. Although such corporate restructuring is expected to improve productivity, it is likely, in the short run, to reduce fixed investment and discourage household expenditure through the resulting deterioration in employment and income conditions. Moreover, it seems that the recent appreciation of the yen will have an adverse effect on corporate profits in the near term. Under such circumstances, it is still difficult to expect an immediate self-sustained recovery in private demand. Overall economic developments require careful monitoring in consideration of the above points. It is also important to promote structural reform in order to assure the economy’s sustained growth in the medium term. With regard to prices, import prices have recently fallen slightly due to the appreciation of the yen, despite the rise in international commodity prices such as crude oil prices. Domestic wholesale prices are leveling off due to the progress in inventory adjustment as well as an increase in prices of some products closely related to international commodities, such as those of petroleum products. Consumer prices continue to be unchanged. Corporate service prices are still falling, although the pace of the decline is slowing. For a while, movements of overall prices are likely to be flat, as the decline in This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on 9 September 1999. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on 9 September as the basis of monetary policy decisions. domestic commodity prices has come to a halt reflecting the rise in import prices to date. However, substantial narrowing in the output gap led by a recovery in private demand is unlikely for the time being, and wages continue to decline. Thus, downward pressure on prices is expected to remain. In the financial market, the overnight call rate has stayed at nearly zero and financial institutions have been confident about the availability of overnight funds. As for interest rates on term instruments, short-term rates such as those of three months have weakened. However, longer-term rates maturing beyond the year-end continue to be relatively high partly due to market participants’ concern over the Year 2000 problem. The Japan premium has continued to be nearly zero for short-term transactions. Yields on long-term government bonds rose to 2 percent in late August, but have recently fallen to 1.8-1.9 percent. The yield spread between government bonds and private bonds (bank debentures and corporate bonds) has stopped narrowing. Stock prices recovered the 18,000 yen level in late August, but subsequently declined against the background of the appreciation of the yen and the weak tone in US stock prices. Currently, the prices are around 17,500-18,000 yen. The yen has appreciated further against the US dollar since mid-August to the current level of around 110 yen. The amount outstanding of funds in the call money market has remained generally stable since the middle of June. To date, this has not led to any difficulty in funds settlement, but close attention should be paid to future market developments. With regard to corporate finance, private banks have basically retained their cautious lending attitude. However, constraint that had been caused by severe fund-raising conditions and insufficient capital base has eased considerably. Under these circumstances, major banks have gradually become more active than before in extending loans, while carefully evaluating the credit risks involved. However, credit demand for economic activities such as business fixed investment remains weak. In addition, some firms have recently been repaying their loans using their on-hand liquidity. As a result, credit demand in the private sector has continued to be weak, and thus private banks’ lending has remained sluggish. Furthermore, the pace of issuance of corporate bonds and CP has generally been slowing. Money stock (M2+CDs) has shown a year-to-year increase of about 4 percent partly due to an increase in fiscal expenditure. In this financial environment, credit conditions have eased somewhat. The following continue to warrant careful monitoring: how actively investors will take risks; how far private banks will ease their lending stance; and how these changes will affect economic activities.
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Bank of Japan, Communication, 15 October 1999.
Bank of Japan’s October report of recent economic and financial developments1 Bank of Japan, Communication, 15 October 1999. * * * The Bank’s View2 Japan’s economy has stopped deteriorating, and exports and production are improving at present. However, clear signs of a self-sustained recovery in private demand have not been observed yet. With regard to final demand, business fixed investment has been on a downward trend. Recovery in private consumption continues to be weak on the whole, reflecting the persistent severity in employment and income conditions. Housing investment, which had been recovering, has recently peaked out. Meanwhile, public works have been rising, and net exports (exports minus imports) have continued to grow due to an increase in exports. Reflecting such developments in final demand and continued progress in inventory adjustment, industrial production is increasing. Additionally, corporate profits have started picking up. In this situation, corporate sentiment has continued to improve. Such positive developments in corporate profits and sentiment, however, have not necessarily stimulated business activities, because firms strongly feel that they have excess capacity and employees and that they should reduce their debts to restore financial soundness. As for the outlook, improvements in the overall financial environment partly due to the monetary easing by the Bank, along with a series of economic measures taken by the government, are expected to continue underpinning the economy. Moreover, the positive impact on domestic production of the recovery of overseas economies, especially of Asian economies, is likely to continue for some time. By contrast, leading indicators suggest a high probability of a moderate decrease in housing investment in the near future. The recent developments in public works orders indicate that public investment is likely to stop increasing. In addition, under cautious sales plans, firms are expected to continue corporate restructuring to improve their profitability. Although such restructuring is expected to improve productivity, in the short run, it reduces fixed investment and also discourages household expenditure through the resulting deterioration in employment and income conditions. Moreover, it seems that the recent appreciation of the yen will have an adverse effect on corporate profits in the near term. Under such circumstances, it is still difficult to expect an immediate self-sustained recovery in private demand. Overall economic developments require careful monitoring in consideration of the above points. It is also important to promote structural reform in order to assure the economy’s sustained growth in the medium term. With regard to prices, import prices have recently fallen slightly due to the appreciation of the yen, despite the rise in international commodity prices such as crude oil prices. Domestic wholesale prices are levelling off due to the progress in inventory adjustment as well as an increase in prices of some products closely related to international commodities, such as those of petroleum products. Consumer prices continue to be unchanged. Corporate service prices are still falling, although the pace of the decline is slowing. As regards the movements of overall prices in the future, they are likely to be flat, This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on 13 October 1999. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on 13 October as the basis of monetary policy decisions. as the rise in crude oil prices to date will continue to be passed on to prices of other products for a while. However, substantial narrowing in the output gap led by a recovery in private demand is unlikely for the time being, and wages continue to decline. Thus, downward pressure on prices is expected to remain. In the financial market, the overnight call rate has stayed at nearly zero, and financial institutions have been confident about the availability of overnight funds. As for interest rates on term instruments, short-term rates maturing before the year-end have been moving at a historically low level. Meanwhile, rates maturing beyond the year-end are relatively high due to market participants’ concern over the Year 2000 problem. The Japan premium has continued to be nearly zero for short-term transactions, but a small premium has been observed for transactions maturing beyond the year-end. Yields on long-term government bonds declined from late August to the level of around 1.6 percent. They rose somewhat thereafter and have recently been moving between 1.7 and 1.8 percent. The yield spread between government bonds and private bonds (bank debentures and corporate bonds) has been stable and noticeably smaller than before. Stock prices fell below the 17,000 yen level in late September against the background of the weak tone in U.S. stock prices and the rapid appreciation of the yen, but subsequently rebounded reacting to the recovery in U.S. stock prices and the restoration of stability in the foreign exchange market. The prices are presently moving around 18,000 yen. In the foreign exchange market, the yen surged against the U.S. dollar and reached the 103–104 yen level in the middle of and late September, but then declined to the current level of 106—108 yen to the dollar. The amount outstanding of funds in the call money market has remained generally stable since the middle of June. To date, this has not led to any difficulty in funds settlement, but close attention should be paid to future market developments. With regard to corporate finance, private banks have basically retained their cautious lending attitude. However, constraint that had been caused by severe fund-raising conditions and insufficient capital base has eased considerably. Under these circumstances, major banks have gradually become more active than before in extending loans, while carefully evaluating the credit risks involved. However, credit demand for economic activities such as business fixed investment remains weak. In addition, some firms have been trying to reduce debts using their on hand liquidity. As a result, credit demand in the private sector has continued to be weak, and thus private banks’ lending has remained sluggish. Meanwhile, issuance of corporate bonds and CP has recently been steady. The year-to-year growth rate of money stock (M2+CDs) has declined to around 3.5 percent mainly due to the weakness in credit demand in the private sector. In this financial environment, credit conditions have eased somewhat. The following continue to warrant careful monitoring: how actively investors will take risks; how far private banks will ease their lending stance; and how these changes will affect economic activities.
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Bank of Japan, Communication 15 November 1999.
Bank of Japan’s November report of recent economic and financial developments1 Bank of Japan, Communication 15 November 1999. * * * The Bank’s view2 Japan’s economy, which had stopped deteriorating, is currently turning to improve, with exports and production increasing. However, clear signs of a self-sustained recovery in private demand have not yet been observed. With regard to final demand, business fixed investment has been on a downward trend, although the pace of its decline is slowing. Recovery in private consumption continues to be weak through lack of notable improvements in employment and income conditions. Housing investment has recently peaked out, and public investment seems to have stopped rising. Meanwhile, net exports (real exports minus real imports) have increased further due to an upturn in overseas economies. Reflecting such developments in final demand and continued progress in inventory adjustment, industrial production is increasing. Additionally, corporate profits have started picking up. In this situation, corporate sentiment continues to improve. Regarding the employment condition, there are some indicators that suggest a slowdown of the decrease in the number of employees. The positive developments in corporate profits and sentiment, however, have not necessarily stimulated business activities, because firms still strongly feel that they have excess capacity and employees and that they should reduce their debts to restore financial soundness. In addition, efforts by firms to reduce personnel expenses have prolonged the severity of households’ income conditions. As for the outlook, improvements in the overall financial environment partly due to the monetary easing by the Bank, along with a series of economic measures taken by the government including those announced recently, are expected to continue underpinning the economy. Moreover, the positive impact on domestic production of the recovery of overseas economies, especially of Asian economies, is likely to continue for some time. By contrast, it is highly probable that housing investment will remain flat for the time being. In addition, under cautious sales outlook, firms are expected to continue corporate restructuring to improve their profitability. Such restructuring is unavoidable to enhance medium-term growth of the corporate sector and thereby that of the overall economy. In the short run, however, it reduces fixed investment, and also delays an improvement in employment and income conditions, thereby discouraging household expenditure. Moreover, it seems that the recent appreciation of the yen will have an adverse effect on corporate profits in the near term. Under such circumstances, it is still difficult to expect an immediate self-sustained recovery in private demand, even though an upturn in economic activities, such as production, is expected to give favorable effects to corporate and household income gradually. Consequently, economic developments still require careful monitoring, although the economy is turning to improve. Further, it is important to promote structural reform in order to encourage a recovery in private demand. With regard to prices, import prices are increasing somewhat due to the rise to date in international commodity prices, such as crude oil prices. Domestic wholesale prices, notwithstanding the fall in prices of electric machinery, are flat due to an increase in prices of some products closely related to This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on 12 November 1999. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on 12 November as the basis of monetary policy decisions. international commodities, such as those of petroleum products. Consumer prices remain unchanged. Corporate service prices are still falling slowly. As regards the movements of overall prices in the future, they are likely to be flat despite the continued fall in prices of some goods and services, as the rise in crude oil prices to date will continue to be passed on to prices of other products for a while. However, substantial narrowing in the output gap led by a recovery in private demand is unlikely for the time being, and wages continue to follow a declining trend. Thus, downward pressure on prices is expected to remain. In the financial market, the overnight call rate has stayed at nearly zero, and financial institutions have been confident about the availability of overnight funds. The amount outstanding of funds in the call money market has remained generally stable since the middle of June. As for interest rates on term instruments, short-term rates maturing before the year-end have remained at a historically low level. Meanwhile, rates maturing beyond the year-end are rising due to market participants’ concern over the Year 2000 problem. The Japan premium has continued to be nearly zero for short-term transactions, but there remains a small premium for transactions maturing beyond the year-end. Yields on long-term government bonds rose to around 1.9 per cent in late October. They declined somewhat thereafter and are presently moving between 1.7 and 1.8 per cent again. The yield spread between private bonds (bank debentures and corporate bonds) and government bonds once stopped contracting. However, there has recently been a conspicuous narrowing in the spread, primarily between private bonds with relatively low credit ratings and government bonds. Stock prices, after having declined in October against the background of the weak tone in U.S. stock prices, rebounded reacting to the recovery in U.S. stock prices, and are currently moving around 18,000-18,500 yen. In the foreign exchange market, the yen has recently been traded at around 104-107 yen to the U.S. dollar. With regard to corporate finance, private banks have basically retained their cautious lending attitude. However, constraint that had been caused by severe fund-raising conditions and insufficient capital base has eased considerably. Under these circumstances, major banks are gradually becoming more active in extending loans, while carefully evaluating the credit risks involved. However, credit demand for economic activities such as business fixed investment remains weak. In addition, some firms have been trying to reduce debts using their on-hand liquidity. As a result, credit demand in the private sector has continued to be basically stagnant, and thus private banks’ lending has remained sluggish. Corporate bond issuance has been steady. Meanwhile, CP issuance has been increasing with the year-end approaching. The year-to-year growth rate of money stock (M2+CDs) has declined to 3.0-3.5 per cent mainly due to the weakness in credit demand in the private sector. In this financial environment, credit conditions have eased somewhat. The following continue to warrant careful monitoring: how actively investors will take risks; how far private banks will ease their lending stance; and how these changes will affect economic activities.
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Bank of Japan, Communication 21 December 1999.
Bank of Japan’s December report of recent economic and financial developments1 Bank of Japan, Communication 21 December 1999. * * * The Bank’s View2 Japan’s economy, which had stopped deteriorating, has recently started to improve, with exports and production increasing. The economic environment surrounding private demand is gradually improving, as seen in the continuing increase in corporate profits. However, clear signs of a selfsustained recovery in private demand have not been observed yet. With regard to final demand, housing investment has recently peaked out, and public investment seems to have stopped rising. Recovery in private consumption continues to be weak through lack of notable improvements in employment and income conditions. Business fixed investment, which had been on a downward trend, shows signs of leveling off. Meanwhile, net exports (real exports minus real imports) continue to expand due to an upturn in overseas economies. Reflecting such developments in final demand and continued progress in inventory adjustment, industrial production remains on an uptrend and an increase in corporate profits is becoming distinct. In this situation, corporate sentiment continues to improve. Regarding the employment condition, there are some indicators that suggest a slowdown of decrease in the number of employees. The positive developments in corporate profits and sentiment, however, have not necessarily stimulated business activities, because firms still strongly feel that they have excess capacity and employees and that they should reduce their debts to restore financial soundness. In addition, efforts by firms to reduce personnel expenses have prolonged the severity of households’ income conditions. As for the outlook, improvements in the overall financial environment partly due to the monetary easing by the Bank, along with a series of economic measures taken by the government, are expected to continue underpinning the economy. Moreover, the positive impact on domestic production of the recovery of overseas economies, especially of Asian economies, is likely to continue for some time and have favorable effects on corporate profits and then on household income. By contrast, it is highly probable that housing investment will remain flat for the time being. In addition, firms are expected to maintain a cautious stance toward business fixed investment based on their modest prospects for sales, although corporate restructuring is improving profitability to some extent. Moreover, it seems that the appreciation of the yen since the summer will have an adverse effect on corporate profits in the near term. In these circumstances, future economic developments still require careful monitoring in spite of the gradual recovery in the environment for private demand. Furthermore, it is important to promote structural reform in order to facilitate a recovery in private demand. With regard to prices, import prices are declining somewhat due to the appreciation of the yen. Domestic wholesale prices, notwithstanding the fall in prices of electric machinery, are flat mainly due to the rise in prices of petroleum and chemical products reflecting an increase in crude oil prices. Consumer prices remain unchanged. Corporate service prices are still falling slowly. As for the outlook, overall prices are likely to be flat for the time being despite the continued fall expected in This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on December 17, 1999. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on December 17 as the basis of monetary policy decisions. prices of some machinery. This is because the supply-demand balance is improving gradually, as shown in the decline in inventories, and because the rise in crude oil prices to date will continue to be passed on to prices of other products for a while. However, attention should still be paid to the downward pressure on prices, as clear signs of a self-sustained recovery in private demand have not yet been observed and wages continue to fall. In the financial market, the overnight call rate has stayed at nearly zero, and financial institutions have been confident about the availability of overnight funds. The amount outstanding of funds in the call money market has increased slightly as transactions are becoming active with the year-end approaching. As for interest rates on term instruments, rates maturing beyond the year-end rose until the beginning of December mainly due to the influence of the Year 2000 problem, but plunged subsequently as financial institutions made progress in securing year-end funds amid ample funds provision by the Bank of Japan. The Japan premium has almost disappeared even for transactions maturing beyond the year-end. Yields on long-term government bonds rose slightly to nearly 1.9 percent from the middle of to late November reflecting improved confidence in the economy, but then fell back due to the yen’s appreciation and other factors, and are presently ranging between 1.70-1.75 percent. The yield spread between private bonds (bank debentures and corporate bonds) and government bonds continues narrowing, primarily that between private bonds with relatively low credit ratings and government bonds. Stock prices, after rising in November against the background of improved confidence in the economy and firmness of U.S. stock prices, weakened slightly due to the strengthening of the yen and other factors, and are currently moving around 18,000-18,500 yen. In the foreign exchange market, the yen appreciated further against the U.S. dollar in late November, and is recently been traded in the range of 102-104 yen. With regard to corporate finance, private banks have basically retained their cautious lending attitude. However, constraint that had been caused by severe fund-raising conditions and insufficient capital base has eased considerably. Under these circumstances, major banks are gradually becoming more active in extending loans, while carefully evaluating the credit risks involved. However, credit demand for economic activities such as business fixed investment remains weak. In addition, some firms have been trying to reduce debts using their on-hand liquidity. As a result, credit demand in the private sector has continued to be basically stagnant, and thus private banks’ lending has remained sluggish. Corporate bond issuance has been steady. Meanwhile, CP issuance is increasing with the year-end approaching. The growth of money stock (M2+CDs) has slowed somewhat mainly due to the weakness in credit demand in the private sector. In this financial environment, the financial position of firms is easing, and the lending attitude of financial institutions as perceived by firms is becoming less severe. It continues to warrant careful monitoring how these favorable developments in corporate financing environment will affect economic activities.
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Bank of Japan, Communication, 19 January 2000.
Bank of Japan’s January report of recent economic and financial developments1 Bank of Japan, Communication, 19 January 2000. * * * The Bank’s View2 Japan’s economy, which had stopped deteriorating, has recently started to improve, with exports and production increasing. The economic environment surrounding private demand is gradually improving, as seen in the continuing increase in corporate profits. However, clear signs of a selfsustained recovery in private demand have not been observed yet. With regard to final demand, housing investment has recently peaked out, and public investment seems to have stopped rising. Recovery in private consumption continues to be weak through lack of notable improvements in employment and income conditions. Business fixed investment, which had been on a downward trend, shows signs of leveling off. Meanwhile, net exports (real exports minus real imports) continue to follow an upward trend, despite monthly fluctuations, due to an upturn in overseas economies. Reflecting such developments in final demand and progress in inventory adjustment, industrial production continues to rise and an increase in corporate profits is becoming distinct. In this situation, corporate sentiment continues to improve. Regarding the employment condition, there are some indicators that suggest a slowdown of decrease in the number of employees. The positive developments in corporate profits and sentiment, however, have not necessarily stimulated business activities, because firms still strongly feel that they have excess capacity and employees and that they should reduce their debts to restore financial soundness. In addition, efforts by firms to reduce personnel expenses have prolonged the severity of households’ income conditions. As for the outlook, improvements in the overall financial environment partly due to the monetary easing by the Bank, along with a series of economic measures taken by the government, are expected to continue underpinning the economy. Moreover, the positive impact on domestic production of the recovery of overseas economies, especially of Asian economies, is likely to continue for some time and have favorable effects on corporate profits and then on household income. By contrast, it is highly probable that housing investment will remain flat for the time being. In addition, firms are expected to maintain a cautious stance toward business fixed investment based on their modest prospects for sales, although corporate restructuring is improving profitability to some extent. Moreover, it seems that the appreciation of the yen since the summer of 1999 will have an adverse effect on corporate profits in the near term. In these circumstances, future economic developments still require careful monitoring in spite of the gradual recovery in the environment for private demand. Furthermore, it is important to promote structural reform in order to facilitate a recovery in private demand. With regard to prices, import prices are declining somewhat due to the appreciation of the yen. Domestic wholesale prices, notwithstanding the fall in prices of electric machinery, are flat mainly due to the rise in prices of petroleum and chemical products reflecting an increase in crude oil prices. Consumer prices remain unchanged fundamentally. Corporate service prices are still falling slowly. As This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on January 17, 2000. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on January 17 as the basis of monetary policy decisions. for the outlook, overall prices are likely to be flat for the time being despite the continued fall expected in prices of some machinery. This is because the supply-demand balance is improving gradually, as shown in the decline in inventories, and because the rise in crude oil prices to date will continue to be passed on to prices of other products for a while. However, attention should still be paid to the downward pressure on prices, as clear signs of a self-sustained recovery in private demand have not yet been observed and wages continue to fall. The financial markets have been generally stable reflecting ample funds provision by the Bank of Japan, despite the surge in demand for liquidity including seasonal demand for year-end funds and precautionary demand in view of the Year 2000 problem. No significant disruptions have resulted from the millennium date change in financial transactions. The overnight call rate has stayed at nearly zero, and financial institutions have been confident about the availability of overnight funds. The amount outstanding of funds in the call money market has increased slightly. Interest rates on term instruments rose toward the end of 1999 due to market participants’ concerns about the Year 2000 problem, but declined around the turn of the year as these concerns were dispelled. The Japan premium remains negligible. Yields on long-term government bonds generally followed a downward trend from late November throughout December 1999, but then rebounded somewhat and are presently ranging between 1.751.80 percent. The yield spread between private bonds (bank debentures and corporate bonds) and government bonds continues narrowing, primarily that between private bonds with relatively low credit ratings and government bonds. Stock prices, after exceeding 19,000 yen at the beginning of 2000, weakened to around 18,000-18,500 yen following the correction in the U.S. stock market. Subsequently, they recovered reacting to the rebound in U.S. stocks and have returned to the level of above 19,000 yen. In the foreign exchange market, the yen once appreciated to the 101-102 yen level against the U.S. dollar at the beginning of the year, but then depreciated and is currently being traded in the range of 105-107 yen. With regard to corporate finance, private banks have basically retained their cautious lending attitude. However, constraint that had been caused by severe fund-raising conditions and insufficient capital base has eased considerably. Under these circumstances, major banks are gradually becoming more active in extending loans, while carefully evaluating the credit risks involved. However, credit demand for economic activities such as business fixed investment remains weak. In addition, firms continue to reduce debts as part of their balance-sheet restructuring measures. As a result, credit demand in the private sector has continued to be basically stagnant, and thus private banks’ lending has remained sluggish. Issuance of corporate bonds and CP has been steady at present. The growth in money stock (M2+CDs) has slowed somewhat reflecting the stagnant private credit demand. In this financial environment, the financial position of firms is easing, and the lending attitude of financial institutions as perceived by firms is becoming less severe. It continues to warrant careful monitoring how these favorable developments in corporate financing environment will affect economic activities.
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Bank of Japan, Communication, 15 February 2000.
Bank of Japan’s February report of recent economic and financial developments1 Bank of Japan, Communication, 15 February 2000. * * * The Bank’s View2 Japan’s economy has recently started to improve. The economic environment surrounding private demand is gradually improving, as seen in the continuing increase in corporate profits. However, clear signs of a self-sustained recovery in private demand have not been observed yet. With regard to final demand, housing investment has peaked out and started to decline slowly, and public investment seems to be decreasing moderately. Recovery in private consumption continues to be weak with the decrease in income, particularly in winter bonuses. Business fixed investment, which had been on a downward trend, is starting to level off. Meanwhile, net exports (real exports minus real imports) continue to follow an upward trend, despite monthly fluctuations, due to an upturn in overseas economies. Reflecting such developments in final demand and progress in inventory adjustment, industrial production continues to rise and an increase in corporate profits is becoming distinct. In this situation, corporate sentiment continues to improve. Regarding the employment condition, the decrease in the number of employees is gradually slowing. However, the improvements in corporate profits and sentiment have not stimulated business activities of many firms, because these firms still strongly feel that they have excess capacity and employees and that they should reduce their debts to restore financial soundness. In addition, efforts by firms to reduce personnel expenses have prolonged the severity of households’ income conditions. As for the outlook, improvements in the overall financial environment partly due to the monetary easing by the Bank, along with a series of economic measures taken by the government, are expected to continue underpinning the economy. Moreover, the positive impact on domestic production of the recovery of overseas economies is likely to continue for some time and have favorable effects on corporate profits and then on household income. By contrast, it is highly probable that housing investment will continue to decline slowly, and public investment is expected to follow a moderately downward trend for some time. In the corporate sector, restructuring is gradually improving profitability to some extent and some firms in high-growth sectors are inclining toward increasing capital spending. Many firms, however, are very likely to maintain a cautious stance toward fixed investment based on their modest prospects for sales. It seems that the appreciation of the yen since the summer of 1999 will have an adverse effect on corporate profits in the near term. In these circumstances, future economic developments still require careful monitoring in spite of the gradual recovery in the environment for private demand. Furthermore, it is important to promote structural reform in order to facilitate a recovery in private demand. With regard to prices, import prices are rising somewhat due to the increase in international commodity prices such as crude oil prices, along with the recent depreciation of the yen. Domestic wholesale prices, notwithstanding the fall in prices of electric machinery, are flat mainly due to the This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on 10 February 2000. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on 10 February as the basis of monetary policy decisions. rise in prices of petroleum and chemical products reflecting an increase in crude oil prices. Consumer prices remain unchanged fundamentally. Corporate service prices are still falling slowly. As for the outlook, overall prices are likely to be flat for the time being despite the continued fall expected in prices of some machinery. This is because the supply-demand balance is improving gradually, as shown in the decline in inventories, and because the rise in crude oil prices to date will continue to be passed on to prices of other products for a while. However, attention should still be paid to the downward pressure on prices, as clear signs of a self-sustained recovery in private demand have not yet been observed and wages continue to fall. Turning to the financial markets, the influence on the money market of concerns related to the Year 2000 problem has almost disappeared. The overnight call rate has stayed at nearly zero, and financial institutions have been confident about the availability of overnight funds. The amount outstanding of funds in the call money market has been basically unchanged. Interest rates on term instruments have generally been stable at the level as low as that prior to the emergence of concerns related to the Year 2000 problem. The Japan premium remains negligible. Yields on long-term government bonds declined and, in late January, reached around 1.60-1.65 percent. But then they rebounded in reaction to the depreciation of the yen and the developments in the stock market, and are presently around 1.85 percent. The yield spread between private bonds (bank debentures and corporate bonds) and government bonds continues narrowing, primarily that between private bonds with relatively low credit ratings and government bonds. Stock prices have been on a rising trend since mid-January against the background of the depreciation of the yen, and are currently moving around 19,500-20,000 yen. In the foreign exchange market, the trend has been toward a weaker yen against the U.S. dollar, and the yen is being traded in the range of 107-110 yen. With regard to corporate finance, private banks have basically retained their cautious lending attitude. However, constraint that had been caused by severe fund-raising conditions and insufficient capital base has eased considerably. Under these circumstances, major banks are gradually becoming more active in extending loans, while carefully evaluating the credit risks involved. However, credit demand for economic activities such as business fixed investment remains weak. In addition, firms continue to reduce debts as part of their balance-sheet restructuring measures. As a result, credit demand in the private sector has continued to be basically stagnant, and thus private banks’ lending has remained sluggish. Issuance of corporate bonds and CP has been sluggish. The growth in money stock (M2+CDs) continues to slow reflecting the stagnant private credit demand. In this financial environment, the financial position of firms is easing, and the lending attitude of financial institutions as perceived by firms is becoming less severe. It continues to warrant careful monitoring how these favorable developments in corporate financing environment will affect economic activities.
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Bank of Japan, Communication, 10 March 2000.
Bank of Japan’s March report of recent economic and financial developments1 Bank of Japan, Communication, 10 March 2000. * * * The Bank’s view Japan’s economy has recently started to improve. The economic environment surrounding private demand continues to improve, as seen in the increase in corporate profits. However, clear signs of a self-sustained recovery in private demand have not been observed yet. With regard to final demand, housing investment and public investment are decreasing moderately. Recovery in private consumption continues to be weak through lack of notable improvements in employment and income conditions. Meanwhile, business fixed investment, which had been on a downward trend, seems to have almost leveled off. Net exports (real exports minus real imports) continue to follow an upward trend due to an upturn in overseas economies. Reflecting such developments in final demand, industrial production continues to rise, and an increase in corporate profits is becoming distinct. In this situation, corporate sentiment continues to improve. Regarding the employment condition, the decrease in the number of employees is slowing. However, the improvements in corporate profits and sentiment have not stimulated business activities of many firms, because these firms still strongly feel that they have excess capacity and employees and that they should reduce their debts to restore financial soundness. In addition, efforts by firms to reduce personnel expenses have prolonged the severity of households’ income conditions. As for the outlook, public investment is likely to pick up reflecting the progress in the implementation of the supplementary budget for fiscal 1999. This, along with the favorable financial environment created partly by the Bank’s monetary easing, is expected to continue underpinning the economy. Moreover, the positive impact on domestic production of the recovery of overseas economies is likely to continue for some time, having favorable effects on corporate profits and spending, and then on household income and consumption. By contrast, it is highly probable that housing investment will continue to decline moderately. In the corporate sector, restructuring is gradually improving profitability to some extent, and some firms in high-growth sectors are inclining toward increasing capital spending. Many firms, however, are expected to maintain a cautious stance toward fixed investment based on their modest prospects for sales. It seems that the appreciation of the yen since the summer of 1999 will have an adverse effect on corporate profits in the near term. In these circumstances, future economic developments still require careful monitoring in spite of the continued improvements in the environment for private demand. Furthermore, it is important to promote structural reform in order to facilitate a recovery in private demand. With regard to prices, import prices are rising due to the increase in international commodity prices such as crude oil prices, along with the recent depreciation of the yen. Domestic wholesale prices, notwithstanding the fall in prices of electric machinery, are flat mainly due to the rise in prices of petroleum and chemical products reflecting an increase in crude oil prices. Meanwhile, consumer prices are somewhat weak due to a decline in prices of imported products reflecting the past This report was written based on data and information available when the Bank of Japan Monetary Policy Meeting was held on 8 March 2000. The Bank’s view on recent economic and financial developments, determined by the Policy Board at the Monetary Policy Meeting held on 8 March as the basis of monetary policy decisions. appreciation of the yen. Corporate service prices are still falling slowly. As for the outlook, upward pressure on prices is likely to arise from the gradual improvement in domestic supply-demand balance, as shown in the decline in inventories, and from the rise in crude oil prices. On the other hand, downward pressure is expected from the long-term declining trend of machinery prices due to technological innovations and from the fall in prices of imported products reflecting the past appreciation of the yen. On balance, overall prices are likely to remain unchanged for the time being. However, attention should still be paid to the downward pressure on prices stemming from weak demand, as clear signs of a self-sustained recovery in private demand have not yet been observed and wages continue to fall. In the financial market, the overnight call rate has generally stayed near zero, except for a temporary rise reflecting concerns about the possible computer problems related to the leap year, and financial institutions have been confident about the availability of overnight funds. The amount outstanding of funds in the call money market increased slightly in late February, and decreased thereafter. Interest rates on term instruments have generally been stable at an extremely low level. The Japan premium remains negligible. Yields on long-term government bonds were generally above 1.8% in February, but declined somewhat from the beginning of March, and are recently ranging between 1.7% and 1.8%. The yield spread between private bonds (bank debentures and corporate bonds) and government bonds continues narrowing, primarily that between private bonds with relatively low credit ratings and government bonds. Stock prices have been firm on the whole, and are currently moving around 20,000 yen. In the foreign exchange market, the yen weakened against the US dollar for most part of February. However, the trend was reversed late in the month, and the yen is recently being traded in the range of 106-108 yen. With regard to corporate finance, private banks have basically retained their cautious lending attitude. However, constraint that had been caused by severe fund-raising conditions and insufficient capital base has eased considerably. Under these circumstances, major banks are becoming more active in extending loans, while carefully evaluating the credit risks involved. However, credit demand for economic activities such as business fixed investment remains weak. In addition, firms continue to reduce debts as part of their balance-sheet restructuring measures. As a result, credit demand in the private sector has continued to be basically stagnant, and thus private banks’ lending has remained sluggish. Issuance of corporate bonds and CP has been steady. The growth in money stock (M2+CDs) continues to slow reflecting the above-mentioned situation. In this financial environment, corporate financing conditions are easing, and the lending attitude of financial institutions is perceived by firms as becoming less severe. It continues to warrant careful monitoring how these favorable developments in the corporate financing environment will affect economic activities.
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Speech given by Mr Masaru Hayami, Governor of the Bank of Japan, at the Asian Pacific Bankers Club, in Tokyo, on 17 March 2000.
Mr Hayami: Globalization and regional cooperation in Asia Speech given by Mr Masaru Hayami, Governor of the Bank of Japan, at the Asian Pacific Bankers Club, in Tokyo, on 17 March 2000. * * * It is a great honor to be invited today and given an opportunity to address distinguished members of the Asian Pacific Bankers Club. In particular, I would like to commend the Club for providing a valuable forum for fostering mutual understanding among representatives of major banks in East Asia and the Pacific region. More than two years have passed since the outset of the currency crisis in Asia, and we can now say that we have clearly witnessed a recovery. Thus, at this juncture, I believe it useful to examine what kind of regional cooperation is desirable in Asia from a long-term perspective. Positive and negative sides of globalization Let me first consider globalization. The essence of globalization is the integration of markets worldwide and the deepening of various interdependent relations. As we all know, the speed of globalization has been accelerating, especially in financial markets. This is clearly evidenced by the significant increase in foreign exchange transactions and international bond issues over the span of the past ten years. You will all agree that the rapid progress of information and communication technology has played a decisive role as the driving force behind globalization. But, we should not forget the dynamic mechanism whereby globalization creates pressures for the harmonization of such systems as accounting, taxation and corporate governance across borders, which, in turn, leads to further globalization. As is commonly said, “globalization begets globalization”. Thus, the move toward globalization is an inevitable reality, and not likely to be reversed. Bearing in mind such a reality, we need to examine the problems related to globalization and how we should respond to them. Globalization has brought about a variety of changes. One obvious benefit from a long-term viewpoint is that active cross-border capital flows will realize the efficient allocation of world resources. At the same time, precisely because of enhanced efficiency, there is a greater risk that the rapid increase in international capital flows will induce an unexpected adverse impact, as was the case when financial crisis contagion following the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 spread to Russia and Latin America. Given the fact of life that globalization is not reversible, what we need to do is to minimize the negative side of globalization. In fact, since the financial crisis in Asia, various measures have been effected to prevent international contagion stemming from financial crises and to improve the international financial system. These measures include the improvement of disclosure to achieve enhanced market discipline, the establishment of a domestic financial system which is robust and resilient to external shocks, closer international cooperation in terms of financial supervision, and the review and strengthening of IMF functions. Progress of regional cooperation Amid globalization, it is worth noting that we have also witnessed a clear trend toward regionalism or regional cooperation in various parts of the world. These movements toward promoting regional cooperation have taken due account of trade and financial relations. For example, in Europe, the introduction of the euro and the expansion of the EU. In the Americas, the expansion of NAFTA and dollarization which is being considered by some Latin American countries. In Asia, we have begun to observe some moves toward closer cooperation as I will describe later. Can we reconcile these two contrasting trends, the progress of economic and financial globalization on the one hand, and the strengthening of regional cooperation on the other? One possible interpretation of this difficult question is that the driving force behind globalization has also made the interaction of economic and financial activities closer in regions which have a lot in common. For example, the rapid progress of information and communication technology can be regarded as one of the major factors supporting the integration of financial markets in the euro zone. Therefore, globalization and regional cooperation can proceed simultaneously. Furthermore, regional cooperation, if managed properly, will promote globalization. For example, if there are problems for which it will take a long time to form a global consensus, it may be possible to reach a consensus relatively quickly among specific regions. This is a case where regional cooperation lowers barriers to globalization in countries within the regions concerned. Furthermore, if there is a common platform for discussion or a framework for solving problems in a region which consists of countries with similar economic conditions and policy orientation, we may be able to reduce the cost of global negotiations in the event of international policy conflicts or shocks. In such a case, regional cooperation may supplement a global cooperative framework. It may sound a little ironic, but regional cooperation has become all the more significant and important when globalization progresses rapidly. The global economy of the twenty-first century will most likely be a multi-layered global network of various forms of regional cooperation. Regional cooperation in Asia Now, I would turn to regional cooperation in Asia. Needless to say, Asia is extremely diverse in terms of culture, politics, and religion. Such diversity entails difficulties in promoting regional cooperation. In fact, the speed of regional cooperation in Asia has been slow compared to other regions. However, it is also true that the extent of interdependence has become more widespread and deep as witnessed by the progress of the horizontal division of labor and increased capital flows in East Asia. In addition, since the bitter experience of the currency crisis in 1997 has made us recognize the risk of spillover and contagion, I believe that momentum for actively promoting regional cooperation as a device to support globalization has steadily increased. In promoting regional cooperation, let me offer you three important points in the economic and financial area. First is the strengthening of mutual surveillance. It is a major premise for any regional cooperation that the countries concerned share a common recognition with respect to the economic and financial conditions of individual countries in the region, their interdependence, and the risks inherent in the regional economy. Second, countries in the region should share a common view of the future direction of the regional economy and also concrete policy response based on such recognition. Bearing in mind the lessons we learned from the currency crises, we should improve the functioning of financial markets and foreign exchange regimes, and also strengthen domestic financial systems and financial supervisory frameworks. In order to make an appropriate policy response, not only coordination among countries in the region but also competition among them are very much needed. Third is participation in global efforts toward the stability of the international financial system, which is often termed the “New International Financial Architecture” problem. It seems to me increasingly important to send a coherent message from Asia to such international fora as the Financial Stability Forum, the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, and the International Monetary and Financial Committee. Having said all this, we should never forget the importance of maintaining the basic philosophy of “open regionalism” as a major underlying premise to contribute to the stability and development of the world economy. Central banks also play a very important role in promoting regional cooperation. As symbolized by the rapid expansion of derivative transactions, we now live in a world where international capital flows have become extremely complex and the speed at which a shock is transmitted across borders has accelerated. In such a world, it is not possible for the central bank of any one country to ensure integrity of the international financial system. This can be easily understood if we recall such problems as the liquidity risk involved in foreign exchange and the Herstatt risk in cross-border settlements. To discharge the responsibility of conducting appropriate monetary policy and maintaining financial system stability as well as to prevent international systemic risk from emerging, mutual cooperation and coordination have become increasingly essential among central banks in the region. In this context, a forum called EMEAP, composed of central banks in the East Asia and Pacific region, was established in 1991. In this forum, member central banks have been exchanging views and information regarding economic, financial market, and foreign exchange market developments. They have also been studying ways to make improvements in such areas as financial markets, settlement systems, and bank supervisory methods. Conclusion In closing, let me briefly touch upon Japan’s role in Asia. Given the size of its economic presence and close relations with countries in the Asian region, Japan should make an appropriate contribution to regional development. To this end, first of all, Japan itself must aggressively implement structural reform to realize robust economic fundamentals. At the same time, Japan should promote further opening and improvement of its domestic markets to contribute to the efficient and fair allocation of world resources. Particularly in financial markets, various measures for improvement have been effected. For example, in the benchmark government bond market, the maturity of bonds has been diversified and the withholding tax on non-residents lifted. We should continue such efforts to make domestic markets more attractive for overseas investors. Through such efforts, I believe and sincerely hope that countries both within and outside the Asian region will come to have greater confidence in Japan, which, in turn, will contribute to closer and stronger cooperation in Asia.
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