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stringlengths 1.19k
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Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ProcScreenSaverUnsetAttributes(ClientPtr client)
{
#ifdef PANORAMIX
if (!noPanoramiXExtension) {
REQUEST(xScreenSaverUnsetAttributesReq);
PanoramiXRes *draw;
int rc, i;
rc = dixLookupResourceByClass((void **) &draw, stuff->drawable,
XRC_DRAWABLE, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (rc != Success)
for (i = PanoramiXNumScreens - 1; i > 0; i--) {
stuff->drawable = draw->info[i].id;
ScreenSaverUnsetAttributes(client);
}
stuff->drawable = draw->info[0].id;
}
#endif
return ScreenSaverUnsetAttributes(client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: SkColor DialogNotification::GetBackgroundColor() const {
switch (type_) {
case DialogNotification::WALLET_USAGE_CONFIRMATION:
return SkColorSetRGB(0xf5, 0xf5, 0xf5);
case DialogNotification::REQUIRED_ACTION:
case DialogNotification::WALLET_ERROR:
return SkColorSetRGB(0xfc, 0xf3, 0xbf);
case DialogNotification::DEVELOPER_WARNING:
case DialogNotification::SECURITY_WARNING:
return kWarningColor;
case DialogNotification::NONE:
return SK_ColorTRANSPARENT;
}
NOTREACHED();
return SK_ColorTRANSPARENT;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void encrypt_to_decrypt(u64 *d, const u64 *e)
{
const u64 *s = e + (DES_EXPKEY_WORDS / 2) - 1;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < DES_EXPKEY_WORDS / 2; i++)
*d++ = *s--;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
{
int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
long n;
const unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *d;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
if (n < 6) {
/* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
n2s(p, ticklen);
/* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
/*
* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
* an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
* ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
* and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
* other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
* presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
* We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
* elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
* SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
*/
EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
EVP_sha256(), NULL);
ret = 1;
return (ret);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
return (-1);
}
Commit Message: Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void Document::LayoutUpdated() {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
DCHECK(View());
View()->ScrollAndFocusFragmentAnchor();
if (GetFrame() && View()) {
GetFrame()->Loader().RestoreScrollPositionAndViewState();
if (View()->NeedsLayout())
View()->UpdateLayout();
}
if (GetFrame() && GetFrame()->IsMainFrame())
GetFrame()->GetPage()->GetChromeClient().MainFrameLayoutUpdated();
Markers().InvalidateRectsForAllTextMatchMarkers();
if (IsRenderingReady() && body() && HaveRenderBlockingResourcesLoaded()) {
if (document_timing_.FirstLayout().is_null())
document_timing_.MarkFirstLayout();
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void tcp_fixup_rcvbuf(struct sock *sk)
{
u32 mss = tcp_sk(sk)->advmss;
u32 icwnd = TCP_DEFAULT_INIT_RCVWND;
int rcvmem;
/* Limit to 10 segments if mss <= 1460,
* or 14600/mss segments, with a minimum of two segments.
*/
if (mss > 1460)
icwnd = max_t(u32, (1460 * TCP_DEFAULT_INIT_RCVWND) / mss, 2);
rcvmem = SKB_TRUESIZE(mss + MAX_TCP_HEADER);
while (tcp_win_from_space(rcvmem) < mss)
rcvmem += 128;
rcvmem *= icwnd;
if (sk->sk_rcvbuf < rcvmem)
sk->sk_rcvbuf = min(rcvmem, sysctl_tcp_rmem[2]);
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: status_t BnOMX::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case LIVES_LOCALLY:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
pid_t pid = (pid_t)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(livesLocally(node, pid));
return OK;
}
case LIST_NODES:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
List<ComponentInfo> list;
listNodes(&list);
reply->writeInt32(list.size());
for (List<ComponentInfo>::iterator it = list.begin();
it != list.end(); ++it) {
ComponentInfo &cur = *it;
reply->writeString8(cur.mName);
reply->writeInt32(cur.mRoles.size());
for (List<String8>::iterator role_it = cur.mRoles.begin();
role_it != cur.mRoles.end(); ++role_it) {
reply->writeString8(*role_it);
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOCATE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
const char *name = data.readCString();
sp<IOMXObserver> observer =
interface_cast<IOMXObserver>(data.readStrongBinder());
node_id node;
status_t err = allocateNode(name, observer, &node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)node);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeNode(node));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SEND_COMMAND:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_COMMANDTYPE cmd =
static_cast<OMX_COMMANDTYPE>(data.readInt32());
OMX_S32 param = data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(sendCommand(node, cmd, param));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_PARAMETER:
case SET_PARAMETER:
case GET_CONFIG:
case SET_CONFIG:
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = static_cast<OMX_INDEXTYPE>(data.readInt32());
size_t size = data.readInt64();
void *params = malloc(size);
data.read(params, size);
status_t err;
switch (code) {
case GET_PARAMETER:
err = getParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_PARAMETER:
err = setParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case GET_CONFIG:
err = getConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_CONFIG:
err = setConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
InternalOptionType type =
(InternalOptionType)data.readInt32();
err = setInternalOption(node, index, type, params, size);
break;
}
default:
TRESPASS();
}
reply->writeInt32(err);
if ((code == GET_PARAMETER || code == GET_CONFIG) && err == OK) {
reply->write(params, size);
}
free(params);
params = NULL;
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_STATE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_STATETYPE state = OMX_StateInvalid;
status_t err = getState(node, &state);
reply->writeInt32(state);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ENABLE_GRAPHIC_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
status_t err = enableGraphicBuffers(node, port_index, enable);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_USAGE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 usage = 0;
status_t err = getGraphicBufferUsage(node, port_index, &usage);
reply->writeInt32(err);
reply->writeInt32(usage);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useBuffer(node, port_index, params, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useGraphicBuffer(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case UPDATE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_IN_META:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CREATE_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> bufferProducer;
status_t err = createInputSurface(node, port_index,
&bufferProducer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeStrongBinder(bufferProducer->asBinder());
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SIGNAL_END_OF_INPUT_STREAM:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = signalEndOfInputStream(node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case STORE_META_DATA_IN_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
status_t err = storeMetaDataInBuffers(node, port_index, enable);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case PREPARE_FOR_ADAPTIVE_PLAYBACK:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_width = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_height = data.readInt32();
status_t err = prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
node, port_index, enable, max_width, max_height);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONFIGURE_VIDEO_TUNNEL_MODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL tunneled = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 audio_hw_sync = data.readInt32();
native_handle_t *sideband_handle;
status_t err = configureVideoTunnelMode(
node, port_index, tunneled, audio_hw_sync, &sideband_handle);
reply->writeInt32(err);
reply->writeNativeHandle(sideband_handle);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
if (!isSecure(node) || port_index != 0 /* kPortIndexInput */) {
ALOGE("b/24310423");
reply->writeInt32(INVALID_OPERATION);
return NO_ERROR;
}
size_t size = data.readInt64();
buffer_id buffer;
void *buffer_data;
status_t err = allocateBuffer(
node, port_index, size, &buffer, &buffer_data);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
reply->writeInt64((uintptr_t)buffer_data);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER_WITH_BACKUP:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = allocateBufferWithBackup(
node, port_index, params, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeBuffer(node, port_index, buffer));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FILL_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(fillBuffer(node, buffer));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case EMPTY_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_offset = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_length = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 flags = data.readInt32();
OMX_TICKS timestamp = data.readInt64();
reply->writeInt32(
emptyBuffer(
node, buffer, range_offset, range_length,
flags, timestamp));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_EXTENSION_INDEX:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
const char *parameter_name = data.readCString();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
status_t err = getExtensionIndex(node, parameter_name, &index);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32(index);
}
return OK;
}
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
Commit Message: IOMX.cpp uninitialized pointer in BnOMX::onTransact
This can lead to local code execution in media server.
Fix initializes the pointer and checks the error conditions before
returning
Bug: 26403627
Change-Id: I7fa90682060148448dba01d6acbe3471d1ddb500
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: char* fb_get_buffer_offset(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_pixmap *buf, u32 size)
{
u32 align = buf->buf_align - 1, offset;
char *addr = buf->addr;
/* If IO mapped, we need to sync before access, no sharing of
* the pixmap is done
*/
if (buf->flags & FB_PIXMAP_IO) {
if (info->fbops->fb_sync && (buf->flags & FB_PIXMAP_SYNC))
info->fbops->fb_sync(info);
return addr;
}
/* See if we fit in the remaining pixmap space */
offset = buf->offset + align;
offset &= ~align;
if (offset + size > buf->size) {
/* We do not fit. In order to be able to re-use the buffer,
* we must ensure no asynchronous DMA'ing or whatever operation
* is in progress, we sync for that.
*/
if (info->fbops->fb_sync && (buf->flags & FB_PIXMAP_SYNC))
info->fbops->fb_sync(info);
offset = 0;
}
buf->offset = offset + size;
addr += offset;
return addr;
}
Commit Message: vm: convert fb_mmap to vm_iomap_memory() helper
This is my example conversion of a few existing mmap users. The
fb_mmap() case is a good example because it is a bit more complicated
than some: fb_mmap() mmaps one of two different memory areas depending
on the page offset of the mmap (but happily there is never any mixing of
the two, so the helper function still works).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static inline unsigned int ReadPropertyUnsignedLong(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
unsigned int
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned int) ((buffer[3] << 24) | (buffer[2] << 16) |
(buffer[1] << 8 ) | (buffer[0]));
return((unsigned int) (value & 0xffffffff));
}
value=(unsigned int) ((buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16) |
(buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[3]);
return((unsigned int) (value & 0xffffffff));
}
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: validate_event(struct pmu_hw_events *hw_events,
struct perf_event *event)
{
struct arm_pmu *armpmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu);
struct hw_perf_event fake_event = event->hw;
struct pmu *leader_pmu = event->group_leader->pmu;
if (is_software_event(event))
return 1;
if (event->pmu != leader_pmu || event->state < PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
return 1;
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF && !event->attr.enable_on_exec)
return 1;
return armpmu->get_event_idx(hw_events, &fake_event) >= 0;
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static u8 cm_ack_timeout(u8 ca_ack_delay, u8 packet_life_time)
{
int ack_timeout = packet_life_time + 1;
if (ack_timeout >= ca_ack_delay)
ack_timeout += (ca_ack_delay >= (ack_timeout - 1));
else
ack_timeout = ca_ack_delay +
(ack_timeout >= (ca_ack_delay - 1));
return min(31, ack_timeout);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void RenderMessageFilter::OnCreateWidget(int opener_id,
WebKit::WebPopupType popup_type,
int* route_id,
int* surface_id) {
render_widget_helper_->CreateNewWidget(
opener_id, popup_type, route_id, surface_id);
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: GLboolean WebGLRenderingContextBase::isShader(WebGLShader* shader) {
if (!shader || isContextLost())
return 0;
return ContextGL()->IsShader(shader->Object());
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: Response PageHandler::GetNavigationHistory(
int* current_index,
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntries>* entries) {
WebContentsImpl* web_contents = GetWebContents();
if (!web_contents)
return Response::InternalError();
NavigationController& controller = web_contents->GetController();
*current_index = controller.GetCurrentEntryIndex();
*entries = NavigationEntries::create();
for (int i = 0; i != controller.GetEntryCount(); ++i) {
auto* entry = controller.GetEntryAtIndex(i);
(*entries)->addItem(
Page::NavigationEntry::Create()
.SetId(entry->GetUniqueID())
.SetUrl(entry->GetURL().spec())
.SetUserTypedURL(entry->GetUserTypedURL().spec())
.SetTitle(base::UTF16ToUTF8(entry->GetTitle()))
.SetTransitionType(TransitionTypeName(entry->GetTransitionType()))
.Build());
}
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: do_device_not_available(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
unsigned long cr0;
RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN(!rcu_is_watching(), "entry code didn't wake RCU");
#ifdef CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU) && (read_cr0() & X86_CR0_EM)) {
struct math_emu_info info = { };
cond_local_irq_enable(regs);
info.regs = regs;
math_emulate(&info);
return;
}
#endif
/* This should not happen. */
cr0 = read_cr0();
if (WARN(cr0 & X86_CR0_TS, "CR0.TS was set")) {
/* Try to fix it up and carry on. */
write_cr0(cr0 & ~X86_CR0_TS);
} else {
/*
* Something terrible happened, and we're better off trying
* to kill the task than getting stuck in a never-ending
* loop of #NM faults.
*/
die("unexpected #NM exception", regs, error_code);
}
}
Commit Message: x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stack
There's nothing IST-worthy about #BP/int3. We don't allow kprobes
in the small handful of places in the kernel that run at CPL0 with
an invalid stack, and 32-bit kernels have used normal interrupt
gates for #BP forever.
Furthermore, we don't allow kprobes in places that have usergs while
in kernel mode, so "paranoid" is also unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-362
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType AnnotateImage(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info)
{
char
*p,
primitive[MaxTextExtent],
*text,
**textlist;
DrawInfo
*annotate,
*annotate_info;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PointInfo
offset;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
register ssize_t
i;
TypeMetric
metrics;
size_t
height,
number_lines;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(draw_info != (DrawInfo *) NULL);
assert(draw_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (draw_info->text == (char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
if (*draw_info->text == '\0')
return(MagickTrue);
annotate=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
text=annotate->text;
annotate->text=(char *) NULL;
annotate_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
number_lines=1;
for (p=text; *p != '\0'; p++)
if (*p == '\n')
number_lines++;
textlist=AcquireQuantumMemory(number_lines+1,sizeof(*textlist));
if (textlist == (char **) NULL)
{
annotate_info=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate_info);
annotate=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate);
return(MagickFalse);
}
p=text;
for (i=0; i < number_lines; i++)
{
char
*q;
textlist[i]=p;
for (q=p; *q != '\0'; q++)
if ((*q == '\r') || (*q == '\n'))
break;
if (*q == '\r')
{
*q='\0';
q++;
}
*q='\0';
p=q+1;
}
textlist[i]=(char *) NULL;
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
SetGeometryInfo(&geometry_info);
if (annotate_info->geometry != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) ParsePageGeometry(image,annotate_info->geometry,&geometry,
&image->exception);
(void) ParseGeometry(annotate_info->geometry,&geometry_info);
}
if (SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass) == MagickFalse)
{
annotate_info=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate_info);
annotate=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate);
textlist=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(textlist);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
status=MagickTrue;
(void) memset(&metrics,0,sizeof(metrics));
for (i=0; textlist[i] != (char *) NULL; i++)
{
if (*textlist[i] == '\0')
continue;
/*
Position text relative to image.
*/
annotate_info->affine.tx=geometry_info.xi-image->page.x;
annotate_info->affine.ty=geometry_info.psi-image->page.y;
(void) CloneString(&annotate->text,textlist[i]);
if ((metrics.width == 0) || (annotate->gravity != NorthWestGravity))
(void) GetTypeMetrics(image,annotate,&metrics);
height=(ssize_t) (metrics.ascent-metrics.descent+
draw_info->interline_spacing+0.5);
switch (annotate->gravity)
{
case UndefinedGravity:
default:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height;
break;
}
case NorthWestGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+i*
annotate_info->affine.ry*height+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent);
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+i*
annotate_info->affine.sy*height+annotate_info->affine.sy*
metrics.ascent;
break;
}
case NorthGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent);
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+i*
annotate_info->affine.sy*height+annotate_info->affine.sy*
metrics.ascent-annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0;
break;
}
case NorthEastGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent)-1.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+i*
annotate_info->affine.sy*height+annotate_info->affine.sy*
metrics.ascent-annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width;
break;
}
case WestGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+i*
annotate_info->affine.ry*height+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height+
annotate_info->affine.sy*(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-
(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
break;
}
case StaticGravity:
case CenterGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1)*height)/2.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0+annotate_info->affine.sy*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
break;
}
case EastGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width+annotate_info->affine.ry*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0-1.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width+annotate_info->affine.sy*
(metrics.ascent+metrics.descent-(number_lines-1.0)*height)/2.0;
break;
}
case SouthWestGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+i*
annotate_info->affine.ry*height-annotate_info->affine.ry*
(number_lines-1.0)*height;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.sy*(number_lines-1.0)*height+metrics.descent;
break;
}
case SouthGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? -1.0 : 1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width/2.0+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0-annotate_info->affine.ry*
(number_lines-1.0)*height/2.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0-annotate_info->affine.sy*
(number_lines-1.0)*height+metrics.descent;
break;
}
case SouthEastGravity:
{
offset.x=(geometry.width == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.tx+
geometry.width+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width-annotate_info->affine.ry*
(number_lines-1.0)*height-1.0;
offset.y=(geometry.height == 0 ? 1.0 : -1.0)*annotate_info->affine.ty+
geometry.height+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width-annotate_info->affine.sy*
(number_lines-1.0)*height+metrics.descent;
break;
}
}
switch (annotate->align)
{
case LeftAlign:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height;
break;
}
case CenterAlign:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width/2.0;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width/2.0;
break;
}
case RightAlign:
{
offset.x=annotate_info->affine.tx+i*annotate_info->affine.ry*height-
annotate_info->affine.sx*metrics.width;
offset.y=annotate_info->affine.ty+i*annotate_info->affine.sy*height-
annotate_info->affine.rx*metrics.width;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (draw_info->undercolor.opacity != TransparentOpacity)
{
DrawInfo
*undercolor_info;
/*
Text box.
*/
undercolor_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
undercolor_info->fill=draw_info->undercolor;
undercolor_info->affine=draw_info->affine;
undercolor_info->affine.tx=offset.x-draw_info->affine.ry*metrics.ascent;
undercolor_info->affine.ty=offset.y-draw_info->affine.sy*metrics.ascent;
(void) FormatLocaleString(primitive,MaxTextExtent,
"rectangle 0.0,0.0 %g,%g",metrics.origin.x,(double) height);
(void) CloneString(&undercolor_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,undercolor_info);
(void) DestroyDrawInfo(undercolor_info);
}
annotate_info->affine.tx=offset.x;
annotate_info->affine.ty=offset.y;
(void) FormatLocaleString(primitive,MaxTextExtent,"stroke-width %g "
"line 0,0 %g,0",metrics.underline_thickness,metrics.width);
if (annotate->decorate == OverlineDecoration)
{
annotate_info->affine.ty-=(draw_info->affine.sy*(metrics.ascent+
metrics.descent-metrics.underline_position));
(void) CloneString(&annotate_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,annotate_info);
}
else
if (annotate->decorate == UnderlineDecoration)
{
annotate_info->affine.ty-=(draw_info->affine.sy*
metrics.underline_position);
(void) CloneString(&annotate_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,annotate_info);
}
/*
Annotate image with text.
*/
status=RenderType(image,annotate,&offset,&metrics);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if (annotate->decorate == LineThroughDecoration)
{
annotate_info->affine.ty-=(draw_info->affine.sy*(height+
metrics.underline_position+metrics.descent)/2.0);
(void) CloneString(&annotate_info->primitive,primitive);
(void) DrawImage(image,annotate_info);
}
}
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
annotate_info=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate_info);
annotate=DestroyDrawInfo(annotate);
textlist=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(textlist);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1588
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int aes_ablkcipher_setkey(struct crypto_ablkcipher *cipher,
const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
struct cryp_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(cipher);
u32 *flags = &cipher->base.crt_flags;
pr_debug(DEV_DBG_NAME " [%s]", __func__);
switch (keylen) {
case AES_KEYSIZE_128:
ctx->config.keysize = CRYP_KEY_SIZE_128;
break;
case AES_KEYSIZE_192:
ctx->config.keysize = CRYP_KEY_SIZE_192;
break;
case AES_KEYSIZE_256:
ctx->config.keysize = CRYP_KEY_SIZE_256;
break;
default:
pr_err(DEV_DBG_NAME "[%s]: Unknown keylen!", __func__);
*flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN;
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(ctx->key, key, keylen);
ctx->keylen = keylen;
ctx->updated = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int svc_can_register(const uint16_t *name, size_t name_len, pid_t spid, uid_t uid)
{
const char *perm = "add";
return check_mac_perms_from_lookup(spid, uid, perm, str8(name, name_len)) ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: ServiceManager: Restore basic uid check
Prevent apps from registering services without relying on selinux checks.
Bug: 29431260
Change-Id: I38c6e8bc7f7cba1cbd3568e8fed1ae7ac2054a9b
(cherry picked from commit 2b74d2c1d2a2c1bb6e9c420f7e9b339ba2a95179)
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
struct mg_context *ctx;
base::AtExitManager exit;
base::WaitableEvent shutdown_event(false, false);
CommandLine::Init(argc, argv);
CommandLine* cmd_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
#endif
srand((unsigned int)time(NULL));
chrome::RegisterPathProvider();
TestTimeouts::Initialize();
InitChromeDriverLogging(*cmd_line);
std::string port = "9515";
std::string root;
std::string url_base;
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch("port"))
port = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII("port");
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch("root"))
root = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII("root");
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch("url-base"))
url_base = cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII("url-base");
webdriver::SessionManager* manager = webdriver::SessionManager::GetInstance();
manager->set_port(port);
manager->set_url_base(url_base);
ctx = mg_start();
if (!SetMongooseOptions(ctx, port, root)) {
mg_stop(ctx);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
return WSAEADDRINUSE;
#else
return EADDRINUSE;
#endif
}
webdriver::Dispatcher dispatcher(ctx, url_base);
webdriver::InitCallbacks(ctx, &dispatcher, &shutdown_event, root.empty());
std::cout << "Started ChromeDriver" << std::endl
<< "port=" << port << std::endl;
if (root.length()) {
VLOG(1) << "Serving files from the current working directory";
}
shutdown_event.Wait();
mg_stop(ctx);
return (EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void DocumentLoader::callContinueAfterNavigationPolicy(void* argument, const ResourceRequest& request, PassRefPtr<FormState>, bool shouldContinue)
{
static_cast<DocumentLoader*>(argument)->continueAfterNavigationPolicy(request, shouldContinue);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::DidChangeContents() {
if (web_frame_->Client())
web_frame_->Client()->DidChangeContents();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int fill_thread_core_info(struct elf_thread_core_info *t,
const struct user_regset_view *view,
long signr, size_t *total)
{
unsigned int i;
/*
* NT_PRSTATUS is the one special case, because the regset data
* goes into the pr_reg field inside the note contents, rather
* than being the whole note contents. We fill the reset in here.
* We assume that regset 0 is NT_PRSTATUS.
*/
fill_prstatus(&t->prstatus, t->task, signr);
(void) view->regsets[0].get(t->task, &view->regsets[0],
0, sizeof(t->prstatus.pr_reg),
&t->prstatus.pr_reg, NULL);
fill_note(&t->notes[0], "CORE", NT_PRSTATUS,
sizeof(t->prstatus), &t->prstatus);
*total += notesize(&t->notes[0]);
do_thread_regset_writeback(t->task, &view->regsets[0]);
/*
* Each other regset might generate a note too. For each regset
* that has no core_note_type or is inactive, we leave t->notes[i]
* all zero and we'll know to skip writing it later.
*/
for (i = 1; i < view->n; ++i) {
const struct user_regset *regset = &view->regsets[i];
do_thread_regset_writeback(t->task, regset);
if (regset->core_note_type &&
(!regset->active || regset->active(t->task, regset))) {
int ret;
size_t size = regset->n * regset->size;
void *data = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!data))
return 0;
ret = regset->get(t->task, regset,
0, size, data, NULL);
if (unlikely(ret))
kfree(data);
else {
if (regset->core_note_type != NT_PRFPREG)
fill_note(&t->notes[i], "LINUX",
regset->core_note_type,
size, data);
else {
t->prstatus.pr_fpvalid = 1;
fill_note(&t->notes[i], "CORE",
NT_PRFPREG, size, data);
}
*total += notesize(&t->notes[i]);
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: regset: Prevent null pointer reference on readonly regsets
The regset common infrastructure assumed that regsets would always
have .get and .set methods, but not necessarily .active methods.
Unfortunately people have since written regsets without .set methods.
Rather than putting in stub functions everywhere, handle regsets with
null .get or .set methods explicitly.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool BlinkTestRunner::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(BlinkTestRunner, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ShellViewMsg_SetTestConfiguration,
OnSetTestConfiguration)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ShellViewMsg_SessionHistory, OnSessionHistory)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ShellViewMsg_Reset, OnReset)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ShellViewMsg_NotifyDone, OnNotifyDone)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ShellViewMsg_TryLeakDetection, OnTryLeakDetection)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void LoginDisplayHostWebUI::OnUserSwitchAnimationFinished() {
ShutdownDisplayHost();
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: MagickExport void *ResizeQuantumMemory(void *memory,const size_t count,
const size_t quantum)
{
size_t
extent;
if (CheckMemoryOverflow(count,quantum) != MagickFalse)
{
memory=RelinquishMagickMemory(memory);
return((void *) NULL);
}
extent=count*quantum;
return(ResizeMagickMemory(memory,extent));
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType ListThresholdMaps(FILE *file,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const StringInfo
*option;
LinkedListInfo
*options;
MagickStatusType
status;
status=MagickTrue;
if (file == (FILE *) NULL)
file=stdout;
options=GetConfigureOptions(ThresholdsFilename,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(file,
"\n Threshold Maps for Ordered Dither Operations\n");
option=(const StringInfo *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(options);
while (option != (const StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleFile(file,"\nPath: %s\n\n",GetStringInfoPath(option));
status&=ListThresholdMapFile(file,(const char *) GetStringInfoDatum(option),
GetStringInfoPath(option),exception);
option=(const StringInfo *) GetNextValueInLinkedList(options);
}
options=DestroyConfigureOptions(options);
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1609
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void ToggleBookmarkBarWhenVisible(content::BrowserContext* browser_context) {
PrefService* prefs = user_prefs::UserPrefs::Get(browser_context);
const bool always_show =
!prefs->GetBoolean(bookmarks::prefs::kShowBookmarkBar);
prefs->SetBoolean(bookmarks::prefs::kShowBookmarkBar, always_show);
}
Commit Message: Prevent interpretating userinfo as url scheme when editing bookmarks
Chrome's Edit Bookmark dialog formats urls for display such that a
url of http://javascript:[email protected] is later converted to a
javascript url scheme, allowing persistence of a script injection
attack within the user's bookmarks.
This fix prevents such misinterpretations by always showing the
scheme when a userinfo component is present within the url.
BUG=639126
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2368593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#422467}
CWE ID: CWE-79
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
unsigned long stack_start,
struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned long stack_size,
int __user *child_tidptr,
struct pid *pid,
int trace)
{
int retval;
struct task_struct *p;
int cgroup_callbacks_done = 0;
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_FS))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
* can only be started up within the thread group.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) && !(clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Shared signal handlers imply shared VM. By way of the above,
* thread groups also imply shared VM. Blocking this case allows
* for various simplifications in other code.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND) && !(clone_flags & CLONE_VM))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Siblings of global init remain as zombies on exit since they are
* not reaped by their parent (swapper). To solve this and to avoid
* multi-rooted process trees, prevent global and container-inits
* from creating siblings.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT) &&
current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
retval = security_task_create(clone_flags);
if (retval)
goto fork_out;
retval = -ENOMEM;
p = dup_task_struct(current);
if (!p)
goto fork_out;
ftrace_graph_init_task(p);
rt_mutex_init_task(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->hardirqs_enabled);
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
#endif
retval = -EAGAIN;
if (atomic_read(&p->real_cred->user->processes) >=
p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC].rlim_cur) {
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
p->real_cred->user != INIT_USER)
goto bad_fork_free;
}
retval = copy_creds(p, clone_flags);
if (retval < 0)
goto bad_fork_free;
/*
* If multiple threads are within copy_process(), then this check
* triggers too late. This doesn't hurt, the check is only there
* to stop root fork bombs.
*/
retval = -EAGAIN;
if (nr_threads >= max_threads)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_count;
if (!try_module_get(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_count;
p->did_exec = 0;
delayacct_tsk_init(p); /* Must remain after dup_task_struct() */
copy_flags(clone_flags, p);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->children);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->sibling);
rcu_copy_process(p);
p->vfork_done = NULL;
spin_lock_init(&p->alloc_lock);
init_sigpending(&p->pending);
p->utime = cputime_zero;
p->stime = cputime_zero;
p->gtime = cputime_zero;
p->utimescaled = cputime_zero;
p->stimescaled = cputime_zero;
p->prev_utime = cputime_zero;
p->prev_stime = cputime_zero;
p->default_timer_slack_ns = current->timer_slack_ns;
task_io_accounting_init(&p->ioac);
acct_clear_integrals(p);
posix_cpu_timers_init(p);
p->lock_depth = -1; /* -1 = no lock */
do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&p->start_time);
p->real_start_time = p->start_time;
monotonic_to_bootbased(&p->real_start_time);
p->io_context = NULL;
p->audit_context = NULL;
cgroup_fork(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
p->mempolicy = mpol_dup(p->mempolicy);
if (IS_ERR(p->mempolicy)) {
retval = PTR_ERR(p->mempolicy);
p->mempolicy = NULL;
goto bad_fork_cleanup_cgroup;
}
mpol_fix_fork_child_flag(p);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
p->irq_events = 0;
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_INTERRUPTS_ON_CTXSW
p->hardirqs_enabled = 1;
#else
p->hardirqs_enabled = 0;
#endif
p->hardirq_enable_ip = 0;
p->hardirq_enable_event = 0;
p->hardirq_disable_ip = _THIS_IP_;
p->hardirq_disable_event = 0;
p->softirqs_enabled = 1;
p->softirq_enable_ip = _THIS_IP_;
p->softirq_enable_event = 0;
p->softirq_disable_ip = 0;
p->softirq_disable_event = 0;
p->hardirq_context = 0;
p->softirq_context = 0;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
p->lockdep_depth = 0; /* no locks held yet */
p->curr_chain_key = 0;
p->lockdep_recursion = 0;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES
p->blocked_on = NULL; /* not blocked yet */
#endif
p->bts = NULL;
p->stack_start = stack_start;
/* Perform scheduler related setup. Assign this task to a CPU. */
sched_fork(p, clone_flags);
retval = perf_event_init_task(p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_policy;
if ((retval = audit_alloc(p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_policy;
/* copy all the process information */
if ((retval = copy_semundo(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_audit;
if ((retval = copy_files(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_semundo;
if ((retval = copy_fs(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_files;
if ((retval = copy_sighand(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_fs;
if ((retval = copy_signal(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_sighand;
if ((retval = copy_mm(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_signal;
if ((retval = copy_namespaces(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm;
if ((retval = copy_io(clone_flags, p)))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;
retval = copy_thread(clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, regs);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
if (pid != &init_struct_pid) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
pid = alloc_pid(p->nsproxy->pid_ns);
if (!pid)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWPID) {
retval = pid_ns_prepare_proc(p->nsproxy->pid_ns);
if (retval < 0)
goto bad_fork_free_pid;
}
}
p->pid = pid_nr(pid);
p->tgid = p->pid;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
p->tgid = current->tgid;
if (current->nsproxy != p->nsproxy) {
retval = ns_cgroup_clone(p, pid);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_free_pid;
}
p->set_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL;
/*
* Clear TID on mm_release()?
*/
p->clear_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) ? child_tidptr: NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
p->robust_list = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
p->compat_robust_list = NULL;
#endif
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->pi_state_list);
p->pi_state_cache = NULL;
#endif
/*
* sigaltstack should be cleared when sharing the same VM
*/
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VM|CLONE_VFORK)) == CLONE_VM)
p->sas_ss_sp = p->sas_ss_size = 0;
/*
* Syscall tracing should be turned off in the child regardless
* of CLONE_PTRACE.
*/
clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE);
#ifdef TIF_SYSCALL_EMU
clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SYSCALL_EMU);
#endif
clear_all_latency_tracing(p);
/* ok, now we should be set up.. */
p->exit_signal = (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) ? -1 : (clone_flags & CSIGNAL);
p->pdeath_signal = 0;
p->exit_state = 0;
/*
* Ok, make it visible to the rest of the system.
* We dont wake it up yet.
*/
p->group_leader = p;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->thread_group);
/* Now that the task is set up, run cgroup callbacks if
* necessary. We need to run them before the task is visible
* on the tasklist. */
cgroup_fork_callbacks(p);
cgroup_callbacks_done = 1;
/* Need tasklist lock for parent etc handling! */
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/*
* The task hasn't been attached yet, so its cpus_allowed mask will
* not be changed, nor will its assigned CPU.
*
* The cpus_allowed mask of the parent may have changed after it was
* copied first time - so re-copy it here, then check the child's CPU
* to ensure it is on a valid CPU (and if not, just force it back to
* parent's CPU). This avoids alot of nasty races.
*/
p->cpus_allowed = current->cpus_allowed;
p->rt.nr_cpus_allowed = current->rt.nr_cpus_allowed;
if (unlikely(!cpu_isset(task_cpu(p), p->cpus_allowed) ||
!cpu_online(task_cpu(p))))
set_task_cpu(p, smp_processor_id());
/* CLONE_PARENT re-uses the old parent */
if (clone_flags & (CLONE_PARENT|CLONE_THREAD)) {
p->real_parent = current->real_parent;
p->parent_exec_id = current->parent_exec_id;
} else {
p->real_parent = current;
p->parent_exec_id = current->self_exec_id;
}
spin_lock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
/*
* Process group and session signals need to be delivered to just the
* parent before the fork or both the parent and the child after the
* fork. Restart if a signal comes in before we add the new process to
* it's process group.
* A fatal signal pending means that current will exit, so the new
* thread can't slip out of an OOM kill (or normal SIGKILL).
*/
recalc_sigpending();
if (signal_pending(current)) {
spin_unlock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
retval = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
goto bad_fork_free_pid;
}
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) {
atomic_inc(¤t->signal->count);
atomic_inc(¤t->signal->live);
p->group_leader = current->group_leader;
list_add_tail_rcu(&p->thread_group, &p->group_leader->thread_group);
}
if (likely(p->pid)) {
list_add_tail(&p->sibling, &p->real_parent->children);
tracehook_finish_clone(p, clone_flags, trace);
if (thread_group_leader(p)) {
if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWPID)
p->nsproxy->pid_ns->child_reaper = p;
p->signal->leader_pid = pid;
tty_kref_put(p->signal->tty);
p->signal->tty = tty_kref_get(current->signal->tty);
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, task_pgrp(current));
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_SID, task_session(current));
list_add_tail_rcu(&p->tasks, &init_task.tasks);
__get_cpu_var(process_counts)++;
}
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID, pid);
nr_threads++;
}
total_forks++;
spin_unlock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
proc_fork_connector(p);
cgroup_post_fork(p);
perf_event_fork(p);
return p;
bad_fork_free_pid:
if (pid != &init_struct_pid)
free_pid(pid);
bad_fork_cleanup_io:
put_io_context(p->io_context);
bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces:
exit_task_namespaces(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_mm:
if (p->mm)
mmput(p->mm);
bad_fork_cleanup_signal:
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD))
__cleanup_signal(p->signal);
bad_fork_cleanup_sighand:
__cleanup_sighand(p->sighand);
bad_fork_cleanup_fs:
exit_fs(p); /* blocking */
bad_fork_cleanup_files:
exit_files(p); /* blocking */
bad_fork_cleanup_semundo:
exit_sem(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_audit:
audit_free(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_policy:
perf_event_free_task(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
mpol_put(p->mempolicy);
bad_fork_cleanup_cgroup:
#endif
cgroup_exit(p, cgroup_callbacks_done);
delayacct_tsk_free(p);
module_put(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module);
bad_fork_cleanup_count:
atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes);
exit_creds(p);
bad_fork_free:
free_task(p);
fork_out:
return ERR_PTR(retval);
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after failure of clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, parent's io_context->nr_tasks is incremented, but never
decremented whenever copy_process() fails afterwards, which prevents
exit_io_context() from calling IO schedulers exit functions.
Give a task_struct to exit_io_context(), and call exit_io_context() instead of
put_io_context() in copy_process() cleanup path.
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: ZEND_API zval* zend_object_proxy_get(zval *property TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_proxy_object *probj = zend_object_store_get_object(property TSRMLS_CC);
if (Z_OBJ_HT_P(probj->object) && Z_OBJ_HT_P(probj->object)->read_property) {
return Z_OBJ_HT_P(probj->object)->read_property(probj->object, probj->property, BP_VAR_R, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Cannot read property of object - no read handler defined");
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void br_multicast_del_pg(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port_group *pg)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct net_bridge_port_group *p;
struct net_bridge_port_group __rcu **pp;
mdb = mlock_dereference(br->mdb, br);
mp = br_mdb_ip_get(mdb, &pg->addr);
if (WARN_ON(!mp))
return;
for (pp = &mp->ports;
(p = mlock_dereference(*pp, br)) != NULL;
pp = &p->next) {
if (p != pg)
continue;
rcu_assign_pointer(*pp, p->next);
hlist_del_init(&p->mglist);
del_timer(&p->timer);
call_rcu_bh(&p->rcu, br_multicast_free_pg);
if (!mp->ports && !mp->mglist &&
netif_running(br->dev))
mod_timer(&mp->timer, jiffies);
return;
}
WARN_ON(1);
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <[email protected]>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void Reinitialize(ReinitTestCase test_case) {
feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(network::features::kNetworkService);
ASSERT_TRUE(temp_directory_.CreateUniqueTempDir());
AppCacheDatabase db(temp_directory_.GetPath().AppendASCII("Index"));
EXPECT_TRUE(db.LazyOpen(true));
if (test_case == CORRUPT_CACHE_ON_INSTALL ||
test_case == CORRUPT_CACHE_ON_LOAD_EXISTING) {
const std::string kCorruptData("deadbeef");
base::FilePath disk_cache_directory =
temp_directory_.GetPath().AppendASCII("Cache");
ASSERT_TRUE(base::CreateDirectory(disk_cache_directory));
base::FilePath index_file = disk_cache_directory.AppendASCII("index");
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<int>(kCorruptData.length()),
base::WriteFile(index_file, kCorruptData.data(),
kCorruptData.length()));
base::FilePath entry_file =
disk_cache_directory.AppendASCII("01234567_0");
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<int>(kCorruptData.length()),
base::WriteFile(entry_file, kCorruptData.data(),
kCorruptData.length()));
}
if (test_case == CORRUPT_CACHE_ON_LOAD_EXISTING) {
AppCacheDatabase db(temp_directory_.GetPath().AppendASCII("Index"));
GURL manifest_url = GetMockUrl("manifest");
AppCacheDatabase::GroupRecord group_record;
group_record.group_id = 1;
group_record.manifest_url = manifest_url;
group_record.origin = url::Origin::Create(manifest_url);
EXPECT_TRUE(db.InsertGroup(&group_record));
AppCacheDatabase::CacheRecord cache_record;
cache_record.cache_id = 1;
cache_record.group_id = 1;
cache_record.online_wildcard = false;
cache_record.update_time = kZeroTime;
cache_record.cache_size = kDefaultEntrySize;
EXPECT_TRUE(db.InsertCache(&cache_record));
AppCacheDatabase::EntryRecord entry_record;
entry_record.cache_id = 1;
entry_record.url = manifest_url;
entry_record.flags = AppCacheEntry::MANIFEST;
entry_record.response_id = 1;
entry_record.response_size = kDefaultEntrySize;
EXPECT_TRUE(db.InsertEntry(&entry_record));
}
service_.reset(new AppCacheServiceImpl(nullptr));
auto loader_factory_getter = base::MakeRefCounted<URLLoaderFactoryGetter>();
loader_factory_getter->SetNetworkFactoryForTesting(
&mock_url_loader_factory_, /* is_corb_enabled = */ true);
service_->set_url_loader_factory_getter(loader_factory_getter.get());
service_->Initialize(temp_directory_.GetPath());
mock_quota_manager_proxy_ = new MockQuotaManagerProxy();
service_->quota_manager_proxy_ = mock_quota_manager_proxy_;
delegate_.reset(new MockStorageDelegate(this));
observer_.reset(new MockServiceObserver(this));
service_->AddObserver(observer_.get());
FlushAllTasks();
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&AppCacheStorageImplTest::Continue_Reinitialize,
base::Unretained(this), test_case));
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mq_getsetattr, mqd_t, mqdes,
const struct compat_mq_attr __user *, u_mqstat,
struct compat_mq_attr __user *, u_omqstat)
{
int ret;
struct mq_attr mqstat, omqstat;
struct mq_attr *new = NULL, *old = NULL;
if (u_mqstat) {
new = &mqstat;
if (get_compat_mq_attr(new, u_mqstat))
return -EFAULT;
}
if (u_omqstat)
old = &omqstat;
ret = do_mq_getsetattr(mqdes, new, old);
if (ret || !old)
return ret;
if (put_compat_mq_attr(old, u_omqstat))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mqueue: fix a use-after-free in sys_mq_notify()
The retry logic for netlink_attachskb() inside sys_mq_notify()
is nasty and vulnerable:
1) The sock refcnt is already released when retry is needed
2) The fd is controllable by user-space because we already
release the file refcnt
so we when retry but the fd has been just closed by user-space
during this small window, we end up calling netlink_detachskb()
on the error path which releases the sock again, later when
the user-space closes this socket a use-after-free could be
triggered.
Setting 'sock' to NULL here should be sufficient to fix it.
Reported-by: GeneBlue <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: pdf_obj_read(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, int64_t *offset, int *nump, pdf_obj **page)
{
pdf_lexbuf *buf = &doc->lexbuf.base;
int num, gen, tok;
int64_t numofs, genofs, stmofs, tmpofs, newtmpofs;
int xref_len;
pdf_xref_entry *entry;
numofs = *offset;
fz_seek(ctx, doc->file, numofs, SEEK_SET);
/* We expect to read 'num' here */
tok = pdf_lex(ctx, doc->file, buf);
genofs = fz_tell(ctx, doc->file);
if (tok != PDF_TOK_INT)
{
/* Failed! */
DEBUGMESS((ctx, "skipping unexpected data (tok=%d) at %d", tok, *offset));
*offset = genofs;
return tok == PDF_TOK_EOF;
}
*nump = num = buf->i;
/* We expect to read 'gen' here */
tok = pdf_lex(ctx, doc->file, buf);
tmpofs = fz_tell(ctx, doc->file);
if (tok != PDF_TOK_INT)
{
/* Failed! */
DEBUGMESS((ctx, "skipping unexpected data after \"%d\" (tok=%d) at %d", num, tok, *offset));
*offset = tmpofs;
return tok == PDF_TOK_EOF;
}
gen = buf->i;
/* We expect to read 'obj' here */
do
{
tmpofs = fz_tell(ctx, doc->file);
tok = pdf_lex(ctx, doc->file, buf);
if (tok == PDF_TOK_OBJ)
break;
if (tok != PDF_TOK_INT)
{
DEBUGMESS((ctx, "skipping unexpected data (tok=%d) at %d", tok, tmpofs));
*offset = fz_tell(ctx, doc->file);
return tok == PDF_TOK_EOF;
}
DEBUGMESS((ctx, "skipping unexpected int %d at %d", num, numofs));
*nump = num = gen;
numofs = genofs;
gen = buf->i;
genofs = tmpofs;
}
while (1);
/* Now we read the actual object */
xref_len = pdf_xref_len(ctx, doc);
/* When we are reading a progressive file, we typically see:
* File Header
* obj m (Linearization params)
* xref #1 (refers to objects m-n)
* obj m+1
* ...
* obj n
* obj 1
* ...
* obj n-1
* xref #2
*
* The linearisation params are read elsewhere, hence
* whenever we read an object it should just go into the
* previous xref.
*/
tok = pdf_repair_obj(ctx, doc, buf, &stmofs, NULL, NULL, NULL, page, &newtmpofs, NULL);
do /* So we can break out of it */
{
if (num <= 0 || num >= xref_len)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "Not a valid object number (%d %d obj)", num, gen);
break;
}
if (gen != 0)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "Unexpected non zero generation number in linearized file");
}
entry = pdf_get_populating_xref_entry(ctx, doc, num);
if (entry->type != 0)
{
DEBUGMESS((ctx, "Duplicate object found (%d %d obj)", num, gen));
break;
}
if (page && *page)
{
DEBUGMESS((ctx, "Successfully read object %d @ %d - and found page %d!", num, numofs, doc->linear_page_num));
if (!entry->obj)
entry->obj = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, *page);
if (doc->linear_page_refs[doc->linear_page_num] == NULL)
doc->linear_page_refs[doc->linear_page_num] = pdf_new_indirect(ctx, doc, num, gen);
}
else
{
DEBUGMESS((ctx, "Successfully read object %d @ %d", num, numofs));
}
entry->type = 'n';
entry->gen = gen; // XXX: was 0
entry->num = num;
entry->ofs = numofs;
entry->stm_ofs = stmofs;
}
while (0);
if (page && *page)
doc->linear_page_num++;
if (tok == PDF_TOK_ENDOBJ)
{
*offset = fz_tell(ctx, doc->file);
}
else
{
*offset = newtmpofs;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void Browser::AddNewContents(WebContents* source,
std::unique_ptr<WebContents> new_contents,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
const gfx::Rect& initial_rect,
bool user_gesture,
bool* was_blocked) {
if (source && PopupBlockerTabHelper::ConsiderForPopupBlocking(disposition))
PopupTracker::CreateForWebContents(new_contents.get(), source);
chrome::AddWebContents(this, source, std::move(new_contents), disposition,
initial_rect);
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static struct ldb_dn_component ldb_dn_copy_component(
TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct ldb_dn_component *src)
{
struct ldb_dn_component dst;
memset(&dst, 0, sizeof(dst));
if (src == NULL) {
return dst;
}
dst.value = ldb_val_dup(mem_ctx, &(src->value));
if (dst.value.data == NULL) {
return dst;
}
dst.name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, src->name);
if (dst.name == NULL) {
LDB_FREE(dst.value.data);
return dst;
}
if (src->cf_value.data) {
dst.cf_value = ldb_val_dup(mem_ctx, &(src->cf_value));
if (dst.cf_value.data == NULL) {
LDB_FREE(dst.value.data);
LDB_FREE(dst.name);
return dst;
}
dst.cf_name = talloc_strdup(mem_ctx, src->cf_name);
if (dst.cf_name == NULL) {
LDB_FREE(dst.cf_name);
LDB_FREE(dst.value.data);
LDB_FREE(dst.name);
return dst;
}
} else {
dst.cf_value.data = NULL;
dst.cf_name = NULL;
}
return dst;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoCopyTexSubImage2D(
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint x,
GLint y,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height) {
const char* func_name = "glCopyTexSubImage2D";
DCHECK(!ShouldDeferReads());
TextureRef* texture_ref = texture_manager()->GetTextureInfoForTarget(
&state_, target);
if (!texture_ref) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name, "unknown texture for target");
return;
}
Texture* texture = texture_ref->texture();
GLenum type = 0;
GLenum internal_format = 0;
if (!texture->GetLevelType(target, level, &type, &internal_format) ||
!texture->ValidForTexture(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, 0, width, height, 1)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "bad dimensions.");
return;
}
if (!CheckBoundReadFramebufferValid(func_name,
GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION)) {
return;
}
GLenum read_format = GetBoundReadFramebufferInternalFormat();
GLenum read_type = GetBoundReadFramebufferTextureType();
if (!ValidateCopyTexFormat(func_name, internal_format,
read_format, read_type)) {
return;
}
if (FormsTextureCopyingFeedbackLoop(texture_ref, level, 0)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
func_name, "source and destination textures are the same");
return;
}
ScopedResolvedFramebufferBinder binder(this, false, true);
gfx::Size size = GetBoundReadFramebufferSize();
gfx::Rect src(x, y, width, height);
const gfx::Rect dst(0, 0, size.width(), size.height());
src.Intersect(dst);
if (src.IsEmpty())
return;
GLint dx = src.x() - x;
GLint dy = src.y() - y;
GLint destX = xoffset + dx;
GLint destY = yoffset + dy;
GLsizei level_width = 0;
GLsizei level_height = 0;
GLsizei level_depth = 0;
bool have_level = texture->GetLevelSize(
target, level, &level_width, &level_height, &level_depth);
DCHECK(have_level);
if (destX == 0 && destY == 0 &&
src.width() == level_width && src.height() == level_height) {
texture_manager()->SetLevelCleared(texture_ref, target, level, true);
} else {
gfx::Rect cleared_rect;
if (TextureManager::CombineAdjacentRects(
texture->GetLevelClearedRect(target, level),
gfx::Rect(destX, destY, src.width(), src.height()),
&cleared_rect)) {
DCHECK_GE(cleared_rect.size().GetArea(),
texture->GetLevelClearedRect(target, level).size().GetArea());
texture_manager()->SetLevelClearedRect(texture_ref, target, level,
cleared_rect);
} else {
if (!texture_manager()->ClearTextureLevel(this, texture_ref, target,
level)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, func_name, "dimensions too big");
return;
}
}
}
if (CopyTexImageResourceManager::CopyTexImageRequiresBlit(
feature_info_.get(), internal_format)) {
if (!InitializeCopyTexImageBlitter("glCopyTexSubImage2D")) {
return;
}
copy_tex_image_blit_->DoCopyTexSubImageToLUMACompatibilityTexture(
this, texture->service_id(), texture->target(), target,
internal_format, type, level, destX, destY, 0,
src.x(), src.y(), src.width(), src.height(),
GetBoundReadFramebufferServiceId(),
GetBoundReadFramebufferInternalFormat());
} else {
api()->glCopyTexSubImage2DFn(target, level, destX, destY, src.x(), src.y(),
src.width(), src.height());
}
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl* WebContentsImpl::GetRenderWidgetHostWithPageFocus() {
WebContentsImpl* focused_web_contents = GetFocusedWebContents();
if (focused_web_contents->ShowingInterstitialPage()) {
return static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(
focused_web_contents->GetRenderManager()
->interstitial_page()
->GetMainFrame())
->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
return focused_web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetRenderWidgetHost();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int ssl3_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, int len, int peek)
{
int ret;
clear_sys_error();
if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s);
s->s3->in_read_app_data=1;
ret=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,buf,len,peek);
if ((ret == -1) && (s->s3->in_read_app_data == 2))
{
/* ssl3_read_bytes decided to call s->handshake_func, which
* called ssl3_read_bytes to read handshake data.
* However, ssl3_read_bytes actually found application data
* and thinks that application data makes sense here; so disable
* handshake processing and try to read application data again. */
s->in_handshake++;
ret=s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA,buf,len,peek);
s->in_handshake--;
}
else
s->s3->in_read_app_data=0;
return(ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool ProxyClientSocket::SanitizeProxyRedirect(HttpResponseInfo* response,
const GURL& url) {
//// static
DCHECK(response && response->headers.get());
std::string location;
if (!response->headers->IsRedirect(&location))
return false;
std::string fake_response_headers =
base::StringPrintf("HTTP/1.0 302 Found\n"
"Location: %s\n"
"Content-length: 0\n"
"Connection: close\n"
"\n",
location.c_str());
std::string raw_headers =
HttpUtil::AssembleRawHeaders(fake_response_headers.data(),
fake_response_headers.length());
response->headers = new HttpResponseHeaders(raw_headers);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: my_object_get_value (MyObject *obj, guint *ret, GError **error)
{
*ret = obj->val;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static CURLcode imap_logout(struct connectdata *conn)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
const char *str;
str = getcmdid(conn);
result = imapsendf(conn, str, "%s LOGOUT", str, NULL);
if(result)
return result;
state(conn, IMAP_LOGOUT);
result = imap_easy_statemach(conn);
return result;
}
Commit Message: URL sanitize: reject URLs containing bad data
Protocols (IMAP, POP3 and SMTP) that use the path part of a URL in a
decoded manner now use the new Curl_urldecode() function to reject URLs
with embedded control codes (anything that is or decodes to a byte value
less than 32).
URLs containing such codes could easily otherwise be used to do harm and
allow users to do unintended actions with otherwise innocent tools and
applications. Like for example using a URL like
pop3://pop3.example.com/1%0d%0aDELE%201 when the app wants a URL to get
a mail and instead this would delete one.
This flaw is considered a security vulnerability: CVE-2012-0036
Security advisory at: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20120124.html
Reported by: Dan Fandrich
CWE ID: CWE-89
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool PermissionsRemoveFunction::RunImpl() {
scoped_ptr<Remove::Params> params(Remove::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> permissions =
helpers::UnpackPermissionSet(params->permissions, &error_);
if (!permissions.get())
return false;
const extensions::Extension* extension = GetExtension();
APIPermissionSet apis = permissions->apis();
for (APIPermissionSet::const_iterator i = apis.begin();
i != apis.end(); ++i) {
if (!i->info()->supports_optional()) {
error_ = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kNotWhitelistedError, i->name());
return false;
}
}
const PermissionSet* required = extension->required_permission_set();
scoped_refptr<PermissionSet> intersection(
PermissionSet::CreateIntersection(permissions.get(), required));
if (!intersection->IsEmpty()) {
error_ = kCantRemoveRequiredPermissionsError;
results_ = Remove::Results::Create(false);
return false;
}
PermissionsUpdater(profile()).RemovePermissions(extension, permissions.get());
results_ = Remove::Results::Create(true);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
[email protected]
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnDidAddMessageToConsole(
int32_t level,
const base::string16& message,
int32_t line_no,
const base::string16& source_id) {
if (level < logging::LOG_VERBOSE || level > logging::LOG_FATAL) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(
GetProcess(), bad_message::RFH_DID_ADD_CONSOLE_MESSAGE_BAD_SEVERITY);
return;
}
if (delegate_->DidAddMessageToConsole(level, message, line_no, source_id))
return;
const bool is_builtin_component =
HasWebUIScheme(delegate_->GetMainFrameLastCommittedURL()) ||
GetContentClient()->browser()->IsBuiltinComponent(
GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext(), GetLastCommittedOrigin());
const bool is_off_the_record =
GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord();
LogConsoleMessage(level, message, line_no, is_builtin_component,
is_off_the_record, source_id);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void fz_cmm_init_profile(fz_context *ctx, fz_iccprofile *profile)
{
if (ctx && ctx->colorspace && ctx->colorspace->cmm && ctx->cmm_instance)
ctx->colorspace->cmm->init_profile(ctx->cmm_instance, profile);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::CancelPendingReload() {
DCHECK(pending_reload_ != ReloadType::NONE);
pending_reload_ = ReloadType::NONE;
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static long ext4_zero_range(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
loff_t len, int mode)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
handle_t *handle = NULL;
unsigned int max_blocks;
loff_t new_size = 0;
int ret = 0;
int flags;
int credits;
int partial_begin, partial_end;
loff_t start, end;
ext4_lblk_t lblk;
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
unsigned int blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
trace_ext4_zero_range(inode, offset, len, mode);
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;
/* Call ext4_force_commit to flush all data in case of data=journal. */
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
ret = ext4_force_commit(inode->i_sb);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Write out all dirty pages to avoid race conditions
* Then release them.
*/
if (mapping->nrpages && mapping_tagged(mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY)) {
ret = filemap_write_and_wait_range(mapping, offset,
offset + len - 1);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* Round up offset. This is not fallocate, we neet to zero out
* blocks, so convert interior block aligned part of the range to
* unwritten and possibly manually zero out unaligned parts of the
* range.
*/
start = round_up(offset, 1 << blkbits);
end = round_down((offset + len), 1 << blkbits);
if (start < offset || end > offset + len)
return -EINVAL;
partial_begin = offset & ((1 << blkbits) - 1);
partial_end = (offset + len) & ((1 << blkbits) - 1);
lblk = start >> blkbits;
max_blocks = (end >> blkbits);
if (max_blocks < lblk)
max_blocks = 0;
else
max_blocks -= lblk;
flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE_UNWRIT_EXT |
EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT_UNWRITTEN |
EXT4_EX_NOCACHE;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)
flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_KEEP_SIZE;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/*
* Indirect files do not support unwritten extnets
*/
if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_mutex;
}
if (!(mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE) &&
offset + len > i_size_read(inode)) {
new_size = offset + len;
ret = inode_newsize_ok(inode, new_size);
if (ret)
goto out_mutex;
/*
* If we have a partial block after EOF we have to allocate
* the entire block.
*/
if (partial_end)
max_blocks += 1;
}
if (max_blocks > 0) {
/* Now release the pages and zero block aligned part of pages*/
truncate_pagecache_range(inode, start, end - 1);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
/* Wait all existing dio workers, newcomers will block on i_mutex */
ext4_inode_block_unlocked_dio(inode);
inode_dio_wait(inode);
ret = ext4_alloc_file_blocks(file, lblk, max_blocks, new_size,
flags, mode);
if (ret)
goto out_dio;
/*
* Remove entire range from the extent status tree.
*
* ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, lblk, max_blocks) is
* NOT sufficient. I'm not sure why this is the case,
* but let's be conservative and remove the extent
* status tree for the entire inode. There should be
* no outstanding delalloc extents thanks to the
* filemap_write_and_wait_range() call above.
*/
ret = ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, 0, EXT_MAX_BLOCKS);
if (ret)
goto out_dio;
}
if (!partial_begin && !partial_end)
goto out_dio;
/*
* In worst case we have to writeout two nonadjacent unwritten
* blocks and update the inode
*/
credits = (2 * ext4_ext_index_trans_blocks(inode, 2)) + 1;
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode))
credits += 2;
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_MISC, credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, ret);
goto out_dio;
}
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
if (new_size) {
ext4_update_inode_size(inode, new_size);
} else {
/*
* Mark that we allocate beyond EOF so the subsequent truncate
* can proceed even if the new size is the same as i_size.
*/
if ((offset + len) > i_size_read(inode))
ext4_set_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EOFBLOCKS);
}
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
/* Zero out partial block at the edges of the range */
ret = ext4_zero_partial_blocks(handle, inode, offset, len);
if (file->f_flags & O_SYNC)
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out_dio:
ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode);
out_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: allocate entire range in zero range
Currently there is a bug in zero range code which causes zero range
calls to only allocate block aligned portion of the range, while
ignoring the rest in some cases.
In some cases, namely if the end of the range is past i_size, we do
attempt to preallocate the last nonaligned block. However this might
cause kernel to BUG() in some carefully designed zero range requests
on setups where page size > block size.
Fix this problem by first preallocating the entire range, including
the nonaligned edges and converting the written extents to unwritten
in the next step. This approach will also give us the advantage of
having the range to be as linearly contiguous as possible.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void InspectorPageAgent::searchInResource(
const String& frame_id,
const String& url,
const String& query,
Maybe<bool> optional_case_sensitive,
Maybe<bool> optional_is_regex,
std::unique_ptr<SearchInResourceCallback> callback) {
if (!enabled_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::Error("Agent is not enabled."));
return;
}
inspector_resource_content_loader_->EnsureResourcesContentLoaded(
resource_content_loader_client_id_,
WTF::Bind(&InspectorPageAgent::SearchContentAfterResourcesContentLoaded,
WrapPersistent(this), frame_id, url, query,
optional_case_sensitive.fromMaybe(false),
optional_is_regex.fromMaybe(false),
WTF::Passed(std::move(callback))));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: size_t jsvGetArrayBufferLength(const JsVar *arrayBuffer) {
assert(jsvIsArrayBuffer(arrayBuffer));
return arrayBuffer->varData.arraybuffer.length;
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void btsock_l2cap_signaled(int fd, int flags, uint32_t user_id)
{
l2cap_socket *sock;
char drop_it = FALSE;
/* We use MSG_DONTWAIT when sending data to JAVA, hence it can be accepted to hold the lock. */
pthread_mutex_lock(&state_lock);
sock = btsock_l2cap_find_by_id_l(user_id);
if (sock) {
if ((flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_RD) && !sock->server) {
if (sock->connected) {
int size = 0;
if (!(flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_EXCEPTION) || (ioctl(sock->our_fd, FIONREAD, &size)
== 0 && size)) {
uint8_t *buffer = osi_malloc(L2CAP_MAX_SDU_LENGTH);
/* Apparently we hijack the req_id (UINT32) to pass the pointer to the buffer to
* the write complete callback, which call a free... wonder if this works on a
* 64 bit platform? */
if (buffer != NULL) {
/* The socket is created with SOCK_SEQPACKET, hence we read one message at
* the time. The maximum size of a message is allocated to ensure data is
* not lost. This is okay to do as Android uses virtual memory, hence even
* if we only use a fraction of the memory it should not block for others
* to use the memory. As the definition of ioctl(FIONREAD) do not clearly
* define what value will be returned if multiple messages are written to
* the socket before any message is read from the socket, we could
* potentially risk to allocate way more memory than needed. One of the use
* cases for this socket is obex where multiple 64kbyte messages are
* typically written to the socket in a tight loop, hence we risk the ioctl
* will return the total amount of data in the buffer, which could be
* multiple 64kbyte chunks.
* UPDATE: As bluedroid cannot handle 64kbyte buffers, the size is reduced
* to around 8kbyte - and using malloc for buffer allocation here seems to
* be wrong
* UPDATE: Since we are responsible for freeing the buffer in the
* write_complete_ind, it is OK to use malloc. */
int count = recv(fd, buffer, L2CAP_MAX_SDU_LENGTH,
MSG_NOSIGNAL | MSG_DONTWAIT);
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("btsock_l2cap_signaled - %d bytes received from socket",
count);
if (sock->fixed_chan) {
if(BTA_JvL2capWriteFixed(sock->channel, (BD_ADDR*)&sock->addr,
(UINT32)buffer, btsock_l2cap_cbk, buffer, count,
(void *)user_id) != BTA_JV_SUCCESS) {
on_l2cap_write_fixed_done(buffer, user_id);
}
} else {
if(BTA_JvL2capWrite(sock->handle, (UINT32)buffer, buffer, count,
(void *)user_id) != BTA_JV_SUCCESS) {
on_l2cap_write_done(buffer, user_id);
}
}
} else {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("Unable to allocate memory for data packet from JAVA...")
}
}
} else
drop_it = TRUE;
}
if (flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_WR) {
if (flush_incoming_que_on_wr_signal_l(sock) && sock->connected)
btsock_thread_add_fd(pth, sock->our_fd, BTSOCK_L2CAP, SOCK_THREAD_FD_WR, sock->id);
}
if (drop_it || (flags & SOCK_THREAD_FD_EXCEPTION)) {
int size = 0;
if (drop_it || ioctl(sock->our_fd, FIONREAD, &size) != 0 || size == 0)
btsock_l2cap_free_l(sock);
}
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&state_lock);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: pdf14_fill_rectangle(gx_device * dev,
int x, int y, int w, int h, gx_color_index color)
{
pdf14_device *pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
pdf14_buf *buf = pdev->ctx->stack;
fit_fill_xywh(dev, x, y, w, h);
if (w <= 0 || h <= 0)
return 0;
if (buf->knockout)
return pdf14_mark_fill_rectangle_ko_simple(dev, x, y, w, h, color, NULL,
false);
else
return pdf14_mark_fill_rectangle(dev, x, y, w, h, color, NULL, false);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int lxc_cgroupfs_get(const char *filename, char *value, size_t len, const char *name, const char *lxcpath)
{
char *subsystem = NULL, *p, *path;
int ret = -1;
subsystem = alloca(strlen(filename) + 1);
strcpy(subsystem, filename);
if ((p = strchr(subsystem, '.')) != NULL)
*p = '\0';
path = lxc_cgroup_get_hierarchy_abs_path(subsystem, name, lxcpath);
if (path) {
ret = do_cgroup_get(path, filename, value, len);
free(path);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool GpuProcessHost::LaunchGpuProcess(const std::string& channel_id) {
if (!(gpu_enabled_ &&
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->ShouldUseSoftwareRendering()) &&
!hardware_gpu_enabled_) {
SendOutstandingReplies();
return false;
}
const CommandLine& browser_command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
CommandLine::StringType gpu_launcher =
browser_command_line.GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kGpuLauncher);
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
int child_flags = gpu_launcher.empty() ? ChildProcessHost::CHILD_ALLOW_SELF :
ChildProcessHost::CHILD_NORMAL;
#else
int child_flags = ChildProcessHost::CHILD_NORMAL;
#endif
FilePath exe_path = ChildProcessHost::GetChildPath(child_flags);
if (exe_path.empty())
return false;
CommandLine* cmd_line = new CommandLine(exe_path);
cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kProcessType, switches::kGpuProcess);
cmd_line->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kProcessChannelID, channel_id);
if (kind_ == GPU_PROCESS_KIND_UNSANDBOXED)
cmd_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuSandbox);
static const char* const kSwitchNames[] = {
switches::kDisableBreakpad,
switches::kDisableGLMultisampling,
switches::kDisableGpuSandbox,
switches::kReduceGpuSandbox,
switches::kDisableSeccompFilterSandbox,
switches::kDisableGpuSwitching,
switches::kDisableGpuVsync,
switches::kDisableGpuWatchdog,
switches::kDisableImageTransportSurface,
switches::kDisableLogging,
switches::kEnableGPUServiceLogging,
switches::kEnableLogging,
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
switches::kEnableSandboxLogging,
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
switches::kEnableVaapi,
#endif
switches::kGpuNoContextLost,
switches::kGpuStartupDialog,
switches::kLoggingLevel,
switches::kNoSandbox,
switches::kTestGLLib,
switches::kTraceStartup,
switches::kV,
switches::kVModule,
};
cmd_line->CopySwitchesFrom(browser_command_line, kSwitchNames,
arraysize(kSwitchNames));
cmd_line->CopySwitchesFrom(
browser_command_line, switches::kGpuSwitches, switches::kNumGpuSwitches);
content::GetContentClient()->browser()->AppendExtraCommandLineSwitches(
cmd_line, process_->GetData().id);
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->AppendGpuCommandLine(cmd_line);
if (cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kUseGL))
software_rendering_ =
(cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) == "swiftshader");
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("GPU.GPUProcessSoftwareRendering", software_rendering_);
if (!gpu_launcher.empty())
cmd_line->PrependWrapper(gpu_launcher);
process_->Launch(
#if defined(OS_WIN)
FilePath(),
#elif defined(OS_POSIX)
false, // Never use the zygote (GPU plugin can't be sandboxed).
base::EnvironmentVector(),
#endif
cmd_line);
process_launched_ = true;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.GPUProcessLifetimeEvents",
LAUNCHED, GPU_PROCESS_LIFETIME_EVENT_MAX);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: unsigned long long task_sched_runtime(struct task_struct *p)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct rq *rq;
u64 ns = 0;
rq = task_rq_lock(p, &flags);
ns = p->se.sum_exec_runtime + do_task_delta_exec(p, rq);
task_rq_unlock(rq, &flags);
return ns;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static enum try_read_result try_read_udp(conn *c) {
int res;
assert(c != NULL);
c->request_addr_size = sizeof(c->request_addr);
res = recvfrom(c->sfd, c->rbuf, c->rsize,
0, &c->request_addr, &c->request_addr_size);
if (res > 8) {
unsigned char *buf = (unsigned char *)c->rbuf;
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.bytes_read += res;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
/* Beginning of UDP packet is the request ID; save it. */
c->request_id = buf[0] * 256 + buf[1];
/* If this is a multi-packet request, drop it. */
if (buf[4] != 0 || buf[5] != 1) {
out_string(c, "SERVER_ERROR multi-packet request not supported");
return READ_NO_DATA_RECEIVED;
}
/* Don't care about any of the rest of the header. */
res -= 8;
memmove(c->rbuf, c->rbuf + 8, res);
c->rbytes += res;
c->rcurr = c->rbuf;
return READ_DATA_RECEIVED;
}
return READ_NO_DATA_RECEIVED;
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void record_and_restart(struct perf_event *event, unsigned long val,
struct pt_regs *regs, int nmi)
{
u64 period = event->hw.sample_period;
s64 prev, delta, left;
int record = 0;
if (event->hw.state & PERF_HES_STOPPED) {
write_pmc(event->hw.idx, 0);
return;
}
/* we don't have to worry about interrupts here */
prev = local64_read(&event->hw.prev_count);
delta = check_and_compute_delta(prev, val);
local64_add(delta, &event->count);
/*
* See if the total period for this event has expired,
* and update for the next period.
*/
val = 0;
left = local64_read(&event->hw.period_left) - delta;
if (period) {
if (left <= 0) {
left += period;
if (left <= 0)
left = period;
record = 1;
event->hw.last_period = event->hw.sample_period;
}
if (left < 0x80000000LL)
val = 0x80000000LL - left;
}
write_pmc(event->hw.idx, val);
local64_set(&event->hw.prev_count, val);
local64_set(&event->hw.period_left, left);
perf_event_update_userpage(event);
/*
* Finally record data if requested.
*/
if (record) {
struct perf_sample_data data;
perf_sample_data_init(&data, ~0ULL);
data.period = event->hw.last_period;
if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR)
perf_get_data_addr(regs, &data.addr);
if (perf_event_overflow(event, nmi, &data, regs))
power_pmu_stop(event, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::WasShown() {
if (!host_->is_hidden())
return;
host_->WasShown();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void free_vfsmnt(struct mount *mnt)
{
kfree(mnt->mnt_devname);
mnt_free_id(mnt);
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
free_percpu(mnt->mnt_pcp);
#endif
kmem_cache_free(mnt_cache, mnt);
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int spl_filesystem_file_open(spl_filesystem_object *intern, int use_include_path, int silent TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval tmp;
intern->type = SPL_FS_FILE;
php_stat(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, FS_IS_DIR, &tmp TSRMLS_CC);
if (Z_LVAL(tmp)) {
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->file_name = NULL;
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_LogicException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot use SplFileObject with directories");
return FAILURE;
}
intern->u.file.context = php_stream_context_from_zval(intern->u.file.zcontext, 0);
intern->u.file.stream = php_stream_open_wrapper_ex(intern->file_name, intern->u.file.open_mode, (use_include_path ? USE_PATH : 0) | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, intern->u.file.context);
if (!intern->file_name_len || !intern->u.file.stream) {
if (!EG(exception)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot open file '%s'", intern->file_name_len ? intern->file_name : "");
}
intern->file_name = NULL; /* until here it is not a copy */
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
return FAILURE;
}
if (intern->u.file.zcontext) {
zend_list_addref(Z_RESVAL_P(intern->u.file.zcontext));
}
if (intern->file_name_len > 1 && IS_SLASH_AT(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len-1)) {
intern->file_name_len--;
}
intern->orig_path = estrndup(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, strlen(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path));
intern->file_name = estrndup(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len);
intern->u.file.open_mode = estrndup(intern->u.file.open_mode, intern->u.file.open_mode_len);
/* avoid reference counting in debug mode, thus do it manually */
ZVAL_RESOURCE(&intern->u.file.zresource, php_stream_get_resource_id(intern->u.file.stream));
Z_SET_REFCOUNT(intern->u.file.zresource, 1);
intern->u.file.delimiter = ',';
intern->u.file.enclosure = '"';
intern->u.file.escape = '\\';
zend_hash_find(&intern->std.ce->function_table, "getcurrentline", sizeof("getcurrentline"), (void **) &intern->u.file.func_getCurr);
return SUCCESS;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: fbFetchPixel_a1b1g1r1 (const FbBits *bits, int offset, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
CARD32 pixel = Fetch4(bits, offset);
CARD32 a,r,g,b;
a = ((pixel & 0x8) * 0xff) << 21;
r = ((pixel & 0x4) * 0xff) >> 3;
g = ((pixel & 0x2) * 0xff) << 7;
b = ((pixel & 0x1) * 0xff) << 16;
return a|r|g|b;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void nfs4_renew_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *data)
{
struct nfs_client *clp = (struct nfs_client *)task->tk_msg.rpc_argp;
unsigned long timestamp = (unsigned long)data;
if (task->tk_status < 0) {
switch (task->tk_status) {
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID:
case -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED:
case -NFS4ERR_CB_PATH_DOWN:
nfs4_schedule_state_recovery(clp);
}
return;
}
spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock);
if (time_before(clp->cl_last_renewal,timestamp))
clp->cl_last_renewal = timestamp;
spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static inline int verify_replay(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL];
if ((p->flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) && !rt)
return -EINVAL;
if (!rt)
return 0;
if (p->id.proto != IPPROTO_ESP)
return -EINVAL;
if (p->replay_window != 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid
The current code fails to ensure that the netlink message actually
contains as many bytes as the header indicates. If a user creates a new
state or updates an existing one but does not supply the bytes for the
whole ESN replay window, the kernel copies random heap bytes into the
replay bitmap, the ones happen to follow the XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL
netlink attribute. This leads to following issues:
1. The replay window has random bits set confusing the replay handling
code later on.
2. A malicious user could use this flaw to leak up to ~3.5kB of heap
memory when she has access to the XFRM netlink interface (requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN).
Known users of the ESN replay window are strongSwan and Steffen's
iproute2 patch (<http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/85962/>). The latter
uses the interface with a bitmap supplied while the former does not.
strongSwan is therefore prone to run into issue 1.
To fix both issues without breaking existing userland allow using the
XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL netlink attribute with either an empty bitmap or a
fully specified one. For the former case we initialize the in-kernel
bitmap with zero, for the latter we copy the user supplied bitmap. For
state updates the full bitmap must be supplied.
To prevent overflows in the bitmap length calculation the maximum size
of bmp_len is limited to 128 by this patch -- resulting in a maximum
replay window of 4096 packets. This should be sufficient for all real
life scenarios (RFC 4303 recommends a default replay window size of 64).
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Cc: Martin Willi <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool AudioFlinger::EffectChain::setVolume_l(uint32_t *left, uint32_t *right)
{
uint32_t newLeft = *left;
uint32_t newRight = *right;
bool hasControl = false;
int ctrlIdx = -1;
size_t size = mEffects.size();
for (size_t i = size; i > 0; i--) {
if (mEffects[i - 1]->isProcessEnabled() &&
(mEffects[i - 1]->desc().flags & EFFECT_FLAG_VOLUME_MASK) == EFFECT_FLAG_VOLUME_CTRL) {
ctrlIdx = i - 1;
hasControl = true;
break;
}
}
if (!isVolumeForced() && ctrlIdx == mVolumeCtrlIdx &&
*left == mLeftVolume && *right == mRightVolume) {
if (hasControl) {
*left = mNewLeftVolume;
*right = mNewRightVolume;
}
return hasControl;
}
mVolumeCtrlIdx = ctrlIdx;
mLeftVolume = newLeft;
mRightVolume = newRight;
if (ctrlIdx >= 0) {
mEffects[ctrlIdx]->setVolume(&newLeft, &newRight, true);
mNewLeftVolume = newLeft;
mNewRightVolume = newRight;
}
uint32_t lVol = newLeft;
uint32_t rVol = newRight;
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
if ((int)i == ctrlIdx) {
continue;
}
if ((int)i > ctrlIdx) {
lVol = *left;
rVol = *right;
}
mEffects[i]->setVolume(&lVol, &rVol, false);
}
*left = newLeft;
*right = newRight;
return hasControl;
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int jpc_dec_tileinit(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_dec_tile_t *tile)
{
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int compno;
int rlvlno;
jpc_dec_rlvl_t *rlvl;
jpc_dec_band_t *band;
jpc_dec_prc_t *prc;
int bndno;
jpc_tsfb_band_t *bnd;
int bandno;
jpc_dec_ccp_t *ccp;
int prccnt;
jpc_dec_cblk_t *cblk;
int cblkcnt;
uint_fast32_t tlprcxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlprcystart;
uint_fast32_t brprcxend;
uint_fast32_t brprcyend;
uint_fast32_t tlcbgxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlcbgystart;
uint_fast32_t brcbgxend;
uint_fast32_t brcbgyend;
uint_fast32_t cbgxstart;
uint_fast32_t cbgystart;
uint_fast32_t cbgxend;
uint_fast32_t cbgyend;
uint_fast32_t tlcblkxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlcblkystart;
uint_fast32_t brcblkxend;
uint_fast32_t brcblkyend;
uint_fast32_t cblkxstart;
uint_fast32_t cblkystart;
uint_fast32_t cblkxend;
uint_fast32_t cblkyend;
uint_fast32_t tmpxstart;
uint_fast32_t tmpystart;
uint_fast32_t tmpxend;
uint_fast32_t tmpyend;
jpc_dec_cp_t *cp;
jpc_tsfb_band_t bnds[64];
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int pchgno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
cp = tile->cp;
tile->realmode = 0;
if (cp->mctid == JPC_MCT_ICT) {
tile->realmode = 1;
}
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
if (ccp->qmfbid == JPC_COX_INS) {
tile->realmode = 1;
}
tcomp->numrlvls = ccp->numrlvls;
if (!(tcomp->rlvls = jas_alloc2(tcomp->numrlvls,
sizeof(jpc_dec_rlvl_t)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(tcomp->data = jas_seq2d_create(JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart,
cmpt->hstep), JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep),
JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep), JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend,
cmpt->vstep)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(tcomp->tsfb = jpc_cod_gettsfb(ccp->qmfbid,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1))) {
return -1;
}
{
jpc_tsfb_getbands(tcomp->tsfb, jas_seq2d_xstart(tcomp->data),
jas_seq2d_ystart(tcomp->data), jas_seq2d_xend(tcomp->data),
jas_seq2d_yend(tcomp->data), bnds);
}
for (rlvlno = 0, rlvl = tcomp->rlvls; rlvlno < tcomp->numrlvls;
++rlvlno, ++rlvl) {
rlvl->bands = 0;
rlvl->xstart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->xstart,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->ystart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->ystart,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->xend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->xend,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->yend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->yend,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->prcwidthexpn = ccp->prcwidthexpns[rlvlno];
rlvl->prcheightexpn = ccp->prcheightexpns[rlvlno];
tlprcxstart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(rlvl->xstart,
rlvl->prcwidthexpn) << rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
tlprcystart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(rlvl->ystart,
rlvl->prcheightexpn) << rlvl->prcheightexpn;
brprcxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(rlvl->xend,
rlvl->prcwidthexpn) << rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
brprcyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(rlvl->yend,
rlvl->prcheightexpn) << rlvl->prcheightexpn;
rlvl->numhprcs = (brprcxend - tlprcxstart) >>
rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rlvl->numvprcs = (brprcyend - tlprcystart) >>
rlvl->prcheightexpn;
rlvl->numprcs = rlvl->numhprcs * rlvl->numvprcs;
if (rlvl->xstart >= rlvl->xend || rlvl->ystart >= rlvl->yend) {
rlvl->bands = 0;
rlvl->numprcs = 0;
rlvl->numhprcs = 0;
rlvl->numvprcs = 0;
continue;
}
if (!rlvlno) {
tlcbgxstart = tlprcxstart;
tlcbgystart = tlprcystart;
brcbgxend = brprcxend;
brcbgyend = brprcyend;
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn = rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rlvl->cbgheightexpn = rlvl->prcheightexpn;
} else {
tlcbgxstart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tlprcxstart, 1);
tlcbgystart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tlprcystart, 1);
brcbgxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(brprcxend, 1);
brcbgyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(brprcyend, 1);
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn = rlvl->prcwidthexpn - 1;
rlvl->cbgheightexpn = rlvl->prcheightexpn - 1;
}
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn = JAS_MIN(ccp->cblkwidthexpn,
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn);
rlvl->cblkheightexpn = JAS_MIN(ccp->cblkheightexpn,
rlvl->cbgheightexpn);
rlvl->numbands = (!rlvlno) ? 1 : 3;
if (!(rlvl->bands = jas_alloc2(rlvl->numbands,
sizeof(jpc_dec_band_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands;
bandno < rlvl->numbands; ++bandno, ++band) {
bndno = (!rlvlno) ? 0 : (3 * (rlvlno - 1) +
bandno + 1);
bnd = &bnds[bndno];
band->orient = bnd->orient;
band->stepsize = ccp->stepsizes[bndno];
band->analgain = JPC_NOMINALGAIN(ccp->qmfbid,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1, rlvlno, band->orient);
band->absstepsize = jpc_calcabsstepsize(band->stepsize,
cmpt->prec + band->analgain);
band->numbps = ccp->numguardbits +
JPC_QCX_GETEXPN(band->stepsize) - 1;
band->roishift = (ccp->roishift + band->numbps >= JPC_PREC) ?
(JPC_PREC - 1 - band->numbps) : ccp->roishift;
band->data = 0;
band->prcs = 0;
if (bnd->xstart == bnd->xend || bnd->ystart == bnd->yend) {
continue;
}
if (!(band->data = jas_seq2d_create(0, 0, 0, 0))) {
return -1;
}
jas_seq2d_bindsub(band->data, tcomp->data, bnd->locxstart,
bnd->locystart, bnd->locxend, bnd->locyend);
jas_seq2d_setshift(band->data, bnd->xstart, bnd->ystart);
assert(rlvl->numprcs);
if (!(band->prcs = jas_alloc2(rlvl->numprcs,
sizeof(jpc_dec_prc_t)))) {
return -1;
}
/************************************************/
cbgxstart = tlcbgxstart;
cbgystart = tlcbgystart;
for (prccnt = rlvl->numprcs, prc = band->prcs;
prccnt > 0; --prccnt, ++prc) {
cbgxend = cbgxstart + (1 << rlvl->cbgwidthexpn);
cbgyend = cbgystart + (1 << rlvl->cbgheightexpn);
prc->xstart = JAS_MAX(cbgxstart, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_xstart(band->data)));
prc->ystart = JAS_MAX(cbgystart, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_ystart(band->data)));
prc->xend = JAS_MIN(cbgxend, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_xend(band->data)));
prc->yend = JAS_MIN(cbgyend, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_yend(band->data)));
if (prc->xend > prc->xstart && prc->yend > prc->ystart) {
tlcblkxstart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(prc->xstart,
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn) << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
tlcblkystart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(prc->ystart,
rlvl->cblkheightexpn) << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
brcblkxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(prc->xend,
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn) << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
brcblkyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(prc->yend,
rlvl->cblkheightexpn) << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
prc->numhcblks = (brcblkxend - tlcblkxstart) >>
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
prc->numvcblks = (brcblkyend - tlcblkystart) >>
rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
prc->numcblks = prc->numhcblks * prc->numvcblks;
assert(prc->numcblks > 0);
if (!(prc->incltagtree = jpc_tagtree_create(
prc->numhcblks, prc->numvcblks))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(prc->numimsbstagtree = jpc_tagtree_create(
prc->numhcblks, prc->numvcblks))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(prc->cblks = jas_alloc2(prc->numcblks,
sizeof(jpc_dec_cblk_t)))) {
return -1;
}
cblkxstart = cbgxstart;
cblkystart = cbgystart;
for (cblkcnt = prc->numcblks, cblk = prc->cblks;
cblkcnt > 0;) {
cblkxend = cblkxstart + (1 << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn);
cblkyend = cblkystart + (1 << rlvl->cblkheightexpn);
tmpxstart = JAS_MAX(cblkxstart, prc->xstart);
tmpystart = JAS_MAX(cblkystart, prc->ystart);
tmpxend = JAS_MIN(cblkxend, prc->xend);
tmpyend = JAS_MIN(cblkyend, prc->yend);
if (tmpxend > tmpxstart && tmpyend > tmpystart) {
cblk->firstpassno = -1;
cblk->mqdec = 0;
cblk->nulldec = 0;
cblk->flags = 0;
cblk->numpasses = 0;
cblk->segs.head = 0;
cblk->segs.tail = 0;
cblk->curseg = 0;
cblk->numimsbs = 0;
cblk->numlenbits = 3;
cblk->flags = 0;
if (!(cblk->data = jas_seq2d_create(0, 0, 0,
0))) {
return -1;
}
jas_seq2d_bindsub(cblk->data, band->data,
tmpxstart, tmpystart, tmpxend, tmpyend);
++cblk;
--cblkcnt;
}
cblkxstart += 1 << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
if (cblkxstart >= cbgxend) {
cblkxstart = cbgxstart;
cblkystart += 1 << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
}
}
} else {
prc->cblks = 0;
prc->incltagtree = 0;
prc->numimsbstagtree = 0;
}
cbgxstart += 1 << rlvl->cbgwidthexpn;
if (cbgxstart >= brcbgxend) {
cbgxstart = tlcbgxstart;
cbgystart += 1 << rlvl->cbgheightexpn;
}
}
/********************************************/
}
}
}
if (!(tile->pi = jpc_dec_pi_create(dec, tile))) {
return -1;
}
for (pchgno = 0; pchgno < jpc_pchglist_numpchgs(tile->cp->pchglist);
++pchgno) {
pchg = jpc_pchg_copy(jpc_pchglist_get(tile->cp->pchglist, pchgno));
assert(pchg);
jpc_pi_addpchg(tile->pi, pchg);
}
jpc_pi_init(tile->pi);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an array overflow problem in the JPC decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int sh_op(RAnal *anal, RAnalOp *op, ut64 addr, const ut8 *data, int len) {
ut8 op_MSB,op_LSB;
int ret;
if (!data)
return 0;
memset (op, '\0', sizeof (RAnalOp));
op->addr = addr;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK;
op->jump = op->fail = -1;
op->ptr = op->val = -1;
op->size = 2;
op_MSB = anal->big_endian? data[0]: data[1];
op_LSB = anal->big_endian? data[1]: data[0];
ret = first_nibble_decode[(op_MSB>>4) & 0x0F](anal, op, (ut16)(op_MSB<<8 | op_LSB));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9903 - oobread in RAnal.sh
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::WasHidden() {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.WasHidden();
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
for (auto* plugin : active_pepper_instances_)
plugin->PageVisibilityChanged(false);
#endif // ENABLE_PLUGINS
if (GetWebFrame()->FrameWidget()) {
GetWebFrame()->FrameWidget()->SetVisibilityState(VisibilityState());
}
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static unsigned char readBitFromStream(size_t* bitpointer, const unsigned char* bitstream)
{
unsigned char result = (unsigned char)(READBIT(*bitpointer, bitstream));
(*bitpointer)++;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int wvlan_uil_put_info(struct uilreq *urq, struct wl_private *lp)
{
int result = 0;
ltv_t *pLtv;
bool_t ltvAllocated = FALSE;
ENCSTRCT sEncryption;
#ifdef USE_WDS
hcf_16 hcfPort = HCF_PORT_0;
#endif /* USE_WDS */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
DBG_FUNC("wvlan_uil_put_info");
DBG_ENTER(DbgInfo);
if (urq->hcfCtx == &(lp->hcfCtx)) {
if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
if ((urq->data != NULL) && (urq->len != 0)) {
/* Make sure that we have at least a command and length to send. */
if (urq->len < (sizeof(hcf_16) * 2)) {
urq->len = sizeof(lp->ltvRecord);
urq->result = UIL_ERR_LEN;
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "No Length/Type in LTV!!!\n");
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "UIL_ERR_LEN\n");
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
/* Verify the user buffer */
result = verify_area(VERIFY_READ, urq->data, urq->len);
if (result != 0) {
urq->result = UIL_FAILURE;
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "verify_area(), VERIFY_READ FAILED\n");
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
/* Get only the command and length information. */
copy_from_user(&(lp->ltvRecord), urq->data, sizeof(hcf_16) * 2);
/* Make sure the incoming LTV record length is within the bounds of the
IOCTL length */
if (((lp->ltvRecord.len + 1) * sizeof(hcf_16)) > urq->len) {
urq->len = sizeof(lp->ltvRecord);
urq->result = UIL_ERR_LEN;
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "UIL_ERR_LEN\n");
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
/* If the requested length is greater than the size of our local
LTV record, try to allocate it from the kernel stack.
Otherwise, we just use our local LTV record. */
if (urq->len > sizeof(lp->ltvRecord)) {
pLtv = kmalloc(urq->len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pLtv != NULL) {
ltvAllocated = TRUE;
} else {
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "Alloc FAILED\n");
urq->len = sizeof(lp->ltvRecord);
urq->result = UIL_ERR_LEN;
result = -ENOMEM;
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
}
} else {
pLtv = &(lp->ltvRecord);
}
/* Copy the data from the user's buffer into the local LTV
record data area. */
copy_from_user(pLtv, urq->data, urq->len);
/* We need to snoop the commands to see if there is anything we
need to store for the purposes of a reset or start/stop
sequence. Perform endian translation as needed */
switch (pLtv->typ) {
case CFG_CNF_PORT_TYPE:
lp->PortType = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_OWN_MAC_ADDR:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_CNF_OWN_CHANNEL:
lp->Channel = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
/* CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID currently same as CNF_DESIRED_SSID. Do we
need separate storage for this? */
/* case CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID: */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_ATIM_WINDOW:
lp->atimWindow = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_SYSTEM_SCALE:
lp->DistanceBetweenAPs = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
case CFG_CNF_MAX_DATA_LEN:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based
on this */
break;
case CFG_CNF_PM_ENABLED:
lp->PMEnabled = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RX:
lp->MulticastReceive = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_MAX_SLEEP_DURATION:
lp->MaxSleepDuration = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_HOLDOVER_DURATION:
lp->holdoverDuration = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_OWN_NAME:
memset(lp->StationName, 0, sizeof(lp->StationName));
memcpy((void *)lp->StationName, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[2], (size_t)pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING:
lp->loadBalancing = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION:
lp->mediumDistribution = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_TX_POW_LVL:
lp->txPowLevel = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
/* case CFG_CNF_SHORT_RETRY_LIMIT: */ /* Short Retry Limit */
/* case 0xFC33: */ /* Long Retry Limit */
case CFG_SUPPORTED_RATE_SET_CNTL: /* Supported Rate Set Control */
lp->srsc[0] = pLtv->u.u16[0];
lp->srsc[1] = pLtv->u.u16[1];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[1] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[1]);
break;
case CFG_BASIC_RATE_SET_CNTL: /* Basic Rate Set Control */
lp->brsc[0] = pLtv->u.u16[0];
lp->brsc[1] = pLtv->u.u16[1];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[1] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[1]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_CONNECTION_CNTL:
lp->connectionControl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
/* case CFG_PROBE_DATA_RATE: */
#endif /* HERMES25 */
#if 1 /* ;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_DTIM_PERIOD:
lp->DTIMPeriod = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_OWN_BEACON_INTERVAL: /* Own Beacon Interval */
lp->ownBeaconInterval = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#endif /* WARP */
case CFG_COEXISTENSE_BEHAVIOUR: /* Coexistence behavior */
lp->coexistence = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef USE_WDS
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR1:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[0].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_1;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR2:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[1].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_2;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR3:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[2].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_3;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR4:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[3].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_4;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR5:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[4].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_5;
break;
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR6:
memcpy(&lp->wds_port[5].wdsAddress, &pLtv->u.u8[0], ETH_ALEN);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_6;
break;
#endif /* USE_WDS */
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_PM_BUF:
lp->multicastPMBuffering = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_REJECT_ANY:
lp->RejectAny = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#endif
case CFG_CNF_ENCRYPTION:
lp->EnableEncryption = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_CNF_AUTHENTICATION:
lp->authentication = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#if 1 /* ;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
/* case CFG_CNF_EXCL_UNENCRYPTED:
lp->ExcludeUnencrypted = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break; */
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RATE:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_CNF_INTRA_BSS_RELAY:
lp->intraBSSRelay = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#endif
case CFG_CNF_MICRO_WAVE:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
/*case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING:*/
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
/* case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
/* case CFG_CNF_RX_ALL_GROUP_ADDRESS: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
/* case CFG_CNF_COUNTRY_INFO: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID:
/* case CNF_DESIRED_SSID: */
case CFG_DESIRED_SSID:
memset(lp->NetworkName, 0, sizeof(lp->NetworkName));
memcpy((void *)lp->NetworkName, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[2], (size_t)pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
/* take care of the special network name "ANY" case */
if ((strlen(&pLtv->u.u8[2]) == 0) ||
(strcmp(&pLtv->u.u8[2], "ANY") == 0) ||
(strcmp(&pLtv->u.u8[2], "any") == 0)) {
/* set the SSID_STRCT llen field (u16[0]) to zero, and the
effectually null the string u8[2] */
pLtv->u.u16[0] = 0;
pLtv->u.u8[2] = 0;
}
break;
case CFG_GROUP_ADDR:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_CREATE_IBSS:
lp->CreateIBSS = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH:
lp->RTSThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL:
lp->TxRateControl[0] = pLtv->u.u16[0];
lp->TxRateControl[1] = pLtv->u.u16[1];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
pLtv->u.u16[1] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[1]);
break;
case CFG_PROMISCUOUS_MODE:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
/* case CFG_WAKE_ON_LAN: */
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
/* break; */
#if 1 /* ;? #if (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_RTS_THRH0:
lp->RTSThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL0:
/*;?no idea what this should be, get going so comment it out lp->TxRateControl = pLtv->u.u16[0];*/
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
#ifdef USE_WDS
case CFG_RTS_THRH1:
lp->wds_port[0].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_1;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH2:
lp->wds_port[1].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_2;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH3:
lp->wds_port[2].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_3;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH4:
lp->wds_port[3].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_4;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH5:
lp->wds_port[4].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_5;
break;
case CFG_RTS_THRH6:
lp->wds_port[5].rtsThreshold = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_6;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL1:
lp->wds_port[0].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_1;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL2:
lp->wds_port[1].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_2;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL3:
lp->wds_port[2].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_3;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL4:
lp->wds_port[3].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_4;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL5:
lp->wds_port[4].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_5;
break;
case CFG_TX_RATE_CNTL6:
lp->wds_port[5].txRateCntl = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
hcfPort = HCF_PORT_6;
break;
#endif /* USE_WDS */
#endif /* (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
case CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS:
{
CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT *pKeys = (CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT *)pLtv;
pKeys->key[0].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[0].len);
pKeys->key[1].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[1].len);
pKeys->key[2].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[2].len);
pKeys->key[3].len = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pKeys->key[3].len);
memcpy((void *)&(lp->DefaultKeys), (void *)pKeys,
sizeof(CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT));
}
break;
case CFG_TX_KEY_ID:
lp->TransmitKeyID = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_SCAN_SSID:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
case CFG_TICK_TIME:
/* TODO: determine if we are going to store anything based on this */
break;
/* these RIDS are Info RIDs, and should they be allowed for puts??? */
case CFG_MAX_LOAD_TIME:
case CFG_DL_BUF:
/* case CFG_HSI_SUP_RANGE: */
case CFG_NIC_SERIAL_NUMBER:
case CFG_NIC_IDENTITY:
case CFG_NIC_MFI_SUP_RANGE:
case CFG_NIC_CFI_SUP_RANGE:
case CFG_NIC_TEMP_TYPE:
case CFG_NIC_PROFILE:
case CFG_FW_IDENTITY:
case CFG_FW_SUP_RANGE:
case CFG_MFI_ACT_RANGES_STA:
case CFG_CFI_ACT_RANGES_STA:
case CFG_PORT_STAT:
case CFG_CUR_SSID:
case CFG_CUR_BSSID:
case CFG_COMMS_QUALITY:
case CFG_CUR_TX_RATE:
case CFG_CUR_BEACON_INTERVAL:
case CFG_CUR_SCALE_THRH:
case CFG_PROTOCOL_RSP_TIME:
case CFG_CUR_SHORT_RETRY_LIMIT:
case CFG_CUR_LONG_RETRY_LIMIT:
case CFG_MAX_TX_LIFETIME:
case CFG_MAX_RX_LIFETIME:
case CFG_CF_POLLABLE:
case CFG_AUTHENTICATION_ALGORITHMS:
case CFG_PRIVACY_OPT_IMPLEMENTED:
/* case CFG_CURRENT_REMOTE_RATES: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_USED_RATES: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_SYSTEM_SCALE: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE1: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE2: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE3: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE4: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE5: */
/* case CFG_CURRENT_TX_RATE6: */
case CFG_NIC_MAC_ADDR:
case CFG_PCF_INFO:
/* case CFG_CURRENT_COUNTRY_INFO: */
case CFG_PHY_TYPE:
case CFG_CUR_CHANNEL:
/* case CFG_CURRENT_POWER_STATE: */
/* case CFG_CCAMODE: */
case CFG_SUPPORTED_DATA_RATES:
break;
case CFG_AP_MODE:
/*;? lp->DownloadFirmware = (pLtv->u.u16[0]) + 1; */
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "set CFG_AP_MODE no longer supported\n");
break;
case CFG_ENCRYPT_STRING:
/* TODO: ENDIAN TRANSLATION HERE??? */
memset(lp->szEncryption, 0, sizeof(lp->szEncryption));
memcpy((void *)lp->szEncryption, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[0],
(pLtv->len * sizeof(hcf_16)));
wl_wep_decode(CRYPT_CODE, &sEncryption,
lp->szEncryption);
/* the Linux driver likes to use 1-4 for the key IDs, and then
convert to 0-3 when sending to the card. The Windows code
base used 0-3 in the API DLL, which was ported to Linux. For
the sake of the user experience, we decided to keep 0-3 as the
numbers used in the DLL; and will perform the +1 conversion here.
We could have converted the entire Linux driver, but this is
less obtrusive. This may be a "todo" to convert the whole driver */
lp->TransmitKeyID = sEncryption.wTxKeyID + 1;
lp->EnableEncryption = sEncryption.wEnabled;
memcpy(&lp->DefaultKeys, &sEncryption.EncStr,
sizeof(CFG_DEFAULT_KEYS_STRCT));
break;
/*case CFG_COUNTRY_STRING:
memset(lp->countryString, 0, sizeof(lp->countryString));
memcpy((void *)lp->countryString, (void *)&pLtv->u.u8[2], (size_t)pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
*/
case CFG_DRIVER_ENABLE:
lp->driverEnable = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_WOLAS_ENABLE:
lp->wolasEnable = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_SET_WPA_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SUITE:
lp->AuthKeyMgmtSuite = pLtv->u.u16[0];
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_DISASSOCIATE_ADDR:
pLtv->u.u16[ETH_ALEN / 2] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[ETH_ALEN / 2]);
break;
case CFG_ADD_TKIP_DEFAULT_KEY:
case CFG_REMOVE_TKIP_DEFAULT_KEY:
/* Endian convert the Tx Key Information */
pLtv->u.u16[0] = CNV_INT_TO_LITTLE(pLtv->u.u16[0]);
break;
case CFG_ADD_TKIP_MAPPED_KEY:
break;
case CFG_REMOVE_TKIP_MAPPED_KEY:
break;
/* some RIDs just can't be put */
case CFG_MB_INFO:
case CFG_IFB:
default:
break;
}
/* This code will prevent Static Configuration Entities from
being sent to the card, as they require a call to
UIL_ACT_APPLY to take effect. Dynamic Entities will be sent
immediately */
switch (pLtv->typ) {
case CFG_CNF_PORT_TYPE:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_MAC_ADDR:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_CHANNEL:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_SSID:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_ATIM_WINDOW:
case CFG_CNF_SYSTEM_SCALE:
case CFG_CNF_MAX_DATA_LEN:
case CFG_CNF_PM_ENABLED:
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RX:
case CFG_CNF_MAX_SLEEP_DURATION:
case CFG_CNF_HOLDOVER_DURATION:
case CFG_CNF_OWN_NAME:
case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING:
case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION:
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_TX_POW_LVL:
case CFG_CNF_CONNECTION_CNTL:
/*case CFG_PROBE_DATA_RATE: */
#endif /* HERMES25 */
#if 1 /*;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/*;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_CNF_OWN_DTIM_PERIOD:
#ifdef WARP
case CFG_CNF_OWN_BEACON_INTERVAL: /* Own Beacon Interval */
#endif /* WARP */
#ifdef USE_WDS
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR1:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR2:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR3:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR4:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR5:
case CFG_CNF_WDS_ADDR6:
#endif
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_PM_BUF:
case CFG_CNF_REJECT_ANY:
#endif
case CFG_CNF_ENCRYPTION:
case CFG_CNF_AUTHENTICATION:
#if 1 /* ;? (HCF_TYPE) & HCF_TYPE_AP */
/* ;?should we restore this to allow smaller memory footprint */
case CFG_CNF_EXCL_UNENCRYPTED:
case CFG_CNF_MCAST_RATE:
case CFG_CNF_INTRA_BSS_RELAY:
#endif
case CFG_CNF_MICRO_WAVE:
/* case CFG_CNF_LOAD_BALANCING: */
/* case CFG_CNF_MEDIUM_DISTRIBUTION: */
/* case CFG_CNF_RX_ALL_GROUP_ADDRESS: */
/* case CFG_CNF_COUNTRY_INFO: */
/* case CFG_COUNTRY_STRING: */
case CFG_AP_MODE:
case CFG_ENCRYPT_STRING:
/* case CFG_DRIVER_ENABLE: */
case CFG_WOLAS_ENABLE:
case CFG_MB_INFO:
case CFG_IFB:
break;
/* Deal with this dynamic MSF RID, as it's required for WPA */
case CFG_DRIVER_ENABLE:
if (lp->driverEnable) {
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_ENABLE | HCF_PORT_0);
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_CONNECT);
} else {
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_DISABLE | HCF_PORT_0);
hcf_cntl(&(lp->hcfCtx), HCF_CNTL_DISCONNECT);
}
break;
default:
wl_act_int_off(lp);
urq->result = hcf_put_info(&(lp->hcfCtx), (LTVP) pLtv);
wl_act_int_on(lp);
break;
}
if (ltvAllocated)
kfree(pLtv);
} else {
urq->result = UIL_FAILURE;
}
} else {
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "EPERM\n");
urq->result = UIL_FAILURE;
result = -EPERM;
}
} else {
DBG_ERROR(DbgInfo, "UIL_ERR_WRONG_IFB\n");
urq->result = UIL_ERR_WRONG_IFB;
}
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return result;
} /* wvlan_uil_put_info */
Commit Message: staging: wlags49_h2: buffer overflow setting station name
We need to check the length parameter before doing the memcpy(). I've
actually changed it to strlcpy() as well so that it's NUL terminated.
You need CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger these so it's not the end of the
world.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: acc_ctx_call_acc(OM_uint32 *minor_status, spnego_gss_ctx_id_t sc,
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred, gss_buffer_t mechtok_in,
gss_OID *mech_type, gss_buffer_t mechtok_out,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags, OM_uint32 *time_rec,
gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle,
OM_uint32 *negState, send_token_flag *tokflag)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
gss_OID_desc mechoid;
gss_cred_id_t mcred;
if (sc->ctx_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
/*
* mechoid is an alias; don't free it.
*/
ret = gssint_get_mech_type(&mechoid, mechtok_in);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
*tokflag = NO_TOKEN_SEND;
return ret;
}
ret = acc_ctx_vfy_oid(minor_status, sc, &mechoid,
negState, tokflag);
if (ret != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return ret;
}
mcred = (spcred == NULL) ? GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL : spcred->mcred;
ret = gss_accept_sec_context(minor_status,
&sc->ctx_handle,
mcred,
mechtok_in,
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
&sc->internal_name,
mech_type,
mechtok_out,
&sc->ctx_flags,
time_rec,
delegated_cred_handle);
if (ret == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
#ifdef MS_BUG_TEST
/*
* Force MIC to be not required even if we previously
* requested a MIC.
*/
char *envstr = getenv("MS_FORCE_NO_MIC");
if (envstr != NULL && strcmp(envstr, "1") == 0 &&
!(sc->ctx_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&
sc->mic_reqd) {
sc->mic_reqd = 0;
}
#endif
sc->mech_complete = 1;
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = sc->ctx_flags;
if (!sc->mic_reqd ||
!(sc->ctx_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
/* No MIC exchange required, so we're done. */
*negState = ACCEPT_COMPLETE;
ret = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
} else {
/* handle_mic will decide if we're done. */
ret = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
} else if (ret != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
*negState = REJECT;
*tokflag = ERROR_TOKEN_SEND;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t *
p_code_block)
{
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_size;
/* The +1 is needed for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/835 */
l_data_size = 1 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) *
(p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) {
if (p_code_block->data) {
/* We refer to data - 1 since below we incremented it */
opj_free(p_code_block->data - 1);
}
p_code_block->data = (OPJ_BYTE*) opj_malloc(l_data_size + 1);
if (! p_code_block->data) {
p_code_block->data_size = 0U;
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
p_code_block->data_size = l_data_size;
/* We reserve the initial byte as a fake byte to a non-FF value */
/* and increment the data pointer, so that opj_mqc_init_enc() */
/* can do bp = data - 1, and opj_mqc_byteout() can safely dereference */
/* it. */
p_code_block->data[0] = 0;
p_code_block->data += 1; /*why +1 ?*/
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Encoder: grow buffer size in opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data() to avoid write heap buffer overflow in opj_mqc_flush (#982)
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
{
struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
/* clear the quota */
key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
if (key_is_instantiated(key) &&
(size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
vfs_truncate(path, 0);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_disable_fragments(struct sock *sk,
char __user *optval, int optlen)
{
int val;
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (get_user(val, (int __user *)optval))
return -EFAULT;
sctp_sk(sk)->disable_fragments = (val == 0) ? 0 : 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: modifier_total_encodings(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm)
{
return 1 + /* (1) nothing */
pm->ngammas + /* (2) gamma values to test */
pm->nencodings + /* (3) total number of encodings */
/* The following test only works after the first time through the
* png_modifier code because 'bit_depth' is set when the IHDR is read.
* modifier_reset, below, preserves the setting until after it has called
* the iterate function (also below.)
*
* For this reason do not rely on this function outside a call to
* modifier_reset.
*/
((pm->bit_depth == 16 || pm->assume_16_bit_calculations) ?
pm->nencodings : 0); /* (4) encodings with gamma == 1.0 */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: zend_object_iterator *spl_filesystem_dir_get_iterator(zend_class_entry *ce, zval *object, int by_ref TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator;
spl_filesystem_object *dir_object;
if (by_ref) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "An iterator cannot be used with foreach by reference");
}
dir_object = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
iterator = spl_filesystem_object_to_iterator(dir_object);
/* initialize iterator if it wasn't gotten before */
if (iterator->intern.data == NULL) {
iterator->intern.data = object;
iterator->intern.funcs = &spl_filesystem_dir_it_funcs;
/* ->current must be initialized; rewind doesn't set it and valid
* doesn't check whether it's set */
iterator->current = object;
}
zval_add_ref(&object);
return (zend_object_iterator*)iterator;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static inline void dec_slabs_node(struct kmem_cache *s, int node, int objects)
{
struct kmem_cache_node *n = get_node(s, node);
atomic_long_dec(&n->nr_slabs);
atomic_long_sub(objects, &n->total_objects);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: HeadlessPrintManager::GetPrintParamsFromSettings(
const HeadlessPrintSettings& settings) {
printing::PrintSettings print_settings;
print_settings.set_dpi(printing::kPointsPerInch);
print_settings.set_should_print_backgrounds(
settings.should_print_backgrounds);
print_settings.set_scale_factor(settings.scale);
print_settings.SetOrientation(settings.landscape);
print_settings.set_display_header_footer(settings.display_header_footer);
if (print_settings.display_header_footer()) {
url::Replacements<char> url_sanitizer;
url_sanitizer.ClearUsername();
url_sanitizer.ClearPassword();
std::string url = printing_rfh_->GetLastCommittedURL()
.ReplaceComponents(url_sanitizer)
.spec();
print_settings.set_url(base::UTF8ToUTF16(url));
}
print_settings.set_margin_type(printing::CUSTOM_MARGINS);
print_settings.SetCustomMargins(settings.margins_in_points);
gfx::Rect printable_area_device_units(settings.paper_size_in_points);
print_settings.SetPrinterPrintableArea(settings.paper_size_in_points,
printable_area_device_units, true);
auto print_params = std::make_unique<PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params>();
printing::RenderParamsFromPrintSettings(print_settings,
&print_params->params);
print_params->params.document_cookie = printing::PrintSettings::NewCookie();
return print_params;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: isakmp_rfc3948_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length,
const u_char *bp2)
{
if(length == 1 && bp[0]==0xff) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "isakmp-nat-keep-alive"));
return;
}
if(length < 4) {
goto trunc;
}
/*
* see if this is an IKE packet
*/
if(bp[0]==0 && bp[1]==0 && bp[2]==0 && bp[3]==0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NONESP-encap: "));
isakmp_print(ndo, bp+4, length-4, bp2);
return;
}
/* must be an ESP packet */
{
int nh, enh, padlen;
int advance;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "UDP-encap: "));
advance = esp_print(ndo, bp, length, bp2, &enh, &padlen);
if(advance <= 0)
return;
bp += advance;
length -= advance + padlen;
nh = enh & 0xff;
ip_print_inner(ndo, bp, length, nh, bp2);
return;
}
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|isakmp]"));
return;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12896/ISAKMP: Do bounds checks in isakmp_rfc3948_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RTCPeerConnection::close(ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (m_readyState == ReadyStateClosing || m_readyState == ReadyStateClosed) {
ec = INVALID_STATE_ERR;
return;
}
changeIceState(IceStateClosed);
changeReadyState(ReadyStateClosed);
stop();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void StartAndImmediateStopCapture() {
InSequence s;
base::RunLoop run_loop;
media::VideoCaptureParams params;
params.requested_format = media::VideoCaptureFormat(
gfx::Size(352, 288), 30, media::PIXEL_FORMAT_I420);
EXPECT_CALL(*this, OnStateChanged(media::mojom::VideoCaptureState::STARTED))
.Times(AtMost(1));
media::mojom::VideoCaptureObserverPtr observer;
observer_binding_.Bind(mojo::MakeRequest(&observer));
host_->Start(kDeviceId, opened_session_id_, params, std::move(observer));
EXPECT_CALL(*this,
OnStateChanged(media::mojom::VideoCaptureState::STOPPED));
host_->Stop(kDeviceId);
run_loop.RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::Decode(
const media::BitstreamBuffer& bitstream_buffer) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE((state_ == kNormal || state_ == kStopped),
"Invalid state: " << state_, ILLEGAL_STATE,);
base::win::ScopedComPtr<IMFSample> sample;
sample.Attach(CreateSampleFromInputBuffer(bitstream_buffer,
renderer_process_,
input_stream_info_.cbSize,
input_stream_info_.cbAlignment));
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(sample, "Failed to create input sample",
PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
if (!inputs_before_decode_) {
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN_ETW("DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator.Decoding", this, "");
}
inputs_before_decode_++;
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(
SendMFTMessage(MFT_MESSAGE_NOTIFY_START_OF_STREAM, 0),
"Failed to create input sample", PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
HRESULT hr = decoder_->ProcessInput(0, sample, 0);
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_HR_FAILURE(hr, "Failed to process input sample",
PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE(
SendMFTMessage(MFT_MESSAGE_NOTIFY_END_OF_STREAM, 0),
"Failed to send eos message to MFT", PLATFORM_FAILURE,);
state_ = kEosDrain;
last_input_buffer_id_ = bitstream_buffer.id();
DoDecode();
RETURN_AND_NOTIFY_ON_FAILURE((state_ == kStopped || state_ == kNormal),
"Failed to process output. Unexpected decoder state: " << state_,
ILLEGAL_STATE,);
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE, base::Bind(
&DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::NotifyInputBufferRead, this,
bitstream_buffer.id()));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: encode_STRIP_VLAN(const struct ofpact_null *null OVS_UNUSED,
enum ofp_version ofp_version, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
if (ofp_version == OFP10_VERSION) {
put_OFPAT10_STRIP_VLAN(out);
} else {
put_OFPAT11_POP_VLAN(out);
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int newary(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct ipc_params *params)
{
int id;
int retval;
struct sem_array *sma;
int size;
key_t key = params->key;
int nsems = params->u.nsems;
int semflg = params->flg;
int i;
if (!nsems)
return -EINVAL;
if (ns->used_sems + nsems > ns->sc_semmns)
return -ENOSPC;
size = sizeof (*sma) + nsems * sizeof (struct sem);
sma = ipc_rcu_alloc(size);
if (!sma) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset (sma, 0, size);
sma->sem_perm.mode = (semflg & S_IRWXUGO);
sma->sem_perm.key = key;
sma->sem_perm.security = NULL;
retval = security_sem_alloc(sma);
if (retval) {
ipc_rcu_putref(sma);
return retval;
}
id = ipc_addid(&sem_ids(ns), &sma->sem_perm, ns->sc_semmni);
if (id < 0) {
security_sem_free(sma);
ipc_rcu_putref(sma);
return id;
}
ns->used_sems += nsems;
sma->sem_base = (struct sem *) &sma[1];
for (i = 0; i < nsems; i++)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sma->sem_base[i].sem_pending);
sma->complex_count = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sma->sem_pending);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sma->list_id);
sma->sem_nsems = nsems;
sma->sem_ctime = get_seconds();
sem_unlock(sma);
return sma->sem_perm.id;
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[[email protected]: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[[email protected]: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Low <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bgp_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_int atype, const u_char *pptr, u_int len)
{
int i;
uint16_t af;
uint8_t safi, snpa, nhlen;
union { /* copy buffer for bandwidth values */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
int advance;
u_int tlen;
const u_char *tptr;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
int as_size;
tptr = pptr;
tlen=len;
switch (atype) {
case BGPTYPE_ORIGIN:
if (len != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK(*tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_origin_values,
"Unknown Origin Typecode",
tptr[0])));
}
break;
/*
* Process AS4 byte path and AS2 byte path attributes here.
*/
case BGPTYPE_AS4_PATH:
case BGPTYPE_AS_PATH:
if (len % 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
if (!len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "empty"));
break;
}
/*
* BGP updates exchanged between New speakers that support 4
* byte AS, ASs are always encoded in 4 bytes. There is no
* definitive way to find this, just by the packet's
* contents. So, check for packet's TLV's sanity assuming
* 2 bytes first, and it does not pass, assume that ASs are
* encoded in 4 bytes format and move on.
*/
as_size = bgp_attr_get_as_size(ndo, atype, pptr, len);
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_open_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
for (i = 0; i < tptr[1] * as_size; i += as_size) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[2 + i], as_size);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
as_size == 2 ?
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tptr[2 + i]) :
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tptr[2 + i]))));
}
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_close_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
tptr += 2 + tptr[1] * as_size;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_NEXT_HOP:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MULTI_EXIT_DISC:
case BGPTYPE_LOCAL_PREF:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE:
if (len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR:
/*
* Depending on the AS encoded is of 2 bytes or of 4 bytes,
* the length of this PA can be either 6 bytes or 8 bytes.
*/
if (len != 6 && len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], len);
if (len == 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 2)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)), ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR4:
if (len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint32_t comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
comm = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
switch (comm) {
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_ADVERT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_ADVERTISE"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u%s",
(comm >> 16) & 0xffff,
comm & 0xffff,
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
break;
}
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ORIGINATOR_ID:
if (len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_CLUSTER_LIST:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_REACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
goto done;
break;
}
tptr +=3;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
nhlen = tptr[0];
tlen = nhlen;
tptr++;
if (tlen) {
int nnh = 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t nexthop: "));
while (tlen > 0) {
if ( nnh++ > 0 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", " ));
}
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr));
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr));
}
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, tlen)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN,tlen-BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
/* rfc986 mapped IPv4 address ? */
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x47000601)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+4)));
/* rfc1888 mapped IPv6 address ? */
else if (EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x350000)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+3)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u/SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
goto done;
break;
}
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", nh-length: %u", nhlen));
tptr += tlen;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
snpa = tptr[0];
tptr++;
if (snpa) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u SNPA", snpa));
for (/*nothing*/; snpa > 0; snpa--) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %d bytes", tptr[0]));
tptr += tptr[0] + 1;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", no SNPA"));
}
while (len - (tptr - pptr) > 0) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
advance = decode_rt_routing_info(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
done:
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_UNREACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
if (len == BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t End-of-Rib Marker (empty NLRI)"));
tptr += 3;
while (len - (tptr - pptr) > 0) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr-3),tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr-3, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_EXTD_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint16_t extd_comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
extd_comm=EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (0x%04x), Flags [%s]",
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_subtype_values,
"unknown extd community typecode",
extd_comm),
extd_comm,
bittok2str(bgp_extd_comm_flag_values, "none", extd_comm)));
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr+2), 6);
switch(extd_comm) {
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u:%u (= %s)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VRF_RT_IMP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2)), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_LINKBAND:
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN3:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN4:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": area:%s, router-type:%s, metric-type:%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_ospf_rtype_values,
"unknown (0x%02x)",
*(tptr+6)),
(*(tptr+7) & BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_METRIC_TYPE) ? "E2" : "",
((*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_EXT) || (*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_NSSA)) ? "E1" : ""));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2INFO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s Control Flags [0x%02x]:MTU %u",
tok2str(l2vpn_encaps_values,
"unknown encaps",
*(tptr+2)),
*(tptr+3),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_SOURCE_AS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": AS %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,8);
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", 8);
break;
}
tlen -=8;
tptr +=8;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_PMSI_TUNNEL:
{
uint8_t tunnel_type, flags;
tunnel_type = *(tptr+1);
flags = *tptr;
tlen = len;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 5);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-type %s (%u), Flags [%s], MPLS Label %u",
tok2str(bgp_pmsi_tunnel_values, "Unknown", tunnel_type),
tunnel_type,
bittok2str(bgp_pmsi_flag_values, "none", flags),
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+2)>>4));
tptr +=5;
tlen -= 5;
switch (tunnel_type) {
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SM: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_BIDIR:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sender %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SSM:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_INGRESS:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-Endpoint %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_P2MP: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_MP2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, LSP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_RSVP_P2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Extended-Tunnel-ID %s, P2MP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
}
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_AIGP:
{
uint8_t type;
uint16_t length;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
tlen = len;
while (tlen >= 3) {
type = *tptr;
length = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (%u), length %u",
tok2str(bgp_aigp_values, "Unknown", type),
type, length));
/*
* Check if we can read the TLV data.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[3], length - 3);
switch (type) {
case BGP_AIGP_TLV:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[3], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", metric %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_64BITS(tptr+3)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr+3,"\n\t ", length-3);
}
}
tptr += length;
tlen -= length;
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_ATTR_SET:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Origin AS: %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr))));
tptr+=4;
len -=4;
while (len) {
u_int aflags, alenlen, alen;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
aflags = *tptr;
atype = *(tptr + 1);
tptr += 2;
len -= 2;
alenlen = bgp_attr_lenlen(aflags, tptr);
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], alenlen);
if (len < alenlen)
goto trunc;
alen = bgp_attr_len(aflags, tptr);
tptr += alenlen;
len -= alenlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_attr_values,
"Unknown Attribute", atype),
atype,
alen));
if (aflags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s%s%s%s",
aflags & 0x80 ? "O" : "",
aflags & 0x40 ? "T" : "",
aflags & 0x20 ? "P" : "",
aflags & 0x10 ? "E" : ""));
if (aflags & 0xf)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+%x", aflags & 0xf));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]: "));
}
/* FIXME check for recursion */
if (!bgp_attr_print(ndo, atype, tptr, alen))
return 0;
tptr += alen;
len -= alen;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_LARGE_COMMUNITY:
if (len == 0 || len % 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
while (len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u:%u%s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
(len > 12) ? ", " : ""));
tptr += 12;
len -= 12;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no Attribute %u decoder", atype)); /* we have no decoder for the attribute */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 && len) { /* omit zero length attributes*/
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
}
return 1;
trunc:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12994/BGP: Move a test inside a loop.
The loop can be executed more than once (that's kinda the whole point of
a loop), so the check has to be made each time through the loop, not
just once before the loop is executed.
Do some additional length checks while we're at it.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void BackFramebuffer::Create() {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor("BackFramebuffer::Create",
decoder_->GetErrorState());
Destroy();
glGenFramebuffersEXT(1, &id_);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: krb5_gss_inquire_context(minor_status, context_handle, initiator_name,
acceptor_name, lifetime_rec, mech_type, ret_flags,
locally_initiated, opened)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
gss_name_t *initiator_name;
gss_name_t *acceptor_name;
OM_uint32 *lifetime_rec;
gss_OID *mech_type;
OM_uint32 *ret_flags;
int *locally_initiated;
int *opened;
{
krb5_context context;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_gss_name_t initiator, acceptor;
krb5_timestamp now;
krb5_deltat lifetime;
if (initiator_name)
*initiator_name = (gss_name_t) NULL;
if (acceptor_name)
*acceptor_name = (gss_name_t) NULL;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
initiator = NULL;
acceptor = NULL;
context = ctx->k5_context;
if ((code = krb5_timeofday(context, &now))) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if ((lifetime = ctx->krb_times.endtime - now) < 0)
lifetime = 0;
if (initiator_name) {
if ((code = kg_duplicate_name(context,
ctx->initiate ? ctx->here : ctx->there,
&initiator))) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
}
if (acceptor_name) {
if ((code = kg_duplicate_name(context,
ctx->initiate ? ctx->there : ctx->here,
&acceptor))) {
if (initiator)
kg_release_name(context, &initiator);
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
}
if (initiator_name)
*initiator_name = (gss_name_t) initiator;
if (acceptor_name)
*acceptor_name = (gss_name_t) acceptor;
if (lifetime_rec)
*lifetime_rec = lifetime;
if (mech_type)
*mech_type = (gss_OID) ctx->mech_used;
if (ret_flags)
*ret_flags = ctx->gss_flags;
if (locally_initiated)
*locally_initiated = ctx->initiate;
if (opened)
*opened = ctx->established;
*minor_status = 0;
return((lifetime == 0)?GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED:GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int wdm_post_reset(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct wdm_device *desc = wdm_find_device(intf);
int rv;
clear_bit(WDM_RESETTING, &desc->flags);
rv = recover_from_urb_loss(desc);
mutex_unlock(&desc->wlock);
mutex_unlock(&desc->rlock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: crm_ipcs_sendv(crm_client_t * c, struct iovec * iov, enum crm_ipc_flags flags)
{
ssize_t rc;
static uint32_t id = 1;
struct crm_ipc_response_header *header = iov[0].iov_base;
if (c->flags & crm_client_flag_ipc_proxied) {
/* _ALL_ replies to proxied connections need to be sent as events */
if (is_not_set(flags, crm_ipc_server_event)) {
flags |= crm_ipc_server_event;
/* this flag lets us know this was originally meant to be a response.
* even though we're sending it over the event channel. */
flags |= crm_ipc_proxied_relay_response;
}
}
header->flags |= flags;
if (flags & crm_ipc_server_event) {
header->qb.id = id++; /* We don't really use it, but doesn't hurt to set one */
if (flags & crm_ipc_server_free) {
crm_trace("Sending the original to %p[%d]", c->ipcs, c->pid);
c->event_queue = g_list_append(c->event_queue, iov);
} else {
struct iovec *iov_copy = calloc(2, sizeof(struct iovec));
crm_trace("Sending a copy to %p[%d]", c->ipcs, c->pid);
iov_copy[0].iov_len = iov[0].iov_len;
iov_copy[0].iov_base = malloc(iov[0].iov_len);
memcpy(iov_copy[0].iov_base, iov[0].iov_base, iov[0].iov_len);
iov_copy[1].iov_len = iov[1].iov_len;
iov_copy[1].iov_base = malloc(iov[1].iov_len);
memcpy(iov_copy[1].iov_base, iov[1].iov_base, iov[1].iov_len);
c->event_queue = g_list_append(c->event_queue, iov_copy);
}
} else {
CRM_LOG_ASSERT(header->qb.id != 0); /* Replying to a specific request */
rc = qb_ipcs_response_sendv(c->ipcs, iov, 2);
if (rc < header->qb.size) {
crm_notice("Response %d to %p[%d] (%u bytes) failed: %s (%d)",
header->qb.id, c->ipcs, c->pid, header->qb.size, pcmk_strerror(rc), rc);
} else {
crm_trace("Response %d sent, %lld bytes to %p[%d]",
header->qb.id, (long long) rc, c->ipcs, c->pid);
}
if (flags & crm_ipc_server_free) {
free(iov[0].iov_base);
free(iov[1].iov_base);
free(iov);
}
}
if (flags & crm_ipc_server_event) {
rc = crm_ipcs_flush_events(c);
} else {
crm_ipcs_flush_events(c);
}
if (rc == -EPIPE || rc == -ENOTCONN) {
crm_trace("Client %p disconnected", c->ipcs);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: High: libcrmcommon: fix CVE-2016-7035 (improper IPC guarding)
It was discovered that at some not so uncommon circumstances, some
pacemaker daemons could be talked to, via libqb-facilitated IPC, by
unprivileged clients due to flawed authorization decision. Depending
on the capabilities of affected daemons, this might equip unauthorized
user with local privilege escalation or up to cluster-wide remote
execution of possibly arbitrary commands when such user happens to
reside at standard or remote/guest cluster node, respectively.
The original vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to allow
unprivileged IPC clients to clean up the file system materialized
leftovers in case the server (otherwise responsible for the lifecycle
of these files) crashes. While the intended part of such behavior is
now effectively voided (along with the unintended one), a best-effort
fix to address this corner case systemically at libqb is coming along
(https://github.com/ClusterLabs/libqb/pull/231).
Affected versions: 1.1.10-rc1 (2013-04-17) - 1.1.15 (2016-06-21)
Impact: Important
CVSSv3 ranking: 8.8 : AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credits for independent findings, in chronological order:
Jan "poki" Pokorný, of Red Hat
Alain Moulle, of ATOS/BULL
CWE ID: CWE-285
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bt_status_t btif_dm_get_adapter_property(bt_property_t *prop)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s: type=0x%x", __FUNCTION__, prop->type);
switch (prop->type)
{
case BT_PROPERTY_BDNAME:
{
bt_bdname_t *bd_name = (bt_bdname_t*)prop->val;
strncpy((char *)bd_name->name, (char *)btif_get_default_local_name(),
sizeof(bd_name->name) - 1);
bd_name->name[sizeof(bd_name->name) - 1] = 0;
prop->len = strlen((char *)bd_name->name);
}
break;
case BT_PROPERTY_ADAPTER_SCAN_MODE:
{
/* if the storage does not have it. Most likely app never set it. Default is NONE */
bt_scan_mode_t *mode = (bt_scan_mode_t*)prop->val;
*mode = BT_SCAN_MODE_NONE;
prop->len = sizeof(bt_scan_mode_t);
}
break;
case BT_PROPERTY_ADAPTER_DISCOVERY_TIMEOUT:
{
uint32_t *tmt = (uint32_t*)prop->val;
*tmt = 120; /* default to 120s, if not found in NV */
prop->len = sizeof(uint32_t);
}
break;
default:
prop->len = 0;
return BT_STATUS_FAIL;
}
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: qtdemux_parse_samples (GstQTDemux * qtdemux, QtDemuxStream * stream,
GNode * stbl)
{
int offset;
GNode *stsc;
GNode *stsz;
GNode *stco;
GNode *co64;
GNode *stts;
GNode *stss;
GNode *ctts;
const guint8 *stsc_data, *stsz_data, *stco_data;
int sample_size;
int sample_index;
int n_samples;
int n_samples_per_chunk;
int n_sample_times;
QtDemuxSample *samples;
gint i, j, k;
int index;
guint64 timestamp, time;
/* sample to chunk */
if (!(stsc = qtdemux_tree_get_child_by_type (stbl, FOURCC_stsc)))
goto corrupt_file;
stsc_data = (const guint8 *) stsc->data;
/* sample size */
if (!(stsz = qtdemux_tree_get_child_by_type (stbl, FOURCC_stsz)))
goto corrupt_file;
stsz_data = (const guint8 *) stsz->data;
/* chunk offsets */
stco = qtdemux_tree_get_child_by_type (stbl, FOURCC_stco);
co64 = qtdemux_tree_get_child_by_type (stbl, FOURCC_co64);
if (stco) {
stco_data = (const guint8 *) stco->data;
} else {
stco_data = NULL;
if (co64 == NULL)
goto corrupt_file;
}
/* sample time */
if (!(stts = qtdemux_tree_get_child_by_type (stbl, FOURCC_stts)))
goto corrupt_file;
/* sample sync, can be NULL */
stss = qtdemux_tree_get_child_by_type (stbl, FOURCC_stss);
sample_size = QT_UINT32 (stsz_data + 12);
if (sample_size == 0 || stream->sampled) {
n_samples = QT_UINT32 (stsz_data + 16);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "stsz sample_size 0, allocating n_samples %d",
n_samples);
stream->n_samples = n_samples;
samples = g_new0 (QtDemuxSample, n_samples);
stream->samples = samples;
for (i = 0; i < n_samples; i++) {
if (sample_size == 0)
samples[i].size = QT_UINT32 (stsz_data + i * 4 + 20);
else
samples[i].size = sample_size;
GST_LOG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "sample %d has size %d", i, samples[i].size);
/* init other fields to defaults for this sample */
samples[i].keyframe = FALSE;
}
n_samples_per_chunk = QT_UINT32 (stsc_data + 12);
index = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_samples_per_chunk; i++) {
guint32 first_chunk, last_chunk;
guint32 samples_per_chunk;
first_chunk = QT_UINT32 (stsc_data + 16 + i * 12 + 0) - 1;
if (i == n_samples_per_chunk - 1) {
last_chunk = G_MAXUINT32;
} else {
last_chunk = QT_UINT32 (stsc_data + 16 + i * 12 + 12) - 1;
}
samples_per_chunk = QT_UINT32 (stsc_data + 16 + i * 12 + 4);
for (j = first_chunk; j < last_chunk; j++) {
guint64 chunk_offset;
if (stco) {
chunk_offset = QT_UINT32 (stco_data + 16 + j * 4);
} else {
chunk_offset = QT_UINT64 ((guint8 *) co64->data + 16 + j * 8);
}
for (k = 0; k < samples_per_chunk; k++) {
GST_LOG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "Creating entry %d with offset %lld",
index, chunk_offset);
samples[index].chunk = j;
samples[index].offset = chunk_offset;
chunk_offset += samples[index].size;
index++;
if (index >= n_samples)
goto done2;
}
}
}
done2:
n_sample_times = QT_UINT32 ((guint8 *) stts->data + 12);
timestamp = 0;
stream->min_duration = 0;
time = 0;
index = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_sample_times; i++) {
guint32 n;
guint32 duration;
n = QT_UINT32 ((guint8 *) stts->data + 16 + 8 * i);
duration = QT_UINT32 ((guint8 *) stts->data + 16 + 8 * i + 4);
for (j = 0; j < n; j++) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "sample %d: timestamp %" GST_TIME_FORMAT,
index, GST_TIME_ARGS (timestamp));
samples[index].timestamp = timestamp;
/* take first duration for fps */
if (stream->min_duration == 0)
stream->min_duration = duration;
/* add non-scaled values to avoid rounding errors */
time += duration;
timestamp = gst_util_uint64_scale (time, GST_SECOND, stream->timescale);
samples[index].duration = timestamp - samples[index].timestamp;
index++;
}
}
if (stss) {
/* mark keyframes */
guint32 n_sample_syncs;
n_sample_syncs = QT_UINT32 ((guint8 *) stss->data + 12);
if (n_sample_syncs == 0) {
stream->all_keyframe = TRUE;
} else {
offset = 16;
for (i = 0; i < n_sample_syncs; i++) {
/* note that the first sample is index 1, not 0 */
index = QT_UINT32 ((guint8 *) stss->data + offset);
if (index > 0) {
samples[index - 1].keyframe = TRUE;
offset += 4;
}
}
}
} else {
/* no stss, all samples are keyframes */
stream->all_keyframe = TRUE;
}
} else {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux,
"stsz sample_size %d != 0, treating chunks as samples", sample_size);
/* treat chunks as samples */
if (stco) {
n_samples = QT_UINT32 (stco_data + 12);
} else {
n_samples = QT_UINT32 ((guint8 *) co64->data + 12);
}
stream->n_samples = n_samples;
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "allocating n_samples %d", n_samples);
samples = g_new0 (QtDemuxSample, n_samples);
stream->samples = samples;
n_samples_per_chunk = QT_UINT32 (stsc_data + 12);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "n_samples_per_chunk %d", n_samples_per_chunk);
sample_index = 0;
timestamp = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n_samples_per_chunk; i++) {
guint32 first_chunk, last_chunk;
guint32 samples_per_chunk;
first_chunk = QT_UINT32 (stsc_data + 16 + i * 12 + 0) - 1;
/* the last chunk of each entry is calculated by taking the first chunk
* of the next entry; except if there is no next, where we fake it with
* INT_MAX */
if (i == n_samples_per_chunk - 1) {
last_chunk = G_MAXUINT32;
} else {
last_chunk = QT_UINT32 (stsc_data + 16 + i * 12 + 12) - 1;
}
samples_per_chunk = QT_UINT32 (stsc_data + 16 + i * 12 + 4);
GST_LOG_OBJECT (qtdemux,
"entry %d has first_chunk %d, last_chunk %d, samples_per_chunk %d", i,
first_chunk, last_chunk, samples_per_chunk);
for (j = first_chunk; j < last_chunk; j++) {
guint64 chunk_offset;
if (j >= n_samples)
goto done;
if (stco) {
chunk_offset = QT_UINT32 (stco_data + 16 + j * 4);
} else {
chunk_offset = QT_UINT64 ((guint8 *) co64->data + 16 + j * 8);
}
GST_LOG_OBJECT (qtdemux,
"Creating entry %d with offset %" G_GUINT64_FORMAT, j,
chunk_offset);
samples[j].chunk = j;
samples[j].offset = chunk_offset;
if (stream->samples_per_frame * stream->bytes_per_frame) {
samples[j].size = (samples_per_chunk * stream->n_channels) /
stream->samples_per_frame * stream->bytes_per_frame;
} else {
samples[j].size = samples_per_chunk;
}
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "sample %d: timestamp %" GST_TIME_FORMAT
", size %u", j, GST_TIME_ARGS (timestamp), samples[j].size);
samples[j].timestamp = timestamp;
sample_index += samples_per_chunk;
timestamp = gst_util_uint64_scale (sample_index,
GST_SECOND, stream->timescale);
samples[j].duration = timestamp - samples[j].timestamp;
samples[j].keyframe = TRUE;
}
}
}
/* composition time to sample */
if ((ctts = qtdemux_tree_get_child_by_type (stbl, FOURCC_ctts))) {
const guint8 *ctts_data = (const guint8 *) ctts->data;
guint32 n_entries = QT_UINT32 (ctts_data + 12);
guint32 count;
gint32 soffset;
/* Fill in the pts_offsets */
for (i = 0, j = 0; (j < stream->n_samples) && (i < n_entries); i++) {
count = QT_UINT32 (ctts_data + 16 + i * 8);
soffset = QT_UINT32 (ctts_data + 20 + i * 8);
for (k = 0; k < count; k++, j++) {
/* we operate with very small soffset values here, it shouldn't overflow */
samples[j].pts_offset = soffset * GST_SECOND / stream->timescale;
}
}
}
done:
return TRUE;
/* ERRORS */
corrupt_file:
{
GST_ELEMENT_ERROR (qtdemux, STREAM, DECODE,
(_("This file is corrupt and cannot be played.")), (NULL));
return FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: IsValidJsonNumber(const char *str, int len)
{
bool numeric_error;
JsonLexContext dummy_lex;
/*
* json_lex_number expects a leading '-' to have been eaten already.
*
* having to cast away the constness of str is ugly, but there's not much
* easy alternative.
*/
if (*str == '-')
{
dummy_lex.input = (char *) str + 1;
dummy_lex.input_length = len - 1;
}
else
{
dummy_lex.input = (char *) str;
dummy_lex.input_length = len;
}
json_lex_number(&dummy_lex, dummy_lex.input, &numeric_error);
return !numeric_error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplHeap, top)
{
zval *value;
spl_heap_object *intern;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "") == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = (spl_heap_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->heap->flags & SPL_HEAP_CORRUPTED) {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_RuntimeException, "Heap is corrupted, heap properties are no longer ensured.", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
value = (zval *)spl_ptr_heap_top(intern->heap);
if (!value) {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_RuntimeException, "Can't peek at an empty heap", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
RETURN_ZVAL(value, 1, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void sctp_sock_migrate(struct sock *oldsk, struct sock *newsk,
struct sctp_association *assoc,
sctp_socket_type_t type)
{
struct sctp_sock *oldsp = sctp_sk(oldsk);
struct sctp_sock *newsp = sctp_sk(newsk);
struct sctp_bind_bucket *pp; /* hash list port iterator */
struct sctp_endpoint *newep = newsp->ep;
struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp;
struct sctp_ulpevent *event;
struct sctp_bind_hashbucket *head;
struct list_head tmplist;
/* Migrate socket buffer sizes and all the socket level options to the
* new socket.
*/
newsk->sk_sndbuf = oldsk->sk_sndbuf;
newsk->sk_rcvbuf = oldsk->sk_rcvbuf;
/* Brute force copy old sctp opt. */
if (oldsp->do_auto_asconf) {
memcpy(&tmplist, &newsp->auto_asconf_list, sizeof(tmplist));
inet_sk_copy_descendant(newsk, oldsk);
memcpy(&newsp->auto_asconf_list, &tmplist, sizeof(tmplist));
} else
inet_sk_copy_descendant(newsk, oldsk);
/* Restore the ep value that was overwritten with the above structure
* copy.
*/
newsp->ep = newep;
newsp->hmac = NULL;
/* Hook this new socket in to the bind_hash list. */
head = &sctp_port_hashtable[sctp_phashfn(sock_net(oldsk),
inet_sk(oldsk)->inet_num)];
local_bh_disable();
spin_lock(&head->lock);
pp = sctp_sk(oldsk)->bind_hash;
sk_add_bind_node(newsk, &pp->owner);
sctp_sk(newsk)->bind_hash = pp;
inet_sk(newsk)->inet_num = inet_sk(oldsk)->inet_num;
spin_unlock(&head->lock);
local_bh_enable();
/* Copy the bind_addr list from the original endpoint to the new
* endpoint so that we can handle restarts properly
*/
sctp_bind_addr_dup(&newsp->ep->base.bind_addr,
&oldsp->ep->base.bind_addr, GFP_KERNEL);
/* Move any messages in the old socket's receive queue that are for the
* peeled off association to the new socket's receive queue.
*/
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &oldsk->sk_receive_queue, tmp) {
event = sctp_skb2event(skb);
if (event->asoc == assoc) {
__skb_unlink(skb, &oldsk->sk_receive_queue);
__skb_queue_tail(&newsk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
}
}
/* Clean up any messages pending delivery due to partial
* delivery. Three cases:
* 1) No partial deliver; no work.
* 2) Peeling off partial delivery; keep pd_lobby in new pd_lobby.
* 3) Peeling off non-partial delivery; move pd_lobby to receive_queue.
*/
skb_queue_head_init(&newsp->pd_lobby);
atomic_set(&sctp_sk(newsk)->pd_mode, assoc->ulpq.pd_mode);
if (atomic_read(&sctp_sk(oldsk)->pd_mode)) {
struct sk_buff_head *queue;
/* Decide which queue to move pd_lobby skbs to. */
if (assoc->ulpq.pd_mode) {
queue = &newsp->pd_lobby;
} else
queue = &newsk->sk_receive_queue;
/* Walk through the pd_lobby, looking for skbs that
* need moved to the new socket.
*/
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &oldsp->pd_lobby, tmp) {
event = sctp_skb2event(skb);
if (event->asoc == assoc) {
__skb_unlink(skb, &oldsp->pd_lobby);
__skb_queue_tail(queue, skb);
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
}
}
/* Clear up any skbs waiting for the partial
* delivery to finish.
*/
if (assoc->ulpq.pd_mode)
sctp_clear_pd(oldsk, NULL);
}
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &assoc->ulpq.reasm, tmp)
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
sctp_skb_for_each(skb, &assoc->ulpq.lobby, tmp)
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(skb, newsk);
/* Set the type of socket to indicate that it is peeled off from the
* original UDP-style socket or created with the accept() call on a
* TCP-style socket..
*/
newsp->type = type;
/* Mark the new socket "in-use" by the user so that any packets
* that may arrive on the association after we've moved it are
* queued to the backlog. This prevents a potential race between
* backlog processing on the old socket and new-packet processing
* on the new socket.
*
* The caller has just allocated newsk so we can guarantee that other
* paths won't try to lock it and then oldsk.
*/
lock_sock_nested(newsk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
sctp_assoc_migrate(assoc, newsk);
/* If the association on the newsk is already closed before accept()
* is called, set RCV_SHUTDOWN flag.
*/
if (sctp_state(assoc, CLOSED) && sctp_style(newsk, TCP))
newsk->sk_shutdown |= RCV_SHUTDOWN;
newsk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_ESTABLISHED;
release_sock(newsk);
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void OnUpdateVSyncParameters(
base::TimeTicks timebase, base::TimeDelta interval) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(client_);
double monotonicTimebase = timebase.ToInternalValue() /
static_cast<double>(base::Time::kMicrosecondsPerSecond);
double intervalInSeconds = interval.ToInternalValue() /
static_cast<double>(base::Time::kMicrosecondsPerSecond);
client_->onVSyncParametersChanged(monotonicTimebase, intervalInSeconds);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
char *provider = NULL, *pin;
int r, i, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
u_int seconds;
time_t death = 0;
u_char type;
struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
Identity *id;
Idtab *tab;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
switch (type) {
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
death = monotime() + seconds;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
confirm = 1;
break;
default:
error("process_add_smartcard_key: "
"Unknown constraint type %d", type);
goto send;
}
}
if (lifetime && !death)
death = monotime() + lifetime;
count = pkcs11_add_provider(provider, pin, &keys);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
k = keys[i];
version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2;
tab = idtab_lookup(version);
if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
id->key = k;
id->provider = xstrdup(provider);
id->comment = xstrdup(provider); /* XXX */
id->death = death;
id->confirm = confirm;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next);
tab->nentries++;
success = 1;
} else {
sshkey_free(k);
}
keys[i] = NULL;
}
send:
free(pin);
free(provider);
free(keys);
send_status(e, success);
}
Commit Message: add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load (via
ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@
CWE ID: CWE-426
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int cg_opendir(const char *path, struct fuse_file_info *fi)
{
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
const char *cgroup;
struct file_info *dir_info;
char *controller = NULL;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
if (strcmp(path, "/cgroup") == 0) {
cgroup = NULL;
controller = NULL;
} else {
controller = pick_controller_from_path(fc, path);
if (!controller)
return -EIO;
cgroup = find_cgroup_in_path(path);
if (!cgroup) {
/* this is just /cgroup/controller, return its contents */
cgroup = "/";
}
}
if (cgroup && !fc_may_access(fc, controller, cgroup, NULL, O_RDONLY)) {
return -EACCES;
}
/* we'll free this at cg_releasedir */
dir_info = malloc(sizeof(*dir_info));
if (!dir_info)
return -ENOMEM;
dir_info->controller = must_copy_string(controller);
dir_info->cgroup = must_copy_string(cgroup);
dir_info->type = LXC_TYPE_CGDIR;
dir_info->buf = NULL;
dir_info->file = NULL;
dir_info->buflen = 0;
fi->fh = (unsigned long)dir_info;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix checking of parent directories
Taken from the justification in the launchpad bug:
To a task in freezer cgroup /a/b/c/d, it should appear that there are no
cgroups other than its descendents. Since this is a filesystem, we must have
the parent directories, but each parent cgroup should only contain the child
which the task can see.
So, when this task looks at /a/b, it should see only directory 'c' and no
files. Attempt to create /a/b/x should result in -EPERM, whether /a/b/x already
exists or not. Attempts to query /a/b/x should result in -ENOENT whether /a/b/x
exists or not. Opening /a/b/tasks should result in -ENOENT.
The caller_may_see_dir checks specifically whether a task may see a cgroup
directory - i.e. /a/b/x if opening /a/b/x/tasks, and /a/b/c/d if doing
opendir('/a/b/c/d').
caller_is_in_ancestor() will return true if the caller in /a/b/c/d looks at
/a/b/c/d/e. If the caller is in a child cgroup of the queried one - i.e. if the
task in /a/b/c/d queries /a/b, then *nextcg will container the next (the only)
directory which he can see in the path - 'c'.
Beyond this, regular DAC permissions should apply, with the
root-in-user-namespace privilege over its mapped uids being respected. The
fc_may_access check does this check for both directories and files.
This is CVE-2015-1342 (LP: #1508481)
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnRenderFrameMetadataChangedBeforeActivation(
const cc::RenderFrameMetadata& metadata) {}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: image_transform_default_ini(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that)
{
this->next->ini(this->next, that);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: psf_close (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ uint32_t k ;
int error = 0 ;
if (psf->codec_close)
{ error = psf->codec_close (psf) ;
/* To prevent it being called in psf->container_close(). */
psf->codec_close = NULL ;
} ;
if (psf->container_close)
error = psf->container_close (psf) ;
error = psf_fclose (psf) ;
psf_close_rsrc (psf) ;
/* For an ISO C compliant implementation it is ok to free a NULL pointer. */
free (psf->container_data) ;
free (psf->codec_data) ;
free (psf->interleave) ;
free (psf->dither) ;
free (psf->peak_info) ;
free (psf->broadcast_16k) ;
free (psf->loop_info) ;
free (psf->instrument) ;
free (psf->cues) ;
free (psf->channel_map) ;
free (psf->format_desc) ;
free (psf->strings.storage) ;
if (psf->wchunks.chunks)
for (k = 0 ; k < psf->wchunks.used ; k++)
free (psf->wchunks.chunks [k].data) ;
free (psf->rchunks.chunks) ;
free (psf->wchunks.chunks) ;
free (psf->iterator) ;
free (psf->cart_16k) ;
memset (psf, 0, sizeof (SF_PRIVATE)) ;
free (psf) ;
return error ;
} /* psf_close */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int rpng2_win_load_bg_image()
{
uch *src, *dest;
uch r1, r2, g1, g2, b1, b2;
uch r1_inv, r2_inv, g1_inv, g2_inv, b1_inv, b2_inv;
int k, hmax, max;
int xidx, yidx, yidx_max = (bgscale-1);
int even_odd_vert, even_odd_horiz, even_odd;
int invert_gradient2 = (bg[pat].type & 0x08);
int invert_column;
ulg i, row;
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Allocate buffer for fake background image to be used with transparent
images; if this fails, revert to plain background color.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
bg_rowbytes = 3 * rpng2_info.width;
bg_data = (uch *)malloc(bg_rowbytes * rpng2_info.height);
if (!bg_data) {
fprintf(stderr, PROGNAME
": unable to allocate memory for background image\n");
bg_image = 0;
return 1;
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vertical gradients (ramps) in NxN squares, alternating direction and
colors (N == bgscale).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if ((bg[pat].type & 0x07) == 0) {
uch r1_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_min].r;
uch g1_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_min].g;
uch b1_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_min].b;
uch r2_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_min].r;
uch g2_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_min].g;
uch b2_min = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_min].b;
int r1_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].r - r1_min;
int g1_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].g - g1_min;
int b1_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].b - b1_min;
int r2_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].r - r2_min;
int g2_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].g - g2_min;
int b2_diff = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].b - b2_min;
for (row = 0; row < rpng2_info.height; ++row) {
yidx = row % bgscale;
even_odd_vert = (row / bgscale) & 1;
r1 = r1_min + (r1_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
g1 = g1_min + (g1_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
b1 = b1_min + (b1_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
r1_inv = r1_min + (r1_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
g1_inv = g1_min + (g1_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
b1_inv = b1_min + (b1_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
r2 = r2_min + (r2_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
g2 = g2_min + (g2_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
b2 = b2_min + (b2_diff * yidx) / yidx_max;
r2_inv = r2_min + (r2_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
g2_inv = g2_min + (g2_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
b2_inv = b2_min + (b2_diff * (yidx_max-yidx)) / yidx_max;
dest = bg_data + row*bg_rowbytes;
for (i = 0; i < rpng2_info.width; ++i) {
even_odd_horiz = (i / bgscale) & 1;
even_odd = even_odd_vert ^ even_odd_horiz;
invert_column =
(even_odd_horiz && (bg[pat].type & 0x10));
if (even_odd == 0) { /* gradient #1 */
if (invert_column) {
*dest++ = r1_inv;
*dest++ = g1_inv;
*dest++ = b1_inv;
} else {
*dest++ = r1;
*dest++ = g1;
*dest++ = b1;
}
} else { /* gradient #2 */
if ((invert_column && invert_gradient2) ||
(!invert_column && !invert_gradient2))
{
*dest++ = r2; /* not inverted or */
*dest++ = g2; /* doubly inverted */
*dest++ = b2;
} else {
*dest++ = r2_inv;
*dest++ = g2_inv; /* singly inverted */
*dest++ = b2_inv;
}
}
}
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Soft gradient-diamonds with scale = bgscale. Code contributed by Adam
M. Costello.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
} else if ((bg[pat].type & 0x07) == 1) {
hmax = (bgscale-1)/2; /* half the max weight of a color */
max = 2*hmax; /* the max weight of a color */
r1 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].r;
g1 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].g;
b1 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb1_max].b;
r2 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].r;
g2 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].g;
b2 = rgb[bg[pat].rgb2_max].b;
for (row = 0; row < rpng2_info.height; ++row) {
yidx = row % bgscale;
if (yidx > hmax)
yidx = bgscale-1 - yidx;
dest = bg_data + row*bg_rowbytes;
for (i = 0; i < rpng2_info.width; ++i) {
xidx = i % bgscale;
if (xidx > hmax)
xidx = bgscale-1 - xidx;
k = xidx + yidx;
*dest++ = (k*r1 + (max-k)*r2) / max;
*dest++ = (k*g1 + (max-k)*g2) / max;
*dest++ = (k*b1 + (max-k)*b2) / max;
}
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radial "starburst" with azimuthal sinusoids; [eventually number of sinu-
soids will equal bgscale?]. This one is slow but very cool. Code con-
tributed by Pieter S. van der Meulen (originally in Smalltalk).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
} else if ((bg[pat].type & 0x07) == 2) {
uch ch;
int ii, x, y, hw, hh, grayspot;
double freq, rotate, saturate, gray, intensity;
double angle=0.0, aoffset=0.0, maxDist, dist;
double red=0.0, green=0.0, blue=0.0, hue, s, v, f, p, q, t;
fprintf(stderr, "%s: computing radial background...",
PROGNAME);
fflush(stderr);
hh = rpng2_info.height / 2;
hw = rpng2_info.width / 2;
/* variables for radial waves:
* aoffset: number of degrees to rotate hue [CURRENTLY NOT USED]
* freq: number of color beams originating from the center
* grayspot: size of the graying center area (anti-alias)
* rotate: rotation of the beams as a function of radius
* saturate: saturation of beams' shape azimuthally
*/
angle = CLIP(angle, 0.0, 360.0);
grayspot = CLIP(bg[pat].bg_gray, 1, (hh + hw));
freq = MAX((double)bg[pat].bg_freq, 0.0);
saturate = (double)bg[pat].bg_bsat * 0.1;
rotate = (double)bg[pat].bg_brot * 0.1;
gray = 0.0;
intensity = 0.0;
maxDist = (double)((hw*hw) + (hh*hh));
for (row = 0; row < rpng2_info.height; ++row) {
y = row - hh;
dest = bg_data + row*bg_rowbytes;
for (i = 0; i < rpng2_info.width; ++i) {
x = i - hw;
angle = (x == 0)? PI_2 : atan((double)y / (double)x);
gray = (double)MAX(ABS(y), ABS(x)) / grayspot;
gray = MIN(1.0, gray);
dist = (double)((x*x) + (y*y)) / maxDist;
intensity = cos((angle+(rotate*dist*PI)) * freq) *
gray * saturate;
intensity = (MAX(MIN(intensity,1.0),-1.0) + 1.0) * 0.5;
hue = (angle + PI) * INV_PI_360 + aoffset;
s = gray * ((double)(ABS(x)+ABS(y)) / (double)(hw + hh));
s = MIN(MAX(s,0.0), 1.0);
v = MIN(MAX(intensity,0.0), 1.0);
if (s == 0.0) {
ch = (uch)(v * 255.0);
*dest++ = ch;
*dest++ = ch;
*dest++ = ch;
} else {
if ((hue < 0.0) || (hue >= 360.0))
hue -= (((int)(hue / 360.0)) * 360.0);
hue /= 60.0;
ii = (int)hue;
f = hue - (double)ii;
p = (1.0 - s) * v;
q = (1.0 - (s * f)) * v;
t = (1.0 - (s * (1.0 - f))) * v;
if (ii == 0) { red = v; green = t; blue = p; }
else if (ii == 1) { red = q; green = v; blue = p; }
else if (ii == 2) { red = p; green = v; blue = t; }
else if (ii == 3) { red = p; green = q; blue = v; }
else if (ii == 4) { red = t; green = p; blue = v; }
else if (ii == 5) { red = v; green = p; blue = q; }
*dest++ = (uch)(red * 255.0);
*dest++ = (uch)(green * 255.0);
*dest++ = (uch)(blue * 255.0);
}
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "done.\n");
fflush(stderr);
}
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Blast background image to display buffer before beginning PNG decode;
calling function will handle invalidation and UpdateWindow() call.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
for (row = 0; row < rpng2_info.height; ++row) {
src = bg_data + row*bg_rowbytes;
dest = wimage_data + row*wimage_rowbytes;
for (i = rpng2_info.width; i > 0; --i) {
r1 = *src++;
g1 = *src++;
b1 = *src++;
*dest++ = b1;
*dest++ = g1; /* note reverse order */
*dest++ = r1;
}
}
return 0;
} /* end function rpng2_win_load_bg_image() */
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: e1000e_ring_empty(E1000ECore *core, const E1000E_RingInfo *r)
{
return core->mac[r->dh] == core->mac[r->dt];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11(ExecState* exec)
{
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
int arg(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
TestObj::overloadedMethod1(arg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int dev_cpu_callback(struct notifier_block *nfb,
unsigned long action,
void *ocpu)
{
struct sk_buff **list_skb;
struct Qdisc **list_net;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int cpu, oldcpu = (unsigned long)ocpu;
struct softnet_data *sd, *oldsd;
if (action != CPU_DEAD && action != CPU_DEAD_FROZEN)
return NOTIFY_OK;
local_irq_disable();
cpu = smp_processor_id();
sd = &per_cpu(softnet_data, cpu);
oldsd = &per_cpu(softnet_data, oldcpu);
/* Find end of our completion_queue. */
list_skb = &sd->completion_queue;
while (*list_skb)
list_skb = &(*list_skb)->next;
/* Append completion queue from offline CPU. */
*list_skb = oldsd->completion_queue;
oldsd->completion_queue = NULL;
/* Find end of our output_queue. */
list_net = &sd->output_queue;
while (*list_net)
list_net = &(*list_net)->next_sched;
/* Append output queue from offline CPU. */
*list_net = oldsd->output_queue;
oldsd->output_queue = NULL;
raise_softirq_irqoff(NET_TX_SOFTIRQ);
local_irq_enable();
/* Process offline CPU's input_pkt_queue */
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&oldsd->input_pkt_queue)))
netif_rx(skb);
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void Document::DidAssociateFormControlsTimerFired(TimerBase* timer) {
DCHECK_EQ(timer, &did_associate_form_controls_timer_);
if (!GetFrame() || !GetFrame()->GetPage())
return;
GetFrame()->GetPage()->GetChromeClient().DidAssociateFormControlsAfterLoad(
GetFrame());
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
{
int err;
struct super_block *sb;
struct pid_namespace *ns;
char *options;
if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT) {
ns = (struct pid_namespace *)data;
options = NULL;
} else {
ns = task_active_pid_ns(current);
options = data;
/* Does the mounter have privilege over the pid namespace? */
if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
}
sb = sget(fs_type, proc_test_super, proc_set_super, flags, ns);
if (IS_ERR(sb))
return ERR_CAST(sb);
if (!proc_parse_options(options, ns)) {
deactivate_locked_super(sb);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (!sb->s_root) {
err = proc_fill_super(sb);
if (err) {
deactivate_locked_super(sb);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
sb->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
/* User space would break if executables appear on proc */
sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NOEXEC;
}
return dget(sb->s_root);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void inet_csk_listen_stop(struct sock *sk)
{
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
struct request_sock *acc_req;
struct request_sock *req;
inet_csk_delete_keepalive_timer(sk);
/* make all the listen_opt local to us */
acc_req = reqsk_queue_yank_acceptq(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue);
/* Following specs, it would be better either to send FIN
* (and enter FIN-WAIT-1, it is normal close)
* or to send active reset (abort).
* Certainly, it is pretty dangerous while synflood, but it is
* bad justification for our negligence 8)
* To be honest, we are not able to make either
* of the variants now. --ANK
*/
reqsk_queue_destroy(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue);
while ((req = acc_req) != NULL) {
struct sock *child = req->sk;
acc_req = req->dl_next;
local_bh_disable();
bh_lock_sock(child);
WARN_ON(sock_owned_by_user(child));
sock_hold(child);
sk->sk_prot->disconnect(child, O_NONBLOCK);
sock_orphan(child);
percpu_counter_inc(sk->sk_prot->orphan_count);
inet_csk_destroy_sock(child);
bh_unlock_sock(child);
local_bh_enable();
sock_put(child);
sk_acceptq_removed(sk);
__reqsk_free(req);
}
WARN_ON(sk->sk_ack_backlog);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int __blk_rq_map_user_iov(struct request *rq,
struct rq_map_data *map_data, struct iov_iter *iter,
gfp_t gfp_mask, bool copy)
{
struct request_queue *q = rq->q;
struct bio *bio, *orig_bio;
int ret;
if (copy)
bio = bio_copy_user_iov(q, map_data, iter, gfp_mask);
else
bio = bio_map_user_iov(q, iter, gfp_mask);
if (IS_ERR(bio))
return PTR_ERR(bio);
if (map_data && map_data->null_mapped)
bio_set_flag(bio, BIO_NULL_MAPPED);
iov_iter_advance(iter, bio->bi_iter.bi_size);
if (map_data)
map_data->offset += bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
orig_bio = bio;
blk_queue_bounce(q, &bio);
/*
* We link the bounce buffer in and could have to traverse it
* later so we have to get a ref to prevent it from being freed
*/
bio_get(bio);
ret = blk_rq_append_bio(rq, bio);
if (ret) {
bio_endio(bio);
__blk_rq_unmap_user(orig_bio);
bio_put(bio);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Don't feed anything but regular iovec's to blk_rq_map_user_iov
In theory we could map other things, but there's a reason that function
is called "user_iov". Using anything else (like splice can do) just
confuses it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int ocfs2_set_acl(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct buffer_head *di_bh,
int type,
struct posix_acl *acl,
struct ocfs2_alloc_context *meta_ac,
struct ocfs2_alloc_context *data_ac)
{
int name_index;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
int ret;
if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name_index = OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
ret = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &mode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret == 0)
acl = NULL;
ret = ocfs2_acl_set_mode(inode, di_bh,
handle, mode);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name_index = OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
value = ocfs2_acl_to_xattr(acl, &size);
if (IS_ERR(value))
return (int)PTR_ERR(value);
}
if (handle)
ret = ocfs2_xattr_set_handle(handle, inode, di_bh, name_index,
"", value, size, 0,
meta_ac, data_ac);
else
ret = ocfs2_xattr_set(inode, name_index, "", value, size, 0);
kfree(value);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-285
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int config_props(AVFilterLink *inlink)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
LutContext *s = ctx->priv;
const AVPixFmtDescriptor *desc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(inlink->format);
uint8_t rgba_map[4]; /* component index -> RGBA color index map */
int min[4], max[4];
int val, color, ret;
s->hsub = desc->log2_chroma_w;
s->vsub = desc->log2_chroma_h;
s->var_values[VAR_W] = inlink->w;
s->var_values[VAR_H] = inlink->h;
switch (inlink->format) {
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV410P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV411P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV420P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV422P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV440P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUV444P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA420P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA422P:
case AV_PIX_FMT_YUVA444P:
min[Y] = min[U] = min[V] = 16;
max[Y] = 235;
max[U] = max[V] = 240;
min[A] = 0; max[A] = 255;
break;
default:
min[0] = min[1] = min[2] = min[3] = 0;
max[0] = max[1] = max[2] = max[3] = 255;
}
s->is_yuv = s->is_rgb = 0;
if (ff_fmt_is_in(inlink->format, yuv_pix_fmts)) s->is_yuv = 1;
else if (ff_fmt_is_in(inlink->format, rgb_pix_fmts)) s->is_rgb = 1;
if (s->is_rgb) {
ff_fill_rgba_map(rgba_map, inlink->format);
s->step = av_get_bits_per_pixel(desc) >> 3;
}
for (color = 0; color < desc->nb_components; color++) {
double res;
int comp = s->is_rgb ? rgba_map[color] : color;
/* create the parsed expression */
av_expr_free(s->comp_expr[color]);
s->comp_expr[color] = NULL;
ret = av_expr_parse(&s->comp_expr[color], s->comp_expr_str[color],
var_names, funcs1_names, funcs1, NULL, NULL, 0, ctx);
if (ret < 0) {
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Error when parsing the expression '%s' for the component %d and color %d.\n",
s->comp_expr_str[comp], comp, color);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* compute the lut */
s->var_values[VAR_MAXVAL] = max[color];
s->var_values[VAR_MINVAL] = min[color];
for (val = 0; val < 256; val++) {
s->var_values[VAR_VAL] = val;
s->var_values[VAR_CLIPVAL] = av_clip(val, min[color], max[color]);
s->var_values[VAR_NEGVAL] =
av_clip(min[color] + max[color] - s->var_values[VAR_VAL],
min[color], max[color]);
res = av_expr_eval(s->comp_expr[color], s->var_values, s);
if (isnan(res)) {
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Error when evaluating the expression '%s' for the value %d for the component %d.\n",
s->comp_expr_str[color], val, comp);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
s->lut[comp][val] = av_clip((int)res, min[color], max[color]);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "val[%d][%d] = %d\n", comp, val, s->lut[comp][val]);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void conn_close(conn *c) {
assert(c != NULL);
/* delete the event, the socket and the conn */
event_del(&c->event);
if (settings.verbose > 1)
fprintf(stderr, "<%d connection closed.\n", c->sfd);
conn_cleanup(c);
MEMCACHED_CONN_RELEASE(c->sfd);
conn_set_state(c, conn_closed);
#ifdef TLS
if (c->ssl) {
SSL_shutdown(c->ssl);
SSL_free(c->ssl);
}
#endif
close(c->sfd);
pthread_mutex_lock(&conn_lock);
allow_new_conns = true;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&conn_lock);
STATS_LOCK();
stats_state.curr_conns--;
STATS_UNLOCK();
return;
}
Commit Message: fix strncpy call to avoid ASAN violation
Ensure we're only reading to the size of the smallest buffer, since
they're both on the stack and could potentially overlap. Overlapping is
defined as ... undefined behavior. I've looked through all available
implementations of strncpy and they still only copy from the first \0
found.
We'll also never read past the end of sun_path since we _supply_
sun_path with a proper null terminator.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: status_t GraphicBuffer::unflatten(
void const*& buffer, size_t& size, int const*& fds, size_t& count) {
if (size < 8*sizeof(int)) return NO_MEMORY;
int const* buf = static_cast<int const*>(buffer);
if (buf[0] != 'GBFR') return BAD_TYPE;
const size_t numFds = buf[8];
const size_t numInts = buf[9];
const size_t sizeNeeded = (10 + numInts) * sizeof(int);
if (size < sizeNeeded) return NO_MEMORY;
size_t fdCountNeeded = 0;
if (count < fdCountNeeded) return NO_MEMORY;
if (handle) {
free_handle();
}
if (numFds || numInts) {
width = buf[1];
height = buf[2];
stride = buf[3];
format = buf[4];
usage = buf[5];
native_handle* h = native_handle_create(numFds, numInts);
memcpy(h->data, fds, numFds*sizeof(int));
memcpy(h->data + numFds, &buf[10], numInts*sizeof(int));
handle = h;
} else {
width = height = stride = format = usage = 0;
handle = NULL;
}
mId = static_cast<uint64_t>(buf[6]) << 32;
mId |= static_cast<uint32_t>(buf[7]);
mOwner = ownHandle;
if (handle != 0) {
status_t err = mBufferMapper.registerBuffer(handle);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
width = height = stride = format = usage = 0;
handle = NULL;
ALOGE("unflatten: registerBuffer failed: %s (%d)",
strerror(-err), err);
return err;
}
}
buffer = reinterpret_cast<void const*>(static_cast<int const*>(buffer) + sizeNeeded);
size -= sizeNeeded;
fds += numFds;
count -= numFds;
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::blendFunc(GLenum sfactor, GLenum dfactor) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateBlendFuncFactors("blendFunc", sfactor, dfactor))
return;
ContextGL()->BlendFunc(sfactor, dfactor);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void BrowserCommandController::LoadingStateChanged(bool is_loading,
bool force) {
UpdateReloadStopState(is_loading, force);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int32_t PepperFlashRendererHost::OnNavigate(
ppapi::host::HostMessageContext* host_context,
const ppapi::URLRequestInfoData& data,
const std::string& target,
bool from_user_action) {
content::PepperPluginInstance* plugin_instance =
host_->GetPluginInstance(pp_instance());
if (!plugin_instance)
return PP_ERROR_FAILED;
ppapi::proxy::HostDispatcher* host_dispatcher =
ppapi::proxy::HostDispatcher::GetForInstance(pp_instance());
host_dispatcher->set_allow_plugin_reentrancy();
base::WeakPtr<PepperFlashRendererHost> weak_ptr = weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
navigate_replies_.push_back(host_context->MakeReplyMessageContext());
plugin_instance->Navigate(data, target.c_str(), from_user_action);
if (weak_ptr.get()) {
SendReply(navigate_replies_.back(), IPC::Message());
navigate_replies_.pop_back();
}
return PP_OK_COMPLETIONPENDING;
}
Commit Message: PPB_Flash.Navigate(): Disallow certain HTTP request headers.
With this CL, PPB_Flash.Navigate() fails the operation with
PP_ERROR_NOACCESS if the request headers contain non-simple headers.
BUG=332023
TEST=None
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/136393004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@249114 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int platform_add_devices(struct platform_device **devs, int num)
{
int i, ret = 0;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
ret = platform_device_register(devs[i]);
if (ret) {
while (--i >= 0)
platform_device_unregister(devs[i]);
break;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
(BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose("BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM &&
BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose("BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
struct bpf_map *map;
struct fd f;
if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
insn[1].off != 0) {
verbose("invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->src_reg == 0)
/* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
goto next_insn;
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
verbose("unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
f = fdget(insn->imm);
map = __bpf_map_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
insn->imm);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
/* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map;
insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32;
/* check whether we recorded this map already */
for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++)
if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
fdput(f);
goto next_insn;
}
if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
fdput(f);
return -E2BIG;
}
/* remember this map */
env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
* the map will be released by release_maps() or it
* will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
* and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info()
*/
bpf_map_inc(map, false);
fdput(f);
next_insn:
insn++;
i++;
}
}
/* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
* 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
* These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
*/
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void Browser::FindInPage(bool find_next, bool forward_direction) {
ShowFindBar();
if (find_next) {
string16 find_text;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
find_text = GetFindPboardText();
#endif
GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper()->
GetFindManager()->StartFinding(find_text,
forward_direction,
false); // Not case sensitive.
}
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void ManifestUmaUtil::FetchSucceeded() {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(kUMANameFetchResult,
MANIFEST_FETCH_SUCCESS,
MANIFEST_FETCH_RESULT_TYPE_COUNT);
}
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: virtual bool InputMethodIsActivated(const std::string& input_method_id) {
scoped_ptr<InputMethodDescriptors> active_input_method_descriptors(
GetActiveInputMethods());
for (size_t i = 0; i < active_input_method_descriptors->size(); ++i) {
if (active_input_method_descriptors->at(i).id == input_method_id) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> overloadedMethod1Callback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.overloadedMethod1");
if (args.Length() < 2)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(TestObj*, objArg, V8TestObj::HasInstance(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)) ? V8TestObj::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined))) : 0);
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, strArg, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined));
imp->overloadedMethod(objArg, strArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void PluginServiceImpl::StartWatchingPlugins() {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (hkcu_key_.Create(HKEY_CURRENT_USER,
webkit::npapi::kRegistryMozillaPlugins,
KEY_NOTIFY) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
if (hkcu_key_.StartWatching() == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
hkcu_event_.reset(new base::WaitableEvent(hkcu_key_.watch_event()));
base::WaitableEventWatcher::EventCallback callback =
base::Bind(&PluginServiceImpl::OnWaitableEventSignaled,
base::Unretained(this));
hkcu_watcher_.StartWatching(hkcu_event_.get(), callback);
}
}
if (hklm_key_.Create(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
webkit::npapi::kRegistryMozillaPlugins,
KEY_NOTIFY) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
if (hklm_key_.StartWatching() == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
hklm_event_.reset(new base::WaitableEvent(hklm_key_.watch_event()));
base::WaitableEventWatcher::EventCallback callback =
base::Bind(&PluginServiceImpl::OnWaitableEventSignaled,
base::Unretained(this));
hklm_watcher_.StartWatching(hklm_event_.get(), callback);
}
}
#endif
#if defined(OS_POSIX) && !defined(OS_OPENBSD) && !defined(OS_ANDROID)
std::vector<FilePath> plugin_dirs;
plugin_list_->GetPluginDirectories(&plugin_dirs);
for (size_t i = 0; i < plugin_dirs.size(); ++i) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (!plugin_dirs[i].IsAbsolute())
continue;
#endif
FilePathWatcher* watcher = new FilePathWatcher();
VLOG(1) << "Watching for changes in: " << plugin_dirs[i].value();
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&PluginServiceImpl::RegisterFilePathWatcher, watcher,
plugin_dirs[i]));
file_watchers_.push_back(watcher);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: gfx::Vector2d LayerTreeHost::DistributeScrollOffsetToViewports(
const gfx::Vector2d offset,
Layer* layer) {
DCHECK(layer);
if (layer != outer_viewport_scroll_layer_.get())
return offset;
gfx::Vector2d inner_viewport_offset =
inner_viewport_scroll_layer_->scroll_offset();
gfx::Vector2d outer_viewport_offset =
outer_viewport_scroll_layer_->scroll_offset();
if (offset == inner_viewport_offset + outer_viewport_offset) {
return outer_viewport_offset;
}
gfx::Vector2d max_outer_viewport_scroll_offset =
outer_viewport_scroll_layer_->MaxScrollOffset();
gfx::Vector2d max_inner_viewport_scroll_offset =
inner_viewport_scroll_layer_->MaxScrollOffset();
outer_viewport_offset = offset - inner_viewport_offset;
outer_viewport_offset.SetToMin(max_outer_viewport_scroll_offset);
outer_viewport_offset.SetToMax(gfx::Vector2d());
inner_viewport_offset = offset - outer_viewport_offset;
inner_viewport_offset.SetToMin(max_inner_viewport_scroll_offset);
inner_viewport_offset.SetToMax(gfx::Vector2d());
inner_viewport_scroll_layer_->SetScrollOffset(inner_viewport_offset);
return outer_viewport_offset;
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ft_smooth_render_generic( FT_Renderer render,
FT_GlyphSlot slot,
FT_Render_Mode mode,
const FT_Vector* origin,
FT_Render_Mode required_mode )
{
FT_Error error;
FT_Outline* outline = NULL;
FT_BBox cbox;
FT_UInt width, height, height_org, width_org, pitch;
FT_Bitmap* bitmap;
FT_Memory memory;
FT_Int hmul = mode == FT_RENDER_MODE_LCD;
FT_Int vmul = mode == FT_RENDER_MODE_LCD_V;
FT_Pos x_shift, y_shift, x_left, y_top;
FT_Raster_Params params;
/* check glyph image format */
if ( slot->format != render->glyph_format )
{
error = Smooth_Err_Invalid_Argument;
goto Exit;
}
/* check mode */
if ( mode != required_mode )
return Smooth_Err_Cannot_Render_Glyph;
outline = &slot->outline;
/* translate the outline to the new origin if needed */
if ( origin )
FT_Outline_Translate( outline, origin->x, origin->y );
/* compute the control box, and grid fit it */
FT_Outline_Get_CBox( outline, &cbox );
cbox.xMin = FT_PIX_FLOOR( cbox.xMin );
cbox.yMin = FT_PIX_FLOOR( cbox.yMin );
cbox.xMax = FT_PIX_CEIL( cbox.xMax );
cbox.yMax = FT_PIX_CEIL( cbox.yMax );
width = (FT_UInt)( ( cbox.xMax - cbox.xMin ) >> 6 );
height = (FT_UInt)( ( cbox.yMax - cbox.yMin ) >> 6 );
bitmap = &slot->bitmap;
memory = render->root.memory;
width_org = width;
height_org = height;
/* release old bitmap buffer */
if ( slot->internal->flags & FT_GLYPH_OWN_BITMAP )
{
FT_FREE( bitmap->buffer );
slot->internal->flags &= ~FT_GLYPH_OWN_BITMAP;
}
/* allocate new one, depends on pixel format */
pitch = width;
if ( hmul )
{
width = width * 3;
pitch = FT_PAD_CEIL( width, 4 );
}
if ( vmul )
height *= 3;
x_shift = (FT_Int) cbox.xMin;
y_shift = (FT_Int) cbox.yMin;
x_left = (FT_Int)( cbox.xMin >> 6 );
y_top = (FT_Int)( cbox.yMax >> 6 );
#ifdef FT_CONFIG_OPTION_SUBPIXEL_RENDERING
if ( slot->library->lcd_filter_func )
{
FT_Int extra = slot->library->lcd_extra;
if ( hmul )
{
x_shift -= 64 * ( extra >> 1 );
width += 3 * extra;
pitch = FT_PAD_CEIL( width, 4 );
x_left -= extra >> 1;
}
if ( vmul )
{
y_shift -= 64 * ( extra >> 1 );
height += 3 * extra;
y_top += extra >> 1;
}
}
#endif
bitmap->pixel_mode = FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY;
bitmap->num_grays = 256;
bitmap->width = width;
goto Exit;
slot->internal->flags |= FT_GLYPH_OWN_BITMAP;
/* set up parameters */
params.target = bitmap;
params.source = outline;
params.flags = FT_RASTER_FLAG_AA;
#ifdef FT_CONFIG_OPTION_SUBPIXEL_RENDERING
/* implode outline if needed */
{
FT_Vector* points = outline->points;
FT_Vector* points_end = points + outline->n_points;
FT_Vector* vec;
if ( hmul )
for ( vec = points; vec < points_end; vec++ )
vec->x *= 3;
if ( vmul )
for ( vec = points; vec < points_end; vec++ )
vec->y *= 3;
}
/* render outline into the bitmap */
error = render->raster_render( render->raster, ¶ms );
/* deflate outline if needed */
{
FT_Vector* points = outline->points;
FT_Vector* points_end = points + outline->n_points;
FT_Vector* vec;
if ( hmul )
for ( vec = points; vec < points_end; vec++ )
vec->x /= 3;
if ( vmul )
for ( vec = points; vec < points_end; vec++ )
vec->y /= 3;
}
if ( slot->library->lcd_filter_func )
slot->library->lcd_filter_func( bitmap, mode, slot->library );
#else /* !FT_CONFIG_OPTION_SUBPIXEL_RENDERING */
/* render outline into bitmap */
error = render->raster_render( render->raster, ¶ms );
/* expand it horizontally */
if ( hmul )
{
FT_Byte* line = bitmap->buffer;
FT_UInt hh;
for ( hh = height_org; hh > 0; hh--, line += pitch )
{
FT_UInt xx;
FT_Byte* end = line + width;
for ( xx = width_org; xx > 0; xx-- )
{
FT_UInt pixel = line[xx-1];
end[-3] = (FT_Byte)pixel;
end[-2] = (FT_Byte)pixel;
end[-1] = (FT_Byte)pixel;
end -= 3;
}
}
}
/* expand it vertically */
if ( vmul )
{
FT_Byte* read = bitmap->buffer + ( height - height_org ) * pitch;
FT_Byte* write = bitmap->buffer;
FT_UInt hh;
for ( hh = height_org; hh > 0; hh-- )
{
ft_memcpy( write, read, pitch );
write += pitch;
ft_memcpy( write, read, pitch );
write += pitch;
ft_memcpy( write, read, pitch );
write += pitch;
read += pitch;
}
}
#endif /* !FT_CONFIG_OPTION_SUBPIXEL_RENDERING */
FT_Outline_Translate( outline, x_shift, y_shift );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
slot->format = FT_GLYPH_FORMAT_BITMAP;
slot->bitmap_left = x_left;
slot->bitmap_top = y_top;
Exit:
if ( outline && origin )
FT_Outline_Translate( outline, -origin->x, -origin->y );
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *))
{
softirq_vec[nr].action = action;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: swabHorAcc16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
TIFFSwabArrayOfShort(wp, wc);
horAcc16(tif, cp0, cc);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: archive_read_format_zip_cleanup(struct archive_read *a)
{
struct zip *zip;
struct zip_entry *zip_entry, *next_zip_entry;
zip = (struct zip *)(a->format->data);
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H
if (zip->stream_valid)
inflateEnd(&zip->stream);
#endif
#if HAVA_LZMA_H && HAVE_LIBLZMA
if (zip->zipx_lzma_valid) {
lzma_end(&zip->zipx_lzma_stream);
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_BZLIB_H
if (zip->bzstream_valid) {
BZ2_bzDecompressEnd(&zip->bzstream);
}
#endif
free(zip->uncompressed_buffer);
if (zip->ppmd8_valid)
__archive_ppmd8_functions.Ppmd8_Free(&zip->ppmd8);
if (zip->zip_entries) {
zip_entry = zip->zip_entries;
while (zip_entry != NULL) {
next_zip_entry = zip_entry->next;
archive_string_free(&zip_entry->rsrcname);
free(zip_entry);
zip_entry = next_zip_entry;
}
}
free(zip->decrypted_buffer);
if (zip->cctx_valid)
archive_decrypto_aes_ctr_release(&zip->cctx);
if (zip->hctx_valid)
archive_hmac_sha1_cleanup(&zip->hctx);
free(zip->iv);
free(zip->erd);
free(zip->v_data);
archive_string_free(&zip->format_name);
free(zip);
(a->format->data) = NULL;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Fix typo in preprocessor macro in archive_read_format_zip_cleanup()
Frees lzma_stream on cleanup()
Fixes #1165
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void OffscreenCanvas::setHeight(unsigned height) {
IntSize new_size = size_;
new_size.SetHeight(clampTo<int>(height));
SetSize(new_size);
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: rdpCredssp* credssp_new(freerdp* instance, rdpTransport* transport, rdpSettings* settings)
{
rdpCredssp* credssp;
credssp = (rdpCredssp*) malloc(sizeof(rdpCredssp));
ZeroMemory(credssp, sizeof(rdpCredssp));
if (credssp != NULL)
{
HKEY hKey;
LONG status;
DWORD dwType;
DWORD dwSize;
credssp->instance = instance;
credssp->settings = settings;
credssp->server = settings->ServerMode;
credssp->transport = transport;
credssp->send_seq_num = 0;
credssp->recv_seq_num = 0;
ZeroMemory(&credssp->negoToken, sizeof(SecBuffer));
ZeroMemory(&credssp->pubKeyAuth, sizeof(SecBuffer));
ZeroMemory(&credssp->authInfo, sizeof(SecBuffer));
if (credssp->server)
{
status = RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, _T("Software\\FreeRDP\\Server"),
0, KEY_READ | KEY_WOW64_64KEY, &hKey);
if (status == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
status = RegQueryValueEx(hKey, _T("SspiModule"), NULL, &dwType, NULL, &dwSize);
if (status == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
credssp->SspiModule = (LPTSTR) malloc(dwSize + sizeof(TCHAR));
status = RegQueryValueEx(hKey, _T("SspiModule"), NULL, &dwType,
(BYTE*) credssp->SspiModule, &dwSize);
if (status == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
_tprintf(_T("Using SSPI Module: %s\n"), credssp->SspiModule);
RegCloseKey(hKey);
}
}
}
}
}
return credssp;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void Splash::scaleMaskYdXu(SplashImageMaskSource src, void *srcData,
int srcWidth, int srcHeight,
int scaledWidth, int scaledHeight,
SplashBitmap *dest) {
Guchar *lineBuf;
Guint *pixBuf;
Guint pix;
Guchar *destPtr;
int yp, yq, xp, xq, yt, y, yStep, xt, x, xStep, d;
int i, j;
yp = srcHeight / scaledHeight;
lineBuf = (Guchar *)gmalloc(srcWidth);
pixBuf = (Guint *)gmallocn(srcWidth, sizeof(int));
yt = 0;
destPtr = dest->data;
for (y = 0; y < scaledHeight; ++y) {
yt = 0;
destPtr = dest->data;
for (y = 0; y < scaledHeight; ++y) {
}
memset(pixBuf, 0, srcWidth * sizeof(int));
for (i = 0; i < yStep; ++i) {
(*src)(srcData, lineBuf);
for (j = 0; j < srcWidth; ++j) {
pixBuf[j] += lineBuf[j];
}
}
xt = 0;
d = (255 << 23) / yStep;
for (x = 0; x < srcWidth; ++x) {
if ((xt += xq) >= srcWidth) {
xt -= srcWidth;
xStep = xp + 1;
} else {
xStep = xp;
}
pix = pixBuf[x];
pix = (pix * d) >> 23;
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix;
}
}
}
gfree(pixBuf);
gfree(lineBuf);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniformMatrix2x4fv(GLint fake_location,
GLsizei count,
GLboolean transpose,
const volatile GLfloat* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniformMatrix2x4fv",
Program::kUniformMatrix2x4f,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
api()->glUniformMatrix2x4fvFn(real_location, count, transpose,
const_cast<const GLfloat*>(value));
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ossl_cipher_alloc(VALUE klass)
{
return NewCipher(klass);
}
Commit Message: cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
CWE ID: CWE-310
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void MaybeReportDownloadDeepScanningVerdict(
Profile* profile,
const GURL& url,
const std::string& file_name,
const std::string& download_digest_sha256,
BinaryUploadService::Result result,
DeepScanningClientResponse response) {
if (response.malware_scan_verdict().verdict() ==
MalwareDeepScanningVerdict::UWS ||
response.malware_scan_verdict().verdict() ==
MalwareDeepScanningVerdict::MALWARE) {
extensions::SafeBrowsingPrivateEventRouterFactory::GetForProfile(profile)
->OnDangerousDeepScanningResult(url, file_name, download_digest_sha256);
}
}
Commit Message: Add reporting for DLP deep scanning
For each triggered rule in the DLP response, we report the download as
violating that rule.
This also implements the UnsafeReportingEnabled enterprise policy, which
controls whether or not we do any reporting.
Bug: 980777
Change-Id: I48100cfb4dd5aa92ed80da1f34e64a6e393be2fa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1772381
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691371}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void GpuProcessHost::OnChannelEstablished(
const IPC::ChannelHandle& channel_handle) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnChannelEstablished");
EstablishChannelCallback callback = channel_requests_.front();
channel_requests_.pop();
if (!channel_handle.name.empty() &&
!GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->GpuAccessAllowed()) {
Send(new GpuMsg_CloseChannel(channel_handle));
EstablishChannelError(callback,
IPC::ChannelHandle(),
base::kNullProcessHandle,
content::GPUInfo());
RouteOnUIThread(GpuHostMsg_OnLogMessage(
logging::LOG_WARNING,
"WARNING",
"Hardware acceleration is unavailable."));
return;
}
callback.Run(channel_handle,
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->GetGPUInfo());
}
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void DataReductionProxySettings::SetDataReductionProxyEnabled(bool enabled) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats());
if (spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.GetValue() != enabled) {
spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.SetValue(enabled);
OnProxyEnabledPrefChange();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats()
->SetDataUsageReportingEnabled(enabled);
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
unsigned timeout,
unsigned error,
struct key *keyring,
struct key *authkey)
{
struct assoc_array_edit *edit;
struct timespec now;
int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0;
key_check(key);
key_check(keyring);
awaken = 0;
ret = -EBUSY;
if (keyring) {
if (keyring->restrict_link)
return -EPERM;
link_ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
}
mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex);
/* can't instantiate twice */
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
key->reject_error = -error;
smp_wmb();
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
now = current_kernel_time();
key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
awaken = 1;
ret = 0;
/* and link it into the destination keyring */
if (keyring && link_ret == 0)
__key_link(key, &edit);
/* disable the authorisation key */
if (authkey)
key_revoke(authkey);
}
mutex_unlock(&key_construction_mutex);
if (keyring)
__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
/* wake up anyone waiting for a key to be constructed */
if (awaken)
wake_up_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT);
return ret == 0 ? link_ret : ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: potential uninitialized variable
If __key_link_begin() failed then "edit" would be uninitialized. I've
added a check to fix that.
This allows a random user to crash the kernel, though it's quite
difficult to achieve. There are three ways it can be done as the user
would have to cause an error to occur in __key_link():
(1) Cause the kernel to run out of memory. In practice, this is difficult
to achieve without ENOMEM cropping up elsewhere and aborting the
attempt.
(2) Revoke the destination keyring between the keyring ID being looked up
and it being tested for revocation. In practice, this is difficult to
time correctly because the KEYCTL_REJECT function can only be used
from the request-key upcall process. Further, users can only make use
of what's in /sbin/request-key.conf, though this does including a
rejection debugging test - which means that the destination keyring
has to be the caller's session keyring in practice.
(3) Have just enough key quota available to create a key, a new session
keyring for the upcall and a link in the session keyring, but not then
sufficient quota to create a link in the nominated destination keyring
so that it fails with EDQUOT.
The bug can be triggered using option (3) above using something like the
following:
echo 80 >/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes
keyctl request2 user debug:fred negate @t
The above sets the quota to something much lower (80) to make the bug
easier to trigger, but this is dependent on the system. Note also that
the name of the keyring created contains a random number that may be
between 1 and 10 characters in size, so may throw the test off by
changing the amount of quota used.
Assuming the failure occurs, something like the following will be seen:
kfree_debugcheck: out of range ptr 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68h
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at ../mm/slab.c:2821!
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811600f9>] kfree_debugcheck+0x20/0x25
RSP: 0018:ffff8804014a7de8 EFLAGS: 00010092
RAX: 0000000000000034 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b68 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000040001 RSI: 00000000000000f6 RDI: 0000000000000300
RBP: ffff8804014a7df0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8804014a7e68 R11: 0000000000000054 R12: 0000000000000202
R13: ffffffff81318a66 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
...
Call Trace:
kfree+0xde/0x1bc
assoc_array_cancel_edit+0x1f/0x36
__key_link_end+0x55/0x63
key_reject_and_link+0x124/0x155
keyctl_reject_key+0xb6/0xe0
keyctl_negate_key+0x10/0x12
SyS_keyctl+0x9f/0xe7
do_syscall_64+0x63/0x13a
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
Fixes: f70e2e06196a ('KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void __attribute__((no_instrument_function)) trace_save_gd(void)
{
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int msPostGISLayerSetTimeFilter(layerObj *lp, const char *timestring, const char *timefield)
{
char **atimes, **aranges = NULL;
int numtimes=0,i=0,numranges=0;
size_t buffer_size = 512;
char buffer[512], bufferTmp[512];
buffer[0] = '\0';
bufferTmp[0] = '\0';
if (!lp || !timestring || !timefield)
return MS_FALSE;
/* discrete time */
if (strstr(timestring, ",") == NULL &&
strstr(timestring, "/") == NULL) { /* discrete time */
createPostgresTimeCompareSimple(timefield, timestring, buffer, buffer_size);
} else {
/* multiple times, or ranges */
atimes = msStringSplit (timestring, ',', &numtimes);
if (atimes == NULL || numtimes < 1)
return MS_FALSE;
strlcat(buffer, "(", buffer_size);
for(i=0; i<numtimes; i++) {
if(i!=0) {
strlcat(buffer, " OR ", buffer_size);
}
strlcat(buffer, "(", buffer_size);
aranges = msStringSplit(atimes[i], '/', &numranges);
if(!aranges) return MS_FALSE;
if(numranges == 1) {
/* we don't have range, just a simple time */
createPostgresTimeCompareSimple(timefield, atimes[i], bufferTmp, buffer_size);
strlcat(buffer, bufferTmp, buffer_size);
} else if(numranges == 2) {
/* we have a range */
createPostgresTimeCompareRange(timefield, aranges[0], aranges[1], bufferTmp, buffer_size);
strlcat(buffer, bufferTmp, buffer_size);
} else {
return MS_FALSE;
}
msFreeCharArray(aranges, numranges);
strlcat(buffer, ")", buffer_size);
}
strlcat(buffer, ")", buffer_size);
msFreeCharArray(atimes, numtimes);
}
if(!*buffer) {
return MS_FALSE;
}
if(lp->filteritem) free(lp->filteritem);
lp->filteritem = msStrdup(timefield);
if (&lp->filter) {
/* if the filter is set and it's a string type, concatenate it with
the time. If not just free it */
if (lp->filter.type == MS_EXPRESSION) {
snprintf(bufferTmp, buffer_size, "(%s) and %s", lp->filter.string, buffer);
loadExpressionString(&lp->filter, bufferTmp);
} else {
freeExpression(&lp->filter);
loadExpressionString(&lp->filter, buffer);
}
}
return MS_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential SQL Injection with postgis TIME filters (#4834)
CWE ID: CWE-89
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int VRDisplay::requestAnimationFrame(FrameRequestCallback* callback) {
Document* doc = this->GetDocument();
if (!doc)
return 0;
pending_raf_ = true;
if (!vr_v_sync_provider_.is_bound()) {
ConnectVSyncProvider();
} else if (!display_blurred_ && !pending_vsync_) {
pending_vsync_ = true;
vr_v_sync_provider_->GetVSync(ConvertToBaseCallback(
WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::OnVSync, WrapWeakPersistent(this))));
}
callback->use_legacy_time_base_ = false;
return EnsureScriptedAnimationController(doc).RegisterCallback(callback);
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: delay(int64_t ns)
{
struct timespec req, rem;
req.tv_sec = 0;
while (ns >= 1000000000L) {
ns -= 1000000000L;
req.tv_sec += 1;
}
req.tv_nsec = ns;
while (nanosleep(&req, &rem) == -1)
if (EINTR == errno)
memcpy(&req, &rem, sizeof(rem));
else
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: WindowMaximizedObserver::WindowMaximizedObserver(
AutomationProvider* automation,
IPC::Message* reply_message)
: automation_(automation->AsWeakPtr()),
reply_message_(reply_message) {
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_WINDOW_MAXIMIZED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bdfReadCharacters(FontFilePtr file, FontPtr pFont, bdfFileState *pState,
int bit, int byte, int glyph, int scan)
{
unsigned char *line;
register CharInfoPtr ci;
int i,
ndx,
nchars,
nignored;
unsigned int char_row, char_col;
int numEncodedGlyphs = 0;
CharInfoPtr *bdfEncoding[256];
BitmapFontPtr bitmapFont;
BitmapExtraPtr bitmapExtra;
CARD32 *bitmapsSizes;
unsigned char lineBuf[BDFLINELEN];
int nencoding;
bitmapFont = (BitmapFontPtr) pFont->fontPrivate;
bitmapExtra = (BitmapExtraPtr) bitmapFont->bitmapExtra;
if (bitmapExtra) {
bitmapsSizes = bitmapExtra->bitmapsSizes;
for (i = 0; i < GLYPHPADOPTIONS; i++)
bitmapsSizes[i] = 0;
} else
bitmapsSizes = NULL;
bzero(bdfEncoding, sizeof(bdfEncoding));
bitmapFont->metrics = NULL;
ndx = 0;
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if ((!line) || (sscanf((char *) line, "CHARS %d", &nchars) != 1)) {
bdfError("bad 'CHARS' in bdf file\n");
return (FALSE);
}
if (nchars < 1) {
bdfError("invalid number of CHARS in BDF file\n");
return (FALSE);
}
if (nchars > INT32_MAX / sizeof(CharInfoRec)) {
bdfError("Couldn't allocate pCI (%d*%d)\n", nchars,
(int) sizeof(CharInfoRec));
goto BAILOUT;
}
ci = calloc(nchars, sizeof(CharInfoRec));
if (!ci) {
bdfError("Couldn't allocate pCI (%d*%d)\n", nchars,
(int) sizeof(CharInfoRec));
goto BAILOUT;
}
bitmapFont->metrics = ci;
if (bitmapExtra) {
bitmapExtra->glyphNames = malloc(nchars * sizeof(Atom));
if (!bitmapExtra->glyphNames) {
bdfError("Couldn't allocate glyphNames (%d*%d)\n",
nchars, (int) sizeof(Atom));
goto BAILOUT;
}
}
if (bitmapExtra) {
bitmapExtra->sWidths = malloc(nchars * sizeof(int));
if (!bitmapExtra->sWidths) {
bdfError("Couldn't allocate sWidth (%d *%d)\n",
nchars, (int) sizeof(int));
return FALSE;
}
}
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
pFont->info.firstRow = 256;
pFont->info.lastRow = 0;
pFont->info.firstCol = 256;
pFont->info.lastCol = 0;
nignored = 0;
for (ndx = 0; (ndx < nchars) && (line) && (bdfIsPrefix(line, "STARTCHAR"));) {
int t;
int wx; /* x component of width */
int wy; /* y component of width */
int bw; /* bounding-box width */
int bh; /* bounding-box height */
int bl; /* bounding-box left */
int bb; /* bounding-box bottom */
int enc,
enc2; /* encoding */
unsigned char *p; /* temp pointer into line */
char charName[100];
int ignore;
if (sscanf((char *) line, "STARTCHAR %s", charName) != 1) {
bdfError("bad character name in BDF file\n");
goto BAILOUT; /* bottom of function, free and return error */
}
if (bitmapExtra)
bitmapExtra->glyphNames[ndx] = bdfForceMakeAtom(charName, NULL);
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if (!line || (t = sscanf((char *) line, "ENCODING %d %d", &enc, &enc2)) < 1) {
bdfError("bad 'ENCODING' in BDF file\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if (enc < -1 || (t == 2 && enc2 < -1)) {
bdfError("bad ENCODING value");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if (t == 2 && enc == -1)
enc = enc2;
ignore = 0;
if (enc == -1) {
if (!bitmapExtra) {
nignored++;
ignore = 1;
}
} else if (enc > MAXENCODING) {
bdfError("char '%s' has encoding too large (%d)\n",
charName, enc);
} else {
char_row = (enc >> 8) & 0xFF;
char_col = enc & 0xFF;
if (char_row < pFont->info.firstRow)
pFont->info.firstRow = char_row;
if (char_row > pFont->info.lastRow)
pFont->info.lastRow = char_row;
if (char_col < pFont->info.firstCol)
pFont->info.firstCol = char_col;
if (char_col > pFont->info.lastCol)
pFont->info.lastCol = char_col;
if (bdfEncoding[char_row] == (CharInfoPtr *) NULL) {
bdfEncoding[char_row] = malloc(256 * sizeof(CharInfoPtr));
if (!bdfEncoding[char_row]) {
bdfError("Couldn't allocate row %d of encoding (%d*%d)\n",
char_row, INDICES, (int) sizeof(CharInfoPtr));
goto BAILOUT;
}
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
bdfEncoding[char_row][i] = (CharInfoPtr) NULL;
}
if (bdfEncoding[char_row] != NULL) {
bdfEncoding[char_row][char_col] = ci;
numEncodedGlyphs++;
}
}
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if ((!line) || (sscanf((char *) line, "SWIDTH %d %d", &wx, &wy) != 2)) {
bdfError("bad 'SWIDTH'\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if (wy != 0) {
bdfError("SWIDTH y value must be zero\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if (bitmapExtra)
bitmapExtra->sWidths[ndx] = wx;
/* 5/31/89 (ef) -- we should be able to ditch the character and recover */
/* from all of these. */
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if ((!line) || (sscanf((char *) line, "DWIDTH %d %d", &wx, &wy) != 2)) {
bdfError("bad 'DWIDTH'\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if (wy != 0) {
bdfError("DWIDTH y value must be zero\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if ((!line) || (sscanf((char *) line, "BBX %d %d %d %d", &bw, &bh, &bl, &bb) != 4)) {
bdfError("bad 'BBX'\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if ((bh < 0) || (bw < 0)) {
bdfError("character '%s' has a negative sized bitmap, %dx%d\n",
charName, bw, bh);
goto BAILOUT;
}
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
if ((line) && (bdfIsPrefix(line, "ATTRIBUTES"))) {
for (p = line + strlen("ATTRIBUTES ");
(*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t');
p++)
/* empty for loop */ ;
ci->metrics.attributes = (bdfHexByte(p) << 8) + bdfHexByte(p + 2);
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN);
} else
ci->metrics.attributes = 0;
if (!line || !bdfIsPrefix(line, "BITMAP")) {
bdfError("missing 'BITMAP'\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
/* collect data for generated properties */
if ((strlen(charName) == 1)) {
if ((charName[0] >= '0') && (charName[0] <= '9')) {
pState->digitWidths += wx;
pState->digitCount++;
} else if (charName[0] == 'x') {
pState->exHeight = (bh + bb) <= 0 ? bh : bh + bb;
}
}
if (!ignore) {
ci->metrics.leftSideBearing = bl;
ci->metrics.rightSideBearing = bl + bw;
ci->metrics.ascent = bh + bb;
ci->metrics.descent = -bb;
ci->metrics.characterWidth = wx;
ci->bits = NULL;
bdfReadBitmap(ci, file, bit, byte, glyph, scan, bitmapsSizes);
ci++;
ndx++;
} else
bdfSkipBitmap(file, bh);
line = bdfGetLine(file, lineBuf, BDFLINELEN); /* get STARTCHAR or
* ENDFONT */
}
if (ndx + nignored != nchars) {
bdfError("%d too few characters\n", nchars - (ndx + nignored));
goto BAILOUT;
}
nchars = ndx;
bitmapFont->num_chars = nchars;
if ((line) && (bdfIsPrefix(line, "STARTCHAR"))) {
bdfError("more characters than specified\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if ((!line) || (!bdfIsPrefix(line, "ENDFONT"))) {
bdfError("missing 'ENDFONT'\n");
goto BAILOUT;
}
if (numEncodedGlyphs == 0)
bdfWarning("No characters with valid encodings\n");
nencoding = (pFont->info.lastRow - pFont->info.firstRow + 1) *
(pFont->info.lastCol - pFont->info.firstCol + 1);
bitmapFont->encoding = calloc(NUM_SEGMENTS(nencoding),sizeof(CharInfoPtr*));
if (!bitmapFont->encoding) {
bdfError("Couldn't allocate ppCI (%d,%d)\n",
NUM_SEGMENTS(nencoding),
(int) sizeof(CharInfoPtr*));
goto BAILOUT;
}
pFont->info.allExist = TRUE;
i = 0;
for (char_row = pFont->info.firstRow;
char_row <= pFont->info.lastRow;
char_row++) {
if (bdfEncoding[char_row] == (CharInfoPtr *) NULL) {
pFont->info.allExist = FALSE;
i += pFont->info.lastCol - pFont->info.firstCol + 1;
} else {
for (char_col = pFont->info.firstCol;
char_col <= pFont->info.lastCol;
char_col++) {
if (!bdfEncoding[char_row][char_col])
pFont->info.allExist = FALSE;
else {
if (!bitmapFont->encoding[SEGMENT_MAJOR(i)]) {
bitmapFont->encoding[SEGMENT_MAJOR(i)]=
calloc(BITMAP_FONT_SEGMENT_SIZE,
sizeof(CharInfoPtr));
if (!bitmapFont->encoding[SEGMENT_MAJOR(i)])
goto BAILOUT;
}
ACCESSENCODINGL(bitmapFont->encoding,i) =
bdfEncoding[char_row][char_col];
}
i++;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
if (bdfEncoding[i])
free(bdfEncoding[i]);
return (TRUE);
BAILOUT:
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
if (bdfEncoding[i])
free(bdfEncoding[i]);
/* bdfFreeFontBits will clean up the rest */
return (FALSE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void pmu_dev_release(struct device *dev)
{
kfree(dev);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ExtensionProcessManager* TestExtensionSystem::process_manager() {
return extension_process_manager_.get();
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
[email protected]
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int main(void)
{
int fd, len, sock_opt;
int error;
struct cn_msg *message;
struct pollfd pfd;
struct nlmsghdr *incoming_msg;
struct cn_msg *incoming_cn_msg;
struct hv_kvp_msg *hv_msg;
char *p;
char *key_value;
char *key_name;
daemon(1, 0);
openlog("KVP", 0, LOG_USER);
syslog(LOG_INFO, "KVP starting; pid is:%d", getpid());
/*
* Retrieve OS release information.
*/
kvp_get_os_info();
if (kvp_file_init()) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to initialize the pools");
exit(-1);
}
fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, NETLINK_CONNECTOR);
if (fd < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "netlink socket creation failed; error:%d", fd);
exit(-1);
}
addr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
addr.nl_pad = 0;
addr.nl_pid = 0;
addr.nl_groups = CN_KVP_IDX;
error = bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
if (error < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "bind failed; error:%d", error);
close(fd);
exit(-1);
}
sock_opt = addr.nl_groups;
setsockopt(fd, 270, 1, &sock_opt, sizeof(sock_opt));
/*
* Register ourselves with the kernel.
*/
message = (struct cn_msg *)kvp_send_buffer;
message->id.idx = CN_KVP_IDX;
message->id.val = CN_KVP_VAL;
hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)message->data;
hv_msg->kvp_hdr.operation = KVP_OP_REGISTER;
message->ack = 0;
message->len = sizeof(struct hv_kvp_msg);
len = netlink_send(fd, message);
if (len < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "netlink_send failed; error:%d", len);
close(fd);
exit(-1);
}
pfd.fd = fd;
while (1) {
pfd.events = POLLIN;
pfd.revents = 0;
poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
len = recv(fd, kvp_recv_buffer, sizeof(kvp_recv_buffer), 0);
if (len < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "recv failed; error:%d", len);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
incoming_msg = (struct nlmsghdr *)kvp_recv_buffer;
incoming_cn_msg = (struct cn_msg *)NLMSG_DATA(incoming_msg);
hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)incoming_cn_msg->data;
switch (hv_msg->kvp_hdr.operation) {
case KVP_OP_REGISTER:
/*
* Driver is registering with us; stash away the version
* information.
*/
p = (char *)hv_msg->body.kvp_register.version;
lic_version = malloc(strlen(p) + 1);
if (lic_version) {
strcpy(lic_version, p);
syslog(LOG_INFO, "KVP LIC Version: %s",
lic_version);
} else {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "malloc failed");
}
continue;
/*
* The current protocol with the kernel component uses a
* NULL key name to pass an error condition.
* For the SET, GET and DELETE operations,
* use the existing protocol to pass back error.
*/
case KVP_OP_SET:
if (kvp_key_add_or_modify(hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key_size,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value_size))
strcpy(hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key, "");
break;
case KVP_OP_GET:
if (kvp_get_value(hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key_size,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value,
hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.value_size))
strcpy(hv_msg->body.kvp_set.data.key, "");
break;
case KVP_OP_DELETE:
if (kvp_key_delete(hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_delete.key,
hv_msg->body.kvp_delete.key_size))
strcpy(hv_msg->body.kvp_delete.key, "");
break;
default:
break;
}
if (hv_msg->kvp_hdr.operation != KVP_OP_ENUMERATE)
goto kvp_done;
/*
* If the pool is KVP_POOL_AUTO, dynamically generate
* both the key and the value; if not read from the
* appropriate pool.
*/
if (hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool != KVP_POOL_AUTO) {
kvp_pool_enumerate(hv_msg->kvp_hdr.pool,
hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.index,
hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.key,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
goto kvp_done;
}
hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)incoming_cn_msg->data;
key_name = (char *)hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.key;
key_value = (char *)hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.data.value;
switch (hv_msg->body.kvp_enum_data.index) {
case FullyQualifiedDomainName:
kvp_get_domain_name(key_value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
strcpy(key_name, "FullyQualifiedDomainName");
break;
case IntegrationServicesVersion:
strcpy(key_name, "IntegrationServicesVersion");
strcpy(key_value, lic_version);
break;
case NetworkAddressIPv4:
kvp_get_ip_address(AF_INET, key_value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
strcpy(key_name, "NetworkAddressIPv4");
break;
case NetworkAddressIPv6:
kvp_get_ip_address(AF_INET6, key_value,
HV_KVP_EXCHANGE_MAX_VALUE_SIZE);
strcpy(key_name, "NetworkAddressIPv6");
break;
case OSBuildNumber:
strcpy(key_value, os_build);
strcpy(key_name, "OSBuildNumber");
break;
case OSName:
strcpy(key_value, os_name);
strcpy(key_name, "OSName");
break;
case OSMajorVersion:
strcpy(key_value, os_major);
strcpy(key_name, "OSMajorVersion");
break;
case OSMinorVersion:
strcpy(key_value, os_minor);
strcpy(key_name, "OSMinorVersion");
break;
case OSVersion:
strcpy(key_value, os_build);
strcpy(key_name, "OSVersion");
break;
case ProcessorArchitecture:
strcpy(key_value, processor_arch);
strcpy(key_name, "ProcessorArchitecture");
break;
default:
strcpy(key_value, "Unknown Key");
/*
* We use a null key name to terminate enumeration.
*/
strcpy(key_name, "");
break;
}
/*
* Send the value back to the kernel. The response is
* already in the receive buffer. Update the cn_msg header to
* reflect the key value that has been added to the message
*/
kvp_done:
incoming_cn_msg->id.idx = CN_KVP_IDX;
incoming_cn_msg->id.val = CN_KVP_VAL;
incoming_cn_msg->ack = 0;
incoming_cn_msg->len = sizeof(struct hv_kvp_msg);
len = netlink_send(fd, incoming_cn_msg);
if (len < 0) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "net_link send failed; error:%d", len);
exit(-1);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Tools: hv: verify origin of netlink connector message
The SuSE security team suggested to use recvfrom instead of recv to be
certain that the connector message is originated from kernel.
CVE-2012-2669
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcus Meissner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Krahmer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static struct segment *new_init_section(struct playlist *pls,
struct init_section_info *info,
const char *url_base)
{
struct segment *sec;
char *ptr;
char tmp_str[MAX_URL_SIZE];
if (!info->uri[0])
return NULL;
sec = av_mallocz(sizeof(*sec));
if (!sec)
return NULL;
ff_make_absolute_url(tmp_str, sizeof(tmp_str), url_base, info->uri);
sec->url = av_strdup(tmp_str);
if (!sec->url) {
av_free(sec);
return NULL;
}
if (info->byterange[0]) {
sec->size = strtoll(info->byterange, NULL, 10);
ptr = strchr(info->byterange, '@');
if (ptr)
sec->url_offset = strtoll(ptr+1, NULL, 10);
} else {
/* the entire file is the init section */
sec->size = -1;
}
dynarray_add(&pls->init_sections, &pls->n_init_sections, sec);
return sec;
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-835
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static struct ion_handle *ion_handle_get_by_id(struct ion_client *client,
int id)
{
struct ion_handle *handle;
mutex_lock(&client->lock);
handle = idr_find(&client->idr, id);
if (handle)
ion_handle_get(handle);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
return handle ? handle : ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: unsigned int munlock_vma_page(struct page *page)
{
unsigned int nr_pages;
struct zone *zone = page_zone(page);
BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page));
/*
* Serialize with any parallel __split_huge_page_refcount() which
* might otherwise copy PageMlocked to part of the tail pages before
* we clear it in the head page. It also stabilizes hpage_nr_pages().
*/
spin_lock_irq(&zone->lru_lock);
nr_pages = hpage_nr_pages(page);
if (!TestClearPageMlocked(page))
goto unlock_out;
__mod_zone_page_state(zone, NR_MLOCK, -nr_pages);
if (__munlock_isolate_lru_page(page, true)) {
spin_unlock_irq(&zone->lru_lock);
__munlock_isolated_page(page);
goto out;
}
__munlock_isolation_failed(page);
unlock_out:
spin_unlock_irq(&zone->lru_lock);
out:
return nr_pages - 1;
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static ut64 size(RBinFile *bf) {
ut64 off = 0;
ut64 len = 0;
if (!bf->o->sections) {
RListIter *iter;
RBinSection *section;
bf->o->sections = sections (bf);
r_list_foreach (bf->o->sections, iter, section) {
if (section->paddr > off) {
off = section->paddr;
len = section->size;
}
}
}
return off + len;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: X11SurfaceFactory::GetAllowedGLImplementations() {
std::vector<gl::GLImplementation> impls;
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2);
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationDesktopGL);
impls.push_back(gl::kGLImplementationOSMesaGL);
return impls;
}
Commit Message: Add ThreadChecker for Ozone X11 GPU.
Ensure Ozone X11 tests the same thread constraints we have in Ozone GBM.
BUG=none
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2366643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421817}
CWE ID: CWE-284
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void PrintViewManager::OnShowScriptedPrintPreview(content::RenderFrameHost* rfh,
bool source_is_modifiable) {
DCHECK(print_preview_rfh_);
if (rfh != print_preview_rfh_)
return;
PrintPreviewDialogController* dialog_controller =
PrintPreviewDialogController::GetInstance();
if (!dialog_controller) {
PrintPreviewDone();
return;
}
dialog_controller->PrintPreview(web_contents());
PrintHostMsg_RequestPrintPreview_Params params;
params.is_modifiable = source_is_modifiable;
PrintPreviewUI::SetInitialParams(
dialog_controller->GetPrintPreviewForContents(web_contents()), params);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void OnCallbackFired() { callback_counter_--; }
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
{
struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
if (s) {
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
} else {
BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
}
unix_tot_inflight++;
spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
}
}
Commit Message: unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than
the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them
to keep the process' fd count low.
This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs
in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having
more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int validate_camera_metadata_structure(const camera_metadata_t *metadata,
const size_t *expected_size) {
if (metadata == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: metadata is null!", __FUNCTION__);
return ERROR;
}
{
static const struct {
const char *name;
size_t alignment;
} alignments[] = {
{
.name = "camera_metadata",
.alignment = METADATA_ALIGNMENT
},
{
.name = "camera_metadata_buffer_entry",
.alignment = ENTRY_ALIGNMENT
},
{
.name = "camera_metadata_data",
.alignment = DATA_ALIGNMENT
},
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(alignments)/sizeof(alignments[0]); ++i) {
uintptr_t aligned_ptr = ALIGN_TO(metadata, alignments[i].alignment);
if ((uintptr_t)metadata != aligned_ptr) {
ALOGE("%s: Metadata pointer is not aligned (actual %p, "
"expected %p) to type %s",
__FUNCTION__, metadata,
(void*)aligned_ptr, alignments[i].name);
return ERROR;
}
}
}
/**
* Check that the metadata contents are correct
*/
if (expected_size != NULL && metadata->size > *expected_size) {
ALOGE("%s: Metadata size (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= expected size (%zu)",
__FUNCTION__, metadata->size, *expected_size);
return ERROR;
}
if (metadata->entry_count > metadata->entry_capacity) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry count (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= entry capacity "
"(%" PRIu32 ")",
__FUNCTION__, metadata->entry_count, metadata->entry_capacity);
return ERROR;
}
const metadata_uptrdiff_t entries_end =
metadata->entries_start + metadata->entry_capacity;
if (entries_end < metadata->entries_start || // overflow check
entries_end > metadata->data_start) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry start + capacity (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= data start "
"(%" PRIu32 ")",
__FUNCTION__,
(metadata->entries_start + metadata->entry_capacity),
metadata->data_start);
return ERROR;
}
const metadata_uptrdiff_t data_end =
metadata->data_start + metadata->data_capacity;
if (data_end < metadata->data_start || // overflow check
data_end > metadata->size) {
ALOGE("%s: Data start + capacity (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= total size "
"(%" PRIu32 ")",
__FUNCTION__,
(metadata->data_start + metadata->data_capacity),
metadata->size);
return ERROR;
}
const metadata_size_t entry_count = metadata->entry_count;
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t *entries = get_entries(metadata);
for (size_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
if ((uintptr_t)&entries[i] != ALIGN_TO(&entries[i], ENTRY_ALIGNMENT)) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had bad alignment (address %p),"
" expected alignment %zu",
__FUNCTION__, i, &entries[i], ENTRY_ALIGNMENT);
return ERROR;
}
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t entry = entries[i];
if (entry.type >= NUM_TYPES) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had a bad type %d",
__FUNCTION__, i, entry.type);
return ERROR;
}
uint32_t tag_section = entry.tag >> 16;
int tag_type = get_camera_metadata_tag_type(entry.tag);
if (tag_type != (int)entry.type && tag_section < VENDOR_SECTION) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had tag type %d, but the type was %d",
__FUNCTION__, i, tag_type, entry.type);
return ERROR;
}
size_t data_size;
if (validate_and_calculate_camera_metadata_entry_data_size(&data_size, entry.type,
entry.count) != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry data size is invalid. type: %u count: %u", __FUNCTION__, entry.type,
entry.count);
return ERROR;
}
if (data_size != 0) {
camera_metadata_data_t *data =
(camera_metadata_data_t*) (get_data(metadata) +
entry.data.offset);
if ((uintptr_t)data != ALIGN_TO(data, DATA_ALIGNMENT)) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had bad data alignment (address %p),"
" expected align %zu, (tag name %s, data size %zu)",
__FUNCTION__, i, data, DATA_ALIGNMENT,
get_camera_metadata_tag_name(entry.tag) ?: "unknown",
data_size);
return ERROR;
}
size_t data_entry_end = entry.data.offset + data_size;
if (data_entry_end < entry.data.offset || // overflow check
data_entry_end > metadata->data_capacity) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu data ends (%zu) beyond the capacity "
"%" PRIu32, __FUNCTION__, i, data_entry_end,
metadata->data_capacity);
return ERROR;
}
} else if (entry.count == 0) {
if (entry.data.offset != 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had 0 items, but offset was non-0 "
"(%" PRIu32 "), tag name: %s", __FUNCTION__, i, entry.data.offset,
get_camera_metadata_tag_name(entry.tag) ?: "unknown");
return ERROR;
}
} // else data stored inline, so we look at value which can be anything.
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera metadata: Check for inconsistent data count
Resolve merge conflict for nyc-release
Also check for overflow of data/entry count on append.
Bug: 30591838
Change-Id: Ibf4c3c6e236cdb28234f3125055d95ef0a2416a2
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int ff_set_sar(AVCodecContext *avctx, AVRational sar)
{
int ret = av_image_check_sar(avctx->width, avctx->height, sar);
if (ret < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "ignoring invalid SAR: %d/%d\n",
sar.num, sar.den);
avctx->sample_aspect_ratio = (AVRational){ 0, 1 };
return ret;
} else {
avctx->sample_aspect_ratio = sar;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void btif_init_fail(UNUSED_ATTR uint16_t event, UNUSED_ATTR char *p_param) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_task: hardware init failed");
bte_main_disable();
btif_queue_release();
bte_main_shutdown();
btif_dut_mode = 0;
future_ready(stack_manager_get_hack_future(), FUTURE_FAIL);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int packet_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, err;
struct sockaddr_ll *sll;
int vnet_hdr_len = 0;
err = -EINVAL;
if (flags & ~(MSG_PEEK|MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_TRUNC|MSG_CMSG_COMPAT|MSG_ERRQUEUE))
goto out;
#if 0
/* What error should we return now? EUNATTACH? */
if (pkt_sk(sk)->ifindex < 0)
return -ENODEV;
#endif
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) {
err = sock_recv_errqueue(sk, msg, len,
SOL_PACKET, PACKET_TX_TIMESTAMP);
goto out;
}
/*
* Call the generic datagram receiver. This handles all sorts
* of horrible races and re-entrancy so we can forget about it
* in the protocol layers.
*
* Now it will return ENETDOWN, if device have just gone down,
* but then it will block.
*/
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
/*
* An error occurred so return it. Because skb_recv_datagram()
* handles the blocking we don't see and worry about blocking
* retries.
*/
if (skb == NULL)
goto out;
if (pkt_sk(sk)->has_vnet_hdr) {
struct virtio_net_hdr vnet_hdr = { 0 };
err = -EINVAL;
vnet_hdr_len = sizeof(vnet_hdr);
if (len < vnet_hdr_len)
goto out_free;
len -= vnet_hdr_len;
if (skb_is_gso(skb)) {
struct skb_shared_info *sinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
/* This is a hint as to how much should be linear. */
vnet_hdr.hdr_len = skb_headlen(skb);
vnet_hdr.gso_size = sinfo->gso_size;
if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4)
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4;
else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6)
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6;
else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP)
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP;
else if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FCOE)
goto out_free;
else
BUG();
if (sinfo->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCP_ECN)
vnet_hdr.gso_type |= VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_ECN;
} else
vnet_hdr.gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
vnet_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
vnet_hdr.csum_start = skb_checksum_start_offset(skb);
vnet_hdr.csum_offset = skb->csum_offset;
} else if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY) {
vnet_hdr.flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_DATA_VALID;
} /* else everything is zero */
err = memcpy_toiovec(msg->msg_iov, (void *)&vnet_hdr,
vnet_hdr_len);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
}
/*
* If the address length field is there to be filled in, we fill
* it in now.
*/
sll = &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa.ll;
if (sock->type == SOCK_PACKET)
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_pkt);
else
msg->msg_namelen = sll->sll_halen + offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll, sll_addr);
/*
* You lose any data beyond the buffer you gave. If it worries a
* user program they can ask the device for its MTU anyway.
*/
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
copied = len;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto out_free;
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
if (msg->msg_name)
memcpy(msg->msg_name, &PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->sa,
msg->msg_namelen);
if (pkt_sk(sk)->auxdata) {
struct tpacket_auxdata aux;
aux.tp_status = TP_STATUS_USER;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
aux.tp_status |= TP_STATUS_CSUMNOTREADY;
aux.tp_len = PACKET_SKB_CB(skb)->origlen;
aux.tp_snaplen = skb->len;
aux.tp_mac = 0;
aux.tp_net = skb_network_offset(skb);
if (vlan_tx_tag_present(skb)) {
aux.tp_vlan_tci = vlan_tx_tag_get(skb);
aux.tp_status |= TP_STATUS_VLAN_VALID;
} else {
aux.tp_vlan_tci = 0;
}
aux.tp_padding = 0;
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_AUXDATA, sizeof(aux), &aux);
}
/*
* Free or return the buffer as appropriate. Again this
* hides all the races and re-entrancy issues from us.
*/
err = vnet_hdr_len + ((flags&MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : copied);
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::DidReceiveData(unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const char* data,
int data_length) {
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
if (data) {
NetworkResourcesData::ResourceData const* resource_data =
resources_data_->Data(request_id);
if (resource_data &&
(!resource_data->CachedResource() ||
resource_data->CachedResource()->GetDataBufferingPolicy() ==
kDoNotBufferData ||
IsErrorStatusCode(resource_data->HttpStatusCode())))
resources_data_->MaybeAddResourceData(request_id, data, data_length);
}
GetFrontend()->dataReceived(
request_id, MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(), data_length,
resources_data_->GetAndClearPendingEncodedDataLength(request_id));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer (TIFF *in, uint8 *obuf, uint32 length,
uint32 width, uint16 spp,
struct dump_opts *dump)
{
int i, bytes_per_sample, bytes_per_pixel, shift_width, result = 1;
uint32 j;
int32 bytes_read = 0;
uint16 bps, planar;
uint32 nstrips;
uint32 strips_per_sample;
uint32 src_rowsize, dst_rowsize, rows_processed, rps;
uint32 rows_this_strip = 0;
tsample_t s;
tstrip_t strip;
tsize_t scanlinesize = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
tsize_t stripsize = TIFFStripSize(in);
unsigned char *srcbuffs[MAX_SAMPLES];
unsigned char *buff = NULL;
unsigned char *dst = NULL;
if (obuf == NULL)
{
TIFFError("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer","Invalid buffer argument");
return (0);
}
memset (srcbuffs, '\0', sizeof(srcbuffs));
TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, &planar);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rps);
if (rps > length)
rps = length;
bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
bytes_per_pixel = ((bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
if (bytes_per_pixel < (bytes_per_sample + 1))
shift_width = bytes_per_pixel;
else
shift_width = bytes_per_sample + 1;
src_rowsize = ((bps * width) + 7) / 8;
dst_rowsize = ((bps * width * spp) + 7) / 8;
dst = obuf;
if ((dump->infile != NULL) && (dump->level == 3))
{
dump_info (dump->infile, dump->format, "",
"Image width %d, length %d, Scanline size, %4d bytes",
width, length, scanlinesize);
dump_info (dump->infile, dump->format, "",
"Bits per sample %d, Samples per pixel %d, Shift width %d",
bps, spp, shift_width);
}
/* Libtiff seems to assume/require that data for separate planes are
* written one complete plane after another and not interleaved in any way.
* Multiple scanlines and possibly strips of the same plane must be
* written before data for any other plane.
*/
nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in);
strips_per_sample = nstrips /spp;
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
srcbuffs[s] = NULL;
buff = _TIFFmalloc(stripsize);
if (!buff)
{
TIFFError ("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer",
"Unable to allocate strip read buffer for sample %d", s);
for (i = 0; i < s; i++)
_TIFFfree (srcbuffs[i]);
return 0;
}
srcbuffs[s] = buff;
}
rows_processed = 0;
for (j = 0; (j < strips_per_sample) && (result == 1); j++)
{
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
buff = srcbuffs[s];
strip = (s * strips_per_sample) + j;
bytes_read = TIFFReadEncodedStrip (in, strip, buff, stripsize);
rows_this_strip = bytes_read / src_rowsize;
if (bytes_read < 0 && !ignore)
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read strip %lu for sample %d",
(unsigned long) strip, s + 1);
result = 0;
break;
}
#ifdef DEVELMODE
TIFFError("", "Strip %2d, read %5d bytes for %4d scanlines, shift width %d",
strip, bytes_read, rows_this_strip, shift_width);
#endif
}
if (rps > rows_this_strip)
rps = rows_this_strip;
dst = obuf + (dst_rowsize * rows_processed);
if ((bps % 8) == 0)
{
if (combineSeparateSamplesBytes (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
}
else
{
switch (shift_width)
{
case 1: if (combineSeparateSamples8bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 2: if (combineSeparateSamples16bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 3: if (combineSeparateSamples24bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 4:
case 5:
case 6:
case 7:
case 8: if (combineSeparateSamples32bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
default: TIFFError ("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer", "Unsupported bit depth: %d", bps);
result = 0;
break;
}
}
if ((rows_processed + rps) > length)
{
rows_processed = length;
rps = length - rows_processed;
}
else
rows_processed += rps;
}
/* free any buffers allocated for each plane or scanline and
* any temporary buffers
*/
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
buff = srcbuffs[s];
if (buff != NULL)
_TIFFfree(buff);
}
return (result);
} /* end readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: enum nss_status _nss_mymachines_getpwnam_r(
const char *name,
struct passwd *pwd,
char *buffer, size_t buflen,
int *errnop) {
_cleanup_bus_error_free_ sd_bus_error error = SD_BUS_ERROR_NULL;
_cleanup_bus_message_unref_ sd_bus_message* reply = NULL;
_cleanup_bus_flush_close_unref_ sd_bus *bus = NULL;
const char *p, *e, *machine;
uint32_t mapped;
uid_t uid;
size_t l;
int r;
assert(name);
assert(pwd);
p = startswith(name, "vu-");
if (!p)
goto not_found;
e = strrchr(p, '-');
if (!e || e == p)
goto not_found;
r = parse_uid(e + 1, &uid);
if (r < 0)
goto not_found;
machine = strndupa(p, e - p);
if (!machine_name_is_valid(machine))
goto not_found;
r = sd_bus_open_system(&bus);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
r = sd_bus_call_method(bus,
"org.freedesktop.machine1",
"/org/freedesktop/machine1",
"org.freedesktop.machine1.Manager",
"MapFromMachineUser",
&error,
&reply,
"su",
machine, (uint32_t) uid);
if (r < 0) {
if (sd_bus_error_has_name(&error, BUS_ERROR_NO_SUCH_USER_MAPPING))
goto not_found;
goto fail;
}
r = sd_bus_message_read(reply, "u", &mapped);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
l = strlen(name);
if (buflen < l+1) {
*errnop = ENOMEM;
return NSS_STATUS_TRYAGAIN;
}
memcpy(buffer, name, l+1);
pwd->pw_name = buffer;
pwd->pw_uid = mapped;
pwd->pw_gid = 65534; /* nobody */
pwd->pw_gecos = buffer;
pwd->pw_passwd = (char*) "*"; /* locked */
pwd->pw_dir = (char*) "/";
pwd->pw_shell = (char*) "/sbin/nologin";
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
not_found:
*errnop = 0;
return NSS_STATUS_NOTFOUND;
fail:
*errnop = -r;
return NSS_STATUS_UNAVAIL;
}
Commit Message: nss-mymachines: do not allow overlong machine names
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/2002
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static ssize_t ucma_join_multicast(struct ucma_file *file,
const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_join_mcast cmd;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
if (!rdma_addr_size_kss(&cmd.addr))
return -EINVAL;
return ucma_process_join(file, &cmd, out_len);
}
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void *Type_CrdInfo_Read(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, cmsUInt32Number* nItems, cmsUInt32Number SizeOfTag)
{
cmsMLU* mlu = cmsMLUalloc(self ->ContextID, 5);
*nItems = 0;
if (!ReadCountAndSting(self, io, mlu, &SizeOfTag, "nm")) goto Error;
if (!ReadCountAndSting(self, io, mlu, &SizeOfTag, "#0")) goto Error;
if (!ReadCountAndSting(self, io, mlu, &SizeOfTag, "#1")) goto Error;
if (!ReadCountAndSting(self, io, mlu, &SizeOfTag, "#2")) goto Error;
if (!ReadCountAndSting(self, io, mlu, &SizeOfTag, "#3")) goto Error;
*nItems = 1;
return (void*) mlu;
Error:
cmsMLUfree(mlu);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: jas_matrix_t *jas_seq2d_create(int xstart, int ystart, int xend, int yend)
{
jas_matrix_t *matrix;
assert(xstart <= xend && ystart <= yend);
if (!(matrix = jas_matrix_create(yend - ystart, xend - xstart))) {
return 0;
}
matrix->xstart_ = xstart;
matrix->ystart_ = ystart;
matrix->xend_ = xend;
matrix->yend_ = yend;
return matrix;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool XSSAuditor::EraseAttributeIfInjected(const FilterTokenRequest& request,
const QualifiedName& attribute_name,
const String& replacement_value,
TruncationKind treatment,
HrefRestriction restriction) {
size_t index_of_attribute = 0;
if (!FindAttributeWithName(request.token, attribute_name, index_of_attribute))
return false;
const HTMLToken::Attribute& attribute =
request.token.Attributes().at(index_of_attribute);
if (!IsContainedInRequest(
Canonicalize(SnippetFromAttribute(request, attribute), treatment)))
return false;
if (ThreadSafeMatch(attribute_name, srcAttr) ||
(restriction == kAllowSameOriginHref &&
ThreadSafeMatch(attribute_name, hrefAttr))) {
if (IsLikelySafeResource(attribute.Value()))
return false;
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(attribute_name, http_equivAttr)) {
if (!IsDangerousHTTPEquiv(attribute.Value()))
return false;
}
request.token.EraseValueOfAttribute(index_of_attribute);
if (!replacement_value.IsEmpty())
request.token.AppendToAttributeValue(index_of_attribute, replacement_value);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
unsigned int len)
{
int ret, countersize;
struct ebt_table_info *newinfo;
struct ebt_replace tmp;
if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
if (len != sizeof(tmp) + tmp.entries_size) {
BUGPRINT("Wrong len argument\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (tmp.entries_size == 0) {
BUGPRINT("Entries_size never zero\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* overflow check */
if (tmp.nentries >= ((INT_MAX - sizeof(struct ebt_table_info)) /
NR_CPUS - SMP_CACHE_BYTES) / sizeof(struct ebt_counter))
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct ebt_counter))
return -ENOMEM;
countersize = COUNTER_OFFSET(tmp.nentries) * nr_cpu_ids;
newinfo = vmalloc(sizeof(*newinfo) + countersize);
if (!newinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
if (countersize)
memset(newinfo->counters, 0, countersize);
newinfo->entries = vmalloc(tmp.entries_size);
if (!newinfo->entries) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free_newinfo;
}
if (copy_from_user(
newinfo->entries, tmp.entries, tmp.entries_size) != 0) {
BUGPRINT("Couldn't copy entries from userspace\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_entries;
}
ret = do_replace_finish(net, &tmp, newinfo);
if (ret == 0)
return ret;
free_entries:
vfree(newinfo->entries);
free_newinfo:
vfree(newinfo);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void ptrace_triggered(struct perf_event *bp, int nmi,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int i;
struct thread_struct *thread = &(current->thread);
/*
* Store in the virtual DR6 register the fact that the breakpoint
* was hit so the thread's debugger will see it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < HBP_NUM; i++) {
if (thread->ptrace_bps[i] == bp)
break;
}
thread->debugreg6 |= (DR_TRAP0 << i);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: HTMLFormControlsCollection* HTMLFormElement::elements() {
return EnsureCachedCollection<HTMLFormControlsCollection>(kFormControls);
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: QPointF QQuickWebView::contentPos() const
{
Q_D(const QQuickWebView);
return d->contentPos();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestNamedConstructor.Constructor");
if (!args.IsConstructCall())
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("DOM object constructor cannot be called as a function.");
if (ConstructorMode::current() == ConstructorMode::WrapExistingObject)
return args.Holder();
Frame* frame = V8Proxy::retrieveFrameForCurrentContext();
if (!frame)
return V8Proxy::throwError(V8Proxy::ReferenceError, "TestNamedConstructor constructor associated frame is unavailable", args.GetIsolate());
Document* document = frame->document();
toV8(document, args.GetIsolate());
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str1, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str2, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined));
STRING_TO_V8PARAMETER_EXCEPTION_BLOCK(V8Parameter<>, str3, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 2, DefaultIsNullString));
RefPtr<TestNamedConstructor> impl = TestNamedConstructor::createForJSConstructor(document, str1, str2, str3, ec);
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper = args.Holder();
if (ec)
goto fail;
V8DOMWrapper::setDOMWrapper(wrapper, &V8TestNamedConstructorConstructor::info, impl.get());
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForActiveDOMObject(impl.release(), v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper), args.GetIsolate());
return args.Holder();
fail:
return throwError(ec, args.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: PSOutputDev::PSOutputDev(PSOutputFunc outputFuncA, void *outputStreamA,
char *psTitle,
XRef *xrefA, Catalog *catalog,
int firstPage, int lastPage, PSOutMode modeA,
int paperWidthA, int paperHeightA, GBool duplexA,
int imgLLXA, int imgLLYA, int imgURXA, int imgURYA,
GBool forceRasterizeA,
GBool manualCtrlA) {
underlayCbk = NULL;
underlayCbkData = NULL;
overlayCbk = NULL;
overlayCbkData = NULL;
fontIDs = NULL;
fontFileIDs = NULL;
fontFileNames = NULL;
font8Info = NULL;
font16Enc = NULL;
imgIDs = NULL;
formIDs = NULL;
xobjStack = NULL;
embFontList = NULL;
customColors = NULL;
haveTextClip = gFalse;
t3String = NULL;
forceRasterize = forceRasterizeA;
init(outputFuncA, outputStreamA, psGeneric, psTitle,
xrefA, catalog, firstPage, lastPage, modeA,
imgLLXA, imgLLYA, imgURXA, imgURYA, manualCtrlA,
paperWidthA, paperHeightA, duplexA);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int jpc_poc_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_poc_t *poc = &ms->parms.poc;
jpc_pocpchg_t *pchg;
int pchgno;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
poc->numpchgs = (cstate->numcomps > 256) ? (ms->len / 9) :
(ms->len / 7);
if (!(poc->pchgs = jas_alloc2(poc->numpchgs, sizeof(jpc_pocpchg_t)))) {
goto error;
}
for (pchgno = 0, pchg = poc->pchgs; pchgno < poc->numpchgs; ++pchgno,
++pchg) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &pchg->rlvlnostart)) {
goto error;
}
if (cstate->numcomps > 256) {
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &pchg->compnostart)) {
goto error;
}
} else {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp)) {
goto error;
};
pchg->compnostart = tmp;
}
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &pchg->lyrnoend) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &pchg->rlvlnoend)) {
goto error;
}
if (cstate->numcomps > 256) {
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &pchg->compnoend)) {
goto error;
}
} else {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp)) {
goto error;
}
pchg->compnoend = tmp;
}
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &pchg->prgord)) {
goto error;
}
if (pchg->rlvlnostart > pchg->rlvlnoend ||
pchg->compnostart > pchg->compnoend) {
goto error;
}
}
return 0;
error:
jpc_poc_destroyparms(ms);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: WebsiteSettingsPopupView::WebsiteSettingsPopupView(
views::View* anchor_view,
gfx::NativeView parent_window,
Profile* profile,
content::WebContents* web_contents,
const GURL& url,
const content::SSLStatus& ssl)
: BubbleDelegateView(anchor_view, views::BubbleBorder::TOP_LEFT),
web_contents_(web_contents),
header_(nullptr),
tabbed_pane_(nullptr),
permissions_tab_(nullptr),
site_data_content_(nullptr),
cookie_dialog_link_(nullptr),
permissions_content_(nullptr),
connection_tab_(nullptr),
identity_info_content_(nullptr),
certificate_dialog_link_(nullptr),
reset_decisions_button_(nullptr),
help_center_content_(nullptr),
cert_id_(0),
help_center_link_(nullptr),
connection_info_content_(nullptr),
weak_factory_(this) {
set_parent_window(parent_window);
set_anchor_view_insets(gfx::Insets(kLocationIconVerticalMargin, 0,
kLocationIconVerticalMargin, 0));
views::GridLayout* layout = new views::GridLayout(this);
SetLayoutManager(layout);
const int content_column = 0;
views::ColumnSet* column_set = layout->AddColumnSet(content_column);
column_set->AddColumn(views::GridLayout::FILL,
views::GridLayout::FILL,
1,
views::GridLayout::USE_PREF,
0,
0);
header_ = new PopupHeaderView(this);
layout->StartRow(1, content_column);
layout->AddView(header_);
layout->AddPaddingRow(1, kHeaderMarginBottom);
tabbed_pane_ = new views::TabbedPane();
layout->StartRow(1, content_column);
layout->AddView(tabbed_pane_);
permissions_tab_ = CreatePermissionsTab();
tabbed_pane_->AddTabAtIndex(
TAB_ID_PERMISSIONS,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBSITE_SETTINGS_TAB_LABEL_PERMISSIONS),
permissions_tab_);
connection_tab_ = CreateConnectionTab();
tabbed_pane_->AddTabAtIndex(
TAB_ID_CONNECTION,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBSITE_SETTINGS_TAB_LABEL_CONNECTION),
connection_tab_);
DCHECK_EQ(tabbed_pane_->GetTabCount(), NUM_TAB_IDS);
tabbed_pane_->set_listener(this);
set_margins(gfx::Insets(kPopupMarginTop, kPopupMarginLeft,
kPopupMarginBottom, kPopupMarginRight));
views::BubbleDelegateView::CreateBubble(this);
presenter_.reset(new WebsiteSettings(
this, profile,
TabSpecificContentSettings::FromWebContents(web_contents),
InfoBarService::FromWebContents(web_contents), url, ssl,
content::CertStore::GetInstance()));
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool RenderBlock::positionNewFloatOnLine(FloatingObject* newFloat, FloatingObject* lastFloatFromPreviousLine, LineInfo& lineInfo, LineWidth& width)
{
if (!positionNewFloats())
return false;
width.shrinkAvailableWidthForNewFloatIfNeeded(newFloat);
if (!newFloat->paginationStrut() || !lineInfo.previousLineBrokeCleanly() || !lineInfo.isEmpty())
return true;
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
ASSERT(floatingObjectSet.last() == newFloat);
LayoutUnit floatLogicalTop = newFloat->logicalTop(isHorizontalWritingMode());
int paginationStrut = newFloat->paginationStrut();
if (floatLogicalTop - paginationStrut != logicalHeight() + lineInfo.floatPaginationStrut())
return true;
FloatingObjectSetIterator it = floatingObjectSet.end();
--it; // Last float is newFloat, skip that one.
FloatingObjectSetIterator begin = floatingObjectSet.begin();
while (it != begin) {
--it;
FloatingObject* f = *it;
if (f == lastFloatFromPreviousLine)
break;
if (f->logicalTop(isHorizontalWritingMode()) == logicalHeight() + lineInfo.floatPaginationStrut()) {
f->setPaginationStrut(paginationStrut + f->paginationStrut());
RenderBox* o = f->renderer();
setLogicalTopForChild(o, logicalTopForChild(o) + marginBeforeForChild(o) + paginationStrut);
if (o->isRenderBlock())
o->forceChildLayout();
else
o->layoutIfNeeded();
LayoutUnit oldLogicalTop = f->logicalTop(isHorizontalWritingMode());
m_floatingObjects->removePlacedObject(f);
f->setLogicalTop(oldLogicalTop + paginationStrut, isHorizontalWritingMode());
m_floatingObjects->addPlacedObject(f);
}
}
lineInfo.setFloatPaginationStrut(lineInfo.floatPaginationStrut() + paginationStrut);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: GURL DevToolsWindow::GetDevToolsURL(Profile* profile,
const GURL& base_url,
bool shared_worker_frontend,
bool v8_only_frontend,
const std::string& remote_frontend,
bool can_dock) {
if (base_url.SchemeIs("data"))
return base_url;
std::string frontend_url(
!remote_frontend.empty() ?
remote_frontend :
base_url.is_empty() ? chrome::kChromeUIDevToolsURL : base_url.spec());
std::string url_string(
frontend_url +
((frontend_url.find("?") == std::string::npos) ? "?" : "&"));
if (shared_worker_frontend)
url_string += "&isSharedWorker=true";
if (v8_only_frontend)
url_string += "&v8only=true";
if (remote_frontend.size()) {
url_string += "&remoteFrontend=true";
} else {
url_string += "&remoteBase=" + DevToolsUI::GetRemoteBaseURL().spec();
}
if (can_dock)
url_string += "&can_dock=true";
return GURL(url_string);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Move sanitize url to devtools_ui.cc.
Compatibility script is not reliable enough.
BUG=653134
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2403633002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#425814}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int mpeg4video_probe(AVProbeData *probe_packet)
{
uint32_t temp_buffer = -1;
int VO = 0, VOL = 0, VOP = 0, VISO = 0, res = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < probe_packet->buf_size; i++) {
temp_buffer = (temp_buffer << 8) + probe_packet->buf[i];
if ((temp_buffer & 0xffffff00) != 0x100)
continue;
if (temp_buffer == VOP_START_CODE)
VOP++;
else if (temp_buffer == VISUAL_OBJECT_START_CODE)
VISO++;
else if (temp_buffer < 0x120)
VO++;
else if (temp_buffer < 0x130)
VOL++;
else if (!(0x1AF < temp_buffer && temp_buffer < 0x1B7) &&
!(0x1B9 < temp_buffer && temp_buffer < 0x1C4))
res++;
}
if (VOP >= VISO && VOP >= VOL && VO >= VOL && VOL > 0 && res == 0)
return AVPROBE_SCORE_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: m4vdec: Check for non-startcode 00 00 00 sequences in probe
This makes the m4v detection less trigger-happy.
Bug-Id: 949
Signed-off-by: Diego Biurrun <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void GpuProcessHost::ConnectFrameSinkManager(
viz::mojom::FrameSinkManagerRequest request,
viz::mojom::FrameSinkManagerClientPtrInfo client) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHost::ConnectFrameSinkManager");
viz::mojom::FrameSinkManagerParamsPtr params =
viz::mojom::FrameSinkManagerParams::New();
params->restart_id = host_id_;
base::Optional<uint32_t> activation_deadline_in_frames =
switches::GetDeadlineToSynchronizeSurfaces();
params->use_activation_deadline = activation_deadline_in_frames.has_value();
params->activation_deadline_in_frames =
activation_deadline_in_frames.value_or(0u);
params->frame_sink_manager = std::move(request);
params->frame_sink_manager_client = std::move(client);
gpu_main_ptr_->CreateFrameSinkManager(std::move(params));
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int opl3_load_patch(int dev, int format, const char __user *addr,
int offs, int count, int pmgr_flag)
{
struct sbi_instrument ins;
if (count <sizeof(ins))
{
printk(KERN_WARNING "FM Error: Patch record too short\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* What the fuck is going on here? We leave junk in the beginning
* of ins and then check the field pretty close to that beginning?
*/
if(copy_from_user(&((char *) &ins)[offs], addr + offs, sizeof(ins) - offs))
return -EFAULT;
if (ins.channel < 0 || ins.channel >= SBFM_MAXINSTR)
{
printk(KERN_WARNING "FM Error: Invalid instrument number %d\n", ins.channel);
return -EINVAL;
}
ins.key = format;
return store_instr(ins.channel, &ins);
}
Commit Message: sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: mcs_parse_domain_params(STREAM s)
{
int length;
ber_parse_header(s, MCS_TAG_DOMAIN_PARAMS, &length);
in_uint8s(s, length);
return s_check(s);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int ext4_register_li_request(struct super_block *sb,
ext4_group_t first_not_zeroed)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_li_request *elr;
ext4_group_t ngroups = EXT4_SB(sb)->s_groups_count;
int ret = 0;
if (sbi->s_li_request != NULL) {
/*
* Reset timeout so it can be computed again, because
* s_li_wait_mult might have changed.
*/
sbi->s_li_request->lr_timeout = 0;
return 0;
}
if (first_not_zeroed == ngroups ||
(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) ||
!test_opt(sb, INIT_INODE_TABLE))
return 0;
elr = ext4_li_request_new(sb, first_not_zeroed);
if (!elr)
return -ENOMEM;
mutex_lock(&ext4_li_mtx);
if (NULL == ext4_li_info) {
ret = ext4_li_info_new();
if (ret)
goto out;
}
mutex_lock(&ext4_li_info->li_list_mtx);
list_add(&elr->lr_request, &ext4_li_info->li_request_list);
mutex_unlock(&ext4_li_info->li_list_mtx);
sbi->s_li_request = elr;
/*
* set elr to NULL here since it has been inserted to
* the request_list and the removal and free of it is
* handled by ext4_clear_request_list from now on.
*/
elr = NULL;
if (!(ext4_li_info->li_state & EXT4_LAZYINIT_RUNNING)) {
ret = ext4_run_lazyinit_thread();
if (ret)
goto out;
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&ext4_li_mtx);
if (ret)
kfree(elr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void cJSON_AddItemToObject( cJSON *object, const char *string, cJSON *item )
{
if ( ! item )
return;
if ( item->string )
cJSON_free( item->string );
item->string = cJSON_strdup( string );
cJSON_AddItemToArray( object, item );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"ӏ > l; [кĸκ] > k; п > n; [ƅь] > b; в > b; м > m; н > h; "
"т > t; [шщ] > w; ട > s;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Add more confusable character map entries
When comparing domain names with top 10k domain names for confusability,
characters with diacritics are decomposed into base + diacritic marks
(Unicode Normalization Form D) and diacritics are dropped before
calculating the confusability skeleton because two characters with and
without a diacritics is NOT regarded as confusable.
However, there are a dozen of characters (most of them are Cyrillic)
with a diacritic-like mark attached but they are not decomposed into
base + diacritics by NFD (e.g. U+049B, қ; Cyrillic Small Letter Ka
with Descender). This CL treats them the same way as their "base"
characters. For instance, қ (U+049B) is treated as confusable with
Latin k because к (U+043A; Cyrillic Small Letter Ka) is.
They're curated from the following sets:
[:IdentifierStatus=Allowed:] & [:Ll:] &
[[:sc=Cyrillic:] -
[[\u01cd-\u01dc][\u1c80-\u1c8f][\u1e00-\u1e9b][\u1f00-\u1fff]
[\ua640-\ua69f][\ua720-\ua7ff]]] &
[:NFD_Inert=Yes:]
[:IdentifierStatus=Allowed:] & [:Ll:] &
[[:sc=Latin:] - [[\u01cd-\u01dc][\u1e00-\u1e9b][\ua720-\ua7ff]]] &
[:NFD_Inert=Yes:]
[:IdentifierStatus=Allowed:] & [:Ll:] & [[:sc=Greek:]] &
[:NFD_Inert=Yes:]
Bug: 793628,798892
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I20c6af13defa295f6952f33d75987e87ce1853d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/860567
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529129}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: crm_client_name(crm_client_t * c)
{
if (c == NULL) {
return "null";
} else if (c->name == NULL && c->id == NULL) {
return "unknown";
} else if (c->name == NULL) {
return c->id;
} else {
return c->name;
}
}
Commit Message: High: libcrmcommon: fix CVE-2016-7035 (improper IPC guarding)
It was discovered that at some not so uncommon circumstances, some
pacemaker daemons could be talked to, via libqb-facilitated IPC, by
unprivileged clients due to flawed authorization decision. Depending
on the capabilities of affected daemons, this might equip unauthorized
user with local privilege escalation or up to cluster-wide remote
execution of possibly arbitrary commands when such user happens to
reside at standard or remote/guest cluster node, respectively.
The original vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to allow
unprivileged IPC clients to clean up the file system materialized
leftovers in case the server (otherwise responsible for the lifecycle
of these files) crashes. While the intended part of such behavior is
now effectively voided (along with the unintended one), a best-effort
fix to address this corner case systemically at libqb is coming along
(https://github.com/ClusterLabs/libqb/pull/231).
Affected versions: 1.1.10-rc1 (2013-04-17) - 1.1.15 (2016-06-21)
Impact: Important
CVSSv3 ranking: 8.8 : AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credits for independent findings, in chronological order:
Jan "poki" Pokorný, of Red Hat
Alain Moulle, of ATOS/BULL
CWE ID: CWE-285
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int common_perm(int op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
struct path_cond *cond)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
int error = 0;
profile = __aa_current_profile();
if (!unconfined(profile))
error = aa_path_perm(op, profile, path, 0, mask, cond);
return error;
}
Commit Message: apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void Chapters::Edition::Clear()
{
while (m_atoms_count > 0)
{
Atom& a = m_atoms[--m_atoms_count];
a.Clear();
}
delete[] m_atoms;
m_atoms = NULL;
m_atoms_size = 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: addresses_are_duplicate (const NMPlatformIP4Address *a, const NMPlatformIP4Address *b, gboolean consider_plen)
{
return a->address == b->address && (!consider_plen || a->plen == b->plen);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static struct perf_guest_switch_msr *intel_guest_get_msrs(int *nr)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
struct perf_guest_switch_msr *arr = cpuc->guest_switch_msrs;
arr[0].msr = MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
arr[0].host = x86_pmu.intel_ctrl & ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_guest_mask;
arr[0].guest = x86_pmu.intel_ctrl & ~cpuc->intel_ctrl_host_mask;
/*
* If PMU counter has PEBS enabled it is not enough to disable counter
* on a guest entry since PEBS memory write can overshoot guest entry
* and corrupt guest memory. Disabling PEBS solves the problem.
*/
arr[1].msr = MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE;
arr[1].host = cpuc->pebs_enabled;
arr[1].guest = 0;
*nr = 2;
return arr;
}
Commit Message: perf/x86: Fix offcore_rsp valid mask for SNB/IVB
The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.
This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.
A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.
This version of the patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: create_tls_session(int csock, int type /* GNUTLS_SERVER, GNUTLS_CLIENT */ )
{
int rc = 0;
gnutls_session *session = gnutls_malloc(sizeof(gnutls_session));
gnutls_init(session, type);
# ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_PRIORITY_SET_DIRECT
/* http://www.manpagez.com/info/gnutls/gnutls-2.10.4/gnutls_81.php#Echo-Server-with-anonymous-authentication */
gnutls_priority_set_direct(*session, "NORMAL:+ANON-DH", NULL);
/* gnutls_priority_set_direct (*session, "NONE:+VERS-TLS-ALL:+CIPHER-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+COMP-ALL:+ANON-DH", NULL); */
# else
gnutls_set_default_priority(*session);
gnutls_kx_set_priority(*session, tls_kx_order);
# endif
gnutls_transport_set_ptr(*session, (gnutls_transport_ptr) GINT_TO_POINTER(csock));
switch (type) {
case GNUTLS_SERVER:
gnutls_credentials_set(*session, GNUTLS_CRD_ANON, anon_cred_s);
break;
case GNUTLS_CLIENT:
gnutls_credentials_set(*session, GNUTLS_CRD_ANON, anon_cred_c);
break;
}
do {
rc = gnutls_handshake(*session);
} while (rc == GNUTLS_E_INTERRUPTED || rc == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN);
if (rc < 0) {
crm_err("Handshake failed: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
gnutls_deinit(*session);
gnutls_free(session);
return NULL;
}
return session;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static noinline int udf_process_sequence(struct super_block *sb, long block,
long lastblock, struct kernel_lb_addr *fileset)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct udf_vds_record vds[VDS_POS_LENGTH];
struct udf_vds_record *curr;
struct generic_desc *gd;
struct volDescPtr *vdp;
int done = 0;
uint32_t vdsn;
uint16_t ident;
long next_s = 0, next_e = 0;
memset(vds, 0, sizeof(struct udf_vds_record) * VDS_POS_LENGTH);
/*
* Read the main descriptor sequence and find which descriptors
* are in it.
*/
for (; (!done && block <= lastblock); block++) {
bh = udf_read_tagged(sb, block, block, &ident);
if (!bh) {
udf_err(sb,
"Block %llu of volume descriptor sequence is corrupted or we could not read it\n",
(unsigned long long)block);
return 1;
}
/* Process each descriptor (ISO 13346 3/8.3-8.4) */
gd = (struct generic_desc *)bh->b_data;
vdsn = le32_to_cpu(gd->volDescSeqNum);
switch (ident) {
case TAG_IDENT_PVD: /* ISO 13346 3/10.1 */
curr = &vds[VDS_POS_PRIMARY_VOL_DESC];
if (vdsn >= curr->volDescSeqNum) {
curr->volDescSeqNum = vdsn;
curr->block = block;
}
break;
case TAG_IDENT_VDP: /* ISO 13346 3/10.3 */
curr = &vds[VDS_POS_VOL_DESC_PTR];
if (vdsn >= curr->volDescSeqNum) {
curr->volDescSeqNum = vdsn;
curr->block = block;
vdp = (struct volDescPtr *)bh->b_data;
next_s = le32_to_cpu(
vdp->nextVolDescSeqExt.extLocation);
next_e = le32_to_cpu(
vdp->nextVolDescSeqExt.extLength);
next_e = next_e >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
next_e += next_s;
}
break;
case TAG_IDENT_IUVD: /* ISO 13346 3/10.4 */
curr = &vds[VDS_POS_IMP_USE_VOL_DESC];
if (vdsn >= curr->volDescSeqNum) {
curr->volDescSeqNum = vdsn;
curr->block = block;
}
break;
case TAG_IDENT_PD: /* ISO 13346 3/10.5 */
curr = &vds[VDS_POS_PARTITION_DESC];
if (!curr->block)
curr->block = block;
break;
case TAG_IDENT_LVD: /* ISO 13346 3/10.6 */
curr = &vds[VDS_POS_LOGICAL_VOL_DESC];
if (vdsn >= curr->volDescSeqNum) {
curr->volDescSeqNum = vdsn;
curr->block = block;
}
break;
case TAG_IDENT_USD: /* ISO 13346 3/10.8 */
curr = &vds[VDS_POS_UNALLOC_SPACE_DESC];
if (vdsn >= curr->volDescSeqNum) {
curr->volDescSeqNum = vdsn;
curr->block = block;
}
break;
case TAG_IDENT_TD: /* ISO 13346 3/10.9 */
vds[VDS_POS_TERMINATING_DESC].block = block;
if (next_e) {
block = next_s;
lastblock = next_e;
next_s = next_e = 0;
} else
done = 1;
break;
}
brelse(bh);
}
/*
* Now read interesting descriptors again and process them
* in a suitable order
*/
if (!vds[VDS_POS_PRIMARY_VOL_DESC].block) {
udf_err(sb, "Primary Volume Descriptor not found!\n");
return 1;
}
if (udf_load_pvoldesc(sb, vds[VDS_POS_PRIMARY_VOL_DESC].block))
return 1;
if (vds[VDS_POS_LOGICAL_VOL_DESC].block && udf_load_logicalvol(sb,
vds[VDS_POS_LOGICAL_VOL_DESC].block, fileset))
return 1;
if (vds[VDS_POS_PARTITION_DESC].block) {
/*
* We rescan the whole descriptor sequence to find
* partition descriptor blocks and process them.
*/
for (block = vds[VDS_POS_PARTITION_DESC].block;
block < vds[VDS_POS_TERMINATING_DESC].block;
block++)
if (udf_load_partdesc(sb, block))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: WebContext::BrowserContextDelegate::GetIOClient() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::IO);
base::AutoLock lock(io_client_lock_);
return io_client_.toStrongRef();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void iriap_getvaluebyclass_indication(struct iriap_cb *self,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct ias_object *obj;
struct ias_attrib *attrib;
int name_len;
int attr_len;
char name[IAS_MAX_CLASSNAME + 1]; /* 60 bytes */
char attr[IAS_MAX_ATTRIBNAME + 1]; /* 60 bytes */
__u8 *fp;
int n;
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "%s()\n", __func__);
IRDA_ASSERT(self != NULL, return;);
IRDA_ASSERT(self->magic == IAS_MAGIC, return;);
IRDA_ASSERT(skb != NULL, return;);
fp = skb->data;
n = 1;
name_len = fp[n++];
memcpy(name, fp+n, name_len); n+=name_len;
name[name_len] = '\0';
attr_len = fp[n++];
memcpy(attr, fp+n, attr_len); n+=attr_len;
attr[attr_len] = '\0';
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "LM-IAS: Looking up %s: %s\n", name, attr);
obj = irias_find_object(name);
if (obj == NULL) {
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "LM-IAS: Object %s not found\n", name);
iriap_getvaluebyclass_response(self, 0x1235, IAS_CLASS_UNKNOWN,
&irias_missing);
return;
}
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "LM-IAS: found %s, id=%d\n", obj->name, obj->id);
attrib = irias_find_attrib(obj, attr);
if (attrib == NULL) {
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "LM-IAS: Attribute %s not found\n", attr);
iriap_getvaluebyclass_response(self, obj->id,
IAS_ATTRIB_UNKNOWN,
&irias_missing);
return;
}
/* We have a match; send the value. */
iriap_getvaluebyclass_response(self, obj->id, IAS_SUCCESS,
attrib->value);
}
Commit Message: irda: validate peer name and attribute lengths
Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: get_v_kerning(hb_font_t *font, void *font_data, hb_codepoint_t first,
hb_codepoint_t second, void *user_data)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: shaper: fix reallocation
Update the variable that tracks the allocated size. This potentially
improves performance and avoid some side effects, which lead to
undefined behavior in some cases.
Fixes fuzzer test case id:000051,sig:11,sync:fuzzer3,src:004221.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int cJSON_strcasecmp( const char *s1, const char *s2 )
{
if ( ! s1 )
return ( s1 == s2 ) ? 0 : 1;
if ( ! s2 )
return 1;
for ( ; tolower(*s1) == tolower(*s2); ++s1, ++s2)
if( *s1 == 0 )
return 0;
return tolower(*(const unsigned char *)s1) - tolower(*(const unsigned char *)s2);
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: Response StorageHandler::UntrackCacheStorageForOrigin(
const std::string& origin) {
if (!process_)
return Response::InternalError();
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid())
return Response::InvalidParams(origin + " is not a valid URL");
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CacheStorageObserver::UntrackOriginOnIOThread,
base::Unretained(GetCacheStorageObserver()),
url::Origin::Create(origin_url)));
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static unsigned int vop_poll(struct file *f, poll_table *wait)
{
struct vop_vdev *vdev = f->private_data;
int mask = 0;
mutex_lock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
if (vop_vdev_inited(vdev)) {
mask = POLLERR;
goto done;
}
poll_wait(f, &vdev->waitq, wait);
if (vop_vdev_inited(vdev)) {
mask = POLLERR;
} else if (vdev->poll_wake) {
vdev->poll_wake = 0;
mask = POLLIN | POLLOUT;
}
done:
mutex_unlock(&vdev->vdev_mutex);
return mask;
}
Commit Message: misc: mic: Fix for double fetch security bug in VOP driver
The MIC VOP driver does two successive reads from user space to read a
variable length data structure. Kernel memory corruption can result if
the data structure changes between the two reads. This patch disallows
the chance of this happening.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116651
Reported by: Pengfei Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Dutt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Dixit <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ApiDefinitionsNatives::ApiDefinitionsNatives(Dispatcher* dispatcher,
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context), dispatcher_(dispatcher) {
RouteFunction(
"GetExtensionAPIDefinitionsForTest",
base::Bind(&ApiDefinitionsNatives::GetExtensionAPIDefinitionsForTest,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_mod(
PNG_CONST image_transform *this, image_pixel *that, png_const_structp pp,
PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
image_transform_png_set_expand_mod(this, that, pp, display);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int DCTStream::readAmp(int size) {
int amp, bit;
int bits;
amp = 0;
for (bits = 0; bits < size; ++bits) {
if ((bit = readBit()) == EOF)
return 9999;
amp = (amp << 1) + bit;
}
if (amp < (1 << (size - 1)))
amp -= (1 << size) - 1;
return amp;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void snd_msndmidi_input_read(void *mpuv)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct snd_msndmidi *mpu = mpuv;
void *pwMIDQData = mpu->dev->mappedbase + MIDQ_DATA_BUFF;
spin_lock_irqsave(&mpu->input_lock, flags);
while (readw(mpu->dev->MIDQ + JQS_wTail) !=
readw(mpu->dev->MIDQ + JQS_wHead)) {
u16 wTmp, val;
val = readw(pwMIDQData + 2 * readw(mpu->dev->MIDQ + JQS_wHead));
if (test_bit(MSNDMIDI_MODE_BIT_INPUT_TRIGGER,
&mpu->mode))
snd_rawmidi_receive(mpu->substream_input,
(unsigned char *)&val, 1);
wTmp = readw(mpu->dev->MIDQ + JQS_wHead) + 1;
if (wTmp > readw(mpu->dev->MIDQ + JQS_wSize))
writew(0, mpu->dev->MIDQ + JQS_wHead);
else
writew(wTmp, mpu->dev->MIDQ + JQS_wHead);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mpu->input_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: msnd: Optimize / harden DSP and MIDI loops
The ISA msnd drivers have loops fetching the ring-buffer head, tail
and size values inside the loops. Such codes are inefficient and
fragile.
This patch optimizes it, and also adds the sanity check to avoid the
endless loops.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196131
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196133
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: long mkvparser::ParseElementHeader(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos,
long long stop, long long& id,
long long& size) {
if ((stop >= 0) && (pos >= stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long len;
id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume id
if ((stop >= 0) && (pos >= stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume length of size
if ((stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static Handle<JSArray> SpliceImpl(Handle<JSArray> receiver,
uint32_t start, uint32_t delete_count,
Arguments* args, uint32_t add_count) {
Isolate* isolate = receiver->GetIsolate();
Heap* heap = isolate->heap();
uint32_t length = Smi::cast(receiver->length())->value();
uint32_t new_length = length - delete_count + add_count;
ElementsKind kind = KindTraits::Kind;
if (new_length <= static_cast<uint32_t>(receiver->elements()->length()) &&
IsFastSmiOrObjectElementsKind(kind)) {
HandleScope scope(isolate);
JSObject::EnsureWritableFastElements(receiver);
}
Handle<FixedArrayBase> backing_store(receiver->elements(), isolate);
if (new_length == 0) {
receiver->set_elements(heap->empty_fixed_array());
receiver->set_length(Smi::kZero);
return isolate->factory()->NewJSArrayWithElements(
backing_store, KindTraits::Kind, delete_count);
}
Handle<JSArray> deleted_elements = isolate->factory()->NewJSArray(
KindTraits::Kind, delete_count, delete_count);
if (delete_count > 0) {
DisallowHeapAllocation no_gc;
Subclass::CopyElementsImpl(*backing_store, start,
deleted_elements->elements(), KindTraits::Kind,
0, kPackedSizeNotKnown, delete_count);
}
if (add_count < delete_count) {
Subclass::SpliceShrinkStep(isolate, receiver, backing_store, start,
delete_count, add_count, length, new_length);
} else if (add_count > delete_count) {
backing_store =
Subclass::SpliceGrowStep(isolate, receiver, backing_store, start,
delete_count, add_count, length, new_length);
}
Subclass::CopyArguments(args, backing_store, add_count, 3, start);
receiver->set_length(Smi::FromInt(new_length));
Subclass::TryTransitionResultArrayToPacked(deleted_elements);
return deleted_elements;
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void WebContentsImpl::RequestToLockMouse(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* render_widget_host,
bool user_gesture,
bool last_unlocked_by_target) {
if (render_widget_host != GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget()) {
render_widget_host->GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(false);
return;
}
if (delegate_)
delegate_->RequestToLockMouse(this, user_gesture, last_unlocked_by_target);
else
GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(false);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void DataReductionProxyConfig::InitializeOnIOThread(
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> url_loader_factory,
WarmupURLFetcher::CreateCustomProxyConfigCallback
create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
NetworkPropertiesManager* manager,
const std::string& user_agent) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
network_properties_manager_ = manager;
network_properties_manager_->ResetWarmupURLFetchMetrics();
secure_proxy_checker_.reset(new SecureProxyChecker(url_loader_factory));
warmup_url_fetcher_.reset(new WarmupURLFetcher(
create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
base::BindRepeating(
&DataReductionProxyConfig::HandleWarmupFetcherResponse,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindRepeating(&DataReductionProxyConfig::GetHttpRttEstimate,
base::Unretained(this)),
ui_task_runner_, user_agent));
AddDefaultProxyBypassRules();
network_connection_tracker_->AddNetworkConnectionObserver(this);
network_connection_tracker_->GetConnectionType(
&connection_type_,
base::BindOnce(&DataReductionProxyConfig::OnConnectionChanged,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: VisibleSelection Editor::SelectionForCommand(Event* event) {
VisibleSelection selection =
GetFrame().Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree();
if (!event)
return selection;
TextControlElement* text_control_of_selection_start =
EnclosingTextControl(selection.Start());
TextControlElement* text_control_of_target =
IsTextControlElement(*event->target()->ToNode())
? ToTextControlElement(event->target()->ToNode())
: nullptr;
if (text_control_of_target &&
(selection.Start().IsNull() ||
text_control_of_target != text_control_of_selection_start)) {
const SelectionInDOMTree& select = text_control_of_target->Selection();
if (!select.IsNone())
return CreateVisibleSelection(select);
}
return selection;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct rb_node *_p = v;
struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);
struct timespec now;
unsigned long timo;
key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
char xbuf[16];
int rc;
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = key->type,
.index_key.description = key->description,
.cred = m->file->f_cred,
.match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed,
.match_data.raw_data = key,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
.flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK,
};
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
/* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can
* skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it
*/
if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {
skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(&ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
key_ref_put(skey_ref);
key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
}
}
/* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */
rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
if (rc < 0)
return 0;
now = current_kernel_time();
rcu_read_lock();
/* come up with a suitable timeout value */
if (key->expiry == 0) {
memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5);
} else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5);
} else {
timo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec;
if (timo < 60)
sprintf(xbuf, "%lus", timo);
else if (timo < 60*60)
sprintf(xbuf, "%lum", timo / 60);
else if (timo < 60*60*24)
sprintf(xbuf, "%luh", timo / (60*60));
else if (timo < 60*60*24*7)
sprintf(xbuf, "%lud", timo / (60*60*24));
else
sprintf(xbuf, "%luw", timo / (60*60*24*7));
}
#define showflag(KEY, LETTER, FLAG) \
(test_bit(FLAG, &(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-')
seq_printf(m, "%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s ",
key->serial,
showflag(key, 'I', KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED),
showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED),
showflag(key, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD),
showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA),
showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT),
showflag(key, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE),
showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED),
refcount_read(&key->usage),
xbuf,
key->perm,
from_kuid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->uid),
from_kgid_munged(seq_user_ns(m), key->gid),
key->type->name);
#undef showflag
if (key->type->describe)
key->type->describe(key, m);
seq_putc(m, '\n');
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void WebContentsImpl::LoadingStateChanged(bool to_different_document,
bool due_to_interstitial,
LoadNotificationDetails* details) {
if (ShowingInterstitialPage() &&
GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page()->pause_throbber() &&
!due_to_interstitial) {
return;
}
bool is_loading = IsLoading();
if (!is_loading) {
load_state_ = net::LoadStateWithParam(net::LOAD_STATE_IDLE,
base::string16());
load_state_host_.clear();
upload_size_ = 0;
upload_position_ = 0;
}
GetRenderManager()->SetIsLoading(is_loading);
waiting_for_response_ = is_loading;
is_load_to_different_document_ = to_different_document;
if (delegate_)
delegate_->LoadingStateChanged(this, to_different_document);
NotifyNavigationStateChanged(INVALIDATE_TYPE_LOAD);
std::string url = (details ? details->url.possibly_invalid_spec() : "NULL");
if (is_loading) {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_BEGIN2("browser,navigation", "WebContentsImpl Loading",
this, "URL", url, "Main FrameTreeNode id",
GetFrameTree()->root()->frame_tree_node_id());
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidStartLoading();
} else {
TRACE_EVENT_ASYNC_END1("browser,navigation", "WebContentsImpl Loading",
this, "URL", url);
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidStopLoading();
}
int type = is_loading ? NOTIFICATION_LOAD_START : NOTIFICATION_LOAD_STOP;
NotificationDetails det = NotificationService::NoDetails();
if (details)
det = Details<LoadNotificationDetails>(details);
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
type, Source<NavigationController>(&controller_), det);
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static inline bool vmcs12_read_any(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned long field, u64 *ret)
{
short offset = vmcs_field_to_offset(field);
char *p;
if (offset < 0)
return 0;
p = ((char *)(get_vmcs12(vcpu))) + offset;
switch (vmcs_field_type(field)) {
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_NATURAL_WIDTH:
*ret = *((natural_width *)p);
return 1;
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_U16:
*ret = *((u16 *)p);
return 1;
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_U32:
*ret = *((u32 *)p);
return 1;
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_U64:
*ret = *((u64 *)p);
return 1;
default:
return 0; /* can never happen. */
}
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool ExtensionInstallDialogView::AddPermissions(
views::GridLayout* layout,
ui::ResourceBundle& rb,
int column_set_id,
int left_column_width,
ExtensionInstallPrompt::PermissionsType perm_type) {
if (prompt_->GetPermissionCount(perm_type) == 0)
return false;
layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* permissions_header = NULL;
if (is_bundle_install()) {
permissions_header =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetPermissionsHeading(perm_type),
rb.GetFontList(ui::ResourceBundle::MediumFont));
} else {
permissions_header =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetPermissionsHeading(perm_type));
}
permissions_header->SetMultiLine(true);
permissions_header->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
permissions_header->SizeToFit(left_column_width);
layout->AddView(permissions_header);
for (size_t i = 0; i < prompt_->GetPermissionCount(perm_type); ++i) {
layout->AddPaddingRow(0, views::kRelatedControlVerticalSpacing);
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
views::Label* permission_label =
new views::Label(prompt_->GetPermission(i, perm_type));
permission_label->SetMultiLine(true);
permission_label->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
permission_label->SizeToFit(left_column_width - kBulletWidth);
layout->AddView(new BulletedView(permission_label));
if (!prompt_->GetPermissionsDetails(i, perm_type).empty()) {
layout->StartRow(0, column_set_id);
PermissionDetails details;
details.push_back(PrepareForDisplay(
prompt_->GetPermissionsDetails(i, perm_type), false));
ExpandableContainerView* details_container =
new ExpandableContainerView(this,
base::string16(),
details,
left_column_width,
true);
layout->AddView(details_container);
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteImageChannels(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
const MagickBooleanType separate,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
size_t
channels,
packet_size;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
/*
Write uncompressed pixels as separate planes.
*/
channels=1;
packet_size=next_image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(2*channels*
next_image->columns,packet_size*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (IsImageGray(next_image) != MagickFalse)
{
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,GrayQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum,exception);
}
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
GrayQuantum,MagickTrue,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,1);
}
else
if (next_image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,IndexQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum,exception);
}
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
IndexQuantum,MagickTrue,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,1);
}
else
{
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
/*
Packbits compression.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,1);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,RedQuantum,exception);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,GreenQuantum,exception);
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,BlueQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,BlackQuantum,exception);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WritePackbitsLength(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
compact_pixels,AlphaQuantum,exception);
}
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,0,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
RedQuantum,MagickTrue,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,1,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
GreenQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,2,6);
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
BlueQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,3,6);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
BlackQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,4,6);
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
WriteOneChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,compact_pixels,
AlphaQuantum,separate,exception);
(void) SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,5,6);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
}
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Fixed overflow.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnReadDirectory(
const ReadDirectoryWithSettingCallback& callback,
GDataFileError error,
GDataEntry* entry) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(error,
hide_hosted_docs_,
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProtoVector>());
return;
}
DCHECK(entry);
GDataDirectory* directory = entry->AsGDataDirectory();
if (!directory) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND,
hide_hosted_docs_,
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProtoVector>());
return;
}
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProtoVector> entries(directory->ToProtoVector());
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_OK, hide_hosted_docs_, entries.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static Image *ReadPWPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
FILE
*file;
Image
*image,
*next_image,
*pwp_image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c,
unique_file;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register Image
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
filesize,
length;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
magick[MaxTextExtent];
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
pwp_image=AcquireImage(image_info);
image=pwp_image;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,pwp_image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Image *) NULL);
count=ReadBlob(pwp_image,5,magick);
if ((count != 5) || (LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"SFW95",5) != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) SetImageInfoProgressMonitor(read_info,(MagickProgressMonitor) NULL,
(void *) NULL);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
for ( ; ; )
{
for (c=ReadBlobByte(pwp_image); c != EOF; c=ReadBlobByte(pwp_image))
{
for (i=0; i < 17; i++)
magick[i]=magick[i+1];
magick[17]=(unsigned char) c;
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) (magick+12),"SFW94A",6) == 0)
break;
}
if (c == EOF)
break;
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) (magick+12),"SFW94A",6) != 0)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
/*
Dump SFW image to a temporary file.
*/
file=(FILE *) NULL;
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToWriteFile",
image->filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=fwrite("SFW94A",1,6,file);
(void) length;
filesize=65535UL*magick[2]+256L*magick[1]+magick[0];
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) filesize; i++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(pwp_image);
(void) fputc(c,file);
}
(void) fclose(file);
next_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
if (next_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
(void) FormatLocaleString(next_image->filename,MaxTextExtent,
"slide_%02ld.sfw",(long) next_image->scene);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
image=next_image;
else
{
/*
Link image into image list.
*/
for (p=image; p->next != (Image *) NULL; p=GetNextImageInList(p)) ;
next_image->previous=p;
next_image->scene=p->scene+1;
p->next=next_image;
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (next_image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(pwp_image),
GetBlobSize(pwp_image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (unique_file != -1)
(void) close(unique_file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
(void) CloseBlob(pwp_image);
pwp_image=DestroyImage(pwp_image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
char
*message;
message=GetExceptionMessage(errno);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile","`%s': %s",image->filename,message);
message=DestroyString(message);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: Prevent memory use after free
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML(const String& where, const String& markup, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
RefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment = document()->createDocumentFragment();
Element* contextElement = contextElementForInsertion(where, this, ec);
if (!contextElement)
return;
if (document()->isHTMLDocument())
fragment->parseHTML(markup, contextElement);
else {
if (!fragment->parseXML(markup, contextElement))
return;
}
insertAdjacent(where, fragment.get(), ec);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int csnmp_config_add_data_instance_prefix(data_definition_t *dd,
oconfig_item_t *ci) {
int status;
if (!dd->is_table) {
WARNING("snmp plugin: data %s: InstancePrefix is ignored when `Table' "
"is set to `false'.",
dd->name);
return (-1);
}
status = cf_util_get_string(ci, &dd->instance_prefix);
return status;
} /* int csnmp_config_add_data_instance_prefix */
Commit Message: snmp plugin: Fix double free of request PDU
snmp_sess_synch_response() always frees request PDU, in both case of request
error and success. If error condition occurs inside of `while (status == 0)`
loop, double free of `req` happens.
Issue: #2291
Signed-off-by: Florian Forster <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-415
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static UINT drdynvc_order_recv(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, wStream* s)
{
int value;
int Cmd;
int Sp;
int cbChId;
Stream_Read_UINT8(s, value);
Cmd = (value & 0xf0) >> 4;
Sp = (value & 0x0c) >> 2;
cbChId = (value & 0x03) >> 0;
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG, "order_recv: Cmd=0x%x, Sp=%d cbChId=%d", Cmd, Sp, cbChId);
switch (Cmd)
{
case CAPABILITY_REQUEST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_capability_request(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case CREATE_REQUEST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_create_request(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case DATA_FIRST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_data_first(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case DATA_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_data(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
case CLOSE_REQUEST_PDU:
return drdynvc_process_close_request(drdynvc, Sp, cbChId, s);
default:
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "unknown drdynvc cmd 0x%x", Cmd);
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int StreamTcpPacket (ThreadVars *tv, Packet *p, StreamTcpThread *stt,
PacketQueue *pq)
{
SCEnter();
DEBUG_ASSERT_FLOW_LOCKED(p->flow);
SCLogDebug("p->pcap_cnt %"PRIu64, p->pcap_cnt);
/* assign the thread id to the flow */
if (unlikely(p->flow->thread_id == 0)) {
p->flow->thread_id = (FlowThreadId)tv->id;
#ifdef DEBUG
} else if (unlikely((FlowThreadId)tv->id != p->flow->thread_id)) {
SCLogDebug("wrong thread: flow has %u, we are %d", p->flow->thread_id, tv->id);
#endif
}
TcpSession *ssn = (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx;
/* track TCP flags */
if (ssn != NULL) {
ssn->tcp_packet_flags |= p->tcph->th_flags;
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p))
ssn->client.tcp_flags |= p->tcph->th_flags;
else if (PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p))
ssn->server.tcp_flags |= p->tcph->th_flags;
/* check if we need to unset the ASYNC flag */
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_ASYNC &&
ssn->client.tcp_flags != 0 &&
ssn->server.tcp_flags != 0)
{
SCLogDebug("ssn %p: removing ASYNC flag as we have packets on both sides", ssn);
ssn->flags &= ~STREAMTCP_FLAG_ASYNC;
}
}
/* update counters */
if ((p->tcph->th_flags & (TH_SYN|TH_ACK)) == (TH_SYN|TH_ACK)) {
StatsIncr(tv, stt->counter_tcp_synack);
} else if (p->tcph->th_flags & (TH_SYN)) {
StatsIncr(tv, stt->counter_tcp_syn);
}
if (p->tcph->th_flags & (TH_RST)) {
StatsIncr(tv, stt->counter_tcp_rst);
}
/* broken TCP http://ask.wireshark.org/questions/3183/acknowledgment-number-broken-tcp-the-acknowledge-field-is-nonzero-while-the-ack-flag-is-not-set */
if (!(p->tcph->th_flags & TH_ACK) && TCP_GET_ACK(p) != 0) {
StreamTcpSetEvent(p, STREAM_PKT_BROKEN_ACK);
}
/* If we are on IPS mode, and got a drop action triggered from
* the IP only module, or from a reassembled msg and/or from an
* applayer detection, then drop the rest of the packets of the
* same stream and avoid inspecting it any further */
if (StreamTcpCheckFlowDrops(p) == 1) {
SCLogDebug("This flow/stream triggered a drop rule");
FlowSetNoPacketInspectionFlag(p->flow);
DecodeSetNoPacketInspectionFlag(p);
StreamTcpDisableAppLayer(p->flow);
PACKET_DROP(p);
/* return the segments to the pool */
StreamTcpSessionPktFree(p);
SCReturnInt(0);
}
if (ssn == NULL || ssn->state == TCP_NONE) {
if (StreamTcpPacketStateNone(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue) == -1) {
goto error;
}
if (ssn != NULL)
SCLogDebug("ssn->alproto %"PRIu16"", p->flow->alproto);
} else {
/* special case for PKT_PSEUDO_STREAM_END packets:
* bypass the state handling and various packet checks,
* we care about reassembly here. */
if (p->flags & PKT_PSEUDO_STREAM_END) {
if (PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p)) {
ssn->client.last_ack = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->server, p, pq);
} else {
ssn->server.last_ack = TCP_GET_ACK(p);
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, p, pq);
}
/* straight to 'skip' as we already handled reassembly */
goto skip;
}
/* check if the packet is in right direction, when we missed the
SYN packet and picked up midstream session. */
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_MIDSTREAM_SYNACK)
StreamTcpPacketSwitchDir(ssn, p);
if (StreamTcpPacketIsKeepAlive(ssn, p) == 1) {
goto skip;
}
if (StreamTcpPacketIsKeepAliveACK(ssn, p) == 1) {
StreamTcpClearKeepAliveFlag(ssn, p);
goto skip;
}
StreamTcpClearKeepAliveFlag(ssn, p);
/* if packet is not a valid window update, check if it is perhaps
* a bad window update that we should ignore (and alert on) */
if (StreamTcpPacketIsFinShutdownAck(ssn, p) == 0)
if (StreamTcpPacketIsWindowUpdate(ssn, p) == 0)
if (StreamTcpPacketIsBadWindowUpdate(ssn,p))
goto skip;
switch (ssn->state) {
case TCP_SYN_SENT:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateSynSent(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_SYN_RECV:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateSynRecv(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_ESTABLISHED:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateEstablished(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_FIN_WAIT1:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateFinWait1(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_FIN_WAIT2:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateFinWait2(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_CLOSING:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateClosing(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_CLOSE_WAIT:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateCloseWait(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_LAST_ACK:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateLastAck(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_TIME_WAIT:
if(StreamTcpPacketStateTimeWait(tv, p, stt, ssn, &stt->pseudo_queue)) {
goto error;
}
break;
case TCP_CLOSED:
/* TCP session memory is not returned to pool until timeout. */
SCLogDebug("packet received on closed state");
break;
default:
SCLogDebug("packet received on default state");
break;
}
skip:
if (ssn->state >= TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
p->flags |= PKT_STREAM_EST;
}
}
/* deal with a pseudo packet that is created upon receiving a RST
* segment. To be sure we process both sides of the connection, we
* inject a fake packet into the system, forcing reassembly of the
* opposing direction.
* There should be only one, but to be sure we do a while loop. */
if (ssn != NULL) {
while (stt->pseudo_queue.len > 0) {
SCLogDebug("processing pseudo packet / stream end");
Packet *np = PacketDequeue(&stt->pseudo_queue);
if (np != NULL) {
/* process the opposing direction of the original packet */
if (PKT_IS_TOSERVER(np)) {
SCLogDebug("pseudo packet is to server");
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->client, np, NULL);
} else {
SCLogDebug("pseudo packet is to client");
StreamTcpReassembleHandleSegment(tv, stt->ra_ctx, ssn,
&ssn->server, np, NULL);
}
/* enqueue this packet so we inspect it in detect etc */
PacketEnqueue(pq, np);
}
SCLogDebug("processing pseudo packet / stream end done");
}
/* recalc the csum on the packet if it was modified */
if (p->flags & PKT_STREAM_MODIFIED) {
ReCalculateChecksum(p);
}
/* check for conditions that may make us not want to log this packet */
/* streams that hit depth */
if ((ssn->client.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_DEPTH_REACHED) &&
(ssn->server.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_DEPTH_REACHED))
{
/* we can call bypass callback, if enabled */
if (StreamTcpBypassEnabled()) {
PacketBypassCallback(p);
}
}
if ((ssn->client.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_DEPTH_REACHED) ||
(ssn->server.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_DEPTH_REACHED))
{
p->flags |= PKT_STREAM_NOPCAPLOG;
}
/* encrypted packets */
if ((PKT_IS_TOSERVER(p) && (ssn->client.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_NOREASSEMBLY)) ||
(PKT_IS_TOCLIENT(p) && (ssn->server.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_NOREASSEMBLY)))
{
p->flags |= PKT_STREAM_NOPCAPLOG;
}
if (ssn->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_BYPASS) {
/* we can call bypass callback, if enabled */
if (StreamTcpBypassEnabled()) {
PacketBypassCallback(p);
}
/* if stream is dead and we have no detect engine at all, bypass. */
} else if (g_detect_disabled &&
(ssn->client.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_NOREASSEMBLY) &&
(ssn->server.flags & STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_NOREASSEMBLY) &&
StreamTcpBypassEnabled())
{
SCLogDebug("bypass as stream is dead and we have no rules");
PacketBypassCallback(p);
}
}
SCReturnInt(0);
error:
/* make sure we don't leave packets in our pseudo queue */
while (stt->pseudo_queue.len > 0) {
Packet *np = PacketDequeue(&stt->pseudo_queue);
if (np != NULL) {
PacketEnqueue(pq, np);
}
}
/* recalc the csum on the packet if it was modified */
if (p->flags & PKT_STREAM_MODIFIED) {
ReCalculateChecksum(p);
}
if (StreamTcpInlineDropInvalid()) {
PACKET_DROP(p);
}
SCReturnInt(-1);
}
Commit Message: stream: still inspect packets dropped by stream
The detect engine would bypass packets that are set as dropped. This
seems sane, as these packets are going to be dropped anyway.
However, it lead to the following corner case: stream events that
triggered the drop could not be matched on the rules. The packet
with the event wouldn't make it to the detect engine due to the bypass.
This patch changes the logic to not bypass DROP packets anymore.
Packets that are dropped by the stream engine will set the no payload
inspection flag, so avoid needless cost.
CWE ID: CWE-693
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void digi_dtr_rts(struct usb_serial_port *port, int on)
{
/* Adjust DTR and RTS */
digi_set_modem_signals(port, on * (TIOCM_DTR|TIOCM_RTS), 1);
}
Commit Message: USB: digi_acceleport: do sanity checking for the number of ports
The driver can be crashed with devices that expose crafted descriptors
with too few endpoints.
See: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/61
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
[johan: fix OOB endpoint check and add error messages ]
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static inline void update_blocked_averages(int cpu)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq = &rq->cfs;
const struct sched_class *curr_class;
struct rq_flags rf;
rq_lock_irqsave(rq, &rf);
update_rq_clock(rq);
update_cfs_rq_load_avg(cfs_rq_clock_task(cfs_rq), cfs_rq);
curr_class = rq->curr->sched_class;
update_rt_rq_load_avg(rq_clock_task(rq), rq, curr_class == &rt_sched_class);
update_dl_rq_load_avg(rq_clock_task(rq), rq, curr_class == &dl_sched_class);
update_irq_load_avg(rq, 0);
#ifdef CONFIG_NO_HZ_COMMON
rq->last_blocked_load_update_tick = jiffies;
if (!cfs_rq_has_blocked(cfs_rq) && !others_have_blocked(rq))
rq->has_blocked_load = 0;
#endif
rq_unlock_irqrestore(rq, &rf);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-400
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void common_timer_get(struct k_itimer *timr, struct itimerspec64 *cur_setting)
{
const struct k_clock *kc = timr->kclock;
ktime_t now, remaining, iv;
struct timespec64 ts64;
bool sig_none;
sig_none = (timr->it_sigev_notify & ~SIGEV_THREAD_ID) == SIGEV_NONE;
iv = timr->it_interval;
/* interval timer ? */
if (iv) {
cur_setting->it_interval = ktime_to_timespec64(iv);
} else if (!timr->it_active) {
/*
* SIGEV_NONE oneshot timers are never queued. Check them
* below.
*/
if (!sig_none)
return;
}
/*
* The timespec64 based conversion is suboptimal, but it's not
* worth to implement yet another callback.
*/
kc->clock_get(timr->it_clock, &ts64);
now = timespec64_to_ktime(ts64);
/*
* When a requeue is pending or this is a SIGEV_NONE timer move the
* expiry time forward by intervals, so expiry is > now.
*/
if (iv && (timr->it_requeue_pending & REQUEUE_PENDING || sig_none))
timr->it_overrun += kc->timer_forward(timr, now);
remaining = kc->timer_remaining(timr, now);
/* Return 0 only, when the timer is expired and not pending */
if (remaining <= 0) {
/*
* A single shot SIGEV_NONE timer must return 0, when
* it is expired !
*/
if (!sig_none)
cur_setting->it_value.tv_nsec = 1;
} else {
cur_setting->it_value = ktime_to_timespec64(remaining);
}
}
Commit Message: posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify
timer_create() specifies via sigevent->sigev_notify the signal delivery for
the new timer. The valid modes are SIGEV_NONE, SIGEV_SIGNAL, SIGEV_THREAD
and (SIGEV_SIGNAL | SIGEV_THREAD_ID).
The sanity check in good_sigevent() is only checking the valid combination
for the SIGEV_THREAD_ID bit, i.e. SIGEV_SIGNAL, but if SIGEV_THREAD_ID is
not set it accepts any random value.
This has no real effects on the posix timer and signal delivery code, but
it affects show_timer() which handles the output of /proc/$PID/timers. That
function uses a string array to pretty print sigev_notify. The access to
that array has no bound checks, so random sigev_notify cause access beyond
the array bounds.
Add proper checks for the valid notify modes and remove the SIGEV_THREAD_ID
masking from various code pathes as SIGEV_NONE can never be set in
combination with SIGEV_THREAD_ID.
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void AutomationProviderSearchEngineObserver::OnTemplateURLServiceChanged() {
if (provider_) {
TemplateURLService* url_service =
TemplateURLServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
url_service->RemoveObserver(this);
AutomationJSONReply(provider_, reply_message_.release()).SendSuccess(NULL);
}
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int snd_timer_user_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
int err;
err = nonseekable_open(inode, file);
if (err < 0)
return err;
tu = kzalloc(sizeof(*tu), GFP_KERNEL);
if (tu == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&tu->qlock);
init_waitqueue_head(&tu->qchange_sleep);
mutex_init(&tu->tread_sem);
tu->ticks = 1;
tu->queue_size = 128;
tu->queue = kmalloc(tu->queue_size * sizeof(struct snd_timer_read),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tu->queue == NULL) {
kfree(tu);
return -ENOMEM;
}
file->private_data = tu;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctls
ALSA timer ioctls have an open race and this may lead to a
use-after-free of timer instance object. A simplistic fix is to make
each ioctl exclusive. We have already tread_sem for controlling the
tread, and extend this as a global mutex to be applied to each ioctl.
The downside is, of course, the worse concurrency. But these ioctls
aren't to be parallel accessible, in anyway, so it should be fine to
serialize there.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int mxf_read_index_entry_array(AVIOContext *pb, MXFIndexTableSegment *segment)
{
int i, length;
segment->nb_index_entries = avio_rb32(pb);
length = avio_rb32(pb);
if (!(segment->temporal_offset_entries=av_calloc(segment->nb_index_entries, sizeof(*segment->temporal_offset_entries))) ||
!(segment->flag_entries = av_calloc(segment->nb_index_entries, sizeof(*segment->flag_entries))) ||
!(segment->stream_offset_entries = av_calloc(segment->nb_index_entries, sizeof(*segment->stream_offset_entries)))) {
av_freep(&segment->temporal_offset_entries);
av_freep(&segment->flag_entries);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = 0; i < segment->nb_index_entries; i++) {
segment->temporal_offset_entries[i] = avio_r8(pb);
avio_r8(pb); /* KeyFrameOffset */
segment->flag_entries[i] = avio_r8(pb);
segment->stream_offset_entries[i] = avio_rb64(pb);
avio_skip(pb, length - 11);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <[email protected]>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-834
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: dispose(GObject *obj)
{
RSFilter *filter = RS_FILTER(obj);
if (!filter->dispose_has_run)
{
filter->dispose_has_run = TRUE;
if (filter->previous)
{
filter->previous->next_filters = g_slist_remove(filter->previous->next_filters, filter);
g_object_unref(filter->previous);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixes insecure use of temporary file (CVE-2014-4978).
CWE ID: CWE-59
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int kvm_clear_guest(struct kvm *kvm, gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len)
{
gfn_t gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
int seg;
int offset = offset_in_page(gpa);
int ret;
while ((seg = next_segment(len, offset)) != 0) {
ret = kvm_clear_guest_page(kvm, gfn, offset, seg);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
offset = 0;
len -= seg;
++gfn;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void FindBarController::ChangeTabContents(TabContentsWrapper* contents) {
if (tab_contents_) {
registrar_.RemoveAll();
find_bar_->StopAnimation();
}
tab_contents_ = contents;
if (find_bar_->IsFindBarVisible() &&
(!tab_contents_ || !tab_contents_->GetFindManager()->find_ui_active())) {
find_bar_->Hide(false);
}
if (!tab_contents_)
return;
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::FIND_RESULT_AVAILABLE,
Source<TabContents>(tab_contents_->tab_contents()));
registrar_.Add(this, NotificationType::NAV_ENTRY_COMMITTED,
Source<NavigationController>(&tab_contents_->controller()));
MaybeSetPrepopulateText();
if (tab_contents_->GetFindManager()->find_ui_active()) {
find_bar_->Show(false);
}
UpdateFindBarForCurrentResult();
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void rm_read_metadata(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb, int wide)
{
char buf[1024];
int i;
for (i=0; i<FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(ff_rm_metadata); i++) {
int len = wide ? avio_rb16(pb) : avio_r8(pb);
if (len > 0) {
get_strl(pb, buf, sizeof(buf), len);
av_dict_set(&s->metadata, ff_rm_metadata[i], buf, 0);
}
}
}
Commit Message: avformat/rmdec: Do not pass mime type in rm_read_multi() to ff_rm_read_mdpr_codecdata()
Fixes: use after free()
Fixes: rmdec-crash-ffe85b4cab1597d1cfea6955705e53f1f5c8a362
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_zip_entry_read)
{
zval * zip_entry;
zend_long len = 0;
zip_read_rsrc * zr_rsrc;
zend_string *buffer;
int n = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r|l", &zip_entry, &len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((zr_rsrc = (zip_read_rsrc *)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(zip_entry), le_zip_entry_name, le_zip_entry)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (len <= 0) {
len = 1024;
}
if (zr_rsrc->zf) {
buffer = zend_string_alloc(len, 0);
n = zip_fread(zr_rsrc->zf, ZSTR_VAL(buffer), ZSTR_LEN(buffer));
if (n > 0) {
ZSTR_VAL(buffer)[n] = '\0';
ZSTR_LEN(buffer) = n;
RETURN_NEW_STR(buffer);
} else {
zend_string_free(buffer);
RETURN_EMPTY_STRING()
}
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void smp_proc_id_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->tk, p, BT_OCTET16_LEN); /* reuse TK for IRK */
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void nfs40_clear_delegation_stateid(struct nfs4_state *state)
{
if (rcu_access_pointer(NFS_I(state->inode)->delegation) != NULL)
nfs_finish_clear_delegation_stateid(state);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: [email protected] # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: my_object_init (MyObject *obj)
{
obj->val = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void perf_event_interrupt(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int i;
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
struct perf_event *event;
unsigned long val;
int found = 0;
int nmi;
nmi = perf_intr_is_nmi(regs);
if (nmi)
nmi_enter();
else
irq_enter();
for (i = 0; i < ppmu->n_counter; ++i) {
event = cpuhw->event[i];
val = read_pmc(i);
if ((int)val < 0) {
if (event) {
/* event has overflowed */
found = 1;
record_and_restart(event, val, regs, nmi);
} else {
/*
* Disabled counter is negative,
* reset it just in case.
*/
write_pmc(i, 0);
}
}
}
/* PMM will keep counters frozen until we return from the interrupt. */
mtmsr(mfmsr() | MSR_PMM);
mtpmr(PMRN_PMGC0, PMGC0_PMIE | PMGC0_FCECE);
isync();
if (nmi)
nmi_exit();
else
irq_exit();
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void ImageLoader::doUpdateFromElement(BypassMainWorldBehavior bypassBehavior,
UpdateFromElementBehavior updateBehavior,
const KURL& url,
ReferrerPolicy referrerPolicy) {
m_pendingTask.reset();
std::unique_ptr<IncrementLoadEventDelayCount> loadDelayCounter;
loadDelayCounter.swap(m_loadDelayCounter);
Document& document = m_element->document();
if (!document.isActive())
return;
AtomicString imageSourceURL = m_element->imageSourceURL();
ImageResourceContent* newImage = nullptr;
if (!url.isNull()) {
ResourceLoaderOptions resourceLoaderOptions =
ResourceFetcher::defaultResourceOptions();
ResourceRequest resourceRequest(url);
if (updateBehavior == UpdateForcedReload) {
resourceRequest.setCachePolicy(WebCachePolicy::BypassingCache);
resourceRequest.setPreviewsState(WebURLRequest::PreviewsNoTransform);
}
if (referrerPolicy != ReferrerPolicyDefault) {
resourceRequest.setHTTPReferrer(SecurityPolicy::generateReferrer(
referrerPolicy, url, document.outgoingReferrer()));
}
if (isHTMLPictureElement(element()->parentNode()) ||
!element()->fastGetAttribute(HTMLNames::srcsetAttr).isNull())
resourceRequest.setRequestContext(WebURLRequest::RequestContextImageSet);
FetchRequest request(resourceRequest, element()->localName(),
resourceLoaderOptions);
configureRequest(request, bypassBehavior, *m_element,
document.clientHintsPreferences());
if (updateBehavior != UpdateForcedReload && document.settings() &&
document.settings()->getFetchImagePlaceholders()) {
request.setAllowImagePlaceholder();
}
newImage = ImageResourceContent::fetch(request, document.fetcher());
if (!newImage && !pageIsBeingDismissed(&document)) {
crossSiteOrCSPViolationOccurred(imageSourceURL);
dispatchErrorEvent();
} else {
clearFailedLoadURL();
}
} else {
if (!imageSourceURL.isNull()) {
dispatchErrorEvent();
}
noImageResourceToLoad();
}
ImageResourceContent* oldImage = m_image.get();
if (updateBehavior == UpdateSizeChanged && m_element->layoutObject() &&
m_element->layoutObject()->isImage() && newImage == oldImage) {
toLayoutImage(m_element->layoutObject())->intrinsicSizeChanged();
} else {
if (m_hasPendingLoadEvent) {
loadEventSender().cancelEvent(this);
m_hasPendingLoadEvent = false;
}
if (m_hasPendingErrorEvent && newImage) {
errorEventSender().cancelEvent(this);
m_hasPendingErrorEvent = false;
}
m_image = newImage;
m_hasPendingLoadEvent = newImage;
m_imageComplete = !newImage;
updateLayoutObject();
if (newImage) {
newImage->addObserver(this);
}
if (oldImage) {
oldImage->removeObserver(this);
}
}
if (LayoutImageResource* imageResource = layoutImageResource())
imageResource->resetAnimation();
updatedHasPendingEvent();
}
Commit Message: Move ImageLoader timer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
Move ImageLoader timer m_derefElementTimer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
This associates it with the frame's Networking timer task queue.
BUG=624694
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2642103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#444927}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void VRDisplay::BeginPresent() {
Document* doc = this->GetDocument();
if (capabilities_->hasExternalDisplay()) {
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError,
"VR Presentation not implemented for this VRDisplay.");
while (!pending_present_resolvers_.IsEmpty()) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = pending_present_resolvers_.TakeFirst();
resolver->Reject(exception);
}
ReportPresentationResult(
PresentationResult::kPresentationNotSupportedByDisplay);
return;
} else {
if (layer_.source().isHTMLCanvasElement()) {
} else {
DCHECK(layer_.source().isOffscreenCanvas());
ForceExitPresent();
DOMException* exception = DOMException::Create(
kInvalidStateError, "OffscreenCanvas presentation not implemented.");
while (!pending_present_resolvers_.IsEmpty()) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver =
pending_present_resolvers_.TakeFirst();
resolver->Reject(exception);
}
ReportPresentationResult(
PresentationResult::kPresentationNotSupportedByDisplay);
return;
}
}
if (doc) {
Platform::Current()->RecordRapporURL("VR.WebVR.PresentSuccess",
WebURL(doc->Url()));
}
is_presenting_ = true;
ReportPresentationResult(PresentationResult::kSuccess);
UpdateLayerBounds();
while (!pending_present_resolvers_.IsEmpty()) {
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = pending_present_resolvers_.TakeFirst();
resolver->Resolve();
}
OnPresentChange();
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int __poke_user_compat(struct task_struct *child,
addr_t addr, addr_t data)
{
struct compat_user *dummy32 = NULL;
__u32 tmp = (__u32) data;
addr_t offset;
if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.acrs) {
struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
/*
* psw, gprs, acrs and orig_gpr2 are stored on the stack
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.psw.mask) {
__u32 mask = PSW32_MASK_USER;
mask |= is_ri_task(child) ? PSW32_MASK_RI : 0;
/* Build a 64 bit psw mask from 31 bit mask. */
if ((tmp & ~mask) != PSW32_USER_BITS)
/* Invalid psw mask. */
return -EINVAL;
regs->psw.mask = (regs->psw.mask & ~PSW_MASK_USER) |
(regs->psw.mask & PSW_MASK_BA) |
(__u64)(tmp & mask) << 32;
} else if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.psw.addr) {
/* Build a 64 bit psw address from 31 bit address. */
regs->psw.addr = (__u64) tmp & PSW32_ADDR_INSN;
/* Transfer 31 bit amode bit to psw mask. */
regs->psw.mask = (regs->psw.mask & ~PSW_MASK_BA) |
(__u64)(tmp & PSW32_ADDR_AMODE);
} else {
/* gpr 0-15 */
*(__u32*)((addr_t) ®s->psw + addr*2 + 4) = tmp;
}
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.orig_gpr2)) {
/*
* access registers are stored in the thread structure
*/
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.acrs;
*(__u32*)((addr_t) &child->thread.acrs + offset) = tmp;
} else if (addr == (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.orig_gpr2)) {
/*
* orig_gpr2 is stored on the kernel stack
*/
*(__u32*)((addr_t) &task_pt_regs(child)->orig_gpr2 + 4) = tmp;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs) {
/*
* prevent writess of padding hole between
* orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390.
*/
return 0;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.fp_regs + 1)) {
/*
* floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure
*/
if (addr == (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs.fpc &&
test_fp_ctl(tmp))
return -EINVAL;
offset = addr - (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.fp_regs;
*(__u32 *)((addr_t) &child->thread.fp_regs + offset) = tmp;
} else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.per_info + 1)) {
/*
* Handle access to the per_info structure.
*/
addr -= (addr_t) &dummy32->regs.per_info;
__poke_user_per_compat(child, addr, data);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: s390/ptrace: fix PSW mask check
The PSW mask check of the PTRACE_POKEUSR_AREA command is incorrect.
The PSW_MASK_USER define contains the PSW_MASK_ASC bits, the ptrace
interface accepts all combinations for the address-space-control
bits. To protect the kernel space the PSW mask check in ptrace needs
to reject the address-space-control bit combination for home space.
Fixes CVE-2014-3534
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool SubsetterImpl::HasName(const char* font_name, Font* font) {
UnicodeString font_string = UnicodeString::fromUTF8(font_name);
if (font_string.isEmpty())
return false;
UnicodeString regular_suffix = UnicodeString::fromUTF8(" Regular");
UnicodeString alt_font_string = font_string;
alt_font_string += regular_suffix;
typedef std::map<int32_t, UnicodeString> NameMap;
NameMap names;
NameTablePtr name_table = down_cast<NameTable*>(font->GetTable(Tag::name));
for (int32_t i = 0; i < name_table->NameCount(); ++i) {
switch(name_table->NameId(i)) {
case NameId::kFontFamilyName:
case NameId::kFontSubfamilyName:
case NameId::kFullFontName:
case NameId::kPreferredFamily:
case NameId::kPreferredSubfamily:
case NameId::kWWSFamilyName:
case NameId::kWWSSubfamilyName: {
int32_t hash_code = HashCode(name_table->PlatformId(i),
name_table->EncodingId(i),
name_table->LanguageId(i),
name_table->NameId(i));
UChar* name_part = name_table->Name(i);
ConstructName(name_part, &(names[hash_code]), name_table->NameId(i));
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
if (!names.empty()) {
for (NameMap::iterator b = names.begin(), e = names.end(); b != e; ++b) {
if (b->second.caseCompare(font_string, 0) == 0 ||
b->second.caseCompare(alt_font_string, 0) == 0) {
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix compile warning.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7572039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@95563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: comics_check_decompress_command (gchar *mime_type,
ComicsDocument *comics_document,
GError **error)
{
gboolean success;
gchar *std_out, *std_err;
gint retval;
GError *err = NULL;
/* FIXME, use proper cbr/cbz mime types once they're
* included in shared-mime-info */
if (g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/x-cbr") ||
g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/x-rar")) {
/* The RARLAB provides a no-charge proprietary (freeware)
* decompress-only client for Linux called unrar. Another
* option is a GPLv2-licensed command-line tool developed by
* the Gna! project. Confusingly enough, the free software RAR
* decoder is also named unrar. For this reason we need to add
* some lines for disambiguation. Sorry for the added the
* complexity but it's life :)
* Finally, some distributions, like Debian, rename this free
* option as unrar-free.
* */
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("unrar");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
/* We only use std_err to avoid printing useless error
* messages on the terminal */
success =
g_spawn_command_line_sync (
comics_document->selected_command,
&std_out, &std_err,
&retval, &err);
if (!success) {
g_propagate_error (error, err);
g_error_free (err);
return FALSE;
/* I don't check retval status because RARLAB unrar
* doesn't have a way to return 0 without involving an
* operation with a file*/
} else if (WIFEXITED (retval)) {
if (g_strrstr (std_out,"freeware") != NULL)
/* The RARLAB freeware client */
comics_document->command_usage = RARLABS;
else
/* The Gna! free software client */
comics_document->command_usage = GNAUNRAR;
g_free (std_out);
g_free (std_err);
return TRUE;
}
}
/* The Gna! free software client with Debian naming convention */
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("unrar-free");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = GNAUNRAR;
return TRUE;
}
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("bsdtar");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = TAR;
return TRUE;
}
} else if (g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/x-cbz") ||
g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/zip")) {
/* InfoZIP's unzip program */
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("unzip");
comics_document->alternative_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("zipnote");
if (comics_document->selected_command &&
comics_document->alternative_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = UNZIP;
return TRUE;
}
/* fallback mode using 7za and 7z from p7zip project */
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("7za");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = P7ZIP;
return TRUE;
}
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("7z");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = P7ZIP;
return TRUE;
}
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("bsdtar");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = TAR;
return TRUE;
}
} else if (g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/x-cb7") ||
g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/x-7z-compressed")) {
/* 7zr, 7za and 7z are the commands from the p7zip project able
* to decompress .7z files */
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("7zr");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = P7ZIP;
return TRUE;
}
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("7za");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = P7ZIP;
return TRUE;
}
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("7z");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = P7ZIP;
return TRUE;
}
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("bsdtar");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = TAR;
return TRUE;
}
} else if (g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/x-cbt") ||
g_content_type_is_a (mime_type, "application/x-tar")) {
/* tar utility (Tape ARchive) */
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("tar");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = TAR;
return TRUE;
}
comics_document->selected_command =
g_find_program_in_path ("bsdtar");
if (comics_document->selected_command) {
comics_document->command_usage = TAR;
return TRUE;
}
} else {
g_set_error (error,
EV_DOCUMENT_ERROR,
EV_DOCUMENT_ERROR_INVALID,
_("Not a comic book MIME type: %s"),
mime_type);
return FALSE;
}
g_set_error_literal (error,
EV_DOCUMENT_ERROR,
EV_DOCUMENT_ERROR_INVALID,
_("Can’t find an appropriate command to "
"decompress this type of comic book"));
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: comics: Remove support for tar and tar-like commands
When handling tar files, or using a command with tar-compatible syntax,
to open comic-book archives, both the archive name (the name of the
comics file) and the filename (the name of a page within the archive)
are quoted to not be interpreted by the shell.
But the filename is completely with the attacker's control and can start
with "--" which leads to tar interpreting it as a command line flag.
This can be exploited by creating a CBT file (a tar archive with the
.cbt suffix) with an embedded file named something like this:
"--checkpoint-action=exec=bash -c 'touch ~/hacked;'.jpg"
CBT files are infinitely rare (CBZ is usually used for DRM-free
commercial releases, CBR for those from more dubious provenance), so
removing support is the easiest way to avoid the bug triggering. All
this code was rewritten in the development release for GNOME 3.26 to not
shell out to any command, closing off this particular attack vector.
This also removes the ability to use libarchive's bsdtar-compatible
binary for CBZ (ZIP), CB7 (7zip), and CBR (RAR) formats. The first two
are already supported by unzip and 7zip respectively. libarchive's RAR
support is limited, so unrar is a requirement anyway.
Discovered by Felix Wilhelm from the Google Security Team.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=784630
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int php_session_destroy(TSRMLS_D) /* {{{ */
{
int retval = SUCCESS;
if (PS(session_status) != php_session_active) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Trying to destroy uninitialized session");
return FAILURE;
}
return FAILURE;
}
if (PS(mod)->s_destroy(&PS(mod_data), PS(id) TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
retval = FAILURE;
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Session object destruction failed");
}
php_rinit_session_globals(TSRMLS_C);
return retval;
}
/* }}} */
PHPAPI void php_add_session_var(char *name, size_t namelen TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval **sym_track = NULL;
IF_SESSION_VARS() {
zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(PS(http_session_vars)), name, namelen + 1, (void *) &sym_track);
} else {
return;
}
if (sym_track == NULL) {
zval *empty_var;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(empty_var);
ZEND_SET_SYMBOL_WITH_LENGTH(Z_ARRVAL_P(PS(http_session_vars)), name, namelen+1, empty_var, 1, 0);
}
}
/* }}} */
PHPAPI void php_set_session_var(char *name, size_t namelen, zval *state_val, php_unserialize_data_t *var_hash TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
IF_SESSION_VARS() {
zend_set_hash_symbol(state_val, name, namelen, PZVAL_IS_REF(state_val), 1, Z_ARRVAL_P(PS(http_session_vars)));
}
}
/* }}} */
PHPAPI int php_get_session_var(char *name, size_t namelen, zval ***state_var TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
int ret = FAILURE;
IF_SESSION_VARS() {
ret = zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(PS(http_session_vars)), name, namelen + 1, (void **) state_var);
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
static void php_session_track_init(TSRMLS_D) /* {{{ */
{
zval *session_vars = NULL;
/* Unconditionally destroy existing array -- possible dirty data */
zend_delete_global_variable("_SESSION", sizeof("_SESSION")-1 TSRMLS_CC);
if (PS(http_session_vars)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&PS(http_session_vars));
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(session_vars);
array_init(session_vars);
PS(http_session_vars) = session_vars;
ZEND_SET_GLOBAL_VAR_WITH_LENGTH("_SESSION", sizeof("_SESSION"), PS(http_session_vars), 2, 1);
}
/* }}} */
static char *php_session_encode(int *newlen TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *ret = NULL;
IF_SESSION_VARS() {
if (!PS(serializer)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown session.serialize_handler. Failed to encode session object");
ret = NULL;
} else if (PS(serializer)->encode(&ret, newlen TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
ret = NULL;
}
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot encode non-existent session");
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
static void php_session_decode(const char *val, int vallen TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
if (!PS(serializer)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown session.serialize_handler. Failed to decode session object");
return;
}
if (PS(serializer)->decode(val, vallen TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
php_session_destroy(TSRMLS_C);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to decode session object. Session has been destroyed");
}
}
/* }}} */
/*
* Note that we cannot use the BASE64 alphabet here, because
* it contains "/" and "+": both are unacceptable for simple inclusion
* into URLs.
*/
static char hexconvtab[] = "0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ,-";
enum {
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void pdu_push_and_notify(V9fsPDU *pdu)
{
virtio_9p_push_and_notify(pdu);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
{
xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *any;
size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */
int rc = Success;
int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
if (!stuff->num_changes)
return rc;
len = ((size_t)stuff->length << 2) - sizeof(xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo);
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) &stuff[1];
while (stuff->num_changes--) {
if (len < sizeof(xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo)) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
SWAPIF(swaps(&any->type));
SWAPIF(swaps(&any->length));
if (len < ((size_t)any->length << 2))
return BadLength;
#define CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(type) \
do { \
if ((len < sizeof(type)) || (any->length != (sizeof(type) >> 2))) { \
rc = BadLength; \
goto unwind; \
} \
} while(0)
switch (any->type) {
case XIAddMaster:
{
xXIAddMasterInfo *c = (xXIAddMasterInfo *) any;
/* Variable length, due to appended name string */
if (len < sizeof(xXIAddMasterInfo)) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
SWAPIF(swaps(&c->name_len));
if (c->name_len > (len - sizeof(xXIAddMasterInfo))) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
rc = add_master(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIRemoveMaster:
{
xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIRemoveMasterInfo);
rc = remove_master(client, r, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIDetachSlave:
{
xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIDetachSlaveInfo);
rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIAttachSlave:
{
xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIAttachSlaveInfo);
rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
}
len -= any->length * 4;
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4);
}
unwind:
XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void _xml_add_to_info(xml_parser *parser,char *name)
{
zval **element, *values;
if (! parser->info) {
return;
}
if (zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->info),name,strlen(name) + 1,(void **) &element) == FAILURE) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(values);
array_init(values);
zend_hash_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(parser->info), name, strlen(name)+1, (void *) &values, sizeof(zval*), (void **) &element);
}
add_next_index_long(*element,parser->curtag);
parser->curtag++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void BrowserView::SetBookmarkBarParent(views::View* new_parent) {
if (new_parent == this) {
views::View* target_view = nullptr;
if (ui::MaterialDesignController::IsRefreshUi()) {
target_view = infobar_container_;
} else {
target_view = top_container_;
}
const int target_index = GetIndexOf(target_view);
DCHECK_GE(target_index, 0);
AddChildViewAt(bookmark_bar_view_.get(), target_index);
} else if (new_parent == top_container_) {
if (ui::MaterialDesignController::IsRefreshUi()) {
new_parent->AddChildView(bookmark_bar_view_.get());
} else {
new_parent->AddChildViewAt(bookmark_bar_view_.get(), 0);
}
} else {
DCHECK(!new_parent);
bookmark_bar_view_->parent()->RemoveChildView(bookmark_bar_view_.get());
}
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: media::AudioManager* GetAudioManager() { return audio_manager_.get(); }
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: flac_read_loop (SF_PRIVATE *psf, unsigned len)
{ FLAC_PRIVATE* pflac = (FLAC_PRIVATE*) psf->codec_data ;
pflac->pos = 0 ;
pflac->len = len ;
pflac->remain = len ;
/* First copy data that has already been decoded and buffered. */
if (pflac->frame != NULL && pflac->bufferpos < pflac->frame->header.blocksize)
flac_buffer_copy (psf) ;
/* Decode some more. */
while (pflac->pos < pflac->len)
{ if (FLAC__stream_decoder_process_single (pflac->fsd) == 0)
break ;
if (FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state (pflac->fsd) >= FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_END_OF_STREAM)
break ;
} ;
pflac->ptr = NULL ;
return pflac->pos ;
} /* flac_read_loop */
Commit Message: src/flac.c: Improve error handling
Especially when dealing with corrupt or malicious files.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void Browser::OnWindowDidShow() {
if (window_has_shown_)
return;
window_has_shown_ = true;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_WIN)
static bool is_first_browser_window = true;
if (is_first_browser_window &&
!startup_metric_utils::WasNonBrowserUIDisplayed()) {
is_first_browser_window = false;
const base::Time* process_creation_time =
base::CurrentProcessInfo::CreationTime();
if (process_creation_time) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_LONG_TIMES(
"Startup.BrowserWindowDisplay",
base::Time::Now() - *process_creation_time);
}
}
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_WIN)
if (!is_type_tabbed())
return;
GlobalErrorService* service =
GlobalErrorServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile());
GlobalError* error = service->GetFirstGlobalErrorWithBubbleView();
if (error)
error->ShowBubbleView(this);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: jbig2_end_of_stripe(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment, const uint8_t *segment_data)
{
Jbig2Page page = ctx->pages[ctx->current_page];
int end_row;
end_row = jbig2_get_int32(segment_data);
if (end_row < page.end_row) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number,
"end of stripe segment with non-positive end row advance" " (new end row %d vs current end row %d)", end_row, page.end_row);
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_INFO, segment->number, "end of stripe: advancing end row to %d", end_row);
}
page.end_row = end_row;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void nsc_encode_sse2(NSC_CONTEXT* context, const BYTE* data,
UINT32 scanline)
{
nsc_encode_argb_to_aycocg_sse2(context, data, scanline);
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel > 0)
{
nsc_encode_subsampling_sse2(context);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int32 PVLocateH263FrameHeader(uint8 *ptr, int32 size)
{
int count = 0;
int32 i = size;
if (size < 1)
{
return 0;
}
while (i--)
{
if ((count > 1) && ((*ptr & 0xFC) == 0x80))
{
i += 2;
break;
}
if (*ptr++)
count = 0;
else
count++;
}
return (size - (i + 1));
}
Commit Message: Fix NPDs in h263 decoder
Bug: 35269635
Test: decoded PoC with and without patch
Change-Id: I636a14360c7801cc5bca63c9cb44d1d235df8fd8
(cherry picked from commit 2ad2a92318a3b9daf78ebcdc597085adbf32600d)
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AcceleratedSurfaceNew(
int32 width_in_pixel,
int32 height_in_pixel,
uint64 surface_handle) {
ImageTransportFactory* factory = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance();
scoped_refptr<ui::Texture> surface(factory->CreateTransportClient(
gfx::Size(width_in_pixel, height_in_pixel), device_scale_factor_,
surface_handle));
if (!surface) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create ImageTransport texture";
return;
}
image_transport_clients_[surface_handle] = surface;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void FailStoreGroup() {
PushNextTask(base::BindOnce(&AppCacheStorageImplTest::Verify_FailStoreGroup,
base::Unretained(this)));
const int64_t kTooBig = 10 * 1024 * 1024; // 10M
group_ =
new AppCacheGroup(storage(), kManifestUrl, storage()->NewGroupId());
cache_ = new AppCache(storage(), storage()->NewCacheId());
cache_->AddEntry(kManifestUrl,
AppCacheEntry(AppCacheEntry::MANIFEST, 1, kTooBig));
storage()->StoreGroupAndNewestCache(group_.get(), cache_.get(), delegate());
EXPECT_FALSE(delegate()->stored_group_success_); // Expected to be async.
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: vips_gifload_buffer( void *buf, size_t len, VipsImage **out, ... )
{
va_list ap;
VipsBlob *blob;
int result;
/* We don't take a copy of the data or free it.
*/
blob = vips_blob_new( NULL, buf, len );
va_start( ap, out );
result = vips_call_split( "gifload_buffer", ap, blob, out );
va_end( ap );
vips_area_unref( VIPS_AREA( blob ) );
return( result );
}
Commit Message: fetch map after DGifGetImageDesc()
Earlier refactoring broke GIF map fetch.
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void UsbGetUserSelectedDevicesFunction::OnDevicesChosen(
const std::vector<scoped_refptr<UsbDevice>>& devices) {
scoped_ptr<base::ListValue> result(new base::ListValue());
UsbGuidMap* guid_map = UsbGuidMap::Get(browser_context());
for (const auto& device : devices) {
result->Append(
PopulateDevice(device.get(), guid_map->GetIdFromGuid(device->guid())));
}
Respond(OneArgument(result.release()));
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mb_ereg_search_init)
{
size_t argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
zval *arg_str;
char *arg_pattern = NULL, *arg_options = NULL;
int arg_pattern_len = 0, arg_options_len = 0;
OnigSyntaxType *syntax = NULL;
OnigOptionType option;
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "z|ss", &arg_str, &arg_pattern, &arg_pattern_len, &arg_options, &arg_options_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (argc > 1 && arg_pattern_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty pattern");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
option = MBREX(regex_default_options);
syntax = MBREX(regex_default_syntax);
if (argc == 3) {
option = 0;
_php_mb_regex_init_options(arg_options, arg_options_len, &option, &syntax, NULL);
}
if (argc > 1) {
/* create regex pattern buffer */
if ((MBREX(search_re) = php_mbregex_compile_pattern(arg_pattern, arg_pattern_len, option, MBREX(current_mbctype), syntax TSRMLS_CC)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (MBREX(search_str) != NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&MBREX(search_str));
MBREX(search_str) = (zval *)NULL;
}
MBREX(search_str) = arg_str;
Z_ADDREF_P(MBREX(search_str));
SEPARATE_ZVAL_IF_NOT_REF(&MBREX(search_str));
MBREX(search_pos) = 0;
if (MBREX(search_regs) != NULL) {
onig_region_free(MBREX(search_regs), 1);
MBREX(search_regs) = (OnigRegion *) NULL;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode)
{
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
static unsigned int mnt_count;
int err, ret;
might_sleep();
trace_ext4_mark_inode_dirty(inode, _RET_IP_);
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc);
if (err)
return err;
if (ext4_handle_valid(handle) &&
EXT4_I(inode)->i_extra_isize < sbi->s_want_extra_isize &&
!ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND)) {
/*
* We need extra buffer credits since we may write into EA block
* with this same handle. If journal_extend fails, then it will
* only result in a minor loss of functionality for that inode.
* If this is felt to be critical, then e2fsck should be run to
* force a large enough s_min_extra_isize.
*/
if ((jbd2_journal_extend(handle,
EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(inode->i_sb))) == 0) {
ret = ext4_expand_extra_isize(inode,
sbi->s_want_extra_isize,
iloc, handle);
if (ret) {
ext4_set_inode_state(inode,
EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND);
if (mnt_count !=
le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_mnt_count)) {
ext4_warning(inode->i_sb,
"Unable to expand inode %lu. Delete"
" some EAs or run e2fsck.",
inode->i_ino);
mnt_count =
le16_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_mnt_count);
}
}
}
}
return ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix data exposure after a crash
Huang has reported that in his powerfail testing he is seeing stale
block contents in some of recently allocated blocks although he mounts
ext4 in data=ordered mode. After some investigation I have found out
that indeed when delayed allocation is used, we don't add inode to
transaction's list of inodes needing flushing before commit. Originally
we were doing that but commit f3b59291a69d removed the logic with a
flawed argument that it is not needed.
The problem is that although for delayed allocated blocks we write their
contents immediately after allocating them, there is no guarantee that
the IO scheduler or device doesn't reorder things and thus transaction
allocating blocks and attaching them to inode can reach stable storage
before actual block contents. Actually whenever we attach freshly
allocated blocks to inode using a written extent, we should add inode to
transaction's ordered inode list to make sure we properly wait for block
contents to be written before committing the transaction. So that is
what we do in this patch. This also handles other cases where stale data
exposure was possible - like filling hole via mmap in
data=ordered,nodelalloc mode.
The only exception to the above rule are extending direct IO writes where
blkdev_direct_IO() waits for IO to complete before increasing i_size and
thus stale data exposure is not possible. For now we don't complicate
the code with optimizing this special case since the overhead is pretty
low. In case this is observed to be a performance problem we can always
handle it using a special flag to ext4_map_blocks().
CC: [email protected]
Fixes: f3b59291a69d0b734be1fc8be489fef2dd846d3d
Reported-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: "HUANG Weller (CM/ESW12-CN)" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
struct ext4_extent *ex, newex, orig_ex;
struct ext4_extent *ex1 = NULL;
struct ext4_extent *ex2 = NULL;
struct ext4_extent *ex3 = NULL;
struct ext4_extent_header *eh;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block, eof_block;
unsigned int allocated, ee_len, depth;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock;
int err = 0;
int ret = 0;
int may_zeroout;
ext_debug("ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu, max_blocks %u\n", inode->i_ino,
(unsigned long long)map->m_lblk, map->m_len);
eof_block = (inode->i_size + inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1) >>
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits;
if (eof_block < map->m_lblk + map->m_len)
eof_block = map->m_lblk + map->m_len;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
allocated = ee_len - (map->m_lblk - ee_block);
newblock = map->m_lblk - ee_block + ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
ex2 = ex;
orig_ex.ee_block = ex->ee_block;
orig_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&orig_ex, ext4_ext_pblock(ex));
/*
* It is safe to convert extent to initialized via explicit
* zeroout only if extent is fully insde i_size or new_size.
*/
may_zeroout = ee_block + ee_len <= eof_block;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
/* If extent has less than 2*EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN zerout directly */
if (ee_len <= 2*EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN && may_zeroout) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zeroed the full extent */
return allocated;
}
/* ex1: ee_block to map->m_lblk - 1 : uninitialized */
if (map->m_lblk > ee_block) {
ex1 = ex;
ex1->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(map->m_lblk - ee_block);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex1);
ex2 = &newex;
}
/*
* for sanity, update the length of the ex2 extent before
* we insert ex3, if ex1 is NULL. This is to avoid temporary
* overlap of blocks.
*/
if (!ex1 && allocated > map->m_len)
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(map->m_len);
/* ex3: to ee_block + ee_len : uninitialised */
if (allocated > map->m_len) {
unsigned int newdepth;
/* If extent has less than EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN zerout directly */
if (allocated <= EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN && may_zeroout) {
/*
* map->m_lblk == ee_block is handled by the zerouout
* at the beginning.
* Mark first half uninitialized.
* Mark second half initialized and zero out the
* initialized extent
*/
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len - allocated);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
ex3 = &newex;
ex3->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(map->m_lblk);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex3, newblock);
ex3->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path,
ex3, 0);
if (err == -ENOSPC) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex,
ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* blocks available from map->m_lblk */
return allocated;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/*
* We need to zero out the second half because
* an fallocate request can update file size and
* converting the second half to initialized extent
* implies that we can leak some junk data to user
* space.
*/
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, ex3);
if (err) {
/*
* We should actually mark the
* second half as uninit and return error
* Insert would have changed the extent
*/
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
path = ext4_ext_find_extent(inode, map->m_lblk,
path);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
err = PTR_ERR(path);
return err;
}
/* get the second half extent details */
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode,
path + depth);
if (err)
return err;
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
}
/* zeroed the second half */
return allocated;
}
ex3 = &newex;
ex3->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(map->m_lblk + map->m_len);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex3, newblock + map->m_len);
ex3->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated - map->m_len);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex3);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, ex3, 0);
if (err == -ENOSPC && may_zeroout) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zeroed the full extent */
/* blocks available from map->m_lblk */
return allocated;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/*
* The depth, and hence eh & ex might change
* as part of the insert above.
*/
newdepth = ext_depth(inode);
/*
* update the extent length after successful insert of the
* split extent
*/
ee_len -= ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex3);
orig_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len);
may_zeroout = ee_block + ee_len <= eof_block;
depth = newdepth;
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
path = ext4_ext_find_extent(inode, map->m_lblk, path);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
err = PTR_ERR(path);
goto out;
}
eh = path[depth].p_hdr;
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
if (ex2 != &newex)
ex2 = ex;
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
allocated = map->m_len;
/* If extent has less than EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN and we are trying
* to insert a extent in the middle zerout directly
* otherwise give the extent a chance to merge to left
*/
if (le16_to_cpu(orig_ex.ee_len) <= EXT4_EXT_ZERO_LEN &&
map->m_lblk != ee_block && may_zeroout) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zero out the first half */
/* blocks available from map->m_lblk */
return allocated;
}
}
/*
* If there was a change of depth as part of the
* insertion of ex3 above, we need to update the length
* of the ex1 extent again here
*/
if (ex1 && ex1 != ex) {
ex1 = ex;
ex1->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(map->m_lblk - ee_block);
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex1);
ex2 = &newex;
}
/* ex2: map->m_lblk to map->m_lblk + maxblocks-1 : initialised */
ex2->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(map->m_lblk);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex2, newblock);
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(allocated);
if (ex2 != ex)
goto insert;
/*
* New (initialized) extent starts from the first block
* in the current extent. i.e., ex2 == ex
* We have to see if it can be merged with the extent
* on the left.
*/
if (ex2 > EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(eh)) {
/*
* To merge left, pass "ex2 - 1" to try_to_merge(),
* since it merges towards right _only_.
*/
ret = ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex2 - 1);
if (ret) {
err = ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
goto out;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex2--;
}
}
/*
* Try to Merge towards right. This might be required
* only when the whole extent is being written to.
* i.e. ex2 == ex and ex3 == NULL.
*/
if (!ex3) {
ret = ext4_ext_try_to_merge(inode, path, ex2);
if (ret) {
err = ext4_ext_correct_indexes(handle, inode, path);
if (err)
goto out;
}
}
/* Mark modified extent as dirty */
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
goto out;
insert:
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, path, &newex, 0);
if (err == -ENOSPC && may_zeroout) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
/* zero out the first half */
return allocated;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err ? err : allocated;
fix_extent_len:
ex->ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_mark_uninitialized(ex);
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CreateDelegatedFrameHostClient() {
if (IsMus())
return;
cc::FrameSinkId frame_sink_id =
host_->AllocateFrameSinkId(is_guest_view_hack_);
if (!delegated_frame_host_client_) {
delegated_frame_host_client_ =
base::MakeUnique<DelegatedFrameHostClientAura>(this);
}
delegated_frame_host_ = base::MakeUnique<DelegatedFrameHost>(
frame_sink_id, delegated_frame_host_client_.get());
if (renderer_compositor_frame_sink_) {
delegated_frame_host_->DidCreateNewRendererCompositorFrameSink(
renderer_compositor_frame_sink_);
}
UpdateNeedsBeginFramesInternal();
if (host_->delegate() && host_->delegate()->GetInputEventRouter()) {
host_->delegate()->GetInputEventRouter()->AddFrameSinkIdOwner(
GetFrameSinkId(), this);
}
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: MetadataRetrieverClient::MetadataRetrieverClient(pid_t pid)
{
ALOGV("MetadataRetrieverClient constructor pid(%d)", pid);
mPid = pid;
mThumbnail = NULL;
mAlbumArt = NULL;
mRetriever = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Clear unused pointer field when sending across binder
Bug: 28377502
Change-Id: Iad5ebfb0a9ef89f09755bb332579dbd3534f9c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: xps_true_callback_glyph_name(gs_font *pfont, gs_glyph glyph, gs_const_string *pstr)
{
/* This function is copied verbatim from plfont.c */
int table_length;
int table_offset;
ulong format;
uint numGlyphs;
uint glyph_name_index;
const byte *postp; /* post table pointer */
/* guess if the font type is not truetype */
if ( pfont->FontType != ft_TrueType )
{
pstr->size = strlen((char*)pstr->data);
return 0;
}
else
{
return gs_throw1(-1, "glyph index %lu out of range", (ulong)glyph);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void PaymentRequest::Init(mojom::PaymentRequestClientPtr client,
std::vector<mojom::PaymentMethodDataPtr> method_data,
mojom::PaymentDetailsPtr details,
mojom::PaymentOptionsPtr options) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
client_ = std::move(client);
const GURL last_committed_url = delegate_->GetLastCommittedURL();
if (!OriginSecurityChecker::IsOriginSecure(last_committed_url)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not in a secure origin";
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
bool allowed_origin =
OriginSecurityChecker::IsSchemeCryptographic(last_committed_url) ||
OriginSecurityChecker::IsOriginLocalhostOrFile(last_committed_url);
if (!allowed_origin) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Only localhost, file://, and cryptographic scheme origins "
"allowed";
}
bool invalid_ssl =
OriginSecurityChecker::IsSchemeCryptographic(last_committed_url) &&
!delegate_->IsSslCertificateValid();
if (invalid_ssl)
LOG(ERROR) << "SSL certificate is not valid";
if (!allowed_origin || invalid_ssl) {
return;
}
std::string error;
if (!ValidatePaymentDetails(ConvertPaymentDetails(details), &error)) {
LOG(ERROR) << error;
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
if (!details->total) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Missing total";
OnConnectionTerminated();
return;
}
spec_ = std::make_unique<PaymentRequestSpec>(
std::move(options), std::move(details), std::move(method_data), this,
delegate_->GetApplicationLocale());
state_ = std::make_unique<PaymentRequestState>(
web_contents_, top_level_origin_, frame_origin_, spec_.get(), this,
delegate_->GetApplicationLocale(), delegate_->GetPersonalDataManager(),
delegate_.get(), &journey_logger_);
journey_logger_.SetRequestedInformation(
spec_->request_shipping(), spec_->request_payer_email(),
spec_->request_payer_phone(), spec_->request_payer_name());
GURL google_pay_url(kGooglePayMethodName);
GURL android_pay_url(kAndroidPayMethodName);
auto non_google_it =
std::find_if(spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers().begin(),
spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers().end(),
[google_pay_url, android_pay_url](const GURL& url) {
return url != google_pay_url && url != android_pay_url;
});
journey_logger_.SetRequestedPaymentMethodTypes(
/*requested_basic_card=*/!spec_->supported_card_networks().empty(),
/*requested_method_google=*/
base::ContainsValue(spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers(),
google_pay_url) ||
base::ContainsValue(spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers(),
android_pay_url),
/*requested_method_other=*/non_google_it !=
spec_->url_payment_method_identifiers().end());
}
Commit Message: [Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822}
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void rng_backend_init(Object *obj)
{
object_property_add_bool(obj, "opened",
rng_backend_prop_get_opened,
rng_backend_prop_set_opened,
NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: NewTabUILoadObserver::~NewTabUILoadObserver() {
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::CheckThread() {
if (detach_thread_at_next_check_) {
thread_checker_.DetachFromThread();
detach_thread_at_next_check_ = false;
}
CHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void ctimestampFunc(
sqlite3_context *context,
int NotUsed,
sqlite3_value **NotUsed2
){
UNUSED_PARAMETER2(NotUsed, NotUsed2);
datetimeFunc(context, 0, 0);
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadPSDChannelRLE(Image *image,const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ssize_t type,MagickOffsetType *sizes,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
length,
row_size;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels,
*pixels;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" layer data is RLE compressed");
row_size=GetPSDRowSize(image);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(row_size,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
length=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
if ((MagickOffsetType) length < sizes[y])
length=(size_t) sizes[y];
if (length > row_size + 256) // arbitrary number
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"InvalidLength",
image->filename);
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(compact_pixels,0,length*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
status=MagickTrue;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
status=MagickFalse;
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) sizes[y],compact_pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) sizes[y])
break;
count=DecodePSDPixels((size_t) sizes[y],compact_pixels,
(ssize_t) (image->depth == 1 ? 123456 : image->depth),row_size,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) row_size)
break;
status=ReadPSDChannelPixels(image,psd_info->channels,y,type,pixels,
exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/350
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,
char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
const EVP_MD *type;
unsigned char *p,*buf_in=NULL;
int ret= -1,i,inl;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm);
type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i));
if (type == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
inl=i2d(data,NULL);
buf_in=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl);
if (buf_in == NULL)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p=buf_in;
i2d(data,&p);
ret=
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL)
&& EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl);
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl);
OPENSSL_free(buf_in);
if (!ret)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = -1;
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data,
(unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0)
{
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret=0;
goto err;
}
/* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked
* public information */
/* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */
ret=1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int nfc_llcp_send_i_frame(struct nfc_llcp_sock *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sk_buff *pdu;
struct sock *sk = &sock->sk;
struct nfc_llcp_local *local;
size_t frag_len = 0, remaining_len;
u8 *msg_data, *msg_ptr;
u16 remote_miu;
pr_debug("Send I frame len %zd\n", len);
local = sock->local;
if (local == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
/* Remote is ready but has not acknowledged our frames */
if((sock->remote_ready &&
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_pending_queue) >= sock->remote_rw &&
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_queue) >= 2 * sock->remote_rw)) {
pr_err("Pending queue is full %d frames\n",
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_pending_queue));
return -ENOBUFS;
}
/* Remote is not ready and we've been queueing enough frames */
if ((!sock->remote_ready &&
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_queue) >= 2 * sock->remote_rw)) {
pr_err("Tx queue is full %d frames\n",
skb_queue_len(&sock->tx_queue));
return -ENOBUFS;
}
msg_data = kmalloc(len, GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (msg_data == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (memcpy_from_msg(msg_data, msg, len)) {
kfree(msg_data);
return -EFAULT;
}
remaining_len = len;
msg_ptr = msg_data;
do {
remote_miu = sock->remote_miu > LLCP_MAX_MIU ?
LLCP_DEFAULT_MIU : sock->remote_miu;
frag_len = min_t(size_t, remote_miu, remaining_len);
pr_debug("Fragment %zd bytes remaining %zd",
frag_len, remaining_len);
pdu = llcp_allocate_pdu(sock, LLCP_PDU_I,
frag_len + LLCP_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
if (pdu == NULL) {
kfree(msg_data);
return -ENOMEM;
}
skb_put(pdu, LLCP_SEQUENCE_SIZE);
if (likely(frag_len > 0))
skb_put_data(pdu, msg_ptr, frag_len);
skb_queue_tail(&sock->tx_queue, pdu);
lock_sock(sk);
nfc_llcp_queue_i_frames(sock);
release_sock(sk);
remaining_len -= frag_len;
msg_ptr += frag_len;
} while (remaining_len > 0);
kfree(msg_data);
return len;
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: mkvparser::IMkvReader::~IMkvReader()
{
//// Disable MSVC warnings that suggest making code non-portable.
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: long Segment::DoLoadCluster(
long long& pos,
long& len)
{
if (m_pos < 0)
return DoLoadClusterUnknownSize(pos, len);
long long total, avail;
long status = m_pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
const long long segment_stop = (m_size < 0) ? -1 : m_start + m_size;
long long cluster_off = -1; //offset relative to start of segment
long long cluster_size = -1; //size of cluster payload
for (;;)
{
if ((total >= 0) && (m_pos >= total))
return 1; //no more clusters
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (m_pos >= segment_stop))
return 1; //no more clusters
pos = m_pos;
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
pos += len; //consume ID
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume length of size of element
if (size == 0) //weird
{
m_pos = pos;
continue;
}
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
#if 0 //we must handle this to support live webm
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: allow this
#endif
if ((segment_stop >= 0) &&
(size != unknown_size) &&
((pos + size) > segment_stop))
{
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
#if 0 //commented-out, to support incremental cluster parsing
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if ((pos + size) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
#endif
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
{
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: liberalize
if (m_pCues == NULL)
{
const long long element_size = (pos - idpos) + size;
m_pCues = new Cues(this,
pos,
size,
idpos,
element_size);
assert(m_pCues); //TODO
}
m_pos = pos + size; //consume payload
continue;
}
if (id != 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
{
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: liberalize
m_pos = pos + size; //consume payload
continue;
}
cluster_off = idpos - m_start; //relative pos
if (size != unknown_size)
cluster_size = size;
break;
}
assert(cluster_off >= 0); //have cluster
long long pos_;
long len_;
status = Cluster::HasBlockEntries(this, cluster_off, pos_, len_);
if (status < 0) //error, or underflow
{
pos = pos_;
len = len_;
return status;
}
const long idx = m_clusterCount;
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0)
{
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
const long long off = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(off >= 0);
if (off == cluster_off) //preloaded already
{
if (status == 0) //no entries found
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (cluster_size >= 0)
pos += cluster_size;
else
{
const long long element_size = pCluster->GetElementSize();
if (element_size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: handle this case
pos = pCluster->m_element_start + element_size;
}
pCluster->m_index = idx; //move from preloaded to loaded
++m_clusterCount;
--m_clusterPreloadCount;
m_pos = pos; //consume payload
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 0; //success
}
}
if (status == 0) //no entries found
{
if (cluster_size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //TODO: handle this
pos += cluster_size;
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
{
m_pos = total;
return 1; //no more clusters
}
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
{
m_pos = segment_stop;
return 1; //no more clusters
}
m_pos = pos;
return 2; //try again
}
Cluster* const pCluster = Cluster::Create(this,
idx,
cluster_off);
assert(pCluster);
AppendCluster(pCluster);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
assert(m_clusters[idx] == pCluster);
if (cluster_size >= 0)
{
pos += cluster_size;
m_pos = pos;
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 0;
}
m_pUnknownSize = pCluster;
m_pos = -pos;
return 0; //partial success, since we have a new cluster
//// status == 0 means "no block entries found"
//// pos designates start of payload
//// m_pos has NOT been adjusted yet (in case we need to come back here)
#if 0
if (cluster_size < 0) //unknown size
{
const long long payload_pos = pos; //absolute pos of cluster payload
for (;;) //determine cluster size
{
if ((total >= 0) && (pos >= total))
break;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && (pos >= segment_stop))
break; //no more clusters
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long idpos = pos;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
if (id < 0) //error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0x0F43B675) //Cluster ID
break;
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) //Cues ID
break;
switch (id)
{
case 0x20: //BlockGroup
case 0x23: //Simple Block
case 0x67: //TimeCode
case 0x2B: //PrevSize
break;
default:
assert(false);
break;
}
pos += len; //consume ID (of sub-element)
if ((pos + 1) > avail)
{
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) //weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > segment_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) //error
return static_cast<long>(size);
pos += len; //consume size field of element
if (size == 0) //weird
continue;
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //not allowed for sub-elements
if ((segment_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > segment_stop)) //weird
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += size; //consume payload of sub-element
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (pos <= segment_stop));
} //determine cluster size
cluster_size = pos - payload_pos;
assert(cluster_size >= 0);
pos = payload_pos; //reset and re-parse original cluster
}
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0)
{
assert(idx < m_clusterSize);
Cluster* const pCluster = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
const long long off = pCluster->GetPosition();
assert(off >= 0);
if (off == cluster_off) //preloaded already
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; //subtle
}
m_pos = pos + cluster_size; //consume payload
assert((segment_stop < 0) || (m_pos <= segment_stop));
return 2; //try to find another cluster
#endif
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::formAction(USVStringOrTrustedURL& result) const {
const AtomicString& action = FastGetAttribute(kFormactionAttr);
if (action.IsEmpty()) {
result.SetUSVString(GetDocument().Url());
return;
}
result.SetUSVString(
GetDocument().CompleteURL(StripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(action)));
}
Commit Message: autofocus: Fix a crash with an autofocus element in a document without browsing context.
ShouldAutofocus() should check existence of the browsing context.
Otherwise, doc.TopFrameOrigin() returns null.
Before crrev.com/695830, ShouldAutofocus() was called only for
rendered elements. That is to say, the document always had
browsing context.
Bug: 1003228
Change-Id: I2a941c34e9707d44869a6d7585dc7fb9f06e3bf4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1800902
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Keishi Hattori <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#696291}
CWE ID: CWE-704
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void srpt_qp_event(struct ib_event *event, struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch)
{
pr_debug("QP event %d on cm_id=%p sess_name=%s state=%d\n",
event->event, ch->cm_id, ch->sess_name, srpt_get_ch_state(ch));
switch (event->event) {
case IB_EVENT_COMM_EST:
ib_cm_notify(ch->cm_id, event->event);
break;
case IB_EVENT_QP_LAST_WQE_REACHED:
if (srpt_test_and_set_ch_state(ch, CH_DRAINING,
CH_RELEASING))
srpt_release_channel(ch);
else
pr_debug("%s: state %d - ignored LAST_WQE.\n",
ch->sess_name, srpt_get_ch_state(ch));
break;
default:
pr_err("received unrecognized IB QP event %d\n", event->event);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <[email protected]>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static bool add_free_nid(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t nid, bool build)
{
struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
struct free_nid *i;
struct nat_entry *ne;
int err;
/* 0 nid should not be used */
if (unlikely(nid == 0))
return false;
if (build) {
/* do not add allocated nids */
ne = __lookup_nat_cache(nm_i, nid);
if (ne && (!get_nat_flag(ne, IS_CHECKPOINTED) ||
nat_get_blkaddr(ne) != NULL_ADDR))
return false;
}
i = f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(free_nid_slab, GFP_NOFS);
i->nid = nid;
i->state = NID_NEW;
if (radix_tree_preload(GFP_NOFS)) {
kmem_cache_free(free_nid_slab, i);
return true;
}
spin_lock(&nm_i->nid_list_lock);
err = __insert_nid_to_list(sbi, i, FREE_NID_LIST, true);
spin_unlock(&nm_i->nid_list_lock);
radix_tree_preload_end();
if (err) {
kmem_cache_free(free_nid_slab, i);
return true;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int on_header_field(http_parser *parser, const char *str, size_t len)
{
parser_context *ctx = (parser_context *) parser->data;
http_subtransport *t = ctx->t;
/* Both parse_header_name and parse_header_value are populated
* and ready for consumption */
if (VALUE == t->last_cb)
if (on_header_ready(t) < 0)
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
if (NONE == t->last_cb || VALUE == t->last_cb)
git_buf_clear(&t->parse_header_name);
if (git_buf_put(&t->parse_header_name, str, len) < 0)
return t->parse_error = PARSE_ERROR_GENERIC;
t->last_cb = FIELD;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: http: check certificate validity before clobbering the error variable
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void ihevcd_parse_sei_payload(codec_t *ps_codec,
UWORD32 u4_payload_type,
UWORD32 u4_payload_size,
WORD8 i1_nal_type)
{
parse_ctxt_t *ps_parse = &ps_codec->s_parse;
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm = &ps_parse->s_bitstrm;
WORD32 payload_bits_remaining = 0;
sps_t *ps_sps;
UWORD32 i;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_SPS_CNT; i++)
{
ps_sps = ps_codec->ps_sps_base + i;
if(ps_sps->i1_sps_valid)
{
break;
}
}
if(NULL == ps_sps)
{
return;
}
if(NAL_PREFIX_SEI == i1_nal_type)
{
switch(u4_payload_type)
{
case SEI_BUFFERING_PERIOD:
ps_parse->s_sei_params.i1_sei_parameters_present_flag = 1;
ihevcd_parse_buffering_period_sei(ps_codec, ps_sps);
break;
case SEI_PICTURE_TIMING:
ps_parse->s_sei_params.i1_sei_parameters_present_flag = 1;
ihevcd_parse_pic_timing_sei(ps_codec, ps_sps);
break;
case SEI_TIME_CODE:
ps_parse->s_sei_params.i1_sei_parameters_present_flag = 1;
ihevcd_parse_time_code_sei(ps_codec);
break;
case SEI_MASTERING_DISPLAY_COLOUR_VOLUME:
ps_parse->s_sei_params.i4_sei_mastering_disp_colour_vol_params_present_flags = 1;
ihevcd_parse_mastering_disp_params_sei(ps_codec);
break;
case SEI_USER_DATA_REGISTERED_ITU_T_T35:
ps_parse->s_sei_params.i1_sei_parameters_present_flag = 1;
ihevcd_parse_user_data_registered_itu_t_t35(ps_codec,
u4_payload_size);
break;
default:
for(i = 0; i < u4_payload_size; i++)
{
ihevcd_bits_flush(ps_bitstrm, 8);
}
break;
}
}
else /* NAL_SUFFIX_SEI */
{
switch(u4_payload_type)
{
case SEI_USER_DATA_REGISTERED_ITU_T_T35:
ps_parse->s_sei_params.i1_sei_parameters_present_flag = 1;
ihevcd_parse_user_data_registered_itu_t_t35(ps_codec,
u4_payload_size);
break;
default:
for(i = 0; i < u4_payload_size; i++)
{
ihevcd_bits_flush(ps_bitstrm, 8);
}
break;
}
}
/**
* By definition the underlying bitstream terminates in a byte-aligned manner.
* 1. Extract all bar the last MIN(bitsremaining,nine) bits as reserved_payload_extension_data
* 2. Examine the final 8 bits to determine the payload_bit_equal_to_one marker
* 3. Extract the remainingreserved_payload_extension_data bits.
*
* If there are fewer than 9 bits available, extract them.
*/
payload_bits_remaining = ihevcd_bits_num_bits_remaining(ps_bitstrm);
if(payload_bits_remaining) /* more_data_in_payload() */
{
WORD32 final_bits;
WORD32 final_payload_bits = 0;
WORD32 mask = 0xFF;
UWORD32 u4_dummy;
UWORD32 u4_reserved_payload_extension_data;
UNUSED(u4_dummy);
UNUSED(u4_reserved_payload_extension_data);
while(payload_bits_remaining > 9)
{
BITS_PARSE("reserved_payload_extension_data",
u4_reserved_payload_extension_data, ps_bitstrm, 1);
payload_bits_remaining--;
}
final_bits = ihevcd_bits_nxt(ps_bitstrm, payload_bits_remaining);
while(final_bits & (mask >> final_payload_bits))
{
final_payload_bits++;
continue;
}
while(payload_bits_remaining > (9 - final_payload_bits))
{
BITS_PARSE("reserved_payload_extension_data",
u4_reserved_payload_extension_data, ps_bitstrm, 1);
payload_bits_remaining--;
}
BITS_PARSE("payload_bit_equal_to_one", u4_dummy, ps_bitstrm, 1);
payload_bits_remaining--;
while(payload_bits_remaining)
{
BITS_PARSE("payload_bit_equal_to_zero", u4_dummy, ps_bitstrm, 1);
payload_bits_remaining--;
}
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Fix overflow in sei user data parsing
Bug: 37968960
Bug: 65484460
Test: ran POC post-patch
Change-Id: I73e91b4b2976b954b5fd4f29182d6072abbc7f70
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::InitPrintSettings(WebKit::WebFrame* frame,
WebKit::WebNode* node,
bool is_preview) {
DCHECK(frame);
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params settings;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_GetDefaultPrintSettings(routing_id(),
&settings.params));
bool result = true;
if (PrintMsg_Print_Params_IsEmpty(settings.params)) {
if (!is_preview) {
render_view()->runModalAlertDialog(
frame,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_PRINT_PREVIEW_INVALID_PRINTER_SETTINGS));
}
result = false;
}
if (result &&
(settings.params.dpi < kMinDpi || settings.params.document_cookie == 0)) {
NOTREACHED();
result = false;
}
settings.pages.clear();
print_pages_params_.reset(new PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params(settings));
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool RenderThreadImpl::IsGpuRasterizationForced() {
return is_gpu_rasterization_forced_;
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int crypto_ahash_op(struct ahash_request *req,
int (*op)(struct ahash_request *))
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
unsigned long alignmask = crypto_ahash_alignmask(tfm);
if ((unsigned long)req->result & alignmask)
return ahash_op_unaligned(req, op);
return op(req);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: Tracks::~Tracks()
{
Track** i = m_trackEntries;
Track** const j = m_trackEntriesEnd;
while (i != j)
{
Track* const pTrack = *i++;
delete pTrack;
}
delete[] m_trackEntries;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static inline bool vrend_format_can_sample(enum virgl_formats format)
{
return tex_conv_table[format].bindings & VREND_BIND_SAMPLER;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: CSSStyleSheet::CSSStyleSheet(StyleSheetContents* contents,
CSSImportRule* owner_rule)
: contents_(contents),
owner_rule_(owner_rule),
start_position_(TextPosition::MinimumPosition()) {
contents_->RegisterClient(this);
}
Commit Message: Disallow access to opaque CSS responses.
Bug: 848786
Change-Id: Ie53fbf644afdd76d7c65649a05c939c63d89b4ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1088335
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565537}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void hostap_setup_dev(struct net_device *dev, local_info_t *local,
int type)
{
struct hostap_interface *iface;
iface = netdev_priv(dev);
ether_setup(dev);
/* kernel callbacks */
if (iface) {
/* Currently, we point to the proper spy_data only on
* the main_dev. This could be fixed. Jean II */
iface->wireless_data.spy_data = &iface->spy_data;
dev->wireless_data = &iface->wireless_data;
}
dev->wireless_handlers = &hostap_iw_handler_def;
dev->watchdog_timeo = TX_TIMEOUT;
switch(type) {
case HOSTAP_INTERFACE_AP:
dev->tx_queue_len = 0; /* use main radio device queue */
dev->netdev_ops = &hostap_mgmt_netdev_ops;
dev->type = ARPHRD_IEEE80211;
dev->header_ops = &hostap_80211_ops;
break;
case HOSTAP_INTERFACE_MASTER:
dev->netdev_ops = &hostap_master_ops;
break;
default:
dev->tx_queue_len = 0; /* use main radio device queue */
dev->netdev_ops = &hostap_netdev_ops;
}
dev->mtu = local->mtu;
SET_ETHTOOL_OPS(dev, &prism2_ethtool_ops);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool DirectoryExists(const std::wstring& path) {
DWORD file_attributes = ::GetFileAttributes(path.c_str());
if (file_attributes == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES)
return false;
return (file_attributes & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) != 0;
}
Commit Message: Ignore switches following "--" when parsing a command line.
BUG=933004
[email protected]
Change-Id: I911be4cbfc38a4d41dec85d85f7fe0f50ddca392
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481210
Auto-Submit: Greg Thompson <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634604}
CWE ID: CWE-77
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void ikev2_parent_inR1outI2_continue(struct pluto_crypto_req_cont *pcrc,
struct pluto_crypto_req *r,
err_t ugh)
{
struct dh_continuation *dh = (struct dh_continuation *)pcrc;
struct msg_digest *md = dh->md;
struct state *const st = md->st;
stf_status e;
DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
DBG_log("ikev2 parent inR1outI2: calculating g^{xy}, sending I2"));
if (st == NULL) {
loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
"%s: Request was disconnected from state",
__FUNCTION__);
if (dh->md)
release_md(dh->md);
return;
}
/* XXX should check out ugh */
passert(ugh == NULL);
passert(cur_state == NULL);
passert(st != NULL);
passert(st->st_suspended_md == dh->md);
set_suspended(st, NULL); /* no longer connected or suspended */
set_cur_state(st);
st->st_calculating = FALSE;
e = ikev2_parent_inR1outI2_tail(pcrc, r);
if (dh->md != NULL) {
complete_v2_state_transition(&dh->md, e);
if (dh->md)
release_md(dh->md);
}
reset_globals();
passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: XpmCreateDataFromXpmImage(
char ***data_return,
XpmImage *image,
XpmInfo *info)
{
/* calculation variables */
int ErrorStatus;
char buf[BUFSIZ];
char **header = NULL, **data, **sptr, **sptr2, *s;
unsigned int header_size, header_nlines;
unsigned int data_size, data_nlines;
unsigned int extensions = 0, ext_size = 0, ext_nlines = 0;
unsigned int offset, l, n;
*data_return = NULL;
extensions = info && (info->valuemask & XpmExtensions)
&& info->nextensions;
/* compute the number of extensions lines and size */
if (extensions)
CountExtensions(info->extensions, info->nextensions,
&ext_size, &ext_nlines);
/*
* alloc a temporary array of char pointer for the header section which
*/
header_nlines = 1 + image->ncolors; /* this may wrap and/or become 0 */
/* 2nd check superfluous if we do not need header_nlines any further */
if(header_nlines <= image->ncolors ||
header_nlines >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(char *))
return(XpmNoMemory);
header_size = sizeof(char *) * header_nlines;
if (header_size >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(char *))
return (XpmNoMemory);
header = (char **) XpmCalloc(header_size, sizeof(char *)); /* can we trust image->ncolors */
if (!header)
return (XpmNoMemory);
/* print the hints line */
s = buf;
#ifndef VOID_SPRINTF
s +=
#endif
sprintf(s, "%d %d %d %d", image->width, image->height,
image->ncolors, image->cpp);
#ifdef VOID_SPRINTF
s += strlen(s);
#endif
if (info && (info->valuemask & XpmHotspot)) {
#ifndef VOID_SPRINTF
s +=
#endif
sprintf(s, " %d %d", info->x_hotspot, info->y_hotspot);
#ifdef VOID_SPRINTF
s += strlen(s);
#endif
}
if (extensions) {
strcpy(s, " XPMEXT");
s += 7;
}
l = s - buf + 1;
*header = (char *) XpmMalloc(l);
if (!*header)
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
header_size += l;
strcpy(*header, buf);
/* print colors */
ErrorStatus = CreateColors(header + 1, &header_size,
image->colorTable, image->ncolors, image->cpp);
if (ErrorStatus != XpmSuccess)
RETURN(ErrorStatus);
/* now we know the size needed, alloc the data and copy the header lines */
offset = image->width * image->cpp + 1;
if(offset <= image->width || offset <= image->cpp)
if(offset <= image->width || offset <= image->cpp)
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
if( (image->height + ext_nlines) >= UINT_MAX / sizeof(char *))
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size = (image->height + ext_nlines) * sizeof(char *);
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size += image->height * offset;
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size += image->height * offset;
if( (header_size + ext_size) >= (UINT_MAX - data_size) )
RETURN(XpmNoMemory);
data_size += header_size + ext_size;
data_nlines = header_nlines + image->height + ext_nlines;
*data = (char *) (data + data_nlines);
/* can header have less elements then n suggests? */
n = image->ncolors;
for (l = 0, sptr = data, sptr2 = header; l <= n && sptr && sptr2; l++, sptr++, sptr2++) {
strcpy(*sptr, *sptr2);
*(sptr + 1) = *sptr + strlen(*sptr2) + 1;
}
/* print pixels */
data[header_nlines] = (char *) data + header_size
+ (image->height + ext_nlines) * sizeof(char *);
CreatePixels(data + header_nlines, data_size-header_nlines, image->width, image->height,
image->cpp, image->data, image->colorTable);
/* print extensions */
if (extensions)
CreateExtensions(data + header_nlines + image->height - 1,
data_size - header_nlines - image->height + 1, offset,
info->extensions, info->nextensions,
ext_nlines);
*data_return = data;
ErrorStatus = XpmSuccess;
/* exit point, free only locally allocated variables */
exit:
if (header) {
for (l = 0; l < header_nlines; l++)
if (header[l])
XpmFree(header[l]);
XpmFree(header);
}
return(ErrorStatus);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void free_subdir(struct pathnames *paths)
{
free(paths);
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::RouteJsMessageReply(
const std::string& name, const JsArgList& args,
const JsEventHandler* target) {
host_->frontend_loop_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, NewRunnableMethod(
this, &Core::RouteJsMessageReplyOnFrontendLoop,
name, args, target));
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: DefragRegisterTests(void)
{
#ifdef UNITTESTS
UtRegisterTest("DefragInOrderSimpleTest", DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragReverseSimpleTest", DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest", DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest", DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest", DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragSturgesNovakLastTest", DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4NoDataTest", DefragIPv4NoDataTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragIPv4TooLargeTest", DefragIPv4TooLargeTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest", IPV6DefragInOrderSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest", IPV6DefragReverseSimpleTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakBsdTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLinuxTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakWindowsTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakSolarisTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakFirstTest);
UtRegisterTest("IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest",
IPV6DefragSturgesNovakLastTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanTest", DefragVlanTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragVlanQinQTest", DefragVlanQinQTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTrackerReuseTest", DefragTrackerReuseTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragTimeoutTest", DefragTimeoutTest);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv4Test", DefragMfIpv4Test);
UtRegisterTest("DefragMfIpv6Test", DefragMfIpv6Test);
#endif /* UNITTESTS */
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: hb_buffer_set_script (hb_buffer_t *buffer,
hb_script_t script)
{
buffer->script = script;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: usage(const char *prog)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [OPTION...]\n", prog);
fprintf(stderr, " -f, --use-file=FILE Use the specified configuration file\n");
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -P, --vrrp Only run with VRRP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -C, --check Only run with Health-checker subsystem\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -B, --no_bfd Don't run BFD subsystem\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " --all Force all child processes to run, even if have no configuration\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -l, --log-console Log messages to local console\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -D, --log-detail Detailed log messages\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -S, --log-facility=[0-7] Set syslog facility to LOG_LOCAL[0-7]\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -g, --log-file=FILE Also log to FILE (default /tmp/keepalived.log)\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --flush-log-file Flush log file on write\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -G, --no-syslog Don't log via syslog\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -X, --release-vips Drop VIP on transition from signal.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -V, --dont-release-vrrp Don't remove VRRP VIPs and VROUTEs on daemon stop\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -I, --dont-release-ipvs Don't remove IPVS topology on daemon stop\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -R, --dont-respawn Don't respawn child processes\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -n, --dont-fork Don't fork the daemon process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -d, --dump-conf Dump the configuration data\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -p, --pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for parent process\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -r, --vrrp_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for VRRP child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -c, --checkers_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for checkers child process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -a, --address-monitoring Report all address additions/deletions notified via netlink\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -b, --bfd_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for BFD child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
fprintf(stderr, " -x, --snmp Enable SNMP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -A, --snmp-agent-socket=FILE Use the specified socket for master agent\n");
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
fprintf(stderr, " -s, --namespace=NAME Run in network namespace NAME (overrides config)\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -m, --core-dump Produce core dump if terminate abnormally\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -M, --core-dump-pattern=PATN Also set /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern to PATN (default 'core')\n");
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
fprintf(stderr, " -L, --mem-check-log Log malloc/frees to syslog\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -i, --config-id id Skip any configuration lines beginning '@' that don't match id\n"
" or any lines beginning @^ that do match.\n"
" The config-id defaults to the node name if option not used\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --signum=SIGFUNC Return signal number for STOP, RELOAD, DATA, STATS"
#ifdef _WITH_JSON_
", JSON"
#endif
"\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -t, --config-test[=LOG_FILE] Check the configuration for obvious errors, output to\n"
" stderr by default\n");
#ifdef _WITH_PERF_
fprintf(stderr, " --perf[=PERF_TYPE] Collect perf data, PERF_TYPE=all, run(default) or end\n");
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_OPTIONS
fprintf(stderr, " --debug[=...] Enable debug options. p, b, c, v specify parent, bfd, checker and vrrp processes\n");
#ifdef _TIMER_CHECK_
fprintf(stderr, " T - timer debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _SMTP_ALERT_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " M - email alert debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " E - epoll debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_THREAD_DUMP_
fprintf(stderr, " D - epoll thread dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _VRRP_FD_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, " F - vrrp fd dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _REGEX_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " R - regex debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_REGEX_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " X - regex timers\n");
#endif
#ifdef _TSM_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " S - TSM debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _NETLINK_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " N - netlink timer debug\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " Example --debug=TpMEvcp\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -v, --version Display the version number\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -h, --help Display this help message\n");
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int save_dev(blkid_dev dev, FILE *file)
{
struct list_head *p;
if (!dev || dev->bid_name[0] != '/')
return 0;
DBG(SAVE, ul_debug("device %s, type %s", dev->bid_name, dev->bid_type ?
dev->bid_type : "(null)"));
fprintf(file, "<device DEVNO=\"0x%04lx\" TIME=\"%ld.%ld\"",
(unsigned long) dev->bid_devno,
(long) dev->bid_time,
(long) dev->bid_utime);
if (dev->bid_pri)
fprintf(file, " PRI=\"%d\"", dev->bid_pri);
list_for_each(p, &dev->bid_tags) {
blkid_tag tag = list_entry(p, struct blkid_struct_tag, bit_tags);
fprintf(file, " %s=\"%s\"", tag->bit_name,tag->bit_val);
}
fprintf(file, ">%s</device>\n", dev->bid_name);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-77
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int nfs4_acl_bytes(int entries)
{
return sizeof(struct nfs4_acl) + entries * sizeof(struct nfs4_ace);
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void IDNSpoofChecker::SetAllowedUnicodeSet(UErrorCode* status) {
if (U_FAILURE(*status))
return;
const icu::UnicodeSet* recommended_set =
uspoof_getRecommendedUnicodeSet(status);
icu::UnicodeSet allowed_set;
allowed_set.addAll(*recommended_set);
const icu::UnicodeSet* inclusion_set = uspoof_getInclusionUnicodeSet(status);
allowed_set.addAll(*inclusion_set);
allowed_set.remove(0x338u);
allowed_set.remove(0x58au); // Armenian Hyphen
allowed_set.remove(0x2010u);
allowed_set.remove(0x2019u); // Right Single Quotation Mark
allowed_set.remove(0x2027u);
allowed_set.remove(0x30a0u); // Katakana-Hiragana Double Hyphen
allowed_set.remove(0x2bbu); // Modifier Letter Turned Comma
allowed_set.remove(0x2bcu); // Modifier Letter Apostrophe
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
allowed_set.remove(0x0620u);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Cu);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Du);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Eu);
allowed_set.remove(0x0F8Fu);
#endif
uspoof_setAllowedUnicodeSet(checker_, &allowed_set, status);
}
Commit Message: Block dotless-i / j + a combining mark
U+0131 (doltess i) and U+0237 (dotless j) are blocked from being
followed by a combining mark in U+0300 block.
Bug: 774842
Test: See the bug
Change-Id: I92aac0e97233184864d060fd0f137a90b042c679
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/767888
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#517605}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
{
struct tun_struct *tun;
struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
struct net_device *dev;
int err;
if (tfile->detached)
return -EINVAL;
dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr->ifr_name);
if (dev) {
if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN_EXCL)
return -EBUSY;
if ((ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) && dev->netdev_ops == &tun_netdev_ops)
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
else if ((ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TAP) && dev->netdev_ops == &tap_netdev_ops)
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
else
return -EINVAL;
if (!!(ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE) !=
!!(tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE))
return -EINVAL;
if (tun_not_capable(tun))
return -EPERM;
err = security_tun_dev_open(tun->security);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = tun_attach(tun, file, ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_NOFILTER);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (tun->flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE &&
(tun->numqueues + tun->numdisabled > 1)) {
/* One or more queue has already been attached, no need
* to initialize the device again.
*/
return 0;
}
}
else {
char *name;
unsigned long flags = 0;
int queues = ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_MULTI_QUEUE ?
MAX_TAP_QUEUES : 1;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
err = security_tun_dev_create();
if (err < 0)
return err;
/* Set dev type */
if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TUN) {
/* TUN device */
flags |= IFF_TUN;
name = "tun%d";
} else if (ifr->ifr_flags & IFF_TAP) {
/* TAP device */
flags |= IFF_TAP;
name = "tap%d";
} else
return -EINVAL;
if (*ifr->ifr_name)
name = ifr->ifr_name;
dev = alloc_netdev_mqs(sizeof(struct tun_struct), name,
NET_NAME_UNKNOWN, tun_setup, queues,
queues);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
dev_net_set(dev, net);
dev->rtnl_link_ops = &tun_link_ops;
dev->ifindex = tfile->ifindex;
dev->sysfs_groups[0] = &tun_attr_group;
tun = netdev_priv(dev);
tun->dev = dev;
tun->flags = flags;
tun->txflt.count = 0;
tun->vnet_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
tun->align = NET_SKB_PAD;
tun->filter_attached = false;
tun->sndbuf = tfile->socket.sk->sk_sndbuf;
tun->rx_batched = 0;
tun->pcpu_stats = netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats(struct tun_pcpu_stats);
if (!tun->pcpu_stats) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_dev;
}
spin_lock_init(&tun->lock);
err = security_tun_dev_alloc_security(&tun->security);
if (err < 0)
goto err_free_stat;
tun_net_init(dev);
tun_flow_init(tun);
dev->hw_features = NETIF_F_SG | NETIF_F_FRAGLIST |
TUN_USER_FEATURES | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX;
dev->features = dev->hw_features | NETIF_F_LLTX;
dev->vlan_features = dev->features &
~(NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX |
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tun->disabled);
err = tun_attach(tun, file, false);
if (err < 0)
goto err_free_flow;
err = register_netdevice(tun->dev);
if (err < 0)
goto err_detach;
}
netif_carrier_on(tun->dev);
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "tun_set_iff\n");
tun->flags = (tun->flags & ~TUN_FEATURES) |
(ifr->ifr_flags & TUN_FEATURES);
/* Make sure persistent devices do not get stuck in
* xoff state.
*/
if (netif_running(tun->dev))
netif_tx_wake_all_queues(tun->dev);
strcpy(ifr->ifr_name, tun->dev->name);
return 0;
err_detach:
tun_detach_all(dev);
/* register_netdevice() already called tun_free_netdev() */
goto err_free_dev;
err_free_flow:
tun_flow_uninit(tun);
security_tun_dev_free_security(tun->security);
err_free_stat:
free_percpu(tun->pcpu_stats);
err_free_dev:
free_netdev(dev);
return err;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: evdns_err_to_string(int err)
{
switch (err) {
case DNS_ERR_NONE: return "no error";
case DNS_ERR_FORMAT: return "misformatted query";
case DNS_ERR_SERVERFAILED: return "server failed";
case DNS_ERR_NOTEXIST: return "name does not exist";
case DNS_ERR_NOTIMPL: return "query not implemented";
case DNS_ERR_REFUSED: return "refused";
case DNS_ERR_TRUNCATED: return "reply truncated or ill-formed";
case DNS_ERR_UNKNOWN: return "unknown";
case DNS_ERR_TIMEOUT: return "request timed out";
case DNS_ERR_SHUTDOWN: return "dns subsystem shut down";
case DNS_ERR_CANCEL: return "dns request canceled";
case DNS_ERR_NODATA: return "no records in the reply";
default: return "[Unknown error code]";
}
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void Document::detach(const AttachContext& context)
{
TRACE_EVENT0("blink", "Document::detach");
ASSERT(!m_frame || m_frame->tree().childCount() == 0);
if (!isActive())
return;
FrameNavigationDisabler navigationDisabler(*m_frame);
HTMLFrameOwnerElement::UpdateSuspendScope suspendWidgetHierarchyUpdates;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbidScript;
view()->dispose();
m_markers->prepareForDestruction();
if (LocalDOMWindow* window = this->domWindow())
window->willDetachDocumentFromFrame();
m_lifecycle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Stopping);
if (page())
page()->documentDetached(this);
InspectorInstrumentation::documentDetached(this);
if (m_frame->loader().client()->sharedWorkerRepositoryClient())
m_frame->loader().client()->sharedWorkerRepositoryClient()->documentDetached(this);
stopActiveDOMObjects();
if (m_scriptedAnimationController)
m_scriptedAnimationController->clearDocumentPointer();
m_scriptedAnimationController.clear();
m_scriptedIdleTaskController.clear();
if (svgExtensions())
accessSVGExtensions().pauseAnimations();
if (m_domWindow)
m_domWindow->clearEventQueue();
if (m_layoutView)
m_layoutView->setIsInWindow(false);
if (registrationContext())
registrationContext()->documentWasDetached();
m_hoverNode = nullptr;
m_activeHoverElement = nullptr;
m_autofocusElement = nullptr;
if (m_focusedElement.get()) {
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Element> oldFocusedElement = m_focusedElement;
m_focusedElement = nullptr;
if (frameHost())
frameHost()->chromeClient().focusedNodeChanged(oldFocusedElement.get(), nullptr);
}
if (this == &axObjectCacheOwner())
clearAXObjectCache();
m_layoutView = nullptr;
ContainerNode::detach(context);
if (this != &axObjectCacheOwner()) {
if (AXObjectCache* cache = existingAXObjectCache()) {
for (Node& node : NodeTraversal::descendantsOf(*this)) {
cache->remove(&node);
}
}
}
styleEngine().didDetach();
frameHost()->eventHandlerRegistry().documentDetached(*this);
m_frame->inputMethodController().documentDetached();
if (!loader())
m_fetcher->clearContext();
if (m_importsController)
HTMLImportsController::removeFrom(*this);
m_timers.setTimerTaskRunner(
Platform::current()->currentThread()->scheduler()->timerTaskRunner()->adoptClone());
m_frame = nullptr;
if (m_mediaQueryMatcher)
m_mediaQueryMatcher->documentDetached();
DocumentLifecycleNotifier::notifyDocumentWasDetached();
m_lifecycle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Stopped);
DocumentLifecycleNotifier::notifyContextDestroyed();
ExecutionContext::notifyContextDestroyed();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: gfx::Rect AutofillPopupBaseView::CalculateClippingBounds() const {
if (parent_widget_)
return parent_widget_->GetClientAreaBoundsInScreen();
return PopupViewCommon().GetWindowBounds(delegate_->container_view());
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void unsignedLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::unsignedLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void free_states(struct verifier_env *env)
{
struct verifier_state_list *sl, *sln;
int i;
if (!env->explored_states)
return;
for (i = 0; i < env->prog->len; i++) {
sl = env->explored_states[i];
if (sl)
while (sl != STATE_LIST_MARK) {
sln = sl->next;
kfree(sl);
sl = sln;
}
}
kfree(env->explored_states);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void jiffies_to_timeval(const unsigned long jiffies, struct timeval *value)
{
/*
* Convert jiffies to nanoseconds and separate with
* one divide.
*/
u64 nsec = (u64)jiffies * TICK_NSEC;
long tv_usec;
value->tv_sec = div_long_long_rem(nsec, NSEC_PER_SEC, &tv_usec);
tv_usec /= NSEC_PER_USEC;
value->tv_usec = tv_usec;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: struct page *alloc_huge_page_node(struct hstate *h, int nid)
{
struct page *page;
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
page = dequeue_huge_page_node(h, nid);
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (!page)
page = alloc_buddy_huge_page(h, nid);
return page;
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void InspectorHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
host_ = frame_host;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void AppCacheUpdateJob::HandleUrlFetchCompleted(URLFetcher* fetcher,
int net_error) {
DCHECK(internal_state_ == DOWNLOADING);
UpdateURLLoaderRequest* request = fetcher->request();
const GURL& url = request->GetURL();
pending_url_fetches_.erase(url);
NotifyAllProgress(url);
++url_fetches_completed_;
int response_code = net_error == net::OK ? request->GetResponseCode()
: fetcher->redirect_response_code();
AppCacheEntry& entry = url_file_list_.find(url)->second;
if (response_code / 100 == 2) {
DCHECK(fetcher->response_writer());
entry.set_response_id(fetcher->response_writer()->response_id());
entry.set_response_size(fetcher->response_writer()->amount_written());
if (!inprogress_cache_->AddOrModifyEntry(url, entry))
duplicate_response_ids_.push_back(entry.response_id());
} else {
VLOG(1) << "Request error: " << net_error
<< " response code: " << response_code;
if (entry.IsExplicit() || entry.IsFallback() || entry.IsIntercept()) {
if (response_code == 304 && fetcher->existing_entry().has_response_id()) {
entry.set_response_id(fetcher->existing_entry().response_id());
entry.set_response_size(fetcher->existing_entry().response_size());
inprogress_cache_->AddOrModifyEntry(url, entry);
} else {
const char kFormatString[] = "Resource fetch failed (%d) %s";
std::string message = FormatUrlErrorMessage(
kFormatString, url, fetcher->result(), response_code);
ResultType result = fetcher->result();
bool is_cross_origin = url.GetOrigin() != manifest_url_.GetOrigin();
switch (result) {
case DISKCACHE_ERROR:
HandleCacheFailure(
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails(
message,
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_UNKNOWN_ERROR,
GURL(), 0, is_cross_origin),
result, url);
break;
case NETWORK_ERROR:
HandleCacheFailure(
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails(
message,
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_RESOURCE_ERROR,
url, 0, is_cross_origin),
result, url);
break;
default:
HandleCacheFailure(
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorDetails(
message,
blink::mojom::AppCacheErrorReason::APPCACHE_RESOURCE_ERROR,
url, response_code, is_cross_origin),
result, url);
break;
}
return;
}
} else if (response_code == 404 || response_code == 410) {
} else if (update_type_ == UPGRADE_ATTEMPT &&
fetcher->existing_entry().has_response_id()) {
entry.set_response_id(fetcher->existing_entry().response_id());
entry.set_response_size(fetcher->existing_entry().response_size());
inprogress_cache_->AddOrModifyEntry(url, entry);
}
}
DCHECK(internal_state_ != CACHE_FAILURE);
FetchUrls();
MaybeCompleteUpdate();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_dc_level_shift_decode(opj_tcd_t *p_tcd)
{
OPJ_UINT32 compno;
opj_tcd_tilecomp_t * l_tile_comp = 00;
opj_tccp_t * l_tccp = 00;
opj_image_comp_t * l_img_comp = 00;
opj_tcd_resolution_t* l_res = 00;
opj_tcd_tile_t * l_tile;
OPJ_UINT32 l_width, l_height, i, j;
OPJ_INT32 * l_current_ptr;
OPJ_INT32 l_min, l_max;
OPJ_UINT32 l_stride;
l_tile = p_tcd->tcd_image->tiles;
l_tile_comp = l_tile->comps;
l_tccp = p_tcd->tcp->tccps;
l_img_comp = p_tcd->image->comps;
for (compno = 0; compno < l_tile->numcomps; compno++) {
l_res = l_tile_comp->resolutions + l_img_comp->resno_decoded;
l_width = (OPJ_UINT32)(l_res->x1 - l_res->x0);
l_height = (OPJ_UINT32)(l_res->y1 - l_res->y0);
l_stride = (OPJ_UINT32)(l_tile_comp->x1 - l_tile_comp->x0) - l_width;
assert(l_height == 0 ||
l_width + l_stride <= l_tile_comp->data_size / l_height); /*MUPDF*/
if (l_img_comp->sgnd) {
l_min = -(1 << (l_img_comp->prec - 1));
l_max = (1 << (l_img_comp->prec - 1)) - 1;
} else {
l_min = 0;
l_max = (1 << l_img_comp->prec) - 1;
}
l_current_ptr = l_tile_comp->data;
if (l_tccp->qmfbid == 1) {
for (j = 0; j < l_height; ++j) {
for (i = 0; i < l_width; ++i) {
*l_current_ptr = opj_int_clamp(*l_current_ptr + l_tccp->m_dc_level_shift, l_min,
l_max);
++l_current_ptr;
}
l_current_ptr += l_stride;
}
} else {
for (j = 0; j < l_height; ++j) {
for (i = 0; i < l_width; ++i) {
OPJ_FLOAT32 l_value = *((OPJ_FLOAT32 *) l_current_ptr);
OPJ_INT32 l_value_int = (OPJ_INT32)opj_lrintf(l_value);
if (l_value > INT_MAX ||
(l_value_int > 0 && l_tccp->m_dc_level_shift > 0 &&
l_value_int > INT_MAX - l_tccp->m_dc_level_shift)) {
*l_current_ptr = l_max;
} else {
*l_current_ptr = opj_int_clamp(
l_value_int + l_tccp->m_dc_level_shift, l_min, l_max);
}
++l_current_ptr;
}
l_current_ptr += l_stride;
}
}
++l_img_comp;
++l_tccp;
++l_tile_comp;
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix write heap buffer overflow in opj_mqc_byteout(). Discovered by Ke Liu of Tencent's Xuanwu LAB (#835)
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
void *ptr)
{
EVP_AES_HMAC_SHA1 *key = data(ctx);
switch (type) {
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY:
{
unsigned int i;
unsigned char hmac_key[64];
memset(hmac_key, 0, sizeof(hmac_key));
if (arg > (int)sizeof(hmac_key)) {
SHA1_Init(&key->head);
SHA1_Update(&key->head, ptr, arg);
SHA1_Final(hmac_key, &key->head);
} else {
memcpy(hmac_key, ptr, arg);
}
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++)
hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36; /* ipad */
SHA1_Init(&key->head);
SHA1_Update(&key->head, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hmac_key); i++)
hmac_key[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c; /* opad */
SHA1_Init(&key->tail);
SHA1_Update(&key->tail, hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
OPENSSL_cleanse(hmac_key, sizeof(hmac_key));
return 1;
}
case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
{
unsigned char *p = ptr;
unsigned int len;
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return -1;
len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
if (ctx->encrypt) {
key->payload_length = len;
if ((key->aux.tls_ver =
p[arg - 4] << 8 | p[arg - 3]) >= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
p[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
p[arg - 1] = len;
}
key->md = key->head;
SHA1_Update(&key->md, p, arg);
return (int)(((len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH +
AES_BLOCK_SIZE) & -AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
- len);
} else {
memcpy(key->aux.tls_aad, ptr, arg);
key->payload_length = arg;
return SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
}
}
# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE:
return (int)(5 + 16 + ((arg + 20 + 16) & -16));
case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD:
{
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *param =
(EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *) ptr;
unsigned int n4x = 1, x4;
unsigned int frag, last, packlen, inp_len;
if (arg < (int)sizeof(EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM))
return -1;
inp_len = param->inp[11] << 8 | param->inp[12];
if (ctx->encrypt) {
if ((param->inp[9] << 8 | param->inp[10]) < TLS1_1_VERSION)
return -1;
if (inp_len) {
if (inp_len < 4096)
return 0; /* too short */
if (inp_len >= 8192 && OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[2] & (1 << 5))
n4x = 2; /* AVX2 */
} else if ((n4x = param->interleave / 4) && n4x <= 2)
inp_len = param->len;
else
return -1;
key->md = key->head;
SHA1_Update(&key->md, param->inp, 13);
x4 = 4 * n4x;
n4x += 1;
frag = inp_len >> n4x;
last = inp_len + frag - (frag << n4x);
if (last > frag && ((last + 13 + 9) % 64 < (x4 - 1))) {
frag++;
last -= x4 - 1;
}
packlen = 5 + 16 + ((frag + 20 + 16) & -16);
packlen = (packlen << n4x) - packlen;
packlen += 5 + 16 + ((last + 20 + 16) & -16);
param->interleave = x4;
return (int)packlen;
} else
return -1; /* not yet */
}
case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT:
{
EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *param =
(EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM *) ptr;
return (int)tls1_1_multi_block_encrypt(key, param->out,
param->inp, param->len,
param->interleave / 4);
}
case EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_DECRYPT:
# endif
default:
return -1;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, unserialize)
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char *buf;
int buf_len;
const unsigned char *p, *s;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
zval *pmembers, *pflags = NULL;
HashTable *aht;
long flags;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &buf, &buf_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (buf_len == 0) {
return;
}
aht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (aht->nApplyCount > 0) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Modification of ArrayObject during sorting is prohibited");
return;
}
/* storage */
s = p = (const unsigned char*)buf;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
if (*p!= 'x' || *++p != ':') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(pflags);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&pflags, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC) || Z_TYPE_P(pflags) != IS_LONG) {
goto outexcept;
}
var_push_dtor(&var_hash, &pflags);
--p; /* for ';' */
flags = Z_LVAL_P(pflags);
/* flags needs to be verified and we also need to verify whether the next
* thing we get is ';'. After that we require an 'm' or somethign else
* where 'm' stands for members and anything else should be an array. If
* neither 'a' or 'm' follows we have an error. */
if (*p != ';') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
if (*p!='m') {
if (*p!='a' && *p!='O' && *p!='C' && *p!='r') {
goto outexcept;
}
intern->ar_flags &= ~SPL_ARRAY_CLONE_MASK;
intern->ar_flags |= flags & SPL_ARRAY_CLONE_MASK;
zval_ptr_dtor(&intern->array);
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(intern->array);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&intern->array, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto outexcept;
}
var_push_dtor(&var_hash, &intern->array);
}
if (*p != ';') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
/* members */
if (*p!= 'm' || *++p != ':') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(pmembers);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&pmembers, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC) || Z_TYPE_P(pmembers) != IS_ARRAY) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pmembers);
goto outexcept;
}
var_push_dtor(&var_hash, &pmembers);
/* copy members */
if (!intern->std.properties) {
rebuild_object_properties(&intern->std);
}
zend_hash_copy(intern->std.properties, Z_ARRVAL_P(pmembers), (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, (void *) NULL, sizeof(zval *));
zval_ptr_dtor(&pmembers);
/* done reading $serialized */
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
if (pflags) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pflags);
}
return;
outexcept:
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
if (pflags) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pflags);
}
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Error at offset %ld of %d bytes", (long)((char*)p - buf), buf_len);
return;
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ arginfo and function table */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73029 - Missing type check when unserializing SplArray
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int proc_stats_rid_open( struct inode *inode,
struct file *file,
u16 rid )
{
struct proc_data *data;
struct proc_dir_entry *dp = PDE(inode);
struct net_device *dev = dp->data;
struct airo_info *apriv = dev->ml_priv;
StatsRid stats;
int i, j;
__le32 *vals = stats.vals;
int len;
if ((file->private_data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct proc_data ), GFP_KERNEL)) == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
data = file->private_data;
if ((data->rbuffer = kmalloc( 4096, GFP_KERNEL )) == NULL) {
kfree (file->private_data);
return -ENOMEM;
}
readStatsRid(apriv, &stats, rid, 1);
len = le16_to_cpu(stats.len);
j = 0;
for(i=0; statsLabels[i]!=(char *)-1 && i*4<len; i++) {
if (!statsLabels[i]) continue;
if (j+strlen(statsLabels[i])+16>4096) {
airo_print_warn(apriv->dev->name,
"Potentially disastrous buffer overflow averted!");
break;
}
j+=sprintf(data->rbuffer+j, "%s: %u\n", statsLabels[i],
le32_to_cpu(vals[i]));
}
if (i*4 >= len) {
airo_print_warn(apriv->dev->name, "Got a short rid");
}
data->readlen = j;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static BOOL zgfx_decompress_segment(ZGFX_CONTEXT* zgfx, wStream* stream, size_t segmentSize)
{
BYTE c;
BYTE flags;
UINT32 extra = 0;
int opIndex;
int haveBits;
int inPrefix;
UINT32 count;
UINT32 distance;
BYTE* pbSegment;
size_t cbSegment = segmentSize - 1;
if ((Stream_GetRemainingLength(stream) < segmentSize) || (segmentSize < 1))
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT8(stream, flags); /* header (1 byte) */
zgfx->OutputCount = 0;
pbSegment = Stream_Pointer(stream);
Stream_Seek(stream, cbSegment);
if (!(flags & PACKET_COMPRESSED))
{
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_write(zgfx, pbSegment, cbSegment);
CopyMemory(zgfx->OutputBuffer, pbSegment, cbSegment);
zgfx->OutputCount = cbSegment;
return TRUE;
}
zgfx->pbInputCurrent = pbSegment;
zgfx->pbInputEnd = &pbSegment[cbSegment - 1];
/* NumberOfBitsToDecode = ((NumberOfBytesToDecode - 1) * 8) - ValueOfLastByte */
zgfx->cBitsRemaining = 8 * (cbSegment - 1) - *zgfx->pbInputEnd;
zgfx->cBitsCurrent = 0;
zgfx->BitsCurrent = 0;
while (zgfx->cBitsRemaining)
{
haveBits = 0;
inPrefix = 0;
for (opIndex = 0; ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].prefixLength != 0; opIndex++)
{
while (haveBits < ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].prefixLength)
{
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
inPrefix = (inPrefix << 1) + zgfx->bits;
haveBits++;
}
if (inPrefix == ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].prefixCode)
{
if (ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].tokenType == 0)
{
/* Literal */
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBits);
c = (BYTE)(ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBase + zgfx->bits);
zgfx->HistoryBuffer[zgfx->HistoryIndex] = c;
if (++zgfx->HistoryIndex == zgfx->HistoryBufferSize)
zgfx->HistoryIndex = 0;
zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount++] = c;
}
else
{
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBits);
distance = ZGFX_TOKEN_TABLE[opIndex].valueBase + zgfx->bits;
if (distance != 0)
{
/* Match */
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
if (zgfx->bits == 0)
{
count = 3;
}
else
{
count = 4;
extra = 2;
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
while (zgfx->bits == 1)
{
count *= 2;
extra++;
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 1);
}
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, extra);
count += zgfx->bits;
}
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_read(zgfx, distance, &(zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount]), count);
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_write(zgfx, &(zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount]), count);
zgfx->OutputCount += count;
}
else
{
/* Unencoded */
zgfx_GetBits(zgfx, 15);
count = zgfx->bits;
zgfx->cBitsRemaining -= zgfx->cBitsCurrent;
zgfx->cBitsCurrent = 0;
zgfx->BitsCurrent = 0;
CopyMemory(&(zgfx->OutputBuffer[zgfx->OutputCount]), zgfx->pbInputCurrent, count);
zgfx_history_buffer_ring_write(zgfx, zgfx->pbInputCurrent, count);
zgfx->pbInputCurrent += count;
zgfx->cBitsRemaining -= (8 * count);
zgfx->OutputCount += count;
}
}
break;
}
}
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8784
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
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