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Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static struct svc_xprt *svc_rdma_accept(struct svc_xprt *xprt)
{
struct svcxprt_rdma *listen_rdma;
struct svcxprt_rdma *newxprt = NULL;
struct rdma_conn_param conn_param;
struct rpcrdma_connect_private pmsg;
struct ib_qp_init_attr qp_attr;
struct ib_device *dev;
struct sockaddr *sap;
unsigned int i;
int ret = 0;
listen_rdma = container_of(xprt, struct svcxprt_rdma, sc_xprt);
clear_bit(XPT_CONN, &xprt->xpt_flags);
/* Get the next entry off the accept list */
spin_lock_bh(&listen_rdma->sc_lock);
if (!list_empty(&listen_rdma->sc_accept_q)) {
newxprt = list_entry(listen_rdma->sc_accept_q.next,
struct svcxprt_rdma, sc_accept_q);
list_del_init(&newxprt->sc_accept_q);
}
if (!list_empty(&listen_rdma->sc_accept_q))
set_bit(XPT_CONN, &listen_rdma->sc_xprt.xpt_flags);
spin_unlock_bh(&listen_rdma->sc_lock);
if (!newxprt)
return NULL;
dprintk("svcrdma: newxprt from accept queue = %p, cm_id=%p\n",
newxprt, newxprt->sc_cm_id);
dev = newxprt->sc_cm_id->device;
/* Qualify the transport resource defaults with the
* capabilities of this particular device */
newxprt->sc_max_sge = min((size_t)dev->attrs.max_sge,
(size_t)RPCSVC_MAXPAGES);
newxprt->sc_max_sge_rd = min_t(size_t, dev->attrs.max_sge_rd,
RPCSVC_MAXPAGES);
newxprt->sc_max_req_size = svcrdma_max_req_size;
newxprt->sc_max_requests = min_t(u32, dev->attrs.max_qp_wr,
svcrdma_max_requests);
newxprt->sc_fc_credits = cpu_to_be32(newxprt->sc_max_requests);
newxprt->sc_max_bc_requests = min_t(u32, dev->attrs.max_qp_wr,
svcrdma_max_bc_requests);
newxprt->sc_rq_depth = newxprt->sc_max_requests +
newxprt->sc_max_bc_requests;
newxprt->sc_sq_depth = RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT * newxprt->sc_rq_depth;
atomic_set(&newxprt->sc_sq_avail, newxprt->sc_sq_depth);
if (!svc_rdma_prealloc_ctxts(newxprt))
goto errout;
if (!svc_rdma_prealloc_maps(newxprt))
goto errout;
/*
* Limit ORD based on client limit, local device limit, and
* configured svcrdma limit.
*/
newxprt->sc_ord = min_t(size_t, dev->attrs.max_qp_rd_atom, newxprt->sc_ord);
newxprt->sc_ord = min_t(size_t, svcrdma_ord, newxprt->sc_ord);
newxprt->sc_pd = ib_alloc_pd(dev, 0);
if (IS_ERR(newxprt->sc_pd)) {
dprintk("svcrdma: error creating PD for connect request\n");
goto errout;
}
newxprt->sc_sq_cq = ib_alloc_cq(dev, newxprt, newxprt->sc_sq_depth,
0, IB_POLL_WORKQUEUE);
if (IS_ERR(newxprt->sc_sq_cq)) {
dprintk("svcrdma: error creating SQ CQ for connect request\n");
goto errout;
}
newxprt->sc_rq_cq = ib_alloc_cq(dev, newxprt, newxprt->sc_rq_depth,
0, IB_POLL_WORKQUEUE);
if (IS_ERR(newxprt->sc_rq_cq)) {
dprintk("svcrdma: error creating RQ CQ for connect request\n");
goto errout;
}
memset(&qp_attr, 0, sizeof qp_attr);
qp_attr.event_handler = qp_event_handler;
qp_attr.qp_context = &newxprt->sc_xprt;
qp_attr.cap.max_send_wr = newxprt->sc_sq_depth;
qp_attr.cap.max_recv_wr = newxprt->sc_rq_depth;
qp_attr.cap.max_send_sge = newxprt->sc_max_sge;
qp_attr.cap.max_recv_sge = newxprt->sc_max_sge;
qp_attr.sq_sig_type = IB_SIGNAL_REQ_WR;
qp_attr.qp_type = IB_QPT_RC;
qp_attr.send_cq = newxprt->sc_sq_cq;
qp_attr.recv_cq = newxprt->sc_rq_cq;
dprintk("svcrdma: newxprt->sc_cm_id=%p, newxprt->sc_pd=%p\n",
newxprt->sc_cm_id, newxprt->sc_pd);
dprintk(" cap.max_send_wr = %d, cap.max_recv_wr = %d\n",
qp_attr.cap.max_send_wr, qp_attr.cap.max_recv_wr);
dprintk(" cap.max_send_sge = %d, cap.max_recv_sge = %d\n",
qp_attr.cap.max_send_sge, qp_attr.cap.max_recv_sge);
ret = rdma_create_qp(newxprt->sc_cm_id, newxprt->sc_pd, &qp_attr);
if (ret) {
dprintk("svcrdma: failed to create QP, ret=%d\n", ret);
goto errout;
}
newxprt->sc_qp = newxprt->sc_cm_id->qp;
/*
* Use the most secure set of MR resources based on the
* transport type and available memory management features in
* the device. Here's the table implemented below:
*
* Fast Global DMA Remote WR
* Reg LKEY MR Access
* Sup'd Sup'd Needed Needed
*
* IWARP N N Y Y
* N Y Y Y
* Y N Y N
* Y Y N -
*
* IB N N Y N
* N Y N -
* Y N Y N
* Y Y N -
*
* NB: iWARP requires remote write access for the data sink
* of an RDMA_READ. IB does not.
*/
newxprt->sc_reader = rdma_read_chunk_lcl;
if (dev->attrs.device_cap_flags & IB_DEVICE_MEM_MGT_EXTENSIONS) {
newxprt->sc_frmr_pg_list_len =
dev->attrs.max_fast_reg_page_list_len;
newxprt->sc_dev_caps |= SVCRDMA_DEVCAP_FAST_REG;
newxprt->sc_reader = rdma_read_chunk_frmr;
} else
newxprt->sc_snd_w_inv = false;
/*
* Determine if a DMA MR is required and if so, what privs are required
*/
if (!rdma_protocol_iwarp(dev, newxprt->sc_cm_id->port_num) &&
!rdma_ib_or_roce(dev, newxprt->sc_cm_id->port_num))
goto errout;
if (rdma_protocol_iwarp(dev, newxprt->sc_cm_id->port_num))
newxprt->sc_dev_caps |= SVCRDMA_DEVCAP_READ_W_INV;
/* Post receive buffers */
for (i = 0; i < newxprt->sc_max_requests; i++) {
ret = svc_rdma_post_recv(newxprt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret) {
dprintk("svcrdma: failure posting receive buffers\n");
goto errout;
}
}
/* Swap out the handler */
newxprt->sc_cm_id->event_handler = rdma_cma_handler;
/* Construct RDMA-CM private message */
pmsg.cp_magic = rpcrdma_cmp_magic;
pmsg.cp_version = RPCRDMA_CMP_VERSION;
pmsg.cp_flags = 0;
pmsg.cp_send_size = pmsg.cp_recv_size =
rpcrdma_encode_buffer_size(newxprt->sc_max_req_size);
/* Accept Connection */
set_bit(RDMAXPRT_CONN_PENDING, &newxprt->sc_flags);
memset(&conn_param, 0, sizeof conn_param);
conn_param.responder_resources = 0;
conn_param.initiator_depth = newxprt->sc_ord;
conn_param.private_data = &pmsg;
conn_param.private_data_len = sizeof(pmsg);
ret = rdma_accept(newxprt->sc_cm_id, &conn_param);
if (ret) {
dprintk("svcrdma: failed to accept new connection, ret=%d\n",
ret);
goto errout;
}
dprintk("svcrdma: new connection %p accepted:\n", newxprt);
sap = (struct sockaddr *)&newxprt->sc_cm_id->route.addr.src_addr;
dprintk(" local address : %pIS:%u\n", sap, rpc_get_port(sap));
sap = (struct sockaddr *)&newxprt->sc_cm_id->route.addr.dst_addr;
dprintk(" remote address : %pIS:%u\n", sap, rpc_get_port(sap));
dprintk(" max_sge : %d\n", newxprt->sc_max_sge);
dprintk(" max_sge_rd : %d\n", newxprt->sc_max_sge_rd);
dprintk(" sq_depth : %d\n", newxprt->sc_sq_depth);
dprintk(" max_requests : %d\n", newxprt->sc_max_requests);
dprintk(" ord : %d\n", newxprt->sc_ord);
return &newxprt->sc_xprt;
errout:
dprintk("svcrdma: failure accepting new connection rc=%d.\n", ret);
/* Take a reference in case the DTO handler runs */
svc_xprt_get(&newxprt->sc_xprt);
if (newxprt->sc_qp && !IS_ERR(newxprt->sc_qp))
ib_destroy_qp(newxprt->sc_qp);
rdma_destroy_id(newxprt->sc_cm_id);
/* This call to put will destroy the transport */
svc_xprt_put(&newxprt->sc_xprt);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: std::string HeadlessWebContentsImpl::GetMainFrameDevToolsId() const {
return web_contents()->GetMainFrame()->GetDevToolsFrameToken().ToString();
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
[email protected]
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
#else
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
#endif
}
Commit Message: x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <[email protected]>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void RunInvAccuracyCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 1000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, in, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, coeff, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
in[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
fwd_txfm_ref(in, coeff, pitch_, tx_type_);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(coeff, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
const uint32_t diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const uint32_t error = diff * diff;
EXPECT_GE(1u, error)
<< "Error: 16x16 IDCT has error " << error
<< " at index " << j;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void print_fatal_signal(struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
{
printk("%s/%d: potentially unexpected fatal signal %d.\n",
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), signr);
#if defined(__i386__) && !defined(__arch_um__)
printk("code at %08lx: ", regs->ip);
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
unsigned char insn;
if (get_user(insn, (unsigned char *)(regs->ip + i)))
break;
printk("%02x ", insn);
}
}
#endif
printk("\n");
preempt_disable();
show_regs(regs);
preempt_enable();
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void Cues::Init() const {
if (m_cue_points)
return;
assert(m_count == 0);
assert(m_preload_count == 0);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
long long pos = m_start;
long cue_points_size = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
const long long idpos = pos;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x3B) // CuePoint ID
PreloadCuePoint(cue_points_size, idpos);
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ldp_pdu_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *pptr)
{
const struct ldp_common_header *ldp_com_header;
const struct ldp_msg_header *ldp_msg_header;
const u_char *tptr,*msg_tptr;
u_short tlen;
u_short pdu_len,msg_len,msg_type,msg_tlen;
int hexdump,processed;
ldp_com_header = (const struct ldp_common_header *)pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*ldp_com_header);
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_com_header->version) != LDP_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sLDP version %u packet not supported",
(ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) ? "" : "\n\t",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_com_header->version)));
return 0;
}
pdu_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_com_header->pdu_length);
if (pdu_len < sizeof(const struct ldp_common_header)-4) {
/* length too short */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sLDP, pdu-length: %u (too short, < %u)",
(ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) ? "" : "\n\t",
pdu_len,
(u_int)(sizeof(const struct ldp_common_header)-4)));
return 0;
}
/* print the LSR-ID, label-space & length */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sLDP, Label-Space-ID: %s:%u, pdu-length: %u",
(ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) ? "" : "\n\t",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ldp_com_header->lsr_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_com_header->label_space),
pdu_len));
/* bail out if non-verbose */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1)
return 0;
/* ok they seem to want to know everything - lets fully decode it */
tptr = pptr + sizeof(const struct ldp_common_header);
tlen = pdu_len - (sizeof(const struct ldp_common_header)-4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
while(tlen>0) {
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the msg header ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header));
ldp_msg_header = (const struct ldp_msg_header *)tptr;
msg_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(ldp_msg_header->length);
msg_type=LDP_MASK_MSG_TYPE(EXTRACT_16BITS(ldp_msg_header->type));
if (msg_len < sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header)-4) {
/* length too short */
/* FIXME vendor private / experimental check */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Message (0x%04x), length: %u (too short, < %u)",
tok2str(ldp_msg_values,
"Unknown",
msg_type),
msg_type,
msg_len,
(u_int)(sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header)-4)));
return 0;
}
/* FIXME vendor private / experimental check */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Message (0x%04x), length: %u, Message ID: 0x%08x, Flags: [%s if unknown]",
tok2str(ldp_msg_values,
"Unknown",
msg_type),
msg_type,
msg_len,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ldp_msg_header->id),
LDP_MASK_U_BIT(EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_msg_header->type)) ? "continue processing" : "ignore"));
msg_tptr=tptr+sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header);
msg_tlen=msg_len-(sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header)-4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the message ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, msg_len);
hexdump=FALSE;
switch(msg_type) {
case LDP_MSG_NOTIF:
case LDP_MSG_HELLO:
case LDP_MSG_INIT:
case LDP_MSG_KEEPALIVE:
case LDP_MSG_ADDRESS:
case LDP_MSG_LABEL_MAPPING:
case LDP_MSG_ADDRESS_WITHDRAW:
case LDP_MSG_LABEL_WITHDRAW:
while(msg_tlen >= 4) {
processed = ldp_tlv_print(ndo, msg_tptr, msg_tlen);
if (processed == 0)
break;
msg_tlen-=processed;
msg_tptr+=processed;
}
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined messages that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case LDP_MSG_LABEL_REQUEST:
case LDP_MSG_LABEL_RELEASE:
case LDP_MSG_LABEL_ABORT_REQUEST:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, msg_tptr, "\n\t ", msg_tlen);
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 || hexdump==TRUE)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr+sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header), "\n\t ",
msg_len);
tptr += msg_len+4;
tlen -= msg_len+4;
}
return pdu_len+4;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t packet exceeded snapshot"));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14461/LDP: Fix a bounds check
In ldp_tlv_print(), the FT Session TLV length must be 12, not 8 (RFC3479)
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Konrad Rieck and
Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
Moreover:
Add and use tstr[].
Add a comment.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::PrepareFrameForPreviewDocument() {
reset_prep_frame_view_ = false;
if (!print_pages_params_ || CheckForCancel()) {
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (prep_frame_view_ && prep_frame_view_->IsLoadingSelection()) {
reset_prep_frame_view_ = true;
return;
}
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& print_params = print_pages_params_->params;
prep_frame_view_.reset(new PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint(
print_params, print_preview_context_.source_frame(),
print_preview_context_.source_node(), ignore_css_margins_));
prep_frame_view_->CopySelectionIfNeeded(
render_view()->GetWebkitPreferences(),
base::Bind(&PrintWebViewHelper::OnFramePreparedForPreviewDocument,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static inline int ping_hashfn(struct net *net, unsigned int num, unsigned int mask)
{
int res = (num + net_hash_mix(net)) & mask;
pr_debug("hash(%d) = %d\n", num, res);
return res;
}
Commit Message: ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name
A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
{
struct key *keyring;
keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(keyring))
return PTR_ERR(keyring);
new->thread_keyring = keyring;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: fix keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring() to not leak thread keyrings
This fixes CVE-2017-7472.
Running the following program as an unprivileged user exhausts kernel
memory by leaking thread keyrings:
#include <keyutils.h>
int main()
{
for (;;)
keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING);
}
Fix it by only creating a new thread keyring if there wasn't one before.
To make things more consistent, make install_thread_keyring_to_cred()
and install_process_keyring_to_cred() both return 0 if the corresponding
keyring is already present.
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Cc: [email protected] # 2.6.29+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-404
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int sock_diag_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
int ret;
switch (nlh->nlmsg_type) {
case TCPDIAG_GETSOCK:
case DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK:
if (inet_rcv_compat == NULL)
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d-type-%d", PF_NETLINK,
NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG, AF_INET);
mutex_lock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
if (inet_rcv_compat != NULL)
ret = inet_rcv_compat(skb, nlh);
else
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
mutex_unlock(&sock_diag_table_mutex);
return ret;
case SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY:
return __sock_diag_rcv_msg(skb, nlh);
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: sock_diag: Fix out-of-bounds access to sock_diag_handlers[]
Userland can send a netlink message requesting SOCK_DIAG_BY_FAMILY
with a family greater or equal then AF_MAX -- the array size of
sock_diag_handlers[]. The current code does not test for this
condition therefore is vulnerable to an out-of-bound access opening
doors for a privilege escalation.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void SoftHEVC::onPortFlushCompleted(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
/* Once the output buffers are flushed, ignore any buffers that are held in decoder */
if (kOutputPortIndex == portIndex) {
setFlushMode();
/* Allocate a picture buffer to flushed data */
uint32_t displayStride = outputBufferWidth();
uint32_t displayHeight = outputBufferHeight();
uint32_t bufferSize = displayStride * displayHeight * 3 / 2;
mFlushOutBuffer = (uint8_t *)memalign(128, bufferSize);
if (NULL == mFlushOutBuffer) {
ALOGE("Could not allocate flushOutputBuffer of size %zu", bufferSize);
return;
}
while (true) {
ivd_video_decode_ip_t s_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t s_dec_op;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
size_t sizeY, sizeUV;
setDecodeArgs(&s_dec_ip, &s_dec_op, NULL, NULL, 0);
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_dec_ip,
(void *)&s_dec_op);
if (0 == s_dec_op.u4_output_present) {
resetPlugin();
break;
}
}
if (mFlushOutBuffer) {
free(mFlushOutBuffer);
mFlushOutBuffer = NULL;
}
}
}
Commit Message: SoftHEVC: Exit gracefully in case of decoder errors
Exit for error in allocation and unsupported resolutions
Bug: 28816956
Change-Id: Ieb830bedeb3a7431d1d21a024927df630f7eda1e
CWE ID: CWE-172
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void NaClListener::OnMsgStart(const nacl::NaClStartParams& params) {
struct NaClChromeMainArgs *args = NaClChromeMainArgsCreate();
if (args == NULL) {
LOG(ERROR) << "NaClChromeMainArgsCreate() failed";
return;
}
if (params.enable_ipc_proxy) {
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle =
IPC::Channel::GenerateVerifiedChannelID("nacl");
scoped_refptr<NaClIPCAdapter> ipc_adapter(new NaClIPCAdapter(
channel_handle, io_thread_.message_loop_proxy()));
args->initial_ipc_desc = ipc_adapter.get()->MakeNaClDesc();
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
channel_handle.socket = base::FileDescriptor(
ipc_adapter.get()->TakeClientFileDescriptor(), true);
#endif
if (!Send(new NaClProcessHostMsg_PpapiChannelCreated(channel_handle)))
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to send IPC channel handle to renderer.";
}
std::vector<nacl::FileDescriptor> handles = params.handles;
#if defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_MACOSX)
args->urandom_fd = dup(base::GetUrandomFD());
if (args->urandom_fd < 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to dup() the urandom FD";
return;
}
args->create_memory_object_func = CreateMemoryObject;
# if defined(OS_MACOSX)
CHECK(handles.size() >= 1);
g_shm_fd = nacl::ToNativeHandle(handles[handles.size() - 1]);
handles.pop_back();
# endif
#endif
CHECK(handles.size() >= 1);
NaClHandle irt_handle = nacl::ToNativeHandle(handles[handles.size() - 1]);
handles.pop_back();
#if defined(OS_WIN)
args->irt_fd = _open_osfhandle(reinterpret_cast<intptr_t>(irt_handle),
_O_RDONLY | _O_BINARY);
if (args->irt_fd < 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "_open_osfhandle() failed";
return;
}
#else
args->irt_fd = irt_handle;
#endif
if (params.validation_cache_enabled) {
CHECK_EQ(params.validation_cache_key.length(), (size_t) 64);
args->validation_cache = CreateValidationCache(
new BrowserValidationDBProxy(this), params.validation_cache_key,
params.version);
}
CHECK(handles.size() == 1);
args->imc_bootstrap_handle = nacl::ToNativeHandle(handles[0]);
args->enable_exception_handling = params.enable_exception_handling;
args->enable_debug_stub = params.enable_debug_stub;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
args->broker_duplicate_handle_func = BrokerDuplicateHandle;
args->attach_debug_exception_handler_func = AttachDebugExceptionHandler;
#endif
NaClChromeMainStart(args);
NOTREACHED();
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static char *keep_pack(const char *curr_index_name)
{
static char name[PATH_MAX];
static const char *keep_msg = "fast-import";
int keep_fd;
keep_fd = odb_pack_keep(name, sizeof(name), pack_data->sha1);
if (keep_fd < 0)
die_errno("cannot create keep file");
write_or_die(keep_fd, keep_msg, strlen(keep_msg));
if (close(keep_fd))
die_errno("failed to write keep file");
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s/pack/pack-%s.pack",
get_object_directory(), sha1_to_hex(pack_data->sha1));
if (finalize_object_file(pack_data->pack_name, name))
die("cannot store pack file");
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s/pack/pack-%s.idx",
get_object_directory(), sha1_to_hex(pack_data->sha1));
if (finalize_object_file(curr_index_name, name))
die("cannot store index file");
free((void *)curr_index_name);
return name;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void vga_dirty_log_start(VGACommonState *s)
{
memory_region_set_log(&s->vram, true, DIRTY_MEMORY_VGA);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-617
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void SetPreviewDataForIndex(int index, const base::RefCountedBytes* data) {
if (index != printing::COMPLETE_PREVIEW_DOCUMENT_INDEX &&
index < printing::FIRST_PAGE_INDEX) {
return;
}
page_data_map_[index] = const_cast<base::RefCountedBytes*>(data);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void sig_channel_created(CHANNEL_REC *channel)
{
g_return_if_fail(IS_CHANNEL(channel));
channel->nicks = g_hash_table_new((GHashFunc) g_istr_hash,
(GCompareFunc) g_istr_equal);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: Track::Info::~Info()
{
Clear();
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static sent_status_t send_data_to_app(int fd, BT_HDR *p_buf) {
if (p_buf->len == 0)
return SENT_ALL;
ssize_t sent = send(fd, p_buf->data + p_buf->offset, p_buf->len, MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (sent == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)
return SENT_NONE;
LOG_ERROR("%s error writing RFCOMM data back to app: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return SENT_FAILED;
}
if (sent == 0)
return SENT_FAILED;
if (sent == p_buf->len)
return SENT_ALL;
p_buf->offset += sent;
p_buf->len -= sent;
return SENT_PARTIAL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: parserInit(XML_Parser parser, const XML_Char *encodingName) {
parser->m_processor = prologInitProcessor;
XmlPrologStateInit(&parser->m_prologState);
if (encodingName != NULL) {
parser->m_protocolEncodingName = copyString(encodingName, &(parser->m_mem));
}
parser->m_curBase = NULL;
XmlInitEncoding(&parser->m_initEncoding, &parser->m_encoding, 0);
parser->m_userData = NULL;
parser->m_handlerArg = NULL;
parser->m_startElementHandler = NULL;
parser->m_endElementHandler = NULL;
parser->m_characterDataHandler = NULL;
parser->m_processingInstructionHandler = NULL;
parser->m_commentHandler = NULL;
parser->m_startCdataSectionHandler = NULL;
parser->m_endCdataSectionHandler = NULL;
parser->m_defaultHandler = NULL;
parser->m_startDoctypeDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_endDoctypeDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_unparsedEntityDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_notationDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_startNamespaceDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_notStandaloneHandler = NULL;
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler = NULL;
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg = parser;
parser->m_skippedEntityHandler = NULL;
parser->m_elementDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_attlistDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_entityDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_xmlDeclHandler = NULL;
parser->m_bufferPtr = parser->m_buffer;
parser->m_bufferEnd = parser->m_buffer;
parser->m_parseEndByteIndex = 0;
parser->m_parseEndPtr = NULL;
parser->m_declElementType = NULL;
parser->m_declAttributeId = NULL;
parser->m_declEntity = NULL;
parser->m_doctypeName = NULL;
parser->m_doctypeSysid = NULL;
parser->m_doctypePubid = NULL;
parser->m_declAttributeType = NULL;
parser->m_declNotationName = NULL;
parser->m_declNotationPublicId = NULL;
parser->m_declAttributeIsCdata = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_declAttributeIsId = XML_FALSE;
memset(&parser->m_position, 0, sizeof(POSITION));
parser->m_errorCode = XML_ERROR_NONE;
parser->m_eventPtr = NULL;
parser->m_eventEndPtr = NULL;
parser->m_positionPtr = NULL;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = NULL;
parser->m_defaultExpandInternalEntities = XML_TRUE;
parser->m_tagLevel = 0;
parser->m_tagStack = NULL;
parser->m_inheritedBindings = NULL;
parser->m_nSpecifiedAtts = 0;
parser->m_unknownEncodingMem = NULL;
parser->m_unknownEncodingRelease = NULL;
parser->m_unknownEncodingData = NULL;
parser->m_parentParser = NULL;
parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing = XML_INITIALIZED;
#ifdef XML_DTD
parser->m_isParamEntity = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_useForeignDTD = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_paramEntityParsing = XML_PARAM_ENTITY_PARSING_NEVER;
#endif
parser->m_hash_secret_salt = 0;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void ndisc_cleanup(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
neigh_sysctl_unregister(&nd_tbl.parms);
#endif
neigh_table_clear(NEIGH_ND_TABLE, &nd_tbl);
unregister_pernet_subsys(&ndisc_net_ops);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static SUB_STATE_RETURN read_state_machine(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ret, mt;
unsigned long len = 0;
int (*transition) (SSL *s, int mt);
PACKET pkt;
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN(*process_message) (SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
WORK_STATE(*post_process_message) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
unsigned long (*max_message_size) (SSL *s);
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
cb = get_callback(s);
if (s->server) {
transition = ossl_statem_server_read_transition;
process_message = ossl_statem_server_process_message;
max_message_size = ossl_statem_server_max_message_size;
post_process_message = ossl_statem_server_post_process_message;
} else {
transition = ossl_statem_client_read_transition;
process_message = ossl_statem_client_process_message;
max_message_size = ossl_statem_client_max_message_size;
post_process_message = ossl_statem_client_post_process_message;
}
if (st->read_state_first_init) {
s->first_packet = 1;
st->read_state_first_init = 0;
}
while (1) {
switch (st->read_state) {
case READ_STATE_HEADER:
/* Get the state the peer wants to move to */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/*
* In DTLS we get the whole message in one go - header and body
*/
ret = dtls_get_message(s, &mt, &len);
} else {
ret = tls_get_message_header(s, &mt);
}
if (ret == 0) {
/* Could be non-blocking IO */
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
if (cb != NULL) {
/* Notify callback of an impending state change */
if (s->server)
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
else
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
}
/*
* Validate that we are allowed to move to the new state and move
* to that state if so
*/
if (!transition(s, mt)) {
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_size > max_message_size(s)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
st->read_state = READ_STATE_BODY;
/* Fall through */
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, len)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
ret = process_message(s, &pkt);
/* Discard the packet data */
s->init_num = 0;
switch (ret) {
case MSG_PROCESS_ERROR:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
case MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
}
return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
case MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING:
st->read_state = READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS;
st->read_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
break;
default:
st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
break;
}
break;
case READ_STATE_POST_PROCESS:
st->read_state_work = post_process_message(s, st->read_state_work);
switch (st->read_state_work) {
default:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
st->read_state = READ_STATE_HEADER;
break;
case WORK_FINISHED_STOP:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
}
return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
}
break;
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: grub_ext2_open (struct grub_file *file, const char *name)
{
struct grub_ext2_data *data;
struct grub_fshelp_node *fdiro = 0;
grub_dl_ref (my_mod);
data = grub_ext2_mount (file->device->disk);
if (! data)
goto fail;
grub_fshelp_find_file (name, &data->diropen, &fdiro, grub_ext2_iterate_dir, 0,
grub_ext2_read_symlink, GRUB_FSHELP_REG);
if (grub_errno)
goto fail;
if (! fdiro->inode_read)
{
grub_ext2_read_inode (data, fdiro->ino, &fdiro->inode);
if (grub_errno)
goto fail;
}
grub_memcpy (data->inode, &fdiro->inode, sizeof (struct grub_ext2_inode));
grub_free (fdiro);
file->size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (data->inode->size);
file->data = data;
file->offset = 0;
return 0;
fail:
if (fdiro != &data->diropen)
grub_free (fdiro);
grub_free (data);
grub_dl_unref (my_mod);
return grub_errno;
}
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 access,
struct x86_exception *exception)
{
void *data = val;
int r = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
while (bytes) {
gpa_t gpa = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, addr, access,
exception);
unsigned offset = addr & (PAGE_SIZE-1);
unsigned toread = min(bytes, (unsigned)PAGE_SIZE - offset);
int ret;
if (gpa == UNMAPPED_GVA)
return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
ret = kvm_read_guest(vcpu->kvm, gpa, data, toread);
if (ret < 0) {
r = X86EMUL_IO_NEEDED;
goto out;
}
bytes -= toread;
data += toread;
addr += toread;
}
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: NavigationPolicy EffectiveNavigationPolicy(NavigationPolicy policy,
const WebInputEvent* current_event,
const WebWindowFeatures& features) {
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyIgnore)
return GetNavigationPolicy(current_event, features);
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
GetNavigationPolicy(current_event, features) !=
kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
!UIEventWithKeyState::NewTabModifierSetFromIsolatedWorld()) {
return kNavigationPolicyNewForegroundTab;
}
return policy;
}
Commit Message: Only allow downloading in response to real keyboard modifiers
BUG=848531
Change-Id: I97554c8d312243b55647f1376945aee32dbd95bf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1082216
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564051}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
struct ext4_ext_path **ppath)
{
struct ext4_ext_path *path = *ppath;
struct ext4_extent *ex;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
unsigned int ee_len;
int depth;
int err = 0;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
ext_debug("ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu, max_blocks %u\n", inode->i_ino,
(unsigned long long)ee_block, ee_len);
/* If extent is larger than requested it is a clear sign that we still
* have some extent state machine issues left. So extent_split is still
* required.
* TODO: Once all related issues will be fixed this situation should be
* illegal.
*/
if (ee_block != map->m_lblk || ee_len > map->m_len) {
#ifdef EXT4_DEBUG
ext4_warning("Inode (%ld) finished: extent logical block %llu,"
" len %u; IO logical block %llu, len %u\n",
inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)ee_block, ee_len,
(unsigned long long)map->m_lblk, map->m_len);
#endif
err = ext4_split_convert_extents(handle, inode, map, ppath,
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT);
if (err < 0)
return err;
path = ext4_find_extent(inode, map->m_lblk, ppath, 0);
if (IS_ERR(path))
return PTR_ERR(path);
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
}
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
/* first mark the extent as initialized */
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
/* note: ext4_ext_correct_indexes() isn't needed here because
* borders are not changed
*/
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
/* Mark modified extent as dirty */
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: allocate entire range in zero range
Currently there is a bug in zero range code which causes zero range
calls to only allocate block aligned portion of the range, while
ignoring the rest in some cases.
In some cases, namely if the end of the range is past i_size, we do
attempt to preallocate the last nonaligned block. However this might
cause kernel to BUG() in some carefully designed zero range requests
on setups where page size > block size.
Fix this problem by first preallocating the entire range, including
the nonaligned edges and converting the written extents to unwritten
in the next step. This approach will also give us the advantage of
having the range to be as linearly contiguous as possible.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: get_link_name (const char *name,
int count,
int max_length)
{
const char *format;
char *result;
int unshortened_length;
gboolean use_count;
g_assert (name != NULL);
if (count < 0)
{
g_warning ("bad count in get_link_name");
count = 0;
}
if (count <= 2)
{
/* Handle special cases for low numbers.
* Perhaps for some locales we will need to add more.
*/
switch (count)
{
default:
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
/* fall through */
}
case 0:
{
/* duplicate original file name */
format = "%s";
}
break;
case 1:
{
/* appended to new link file */
format = _("Link to %s");
}
break;
case 2:
{
/* appended to new link file */
format = _("Another link to %s");
}
break;
}
use_count = FALSE;
}
else
{
/* Handle special cases for the first few numbers of each ten.
* For locales where getting this exactly right is difficult,
* these can just be made all the same as the general case below.
*/
switch (count % 10)
{
case 1:
{
/* Localizers: Feel free to leave out the "st" suffix
* if there's no way to do that nicely for a
* particular language.
*/
format = _("%'dst link to %s");
}
break;
case 2:
{
/* appended to new link file */
format = _("%'dnd link to %s");
}
break;
case 3:
{
/* appended to new link file */
format = _("%'drd link to %s");
}
break;
default:
{
/* appended to new link file */
format = _("%'dth link to %s");
}
break;
}
use_count = TRUE;
}
#pragma GCC diagnostic push
#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wformat-nonliteral"
if (use_count)
{
result = g_strdup_printf (format, count, name);
}
else
{
result = g_strdup_printf (format, name);
}
if (max_length > 0 && (unshortened_length = strlen (result)) > max_length)
{
char *new_name;
new_name = shorten_utf8_string (name, unshortened_length - max_length);
if (new_name)
{
g_free (result);
if (use_count)
{
result = g_strdup_printf (format, count, new_name);
}
else
{
result = g_strdup_printf (format, new_name);
}
g_assert (strlen (result) <= max_length);
g_free (new_name);
}
}
#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
return result;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void cipso_v4_sock_delattr(struct sock *sk)
{
int hdr_delta;
struct ip_options *opt;
struct inet_sock *sk_inet;
sk_inet = inet_sk(sk);
opt = sk_inet->opt;
if (opt == NULL || opt->cipso == 0)
return;
hdr_delta = cipso_v4_delopt(&sk_inet->opt);
if (sk_inet->is_icsk && hdr_delta > 0) {
struct inet_connection_sock *sk_conn = inet_csk(sk);
sk_conn->icsk_ext_hdr_len -= hdr_delta;
sk_conn->icsk_sync_mss(sk, sk_conn->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
}
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: mrb_mod_eqq(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value mod)
{
mrb_value obj;
mrb_bool eqq;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "o", &obj);
eqq = mrb_obj_is_kind_of(mrb, obj, mrb_class_ptr(mod));
return mrb_bool_value(eqq);
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static U32 ZSTD_sufficientBuff(size_t bufferSize1, size_t maxNbSeq1,
size_t maxNbLit1,
ZSTD_buffered_policy_e buffPol2,
ZSTD_compressionParameters cParams2,
U64 pledgedSrcSize)
{
size_t const windowSize2 = MAX(1, (size_t)MIN(((U64)1 << cParams2.windowLog), pledgedSrcSize));
size_t const blockSize2 = MIN(ZSTD_BLOCKSIZE_MAX, windowSize2);
size_t const maxNbSeq2 = blockSize2 / ((cParams2.searchLength == 3) ? 3 : 4);
size_t const maxNbLit2 = blockSize2;
size_t const neededBufferSize2 = (buffPol2==ZSTDb_buffered) ? windowSize2 + blockSize2 : 0;
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_sufficientBuff: is neededBufferSize2=%u <= bufferSize1=%u",
(U32)neededBufferSize2, (U32)bufferSize1);
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_sufficientBuff: is maxNbSeq2=%u <= maxNbSeq1=%u",
(U32)maxNbSeq2, (U32)maxNbSeq1);
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_sufficientBuff: is maxNbLit2=%u <= maxNbLit1=%u",
(U32)maxNbLit2, (U32)maxNbLit1);
return (maxNbLit2 <= maxNbLit1)
& (maxNbSeq2 <= maxNbSeq1)
& (neededBufferSize2 <= bufferSize1);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static zend_always_inline int process_nested_data(UNSERIALIZE_PARAMETER, HashTable *ht, zend_long elements, int objprops)
{
while (elements-- > 0) {
zval key, *data, d, *old_data;
zend_ulong idx;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&key);
if (!php_var_unserialize_internal(&key, p, max, NULL, classes)) {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
data = NULL;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&d);
if (!objprops) {
if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
idx = Z_LVAL(key);
numeric_key:
if (UNEXPECTED((old_data = zend_hash_index_find(ht, idx)) != NULL)) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_index_update(ht, idx, &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_index_add_new(ht, idx, &d);
}
} else if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_STRING) {
if (UNEXPECTED(ZEND_HANDLE_NUMERIC(Z_STR(key), idx))) {
goto numeric_key;
}
if (UNEXPECTED((old_data = zend_hash_find(ht, Z_STR(key))) != NULL)) {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_update(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_add_new(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
}
} else {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (EXPECTED(Z_TYPE(key) == IS_STRING)) {
string_key:
if ((old_data = zend_hash_find(ht, Z_STR(key))) != NULL) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(old_data) == IS_INDIRECT) {
old_data = Z_INDIRECT_P(old_data);
}
var_push_dtor(var_hash, old_data);
data = zend_hash_update_ind(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
} else {
data = zend_hash_add_new(ht, Z_STR(key), &d);
}
} else if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
/* object properties should include no integers */
convert_to_string(&key);
goto string_key;
} else {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
}
if (!php_var_unserialize_internal(data, p, max, var_hash, classes)) {
zval_dtor(&key);
return 0;
}
if (UNEXPECTED(Z_ISUNDEF_P(data))) {
if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_LONG) {
zend_hash_index_del(ht, Z_LVAL(key));
} else {
zend_hash_del_ind(ht, Z_STR(key));
}
} else {
var_push_dtor(var_hash, data);
}
zval_dtor(&key);
if (elements && *(*p-1) != ';' && *(*p-1) != '}') {
(*p)--;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #74103 and bug #75054
Directly fail unserialization when trying to acquire an r/R
reference to an UNDEF HT slot. Previously this left an UNDEF and
later deleted the index/key from the HT.
What actually caused the issue here is a combination of two
factors: First, the key deletion was performed using the hash API,
rather than the symtable API, such that the element was not actually
removed if it used an integral string key. Second, a subsequent
deletion operation, while collecting trailing UNDEF ranges, would
mark the element as available for reuse (leaving a corrupted HT
state with nNumOfElemnts > nNumUsed).
Fix this by failing early and dropping the deletion code.
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static bool isElementPresentational(const Node* node)
{
return node->hasTagName(uTag) || node->hasTagName(sTag) || node->hasTagName(strikeTag)
|| node->hasTagName(iTag) || node->hasTagName(emTag) || node->hasTagName(bTag) || node->hasTagName(strongTag);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags)
{
BIO *cmsbio;
int ret = 0;
if (!(cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont)))
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
SMIME_crlf_copy(data, cmsbio, flags);
(void)BIO_flush(cmsbio);
if (!CMS_dataFinal(cms, cmsbio))
{
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL,CMS_R_CMS_DATAFINAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
do_free_upto(cmsbio, dcont);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Canonicalise input in CMS_verify.
If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to
CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim
which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int readpng_init(FILE *infile, ulg *pWidth, ulg *pHeight)
{
uch sig[8];
/* first do a quick check that the file really is a PNG image; could
* have used slightly more general png_sig_cmp() function instead */
fread(sig, 1, 8, infile);
if (png_sig_cmp(sig, 0, 8))
return 1; /* bad signature */
/* could pass pointers to user-defined error handlers instead of NULLs: */
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (!png_ptr)
return 4; /* out of memory */
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
return 4; /* out of memory */
}
/* we could create a second info struct here (end_info), but it's only
* useful if we want to keep pre- and post-IDAT chunk info separated
* (mainly for PNG-aware image editors and converters) */
/* setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a PNG-reading
* libpng function */
if (setjmp(png_jmpbuf(png_ptr))) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return 2;
}
png_init_io(png_ptr, infile);
png_set_sig_bytes(png_ptr, 8); /* we already read the 8 signature bytes */
png_read_info(png_ptr, info_ptr); /* read all PNG info up to image data */
/* alternatively, could make separate calls to png_get_image_width(),
* etc., but want bit_depth and color_type for later [don't care about
* compression_type and filter_type => NULLs] */
png_get_IHDR(png_ptr, info_ptr, &width, &height, &bit_depth, &color_type,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
*pWidth = width;
*pHeight = height;
/* OK, that's all we need for now; return happy */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void IterateOverPieces(const int sizes[],
Callback2<int, int>::Type* function) {
DCHECK_GT(sizes[0], 0);
int pos = 0;
int index = 0;
while (pos < kDataSize) {
int size = std::min(sizes[index], kDataSize - pos);
++index;
if (sizes[index] <= 0)
index = 0;
function->Run(pos, size);
pos += size;
}
delete function;
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: R_API void U(add_field_infos_to_sdb)(RBinJavaObj * bin) {
/*
*** Experimental and May Change ***
Add field information to an Array
the key for this info variable depenedent on addr, method ordinal, etc.
Key 1, mapping to method key:
java.<file_offset> = <field_key>
Key 3, method description
<field_key>.info = [<access str>, <class_name>, <name>, <signature>]
key 4, method meta
<field_key>.meta = [<file_offset>, ?]
*/
RListIter *iter = NULL, *iter_tmp = NULL;
RBinJavaField *fm_type;
ut32 key_size = 255,
value_buffer_size = 1024,
class_name_inheap = 1;
char *field_key = NULL,
*field_key_value = NULL,
*value_buffer = NULL;
char *class_name = r_bin_java_get_this_class_name (bin);
if (class_name == NULL) {
class_name = "unknown";
class_name_inheap = 0;
}
key_size += strlen (class_name);
value_buffer_size += strlen (class_name);
field_key = malloc (key_size);
value_buffer = malloc (value_buffer_size);
field_key_value = malloc (key_size);
snprintf (field_key, key_size, "%s.methods", class_name);
field_key[key_size - 1] = 0;
r_list_foreach_safe (bin->fields_list, iter, iter_tmp, fm_type) {
char number_buffer[80];
ut64 file_offset = fm_type->file_offset + bin->loadaddr;
snprintf (number_buffer, sizeof (number_buffer), "0x%04"PFMT64x, file_offset);
IFDBG eprintf("Inserting: []%s = %s\n", field_key, number_buffer);
sdb_array_push (bin->kv, field_key, number_buffer, 0);
}
r_list_foreach_safe (bin->fields_list, iter, iter_tmp, fm_type) {
ut64 field_offset = fm_type->file_offset + bin->loadaddr;
snprintf (field_key, key_size, "%s.0x%04"PFMT64x, class_name, field_offset);
field_key[key_size - 1] = 0;
snprintf (field_key_value, key_size, "%s.0x%04"PFMT64x ".field", class_name, field_offset);
field_key_value[key_size - 1] = 0;
sdb_set (bin->kv, field_key, field_key_value, 0);
IFDBG eprintf("Inserting: %s = %s\n", field_key, field_key_value);
snprintf (field_key, key_size, "%s.info", field_key_value);
field_key[key_size - 1] = 0;
snprintf (value_buffer, value_buffer_size, "%s", fm_type->flags_str);
value_buffer[value_buffer_size - 1] = 0;
sdb_array_push (bin->kv, field_key, value_buffer, 0);
IFDBG eprintf("Inserting: []%s = %s\n", field_key, value_buffer);
snprintf (value_buffer, value_buffer_size, "%s", fm_type->class_name);
value_buffer[value_buffer_size - 1] = 0;
sdb_array_push (bin->kv, field_key, value_buffer, 0);
IFDBG eprintf("Inserting: []%s = %s\n", field_key, value_buffer);
snprintf (value_buffer, value_buffer_size, "%s", fm_type->name);
value_buffer[value_buffer_size - 1] = 0;
sdb_array_push (bin->kv, field_key, value_buffer, 0);
IFDBG eprintf("Inserting: []%s = %s\n", field_key, value_buffer);
snprintf (value_buffer, value_buffer_size, "%s", fm_type->descriptor);
value_buffer[value_buffer_size - 1] = 0;
sdb_array_push (bin->kv, field_key, value_buffer, 0);
IFDBG eprintf("Inserting: []%s = %s\n", field_key, value_buffer);
}
free (field_key);
free (field_key_value);
free (value_buffer);
if (class_name_inheap) {
free (class_name);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #10498 - Crash in fuzzed java file
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: const Cluster* Segment::FindOrPreloadCluster(long long requested_pos)
{
if (requested_pos < 0)
return 0;
Cluster** const ii = m_clusters;
Cluster** i = ii;
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** const jj = ii + count;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j)
{
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
Cluster* const pCluster = *k;
assert(pCluster);
const long long pos = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(pos >= 0);
if (pos < requested_pos)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > requested_pos)
j = k;
else
return pCluster;
}
assert(i == j);
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(
this,
-1,
requested_pos);
assert(pCluster);
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_clusters;
PreloadCluster(pCluster, idx);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
return pCluster;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void smb2cli_conn_set_max_credits(struct smbXcli_conn *conn,
uint16_t max_credits)
{
conn->smb2.max_credits = max_credits;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: random_32(void)
{
for(;;)
{
png_byte mark[4];
png_uint_32 result;
store_pool_mark(mark);
result = png_get_uint_32(mark);
if (result != 0)
return result;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int ax25_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied;
int err = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
/*
* This works for seqpacket too. The receiver has ordered the
* queue for us! We do one quick check first though
*/
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
err = -ENOTCONN;
goto out;
}
/* Now we can treat all alike */
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags & ~MSG_DONTWAIT,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
if (!ax25_sk(sk)->pidincl)
skb_pull(skb, 1); /* Remove PID */
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > size) {
copied = size;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (msg->msg_namelen != 0) {
struct sockaddr_ax25 *sax = (struct sockaddr_ax25 *)msg->msg_name;
ax25_digi digi;
ax25_address src;
const unsigned char *mac = skb_mac_header(skb);
ax25_addr_parse(mac + 1, skb->data - mac - 1, &src, NULL,
&digi, NULL, NULL);
sax->sax25_family = AF_AX25;
/* We set this correctly, even though we may not let the
application know the digi calls further down (because it
did NOT ask to know them). This could get political... **/
sax->sax25_ndigis = digi.ndigi;
sax->sax25_call = src;
if (sax->sax25_ndigis != 0) {
int ct;
struct full_sockaddr_ax25 *fsa = (struct full_sockaddr_ax25 *)sax;
for (ct = 0; ct < digi.ndigi; ct++)
fsa->fsa_digipeater[ct] = digi.calls[ct];
}
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25);
}
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
err = copied;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ax25: fix info leak via msg_name in ax25_recvmsg()
When msg_namelen is non-zero the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Additionally the
msg_namelen value is updated to sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25) but is
not always filled up to this size.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void IDNSpoofChecker::SetAllowedUnicodeSet(UErrorCode* status) {
if (U_FAILURE(*status))
return;
const icu::UnicodeSet* recommended_set =
uspoof_getRecommendedUnicodeSet(status);
icu::UnicodeSet allowed_set;
allowed_set.addAll(*recommended_set);
const icu::UnicodeSet* inclusion_set = uspoof_getInclusionUnicodeSet(status);
allowed_set.addAll(*inclusion_set);
allowed_set.remove(0x338u);
allowed_set.remove(0x58au); // Armenian Hyphen
allowed_set.remove(0x2010u);
allowed_set.remove(0x2019u); // Right Single Quotation Mark
allowed_set.remove(0x2027u);
allowed_set.remove(0x30a0u); // Katakana-Hiragana Double Hyphen
allowed_set.remove(0x2bbu); // Modifier Letter Turned Comma
allowed_set.remove(0x2bcu); // Modifier Letter Apostrophe
allowed_set.remove(0x2ecu);
allowed_set.remove(0x0138);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
allowed_set.remove(0x0620u);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Cu);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Du);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Eu);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Fu);
#endif
allowed_set.remove(0x01CDu, 0x01DCu); // Latin Ext B; Pinyin
allowed_set.remove(0x1C80u, 0x1C8Fu); // Cyrillic Extended-C
allowed_set.remove(0x1E00u, 0x1E9Bu); // Latin Extended Additional
allowed_set.remove(0x1F00u, 0x1FFFu); // Greek Extended
allowed_set.remove(0xA640u, 0xA69Fu); // Cyrillic Extended-B
allowed_set.remove(0xA720u, 0xA7FFu); // Latin Extended-D
uspoof_setAllowedUnicodeSet(checker_, &allowed_set, status);
}
Commit Message: Restrict Latin Small Letter Thorn (U+00FE) to Icelandic domains
This character (þ) can be confused with both b and p when used in a domain
name. IDN spoof checker doesn't have a good way of flagging a character as
confusable with multiple characters, so it can't catch spoofs containing
this character. As a practical fix, this CL restricts this character to
domains under Iceland's ccTLD (.is). With this change, a domain name containing
"þ" with a non-.is TLD will be displayed in punycode in the UI.
This change affects less than 10 real world domains with limited popularity.
Bug: 798892, 843352, 904327, 1017707
Change-Id: Ib07190dcde406bf62ce4413688a4fb4859a51030
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1879992
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christopher Thompson <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#709309}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int parse_csum_name(const char *name, int len)
{
if (len < 0 && name)
len = strlen(name);
if (!name || (len == 4 && strncasecmp(name, "auto", 4) == 0)) {
if (protocol_version >= 30)
return CSUM_MD5;
if (protocol_version >= 27)
return CSUM_MD4_OLD;
if (protocol_version >= 21)
return CSUM_MD4_BUSTED;
return CSUM_ARCHAIC;
}
if (len == 3 && strncasecmp(name, "md4", 3) == 0)
return CSUM_MD4;
if (len == 3 && strncasecmp(name, "md5", 3) == 0)
return CSUM_MD5;
if (len == 4 && strncasecmp(name, "none", 4) == 0)
return CSUM_NONE;
rprintf(FERROR, "unknown checksum name: %s\n", name);
exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-354
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::CheckForCancel() {
bool cancel = false;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_CheckForCancel(
routing_id(),
print_pages_params_->params.preview_ui_addr,
print_pages_params_->params.preview_request_id,
&cancel));
if (cancel)
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false;
return cancel;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void V8TestObject::HighEntropyConstantConstantGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::Name>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_highEntropyConstant_ConstantGetter");
ExecutionContext* execution_context_for_measurement = CurrentExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate());
UseCounter::Count(execution_context_for_measurement, WebFeature::kTestFeatureHighEntropyConstant);
Dactyloscoper::Record(execution_context_for_measurement, WebFeature::kTestFeatureHighEntropyConstant);
V8SetReturnValueString(info, "1");
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: trace_poll(struct trace_iterator *iter, struct file *filp, poll_table *poll_table)
{
struct trace_array *tr = iter->tr;
/* Iterators are static, they should be filled or empty */
if (trace_buffer_iter(iter, iter->cpu_file))
return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
if (tr->trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_BLOCK)
/*
* Always select as readable when in blocking mode
*/
return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
else
return ring_buffer_poll_wait(iter->trace_buffer->buffer, iter->cpu_file,
filp, poll_table);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void EncoderTest::MismatchHook(const vpx_image_t *img1,
const vpx_image_t *img2) {
ASSERT_TRUE(0) << "Encode/Decode mismatch found";
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static PHP_INI_MH(OnUpdateSerializer) /* {{{ */
{
const ps_serializer *tmp;
SESSION_CHECK_ACTIVE_STATE;
tmp = _php_find_ps_serializer(new_value TSRMLS_CC);
if (PG(modules_activated) && !tmp) {
int err_type;
if (stage == ZEND_INI_STAGE_RUNTIME) {
err_type = E_WARNING;
} else {
err_type = E_ERROR;
}
/* Do not output error when restoring ini options. */
if (stage != ZEND_INI_STAGE_DEACTIVATE) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, err_type, "Cannot find serialization handler '%s'", new_value);
}
return FAILURE;
}
PS(serializer) = tmp;
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int futex_requeue(u32 __user *uaddr1, unsigned int flags,
u32 __user *uaddr2, int nr_wake, int nr_requeue,
u32 *cmpval, int requeue_pi)
{
union futex_key key1 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT, key2 = FUTEX_KEY_INIT;
int drop_count = 0, task_count = 0, ret;
struct futex_pi_state *pi_state = NULL;
struct futex_hash_bucket *hb1, *hb2;
struct futex_q *this, *next;
DEFINE_WAKE_Q(wake_q);
/*
* When PI not supported: return -ENOSYS if requeue_pi is true,
* consequently the compiler knows requeue_pi is always false past
* this point which will optimize away all the conditional code
* further down.
*/
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_FUTEX_PI) && requeue_pi)
return -ENOSYS;
if (requeue_pi) {
/*
* Requeue PI only works on two distinct uaddrs. This
* check is only valid for private futexes. See below.
*/
if (uaddr1 == uaddr2)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* requeue_pi requires a pi_state, try to allocate it now
* without any locks in case it fails.
*/
if (refill_pi_state_cache())
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* requeue_pi must wake as many tasks as it can, up to nr_wake
* + nr_requeue, since it acquires the rt_mutex prior to
* returning to userspace, so as to not leave the rt_mutex with
* waiters and no owner. However, second and third wake-ups
* cannot be predicted as they involve race conditions with the
* first wake and a fault while looking up the pi_state. Both
* pthread_cond_signal() and pthread_cond_broadcast() should
* use nr_wake=1.
*/
if (nr_wake != 1)
return -EINVAL;
}
retry:
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr1, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key1, VERIFY_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2,
requeue_pi ? VERIFY_WRITE : VERIFY_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out_put_key1;
/*
* The check above which compares uaddrs is not sufficient for
* shared futexes. We need to compare the keys:
*/
if (requeue_pi && match_futex(&key1, &key2)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_put_keys;
}
hb1 = hash_futex(&key1);
hb2 = hash_futex(&key2);
retry_private:
hb_waiters_inc(hb2);
double_lock_hb(hb1, hb2);
if (likely(cmpval != NULL)) {
u32 curval;
ret = get_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr1);
if (unlikely(ret)) {
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
ret = get_user(curval, uaddr1);
if (ret)
goto out_put_keys;
if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED))
goto retry_private;
put_futex_key(&key2);
put_futex_key(&key1);
goto retry;
}
if (curval != *cmpval) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
if (requeue_pi && (task_count - nr_wake < nr_requeue)) {
/*
* Attempt to acquire uaddr2 and wake the top waiter. If we
* intend to requeue waiters, force setting the FUTEX_WAITERS
* bit. We force this here where we are able to easily handle
* faults rather in the requeue loop below.
*/
ret = futex_proxy_trylock_atomic(uaddr2, hb1, hb2, &key1,
&key2, &pi_state, nr_requeue);
/*
* At this point the top_waiter has either taken uaddr2 or is
* waiting on it. If the former, then the pi_state will not
* exist yet, look it up one more time to ensure we have a
* reference to it. If the lock was taken, ret contains the
* vpid of the top waiter task.
* If the lock was not taken, we have pi_state and an initial
* refcount on it. In case of an error we have nothing.
*/
if (ret > 0) {
WARN_ON(pi_state);
drop_count++;
task_count++;
/*
* If we acquired the lock, then the user space value
* of uaddr2 should be vpid. It cannot be changed by
* the top waiter as it is blocked on hb2 lock if it
* tries to do so. If something fiddled with it behind
* our back the pi state lookup might unearth it. So
* we rather use the known value than rereading and
* handing potential crap to lookup_pi_state.
*
* If that call succeeds then we have pi_state and an
* initial refcount on it.
*/
ret = lookup_pi_state(uaddr2, ret, hb2, &key2, &pi_state);
}
switch (ret) {
case 0:
/* We hold a reference on the pi state. */
break;
/* If the above failed, then pi_state is NULL */
case -EFAULT:
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
put_futex_key(&key2);
put_futex_key(&key1);
ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr2);
if (!ret)
goto retry;
goto out;
case -EAGAIN:
/*
* Two reasons for this:
* - Owner is exiting and we just wait for the
* exit to complete.
* - The user space value changed.
*/
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
put_futex_key(&key2);
put_futex_key(&key1);
cond_resched();
goto retry;
default:
goto out_unlock;
}
}
plist_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &hb1->chain, list) {
if (task_count - nr_wake >= nr_requeue)
break;
if (!match_futex(&this->key, &key1))
continue;
/*
* FUTEX_WAIT_REQEUE_PI and FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI should always
* be paired with each other and no other futex ops.
*
* We should never be requeueing a futex_q with a pi_state,
* which is awaiting a futex_unlock_pi().
*/
if ((requeue_pi && !this->rt_waiter) ||
(!requeue_pi && this->rt_waiter) ||
this->pi_state) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/*
* Wake nr_wake waiters. For requeue_pi, if we acquired the
* lock, we already woke the top_waiter. If not, it will be
* woken by futex_unlock_pi().
*/
if (++task_count <= nr_wake && !requeue_pi) {
mark_wake_futex(&wake_q, this);
continue;
}
/* Ensure we requeue to the expected futex for requeue_pi. */
if (requeue_pi && !match_futex(this->requeue_pi_key, &key2)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/*
* Requeue nr_requeue waiters and possibly one more in the case
* of requeue_pi if we couldn't acquire the lock atomically.
*/
if (requeue_pi) {
/*
* Prepare the waiter to take the rt_mutex. Take a
* refcount on the pi_state and store the pointer in
* the futex_q object of the waiter.
*/
get_pi_state(pi_state);
this->pi_state = pi_state;
ret = rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(&pi_state->pi_mutex,
this->rt_waiter,
this->task);
if (ret == 1) {
/*
* We got the lock. We do neither drop the
* refcount on pi_state nor clear
* this->pi_state because the waiter needs the
* pi_state for cleaning up the user space
* value. It will drop the refcount after
* doing so.
*/
requeue_pi_wake_futex(this, &key2, hb2);
drop_count++;
continue;
} else if (ret) {
/*
* rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() detected a
* potential deadlock when we tried to queue
* that waiter. Drop the pi_state reference
* which we took above and remove the pointer
* to the state from the waiters futex_q
* object.
*/
this->pi_state = NULL;
put_pi_state(pi_state);
/*
* We stop queueing more waiters and let user
* space deal with the mess.
*/
break;
}
}
requeue_futex(this, hb1, hb2, &key2);
drop_count++;
}
/*
* We took an extra initial reference to the pi_state either
* in futex_proxy_trylock_atomic() or in lookup_pi_state(). We
* need to drop it here again.
*/
put_pi_state(pi_state);
out_unlock:
double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
wake_up_q(&wake_q);
hb_waiters_dec(hb2);
/*
* drop_futex_key_refs() must be called outside the spinlocks. During
* the requeue we moved futex_q's from the hash bucket at key1 to the
* one at key2 and updated their key pointer. We no longer need to
* hold the references to key1.
*/
while (--drop_count >= 0)
drop_futex_key_refs(&key1);
out_put_keys:
put_futex_key(&key2);
out_put_key1:
put_futex_key(&key1);
out:
return ret ? ret : task_count;
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void MostVisitedSitesBridge::SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& j_observer,
jint num_sites) {
java_observer_.reset(new JavaObserver(env, j_observer));
most_visited_->SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(java_observer_.get(), num_sites);
}
Commit Message: Rename MostVisitedSites.MostVisitedURLsObserver to Observer.
BUG=677672
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2697543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#449958}
CWE ID: CWE-17
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int hns_rcb_get_port_in_comm(
struct rcb_common_cb *rcb_common, int ring_idx)
{
return ring_idx / (rcb_common->max_q_per_vf * rcb_common->max_vfn);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ext4_xattr_cache_insert(struct mb_cache *ext4_mb_cache, struct buffer_head *bh)
{
__u32 hash = le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_hash);
struct mb_cache_entry *ce;
int error;
ce = mb_cache_entry_alloc(ext4_mb_cache, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ce) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "out of memory");
return;
}
error = mb_cache_entry_insert(ce, bh->b_bdev, bh->b_blocknr, hash);
if (error) {
mb_cache_entry_free(ce);
if (error == -EBUSY) {
ea_bdebug(bh, "already in cache");
error = 0;
}
} else {
ea_bdebug(bh, "inserting [%x]", (int)hash);
mb_cache_entry_release(ce);
}
}
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int ieee80211_fragment(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
struct sk_buff *skb, int hdrlen,
int frag_threshold)
{
struct ieee80211_local *local = tx->local;
struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
struct sk_buff *tmp;
int per_fragm = frag_threshold - hdrlen - FCS_LEN;
int pos = hdrlen + per_fragm;
int rem = skb->len - hdrlen - per_fragm;
if (WARN_ON(rem < 0))
return -EINVAL;
/* first fragment was already added to queue by caller */
while (rem) {
int fraglen = per_fragm;
if (fraglen > rem)
fraglen = rem;
rem -= fraglen;
tmp = dev_alloc_skb(local->tx_headroom +
frag_threshold +
tx->sdata->encrypt_headroom +
IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM);
if (!tmp)
return -ENOMEM;
__skb_queue_tail(&tx->skbs, tmp);
skb_reserve(tmp,
local->tx_headroom + tx->sdata->encrypt_headroom);
/* copy control information */
memcpy(tmp->cb, skb->cb, sizeof(tmp->cb));
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(tmp);
info->flags &= ~(IEEE80211_TX_CTL_CLEAR_PS_FILT |
IEEE80211_TX_CTL_FIRST_FRAGMENT);
if (rem)
info->flags |= IEEE80211_TX_CTL_MORE_FRAMES;
skb_copy_queue_mapping(tmp, skb);
tmp->priority = skb->priority;
tmp->dev = skb->dev;
/* copy header and data */
memcpy(skb_put(tmp, hdrlen), skb->data, hdrlen);
memcpy(skb_put(tmp, fraglen), skb->data + pos, fraglen);
pos += fraglen;
}
/* adjust first fragment's length */
skb->len = hdrlen + per_fragm;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix fragmentation code, particularly for encryption
The "new" fragmentation code (since my rewrite almost 5 years ago)
erroneously sets skb->len rather than using skb_trim() to adjust
the length of the first fragment after copying out all the others.
This leaves the skb tail pointer pointing to after where the data
originally ended, and thus causes the encryption MIC to be written
at that point, rather than where it belongs: immediately after the
data.
The impact of this is that if software encryption is done, then
a) encryption doesn't work for the first fragment, the connection
becomes unusable as the first fragment will never be properly
verified at the receiver, the MIC is practically guaranteed to
be wrong
b) we leak up to 8 bytes of plaintext (!) of the packet out into
the air
This is only mitigated by the fact that many devices are capable
of doing encryption in hardware, in which case this can't happen
as the tail pointer is irrelevant in that case. Additionally,
fragmentation is not used very frequently and would normally have
to be configured manually.
Fix this by using skb_trim() properly.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 2de8e0d999b8 ("mac80211: rewrite fragmentation")
Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static char *get_sessionid(json_t *val)
{
char *ret = NULL;
json_t *arr_val;
int arrsize, i;
arr_val = json_array_get(val, 0);
if (!arr_val || !json_is_array(arr_val))
goto out;
arrsize = json_array_size(arr_val);
for (i = 0; i < arrsize; i++) {
json_t *arr = json_array_get(arr_val, i);
char *notify;
if (!arr | !json_is_array(arr))
break;
notify = __json_array_string(arr, 0);
if (!notify)
continue;
if (!strncasecmp(notify, "mining.notify", 13)) {
ret = json_array_string(arr, 1);
break;
}
}
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void FaviconSource::OnFaviconDataAvailable(
FaviconService::Handle request_handle,
history::FaviconData favicon) {
FaviconService* favicon_service =
profile_->GetFaviconService(Profile::EXPLICIT_ACCESS);
int request_id = cancelable_consumer_.GetClientData(favicon_service,
request_handle);
if (favicon.is_valid()) {
SendResponse(request_id, favicon.image_data);
} else {
SendDefaultResponse(request_id);
}
}
Commit Message: ntp4: show larger favicons in most visited page
extend favicon source to provide larger icons. For now, larger means at most 32x32. Also, the only icon we actually support at this resolution is the default (globe).
BUG=none
TEST=manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7300017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91517 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void *sock_poll_thread(void *arg)
{
struct pollfd pfds[MAX_POLL];
memset(pfds, 0, sizeof(pfds));
int h = (intptr_t)arg;
for(;;)
{
prepare_poll_fds(h, pfds);
int ret = poll(pfds, ts[h].poll_count, -1);
if(ret == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("poll ret -1, exit the thread, errno:%d, err:%s", errno, strerror(errno));
break;
}
if(ret != 0)
{
int need_process_data_fd = TRUE;
if(pfds[0].revents) //cmd fd always is the first one
{
asrt(pfds[0].fd == ts[h].cmd_fdr);
if(!process_cmd_sock(h))
{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("h:%d, process_cmd_sock return false, exit...", h);
break;
}
if(ret == 1)
need_process_data_fd = FALSE;
else ret--; //exclude the cmd fd
}
if(need_process_data_fd)
process_data_sock(h, pfds, ret);
}
else {APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("no data, select ret: %d", ret)};
}
ts[h].thread_id = -1;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("socket poll thread exiting, h:%d", h);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int IsPipeliningPossible(const struct Curl_easy *handle,
const struct connectdata *conn)
{
int avail = 0;
/* If a HTTP protocol and pipelining is enabled */
if((conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP) &&
(!conn->bits.protoconnstart || !conn->bits.close)) {
if(Curl_pipeline_wanted(handle->multi, CURLPIPE_HTTP1) &&
(handle->set.httpversion != CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_0) &&
(handle->set.httpreq == HTTPREQ_GET ||
handle->set.httpreq == HTTPREQ_HEAD))
/* didn't ask for HTTP/1.0 and a GET or HEAD */
avail |= CURLPIPE_HTTP1;
if(Curl_pipeline_wanted(handle->multi, CURLPIPE_MULTIPLEX) &&
(handle->set.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2))
/* allows HTTP/2 */
avail |= CURLPIPE_MULTIPLEX;
}
return avail;
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void DefragTrackerInit(DefragTracker *dt, Packet *p)
{
/* copy address */
COPY_ADDRESS(&p->src, &dt->src_addr);
COPY_ADDRESS(&p->dst, &dt->dst_addr);
if (PKT_IS_IPV4(p)) {
dt->id = (int32_t)IPV4_GET_IPID(p);
dt->af = AF_INET;
} else {
dt->id = (int32_t)IPV6_EXTHDR_GET_FH_ID(p);
dt->af = AF_INET6;
}
dt->vlan_id[0] = p->vlan_id[0];
dt->vlan_id[1] = p->vlan_id[1];
dt->policy = DefragGetOsPolicy(p);
dt->host_timeout = DefragPolicyGetHostTimeout(p);
dt->remove = 0;
dt->seen_last = 0;
TAILQ_INIT(&dt->frags);
(void) DefragTrackerIncrUsecnt(dt);
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: virtual void FramePktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
if (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) {
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: SpoolssClosePrinter_r(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_nt_policy_hnd(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_hnd, NULL, NULL,
FALSE, FALSE);
offset = dissect_doserror(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_rc, NULL);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ASS_Image *ass_render_frame(ASS_Renderer *priv, ASS_Track *track,
long long now, int *detect_change)
{
int i, cnt, rc;
EventImages *last;
ASS_Image **tail;
rc = ass_start_frame(priv, track, now);
if (rc != 0) {
if (detect_change) {
*detect_change = 2;
}
return NULL;
}
cnt = 0;
for (i = 0; i < track->n_events; ++i) {
ASS_Event *event = track->events + i;
if ((event->Start <= now)
&& (now < (event->Start + event->Duration))) {
if (cnt >= priv->eimg_size) {
priv->eimg_size += 100;
priv->eimg =
realloc(priv->eimg,
priv->eimg_size * sizeof(EventImages));
}
rc = ass_render_event(priv, event, priv->eimg + cnt);
if (!rc)
++cnt;
}
}
qsort(priv->eimg, cnt, sizeof(EventImages), cmp_event_layer);
last = priv->eimg;
for (i = 1; i < cnt; ++i)
if (last->event->Layer != priv->eimg[i].event->Layer) {
fix_collisions(priv, last, priv->eimg + i - last);
last = priv->eimg + i;
}
if (cnt > 0)
fix_collisions(priv, last, priv->eimg + cnt - last);
tail = &priv->images_root;
for (i = 0; i < cnt; ++i) {
ASS_Image *cur = priv->eimg[i].imgs;
while (cur) {
*tail = cur;
tail = &cur->next;
cur = cur->next;
}
}
ass_frame_ref(priv->images_root);
if (detect_change)
*detect_change = ass_detect_change(priv);
ass_frame_unref(priv->prev_images_root);
priv->prev_images_root = NULL;
return priv->images_root;
}
Commit Message: Fix line wrapping mode 0/3 bugs
This fixes two separate bugs:
a) Don't move a linebreak into the first symbol. This results in a empty
line at the front, which does not help to equalize line lengths at all.
b) When moving a linebreak into a symbol that already is a break, the
number of lines must be decremented. Otherwise, uninitialized memory
is possibly used for later layout operations.
Found by fuzzer test case
id:000085,sig:11,src:003377+003350,op:splice,rep:8.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool AXNodeObject::isModal() const {
if (roleValue() != DialogRole && roleValue() != AlertDialogRole)
return false;
if (hasAttribute(aria_modalAttr)) {
const AtomicString& modal = getAttribute(aria_modalAttr);
if (equalIgnoringCase(modal, "true"))
return true;
if (equalIgnoringCase(modal, "false"))
return false;
}
if (getNode() && isHTMLDialogElement(*getNode()))
return toElement(getNode())->isInTopLayer();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: exsltDateHourInDay (const xmlChar *dateTime)
{
exsltDateValPtr dt;
double ret;
if (dateTime == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_TIME
dt = exsltDateCurrent();
if (dt == NULL)
#endif
return xmlXPathNAN;
} else {
dt = exsltDateParse(dateTime);
if (dt == NULL)
return xmlXPathNAN;
if ((dt->type != XS_DATETIME) && (dt->type != XS_TIME)) {
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return xmlXPathNAN;
}
}
ret = (double) dt->value.date.hour;
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: png_set_text_2(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_textp text_ptr,
int num_text)
{
int i;
png_debug1(1, "in %s storage function", ((png_ptr == NULL ||
png_ptr->chunk_name[0] == '\0') ?
"text" : (png_const_charp)png_ptr->chunk_name));
if (png_ptr == NULL || info_ptr == NULL || num_text == 0)
return(0);
/* Make sure we have enough space in the "text" array in info_struct
* to hold all of the incoming text_ptr objects.
*/
if (info_ptr->num_text + num_text > info_ptr->max_text)
{
int old_max_text = info_ptr->max_text;
int old_num_text = info_ptr->num_text;
if (info_ptr->text != NULL)
{
png_textp old_text;
info_ptr->max_text = info_ptr->num_text + num_text + 8;
old_text = info_ptr->text;
info_ptr->text = (png_textp)png_malloc_warn(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(info_ptr->max_text * png_sizeof(png_text)));
if (info_ptr->text == NULL)
{
/* Restore to previous condition */
info_ptr->max_text = old_max_text;
info_ptr->text = old_text;
return(1);
}
png_memcpy(info_ptr->text, old_text, (png_size_t)(old_max_text *
png_sizeof(png_text)));
png_free(png_ptr, old_text);
}
else
{
info_ptr->max_text = num_text + 8;
info_ptr->num_text = 0;
info_ptr->text = (png_textp)png_malloc_warn(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)(info_ptr->max_text * png_sizeof(png_text)));
if (info_ptr->text == NULL)
{
/* Restore to previous condition */
info_ptr->num_text = old_num_text;
info_ptr->max_text = old_max_text;
return(1);
}
#ifdef PNG_FREE_ME_SUPPORTED
info_ptr->free_me |= PNG_FREE_TEXT;
#endif
}
png_debug1(3, "allocated %d entries for info_ptr->text",
info_ptr->max_text);
}
for (i = 0; i < num_text; i++)
{
png_size_t text_length, key_len;
png_size_t lang_len, lang_key_len;
png_textp textp = &(info_ptr->text[info_ptr->num_text]);
if (text_ptr[i].key == NULL)
continue;
key_len = png_strlen(text_ptr[i].key);
if (text_ptr[i].compression <= 0)
{
lang_len = 0;
lang_key_len = 0;
}
else
#ifdef PNG_iTXt_SUPPORTED
{
/* Set iTXt data */
if (text_ptr[i].lang != NULL)
lang_len = png_strlen(text_ptr[i].lang);
else
lang_len = 0;
if (text_ptr[i].lang_key != NULL)
lang_key_len = png_strlen(text_ptr[i].lang_key);
else
lang_key_len = 0;
}
#else /* PNG_iTXt_SUPPORTED */
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "iTXt chunk not supported.");
continue;
}
#endif
if (text_ptr[i].text == NULL || text_ptr[i].text[0] == '\0')
{
text_length = 0;
#ifdef PNG_iTXt_SUPPORTED
if (text_ptr[i].compression > 0)
textp->compression = PNG_ITXT_COMPRESSION_NONE;
else
#endif
textp->compression = PNG_TEXT_COMPRESSION_NONE;
}
else
{
text_length = png_strlen(text_ptr[i].text);
textp->compression = text_ptr[i].compression;
}
textp->key = (png_charp)png_malloc_warn(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)
(key_len + text_length + lang_len + lang_key_len + 4));
if (textp->key == NULL)
return(1);
png_debug2(2, "Allocated %lu bytes at %x in png_set_text",
(png_uint_32)
(key_len + lang_len + lang_key_len + text_length + 4),
(int)textp->key);
png_memcpy(textp->key, text_ptr[i].key,(png_size_t)(key_len));
*(textp->key + key_len) = '\0';
#ifdef PNG_iTXt_SUPPORTED
if (text_ptr[i].compression > 0)
{
textp->lang = textp->key + key_len + 1;
png_memcpy(textp->lang, text_ptr[i].lang, lang_len);
*(textp->lang + lang_len) = '\0';
textp->lang_key = textp->lang + lang_len + 1;
png_memcpy(textp->lang_key, text_ptr[i].lang_key, lang_key_len);
*(textp->lang_key + lang_key_len) = '\0';
textp->text = textp->lang_key + lang_key_len + 1;
}
else
#endif
{
#ifdef PNG_iTXt_SUPPORTED
textp->lang=NULL;
textp->lang_key=NULL;
#endif
textp->text = textp->key + key_len + 1;
}
if (text_length)
png_memcpy(textp->text, text_ptr[i].text,
(png_size_t)(text_length));
*(textp->text + text_length) = '\0';
#ifdef PNG_iTXt_SUPPORTED
if (textp->compression > 0)
{
textp->text_length = 0;
textp->itxt_length = text_length;
}
else
#endif
{
textp->text_length = text_length;
#ifdef PNG_iTXt_SUPPORTED
textp->itxt_length = 0;
#endif
}
info_ptr->num_text++;
png_debug1(3, "transferred text chunk %d", info_ptr->num_text);
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh_clnt = NULL;
const BIGNUM *pub_key;
EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
if (skey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return 0;
}
/* send off the data */
DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
*len = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
s2n(*len, *p);
BN_bn2bin(pub_key, *p);
*len += 2;
EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
return 1;
#else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix missing NULL checks in CKE processing
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeLongSlong(int32 value)
{
if (value<0)
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrRange);
else
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void ExtensionTtsController::FinishCurrentUtterance() {
if (current_utterance_) {
current_utterance_->FinishAndDestroy();
current_utterance_ = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void parse_input(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn)
{
size_t http2_max_concurrent_requests_per_connection = conn->super.ctx->globalconf->http2.max_concurrent_requests_per_connection;
int perform_early_exit = 0;
if (conn->num_streams.pull.half_closed + conn->num_streams.push.half_closed != http2_max_concurrent_requests_per_connection)
perform_early_exit = 1;
/* handle the input */
while (conn->state < H2O_HTTP2_CONN_STATE_IS_CLOSING && conn->sock->input->size != 0) {
if (perform_early_exit == 1 &&
conn->num_streams.pull.half_closed + conn->num_streams.push.half_closed == http2_max_concurrent_requests_per_connection)
goto EarlyExit;
/* process a frame */
const char *err_desc = NULL;
ssize_t ret = conn->_read_expect(conn, (uint8_t *)conn->sock->input->bytes, conn->sock->input->size, &err_desc);
if (ret == H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_INCOMPLETE) {
break;
} else if (ret < 0) {
if (ret != H2O_HTTP2_ERROR_PROTOCOL_CLOSE_IMMEDIATELY) {
enqueue_goaway(conn, (int)ret,
err_desc != NULL ? (h2o_iovec_t){(char *)err_desc, strlen(err_desc)} : (h2o_iovec_t){});
}
close_connection(conn);
return;
}
/* advance to the next frame */
h2o_buffer_consume(&conn->sock->input, ret);
}
if (!h2o_socket_is_reading(conn->sock))
h2o_socket_read_start(conn->sock, on_read);
return;
EarlyExit:
if (h2o_socket_is_reading(conn->sock))
h2o_socket_read_stop(conn->sock);
}
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void tcp_v6_reqsk_destructor(struct request_sock *req)
{
kfree(inet_rsk(req)->ipv6_opt);
kfree_skb(inet_rsk(req)->pktopts);
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::postViolationReport(
const SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& violationData,
LocalFrame* contextFrame,
const Vector<String>& reportEndpoints) {
Document* document =
contextFrame ? contextFrame->document() : this->document();
if (!document)
return;
std::unique_ptr<JSONObject> cspReport = JSONObject::create();
cspReport->setString("document-uri", violationData.documentURI());
cspReport->setString("referrer", violationData.referrer());
cspReport->setString("violated-directive", violationData.violatedDirective());
cspReport->setString("effective-directive",
violationData.effectiveDirective());
cspReport->setString("original-policy", violationData.originalPolicy());
cspReport->setString("disposition", violationData.disposition());
cspReport->setString("blocked-uri", violationData.blockedURI());
if (violationData.lineNumber())
cspReport->setInteger("line-number", violationData.lineNumber());
if (violationData.columnNumber())
cspReport->setInteger("column-number", violationData.columnNumber());
if (!violationData.sourceFile().isEmpty())
cspReport->setString("source-file", violationData.sourceFile());
cspReport->setInteger("status-code", violationData.statusCode());
if (experimentalFeaturesEnabled())
cspReport->setString("sample", violationData.sample());
std::unique_ptr<JSONObject> reportObject = JSONObject::create();
reportObject->setObject("csp-report", std::move(cspReport));
String stringifiedReport = reportObject->toJSONString();
if (shouldSendViolationReport(stringifiedReport)) {
didSendViolationReport(stringifiedReport);
RefPtr<EncodedFormData> report =
EncodedFormData::create(stringifiedReport.utf8());
LocalFrame* frame = document->frame();
if (!frame)
return;
for (const String& endpoint : reportEndpoints) {
DCHECK(!contextFrame || !m_executionContext);
DCHECK(!contextFrame ||
getDirectiveType(violationData.effectiveDirective()) ==
DirectiveType::FrameAncestors);
KURL url =
contextFrame
? frame->document()->completeURLWithOverride(
endpoint, KURL(ParsedURLString, violationData.blockedURI()))
: completeURL(endpoint);
PingLoader::sendViolationReport(
frame, url, report, PingLoader::ContentSecurityPolicyViolationReport);
}
}
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: eval_condition(uschar *s, BOOL *resetok, BOOL *yield)
{
BOOL testfor = TRUE;
BOOL tempcond, combined_cond;
BOOL *subcondptr;
BOOL sub2_honour_dollar = TRUE;
int i, rc, cond_type, roffset;
int_eximarith_t num[2];
struct stat statbuf;
uschar name[256];
uschar *sub[10];
const pcre *re;
const uschar *rerror;
for (;;)
{
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s == '!') { testfor = !testfor; s++; } else break;
}
/* Numeric comparisons are symbolic */
if (*s == '=' || *s == '>' || *s == '<')
{
int p = 0;
name[p++] = *s++;
if (*s == '=')
{
name[p++] = '=';
s++;
}
name[p] = 0;
}
/* All other conditions are named */
else s = read_name(name, 256, s, US"_");
/* If we haven't read a name, it means some non-alpha character is first. */
if (name[0] == 0)
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("condition name expected, "
"but found \"%.16s\"", s);
return NULL;
}
/* Find which condition we are dealing with, and switch on it */
cond_type = chop_match(name, cond_table, sizeof(cond_table)/sizeof(uschar *));
switch(cond_type)
{
/* def: tests for a non-empty variable, or for the existence of a header. If
yield == NULL we are in a skipping state, and don't care about the answer. */
case ECOND_DEF:
if (*s != ':')
{
expand_string_message = US"\":\" expected after \"def\"";
return NULL;
}
s = read_name(name, 256, s+1, US"_");
/* Test for a header's existence. If the name contains a closing brace
character, this may be a user error where the terminating colon has been
omitted. Set a flag to adjust a subsequent error message in this case. */
if (Ustrncmp(name, "h_", 2) == 0 ||
Ustrncmp(name, "rh_", 3) == 0 ||
Ustrncmp(name, "bh_", 3) == 0 ||
Ustrncmp(name, "header_", 7) == 0 ||
Ustrncmp(name, "rheader_", 8) == 0 ||
Ustrncmp(name, "bheader_", 8) == 0)
{
s = read_header_name(name, 256, s);
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (Ustrchr(name, '}') != NULL) malformed_header = TRUE;
if (yield != NULL) *yield =
(find_header(name, TRUE, NULL, FALSE, NULL) != NULL) == testfor;
}
/* Test for a variable's having a non-empty value. A non-existent variable
causes an expansion failure. */
else
{
uschar *value = find_variable(name, TRUE, yield == NULL, NULL);
if (value == NULL)
{
expand_string_message = (name[0] == 0)?
string_sprintf("variable name omitted after \"def:\"") :
string_sprintf("unknown variable \"%s\" after \"def:\"", name);
check_variable_error_message(name);
return NULL;
}
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (value[0] != 0) == testfor;
}
return s;
/* first_delivery tests for first delivery attempt */
case ECOND_FIRST_DELIVERY:
if (yield != NULL) *yield = deliver_firsttime == testfor;
return s;
/* queue_running tests for any process started by a queue runner */
case ECOND_QUEUE_RUNNING:
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (queue_run_pid != (pid_t)0) == testfor;
return s;
/* exists: tests for file existence
isip: tests for any IP address
isip4: tests for an IPv4 address
isip6: tests for an IPv6 address
pam: does PAM authentication
radius: does RADIUS authentication
ldapauth: does LDAP authentication
pwcheck: does Cyrus SASL pwcheck authentication
*/
case ECOND_EXISTS:
case ECOND_ISIP:
case ECOND_ISIP4:
case ECOND_ISIP6:
case ECOND_PAM:
case ECOND_RADIUS:
case ECOND_LDAPAUTH:
case ECOND_PWCHECK:
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
sub[0] = expand_string_internal(s+1, TRUE, &s, yield == NULL, TRUE, resetok);
if (sub[0] == NULL) return NULL;
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (*s++ != '}') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_END;
if (yield == NULL) return s; /* No need to run the test if skipping */
switch(cond_type)
{
case ECOND_EXISTS:
if ((expand_forbid & RDO_EXISTS) != 0)
{
expand_string_message = US"File existence tests are not permitted";
return NULL;
}
*yield = (Ustat(sub[0], &statbuf) == 0) == testfor;
break;
case ECOND_ISIP:
case ECOND_ISIP4:
case ECOND_ISIP6:
rc = string_is_ip_address(sub[0], NULL);
*yield = ((cond_type == ECOND_ISIP)? (rc != 0) :
(cond_type == ECOND_ISIP4)? (rc == 4) : (rc == 6)) == testfor;
break;
/* Various authentication tests - all optionally compiled */
case ECOND_PAM:
#ifdef SUPPORT_PAM
rc = auth_call_pam(sub[0], &expand_string_message);
goto END_AUTH;
#else
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#endif /* SUPPORT_PAM */
case ECOND_RADIUS:
#ifdef RADIUS_CONFIG_FILE
rc = auth_call_radius(sub[0], &expand_string_message);
goto END_AUTH;
#else
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#endif /* RADIUS_CONFIG_FILE */
case ECOND_LDAPAUTH:
#ifdef LOOKUP_LDAP
{
/* Just to keep the interface the same */
BOOL do_cache;
int old_pool = store_pool;
store_pool = POOL_SEARCH;
rc = eldapauth_find((void *)(-1), NULL, sub[0], Ustrlen(sub[0]), NULL,
&expand_string_message, &do_cache);
store_pool = old_pool;
}
goto END_AUTH;
#else
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#endif /* LOOKUP_LDAP */
case ECOND_PWCHECK:
#ifdef CYRUS_PWCHECK_SOCKET
rc = auth_call_pwcheck(sub[0], &expand_string_message);
goto END_AUTH;
#else
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#endif /* CYRUS_PWCHECK_SOCKET */
#if defined(SUPPORT_PAM) || defined(RADIUS_CONFIG_FILE) || \
defined(LOOKUP_LDAP) || defined(CYRUS_PWCHECK_SOCKET)
END_AUTH:
if (rc == ERROR || rc == DEFER) return NULL;
*yield = (rc == OK) == testfor;
#endif
}
return s;
/* call ACL (in a conditional context). Accept true, deny false.
Defer is a forced-fail. Anything set by message= goes to $value.
Up to ten parameters are used; we use the braces round the name+args
like the saslauthd condition does, to permit a variable number of args.
See also the expansion-item version EITEM_ACL and the traditional
acl modifier ACLC_ACL.
Since the ACL may allocate new global variables, tell our caller to not
reclaim memory.
*/
case ECOND_ACL:
/* ${if acl {{name}{arg1}{arg2}...} {yes}{no}} */
{
uschar *user_msg;
BOOL cond = FALSE;
int size = 0;
int ptr = 0;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s++ != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /*}*/
switch(read_subs(sub, sizeof(sub)/sizeof(*sub), 1,
&s, yield == NULL, TRUE, US"acl", resetok))
{
case 1: expand_string_message = US"too few arguments or bracketing "
"error for acl";
case 2:
case 3: return NULL;
}
*resetok = FALSE;
if (yield != NULL) switch(eval_acl(sub, sizeof(sub)/sizeof(*sub), &user_msg))
{
case OK:
cond = TRUE;
case FAIL:
lookup_value = NULL;
if (user_msg)
{
lookup_value = string_cat(NULL, &size, &ptr, user_msg, Ustrlen(user_msg));
lookup_value[ptr] = '\0';
}
*yield = cond == testfor;
break;
case DEFER:
expand_string_forcedfail = TRUE;
default:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("error from acl \"%s\"", sub[0]);
return NULL;
}
return s;
}
/* saslauthd: does Cyrus saslauthd authentication. Four parameters are used:
${if saslauthd {{username}{password}{service}{realm}} {yes}{no}}
However, the last two are optional. That is why the whole set is enclosed
in their own set of braces. */
case ECOND_SASLAUTHD:
#ifndef CYRUS_SASLAUTHD_SOCKET
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#else
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s++ != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
switch(read_subs(sub, 4, 2, &s, yield == NULL, TRUE, US"saslauthd", resetok))
{
case 1: expand_string_message = US"too few arguments or bracketing "
"error for saslauthd";
case 2:
case 3: return NULL;
}
if (sub[2] == NULL) sub[3] = NULL; /* realm if no service */
if (yield != NULL)
{
int rc;
rc = auth_call_saslauthd(sub[0], sub[1], sub[2], sub[3],
&expand_string_message);
if (rc == ERROR || rc == DEFER) return NULL;
*yield = (rc == OK) == testfor;
}
return s;
#endif /* CYRUS_SASLAUTHD_SOCKET */
/* symbolic operators for numeric and string comparison, and a number of
other operators, all requiring two arguments.
crypteq: encrypts plaintext and compares against an encrypted text,
using crypt(), crypt16(), MD5 or SHA-1
inlist/inlisti: checks if first argument is in the list of the second
match: does a regular expression match and sets up the numerical
variables if it succeeds
match_address: matches in an address list
match_domain: matches in a domain list
match_ip: matches a host list that is restricted to IP addresses
match_local_part: matches in a local part list
*/
case ECOND_MATCH_ADDRESS:
case ECOND_MATCH_DOMAIN:
case ECOND_MATCH_IP:
case ECOND_MATCH_LOCAL_PART:
#ifndef EXPAND_LISTMATCH_RHS
sub2_honour_dollar = FALSE;
#endif
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case ECOND_CRYPTEQ:
case ECOND_INLIST:
case ECOND_INLISTI:
case ECOND_MATCH:
case ECOND_NUM_L: /* Numerical comparisons */
case ECOND_NUM_LE:
case ECOND_NUM_E:
case ECOND_NUM_EE:
case ECOND_NUM_G:
case ECOND_NUM_GE:
case ECOND_STR_LT: /* String comparisons */
case ECOND_STR_LTI:
case ECOND_STR_LE:
case ECOND_STR_LEI:
case ECOND_STR_EQ:
case ECOND_STR_EQI:
case ECOND_STR_GT:
case ECOND_STR_GTI:
case ECOND_STR_GE:
case ECOND_STR_GEI:
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
{
/* Sometimes, we don't expand substrings; too many insecure configurations
created using match_address{}{} and friends, where the second param
includes information from untrustworthy sources. */
BOOL honour_dollar = TRUE;
if ((i > 0) && !sub2_honour_dollar)
honour_dollar = FALSE;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s != '{')
{
if (i == 0) goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START;
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("missing 2nd string in {} "
"after \"%s\"", name);
return NULL;
}
sub[i] = expand_string_internal(s+1, TRUE, &s, yield == NULL,
honour_dollar, resetok);
if (sub[i] == NULL) return NULL;
if (*s++ != '}') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_END;
/* Convert to numerical if required; we know that the names of all the
conditions that compare numbers do not start with a letter. This just saves
checking for them individually. */
if (!isalpha(name[0]) && yield != NULL)
{
if (sub[i][0] == 0)
{
num[i] = 0;
DEBUG(D_expand)
debug_printf("empty string cast to zero for numerical comparison\n");
}
else
{
num[i] = expand_string_integer(sub[i], FALSE);
if (expand_string_message != NULL) return NULL;
}
}
}
/* Result not required */
if (yield == NULL) return s;
/* Do an appropriate comparison */
switch(cond_type)
{
case ECOND_NUM_E:
case ECOND_NUM_EE:
tempcond = (num[0] == num[1]);
break;
case ECOND_NUM_G:
tempcond = (num[0] > num[1]);
break;
case ECOND_NUM_GE:
tempcond = (num[0] >= num[1]);
break;
case ECOND_NUM_L:
tempcond = (num[0] < num[1]);
break;
case ECOND_NUM_LE:
tempcond = (num[0] <= num[1]);
break;
case ECOND_STR_LT:
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(sub[0], sub[1]) < 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_LTI:
tempcond = (strcmpic(sub[0], sub[1]) < 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_LE:
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(sub[0], sub[1]) <= 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_LEI:
tempcond = (strcmpic(sub[0], sub[1]) <= 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_EQ:
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(sub[0], sub[1]) == 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_EQI:
tempcond = (strcmpic(sub[0], sub[1]) == 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_GT:
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(sub[0], sub[1]) > 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_GTI:
tempcond = (strcmpic(sub[0], sub[1]) > 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_GE:
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(sub[0], sub[1]) >= 0);
break;
case ECOND_STR_GEI:
tempcond = (strcmpic(sub[0], sub[1]) >= 0);
break;
case ECOND_MATCH: /* Regular expression match */
re = pcre_compile(CS sub[1], PCRE_COPT, (const char **)&rerror, &roffset,
NULL);
if (re == NULL)
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("regular expression error in "
"\"%s\": %s at offset %d", sub[1], rerror, roffset);
return NULL;
}
tempcond = regex_match_and_setup(re, sub[0], 0, -1);
break;
case ECOND_MATCH_ADDRESS: /* Match in an address list */
rc = match_address_list(sub[0], TRUE, FALSE, &(sub[1]), NULL, -1, 0, NULL);
goto MATCHED_SOMETHING;
case ECOND_MATCH_DOMAIN: /* Match in a domain list */
rc = match_isinlist(sub[0], &(sub[1]), 0, &domainlist_anchor, NULL,
MCL_DOMAIN + MCL_NOEXPAND, TRUE, NULL);
goto MATCHED_SOMETHING;
case ECOND_MATCH_IP: /* Match IP address in a host list */
if (sub[0][0] != 0 && string_is_ip_address(sub[0], NULL) == 0)
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("\"%s\" is not an IP address",
sub[0]);
return NULL;
}
else
{
unsigned int *nullcache = NULL;
check_host_block cb;
cb.host_name = US"";
cb.host_address = sub[0];
/* If the host address starts off ::ffff: it is an IPv6 address in
IPv4-compatible mode. Find the IPv4 part for checking against IPv4
addresses. */
cb.host_ipv4 = (Ustrncmp(cb.host_address, "::ffff:", 7) == 0)?
cb.host_address + 7 : cb.host_address;
rc = match_check_list(
&sub[1], /* the list */
0, /* separator character */
&hostlist_anchor, /* anchor pointer */
&nullcache, /* cache pointer */
check_host, /* function for testing */
&cb, /* argument for function */
MCL_HOST, /* type of check */
sub[0], /* text for debugging */
NULL); /* where to pass back data */
}
goto MATCHED_SOMETHING;
case ECOND_MATCH_LOCAL_PART:
rc = match_isinlist(sub[0], &(sub[1]), 0, &localpartlist_anchor, NULL,
MCL_LOCALPART + MCL_NOEXPAND, TRUE, NULL);
/* Fall through */
/* VVVVVVVVVVVV */
MATCHED_SOMETHING:
switch(rc)
{
case OK:
tempcond = TRUE;
break;
case FAIL:
tempcond = FALSE;
break;
case DEFER:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("unable to complete match "
"against \"%s\": %s", sub[1], search_error_message);
return NULL;
}
break;
/* Various "encrypted" comparisons. If the second string starts with
"{" then an encryption type is given. Default to crypt() or crypt16()
(build-time choice). */
/* }-for-text-editors */
case ECOND_CRYPTEQ:
#ifndef SUPPORT_CRYPTEQ
goto COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED;
#else
if (strncmpic(sub[1], US"{md5}", 5) == 0)
{
int sublen = Ustrlen(sub[1]+5);
md5 base;
uschar digest[16];
md5_start(&base);
md5_end(&base, (uschar *)sub[0], Ustrlen(sub[0]), digest);
/* If the length that we are comparing against is 24, the MD5 digest
is expressed as a base64 string. This is the way LDAP does it. However,
some other software uses a straightforward hex representation. We assume
this if the length is 32. Other lengths fail. */
if (sublen == 24)
{
uschar *coded = auth_b64encode((uschar *)digest, 16);
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: using MD5+B64 hashing\n"
" subject=%s\n crypted=%s\n", coded, sub[1]+5);
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(coded, sub[1]+5) == 0);
}
else if (sublen == 32)
{
int i;
uschar coded[36];
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) sprintf(CS (coded+2*i), "%02X", digest[i]);
coded[32] = 0;
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: using MD5+hex hashing\n"
" subject=%s\n crypted=%s\n", coded, sub[1]+5);
tempcond = (strcmpic(coded, sub[1]+5) == 0);
}
else
{
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: length for MD5 not 24 or 32: "
"fail\n crypted=%s\n", sub[1]+5);
tempcond = FALSE;
}
}
else if (strncmpic(sub[1], US"{sha1}", 6) == 0)
{
int sublen = Ustrlen(sub[1]+6);
sha1 base;
uschar digest[20];
sha1_start(&base);
sha1_end(&base, (uschar *)sub[0], Ustrlen(sub[0]), digest);
/* If the length that we are comparing against is 28, assume the SHA1
digest is expressed as a base64 string. If the length is 40, assume a
straightforward hex representation. Other lengths fail. */
if (sublen == 28)
{
uschar *coded = auth_b64encode((uschar *)digest, 20);
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: using SHA1+B64 hashing\n"
" subject=%s\n crypted=%s\n", coded, sub[1]+6);
tempcond = (Ustrcmp(coded, sub[1]+6) == 0);
}
else if (sublen == 40)
{
int i;
uschar coded[44];
for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) sprintf(CS (coded+2*i), "%02X", digest[i]);
coded[40] = 0;
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: using SHA1+hex hashing\n"
" subject=%s\n crypted=%s\n", coded, sub[1]+6);
tempcond = (strcmpic(coded, sub[1]+6) == 0);
}
else
{
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: length for SHA-1 not 28 or 40: "
"fail\n crypted=%s\n", sub[1]+6);
tempcond = FALSE;
}
}
else /* {crypt} or {crypt16} and non-{ at start */
/* }-for-text-editors */
{
int which = 0;
uschar *coded;
if (strncmpic(sub[1], US"{crypt}", 7) == 0)
{
sub[1] += 7;
which = 1;
}
else if (strncmpic(sub[1], US"{crypt16}", 9) == 0)
{
sub[1] += 9;
which = 2;
}
else if (sub[1][0] == '{') /* }-for-text-editors */
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("unknown encryption mechanism "
"in \"%s\"", sub[1]);
return NULL;
}
switch(which)
{
case 0: coded = US DEFAULT_CRYPT(CS sub[0], CS sub[1]); break;
case 1: coded = US crypt(CS sub[0], CS sub[1]); break;
default: coded = US crypt16(CS sub[0], CS sub[1]); break;
}
#define STR(s) # s
#define XSTR(s) STR(s)
DEBUG(D_auth) debug_printf("crypteq: using %s()\n"
" subject=%s\n crypted=%s\n",
(which == 0)? XSTR(DEFAULT_CRYPT) : (which == 1)? "crypt" : "crypt16",
coded, sub[1]);
#undef STR
#undef XSTR
/* If the encrypted string contains fewer than two characters (for the
salt), force failure. Otherwise we get false positives: with an empty
string the yield of crypt() is an empty string! */
tempcond = (Ustrlen(sub[1]) < 2)? FALSE :
(Ustrcmp(coded, sub[1]) == 0);
}
break;
#endif /* SUPPORT_CRYPTEQ */
case ECOND_INLIST:
case ECOND_INLISTI:
{
int sep = 0;
uschar *save_iterate_item = iterate_item;
int (*compare)(const uschar *, const uschar *);
tempcond = FALSE;
if (cond_type == ECOND_INLISTI)
compare = strcmpic;
else
compare = (int (*)(const uschar *, const uschar *)) strcmp;
while ((iterate_item = string_nextinlist(&sub[1], &sep, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
if (compare(sub[0], iterate_item) == 0)
{
tempcond = TRUE;
break;
}
iterate_item = save_iterate_item;
}
} /* Switch for comparison conditions */
*yield = tempcond == testfor;
return s; /* End of comparison conditions */
/* and/or: computes logical and/or of several conditions */
case ECOND_AND:
case ECOND_OR:
subcondptr = (yield == NULL)? NULL : &tempcond;
combined_cond = (cond_type == ECOND_AND);
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s++ != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
for (;;)
{
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (*s == '}') break;
if (*s != '{') /* }-for-text-editors */
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("each subcondition "
"inside an \"%s{...}\" condition must be in its own {}", name);
return NULL;
}
if (!(s = eval_condition(s+1, resetok, subcondptr)))
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("%s inside \"%s{...}\" condition",
expand_string_message, name);
return NULL;
}
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (*s++ != '}')
{
/* {-for-text-editors */
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("missing } at end of condition "
"inside \"%s\" group", name);
return NULL;
}
if (yield != NULL)
{
if (cond_type == ECOND_AND)
{
combined_cond &= tempcond;
if (!combined_cond) subcondptr = NULL; /* once false, don't */
} /* evaluate any more */
else
{
combined_cond |= tempcond;
if (combined_cond) subcondptr = NULL; /* once true, don't */
} /* evaluate any more */
}
}
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (combined_cond == testfor);
return ++s;
/* forall/forany: iterates a condition with different values */
case ECOND_FORALL:
case ECOND_FORANY:
{
int sep = 0;
uschar *save_iterate_item = iterate_item;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s++ != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
sub[0] = expand_string_internal(s, TRUE, &s, (yield == NULL), TRUE, resetok);
if (sub[0] == NULL) return NULL;
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (*s++ != '}') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_END;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s++ != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
sub[1] = s;
/* Call eval_condition once, with result discarded (as if scanning a
"false" part). This allows us to find the end of the condition, because if
the list it empty, we won't actually evaluate the condition for real. */
if (!(s = eval_condition(sub[1], resetok, NULL)))
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("%s inside \"%s\" condition",
expand_string_message, name);
return NULL;
}
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
/* {-for-text-editors */
if (*s++ != '}')
{
/* {-for-text-editors */
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("missing } at end of condition "
"inside \"%s\"", name);
return NULL;
}
if (yield != NULL) *yield = !testfor;
while ((iterate_item = string_nextinlist(&sub[0], &sep, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
{
DEBUG(D_expand) debug_printf("%s: $item = \"%s\"\n", name, iterate_item);
if (!eval_condition(sub[1], resetok, &tempcond))
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("%s inside \"%s\" condition",
expand_string_message, name);
iterate_item = save_iterate_item;
return NULL;
}
DEBUG(D_expand) debug_printf("%s: condition evaluated to %s\n", name,
tempcond? "true":"false");
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (tempcond == testfor);
if (tempcond == (cond_type == ECOND_FORANY)) break;
}
iterate_item = save_iterate_item;
return s;
}
/* The bool{} expansion condition maps a string to boolean.
The values supported should match those supported by the ACL condition
(acl.c, ACLC_CONDITION) so that we keep to a minimum the different ideas
of true/false. Note that Router "condition" rules have a different
interpretation, where general data can be used and only a few values
map to FALSE.
Note that readconf.c boolean matching, for boolean configuration options,
only matches true/yes/false/no.
The bool_lax{} condition matches the Router logic, which is much more
liberal. */
case ECOND_BOOL:
case ECOND_BOOL_LAX:
{
uschar *sub_arg[1];
uschar *t, *t2;
uschar *ourname;
size_t len;
BOOL boolvalue = FALSE;
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s != '{') goto COND_FAILED_CURLY_START; /* }-for-text-editors */
ourname = cond_type == ECOND_BOOL_LAX ? US"bool_lax" : US"bool";
switch(read_subs(sub_arg, 1, 1, &s, yield == NULL, FALSE, ourname, resetok))
{
case 1: expand_string_message = string_sprintf(
"too few arguments or bracketing error for %s",
ourname);
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case 2:
case 3: return NULL;
}
t = sub_arg[0];
while (isspace(*t)) t++;
len = Ustrlen(t);
if (len)
{
/* trailing whitespace: seems like a good idea to ignore it too */
t2 = t + len - 1;
while (isspace(*t2)) t2--;
if (t2 != (t + len))
{
*++t2 = '\0';
len = t2 - t;
}
}
DEBUG(D_expand)
debug_printf("considering %s: %s\n", ourname, len ? t : US"<empty>");
/* logic for the lax case from expand_check_condition(), which also does
expands, and the logic is both short and stable enough that there should
be no maintenance burden from replicating it. */
if (len == 0)
boolvalue = FALSE;
else if (*t == '-'
? Ustrspn(t+1, "0123456789") == len-1
: Ustrspn(t, "0123456789") == len)
{
boolvalue = (Uatoi(t) == 0) ? FALSE : TRUE;
/* expand_check_condition only does a literal string "0" check */
if ((cond_type == ECOND_BOOL_LAX) && (len > 1))
boolvalue = TRUE;
}
else if (strcmpic(t, US"true") == 0 || strcmpic(t, US"yes") == 0)
boolvalue = TRUE;
else if (strcmpic(t, US"false") == 0 || strcmpic(t, US"no") == 0)
boolvalue = FALSE;
else if (cond_type == ECOND_BOOL_LAX)
boolvalue = TRUE;
else
{
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("unrecognised boolean "
"value \"%s\"", t);
return NULL;
}
if (yield != NULL) *yield = (boolvalue == testfor);
return s;
}
/* Unknown condition */
default:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("unknown condition \"%s\"", name);
return NULL;
} /* End switch on condition type */
/* Missing braces at start and end of data */
COND_FAILED_CURLY_START:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("missing { after \"%s\"", name);
return NULL;
COND_FAILED_CURLY_END:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("missing } at end of \"%s\" condition",
name);
return NULL;
/* A condition requires code that is not compiled */
#if !defined(SUPPORT_PAM) || !defined(RADIUS_CONFIG_FILE) || \
!defined(LOOKUP_LDAP) || !defined(CYRUS_PWCHECK_SOCKET) || \
!defined(SUPPORT_CRYPTEQ) || !defined(CYRUS_SASLAUTHD_SOCKET)
COND_FAILED_NOT_COMPILED:
expand_string_message = string_sprintf("support for \"%s\" not compiled",
name);
return NULL;
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void rb_head_page_activate(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
{
struct buffer_page *head;
head = cpu_buffer->head_page;
if (!head)
return;
/*
* Set the previous list pointer to have the HEAD flag.
*/
rb_set_list_to_head(cpu_buffer, head->list.prev);
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: [email protected] # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void *arm_coherent_dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size,
dma_addr_t *handle, gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
pgprot_t prot = __get_dma_pgprot(attrs, pgprot_kernel);
void *memory;
if (dma_alloc_from_coherent(dev, size, handle, &memory))
return memory;
return __dma_alloc(dev, size, handle, gfp, prot, true,
__builtin_return_address(0));
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePCXImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
*page_table,
scene;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
PCXInfo
pcx_info;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pcx_colormap,
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) NULL;
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"DCX") == 0) ||
((GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL) &&
(image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse)))
{
/*
Write the DCX page table.
*/
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x3ADE68B1L);
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) AcquireQuantumMemory(1024UL,
sizeof(*page_table));
if (page_table == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (scene=0; scene < 1024; scene++)
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00000000L);
}
scene=0;
do
{
if (page_table != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
page_table[scene]=TellBlob(image);
/*
Initialize PCX raster file header.
*/
pcx_info.identifier=0x0a;
pcx_info.version=5;
pcx_info.encoding=image_info->compression == NoCompression ? 0 : 1;
pcx_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) &&
(SetImageMonochrome(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
pcx_info.bits_per_pixel=1;
pcx_info.left=0;
pcx_info.top=0;
pcx_info.right=(unsigned short) (image->columns-1);
pcx_info.bottom=(unsigned short) (image->rows-1);
switch (image->units)
{
case UndefinedResolution:
case PixelsPerInchResolution:
default:
{
pcx_info.horizontal_resolution=(unsigned short) image->x_resolution;
pcx_info.vertical_resolution=(unsigned short) image->y_resolution;
break;
}
case PixelsPerCentimeterResolution:
{
pcx_info.horizontal_resolution=(unsigned short)
(2.54*image->x_resolution+0.5);
pcx_info.vertical_resolution=(unsigned short)
(2.54*image->y_resolution+0.5);
break;
}
}
pcx_info.reserved=0;
pcx_info.planes=1;
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
{
pcx_info.planes=3;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
pcx_info.planes++;
}
pcx_info.bytes_per_line=(unsigned short) (((size_t) image->columns*
pcx_info.bits_per_pixel+7)/8);
pcx_info.palette_info=1;
pcx_info.colormap_signature=0x0c;
/*
Write PCX header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.identifier);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.version);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.encoding);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.bits_per_pixel);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.left);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.top);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.right);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.bottom);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.horizontal_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.vertical_resolution);
/*
Dump colormap to file.
*/
pcx_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(256UL,
3*sizeof(*pcx_colormap));
if (pcx_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) memset(pcx_colormap,0,3*256*sizeof(*pcx_colormap));
q=pcx_colormap;
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) && (image->colors <= 256))
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].green);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,3*16,(const unsigned char *) pcx_colormap);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.reserved);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.planes);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.bytes_per_line);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,pcx_info.palette_info);
for (i=0; i < 58; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\0');
length=(size_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line;
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(length,pcx_info.planes*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
q=pixels;
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
{
/*
Convert DirectClass image to PCX raster pixels.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=pixels;
for (i=0; i < pcx_info.planes; i++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
switch ((int) i)
{
case 0:
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p));
p++;
}
break;
}
case 1:
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p));
p++;
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p));
p++;
}
break;
}
case 3:
default:
{
for (x=(ssize_t) pcx_info.bytes_per_line; x != 0; x--)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar((Quantum)
(GetPixelAlpha(p)));
p++;
}
break;
}
}
}
if (PCXWritePixels(&pcx_info,pixels,image) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
if (pcx_info.bits_per_pixel > 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
q=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
if (PCXWritePixels(&pcx_info,pixels,image) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
{
register unsigned char
bit,
byte;
/*
Convert PseudoClass image to a PCX monochrome image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
q=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=1;
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p) >= (QuantumRange/2.0))
byte|=0x01;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
*q++=byte;
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p++;
}
if (bit != 0)
*q++=byte << (8-bit);
if (PCXWritePixels(&pcx_info,pixels,image) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,pcx_info.colormap_signature);
(void) WriteBlob(image,3*256,pcx_colormap);
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
pcx_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pcx_colormap);
if (page_table == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
break;
if (scene >= 1023)
break;
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
if (page_table != (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
{
/*
Write the DCX page table.
*/
page_table[scene+1]=0;
offset=SeekBlob(image,0L,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowWriterException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x3ADE68B1L);
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) scene; i++)
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) page_table[i]);
page_table=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(page_table);
}
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
char
*message;
message=GetExceptionMessage(errno);
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
FileOpenError,"UnableToWriteFile","`%s': %s",image->filename,message);
message=DestroyString(message);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/575
CWE ID: CWE-772
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::UpdateLoadStateOnUI(
LoaderDelegate* loader_delegate, std::unique_ptr<LoadInfoList> infos) {
DCHECK(Get()->main_thread_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
std::unique_ptr<LoadInfoMap> info_map =
PickMoreInterestingLoadInfos(std::move(infos));
for (const auto& load_info : *info_map) {
loader_delegate->LoadStateChanged(
load_info.first, load_info.second.host, load_info.second.load_state,
load_info.second.upload_position, load_info.second.upload_size);
}
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static bool has_byte(const eager_reader_t *reader) {
assert(reader != NULL);
fd_set read_fds;
FD_ZERO(&read_fds);
FD_SET(reader->bytes_available_fd, &read_fds);
struct timeval timeout;
timeout.tv_sec = 0;
timeout.tv_usec = 0;
select(reader->bytes_available_fd + 1, &read_fds, NULL, NULL, &timeout);
return FD_ISSET(reader->bytes_available_fd, &read_fds);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: DevToolsSession::DevToolsSession(DevToolsAgentHostImpl* agent_host,
DevToolsAgentHostClient* client)
: binding_(this),
agent_host_(agent_host),
client_(client),
process_host_id_(ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID),
host_(nullptr),
dispatcher_(new protocol::UberDispatcher(this)),
weak_factory_(this) {
dispatcher_->setFallThroughForNotFound(true);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: blink::WebMediaPlayer* RenderFrameImpl::CreateMediaPlayer(
const blink::WebMediaPlayerSource& source,
WebMediaPlayerClient* client,
WebMediaPlayerEncryptedMediaClient* encrypted_client,
WebContentDecryptionModule* initial_cdm,
const blink::WebString& sink_id,
blink::WebLayerTreeView* layer_tree_view) {
const cc::LayerTreeSettings& settings =
GetRenderWidget()->compositor()->GetLayerTreeSettings();
return media_factory_.CreateMediaPlayer(source, client, encrypted_client,
initial_cdm, sink_id, layer_tree_view,
settings);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: build_path_from_dentry(struct dentry *direntry)
{
struct dentry *temp;
int namelen;
int dfsplen;
char *full_path;
char dirsep;
struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb = CIFS_SB(direntry->d_sb);
struct cifs_tcon *tcon = cifs_sb_master_tcon(cifs_sb);
unsigned seq;
dirsep = CIFS_DIR_SEP(cifs_sb);
if (tcon->Flags & SMB_SHARE_IS_IN_DFS)
dfsplen = strnlen(tcon->treeName, MAX_TREE_SIZE + 1);
else
dfsplen = 0;
cifs_bp_rename_retry:
namelen = dfsplen;
seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
rcu_read_lock();
for (temp = direntry; !IS_ROOT(temp);) {
namelen += (1 + temp->d_name.len);
temp = temp->d_parent;
if (temp == NULL) {
cERROR(1, "corrupt dentry");
rcu_read_unlock();
return NULL;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
full_path = kmalloc(namelen+1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (full_path == NULL)
return full_path;
full_path[namelen] = 0; /* trailing null */
rcu_read_lock();
for (temp = direntry; !IS_ROOT(temp);) {
spin_lock(&temp->d_lock);
namelen -= 1 + temp->d_name.len;
if (namelen < 0) {
spin_unlock(&temp->d_lock);
break;
} else {
full_path[namelen] = dirsep;
strncpy(full_path + namelen + 1, temp->d_name.name,
temp->d_name.len);
cFYI(0, "name: %s", full_path + namelen);
}
spin_unlock(&temp->d_lock);
temp = temp->d_parent;
if (temp == NULL) {
cERROR(1, "corrupt dentry");
rcu_read_unlock();
kfree(full_path);
return NULL;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (namelen != dfsplen || read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq)) {
cFYI(1, "did not end path lookup where expected. namelen=%d "
"dfsplen=%d", namelen, dfsplen);
/* presumably this is only possible if racing with a rename
of one of the parent directories (we can not lock the dentries
above us to prevent this, but retrying should be harmless) */
kfree(full_path);
goto cifs_bp_rename_retry;
}
/* DIR_SEP already set for byte 0 / vs \ but not for
subsequent slashes in prepath which currently must
be entered the right way - not sure if there is an alternative
since the '\' is a valid posix character so we can not switch
those safely to '/' if any are found in the middle of the prepath */
/* BB test paths to Windows with '/' in the midst of prepath */
if (dfsplen) {
strncpy(full_path, tcon->treeName, dfsplen);
if (cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags & CIFS_MOUNT_POSIX_PATHS) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < dfsplen; i++) {
if (full_path[i] == '\\')
full_path[i] = '/';
}
}
}
return full_path;
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix dentry refcount leak when opening a FIFO on lookup
commit 5bccda0ebc7c0331b81ac47d39e4b920b198b2cd upstream.
The cifs code will attempt to open files on lookup under certain
circumstances. What happens though if we find that the file we opened
was actually a FIFO or other special file?
Currently, the open filehandle just ends up being leaked leading to
a dentry refcount mismatch and oops on umount. Fix this by having the
code close the filehandle on the server if it turns out not to be a
regular file. While we're at it, change this spaghetti if statement
into a switch too.
Reported-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Tested-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void GrantActiveTab(const GURL& url) {
APIPermissionSet tab_api_permissions;
tab_api_permissions.insert(APIPermission::kTab);
URLPatternSet tab_hosts;
tab_hosts.AddOrigin(UserScript::ValidUserScriptSchemes(),
url::Origin::Create(url).GetURL());
PermissionSet tab_permissions(std::move(tab_api_permissions),
ManifestPermissionSet(), tab_hosts,
tab_hosts);
active_tab_->permissions_data()->UpdateTabSpecificPermissions(
kTabId, tab_permissions);
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: pp::VarDictionary PDFiumEngine::TraverseBookmarks(FPDF_BOOKMARK bookmark,
unsigned int depth) {
pp::VarDictionary dict;
base::string16 title;
unsigned long buffer_size = FPDFBookmark_GetTitle(bookmark, nullptr, 0);
if (buffer_size > 0) {
PDFiumAPIStringBufferSizeInBytesAdapter<base::string16> api_string_adapter(
&title, buffer_size, true);
api_string_adapter.Close(FPDFBookmark_GetTitle(
bookmark, api_string_adapter.GetData(), buffer_size));
}
dict.Set(pp::Var("title"), pp::Var(base::UTF16ToUTF8(title)));
FPDF_DEST dest = FPDFBookmark_GetDest(doc_, bookmark);
if (dest) {
int page_index = FPDFDest_GetDestPageIndex(doc_, dest);
if (PageIndexInBounds(page_index)) {
dict.Set(pp::Var("page"), pp::Var(page_index));
base::Optional<gfx::PointF> xy =
pages_[page_index]->GetPageXYTarget(dest);
if (xy)
dict.Set(pp::Var("y"), pp::Var(static_cast<int>(xy.value().y())));
}
} else {
FPDF_ACTION action = FPDFBookmark_GetAction(bookmark);
buffer_size = FPDFAction_GetURIPath(doc_, action, nullptr, 0);
if (buffer_size > 0) {
std::string uri;
PDFiumAPIStringBufferAdapter<std::string> api_string_adapter(
&uri, buffer_size, true);
api_string_adapter.Close(FPDFAction_GetURIPath(
doc_, action, api_string_adapter.GetData(), buffer_size));
dict.Set(pp::Var("uri"), pp::Var(uri));
}
}
pp::VarArray children;
const unsigned int kMaxDepth = 128;
if (depth < kMaxDepth) {
int child_index = 0;
std::set<FPDF_BOOKMARK> seen_bookmarks;
for (FPDF_BOOKMARK child_bookmark =
FPDFBookmark_GetFirstChild(doc_, bookmark);
child_bookmark;
child_bookmark = FPDFBookmark_GetNextSibling(doc_, child_bookmark)) {
if (base::ContainsKey(seen_bookmarks, child_bookmark))
break;
seen_bookmarks.insert(child_bookmark);
children.Set(child_index, TraverseBookmarks(child_bookmark, depth + 1));
child_index++;
}
}
dict.Set(pp::Var("children"), children);
return dict;
}
Commit Message: Copy visible_pages_ when iterating over it.
On this case, a call inside the loop may cause visible_pages_ to
change.
Bug: 822091
Change-Id: I41b0715faa6fe3e39203cd9142cf5ea38e59aefb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964592
Reviewed-by: dsinclair <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543494}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void ept_save_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_paging(vcpu) && is_pae(vcpu) && !is_long_mode(vcpu)) {
vcpu->arch.mmu.pdptrs[0] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0);
vcpu->arch.mmu.pdptrs[1] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1);
vcpu->arch.mmu.pdptrs[2] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2);
vcpu->arch.mmu.pdptrs[3] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3);
}
__set_bit(VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR,
(unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_avail);
__set_bit(VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR,
(unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs_dirty);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: header_read (SF_PRIVATE *psf, void *ptr, int bytes)
{ int count = 0 ;
if (psf->headindex >= SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header))
return psf_fread (ptr, 1, bytes, psf) ;
if (psf->headindex + bytes > SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header))
{ int most ;
most = SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - psf->headend ;
psf_fread (psf->header + psf->headend, 1, most, psf) ;
memcpy (ptr, psf->header + psf->headend, most) ;
psf->headend = psf->headindex += most ;
psf_fread ((char *) ptr + most, bytes - most, 1, psf) ;
return bytes ;
} ;
if (psf->headindex + bytes > psf->headend)
{ count = psf_fread (psf->header + psf->headend, 1, bytes - (psf->headend - psf->headindex), psf) ;
if (count != bytes - (int) (psf->headend - psf->headindex))
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Error : psf_fread returned short count.\n") ;
return count ;
} ;
psf->headend += count ;
} ;
memcpy (ptr, psf->header + psf->headindex, bytes) ;
psf->headindex += bytes ;
return bytes ;
} /* header_read */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void __net_exit default_device_exit_batch(struct list_head *net_list)
{
/* At exit all network devices most be removed from a network
* namespace. Do this in the reverse order of registration.
* Do this across as many network namespaces as possible to
* improve batching efficiency.
*/
struct net_device *dev;
struct net *net;
LIST_HEAD(dev_kill_list);
rtnl_lock();
list_for_each_entry(net, net_list, exit_list) {
for_each_netdev_reverse(net, dev) {
if (dev->rtnl_link_ops)
dev->rtnl_link_ops->dellink(dev, &dev_kill_list);
else
unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, &dev_kill_list);
}
}
unregister_netdevice_many(&dev_kill_list);
list_del(&dev_kill_list);
rtnl_unlock();
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 2)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
JSValue listener = exec->argument(1);
if (!listener.isObject())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->addEventListener(ustringToAtomicString(exec->argument(0).toString(exec)->value(exec)), JSEventListener::create(asObject(listener), castedThis, false, currentWorld(exec)), exec->argument(2).toBoolean(exec));
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer(
OMX::buffer_id buffer,
OMX_U32 rangeOffset, OMX_U32 rangeLength,
OMX_U32 flags, OMX_TICKS timestamp) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer);
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength;
header->nOffset = rangeOffset;
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
buffer_meta->CopyToOMX(header);
return emptyBuffer_l(header, flags, timestamp, (intptr_t)buffer);
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Add buffer range check to emptyBuffer
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: If351dbd573bb4aeb6968bfa33f6d407225bc752c
(cherry picked from commit d971df0eb300356b3c995d533289216f43aa60de)
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::PurgeAndSuspend() {
GetRendererInterface()->ProcessPurgeAndSuspend();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: const AtomicString& HTMLInputElement::DefaultValue() const {
return FastGetAttribute(valueAttr);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void RunInvAccuracyCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 1000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, in, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, coeff, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
double out_r[kNumCoeffs];
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8();
dst[j] = rnd.Rand8();
in[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
reference_16x16_dct_2d(in, out_r);
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
coeff[j] = round(out_r[j]);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunInvTxfm(coeff, dst, 16));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j) {
const uint32_t diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const uint32_t error = diff * diff;
EXPECT_GE(1u, error)
<< "Error: 16x16 IDCT has error " << error
<< " at index " << j;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: RList* MACH0_(mach_fields)(RBinFile *arch) {
struct MACH0_(mach_header) *mh = MACH0_(get_hdr_from_bytes)(arch->buf);
if (!mh) {
return NULL;
}
RList *ret = r_list_new ();
if (!ret) {
return NULL;
}
ret->free = free;
ut64 addr = 0;
#define ROW(nam,siz,val,fmt) \
r_list_append (ret, r_bin_field_new (addr, addr, siz, nam, sdb_fmt (0, "0x%08x", val), fmt)); \
addr += 4;
ROW("hdr.magic", 4, mh->magic, "x");
ROW("hdr.cputype", 4, mh->cputype, NULL);
ROW("hdr.cpusubtype", 4, mh->cpusubtype, NULL);
ROW("hdr.filetype", 4, mh->filetype, NULL);
ROW("hdr.ncmds", 4, mh->ncmds, NULL);
ROW("hdr.sizeofcmds", 4, mh->sizeofcmds, NULL);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool TabsCaptureVisibleTabFunction::RunImpl() {
PrefService* service = profile()->GetPrefs();
if (service->GetBoolean(prefs::kDisableScreenshots)) {
error_ = keys::kScreenshotsDisabled;
return false;
}
WebContents* web_contents = NULL;
if (!GetTabToCapture(&web_contents))
return false;
image_format_ = FORMAT_JPEG; // Default format is JPEG.
image_quality_ = kDefaultQuality; // Default quality setting.
if (HasOptionalArgument(1)) {
DictionaryValue* options = NULL;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetDictionary(1, &options));
if (options->HasKey(keys::kFormatKey)) {
std::string format;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetString(keys::kFormatKey, &format));
if (format == keys::kFormatValueJpeg) {
image_format_ = FORMAT_JPEG;
} else if (format == keys::kFormatValuePng) {
image_format_ = FORMAT_PNG;
} else {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(0);
}
}
if (options->HasKey(keys::kQualityKey)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(
options->GetInteger(keys::kQualityKey, &image_quality_));
}
}
if (!GetExtension()->CanCaptureVisiblePage(
web_contents->GetURL(),
SessionID::IdForTab(web_contents),
&error_)) {
return false;
}
RenderViewHost* render_view_host = web_contents->GetRenderViewHost();
content::RenderWidgetHostView* view = render_view_host->GetView();
if (!view) {
error_ = keys::kInternalVisibleTabCaptureError;
return false;
}
render_view_host->CopyFromBackingStore(
gfx::Rect(),
view->GetViewBounds().size(),
base::Bind(&TabsCaptureVisibleTabFunction::CopyFromBackingStoreComplete,
this));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Don't allow extensions to take screenshots of interstitial pages. Branched from
https://codereview.chromium.org/14885004/ which is trying to test it.
BUG=229504
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14954004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@198297 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void PSIR_FileWriter::ParseFileResources ( XMP_IO* fileRef, XMP_Uns32 length )
{
static const size_t kMinPSIRSize = 12; // 4+2+1+1+4
this->DeleteExistingInfo();
this->fileParsed = true;
if ( length == 0 ) return;
XMP_Int64 psirOrigin = fileRef->Offset(); // Need this to determine the resource data offsets.
XMP_Int64 fileEnd = psirOrigin + length;
char nameBuffer [260]; // The name is a PString, at 1+255+1 including length and pad.
while ( fileRef->Offset() < fileEnd ) {
if ( ! XIO::CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, kMinPSIRSize ) ) break; // Bad image resource.
XMP_Int64 thisRsrcPos = fileRef->Offset();
XMP_Uns32 type = XIO::ReadUns32_BE ( fileRef );
XMP_Uns16 id = XIO::ReadUns16_BE ( fileRef );
XMP_Uns8 nameLen = XIO::ReadUns8 ( fileRef ); // ! The length for the Pascal string.
XMP_Uns16 paddedLen = (nameLen + 2) & 0xFFFE; // ! Round up to an even total. Yes, +2!
if ( ! XIO::CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, paddedLen+4 ) ) break; // Bad image resource.
nameBuffer[0] = nameLen;
fileRef->ReadAll ( &nameBuffer[1], paddedLen-1 ); // Include the pad byte, present for zero nameLen.
XMP_Uns32 dataLen = XIO::ReadUns32_BE ( fileRef );
XMP_Uns32 dataTotal = ((dataLen + 1) & 0xFFFFFFFEUL); // Round up to an even total.
if ( ! XIO::CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, dataTotal ) ) break; // Bad image resource.
XMP_Int64 thisDataPos = fileRef->Offset();
continue;
}
InternalRsrcInfo newInfo ( id, dataLen, kIsFileBased );
InternalRsrcMap::iterator rsrcPos = this->imgRsrcs.find ( id );
if ( rsrcPos == this->imgRsrcs.end() ) {
rsrcPos = this->imgRsrcs.insert ( rsrcPos, InternalRsrcMap::value_type ( id, newInfo ) );
} else if ( (rsrcPos->second.dataLen == 0) && (newInfo.dataLen != 0) ) {
rsrcPos->second = newInfo;
} else {
fileRef->Seek ( nextRsrcPos, kXMP_SeekFromStart );
continue;
}
InternalRsrcInfo* rsrcPtr = &rsrcPos->second;
rsrcPtr->origOffset = (XMP_Uns32)thisDataPos;
if ( nameLen > 0 ) {
rsrcPtr->rsrcName = (XMP_Uns8*) malloc ( paddedLen );
if ( rsrcPtr->rsrcName == 0 ) XMP_Throw ( "Out of memory", kXMPErr_NoMemory );
memcpy ( (void*)rsrcPtr->rsrcName, nameBuffer, paddedLen ); // AUDIT: Safe, allocated enough bytes above.
}
if ( ! IsMetadataImgRsrc ( id ) ) {
fileRef->Seek ( nextRsrcPos, kXMP_SeekFromStart );
continue;
}
rsrcPtr->dataPtr = malloc ( dataTotal ); // ! Allocate after the IsMetadataImgRsrc check.
if ( rsrcPtr->dataPtr == 0 ) XMP_Throw ( "Out of memory", kXMPErr_NoMemory );
fileRef->ReadAll ( (void*)rsrcPtr->dataPtr, dataTotal );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void WallpaperManagerBase::SetDefaultWallpaper(const AccountId& account_id,
bool update_wallpaper) {
RemoveUserWallpaperInfo(account_id);
const wallpaper::WallpaperInfo info = {
std::string(), wallpaper::WALLPAPER_LAYOUT_CENTER, DEFAULT,
base::Time::Now().LocalMidnight()};
const bool is_persistent =
!user_manager::UserManager::Get()->IsUserNonCryptohomeDataEphemeral(
account_id);
SetUserWallpaperInfo(account_id, info, is_persistent);
if (update_wallpaper)
SetDefaultWallpaperNow(account_id);
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: uint8_t smb2cli_session_security_mode(struct smbXcli_session *session)
{
struct smbXcli_conn *conn = session->conn;
uint8_t security_mode = 0;
if (conn == NULL) {
return security_mode;
}
security_mode = SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED;
if (conn->mandatory_signing) {
security_mode |= SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
}
return security_mode;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int write_empty_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned from, unsigned to,
int mode)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
unsigned start, end, next, blksize;
sector_t block = page->index << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
int ret;
blksize = 1 << inode->i_blkbits;
next = end = 0;
while (next < from) {
next += blksize;
block++;
}
start = next;
do {
next += blksize;
ret = needs_empty_write(block, inode);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
return ret;
if (ret == 0) {
if (end) {
ret = __block_write_begin(page, start, end - start,
gfs2_block_map);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
ret = empty_write_end(page, start, end, mode);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
end = 0;
}
start = next;
}
else
end = next;
block++;
} while (next < to);
if (end) {
ret = __block_write_begin(page, start, end - start, gfs2_block_map);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
ret = empty_write_end(page, start, end, mode);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int get_multidrop_addr(struct sb_uart_port *port)
{
return sb1054_get_register(port, PAGE_3, SB105X_XOFF2);
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: Editor::RevealSelectionScope::RevealSelectionScope(Editor* editor)
: editor_(editor) {
++editor_->prevent_reveal_selection_;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::useBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
if (params == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size()) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(params, portIndex);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_UseBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta,
allottedSize, static_cast<OMX_U8 *>(params->pointer()));
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, err, SIMPLE_BUFFER(
portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, params->pointer()));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(useBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%u(%zu)@%p", allottedSize, params->size(), params->pointer()));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void print_snapshot_help(struct seq_file *m, struct trace_iterator *iter)
{
if (iter->tr->allocated_snapshot)
seq_puts(m, "#\n# * Snapshot is allocated *\n#\n");
else
seq_puts(m, "#\n# * Snapshot is freed *\n#\n");
seq_puts(m, "# Snapshot commands:\n");
if (iter->cpu_file == RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS)
show_snapshot_main_help(m);
else
show_snapshot_percpu_help(m);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int try_to_unuse(unsigned int type)
{
struct swap_info_struct *si = swap_info[type];
struct mm_struct *start_mm;
unsigned char *swap_map;
unsigned char swcount;
struct page *page;
swp_entry_t entry;
unsigned int i = 0;
int retval = 0;
/*
* When searching mms for an entry, a good strategy is to
* start at the first mm we freed the previous entry from
* (though actually we don't notice whether we or coincidence
* freed the entry). Initialize this start_mm with a hold.
*
* A simpler strategy would be to start at the last mm we
* freed the previous entry from; but that would take less
* advantage of mmlist ordering, which clusters forked mms
* together, child after parent. If we race with dup_mmap(), we
* prefer to resolve parent before child, lest we miss entries
* duplicated after we scanned child: using last mm would invert
* that.
*/
start_mm = &init_mm;
atomic_inc(&init_mm.mm_users);
/*
* Keep on scanning until all entries have gone. Usually,
* one pass through swap_map is enough, but not necessarily:
* there are races when an instance of an entry might be missed.
*/
while ((i = find_next_to_unuse(si, i)) != 0) {
if (signal_pending(current)) {
retval = -EINTR;
break;
}
/*
* Get a page for the entry, using the existing swap
* cache page if there is one. Otherwise, get a clean
* page and read the swap into it.
*/
swap_map = &si->swap_map[i];
entry = swp_entry(type, i);
page = read_swap_cache_async(entry,
GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE, NULL, 0);
if (!page) {
/*
* Either swap_duplicate() failed because entry
* has been freed independently, and will not be
* reused since sys_swapoff() already disabled
* allocation from here, or alloc_page() failed.
*/
if (!*swap_map)
continue;
retval = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
/*
* Don't hold on to start_mm if it looks like exiting.
*/
if (atomic_read(&start_mm->mm_users) == 1) {
mmput(start_mm);
start_mm = &init_mm;
atomic_inc(&init_mm.mm_users);
}
/*
* Wait for and lock page. When do_swap_page races with
* try_to_unuse, do_swap_page can handle the fault much
* faster than try_to_unuse can locate the entry. This
* apparently redundant "wait_on_page_locked" lets try_to_unuse
* defer to do_swap_page in such a case - in some tests,
* do_swap_page and try_to_unuse repeatedly compete.
*/
wait_on_page_locked(page);
wait_on_page_writeback(page);
lock_page(page);
wait_on_page_writeback(page);
/*
* Remove all references to entry.
*/
swcount = *swap_map;
if (swap_count(swcount) == SWAP_MAP_SHMEM) {
retval = shmem_unuse(entry, page);
/* page has already been unlocked and released */
if (retval < 0)
break;
continue;
}
if (swap_count(swcount) && start_mm != &init_mm)
retval = unuse_mm(start_mm, entry, page);
if (swap_count(*swap_map)) {
int set_start_mm = (*swap_map >= swcount);
struct list_head *p = &start_mm->mmlist;
struct mm_struct *new_start_mm = start_mm;
struct mm_struct *prev_mm = start_mm;
struct mm_struct *mm;
atomic_inc(&new_start_mm->mm_users);
atomic_inc(&prev_mm->mm_users);
spin_lock(&mmlist_lock);
while (swap_count(*swap_map) && !retval &&
(p = p->next) != &start_mm->mmlist) {
mm = list_entry(p, struct mm_struct, mmlist);
if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&mm->mm_users))
continue;
spin_unlock(&mmlist_lock);
mmput(prev_mm);
prev_mm = mm;
cond_resched();
swcount = *swap_map;
if (!swap_count(swcount)) /* any usage ? */
;
else if (mm == &init_mm)
set_start_mm = 1;
else
retval = unuse_mm(mm, entry, page);
if (set_start_mm && *swap_map < swcount) {
mmput(new_start_mm);
atomic_inc(&mm->mm_users);
new_start_mm = mm;
set_start_mm = 0;
}
spin_lock(&mmlist_lock);
}
spin_unlock(&mmlist_lock);
mmput(prev_mm);
mmput(start_mm);
start_mm = new_start_mm;
}
if (retval) {
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
break;
}
/*
* If a reference remains (rare), we would like to leave
* the page in the swap cache; but try_to_unmap could
* then re-duplicate the entry once we drop page lock,
* so we might loop indefinitely; also, that page could
* not be swapped out to other storage meanwhile. So:
* delete from cache even if there's another reference,
* after ensuring that the data has been saved to disk -
* since if the reference remains (rarer), it will be
* read from disk into another page. Splitting into two
* pages would be incorrect if swap supported "shared
* private" pages, but they are handled by tmpfs files.
*
* Given how unuse_vma() targets one particular offset
* in an anon_vma, once the anon_vma has been determined,
* this splitting happens to be just what is needed to
* handle where KSM pages have been swapped out: re-reading
* is unnecessarily slow, but we can fix that later on.
*/
if (swap_count(*swap_map) &&
PageDirty(page) && PageSwapCache(page)) {
struct writeback_control wbc = {
.sync_mode = WB_SYNC_NONE,
};
swap_writepage(page, &wbc);
lock_page(page);
wait_on_page_writeback(page);
}
/*
* It is conceivable that a racing task removed this page from
* swap cache just before we acquired the page lock at the top,
* or while we dropped it in unuse_mm(). The page might even
* be back in swap cache on another swap area: that we must not
* delete, since it may not have been written out to swap yet.
*/
if (PageSwapCache(page) &&
likely(page_private(page) == entry.val))
delete_from_swap_cache(page);
/*
* So we could skip searching mms once swap count went
* to 1, we did not mark any present ptes as dirty: must
* mark page dirty so shrink_page_list will preserve it.
*/
SetPageDirty(page);
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
/*
* Make sure that we aren't completely killing
* interactive performance.
*/
cond_resched();
}
mmput(start_mm);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int rfcomm_sock_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct bt_security sec;
int len, err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (level == SOL_RFCOMM)
return rfcomm_sock_getsockopt_old(sock, optname, optval, optlen);
if (level != SOL_BLUETOOTH)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case BT_SECURITY:
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
sec.level = rfcomm_pi(sk)->sec_level;
len = min_t(unsigned int, len, sizeof(sec));
if (copy_to_user(optval, (char *) &sec, len))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
case BT_DEFER_SETUP:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (put_user(test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags),
(u32 __user *) optval))
err = -EFAULT;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in getsockopt(BT_SECURITY)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the key_size member of struct
bt_security before copying it to userland -- that for leaking one
byte kernel stack. Initialize key_size with 0 to avoid the info
leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int LauncherView::CancelDrag(int modified_index) {
if (!drag_view_)
return modified_index;
bool was_dragging = dragging_;
int drag_view_index = view_model_->GetIndexOfView(drag_view_);
dragging_ = false;
drag_view_ = NULL;
if (drag_view_index == modified_index) {
return modified_index;
}
if (!was_dragging)
return modified_index;
views::View* removed_view =
(modified_index >= 0) ? view_model_->view_at(modified_index) : NULL;
model_->Move(drag_view_index, start_drag_index_);
return removed_view ? view_model_->GetIndexOfView(removed_view) : -1;
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static inline void unregister_as_ext3(void)
{
unregister_filesystem(&ext3_fs_type);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed(bool allowed) {
if (allowed) {
CHECK(RunLoop::IsNestingAllowedOnCurrentThread());
pump_->ScheduleWork();
}
nestable_tasks_allowed_ = allowed;
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
[email protected]
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: danakj <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void eexec_start(char *string)
{
eexec_string("currentfile eexec\n");
if (pfb && w.blocktyp != PFB_BINARY) {
pfb_writer_output_block(&w);
w.blocktyp = PFB_BINARY;
}
in_eexec = 1;
er = 55665;
eexec_byte(0);
eexec_byte(0);
eexec_byte(0);
eexec_byte(0);
eexec_string(string);
}
Commit Message: Security fixes.
- Don't overflow the small cs_start buffer (reported by Niels
Thykier via the debian tracker (Jakub Wilk), found with a
fuzzer ("American fuzzy lop")).
- Cast arguments to <ctype.h> functions to unsigned char.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool NuMediaExtractor::getTotalBitrate(int64_t *bitrate) const {
if (mTotalBitrate >= 0) {
*bitrate = mTotalBitrate;
return true;
}
off64_t size;
if (mDurationUs >= 0 && mDataSource->getSize(&size) == OK) {
*bitrate = size * 8000000ll / mDurationUs; // in bits/sec
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: status_t SampleTable::setTimeToSampleParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mTimeToSample != NULL || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mTimeToSampleCount = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mTimeToSample = new uint32_t[mTimeToSampleCount * 2];
size_t size = sizeof(uint32_t) * mTimeToSampleCount * 2;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, mTimeToSample, size) < (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mTimeToSampleCount * 2; ++i) {
mTimeToSample[i] = ntohl(mTimeToSample[i]);
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: SampleTable: check integer overflow during table alloc
Bug: 15328708
Bug: 15342615
Bug: 15342751
Change-Id: I6bb110a1eba46506799c73be8ff9a4f71c7e7053
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void MediaStreamDispatcherHost::SetCapturingLinkSecured(
int32_t session_id,
blink::MediaStreamType type,
bool is_secure) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
media_stream_manager_->SetCapturingLinkSecured(render_process_id_, session_id,
type, is_secure);
}
Commit Message: [MediaStream] Pass request ID parameters in the right order for OpenDevice()
Prior to this CL, requester_id and page_request_id parameters were
passed in incorrect order from MediaStreamDispatcherHost to
MediaStreamManager for the OpenDevice() operation, which could lead to
errors.
Bug: 948564
Change-Id: Iadcf3fe26adaac50564102138ce212269cf32d62
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1569113
Reviewed-by: Marina Ciocea <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651255}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoCopySubTextureCHROMIUM(
GLuint source_id,
GLint source_level,
GLenum dest_target,
GLuint dest_id,
GLint dest_level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint x,
GLint y,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLboolean unpack_flip_y,
GLboolean unpack_premultiply_alpha,
GLboolean unpack_unmultiply_alpha) {
BindPendingImageForClientIDIfNeeded(source_id);
api()->glCopySubTextureCHROMIUMFn(
GetTextureServiceID(api(), source_id, resources_, false), source_level,
dest_target, GetTextureServiceID(api(), dest_id, resources_, false),
dest_level, xoffset, yoffset, x, y, width, height, unpack_flip_y,
unpack_premultiply_alpha, unpack_unmultiply_alpha);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int UDPSocketWin::InternalConnect(const IPEndPoint& address) {
DCHECK(!is_connected());
DCHECK(!remote_address_.get());
int addr_family = address.GetSockAddrFamily();
int rv = CreateSocket(addr_family);
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
if (bind_type_ == DatagramSocket::RANDOM_BIND) {
size_t addr_size =
addr_family == AF_INET ? kIPv4AddressSize : kIPv6AddressSize;
IPAddressNumber addr_any(addr_size);
rv = RandomBind(addr_any);
}
if (rv < 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_SPARSE_SLOWLY("Net.UdpSocketRandomBindErrorCode", rv);
Close();
return rv;
}
SockaddrStorage storage;
if (!address.ToSockAddr(storage.addr, &storage.addr_len))
return ERR_ADDRESS_INVALID;
rv = connect(socket_, storage.addr, storage.addr_len);
if (rv < 0) {
int result = MapSystemError(WSAGetLastError());
Close();
return result;
}
remote_address_.reset(new IPEndPoint(address));
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::IsWebSafeScheme(
const std::string& scheme) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
return (web_safe_schemes_.find(scheme) != web_safe_schemes_.end());
}
Commit Message: Apply missing kParentDirectory check
BUG=161564
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11414046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void pci_vmsvga_realize(PCIDevice *dev, Error **errp)
{
struct pci_vmsvga_state_s *s = VMWARE_SVGA(dev);
dev->config[PCI_CACHE_LINE_SIZE] = 0x08;
dev->config[PCI_LATENCY_TIMER] = 0x40;
dev->config[PCI_INTERRUPT_LINE] = 0xff; /* End */
memory_region_init_io(&s->io_bar, NULL, &vmsvga_io_ops, &s->chip,
"vmsvga-io", 0x10);
memory_region_set_flush_coalesced(&s->io_bar);
pci_register_bar(dev, 0, PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_SPACE_IO, &s->io_bar);
vmsvga_init(DEVICE(dev), &s->chip,
pci_address_space(dev), pci_address_space_io(dev));
pci_register_bar(dev, 1, PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_PREFETCH,
&s->chip.vga.vram);
pci_register_bar(dev, 2, PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_PREFETCH,
&s->chip.fifo_ram);
if (!dev->rom_bar) {
/* compatibility with pc-0.13 and older */
vga_init_vbe(&s->chip.vga, OBJECT(dev), pci_address_space(dev));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void WallpaperManager::SetDefaultWallpaperPath(
const base::FilePath& default_small_wallpaper_file,
std::unique_ptr<gfx::ImageSkia> small_wallpaper_image,
const base::FilePath& default_large_wallpaper_file,
std::unique_ptr<gfx::ImageSkia> large_wallpaper_image) {
default_small_wallpaper_file_ = default_small_wallpaper_file;
default_large_wallpaper_file_ = default_large_wallpaper_file;
ash::WallpaperController* controller =
ash::Shell::Get()->wallpaper_controller();
const bool need_update_screen =
default_wallpaper_image_.get() &&
controller->WallpaperIsAlreadyLoaded(default_wallpaper_image_->image(),
false /* compare_layouts */,
wallpaper::WALLPAPER_LAYOUT_CENTER);
default_wallpaper_image_.reset();
if (GetAppropriateResolution() == WALLPAPER_RESOLUTION_SMALL) {
if (small_wallpaper_image) {
default_wallpaper_image_.reset(
new user_manager::UserImage(*small_wallpaper_image));
default_wallpaper_image_->set_file_path(default_small_wallpaper_file);
}
} else {
if (large_wallpaper_image) {
default_wallpaper_image_.reset(
new user_manager::UserImage(*large_wallpaper_image));
default_wallpaper_image_->set_file_path(default_large_wallpaper_file);
}
}
if (need_update_screen)
DoSetDefaultWallpaper(EmptyAccountId(), MovableOnDestroyCallbackHolder());
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: const char *am_get_config_langstring(apr_hash_t *h, const char *lang)
{
char *string;
if (lang == NULL) {
lang = "";
}
string = (char *)apr_hash_get(h, lang, APR_HASH_KEY_STRING);
return string;
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: XIQueryDevice(Display *dpy, int deviceid, int *ndevices_return)
{
XIDeviceInfo *info = NULL;
xXIQueryDeviceReq *req;
xXIQueryDeviceReq *req;
xXIQueryDeviceReply reply;
char *ptr;
int i;
char *buf;
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (_XiCheckExtInit(dpy, XInput_2_0, extinfo) == -1)
goto error_unlocked;
GetReq(XIQueryDevice, req);
req->reqType = extinfo->codes->major_opcode;
req->ReqType = X_XIQueryDevice;
req->deviceid = deviceid;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply*) &reply, 0, xFalse))
goto error;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply*) &reply, 0, xFalse))
goto error;
*ndevices_return = reply.num_devices;
info = Xmalloc((reply.num_devices + 1) * sizeof(XIDeviceInfo));
if (!info)
goto error;
buf = Xmalloc(reply.length * 4);
_XRead(dpy, buf, reply.length * 4);
ptr = buf;
/* info is a null-terminated array */
info[reply.num_devices].name = NULL;
nclasses = wire->num_classes;
ptr += sizeof(xXIDeviceInfo);
lib->name = Xcalloc(wire->name_len + 1, 1);
XIDeviceInfo *lib = &info[i];
xXIDeviceInfo *wire = (xXIDeviceInfo*)ptr;
lib->deviceid = wire->deviceid;
lib->use = wire->use;
lib->attachment = wire->attachment;
Xfree(buf);
ptr += sizeof(xXIDeviceInfo);
lib->name = Xcalloc(wire->name_len + 1, 1);
strncpy(lib->name, ptr, wire->name_len);
ptr += ((wire->name_len + 3)/4) * 4;
sz = size_classes((xXIAnyInfo*)ptr, nclasses);
lib->classes = Xmalloc(sz);
ptr += copy_classes(lib, (xXIAnyInfo*)ptr, &nclasses);
/* We skip over unused classes */
lib->num_classes = nclasses;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static UINT drdynvc_process_capability_request(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, int Sp,
int cbChId, wStream* s)
{
UINT status;
if (!drdynvc)
return CHANNEL_RC_BAD_INIT_HANDLE;
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_TRACE, "capability_request Sp=%d cbChId=%d", Sp, cbChId);
Stream_Seek(s, 1); /* pad */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->version);
/* RDP8 servers offer version 3, though Microsoft forgot to document it
* in their early documents. It behaves the same as version 2.
*/
if ((drdynvc->version == 2) || (drdynvc->version == 3))
{
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge0);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge1);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge2);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, drdynvc->PriorityCharge3);
}
status = drdynvc_send_capability_response(drdynvc);
drdynvc->state = DRDYNVC_STATE_READY;
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void WebContentsImpl::BeforeUnloadFiredFromRenderManager(
bool proceed, const base::TimeTicks& proceed_time,
bool* proceed_to_fire_unload) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.BeforeUnloadFired(proceed, proceed_time);
if (delegate_)
delegate_->BeforeUnloadFired(this, proceed, proceed_to_fire_unload);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebpEx (gdImagePtr im, FILE * outFile, int quality)
{
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewFileCtx(outFile);
if (out == NULL) {
return;
}
gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, quality);
out->gd_free(out);
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to [email protected].
CVE-2016-6912
CWE ID: CWE-415
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ScriptPromise VRDisplay::requestPresent(ScriptState* script_state,
const HeapVector<VRLayer>& layers) {
ExecutionContext* execution_context = ExecutionContext::From(script_state);
UseCounter::Count(execution_context, UseCounter::kVRRequestPresent);
if (!execution_context->IsSecureContext()) {
UseCounter::Count(execution_context,
UseCounter::kVRRequestPresentInsecureOrigin);
}
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kRequested);
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::Create(script_state);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->Promise();
if (!capabilities_->canPresent()) {
DOMException* exception =
DOMException::Create(kInvalidStateError, "VRDisplay cannot present.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kVRDisplayCannotPresent);
return promise;
}
bool first_present = !is_presenting_;
if (first_present && !UserGestureIndicator::UtilizeUserGesture() &&
!in_display_activate_) {
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError, "API can only be initiated by a user gesture.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kNotInitiatedByUserGesture);
return promise;
}
if (layers.size() == 0 || layers.size() > capabilities_->maxLayers()) {
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception =
DOMException::Create(kInvalidStateError, "Invalid number of layers.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kInvalidNumberOfLayers);
return promise;
}
if (layers[0].source().isNull()) {
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception =
DOMException::Create(kInvalidStateError, "Invalid layer source.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kInvalidLayerSource);
return promise;
}
layer_ = layers[0];
CanvasRenderingContext* rendering_context;
if (layer_.source().isHTMLCanvasElement()) {
rendering_context =
layer_.source().getAsHTMLCanvasElement()->RenderingContext();
} else {
DCHECK(layer_.source().isOffscreenCanvas());
rendering_context =
layer_.source().getAsOffscreenCanvas()->RenderingContext();
}
if (!rendering_context || !rendering_context->Is3d()) {
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError, "Layer source must have a WebGLRenderingContext");
resolver->Reject(exception);
ReportPresentationResult(
PresentationResult::kLayerSourceMissingWebGLContext);
return promise;
}
rendering_context_ = ToWebGLRenderingContextBase(rendering_context);
context_gl_ = rendering_context_->ContextGL();
if ((layer_.leftBounds().size() != 0 && layer_.leftBounds().size() != 4) ||
(layer_.rightBounds().size() != 0 && layer_.rightBounds().size() != 4)) {
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError,
"Layer bounds must either be an empty array or have 4 values");
resolver->Reject(exception);
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kInvalidLayerBounds);
return promise;
}
if (!pending_present_resolvers_.IsEmpty()) {
pending_present_resolvers_.push_back(resolver);
} else if (first_present) {
bool secure_context =
ExecutionContext::From(script_state)->IsSecureContext();
if (!display_) {
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError, "The service is no longer active.");
resolver->Reject(exception);
return promise;
}
pending_present_resolvers_.push_back(resolver);
submit_frame_client_binding_.Close();
display_->RequestPresent(
secure_context,
submit_frame_client_binding_.CreateInterfacePtrAndBind(),
ConvertToBaseCallback(
WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::OnPresentComplete, WrapPersistent(this))));
} else {
UpdateLayerBounds();
resolver->Resolve();
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kSuccessAlreadyPresenting);
}
return promise;
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: msg_free (struct msg *msg)
{
if (msg->s)
stream_free (msg->s);
XFREE (MTYPE_OSPF_API_MSG, msg);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void SimulateMouseWheelEvent(WebContents* web_contents,
const gfx::Point& point,
const gfx::Vector2d& delta,
const blink::WebMouseWheelEvent::Phase phase) {
blink::WebMouseWheelEvent wheel_event(blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseWheel,
blink::WebInputEvent::kNoModifiers,
ui::EventTimeForNow());
wheel_event.SetPositionInWidget(point.x(), point.y());
wheel_event.delta_x = delta.x();
wheel_event.delta_y = delta.y();
wheel_event.phase = phase;
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host = RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(
web_contents->GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget());
widget_host->ForwardWheelEvent(wheel_event);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
int i,n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
unsigned short version;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
/* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
* pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
return 1;
/* get something from the wire */
again:
/* check if we have the header */
if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
p=s->packet;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
rr->type= *(p++);
ssl_major= *(p++);
ssl_minor= *(p++);
version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
n2s(p,rr->epoch);
memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
p+=6;
n2s(p,rr->length);
/* Lets check version */
if (!s->first_packet)
{
if (version != s->version)
{
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
}
if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
{
/* wrong version, silently discard record */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
{
/* record too long, silently discard it */
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
{
/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i=rr->length;
n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if ( n != i)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
/* now n == rr->length,
* and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
}
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
/* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if ( bitmap == NULL)
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
{
#endif
/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
* Don't check if we're listening and this message is
* a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
* since they arrive from different connections and
* would be dropped unnecessarily.
*/
if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
}
#endif
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
/* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
* and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
* cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
* anything while listening.
*/
if (is_next_epoch)
{
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
{
dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
}
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0;
goto again;
}
if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
{
rr->length = 0;
s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
return(1);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in dtls1_get_record whilst in the listen state where you get two
separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
handshake record.
CVE-2014-3571
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: check_v8086_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
unsigned long bit;
if (!v8086_mode(regs))
return;
bit = (address - 0xA0000) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (bit < 32)
tsk->thread.screen_bitmap |= 1 << bit;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: WORD32 ihevcd_decode(iv_obj_t *ps_codec_obj, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
WORD32 ret = IV_SUCCESS;
codec_t *ps_codec = (codec_t *)(ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle);
ivd_video_decode_ip_t *ps_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t *ps_dec_op;
WORD32 proc_idx = 0;
WORD32 prev_proc_idx = 0;
/* Initialize error code */
ps_codec->i4_error_code = 0;
ps_dec_ip = (ivd_video_decode_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_dec_op = (ivd_video_decode_op_t *)pv_api_op;
{
UWORD32 u4_size = ps_dec_op->u4_size;
memset(ps_dec_op, 0, sizeof(ivd_video_decode_op_t));
ps_dec_op->u4_size = u4_size; //Restore size field
}
if(ps_codec->i4_init_done != 1)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IHEVCD_INIT_NOT_DONE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt >= NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IHEVCD_NUM_FRAMES_LIMIT_REACHED;
return IV_FAIL;
}
/* If reset flag is set, flush the existing buffers */
if(ps_codec->i4_reset_flag)
{
ps_codec->i4_flush_mode = 1;
}
/*Data memory barries instruction,so that bitstream write by the application is complete*/
/* In case the decoder is not in flush mode check for input buffer validity */
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_flush_mode)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_FRM_BS_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN)
{
if((WORD32)ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes > 0)
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes;
else
ps_dec_op->u4_num_bytes_consumed = 0;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DEC_NUMBYTES_INV;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
#ifdef APPLY_CONCEALMENT
{
WORD32 num_mbs;
num_mbs = (ps_codec->i4_wd * ps_codec->i4_ht + 255) >> 8;
/* Reset MB Count at the beginning of every process call */
ps_codec->mb_count = 0;
memset(ps_codec->mb_map, 0, ((num_mbs + 7) >> 3));
}
#endif
if(0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf && ps_codec->i4_header_mode == 0)
{
UWORD32 i;
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUFS;
return IV_FAIL;
}
for(i = 0; i < ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_num_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[i] == NULL)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_OP_BUF_NULL;
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.u4_min_out_buf_size[i] == 0)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_DISP_FRM_ZERO_OP_BUF_SIZE;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
}
ps_codec->ps_out_buffer = &ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer;
ps_codec->u4_ts = ps_dec_ip->u4_ts;
if(ps_codec->i4_flush_mode)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_wd = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd;
ps_dec_op->u4_pic_ht = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht;
ps_dec_op->u4_new_seq = 0;
ps_codec->ps_disp_buf = (pic_buf_t *)ihevc_disp_mgr_get(
(disp_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_disp_buf_mgr, &ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id);
/* In case of non-shared mode, then convert/copy the frame to output buffer */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf)
&& ((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf)
|| (IV_YUV_420P
== ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)))
{
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[prev_proc_idx];
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
/* Set remaining number of rows to be processed */
ret = ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, &ps_codec->as_process[prev_proc_idx],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], 0,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
}
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
if(1 == ps_dec_op->u4_output_present)
{
WORD32 xpos = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd - 32 - LOGO_WD;
WORD32 ypos = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - 32 - LOGO_HT;
if(ypos < 0)
ypos = 0;
if(xpos < 0)
xpos = 0;
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], ps_codec->i4_disp_strd,
xpos,
ypos,
ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt,
ps_codec->i4_disp_wd,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
}
if(NULL == ps_codec->ps_disp_buf)
{
/* If in flush mode and there are no more buffers to flush,
* check for the reset flag and reset the decoder */
if(ps_codec->i4_reset_flag)
{
ihevcd_init(ps_codec);
}
return (IV_FAIL);
}
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
/* In case of shared mode, check if there is a free buffer for reconstruction */
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_header_mode) && (1 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf))
{
WORD32 buf_status;
buf_status = 1;
if(ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr)
buf_status = ihevc_buf_mgr_check_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr);
/* If there is no free buffer, then return with an error code */
if(0 == buf_status)
{
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code = IVD_DEC_REF_BUF_NULL;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= (1 << IVD_UNSUPPORTEDPARAM);
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining = ps_dec_ip->u4_num_Bytes;
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf = (UWORD8 *)ps_dec_ip->pv_stream_buffer;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame = 0;
ps_codec->i4_pic_present = 0;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
ps_codec->ps_disp_buf = NULL;
if(ps_codec->i4_num_cores > 1)
{
ithread_set_affinity(0);
}
while(MIN_START_CODE_LEN < ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining)
{
WORD32 nal_len;
WORD32 nal_ofst;
WORD32 bits_len;
if(ps_codec->i4_slice_error)
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
WORD32 next_slice_addr = ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x +
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y * ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx == next_slice_addr)
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 0;
}
if(ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_dynamic)
{
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf = ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_dynamic;
ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size = ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size_dynamic;
}
else
{
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf = ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf_static;
ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size = ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size_static;
}
nal_ofst = ihevcd_nal_search_start_code(ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf,
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining);
ps_codec->i4_nal_ofst = nal_ofst;
{
WORD32 bytes_remaining = ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - nal_ofst;
bytes_remaining = MIN((UWORD32)bytes_remaining, ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size);
ihevcd_nal_remv_emuln_bytes(ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf + nal_ofst,
ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf,
bytes_remaining,
&nal_len, &bits_len);
/* Decoder may read upto 8 extra bytes at the end of frame */
/* These are not used, but still set them to zero to avoid uninitialized reads */
if(bits_len < (WORD32)(ps_codec->u4_bitsbuf_size - 8))
{
memset(ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf + bits_len, 0, 2 * sizeof(UWORD32));
}
}
/* This may be used to update the offsets for tiles and entropy sync row offsets */
ps_codec->i4_num_emln_bytes = nal_len - bits_len;
ps_codec->i4_nal_len = nal_len;
ihevcd_bits_init(&ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm, ps_codec->pu1_bitsbuf,
bits_len);
ret = ihevcd_nal_unit(ps_codec);
/* If the frame is incomplete and
* the bytes remaining is zero or a header is received,
* complete the frame treating it to be in error */
if(ps_codec->i4_pic_present &&
(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_next_ctb_indx != ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i4_pic_size_in_ctb))
{
if((ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - (nal_len + nal_ofst) <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN) ||
(ps_codec->i4_header_in_slice_mode))
{
slice_header_t *ps_slice_hdr_next;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx--;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx < 0)
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_slice_hdr_base + ((ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cur_slice_idx + 1) & (MAX_SLICE_HDR_CNT - 1));
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_x = 0;
ps_slice_hdr_next->i2_ctb_y = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb;
ps_codec->i4_slice_error = 1;
continue;
}
}
if(IHEVCD_IGNORE_SLICE == ret)
{
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf += (nal_ofst + nal_len);
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining -= (nal_ofst + nal_len);
continue;
}
if((IVD_RES_CHANGED == ret) ||
(IHEVCD_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS == ret))
{
break;
}
/* Update bytes remaining and bytes consumed and input bitstream pointer */
/* Do not consume the NAL in the following cases */
/* Slice header reached during header decode mode */
/* TODO: Next picture's slice reached */
if(ret != IHEVCD_SLICE_IN_HEADER_MODE)
{
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_slice_error) ||
(ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining - (nal_len + nal_ofst) <= MIN_START_CODE_LEN))
{
ps_codec->pu1_inp_bitsbuf += (nal_ofst + nal_len);
ps_codec->i4_bytes_remaining -= (nal_ofst + nal_len);
}
if(ret != IHEVCD_SUCCESS)
break;
if(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame)
break;
}
else
{
ret = IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
break;
}
/* Allocate dynamic bitstream buffer once SPS is decoded */
if((ps_codec->u4_allocate_dynamic_done == 0) && ps_codec->i4_sps_done)
{
WORD32 ret;
ret = ihevcd_allocate_dynamic_bufs(ps_codec);
if(ret != IV_SUCCESS)
{
/* Free any dynamic buffers that are allocated */
ihevcd_free_dynamic_bufs(ps_codec);
ps_codec->i4_error_code = IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
ps_dec_op->u4_error_code |= IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
return IV_FAIL;
}
}
BREAK_AFTER_SLICE_NAL();
}
if((ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt == 0) && (ret != IHEVCD_SUCCESS))
{
ps_codec->i4_error_code = ret;
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
return IV_FAIL;
}
if(1 == ps_codec->i4_pic_present)
{
WORD32 i;
sps_t *ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
ps_codec->i4_first_pic_done = 1;
/*TODO temporary fix: end_of_frame is checked before adding format conversion to job queue */
if(ps_codec->i4_num_cores > 1 && ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame)
{
/* Add job queue for format conversion / frame copy for each ctb row */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc;
/* i4_num_cores - 1 contexts are currently being used by other threads */
ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1];
if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf) &&
((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) || (IV_YUV_420P == ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)))
{
/* If format conversion jobs were not issued in pic_init() add them here */
if((0 == ps_codec->u4_enable_fmt_conv_ahead) ||
(ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id == ps_proc->i4_cur_pic_buf_id))
for(i = 0; i < ps_sps->i2_pic_ht_in_ctb; i++)
{
proc_job_t s_job;
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret;
s_job.i4_cmd = CMD_FMTCONV;
s_job.i2_ctb_cnt = 0;
s_job.i2_ctb_x = 0;
s_job.i2_ctb_y = i;
s_job.i2_slice_idx = 0;
s_job.i4_tu_coeff_data_ofst = 0;
ret = ihevcd_jobq_queue((jobq_t *)ps_codec->s_parse.pv_proc_jobq,
&s_job, sizeof(proc_job_t), 1);
if(ret != (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS)
return (WORD32)ret;
}
}
/* Reached end of frame : Signal terminate */
/* The terminate flag is checked only after all the jobs are dequeued */
ret = ihevcd_jobq_terminate((jobq_t *)ps_codec->s_parse.pv_proc_jobq);
while(1)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret;
proc_job_t s_job;
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc;
/* i4_num_cores - 1 contexts are currently being used by other threads */
ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1];
ret = ihevcd_jobq_dequeue((jobq_t *)ps_proc->pv_proc_jobq, &s_job,
sizeof(proc_job_t), 1);
if((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS != ret)
break;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_cnt = s_job.i2_ctb_cnt;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_x = s_job.i2_ctb_x;
ps_proc->i4_ctb_y = s_job.i2_ctb_y;
ps_proc->i4_cur_slice_idx = s_job.i2_slice_idx;
if(CMD_PROCESS == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, s_job.i4_tu_coeff_data_ofst);
ihevcd_process(ps_proc);
}
else if(CMD_FMTCONV == s_job.i4_cmd)
{
sps_t *ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
WORD32 num_rows = 1 << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size;
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
num_rows = MIN(num_rows, (ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - (s_job.i2_ctb_y << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size)));
if(num_rows < 0)
num_rows = 0;
ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, ps_proc,
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
s_job.i2_ctb_y << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size,
num_rows);
}
}
}
/* In case of non-shared mode and while running in single core mode, then convert/copy the frame to output buffer */
/* Only if the codec is in non-shared mode or in shared mode but needs 420P output */
else if((ps_codec->ps_disp_buf) && ((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) ||
(IV_YUV_420P == ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)) &&
(ps_codec->s_parse.i4_end_of_frame))
{
process_ctxt_t *ps_proc = &ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx];
/* Set remaining number of rows to be processed */
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht
- ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row;
if(0 == ps_proc->i4_init_done)
{
ihevcd_init_proc_ctxt(ps_proc, 0);
}
if(ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows < 0)
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows = 0;
ret = ihevcd_fmt_conv(ps_codec, ps_proc,
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2],
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row,
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows);
ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_cur_row += ps_codec->s_fmt_conv.i4_num_rows;
}
DEBUG_DUMP_MV_MAP(ps_codec);
/* Mark MV Buf as needed for reference */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_mv_bank_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_REF);
/* Mark pic buf as needed for reference */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_REF);
/* Mark pic buf as needed for display */
ihevc_buf_mgr_set_status((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id,
BUF_MGR_DISP);
/* Insert the current picture as short term reference */
ihevc_dpb_mgr_insert_ref((dpb_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_dpb_mgr,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].ps_cur_pic,
ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx].i4_cur_pic_buf_id);
/* If a frame was displayed (in non-shared mode), then release it from display manager */
if((0 == ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf) && (ps_codec->ps_disp_buf))
ihevc_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
ps_codec->i4_disp_buf_id, BUF_MGR_DISP);
/* Wait for threads */
for(i = 0; i < (ps_codec->i4_num_cores - 1); i++)
{
if(ps_codec->ai4_process_thread_created[i])
{
ithread_join(ps_codec->apv_process_thread_handle[i], NULL);
ps_codec->ai4_process_thread_created[i] = 0;
}
}
DEBUG_VALIDATE_PADDED_REGION(&ps_codec->as_process[proc_idx]);
if(ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt > 0)
{
DEBUG_DUMP_PIC_PU(ps_codec);
}
DEBUG_DUMP_PIC_BUFFERS(ps_codec);
/* Increment the number of pictures decoded */
ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt++;
}
ihevcd_fill_outargs(ps_codec, ps_dec_ip, ps_dec_op);
if(1 == ps_dec_op->u4_output_present)
{
WORD32 xpos = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd - 32 - LOGO_WD;
WORD32 ypos = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht - 32 - LOGO_HT;
if(ypos < 0)
ypos = 0;
if(xpos < 0)
xpos = 0;
INSERT_LOGO(ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[0],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[1],
ps_dec_ip->s_out_buffer.pu1_bufs[2], ps_codec->i4_disp_strd,
xpos,
ypos,
ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt,
ps_codec->i4_disp_wd,
ps_codec->i4_disp_ht);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Handle invalid slice_address in slice header
If an invalid slice_address was parsed, it was resulting in an incomplete
slice header during decode stage. Fix this by not incrementing slice_idx
for ignore slice error
Bug: 32322258
Change-Id: I8638d7094d65f4409faa9b9e337ef7e7b64505de
(cherry picked from commit f4f3556e04a9776bcc776523ae0763e7d0d5c668)
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: qedi_dbg_info(struct qedi_dbg_ctx *qedi, const char *func, u32 line,
u32 level, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list va;
struct va_format vaf;
char nfunc[32];
memset(nfunc, 0, sizeof(nfunc));
memcpy(nfunc, func, sizeof(nfunc) - 1);
va_start(va, fmt);
vaf.fmt = fmt;
vaf.va = &va;
if (!(qedi_dbg_log & level))
goto ret;
if (likely(qedi) && likely(qedi->pdev))
pr_info("[%s]:[%s:%d]:%d: %pV", dev_name(&qedi->pdev->dev),
nfunc, line, qedi->host_no, &vaf);
else
pr_info("[0000:00:00.0]:[%s:%d]: %pV", nfunc, line, &vaf);
ret:
va_end(va);
}
Commit Message: scsi: qedi: remove memset/memcpy to nfunc and use func instead
KASAN reports this:
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in qedi_dbg_err+0xda/0x330 [qedi]
Read of size 31 at addr ffffffffc12b0ae0 by task syz-executor.0/2429
CPU: 0 PID: 2429 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x1c4/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
qedi_dbg_err+0xda/0x330 [qedi]
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
qedi_init+0x118/0x1000 [qedi]
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f2d57e55c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bfa0 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200003c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f2d57e55c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f2d57e566bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
The buggy address belongs to the variable:
__func__.67584+0x0/0xffffffffffffd520 [qedi]
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffffffc12b0980: fa fa fa fa 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 05 fa
ffffffffc12b0a00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa 00 05 fa fa
> ffffffffc12b0a80: fa fa fa fa 00 06 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 02 fa fa
^
ffffffffc12b0b00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 03 fa
ffffffffc12b0b80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 02 fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa
Currently the qedi_dbg_* family of functions can overrun the end of the
source string if it is less than the destination buffer length because of
the use of a fixed sized memcpy. Remove the memset/memcpy calls to nfunc
and just use func instead as it is always a null terminated string.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: ace7f46ba5fd ("scsi: qedi: Add QLogic FastLinQ offload iSCSI driver framework.")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int nfs4_handle_exception(struct nfs_server *server, int errorcode, struct nfs4_exception *exception)
{
struct nfs_client *clp = server->nfs_client;
struct nfs4_state *state = exception->state;
int ret = errorcode;
exception->retry = 0;
switch(errorcode) {
case 0:
return 0;
case -NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED:
case -NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_OPENMODE:
if (state == NULL)
break;
nfs4_schedule_stateid_recovery(server, state);
goto wait_on_recovery;
case -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED:
if (state != NULL)
nfs4_schedule_stateid_recovery(server, state);
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID:
nfs4_schedule_lease_recovery(clp);
goto wait_on_recovery;
#if defined(CONFIG_NFS_V4_1)
case -NFS4ERR_BADSESSION:
case -NFS4ERR_BADSLOT:
case -NFS4ERR_BAD_HIGH_SLOT:
case -NFS4ERR_CONN_NOT_BOUND_TO_SESSION:
case -NFS4ERR_DEADSESSION:
case -NFS4ERR_SEQ_FALSE_RETRY:
case -NFS4ERR_SEQ_MISORDERED:
dprintk("%s ERROR: %d Reset session\n", __func__,
errorcode);
nfs4_schedule_session_recovery(clp->cl_session);
exception->retry = 1;
break;
#endif /* defined(CONFIG_NFS_V4_1) */
case -NFS4ERR_FILE_OPEN:
if (exception->timeout > HZ) {
/* We have retried a decent amount, time to
* fail
*/
ret = -EBUSY;
break;
}
case -NFS4ERR_GRACE:
case -NFS4ERR_DELAY:
case -EKEYEXPIRED:
ret = nfs4_delay(server->client, &exception->timeout);
if (ret != 0)
break;
case -NFS4ERR_RETRY_UNCACHED_REP:
case -NFS4ERR_OLD_STATEID:
exception->retry = 1;
break;
case -NFS4ERR_BADOWNER:
/* The following works around a Linux server bug! */
case -NFS4ERR_BADNAME:
if (server->caps & NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP) {
server->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_UIDGID_NOMAP;
exception->retry = 1;
printk(KERN_WARNING "NFS: v4 server %s "
"does not accept raw "
"uid/gids. "
"Reenabling the idmapper.\n",
server->nfs_client->cl_hostname);
}
}
/* We failed to handle the error */
return nfs4_map_errors(ret);
wait_on_recovery:
ret = nfs4_wait_clnt_recover(clp);
if (ret == 0)
exception->retry = 1;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int blk_init_allocated_queue(struct request_queue *q)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(q->mq_ops);
q->fq = blk_alloc_flush_queue(q, NUMA_NO_NODE, q->cmd_size);
if (!q->fq)
return -ENOMEM;
if (q->init_rq_fn && q->init_rq_fn(q, q->fq->flush_rq, GFP_KERNEL))
goto out_free_flush_queue;
if (blk_init_rl(&q->root_rl, q, GFP_KERNEL))
goto out_exit_flush_rq;
INIT_WORK(&q->timeout_work, blk_timeout_work);
q->queue_flags |= QUEUE_FLAG_DEFAULT;
/*
* This also sets hw/phys segments, boundary and size
*/
blk_queue_make_request(q, blk_queue_bio);
q->sg_reserved_size = INT_MAX;
if (elevator_init(q))
goto out_exit_flush_rq;
return 0;
out_exit_flush_rq:
if (q->exit_rq_fn)
q->exit_rq_fn(q, q->fq->flush_rq);
out_free_flush_queue:
blk_free_flush_queue(q->fq);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction UsbFindDevicesFunction::Run() {
scoped_ptr<extensions::core_api::usb::FindDevices::Params> parameters =
FindDevices::Params::Create(*args_);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(parameters.get());
vendor_id_ = parameters->options.vendor_id;
product_id_ = parameters->options.product_id;
interface_id_ = parameters->options.interface_id.get()
? *parameters->options.interface_id.get()
: UsbDevicePermissionData::ANY_INTERFACE;
UsbDevicePermission::CheckParam param(vendor_id_, product_id_, interface_id_);
if (!extension()->permissions_data()->CheckAPIPermissionWithParam(
APIPermission::kUsbDevice, ¶m)) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorPermissionDenied));
}
UsbService* service = device::DeviceClient::Get()->GetUsbService();
if (!service) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorInitService));
}
service->GetDevices(
base::Bind(&UsbFindDevicesFunction::OnGetDevicesComplete, this));
return RespondLater();
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int f2fs_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(root->d_sb);
if (!f2fs_readonly(sbi->sb) && test_opt(sbi, BG_GC)) {
if (test_opt(sbi, FORCE_FG_GC))
seq_printf(seq, ",background_gc=%s", "sync");
else
seq_printf(seq, ",background_gc=%s", "on");
} else {
seq_printf(seq, ",background_gc=%s", "off");
}
if (test_opt(sbi, DISABLE_ROLL_FORWARD))
seq_puts(seq, ",disable_roll_forward");
if (test_opt(sbi, DISCARD))
seq_puts(seq, ",discard");
if (test_opt(sbi, NOHEAP))
seq_puts(seq, ",no_heap");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",heap");
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR
if (test_opt(sbi, XATTR_USER))
seq_puts(seq, ",user_xattr");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",nouser_xattr");
if (test_opt(sbi, INLINE_XATTR))
seq_puts(seq, ",inline_xattr");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",noinline_xattr");
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL
if (test_opt(sbi, POSIX_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",acl");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",noacl");
#endif
if (test_opt(sbi, DISABLE_EXT_IDENTIFY))
seq_puts(seq, ",disable_ext_identify");
if (test_opt(sbi, INLINE_DATA))
seq_puts(seq, ",inline_data");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",noinline_data");
if (test_opt(sbi, INLINE_DENTRY))
seq_puts(seq, ",inline_dentry");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",noinline_dentry");
if (!f2fs_readonly(sbi->sb) && test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE))
seq_puts(seq, ",flush_merge");
if (test_opt(sbi, NOBARRIER))
seq_puts(seq, ",nobarrier");
if (test_opt(sbi, FASTBOOT))
seq_puts(seq, ",fastboot");
if (test_opt(sbi, EXTENT_CACHE))
seq_puts(seq, ",extent_cache");
else
seq_puts(seq, ",noextent_cache");
if (test_opt(sbi, DATA_FLUSH))
seq_puts(seq, ",data_flush");
seq_puts(seq, ",mode=");
if (test_opt(sbi, ADAPTIVE))
seq_puts(seq, "adaptive");
else if (test_opt(sbi, LFS))
seq_puts(seq, "lfs");
seq_printf(seq, ",active_logs=%u", sbi->active_logs);
if (F2FS_IO_SIZE_BITS(sbi))
seq_printf(seq, ",io_size=%uKB", F2FS_IO_SIZE_KB(sbi));
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
if (test_opt(sbi, FAULT_INJECTION))
seq_printf(seq, ",fault_injection=%u",
sbi->fault_info.inject_rate);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
if (test_opt(sbi, QUOTA))
seq_puts(seq, ",quota");
if (test_opt(sbi, USRQUOTA))
seq_puts(seq, ",usrquota");
if (test_opt(sbi, GRPQUOTA))
seq_puts(seq, ",grpquota");
if (test_opt(sbi, PRJQUOTA))
seq_puts(seq, ",prjquota");
#endif
f2fs_show_quota_options(seq, sbi->sb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static struct cm_id_private * cm_acquire_mraed_id(struct cm_mra_msg *mra_msg)
{
switch (cm_mra_get_msg_mraed(mra_msg)) {
case CM_MSG_RESPONSE_REQ:
return cm_acquire_id(mra_msg->remote_comm_id, 0);
case CM_MSG_RESPONSE_REP:
case CM_MSG_RESPONSE_OTHER:
return cm_acquire_id(mra_msg->remote_comm_id,
mra_msg->local_comm_id);
default:
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void DecoderTest::RunLoop(CompressedVideoSource *video) {
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t dec_cfg = {0};
Decoder* const decoder = codec_->CreateDecoder(dec_cfg, 0);
ASSERT_TRUE(decoder != NULL);
for (video->Begin(); video->cxdata(); video->Next()) {
PreDecodeFrameHook(*video, decoder);
vpx_codec_err_t res_dec = decoder->DecodeFrame(video->cxdata(),
video->frame_size());
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res_dec) << decoder->DecodeError();
DxDataIterator dec_iter = decoder->GetDxData();
const vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
while ((img = dec_iter.Next()))
DecompressedFrameHook(*img, video->frame_number());
}
delete decoder;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: Response EmulationHandler::CanEmulate(bool* result) {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
*result = false;
#else
*result = true;
if (WebContentsImpl* web_contents = GetWebContents())
*result &= !web_contents->GetVisibleURL().SchemeIs(kChromeDevToolsScheme);
if (host_ && host_->GetRenderWidgetHost())
*result &= !host_->GetRenderWidgetHost()->auto_resize_enabled();
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void spl_filesystem_dir_it_current_data(zend_object_iterator *iter, zval ***data TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator = (spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter;
*data = &iterator->current;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void gdImageJpegCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quality)
{
struct jpeg_compress_struct cinfo;
struct jpeg_error_mgr jerr;
int i, j, jidx;
/* volatile so we can gdFree it on return from longjmp */
volatile JSAMPROW row = 0;
JSAMPROW rowptr[1];
jmpbuf_wrapper jmpbufw;
JDIMENSION nlines;
char comment[255];
memset (&cinfo, 0, sizeof (cinfo));
memset (&jerr, 0, sizeof (jerr));
cinfo.err = jpeg_std_error (&jerr);
cinfo.client_data = &jmpbufw;
if (setjmp (jmpbufw.jmpbuf) != 0) {
/* we're here courtesy of longjmp */
if (row) {
gdFree (row);
}
return;
}
cinfo.err->error_exit = fatal_jpeg_error;
jpeg_create_compress (&cinfo);
cinfo.image_width = im->sx;
cinfo.image_height = im->sy;
cinfo.input_components = 3; /* # of color components per pixel */
cinfo.in_color_space = JCS_RGB; /* colorspace of input image */
jpeg_set_defaults (&cinfo);
cinfo.density_unit = 1;
cinfo.X_density = im->res_x;
cinfo.Y_density = im->res_y;
if (quality >= 0) {
jpeg_set_quality (&cinfo, quality, TRUE);
}
/* If user requests interlace, translate that to progressive JPEG */
if (gdImageGetInterlaced (im)) {
jpeg_simple_progression (&cinfo);
}
jpeg_gdIOCtx_dest (&cinfo, outfile);
row = (JSAMPROW) safe_emalloc(cinfo.image_width * cinfo.input_components, sizeof(JSAMPLE), 0);
memset(row, 0, cinfo.image_width * cinfo.input_components * sizeof(JSAMPLE));
rowptr[0] = row;
jpeg_start_compress (&cinfo, TRUE);
if (quality >= 0) {
snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment)-1, "CREATOR: gd-jpeg v%s (using IJG JPEG v%d), quality = %d\n", GD_JPEG_VERSION, JPEG_LIB_VERSION, quality);
} else {
snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment)-1, "CREATOR: gd-jpeg v%s (using IJG JPEG v%d), default quality\n", GD_JPEG_VERSION, JPEG_LIB_VERSION);
}
jpeg_write_marker (&cinfo, JPEG_COM, (unsigned char *) comment, (unsigned int) strlen (comment));
if (im->trueColor) {
#if BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 12
gd_error("gd-jpeg: error: jpeg library was compiled for 12-bit precision. This is mostly useless, because JPEGs on the web are 8-bit and such versions of the jpeg library won't read or write them. GD doesn't support these unusual images. Edit your jmorecfg.h file to specify the correct precision and completely 'make clean' and 'make install' libjpeg again. Sorry");
goto error;
#endif /* BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 12 */
for (i = 0; i < im->sy; i++) {
for (jidx = 0, j = 0; j < im->sx; j++) {
int val = im->tpixels[i][j];
row[jidx++] = gdTrueColorGetRed (val);
row[jidx++] = gdTrueColorGetGreen (val);
row[jidx++] = gdTrueColorGetBlue (val);
}
nlines = jpeg_write_scanlines (&cinfo, rowptr, 1);
if (nlines != 1) {
gd_error_ex(GD_WARNING, "gd_jpeg: warning: jpeg_write_scanlines returns %u -- expected 1", nlines);
}
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < im->sy; i++) {
for (jidx = 0, j = 0; j < im->sx; j++) {
int idx = im->pixels[i][j];
/* NB: Although gd RGB values are ints, their max value is
* 255 (see the documentation for gdImageColorAllocate())
* -- perfect for 8-bit JPEG encoding (which is the norm)
*/
#if BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 8
row[jidx++] = im->red[idx];
row[jidx++] = im->green[idx];
row[jidx++] = im->blue[idx];
#elif BITS_IN_JSAMPLE == 12
row[jidx++] = im->red[idx] << 4;
row[jidx++] = im->green[idx] << 4;
row[jidx++] = im->blue[idx] << 4;
#else
#error IJG JPEG library BITS_IN_JSAMPLE value must be 8 or 12
#endif
}
nlines = jpeg_write_scanlines (&cinfo, rowptr, 1);
if (nlines != 1) {
gd_error_ex(GD_WARNING, "gd_jpeg: warning: jpeg_write_scanlines returns %u -- expected 1", nlines);
}
}
}
jpeg_finish_compress (&cinfo);
jpeg_destroy_compress (&cinfo);
gdFree (row);
}
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
CWE ID: CWE-415
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: MetricsWebContentsObserver::GetPageLoadExtraInfoForCommittedLoad() {
DCHECK(committed_load_);
return committed_load_->ComputePageLoadExtraInfo();
}
Commit Message: Add boolean to UserIntiatedInfo noting if an input event led to navigation.
Also refactor UkmPageLoadMetricsObserver to use this new boolean to
report the user initiated metric in RecordPageLoadExtraInfoMetrics, so
that it works correctly in the case when the page load failed.
Bug: 925104
Change-Id: Ie08e7d3912cb1da484190d838005e95e57a209ff
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450460
Commit-Queue: Annie Sullivan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bryan McQuade <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630870}
CWE ID: CWE-79
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int adev_open_input_stream(struct audio_hw_device *dev,
audio_io_handle_t handle,
audio_devices_t devices,
struct audio_config *config,
struct audio_stream_in **stream_in,
audio_input_flags_t flags,
const char *address,
audio_source_t source)
{
struct a2dp_audio_device *a2dp_dev = (struct a2dp_audio_device *)dev;
struct a2dp_stream_in *in;
int ret;
UNUSED(address);
UNUSED(config);
UNUSED(devices);
UNUSED(flags);
UNUSED(handle);
UNUSED(source);
FNLOG();
in = (struct a2dp_stream_in *)calloc(1, sizeof(struct a2dp_stream_in));
if (!in)
return -ENOMEM;
in->stream.common.get_sample_rate = in_get_sample_rate;
in->stream.common.set_sample_rate = in_set_sample_rate;
in->stream.common.get_buffer_size = in_get_buffer_size;
in->stream.common.get_channels = in_get_channels;
in->stream.common.get_format = in_get_format;
in->stream.common.set_format = in_set_format;
in->stream.common.standby = in_standby;
in->stream.common.dump = in_dump;
in->stream.common.set_parameters = in_set_parameters;
in->stream.common.get_parameters = in_get_parameters;
in->stream.common.add_audio_effect = in_add_audio_effect;
in->stream.common.remove_audio_effect = in_remove_audio_effect;
in->stream.set_gain = in_set_gain;
in->stream.read = in_read;
in->stream.get_input_frames_lost = in_get_input_frames_lost;
/* initialize a2dp specifics */
a2dp_stream_common_init(&in->common);
*stream_in = &in->stream;
a2dp_dev->input = in;
a2dp_open_ctrl_path(&in->common);
if (in->common.ctrl_fd == AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED)
{
ERROR("ctrl socket failed to connect (%s)", strerror(errno));
ret = -1;
goto err_open;
}
if (a2dp_read_audio_config(&in->common) < 0) {
ERROR("a2dp_read_audio_config failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
ret = -1;
goto err_open;
}
DEBUG("success");
return 0;
err_open:
free(in);
*stream_in = NULL;
a2dp_dev->input = NULL;
ERROR("failed");
return ret;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int jpeg_size(unsigned char* data, unsigned int data_size,
int *width, int *height)
{
int i = 0;
if (i + 3 < data_size && data[i] == 0xFF && data[i+1] == 0xD8 &&
data[i+2] == 0xFF && data[i+3] == 0xE0) {
i += 4;
if(i + 6 < data_size &&
data[i+2] == 'J' && data[i+3] == 'F' && data[i+4] == 'I' &&
data[i+5] == 'F' && data[i+6] == 0x00) {
unsigned short block_length = data[i] * 256 + data[i+1];
while(i<data_size) {
i+=block_length;
if((i + 1) >= data_size)
return -1;
if(data[i] != 0xFF)
return -1;
if(data[i+1] == 0xC0) {
*height = data[i+5]*256 + data[i+6];
*width = data[i+7]*256 + data[i+8];
return 0;
}
i+=2;
block_length = data[i] * 256 + data[i+1];
}
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: rdpsnd_queue_next_completion(void)
{
struct audio_packet *packet;
long remaining;
struct timeval now;
if (queue_pending == queue_lo)
return -1;
gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
packet = &packet_queue[queue_pending];
remaining = (packet->completion_tv.tv_sec - now.tv_sec) * 1000000 +
(packet->completion_tv.tv_usec - now.tv_usec);
if (remaining < 0)
return 0;
return remaining;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int vrend_renderer_init(struct vrend_if_cbs *cbs, uint32_t flags)
{
int gl_ver;
virgl_gl_context gl_context;
struct virgl_gl_ctx_param ctx_params;
if (!vrend_state.inited) {
vrend_state.inited = true;
vrend_object_init_resource_table();
vrend_clicbs = cbs;
}
ctx_params.shared = false;
ctx_params.major_ver = VREND_GL_VER_MAJOR;
ctx_params.minor_ver = VREND_GL_VER_MINOR;
gl_context = vrend_clicbs->create_gl_context(0, &ctx_params);
vrend_clicbs->make_current(0, gl_context);
gl_ver = epoxy_gl_version();
vrend_state.gl_major_ver = gl_ver / 10;
vrend_state.gl_minor_ver = gl_ver % 10;
if (gl_ver > 30 && !epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_ARB_compatibility")) {
fprintf(stderr, "gl_version %d - core profile enabled\n", gl_ver);
vrend_state.use_core_profile = 1;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "gl_version %d - compat profile\n", gl_ver);
}
if (epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_ARB_robustness"))
vrend_state.have_robustness = true;
else
fprintf(stderr,"WARNING: running without ARB robustness in place may crash\n");
if (epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_MESA_pack_invert"))
vrend_state.have_mesa_invert = true;
if (gl_ver >= 43 || epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_ARB_vertex_attrib_binding"))
vrend_state.have_vertex_attrib_binding = true;
if (gl_ver >= 33 || epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_ARB_sampler_objects"))
vrend_state.have_samplers = true;
if (gl_ver >= 33 || epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_ARB_shader_bit_encoding"))
vrend_state.have_bit_encoding = true;
if (gl_ver >= 31)
vrend_state.have_gl_prim_restart = true;
else if (epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_NV_primitive_restart"))
vrend_state.have_nv_prim_restart = true;
if (gl_ver >= 40 || epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_ARB_transform_feedback2"))
vrend_state.have_tf2 = true;
if (epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_EXT_framebuffer_multisample") && epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_ARB_texture_multisample")) {
vrend_state.have_multisample = true;
if (epoxy_has_gl_extension("GL_EXT_framebuffer_multisample_blit_scaled"))
vrend_state.have_ms_scaled_blit = true;
}
/* callbacks for when we are cleaning up the object table */
vrend_resource_set_destroy_callback(vrend_destroy_resource_object);
vrend_object_set_destroy_callback(VIRGL_OBJECT_QUERY, vrend_destroy_query_object);
vrend_object_set_destroy_callback(VIRGL_OBJECT_SURFACE, vrend_destroy_surface_object);
vrend_object_set_destroy_callback(VIRGL_OBJECT_SHADER, vrend_destroy_shader_object);
vrend_object_set_destroy_callback(VIRGL_OBJECT_SAMPLER_VIEW, vrend_destroy_sampler_view_object);
vrend_object_set_destroy_callback(VIRGL_OBJECT_STREAMOUT_TARGET, vrend_destroy_so_target_object);
vrend_object_set_destroy_callback(VIRGL_OBJECT_SAMPLER_STATE, vrend_destroy_sampler_state_object);
vrend_object_set_destroy_callback(VIRGL_OBJECT_VERTEX_ELEMENTS, vrend_destroy_vertex_elements_object);
vrend_build_format_list();
vrend_clicbs->destroy_gl_context(gl_context);
list_inithead(&vrend_state.fence_list);
list_inithead(&vrend_state.fence_wait_list);
list_inithead(&vrend_state.waiting_query_list);
list_inithead(&vrend_state.active_ctx_list);
/* create 0 context */
vrend_renderer_context_create_internal(0, 0, NULL);
vrend_state.eventfd = -1;
if (flags & VREND_USE_THREAD_SYNC) {
vrend_renderer_use_threaded_sync();
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8ValueConverterImpl::ToV8Object(
v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::Local<v8::Object> creation_context,
const base::DictionaryValue* val) const {
v8::Local<v8::Object> result(v8::Object::New(isolate));
for (base::DictionaryValue::Iterator iter(*val);
!iter.IsAtEnd(); iter.Advance()) {
const std::string& key = iter.key();
v8::Local<v8::Value> child_v8 =
ToV8ValueImpl(isolate, creation_context, &iter.value());
CHECK(!child_v8.IsEmpty());
v8::TryCatch try_catch(isolate);
result->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate, key.c_str(), v8::String::kNormalString, key.length()),
child_v8);
if (try_catch.HasCaught()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Setter for property " << key.c_str() << " threw an "
<< "exception.";
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: NOINLINE void ResetThread_FILE() {
volatile int inhibit_comdat = __LINE__;
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(inhibit_comdat);
BrowserThreadImpl::StopRedirectionOfThreadID(BrowserThread::FILE);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void cm_format_path_from_lap(struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv,
struct ib_sa_path_rec *path,
struct cm_lap_msg *lap_msg)
{
memset(path, 0, sizeof *path);
path->dgid = lap_msg->alt_local_gid;
path->sgid = lap_msg->alt_remote_gid;
path->dlid = lap_msg->alt_local_lid;
path->slid = lap_msg->alt_remote_lid;
path->flow_label = cm_lap_get_flow_label(lap_msg);
path->hop_limit = lap_msg->alt_hop_limit;
path->traffic_class = cm_lap_get_traffic_class(lap_msg);
path->reversible = 1;
path->pkey = cm_id_priv->pkey;
path->sl = cm_lap_get_sl(lap_msg);
path->mtu_selector = IB_SA_EQ;
path->mtu = cm_id_priv->path_mtu;
path->rate_selector = IB_SA_EQ;
path->rate = cm_lap_get_packet_rate(lap_msg);
path->packet_life_time_selector = IB_SA_EQ;
path->packet_life_time = cm_lap_get_local_ack_timeout(lap_msg);
path->packet_life_time -= (path->packet_life_time > 0);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int atusb_get_and_show_revision(struct atusb *atusb)
{
struct usb_device *usb_dev = atusb->usb_dev;
unsigned char buffer[3];
int ret;
/* Get a couple of the ATMega Firmware values */
ret = atusb_control_msg(atusb, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0),
ATUSB_ID, ATUSB_REQ_FROM_DEV, 0, 0,
buffer, 3, 1000);
if (ret >= 0) {
atusb->fw_ver_maj = buffer[0];
atusb->fw_ver_min = buffer[1];
atusb->fw_hw_type = buffer[2];
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev,
"Firmware: major: %u, minor: %u, hardware type: %u\n",
atusb->fw_ver_maj, atusb->fw_ver_min, atusb->fw_hw_type);
}
if (atusb->fw_ver_maj == 0 && atusb->fw_ver_min < 2) {
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev,
"Firmware version (%u.%u) predates our first public release.",
atusb->fw_ver_maj, atusb->fw_ver_min);
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev, "Please update to version 0.2 or newer");
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ieee802154: atusb: do not use the stack for buffers to make them DMA able
From 4.9 we should really avoid using the stack here as this will not be DMA
able on various platforms. This changes the buffers already being present in
time of 4.9 being released. This should go into stable as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void GLES2Implementation::GetQueryObjectui64vEXT(GLuint id,
GLenum pname,
GLuint64* params) {
GLuint64 result = 0;
if (GetQueryObjectValueHelper("glGetQueryObjectui64vEXT", id, pname, &result))
*params = result;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void updateCachedTime(void) {
server.unixtime = time(NULL);
server.mstime = mstime();
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: _gd2GetHeader (gdIOCtxPtr in, int *sx, int *sy,
int *cs, int *vers, int *fmt, int *ncx, int *ncy,
t_chunk_info ** chunkIdx)
{
int i;
int ch;
char id[5];
t_chunk_info *cidx;
int sidx;
int nc;
GD2_DBG (printf ("Reading gd2 header info\n"));
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
ch = gdGetC (in);
if (ch == EOF) {
goto fail1;
};
id[i] = ch;
};
id[4] = 0;
GD2_DBG (printf ("Got file code: %s\n", id));
/* Equiv. of 'magick'. */
if (strcmp (id, GD2_ID) != 0) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Not a valid gd2 file\n"));
goto fail1;
};
/* Version */
if (gdGetWord (vers, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("Version: %d\n", *vers));
if ((*vers != 1) && (*vers != 2)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Bad version: %d\n", *vers));
goto fail1;
};
/* Image Size */
if (!gdGetWord (sx, in)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Could not get x-size\n"));
goto fail1;
}
if (!gdGetWord (sy, in)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Could not get y-size\n"));
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG (printf ("Image is %dx%d\n", *sx, *sy));
/* Chunk Size (pixels, not bytes!) */
if (gdGetWord (cs, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("ChunkSize: %d\n", *cs));
if ((*cs < GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MIN) || (*cs > GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MAX)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Bad chunk size: %d\n", *cs));
goto fail1;
};
/* Data Format */
if (gdGetWord (fmt, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("Format: %d\n", *fmt));
if ((*fmt != GD2_FMT_RAW) && (*fmt != GD2_FMT_COMPRESSED) &&
(*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_RAW) &&
(*fmt != GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_COMPRESSED)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Bad data format: %d\n", *fmt));
goto fail1;
};
/* # of chunks wide */
if (gdGetWord (ncx, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("%d Chunks Wide\n", *ncx));
/* # of chunks high */
if (gdGetWord (ncy, in) != 1) {
goto fail1;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("%d Chunks vertically\n", *ncy));
if (gd2_compressed (*fmt)) {
nc = (*ncx) * (*ncy);
GD2_DBG (printf ("Reading %d chunk index entries\n", nc));
sidx = sizeof (t_chunk_info) * nc;
cidx = gdCalloc (sidx, 1);
if (!cidx) {
goto fail1;
}
for (i = 0; i < nc; i++) {
if (gdGetInt (&cidx[i].offset, in) != 1) {
goto fail2;
};
if (gdGetInt (&cidx[i].size, in) != 1) {
goto fail2;
};
};
*chunkIdx = cidx;
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("gd2 header complete\n"));
return 1;
fail2:
gdFree(cidx);
fail1:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: gd2: handle corrupt images better (CVE-2016-3074)
Make sure we do some range checking on corrupted chunks.
Thanks to Hans Jerry Illikainen <[email protected]> for indepth report
and reproducer information. Made for easy test case writing :).
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int nfs4_xdr_dec_setclientid(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p,
struct nfs_client *clp)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
xdr_init_decode(&xdr, &req->rq_rcv_buf, p);
status = decode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
if (!status)
status = decode_setclientid(&xdr, clp);
if (!status)
status = nfs4_stat_to_errno(hdr.status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void fe_netjoin_init(void)
{
settings_add_bool("misc", "hide_netsplit_quits", TRUE);
settings_add_int("misc", "netjoin_max_nicks", 10);
join_tag = -1;
printing_joins = FALSE;
read_settings();
signal_add("setup changed", (SIGNAL_FUNC) read_settings);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'netjoin-timeout' into 'master'
fe-netjoin: remove irc servers on "server disconnected" signal
Closes #7
See merge request !10
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: xsltElementComp(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemElementPtr comp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp;
#endif
/*
* <xsl:element
* name = { qname }
* namespace = { uri-reference }
* use-attribute-sets = qnames>
* <!-- Content: template -->
* </xsl:element>
*/
if ((style == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp = (xsltStyleItemElementPtr) xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_ELEMENT);
#else
comp = xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_ELEMENT);
#endif
if (comp == NULL)
return;
inst->psvi = comp;
comp->inst = inst;
/*
* Attribute "name".
*/
/*
* TODO: Precompile the AVT. See bug #344894.
*/
comp->name = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"name", NULL, &comp->has_name);
if (! comp->has_name) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:element: The attribute 'name' is missing.\n");
style->errors++;
goto error;
}
/*
* Attribute "namespace".
*/
/*
* TODO: Precompile the AVT. See bug #344894.
*/
comp->ns = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"namespace", NULL, &comp->has_ns);
if (comp->name != NULL) {
if (xmlValidateQName(comp->name, 0)) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:element: The value '%s' of the attribute 'name' is "
"not a valid QName.\n", comp->name);
style->errors++;
} else {
const xmlChar *prefix = NULL, *name;
name = xsltSplitQName(style->dict, comp->name, &prefix);
if (comp->has_ns == 0) {
xmlNsPtr ns;
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "If the namespace attribute is not present, then the QName is
* expanded into an expanded-name using the namespace declarations
* in effect for the xsl:element element, including any default
* namespace declaration.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNs(inst->doc, inst, prefix);
if (ns != NULL) {
comp->ns = xmlDictLookup(style->dict, ns->href, -1);
comp->has_ns = 1;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp->nsPrefix = prefix;
comp->name = name;
#endif
} else if (prefix != NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:element: The prefixed QName '%s' "
"has no namespace binding in scope in the "
"stylesheet; this is an error, since the namespace was "
"not specified by the instruction itself.\n", comp->name);
style->errors++;
}
}
if ((prefix != NULL) &&
(!xmlStrncasecmp(prefix, (xmlChar *)"xml", 3)))
{
/*
* Mark is to be skipped.
*/
comp->has_name = 0;
}
}
}
/*
* Attribute "use-attribute-sets",
*/
comp->use = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"use-attribute-sets",
NULL, &comp->has_use);
error:
return;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: HTMLDataListElement* HTMLInputElement::dataList() const
{
if (!m_hasNonEmptyList)
return 0;
if (!m_inputType->shouldRespectListAttribute())
return 0;
Element* element = treeScope().getElementById(fastGetAttribute(listAttr));
if (!element)
return 0;
if (!element->hasTagName(datalistTag))
return 0;
return toHTMLDataListElement(element);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void task_move_group_fair(struct task_struct *p)
{
detach_task_cfs_rq(p);
set_task_rq(p, task_cpu(p));
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/* Tell se's cfs_rq has been changed -- migrated */
p->se.avg.last_update_time = 0;
#endif
attach_task_cfs_rq(p);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void IBusBusNameOwnerChangedCallback(
IBusBus* bus,
const gchar* name, const gchar* old_name, const gchar* new_name,
gpointer user_data) {
DCHECK(name);
DCHECK(old_name);
DCHECK(new_name);
DLOG(INFO) << "Name owner is changed: name=" << name
<< ", old_name=" << old_name << ", new_name=" << new_name;
if (name != std::string("org.freedesktop.IBus.Config")) {
return;
}
const std::string empty_string;
if (old_name != empty_string || new_name == empty_string) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Unexpected name owner change: name=" << name
<< ", old_name=" << old_name << ", new_name=" << new_name;
return;
}
LOG(INFO) << "IBus config daemon is started. Recovering ibus_config_";
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->MaybeRestoreConnections();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void r_pkcs7_free_cms (RCMS* container) {
if (container) {
r_asn1_free_string (container->contentType);
r_pkcs7_free_signeddata (&container->signedData);
free (container);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #7152 - Null deref in cms
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void usb_net_handle_statusin(USBNetState *s, USBPacket *p)
{
le32 buf[2];
if (p->iov.size < 8) {
p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
return;
}
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(1);
buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(0);
usb_packet_copy(p, buf, 8);
if (!s->rndis_resp.tqh_first) {
p->status = USB_RET_NAK;
}
#ifdef TRAFFIC_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "usbnet: interrupt poll len %zu return %d",
p->iov.size, p->status);
iov_hexdump(p->iov.iov, p->iov.niov, stderr, "usbnet", p->status);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void cJSON_InitHooks(cJSON_Hooks* hooks)
{
if ( ! hooks ) {
/* Reset hooks. */
cJSON_malloc = malloc;
cJSON_free = free;
return;
}
cJSON_malloc = (hooks->malloc_fn) ? hooks->malloc_fn : malloc;
cJSON_free = (hooks->free_fn) ? hooks->free_fn : free;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static ssize_t aac_store_reset_adapter(struct device *device,
struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t count)
{
int retval = -EACCES;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return retval;
retval = aac_reset_adapter((struct aac_dev*)class_to_shost(device)->hostdata, buf[0] == '!');
if (retval >= 0)
retval = count;
return retval;
}
Commit Message: aacraid: missing capable() check in compat ioctl
In commit d496f94d22d1 ('[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness') we
added a check on CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the ioctl. The compat ioctls need the
check as well.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: register_notify_addresses(void)
{
register_thread_address("child_killed_thread", child_killed_thread);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len)
{
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
int mode = ctxt->mode;
int def_op_bytes, def_ad_bytes, goffset, simd_prefix;
bool op_prefix = false;
bool has_seg_override = false;
struct opcode opcode;
ctxt->memop.type = OP_NONE;
ctxt->memopp = NULL;
ctxt->_eip = ctxt->eip;
ctxt->fetch.ptr = ctxt->fetch.data;
ctxt->fetch.end = ctxt->fetch.data + insn_len;
ctxt->opcode_len = 1;
if (insn_len > 0)
memcpy(ctxt->fetch.data, insn, insn_len);
else {
rc = __do_insn_fetch_bytes(ctxt, 1);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
}
switch (mode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_REAL:
case X86EMUL_MODE_VM86:
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16:
def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 2;
break;
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 4;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
def_op_bytes = 4;
def_ad_bytes = 8;
break;
#endif
default:
return EMULATION_FAILED;
}
ctxt->op_bytes = def_op_bytes;
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes;
/* Legacy prefixes. */
for (;;) {
switch (ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt)) {
case 0x66: /* operand-size override */
op_prefix = true;
/* switch between 2/4 bytes */
ctxt->op_bytes = def_op_bytes ^ 6;
break;
case 0x67: /* address-size override */
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
/* switch between 4/8 bytes */
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 12;
else
/* switch between 2/4 bytes */
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 6;
break;
case 0x26: /* ES override */
case 0x2e: /* CS override */
case 0x36: /* SS override */
case 0x3e: /* DS override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = (ctxt->b >> 3) & 3;
break;
case 0x64: /* FS override */
case 0x65: /* GS override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = ctxt->b & 7;
break;
case 0x40 ... 0x4f: /* REX */
if (mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
goto done_prefixes;
ctxt->rex_prefix = ctxt->b;
continue;
case 0xf0: /* LOCK */
ctxt->lock_prefix = 1;
break;
case 0xf2: /* REPNE/REPNZ */
case 0xf3: /* REP/REPE/REPZ */
ctxt->rep_prefix = ctxt->b;
break;
default:
goto done_prefixes;
}
/* Any legacy prefix after a REX prefix nullifies its effect. */
ctxt->rex_prefix = 0;
}
done_prefixes:
/* REX prefix. */
if (ctxt->rex_prefix & 8)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8; /* REX.W */
/* Opcode byte(s). */
opcode = opcode_table[ctxt->b];
/* Two-byte opcode? */
if (ctxt->b == 0x0f) {
ctxt->opcode_len = 2;
ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
opcode = twobyte_table[ctxt->b];
/* 0F_38 opcode map */
if (ctxt->b == 0x38) {
ctxt->opcode_len = 3;
ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
opcode = opcode_map_0f_38[ctxt->b];
}
}
ctxt->d = opcode.flags;
if (ctxt->d & ModRM)
ctxt->modrm = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
/* vex-prefix instructions are not implemented */
if (ctxt->opcode_len == 1 && (ctxt->b == 0xc5 || ctxt->b == 0xc4) &&
(mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 ||
(mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 && (ctxt->modrm & 0x80)))) {
ctxt->d = NotImpl;
}
while (ctxt->d & GroupMask) {
switch (ctxt->d & GroupMask) {
case Group:
goffset = (ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7;
opcode = opcode.u.group[goffset];
break;
case GroupDual:
goffset = (ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7;
if ((ctxt->modrm >> 6) == 3)
opcode = opcode.u.gdual->mod3[goffset];
else
opcode = opcode.u.gdual->mod012[goffset];
break;
case RMExt:
goffset = ctxt->modrm & 7;
opcode = opcode.u.group[goffset];
break;
case Prefix:
if (ctxt->rep_prefix && op_prefix)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
simd_prefix = op_prefix ? 0x66 : ctxt->rep_prefix;
switch (simd_prefix) {
case 0x00: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_no; break;
case 0x66: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_66; break;
case 0xf2: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_f2; break;
case 0xf3: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_f3; break;
}
break;
case Escape:
if (ctxt->modrm > 0xbf)
opcode = opcode.u.esc->high[ctxt->modrm - 0xc0];
else
opcode = opcode.u.esc->op[(ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7];
break;
default:
return EMULATION_FAILED;
}
ctxt->d &= ~(u64)GroupMask;
ctxt->d |= opcode.flags;
}
/* Unrecognised? */
if (ctxt->d == 0)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
ctxt->execute = opcode.u.execute;
if (unlikely(ctxt->ud) && likely(!(ctxt->d & EmulateOnUD)))
return EMULATION_FAILED;
if (unlikely(ctxt->d &
(NotImpl|Stack|Op3264|Sse|Mmx|Intercept|CheckPerm))) {
/*
* These are copied unconditionally here, and checked unconditionally
* in x86_emulate_insn.
*/
ctxt->check_perm = opcode.check_perm;
ctxt->intercept = opcode.intercept;
if (ctxt->d & NotImpl)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 && (ctxt->d & Stack))
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
if (ctxt->d & Op3264) {
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
else
ctxt->op_bytes = 4;
}
if (ctxt->d & Sse)
ctxt->op_bytes = 16;
else if (ctxt->d & Mmx)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
}
/* ModRM and SIB bytes. */
if (ctxt->d & ModRM) {
rc = decode_modrm(ctxt, &ctxt->memop);
if (!has_seg_override) {
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = ctxt->modrm_seg;
}
} else if (ctxt->d & MemAbs)
rc = decode_abs(ctxt, &ctxt->memop);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
if (!has_seg_override)
ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_DS;
ctxt->memop.addr.mem.seg = ctxt->seg_override;
/*
* Decode and fetch the source operand: register, memory
* or immediate.
*/
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src, (ctxt->d >> SrcShift) & OpMask);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
/*
* Decode and fetch the second source operand: register, memory
* or immediate.
*/
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src2, (ctxt->d >> Src2Shift) & OpMask);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
/* Decode and fetch the destination operand: register or memory. */
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->dst, (ctxt->d >> DstShift) & OpMask);
done:
if (ctxt->rip_relative)
ctxt->memopp->addr.mem.ea += ctxt->_eip;
return (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) ? EMULATION_FAILED : EMULATION_OK;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void InputType::CopyNonAttributeProperties(const HTMLInputElement&) {}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: checker_no_swap_handler(__attribute__((unused)) vector_t *strvec)
{
global_data->checker_no_swap = true;
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int http_request_forward_body(struct session *s, struct channel *req, int an_bit)
{
struct http_txn *txn = &s->txn;
struct http_msg *msg = &s->txn.req;
if (unlikely(msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_BODY))
return 0;
if ((req->flags & (CF_READ_ERROR|CF_READ_TIMEOUT|CF_WRITE_ERROR|CF_WRITE_TIMEOUT)) ||
((req->flags & CF_SHUTW) && (req->to_forward || req->buf->o))) {
/* Output closed while we were sending data. We must abort and
* wake the other side up.
*/
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
http_resync_states(s);
return 1;
}
/* Note that we don't have to send 100-continue back because we don't
* need the data to complete our job, and it's up to the server to
* decide whether to return 100, 417 or anything else in return of
* an "Expect: 100-continue" header.
*/
if (msg->sov > 0) {
/* we have msg->sov which points to the first byte of message
* body, and req->buf.p still points to the beginning of the
* message. We forward the headers now, as we don't need them
* anymore, and we want to flush them.
*/
b_adv(req->buf, msg->sov);
msg->next -= msg->sov;
msg->sov = 0;
/* The previous analysers guarantee that the state is somewhere
* between MSG_BODY and the first MSG_DATA. So msg->sol and
* msg->next are always correct.
*/
if (msg->msg_state < HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE) {
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE;
else
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_DATA;
}
}
/* Some post-connect processing might want us to refrain from starting to
* forward data. Currently, the only reason for this is "balance url_param"
* whichs need to parse/process the request after we've enabled forwarding.
*/
if (unlikely(msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_WAIT_CONN)) {
if (!(s->rep->flags & CF_READ_ATTACHED)) {
channel_auto_connect(req);
req->flags |= CF_WAKE_CONNECT;
goto missing_data;
}
msg->flags &= ~HTTP_MSGF_WAIT_CONN;
}
/* in most states, we should abort in case of early close */
channel_auto_close(req);
if (req->to_forward) {
/* We can't process the buffer's contents yet */
req->flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
goto missing_data;
}
while (1) {
if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_DATA) {
/* must still forward */
/* we may have some pending data starting at req->buf->p */
if (msg->chunk_len > req->buf->i - msg->next) {
req->flags |= CF_WAKE_WRITE;
goto missing_data;
}
msg->next += msg->chunk_len;
msg->chunk_len = 0;
/* nothing left to forward */
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_CRLF;
else
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_DONE;
}
else if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE) {
/* read the chunk size and assign it to ->chunk_len, then
* set ->next to point to the body and switch to DATA or
* TRAILERS state.
*/
int ret = http_parse_chunk_size(msg);
if (ret == 0)
goto missing_data;
else if (ret < 0) {
session_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
http_capture_bad_message(&s->fe->invalid_req, s, msg, HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_SIZE, s->be);
goto return_bad_req;
}
/* otherwise we're in HTTP_MSG_DATA or HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS state */
}
else if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_CRLF) {
/* we want the CRLF after the data */
int ret = http_skip_chunk_crlf(msg);
if (ret == 0)
goto missing_data;
else if (ret < 0) {
session_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
http_capture_bad_message(&s->fe->invalid_req, s, msg, HTTP_MSG_CHUNK_CRLF, s->be);
goto return_bad_req;
}
/* we're in MSG_CHUNK_SIZE now */
}
else if (msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS) {
int ret = http_forward_trailers(msg);
if (ret == 0)
goto missing_data;
else if (ret < 0) {
session_inc_http_err_ctr(s);
if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
http_capture_bad_message(&s->fe->invalid_req, s, msg, HTTP_MSG_TRAILERS, s->be);
goto return_bad_req;
}
/* we're in HTTP_MSG_DONE now */
}
else {
int old_state = msg->msg_state;
/* other states, DONE...TUNNEL */
/* we may have some pending data starting at req->buf->p
* such as last chunk of data or trailers.
*/
b_adv(req->buf, msg->next);
if (unlikely(!(s->rep->flags & CF_READ_ATTACHED)))
msg->sov -= msg->next;
msg->next = 0;
/* for keep-alive we don't want to forward closes on DONE */
if ((txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_KAL ||
(txn->flags & TX_CON_WANT_MSK) == TX_CON_WANT_SCL)
channel_dont_close(req);
if (http_resync_states(s)) {
/* some state changes occurred, maybe the analyser
* was disabled too.
*/
if (unlikely(msg->msg_state == HTTP_MSG_ERROR)) {
if (req->flags & CF_SHUTW) {
/* request errors are most likely due to
* the server aborting the transfer.
*/
goto aborted_xfer;
}
if (msg->err_pos >= 0)
http_capture_bad_message(&s->fe->invalid_req, s, msg, old_state, s->be);
goto return_bad_req;
}
return 1;
}
/* If "option abortonclose" is set on the backend, we
* want to monitor the client's connection and forward
* any shutdown notification to the server, which will
* decide whether to close or to go on processing the
* request.
*/
if (s->be->options & PR_O_ABRT_CLOSE) {
channel_auto_read(req);
channel_auto_close(req);
}
else if (s->txn.meth == HTTP_METH_POST) {
/* POST requests may require to read extra CRLF
* sent by broken browsers and which could cause
* an RST to be sent upon close on some systems
* (eg: Linux).
*/
channel_auto_read(req);
}
return 0;
}
}
missing_data:
/* we may have some pending data starting at req->buf->p */
b_adv(req->buf, msg->next);
if (unlikely(!(s->rep->flags & CF_READ_ATTACHED)))
msg->sov -= msg->next + MIN(msg->chunk_len, req->buf->i);
msg->next = 0;
msg->chunk_len -= channel_forward(req, msg->chunk_len);
/* stop waiting for data if the input is closed before the end */
if (req->flags & CF_SHUTR) {
if (!(s->flags & SN_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SN_ERR_CLICL;
if (!(s->flags & SN_FINST_MASK)) {
if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
s->flags |= SN_FINST_H;
else
s->flags |= SN_FINST_D;
}
s->fe->fe_counters.cli_aborts++;
s->be->be_counters.cli_aborts++;
if (objt_server(s->target))
objt_server(s->target)->counters.cli_aborts++;
goto return_bad_req_stats_ok;
}
/* waiting for the last bits to leave the buffer */
if (req->flags & CF_SHUTW)
goto aborted_xfer;
/* When TE: chunked is used, we need to get there again to parse remaining
* chunks even if the client has closed, so we don't want to set CF_DONTCLOSE.
*/
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
channel_dont_close(req);
/* We know that more data are expected, but we couldn't send more that
* what we did. So we always set the CF_EXPECT_MORE flag so that the
* system knows it must not set a PUSH on this first part. Interactive
* modes are already handled by the stream sock layer. We must not do
* this in content-length mode because it could present the MSG_MORE
* flag with the last block of forwarded data, which would cause an
* additional delay to be observed by the receiver.
*/
if (msg->flags & HTTP_MSGF_TE_CHNK)
req->flags |= CF_EXPECT_MORE;
return 0;
return_bad_req: /* let's centralize all bad requests */
s->fe->fe_counters.failed_req++;
if (s->listener->counters)
s->listener->counters->failed_req++;
return_bad_req_stats_ok:
/* we may have some pending data starting at req->buf->p */
b_adv(req->buf, msg->next);
msg->next = 0;
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
if (txn->status) {
/* Note: we don't send any error if some data were already sent */
stream_int_retnclose(req->prod, NULL);
} else {
txn->status = 400;
stream_int_retnclose(req->prod, http_error_message(s, HTTP_ERR_400));
}
req->analysers = 0;
s->rep->analysers = 0; /* we're in data phase, we want to abort both directions */
if (!(s->flags & SN_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SN_ERR_PRXCOND;
if (!(s->flags & SN_FINST_MASK)) {
if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
s->flags |= SN_FINST_H;
else
s->flags |= SN_FINST_D;
}
return 0;
aborted_xfer:
txn->req.msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
if (txn->status) {
/* Note: we don't send any error if some data were already sent */
stream_int_retnclose(req->prod, NULL);
} else {
txn->status = 502;
stream_int_retnclose(req->prod, http_error_message(s, HTTP_ERR_502));
}
req->analysers = 0;
s->rep->analysers = 0; /* we're in data phase, we want to abort both directions */
s->fe->fe_counters.srv_aborts++;
s->be->be_counters.srv_aborts++;
if (objt_server(s->target))
objt_server(s->target)->counters.srv_aborts++;
if (!(s->flags & SN_ERR_MASK))
s->flags |= SN_ERR_SRVCL;
if (!(s->flags & SN_FINST_MASK)) {
if (txn->rsp.msg_state < HTTP_MSG_ERROR)
s->flags |= SN_FINST_H;
else
s->flags |= SN_FINST_D;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void OverloadedMethodD2Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "overloadedMethodD");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
Vector<int32_t> long_array_sequence;
long_array_sequence = NativeValueTraits<IDLSequence<IDLLong>>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->overloadedMethodD(long_array_sequence);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int is_hex(char c) {
if (((c >= '0') && (c <= '9')) ||
((c >= 'a') && (c <= 'f')) ||
((c >= 'A') && (c <= 'F')))
return(1);
return(0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Use correct limit for port values
no upstream report yet, add it here when we have it
issue found & patch by nmehta@
Bug: 36555370
Change-Id: Ibf1efea554b95f514e23e939363d608021de4614
(cherry picked from commit b62884fb49fe92081e414966d9b5fe58250ae53c)
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: xsltProcessUserParamInternal(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt,
const xmlChar * name,
const xmlChar * value,
int eval) {
xsltStylesheetPtr style;
const xmlChar *prefix;
const xmlChar *href;
xmlXPathCompExprPtr xpExpr;
xmlXPathObjectPtr result;
xsltStackElemPtr elem;
int res;
void *res_ptr;
if (ctxt == NULL)
return(-1);
if (name == NULL)
return(0);
if (value == NULL)
return(0);
style = ctxt->style;
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_VARIABLE
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_VARIABLES,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"Evaluating user parameter %s=%s\n", name, value));
#endif
/*
* Name lookup
*/
name = xsltSplitQName(ctxt->dict, name, &prefix);
href = NULL;
if (prefix != NULL) {
xmlNsPtr ns;
ns = xmlSearchNs(style->doc, xmlDocGetRootElement(style->doc),
prefix);
if (ns == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, style, NULL,
"user param : no namespace bound to prefix %s\n", prefix);
href = NULL;
} else {
href = ns->href;
}
}
if (name == NULL)
return (-1);
res_ptr = xmlHashLookup2(ctxt->globalVars, name, href);
if (res_ptr != 0) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, style, NULL,
"Global parameter %s already defined\n", name);
}
if (ctxt->globalVars == NULL)
ctxt->globalVars = xmlHashCreate(20);
/*
* do not overwrite variables with parameters from the command line
*/
while (style != NULL) {
elem = ctxt->style->variables;
while (elem != NULL) {
if ((elem->comp != NULL) &&
(elem->comp->type == XSLT_FUNC_VARIABLE) &&
(xmlStrEqual(elem->name, name)) &&
(xmlStrEqual(elem->nameURI, href))) {
return(0);
}
elem = elem->next;
}
style = xsltNextImport(style);
}
style = ctxt->style;
elem = NULL;
/*
* Do the evaluation if @eval is non-zero.
*/
result = NULL;
if (eval != 0) {
xpExpr = xmlXPathCompile(value);
if (xpExpr != NULL) {
xmlDocPtr oldXPDoc;
xmlNodePtr oldXPContextNode;
int oldXPProximityPosition, oldXPContextSize, oldXPNsNr;
xmlNsPtr *oldXPNamespaces;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt = ctxt->xpathCtxt;
/*
* Save context states.
*/
oldXPDoc = xpctxt->doc;
oldXPContextNode = xpctxt->node;
oldXPProximityPosition = xpctxt->proximityPosition;
oldXPContextSize = xpctxt->contextSize;
oldXPNamespaces = xpctxt->namespaces;
oldXPNsNr = xpctxt->nsNr;
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "At top-level, the expression or template specifying the
* variable value is evaluated with the same context as that used
* to process the root node of the source document: the current
* node is the root node of the source document and the current
* node list is a list containing just the root node of the source
* document."
*/
xpctxt->doc = ctxt->initialContextDoc;
xpctxt->node = ctxt->initialContextNode;
xpctxt->contextSize = 1;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = 1;
/*
* There is really no in scope namespace for parameters on the
* command line.
*/
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
result = xmlXPathCompiledEval(xpExpr, xpctxt);
/*
* Restore Context states.
*/
xpctxt->doc = oldXPDoc;
xpctxt->node = oldXPContextNode;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->namespaces = oldXPNamespaces;
xpctxt->nsNr = oldXPNsNr;
xmlXPathFreeCompExpr(xpExpr);
}
if (result == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, style, NULL,
"Evaluating user parameter %s failed\n", name);
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
return(-1);
}
}
/*
* If @eval is 0 then @value is to be taken literally and result is NULL
*
* If @eval is not 0, then @value is an XPath expression and has been
* successfully evaluated and result contains the resulting value and
* is not NULL.
*
* Now create an xsltStackElemPtr for insertion into the context's
* global variable/parameter hash table.
*/
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_VARIABLE
#ifdef LIBXML_DEBUG_ENABLED
if ((xsltGenericDebugContext == stdout) ||
(xsltGenericDebugContext == stderr))
xmlXPathDebugDumpObject((FILE *)xsltGenericDebugContext,
result, 0);
#endif
#endif
elem = xsltNewStackElem(NULL);
if (elem != NULL) {
elem->name = name;
elem->select = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, value, -1);
if (href != NULL)
elem->nameURI = xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, href, -1);
elem->tree = NULL;
elem->computed = 1;
if (eval == 0) {
elem->value = xmlXPathNewString(value);
}
else {
elem->value = result;
}
}
/*
* Global parameters are stored in the XPath context variables pool.
*/
res = xmlHashAddEntry2(ctxt->globalVars, name, href, elem);
if (res != 0) {
xsltFreeStackElem(elem);
xsltTransformError(ctxt, style, NULL,
"Global parameter %s already defined\n", name);
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void pdo_dbstmt_free_storage(pdo_stmt_t *stmt TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_pdo_stmt_delref(stmt TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: gsicc_profile_serialize(gsicc_serialized_profile_t *profile_data,
cmm_profile_t *icc_profile)
{
if (icc_profile == NULL)
return;
memcpy(profile_data, icc_profile, GSICC_SERIALIZED_SIZE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void Document::finishedParsing()
{
ASSERT(!scriptableDocumentParser() || !m_parser->isParsing());
ASSERT(!scriptableDocumentParser() || m_readyState != Loading);
setParsingState(InDOMContentLoaded);
if (!m_documentTiming.domContentLoadedEventStart())
m_documentTiming.setDomContentLoadedEventStart(monotonicallyIncreasingTime());
dispatchEvent(Event::createBubble(EventTypeNames::DOMContentLoaded));
if (!m_documentTiming.domContentLoadedEventEnd())
m_documentTiming.setDomContentLoadedEventEnd(monotonicallyIncreasingTime());
setParsingState(FinishedParsing);
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Document> protect(this);
Microtask::performCheckpoint();
if (RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<LocalFrame> frame = this->frame()) {
const bool mainResourceWasAlreadyRequested = frame->loader().stateMachine()->committedFirstRealDocumentLoad();
if (mainResourceWasAlreadyRequested)
updateLayoutTreeIfNeeded();
frame->loader().finishedParsing();
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("devtools.timeline"), "MarkDOMContent", TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD, "data", InspectorMarkLoadEvent::data(frame.get()));
InspectorInstrumentation::domContentLoadedEventFired(frame.get());
}
m_elementDataCacheClearTimer.startOneShot(10, FROM_HERE);
m_fetcher->clearPreloads();
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RootWindow::SetHostSize(const gfx::Size& size_in_pixel) {
DispatchHeldMouseMove();
gfx::Rect bounds = host_->GetBounds();
bounds.set_size(size_in_pixel);
host_->SetBounds(bounds);
last_mouse_location_ =
ui::ConvertPointToDIP(layer(), host_->QueryMouseLocation());
synthesize_mouse_move_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
const EC_POINT *point, BIGNUM *x,
BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
if (group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates == 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP,
EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
return group->meth->point_get_affine_coordinates(group, point, x, y, ctx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: otp_verify(krb5_context context, krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply, krb5_pa_data *pa,
krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb, krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock,
krb5_kdcpreauth_moddata moddata,
krb5_kdcpreauth_verify_respond_fn respond, void *arg)
{
krb5_keyblock *armor_key = NULL;
krb5_pa_otp_req *req = NULL;
struct request_state *rs;
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_data d, plaintext;
char *config;
enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
/* Get the FAST armor key. */
armor_key = cb->fast_armor(context, rock);
if (armor_key == NULL) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
com_err("otp", retval, "No armor key found when verifying padata");
goto error;
}
/* Decode the request. */
d = make_data(pa->contents, pa->length);
retval = decode_krb5_pa_otp_req(&d, &req);
if (retval != 0) {
com_err("otp", retval, "Unable to decode OTP request");
goto error;
}
/* Decrypt the nonce from the request. */
retval = decrypt_encdata(context, armor_key, req, &plaintext);
if (retval != 0) {
com_err("otp", retval, "Unable to decrypt nonce");
goto error;
}
/* Verify the nonce or timestamp. */
retval = nonce_verify(context, armor_key, &plaintext);
if (retval != 0)
retval = timestamp_verify(context, &plaintext);
krb5_free_data_contents(context, &plaintext);
if (retval != 0) {
com_err("otp", retval, "Unable to verify nonce or timestamp");
goto error;
}
/* Create the request state. */
rs = k5alloc(sizeof(struct request_state), &retval);
if (rs == NULL)
goto error;
rs->arg = arg;
rs->respond = respond;
/* Get the principal's OTP configuration string. */
retval = cb->get_string(context, rock, "otp", &config);
if (retval == 0 && config == NULL)
retval = KRB5_PREAUTH_FAILED;
if (retval != 0) {
free(rs);
goto error;
}
/* Send the request. */
otp_state_verify((otp_state *)moddata, cb->event_context(context, rock),
request->client, config, req, on_response, rs);
cb->free_string(context, rock, config);
k5_free_pa_otp_req(context, req);
return;
error:
k5_free_pa_otp_req(context, req);
(*respond)(arg, retval, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Prevent requires_preauth bypass [CVE-2015-2694]
In the OTP kdcpreauth module, don't set the TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH bit until
the request is successfully verified. In the PKINIT kdcpreauth
module, don't respond with code 0 on empty input or an unconfigured
realm. Together these bugs could cause the KDC preauth framework to
erroneously treat a request as pre-authenticated.
CVE-2015-2694:
In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, when the KDC is configured with PKINIT
support, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the
requires_preauth flag on a client principal and obtain a ciphertext
encrypted in the principal's long-term key. This ciphertext could be
used to conduct an off-line dictionary attack against the user's
password.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8160 (new)
target_version: 1.13.2
tags: pullup
subject: requires_preauth bypass in PKINIT-enabled KDC [CVE-2015-2694]
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int hiddev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct hiddev_list *list;
struct usb_interface *intf;
struct hid_device *hid;
struct hiddev *hiddev;
int res;
intf = usbhid_find_interface(iminor(inode));
if (!intf)
return -ENODEV;
hid = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
hiddev = hid->hiddev;
if (!(list = vzalloc(sizeof(struct hiddev_list))))
return -ENOMEM;
mutex_init(&list->thread_lock);
list->hiddev = hiddev;
file->private_data = list;
/*
* no need for locking because the USB major number
* is shared which usbcore guards against disconnect
*/
if (list->hiddev->exist) {
if (!list->hiddev->open++) {
res = usbhid_open(hiddev->hid);
if (res < 0) {
res = -EIO;
goto bail;
}
}
} else {
res = -ENODEV;
goto bail;
}
spin_lock_irq(&list->hiddev->list_lock);
list_add_tail(&list->node, &hiddev->list);
spin_unlock_irq(&list->hiddev->list_lock);
mutex_lock(&hiddev->existancelock);
if (!list->hiddev->open++)
if (list->hiddev->exist) {
struct hid_device *hid = hiddev->hid;
res = usbhid_get_power(hid);
if (res < 0) {
res = -EIO;
goto bail_unlock;
}
usbhid_open(hid);
}
mutex_unlock(&hiddev->existancelock);
return 0;
bail_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&hiddev->existancelock);
bail:
file->private_data = NULL;
vfree(list);
return res;
}
Commit Message: HID: hiddev: validate num_values for HIDIOCGUSAGES, HIDIOCSUSAGES commands
This patch validates the num_values parameter from userland during the
HIDIOCGUSAGES and HIDIOCSUSAGES commands. Previously, if the report id was set
to HID_REPORT_ID_UNKNOWN, we would fail to validate the num_values parameter
leading to a heap overflow.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void tcp_reset(struct sock *sk)
{
/* We want the right error as BSD sees it (and indeed as we do). */
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_SYN_SENT:
sk->sk_err = ECONNREFUSED;
break;
case TCP_CLOSE_WAIT:
sk->sk_err = EPIPE;
break;
case TCP_CLOSE:
return;
default:
sk->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
}
/* This barrier is coupled with smp_rmb() in tcp_poll() */
smp_wmb();
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
tcp_done(sk);
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: SeekHead::SeekHead(
Segment* pSegment,
long long start,
long long size_,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_start(start),
m_size(size_),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
m_entries(0),
m_entry_count(0),
m_void_elements(0),
m_void_element_count(0)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool SwitchToFrench() {
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
std::string default_locale = g_browser_process->GetApplicationLocale();
EXPECT_NE("fr", default_locale);
g_browser_process->SetApplicationLocale("fr");
PrefService* prefs = g_browser_process->local_state();
prefs->SetString(prefs::kApplicationLocale, "fr");
std::string loaded_locale =
ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().ReloadLocaleResources("fr");
return loaded_locale == "fr";
}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelPixels(Image *image,
const size_t channels,const size_t row,const ssize_t type,
const unsigned char *pixels,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Quantum
pixel;
register const unsigned char
*p;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned short
nibble;
p=pixels;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,row,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
packet_size=GetPSDPacketSize(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (packet_size == 1)
pixel=ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++);
else
{
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&nibble);
pixel=ScaleShortToQuantum(nibble);
}
switch (type)
{
case -1:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case -2:
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,pixel,q);
if (channels == 1 || type == -2)
SetPixelGray(image,pixel,q);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (packet_size == 1)
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel),q);
else
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(pixel),q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t)
ConstrainColormapIndex(image,GetPixelIndex(image,q),exception),q);
if (image->depth == 1)
{
ssize_t
bit,
number_bits;
number_bits=image->columns-x;
if (number_bits > 8)
number_bits=8;
for (bit=0; bit < number_bits; bit++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(((unsigned char) pixel) &
(0x01 << (7-bit))) != 0 ? 0 : 255,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t)
GetPixelIndex(image,q),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
x++;
}
x--;
continue;
}
}
break;
}
case 1:
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
else
SetPixelGreen(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 2:
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
else
SetPixelBlue(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 3:
{
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
SetPixelBlack(image,pixel,q);
else
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
(channels > 3))
break;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
return(SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception));
}
Commit Message: Added missing call to ConstrainColormapIndex.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: const char* Track::GetCodecNameAsUTF8() const
{
return m_info.codecNameAsUTF8;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void ffs_data_clear(struct ffs_data *ffs)
{
ENTER();
ffs_closed(ffs);
BUG_ON(ffs->gadget);
if (ffs->epfiles)
ffs_epfiles_destroy(ffs->epfiles, ffs->eps_count);
if (ffs->ffs_eventfd)
eventfd_ctx_put(ffs->ffs_eventfd);
kfree(ffs->raw_descs_data);
kfree(ffs->raw_strings);
kfree(ffs->stringtabs);
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int __bt_get(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, struct blk_mq_bitmap_tags *bt,
unsigned int *tag_cache, struct blk_mq_tags *tags)
{
unsigned int last_tag, org_last_tag;
int index, i, tag;
if (!hctx_may_queue(hctx, bt))
return -1;
last_tag = org_last_tag = *tag_cache;
index = TAG_TO_INDEX(bt, last_tag);
for (i = 0; i < bt->map_nr; i++) {
tag = __bt_get_word(&bt->map[index], TAG_TO_BIT(bt, last_tag),
BT_ALLOC_RR(tags));
if (tag != -1) {
tag += (index << bt->bits_per_word);
goto done;
}
/*
* Jump to next index, and reset the last tag to be the
* first tag of that index
*/
index++;
last_tag = (index << bt->bits_per_word);
if (index >= bt->map_nr) {
index = 0;
last_tag = 0;
}
}
*tag_cache = 0;
return -1;
/*
* Only update the cache from the allocation path, if we ended
* up using the specific cached tag.
*/
done:
if (tag == org_last_tag || unlikely(BT_ALLOC_RR(tags))) {
last_tag = tag + 1;
if (last_tag >= bt->depth - 1)
last_tag = 0;
*tag_cache = last_tag;
}
return tag;
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void RunFwdTxfm(int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride) {
fwd_txfm_(in, out, stride);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static u8 nl80211_band_to_fwil(enum nl80211_band band)
{
switch (band) {
case NL80211_BAND_2GHZ:
return WLC_BAND_2G;
case NL80211_BAND_5GHZ:
return WLC_BAND_5G;
default:
WARN_ON(1);
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: [email protected] # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", *offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, *offset, depth);
#if 0
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
#endif
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (pssh.datalen + 20 > chunk_size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
int32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, &width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight, &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('\xA9', 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return OK;
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t duration;
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %lld and data_offset = %lld",
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
if (chunk_data_size <= kSkipBytesOfDataBox) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow when handling MPEG4 tx3g atom
When the sum of the 'size' and 'chunk_size' variables is larger than 2^32,
an integer overflow occurs. Using the result value to allocate memory
leads to an undersized buffer allocation and later a potentially
exploitable heap corruption condition. Ensure that integer overflow does
not occur.
Bug: 20923261
Change-Id: Id050a36b33196864bdd98b5ea24241f95a0b5d1f
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int php_handler(request_rec *r)
{
php_struct * volatile ctx;
void *conf;
apr_bucket_brigade * volatile brigade;
apr_bucket *bucket;
apr_status_t rv;
request_rec * volatile parent_req = NULL;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
#define PHPAP_INI_OFF php_apache_ini_dtor(r, parent_req TSRMLS_CC);
conf = ap_get_module_config(r->per_dir_config, &php5_module);
/* apply_config() needs r in some cases, so allocate server_context early */
ctx = SG(server_context);
if (ctx == NULL || (ctx && ctx->request_processed && !strcmp(r->protocol, "INCLUDED"))) {
normal:
ctx = SG(server_context) = apr_pcalloc(r->pool, sizeof(*ctx));
/* register a cleanup so we clear out the SG(server_context)
* after each request. Note: We pass in the pointer to the
* server_context in case this is handled by a different thread.
*/
apr_pool_cleanup_register(r->pool, (void *)&SG(server_context), php_server_context_cleanup, apr_pool_cleanup_null);
ctx->r = r;
ctx = NULL; /* May look weird to null it here, but it is to catch the right case in the first_try later on */
} else {
parent_req = ctx->r;
ctx->r = r;
}
apply_config(conf);
if (strcmp(r->handler, PHP_MAGIC_TYPE) && strcmp(r->handler, PHP_SOURCE_MAGIC_TYPE) && strcmp(r->handler, PHP_SCRIPT)) {
/* Check for xbithack in this case. */
if (!AP2(xbithack) || strcmp(r->handler, "text/html") || !(r->finfo.protection & APR_UEXECUTE)) {
PHPAP_INI_OFF;
return DECLINED;
}
}
/* Give a 404 if PATH_INFO is used but is explicitly disabled in
* the configuration; default behaviour is to accept. */
if (r->used_path_info == AP_REQ_REJECT_PATH_INFO
&& r->path_info && r->path_info[0]) {
PHPAP_INI_OFF;
return HTTP_NOT_FOUND;
}
/* handle situations where user turns the engine off */
if (!AP2(engine)) {
PHPAP_INI_OFF;
return DECLINED;
}
if (r->finfo.filetype == 0) {
php_apache_sapi_log_message_ex("script '%s' not found or unable to stat", r TSRMLS_CC);
PHPAP_INI_OFF;
return HTTP_NOT_FOUND;
}
if (r->finfo.filetype == APR_DIR) {
php_apache_sapi_log_message_ex("attempt to invoke directory '%s' as script", r TSRMLS_CC);
PHPAP_INI_OFF;
return HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
}
/* Setup the CGI variables if this is the main request */
if (r->main == NULL ||
/* .. or if the sub-request environment differs from the main-request. */
r->subprocess_env != r->main->subprocess_env
) {
/* setup standard CGI variables */
ap_add_common_vars(r);
ap_add_cgi_vars(r);
}
zend_first_try {
if (ctx == NULL) {
brigade = apr_brigade_create(r->pool, r->connection->bucket_alloc);
ctx = SG(server_context);
ctx->brigade = brigade;
if (php_apache_request_ctor(r, ctx TSRMLS_CC)!=SUCCESS) {
zend_bailout();
}
} else {
if (!parent_req) {
parent_req = ctx->r;
}
if (parent_req && parent_req->handler &&
strcmp(parent_req->handler, PHP_MAGIC_TYPE) &&
strcmp(parent_req->handler, PHP_SOURCE_MAGIC_TYPE) &&
strcmp(parent_req->handler, PHP_SCRIPT)) {
if (php_apache_request_ctor(r, ctx TSRMLS_CC)!=SUCCESS) {
zend_bailout();
}
}
/*
* check if coming due to ErrorDocument
* We make a special exception of 413 (Invalid POST request) as the invalidity of the request occurs
* during processing of the request by PHP during POST processing. Therefor we need to re-use the exiting
* PHP instance to handle the request rather then creating a new one.
*/
if (parent_req && parent_req->status != HTTP_OK && parent_req->status != 413 && strcmp(r->protocol, "INCLUDED")) {
parent_req = NULL;
goto normal;
}
ctx->r = r;
brigade = ctx->brigade;
}
if (AP2(last_modified)) {
ap_update_mtime(r, r->finfo.mtime);
ap_set_last_modified(r);
}
/* Determine if we need to parse the file or show the source */
if (strncmp(r->handler, PHP_SOURCE_MAGIC_TYPE, sizeof(PHP_SOURCE_MAGIC_TYPE) - 1) == 0) {
zend_syntax_highlighter_ini syntax_highlighter_ini;
php_get_highlight_struct(&syntax_highlighter_ini);
highlight_file((char *)r->filename, &syntax_highlighter_ini TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
zend_file_handle zfd;
zfd.type = ZEND_HANDLE_FILENAME;
zfd.filename = (char *) r->filename;
zfd.free_filename = 0;
zfd.opened_path = NULL;
if (!parent_req) {
php_execute_script(&zfd TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
zend_execute_scripts(ZEND_INCLUDE TSRMLS_CC, NULL, 1, &zfd);
}
apr_table_set(r->notes, "mod_php_memory_usage",
apr_psprintf(ctx->r->pool, "%" APR_SIZE_T_FMT, zend_memory_peak_usage(1 TSRMLS_CC)));
}
} zend_end_try();
if (!parent_req) {
php_apache_request_dtor(r TSRMLS_CC);
ctx->request_processed = 1;
bucket = apr_bucket_eos_create(r->connection->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(brigade, bucket);
rv = ap_pass_brigade(r->output_filters, brigade);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS || r->connection->aborted) {
zend_first_try {
php_handle_aborted_connection();
} zend_end_try();
}
apr_brigade_cleanup(brigade);
} else {
ctx->r = parent_req;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int __init br_netfilter_init(void)
{
int ret;
ret = dst_entries_init(&fake_dst_ops);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
ret = nf_register_hooks(br_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(br_nf_ops));
if (ret < 0) {
dst_entries_destroy(&fake_dst_ops);
return ret;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
brnf_sysctl_header = register_sysctl_paths(brnf_path, brnf_table);
if (brnf_sysctl_header == NULL) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"br_netfilter: can't register to sysctl.\n");
nf_unregister_hooks(br_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(br_nf_ops));
dst_entries_destroy(&fake_dst_ops);
return -ENOMEM;
}
#endif
printk(KERN_NOTICE "Bridge firewalling registered\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bridge: reset IPCB in br_parse_ip_options
Commit 462fb2af9788a82 (bridge : Sanitize skb before it enters the IP
stack), missed one IPCB init before calling ip_options_compile()
Thanks to Scot Doyle for his tests and bug reports.
Reported-by: Scot Doyle <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Hiroaki SHIMODA <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Bandan Das <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Cc: Jan Lübbe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void ContainerNode::cloneChildNodes(ContainerNode *clone)
{
TrackExceptionState es;
for (Node* n = firstChild(); n && !es.hadException(); n = n->nextSibling())
clone->appendChild(n->cloneNode(true), es);
}
Commit Message: Notify nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event
This patch changes notifying nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event. In willRemoveChildren(), like willRemoveChild(); r115686 did same change, although it didn't change willRemoveChildren().
The issue 295010, use-after-free, is caused by setting removed node to Selection in mutation event handler.
BUG=295010
TEST=LayoutTests/fast/dom/Range/range-created-during-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-mutation-event-by-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-blur-event-by-remove-children.html
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25389004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool DeserializeNotificationDatabaseData(const std::string& input,
NotificationDatabaseData* output) {
DCHECK(output);
NotificationDatabaseDataProto message;
if (!message.ParseFromString(input))
return false;
output->notification_id = message.notification_id();
output->origin = GURL(message.origin());
output->service_worker_registration_id =
message.service_worker_registration_id();
PlatformNotificationData* notification_data = &output->notification_data;
const NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData& payload =
message.notification_data();
notification_data->title = base::UTF8ToUTF16(payload.title());
switch (payload.direction()) {
case NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::LEFT_TO_RIGHT:
notification_data->direction =
PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_LEFT_TO_RIGHT;
break;
case NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::RIGHT_TO_LEFT:
notification_data->direction =
PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_RIGHT_TO_LEFT;
break;
case NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::AUTO:
notification_data->direction = PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_AUTO;
break;
}
notification_data->lang = payload.lang();
notification_data->body = base::UTF8ToUTF16(payload.body());
notification_data->tag = payload.tag();
notification_data->icon = GURL(payload.icon());
if (payload.vibration_pattern().size() > 0) {
notification_data->vibration_pattern.assign(
payload.vibration_pattern().begin(), payload.vibration_pattern().end());
}
notification_data->timestamp =
base::Time::FromInternalValue(payload.timestamp());
notification_data->silent = payload.silent();
notification_data->require_interaction = payload.require_interaction();
if (payload.data().length()) {
notification_data->data.assign(payload.data().begin(),
payload.data().end());
}
for (const auto& payload_action : payload.actions()) {
PlatformNotificationAction action;
action.action = payload_action.action();
action.title = base::UTF8ToUTF16(payload_action.title());
notification_data->actions.push_back(action);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: Ins_GPV( INS_ARG )
{
DO_GPV
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void VarianceTest<VarianceFunctionType>::RefTest() {
for (int i = 0; i < 10; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < block_size_; j++) {
src_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
ref_[j] = rnd.Rand8();
}
unsigned int sse1, sse2;
unsigned int var1;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(var1 = variance_(src_, width_, ref_, width_, &sse1));
const unsigned int var2 = variance_ref(src_, ref_, log2width_,
log2height_, &sse2);
EXPECT_EQ(sse1, sse2);
EXPECT_EQ(var1, var2);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
int retval;
/* clear any previous set[ug]id data from a previous binary */
bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();
bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) &&
!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_uid) &&
kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_gid)) {
/* Set-uid? */
if (mode & S_ISUID) {
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->cred->euid = inode->i_uid;
}
/* Set-gid? */
/*
* If setgid is set but no group execute bit then this
* is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid
* executable.
*/
if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) {
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
bprm->cred->egid = inode->i_gid;
}
}
/* fill in binprm security blob */
retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
bprm->cred_prepared = 1;
memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
return kernel_read(bprm->file, 0, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
}
Commit Message: fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables
This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a
setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid
root.
This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int __init rose_proto_init(void)
{
int i;
int rc;
if (rose_ndevs > 0x7FFFFFFF/sizeof(struct net_device *)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ROSE: rose_proto_init - rose_ndevs parameter to large\n");
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
rc = proto_register(&rose_proto, 0);
if (rc != 0)
goto out;
rose_callsign = null_ax25_address;
dev_rose = kzalloc(rose_ndevs * sizeof(struct net_device *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (dev_rose == NULL) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ROSE: rose_proto_init - unable to allocate device structure\n");
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_proto_unregister;
}
for (i = 0; i < rose_ndevs; i++) {
struct net_device *dev;
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
sprintf(name, "rose%d", i);
dev = alloc_netdev(0, name, rose_setup);
if (!dev) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ROSE: rose_proto_init - unable to allocate memory\n");
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
rc = register_netdev(dev);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ROSE: netdevice registration failed\n");
free_netdev(dev);
goto fail;
}
rose_set_lockdep_key(dev);
dev_rose[i] = dev;
}
sock_register(&rose_family_ops);
register_netdevice_notifier(&rose_dev_notifier);
ax25_register_pid(&rose_pid);
ax25_linkfail_register(&rose_linkfail_notifier);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
rose_register_sysctl();
#endif
rose_loopback_init();
rose_add_loopback_neigh();
proc_net_fops_create(&init_net, "rose", S_IRUGO, &rose_info_fops);
proc_net_fops_create(&init_net, "rose_neigh", S_IRUGO, &rose_neigh_fops);
proc_net_fops_create(&init_net, "rose_nodes", S_IRUGO, &rose_nodes_fops);
proc_net_fops_create(&init_net, "rose_routes", S_IRUGO, &rose_routes_fops);
out:
return rc;
fail:
while (--i >= 0) {
unregister_netdev(dev_rose[i]);
free_netdev(dev_rose[i]);
}
kfree(dev_rose);
out_proto_unregister:
proto_unregister(&rose_proto);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static inline struct keydata *get_keyptr(void)
{
struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt & 1];
smp_rmb();
return keyptr;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, u32 id)
{
int r;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, *v;
vcpu = kvm_arch_vcpu_create(kvm, id);
if (IS_ERR(vcpu))
return PTR_ERR(vcpu);
preempt_notifier_init(&vcpu->preempt_notifier, &kvm_preempt_ops);
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_setup(vcpu);
if (r)
goto vcpu_destroy;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
if (!kvm_vcpu_compatible(vcpu)) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto unlock_vcpu_destroy;
}
if (atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus) == KVM_MAX_VCPUS) {
r = -EINVAL;
goto unlock_vcpu_destroy;
}
kvm_for_each_vcpu(r, v, kvm)
if (v->vcpu_id == id) {
r = -EEXIST;
goto unlock_vcpu_destroy;
}
BUG_ON(kvm->vcpus[atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus)]);
/* Now it's all set up, let userspace reach it */
kvm_get_kvm(kvm);
r = create_vcpu_fd(vcpu);
if (r < 0) {
kvm_put_kvm(kvm);
goto unlock_vcpu_destroy;
}
kvm->vcpus[atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus)] = vcpu;
smp_wmb();
atomic_inc(&kvm->online_vcpus);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
kvm_arch_vcpu_postcreate(vcpu);
return r;
unlock_vcpu_destroy:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
vcpu_destroy:
kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy(vcpu);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ||
ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ||
len != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching extended master secret extension" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
((void) buf);
ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED;
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check before length read
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: InternalPageInfoBubbleView::InternalPageInfoBubbleView(
views::View* anchor_view,
const gfx::Rect& anchor_rect,
gfx::NativeView parent_window,
const GURL& url)
: BubbleDialogDelegateView(anchor_view, views::BubbleBorder::TOP_LEFT) {
g_shown_bubble_type = PageInfoBubbleView::BUBBLE_INTERNAL_PAGE;
g_page_info_bubble = this;
set_parent_window(parent_window);
if (!anchor_view)
SetAnchorRect(anchor_rect);
int text = IDS_PAGE_INFO_INTERNAL_PAGE;
int icon = IDR_PRODUCT_LOGO_16;
if (url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme)) {
text = IDS_PAGE_INFO_EXTENSION_PAGE;
icon = IDR_PLUGINS_FAVICON;
} else if (url.SchemeIs(content::kViewSourceScheme)) {
text = IDS_PAGE_INFO_VIEW_SOURCE_PAGE;
icon = IDR_PRODUCT_LOGO_16;
} else if (!url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme) &&
!url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeDevToolsScheme)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
set_anchor_view_insets(gfx::Insets(
GetLayoutConstant(LOCATION_BAR_BUBBLE_ANCHOR_VERTICAL_INSET), 0));
SetLayoutManager(new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal,
gfx::Insets(kSpacing), kSpacing));
set_margins(gfx::Insets());
if (ChromeLayoutProvider::Get()->ShouldShowWindowIcon()) {
views::ImageView* icon_view = new NonAccessibleImageView();
ui::ResourceBundle& rb = ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
icon_view->SetImage(rb.GetImageSkiaNamed(icon));
AddChildView(icon_view);
}
views::Label* label = new views::Label(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(text));
label->SetMultiLine(true);
label->SetAllowCharacterBreak(true);
label->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(label);
views::BubbleDialogDelegateView::CreateBubble(this);
}
Commit Message: Desktop Page Info/Harmony: Show close button for internal pages.
The Harmony version of Page Info for internal Chrome pages (chrome://,
chrome-extension:// and view-source:// pages) show a close button. Update the
code to match this.
This patch also adds TestBrowserDialog tests for the latter two cases described
above (internal extension and view source pages).
See screenshot -
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18RZnMiHCu-rCX9N6DLUpu4mkFWguh1xm/view?usp=sharing
Bug: 535074
Change-Id: I55e5f1aa682fd4ec85f7b65ac88f5a4f5906fe53
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/759624
Commit-Queue: Patti <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Trent Apted <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516624}
CWE ID: CWE-704
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void lxc_execute_bind_init(struct lxc_conf *conf)
{
int ret;
char path[PATH_MAX], destpath[PATH_MAX], *p;
/* If init exists in the container, don't bind mount a static one */
p = choose_init(conf->rootfs.mount);
if (p) {
free(p);
return;
}
ret = snprintf(path, PATH_MAX, SBINDIR "/init.lxc.static");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PATH_MAX) {
WARN("Path name too long searching for lxc.init.static");
return;
}
if (!file_exists(path)) {
INFO("%s does not exist on host", path);
return;
}
ret = snprintf(destpath, PATH_MAX, "%s%s", conf->rootfs.mount, "/init.lxc.static");
if (ret < 0 || ret >= PATH_MAX) {
WARN("Path name too long for container's lxc.init.static");
return;
}
if (!file_exists(destpath)) {
FILE * pathfile = fopen(destpath, "wb");
if (!pathfile) {
SYSERROR("Failed to create mount target '%s'", destpath);
return;
}
fclose(pathfile);
}
ret = mount(path, destpath, "none", MS_BIND, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
SYSERROR("Failed to bind lxc.init.static into container");
INFO("lxc.init.static bound into container at %s", path);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int __skb_vlan_pop(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 *vlan_tci)
{
struct vlan_hdr *vhdr;
int offset = skb->data - skb_mac_header(skb);
int err;
if (WARN_ONCE(offset,
"__skb_vlan_pop got skb with skb->data not at mac header (offset %d)\n",
offset)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
err = skb_ensure_writable(skb, VLAN_ETH_HLEN);
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
skb_postpull_rcsum(skb, skb->data + (2 * ETH_ALEN), VLAN_HLEN);
vhdr = (struct vlan_hdr *)(skb->data + ETH_HLEN);
*vlan_tci = ntohs(vhdr->h_vlan_TCI);
memmove(skb->data + VLAN_HLEN, skb->data, 2 * ETH_ALEN);
__skb_pull(skb, VLAN_HLEN);
vlan_set_encap_proto(skb, vhdr);
skb->mac_header += VLAN_HLEN;
if (skb_network_offset(skb) < ETH_HLEN)
skb_set_network_header(skb, ETH_HLEN);
skb_reset_mac_len(skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteVIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define VFF_CM_genericRGB 15
#define VFF_CM_NONE 0
#define VFF_DEP_IEEEORDER 0x2
#define VFF_DES_RAW 0
#define VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT 1
#define VFF_MAPTYP_NONE 0
#define VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE 1
#define VFF_MS_NONE 0
#define VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND 1
#define VFF_TYP_BIT 0
#define VFF_TYP_1_BYTE 1
typedef struct _ViffInfo
{
char
identifier,
file_type,
release,
version,
machine_dependency,
reserve[3],
comment[512];
size_t
rows,
columns,
subrows;
int
x_offset,
y_offset;
unsigned int
x_bits_per_pixel,
y_bits_per_pixel,
location_type,
location_dimension,
number_of_images,
number_data_bands,
data_storage_type,
data_encode_scheme,
map_scheme,
map_storage_type,
map_rows,
map_columns,
map_subrows,
map_enable,
maps_per_cycle,
color_space_model;
} ViffInfo;
const char
*value;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels,
packets;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
imageListLength;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
ViffInfo
viff_info;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) memset(&viff_info,0,sizeof(ViffInfo));
scene=0;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
/*
Initialize VIFF image structure.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
DisableMSCWarning(4310)
viff_info.identifier=(char) 0xab;
RestoreMSCWarning
viff_info.file_type=1;
viff_info.release=1;
viff_info.version=3;
viff_info.machine_dependency=VFF_DEP_IEEEORDER; /* IEEE byte ordering */
*viff_info.comment='\0';
value=GetImageProperty(image,"comment",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(viff_info.comment,value,MagickMin(strlen(value),
511)+1);
viff_info.rows=image->columns;
viff_info.columns=image->rows;
viff_info.subrows=0;
viff_info.x_offset=(~0);
viff_info.y_offset=(~0);
viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel=0;
viff_info.y_bits_per_pixel=0;
viff_info.location_type=VFF_LOC_IMPLICIT;
viff_info.location_dimension=0;
viff_info.number_of_images=1;
viff_info.data_encode_scheme=VFF_DES_RAW;
viff_info.map_scheme=VFF_MS_NONE;
viff_info.map_storage_type=VFF_MAPTYP_NONE;
viff_info.map_rows=0;
viff_info.map_columns=0;
viff_info.map_subrows=0;
viff_info.map_enable=1; /* no colormap */
viff_info.maps_per_cycle=0;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
{
/*
Full color VIFF raster.
*/
viff_info.number_data_bands=image->alpha_trait ? 4U : 3U;
viff_info.color_space_model=VFF_CM_genericRGB;
viff_info.data_storage_type=VFF_TYP_1_BYTE;
packets=viff_info.number_data_bands*number_pixels;
}
else
{
viff_info.number_data_bands=1;
viff_info.color_space_model=VFF_CM_NONE;
viff_info.data_storage_type=VFF_TYP_1_BYTE;
packets=number_pixels;
if (SetImageGray(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
/*
Colormapped VIFF raster.
*/
viff_info.map_scheme=VFF_MS_ONEPERBAND;
viff_info.map_storage_type=VFF_MAPTYP_1_BYTE;
viff_info.map_rows=3;
viff_info.map_columns=(unsigned int) image->colors;
}
else
if (image->colors <= 2)
{
/*
Monochrome VIFF raster.
*/
viff_info.data_storage_type=VFF_TYP_BIT;
packets=((image->columns+7) >> 3)*image->rows;
}
}
/*
Write VIFF image header (pad to 1024 bytes).
*/
(void) WriteBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.identifier),(unsigned char *)
&viff_info.identifier);
(void) WriteBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.file_type),(unsigned char *)
&viff_info.file_type);
(void) WriteBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.release),(unsigned char *)
&viff_info.release);
(void) WriteBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.version),(unsigned char *)
&viff_info.version);
(void) WriteBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.machine_dependency),
(unsigned char *) &viff_info.machine_dependency);
(void) WriteBlob(image,sizeof(viff_info.reserve),(unsigned char *)
viff_info.reserve);
(void) WriteBlob(image,512,(unsigned char *) viff_info.comment);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.columns);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.subrows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.x_offset);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.y_offset);
viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel=(unsigned int) ((63 << 24) | (128 << 16));
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.x_bits_per_pixel);
viff_info.y_bits_per_pixel=(unsigned int) ((63 << 24) | (128 << 16));
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.y_bits_per_pixel);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,viff_info.location_type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,viff_info.location_dimension);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.number_of_images);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.number_data_bands);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.data_storage_type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.data_encode_scheme);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.map_scheme);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.map_storage_type);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.map_rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.map_columns);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.map_subrows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.map_enable);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.maps_per_cycle);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) viff_info.color_space_model);
for (i=0; i < 420; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\0');
/*
Convert MIFF to VIFF raster pixels.
*/
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) packets,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
q=pixels;
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
{
/*
Convert DirectClass packet to VIFF RGB pixel.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p));
*(q+number_pixels)=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,p));
*(q+number_pixels*2)=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,p));
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
*(q+number_pixels*3)=ScaleQuantumToChar((Quantum)
(GetPixelAlpha(image,p)));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q++;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
if (SetImageGray(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
unsigned char
*viff_colormap;
/*
Dump colormap to file.
*/
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
3*sizeof(*viff_colormap));
if (viff_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
q=viff_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].red));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].green));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].blue));
(void) WriteBlob(image,3*image->colors,viff_colormap);
viff_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(viff_colormap);
/*
Convert PseudoClass packet to VIFF colormapped pixels.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(image,p);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
if (image->colors <= 2)
{
ssize_t
x,
y;
register unsigned char
bit,
byte;
/*
Convert PseudoClass image to a VIFF monochrome image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte>>=1;
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p) < (QuantumRange/2.0))
byte|=0x80;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
*q++=byte;
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (bit != 0)
*q++=byte >> (8-bit);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
/*
Convert PseudoClass packet to VIFF grayscale pixel.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,p));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) packets,pixels);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1600
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: explicit MountState(DriveFsHost* host)
: host_(host),
mojo_connection_delegate_(
host_->delegate_->CreateMojoConnectionDelegate()),
pending_token_(base::UnguessableToken::Create()),
binding_(this) {
source_path_ = base::StrCat({kMountScheme, pending_token_.ToString()});
std::string datadir_option = base::StrCat(
{"datadir=",
host_->profile_path_.Append(kDataPath)
.Append(host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetAccountIdKey())
.value()});
chromeos::disks::DiskMountManager::GetInstance()->MountPath(
source_path_, "",
base::StrCat(
{"drivefs-", host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetAccountIdKey()}),
{datadir_option}, chromeos::MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE,
chromeos::MOUNT_ACCESS_MODE_READ_WRITE);
auto bootstrap =
mojo::MakeProxy(mojo_connection_delegate_->InitializeMojoConnection());
mojom::DriveFsDelegatePtr delegate;
binding_.Bind(mojo::MakeRequest(&delegate));
bootstrap->Init(
{base::in_place, host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetUserEmail()},
mojo::MakeRequest(&drivefs_), std::move(delegate));
PendingConnectionManager::Get().ExpectOpenIpcChannel(
pending_token_,
base::BindOnce(&DriveFsHost::MountState::AcceptMojoConnection,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: MYSQLND_METHOD(mysqlnd_conn_data, restart_psession)(MYSQLND_CONN_DATA * conn TSRMLS_DC)
{
DBG_ENTER("mysqlnd_conn_data::restart_psession");
MYSQLND_INC_CONN_STATISTIC(conn->stats, STAT_CONNECT_REUSED);
/* Free here what should not be seen by the next script */
if (conn->last_message) {
mnd_pefree(conn->last_message, conn->persistent);
conn->last_message = NULL;
}
DBG_RETURN(PASS);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int hevc_update_thread_context(AVCodecContext *dst,
const AVCodecContext *src)
{
HEVCContext *s = dst->priv_data;
HEVCContext *s0 = src->priv_data;
int i, ret;
if (!s->context_initialized) {
ret = hevc_init_context(dst);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(s->DPB); i++) {
ff_hevc_unref_frame(s, &s->DPB[i], ~0);
if (s0->DPB[i].frame->buf[0]) {
ret = hevc_ref_frame(s, &s->DPB[i], &s0->DPB[i]);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
}
if (s->ps.sps != s0->ps.sps)
s->ps.sps = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(s->ps.vps_list); i++) {
av_buffer_unref(&s->ps.vps_list[i]);
if (s0->ps.vps_list[i]) {
s->ps.vps_list[i] = av_buffer_ref(s0->ps.vps_list[i]);
if (!s->ps.vps_list[i])
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(s->ps.sps_list); i++) {
av_buffer_unref(&s->ps.sps_list[i]);
if (s0->ps.sps_list[i]) {
s->ps.sps_list[i] = av_buffer_ref(s0->ps.sps_list[i]);
if (!s->ps.sps_list[i])
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(s->ps.pps_list); i++) {
av_buffer_unref(&s->ps.pps_list[i]);
if (s0->ps.pps_list[i]) {
s->ps.pps_list[i] = av_buffer_ref(s0->ps.pps_list[i]);
if (!s->ps.pps_list[i])
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
}
if (s->ps.sps != s0->ps.sps)
if ((ret = set_sps(s, s0->ps.sps, src->pix_fmt)) < 0)
return ret;
s->seq_decode = s0->seq_decode;
s->seq_output = s0->seq_output;
s->pocTid0 = s0->pocTid0;
s->max_ra = s0->max_ra;
s->eos = s0->eos;
s->no_rasl_output_flag = s0->no_rasl_output_flag;
s->is_nalff = s0->is_nalff;
s->nal_length_size = s0->nal_length_size;
s->threads_number = s0->threads_number;
s->threads_type = s0->threads_type;
if (s0->eos) {
s->seq_decode = (s->seq_decode + 1) & 0xff;
s->max_ra = INT_MAX;
}
s->sei.frame_packing = s0->sei.frame_packing;
s->sei.display_orientation = s0->sei.display_orientation;
s->sei.mastering_display = s0->sei.mastering_display;
s->sei.content_light = s0->sei.content_light;
s->sei.alternative_transfer = s0->sei.alternative_transfer;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/hevcdec: Avoid only partly skiping duplicate first slices
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference and out of array access
Fixes: 13871/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5746167087890432
Fixes: 13845/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5650370728034304
This also fixes the return code for explode mode
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: James Almer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::use_output_buffer(
OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_INOUT OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE** bufferHdr,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 bytes,
OMX_IN OMX_U8* buffer)
{
(void)hComp, (void)port;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufHdr= NULL; // buffer header
unsigned i= 0; // Temporary counter
unsigned char *buf_addr = NULL;
#ifdef _MSM8974_
int align_size;
#endif
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Inside use_output_buffer()");
if (bytes != m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: use_output_buffer: Size Mismatch!! "
"bytes[%u] != Port.nBufferSize[%u]", (unsigned int)bytes, (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (!m_out_mem_ptr) {
output_use_buffer = true;
int nBufHdrSize = 0;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Allocating First Output Buffer(%u)",(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
nBufHdrSize = m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual * sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
/*
* Memory for output side involves the following:
* 1. Array of Buffer Headers
* 2. Bitmask array to hold the buffer allocation details
* In order to minimize the memory management entire allocation
* is done in one step.
*/
m_out_mem_ptr = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *)calloc(nBufHdrSize,1);
if (m_out_mem_ptr == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_out_mem_ptr");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
m_pOutput_pmem = (struct pmem *) calloc(sizeof (struct pmem), m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pOutput_pmem == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pOutput_pmem");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pOutput_ion = (struct venc_ion *) calloc(sizeof (struct venc_ion), m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pOutput_ion == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pOutput_ion");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
if (m_out_mem_ptr) {
bufHdr = m_out_mem_ptr;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Memory Allocation Succeeded for OUT port%p",m_out_mem_ptr);
for (i=0; i < m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual ; i++) {
bufHdr->nSize = sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
bufHdr->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
bufHdr->nAllocLen = bytes;
bufHdr->nFilledLen = 0;
bufHdr->pAppPrivate = appData;
bufHdr->nOutputPortIndex = PORT_INDEX_OUT;
bufHdr->pBuffer = NULL;
bufHdr++;
m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd = -1;
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_device_fd =-1;
m_pOutput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd=-1;
m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data.handle = 0;
#endif
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Output buf mem alloc failed[0x%p]",m_out_mem_ptr);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
}
for (i=0; i< m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++) {
if (BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_out_bm_count,i)) {
break;
}
}
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
if (i < m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
*bufferHdr = (m_out_mem_ptr + i );
(*bufferHdr)->pBuffer = (OMX_U8 *)buffer;
(*bufferHdr)->pAppPrivate = appData;
BITMASK_SET(&m_out_bm_count,i);
if (!m_use_output_pmem) {
#ifdef USE_ION
#ifdef _MSM8974_
align_size = (m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize + (SZ_4K - 1)) & ~(SZ_4K - 1);
m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(align_size,
&m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pOutput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,0);
#else
m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(
m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
&m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pOutput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,ION_FLAG_CACHED);
#endif
if (m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_device_fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ION device open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd = m_pOutput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd;
#else
m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
if (m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd == 0) {
m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
}
if (m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: /dev/pmem_adsp open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
m_pOutput_pmem[i].size = m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize;
m_pOutput_pmem[i].offset = 0;
m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer = (OMX_U8 *)SECURE_BUFPTR;
if(!secure_session) {
#ifdef _MSM8974_
m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)mmap(NULL,
align_size,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd,0);
#else
m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)mmap(NULL,
m_pOutput_pmem[i].size,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd,0);
#endif
if (m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer == MAP_FAILED) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: mmap() Failed");
close(m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pOutput_ion[i]);
#endif
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
}
} else {
OMX_QCOM_PLATFORM_PRIVATE_PMEM_INFO *pParam = reinterpret_cast<OMX_QCOM_PLATFORM_PRIVATE_PMEM_INFO*>((*bufferHdr)->pAppPrivate);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Inside qcom_ext pParam: %p", pParam);
if (pParam) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Inside qcom_ext with luma:(fd:%lu,offset:0x%x)", pParam->pmem_fd, (int)pParam->offset);
m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd = pParam->pmem_fd;
m_pOutput_pmem[i].offset = pParam->offset;
m_pOutput_pmem[i].size = m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize;
m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)buffer;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid AppData given for PMEM o/p UseBuffer case");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
buf_addr = (unsigned char *)buffer;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("use_out:: bufhdr = %p, pBuffer = %p, m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer = %p",
(*bufferHdr), (*bufferHdr)->pBuffer, m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer);
if (dev_use_buf(&m_pOutput_pmem[i],PORT_INDEX_OUT,i) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_use_buf Failed for o/p buf");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: All o/p Buffers have been Used, invalid use_buf call for "
"index = %u", i);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
}
return eRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Heap Overflow and Possible Local Privilege Escalation in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem)
Bug: 27532497
Change-Id: I31e576ef9dc542df73aa6b0ea113d72724b50fc6
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void VoidMethodLongArgOptionalLongArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodLongArgOptionalLongArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
int32_t long_arg;
int32_t optional_long_arg;
int num_args_passed = info.Length();
while (num_args_passed > 0) {
if (!info[num_args_passed - 1]->IsUndefined())
break;
--num_args_passed;
}
long_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
if (UNLIKELY(num_args_passed <= 1)) {
impl->voidMethodLongArgOptionalLongArg(long_arg);
return;
}
optional_long_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[1], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->voidMethodLongArgOptionalLongArg(long_arg, optional_long_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void encode_frame(vpx_codec_ctx_t *codec,
vpx_image_t *img,
int frame_index,
int flags,
VpxVideoWriter *writer) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt = NULL;
const vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_encode(codec, img, frame_index, 1,
flags, VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK)
die_codec(codec, "Failed to encode frame");
while ((pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(codec, &iter)) != NULL) {
if (pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
const int keyframe = (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) != 0;
if (!vpx_video_writer_write_frame(writer,
pkt->data.frame.buf,
pkt->data.frame.sz,
pkt->data.frame.pts)) {
die_codec(codec, "Failed to write compressed frame");
}
printf(keyframe ? "K" : ".");
fflush(stdout);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", *offset, depth);
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, *offset, depth);
#if 0
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
#endif
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
cur->next = NULL;
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (pssh.datalen + 20 > chunk_size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
mHasVideo = true;
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
int32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, &width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight, &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('\xA9', 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset += chunk_size;
return OK;
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s);
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t duration;
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
if (SIZE_MAX - chunk_size <= size) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %lld and data_offset = %lld",
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
if (chunk_data_size >= SIZE_MAX - 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
if (chunk_data_size <= kSkipBytesOfDataBox) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
default:
{
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor.cpp: handle chunk_size > SIZE_MAX
chunk_size is a uint64_t, so it can legitimately be bigger
than SIZE_MAX, which would cause the subtraction to underflow.
https://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=182251
Bug: 23034759
Change-Id: Ic1637fb26bf6edb0feb1bcf2876fd370db1ed547
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int get_compat_itimerval(struct itimerval *o, const struct compat_itimerval __user *i)
{
struct compat_itimerval v32;
if (copy_from_user(&v32, i, sizeof(struct compat_itimerval)))
return -EFAULT;
o->it_interval.tv_sec = v32.it_interval.tv_sec;
o->it_interval.tv_usec = v32.it_interval.tv_usec;
o->it_value.tv_sec = v32.it_value.tv_sec;
o->it_value.tv_usec = v32.it_value.tv_usec;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: compat: fix 4-byte infoleak via uninitialized struct field
Commit 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to
native counterparts") removed the memset() in compat_get_timex(). Since
then, the compat adjtimex syscall can invoke do_adjtimex() with an
uninitialized ->tai.
If do_adjtimex() doesn't write to ->tai (e.g. because the arguments are
invalid), compat_put_timex() then copies the uninitialized ->tai field
to userspace.
Fix it by adding the memset() back.
Fixes: 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to native counterparts")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void page_add_new_anon_rmap(struct page *page,
struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address)
{
VM_BUG_ON(address < vma->vm_start || address >= vma->vm_end);
SetPageSwapBacked(page);
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0); /* increment count (starts at -1) */
if (PageTransHuge(page))
__inc_zone_page_state(page, NR_ANON_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGES);
__mod_zone_page_state(page_zone(page), NR_ANON_PAGES,
hpage_nr_pages(page));
__page_set_anon_rmap(page, vma, address, 1);
if (!mlocked_vma_newpage(vma, page)) {
SetPageActive(page);
lru_cache_add(page);
} else
add_page_to_unevictable_list(page);
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static uint32_t fdctrl_read_data(FDCtrl *fdctrl)
{
FDrive *cur_drv;
uint32_t retval = 0;
int pos;
cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
fdctrl->dsr &= ~FD_DSR_PWRDOWN;
if (!(fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_RQM) || !(fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_DIO)) {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("error: controller not ready for reading\n");
return 0;
}
pos = fdctrl->data_pos;
if (fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_NONDMA) {
pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN;
if (pos == 0) {
if (fdctrl->data_pos != 0)
if (!fdctrl_seek_to_next_sect(fdctrl, cur_drv)) {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("error seeking to next sector %d\n",
fd_sector(cur_drv));
return 0;
}
if (blk_read(cur_drv->blk, fd_sector(cur_drv), fdctrl->fifo, 1)
< 0) {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("error getting sector %d\n",
fd_sector(cur_drv));
/* Sure, image size is too small... */
memset(fdctrl->fifo, 0, FD_SECTOR_LEN);
}
}
}
retval = fdctrl->fifo[pos];
if (++fdctrl->data_pos == fdctrl->data_len) {
fdctrl->data_pos = 0;
/* Switch from transfer mode to status mode
* then from status mode to command mode
*/
if (fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_NONDMA) {
fdctrl_stop_transfer(fdctrl, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00);
} else {
fdctrl_reset_fifo(fdctrl);
fdctrl_reset_irq(fdctrl);
}
}
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("data register: 0x%02x\n", retval);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void btrfs_test_destroy_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
btrfs_drop_extent_cache(inode, 0, (u64)-1, 0);
kmem_cache_free(btrfs_inode_cachep, BTRFS_I(inode));
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static spl_filesystem_object * spl_filesystem_object_create_info(spl_filesystem_object *source, char *file_path, int file_path_len, int use_copy, zend_class_entry *ce, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
zval *arg1;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
if (!file_path || !file_path_len) {
#if defined(PHP_WIN32)
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot create SplFileInfo for empty path");
if (file_path && !use_copy) {
efree(file_path);
}
#else
if (file_path && !use_copy) {
efree(file_path);
}
file_path_len = 1;
file_path = "/";
#endif
return NULL;
}
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
ce = ce ? ce : source->info_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileInfo) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, file_path, file_path_len, use_copy);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
} else {
spl_filesystem_info_set_filename(intern, file_path, file_path_len, use_copy TSRMLS_CC);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return intern;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: datum_to_json(Datum val, bool is_null, StringInfo result,
JsonTypeCategory tcategory, Oid outfuncoid,
bool key_scalar)
{
char *outputstr;
text *jsontext;
/* callers are expected to ensure that null keys are not passed in */
char *outputstr;
text *jsontext;
/* callers are expected to ensure that null keys are not passed in */
Assert(!(key_scalar && is_null));
if (key_scalar &&
(tcategory == JSONTYPE_ARRAY ||
tcategory == JSONTYPE_COMPOSITE ||
tcategory == JSONTYPE_JSON ||
tcategory == JSONTYPE_CAST))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("key value must be scalar, not array, composite, or json")));
switch (tcategory)
{
case JSONTYPE_ARRAY:
array_to_json_internal(val, result, false);
break;
case JSONTYPE_COMPOSITE:
composite_to_json(val, result, false);
break;
case JSONTYPE_BOOL:
outputstr = DatumGetBool(val) ? "true" : "false";
if (key_scalar)
escape_json(result, outputstr);
else
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
break;
case JSONTYPE_NUMERIC:
outputstr = OidOutputFunctionCall(outfuncoid, val);
/*
* Don't call escape_json for a non-key if it's a valid JSON
* number.
*/
if (!key_scalar && IsValidJsonNumber(outputstr, strlen(outputstr)))
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
else
escape_json(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
break;
case JSONTYPE_DATE:
{
DateADT date;
struct pg_tm tm;
char buf[MAXDATELEN + 1];
date = DatumGetDateADT(val);
if (DATE_NOT_FINITE(date))
{
/* we have to format infinity ourselves */
appendStringInfoString(result, DT_INFINITY);
}
else
{
j2date(date + POSTGRES_EPOCH_JDATE,
&(tm.tm_year), &(tm.tm_mon), &(tm.tm_mday));
EncodeDateOnly(&tm, USE_XSD_DATES, buf);
appendStringInfo(result, "\"%s\"", buf);
}
}
break;
case JSONTYPE_TIMESTAMP:
{
Timestamp timestamp;
struct pg_tm tm;
fsec_t fsec;
char buf[MAXDATELEN + 1];
timestamp = DatumGetTimestamp(val);
if (TIMESTAMP_NOT_FINITE(timestamp))
{
/* we have to format infinity ourselves */
appendStringInfoString(result, DT_INFINITY);
}
else if (timestamp2tm(timestamp, NULL, &tm, &fsec, NULL, NULL) == 0)
{
EncodeDateTime(&tm, fsec, false, 0, NULL, USE_XSD_DATES, buf);
appendStringInfo(result, "\"%s\"", buf);
}
else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_DATETIME_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
errmsg("timestamp out of range")));
}
break;
case JSONTYPE_TIMESTAMPTZ:
{
TimestampTz timestamp;
struct pg_tm tm;
int tz;
fsec_t fsec;
const char *tzn = NULL;
char buf[MAXDATELEN + 1];
timestamp = DatumGetTimestamp(val);
if (TIMESTAMP_NOT_FINITE(timestamp))
{
/* we have to format infinity ourselves */
appendStringInfoString(result, DT_INFINITY);
}
else if (timestamp2tm(timestamp, &tz, &tm, &fsec, &tzn, NULL) == 0)
{
EncodeDateTime(&tm, fsec, true, tz, tzn, USE_XSD_DATES, buf);
appendStringInfo(result, "\"%s\"", buf);
}
else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_DATETIME_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE),
errmsg("timestamp out of range")));
}
break;
case JSONTYPE_JSON:
/* JSON and JSONB output will already be escaped */
outputstr = OidOutputFunctionCall(outfuncoid, val);
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
break;
case JSONTYPE_CAST:
/* outfuncoid refers to a cast function, not an output function */
jsontext = DatumGetTextP(OidFunctionCall1(outfuncoid, val));
outputstr = text_to_cstring(jsontext);
appendStringInfoString(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
pfree(jsontext);
break;
default:
outputstr = OidOutputFunctionCall(outfuncoid, val);
escape_json(result, outputstr);
pfree(outputstr);
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: SProcRenderCreateSolidFill(ClientPtr client)
{
register int n;
REQUEST (xRenderCreateSolidFillReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE (xRenderCreateSolidFillReq);
swaps(&stuff->length, n);
swapl(&stuff->pid, n);
swaps(&stuff->color.alpha, n);
swaps(&stuff->color.red, n);
swaps(&stuff->color.green, n);
swaps(&stuff->color.blue, n);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: cc::FrameSinkId RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetFrameSinkId() {
return delegated_frame_host_ ? delegated_frame_host_->GetFrameSinkId()
: cc::FrameSinkId();
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: M_fs_error_t M_fs_move(const char *path_old, const char *path_new, M_uint32 mode, M_fs_progress_cb_t cb, M_uint32 progress_flags)
{
char *norm_path_old;
char *norm_path_new;
char *resolve_path;
M_fs_info_t *info;
M_fs_progress_t *progress = NULL;
M_uint64 entry_size;
M_fs_error_t res;
if (path_old == NULL || *path_old == '\0' || path_new == NULL || *path_new == '\0') {
return M_FS_ERROR_INVALID;
}
/* It's okay if new path doesn't exist. */
res = M_fs_path_norm(&norm_path_new, path_new, M_FS_PATH_NORM_RESDIR, M_FS_SYSTEM_AUTO);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
M_free(norm_path_new);
return res;
}
/* If a path is a file and the destination is a directory the file should be moved
* into the directory. E.g. /file.txt -> /dir = /dir/file.txt */
if (M_fs_isfileintodir(path_old, path_new, &norm_path_old)) {
M_free(norm_path_new);
res = M_fs_move(path_old, norm_path_old, mode, cb, progress_flags);
M_free(norm_path_old);
return res;
}
/* Normalize the old path and do basic checks that it exists. We'll leave really checking that the old path
* existing to rename because any check we perform may not be true when rename is called. */
res = M_fs_path_norm(&norm_path_old, path_old, M_FS_PATH_NORM_RESALL, M_FS_SYSTEM_AUTO);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
M_free(norm_path_new);
M_free(norm_path_old);
return res;
}
progress = M_fs_progress_create();
res = M_fs_info(&info, path_old, (mode & M_FS_FILE_MODE_PRESERVE_PERMS)?M_FS_PATH_INFO_FLAGS_NONE:M_FS_PATH_INFO_FLAGS_BASIC);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
M_fs_progress_destroy(progress);
M_free(norm_path_new);
M_free(norm_path_old);
return res;
}
/* There is a race condition where the path could not exist but be created between the exists check and calling
* rename to move the file but there isn't much we can do in this case. copy will delete and the file so this
* situation won't cause an error. */
if (!M_fs_check_overwrite_allowed(norm_path_old, norm_path_new, mode)) {
M_fs_progress_destroy(progress);
M_free(norm_path_new);
M_free(norm_path_old);
return M_FS_ERROR_FILE_EXISTS;
}
if (cb) {
entry_size = M_fs_info_get_size(info);
M_fs_progress_set_path(progress, norm_path_new);
M_fs_progress_set_type(progress, M_fs_info_get_type(info));
if (progress_flags & M_FS_PROGRESS_SIZE_TOTAL) {
M_fs_progress_set_size_total(progress, entry_size);
M_fs_progress_set_size_total_progess(progress, entry_size);
}
if (progress_flags & M_FS_PROGRESS_SIZE_CUR) {
M_fs_progress_set_size_current(progress, entry_size);
M_fs_progress_set_size_current_progress(progress, entry_size);
}
/* Change the progress count to reflect the count. */
if (progress_flags & M_FS_PROGRESS_COUNT) {
M_fs_progress_set_count_total(progress, 1);
M_fs_progress_set_count(progress, 1);
}
}
/* Move the file. */
if (M_fs_info_get_type(info) == M_FS_TYPE_SYMLINK) {
res = M_fs_path_readlink(&resolve_path, norm_path_old);
if (res == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
res = M_fs_symlink(norm_path_new, resolve_path);
}
M_free(resolve_path);
} else {
res = M_fs_move_file(norm_path_old, norm_path_new);
}
/* Failure was because we're crossing mount points. */
if (res == M_FS_ERROR_NOT_SAMEDEV) {
/* Can't rename so copy and delete. */
if (M_fs_copy(norm_path_old, norm_path_new, mode, cb, progress_flags) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
/* Success - Delete the original files since this is a move. */
res = M_fs_delete(norm_path_old, M_TRUE, NULL, M_FS_PROGRESS_NOEXTRA);
} else {
/* Failure - Delete the new files that were copied but only if we are not overwriting. We don't
* want to remove any existing files (especially if the dest is a dir). */
if (!(mode & M_FS_FILE_MODE_OVERWRITE)) {
M_fs_delete(norm_path_new, M_TRUE, NULL, M_FS_PROGRESS_NOEXTRA);
}
res = M_FS_ERROR_GENERIC;
}
} else {
/* Call the cb with the result of the move whether it was a success for fail. We call the cb only if the
* result of the move is not M_FS_ERROR_NOT_SAMEDEV because the copy operation will call the cb for us. */
if (cb) {
M_fs_progress_set_result(progress, res);
if (!cb(progress)) {
res = M_FS_ERROR_CANCELED;
}
}
}
M_fs_info_destroy(info);
M_fs_progress_destroy(progress);
M_free(norm_path_new);
M_free(norm_path_old);
return res;
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void validate_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
int bug = 0;
int i = 0;
unsigned long highest_address = 0;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = mm->mmap;
while (vma) {
struct anon_vma *anon_vma = vma->anon_vma;
struct anon_vma_chain *avc;
if (anon_vma) {
anon_vma_lock_read(anon_vma);
list_for_each_entry(avc, &vma->anon_vma_chain, same_vma)
anon_vma_interval_tree_verify(avc);
anon_vma_unlock_read(anon_vma);
}
highest_address = vm_end_gap(vma);
vma = vma->vm_next;
i++;
}
if (i != mm->map_count) {
pr_emerg("map_count %d vm_next %d\n", mm->map_count, i);
bug = 1;
}
if (highest_address != mm->highest_vm_end) {
pr_emerg("mm->highest_vm_end %lx, found %lx\n",
mm->highest_vm_end, highest_address);
bug = 1;
}
i = browse_rb(mm);
if (i != mm->map_count) {
if (i != -1)
pr_emerg("map_count %d rb %d\n", mm->map_count, i);
bug = 1;
}
VM_BUG_ON_MM(bug, mm);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void __exit ipddp_cleanup_module(void)
{
struct ipddp_route *p;
unregister_netdev(dev_ipddp);
free_netdev(dev_ipddp);
while (ipddp_route_list) {
p = ipddp_route_list->next;
kfree(ipddp_route_list);
ipddp_route_list = p;
}
}
Commit Message: net/appletalk: fix minor pointer leak to userspace in SIOCFINDIPDDPRT
Fields ->dev and ->next of struct ipddp_route may be copied to
userspace on the SIOCFINDIPDDPRT ioctl. This is only accessible
to CAP_NET_ADMIN though. Let's manually copy the relevant fields
instead of using memcpy().
BugLink: http://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2018/09/linux-kernel-infoleaks.html
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int find_low_bit(unsigned int x)
{
int i;
for(i=0;i<=31;i++) {
if(x&(1<<i)) return i;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int oidc_content_handler(request_rec *r) {
oidc_cfg *c = ap_get_module_config(r->server->module_config,
&auth_openidc_module);
int rc = DECLINED;
if (oidc_util_request_matches_url(r, oidc_get_redirect_uri(r, c))) {
if (oidc_util_request_has_parameter(r,
OIDC_REDIRECT_URI_REQUEST_INFO)) {
oidc_session_t *session = NULL;
oidc_session_load(r, &session);
/* handle request for session info */
rc = oidc_handle_info_request(r, c, session);
/* free resources allocated for the session */
oidc_session_free(r, session);
}
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: release 2.3.10.2: fix XSS vulnerability for poll parameter
in OIDC Session Management RP iframe; CSNC-2019-001; thanks Mischa
Bachmann
Signed-off-by: Hans Zandbelt <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-79
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: double AffineTransform::xScale() const
{
return sqrt(m_transform[0] * m_transform[0] + m_transform[1] * m_transform[1]);
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::FindEntriesForCache(int64_t cache_id,
std::vector<EntryRecord>* records) {
DCHECK(records && records->empty());
if (!LazyOpen(kDontCreate))
return false;
static const char kSql[] =
"SELECT cache_id, url, flags, response_id, response_size FROM Entries"
" WHERE cache_id = ?";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, cache_id);
while (statement.Step()) {
records->push_back(EntryRecord());
ReadEntryRecord(statement, &records->back());
DCHECK(records->back().cache_id == cache_id);
}
return statement.Succeeded();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int cac_add_object_to_list(list_t *list, const cac_object_t *object)
{
if (list_append(list, object) < 0)
return SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void AutomationProvider::HandleUnused(const IPC::Message& message, int handle) {
if (window_tracker_->ContainsHandle(handle)) {
window_tracker_->Remove(window_tracker_->GetResource(handle));
}
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetFocusedRenderWidgetHost(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* receiving_widget) {
if (!SiteIsolationPolicy::AreCrossProcessFramesPossible())
return receiving_widget;
if (receiving_widget != GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost())
return receiving_widget;
WebContentsImpl* focused_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (focused_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
focused_contents->GetRenderManager()
->interstitial_page()
->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
FrameTreeNode* focused_frame = nullptr;
if (focused_contents->browser_plugin_guest_ &&
!GuestMode::IsCrossProcessFrameGuest(focused_contents)) {
focused_frame = frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
} else {
focused_frame = GetFocusedWebContents()->frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
}
if (!focused_frame)
return receiving_widget;
RenderWidgetHostView* view = focused_frame->current_frame_host()->GetView();
if (!view)
return nullptr;
return RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(view->GetRenderWidgetHost());
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnInitiatePrintPreview() {
DCHECK(is_preview_enabled_);
WebKit::WebFrame* frame;
if (GetPrintFrame(&frame)) {
print_preview_context_.InitWithFrame(frame);
RequestPrintPreview(PRINT_PREVIEW_USER_INITIATED_ENTIRE_FRAME);
} else {
CHECK(false);
}
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: cib_tls_close(cib_t * cib)
{
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
shutdown(private->command.socket, SHUT_RDWR); /* no more receptions */
shutdown(private->callback.socket, SHUT_RDWR); /* no more receptions */
close(private->command.socket);
close(private->callback.socket);
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
if (private->command.encrypted) {
gnutls_bye(*(private->command.session), GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR);
gnutls_deinit(*(private->command.session));
gnutls_free(private->command.session);
gnutls_bye(*(private->callback.session), GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR);
gnutls_deinit(*(private->callback.session));
gnutls_free(private->callback.session);
gnutls_anon_free_client_credentials(anon_cred_c);
gnutls_global_deinit();
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg");
if (args.Length() < 2)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(int, nonCallback, toInt32(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (args.Length() <= 1 || !args[1]->IsFunction())
return throwError(TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR, args.GetIsolate());
RefPtr<TestCallback> callback = V8TestCallback::create(args[1], getScriptExecutionContext());
imp->methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg(nonCallback, callback);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void nfs4_xdr_enc_secinfo(struct rpc_rqst *req,
struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs4_secinfo_arg *args)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = nfs4_xdr_minorversion(&args->seq_args),
};
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->dir_fh, &hdr);
encode_secinfo(xdr, args->name, &hdr);
encode_nops(&hdr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: setkey_principal_2_svc(setkey_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (!(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) &&
kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_SETKEY, arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = kadm5_setkey_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ,
arg->keyblocks, arg->n_keys);
} else {
log_unauth("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY;
}
if(ret.code != KADM5_AUTH_SETKEY) {
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_setkey_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: MagickExport Image *ComplexImages(const Image *images,const ComplexOperator op,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ComplexImageTag "Complex/Image"
CacheView
*Ai_view,
*Ar_view,
*Bi_view,
*Br_view,
*Ci_view,
*Cr_view;
const char
*artifact;
const Image
*Ai_image,
*Ar_image,
*Bi_image,
*Br_image;
double
snr;
Image
*Ci_image,
*complex_images,
*Cr_image,
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
ssize_t
y;
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
assert(images->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",images->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->next == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),ImageError,
"ImageSequenceRequired","`%s'",images->filename);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=CloneImage(images,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return(image);
}
image->depth=32UL;
complex_images=NewImageList();
AppendImageToList(&complex_images,image);
image=CloneImage(images,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
complex_images=DestroyImageList(complex_images);
return(complex_images);
}
AppendImageToList(&complex_images,image);
/*
Apply complex mathematics to image pixels.
*/
artifact=GetImageArtifact(image,"complex:snr");
snr=0.0;
if (artifact != (const char *) NULL)
snr=StringToDouble(artifact,(char **) NULL);
Ar_image=images;
Ai_image=images->next;
Br_image=images;
Bi_image=images->next;
if ((images->next->next != (Image *) NULL) &&
(images->next->next->next != (Image *) NULL))
{
Br_image=images->next->next;
Bi_image=images->next->next->next;
}
Cr_image=complex_images;
Ci_image=complex_images->next;
Ar_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Ar_image,exception);
Ai_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Ai_image,exception);
Br_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Br_image,exception);
Bi_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(Bi_image,exception);
Cr_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(Cr_image,exception);
Ci_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(Ci_image,exception);
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(progress,status) \
magick_number_threads(images,complex_images,images->rows,1L)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) images->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict Ai,
*magick_restrict Ar,
*magick_restrict Bi,
*magick_restrict Br;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict Ci,
*magick_restrict Cr;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
Ar=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Ar_view,0,y,Ar_image->columns,1,exception);
Ai=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Ai_view,0,y,Ai_image->columns,1,exception);
Br=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Br_view,0,y,Br_image->columns,1,exception);
Bi=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(Bi_view,0,y,Bi_image->columns,1,exception);
Cr=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Cr_view,0,y,Cr_image->columns,1,exception);
Ci=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Ci_view,0,y,Ci_image->columns,1,exception);
if ((Ar == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (Ai == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(Br == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (Bi == (const Quantum *) NULL) ||
(Cr == (Quantum *) NULL) || (Ci == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) images->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(images); i++)
{
switch (op)
{
case AddComplexOperator:
{
Cr[i]=Ar[i]+Br[i];
Ci[i]=Ai[i]+Bi[i];
break;
}
case ConjugateComplexOperator:
default:
{
Cr[i]=Ar[i];
Ci[i]=(-Bi[i]);
break;
}
case DivideComplexOperator:
{
double
gamma;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal(Br[i]*Br[i]+Bi[i]*Bi[i]+snr);
Cr[i]=gamma*(Ar[i]*Br[i]+Ai[i]*Bi[i]);
Ci[i]=gamma*(Ai[i]*Br[i]-Ar[i]*Bi[i]);
break;
}
case MagnitudePhaseComplexOperator:
{
Cr[i]=sqrt(Ar[i]*Ar[i]+Ai[i]*Ai[i]);
Ci[i]=atan2(Ai[i],Ar[i])/(2.0*MagickPI)+0.5;
break;
}
case MultiplyComplexOperator:
{
Cr[i]=QuantumScale*(Ar[i]*Br[i]-Ai[i]*Bi[i]);
Ci[i]=QuantumScale*(Ai[i]*Br[i]+Ar[i]*Bi[i]);
break;
}
case RealImaginaryComplexOperator:
{
Cr[i]=Ar[i]*cos(2.0*MagickPI*(Ai[i]-0.5));
Ci[i]=Ar[i]*sin(2.0*MagickPI*(Ai[i]-0.5));
break;
}
case SubtractComplexOperator:
{
Cr[i]=Ar[i]-Br[i];
Ci[i]=Ai[i]-Bi[i];
break;
}
}
}
Ar+=GetPixelChannels(Ar_image);
Ai+=GetPixelChannels(Ai_image);
Br+=GetPixelChannels(Br_image);
Bi+=GetPixelChannels(Bi_image);
Cr+=GetPixelChannels(Cr_image);
Ci+=GetPixelChannels(Ci_image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Ci_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(Cr_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (images->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(images,ComplexImageTag,progress,images->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
Cr_view=DestroyCacheView(Cr_view);
Ci_view=DestroyCacheView(Ci_view);
Br_view=DestroyCacheView(Br_view);
Bi_view=DestroyCacheView(Bi_view);
Ar_view=DestroyCacheView(Ar_view);
Ai_view=DestroyCacheView(Ai_view);
if (status == MagickFalse)
complex_images=DestroyImageList(complex_images);
return(complex_images);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1588
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: pkinit_get_certs_pkcs12(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plg_cryptoctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context req_cryptoctx,
pkinit_identity_opts *idopts,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context id_cryptoctx,
krb5_principal princ)
{
krb5_error_code retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
X509 *x = NULL;
PKCS12 *p12 = NULL;
int ret;
FILE *fp;
EVP_PKEY *y = NULL;
if (idopts->cert_filename == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed to get user's cert location\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto cleanup;
}
if (idopts->key_filename == NULL) {
pkiDebug("%s: failed to get user's private key location\n", __FUNCTION__);
goto cleanup;
}
fp = fopen(idopts->cert_filename, "rb");
if (fp == NULL) {
pkiDebug("Failed to open PKCS12 file '%s', error %d\n",
idopts->cert_filename, errno);
goto cleanup;
}
set_cloexec_file(fp);
p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(fp, NULL);
fclose(fp);
if (p12 == NULL) {
pkiDebug("Failed to decode PKCS12 file '%s' contents\n",
idopts->cert_filename);
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Try parsing with no pass phrase first. If that fails,
* prompt for the pass phrase and try again.
*/
ret = PKCS12_parse(p12, NULL, &y, &x, NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
krb5_data rdat;
krb5_prompt kprompt;
krb5_prompt_type prompt_type;
int r = 0;
char prompt_string[128];
char prompt_reply[128];
char *prompt_prefix = _("Pass phrase for");
pkiDebug("Initial PKCS12_parse with no password failed\n");
memset(prompt_reply, '\0', sizeof(prompt_reply));
rdat.data = prompt_reply;
rdat.length = sizeof(prompt_reply);
r = snprintf(prompt_string, sizeof(prompt_string), "%s %s",
prompt_prefix, idopts->cert_filename);
if (r >= (int) sizeof(prompt_string)) {
pkiDebug("Prompt string, '%s %s', is too long!\n",
prompt_prefix, idopts->cert_filename);
goto cleanup;
}
kprompt.prompt = prompt_string;
kprompt.hidden = 1;
kprompt.reply = &rdat;
prompt_type = KRB5_PROMPT_TYPE_PREAUTH;
/* PROMPTER_INVOCATION */
k5int_set_prompt_types(context, &prompt_type);
r = (*id_cryptoctx->prompter)(context, id_cryptoctx->prompter_data,
NULL, NULL, 1, &kprompt);
k5int_set_prompt_types(context, 0);
ret = PKCS12_parse(p12, rdat.data, &y, &x, NULL);
if (ret == 0) {
pkiDebug("Seconde PKCS12_parse with password failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
}
id_cryptoctx->creds[0] = malloc(sizeof(struct _pkinit_cred_info));
if (id_cryptoctx->creds[0] == NULL)
goto cleanup;
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->name =
reassemble_pkcs12_name(idopts->cert_filename);
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert = x;
#ifndef WITHOUT_PKCS11
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id = NULL;
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->cert_id_len = 0;
#endif
id_cryptoctx->creds[0]->key = y;
id_cryptoctx->creds[1] = NULL;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (p12)
PKCS12_free(p12);
if (retval) {
if (x != NULL)
X509_free(x);
if (y != NULL)
EVP_PKEY_free(y);
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[[email protected]: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: xsltFindTemplate(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *name,
const xmlChar *nameURI) {
xsltTemplatePtr cur;
xsltStylesheetPtr style;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (name == NULL))
return(NULL);
style = ctxt->style;
while (style != NULL) {
cur = style->templates;
while (cur != NULL) {
if (xmlStrEqual(name, cur->name)) {
if (((nameURI == NULL) && (cur->nameURI == NULL)) ||
((nameURI != NULL) && (cur->nameURI != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(nameURI, cur->nameURI)))) {
return(cur);
}
}
cur = cur->next;
}
style = xsltNextImport(style);
}
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: _gnutls_ciphertext2compressed (gnutls_session_t session,
opaque * compress_data,
int compress_size,
gnutls_datum_t ciphertext, uint8_t type,
record_parameters_st * params)
{
uint8_t MAC[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
uint16_t c_length;
uint8_t pad;
int length;
uint16_t blocksize;
int ret, i, pad_failed = 0;
opaque preamble[PREAMBLE_SIZE];
int preamble_size;
int ver = gnutls_protocol_get_version (session);
int hash_size = _gnutls_hash_get_algo_len (params->mac_algorithm);
blocksize = gnutls_cipher_get_block_size (params->cipher_algorithm);
/* actual decryption (inplace)
*/
switch (_gnutls_cipher_is_block (params->cipher_algorithm))
{
case CIPHER_STREAM:
if ((ret =
_gnutls_cipher_decrypt (¶ms->read.cipher_state,
ciphertext.data, ciphertext.size)) < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
length = ciphertext.size - hash_size;
break;
case CIPHER_BLOCK:
if ((ciphertext.size < blocksize) || (ciphertext.size % blocksize != 0))
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
if ((ret =
_gnutls_cipher_decrypt (¶ms->read.cipher_state,
ciphertext.data, ciphertext.size)) < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
/* ignore the IV in TLS 1.1.
*/
if (_gnutls_version_has_explicit_iv
(session->security_parameters.version))
{
ciphertext.size -= blocksize;
ciphertext.data += blocksize;
if (ciphertext.size == 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
}
pad = ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1] + 1; /* pad */
if ((int) pad > (int) ciphertext.size - hash_size)
if ((int) pad > (int) ciphertext.size - hash_size)
{
gnutls_assert ();
_gnutls_record_log
("REC[%p]: Short record length %d > %d - %d (under attack?)\n",
session, pad, ciphertext.size, hash_size);
/* We do not fail here. We check below for the
* the pad_failed. If zero means success.
*/
pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
length = ciphertext.size - hash_size - pad;
/* Check the pading bytes (TLS 1.x)
*/
if (_gnutls_version_has_variable_padding (ver) && pad_failed == 0)
for (i = 2; i < pad; i++)
{
if (ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - i] !=
ciphertext.data[ciphertext.size - 1])
pad_failed = GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
break;
default:
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (length < 0)
length = 0;
c_length = _gnutls_conv_uint16 ((uint16_t) length);
/* Pass the type, version, length and compressed through
* MAC.
*/
if (params->mac_algorithm != GNUTLS_MAC_NULL)
{
digest_hd_st td;
ret = mac_init (&td, params->mac_algorithm,
params->read.mac_secret.data,
params->read.mac_secret.size, ver);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
preamble_size =
make_preamble (UINT64DATA
(params->read.sequence_number), type,
c_length, ver, preamble);
mac_hash (&td, preamble, preamble_size, ver);
if (length > 0)
mac_hash (&td, ciphertext.data, length, ver);
mac_deinit (&td, MAC, ver);
}
/* This one was introduced to avoid a timing attack against the TLS
* 1.0 protocol.
*/
if (pad_failed != 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return pad_failed;
}
/* HMAC was not the same.
*/
if (memcmp (MAC, &ciphertext.data[length], hash_size) != 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
}
/* copy the decrypted stuff to compress_data.
*/
if (compress_size < length)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED;
}
memcpy (compress_data, ciphertext.data, length);
return length;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void JSEval(const std::string& script) {
EXPECT_TRUE(content::ExecuteScript(
browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents(), script));
}
Commit Message: Revert "Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol"
This reverts commit 3519e867dc606437f804561f889d7ed95b95876a.
Reason for revert: crbug.com/786150. Application compatibility for Android WebView applications means we need to allow sniffing on that platform.
Original change's description:
> Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol
>
> To reduce attack surface, Chrome should not MIME-sniff to text/html for
> any document delivered via the file protocol. This change only impacts
> the file protocol (documents served via HTTP/HTTPS/etc are unaffected).
>
> Bug: 777737
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
> Change-Id: I7086454356b8d2d092be9e1bca0f5ff6dd3b62c0
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/751402
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Achuith Bhandarkar <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Asanka Herath <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514372}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 777737
Change-Id: I864ae060ce3277d41ea257ae75e0b80c51f3ea98
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/790790
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519347}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: opj_image_t* tgatoimage(const char *filename, opj_cparameters_t *parameters)
{
FILE *f;
opj_image_t *image;
unsigned int image_width, image_height, pixel_bit_depth;
unsigned int x, y;
int flip_image = 0;
opj_image_cmptparm_t cmptparm[4]; /* maximum 4 components */
int numcomps;
OPJ_COLOR_SPACE color_space;
OPJ_BOOL mono ;
OPJ_BOOL save_alpha;
int subsampling_dx, subsampling_dy;
int i;
f = fopen(filename, "rb");
if (!f) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open %s for reading !!\n", filename);
return 0;
}
if (!tga_readheader(f, &pixel_bit_depth, &image_width, &image_height,
&flip_image)) {
fclose(f);
return NULL;
}
/* We currently only support 24 & 32 bit tga's ... */
if (!((pixel_bit_depth == 24) || (pixel_bit_depth == 32))) {
fclose(f);
return NULL;
}
/* initialize image components */
memset(&cmptparm[0], 0, 4 * sizeof(opj_image_cmptparm_t));
mono = (pixel_bit_depth == 8) ||
(pixel_bit_depth == 16); /* Mono with & without alpha. */
save_alpha = (pixel_bit_depth == 16) ||
(pixel_bit_depth == 32); /* Mono with alpha, or RGB with alpha */
if (mono) {
color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_GRAY;
numcomps = save_alpha ? 2 : 1;
} else {
numcomps = save_alpha ? 4 : 3;
color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
}
subsampling_dx = parameters->subsampling_dx;
subsampling_dy = parameters->subsampling_dy;
for (i = 0; i < numcomps; i++) {
cmptparm[i].prec = 8;
cmptparm[i].bpp = 8;
cmptparm[i].sgnd = 0;
cmptparm[i].dx = (OPJ_UINT32)subsampling_dx;
cmptparm[i].dy = (OPJ_UINT32)subsampling_dy;
cmptparm[i].w = image_width;
cmptparm[i].h = image_height;
}
/* create the image */
image = opj_image_create((OPJ_UINT32)numcomps, &cmptparm[0], color_space);
if (!image) {
fclose(f);
return NULL;
}
/* set image offset and reference grid */
image->x0 = (OPJ_UINT32)parameters->image_offset_x0;
image->y0 = (OPJ_UINT32)parameters->image_offset_y0;
image->x1 = !image->x0 ? (OPJ_UINT32)(image_width - 1) *
(OPJ_UINT32)subsampling_dx + 1 : image->x0 + (OPJ_UINT32)(image_width - 1) *
(OPJ_UINT32)subsampling_dx + 1;
image->y1 = !image->y0 ? (OPJ_UINT32)(image_height - 1) *
(OPJ_UINT32)subsampling_dy + 1 : image->y0 + (OPJ_UINT32)(image_height - 1) *
(OPJ_UINT32)subsampling_dy + 1;
/* set image data */
for (y = 0; y < image_height; y++) {
int index;
if (flip_image) {
index = (int)((image_height - y - 1) * image_width);
} else {
index = (int)(y * image_width);
}
if (numcomps == 3) {
for (x = 0; x < image_width; x++) {
unsigned char r, g, b;
if (!fread(&b, 1, 1, f)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
opj_image_destroy(image);
fclose(f);
return NULL;
}
if (!fread(&g, 1, 1, f)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
opj_image_destroy(image);
fclose(f);
return NULL;
}
if (!fread(&r, 1, 1, f)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
opj_image_destroy(image);
fclose(f);
return NULL;
}
image->comps[0].data[index] = r;
image->comps[1].data[index] = g;
image->comps[2].data[index] = b;
index++;
}
} else if (numcomps == 4) {
for (x = 0; x < image_width; x++) {
unsigned char r, g, b, a;
if (!fread(&b, 1, 1, f)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
opj_image_destroy(image);
fclose(f);
return NULL;
}
if (!fread(&g, 1, 1, f)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
opj_image_destroy(image);
fclose(f);
return NULL;
}
if (!fread(&r, 1, 1, f)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
opj_image_destroy(image);
fclose(f);
return NULL;
}
if (!fread(&a, 1, 1, f)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"\nError: fread return a number of element different from the expected.\n");
opj_image_destroy(image);
fclose(f);
return NULL;
}
image->comps[0].data[index] = r;
image->comps[1].data[index] = g;
image->comps[2].data[index] = b;
image->comps[3].data[index] = a;
index++;
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Currently unsupported bit depth : %s\n", filename);
}
}
fclose(f);
return image;
}
Commit Message: tgatoimage(): avoid excessive memory allocation attempt, and fixes unaligned load (#995)
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void SoftAVC::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
UNUSED(portIndex);
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
if (NULL == mCodecCtx) {
if (OK != initDecoder()) {
ALOGE("Failed to initialize decoder");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
}
if (outputBufferWidth() != mStride) {
/* Set the run-time (dynamic) parameters */
mStride = outputBufferWidth();
setParams(mStride);
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
/* If input EOS is seen and decoder is not in flush mode,
* set the decoder in flush mode.
* There can be a case where EOS is sent along with last picture data
* In that case, only after decoding that input data, decoder has to be
* put in flush. This case is handled here */
if (mReceivedEOS && !mIsInFlush) {
setFlushMode();
}
while (!outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader;
size_t timeStampIx;
inInfo = NULL;
inHeader = NULL;
if (!mIsInFlush) {
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader == NULL) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
continue;
}
} else {
break;
}
}
outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = 0;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
if (inHeader != NULL) {
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
if (!(inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS)) {
continue;
}
mReceivedEOS = true;
inHeader = NULL;
setFlushMode();
} else if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mReceivedEOS = true;
}
}
/* Get a free slot in timestamp array to hold input timestamp */
{
size_t i;
timeStampIx = 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_TIME_STAMPS; i++) {
if (!mTimeStampsValid[i]) {
timeStampIx = i;
break;
}
}
if (inHeader != NULL) {
mTimeStampsValid[timeStampIx] = true;
mTimeStamps[timeStampIx] = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
}
}
{
ivd_video_decode_ip_t s_dec_ip;
ivd_video_decode_op_t s_dec_op;
WORD32 timeDelay, timeTaken;
size_t sizeY, sizeUV;
setDecodeArgs(&s_dec_ip, &s_dec_op, inHeader, outHeader, timeStampIx);
DUMP_TO_FILE(mInFile, s_dec_ip.pv_stream_buffer, s_dec_ip.u4_num_Bytes);
GETTIME(&mTimeStart, NULL);
/* Compute time elapsed between end of previous decode()
* to start of current decode() */
TIME_DIFF(mTimeEnd, mTimeStart, timeDelay);
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_dec_ip, (void *)&s_dec_op);
bool unsupportedResolution =
(IVD_STREAM_WIDTH_HEIGHT_NOT_SUPPORTED == (s_dec_op.u4_error_code & 0xFF));
/* Check for unsupported dimensions */
if (unsupportedResolution) {
ALOGE("Unsupported resolution : %dx%d", mWidth, mHeight);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
bool allocationFailed = (IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED == (s_dec_op.u4_error_code & 0xFF));
if (allocationFailed) {
ALOGE("Allocation failure in decoder");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
bool resChanged = (IVD_RES_CHANGED == (s_dec_op.u4_error_code & 0xFF));
GETTIME(&mTimeEnd, NULL);
/* Compute time taken for decode() */
TIME_DIFF(mTimeStart, mTimeEnd, timeTaken);
PRINT_TIME("timeTaken=%6d delay=%6d numBytes=%6d", timeTaken, timeDelay,
s_dec_op.u4_num_bytes_consumed);
if (s_dec_op.u4_frame_decoded_flag && !mFlushNeeded) {
mFlushNeeded = true;
}
if ((inHeader != NULL) && (1 != s_dec_op.u4_frame_decoded_flag)) {
/* If the input did not contain picture data, then ignore
* the associated timestamp */
mTimeStampsValid[timeStampIx] = false;
}
if (mChangingResolution && !s_dec_op.u4_output_present) {
mChangingResolution = false;
resetDecoder();
resetPlugin();
continue;
}
if (resChanged) {
mChangingResolution = true;
if (mFlushNeeded) {
setFlushMode();
}
continue;
}
if ((0 < s_dec_op.u4_pic_wd) && (0 < s_dec_op.u4_pic_ht)) {
uint32_t width = s_dec_op.u4_pic_wd;
uint32_t height = s_dec_op.u4_pic_ht;
bool portWillReset = false;
handlePortSettingsChange(&portWillReset, width, height);
if (portWillReset) {
resetDecoder();
return;
}
}
if (s_dec_op.u4_output_present) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = (outputBufferWidth() * outputBufferHeight() * 3) / 2;
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mTimeStamps[s_dec_op.u4_ts];
mTimeStampsValid[s_dec_op.u4_ts] = false;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
} else {
/* If in flush mode and no output is returned by the codec,
* then come out of flush mode */
mIsInFlush = false;
/* If EOS was recieved on input port and there is no output
* from the codec, then signal EOS on output port */
if (mReceivedEOS) {
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
resetPlugin();
}
}
}
if (inHeader != NULL) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RenderBlockFlow::layoutBlockChild(RenderBox* child, MarginInfo& marginInfo, LayoutUnit& previousFloatLogicalBottom)
{
LayoutUnit oldPosMarginBefore = maxPositiveMarginBefore();
LayoutUnit oldNegMarginBefore = maxNegativeMarginBefore();
child->computeAndSetBlockDirectionMargins(this);
LayoutUnit estimateWithoutPagination;
LayoutUnit logicalTopEstimate = estimateLogicalTopPosition(child, marginInfo, estimateWithoutPagination);
LayoutRect oldRect = child->frameRect();
LayoutUnit oldLogicalTop = logicalTopForChild(child);
#if !ASSERT_DISABLED
LayoutSize oldLayoutDelta = RuntimeEnabledFeatures::repaintAfterLayoutEnabled() ? LayoutSize() : view()->layoutDelta();
#endif
setLogicalTopForChild(child, logicalTopEstimate, ApplyLayoutDelta);
RenderBlock* childRenderBlock = child->isRenderBlock() ? toRenderBlock(child) : 0;
RenderBlockFlow* childRenderBlockFlow = (childRenderBlock && child->isRenderBlockFlow()) ? toRenderBlockFlow(child) : 0;
bool markDescendantsWithFloats = false;
if (logicalTopEstimate != oldLogicalTop && !child->avoidsFloats() && childRenderBlock && childRenderBlock->containsFloats()) {
markDescendantsWithFloats = true;
} else if (UNLIKELY(logicalTopEstimate.mightBeSaturated())) {
markDescendantsWithFloats = true;
} else if (!child->avoidsFloats() || child->shrinkToAvoidFloats()) {
LayoutUnit fb = max(previousFloatLogicalBottom, lowestFloatLogicalBottom());
if (fb > logicalTopEstimate)
markDescendantsWithFloats = true;
}
if (childRenderBlockFlow) {
if (markDescendantsWithFloats)
childRenderBlockFlow->markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout();
if (!child->isWritingModeRoot())
previousFloatLogicalBottom = max(previousFloatLogicalBottom, oldLogicalTop + childRenderBlockFlow->lowestFloatLogicalBottom());
}
SubtreeLayoutScope layoutScope(*child);
if (!child->needsLayout())
child->markForPaginationRelayoutIfNeeded(layoutScope);
bool childHadLayout = child->everHadLayout();
bool childNeededLayout = child->needsLayout();
if (childNeededLayout)
child->layout();
bool atBeforeSideOfBlock = marginInfo.atBeforeSideOfBlock();
bool childIsSelfCollapsing = child->isSelfCollapsingBlock();
LayoutUnit logicalTopBeforeClear = collapseMargins(child, marginInfo, childIsSelfCollapsing);
LayoutUnit logicalTopAfterClear = clearFloatsIfNeeded(child, marginInfo, oldPosMarginBefore, oldNegMarginBefore, logicalTopBeforeClear, childIsSelfCollapsing);
bool paginated = view()->layoutState()->isPaginated();
if (paginated) {
logicalTopAfterClear = adjustBlockChildForPagination(logicalTopAfterClear, estimateWithoutPagination, child,
atBeforeSideOfBlock && logicalTopBeforeClear == logicalTopAfterClear);
}
setLogicalTopForChild(child, logicalTopAfterClear, ApplyLayoutDelta);
if (logicalTopAfterClear != logicalTopEstimate || child->needsLayout() || (paginated && childRenderBlock && childRenderBlock->shouldBreakAtLineToAvoidWidow())) {
SubtreeLayoutScope layoutScope(*child);
if (child->shrinkToAvoidFloats()) {
layoutScope.setChildNeedsLayout(child);
}
if (childRenderBlock) {
if (!child->avoidsFloats() && childRenderBlock->containsFloats())
childRenderBlockFlow->markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout();
if (!child->needsLayout())
child->markForPaginationRelayoutIfNeeded(layoutScope);
}
child->layoutIfNeeded();
}
if (!marginInfo.canCollapseMarginAfterWithLastChild() && !childIsSelfCollapsing)
marginInfo.setCanCollapseMarginAfterWithLastChild(true);
if (marginInfo.atBeforeSideOfBlock() && !childIsSelfCollapsing)
marginInfo.setAtBeforeSideOfBlock(false);
determineLogicalLeftPositionForChild(child, ApplyLayoutDelta);
LayoutSize childOffset = child->location() - oldRect.location();
setLogicalHeight(logicalHeight() + logicalHeightForChild(child));
if (mustSeparateMarginAfterForChild(child)) {
setLogicalHeight(logicalHeight() + marginAfterForChild(child));
marginInfo.clearMargin();
}
if (childRenderBlockFlow)
addOverhangingFloats(childRenderBlockFlow, !childNeededLayout);
if (childOffset.width() || childOffset.height()) {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::repaintAfterLayoutEnabled())
view()->addLayoutDelta(childOffset);
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::repaintAfterLayoutEnabled() && childHadLayout && !selfNeedsLayout())
child->repaintOverhangingFloats(true);
else if (childHadLayout && !selfNeedsLayout() && child->checkForRepaintDuringLayout())
child->repaintDuringLayoutIfMoved(oldRect);
}
if (!childHadLayout && child->checkForRepaint()) {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::repaintAfterLayoutEnabled())
child->repaint();
child->repaintOverhangingFloats(true);
}
if (paginated) {
LayoutUnit newHeight = applyAfterBreak(child, logicalHeight(), marginInfo);
if (newHeight != height())
setLogicalHeight(newHeight);
}
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::repaintAfterLayoutEnabled()) {
ASSERT(view()->layoutDeltaMatches(oldLayoutDelta));
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: on_back_forward_list_changed(void *user_data, Evas_Object *webview, void *event_info)
{
Browser_Window *window = (Browser_Window *)user_data;
/* Update navigation buttons state */
elm_object_disabled_set(window->back_button, !ewk_view_back_possible(webview));
elm_object_disabled_set(window->forward_button, !ewk_view_forward_possible(webview));
}
Commit Message: [EFL][WK2] Add --window-size command line option to EFL MiniBrowser
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100942
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <[email protected]> on 2012-11-05
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Added window-size (-s) command line option to EFL MiniBrowser.
* MiniBrowser/efl/main.c:
(window_create):
(parse_window_size):
(elm_main):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@133450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static MagickBooleanType Get8BIMProperty(const Image *image,const char *key,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
*attribute,
format[MagickPathExtent],
name[MagickPathExtent],
*resource;
const StringInfo
*profile;
const unsigned char
*info;
long
start,
stop;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
id,
sub_number;
/*
There are no newlines in path names, so it's safe as terminator.
*/
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"8bim");
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(key,"8BIM:%ld,%ld:%1024[^\n]\n%1024[^\n]",&start,&stop,
name,format);
if ((count != 2) && (count != 3) && (count != 4))
return(MagickFalse);
if (count < 4)
(void) CopyMagickString(format,"SVG",MagickPathExtent);
if (count < 3)
*name='\0';
sub_number=1;
if (*name == '#')
sub_number=(ssize_t) StringToLong(&name[1]);
sub_number=MagickMax(sub_number,1L);
resource=(char *) NULL;
status=MagickFalse;
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
while ((length > 0) && (status == MagickFalse))
{
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) '8')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'B')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'I')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'M')
continue;
id=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBShort(&info,&length);
if (id < (ssize_t) start)
continue;
if (id > (ssize_t) stop)
continue;
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
resource=DestroyString(resource);
count=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
if ((count != 0) && ((size_t) count <= length))
{
resource=(char *) NULL;
if (~((size_t) count) >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
resource=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) count+
MagickPathExtent,sizeof(*resource));
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
resource[i]=(char) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
resource[count]='\0';
}
}
if ((count & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
count=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBLong(&info,&length);
if ((*name != '\0') && (*name != '#'))
if ((resource == (char *) NULL) || (LocaleCompare(name,resource) != 0))
{
/*
No name match, scroll forward and try next.
*/
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
continue;
}
if ((*name == '#') && (sub_number != 1))
{
/*
No numbered match, scroll forward and try next.
*/
sub_number--;
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
continue;
}
/*
We have the resource of interest.
*/
attribute=(char *) NULL;
if (~((size_t) count) >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
attribute=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) count+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*attribute));
if (attribute != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(attribute,(char *) info,(size_t) count);
attribute[count]='\0';
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
if ((id <= 1999) || (id >= 2999))
(void) SetImageProperty((Image *) image,key,(const char *)
attribute,exception);
else
{
char
*path;
if (LocaleCompare(format,"svg") == 0)
path=TraceSVGClippath((unsigned char *) attribute,(size_t) count,
image->columns,image->rows);
else
path=TracePSClippath((unsigned char *) attribute,(size_t) count);
(void) SetImageProperty((Image *) image,key,(const char *) path,
exception);
path=DestroyString(path);
}
attribute=DestroyString(attribute);
status=MagickTrue;
}
}
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
resource=DestroyString(resource);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int pin_rootfs(const char *rootfs)
{
char absrootfs[MAXPATHLEN];
char absrootfspin[MAXPATHLEN];
struct stat s;
int ret, fd;
if (rootfs == NULL || strlen(rootfs) == 0)
return -2;
if (!realpath(rootfs, absrootfs))
return -2;
if (access(absrootfs, F_OK))
return -1;
if (stat(absrootfs, &s))
return -1;
if (!S_ISDIR(s.st_mode))
return -2;
ret = snprintf(absrootfspin, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/lxc.hold", absrootfs);
if (ret >= MAXPATHLEN)
return -1;
fd = open(absrootfspin, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, S_IWUSR|S_IRUSR);
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
(void)unlink(absrootfspin);
return fd;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: METHODDEF(JDIMENSION)
get_rgb_cmyk_row(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
/* This version is for reading raw-byte-format PPM files with any maxval and
converting to CMYK */
{
ppm_source_ptr source = (ppm_source_ptr)sinfo;
register JSAMPROW ptr;
register U_CHAR *bufferptr;
register JSAMPLE *rescale = source->rescale;
JDIMENSION col;
unsigned int maxval = source->maxval;
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, source->iobuffer, source->buffer_width))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
ptr = source->pub.buffer[0];
bufferptr = source->iobuffer;
if (maxval == MAXJSAMPLE) {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
JSAMPLE r = *bufferptr++;
JSAMPLE g = *bufferptr++;
JSAMPLE b = *bufferptr++;
rgb_to_cmyk(r, g, b, ptr, ptr + 1, ptr + 2, ptr + 3);
ptr += 4;
}
} else {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
JSAMPLE r = rescale[UCH(*bufferptr++)];
JSAMPLE g = rescale[UCH(*bufferptr++)];
JSAMPLE b = rescale[UCH(*bufferptr++)];
rgb_to_cmyk(r, g, b, ptr, ptr + 1, ptr + 2, ptr + 3);
ptr += 4;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: cjpeg: Fix OOB read caused by malformed 8-bit BMP
... in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the
number of palette entries.
Fix partly borrowed from jpeg-9c. This commit also adopts Guido's
JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE enum value in lieu of our project-specific
JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE enum value.
Fixes #258
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static inline bool shouldSetStrutOnBlock(const LayoutBlockFlow& block, const RootInlineBox& lineBox, LayoutUnit lineLogicalOffset, int lineIndex, LayoutUnit remainingLogicalHeight)
{
bool wantsStrutOnBlock = false;
if (!block.style()->hasAutoOrphans() && block.style()->orphans() >= lineIndex) {
wantsStrutOnBlock = true;
} else if (lineBox == block.firstRootBox() && lineLogicalOffset == block.borderAndPaddingBefore()) {
LayoutUnit lineHeight = lineBox.lineBottomWithLeading() - lineBox.lineTopWithLeading();
LayoutUnit totalLogicalHeight = lineHeight + std::max<LayoutUnit>(0, lineLogicalOffset);
LayoutUnit pageLogicalHeightAtNewOffset = block.pageLogicalHeightForOffset(lineLogicalOffset + remainingLogicalHeight);
if (totalLogicalHeight < pageLogicalHeightAtNewOffset)
wantsStrutOnBlock = true;
}
if (!wantsStrutOnBlock || block.isOutOfFlowPositioned())
return false;
LayoutBlock* containingBlock = block.containingBlock();
return containingBlock && containingBlock->isLayoutBlockFlow();
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: QuotaManager::EvictionContext::~EvictionContext() {
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static Image *ReadOTBImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define GetBit(a,i) (((a) >> (i)) & 1L)
Image
*image;
int
byte;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
bit,
info,
depth;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
info=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (GetBit(info,4) == 0)
{
image->columns=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
image->rows=(size_t) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
else
{
image->columns=(size_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
image->rows=(size_t) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
}
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
depth=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (depth != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"OnlyLevelZerofilesSupported");
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,2) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Convert bi-level image to pixel packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (bit == 0)
{
byte=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (byte == EOF)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,(byte & (0x01 << (7-bit))) ?
0x00 : 0x01);
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
bit=0;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr)
{
console_verbose();
pr_crit("Bad mode in %s handler detected, code 0x%08x\n",
handler[reason], esr);
die("Oops - bad mode", regs, 0);
local_irq_disable();
panic("bad mode");
}
Commit Message: arm64: don't kill the kernel on a bad esr from el0
Rather than completely killing the kernel if we receive an esr value we
can't deal with in the el0 handlers, send the process a SIGILL and log
the esr value in the hope that we can debug it. If we receive a bad esr
from el1, we'll die() as before.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void pdf_run_dquote(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc, float aw, float ac, char *string, int string_len)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
gstate->text.word_space = aw;
gstate->text.char_space = ac;
pdf_tos_newline(&pr->tos, gstate->text.leading);
pdf_show_string(ctx, pr, (unsigned char*)string, string_len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void jas_stream_initbuf(jas_stream_t *stream, int bufmode, char *buf,
int bufsize)
{
/* If this function is being called, the buffer should not have been
initialized yet. */
assert(!stream->bufbase_);
if (bufmode != JAS_STREAM_UNBUF) {
/* The full- or line-buffered mode is being employed. */
if (!buf) {
/* The caller has not specified a buffer to employ, so allocate
one. */
if ((stream->bufbase_ = jas_malloc(JAS_STREAM_BUFSIZE +
JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK))) {
stream->bufmode_ |= JAS_STREAM_FREEBUF;
stream->bufsize_ = JAS_STREAM_BUFSIZE;
} else {
/* The buffer allocation has failed. Resort to unbuffered
operation. */
stream->bufbase_ = stream->tinybuf_;
stream->bufsize_ = 1;
}
} else {
/* The caller has specified a buffer to employ. */
/* The buffer must be large enough to accommodate maximum
putback. */
assert(bufsize > JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK);
stream->bufbase_ = JAS_CAST(jas_uchar *, buf);
stream->bufsize_ = bufsize - JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK;
}
} else {
/* The unbuffered mode is being employed. */
/* A buffer should not have been supplied by the caller. */
assert(!buf);
/* Use a trivial one-character buffer. */
stream->bufbase_ = stream->tinybuf_;
stream->bufsize_ = 1;
}
stream->bufstart_ = &stream->bufbase_[JAS_STREAM_MAXPUTBACK];
stream->ptr_ = stream->bufstart_;
stream->cnt_ = 0;
stream->bufmode_ |= bufmode & JAS_STREAM_BUFMODEMASK;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int ras_getdatastd(jas_stream_t *in, ras_hdr_t *hdr, ras_cmap_t *cmap,
jas_image_t *image)
{
int pad;
int nz;
int z;
int c;
int y;
int x;
int v;
int i;
jas_matrix_t *data[3];
/* Note: This function does not properly handle images with a colormap. */
/* Avoid compiler warnings about unused parameters. */
cmap = 0;
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
data[i] = jas_matrix_create(1, jas_image_width(image));
assert(data[i]);
}
pad = RAS_ROWSIZE(hdr) - (hdr->width * hdr->depth + 7) / 8;
for (y = 0; y < hdr->height; y++) {
nz = 0;
z = 0;
for (x = 0; x < hdr->width; x++) {
while (nz < hdr->depth) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
z = (z << 8) | c;
nz += 8;
}
v = (z >> (nz - hdr->depth)) & RAS_ONES(hdr->depth);
z &= RAS_ONES(nz - hdr->depth);
nz -= hdr->depth;
if (jas_image_numcmpts(image) == 3) {
jas_matrix_setv(data[0], x, (RAS_GETRED(v)));
jas_matrix_setv(data[1], x, (RAS_GETGREEN(v)));
jas_matrix_setv(data[2], x, (RAS_GETBLUE(v)));
} else {
jas_matrix_setv(data[0], x, (v));
}
}
if (pad) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
if (jas_image_writecmpt(image, i, 0, y, hdr->width, 1,
data[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
jas_matrix_destroy(data[i]);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a few bugs in the RAS encoder and decoder where errors were tested
with assertions instead of being gracefully handled.
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::SynchronousFind(int request_id,
const string16& search_text,
const WebKit::WebFindOptions& options,
int* match_count,
int* active_ordinal) {
if (!CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableWebViewSynchronousAPIs)) {
return;
}
Send(new ViewMsg_SynchronousFind(GetRoutingID(), request_id, search_text,
options, match_count, active_ordinal));
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
{
struct fd f = fdget(ufd);
struct bpf_prog *prog;
prog = __bpf_prog_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(prog))
return prog;
atomic_inc(&prog->aux->refcnt);
fdput(f);
return prog;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: status_t MediaPlayer::setDataSource(int fd, int64_t offset, int64_t length)
{
ALOGV("setDataSource(%d, %" PRId64 ", %" PRId64 ")", fd, offset, length);
status_t err = UNKNOWN_ERROR;
const sp<IMediaPlayerService>& service(getMediaPlayerService());
if (service != 0) {
sp<IMediaPlayer> player(service->create(this, mAudioSessionId));
if ((NO_ERROR != doSetRetransmitEndpoint(player)) ||
(NO_ERROR != player->setDataSource(fd, offset, length))) {
player.clear();
}
err = attachNewPlayer(player);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void vhost_net_vq_reset(struct vhost_net *n)
{
int i;
vhost_net_clear_ubuf_info(n);
for (i = 0; i < VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX; i++) {
n->vqs[i].done_idx = 0;
n->vqs[i].upend_idx = 0;
n->vqs[i].ubufs = NULL;
n->vqs[i].vhost_hlen = 0;
n->vqs[i].sock_hlen = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl* ExtensionTtsController::GetPlatformImpl() {
if (!platform_impl_)
platform_impl_ = ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl::GetInstance();
return platform_impl_;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: on_unregister_handler(TCMUService1HandlerManager1 *interface,
GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation,
gchar *subtype,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler = find_handler_by_subtype(subtype);
struct dbus_info *info = handler->opaque;
if (!handler) {
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", FALSE,
"unknown subtype"));
return TRUE;
}
dbus_unexport_handler(handler);
tcmur_unregister_handler(handler);
g_bus_unwatch_name(info->watcher_id);
g_free(info);
g_free(handler);
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", TRUE, "succeeded"));
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: fixed local DoS when UnregisterHandler was called for a not existing handler
Any user with DBUS access could cause a SEGFAULT in tcmu-runner by
running something like this:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:123
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: SpoolssRRPCN_r(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_rrpcn_unk0, NULL);
offset = dissect_doserror(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_rc, NULL);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void WebPage::setTimeoutForJavaScriptExecution(unsigned ms)
{
Settings::setTimeoutForJavaScriptExecution(d->m_page->groupName(), ms);
Document* doc = d->m_page->mainFrame()->document();
if (!doc)
return;
doc->globalData()->timeoutChecker.setTimeoutInterval(ms);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void generic_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
get_page(buf->page);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void InspectorTraceEvents::Did(const probe::CallFunction& probe) {
if (probe.depth)
return;
TRACE_EVENT_END0("devtools.timeline", "FunctionCall");
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("devtools.timeline"),
"UpdateCounters", TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD, "data",
InspectorUpdateCountersEvent::Data());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: status_t OMXCodec::configureCodec(const sp<MetaData> &meta) {
ALOGV("configureCodec protected=%d",
(mFlags & kEnableGrallocUsageProtected) ? 1 : 0);
if (!(mFlags & kIgnoreCodecSpecificData)) {
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size;
if (meta->findData(kKeyESDS, &type, &data, &size)) {
ESDS esds((const char *)data, size);
CHECK_EQ(esds.InitCheck(), (status_t)OK);
const void *codec_specific_data;
size_t codec_specific_data_size;
esds.getCodecSpecificInfo(
&codec_specific_data, &codec_specific_data_size);
addCodecSpecificData(
codec_specific_data, codec_specific_data_size);
} else if (meta->findData(kKeyAVCC, &type, &data, &size)) {
unsigned profile, level;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseAVCCodecSpecificData(
data, size, &profile, &level)) != OK) {
ALOGE("Malformed AVC codec specific data.");
return err;
}
CODEC_LOGI(
"AVC profile = %u (%s), level = %u",
profile, AVCProfileToString(profile), level);
} else if (meta->findData(kKeyHVCC, &type, &data, &size)) {
unsigned profile, level;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseHEVCCodecSpecificData(
data, size, &profile, &level)) != OK) {
ALOGE("Malformed HEVC codec specific data.");
return err;
}
CODEC_LOGI(
"HEVC profile = %u , level = %u",
profile, level);
} else if (meta->findData(kKeyVorbisInfo, &type, &data, &size)) {
addCodecSpecificData(data, size);
CHECK(meta->findData(kKeyVorbisBooks, &type, &data, &size));
addCodecSpecificData(data, size);
} else if (meta->findData(kKeyOpusHeader, &type, &data, &size)) {
addCodecSpecificData(data, size);
CHECK(meta->findData(kKeyOpusCodecDelay, &type, &data, &size));
addCodecSpecificData(data, size);
CHECK(meta->findData(kKeyOpusSeekPreRoll, &type, &data, &size));
addCodecSpecificData(data, size);
}
}
int32_t bitRate = 0;
if (mIsEncoder) {
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeyBitRate, &bitRate));
}
if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AMR_NB, mMIME)) {
setAMRFormat(false /* isWAMR */, bitRate);
} else if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AMR_WB, mMIME)) {
setAMRFormat(true /* isWAMR */, bitRate);
} else if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AAC, mMIME)) {
int32_t numChannels, sampleRate, aacProfile;
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeyChannelCount, &numChannels));
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &sampleRate));
if (!meta->findInt32(kKeyAACProfile, &aacProfile)) {
aacProfile = OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectNull;
}
int32_t isADTS;
if (!meta->findInt32(kKeyIsADTS, &isADTS)) {
isADTS = false;
}
status_t err = setAACFormat(numChannels, sampleRate, bitRate, aacProfile, isADTS);
if (err != OK) {
CODEC_LOGE("setAACFormat() failed (err = %d)", err);
return err;
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_MPEG, mMIME)) {
int32_t numChannels, sampleRate;
if (meta->findInt32(kKeyChannelCount, &numChannels)
&& meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &sampleRate)) {
setRawAudioFormat(
mIsEncoder ? kPortIndexInput : kPortIndexOutput,
sampleRate,
numChannels);
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AC3, mMIME)) {
int32_t numChannels;
int32_t sampleRate;
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeyChannelCount, &numChannels));
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &sampleRate));
status_t err = setAC3Format(numChannels, sampleRate);
if (err != OK) {
CODEC_LOGE("setAC3Format() failed (err = %d)", err);
return err;
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_G711_ALAW, mMIME)
|| !strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_G711_MLAW, mMIME)) {
int32_t sampleRate;
int32_t numChannels;
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeyChannelCount, &numChannels));
if (!meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &sampleRate)) {
sampleRate = 8000;
}
setG711Format(sampleRate, numChannels);
} else if (!strcasecmp(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_RAW, mMIME)) {
CHECK(!mIsEncoder);
int32_t numChannels, sampleRate;
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeyChannelCount, &numChannels));
CHECK(meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &sampleRate));
setRawAudioFormat(kPortIndexInput, sampleRate, numChannels);
}
if (!strncasecmp(mMIME, "video/", 6)) {
if (mIsEncoder) {
setVideoInputFormat(mMIME, meta);
} else {
status_t err = setVideoOutputFormat(
mMIME, meta);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
}
int32_t maxInputSize;
if (meta->findInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, &maxInputSize)) {
setMinBufferSize(kPortIndexInput, (OMX_U32)maxInputSize);
}
initOutputFormat(meta);
if ((mFlags & kClientNeedsFramebuffer)
&& !strncmp(mComponentName, "OMX.SEC.", 8)) {
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
status_t err =
mOMX->getExtensionIndex(
mNode,
"OMX.SEC.index.ThumbnailMode",
&index);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
OMX_BOOL enable = OMX_TRUE;
err = mOMX->setConfig(mNode, index, &enable, sizeof(enable));
if (err != OK) {
CODEC_LOGE("setConfig('OMX.SEC.index.ThumbnailMode') "
"returned error 0x%08x", err);
return err;
}
mQuirks &= ~kOutputBuffersAreUnreadable;
}
if (mNativeWindow != NULL
&& !mIsEncoder
&& !strncasecmp(mMIME, "video/", 6)
&& !strncmp(mComponentName, "OMX.", 4)) {
status_t err = initNativeWindow();
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix size check for OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits
since it doesn't follow the OMX convention. And remove support
for the kClientNeedsFrameBuffer flag.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: Ia2c119e2456ebf9e2f4e1de5104ef9032a212255
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int asf_build_simple_index(AVFormatContext *s, int stream_index)
{
ff_asf_guid g;
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int64_t current_pos = avio_tell(s->pb);
int64_t ret;
if((ret = avio_seek(s->pb, asf->data_object_offset + asf->data_object_size, SEEK_SET)) < 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
/* the data object can be followed by other top-level objects,
* skip them until the simple index object is reached */
while (ff_guidcmp(&g, &ff_asf_simple_index_header)) {
int64_t gsize = avio_rl64(s->pb);
if (gsize < 24 || avio_feof(s->pb)) {
goto end;
}
avio_skip(s->pb, gsize - 24);
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
}
{
int64_t itime, last_pos = -1;
int pct, ict;
int i;
int64_t av_unused gsize = avio_rl64(s->pb);
if ((ret = ff_get_guid(s->pb, &g)) < 0)
goto end;
itime = avio_rl64(s->pb);
pct = avio_rl32(s->pb);
ict = avio_rl32(s->pb);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG,
"itime:0x%"PRIx64", pct:%d, ict:%d\n", itime, pct, ict);
for (i = 0; i < ict; i++) {
int pktnum = avio_rl32(s->pb);
int pktct = avio_rl16(s->pb);
int64_t pos = s->internal->data_offset + s->packet_size * (int64_t)pktnum;
int64_t index_pts = FFMAX(av_rescale(itime, i, 10000) - asf->hdr.preroll, 0);
if (pos != last_pos) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "pktnum:%d, pktct:%d pts: %"PRId64"\n",
pktnum, pktct, index_pts);
av_add_index_entry(s->streams[stream_index], pos, index_pts,
s->packet_size, 0, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
last_pos = pos;
}
}
asf->index_read = ict > 1;
}
end:
avio_seek(s->pb, current_pos, SEEK_SET);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void kvm_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
{
kvm_x86_ops->get_segment(vcpu, var, seg);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: gfx::NativeWindow BrowserView::GetNativeWindow() const {
return GetWidget() ? GetWidget()->GetNativeWindow() : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void HTMLAnchorElement::handleClick(Event* event)
{
event->setDefaultHandled();
LocalFrame* frame = document().frame();
if (!frame)
return;
StringBuilder url;
url.append(stripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(fastGetAttribute(hrefAttr)));
appendServerMapMousePosition(url, event);
KURL completedURL = document().completeURL(url.toString());
sendPings(completedURL);
ResourceRequest request(completedURL);
request.setUIStartTime(event->platformTimeStamp());
request.setInputPerfMetricReportPolicy(InputToLoadPerfMetricReportPolicy::ReportLink);
ReferrerPolicy policy;
if (hasAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr) && SecurityPolicy::referrerPolicyFromString(fastGetAttribute(referrerpolicyAttr), &policy) && !hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
request.setHTTPReferrer(SecurityPolicy::generateReferrer(policy, completedURL, document().outgoingReferrer()));
}
if (hasAttribute(downloadAttr)) {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextDownload);
bool isSameOrigin = completedURL.protocolIsData() || document().getSecurityOrigin()->canRequest(completedURL);
const AtomicString& suggestedName = (isSameOrigin ? fastGetAttribute(downloadAttr) : nullAtom);
frame->loader().client()->loadURLExternally(request, NavigationPolicyDownload, suggestedName, false);
} else {
request.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextHyperlink);
FrameLoadRequest frameRequest(&document(), request, getAttribute(targetAttr));
frameRequest.setTriggeringEvent(event);
if (hasRel(RelationNoReferrer)) {
frameRequest.setShouldSendReferrer(NeverSendReferrer);
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
}
if (hasRel(RelationNoOpener))
frameRequest.setShouldSetOpener(NeverSetOpener);
frame->loader().load(frameRequest);
}
}
Commit Message: Disable frame navigations during DocumentLoader detach in FrameLoader::startLoad
BUG=613266
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2006033002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#396241}
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: DOMHighResTimeStamp PerformanceNavigationTiming::redirectStart() const {
bool allow_redirect_details = GetAllowRedirectDetails();
DocumentLoadTiming* timing = GetDocumentLoadTiming();
if (!allow_redirect_details || !timing)
return 0;
return Performance::MonotonicTimeToDOMHighResTimeStamp(
TimeOrigin(), timing->RedirectStart(), false /* allow_negative_value */);
}
Commit Message: Fix the |name| of PerformanceNavigationTiming
Previously, the |name| of a PerformanceNavigationTiming entry was the initial
URL (the request URL). After this CL, it is the response URL, so for example
a url of the form 'redirect?location=newLoc' will have 'newLoc' as the |name|.
Bug: 797465
Change-Id: Icab53ad8027d066422562c82bcf0354c264fea40
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/996579
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548773}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void queue_push(register Queue *qp, size_t extra_length, char const *info)
{
register char *cp;
size_t memory_length;
size_t available_length;
size_t begin_length;
size_t n_begin;
size_t q_length;
if (!extra_length)
return;
memory_length = qp->d_memory_end - qp->d_memory;
q_length =
qp->d_read <= qp->d_write ?
(size_t)(qp->d_write - qp->d_read)
:
memory_length - (qp->d_read - qp->d_write);
available_length = memory_length - q_length - 1;
/* -1, as the Q cannot completely fill up all */
/* available memory in the buffer */
if (message_show(MSG_INFO))
message("push_front %u bytes in `%s'", (unsigned)extra_length, info);
if (extra_length > available_length)
{
/* enlarge the buffer: */
memory_length += extra_length - available_length + BLOCK_QUEUE;
cp = new_memory(memory_length, sizeof(char));
if (message_show(MSG_INFO))
message("Reallocating queue at %p to %p", qp->d_memory, cp);
if (qp->d_read > qp->d_write) /* q wraps around end */
{
size_t tail_len = qp->d_memory_end - qp->d_read;
memcpy(cp, qp->d_read, tail_len); /* first part -> begin */
/* 2nd part beyond */
memcpy(cp + tail_len, qp->d_memory,
(size_t)(qp->d_write - qp->d_memory));
qp->d_write = cp + q_length;
qp->d_read = cp;
}
else /* q as one block */
{
memcpy(cp, qp->d_memory, memory_length);/* cp existing buffer */
qp->d_read = cp + (qp->d_read - qp->d_memory);
qp->d_write = cp + (qp->d_write - qp->d_memory);
}
free(qp->d_memory); /* free old memory */
qp->d_memory_end = cp + memory_length; /* update d_memory_end */
qp->d_memory = cp; /* update d_memory */
}
/*
Write as much as possible at the begin of the buffer, then write
the remaining chars at the end.
q_length is increased by the length of the info string
The first chars to write are at the end of info, and the 2nd part to
write are the initial chars of info, since the initial part of info
is then read first.
*/
/* # chars available at the */
begin_length = qp->d_read - qp->d_memory; /* begin of the buffer */
n_begin = extra_length <= begin_length ? /* determine # to write at */
extra_length /* the begin of the buffer */
:
begin_length;
memcpy /* write trailing part of */
( /* info first */
qp->d_read -= n_begin,
info + extra_length - n_begin,
n_begin
);
if (extra_length > begin_length) /* not yet all chars written*/
{
/* continue with the remaining number of characters. Insert these at*/
/* the end of the buffer */
extra_length -= begin_length; /* reduce # to write */
memcpy /* d_read wraps to the end */
( /* write info's rest */
qp->d_read = qp->d_memory_end - extra_length,
info,
extra_length
);
}
}
Commit Message: fixed invalid memory reads detected by the address sanitizer
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: jbig2_sd_cat(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, int n_dicts, Jbig2SymbolDict **dicts)
{
int i, j, k, symbols;
Jbig2SymbolDict *new = NULL;
/* count the imported symbols and allocate a new array */
symbols = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_dicts; i++)
symbols += dicts[i]->n_symbols;
/* fill a new array with cloned glyph pointers */
new = jbig2_sd_new(ctx, symbols);
if (new != NULL) {
k = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_dicts; i++)
for (j = 0; j < dicts[i]->n_symbols; j++)
new->glyphs[k++] = jbig2_image_clone(ctx, dicts[i]->glyphs[j]);
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, -1, "failed to allocate new symbol dictionary");
}
return new;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool FrameView::shouldSuspendScrollAnimations() const
{
return m_frame->loader().state() != FrameStateComplete;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool HTMLSelectElement::isRequiredFormControl() const
{
return isRequired();
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int pop_fetch_headers(struct Context *ctx)
{
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
struct Progress progress;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
header_cache_t *hc = pop_hcache_open(pop_data, ctx->path);
#endif
time(&pop_data->check_time);
pop_data->clear_cache = false;
for (int i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
ctx->hdrs[i]->refno = -1;
const int old_count = ctx->msgcount;
int ret = pop_fetch_data(pop_data, "UIDL\r\n", NULL, fetch_uidl, ctx);
const int new_count = ctx->msgcount;
ctx->msgcount = old_count;
if (pop_data->cmd_uidl == 2)
{
if (ret == 0)
{
pop_data->cmd_uidl = 1;
mutt_debug(1, "set UIDL capability\n");
}
if (ret == -2 && pop_data->cmd_uidl == 2)
{
pop_data->cmd_uidl = 0;
mutt_debug(1, "unset UIDL capability\n");
snprintf(pop_data->err_msg, sizeof(pop_data->err_msg), "%s",
_("Command UIDL is not supported by server."));
}
}
if (!ctx->quiet)
{
mutt_progress_init(&progress, _("Fetching message headers..."),
MUTT_PROGRESS_MSG, ReadInc, new_count - old_count);
}
if (ret == 0)
{
int i, deleted;
for (i = 0, deleted = 0; i < old_count; i++)
{
if (ctx->hdrs[i]->refno == -1)
{
ctx->hdrs[i]->deleted = true;
deleted++;
}
}
if (deleted > 0)
{
mutt_error(
ngettext("%d message has been lost. Try reopening the mailbox.",
"%d messages have been lost. Try reopening the mailbox.", deleted),
deleted);
}
bool hcached = false;
for (i = old_count; i < new_count; i++)
{
if (!ctx->quiet)
mutt_progress_update(&progress, i + 1 - old_count, -1);
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
void *data = mutt_hcache_fetch(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data));
if (data)
{
char *uidl = mutt_str_strdup(ctx->hdrs[i]->data);
int refno = ctx->hdrs[i]->refno;
int index = ctx->hdrs[i]->index;
/*
* - POP dynamically numbers headers and relies on h->refno
* to map messages; so restore header and overwrite restored
* refno with current refno, same for index
* - h->data needs to a separate pointer as it's driver-specific
* data freed separately elsewhere
* (the old h->data should point inside a malloc'd block from
* hcache so there shouldn't be a memleak here)
*/
struct Header *h = mutt_hcache_restore((unsigned char *) data);
mutt_hcache_free(hc, &data);
mutt_header_free(&ctx->hdrs[i]);
ctx->hdrs[i] = h;
ctx->hdrs[i]->refno = refno;
ctx->hdrs[i]->index = index;
ctx->hdrs[i]->data = uidl;
ret = 0;
hcached = true;
}
else
#endif
if ((ret = pop_read_header(pop_data, ctx->hdrs[i])) < 0)
break;
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
else
{
mutt_hcache_store(hc, ctx->hdrs[i]->data, strlen(ctx->hdrs[i]->data),
ctx->hdrs[i], 0);
}
#endif
/*
* faked support for flags works like this:
* - if 'hcached' is true, we have the message in our hcache:
* - if we also have a body: read
* - if we don't have a body: old
* (if $mark_old is set which is maybe wrong as
* $mark_old should be considered for syncing the
* folder and not when opening it XXX)
* - if 'hcached' is false, we don't have the message in our hcache:
* - if we also have a body: read
* - if we don't have a body: new
*/
const bool bcached =
(mutt_bcache_exists(pop_data->bcache, ctx->hdrs[i]->data) == 0);
ctx->hdrs[i]->old = false;
ctx->hdrs[i]->read = false;
if (hcached)
{
if (bcached)
ctx->hdrs[i]->read = true;
else if (MarkOld)
ctx->hdrs[i]->old = true;
}
else
{
if (bcached)
ctx->hdrs[i]->read = true;
}
ctx->msgcount++;
}
if (i > old_count)
mx_update_context(ctx, i - old_count);
}
#ifdef USE_HCACHE
mutt_hcache_close(hc);
#endif
if (ret < 0)
{
for (int i = ctx->msgcount; i < new_count; i++)
mutt_header_free(&ctx->hdrs[i]);
return ret;
}
/* after putting the result into our structures,
* clean up cache, i.e. wipe messages deleted outside
* the availability of our cache
*/
if (MessageCacheClean)
mutt_bcache_list(pop_data->bcache, msg_cache_check, (void *) ctx);
mutt_clear_error();
return (new_count - old_count);
}
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-22
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: SoftOpus::~SoftOpus() {
if (mDecoder != NULL) {
opus_multistream_decoder_destroy(mDecoder);
mDecoder = NULL;
}
if (mHeader != NULL) {
delete mHeader;
mHeader = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (vorbis|opus)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I1ccdd16a00741da072527a6d13e87fd7c7fe8c54
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void __ext4_abort(struct super_block *sb, const char *function,
unsigned int line, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
save_error_info(sb, function, line);
va_start(args, fmt);
printk(KERN_CRIT "EXT4-fs error (device %s): %s:%d: ", sb->s_id,
function, line);
vprintk(fmt, args);
printk("\n");
va_end(args);
if ((sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) == 0) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_CRIT, "Remounting filesystem read-only");
sb->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_mount_flags |= EXT4_MF_FS_ABORTED;
if (EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal)
jbd2_journal_abort(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_journal, -EIO);
save_error_info(sb, function, line);
}
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC))
panic("EXT4-fs panic from previous error\n");
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static struct page *follow_page_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmd, unsigned int flags)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct dev_pagemap *pgmap = NULL;
struct page *page;
spinlock_t *ptl;
pte_t *ptep, pte;
retry:
if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
ptep = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, &ptl);
pte = *ptep;
if (!pte_present(pte)) {
swp_entry_t entry;
/*
* KSM's break_ksm() relies upon recognizing a ksm page
* even while it is being migrated, so for that case we
* need migration_entry_wait().
*/
if (likely(!(flags & FOLL_MIGRATION)))
goto no_page;
if (pte_none(pte))
goto no_page;
entry = pte_to_swp_entry(pte);
if (!is_migration_entry(entry))
goto no_page;
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
migration_entry_wait(mm, pmd, address);
goto retry;
}
if ((flags & FOLL_NUMA) && pte_protnone(pte))
goto no_page;
if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) && !pte_write(pte)) {
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
return NULL;
}
page = vm_normal_page(vma, address, pte);
if (!page && pte_devmap(pte) && (flags & FOLL_GET)) {
/*
* Only return device mapping pages in the FOLL_GET case since
* they are only valid while holding the pgmap reference.
*/
pgmap = get_dev_pagemap(pte_pfn(pte), NULL);
if (pgmap)
page = pte_page(pte);
else
goto no_page;
} else if (unlikely(!page)) {
if (flags & FOLL_DUMP) {
/* Avoid special (like zero) pages in core dumps */
page = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
goto out;
}
if (is_zero_pfn(pte_pfn(pte))) {
page = pte_page(pte);
} else {
int ret;
ret = follow_pfn_pte(vma, address, ptep, flags);
page = ERR_PTR(ret);
goto out;
}
}
if (flags & FOLL_SPLIT && PageTransCompound(page)) {
int ret;
get_page(page);
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
lock_page(page);
ret = split_huge_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
put_page(page);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
goto retry;
}
if (flags & FOLL_GET) {
get_page(page);
/* drop the pgmap reference now that we hold the page */
if (pgmap) {
put_dev_pagemap(pgmap);
pgmap = NULL;
}
}
if (flags & FOLL_TOUCH) {
if ((flags & FOLL_WRITE) &&
!pte_dirty(pte) && !PageDirty(page))
set_page_dirty(page);
/*
* pte_mkyoung() would be more correct here, but atomic care
* is needed to avoid losing the dirty bit: it is easier to use
* mark_page_accessed().
*/
mark_page_accessed(page);
}
if ((flags & FOLL_MLOCK) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)) {
/* Do not mlock pte-mapped THP */
if (PageTransCompound(page))
goto out;
/*
* The preliminary mapping check is mainly to avoid the
* pointless overhead of lock_page on the ZERO_PAGE
* which might bounce very badly if there is contention.
*
* If the page is already locked, we don't need to
* handle it now - vmscan will handle it later if and
* when it attempts to reclaim the page.
*/
if (page->mapping && trylock_page(page)) {
lru_add_drain(); /* push cached pages to LRU */
/*
* Because we lock page here, and migration is
* blocked by the pte's page reference, and we
* know the page is still mapped, we don't even
* need to check for file-cache page truncation.
*/
mlock_vma_page(page);
unlock_page(page);
}
}
out:
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
return page;
no_page:
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptl);
if (!pte_none(pte))
return NULL;
return no_page_table(vma, flags);
}
Commit Message: mm: remove gup_flags FOLL_WRITE games from __get_user_pages()
This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once
(badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db9757a ("Fix
get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to
problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404e5 ("fix get_user_pages bug").
In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now
fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better). The
s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3cce ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9. Earlier kernels will
have to look at the page state itself.
Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely
theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger.
To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes,
we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that
is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that
the FOLL_COW flag is still valid.
Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Thelen <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: struct posix_acl *orangefs_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct posix_acl *acl;
int ret;
char *key = NULL, *value = NULL;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
key = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
key = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
gossip_err("orangefs_get_acl: bogus value of type %d\n", type);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
/*
* Rather than incurring a network call just to determine the exact
* length of the attribute, I just allocate a max length to save on
* the network call. Conceivably, we could pass NULL to
* orangefs_inode_getxattr() to probe the length of the value, but
* I don't do that for now.
*/
value = kmalloc(ORANGEFS_MAX_XATTR_VALUELEN, GFP_KERNEL);
if (value == NULL)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
gossip_debug(GOSSIP_ACL_DEBUG,
"inode %pU, key %s, type %d\n",
get_khandle_from_ino(inode),
key,
type);
ret = orangefs_inode_getxattr(inode, key, value,
ORANGEFS_MAX_XATTR_VALUELEN);
/* if the key exists, convert it to an in-memory rep */
if (ret > 0) {
acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, value, ret);
} else if (ret == -ENODATA || ret == -ENOSYS) {
acl = NULL;
} else {
gossip_err("inode %pU retrieving acl's failed with error %d\n",
get_khandle_from_ino(inode),
ret);
acl = ERR_PTR(ret);
}
/* kfree(NULL) is safe, so don't worry if value ever got used */
kfree(value);
return acl;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-285
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void InspectorClientImpl::clearBrowserCache()
{
if (WebDevToolsAgentImpl* agent = devToolsAgent())
agent->clearBrowserCache();
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, isValidPharFilename)
{
char *fname;
const char *ext_str;
size_t fname_len;
int ext_len, is_executable;
zend_bool executable = 1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|b", &fname, &fname_len, &executable) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
is_executable = executable;
RETVAL_BOOL(phar_detect_phar_fname_ext(fname, fname_len, &ext_str, &ext_len, is_executable, 2, 1) == SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void get_id3_tag(AVFormatContext *s, int len)
{
ID3v2ExtraMeta *id3v2_extra_meta = NULL;
ff_id3v2_read(s, ID3v2_DEFAULT_MAGIC, &id3v2_extra_meta, len);
if (id3v2_extra_meta) {
ff_id3v2_parse_apic(s, &id3v2_extra_meta);
ff_id3v2_parse_chapters(s, &id3v2_extra_meta);
}
ff_id3v2_free_extra_meta(&id3v2_extra_meta);
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: CURLcode Curl_close(struct Curl_easy *data)
{
struct Curl_multi *m;
if(!data)
return CURLE_OK;
Curl_expire_clear(data); /* shut off timers */
m = data->multi;
if(m)
/* This handle is still part of a multi handle, take care of this first
and detach this handle from there. */
curl_multi_remove_handle(data->multi, data);
if(data->multi_easy)
/* when curl_easy_perform() is used, it creates its own multi handle to
use and this is the one */
curl_multi_cleanup(data->multi_easy);
/* Destroy the timeout list that is held in the easy handle. It is
/normally/ done by curl_multi_remove_handle() but this is "just in
case" */
Curl_llist_destroy(&data->state.timeoutlist, NULL);
data->magic = 0; /* force a clear AFTER the possibly enforced removal from
the multi handle, since that function uses the magic
field! */
if(data->state.rangestringalloc)
free(data->state.range);
/* freed here just in case DONE wasn't called */
Curl_free_request_state(data);
/* Close down all open SSL info and sessions */
Curl_ssl_close_all(data);
Curl_safefree(data->state.first_host);
Curl_safefree(data->state.scratch);
Curl_ssl_free_certinfo(data);
/* Cleanup possible redirect junk */
free(data->req.newurl);
data->req.newurl = NULL;
if(data->change.referer_alloc) {
Curl_safefree(data->change.referer);
data->change.referer_alloc = FALSE;
}
data->change.referer = NULL;
Curl_up_free(data);
Curl_safefree(data->state.buffer);
Curl_safefree(data->state.headerbuff);
Curl_safefree(data->state.ulbuf);
Curl_flush_cookies(data, 1);
Curl_digest_cleanup(data);
Curl_safefree(data->info.contenttype);
Curl_safefree(data->info.wouldredirect);
/* this destroys the channel and we cannot use it anymore after this */
Curl_resolver_cleanup(data->state.resolver);
Curl_http2_cleanup_dependencies(data);
Curl_convert_close(data);
/* No longer a dirty share, if it exists */
if(data->share) {
Curl_share_lock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_SHARE, CURL_LOCK_ACCESS_SINGLE);
data->share->dirty--;
Curl_share_unlock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_SHARE);
}
/* destruct wildcard structures if it is needed */
Curl_wildcard_dtor(&data->wildcard);
Curl_freeset(data);
free(data);
return CURLE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> serializedValueCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.serializedValue");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
bool serializedArgDidThrow = false;
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> serializedArg = SerializedScriptValue::create(args[0], 0, 0, serializedArgDidThrow, args.GetIsolate());
if (serializedArgDidThrow)
return v8::Undefined();
imp->serializedValue(serializedArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int rfcomm_sock_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock, int flags)
{
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
struct sock *sk = sock->sk, *nsk;
long timeo;
int err = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & O_NONBLOCK);
BT_DBG("sk %p timeo %ld", sk, timeo);
/* Wait for an incoming connection. (wake-one). */
add_wait_queue_exclusive(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
while (1) {
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN) {
err = -EBADFD;
break;
}
nsk = bt_accept_dequeue(sk, newsock);
if (nsk)
break;
if (!timeo) {
err = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo);
lock_sock(sk);
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
if (err)
goto done;
newsock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
BT_DBG("new socket %p", nsk);
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the trailing padding byte of struct
sockaddr_rc added for alignment. It that for leaks one byte kernel stack
via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling
the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: media::mojom::VideoFrameDataPtr MakeVideoFrameData(
const scoped_refptr<media::VideoFrame>& input) {
if (input->metadata()->IsTrue(media::VideoFrameMetadata::END_OF_STREAM)) {
return media::mojom::VideoFrameData::NewEosData(
media::mojom::EosVideoFrameData::New());
}
if (input->storage_type() == media::VideoFrame::STORAGE_MOJO_SHARED_BUFFER) {
media::MojoSharedBufferVideoFrame* mojo_frame =
static_cast<media::MojoSharedBufferVideoFrame*>(input.get());
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle dup = mojo_frame->Handle().Clone(
mojo::SharedBufferHandle::AccessMode::READ_ONLY);
DCHECK(dup.is_valid());
return media::mojom::VideoFrameData::NewSharedBufferData(
media::mojom::SharedBufferVideoFrameData::New(
std::move(dup), mojo_frame->MappedSize(),
mojo_frame->stride(media::VideoFrame::kYPlane),
mojo_frame->stride(media::VideoFrame::kUPlane),
mojo_frame->stride(media::VideoFrame::kVPlane),
mojo_frame->PlaneOffset(media::VideoFrame::kYPlane),
mojo_frame->PlaneOffset(media::VideoFrame::kUPlane),
mojo_frame->PlaneOffset(media::VideoFrame::kVPlane)));
}
if (input->HasTextures()) {
std::vector<gpu::MailboxHolder> mailbox_holder(
media::VideoFrame::kMaxPlanes);
size_t num_planes = media::VideoFrame::NumPlanes(input->format());
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_planes; i++)
mailbox_holder[i] = input->mailbox_holder(i);
return media::mojom::VideoFrameData::NewMailboxData(
media::mojom::MailboxVideoFrameData::New(std::move(mailbox_holder)));
}
NOTREACHED() << "Unsupported VideoFrame conversion";
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int TestOpenProcess(DWORD process_id) {
HANDLE process = ::OpenProcess(PROCESS_VM_READ,
FALSE, // Do not inherit handle.
process_id);
if (NULL == process) {
if (ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED == ::GetLastError()) {
return SBOX_TEST_DENIED;
} else {
return SBOX_TEST_FAILED_TO_EXECUTE_COMMAND;
}
} else {
::CloseHandle(process);
return SBOX_TEST_SUCCEEDED;
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool FeatureInfo::IsWebGL2OrES3OrHigherContext() const {
return IsWebGL2OrES3OrHigherContextType(context_type_);
}
Commit Message: gpu: Disallow use of IOSurfaces for half-float format with swiftshader.
[email protected]
Bug: 998038
Change-Id: Ic31d28938ef205b36657fc7bd297fe8a63d08543
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1798052
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#695826}
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void ScriptProfiler::stopTrackingHeapObjects()
{
v8::Isolate::GetCurrent()->GetHeapProfiler()->StopTrackingHeapObjects();
}
Commit Message: Fix clobbered build issue.
[email protected]
NOTRY=true
BUG=269698
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22425005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155711 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int iwgif_read_image(struct iwgifrcontext *rctx)
{
int retval=0;
struct lzwdeccontext d;
size_t subblocksize;
int has_local_ct;
int local_ct_size;
unsigned int root_codesize;
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,9)) goto done;
rctx->image_left = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[0]);
rctx->image_top = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[2]);
rctx->image_width = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[4]);
rctx->image_height = (int)iw_get_ui16le(&rctx->rbuf[6]);
rctx->interlaced = (int)((rctx->rbuf[8]>>6)&0x01);
has_local_ct = (int)((rctx->rbuf[8]>>7)&0x01);
if(has_local_ct) {
local_ct_size = (int)(rctx->rbuf[8]&0x07);
rctx->colortable.num_entries = 1<<(1+local_ct_size);
}
if(has_local_ct) {
if(!iwgif_read_color_table(rctx,&rctx->colortable)) goto done;
}
if(rctx->has_transparency) {
rctx->colortable.entry[rctx->trans_color_index].a = 0;
}
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,1)) goto done;
root_codesize = (unsigned int)rctx->rbuf[0];
if(root_codesize<2 || root_codesize>11) {
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Invalid LZW minimum code size");
goto done;
}
if(!iwgif_init_screen(rctx)) goto done;
rctx->total_npixels = (size_t)rctx->image_width * (size_t)rctx->image_height;
if(!iwgif_make_row_pointers(rctx)) goto done;
lzw_init(&d,root_codesize);
lzw_clear(&d);
while(1) {
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,1)) goto done;
subblocksize = (size_t)rctx->rbuf[0];
if(subblocksize==0) break;
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,subblocksize)) goto done;
if(!lzw_process_bytes(rctx,&d,rctx->rbuf,subblocksize)) goto done;
if(d.eoi_flag) break;
if(rctx->pixels_set >= rctx->total_npixels) break;
}
retval=1;
done:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a GIF decoding bug (divide by zero)
Fixes issue #15
CWE ID: CWE-369
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int build_udp_headers(conn *c) {
int i;
unsigned char *hdr;
assert(c != NULL);
if (c->msgused > c->hdrsize) {
void *new_hdrbuf;
if (c->hdrbuf) {
new_hdrbuf = realloc(c->hdrbuf, c->msgused * 2 * UDP_HEADER_SIZE);
} else {
new_hdrbuf = malloc(c->msgused * 2 * UDP_HEADER_SIZE);
}
if (! new_hdrbuf) {
STATS_LOCK();
stats.malloc_fails++;
STATS_UNLOCK();
return -1;
}
c->hdrbuf = (unsigned char *)new_hdrbuf;
c->hdrsize = c->msgused * 2;
}
hdr = c->hdrbuf;
for (i = 0; i < c->msgused; i++) {
c->msglist[i].msg_iov[0].iov_base = (void*)hdr;
c->msglist[i].msg_iov[0].iov_len = UDP_HEADER_SIZE;
*hdr++ = c->request_id / 256;
*hdr++ = c->request_id % 256;
*hdr++ = i / 256;
*hdr++ = i % 256;
*hdr++ = c->msgused / 256;
*hdr++ = c->msgused % 256;
*hdr++ = 0;
*hdr++ = 0;
assert((void *) hdr == (caddr_t)c->msglist[i].msg_iov[0].iov_base + UDP_HEADER_SIZE);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: set_text_distance(gs_point *pdist, double dx, double dy, const gs_matrix *pmat)
{
int code = gs_distance_transform_inverse(dx, dy, pmat, pdist);
double rounded;
if (code == gs_error_undefinedresult) {
/* The CTM is degenerate.
Can't know the distance in user space.
} else if (code < 0)
return code;
/* If the distance is very close to integers, round it. */
if (fabs(pdist->x - (rounded = floor(pdist->x + 0.5))) < 0.0005)
pdist->x = rounded;
if (fabs(pdist->y - (rounded = floor(pdist->y + 0.5))) < 0.0005)
pdist->y = rounded;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: AccessibilityOrientation AXNodeObject::orientation() const {
const AtomicString& ariaOrientation =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kOrientation);
AccessibilityOrientation orientation = AccessibilityOrientationUndefined;
if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaOrientation, "horizontal"))
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationHorizontal;
else if (equalIgnoringCase(ariaOrientation, "vertical"))
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationVertical;
switch (roleValue()) {
case ComboBoxRole:
case ListBoxRole:
case MenuRole:
case ScrollBarRole:
case TreeRole:
if (orientation == AccessibilityOrientationUndefined)
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationVertical;
return orientation;
case MenuBarRole:
case SliderRole:
case SplitterRole:
case TabListRole:
case ToolbarRole:
if (orientation == AccessibilityOrientationUndefined)
orientation = AccessibilityOrientationHorizontal;
return orientation;
case RadioGroupRole:
case TreeGridRole:
case TableRole:
return orientation;
default:
return AXObject::orientation();
}
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void CSoundFile::FineVibrato(ModChannel *p, uint32 param) const
{
if (param & 0x0F) p->nVibratoDepth = param & 0x0F;
if (param & 0xF0) p->nVibratoSpeed = (param >> 4) & 0x0F;
p->dwFlags.set(CHN_VIBRATO);
if(m_playBehaviour[kST3VibratoMemory] && (param & 0x0F))
{
p->nVibratoDepth *= 4u;
}
}
Commit Message: [Fix] Possible out-of-bounds read when computing length of some IT files with pattern loops (OpenMPT: formats that are converted to IT, libopenmpt: IT/ITP/MO3), caught with afl-fuzz.
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@10027 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void voidMethodDoubleArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodDoubleArg", "TestObjectPython", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(double, doubleArg, static_cast<double>(info[0]->NumberValue()));
imp->voidMethodDoubleArg(doubleArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void SoftVorbis::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE) {
return;
}
if (portIndex == 0 && mInputBufferCount < 2) {
BufferInfo *info = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = info->mHeader;
const uint8_t *data = header->pBuffer + header->nOffset;
size_t size = header->nFilledLen;
ogg_buffer buf;
ogg_reference ref;
oggpack_buffer bits;
makeBitReader(
(const uint8_t *)data + 7, size - 7,
&buf, &ref, &bits);
if (mInputBufferCount == 0) {
CHECK(mVi == NULL);
mVi = new vorbis_info;
vorbis_info_init(mVi);
CHECK_EQ(0, _vorbis_unpack_info(mVi, &bits));
} else {
CHECK_EQ(0, _vorbis_unpack_books(mVi, &bits));
CHECK(mState == NULL);
mState = new vorbis_dsp_state;
CHECK_EQ(0, vorbis_dsp_init(mState, mVi));
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, 1, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
}
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
info->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(header);
++mInputBufferCount;
return;
}
while ((!inQueue.empty() || (mSawInputEos && !mSignalledOutputEos)) && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = NULL;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = NULL;
if (!inQueue.empty()) {
inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
int32_t numPageSamples = 0;
if (inHeader) {
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mSawInputEos = true;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen || !mSawInputEos) {
CHECK_GE(inHeader->nFilledLen, sizeof(numPageSamples));
memcpy(&numPageSamples,
inHeader->pBuffer
+ inHeader->nOffset + inHeader->nFilledLen - 4,
sizeof(numPageSamples));
if (inHeader->nOffset == 0) {
mAnchorTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
mNumFramesOutput = 0;
}
inHeader->nFilledLen -= sizeof(numPageSamples);;
}
}
if (numPageSamples >= 0) {
mNumFramesLeftOnPage = numPageSamples;
}
ogg_buffer buf;
buf.data = inHeader ? inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset : NULL;
buf.size = inHeader ? inHeader->nFilledLen : 0;
buf.refcount = 1;
buf.ptr.owner = NULL;
ogg_reference ref;
ref.buffer = &buf;
ref.begin = 0;
ref.length = buf.size;
ref.next = NULL;
ogg_packet pack;
pack.packet = &ref;
pack.bytes = ref.length;
pack.b_o_s = 0;
pack.e_o_s = 0;
pack.granulepos = 0;
pack.packetno = 0;
int numFrames = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
int err = vorbis_dsp_synthesis(mState, &pack, 1);
if (err != 0) {
#if !defined(__arm__) && !defined(__aarch64__)
ALOGV("vorbis_dsp_synthesis returned %d", err);
#else
ALOGW("vorbis_dsp_synthesis returned %d", err);
#endif
} else {
numFrames = vorbis_dsp_pcmout(
mState, (int16_t *)outHeader->pBuffer,
(kMaxNumSamplesPerBuffer / mVi->channels));
if (numFrames < 0) {
ALOGE("vorbis_dsp_pcmout returned %d", numFrames);
numFrames = 0;
}
}
if (mNumFramesLeftOnPage >= 0) {
if (numFrames > mNumFramesLeftOnPage) {
ALOGV("discarding %d frames at end of page",
numFrames - mNumFramesLeftOnPage);
numFrames = mNumFramesLeftOnPage;
if (mSawInputEos) {
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
mSignalledOutputEos = true;
}
}
mNumFramesLeftOnPage -= numFrames;
}
outHeader->nFilledLen = numFrames * sizeof(int16_t) * mVi->channels;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nTimeStamp =
mAnchorTimeUs
+ (mNumFramesOutput * 1000000ll) / mVi->rate;
mNumFramesOutput += numFrames;
if (inHeader) {
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
++mInputBufferCount;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (vorbis|opus)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I1ccdd16a00741da072527a6d13e87fd7c7fe8c54
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static bool ExecuteMoveWordForward(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.Selection().Modify(SelectionModifyAlteration::kMove,
SelectionModifyDirection::kForward,
TextGranularity::kWord, SetSelectionBy::kUser);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void BrowserTabStripController::CreateNewTab() {
model_->delegate()->AddBlankTabAt(-1, true);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int magicmouse_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
struct hid_report *report, u8 *data, int size)
{
struct magicmouse_sc *msc = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct input_dev *input = msc->input;
int x = 0, y = 0, ii, clicks = 0, npoints;
switch (data[0]) {
case TRACKPAD_REPORT_ID:
/* Expect four bytes of prefix, and N*9 bytes of touch data. */
if (size < 4 || ((size - 4) % 9) != 0)
return 0;
npoints = (size - 4) / 9;
msc->ntouches = 0;
for (ii = 0; ii < npoints; ii++)
magicmouse_emit_touch(msc, ii, data + ii * 9 + 4);
clicks = data[1];
/* The following bits provide a device specific timestamp. They
* are unused here.
*
* ts = data[1] >> 6 | data[2] << 2 | data[3] << 10;
*/
break;
case MOUSE_REPORT_ID:
/* Expect six bytes of prefix, and N*8 bytes of touch data. */
if (size < 6 || ((size - 6) % 8) != 0)
return 0;
npoints = (size - 6) / 8;
msc->ntouches = 0;
for (ii = 0; ii < npoints; ii++)
magicmouse_emit_touch(msc, ii, data + ii * 8 + 6);
/* When emulating three-button mode, it is important
* to have the current touch information before
* generating a click event.
*/
x = (int)(((data[3] & 0x0c) << 28) | (data[1] << 22)) >> 22;
y = (int)(((data[3] & 0x30) << 26) | (data[2] << 22)) >> 22;
clicks = data[3];
/* The following bits provide a device specific timestamp. They
* are unused here.
*
* ts = data[3] >> 6 | data[4] << 2 | data[5] << 10;
*/
break;
case DOUBLE_REPORT_ID:
/* Sometimes the trackpad sends two touch reports in one
* packet.
*/
magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2, data[1]);
magicmouse_raw_event(hdev, report, data + 2 + data[1],
size - 2 - data[1]);
break;
default:
return 0;
}
if (input->id.product == USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICMOUSE) {
magicmouse_emit_buttons(msc, clicks & 3);
input_report_rel(input, REL_X, x);
input_report_rel(input, REL_Y, y);
} else { /* USB_DEVICE_ID_APPLE_MAGICTRACKPAD */
input_report_key(input, BTN_MOUSE, clicks & 1);
input_mt_report_pointer_emulation(input, true);
}
input_sync(input);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: HID: magicmouse: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that
magicmouse_emit_touch() gets only valid values of raw_id.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void wake_up_idle_cpu(int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
if (cpu == smp_processor_id())
return;
/*
* This is safe, as this function is called with the timer
* wheel base lock of (cpu) held. When the CPU is on the way
* to idle and has not yet set rq->curr to idle then it will
* be serialized on the timer wheel base lock and take the new
* timer into account automatically.
*/
if (rq->curr != rq->idle)
return;
/*
* We can set TIF_RESCHED on the idle task of the other CPU
* lockless. The worst case is that the other CPU runs the
* idle task through an additional NOOP schedule()
*/
set_tsk_need_resched(rq->idle);
/* NEED_RESCHED must be visible before we test polling */
smp_mb();
if (!tsk_is_polling(rq->idle))
smp_send_reschedule(cpu);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int do_siocgstamp(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int cmd, void __user *up)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
struct timeval ktv;
int err;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, (unsigned long)&ktv);
set_fs(old_fs);
if (!err)
err = compat_put_timeval(up, &ktv);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void SelectionController::SetNonDirectionalSelectionIfNeeded(
const SelectionInFlatTree& passed_selection,
TextGranularity granularity,
EndPointsAdjustmentMode endpoints_adjustment_mode,
HandleVisibility handle_visibility) {
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const VisibleSelectionInFlatTree& new_selection =
CreateVisibleSelection(passed_selection);
const PositionInFlatTree& base_position =
original_base_in_flat_tree_.GetPosition();
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& original_base =
base_position.IsConnected() ? CreateVisiblePosition(base_position)
: VisiblePositionInFlatTree();
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& base =
original_base.IsNotNull() ? original_base
: CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Base());
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& extent =
CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Extent());
const SelectionInFlatTree& adjusted_selection =
endpoints_adjustment_mode == kAdjustEndpointsAtBidiBoundary
? AdjustEndpointsAtBidiBoundary(base, extent)
: SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(base.DeepEquivalent(),
extent.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
SelectionInFlatTree::Builder builder(new_selection.AsSelection());
if (adjusted_selection.Base() != base.DeepEquivalent() ||
adjusted_selection.Extent() != extent.DeepEquivalent()) {
original_base_in_flat_tree_ = base.ToPositionWithAffinity();
SetContext(&GetDocument());
builder.SetBaseAndExtent(adjusted_selection.Base(),
adjusted_selection.Extent());
} else if (original_base.IsNotNull()) {
if (CreateVisiblePosition(
Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree().Base())
.DeepEquivalent() ==
CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Base()).DeepEquivalent()) {
builder.SetBaseAndExtent(original_base.DeepEquivalent(),
new_selection.Extent());
}
original_base_in_flat_tree_ = PositionInFlatTreeWithAffinity();
}
builder.SetIsHandleVisible(handle_visibility == HandleVisibility::kVisible);
const SelectionInFlatTree& selection_in_flat_tree = builder.Build();
if (Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree() ==
CreateVisibleSelection(selection_in_flat_tree) &&
Selection().IsHandleVisible() == selection_in_flat_tree.IsHandleVisible())
return;
Selection().SetSelection(
ConvertToSelectionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree),
SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.SetCursorAlignOnScroll(CursorAlignOnScroll::kIfNeeded)
.SetGranularity(granularity)
.Build());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void tcp_data_queue(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
int eaten = -1;
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq)
goto drop;
skb_dst_drop(skb);
__skb_pull(skb, th->doff * 4);
TCP_ECN_accept_cwr(tp, skb);
tp->rx_opt.dsack = 0;
/* Queue data for delivery to the user.
* Packets in sequence go to the receive queue.
* Out of sequence packets to the out_of_order_queue.
*/
if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == tp->rcv_nxt) {
if (tcp_receive_window(tp) == 0)
goto out_of_window;
/* Ok. In sequence. In window. */
if (tp->ucopy.task == current &&
tp->copied_seq == tp->rcv_nxt && tp->ucopy.len &&
sock_owned_by_user(sk) && !tp->urg_data) {
int chunk = min_t(unsigned int, skb->len,
tp->ucopy.len);
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
local_bh_enable();
if (!skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, tp->ucopy.iov, chunk)) {
tp->ucopy.len -= chunk;
tp->copied_seq += chunk;
eaten = (chunk == skb->len);
tcp_rcv_space_adjust(sk);
}
local_bh_disable();
}
if (eaten <= 0) {
queue_and_out:
if (eaten < 0 &&
tcp_try_rmem_schedule(sk, skb->truesize))
goto drop;
skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
}
tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
if (skb->len)
tcp_event_data_recv(sk, skb);
if (th->fin)
tcp_fin(sk);
if (!skb_queue_empty(&tp->out_of_order_queue)) {
tcp_ofo_queue(sk);
/* RFC2581. 4.2. SHOULD send immediate ACK, when
* gap in queue is filled.
*/
if (skb_queue_empty(&tp->out_of_order_queue))
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ack.pingpong = 0;
}
if (tp->rx_opt.num_sacks)
tcp_sack_remove(tp);
tcp_fast_path_check(sk);
if (eaten > 0)
__kfree_skb(skb);
else if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0);
return;
}
if (!after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, tp->rcv_nxt)) {
/* A retransmit, 2nd most common case. Force an immediate ack. */
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_DELAYEDACKLOST);
tcp_dsack_set(sk, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq);
out_of_window:
tcp_enter_quickack_mode(sk);
inet_csk_schedule_ack(sk);
drop:
__kfree_skb(skb);
return;
}
/* Out of window. F.e. zero window probe. */
if (!before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->rcv_nxt + tcp_receive_window(tp)))
goto out_of_window;
tcp_enter_quickack_mode(sk);
if (before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->rcv_nxt)) {
/* Partial packet, seq < rcv_next < end_seq */
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "partial packet: rcv_next %X seq %X - %X\n",
tp->rcv_nxt, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq,
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq);
tcp_dsack_set(sk, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->rcv_nxt);
/* If window is closed, drop tail of packet. But after
* remembering D-SACK for its head made in previous line.
*/
if (!tcp_receive_window(tp))
goto out_of_window;
goto queue_and_out;
}
TCP_ECN_check_ce(tp, skb);
if (tcp_try_rmem_schedule(sk, skb->truesize))
goto drop;
/* Disable header prediction. */
tp->pred_flags = 0;
inet_csk_schedule_ack(sk);
SOCK_DEBUG(sk, "out of order segment: rcv_next %X seq %X - %X\n",
tp->rcv_nxt, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq);
skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
if (!skb_peek(&tp->out_of_order_queue)) {
/* Initial out of order segment, build 1 SACK. */
if (tcp_is_sack(tp)) {
tp->rx_opt.num_sacks = 1;
tp->selective_acks[0].start_seq = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
tp->selective_acks[0].end_seq =
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
}
__skb_queue_head(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb);
} else {
struct sk_buff *skb1 = skb_peek_tail(&tp->out_of_order_queue);
u32 seq = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq;
u32 end_seq = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
if (seq == TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->end_seq) {
__skb_queue_after(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb1, skb);
if (!tp->rx_opt.num_sacks ||
tp->selective_acks[0].end_seq != seq)
goto add_sack;
/* Common case: data arrive in order after hole. */
tp->selective_acks[0].end_seq = end_seq;
return;
}
/* Find place to insert this segment. */
while (1) {
if (!after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->seq, seq))
break;
if (skb_queue_is_first(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb1)) {
skb1 = NULL;
break;
}
skb1 = skb_queue_prev(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb1);
}
/* Do skb overlap to previous one? */
if (skb1 && before(seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->end_seq)) {
if (!after(end_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->end_seq)) {
/* All the bits are present. Drop. */
__kfree_skb(skb);
tcp_dsack_set(sk, seq, end_seq);
goto add_sack;
}
if (after(seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->seq)) {
/* Partial overlap. */
tcp_dsack_set(sk, seq,
TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->end_seq);
} else {
if (skb_queue_is_first(&tp->out_of_order_queue,
skb1))
skb1 = NULL;
else
skb1 = skb_queue_prev(
&tp->out_of_order_queue,
skb1);
}
}
if (!skb1)
__skb_queue_head(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb);
else
__skb_queue_after(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb1, skb);
/* And clean segments covered by new one as whole. */
while (!skb_queue_is_last(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb)) {
skb1 = skb_queue_next(&tp->out_of_order_queue, skb);
if (!after(end_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->seq))
break;
if (before(end_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->end_seq)) {
tcp_dsack_extend(sk, TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->seq,
end_seq);
break;
}
__skb_unlink(skb1, &tp->out_of_order_queue);
tcp_dsack_extend(sk, TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->seq,
TCP_SKB_CB(skb1)->end_seq);
__kfree_skb(skb1);
}
add_sack:
if (tcp_is_sack(tp))
tcp_sack_new_ofo_skb(sk, seq, end_seq);
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: struct file *get_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct file *exe_file;
/* We need mmap_sem to protect against races with removal of
* VM_EXECUTABLE vmas */
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
exe_file = mm->exe_file;
if (exe_file)
get_file(exe_file);
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
return exe_file;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ldp_tlv_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *tptr,
u_short msg_tlen)
{
struct ldp_tlv_header {
uint8_t type[2];
uint8_t length[2];
};
const struct ldp_tlv_header *ldp_tlv_header;
u_short tlv_type,tlv_len,tlv_tlen,af,ft_flags;
u_char fec_type;
u_int ui,vc_info_len, vc_info_tlv_type, vc_info_tlv_len,idx;
char buf[100];
int i;
ldp_tlv_header = (const struct ldp_tlv_header *)tptr;
ND_TCHECK(*ldp_tlv_header);
tlv_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(ldp_tlv_header->length);
if (tlv_len + 4 > msg_tlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t TLV contents go past end of message"));
return 0;
}
tlv_tlen=tlv_len;
tlv_type=LDP_MASK_TLV_TYPE(EXTRACT_16BITS(ldp_tlv_header->type));
/* FIXME vendor private / experimental check */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (0x%04x), length: %u, Flags: [%s and %s forward if unknown]",
tok2str(ldp_tlv_values,
"Unknown",
tlv_type),
tlv_type,
tlv_len,
LDP_MASK_U_BIT(EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_tlv_header->type)) ? "continue processing" : "ignore",
LDP_MASK_F_BIT(EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_tlv_header->type)) ? "do" : "don't"));
tptr+=sizeof(struct ldp_tlv_header);
switch(tlv_type) {
case LDP_TLV_COMMON_HELLO:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Hold Time: %us, Flags: [%s Hello%s]",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr),
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)&0x8000) ? "Targeted" : "Link",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)&0x4000) ? ", Request for targeted Hellos" : ""));
break;
case LDP_TLV_IPV4_TRANSPORT_ADDR:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 Transport Address: %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case LDP_TLV_IPV6_TRANSPORT_ADDR:
TLV_TCHECK(16);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv6 Transport Address: %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case LDP_TLV_CONFIG_SEQ_NUMBER:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sequence Number: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST:
TLV_TCHECK(LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
tptr+=LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
tlv_tlen -= LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Address Family: %s, addresses",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown (%u)", af)));
switch (af) {
case AFNUM_INET:
while(tlv_tlen >= sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlv_tlen-=sizeof(struct in_addr);
tptr+=sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
while(tlv_tlen >= sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlv_tlen-=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tptr+=sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
default:
/* unknown AF */
break;
}
break;
case LDP_TLV_COMMON_SESSION:
TLV_TCHECK(8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Version: %u, Keepalive: %us, Flags: [Downstream %s, Loop Detection %s]",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2),
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)&0x8000) ? "On Demand" : "Unsolicited",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)&0x4000) ? "Enabled" : "Disabled"
));
break;
case LDP_TLV_FEC:
TLV_TCHECK(1);
fec_type = *tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s FEC (0x%02x)",
tok2str(ldp_fec_values, "Unknown", fec_type),
fec_type));
tptr+=1;
tlv_tlen-=1;
switch(fec_type) {
case LDP_FEC_WILDCARD:
break;
case LDP_FEC_PREFIX:
TLV_TCHECK(2);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
tptr+=LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
tlv_tlen-=LDP_TLV_ADDRESS_LIST_AFNUM_LEN;
if (af == AFNUM_INET) {
i=decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, tlv_tlen, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i == -2)
goto trunc;
if (i == -3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix (goes past end of TLV)"));
else if (i == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix (invalid length)"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix %s", buf));
}
else if (af == AFNUM_INET6) {
i=decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, tlv_tlen, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (i == -2)
goto trunc;
if (i == -3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv4 prefix (goes past end of TLV)"));
else if (i == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv6 prefix (invalid length)"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": IPv6 prefix %s", buf));
}
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": Address family %u prefix", af));
break;
case LDP_FEC_HOSTADDRESS:
break;
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_VC:
/*
* We assume the type was supposed to be one of the MPLS
* Pseudowire Types.
*/
TLV_TCHECK(7);
vc_info_len = *(tptr+2);
/*
* According to RFC 4908, the VC info Length field can be zero,
* in which case not only are there no interface parameters,
* there's no VC ID.
*/
if (vc_info_len == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s, %scontrol word, group-ID %u, VC-info-length: %u",
tok2str(mpls_pw_types_values, "Unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x7fff),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x8000 ? "" : "no ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+3),
vc_info_len));
break;
}
/* Make sure we have the VC ID as well */
TLV_TCHECK(11);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s, %scontrol word, group-ID %u, VC-ID %u, VC-info-length: %u",
tok2str(mpls_pw_types_values, "Unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x7fff),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)&0x8000 ? "" : "no ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+3),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+7),
vc_info_len));
if (vc_info_len < 4) {
/* minimum 4, for the VC ID */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (invalid, < 4"));
return(tlv_len+4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
}
vc_info_len -= 4; /* subtract out the VC ID, giving the length of the interface parameters */
/* Skip past the fixed information and the VC ID */
tptr+=11;
tlv_tlen-=11;
TLV_TCHECK(vc_info_len);
while (vc_info_len > 2) {
vc_info_tlv_type = *tptr;
vc_info_tlv_len = *(tptr+1);
if (vc_info_tlv_len < 2)
break;
if (vc_info_len < vc_info_tlv_len)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tInterface Parameter: %s (0x%02x), len %u",
tok2str(ldp_fec_martini_ifparm_values,"Unknown",vc_info_tlv_type),
vc_info_tlv_type,
vc_info_tlv_len));
switch(vc_info_tlv_type) {
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_IFPARM_MTU:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)));
break;
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_IFPARM_DESC:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": "));
for (idx = 2; idx < vc_info_tlv_len; idx++)
safeputchar(ndo, *(tptr + idx));
break;
case LDP_FEC_MARTINI_IFPARM_VCCV:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t Control Channels (0x%02x) = [%s]",
*(tptr+2),
bittok2str(ldp_fec_martini_ifparm_vccv_cc_values, "none", *(tptr+2))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t CV Types (0x%02x) = [%s]",
*(tptr+3),
bittok2str(ldp_fec_martini_ifparm_vccv_cv_values, "none", *(tptr+3))));
break;
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr+2, "\n\t\t ", vc_info_tlv_len-2);
break;
}
vc_info_len -= vc_info_tlv_len;
tptr += vc_info_tlv_len;
}
break;
}
break;
case LDP_TLV_GENERIC_LABEL:
TLV_TCHECK(4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Label: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) & 0xfffff));
break;
case LDP_TLV_STATUS:
TLV_TCHECK(8);
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
tptr+=4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Status: 0x%02x, Flags: [%s and %s forward]",
ui&0x3fffffff,
ui&0x80000000 ? "Fatal error" : "Advisory Notification",
ui&0x40000000 ? "do" : "don't"));
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
tptr+=4;
if (ui)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", causing Message ID: 0x%08x", ui));
break;
case LDP_TLV_FT_SESSION:
TLV_TCHECK(8);
ft_flags = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags: [%sReconnect, %sSave State, %sAll-Label Protection, %s Checkpoint, %sRe-Learn State]",
ft_flags&0x8000 ? "" : "No ",
ft_flags&0x8 ? "" : "Don't ",
ft_flags&0x4 ? "" : "No ",
ft_flags&0x2 ? "Sequence Numbered Label" : "All Labels",
ft_flags&0x1 ? "" : "Don't "));
tptr+=4;
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
if (ui)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Reconnect Timeout: %ums", ui));
tptr+=4;
ui = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
if (ui)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Recovery Time: %ums", ui));
break;
case LDP_TLV_MTU:
TLV_TCHECK(2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MTU: %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case LDP_TLV_HOP_COUNT:
case LDP_TLV_PATH_VECTOR:
case LDP_TLV_ATM_LABEL:
case LDP_TLV_FR_LABEL:
case LDP_TLV_EXTD_STATUS:
case LDP_TLV_RETURNED_PDU:
case LDP_TLV_RETURNED_MSG:
case LDP_TLV_ATM_SESSION_PARM:
case LDP_TLV_FR_SESSION_PARM:
case LDP_TLV_LABEL_REQUEST_MSG_ID:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlv_tlen);
break;
}
return(tlv_len+4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t packet exceeded snapshot"));
return 0;
badtlv:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t TLV contents go past end of TLV"));
return(tlv_len+4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14461/LDP: Fix a bounds check
In ldp_tlv_print(), the FT Session TLV length must be 12, not 8 (RFC3479)
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Konrad Rieck and
Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
Moreover:
Add and use tstr[].
Add a comment.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: krb5_get_init_creds_opt_set_pkinit_user_certs(krb5_context context,
krb5_get_init_creds_opt *opt,
struct hx509_certs_data *certs)
{
#ifdef PKINIT
if (opt->opt_private == NULL) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL,
N_("PKINIT: on non extendable opt", ""));
return EINVAL;
}
if (opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx == NULL) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL,
N_("PKINIT: on pkinit context", ""));
return EINVAL;
}
_krb5_pk_set_user_id(context, NULL, opt->opt_private->pk_init_ctx, certs);
return 0;
#else
krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL,
N_("no support for PKINIT compiled in", ""));
return EINVAL;
#endif
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: vmxnet3_read_next_rx_descr(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx, int ridx,
struct Vmxnet3_RxDesc *dbuf, uint32_t *didx)
{
Vmxnet3Ring *ring = &s->rxq_descr[qidx].rx_ring[ridx];
*didx = vmxnet3_ring_curr_cell_idx(ring);
vmxnet3_ring_read_curr_cell(ring, dbuf);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void set_fat(DOS_FS * fs, uint32_t cluster, int32_t new)
{
unsigned char *data = NULL;
int size;
loff_t offs;
if (new == -1)
new = FAT_EOF(fs);
else if ((long)new == -2)
new = FAT_BAD(fs);
switch (fs->fat_bits) {
case 12:
data = fs->fat + cluster * 3 / 2;
offs = fs->fat_start + cluster * 3 / 2;
if (cluster & 1) {
FAT_ENTRY prevEntry;
get_fat(&prevEntry, fs->fat, cluster - 1, fs);
data[0] = ((new & 0xf) << 4) | (prevEntry.value >> 8);
data[1] = new >> 4;
} else {
FAT_ENTRY subseqEntry;
if (cluster != fs->clusters - 1)
get_fat(&subseqEntry, fs->fat, cluster + 1, fs);
else
subseqEntry.value = 0;
data[0] = new & 0xff;
data[1] = (new >> 8) | ((0xff & subseqEntry.value) << 4);
}
size = 2;
break;
case 16:
data = fs->fat + cluster * 2;
offs = fs->fat_start + cluster * 2;
*(unsigned short *)data = htole16(new);
size = 2;
break;
case 32:
{
FAT_ENTRY curEntry;
get_fat(&curEntry, fs->fat, cluster, fs);
data = fs->fat + cluster * 4;
offs = fs->fat_start + cluster * 4;
/* According to M$, the high 4 bits of a FAT32 entry are reserved and
* are not part of the cluster number. So we never touch them. */
*(uint32_t *)data = htole32((new & 0xfffffff) |
(curEntry.reserved << 28));
size = 4;
}
break;
default:
die("Bad FAT entry size: %d bits.", fs->fat_bits);
}
fs_write(offs, size, data);
if (fs->nfats > 1) {
fs_write(offs + fs->fat_size, size, data);
}
}
Commit Message: set_fat(): Fix off-by-2 error leading to corruption in FAT12
In FAT12 two 12 bit entries are combined to a 24 bit value (three
bytes). Therefore, when an even numbered FAT entry is set in FAT12, it
must be be combined with the following entry. To prevent accessing
beyond the end of the FAT array, it must be checked that the cluster is
not the last one.
Previously, the check tested that the requested cluster was equal to
fs->clusters - 1. However, fs->clusters is the number of data clusters
not including the two reserved FAT entries at the start so the test
triggered two clusters early.
If the third to last entry was written on a FAT12 filesystem with an
odd number of clusters, the second to last entry would be corrupted.
This corruption may also lead to invalid memory accesses when the
corrupted entry becomes out of bounds and is used later.
Change the test to fs->clusters + 1 to fix.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: virtual status_t fillBuffer(node_id node, buffer_id buffer) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
remote()->transact(FILL_BUFFER, data, &reply);
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: Clear allocation to avoid info leak
Bug: 26914474
Change-Id: Ie1a86e86d78058d041149fe599a4996e7f8185cf
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::JobRecord::JobRecord(
scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> input_frame,
scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> output_frame,
int quality,
int32_t task_id,
BitstreamBuffer* exif_buffer)
: input_frame(input_frame),
output_frame(output_frame),
quality(quality),
task_id(task_id),
output_shm(base::SharedMemoryHandle(), 0, true), // dummy
exif_shm(nullptr) {
if (exif_buffer) {
exif_shm.reset(new UnalignedSharedMemory(exif_buffer->TakeRegion(),
exif_buffer->size(), false));
exif_offset = exif_buffer->offset();
}
}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
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