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Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void MediaStreamDispatcherHost::BindRequest(
mojom::MediaStreamDispatcherHostRequest request) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
bindings_.AddBinding(this, std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: xmlParseNotationDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
xmlChar *Pubid;
xmlChar *Systemid;
if (CMP10(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', 'N', 'O', 'T', 'A', 'T', 'I', 'O', 'N')) {
xmlParserInputPtr input = ctxt->input;
SHRINK;
SKIP(10);
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after '<!NOTATION'\n");
return;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NOTATION_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return;
}
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after the NOTATION name'\n");
return;
}
if (xmlStrchr(name, ':') != NULL) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_COLON,
"colons are forbidden from notation names '%s'\n",
name, NULL, NULL);
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
/*
* Parse the IDs.
*/
Systemid = xmlParseExternalID(ctxt, &Pubid, 0);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (RAW == '>') {
if (input != ctxt->input) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Notation declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n");
}
NEXT;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->notationDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->notationDecl(ctxt->userData, name, Pubid, Systemid);
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NOTATION_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
}
if (Systemid != NULL) xmlFree(Systemid);
if (Pubid != NULL) xmlFree(Pubid);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ContextCreationAttribParser::ContextCreationAttribParser()
: alpha_size_(-1),
blue_size_(-1),
green_size_(-1),
red_size_(-1),
depth_size_(-1),
stencil_size_(-1),
samples_(-1),
sample_buffers_(-1) {
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreateFromGd2Ctx (gdIOCtxPtr in)
{
int sx, sy;
int i;
int ncx, ncy, nc, cs, cx, cy;
int x, y, ylo, yhi, xlo, xhi;
int vers, fmt;
t_chunk_info *chunkIdx = NULL; /* So we can gdFree it with impunity. */
unsigned char *chunkBuf = NULL; /* So we can gdFree it with impunity. */
int chunkNum = 0;
int chunkMax = 0;
uLongf chunkLen;
int chunkPos = 0;
int compMax = 0;
int bytesPerPixel;
char *compBuf = NULL; /* So we can gdFree it with impunity. */
gdImagePtr im;
/* Get the header */
im =
_gd2CreateFromFile (in, &sx, &sy, &cs, &vers, &fmt, &ncx, &ncy,
&chunkIdx);
if (im == NULL) {
/* No need to free chunkIdx as _gd2CreateFromFile does it for us. */
return 0;
}
bytesPerPixel = im->trueColor ? 4 : 1;
nc = ncx * ncy;
if (gd2_compressed (fmt)) {
/* Find the maximum compressed chunk size. */
compMax = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < nc); i++) {
if (chunkIdx[i].size > compMax) {
compMax = chunkIdx[i].size;
};
};
compMax++;
/* Allocate buffers */
chunkMax = cs * bytesPerPixel * cs;
chunkBuf = gdCalloc (chunkMax, 1);
if (!chunkBuf) {
goto fail;
}
compBuf = gdCalloc (compMax, 1);
if (!compBuf) {
goto fail;
}
GD2_DBG (printf ("Largest compressed chunk is %d bytes\n", compMax));
};
/* if ( (ncx != sx / cs) || (ncy != sy / cs)) { */
/* goto fail2; */
/* }; */
/* Read the data... */
for (cy = 0; (cy < ncy); cy++) {
for (cx = 0; (cx < ncx); cx++) {
ylo = cy * cs;
yhi = ylo + cs;
if (yhi > im->sy) {
yhi = im->sy;
};
GD2_DBG (printf
("Processing Chunk %d (%d, %d), y from %d to %d\n",
chunkNum, cx, cy, ylo, yhi));
if (gd2_compressed (fmt)) {
chunkLen = chunkMax;
if (!_gd2ReadChunk (chunkIdx[chunkNum].offset,
compBuf,
chunkIdx[chunkNum].size,
(char *) chunkBuf, &chunkLen, in)) {
GD2_DBG (printf ("Error reading comproessed chunk\n"));
goto fail;
};
chunkPos = 0;
};
for (y = ylo; (y < yhi); y++) {
xlo = cx * cs;
xhi = xlo + cs;
if (xhi > im->sx) {
xhi = im->sx;
};
/*GD2_DBG(printf("y=%d: ",y)); */
if (!gd2_compressed (fmt)) {
for (x = xlo; x < xhi; x++) {
if (im->trueColor) {
if (!gdGetInt (&im->tpixels[y][x], in)) {
/*printf("EOF while reading\n"); */
/*gdImageDestroy(im); */
/*return 0; */
im->tpixels[y][x] = 0;
}
} else {
int ch;
if (!gdGetByte (&ch, in)) {
/*printf("EOF while reading\n"); */
/*gdImageDestroy(im); */
/*return 0; */
ch = 0;
}
im->pixels[y][x] = ch;
}
}
} else {
for (x = xlo; x < xhi; x++) {
if (im->trueColor) {
/* 2.0.1: work around a gcc bug by being verbose.
TBB */
int a = chunkBuf[chunkPos++] << 24;
int r = chunkBuf[chunkPos++] << 16;
int g = chunkBuf[chunkPos++] << 8;
int b = chunkBuf[chunkPos++];
/* 2.0.11: tpixels */
im->tpixels[y][x] = a + r + g + b;
} else {
im->pixels[y][x] = chunkBuf[chunkPos++];
}
};
};
/*GD2_DBG(printf("\n")); */
};
chunkNum++;
};
};
GD2_DBG (printf ("Freeing memory\n"));
gdFree (chunkBuf);
gdFree (compBuf);
gdFree (chunkIdx);
GD2_DBG (printf ("Done\n"));
return im;
fail:
gdImageDestroy (im);
if (chunkBuf) {
gdFree (chunkBuf);
}
if (compBuf) {
gdFree (compBuf);
}
if (chunkIdx) {
gdFree (chunkIdx);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix DOS vulnerability in gdImageCreateFromGd2Ctx()
We must not pretend that there are image data if there are none. Instead
we fail reading the image file gracefully.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: dbus_g_proxy_manager_list_all (DBusGProxyManager *manager)
{
GSList *ret;
ret = NULL;
if (manager->proxy_lists)
{
g_hash_table_foreach (manager->proxy_lists,
list_proxies_foreach,
&ret);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: CastCastView::CastCastView(CastConfigDelegate* cast_config_delegate)
: cast_config_delegate_(cast_config_delegate) {
set_background(views::Background::CreateSolidBackground(kBackgroundColor));
ui::ResourceBundle& bundle = ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
SetLayoutManager(new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kHorizontal,
kTrayPopupPaddingHorizontal, 0,
kTrayPopupPaddingBetweenItems));
icon_ = new FixedSizedImageView(0, kTrayPopupItemHeight);
icon_->SetImage(
bundle.GetImageNamed(IDR_AURA_UBER_TRAY_CAST_ENABLED).ToImageSkia());
AddChildView(icon_);
label_container_ = new views::View;
label_container_->SetLayoutManager(
new views::BoxLayout(views::BoxLayout::kVertical, 0, 0, 0));
title_ = new views::Label;
title_->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
title_->SetFontList(bundle.GetFontList(ui::ResourceBundle::BoldFont));
label_container_->AddChildView(title_);
details_ = new views::Label;
details_->SetHorizontalAlignment(gfx::ALIGN_LEFT);
details_->SetMultiLine(false);
details_->SetEnabledColor(kHeaderTextColorNormal);
label_container_->AddChildView(details_);
AddChildView(label_container_);
base::string16 stop_button_text =
ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetLocalizedString(
IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_CAST_STOP);
stop_button_ = new TrayPopupLabelButton(this, stop_button_text);
AddChildView(stop_button_);
UpdateLabel();
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int OmniboxViewWin::OnPerformDropImpl(const views::DropTargetEvent& event,
bool in_drag) {
const ui::OSExchangeData& data = event.data();
if (data.HasURL()) {
GURL url;
string16 title;
if (data.GetURLAndTitle(&url, &title)) {
string16 text(StripJavascriptSchemas(UTF8ToUTF16(url.spec())));
SetUserText(text);
if (url.spec().length() == text.length())
model()->AcceptInput(CURRENT_TAB, true);
return CopyOrLinkDragOperation(event.source_operations());
}
} else if (data.HasString()) {
int string_drop_position = drop_highlight_position();
string16 text;
if ((string_drop_position != -1 || !in_drag) && data.GetString(&text)) {
DCHECK(string_drop_position == -1 ||
((string_drop_position >= 0) &&
(string_drop_position <= GetTextLength())));
if (in_drag) {
if (event.source_operations()== ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_MOVE)
MoveSelectedText(string_drop_position);
else
InsertText(string_drop_position, text);
} else {
PasteAndGo(CollapseWhitespace(text, true));
}
return CopyOrLinkDragOperation(event.source_operations());
}
}
return ui::DragDropTypes::DRAG_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int vcpu_ioctl_tpr_access_reporting(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_tpr_access_ctl *tac)
{
if (tac->flags)
return -EINVAL;
vcpu->arch.tpr_access_reporting = !!tac->enabled;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: status_t BnGraphicBufferProducer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case REQUEST_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferIdx = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer;
int result = requestBuffer(bufferIdx, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(buffer != 0);
if (buffer != 0) {
reply->write(*buffer);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int bufferCount = data.readInt32();
int result = setBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DEQUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
bool async = data.readInt32();
uint32_t w = data.readInt32();
uint32_t h = data.readInt32();
uint32_t format = data.readInt32();
uint32_t usage = data.readInt32();
int buf = 0;
sp<Fence> fence;
int result = dequeueBuffer(&buf, &fence, async, w, h, format, usage);
reply->writeInt32(buf);
reply->writeInt32(fence != NULL);
if (fence != NULL) {
reply->write(*fence);
}
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case QUEUE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferInput input(data);
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
status_t result = queueBuffer(buf, input, output);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CANCEL_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
sp<Fence> fence = new Fence();
data.read(*fence.get());
cancelBuffer(buf, fence);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case QUERY: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int value = 0;
int what = data.readInt32();
int res = query(what, &value);
reply->writeInt32(value);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
sp<IBinder> token = data.readStrongBinder();
int api = data.readInt32();
bool producerControlledByApp = data.readInt32();
QueueBufferOutput* const output =
reinterpret_cast<QueueBufferOutput *>(
reply->writeInplace(sizeof(QueueBufferOutput)));
status_t res = connect(token, api, producerControlledByApp, output);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferProducer, data, reply);
int api = data.readInt32();
status_t res = disconnect(api);
reply->writeInt32(res);
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
Commit Message: IGraphicBufferProducer: fix QUEUE_BUFFER info leak
Bug: 26338109
Change-Id: I8a979469bfe1e317ebdefa43685e19f9302baea8
CWE ID: CWE-254
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler()
{
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int bin_header(RCore *r, int mode) {
RBinFile *cur = r_bin_cur (r->bin);
RBinPlugin *plg = r_bin_file_cur_plugin (cur);
if (plg && plg->header) {
plg->header (cur);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int su3000_i2c_transfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
int num)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = i2c_get_adapdata(adap);
u8 obuf[0x40], ibuf[0x40];
if (!d)
return -ENODEV;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&d->i2c_mutex) < 0)
return -EAGAIN;
switch (num) {
case 1:
switch (msg[0].addr) {
case SU3000_STREAM_CTRL:
obuf[0] = msg[0].buf[0] + 0x36;
obuf[1] = 3;
obuf[2] = 0;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 3, ibuf, 0, 0) < 0)
err("i2c transfer failed.");
break;
case DW2102_RC_QUERY:
obuf[0] = 0x10;
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, 1, ibuf, 2, 0) < 0)
err("i2c transfer failed.");
msg[0].buf[1] = ibuf[0];
msg[0].buf[0] = ibuf[1];
break;
default:
/* always i2c write*/
obuf[0] = 0x08;
obuf[1] = msg[0].addr;
obuf[2] = msg[0].len;
memcpy(&obuf[3], msg[0].buf, msg[0].len);
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, msg[0].len + 3,
ibuf, 1, 0) < 0)
err("i2c transfer failed.");
}
break;
case 2:
/* always i2c read */
obuf[0] = 0x09;
obuf[1] = msg[0].len;
obuf[2] = msg[1].len;
obuf[3] = msg[0].addr;
memcpy(&obuf[4], msg[0].buf, msg[0].len);
if (dvb_usb_generic_rw(d, obuf, msg[0].len + 4,
ibuf, msg[1].len + 1, 0) < 0)
err("i2c transfer failed.");
memcpy(msg[1].buf, &ibuf[1], msg[1].len);
break;
default:
warn("more than 2 i2c messages at a time is not handled yet.");
break;
}
mutex_unlock(&d->i2c_mutex);
return num;
}
Commit Message: [media] dw2102: don't do DMA on stack
On Kernel 4.9, WARNINGs about doing DMA on stack are hit at
the dw2102 driver: one in su3000_power_ctrl() and the other in tt_s2_4600_frontend_attach().
Both were due to the use of buffers on the stack as parameters to
dvb_usb_generic_rw() and the resulting attempt to do DMA with them.
The device was non-functional as a result.
So, switch this driver over to use a buffer within the device state
structure, as has been done with other DVB-USB drivers.
Tested with TechnoTrend TT-connect S2-4600.
[[email protected]: fixed a warning at su3000_i2c_transfer() that
state var were dereferenced before check 'd']
Signed-off-by: Jonathan McDowell <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int putint(jas_stream_t *out, int sgnd, int prec, long val)
{
int n;
int c;
bool s;
ulong tmp;
assert((!sgnd && prec >= 1) || (sgnd && prec >= 2));
if (sgnd) {
val = encode_twos_comp(val, prec);
}
assert(val >= 0);
val &= (1 << prec) - 1;
n = (prec + 7) / 8;
while (--n >= 0) {
c = (val >> (n * 8)) & 0xff;
if (jas_stream_putc(out, c) != c)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: RelayDelete(const FilePath& file_path,
bool recursive,
base::FileUtilProxy::StatusCallback* callback)
: RelayWithStatusCallback(callback),
file_path_(file_path),
recursive_(recursive) {
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: GF_Err gnrv_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_GenericVisualSampleEntryBox *ptr = (GF_GenericVisualSampleEntryBox *)s;
ptr->type = ptr->EntryType;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
ptr->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_GNRV;
gf_isom_video_sample_entry_write((GF_VisualSampleEntryBox *)ptr, bs);
gf_bs_write_data(bs, ptr->data, ptr->data_size);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(osf_getdomainname, char __user *, name, int, namelen)
{
unsigned len;
int i;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, namelen))
return -EFAULT;
len = namelen;
if (namelen > 32)
len = 32;
down_read(&uts_sem);
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
__put_user(utsname()->domainname[i], name + i);
if (utsname()->domainname[i] == '\0')
break;
}
up_read(&uts_sem);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Turner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: FillWithEs()
{
register int i;
register unsigned char *p, *ep;
LClearAll(&curr->w_layer, 1);
curr->w_y = curr->w_x = 0;
for (i = 0; i < rows; ++i)
{
clear_mline(&curr->w_mlines[i], 0, cols + 1);
p = curr->w_mlines[i].image;
ep = p + cols;
while (p < ep)
*p++ = 'E';
}
LRefreshAll(&curr->w_layer, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: FrameImpl::~FrameImpl() {
window_tree_host_->Hide();
window_tree_host_->compositor()->SetVisible(false);
}
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::use_input_buffer(
OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_INOUT OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE** bufferHdr,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 bytes,
OMX_IN OMX_U8* buffer)
{
(void) hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned i = 0;
unsigned char *buf_addr = NULL;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("use_input_buffer: port = %u appData = %p bytes = %u buffer = %p",(unsigned int)port,appData,(unsigned int)bytes,buffer);
if (bytes != m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: use_input_buffer: Size Mismatch!! "
"bytes[%u] != Port.nBufferSize[%u]", (unsigned int)bytes, (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (!m_inp_mem_ptr) {
input_use_buffer = true;
m_inp_mem_ptr = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE*) \
calloc( (sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE)), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_inp_mem_ptr == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_inp_mem_ptr");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Successfully allocated m_inp_mem_ptr = %p", m_inp_mem_ptr);
m_pInput_pmem = (struct pmem *) calloc(sizeof (struct pmem), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pInput_pmem == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pInput_pmem");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pInput_ion = (struct venc_ion *) calloc(sizeof (struct venc_ion), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pInput_ion == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pInput_ion");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
for (i=0; i< m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = -1;
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd =-1;
m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd =-1;
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data.handle = 0;
#endif
}
}
for (i=0; i< m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++) {
if (BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_inp_bm_count,i)) {
break;
}
}
if (i < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
*bufferHdr = (m_inp_mem_ptr + i);
BITMASK_SET(&m_inp_bm_count,i);
(*bufferHdr)->pBuffer = (OMX_U8 *)buffer;
(*bufferHdr)->nSize = sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
(*bufferHdr)->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
(*bufferHdr)->nAllocLen = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
(*bufferHdr)->pAppPrivate = appData;
(*bufferHdr)->nInputPortIndex = PORT_INDEX_IN;
if (!m_use_input_pmem) {
#ifdef USE_ION
#ifdef _MSM8974_
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
&m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,0);
#else
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
&m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,ION_FLAG_CACHED);
#endif
if (m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ION device open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd;
#else
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
if (m_pInput_pmem[i].fd == 0) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
}
if (m_pInput_pmem[i] .fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: /dev/pmem_adsp open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
m_pInput_pmem[i].size = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
m_pInput_pmem[i].offset = 0;
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = (OMX_U8 *)SECURE_BUFPTR;
if(!secure_session) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)mmap(
NULL,m_pInput_pmem[i].size,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,m_pInput_pmem[i].fd,0);
if (m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer == MAP_FAILED) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: mmap() Failed");
close(m_pInput_pmem[i].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pInput_ion[i]);
#endif
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
}
} else {
OMX_QCOM_PLATFORM_PRIVATE_PMEM_INFO *pParam = reinterpret_cast<OMX_QCOM_PLATFORM_PRIVATE_PMEM_INFO *>((*bufferHdr)->pAppPrivate);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Inside qcom_ext with luma:(fd:%lu,offset:0x%x)", pParam->pmem_fd, (unsigned)pParam->offset);
if (pParam) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = pParam->pmem_fd;
m_pInput_pmem[i].offset = pParam->offset;
m_pInput_pmem[i].size = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)buffer;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("DBG:: pParam->pmem_fd = %u, pParam->offset = %u",
(unsigned int)pParam->pmem_fd, (unsigned int)pParam->offset);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid AppData given for PMEM i/p UseBuffer case");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("use_inp:: bufhdr = %p, pBuffer = %p, m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = %p",
(*bufferHdr), (*bufferHdr)->pBuffer, m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer);
if ( dev_use_buf(&m_pInput_pmem[i],PORT_INDEX_IN,i) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_use_buf() Failed for i/p buf");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: All buffers are already used, invalid use_buf call for "
"index = %u", i);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
return eRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
{
unsigned int i;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_XICS
/*
* We call kick_all_cpus_sync() to ensure that all
* CPUs have executed any pending IPIs before we
* continue and free VCPUs structures below.
*/
if (is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(kvm))
kick_all_cpus_sync();
#endif
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
kvm_arch_vcpu_free(vcpu);
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
for (i = 0; i < atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus); i++)
kvm->vcpus[i] = NULL;
atomic_set(&kvm->online_vcpus, 0);
kvmppc_core_destroy_vm(kvm);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
/* drop the module reference */
module_put(kvm->arch.kvm_ops->owner);
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static EAS_RESULT PushcdlStack (EAS_U32 *pStack, EAS_INT *pStackPtr, EAS_U32 value)
{
/* stack overflow, return an error */
if (*pStackPtr >= CDL_STACK_SIZE)
return EAS_ERROR_FILE_FORMAT;
/* push the value onto the stack */
*pStackPtr = *pStackPtr + 1;
pStack[*pStackPtr] = value;
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: eas_mdls: fix OOB read.
Bug: 34031018
Change-Id: I8d373c905f64286b23ec819bdbee51368b12e85a
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void BluetoothDeviceChooserController::GetDevice(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothRequestDeviceOptionsPtr options,
const SuccessCallback& success_callback,
const ErrorCallback& error_callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(success_callback_.is_null());
DCHECK(error_callback_.is_null());
success_callback_ = success_callback;
error_callback_ = error_callback;
options_ = std::move(options);
LogRequestDeviceOptions(options_);
if (options_->filters &&
BluetoothBlocklist::Get().IsExcluded(options_->filters.value())) {
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(
UMARequestDeviceOutcome::BLOCKLISTED_SERVICE_IN_FILTER);
PostErrorCallback(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::REQUEST_DEVICE_WITH_BLOCKLISTED_UUID);
return;
}
BluetoothBlocklist::Get().RemoveExcludedUUIDs(options_.get());
const url::Origin requesting_origin =
render_frame_host_->GetLastCommittedOrigin();
const url::Origin embedding_origin =
web_contents_->GetMainFrame()->GetLastCommittedOrigin();
if (!embedding_origin.IsSameOriginWith(requesting_origin)) {
PostErrorCallback(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::
REQUEST_DEVICE_FROM_CROSS_ORIGIN_IFRAME);
return;
}
DCHECK(!requesting_origin.opaque());
if (!adapter_->IsPresent()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Bluetooth Adapter not present. Can't serve requestDevice.";
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(
UMARequestDeviceOutcome::BLUETOOTH_ADAPTER_NOT_PRESENT);
PostErrorCallback(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::NO_BLUETOOTH_ADAPTER);
return;
}
switch (GetContentClient()->browser()->AllowWebBluetooth(
web_contents_->GetBrowserContext(), requesting_origin,
embedding_origin)) {
case ContentBrowserClient::AllowWebBluetoothResult::BLOCK_POLICY: {
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(
UMARequestDeviceOutcome::BLUETOOTH_CHOOSER_POLICY_DISABLED);
PostErrorCallback(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::
CHOOSER_NOT_SHOWN_API_LOCALLY_DISABLED);
return;
}
case ContentBrowserClient::AllowWebBluetoothResult::
BLOCK_GLOBALLY_DISABLED: {
web_contents_->GetMainFrame()->AddMessageToConsole(
blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kInfo,
"Bluetooth permission has been blocked.");
RecordRequestDeviceOutcome(
UMARequestDeviceOutcome::BLUETOOTH_GLOBALLY_DISABLED);
PostErrorCallback(blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::
CHOOSER_NOT_SHOWN_API_GLOBALLY_DISABLED);
return;
}
case ContentBrowserClient::AllowWebBluetoothResult::ALLOW:
break;
}
BluetoothChooser::EventHandler chooser_event_handler =
base::Bind(&BluetoothDeviceChooserController::OnBluetoothChooserEvent,
base::Unretained(this));
if (WebContentsDelegate* delegate = web_contents_->GetDelegate()) {
chooser_ = delegate->RunBluetoothChooser(render_frame_host_,
std::move(chooser_event_handler));
}
if (!chooser_.get()) {
PostErrorCallback(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult::WEB_BLUETOOTH_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return;
}
if (!chooser_->CanAskForScanningPermission()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Closing immediately because Chooser cannot obtain permission.";
OnBluetoothChooserEvent(BluetoothChooser::Event::DENIED_PERMISSION,
"" /* device_address */);
return;
}
device_ids_.clear();
PopulateConnectedDevices();
if (!chooser_.get()) {
return;
}
if (!adapter_->IsPowered()) {
chooser_->SetAdapterPresence(
BluetoothChooser::AdapterPresence::POWERED_OFF);
return;
}
StartDeviceDiscovery();
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void AddRefResource(PP_Resource resource) {
PpapiGlobals::Get()->GetResourceTracker()->AddRefResource(resource);
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
{
struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
char **permission_names = args;
BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void flush_tlb_current_task(void)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
preempt_disable();
count_vm_tlb_event(NR_TLB_LOCAL_FLUSH_ALL);
local_flush_tlb();
trace_tlb_flush(TLB_LOCAL_SHOOTDOWN, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
if (cpumask_any_but(mm_cpumask(mm), smp_processor_id()) < nr_cpu_ids)
flush_tlb_others(mm_cpumask(mm), mm, 0UL, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
preempt_enable();
}
Commit Message: x86/mm: Add barriers and document switch_mm()-vs-flush synchronization
When switch_mm() activates a new PGD, it also sets a bit that
tells other CPUs that the PGD is in use so that TLB flush IPIs
will be sent. In order for that to work correctly, the bit
needs to be visible prior to loading the PGD and therefore
starting to fill the local TLB.
Document all the barriers that make this work correctly and add
a couple that were missing.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: Brian Gerst <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: struct file *do_file_open_root(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
const char *name, const struct open_flags *op)
{
struct nameidata nd;
struct file *file;
struct filename *filename;
int flags = op->lookup_flags | LOOKUP_ROOT;
nd.root.mnt = mnt;
nd.root.dentry = dentry;
if (d_is_symlink(dentry) && op->intent & LOOKUP_OPEN)
return ERR_PTR(-ELOOP);
filename = getname_kernel(name);
if (unlikely(IS_ERR(filename)))
return ERR_CAST(filename);
set_nameidata(&nd, -1, filename);
file = path_openat(&nd, op, flags | LOOKUP_RCU);
if (unlikely(file == ERR_PTR(-ECHILD)))
file = path_openat(&nd, op, flags);
if (unlikely(file == ERR_PTR(-ESTALE)))
file = path_openat(&nd, op, flags | LOOKUP_REVAL);
restore_nameidata();
putname(filename);
return file;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static Maybe<bool> IncludesValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> object,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
DCHECK(JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *object));
Handle<Map> original_map = handle(object->map(), isolate);
Handle<FixedArray> parameter_map(FixedArray::cast(object->elements()),
isolate);
bool search_for_hole = value->IsUndefined(isolate);
for (uint32_t k = start_from; k < length; ++k) {
uint32_t entry = GetEntryForIndexImpl(isolate, *object, *parameter_map, k,
ALL_PROPERTIES);
if (entry == kMaxUInt32) {
if (search_for_hole) return Just(true);
continue;
}
Handle<Object> element_k =
Subclass::GetImpl(isolate, *parameter_map, entry);
if (element_k->IsAccessorPair()) {
LookupIterator it(isolate, object, k, LookupIterator::OWN);
DCHECK(it.IsFound());
DCHECK_EQ(it.state(), LookupIterator::ACCESSOR);
ASSIGN_RETURN_ON_EXCEPTION_VALUE(isolate, element_k,
Object::GetPropertyWithAccessor(&it),
Nothing<bool>());
if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) return Just(true);
if (object->map() != *original_map) {
return IncludesValueSlowPath(isolate, object, value, k + 1, length);
}
} else if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) {
return Just(true);
}
}
return Just(false);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator::Initialize(
const media::VideoCodecProfile profile,
IPC::Message* init_done_msg,
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process) {
DCHECK(!video_decode_accelerator_.get());
DCHECK(!init_done_msg_);
DCHECK(init_done_msg);
init_done_msg_ = init_done_msg;
#if (defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)) || defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(stub_ && stub_->decoder());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN7) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
DLOG(INFO) << "Initializing DXVA HW decoder for windows.";
DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator(this, renderer_process);
#else // OS_WIN
OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
video_decoder->SetEglState(
gfx::GLSurfaceEGL::GetHardwareDisplay(),
stub_->decoder()->GetGLContext()->GetHandle());
#endif // OS_WIN
video_decode_accelerator_ = video_decoder;
if (!video_decode_accelerator_->Initialize(profile))
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#else // Update RenderViewImpl::createMediaPlayer when adding clauses.
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int sg_ioctl_trans(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd,
sg_io_hdr32_t __user *sgio32)
{
sg_io_hdr_t __user *sgio;
u16 iovec_count;
u32 data;
void __user *dxferp;
int err;
int interface_id;
if (get_user(interface_id, &sgio32->interface_id))
return -EFAULT;
if (interface_id != 'S')
return sys_ioctl(fd, cmd, (unsigned long)sgio32);
if (get_user(iovec_count, &sgio32->iovec_count))
return -EFAULT;
{
void __user *top = compat_alloc_user_space(0);
void __user *new = compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(sg_io_hdr_t) +
(iovec_count * sizeof(sg_iovec_t)));
if (new > top)
return -EINVAL;
sgio = new;
}
/* Ok, now construct. */
if (copy_in_user(&sgio->interface_id, &sgio32->interface_id,
(2 * sizeof(int)) +
(2 * sizeof(unsigned char)) +
(1 * sizeof(unsigned short)) +
(1 * sizeof(unsigned int))))
return -EFAULT;
if (get_user(data, &sgio32->dxferp))
return -EFAULT;
dxferp = compat_ptr(data);
if (iovec_count) {
if (sg_build_iovec(sgio, dxferp, iovec_count))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (put_user(dxferp, &sgio->dxferp))
return -EFAULT;
}
{
unsigned char __user *cmdp;
unsigned char __user *sbp;
if (get_user(data, &sgio32->cmdp))
return -EFAULT;
cmdp = compat_ptr(data);
if (get_user(data, &sgio32->sbp))
return -EFAULT;
sbp = compat_ptr(data);
if (put_user(cmdp, &sgio->cmdp) ||
put_user(sbp, &sgio->sbp))
return -EFAULT;
}
if (copy_in_user(&sgio->timeout, &sgio32->timeout,
3 * sizeof(int)))
return -EFAULT;
if (get_user(data, &sgio32->usr_ptr))
return -EFAULT;
if (put_user(compat_ptr(data), &sgio->usr_ptr))
return -EFAULT;
err = sys_ioctl(fd, cmd, (unsigned long) sgio);
if (err >= 0) {
void __user *datap;
if (copy_in_user(&sgio32->pack_id, &sgio->pack_id,
sizeof(int)) ||
get_user(datap, &sgio->usr_ptr) ||
put_user((u32)(unsigned long)datap,
&sgio32->usr_ptr) ||
copy_in_user(&sgio32->status, &sgio->status,
(4 * sizeof(unsigned char)) +
(2 * sizeof(unsigned short)) +
(3 * sizeof(int))))
err = -EFAULT;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: fs/compat_ioctl.c: VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE missing error check
The compat ioctl for VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE was missing an error check
while converting ioctl arguments. This could lead to leaking kernel
stack contents into userspace.
Patch extracted from existing fix in grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: struct symbol_t* MACH0_(get_symbols)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
const char *symstr;
struct symbol_t *symbols;
int from, to, i, j, s, stridx, symbols_size, symbols_count;
SdbHash *hash;
if (!bin || !bin->symtab || !bin->symstr) {
return NULL;
}
/* parse symbol table */
/* parse dynamic symbol table */
symbols_count = (bin->dysymtab.nextdefsym + \
bin->dysymtab.nlocalsym + \
bin->dysymtab.nundefsym );
symbols_count += bin->nsymtab;
symbols_size = (symbols_count + 1) * 2 * sizeof (struct symbol_t);
if (symbols_size < 1) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(symbols = calloc (1, symbols_size))) {
return NULL;
}
hash = sdb_ht_new ();
j = 0; // symbol_idx
for (s = 0; s < 2; s++) {
switch (s) {
case 0:
from = bin->dysymtab.iextdefsym;
to = from + bin->dysymtab.nextdefsym;
break;
case 1:
from = bin->dysymtab.ilocalsym;
to = from + bin->dysymtab.nlocalsym;
break;
#if NOT_USED
case 2:
from = bin->dysymtab.iundefsym;
to = from + bin->dysymtab.nundefsym;
break;
#endif
}
if (from == to) {
continue;
}
#define OLD 1
#if OLD
from = R_MIN (R_MAX (0, from), symbols_size / sizeof (struct symbol_t));
to = R_MIN (to , symbols_size / sizeof (struct symbol_t));
to = R_MIN (to, bin->nsymtab);
#else
from = R_MIN (R_MAX (0, from), symbols_size/sizeof (struct symbol_t));
to = symbols_count; //symbols_size/sizeof(struct symbol_t);
#endif
int maxsymbols = symbols_size / sizeof (struct symbol_t);
if (to > 0x500000) {
bprintf ("WARNING: corrupted mach0 header: symbol table is too big %d\n", to);
free (symbols);
sdb_ht_free (hash);
return NULL;
}
if (symbols_count >= maxsymbols) {
symbols_count = maxsymbols - 1;
}
for (i = from; i < to && j < symbols_count; i++, j++) {
symbols[j].offset = addr_to_offset (bin, bin->symtab[i].n_value);
symbols[j].addr = bin->symtab[i].n_value;
symbols[j].size = 0; /* TODO: Is it anywhere? */
if (bin->symtab[i].n_type & N_EXT) {
symbols[j].type = R_BIN_MACH0_SYMBOL_TYPE_EXT;
} else {
symbols[j].type = R_BIN_MACH0_SYMBOL_TYPE_LOCAL;
}
stridx = bin->symtab[i].n_strx;
if (stridx >= 0 && stridx < bin->symstrlen) {
symstr = (char*)bin->symstr + stridx;
} else {
symstr = "???";
}
{
int i = 0;
int len = 0;
len = bin->symstrlen - stridx;
if (len > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if ((ut8)(symstr[i] & 0xff) == 0xff || !symstr[i]) {
len = i;
break;
}
}
char *symstr_dup = NULL;
if (len > 0) {
symstr_dup = r_str_ndup (symstr, len);
}
if (!symstr_dup) {
symbols[j].name[0] = 0;
} else {
r_str_ncpy (symbols[j].name, symstr_dup, R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH);
r_str_filter (symbols[j].name, -1);
symbols[j].name[R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH - 2] = 0;
}
free (symstr_dup);
} else {
symbols[j].name[0] = 0;
}
symbols[j].last = 0;
}
if (inSymtab (hash, symbols, symbols[j].name, symbols[j].addr)) {
symbols[j].name[0] = 0;
j--;
}
}
}
to = R_MIN (bin->nsymtab, bin->dysymtab.iundefsym + bin->dysymtab.nundefsym);
for (i = bin->dysymtab.iundefsym; i < to; i++) {
if (j > symbols_count) {
bprintf ("mach0-get-symbols: error\n");
break;
}
if (parse_import_stub(bin, &symbols[j], i))
symbols[j++].last = 0;
}
#if 1
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsymtab; i++) {
struct MACH0_(nlist) *st = &bin->symtab[i];
#if 0
bprintf ("stridx %d -> section %d type %d value = %d\n",
st->n_strx, st->n_sect, st->n_type, st->n_value);
#endif
stridx = st->n_strx;
if (stridx >= 0 && stridx < bin->symstrlen) {
symstr = (char*)bin->symstr + stridx;
} else {
symstr = "???";
}
int section = st->n_sect;
if (section == 1 && j < symbols_count) { // text ??st->n_type == 1)
/* is symbol */
symbols[j].addr = st->n_value; // + text_base;
symbols[j].offset = addr_to_offset (bin, symbols[j].addr);
symbols[j].size = 0; /* find next symbol and crop */
if (st->n_type & N_EXT) {
symbols[j].type = R_BIN_MACH0_SYMBOL_TYPE_EXT;
} else {
symbols[j].type = R_BIN_MACH0_SYMBOL_TYPE_LOCAL;
}
strncpy (symbols[j].name, symstr, R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH);
symbols[j].name[R_BIN_MACH0_STRING_LENGTH - 1] = 0;
symbols[j].last = 0;
if (inSymtab (hash, symbols, symbols[j].name, symbols[j].addr)) {
symbols[j].name[0] = 0;
} else {
j++;
}
}
}
#endif
sdb_ht_free (hash);
symbols[j].last = 1;
return symbols;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9970 - heap oobread in mach0 parser (#10026)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int do_video_set_spu_palette(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd,
struct compat_video_spu_palette __user *up)
{
struct video_spu_palette __user *up_native;
compat_uptr_t palp;
int length, err;
err = get_user(palp, &up->palette);
err |= get_user(length, &up->length);
up_native = compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(struct video_spu_palette));
err = put_user(compat_ptr(palp), &up_native->palette);
err |= put_user(length, &up_native->length);
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
err = sys_ioctl(fd, cmd, (unsigned long) up_native);
return err;
}
Commit Message: fs/compat_ioctl.c: VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE missing error check
The compat ioctl for VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE was missing an error check
while converting ioctl arguments. This could lead to leaking kernel
stack contents into userspace.
Patch extracted from existing fix in grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void set_grace_period(struct net *net)
{
unsigned long grace_period = get_lockd_grace_period();
struct lockd_net *ln = net_generic(net, lockd_net_id);
locks_start_grace(net, &ln->lockd_manager);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ln->grace_period_end);
schedule_delayed_work(&ln->grace_period_end, grace_period);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: Document::Document(const DocumentInit& initializer, DocumentClassFlags documentClasses)
: ContainerNode(0, CreateDocument)
, TreeScope(this)
, m_styleResolverThrowawayTimer(this, &Document::styleResolverThrowawayTimerFired)
, m_styleResolverAccessCount(0)
, m_lastStyleResolverAccessCount(0)
, m_didCalculateStyleResolver(false)
, m_ignorePendingStylesheets(false)
, m_evaluateMediaQueriesOnStyleRecalc(false)
, m_needsNotifyRemoveAllPendingStylesheet(false)
, m_hasNodesWithPlaceholderStyle(false)
, m_pendingSheetLayout(NoLayoutWithPendingSheets)
, m_frame(initializer.frame())
, m_domWindow(0)
, m_import(initializer.import())
, m_activeParserCount(0)
, m_contextFeatures(ContextFeatures::defaultSwitch())
, m_wellFormed(false)
, m_printing(false)
, m_paginatedForScreen(false)
, m_compatibilityMode(NoQuirksMode)
, m_compatibilityModeLocked(false)
, m_didPostCheckFocusedElementTask(false)
, m_domTreeVersion(++s_globalTreeVersion)
, m_listenerTypes(0)
, m_mutationObserverTypes(0)
, m_styleEngine(StyleEngine::create(*this))
, m_visitedLinkState(VisitedLinkState::create(*this))
, m_visuallyOrdered(false)
, m_readyState(Complete)
, m_bParsing(false)
, m_styleRecalcTimer(this, &Document::styleRecalcTimerFired)
, m_inStyleRecalc(false)
, m_gotoAnchorNeededAfterStylesheetsLoad(false)
, m_containsValidityStyleRules(false)
, m_updateFocusAppearanceRestoresSelection(false)
, m_ignoreDestructiveWriteCount(0)
, m_titleSetExplicitly(false)
, m_markers(adoptPtr(new DocumentMarkerController))
, m_updateFocusAppearanceTimer(this, &Document::updateFocusAppearanceTimerFired)
, m_cssTarget(0)
, m_loadEventProgress(LoadEventNotRun)
, m_startTime(currentTime())
, m_overMinimumLayoutThreshold(false)
, m_scriptRunner(ScriptRunner::create(this))
, m_xmlVersion("1.0")
, m_xmlStandalone(StandaloneUnspecified)
, m_hasXMLDeclaration(0)
, m_designMode(inherit)
, m_hasAnnotatedRegions(false)
, m_annotatedRegionsDirty(false)
, m_useSecureKeyboardEntryWhenActive(false)
, m_documentClasses(documentClasses)
, m_isViewSource(false)
, m_sawElementsInKnownNamespaces(false)
, m_isSrcdocDocument(false)
, m_isMobileDocument(false)
, m_renderer(0)
, m_eventQueue(DocumentEventQueue::create(this))
, m_weakFactory(this)
, m_contextDocument(initializer.contextDocument())
, m_idAttributeName(idAttr)
, m_hasFullscreenElementStack(false)
, m_loadEventDelayCount(0)
, m_loadEventDelayTimer(this, &Document::loadEventDelayTimerFired)
, m_referrerPolicy(ReferrerPolicyDefault)
, m_directionSetOnDocumentElement(false)
, m_writingModeSetOnDocumentElement(false)
, m_didAllowNavigationViaBeforeUnloadConfirmationPanel(false)
, m_writeRecursionIsTooDeep(false)
, m_writeRecursionDepth(0)
, m_lastHandledUserGestureTimestamp(0)
, m_textAutosizer(TextAutosizer::create(this))
, m_registrationContext(initializer.registrationContext(this))
, m_pendingTasksTimer(this, &Document::pendingTasksTimerFired)
, m_scheduledTasksAreSuspended(false)
, m_sharedObjectPoolClearTimer(this, &Document::sharedObjectPoolClearTimerFired)
#ifndef NDEBUG
, m_didDispatchViewportPropertiesChanged(false)
#endif
, m_timeline(DocumentTimeline::create(this))
, m_templateDocumentHost(0)
, m_fonts(0)
, m_didAssociateFormControlsTimer(this, &Document::didAssociateFormControlsTimerFired)
{
setClient(this);
ScriptWrappable::init(this);
if (m_frame) {
provideContextFeaturesToDocumentFrom(this, m_frame->page());
m_fetcher = m_frame->loader()->activeDocumentLoader()->fetcher();
}
if (!m_fetcher)
m_fetcher = ResourceFetcher::create(0);
m_fetcher->setDocument(this);
if (initializer.shouldSetURL())
setURL(initializer.url());
initSecurityContext(initializer);
initDNSPrefetch();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(m_nodeListCounts); i++)
m_nodeListCounts[i] = 0;
InspectorCounters::incrementCounter(InspectorCounters::DocumentCounter);
m_lifecyle.advanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::Inactive);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bool src_known, dst_known;
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
u64 umin_val, umax_val;
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
/* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->64 */
coerce_reg_to_size(dst_reg, 4);
coerce_reg_to_size(&src_reg, 4);
}
smin_val = src_reg.smin_value;
smax_val = src_reg.smax_value;
umin_val = src_reg.umin_value;
umax_val = src_reg.umax_value;
src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_SUB:
if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val;
dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_MUL:
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
* copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
*/
if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
/* (except what we can learn from the var_off) */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val;
if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
break;
case BPF_AND:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value &
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
* bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val);
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_OR:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value |
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
* maximum of the operands' minima
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val);
dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value |
dst_reg->var_off.mask;
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_LSH:
if (umax_val > 63) {
/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
* shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
* up from var_off)
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
/* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val;
}
if (src_known)
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
else
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_RSH:
if (umax_val > 63) {
/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
* shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might
* be negative, then either:
* 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is
* unknown, so we lose our signed bounds
* 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the
* signed bounds
* 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing
* about the result
* If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the
* unsigned bounts capture the signed bounds.
* Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds
* and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and
* var_off of the result.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
if (src_known)
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off,
umin_val);
else
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val;
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
default:
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification
32-bit ALU ops operate on 32-bit values and have 32-bit outputs.
Adjust the verifier accordingly.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: dissect_u3v_stream_payload(proto_tree *u3v_telegram_tree, tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, usb_conv_info_t *usb_conv_info _U_)
{
proto_item *item = NULL;
/* Subtree initialization for Stream Leader */
item = proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_payload, tvb, 0, -1, ENC_NA);
u3v_telegram_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_u3v_stream_payload);
/* Data */
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_stream_data, tvb, 0, -1, ENC_NA);
/* Add payload type to information string */
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Stream Payload");
}
Commit Message: Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static unsigned int crypto_shash_ctxsize(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type,
u32 mask)
{
switch (mask & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) {
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_HASH_MASK:
return sizeof(struct shash_desc *);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void show_object(struct object *obj,
struct strbuf *path, const char *last,
void *data)
{
char *name = path_name(path, last);
add_preferred_base_object(name);
add_object_entry(obj->oid.hash, obj->type, name, 0);
obj->flags |= OBJECT_ADDED;
/*
* We will have generated the hash from the name,
* but not saved a pointer to it - we can free it
*/
free((char *)name);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static bool __check_direct_spte_mmio_pf(u64 spte)
{
/* It is valid if the spte is zapped. */
return spte == 0ull;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int hns_rcb_get_ring_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)
return HNS_RING_STATIC_REG_NUM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: PlatformSensorWin::PlatformSensorWin(
mojom::SensorType type,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping mapping,
PlatformSensorProvider* provider,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> sensor_thread_runner,
std::unique_ptr<PlatformSensorReaderWin> sensor_reader)
: PlatformSensor(type, std::move(mapping), provider),
sensor_thread_runner_(sensor_thread_runner),
sensor_reader_(sensor_reader.release()),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(sensor_reader_);
sensor_reader_->SetClient(this);
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(radius_strerror)
{
char *msg;
radius_descriptor *raddesc;
zval *z_radh;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &z_radh) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(raddesc, radius_descriptor *, &z_radh, -1, "rad_handle", le_radius);
msg = (char *)rad_strerror(raddesc->radh);
RETURN_STRINGL(msg, strlen(msg), 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void WebPageSerializerImpl::openTagToString(Element* element,
SerializeDomParam* param)
{
bool needSkip;
StringBuilder result;
result.append(preActionBeforeSerializeOpenTag(element, param, &needSkip));
if (needSkip)
return;
result.append('<');
result.append(element->nodeName().lower());
AttributeCollection attributes = element->attributes();
AttributeCollection::iterator end = attributes.end();
for (AttributeCollection::iterator it = attributes.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
result.append(' ');
result.append(it->name().toString());
result.appendLiteral("=\"");
if (!it->value().isEmpty()) {
const String& attrValue = it->value();
const QualifiedName& attrName = it->name();
if (element->hasLegalLinkAttribute(attrName)) {
if (attrValue.startsWith("javascript:", TextCaseInsensitive)) {
result.append(attrValue);
} else {
WebLocalFrameImpl* subFrame = WebLocalFrameImpl::fromFrameOwnerElement(element);
String completeURL = subFrame ? subFrame->frame()->document()->url() :
param->document->completeURL(attrValue);
if (m_localLinks.contains(completeURL)) {
if (!param->directoryName.isEmpty()) {
result.appendLiteral("./");
result.append(param->directoryName);
result.append('/');
}
result.append(m_localLinks.get(completeURL));
} else {
result.append(completeURL);
}
}
} else {
if (param->isHTMLDocument)
result.append(m_htmlEntities.convertEntitiesInString(attrValue));
else
result.append(m_xmlEntities.convertEntitiesInString(attrValue));
}
}
result.append('\"');
}
String addedContents = postActionAfterSerializeOpenTag(element, param);
if (element->hasChildren() || param->haveAddedContentsBeforeEnd)
result.append('>');
result.append(addedContents);
saveHTMLContentToBuffer(result.toString(), param);
}
Commit Message: Make WebPageSerializerImpl to escape URL attribute values in result.
This patch makes |WebPageSerializerImpl| to escape URL attribute values rather
than directly output URL attribute values into result.
BUG=542054
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.URLAttributeValues
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1398453005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#353712}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int string_scan_range(RList *list, RBinFile *bf, int min,
const ut64 from, const ut64 to, int type) {
ut8 tmp[R_STRING_SCAN_BUFFER_SIZE];
ut64 str_start, needle = from;
int count = 0, i, rc, runes;
int str_type = R_STRING_TYPE_DETECT;
if (type == -1) {
type = R_STRING_TYPE_DETECT;
}
if (from >= to) {
eprintf ("Invalid range to find strings 0x%llx .. 0x%llx\n", from, to);
return -1;
}
ut8 *buf = calloc (to - from, 1);
if (!buf || !min) {
return -1;
}
r_buf_read_at (bf->buf, from, buf, to - from);
while (needle < to) {
rc = r_utf8_decode (buf + needle - from, to - needle, NULL);
if (!rc) {
needle++;
continue;
}
if (type == R_STRING_TYPE_DETECT) {
char *w = (char *)buf + needle + rc - from;
if ((to - needle) > 5) {
bool is_wide32 = needle + rc + 2 < to && !w[0] && !w[1] && !w[2] && w[3] && !w[4];
if (is_wide32) {
str_type = R_STRING_TYPE_WIDE32;
} else {
bool is_wide = needle + rc + 2 < to && !w[0] && w[1] && !w[2];
str_type = is_wide? R_STRING_TYPE_WIDE: R_STRING_TYPE_ASCII;
}
} else {
str_type = R_STRING_TYPE_ASCII;
}
} else {
str_type = type;
}
runes = 0;
str_start = needle;
/* Eat a whole C string */
for (rc = i = 0; i < sizeof (tmp) - 3 && needle < to; i += rc) {
RRune r = {0};
if (str_type == R_STRING_TYPE_WIDE32) {
rc = r_utf32le_decode (buf + needle - from, to - needle, &r);
if (rc) {
rc = 4;
}
} else if (str_type == R_STRING_TYPE_WIDE) {
rc = r_utf16le_decode (buf + needle - from, to - needle, &r);
if (rc == 1) {
rc = 2;
}
} else {
rc = r_utf8_decode (buf + needle - from, to - needle, &r);
if (rc > 1) {
str_type = R_STRING_TYPE_UTF8;
}
}
/* Invalid sequence detected */
if (!rc) {
needle++;
break;
}
needle += rc;
if (r_isprint (r) && r != '\\') {
if (str_type == R_STRING_TYPE_WIDE32) {
if (r == 0xff) {
r = 0;
}
}
rc = r_utf8_encode (&tmp[i], r);
runes++;
/* Print the escape code */
} else if (r && r < 0x100 && strchr ("\b\v\f\n\r\t\a\033\\", (char)r)) {
if ((i + 32) < sizeof (tmp) && r < 93) {
tmp[i + 0] = '\\';
tmp[i + 1] = " abtnvfr e "
" "
" "
" \\"[r];
} else {
break;
}
rc = 2;
runes++;
} else {
/* \0 marks the end of C-strings */
break;
}
}
tmp[i++] = '\0';
if (runes >= min) {
if (str_type == R_STRING_TYPE_ASCII) {
int j;
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
char ch = tmp[j];
if (ch != '\n' && ch != '\r' && ch != '\t') {
if (!IS_PRINTABLE (tmp[j])) {
continue;
}
}
}
}
RBinString *bs = R_NEW0 (RBinString);
if (!bs) {
break;
}
bs->type = str_type;
bs->length = runes;
bs->size = needle - str_start;
bs->ordinal = count++;
switch (str_type) {
case R_STRING_TYPE_WIDE:
if (str_start -from> 1) {
const ut8 *p = buf + str_start - 2 - from;
if (p[0] == 0xff && p[1] == 0xfe) {
str_start -= 2; // \xff\xfe
}
}
break;
case R_STRING_TYPE_WIDE32:
if (str_start -from> 3) {
const ut8 *p = buf + str_start - 4 - from;
if (p[0] == 0xff && p[1] == 0xfe) {
str_start -= 4; // \xff\xfe\x00\x00
}
}
break;
}
bs->paddr = bs->vaddr = str_start;
bs->string = r_str_ndup ((const char *)tmp, i);
if (list) {
r_list_append (list, bs);
} else {
print_string (bs, bf);
r_bin_string_free (bs);
}
}
}
free (buf);
return count;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9902 - Fix oobread in RBin.string_scan_range
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool TextureManager::ValidForTarget(
GLenum target, GLint level, GLsizei width, GLsizei height, GLsizei depth) {
GLsizei max_size = MaxSizeForTarget(target);
return level >= 0 &&
width >= 0 &&
height >= 0 &&
depth >= 0 &&
level < MaxLevelsForTarget(target) &&
width <= max_size &&
height <= max_size &&
depth <= max_size &&
(level == 0 || feature_info_->feature_flags().npot_ok ||
(!GLES2Util::IsNPOT(width) &&
!GLES2Util::IsNPOT(height) &&
!GLES2Util::IsNPOT(depth))) &&
(target != GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP || (width == height && depth == 1)) &&
(target != GL_TEXTURE_2D || (depth == 1));
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(clock_nanosleep, const clockid_t, which_clock, int, flags,
const struct __kernel_timespec __user *, rqtp,
struct __kernel_timespec __user *, rmtp)
{
const struct k_clock *kc = clockid_to_kclock(which_clock);
struct timespec64 t;
if (!kc)
return -EINVAL;
if (!kc->nsleep)
return -ENANOSLEEP_NOTSUP;
if (get_timespec64(&t, rqtp))
return -EFAULT;
if (!timespec64_valid(&t))
return -EINVAL;
if (flags & TIMER_ABSTIME)
rmtp = NULL;
current->restart_block.nanosleep.type = rmtp ? TT_NATIVE : TT_NONE;
current->restart_block.nanosleep.rmtp = rmtp;
return kc->nsleep(which_clock, flags, &t);
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <[email protected]>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int llcp_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
unsigned int copied, rlen;
struct sk_buff *skb, *cskb;
int err = 0;
pr_debug("%p %zu\n", sk, len);
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state == LLCP_CLOSED &&
skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
release_sock(sk);
if (flags & (MSG_OOB))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb) {
pr_err("Recv datagram failed state %d %d %d",
sk->sk_state, err, sock_error(sk));
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
return 0;
return err;
}
rlen = skb->len; /* real length of skb */
copied = min_t(unsigned int, rlen, len);
cskb = skb;
if (skb_copy_datagram_iovec(cskb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied)) {
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK))
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
return -EFAULT;
}
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM && msg->msg_name) {
struct nfc_llcp_ui_cb *ui_cb = nfc_llcp_ui_skb_cb(skb);
struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp *sockaddr =
(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp *) msg->msg_name;
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp);
pr_debug("Datagram socket %d %d\n", ui_cb->dsap, ui_cb->ssap);
memset(sockaddr, 0, sizeof(*sockaddr));
sockaddr->sa_family = AF_NFC;
sockaddr->nfc_protocol = NFC_PROTO_NFC_DEP;
sockaddr->dsap = ui_cb->dsap;
sockaddr->ssap = ui_cb->ssap;
}
/* Mark read part of skb as used */
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
/* SOCK_STREAM: re-queue skb if it contains unreceived data */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM ||
sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM ||
sk->sk_type == SOCK_RAW) {
skb_pull(skb, copied);
if (skb->len) {
skb_queue_head(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
goto done;
}
}
kfree_skb(skb);
}
/* XXX Queue backlogged skbs */
done:
/* SOCK_SEQPACKET: return real length if MSG_TRUNC is set */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET && (flags & MSG_TRUNC))
copied = rlen;
return copied;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: SyncBackendHost::DoInitializeOptions::~DoInitializeOptions() {}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static ZIPARCHIVE_METHOD(deleteName)
{
struct zip *intern;
zval *self = getThis();
size_t name_len;
char *name;
struct zip_stat sb;
if (!self) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZIP_FROM_OBJECT(intern, self);
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &name, &name_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (name_len < 1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PHP_ZIP_STAT_PATH(intern, name, name_len, 0, sb);
if (zip_delete(intern, sb.index)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: virtual void SetUp() {
full_itxfm_ = GET_PARAM(0);
partial_itxfm_ = GET_PARAM(1);
tx_size_ = GET_PARAM(2);
last_nonzero_ = GET_PARAM(3);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int ip6_forward(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
struct ipv6hdr *hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
struct inet6_skb_parm *opt = IP6CB(skb);
struct net *net = dev_net(dst->dev);
u32 mtu;
if (net->ipv6.devconf_all->forwarding == 0)
goto error;
if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST)
goto drop;
if (unlikely(skb->sk))
goto drop;
if (skb_warn_if_lro(skb))
goto drop;
if (!xfrm6_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_FWD, skb)) {
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_INDISCARDS);
goto drop;
}
skb_forward_csum(skb);
/*
* We DO NOT make any processing on
* RA packets, pushing them to user level AS IS
* without ane WARRANTY that application will be able
* to interpret them. The reason is that we
* cannot make anything clever here.
*
* We are not end-node, so that if packet contains
* AH/ESP, we cannot make anything.
* Defragmentation also would be mistake, RA packets
* cannot be fragmented, because there is no warranty
* that different fragments will go along one path. --ANK
*/
if (unlikely(opt->flags & IP6SKB_ROUTERALERT)) {
if (ip6_call_ra_chain(skb, ntohs(opt->ra)))
return 0;
}
/*
* check and decrement ttl
*/
if (hdr->hop_limit <= 1) {
/* Force OUTPUT device used as source address */
skb->dev = dst->dev;
icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_TIME_EXCEED, ICMPV6_EXC_HOPLIMIT, 0);
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -ETIMEDOUT;
}
/* XXX: idev->cnf.proxy_ndp? */
if (net->ipv6.devconf_all->proxy_ndp &&
pneigh_lookup(&nd_tbl, net, &hdr->daddr, skb->dev, 0)) {
int proxied = ip6_forward_proxy_check(skb);
if (proxied > 0)
return ip6_input(skb);
else if (proxied < 0) {
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_INDISCARDS);
goto drop;
}
}
if (!xfrm6_route_forward(skb)) {
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_INDISCARDS);
goto drop;
}
dst = skb_dst(skb);
/* IPv6 specs say nothing about it, but it is clear that we cannot
send redirects to source routed frames.
We don't send redirects to frames decapsulated from IPsec.
*/
if (skb->dev == dst->dev && opt->srcrt == 0 && !skb_sec_path(skb)) {
struct in6_addr *target = NULL;
struct inet_peer *peer;
struct rt6_info *rt;
/*
* incoming and outgoing devices are the same
* send a redirect.
*/
rt = (struct rt6_info *) dst;
if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_GATEWAY)
target = &rt->rt6i_gateway;
else
target = &hdr->daddr;
peer = inet_getpeer_v6(net->ipv6.peers, &rt->rt6i_dst.addr, 1);
/* Limit redirects both by destination (here)
and by source (inside ndisc_send_redirect)
*/
if (inet_peer_xrlim_allow(peer, 1*HZ))
ndisc_send_redirect(skb, target);
if (peer)
inet_putpeer(peer);
} else {
int addrtype = ipv6_addr_type(&hdr->saddr);
/* This check is security critical. */
if (addrtype == IPV6_ADDR_ANY ||
addrtype & (IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST | IPV6_ADDR_LOOPBACK))
goto error;
if (addrtype & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH,
ICMPV6_NOT_NEIGHBOUR, 0);
goto error;
}
}
mtu = ip6_dst_mtu_forward(dst);
if (mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
mtu = IPV6_MIN_MTU;
if (ip6_pkt_too_big(skb, mtu)) {
/* Again, force OUTPUT device used as source address */
skb->dev = dst->dev;
icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG, 0, mtu);
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_INTOOBIGERRORS);
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (skb_cow(skb, dst->dev->hard_header_len)) {
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst),
IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
goto drop;
}
hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
/* Mangling hops number delayed to point after skb COW */
hdr->hop_limit--;
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTFORWDATAGRAMS);
IP6_ADD_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTOCTETS, skb->len);
return NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_FORWARD, skb, skb->dev, dst->dev,
ip6_forward_finish);
error:
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_INADDRERRORS);
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: inet: update the IP ID generation algorithm to higher standards.
Commit 355b98553789 ("netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()")
makes net_hash_mix() return a true 32 bits of entropy. When used in the
IP ID generation algorithm, this has the effect of extending the IP ID
generation key from 32 bits to 64 bits.
However, net_hash_mix() is only used for IP ID generation starting with
kernel version 4.1. Therefore, earlier kernels remain with 32-bit key
no matter what the net_hash_mix() return value is.
This change addresses the issue by explicitly extending the key to 64
bits for kernels older than 4.1.
Signed-off-by: Amit Klein <[email protected]>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: nfssvc_decode_writeargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_writeargs *args)
{
unsigned int len, hdr, dlen;
struct kvec *head = rqstp->rq_arg.head;
int v;
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p++; /* beginoffset */
args->offset = ntohl(*p++); /* offset */
p++; /* totalcount */
len = args->len = ntohl(*p++);
/*
* The protocol specifies a maximum of 8192 bytes.
*/
if (len > NFSSVC_MAXBLKSIZE_V2)
return 0;
/*
* Check to make sure that we got the right number of
* bytes.
*/
hdr = (void*)p - head->iov_base;
dlen = head->iov_len + rqstp->rq_arg.page_len - hdr;
/*
* Round the length of the data which was specified up to
* the next multiple of XDR units and then compare that
* against the length which was actually received.
* Note that when RPCSEC/GSS (for example) is used, the
* data buffer can be padded so dlen might be larger
* than required. It must never be smaller.
*/
if (dlen < XDR_QUADLEN(len)*4)
return 0;
rqstp->rq_vec[0].iov_base = (void*)p;
rqstp->rq_vec[0].iov_len = head->iov_len - hdr;
v = 0;
while (len > rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len) {
len -= rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len;
v++;
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = page_address(rqstp->rq_pages[v]);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;
}
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = len;
args->vlen = v + 1;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: nfsd: stricter decoding of write-like NFSv2/v3 ops
The NFSv2/v3 code does not systematically check whether we decode past
the end of the buffer. This generally appears to be harmless, but there
are a few places where we do arithmetic on the pointers involved and
don't account for the possibility that a length could be negative. Add
checks to catch these.
Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void HeapObjectHeader::zapMagic() {
ASSERT(checkHeader());
m_magic = zappedMagic;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void BrowserChildProcessHostImpl::CopyFeatureAndFieldTrialFlags(
base::CommandLine* cmd_line) {
base::FieldTrialList::CopyFieldTrialStateToFlags(
switches::kFieldTrialHandle, switches::kEnableFeatures,
switches::kDisableFeatures, cmd_line);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int f2fs_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space *mapping,
loff_t pos, unsigned len, unsigned flags,
struct page **pagep, void **fsdata)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct page *page = NULL;
pgoff_t index = ((unsigned long long) pos) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
bool need_balance = false;
block_t blkaddr = NULL_ADDR;
int err = 0;
trace_f2fs_write_begin(inode, pos, len, flags);
/*
* We should check this at this moment to avoid deadlock on inode page
* and #0 page. The locking rule for inline_data conversion should be:
* lock_page(page #0) -> lock_page(inode_page)
*/
if (index != 0) {
err = f2fs_convert_inline_inode(inode);
if (err)
goto fail;
}
repeat:
page = grab_cache_page_write_begin(mapping, index, flags);
if (!page) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
*pagep = page;
err = prepare_write_begin(sbi, page, pos, len,
&blkaddr, &need_balance);
if (err)
goto fail;
if (need_balance && has_not_enough_free_secs(sbi, 0, 0)) {
unlock_page(page);
f2fs_balance_fs(sbi, true);
lock_page(page);
if (page->mapping != mapping) {
/* The page got truncated from under us */
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
goto repeat;
}
}
f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback(page, DATA, false);
/* wait for GCed encrypted page writeback */
if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
f2fs_wait_on_encrypted_page_writeback(sbi, blkaddr);
if (len == PAGE_SIZE || PageUptodate(page))
return 0;
if (!(pos & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) && (pos + len) >= i_size_read(inode)) {
zero_user_segment(page, len, PAGE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
if (blkaddr == NEW_ADDR) {
zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
SetPageUptodate(page);
} else {
struct bio *bio;
bio = f2fs_grab_bio(inode, blkaddr, 1);
if (IS_ERR(bio)) {
err = PTR_ERR(bio);
goto fail;
}
bio->bi_opf = REQ_OP_READ;
if (bio_add_page(bio, page, PAGE_SIZE, 0) < PAGE_SIZE) {
bio_put(bio);
err = -EFAULT;
goto fail;
}
__submit_bio(sbi, bio, DATA);
lock_page(page);
if (unlikely(page->mapping != mapping)) {
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
goto repeat;
}
if (unlikely(!PageUptodate(page))) {
err = -EIO;
goto fail;
}
}
return 0;
fail:
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
f2fs_write_failed(mapping, pos + len);
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: open_patch_file (char const *filename)
{
file_offset file_pos = 0;
file_offset pos;
struct stat st;
if (!filename || !*filename || strEQ (filename, "-"))
pfp = stdin;
else
{
pfp = fopen (filename, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r");
if (!pfp)
pfatal ("Can't open patch file %s", quotearg (filename));
}
#if HAVE_SETMODE_DOS
if (binary_transput)
{
if (isatty (fileno (pfp)))
fatal ("cannot read binary data from tty on this platform");
setmode (fileno (pfp), O_BINARY);
}
#endif
if (fstat (fileno (pfp), &st) != 0)
pfatal ("fstat");
if (S_ISREG (st.st_mode) && (pos = file_tell (pfp)) != -1)
file_pos = pos;
else
{
size_t charsread;
int fd = make_tempfile (&TMPPATNAME, 'p', NULL, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, 0);
FILE *read_pfp = pfp;
TMPPATNAME_needs_removal = true;
pfp = fdopen (fd, "w+b");
if (! pfp)
pfatal ("Can't open stream for file %s", quotearg (TMPPATNAME));
for (st.st_size = 0;
(charsread = fread (buf, 1, bufsize, read_pfp)) != 0;
st.st_size += charsread)
if (fwrite (buf, 1, charsread, pfp) != charsread)
write_fatal ();
if (ferror (read_pfp) || fclose (read_pfp) != 0)
read_fatal ();
if (fflush (pfp) != 0
|| file_seek (pfp, (file_offset) 0, SEEK_SET) != 0)
write_fatal ();
}
p_filesize = st.st_size;
if (p_filesize != (file_offset) p_filesize)
fatal ("patch file is too long");
next_intuit_at (file_pos, 1);
set_hunkmax();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void AutomationProviderImportSettingsObserver::ImportEnded() {
if (provider_)
AutomationJSONReply(provider_, reply_message_.release()).SendSuccess(NULL);
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: crm_send_remote_msg(void *session, xmlNode * msg, gboolean encrypted)
{
if (encrypted) {
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
cib_send_tls(session, msg);
#else
CRM_ASSERT(encrypted == FALSE);
#endif
} else {
cib_send_plaintext(GPOINTER_TO_INT(session), msg);
}
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static jboolean enableNative(JNIEnv* env, jobject obj) {
ALOGV("%s:",__FUNCTION__);
jboolean result = JNI_FALSE;
if (!sBluetoothInterface) return result;
int ret = sBluetoothInterface->enable();
result = (ret == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS || ret == BT_STATUS_DONE) ? JNI_TRUE : JNI_FALSE;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int dsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
{
const unsigned char *p, *pm;
int pklen, pmlen;
int ptype;
void *pval;
ASN1_STRING *pstr;
X509_ALGOR *palg;
ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL;
DSA *dsa = NULL;
if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey))
return 0;
X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg);
if (ptype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
pstr = pval;
pm = pstr->data;
pmlen = pstr->length;
if (!(dsa = d2i_DSAparams(NULL, &pm, pmlen))) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
} else if ((ptype == V_ASN1_NULL) || (ptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF)) {
if (!(dsa = DSA_new())) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
} else {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!(public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen))) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!(dsa->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL))) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_PUB_DECODE, DSA_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, dsa);
return 1;
err:
if (public_key)
ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key);
if (dsa)
DSA_free(dsa);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: swabHorDiff32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint32* wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 4;
horDiff32(tif, cp0, cc);
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong(wp, wc);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void MojoAudioInputIPC::StreamCreated(
media::mojom::AudioInputStreamPtr stream,
media::mojom::AudioInputStreamClientRequest stream_client_request,
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferHandle shared_memory,
mojo::ScopedHandle socket,
bool initially_muted) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
DCHECK(delegate_);
DCHECK(socket.is_valid());
DCHECK(shared_memory.is_valid());
DCHECK(!stream_);
DCHECK(!stream_client_binding_.is_bound());
stream_ = std::move(stream);
stream_client_binding_.Bind(std::move(stream_client_request));
base::PlatformFile socket_handle;
auto result = mojo::UnwrapPlatformFile(std::move(socket), &socket_handle);
DCHECK_EQ(result, MOJO_RESULT_OK);
base::SharedMemoryHandle memory_handle;
bool read_only = true;
result = mojo::UnwrapSharedMemoryHandle(std::move(shared_memory),
&memory_handle, nullptr, &read_only);
DCHECK_EQ(result, MOJO_RESULT_OK);
DCHECK(read_only);
delegate_->OnStreamCreated(memory_handle, socket_handle, initially_muted);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static inline bool matchesAdjacentRun(UScriptCode* scriptExtensions, int length,
CandidateRun& adjacentRun)
{
for (int i = 0; i < length; i++) {
if (scriptExtensions[i] == adjacentRun.script)
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
[email protected]
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void AppCacheHost::SetSwappableCache(AppCacheGroup* group) {
if (!group) {
swappable_cache_ = NULL;
} else {
AppCache* new_cache = group->newest_complete_cache();
if (new_cache != associated_cache_.get())
swappable_cache_ = new_cache;
else
swappable_cache_ = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: HeapVector<NotificationAction> Notification::actions() const
{
HeapVector<NotificationAction> actions;
actions.grow(m_data.actions.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_data.actions.size(); ++i) {
actions[i].setAction(m_data.actions[i].action);
actions[i].setTitle(m_data.actions[i].title);
}
return actions;
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int __init ipc_ns_init(void)
{
shm_init_ns(&init_ipc_ns);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static bool assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node(struct assoc_array_edit *edit,
const struct assoc_array_ops *ops,
const void *index_key,
struct assoc_array_walk_result *result)
{
struct assoc_array_shortcut *shortcut, *new_s0;
struct assoc_array_node *node, *new_n0, *new_n1, *side;
struct assoc_array_ptr *ptr;
unsigned long dissimilarity, base_seg, blank;
size_t keylen;
bool have_meta;
int level, diff;
int slot, next_slot, free_slot, i, j;
node = result->terminal_node.node;
level = result->terminal_node.level;
edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] = result->terminal_node.slot;
pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__);
/* We arrived at a node which doesn't have an onward node or shortcut
* pointer that we have to follow. This means that (a) the leaf we
* want must go here (either by insertion or replacement) or (b) we
* need to split this node and insert in one of the fragments.
*/
free_slot = -1;
/* Firstly, we have to check the leaves in this node to see if there's
* a matching one we should replace in place.
*/
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
ptr = node->slots[i];
if (!ptr) {
free_slot = i;
continue;
}
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr) &&
ops->compare_object(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr),
index_key)) {
pr_devel("replace in slot %d\n", i);
edit->leaf_p = &node->slots[i];
edit->dead_leaf = node->slots[i];
pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [replace]\n", __func__);
return true;
}
}
/* If there is a free slot in this node then we can just insert the
* leaf here.
*/
if (free_slot >= 0) {
pr_devel("insert in free slot %d\n", free_slot);
edit->leaf_p = &node->slots[free_slot];
edit->adjust_count_on = node;
pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [insert]\n", __func__);
return true;
}
/* The node has no spare slots - so we're either going to have to split
* it or insert another node before it.
*
* Whatever, we're going to need at least two new nodes - so allocate
* those now. We may also need a new shortcut, but we deal with that
* when we need it.
*/
new_n0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_n0)
return false;
edit->new_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
new_n1 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_node), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_n1)
return false;
edit->new_meta[1] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n1);
/* We need to find out how similar the leaves are. */
pr_devel("no spare slots\n");
have_meta = false;
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
ptr = node->slots[i];
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) {
edit->segment_cache[i] = 0xff;
have_meta = true;
continue;
}
base_seg = ops->get_object_key_chunk(
assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr), level);
base_seg >>= level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
edit->segment_cache[i] = base_seg & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
}
if (have_meta) {
pr_devel("have meta\n");
goto split_node;
}
/* The node contains only leaves */
dissimilarity = 0;
base_seg = edit->segment_cache[0];
for (i = 1; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++)
dissimilarity |= edit->segment_cache[i] ^ base_seg;
pr_devel("only leaves; dissimilarity=%lx\n", dissimilarity);
if ((dissimilarity & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK) == 0) {
/* The old leaves all cluster in the same slot. We will need
* to insert a shortcut if the new node wants to cluster with them.
*/
if ((edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] ^ base_seg) == 0)
goto all_leaves_cluster_together;
/* Otherwise we can just insert a new node ahead of the old
* one.
*/
goto present_leaves_cluster_but_not_new_leaf;
}
split_node:
pr_devel("split node\n");
/* We need to split the current node; we know that the node doesn't
* simply contain a full set of leaves that cluster together (it
* contains meta pointers and/or non-clustering leaves).
*
* We need to expel at least two leaves out of a set consisting of the
* leaves in the node and the new leaf.
*
* We need a new node (n0) to replace the current one and a new node to
* take the expelled nodes (n1).
*/
edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
new_n0->back_pointer = node->back_pointer;
new_n0->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
new_n1->back_pointer = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
new_n1->parent_slot = -1; /* Need to calculate this */
do_split_node:
pr_devel("do_split_node\n");
new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch = node->nr_leaves_on_branch;
new_n1->nr_leaves_on_branch = 0;
/* Begin by finding two matching leaves. There have to be at least two
* that match - even if there are meta pointers - because any leaf that
* would match a slot with a meta pointer in it must be somewhere
* behind that meta pointer and cannot be here. Further, given N
* remaining leaf slots, we now have N+1 leaves to go in them.
*/
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
slot = edit->segment_cache[i];
if (slot != 0xff)
for (j = i + 1; j < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1; j++)
if (edit->segment_cache[j] == slot)
goto found_slot_for_multiple_occupancy;
}
found_slot_for_multiple_occupancy:
pr_devel("same slot: %x %x [%02x]\n", i, j, slot);
BUG_ON(i >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT);
BUG_ON(j >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT + 1);
BUG_ON(slot >= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT);
new_n1->parent_slot = slot;
/* Metadata pointers cannot change slot */
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++)
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(node->slots[i]))
new_n0->slots[i] = node->slots[i];
else
new_n0->slots[i] = NULL;
BUG_ON(new_n0->slots[slot] != NULL);
new_n0->slots[slot] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n1);
/* Filter the leaf pointers between the new nodes */
free_slot = -1;
next_slot = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(node->slots[i]))
continue;
if (edit->segment_cache[i] == slot) {
new_n1->slots[next_slot++] = node->slots[i];
new_n1->nr_leaves_on_branch++;
} else {
do {
free_slot++;
} while (new_n0->slots[free_slot] != NULL);
new_n0->slots[free_slot] = node->slots[i];
}
}
pr_devel("filtered: f=%x n=%x\n", free_slot, next_slot);
if (edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] != slot) {
do {
free_slot++;
} while (new_n0->slots[free_slot] != NULL);
edit->leaf_p = &new_n0->slots[free_slot];
edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
} else {
edit->leaf_p = &new_n1->slots[next_slot++];
edit->adjust_count_on = new_n1;
}
BUG_ON(next_slot <= 1);
edit->set_backpointers_to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
if (edit->segment_cache[i] == 0xff) {
ptr = node->slots[i];
BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_leaf(ptr));
if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr)) {
side = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr);
edit->set_backpointers[i] = &side->back_pointer;
} else {
shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr);
edit->set_backpointers[i] = &shortcut->back_pointer;
}
}
}
ptr = node->back_pointer;
if (!ptr)
edit->set[0].ptr = &edit->array->root;
else if (assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr))
edit->set[0].ptr = &assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr)->slots[node->parent_slot];
else
edit->set[0].ptr = &assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr)->next_node;
edit->excised_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(node);
pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [split node]\n", __func__);
return true;
present_leaves_cluster_but_not_new_leaf:
/* All the old leaves cluster in the same slot, but the new leaf wants
* to go into a different slot, so we create a new node to hold the new
* leaf and a pointer to a new node holding all the old leaves.
*/
pr_devel("present leaves cluster but not new leaf\n");
new_n0->back_pointer = node->back_pointer;
new_n0->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
new_n0->nr_leaves_on_branch = node->nr_leaves_on_branch;
new_n1->back_pointer = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
new_n1->parent_slot = edit->segment_cache[0];
new_n1->nr_leaves_on_branch = node->nr_leaves_on_branch;
edit->adjust_count_on = new_n0;
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++)
new_n1->slots[i] = node->slots[i];
new_n0->slots[edit->segment_cache[0]] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
edit->leaf_p = &new_n0->slots[edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT]];
edit->set[0].ptr = &assoc_array_ptr_to_node(node->back_pointer)->slots[node->parent_slot];
edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
edit->excised_meta[0] = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(node);
pr_devel("<--%s() = ok [insert node before]\n", __func__);
return true;
all_leaves_cluster_together:
/* All the leaves, new and old, want to cluster together in this node
* in the same slot, so we have to replace this node with a shortcut to
* skip over the identical parts of the key and then place a pair of
* nodes, one inside the other, at the end of the shortcut and
* distribute the keys between them.
*
* Firstly we need to work out where the leaves start diverging as a
* bit position into their keys so that we know how big the shortcut
* needs to be.
*
* We only need to make a single pass of N of the N+1 leaves because if
* any keys differ between themselves at bit X then at least one of
* them must also differ with the base key at bit X or before.
*/
pr_devel("all leaves cluster together\n");
diff = INT_MAX;
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
int x = ops->diff_objects(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(node->slots[i]),
index_key);
if (x < diff) {
BUG_ON(x < 0);
diff = x;
}
}
BUG_ON(diff == INT_MAX);
BUG_ON(diff < level + ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP);
keylen = round_up(diff, ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
keylen >>= ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SHIFT;
new_s0 = kzalloc(sizeof(struct assoc_array_shortcut) +
keylen * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_s0)
return false;
edit->new_meta[2] = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
edit->set[0].to = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
new_s0->back_pointer = node->back_pointer;
new_s0->parent_slot = node->parent_slot;
new_s0->next_node = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
new_n0->back_pointer = assoc_array_shortcut_to_ptr(new_s0);
new_n0->parent_slot = 0;
new_n1->back_pointer = assoc_array_node_to_ptr(new_n0);
new_n1->parent_slot = -1; /* Need to calculate this */
new_s0->skip_to_level = level = diff & ~ASSOC_ARRAY_LEVEL_STEP_MASK;
pr_devel("skip_to_level = %d [diff %d]\n", level, diff);
BUG_ON(level <= 0);
for (i = 0; i < keylen; i++)
new_s0->index_key[i] =
ops->get_key_chunk(index_key, i * ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
blank = ULONG_MAX << (level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK);
pr_devel("blank off [%zu] %d: %lx\n", keylen - 1, level, blank);
new_s0->index_key[keylen - 1] &= ~blank;
/* This now reduces to a node splitting exercise for which we'll need
* to regenerate the disparity table.
*/
for (i = 0; i < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; i++) {
ptr = node->slots[i];
base_seg = ops->get_object_key_chunk(assoc_array_ptr_to_leaf(ptr),
level);
base_seg >>= level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
edit->segment_cache[i] = base_seg & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
}
base_seg = ops->get_key_chunk(index_key, level);
base_seg >>= level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK;
edit->segment_cache[ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT] = base_seg & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK;
goto do_split_node;
}
Commit Message: assoc_array: Fix a buggy node-splitting case
This fixes CVE-2017-12193.
Fix a case in the assoc_array implementation in which a new leaf is
added that needs to go into a node that happens to be full, where the
existing leaves in that node cluster together at that level to the
exclusion of new leaf.
What needs to happen is that the existing leaves get moved out to a new
node, N1, at level + 1 and the existing node needs replacing with one,
N0, that has pointers to the new leaf and to N1.
The code that tries to do this gets this wrong in two ways:
(1) The pointer that should've pointed from N0 to N1 is set to point
recursively to N0 instead.
(2) The backpointer from N0 needs to be set correctly in the case N0 is
either the root node or reached through a shortcut.
Fix this by removing this path and using the split_node path instead,
which achieves the same end, but in a more general way (thanks to Eric
Biggers for spotting the redundancy).
The problem manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
IP: assoc_array_apply_edit+0x59/0xe5
Fixes: 3cb989501c26 ("Add a generic associative array implementation.")
Reported-and-tested-by: WU Fan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] [v3.13-rc1+]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: TestJavaScriptDialogManager()
: is_fullscreen_(false), message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner) {}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RenderBox::paintMaskImages(const PaintInfo& paintInfo, const LayoutRect& paintRect)
{
bool pushTransparencyLayer = false;
bool compositedMask = hasLayer() && layer()->hasCompositedMask();
bool flattenCompositingLayers = view()->frameView() && view()->frameView()->paintBehavior() & PaintBehaviorFlattenCompositingLayers;
CompositeOperator compositeOp = CompositeSourceOver;
bool allMaskImagesLoaded = true;
if (!compositedMask || flattenCompositingLayers) {
pushTransparencyLayer = true;
StyleImage* maskBoxImage = style()->maskBoxImage().image();
const FillLayer* maskLayers = style()->maskLayers();
if (maskBoxImage)
allMaskImagesLoaded &= maskBoxImage->isLoaded();
if (maskLayers)
allMaskImagesLoaded &= maskLayers->imagesAreLoaded();
paintInfo.context->setCompositeOperation(CompositeDestinationIn);
paintInfo.context->beginTransparencyLayer(1);
compositeOp = CompositeSourceOver;
}
if (allMaskImagesLoaded) {
paintFillLayers(paintInfo, Color::transparent, style()->maskLayers(), paintRect, BackgroundBleedNone, compositeOp);
paintNinePieceImage(paintInfo.context, paintRect, style(), style()->maskBoxImage(), compositeOp);
}
if (pushTransparencyLayer)
paintInfo.context->endLayer();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int wrmsr_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct msr_data msr;
u32 ecx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
u64 data = (svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] & -1u)
| ((u64)(svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] & -1u) << 32);
msr.data = data;
msr.index = ecx;
msr.host_initiated = false;
svm->next_rip = kvm_rip_read(&svm->vcpu) + 2;
if (svm_set_msr(&svm->vcpu, &msr)) {
trace_kvm_msr_write_ex(ecx, data);
kvm_inject_gp(&svm->vcpu, 0);
} else {
trace_kvm_msr_write(ecx, data);
skip_emulated_instruction(&svm->vcpu);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestEventTarget::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestEventTarget* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestEventTarget*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestEventTarget::s_info);
TestEventTarget* impl = static_cast<TestEventTarget*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
Event* evt(toEvent(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
JSC::JSValue result = jsBoolean(impl->dispatchEvent(evt, ec));
setDOMException(exec, ec);
return JSValue::encode(result);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void FetchManager::Loader::LoadSucceeded() {
DCHECK(!failed_);
finished_ = true;
if (GetDocument() && GetDocument()->GetFrame() &&
GetDocument()->GetFrame()->GetPage() &&
CORS::IsOkStatus(response_http_status_code_)) {
GetDocument()->GetFrame()->GetPage()->GetChromeClient().AjaxSucceeded(
GetDocument()->GetFrame());
}
probe::didFinishFetch(execution_context_, this, fetch_request_data_->Method(),
fetch_request_data_->Url().GetString());
NotifyFinished();
}
Commit Message: [Fetch API] Fix redirect leak on "no-cors" requests
The spec issue is now fixed, and this CL follows the spec change[1].
1: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/commit/14858d3e9402285a7ff3b5e47a22896ff3adc95d
Bug: 791324
Change-Id: Ic3e3955f43578b38fc44a5a6b2a1b43d56a2becb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023613
Reviewed-by: Tsuyoshi Horo <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552964}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void Document::UpdateStyleAndLayoutTree() {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
if (Lifecycle().LifecyclePostponed())
return;
HTMLFrameOwnerElement::PluginDisposeSuspendScope suspend_plugin_dispose;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbid_script;
if (HTMLFrameOwnerElement* owner = LocalOwner()) {
owner->GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutTree();
}
if (!View() || !IsActive())
return;
if (View()->ShouldThrottleRendering())
return;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::IncrementalShadowDOMEnabled()) {
GetSlotAssignmentEngine().RecalcSlotAssignments();
}
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
NestingLevelIncrementer slot_assignment_recalc_forbidden_scope(
slot_assignment_recalc_forbidden_recursion_depth_);
#endif
if (!NeedsLayoutTreeUpdate()) {
if (Lifecycle().GetState() < DocumentLifecycle::kStyleClean) {
Lifecycle().AdvanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::kInStyleRecalc);
Lifecycle().AdvanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::kStyleClean);
}
return;
}
if (InStyleRecalc())
return;
CHECK(Lifecycle().StateAllowsTreeMutations());
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN1("blink,devtools.timeline", "UpdateLayoutTree", "beginData",
InspectorRecalculateStylesEvent::Data(GetFrame()));
unsigned start_element_count = GetStyleEngine().StyleForElementCount();
probe::RecalculateStyle recalculate_style_scope(this);
DocumentAnimations::UpdateAnimationTimingIfNeeded(*this);
EvaluateMediaQueryListIfNeeded();
UpdateUseShadowTreesIfNeeded();
UpdateDistributionForLegacyDistributedNodes();
UpdateActiveStyle();
UpdateStyleInvalidationIfNeeded();
UpdateStyle();
NotifyLayoutTreeOfSubtreeChanges();
if (HoverElement() && !HoverElement()->GetLayoutObject() && GetFrame()) {
GetFrame()->GetEventHandler().DispatchFakeMouseMoveEventSoon(
MouseEventManager::FakeMouseMoveReason::kPerFrame);
}
if (focused_element_ && !focused_element_->IsFocusable())
ClearFocusedElementSoon();
GetLayoutView()->ClearHitTestCache();
DCHECK(!DocumentAnimations::NeedsAnimationTimingUpdate(*this));
unsigned element_count =
GetStyleEngine().StyleForElementCount() - start_element_count;
TRACE_EVENT_END1("blink,devtools.timeline", "UpdateLayoutTree",
"elementCount", element_count);
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
AssertLayoutTreeUpdated(*this);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: std::string MediaStreamManager::MakeMediaAccessRequest(
int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id,
int page_request_id,
const StreamControls& controls,
const url::Origin& security_origin,
MediaAccessRequestCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DeviceRequest* request = new DeviceRequest(
render_process_id, render_frame_id, page_request_id,
false /* user gesture */, MEDIA_DEVICE_ACCESS, controls,
MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin{std::string() /* salt */,
std::string() /* group_id_salt */,
security_origin});
const std::string& label = AddRequest(request);
request->media_access_request_cb = std::move(callback);
base::PostTaskWithTraits(FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::IO},
base::BindOnce(&MediaStreamManager::SetUpRequest,
base::Unretained(this), label));
return label;
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool GetIntProperty(XID window, const std::string& property_name, int* value) {
Atom type = None;
int format = 0; // size in bits of each item in 'property'
unsigned long num_items = 0;
unsigned char* property = NULL;
int result = GetProperty(window, property_name, 1,
&type, &format, &num_items, &property);
if (result != Success)
return false;
if (format != 32 || num_items != 1) {
XFree(property);
return false;
}
*value = static_cast<int>(*(reinterpret_cast<long*>(property)));
XFree(property);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void BrowserDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
session->SetBrowserOnly(true);
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(true /* browser_only */)));
if (only_discovery_)
return;
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SystemInfoHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TetheringHandler(
socket_callback_, tethering_task_runner_)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TracingHandler(
protocol::TracingHandler::Browser,
FrameTreeNode::kFrameTreeNodeInvalidId,
GetIOContext())));
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: file_ms_alloc(int flags)
{
struct magic_set *ms;
size_t i, len;
if ((ms = CAST(struct magic_set *, calloc((size_t)1,
sizeof(struct magic_set)))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (magic_setflags(ms, flags) == -1) {
errno = EINVAL;
goto free;
}
ms->o.buf = ms->o.pbuf = NULL;
len = (ms->c.len = 10) * sizeof(*ms->c.li);
if ((ms->c.li = CAST(struct level_info *, malloc(len))) == NULL)
goto free;
ms->event_flags = 0;
ms->error = -1;
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++)
ms->mlist[i] = NULL;
ms->file = "unknown";
ms->line = 0;
ms->indir_max = FILE_INDIR_MAX;
ms->name_max = FILE_NAME_MAX;
ms->elf_shnum_max = FILE_ELF_SHNUM_MAX;
ms->elf_phnum_max = FILE_ELF_PHNUM_MAX;
return ms;
free:
free(ms);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static inline void fwnet_make_ff_hdr(struct rfc2734_header *hdr,
unsigned ether_type, unsigned dg_size, unsigned dgl)
{
hdr->w0 = fwnet_set_hdr_lf(RFC2374_HDR_FIRSTFRAG)
| fwnet_set_hdr_dg_size(dg_size)
| fwnet_set_hdr_ether_type(ether_type);
hdr->w1 = fwnet_set_hdr_dgl(dgl);
}
Commit Message: firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <[email protected]>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: process(register int code, unsigned char** fill)
{
int incode;
static unsigned char firstchar;
if (code == clear) {
codesize = datasize + 1;
codemask = (1 << codesize) - 1;
avail = clear + 2;
oldcode = -1;
return 1;
}
if (oldcode == -1) {
*(*fill)++ = suffix[code];
firstchar = oldcode = code;
return 1;
}
if (code > avail) {
fprintf(stderr, "code %d too large for %d\n", code, avail);
return 0;
}
incode = code;
if (code == avail) { /* the first code is always < avail */
*stackp++ = firstchar;
code = oldcode;
}
while (code > clear) {
*stackp++ = suffix[code];
code = prefix[code];
}
*stackp++ = firstchar = suffix[code];
prefix[avail] = oldcode;
suffix[avail] = firstchar;
avail++;
if (((avail & codemask) == 0) && (avail < 4096)) {
codesize++;
codemask += avail;
}
oldcode = incode;
do {
*(*fill)++ = *--stackp;
} while (stackp > stack);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fix possible OOB write in gif2tiff.c
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static Image *ReadCUTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define ThrowCUTReaderException(severity,tag) \
{ \
if (palette != NULL) \
palette=DestroyImage(palette); \
if (clone_info != NULL) \
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info); \
ThrowReaderException(severity,tag); \
}
Image *image,*palette;
ImageInfo *clone_info;
MagickBooleanType status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t EncodedByte;
unsigned char RunCount,RunValue,RunCountMasked;
CUTHeader Header;
CUTPalHeader PalHeader;
ssize_t depth;
ssize_t i,j;
ssize_t ldblk;
unsigned char *BImgBuff=NULL,*ptrB;
register Quantum *q;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read CUT image.
*/
palette=NULL;
clone_info=NULL;
Header.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.Width==0 || Header.Height==0 || Header.Reserved!=0)
CUT_KO: ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*---This code checks first line of image---*/
EncodedByte=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
ldblk=0;
while((int) RunCountMasked!=0) /*end of line?*/
{
i=1;
if((int) RunCount<0x80) i=(ssize_t) RunCountMasked;
offset=SeekBlob(image,TellBlob(image)+i,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data*/
EncodedByte-=i+1;
ldblk+=(ssize_t) RunCountMasked;
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if(EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data: unexpected eof in line*/
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
}
if(EncodedByte!=1) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data: size incorrect*/
i=0; /*guess a number of bit planes*/
if(ldblk==(int) Header.Width) i=8;
if(2*ldblk==(int) Header.Width) i=4;
if(8*ldblk==(int) Header.Width) i=1;
if(i==0) goto CUT_KO; /*wrong data: incorrect bit planes*/
depth=i;
image->columns=Header.Width;
image->rows=Header.Height;
image->depth=8;
image->colors=(size_t) (GetQuantumRange(1UL*i)+1);
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse) goto Finish;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
/* ----- Do something with palette ----- */
if ((clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info)) == NULL) goto NoPalette;
i=(ssize_t) strlen(clone_info->filename);
j=i;
while(--i>0)
{
if(clone_info->filename[i]=='.')
{
break;
}
if(clone_info->filename[i]=='/' || clone_info->filename[i]=='\\' ||
clone_info->filename[i]==':' )
{
i=j;
break;
}
}
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_info->filename+i,".PAL",(size_t)
(MagickPathExtent-i));
if((clone_info->file=fopen_utf8(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(clone_info->filename+i,".pal",(size_t)
(MagickPathExtent-i));
if((clone_info->file=fopen_utf8(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL)
{
clone_info->filename[i]='\0';
if((clone_info->file=fopen_utf8(clone_info->filename,"rb"))==NULL)
{
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
clone_info=NULL;
goto NoPalette;
}
}
}
if( (palette=AcquireImage(clone_info,exception))==NULL ) goto NoPalette;
status=OpenBlob(clone_info,palette,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
ErasePalette:
palette=DestroyImage(palette);
palette=NULL;
goto NoPalette;
}
if(palette!=NULL)
{
(void) ReadBlob(palette,2,(unsigned char *) PalHeader.FileId);
if(strncmp(PalHeader.FileId,"AH",2) != 0) goto ErasePalette;
PalHeader.Version=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.Size=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.FileType=(char) ReadBlobByte(palette);
PalHeader.SubType=(char) ReadBlobByte(palette);
PalHeader.BoardID=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.GraphicsMode=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxRed=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxGreen=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
PalHeader.MaxBlue=ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
(void) ReadBlob(palette,20,(unsigned char *) PalHeader.PaletteId);
if (EOFBlob(image))
ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
if(PalHeader.MaxIndex<1) goto ErasePalette;
image->colors=PalHeader.MaxIndex+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse) goto NoMemory;
if(PalHeader.MaxRed==0) PalHeader.MaxRed=(unsigned int) QuantumRange; /*avoid division by 0*/
if(PalHeader.MaxGreen==0) PalHeader.MaxGreen=(unsigned int) QuantumRange;
if(PalHeader.MaxBlue==0) PalHeader.MaxBlue=(unsigned int) QuantumRange;
for(i=0;i<=(int) PalHeader.MaxIndex;i++)
{ /*this may be wrong- I don't know why is palette such strange*/
j=(ssize_t) TellBlob(palette);
if((j % 512)>512-6)
{
j=((j / 512)+1)*512;
offset=SeekBlob(palette,j,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
image->colormap[i].red=(Quantum) ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
if (QuantumRange != (Quantum) PalHeader.MaxRed)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ClampToQuantum(((double)
image->colormap[i].red*QuantumRange+(PalHeader.MaxRed>>1))/
PalHeader.MaxRed);
}
image->colormap[i].green=(Quantum) ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
if (QuantumRange != (Quantum) PalHeader.MaxGreen)
{
image->colormap[i].green=ClampToQuantum
(((double) image->colormap[i].green*QuantumRange+(PalHeader.MaxGreen>>1))/PalHeader.MaxGreen);
}
image->colormap[i].blue=(Quantum) ReadBlobLSBShort(palette);
if (QuantumRange != (Quantum) PalHeader.MaxBlue)
{
image->colormap[i].blue=ClampToQuantum
(((double)image->colormap[i].blue*QuantumRange+(PalHeader.MaxBlue>>1))/PalHeader.MaxBlue);
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image))
ThrowCUTReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
NoPalette:
if(palette==NULL)
{
image->colors=256;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
NoMemory:
ThrowCUTReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t)image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
}
}
/* ----- Load RLE compressed raster ----- */
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) ldblk,
sizeof(*BImgBuff)); /*Ldblk was set in the check phase*/
if(BImgBuff==NULL) goto NoMemory;
offset=SeekBlob(image,6 /*sizeof(Header)*/,SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
{
if (palette != NULL)
palette=DestroyImage(palette);
if (clone_info != NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
for (i=0; i < (int) Header.Height; i++)
{
EncodedByte=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
ptrB=BImgBuff;
j=ldblk;
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
while ((int) RunCountMasked != 0)
{
if((ssize_t) RunCountMasked>j)
{ /*Wrong Data*/
RunCountMasked=(unsigned char) j;
if(j==0)
{
break;
}
}
if((int) RunCount>0x80)
{
RunValue=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
(void) memset(ptrB,(int) RunValue,(size_t) RunCountMasked);
}
else {
(void) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) RunCountMasked,ptrB);
}
ptrB+=(int) RunCountMasked;
j-=(int) RunCountMasked;
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse) goto Finish; /* wrong data: unexpected eof in line */
RunCount=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
RunCountMasked=RunCount & 0x7F;
}
InsertRow(image,depth,BImgBuff,i,exception);
}
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
/*detect monochrome image*/
if(palette==NULL)
{ /*attempt to detect binary (black&white) images*/
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) &&
(SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse))
{
if(GetCutColors(image,exception)==2)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t)image->colors; i++)
{
register Quantum
sample;
sample=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) i);
if(image->colormap[i].red!=sample) goto Finish;
if(image->colormap[i].green!=sample) goto Finish;
if(image->colormap[i].blue!=sample) goto Finish;
}
image->colormap[1].red=image->colormap[1].green=
image->colormap[1].blue=QuantumRange;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t)image->rows; i++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,i,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t)image->columns; j++)
{
if (GetPixelRed(image,q) == ScaleCharToQuantum(1))
{
SetPixelRed(image,QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelGreen(image,QuantumRange,q);
SetPixelBlue(image,QuantumRange,q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse) goto Finish;
}
}
}
}
Finish:
if (BImgBuff != NULL)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
if (palette != NULL)
palette=DestroyImage(palette);
if (clone_info != NULL)
clone_info=DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1599
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: scoped_refptr<AudioRendererHost> RenderProcessHostImpl::audio_renderer_host()
const {
return audio_renderer_host_;
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: setup_called_state(Node* node, int state)
{
switch (NODE_TYPE(node)) {
case NODE_ALT:
state |= IN_ALT;
/* fall */
case NODE_LIST:
do {
setup_called_state(NODE_CAR(node), state);
} while (IS_NOT_NULL(node = NODE_CDR(node)));
break;
#ifdef USE_CALL
case NODE_CALL:
setup_called_state_call(node, state);
break;
#endif
case NODE_BAG:
{
BagNode* en = BAG_(node);
switch (en->type) {
case BAG_MEMORY:
if (en->m.entry_count > 1)
state |= IN_MULTI_ENTRY;
en->m.called_state |= state;
/* fall */
case BAG_OPTION:
case BAG_STOP_BACKTRACK:
setup_called_state(NODE_BODY(node), state);
break;
case BAG_IF_ELSE:
setup_called_state(NODE_BODY(node), state);
if (IS_NOT_NULL(en->te.Then))
setup_called_state(en->te.Then, state);
if (IS_NOT_NULL(en->te.Else))
setup_called_state(en->te.Else, state);
break;
}
}
break;
case NODE_QUANT:
{
QuantNode* qn = QUANT_(node);
if (IS_REPEAT_INFINITE(qn->upper) || qn->upper >= 2)
state |= IN_REAL_REPEAT;
if (qn->lower != qn->upper)
state |= IN_VAR_REPEAT;
setup_called_state(NODE_QUANT_BODY(qn), state);
}
break;
case NODE_ANCHOR:
{
AnchorNode* an = ANCHOR_(node);
switch (an->type) {
case ANCR_PREC_READ_NOT:
case ANCR_LOOK_BEHIND_NOT:
state |= IN_NOT;
/* fall */
case ANCR_PREC_READ:
case ANCR_LOOK_BEHIND:
setup_called_state(NODE_ANCHOR_BODY(an), state);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
break;
case NODE_BACKREF:
case NODE_STRING:
case NODE_CTYPE:
case NODE_CCLASS:
case NODE_GIMMICK:
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::RenderViewCreated(
content::RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
ReloadIfTerminated(render_view_host);
ExtensionWebContentsObserver::RenderViewCreated(render_view_host);
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::DisconnectChannelInFreshCallStack() {
CheckLock();
last_state_lock_.AssertAcquired();
if (gpu_control_client_)
gpu_control_client_->OnGpuControlLostContextMaybeReentrant();
callback_thread_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&CommandBufferProxyImpl::LockAndDisconnectChannel,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: xsltUnregisterExtModule(const xmlChar * URI)
{
int ret;
if (URI == NULL)
return (-1);
if (xsltExtensionsHash == NULL)
return (-1);
xmlMutexLock(xsltExtMutex);
ret = xmlHashRemoveEntry(xsltExtensionsHash, URI,
(xmlHashDeallocator) xsltFreeExtModule);
xmlMutexUnlock(xsltExtMutex);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void ImageFetched(const ContentSuggestion::ID& id,
const GURL& url,
const base::string16& title,
const base::string16& text,
base::Time timeout_at,
const gfx::Image& image) {
if (!ShouldNotifyInState(app_status_listener_.GetState())) {
return; // Became foreground while we were fetching the image; forget it.
}
DVLOG(1) << "Fetched " << image.Size().width() << "x"
<< image.Size().height() << " image for " << url.spec();
if (ContentSuggestionsNotificationHelper::SendNotification(
id, url, title, text, CropSquare(image), timeout_at)) {
RecordContentSuggestionsNotificationImpression(
id.category().IsKnownCategory(KnownCategories::ARTICLES)
? CONTENT_SUGGESTIONS_ARTICLE
: CONTENT_SUGGESTIONS_NONARTICLE);
}
}
Commit Message: NTP: cap number of notifications/day
1 by default; Finch-configurable.
BUG=689465
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2691023002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450389}
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: GF_Err minf_AddBox(GF_Box *s, GF_Box *a)
{
GF_MediaInformationBox *ptr = (GF_MediaInformationBox *)s;
switch (a->type) {
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_NMHD:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STHD:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_VMHD:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SMHD:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HMHD:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_GMHD:
if (ptr->InfoHeader) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->InfoHeader = a;
return GF_OK;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_DINF:
if (ptr->dataInformation) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->dataInformation = (GF_DataInformationBox *)a;
return GF_OK;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STBL:
if (ptr->sampleTable ) ERROR_ON_DUPLICATED_BOX(a, ptr)
ptr->sampleTable = (GF_SampleTableBox *)a;
return GF_OK;
default:
return gf_isom_box_add_default(s, a);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool DebuggerGetTargetsFunction::RunAsync() {
DevToolsTargetImpl::EnumerateAllTargets(
base::Bind(&DebuggerGetTargetsFunction::SendTargetList, this));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int vmx_update_pi_irte(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
uint32_t guest_irq, bool set)
{
struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e;
struct kvm_irq_routing_table *irq_rt;
struct kvm_lapic_irq irq;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
struct vcpu_data vcpu_info;
int idx, ret = -EINVAL;
if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(kvm) ||
!irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP) ||
!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(kvm->vcpus[0]))
return 0;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->irq_srcu);
irq_rt = srcu_dereference(kvm->irq_routing, &kvm->irq_srcu);
BUG_ON(guest_irq >= irq_rt->nr_rt_entries);
hlist_for_each_entry(e, &irq_rt->map[guest_irq], link) {
if (e->type != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI)
continue;
/*
* VT-d PI cannot support posting multicast/broadcast
* interrupts to a vCPU, we still use interrupt remapping
* for these kind of interrupts.
*
* For lowest-priority interrupts, we only support
* those with single CPU as the destination, e.g. user
* configures the interrupts via /proc/irq or uses
* irqbalance to make the interrupts single-CPU.
*
* We will support full lowest-priority interrupt later.
*/
kvm_set_msi_irq(kvm, e, &irq);
if (!kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu(kvm, &irq, &vcpu)) {
/*
* Make sure the IRTE is in remapped mode if
* we don't handle it in posted mode.
*/
ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO
"failed to back to remapped mode, irq: %u\n",
host_irq);
goto out;
}
continue;
}
vcpu_info.pi_desc_addr = __pa(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
vcpu_info.vector = irq.vector;
trace_kvm_pi_irte_update(vcpu->vcpu_id, host_irq, e->gsi,
vcpu_info.vector, vcpu_info.pi_desc_addr, set);
if (set)
ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, &vcpu_info);
else {
/* suppress notification event before unposting */
pi_set_sn(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, NULL);
pi_clear_sn(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
}
if (ret < 0) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: failed to update PI IRTE\n",
__func__);
goto out;
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KVM: VMX: Do not BUG() on out-of-bounds guest IRQ
The value of the guest_irq argument to vmx_update_pi_irte() is
ultimately coming from a KVM_IRQFD API call. Do not BUG() in
vmx_update_pi_irte() if the value is out-of bounds. (Especially,
since KVM as a whole seems to hang after that.)
Instead, print a message only once if we find that we don't have a
route for a certain IRQ (which can be out-of-bounds or within the
array).
This fixes CVE-2017-1000252.
Fixes: efc644048ecde54 ("KVM: x86: Update IRTE for posted-interrupts")
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: EntrySync::EntrySync(DOMFileSystemBase* fileSystem, const String& fullPath)
: EntryBase(fileSystem, fullPath)
{
ScriptWrappable::init(this);
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void RenderViewImpl::DidCommitProvisionalHistoryLoad() {
history_navigation_virtual_time_pauser_.UnpauseVirtualTime();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void MediaStreamDispatcherHost::DoOpenDevice(
int32_t page_request_id,
const std::string& device_id,
blink::MediaStreamType type,
OpenDeviceCallback callback,
MediaDeviceSaltAndOrigin salt_and_origin) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (!MediaStreamManager::IsOriginAllowed(render_process_id_,
salt_and_origin.origin)) {
std::move(callback).Run(false /* success */, std::string(),
blink::MediaStreamDevice());
return;
}
media_stream_manager_->OpenDevice(
render_process_id_, render_frame_id_, page_request_id, requester_id_,
device_id, type, std::move(salt_and_origin), std::move(callback),
base::BindRepeating(&MediaStreamDispatcherHost::OnDeviceStopped,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: [MediaStream] Pass request ID parameters in the right order for OpenDevice()
Prior to this CL, requester_id and page_request_id parameters were
passed in incorrect order from MediaStreamDispatcherHost to
MediaStreamManager for the OpenDevice() operation, which could lead to
errors.
Bug: 948564
Change-Id: Iadcf3fe26adaac50564102138ce212269cf32d62
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1569113
Reviewed-by: Marina Ciocea <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651255}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: mprint(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m)
{
uint64_t v;
float vf;
double vd;
int64_t t = 0;
char buf[128], tbuf[26];
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BYTE:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, (uint64_t)p->b);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d",
(unsigned char)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%d"),
(unsigned char) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(char);
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, (uint64_t)p->h);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u",
(unsigned short)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%u"),
(unsigned short) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(short);
break;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_MELONG:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, (uint64_t)p->l);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", (uint32_t) v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%u"), (uint32_t) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_LEQUAD:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, p->q);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u",
(unsigned long long)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u"),
(unsigned long long) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(int64_t);
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16:
if (m->reln == '=' || m->reln == '!') {
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), m->value.s) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + m->vallen;
}
else {
char *str = p->s;
/* compute t before we mangle the string? */
t = ms->offset + strlen(str);
if (*m->value.s == '\0')
str[strcspn(str, "\n")] = '\0';
if (m->str_flags & STRING_TRIM) {
char *last;
while (isspace((unsigned char)*str))
str++;
last = str;
while (*last)
last++;
--last;
while (isspace((unsigned char)*last))
last--;
*++last = '\0';
}
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), str) == -1)
return -1;
if (m->type == FILE_PSTRING)
t += file_pstring_length_size(m);
}
break;
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_MEDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->l + m->num_mask, FILE_T_LOCAL, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case FILE_LDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->l + m->num_mask, 0, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->q + m->num_mask, FILE_T_LOCAL, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->q + m->num_mask, 0, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case FILE_QWDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->q + m->num_mask, FILE_T_WINDOWS, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case FILE_FLOAT:
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
vf = p->f;
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%g", vf);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%g"), vf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(float);
break;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
vd = p->d;
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%g", vd);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%g"), vd) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(double);
break;
case FILE_REGEX: {
char *cp;
int rval;
cp = strndup((const char *)ms->search.s, ms->search.rm_len);
if (cp == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, ms->search.rm_len);
return -1;
}
rval = file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), cp);
free(cp);
if (rval == -1)
return -1;
if ((m->str_flags & REGEX_OFFSET_START))
t = ms->search.offset;
else
t = ms->search.offset + ms->search.rm_len;
break;
}
case FILE_SEARCH:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), m->value.s) == -1)
return -1;
if ((m->str_flags & REGEX_OFFSET_START))
t = ms->search.offset;
else
t = ms->search.offset + m->vallen;
break;
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", m->desc) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset;
break;
case FILE_INDIRECT:
case FILE_USE:
case FILE_NAME:
t = ms->offset;
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid m->type (%d) in mprint()", m->type);
return -1;
}
return (int32_t)t;
}
Commit Message: Correctly compute the truncated pascal string size (Francisco Alonso and
Jan Kaluza at RedHat)
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void FrameSelection::SetCaretVisible(bool caret_is_visible) {
frame_caret_->SetCaretVisibility(caret_is_visible ? CaretVisibility::kVisible
: CaretVisibility::kHidden);
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::BlockRequestsForRoute(int child_id,
int route_id) {
ProcessRouteIDs key(child_id, route_id);
DCHECK(blocked_loaders_map_.find(key) == blocked_loaders_map_.end()) <<
"BlockRequestsForRoute called multiple time for the same RVH";
blocked_loaders_map_[key] = new BlockedLoadersList();
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static EAS_RESULT Parse_wsmp (SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA *pDLSData, EAS_I32 pos, S_WSMP_DATA *p)
{
EAS_RESULT result;
EAS_U16 wtemp;
EAS_U32 ltemp;
EAS_U32 cbSize;
/* seek to start of chunk */
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, pos)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get structure size */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &cbSize, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get unity note */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &wtemp, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if (wtemp <= 127)
p->unityNote = (EAS_U8) wtemp;
else
{
p->unityNote = 60;
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_WARNING, "Invalid unity note [%u] in DLS wsmp ignored, set to 60\n", wtemp); */ }
}
/* get fine tune */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &p->fineTune, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get gain */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &p->gain, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if (p->gain > 0)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_WARNING, "Positive gain [%ld] in DLS wsmp ignored, set to 0dB\n", p->gain); */ }
p->gain = 0;
}
/* option flags */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, <emp, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* sample loops */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, <emp, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* if looped sample, get loop data */
if (ltemp)
{
if (ltemp > 1)
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_WARNING, "DLS sample with %lu loops, ignoring extra loops\n", ltemp); */ }
/* skip ahead to loop data */
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, pos + (EAS_I32) cbSize)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get structure size */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, <emp, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get loop type */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, <emp, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get loop start */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &p->loopStart, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get loop length */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetDWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &p->loopLength, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
}
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DLS parser: fix wave pool size check.
Bug: 21132860.
Change-Id: I8ae872ea2cc2e8fec5fa0b7815f0b6b31ce744ff
(cherry picked from commit 2d7f8e1be2241e48458f5d3cab5e90be2b07c699)
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::AddTransceiverWithTrackOnSignalingThread(
rtc::scoped_refptr<webrtc::MediaStreamTrackInterface> webrtc_track,
webrtc::RtpTransceiverInit init,
TransceiverStateSurfacer* transceiver_state_surfacer,
webrtc::RTCErrorOr<rtc::scoped_refptr<webrtc::RtpTransceiverInterface>>*
error_or_transceiver) {
*error_or_transceiver =
native_peer_connection_->AddTransceiver(webrtc_track, init);
std::vector<rtc::scoped_refptr<webrtc::RtpTransceiverInterface>> transceivers;
if (error_or_transceiver->ok())
transceivers.push_back(error_or_transceiver->value());
transceiver_state_surfacer->Initialize(track_adapter_map_, transceivers);
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int snd_ctl_tlv_ioctl(struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_tlv __user *_tlv,
int op_flag)
{
struct snd_card *card = file->card;
struct snd_ctl_tlv tlv;
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct snd_kcontrol_volatile *vd;
unsigned int len;
int err = 0;
if (copy_from_user(&tlv, _tlv, sizeof(tlv)))
return -EFAULT;
if (tlv.length < sizeof(unsigned int) * 2)
return -EINVAL;
down_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
kctl = snd_ctl_find_numid(card, tlv.numid);
if (kctl == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (kctl->tlv.p == NULL) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
vd = &kctl->vd[tlv.numid - kctl->id.numid];
if ((op_flag == 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_READ) == 0) ||
(op_flag > 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_WRITE) == 0) ||
(op_flag < 0 && (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_COMMAND) == 0)) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_TLV_CALLBACK) {
if (vd->owner != NULL && vd->owner != file) {
err = -EPERM;
goto __kctl_end;
}
err = kctl->tlv.c(kctl, op_flag, tlv.length, _tlv->tlv);
if (err > 0) {
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_TLV, &kctl->id);
return 0;
}
} else {
if (op_flag) {
err = -ENXIO;
goto __kctl_end;
}
len = kctl->tlv.p[1] + 2 * sizeof(unsigned int);
if (tlv.length < len) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto __kctl_end;
}
if (copy_to_user(_tlv->tlv, kctl->tlv.p, len))
err = -EFAULT;
}
__kctl_end:
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Don't access controls outside of protected regions
A control that is visible on the card->controls list can be freed at any time.
This means we must not access any of its memory while not holding the
controls_rw_lock. Otherwise we risk a use after free access.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void BrowserRenderProcessHost::ReceivedBadMessage() {
if (run_renderer_in_process()) {
CHECK(false);
}
NOTREACHED();
base::KillProcess(GetHandle(), content::RESULT_CODE_KILLED_BAD_MESSAGE,
false);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void edge_sparse_csr_reader_double( const char* i_csr_file_in,
unsigned int** o_row_idx,
unsigned int** o_column_idx,
double** o_values,
unsigned int* o_row_count,
unsigned int* o_column_count,
unsigned int* o_element_count ) {
FILE *l_csr_file_handle;
const unsigned int l_line_length = 512;
char l_line[512/*l_line_length*/+1];
unsigned int l_header_read = 0;
unsigned int* l_row_idx_id = NULL;
unsigned int l_i = 0;
l_csr_file_handle = fopen( i_csr_file_in, "r" );
if ( l_csr_file_handle == NULL ) {
fprintf( stderr, "cannot open CSR file!\n" );
return;
}
while (fgets(l_line, l_line_length, l_csr_file_handle) != NULL) {
if ( strlen(l_line) == l_line_length ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not read file length!\n" );
return;
}
/* check if we are still reading comments header */
if ( l_line[0] == '%' ) {
continue;
} else {
/* if we are the first line after comment header, we allocate our data structures */
if ( l_header_read == 0 ) {
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %u", o_row_count, o_column_count, o_element_count) == 3 ) {
/* allocate CSC datastructure matching mtx file */
*o_column_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_element_count));
*o_row_idx = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count + 1));
*o_values = (double*) malloc(sizeof(double) * (*o_element_count));
l_row_idx_id = (unsigned int*) malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * (*o_row_count));
/* check if mallocs were successful */
if ( ( *o_row_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_column_idx == NULL ) ||
( *o_values == NULL ) ||
( l_row_idx_id == NULL ) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not allocate sp data!\n" );
return;
}
/* set everything to zero for init */
memset(*o_row_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_row_count + 1));
memset(*o_column_idx, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_element_count));
memset(*o_values, 0, sizeof(double)*(*o_element_count));
memset(l_row_idx_id, 0, sizeof(unsigned int)*(*o_row_count));
/* init column idx */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_row_count + 1); l_i++)
(*o_row_idx)[l_i] = (*o_element_count);
/* init */
(*o_row_idx)[0] = 0;
l_i = 0;
l_header_read = 1;
} else {
fprintf( stderr, "could not csr description!\n" );
return;
}
/* now we read the actual content */
} else {
unsigned int l_row, l_column;
double l_value;
/* read a line of content */
if ( sscanf(l_line, "%u %u %lf", &l_row, &l_column, &l_value) != 3 ) {
fprintf( stderr, "could not read element!\n" );
return;
}
/* adjust numbers to zero termination */
l_row--;
l_column--;
/* add these values to row and value structure */
(*o_column_idx)[l_i] = l_column;
(*o_values)[l_i] = l_value;
l_i++;
/* handle columns, set id to own for this column, yeah we need to handle empty columns */
l_row_idx_id[l_row] = 1;
(*o_row_idx)[l_row+1] = l_i;
}
}
}
/* close mtx file */
fclose( l_csr_file_handle );
/* check if we read a file which was consistent */
if ( l_i != (*o_element_count) ) {
fprintf( stderr, "we were not able to read all elements!\n" );
return;
}
/* let's handle empty rows */
for ( l_i = 0; l_i < (*o_row_count); l_i++) {
if ( l_row_idx_id[l_i] == 0 ) {
(*o_row_idx)[l_i+1] = (*o_row_idx)[l_i];
}
}
/* free helper data structure */
if ( l_row_idx_id != NULL ) {
free( l_row_idx_id );
}
}
Commit Message: Issue #287: made CSR/CSC readers more robust against invalid input (case #1).
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void V8Window::namedPropertyGetterCustom(v8::Local<v8::Name> name, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (!name->IsString())
return;
auto nameString = name.As<v8::String>();
LocalDOMWindow* window = toLocalDOMWindow(V8Window::toImpl(info.Holder()));
if (!window)
return;
LocalFrame* frame = window->frame();
if (!frame)
return;
AtomicString propName = toCoreAtomicString(nameString);
Frame* child = frame->tree().scopedChild(propName);
if (child) {
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, child->domWindow(), window);
return;
}
if (!info.Holder()->GetRealNamedProperty(nameString).IsEmpty())
return;
Document* doc = frame->document();
if (doc && doc->isHTMLDocument()) {
if (toHTMLDocument(doc)->hasNamedItem(propName) || doc->hasElementWithId(propName)) {
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<HTMLCollection> items = doc->windowNamedItems(propName);
if (!items->isEmpty()) {
if (items->hasExactlyOneItem()) {
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, items->item(0), window);
return;
}
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, items.release(), window);
return;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Reload frame in V8Window::namedPropertyGetterCustom after js call
[email protected]
BUG=454954
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/901053006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@189574 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool OmniboxEditModel::IsSpaceCharForAcceptingKeyword(wchar_t c) {
switch (c) {
case 0x0020: // Space
case 0x3000: // Ideographic Space
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: [OriginChip] Re-enable the chip as necessary when switching tabs.
BUG=369500
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/292493003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@271161 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void registerURL(const char* file, const char* mimeType)
{
registerURL(file, file, mimeType);
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> [email protected]
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataReductionProxyManaged() {
return spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.IsManaged();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::GetAllowOtherViews() {
return view_->GetAllowOtherViews();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool JSTestInterfaceConstructor::getOwnPropertyDescriptor(JSObject* object, ExecState* exec, const Identifier& propertyName, PropertyDescriptor& descriptor)
{
return getStaticPropertyDescriptor<JSTestInterfaceConstructor, JSDOMWrapper>(exec, &JSTestInterfaceConstructorTable, jsCast<JSTestInterfaceConstructor*>(object), propertyName, descriptor);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void udf_pc_to_char(struct super_block *sb, unsigned char *from,
int fromlen, unsigned char *to)
{
struct pathComponent *pc;
int elen = 0;
unsigned char *p = to;
while (elen < fromlen) {
pc = (struct pathComponent *)(from + elen);
switch (pc->componentType) {
case 1:
/*
* Symlink points to some place which should be agreed
* upon between originator and receiver of the media. Ignore.
*/
if (pc->lengthComponentIdent > 0)
break;
/* Fall through */
case 2:
p = to;
*p++ = '/';
break;
case 3:
memcpy(p, "../", 3);
p += 3;
break;
case 4:
memcpy(p, "./", 2);
p += 2;
/* that would be . - just ignore */
break;
case 5:
p += udf_get_filename(sb, pc->componentIdent, p,
pc->lengthComponentIdent);
*p++ = '/';
break;
}
elen += sizeof(struct pathComponent) + pc->lengthComponentIdent;
}
if (p > to + 1)
p[-1] = '\0';
else
p[0] = '\0';
}
Commit Message: udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: [email protected]
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool InputDispatcher::hasWindowHandleLocked(
const sp<InputWindowHandle>& windowHandle) const {
size_t numWindows = mWindowHandles.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < numWindows; i++) {
if (mWindowHandles.itemAt(i) == windowHandle) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void swap_free_obj(struct page *page, unsigned int a, unsigned int b)
{
swap(((freelist_idx_t *)page->freelist)[a],
((freelist_idx_t *)page->freelist)[b]);
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: InputImeEventRouter* InputImeEventRouterFactory::GetRouter(Profile* profile) {
if (!profile)
return nullptr;
InputImeEventRouter* router = router_map_[profile];
if (!router) {
router = new InputImeEventRouter(profile);
router_map_[profile] = router;
}
return router;
}
Commit Message: Fix the regression caused by http://crrev.com/c/1288350.
Bug: 900124,856135
Change-Id: Ie11ad406bd1ea383dc2a83cc8661076309154865
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1317010
Reviewed-by: Lan Wei <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Shu Chen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605282}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_get_subscription(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_port_subscribe *subs = arg;
int result;
struct snd_seq_client *sender = NULL;
struct snd_seq_client_port *sport = NULL;
struct snd_seq_subscribers *p;
result = -EINVAL;
if ((sender = snd_seq_client_use_ptr(subs->sender.client)) == NULL)
goto __end;
if ((sport = snd_seq_port_use_ptr(sender, subs->sender.port)) == NULL)
goto __end;
p = snd_seq_port_get_subscription(&sport->c_src, &subs->dest);
if (p) {
result = 0;
*subs = p->info;
} else
result = -ENOENT;
__end:
if (sport)
snd_seq_port_unlock(sport);
if (sender)
snd_seq_client_unlock(sender);
return result;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool TabStripGtk::HasAvailableDragActions() const {
return model_->delegate()->GetDragActions() != 0;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool SiteInstanceImpl::ShouldLockToOrigin(BrowserContext* browser_context,
GURL site_url) {
if (RenderProcessHost::run_renderer_in_process())
return false;
if (!DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess(browser_context, site_url))
return false;
if (site_url.SchemeIs(content::kGuestScheme))
return false;
if (site_url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme))
return false;
if (!GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldLockToOrigin(browser_context,
site_url)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Allow origin lock for WebUI pages.
Returning true for WebUI pages in DoesSiteRequireDedicatedProcess helps
to keep enforcing a SiteInstance swap during chrome://foo ->
chrome://bar navigation, even after relaxing
BrowsingInstance::GetSiteInstanceForURL to consider RPH::IsSuitableHost
(see https://crrev.com/c/783470 for that fixes process sharing in
isolated(b(c),d(c)) scenario).
I've manually tested this CL by visiting the following URLs:
- chrome://welcome/
- chrome://settings
- chrome://extensions
- chrome://history
- chrome://help and chrome://chrome (both redirect to chrome://settings/help)
Bug: 510588, 847127
Change-Id: I55073bce00f32cb8bc5c1c91034438ff9a3f8971
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1237392
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595259}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: WebRTCVoidRequest::WebRTCVoidRequest(const PassRefPtr<RTCVoidRequest>& constraints)
: m_private(constraints)
{
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: const Block* SimpleBlock::GetBlock() const
{
return &m_block;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int add_push_report_sideband_pkt(git_push *push, git_pkt_data *data_pkt, git_buf *data_pkt_buf)
{
git_pkt *pkt;
const char *line, *line_end = NULL;
size_t line_len;
int error;
int reading_from_buf = data_pkt_buf->size > 0;
if (reading_from_buf) {
/* We had an existing partial packet, so add the new
* packet to the buffer and parse the whole thing */
git_buf_put(data_pkt_buf, data_pkt->data, data_pkt->len);
line = data_pkt_buf->ptr;
line_len = data_pkt_buf->size;
}
else {
line = data_pkt->data;
line_len = data_pkt->len;
}
while (line_len > 0) {
error = git_pkt_parse_line(&pkt, line, &line_end, line_len);
if (error == GIT_EBUFS) {
/* Buffer the data when the inner packet is split
* across multiple sideband packets */
if (!reading_from_buf)
git_buf_put(data_pkt_buf, line, line_len);
error = 0;
goto done;
}
else if (error < 0)
goto done;
/* Advance in the buffer */
line_len -= (line_end - line);
line = line_end;
/* When a valid packet with no content has been
* read, git_pkt_parse_line does not report an
* error, but the pkt pointer has not been set.
* Handle this by skipping over empty packets.
*/
if (pkt == NULL)
continue;
error = add_push_report_pkt(push, pkt);
git_pkt_free(pkt);
if (error < 0 && error != GIT_ITEROVER)
goto done;
}
error = 0;
done:
if (reading_from_buf)
git_buf_consume(data_pkt_buf, line_end);
return error;
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void FS_Shutdown( qboolean closemfp ) {
searchpath_t *p, *next;
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < MAX_FILE_HANDLES; i++ ) {
if ( fsh[i].fileSize ) {
FS_FCloseFile( i );
}
}
for ( p = fs_searchpaths ; p ; p = next ) {
next = p->next;
if(p->pack)
FS_FreePak(p->pack);
if (p->dir)
Z_Free(p->dir);
Z_Free(p);
}
fs_searchpaths = NULL;
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "path" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "dir" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "fdir" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "touchFile" );
Cmd_RemoveCommand( "which" );
#ifdef FS_MISSING
if ( closemfp ) {
fclose( missingFiles );
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static Handle<JSArray> SliceImpl(Handle<JSObject> receiver,
uint32_t start, uint32_t end) {
Isolate* isolate = receiver->GetIsolate();
Handle<FixedArrayBase> backing_store(receiver->elements(), isolate);
int result_len = end < start ? 0u : end - start;
Handle<JSArray> result_array = isolate->factory()->NewJSArray(
KindTraits::Kind, result_len, result_len);
DisallowHeapAllocation no_gc;
Subclass::CopyElementsImpl(*backing_store, start, result_array->elements(),
KindTraits::Kind, 0, kPackedSizeNotKnown,
result_len);
Subclass::TryTransitionResultArrayToPacked(result_array);
return result_array;
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void FragmentPaintPropertyTreeBuilder::UpdateFilter() {
DCHECK(properties_);
const ComputedStyle& style = object_.StyleRef();
if (NeedsPaintPropertyUpdate()) {
if (NeedsFilter(object_)) {
EffectPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.local_transform_space = context_.current.transform;
state.paint_offset = FloatPoint(context_.current.paint_offset);
auto* layer = ToLayoutBoxModelObject(object_).Layer();
if (layer) {
if (properties_->Filter())
state.filter = properties_->Filter()->Filter();
if (object_.IsLayoutImage() &&
ToLayoutImage(object_).ShouldInvertColor())
state.filter.AppendInvertFilter(1.0f);
layer->UpdateCompositorFilterOperationsForFilter(state.filter);
layer->ClearFilterOnEffectNodeDirty();
} else {
DCHECK(object_.IsLayoutImage() &&
ToLayoutImage(object_).ShouldInvertColor());
state.filter = CompositorFilterOperations();
state.filter.AppendInvertFilter(1.0f);
}
state.output_clip = context_.current.clip;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled() ||
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::BlinkGenPropertyTreesEnabled()) {
state.direct_compositing_reasons =
CompositingReasonFinder::RequiresCompositingForFilterAnimation(
style)
? CompositingReason::kActiveFilterAnimation
: CompositingReason::kNone;
DCHECK(!style.HasCurrentFilterAnimation() ||
state.direct_compositing_reasons != CompositingReason::kNone);
state.compositor_element_id = CompositorElementIdFromUniqueObjectId(
object_.UniqueId(), CompositorElementIdNamespace::kEffectFilter);
}
OnUpdate(
properties_->UpdateFilter(context_.current_effect, std::move(state)));
} else {
OnClear(properties_->ClearFilter());
}
}
if (properties_->Filter()) {
context_.current_effect = properties_->Filter();
const ClipPaintPropertyNode* input_clip =
properties_->Filter()->OutputClip();
context_.current.clip = context_.absolute_position.clip =
context_.fixed_position.clip = input_clip;
}
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void acpi_unregister_debugger(const struct acpi_debugger_ops *ops)
{
mutex_lock(&acpi_debugger.lock);
if (ops == acpi_debugger.ops) {
acpi_debugger.ops = NULL;
acpi_debugger.owner = NULL;
}
mutex_unlock(&acpi_debugger.lock);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void SetUpTestCase() {
input_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, kInputBufferSize + 1)) + 1;
output_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
vpx_memalign(kDataAlignment, kOutputBufferSize));
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> CloneVideoFrameWithLayout(
const VideoFrame* const src_frame,
const VideoFrameLayout& dst_layout) {
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->IsMappable());
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->format() == dst_layout.format());
auto dst_frame = VideoFrame::CreateFrameWithLayout(
dst_layout, src_frame->visible_rect(), src_frame->natural_size(),
src_frame->timestamp(), false /* zero_initialize_memory*/);
if (!dst_frame) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create VideoFrame";
return nullptr;
}
const size_t num_planes = VideoFrame::NumPlanes(dst_layout.format());
LOG_ASSERT(dst_layout.planes().size() == num_planes);
LOG_ASSERT(src_frame->layout().planes().size() == num_planes);
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_planes; ++i) {
libyuv::CopyPlane(
src_frame->data(i), src_frame->layout().planes()[i].stride,
dst_frame->data(i), dst_frame->layout().planes()[i].stride,
VideoFrame::Columns(i, dst_frame->format(),
dst_frame->natural_size().width()),
VideoFrame::Rows(i, dst_frame->format(),
dst_frame->natural_size().height()));
}
return dst_frame;
}
Commit Message: media/gpu/test: ImageProcessorClient: Use bytes for width and height in libyuv::CopyPlane()
|width| is in bytes in libyuv::CopyPlane(). We formerly pass width in pixels.
This should matter when a pixel format is used whose pixel is composed of
more than one bytes.
Bug: None
Test: image_processor_test
Change-Id: I98e90be70c8d0128319172d4d19f3a8017b65d78
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1553129
Commit-Queue: Hirokazu Honda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Courbot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#648117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: http_read_line (int print_fd, int sok, char *buf, int len)
{
len = waitline (sok, buf, len, TRUE);
if (len >= 1)
{
/* print the message out (send it to the parent process) */
write (print_fd, "0\n", 2);
if (buf[len-1] == '\r')
{
buf[len-1] = '\n';
write (print_fd, buf, len);
} else
{
write (print_fd, buf, len);
write (print_fd, "\n", 1);
}
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
CWE ID: CWE-310
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void remove_controlq_data(struct ports_device *portdev)
{
struct port_buffer *buf;
unsigned int len;
if (!use_multiport(portdev))
return;
while ((buf = virtqueue_get_buf(portdev->c_ivq, &len)))
free_buf(buf, true);
while ((buf = virtqueue_detach_unused_buf(portdev->c_ivq)))
free_buf(buf, true);
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer (TIFF *in, uint8 *obuf, uint32 length,
uint32 width, uint16 spp,
struct dump_opts *dump)
{
int i, j, bytes_per_sample, bytes_per_pixel, shift_width, result = 1;
int32 bytes_read = 0;
uint16 bps, nstrips, planar, strips_per_sample;
uint32 src_rowsize, dst_rowsize, rows_processed, rps;
uint32 rows_this_strip = 0;
tsample_t s;
tstrip_t strip;
tsize_t scanlinesize = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
tsize_t stripsize = TIFFStripSize(in);
unsigned char *srcbuffs[MAX_SAMPLES];
unsigned char *buff = NULL;
unsigned char *dst = NULL;
if (obuf == NULL)
{
TIFFError("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer","Invalid buffer argument");
return (0);
}
memset (srcbuffs, '\0', sizeof(srcbuffs));
TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, &planar);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, &rps);
if (rps > length)
rps = length;
bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
bytes_per_pixel = ((bps * spp) + 7) / 8;
if (bytes_per_pixel < (bytes_per_sample + 1))
shift_width = bytes_per_pixel;
else
shift_width = bytes_per_sample + 1;
src_rowsize = ((bps * width) + 7) / 8;
dst_rowsize = ((bps * width * spp) + 7) / 8;
dst = obuf;
if ((dump->infile != NULL) && (dump->level == 3))
{
dump_info (dump->infile, dump->format, "",
"Image width %d, length %d, Scanline size, %4d bytes",
width, length, scanlinesize);
dump_info (dump->infile, dump->format, "",
"Bits per sample %d, Samples per pixel %d, Shift width %d",
bps, spp, shift_width);
}
/* Libtiff seems to assume/require that data for separate planes are
* written one complete plane after another and not interleaved in any way.
* Multiple scanlines and possibly strips of the same plane must be
* written before data for any other plane.
*/
nstrips = TIFFNumberOfStrips(in);
strips_per_sample = nstrips /spp;
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
srcbuffs[s] = NULL;
buff = _TIFFmalloc(stripsize);
if (!buff)
{
TIFFError ("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer",
"Unable to allocate strip read buffer for sample %d", s);
for (i = 0; i < s; i++)
_TIFFfree (srcbuffs[i]);
return 0;
}
srcbuffs[s] = buff;
}
rows_processed = 0;
for (j = 0; (j < strips_per_sample) && (result == 1); j++)
{
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
buff = srcbuffs[s];
strip = (s * strips_per_sample) + j;
bytes_read = TIFFReadEncodedStrip (in, strip, buff, stripsize);
rows_this_strip = bytes_read / src_rowsize;
if (bytes_read < 0 && !ignore)
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read strip %lu for sample %d",
(unsigned long) strip, s + 1);
result = 0;
break;
}
#ifdef DEVELMODE
TIFFError("", "Strip %2d, read %5d bytes for %4d scanlines, shift width %d",
strip, bytes_read, rows_this_strip, shift_width);
#endif
}
if (rps > rows_this_strip)
rps = rows_this_strip;
dst = obuf + (dst_rowsize * rows_processed);
if ((bps % 8) == 0)
{
if (combineSeparateSamplesBytes (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
}
else
{
switch (shift_width)
{
case 1: if (combineSeparateSamples8bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 2: if (combineSeparateSamples16bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 3: if (combineSeparateSamples24bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
case 4:
case 5:
case 6:
case 7:
case 8: if (combineSeparateSamples32bits (srcbuffs, dst, width, rps,
spp, bps, dump->infile,
dump->format, dump->level))
{
result = 0;
break;
}
break;
default: TIFFError ("readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer", "Unsupported bit depth: %d", bps);
result = 0;
break;
}
}
if ((rows_processed + rps) > length)
{
rows_processed = length;
rps = length - rows_processed;
}
else
rows_processed += rps;
}
/* free any buffers allocated for each plane or scanline and
* any temporary buffers
*/
for (s = 0; (s < spp) && (s < MAX_SAMPLES); s++)
{
buff = srcbuffs[s];
if (buff != NULL)
_TIFFfree(buff);
}
return (result);
} /* end readSeparateStripsIntoBuffer */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix read of undefined variable in case of missing
required tags. Found on test case of MSVR 35100.
* tools/tiffcrop.c: fix read of undefined buffer in
readContigStripsIntoBuffer() due to uint16 overflow. Probably not a
security issue but I can be wrong. Reported as MSVR 35100 by Axel
Souchet from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void LayerWebKitThread::setDrawable(bool isDrawable)
{
if (m_isDrawable == isDrawable)
return;
m_isDrawable = isDrawable;
setNeedsTexture(m_isDrawable && (drawsContent() || contents() || pluginView() || mediaPlayer()));
setNeedsCommit();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] GraphicsLayer: rename notifySyncRequired to notifyFlushRequired
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111997
Patch by Alberto Garcia <[email protected]> on 2013-03-11
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
This changed in r130439 but the old name was introduced again by
mistake in r144465.
* platform/graphics/blackberry/GraphicsLayerBlackBerry.h:
(WebCore::GraphicsLayerBlackBerry::notifyFlushRequired):
* platform/graphics/blackberry/LayerWebKitThread.cpp:
(WebCore::LayerWebKitThread::setNeedsCommit):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145363 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: get_futex_key(u32 __user *uaddr, int fshared, union futex_key *key, int rw)
{
unsigned long address = (unsigned long)uaddr;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct page *page, *page_head;
int err, ro = 0;
/*
* The futex address must be "naturally" aligned.
*/
key->both.offset = address % PAGE_SIZE;
if (unlikely((address % sizeof(u32)) != 0))
return -EINVAL;
address -= key->both.offset;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(rw, uaddr, sizeof(u32))))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes are fast.
* As the mm cannot disappear under us and the 'key' only needs
* virtual address, we dont even have to find the underlying vma.
* Note : We do have to check 'uaddr' is a valid user address,
* but access_ok() should be faster than find_vma()
*/
if (!fshared) {
key->private.mm = mm;
key->private.address = address;
get_futex_key_refs(key); /* implies MB (B) */
return 0;
}
again:
err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, 1, &page);
/*
* If write access is not required (eg. FUTEX_WAIT), try
* and get read-only access.
*/
if (err == -EFAULT && rw == VERIFY_READ) {
err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, 0, &page);
ro = 1;
}
if (err < 0)
return err;
else
err = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
page_head = page;
if (unlikely(PageTail(page))) {
put_page(page);
/* serialize against __split_huge_page_splitting() */
local_irq_disable();
if (likely(__get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, !ro, &page) == 1)) {
page_head = compound_head(page);
/*
* page_head is valid pointer but we must pin
* it before taking the PG_lock and/or
* PG_compound_lock. The moment we re-enable
* irqs __split_huge_page_splitting() can
* return and the head page can be freed from
* under us. We can't take the PG_lock and/or
* PG_compound_lock on a page that could be
* freed from under us.
*/
if (page != page_head) {
get_page(page_head);
put_page(page);
}
local_irq_enable();
} else {
local_irq_enable();
goto again;
}
}
#else
page_head = compound_head(page);
if (page != page_head) {
get_page(page_head);
put_page(page);
}
#endif
lock_page(page_head);
/*
* If page_head->mapping is NULL, then it cannot be a PageAnon
* page; but it might be the ZERO_PAGE or in the gate area or
* in a special mapping (all cases which we are happy to fail);
* or it may have been a good file page when get_user_pages_fast
* found it, but truncated or holepunched or subjected to
* invalidate_complete_page2 before we got the page lock (also
* cases which we are happy to fail). And we hold a reference,
* so refcount care in invalidate_complete_page's remove_mapping
* prevents drop_caches from setting mapping to NULL beneath us.
*
* The case we do have to guard against is when memory pressure made
* shmem_writepage move it from filecache to swapcache beneath us:
* an unlikely race, but we do need to retry for page_head->mapping.
*/
if (!page_head->mapping) {
int shmem_swizzled = PageSwapCache(page_head);
unlock_page(page_head);
put_page(page_head);
if (shmem_swizzled)
goto again;
return -EFAULT;
}
/*
* Private mappings are handled in a simple way.
*
* NOTE: When userspace waits on a MAP_SHARED mapping, even if
* it's a read-only handle, it's expected that futexes attach to
* the object not the particular process.
*/
if (PageAnon(page_head)) {
/*
* A RO anonymous page will never change and thus doesn't make
* sense for futex operations.
*/
if (ro) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_MMSHARED; /* ref taken on mm */
key->private.mm = mm;
key->private.address = address;
} else {
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_INODE; /* inode-based key */
key->shared.inode = page_head->mapping->host;
key->shared.pgoff = basepage_index(page);
}
get_futex_key_refs(key); /* implies MB (B) */
out:
unlock_page(page_head);
put_page(page_head);
return err;
}
Commit Message: futex-prevent-requeue-pi-on-same-futex.patch futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_requeue(..., requeue_pi=1)
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing from
a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this, then
dangling pointers may be left for rt_waiter resulting in an exploitable
condition.
This change brings futex_requeue() in line with futex_wait_requeue_pi()
which performs the same check as per commit 6f7b0a2a5c0f ("futex: Forbid
uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()")
[ tglx: Compare the resulting keys as well, as uaddrs might be
different depending on the mapping ]
Fixes CVE-2014-3153.
Reported-by: Pinkie Pie
Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Darren Hart <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ReverbConvolverStage::ReverbConvolverStage(const float* impulseResponse, size_t, size_t reverbTotalLatency, size_t stageOffset, size_t stageLength,
size_t fftSize, size_t renderPhase, size_t renderSliceSize, ReverbAccumulationBuffer* accumulationBuffer, bool directMode)
: m_accumulationBuffer(accumulationBuffer)
, m_accumulationReadIndex(0)
, m_inputReadIndex(0)
, m_directMode(directMode)
{
ASSERT(impulseResponse);
ASSERT(accumulationBuffer);
if (!m_directMode) {
m_fftKernel = adoptPtr(new FFTFrame(fftSize));
m_fftKernel->doPaddedFFT(impulseResponse + stageOffset, stageLength);
m_fftConvolver = adoptPtr(new FFTConvolver(fftSize));
} else {
m_directKernel = adoptPtr(new AudioFloatArray(fftSize / 2));
m_directKernel->copyToRange(impulseResponse + stageOffset, 0, fftSize / 2);
m_directConvolver = adoptPtr(new DirectConvolver(renderSliceSize));
}
m_temporaryBuffer.allocate(renderSliceSize);
size_t totalDelay = stageOffset + reverbTotalLatency;
size_t halfSize = fftSize / 2;
if (!m_directMode) {
ASSERT(totalDelay >= halfSize);
if (totalDelay >= halfSize)
totalDelay -= halfSize;
}
int maxPreDelayLength = std::min(halfSize, totalDelay);
m_preDelayLength = totalDelay > 0 ? renderPhase % maxPreDelayLength : 0;
if (m_preDelayLength > totalDelay)
m_preDelayLength = 0;
m_postDelayLength = totalDelay - m_preDelayLength;
m_preReadWriteIndex = 0;
m_framesProcessed = 0; // total frames processed so far
size_t delayBufferSize = m_preDelayLength < fftSize ? fftSize : m_preDelayLength;
delayBufferSize = delayBufferSize < renderSliceSize ? renderSliceSize : delayBufferSize;
m_preDelayBuffer.allocate(delayBufferSize);
}
Commit Message: Don't read past the end of the impulseResponse array
BUG=281480
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23689004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void ext3_msg(struct super_block *sb, const char *prefix,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
struct va_format vaf;
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
vaf.fmt = fmt;
vaf.va = &args;
printk("%sEXT3-fs (%s): %pV\n", prefix, sb->s_id, &vaf);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: long Chapters::Parse()
{
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start; // payload start
const long long stop = pos + m_size; // payload stop
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x05B9) // EditionEntry ID
{
status = ParseEdition(pos, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: long Cluster::ParseSimpleBlock(long long block_size, long long& pos,
long& len) {
const long long block_start = pos;
const long long block_stop = pos + block_size;
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long track = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (track < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(track);
if (track == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
#if 0
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
#endif
pos += len; // consume track number
if ((pos + 2) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 2) > avail) {
len = 2;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
pos += 2; // consume timecode
if ((pos + 1) > block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
unsigned char flags;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &flags);
if (status < 0) { // error or underflow
len = 1;
return status;
}
++pos; // consume flags byte
assert(pos <= avail);
if (pos >= block_stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const int lacing = int(flags & 0x06) >> 1;
if ((lacing != 0) && (block_stop > avail)) {
len = static_cast<long>(block_stop - pos);
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
status = CreateBlock(0x23, // simple block id
block_start, block_size,
0); // DiscardPadding
if (status != 0)
return status;
m_pos = block_stop;
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
struct ip6t_replace tmp;
struct xt_table_info *newinfo;
void *loc_cpu_entry;
struct ip6t_entry *iter;
if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
/* overflow check */
if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
return -ENOMEM;
if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
return -EINVAL;
tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
if (!newinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
loc_cpu_entry = newinfo->entries;
if (copy_from_user(loc_cpu_entry, user + sizeof(tmp),
tmp.size) != 0) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_newinfo;
}
ret = translate_table(net, newinfo, loc_cpu_entry, &tmp);
if (ret != 0)
goto free_newinfo;
ret = __do_replace(net, tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks, newinfo,
tmp.num_counters, tmp.counters);
if (ret)
goto free_newinfo_untrans;
return 0;
free_newinfo_untrans:
xt_entry_foreach(iter, loc_cpu_entry, newinfo->size)
cleanup_entry(iter, net);
free_newinfo:
xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetterForMainWorld(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<TestInterfaceEmpty> result(imp->perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttribute());
if (result && DOMDataStore::setReturnValueFromWrapperForMainWorld<V8TestInterfaceEmpty>(info.GetReturnValue(), result.get()))
return;
v8::Handle<v8::Value> wrapper = toV8(result.get(), info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (!wrapper.IsEmpty()) {
V8HiddenValue::setHiddenValue(info.GetIsolate(), info.Holder(), v8AtomicString(info.GetIsolate(), "perWorldBindingsReadonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttribute"), wrapper);
v8SetReturnValue(info, wrapper);
}
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: LogLuvSetupEncode(TIFF* tif)
{
static const char module[] = "LogLuvSetupEncode";
LogLuvState* sp = EncoderState(tif);
TIFFDirectory* td = &tif->tif_dir;
switch (td->td_photometric) {
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV:
if (!LogLuvInitState(tif))
break;
if (td->td_compression == COMPRESSION_SGILOG24) {
tif->tif_encoderow = LogLuvEncode24;
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case SGILOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
sp->tfunc = Luv24fromXYZ;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
sp->tfunc = Luv24fromLuv48;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_RAW:
break;
default:
goto notsupported;
}
} else {
tif->tif_encoderow = LogLuvEncode32;
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case SGILOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
sp->tfunc = Luv32fromXYZ;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
sp->tfunc = Luv32fromLuv48;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_RAW:
break;
default:
goto notsupported;
}
}
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL:
if (!LogL16InitState(tif))
break;
tif->tif_encoderow = LogL16Encode;
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case SGILOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
sp->tfunc = L16fromY;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
break;
default:
goto notsupported;
}
break;
default:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Inappropriate photometric interpretation %d for SGILog compression; %s",
td->td_photometric, "must be either LogLUV or LogL");
break;
}
return (1);
notsupported:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"SGILog compression supported only for %s, or raw data",
td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL ? "Y, L" : "XYZ, Luv");
return (0);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::SetSurface(const scoped_refptr<gl::GLSurface>& surface) {
DCHECK(context_->IsCurrent(nullptr));
DCHECK(surface);
surface_ = surface;
RestoreCurrentFramebufferBindings();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: u8 *nfc_llcp_build_tlv(u8 type, u8 *value, u8 value_length, u8 *tlv_length)
{
u8 *tlv, length;
pr_debug("type %d\n", type);
if (type >= LLCP_TLV_MAX)
return NULL;
length = llcp_tlv_length[type];
if (length == 0 && value_length == 0)
return NULL;
else if (length == 0)
length = value_length;
*tlv_length = 2 + length;
tlv = kzalloc(2 + length, GFP_KERNEL);
if (tlv == NULL)
return tlv;
tlv[0] = type;
tlv[1] = length;
memcpy(tlv + 2, value, length);
return tlv;
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: jbig2_page_add_result(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Page *page, Jbig2Image *image, int x, int y, Jbig2ComposeOp op)
{
/* ensure image exists first */
if (page->image == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, -1, "page info possibly missing, no image defined");
return 0;
}
/* grow the page to accomodate a new stripe if necessary */
if (page->striped) {
int new_height = y + image->height + page->end_row;
if (page->image->height < new_height) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_DEBUG, -1, "growing page buffer to %d rows " "to accomodate new stripe", new_height);
jbig2_image_resize(ctx, page->image, page->image->width, new_height);
}
}
jbig2_image_compose(ctx, page->image, image, x, y + page->end_row, op);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool FeatureInfo::IsWebGL2OrES3Context() const {
return IsWebGL2OrES3ContextType(context_type_);
}
Commit Message: gpu: Disallow use of IOSurfaces for half-float format with swiftshader.
[email protected]
Bug: 998038
Change-Id: Ic31d28938ef205b36657fc7bd297fe8a63d08543
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1798052
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#695826}
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
return 0;
return
(state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
(state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) ||
(state->max_blocks_out &&
(state->p_send.blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) ||
(state->max_blocks_in &&
(state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in)) ||
(state->rekey_interval != 0 && state->rekey_time +
state->rekey_interval <= monotime());
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 3)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
int intArg(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined).toInt32(exec));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
const String& strArg(ustringToString(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).isEmpty() ? UString() : MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 1, DefaultIsUndefined).toString(exec)->value(exec)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
TestObj* objArg(toTestObj(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 2, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->voidMethodWithArgs(intArg, strArg, objArg);
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: SoundTriggerHwService::Module::Module(const sp<SoundTriggerHwService>& service,
sound_trigger_hw_device* hwDevice,
sound_trigger_module_descriptor descriptor,
const sp<ISoundTriggerClient>& client)
: mService(service), mHwDevice(hwDevice), mDescriptor(descriptor),
mClient(client), mServiceState(SOUND_TRIGGER_STATE_NO_INIT)
{
}
Commit Message: soundtrigger: add size check on sound model and recogntion data
Bug: 30148546
Change-Id: I082f535a853c96571887eeea37c6d41ecee7d8c0
(cherry picked from commit bb00d8f139ff51336ab3c810d35685003949bcf8)
(cherry picked from commit ef0c91518446e65533ca8bab6726a845f27c73fd)
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: test_bson_append_maxkey (void)
{
bson_t *b;
bson_t *b2;
b = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_maxkey (b, "maxkey", -1));
b2 = get_bson ("test37.bson");
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL (b, b2);
bson_destroy (b);
bson_destroy (b2);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void RunCoeffCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 5000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_ref_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_block, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() - rnd.Rand8();
fwd_txfm_ref(input_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_block, output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: free_init_creds_ctx(krb5_context context, krb5_init_creds_context ctx)
{
if (ctx->etypes)
free(ctx->etypes);
if (ctx->pre_auth_types)
free (ctx->pre_auth_types);
if (ctx->in_tkt_service)
free(ctx->in_tkt_service);
if (ctx->keytab_data)
free(ctx->keytab_data);
if (ctx->password) {
memset(ctx->password, 0, strlen(ctx->password));
free(ctx->password);
}
/*
* FAST state (we don't close the armor_ccache because we might have
* to destroy it, and how would we know? also, the caller should
* take care of cleaning up the armor_ccache).
*/
if (ctx->fast_state.armor_service)
krb5_free_principal(context, ctx->fast_state.armor_service);
if (ctx->fast_state.armor_crypto)
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, ctx->fast_state.armor_crypto);
if (ctx->fast_state.strengthen_key)
krb5_free_keyblock(context, ctx->fast_state.strengthen_key);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &ctx->fast_state.armor_key);
krb5_data_free(&ctx->req_buffer);
krb5_free_cred_contents(context, &ctx->cred);
free_METHOD_DATA(&ctx->md);
free_AS_REP(&ctx->as_rep);
free_EncKDCRepPart(&ctx->enc_part);
free_KRB_ERROR(&ctx->error);
free_AS_REQ(&ctx->as_req);
if (ctx->ppaid) {
free_paid(context, ctx->ppaid);
free(ctx->ppaid);
}
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnRenderViewHostCreated(int child_id,
int route_id) {
scheduler_->OnClientCreated(child_id, route_id);
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int use_conf(char *test_path)
{
int ret;
size_t flags = 0;
char filename[1024], errstr[1024];
char *buffer;
FILE *infile, *conffile;
json_t *json;
json_error_t error;
sprintf(filename, "%s%cinput", test_path, dir_sep);
if (!(infile = fopen(filename, "rb"))) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not open \"%s\"\n", filename);
return 2;
}
sprintf(filename, "%s%cenv", test_path, dir_sep);
conffile = fopen(filename, "rb");
if (conffile) {
read_conf(conffile);
fclose(conffile);
}
if (conf.indent < 0 || conf.indent > 255) {
fprintf(stderr, "invalid value for JSON_INDENT: %d\n", conf.indent);
return 2;
}
if (conf.indent)
flags |= JSON_INDENT(conf.indent);
if (conf.compact)
flags |= JSON_COMPACT;
if (conf.ensure_ascii)
flags |= JSON_ENSURE_ASCII;
if (conf.preserve_order)
flags |= JSON_PRESERVE_ORDER;
if (conf.sort_keys)
flags |= JSON_SORT_KEYS;
if (conf.strip) {
/* Load to memory, strip leading and trailing whitespace */
buffer = loadfile(infile);
json = json_loads(strip(buffer), 0, &error);
free(buffer);
}
else
json = json_loadf(infile, 0, &error);
fclose(infile);
if (!json) {
sprintf(errstr, "%d %d %d\n%s\n",
error.line, error.column, error.position,
error.text);
ret = cmpfile(errstr, test_path, "error");
return ret;
}
buffer = json_dumps(json, flags);
ret = cmpfile(buffer, test_path, "output");
free(buffer);
json_decref(json);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void DownloadItemImpl::RemoveObserver(Observer* observer) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static CURLcode nss_cache_crl(SECItem *crl_der)
{
CERTCertDBHandle *db = CERT_GetDefaultCertDB();
CERTSignedCrl *crl = SEC_FindCrlByDERCert(db, crl_der, 0);
if(crl) {
/* CRL already cached */
SEC_DestroyCrl(crl);
SECITEM_FreeItem(crl_der, PR_TRUE);
return CURLE_OK;
}
/* acquire lock before call of CERT_CacheCRL() and accessing nss_crl_list */
PR_Lock(nss_crllock);
/* store the CRL item so that we can free it in Curl_nss_cleanup() */
if(!Curl_llist_insert_next(nss_crl_list, nss_crl_list->tail, crl_der)) {
SECITEM_FreeItem(crl_der, PR_TRUE);
PR_Unlock(nss_crllock);
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
if(SECSuccess != CERT_CacheCRL(db, crl_der)) {
/* unable to cache CRL */
PR_Unlock(nss_crllock);
return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
}
/* we need to clear session cache, so that the CRL could take effect */
SSL_ClearSessionCache();
PR_Unlock(nss_crllock);
return CURLE_OK;
}
Commit Message: nss: refuse previously loaded certificate from file
... when we are not asked to use a certificate from file
CWE ID: CWE-287
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool PlatformSensorProviderBase::CreateSharedBufferIfNeeded() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (shared_buffer_handle_.is_valid())
return true;
shared_buffer_handle_ =
mojo::SharedBufferHandle::Create(kSharedBufferSizeInBytes);
return shared_buffer_handle_.is_valid();
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
pid_t pid;
int status;
while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
(pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
;
signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
errno = save_errno;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int mov_read_custom(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
int64_t end = avio_tell(pb) + atom.size;
uint8_t *key = NULL, *val = NULL, *mean = NULL;
int i;
int ret = 0;
AVStream *st;
MOVStreamContext *sc;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
sc = st->priv_data;
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
uint8_t **p;
uint32_t len, tag;
if (end - avio_tell(pb) <= 12)
break;
len = avio_rb32(pb);
tag = avio_rl32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, 4); // flags
if (len < 12 || len - 12 > end - avio_tell(pb))
break;
len -= 12;
if (tag == MKTAG('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'))
p = &mean;
else if (tag == MKTAG('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'))
p = &key;
else if (tag == MKTAG('d', 'a', 't', 'a') && len > 4) {
avio_skip(pb, 4);
len -= 4;
p = &val;
} else
break;
*p = av_malloc(len + 1);
if (!*p)
break;
ret = ffio_read_size(pb, *p, len);
if (ret < 0) {
av_freep(p);
break;
}
(*p)[len] = 0;
}
if (mean && key && val) {
if (strcmp(key, "iTunSMPB") == 0) {
int priming, remainder, samples;
if(sscanf(val, "%*X %X %X %X", &priming, &remainder, &samples) == 3){
if(priming>0 && priming<16384)
sc->start_pad = priming;
}
}
if (strcmp(key, "cdec") != 0) {
av_dict_set(&c->fc->metadata, key, val,
AV_DICT_DONT_STRDUP_KEY | AV_DICT_DONT_STRDUP_VAL);
key = val = NULL;
}
} else {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE,
"Unhandled or malformed custom metadata of size %"PRId64"\n", atom.size);
}
avio_seek(pb, end, SEEK_SET);
av_freep(&key);
av_freep(&val);
av_freep(&mean);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-834
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnAllowBindings(int enabled_bindings_flags) {
enabled_bindings_ |= enabled_bindings_flags;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: WORD32 ihevcd_nctb_cnt(codec_t *ps_codec, sps_t *ps_sps)
{
WORD32 nctb = 1;
UNUSED(ps_codec);
/* If CTB size is less than 32 x 32 then set nCTB as 4 */
if(ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size < 5)
nctb = 1;
return nctb;
}
Commit Message: Check only allocated mv bufs for releasing from reference
When checking mv bufs for releasing from reference, unallocated
mv bufs were also checked. This issue was fixed by restricting
the loop count to allocated number of mv bufs.
Bug: 34896906
Bug: 34819017
Change-Id: If832f590b301f414d4cd5206414efc61a70c17cb
(cherry picked from commit 23bfe3e06d53ea749073a5d7ceda84239742b2c2)
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: _dopr(char **sbuffer,
char **buffer,
size_t *maxlen,
size_t *retlen, int *truncated, const char *format, va_list args)
{
char ch;
LLONG value;
LDOUBLE fvalue;
char *strvalue;
int min;
int max;
int state;
int flags;
int cflags;
size_t currlen;
state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
flags = currlen = cflags = min = 0;
max = -1;
ch = *format++;
while (state != DP_S_DONE) {
if (ch == '\0' || (buffer == NULL && currlen >= *maxlen))
state = DP_S_DONE;
switch (state) {
case DP_S_DEFAULT:
if (ch == '%')
state = DP_S_FLAGS;
else
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
ch = *format++;
break;
case DP_S_FLAGS:
case '-':
flags |= DP_F_MINUS;
ch = *format++;
break;
case '+':
flags |= DP_F_PLUS;
ch = *format++;
break;
case ' ':
flags |= DP_F_SPACE;
ch = *format++;
break;
case '#':
flags |= DP_F_NUM;
ch = *format++;
break;
case '0':
flags |= DP_F_ZERO;
ch = *format++;
break;
default:
state = DP_S_MIN;
break;
}
break;
case DP_S_MIN:
if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
min = 10 * min + char_to_int(ch);
ch = *format++;
} else if (ch == '*') {
min = va_arg(args, int);
ch = *format++;
state = DP_S_DOT;
} else
state = DP_S_DOT;
break;
case DP_S_DOT:
if (ch == '.') {
state = DP_S_MAX;
ch = *format++;
} else
state = DP_S_MOD;
break;
case DP_S_MAX:
if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
if (max < 0)
max = 0;
max = 10 * max + char_to_int(ch);
ch = *format++;
} else if (ch == '*') {
max = va_arg(args, int);
ch = *format++;
state = DP_S_MOD;
} else
state = DP_S_MOD;
break;
case DP_S_MOD:
switch (ch) {
case 'h':
cflags = DP_C_SHORT;
ch = *format++;
break;
case 'l':
if (*format == 'l') {
cflags = DP_C_LLONG;
format++;
} else
cflags = DP_C_LONG;
ch = *format++;
break;
case 'q':
cflags = DP_C_LLONG;
ch = *format++;
break;
case 'L':
cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE;
ch = *format++;
break;
default:
break;
}
state = DP_S_CONV;
break;
case DP_S_CONV:
switch (ch) {
case 'd':
case 'i':
switch (cflags) {
case DP_C_SHORT:
value = (short int)va_arg(args, int);
break;
case DP_C_LONG:
value = va_arg(args, long int);
break;
case DP_C_LLONG:
value = va_arg(args, LLONG);
break;
default:
value = va_arg(args, int);
value = va_arg(args, int);
break;
}
fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
value, 10, min, max, flags);
break;
case 'X':
flags |= DP_F_UP;
case 'o':
case 'u':
flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
switch (cflags) {
case DP_C_SHORT:
value = (unsigned short int)va_arg(args, unsigned int);
break;
case DP_C_LONG:
value = (LLONG) va_arg(args, unsigned long int);
break;
case DP_C_LLONG:
value = va_arg(args, unsigned LLONG);
break;
default:
value = (LLONG) va_arg(args, unsigned int);
break;
value = (LLONG) va_arg(args, unsigned int);
break;
}
fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
ch == 'o' ? 8 : (ch == 'u' ? 10 : 16),
min, max, flags);
break;
case 'f':
if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
fvalue = va_arg(args, LDOUBLE);
else
fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
fmtfp(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
fvalue, min, max, flags);
break;
case 'E':
flags |= DP_F_UP;
fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
break;
case 'G':
flags |= DP_F_UP;
case 'g':
if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
fvalue = va_arg(args, LDOUBLE);
else
fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
break;
case 'c':
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
fvalue = va_arg(args, double);
break;
case 'c':
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
va_arg(args, int));
break;
case 's':
strvalue = va_arg(args, char *);
}
fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue,
flags, min, max);
else
max = *maxlen;
}
fmtstr(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue,
flags, min, max);
break;
case 'p':
value = (long)va_arg(args, void *);
fmtint(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
value, 16, min, max, flags | DP_F_NUM);
break;
case 'n': /* XXX */
if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
} else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) { /* XXX */
LLONG *num;
num = va_arg(args, LLONG *);
*num = (LLONG) currlen;
} else {
int *num;
num = va_arg(args, int *);
*num = currlen;
}
break;
case '%':
doapr_outch(sbuffer, buffer, &currlen, maxlen, ch);
break;
case 'w':
/* not supported yet, treat as next char */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(osf_getsysinfo, unsigned long, op, void __user *, buffer,
unsigned long, nbytes, int __user *, start, void __user *, arg)
{
unsigned long w;
struct percpu_struct *cpu;
switch (op) {
case GSI_IEEE_FP_CONTROL:
/* Return current software fp control & status bits. */
/* Note that DU doesn't verify available space here. */
w = current_thread_info()->ieee_state & IEEE_SW_MASK;
w = swcr_update_status(w, rdfpcr());
if (put_user(w, (unsigned long __user *) buffer))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case GSI_IEEE_STATE_AT_SIGNAL:
/*
* Not sure anybody will ever use this weird stuff. These
* ops can be used (under OSF/1) to set the fpcr that should
* be used when a signal handler starts executing.
*/
break;
case GSI_UACPROC:
if (nbytes < sizeof(unsigned int))
return -EINVAL;
w = (current_thread_info()->flags >> UAC_SHIFT) & UAC_BITMASK;
if (put_user(w, (unsigned int __user *)buffer))
return -EFAULT;
return 1;
case GSI_PROC_TYPE:
if (nbytes < sizeof(unsigned long))
return -EINVAL;
cpu = (struct percpu_struct*)
((char*)hwrpb + hwrpb->processor_offset);
w = cpu->type;
if (put_user(w, (unsigned long __user*)buffer))
return -EFAULT;
return 1;
case GSI_GET_HWRPB:
if (nbytes < sizeof(*hwrpb))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, hwrpb, nbytes) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
return 1;
default:
break;
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Turner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: session_input_channel_req(Channel *c, const char *rtype)
{
int success = 0;
Session *s;
if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) {
logit("session_input_channel_req: no session %d req %.100s",
c->self, rtype);
return 0;
}
debug("session_input_channel_req: session %d req %s", s->self, rtype);
/*
* a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command
* or a subsystem is executed
*/
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) {
success = session_shell_req(s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) {
success = session_exec_req(s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) {
success = session_pty_req(s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) {
success = session_x11_req(s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "[email protected]") == 0) {
success = session_auth_agent_req(s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) {
success = session_subsystem_req(s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) {
success = session_env_req(s);
}
}
if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) {
success = session_window_change_req(s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) {
success = session_break_req(s);
}
return success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int edge_write_room(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = tty->driver_data;
struct edgeport_port *edge_port = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
int room = 0;
unsigned long flags;
if (edge_port == NULL)
return 0;
if (edge_port->close_pending == 1)
return 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&edge_port->ep_lock, flags);
room = kfifo_avail(&port->write_fifo);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&edge_port->ep_lock, flags);
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - returns %d\n", __func__, room);
return room;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-191
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: XGetDeviceButtonMapping(
register Display *dpy,
XDevice *device,
unsigned char map[],
unsigned int nmap)
{
int status = 0;
unsigned char mapping[256]; /* known fixed size */
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
register xGetDeviceButtonMappingReq *req;
xGetDeviceButtonMappingReply rep;
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (_XiCheckExtInit(dpy, XInput_Initial_Release, info) == -1)
return (NoSuchExtension);
GetReq(GetDeviceButtonMapping, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->ReqType = X_GetDeviceButtonMapping;
req->deviceid = device->device_id;
status = _XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse);
if (status == 1) {
if (rep.length <= (sizeof(mapping) >> 2)) {
unsigned long nbytes = rep.length << 2;
_XRead(dpy, (char *)mapping, nbytes);
if (rep.nElts)
memcpy(map, mapping, MIN((int)rep.nElts, nmap));
status = rep.nElts;
} else {
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
status = 0;
}
} else
status = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (status);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_events(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_ulpevent *event;
if (optlen > sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&sctp_sk(sk)->subscribe, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
/* At the time when a user app subscribes to SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT,
* if there is no data to be sent or retransmit, the stack will
* immediately send up this notification.
*/
if (sctp_ulpevent_type_enabled(SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT,
&sctp_sk(sk)->subscribe)) {
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, 0);
if (asoc && sctp_outq_is_empty(&asoc->outqueue)) {
event = sctp_ulpevent_make_sender_dry_event(asoc,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!event)
return -ENOMEM;
sctp_ulpq_tail_event(&asoc->ulpq, event);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: const AXObject* AXObject::ariaHiddenRoot() const {
for (const AXObject* object = this; object; object = object->parentObject()) {
if (equalIgnoringCase(object->getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "true"))
return object;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: long FS_FOpenFileRead(const char *filename, fileHandle_t *file, qboolean uniqueFILE)
{
searchpath_t *search;
long len;
if(!fs_searchpaths)
Com_Error(ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization");
for(search = fs_searchpaths; search; search = search->next)
{
len = FS_FOpenFileReadDir(filename, search, file, uniqueFILE, qfalse);
if(file == NULL)
{
if(len > 0)
return len;
}
else
{
if(len >= 0 && *file)
return len;
}
}
#ifdef FS_MISSING
if(missingFiles)
fprintf(missingFiles, "%s\n", filename);
#endif
if(file)
{
*file = 0;
return -1;
}
else
{
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void sc_remote_data_init(struct sc_remote_data *rdata)
{
if (!rdata)
return;
memset(rdata, 0, sizeof(struct sc_remote_data));
rdata->alloc = sc_remote_apdu_allocate;
rdata->free = sc_remote_apdu_free;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static MagickBooleanType IsPNM(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t extent)
{
if (extent < 2)
return(MagickFalse);
if ((*magick == (unsigned char) 'P') &&
((magick[1] == '1') || (magick[1] == '2') || (magick[1] == '3') ||
(magick[1] == '4') || (magick[1] == '5') || (magick[1] == '6') ||
(magick[1] == '7') || (magick[1] == 'F') || (magick[1] == 'f')))
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1612
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static AVFrame *get_video_buffer(AVFilterLink *inlink, int w, int h)
{
PadContext *s = inlink->dst->priv;
AVFrame *frame = ff_get_video_buffer(inlink->dst->outputs[0],
w + (s->w - s->in_w),
h + (s->h - s->in_h));
int plane;
if (!frame)
return NULL;
frame->width = w;
frame->height = h;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane]; plane++) {
int hsub = s->draw.hsub[plane];
int vsub = s->draw.vsub[plane];
frame->data[plane] += (s->x >> hsub) * s->draw.pixelstep[plane] +
(s->y >> vsub) * frame->linesize[plane];
}
return frame;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: XMLRPC_VALUE XMLRPC_UtilityCreateFault(int fault_code, const char* fault_string) {
XMLRPC_VALUE xOutput = NULL;
char* string = NULL;
simplestring description;
simplestring_init(&description);
switch (fault_code) {
case xmlrpc_error_parse_xml_syntax:
string = xmlrpc_error_parse_xml_syntax_str;
break;
case xmlrpc_error_parse_unknown_encoding:
string = xmlrpc_error_parse_unknown_encoding_str;
break;
case xmlrpc_error_parse_bad_encoding:
string = xmlrpc_error_parse_bad_encoding_str;
break;
case xmlrpc_error_invalid_xmlrpc:
string = xmlrpc_error_invalid_xmlrpc_str;
break;
case xmlrpc_error_unknown_method:
string = xmlrpc_error_unknown_method_str;
break;
case xmlrpc_error_invalid_params:
string = xmlrpc_error_invalid_params_str;
break;
case xmlrpc_error_internal_server:
string = xmlrpc_error_internal_server_str;
break;
case xmlrpc_error_application:
string = xmlrpc_error_application_str;
break;
case xmlrpc_error_system:
string = xmlrpc_error_system_str;
break;
case xmlrpc_error_transport:
string = xmlrpc_error_transport_str;
break;
}
simplestring_add(&description, string);
if(string && fault_string) {
simplestring_add(&description, "\n\n");
}
simplestring_add(&description, fault_string);
if(description.len) {
xOutput = XMLRPC_CreateVector(NULL, xmlrpc_vector_struct);
XMLRPC_VectorAppendString (xOutput, "faultString", description.str,
description.len);
XMLRPC_VectorAppendInt(xOutput, "faultCode", fault_code);
}
simplestring_free(&description);
return xOutput;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int ion_handle_put(struct ion_handle *handle)
{
struct ion_client *client = handle->client;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&client->lock);
ret = kref_put(&handle->ref, ion_handle_destroy);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: xsltForEach(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr contextNode,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp)
{
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemForEachPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemForEachPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
int i;
xmlXPathObjectPtr res = NULL;
xmlNodePtr cur, curInst;
xmlNodeSetPtr list = NULL;
xmlNodeSetPtr oldList;
int oldXPProximityPosition, oldXPContextSize;
xmlNodePtr oldContextNode;
xsltTemplatePtr oldCurTemplRule;
xmlDocPtr oldXPDoc;
xsltDocumentPtr oldDocInfo;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt;
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (contextNode == NULL) || (inst == NULL)) {
xsltGenericError(xsltGenericErrorContext,
"xsltForEach(): Bad arguments.\n");
return;
}
if (comp == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltForEach(): "
"The XSLT 'for-each' instruction was not compiled.\n");
return;
}
if ((comp->select == NULL) || (comp->comp == NULL)) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Internal error in xsltForEach(): "
"The selecting expression of the XSLT 'for-each' "
"instruction was not compiled correctly.\n");
return;
}
xpctxt = ctxt->xpathCtxt;
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_FOR_EACH,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltForEach: select %s\n", comp->select));
#endif
/*
* Save context states.
*/
oldDocInfo = ctxt->document;
oldList = ctxt->nodeList;
oldContextNode = ctxt->node;
/*
* The "current template rule" is cleared for the instantiation of
* xsl:for-each.
*/
oldCurTemplRule = ctxt->currentTemplateRule;
ctxt->currentTemplateRule = NULL;
oldXPDoc = xpctxt->doc;
oldXPProximityPosition = xpctxt->proximityPosition;
oldXPContextSize = xpctxt->contextSize;
/*
* Set up XPath.
*/
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
if (comp->inScopeNs != NULL) {
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->inScopeNs->list;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->inScopeNs->xpathNumber;
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
#else
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->nsList;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->nsNr;
#endif
/*
* Evaluate the 'select' expression.
*/
res = xmlXPathCompiledEval(comp->comp, ctxt->xpathCtxt);
if (res != NULL) {
if (res->type == XPATH_NODESET)
list = res->nodesetval;
else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"The 'select' expression does not evaluate to a node set.\n");
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_FOR_EACH,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltForEach: select didn't evaluate to a node list\n"));
#endif
goto error;
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"Failed to evaluate the 'select' expression.\n");
ctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
goto error;
}
if ((list == NULL) || (list->nodeNr <= 0))
goto exit;
#ifdef WITH_XSLT_DEBUG_PROCESS
XSLT_TRACE(ctxt,XSLT_TRACE_FOR_EACH,xsltGenericDebug(xsltGenericDebugContext,
"xsltForEach: select evaluates to %d nodes\n", list->nodeNr));
#endif
/*
* Restore XPath states for the "current node".
*/
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
xpctxt->node = contextNode;
/*
* Set the list; this has to be done already here for xsltDoSortFunction().
*/
ctxt->nodeList = list;
/*
* Handle xsl:sort instructions and skip them for further processing.
* BUG TODO: We are not using namespaced potentially defined on the
* xsl:sort element; XPath expression might fail.
*/
curInst = inst->children;
if (IS_XSLT_ELEM(curInst) && IS_XSLT_NAME(curInst, "sort")) {
int nbsorts = 0;
xmlNodePtr sorts[XSLT_MAX_SORT];
sorts[nbsorts++] = curInst;
#ifdef WITH_DEBUGGER
if (xslDebugStatus != XSLT_DEBUG_NONE)
xslHandleDebugger(curInst, contextNode, NULL, ctxt);
#endif
curInst = curInst->next;
while (IS_XSLT_ELEM(curInst) && IS_XSLT_NAME(curInst, "sort")) {
if (nbsorts >= XSLT_MAX_SORT) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, curInst,
"The number of xsl:sort instructions exceeds the "
"maximum (%d) allowed by this processor.\n",
XSLT_MAX_SORT);
goto error;
} else {
sorts[nbsorts++] = curInst;
}
#ifdef WITH_DEBUGGER
if (xslDebugStatus != XSLT_DEBUG_NONE)
xslHandleDebugger(curInst, contextNode, NULL, ctxt);
#endif
curInst = curInst->next;
}
xsltDoSortFunction(ctxt, sorts, nbsorts);
}
xpctxt->contextSize = list->nodeNr;
/*
* Instantiate the sequence constructor for each selected node.
*/
for (i = 0; i < list->nodeNr; i++) {
cur = list->nodeTab[i];
/*
* The selected node becomes the "current node".
*/
ctxt->node = cur;
/*
* An xsl:for-each can change the current context doc.
* OPTIMIZE TODO: Get rid of the need to set the context doc.
*/
if ((cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL) && (cur->doc != NULL))
xpctxt->doc = cur->doc;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = i + 1;
xsltApplySequenceConstructor(ctxt, cur, curInst, NULL);
}
exit:
error:
if (res != NULL)
xmlXPathFreeObject(res);
/*
* Restore old states.
*/
ctxt->document = oldDocInfo;
ctxt->nodeList = oldList;
ctxt->node = oldContextNode;
ctxt->currentTemplateRule = oldCurTemplRule;
xpctxt->doc = oldXPDoc;
xpctxt->contextSize = oldXPContextSize;
xpctxt->proximityPosition = oldXPProximityPosition;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: scoped_refptr<Extension> LoadExtensionWithLocation(
const std::string& name,
Extension::Location location,
bool strict_error_checks,
std::string* error) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> value(LoadManifestFile(name, error));
if (!value.get())
return NULL;
return LoadExtensionWithLocation(value.get(), location,
strict_error_checks, error);
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool GesturePoint::IsInSecondClickTimeWindow() const {
double duration = last_touch_time_ - last_tap_time_;
return duration < kMaximumSecondsBetweenDoubleClick;
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ,
edge_connection_t *conn,
crypt_path_t *layer_hint)
{
static int num_seen=0;
relay_header_t rh;
unsigned domain = layer_hint?LD_APP:LD_EXIT;
int reason;
int optimistic_data = 0; /* Set to 1 if we receive data on a stream
* that's in the EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING
* or EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING states. */
tor_assert(cell);
tor_assert(circ);
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
num_seen++;
log_debug(domain, "Now seen %d relay cells here (command %d, stream %d).",
num_seen, rh.command, rh.stream_id);
if (rh.length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Relay cell length field too long. Closing circuit.");
return - END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
if (rh.stream_id == 0) {
switch (rh.command) {
case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN:
case RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED:
case RELAY_COMMAND_DATA:
case RELAY_COMMAND_END:
case RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVE:
case RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVED:
case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR:
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Relay command %d with zero "
"stream_id. Dropping.", (int)rh.command);
return 0;
default:
;
}
}
/* either conn is NULL, in which case we've got a control cell, or else
* conn points to the recognized stream. */
if (conn && !connection_state_is_open(TO_CONN(conn))) {
if (conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT &&
(conn->base_.state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING ||
conn->base_.state == EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING) &&
rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_DATA) {
/* Allow DATA cells to be delivered to an exit node in state
* EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING or EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING.
* This speeds up HTTP, for example. */
optimistic_data = 1;
} else {
return connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open(
&rh, cell, circ, conn, layer_hint);
}
}
switch (rh.command) {
case RELAY_COMMAND_DROP:
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN:
case RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR:
if (layer_hint &&
circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_APP,
"Relay begin request unsupported at AP. Dropping.");
return 0;
}
if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED &&
layer_hint != TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->cpath->prev) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_APP,
"Relay begin request to Hidden Service "
"from intermediary node. Dropping.");
return 0;
}
if (conn) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, domain,
"Begin cell for known stream. Dropping.");
return 0;
}
if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) {
/* Assign this circuit and its app-ward OR connection a unique ID,
* so that we can measure download times. The local edge and dir
* connection will be assigned the same ID when they are created
* and linked. */
static uint64_t next_id = 0;
circ->dirreq_id = ++next_id;
TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan->dirreq_id = circ->dirreq_id;
}
return connection_exit_begin_conn(cell, circ);
case RELAY_COMMAND_DATA:
++stats_n_data_cells_received;
if (( layer_hint && --layer_hint->deliver_window < 0) ||
(!layer_hint && --circ->deliver_window < 0)) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"(relay data) circ deliver_window below 0. Killing.");
if (conn) {
/* XXXX Do we actually need to do this? Will killing the circuit
* not send an END and mark the stream for close as appropriate? */
connection_edge_end(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
}
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
log_debug(domain,"circ deliver_window now %d.", layer_hint ?
layer_hint->deliver_window : circ->deliver_window);
circuit_consider_sending_sendme(circ, layer_hint);
if (!conn) {
log_info(domain,"data cell dropped, unknown stream (streamid %d).",
rh.stream_id);
return 0;
}
if (--conn->deliver_window < 0) { /* is it below 0 after decrement? */
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"(relay data) conn deliver_window below 0. Killing.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
stats_n_data_bytes_received += rh.length;
connection_write_to_buf((char*)(cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE),
rh.length, TO_CONN(conn));
if (!optimistic_data) {
/* Only send a SENDME if we're not getting optimistic data; otherwise
* a SENDME could arrive before the CONNECTED.
*/
connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme(conn);
}
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_END:
reason = rh.length > 0 ?
get_uint8(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE) : END_STREAM_REASON_MISC;
if (!conn) {
log_info(domain,"end cell (%s) dropped, unknown stream.",
stream_end_reason_to_string(reason));
return 0;
}
/* XXX add to this log_fn the exit node's nickname? */
log_info(domain,TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT": end cell (%s) for stream %d. "
"Removing stream.",
conn->base_.s,
stream_end_reason_to_string(reason),
conn->stream_id);
if (conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
entry_connection_t *entry_conn = EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
if (entry_conn->socks_request &&
!entry_conn->socks_request->has_finished)
log_warn(LD_BUG,
"open stream hasn't sent socks answer yet? Closing.");
}
/* We just *got* an end; no reason to send one. */
conn->edge_has_sent_end = 1;
if (!conn->end_reason)
conn->end_reason = reason | END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE;
if (!conn->base_.marked_for_close) {
/* only mark it if not already marked. it's possible to
* get the 'end' right around when the client hangs up on us. */
connection_mark_and_flush(TO_CONN(conn));
}
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND:
case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2: {
static uint64_t total_n_extend=0, total_nonearly=0;
total_n_extend++;
if (rh.stream_id) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, domain,
"'extend' cell received for non-zero stream. Dropping.");
return 0;
}
if (cell->command != CELL_RELAY_EARLY &&
!networkstatus_get_param(NULL,"AllowNonearlyExtend",0,0,1)) {
#define EARLY_WARNING_INTERVAL 3600
static ratelim_t early_warning_limit =
RATELIM_INIT(EARLY_WARNING_INTERVAL);
char *m;
if (cell->command == CELL_RELAY) {
++total_nonearly;
if ((m = rate_limit_log(&early_warning_limit, approx_time()))) {
double percentage = ((double)total_nonearly)/total_n_extend;
percentage *= 100;
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, domain, "EXTEND cell received, "
"but not via RELAY_EARLY. Dropping.%s", m);
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, domain, " (We have dropped %.02f%% of "
"all EXTEND cells for this reason)", percentage);
tor_free(m);
}
} else {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, domain,
"EXTEND cell received, in a cell with type %d! Dropping.",
cell->command);
}
return 0;
}
return circuit_extend(cell, circ);
}
case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTENDED:
case RELAY_COMMAND_EXTENDED2:
if (!layer_hint) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"'extended' unsupported at non-origin. Dropping.");
return 0;
}
log_debug(domain,"Got an extended cell! Yay.");
{
extended_cell_t extended_cell;
if (extended_cell_parse(&extended_cell, rh.command,
(const uint8_t*)cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE,
rh.length)<0) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Can't parse EXTENDED cell; killing circuit.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
if ((reason = circuit_finish_handshake(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ),
&extended_cell.created_cell)) < 0) {
log_warn(domain,"circuit_finish_handshake failed.");
return reason;
}
}
if ((reason=circuit_send_next_onion_skin(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)))<0) {
log_info(domain,"circuit_send_next_onion_skin() failed.");
return reason;
}
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATE:
if (layer_hint) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_APP,
"'truncate' unsupported at origin. Dropping.");
return 0;
}
if (circ->n_hop) {
if (circ->n_chan)
log_warn(LD_BUG, "n_chan and n_hop set on the same circuit!");
extend_info_free(circ->n_hop);
circ->n_hop = NULL;
tor_free(circ->n_chan_create_cell);
circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
}
if (circ->n_chan) {
uint8_t trunc_reason = get_uint8(cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE);
circuit_clear_cell_queue(circ, circ->n_chan);
channel_send_destroy(circ->n_circ_id, circ->n_chan,
trunc_reason);
circuit_set_n_circid_chan(circ, 0, NULL);
}
log_debug(LD_EXIT, "Processed 'truncate', replying.");
{
char payload[1];
payload[0] = (char)END_CIRC_REASON_REQUESTED;
relay_send_command_from_edge(0, circ, RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATED,
payload, sizeof(payload), NULL);
}
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATED:
if (!layer_hint) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_EXIT,
"'truncated' unsupported at non-origin. Dropping.");
return 0;
}
circuit_truncated(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ), layer_hint,
get_uint8(cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE));
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED:
if (conn) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"'connected' unsupported while open. Closing circ.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
log_info(domain,
"'connected' received, no conn attached anymore. Ignoring.");
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME:
if (!rh.stream_id) {
if (layer_hint) {
if (layer_hint->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT >
CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Unexpected sendme cell from exit relay. "
"Closing circ.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
layer_hint->package_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT;
log_debug(LD_APP,"circ-level sendme at origin, packagewindow %d.",
layer_hint->package_window);
circuit_resume_edge_reading(circ, layer_hint);
} else {
if (circ->package_window + CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT >
CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Unexpected sendme cell from client. "
"Closing circ (window %d).",
circ->package_window);
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
circ->package_window += CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT;
log_debug(LD_APP,
"circ-level sendme at non-origin, packagewindow %d.",
circ->package_window);
circuit_resume_edge_reading(circ, layer_hint);
}
return 0;
}
if (!conn) {
log_info(domain,"sendme cell dropped, unknown stream (streamid %d).",
rh.stream_id);
return 0;
}
conn->package_window += STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT;
log_debug(domain,"stream-level sendme, packagewindow now %d.",
conn->package_window);
if (circuit_queue_streams_are_blocked(circ)) {
/* Still waiting for queue to flush; don't touch conn */
return 0;
}
connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
/* handle whatever might still be on the inbuf */
if (connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf(conn, 1, NULL) < 0) {
/* (We already sent an end cell if possible) */
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return 0;
}
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVE:
if (layer_hint) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_APP,
"resolve request unsupported at AP; dropping.");
return 0;
} else if (conn) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, domain,
"resolve request for known stream; dropping.");
return 0;
} else if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, domain,
"resolve request on circ with purpose %d; dropping",
circ->purpose);
return 0;
}
connection_exit_begin_resolve(cell, TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ));
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVED:
if (conn) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, domain,
"'resolved' unsupported while open. Closing circ.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
log_info(domain,
"'resolved' received, no conn attached anymore. Ignoring.");
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
case RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS:
case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1:
case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2:
case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK:
case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1:
case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS2:
case RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED:
case RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED:
rend_process_relay_cell(circ, layer_hint,
rh.command, rh.length,
cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE);
return 0;
}
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Received unknown relay command %d. Perhaps the other side is using "
"a newer version of Tor? Dropping.",
rh.command);
return 0; /* for forward compatibility, don't kill the circuit */
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-617
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_save_html_file)
{
zval *id;
xmlDoc *docp;
int file_len, bytes, format;
dom_object *intern;
dom_doc_propsptr doc_props;
char *file;
const char *encoding;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "Os", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &file, &file_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (file_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid Filename");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
encoding = (const char *) htmlGetMetaEncoding(docp);
doc_props = dom_get_doc_props(intern->document);
format = doc_props->formatoutput;
bytes = htmlSaveFileFormat(file, docp, encoding, format);
if (bytes == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_LONG(bytes);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void sigwinch_handler()
{
struct winsize winsize;
if(ioctl(1, TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) == -1) {
if(isatty(STDOUT_FILENO))
ERROR("TIOCGWINSZ ioctl failed, defaulting to 80 "
"columns\n");
columns = 80;
} else
columns = winsize.ws_col;
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: PreconnectRequest::PreconnectRequest(
const GURL& origin,
int num_sockets,
const net::NetworkIsolationKey& network_isolation_key)
: origin(origin),
num_sockets(num_sockets),
network_isolation_key(network_isolation_key) {
DCHECK_GE(num_sockets, 0);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: cipush(mrb_state *mrb)
{
struct mrb_context *c = mrb->c;
static const mrb_callinfo ci_zero = { 0 };
mrb_callinfo *ci = c->ci;
int ridx = ci->ridx;
if (ci + 1 == c->ciend) {
ptrdiff_t size = ci - c->cibase;
c->cibase = (mrb_callinfo *)mrb_realloc(mrb, c->cibase, sizeof(mrb_callinfo)*size*2);
c->ci = c->cibase + size;
c->ciend = c->cibase + size * 2;
}
ci = ++c->ci;
*ci = ci_zero;
ci->epos = mrb->c->eidx;
ci->ridx = ridx;
return ci;
}
Commit Message: Check length of env stack before accessing upvar; fix #3995
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static struct dentry *tracing_get_dentry(struct trace_array *tr)
{
if (WARN_ON(!tr->dir))
return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
/* Top directory uses NULL as the parent */
if (tr->flags & TRACE_ARRAY_FL_GLOBAL)
return NULL;
/* All sub buffers have a descriptor */
return tr->dir;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void php_mcrypt_module_dtor(zend_rsrc_list_entry *rsrc TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_mcrypt *pm = (php_mcrypt *) rsrc->ptr;
if (pm) {
mcrypt_generic_deinit(pm->td);
mcrypt_module_close(pm->td);
efree(pm);
pm = NULL;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: char *find_cookie_value_end(char *s, const char *e)
{
int quoted, qdpair;
quoted = qdpair = 0;
for (; s < e; s++) {
if (qdpair) qdpair = 0;
else if (quoted) {
if (*s == '\\') qdpair = 1;
else if (*s == '"') quoted = 0;
}
else if (*s == '"') quoted = 1;
else if (*s == ',' || *s == ';') return s;
}
return s;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::Init() {
ResumeBlockedRequestsForFrame();
if (!waiting_for_init_)
return;
waiting_for_init_ = false;
if (pending_navigate_) {
frame_tree_node()->navigator()->OnBeginNavigation(
frame_tree_node(), pending_navigate_->common_params,
std::move(pending_navigate_->begin_navigation_params),
std::move(pending_navigate_->blob_url_loader_factory),
std::move(pending_navigate_->navigation_client),
std::move(pending_navigate_->navigation_initiator));
pending_navigate_.reset();
}
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static PassRefPtr<Uint8Array> copySkImageData(SkImage* input,
const SkImageInfo& info) {
size_t width = static_cast<size_t>(input->width());
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer =
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(width * input->height(), info.bytesPerPixel());
if (!dstBuffer)
return nullptr;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
input->readPixels(info, dstPixels->data(), width * info.bytesPerPixel(), 0,
0);
return dstPixels;
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_parse_coding_quadtree(codec_t *ps_codec,
WORD32 x0,
WORD32 y0,
WORD32 log2_cb_size,
WORD32 ct_depth)
{
IHEVCD_ERROR_T ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
sps_t *ps_sps;
pps_t *ps_pps;
WORD32 split_cu_flag;
WORD32 x1, y1;
WORD32 cu_pos_x;
WORD32 cu_pos_y;
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_bitstrm;
cab_ctxt_t *ps_cabac = &ps_codec->s_parse.s_cabac;
WORD32 cb_size = 1 << log2_cb_size;
ps_sps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_sps;
ps_pps = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_pps;
/* Compute CU position with respect to current CTB in (8x8) units */
cu_pos_x = (x0 - (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_x << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size)) >> 3;
cu_pos_y = (y0 - (ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_y << ps_sps->i1_log2_ctb_size)) >> 3;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_pos_x = cu_pos_x;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_pos_y = cu_pos_y;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_log2_cb_size = log2_cb_size;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ct_depth = ct_depth;
{
UWORD32 *pu4_ct_depth_top = ps_codec->s_parse.pu4_ct_depth_top;
UWORD32 u4_ct_depth_left = ps_codec->s_parse.u4_ct_depth_left;
UWORD32 u4_ct_depth_top = 0;
UWORD32 u4_mask;
UWORD32 u4_top_mask, u4_left_mask;
WORD32 ctxt_idx;
UWORD32 u4_min_cu_x = x0 / 8;
UWORD32 u4_min_cu_y = y0 / 8;
pu4_ct_depth_top += (u4_min_cu_x / 16);
if(((x0 + (1 << log2_cb_size)) <= ps_sps->i2_pic_width_in_luma_samples) &&
((y0 + (1 << log2_cb_size)) <= ps_sps->i2_pic_height_in_luma_samples) &&
(log2_cb_size > ps_sps->i1_log2_min_coding_block_size))
{
ctxt_idx = IHEVC_CAB_SPLIT_CU_FLAG;
/* Split cu context increment is decided based on left and top Coding tree
* depth which is stored at frame level
*/
/* Check if the CTB is in first row in the current slice or tile */
if((0 != cu_pos_y) ||
((0 != ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_slice_y) &&
(0 != ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_tile_y)))
{
u4_ct_depth_top = *pu4_ct_depth_top;
u4_ct_depth_top >>= ((u4_min_cu_x % 16) * 2);
u4_ct_depth_top &= 3;
if((WORD32)u4_ct_depth_top > ct_depth)
ctxt_idx++;
}
/* Check if the CTB is in first column in the current slice or tile */
/*****************************************************************/
/* If cu_pos_x is non-zero then left is available */
/* If cu_pos_x is zero then ensure both the following are true */
/* Current CTB is not the first CTB in a tile row */
/* Current CTB is not the first CTB in a slice */
/*****************************************************************/
if((0 != cu_pos_x) ||
(((0 != ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_slice_x) || (0 != ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_slice_y)) &&
(0 != ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_tile_x)))
{
u4_ct_depth_left >>= ((u4_min_cu_y % 16) * 2);
u4_ct_depth_left &= 3;
if((WORD32)u4_ct_depth_left > ct_depth)
ctxt_idx++;
}
TRACE_CABAC_CTXT("split_cu_flag", ps_cabac->u4_range, ctxt_idx);
split_cu_flag = ihevcd_cabac_decode_bin(ps_cabac, ps_bitstrm, ctxt_idx);
AEV_TRACE("split_cu_flag", split_cu_flag, ps_cabac->u4_range);
}
else
{
if(log2_cb_size > ps_sps->i1_log2_min_coding_block_size)
split_cu_flag = 1;
else
split_cu_flag = 0;
}
if(0 == split_cu_flag)
{
/* Update top ct_depth */
u4_ct_depth_top = *pu4_ct_depth_top;
/* Since Max cb_size is 64, maximum of 8 bits will be set or reset */
/* Also since Coding block will be within 64x64 grid, only 8bits within a WORD32
* need to be updated. These 8 bits will not cross 8 bit boundaries
*/
u4_mask = DUP_LSB_11(cb_size / 8);
u4_top_mask = u4_mask << ((u4_min_cu_x % 16) * 2);
u4_ct_depth_top &= ~u4_top_mask;
if(ct_depth)
{
u4_top_mask = gau4_ct_depth_mask[ct_depth] & u4_mask;
u4_top_mask = u4_top_mask << ((u4_min_cu_x % 16) * 2);
u4_ct_depth_top |= u4_top_mask;
}
*pu4_ct_depth_top = u4_ct_depth_top;
/* Update left ct_depth */
u4_ct_depth_left = ps_codec->s_parse.u4_ct_depth_left;
u4_left_mask = u4_mask << ((u4_min_cu_y % 16) * 2);
u4_ct_depth_left &= ~u4_left_mask;
if(ct_depth)
{
u4_left_mask = gau4_ct_depth_mask[ct_depth] & u4_mask;
u4_left_mask = u4_left_mask << ((u4_min_cu_y % 16) * 2);
u4_ct_depth_left |= u4_left_mask;
}
ps_codec->s_parse.u4_ct_depth_left = u4_ct_depth_left;
}
}
if((ps_pps->i1_cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag) &&
(log2_cb_size >= ps_pps->i1_log2_min_cu_qp_delta_size))
{
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_is_cu_qp_delta_coded = 0;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_cu_qp_delta = 0;
}
if(split_cu_flag)
{
x1 = x0 + ((1 << log2_cb_size) >> 1);
y1 = y0 + ((1 << log2_cb_size) >> 1);
ret = ihevcd_parse_coding_quadtree(ps_codec, x0, y0, log2_cb_size - 1, ct_depth + 1);
RETURN_IF((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS != ret, ret);
/* At frame boundaries coding quadtree nodes are sent only if they fall within the frame */
if(x1 < ps_sps->i2_pic_width_in_luma_samples)
{
ret = ihevcd_parse_coding_quadtree(ps_codec, x1, y0, log2_cb_size - 1, ct_depth + 1);
RETURN_IF((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS != ret, ret);
}
if(y1 < ps_sps->i2_pic_height_in_luma_samples)
{
ret = ihevcd_parse_coding_quadtree(ps_codec, x0, y1, log2_cb_size - 1, ct_depth + 1);
RETURN_IF((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS != ret, ret);
}
if((x1 < ps_sps->i2_pic_width_in_luma_samples) &&
(y1 < ps_sps->i2_pic_height_in_luma_samples))
{
ret = ihevcd_parse_coding_quadtree(ps_codec, x1, y1, log2_cb_size - 1, ct_depth + 1);
RETURN_IF((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS != ret, ret);
}
}
else
{
/* Set current group QP if current CU is aligned with the group */
{
WORD32 cu_pos_x = ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_pos_x << 3;
WORD32 cu_pos_y = ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_pos_y << 3;
WORD32 qpg_x = (cu_pos_x - (cu_pos_x & ((1 << ps_pps->i1_log2_min_cu_qp_delta_size) - 1)));
WORD32 qpg_y = (cu_pos_y - (cu_pos_y & ((1 << ps_pps->i1_log2_min_cu_qp_delta_size) - 1)));
if((cu_pos_x == qpg_x) &&
(cu_pos_y == qpg_y))
{
ps_codec->s_parse.u4_qpg = ps_codec->s_parse.u4_qp;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_cu_qp_delta = 0;
}
}
ret = ihevcd_parse_coding_unit(ps_codec, x0, y0, log2_cb_size);
RETURN_IF((IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS != ret, ret);
if(ps_pps->i1_cu_qp_delta_enabled_flag)
{
WORD32 qp_pred, qp_left, qp_top;
WORD32 cu_pos_x;
WORD32 cu_pos_y;
WORD32 qpg_x;
WORD32 qpg_y;
WORD32 i, j;
WORD32 qp;
WORD32 cur_cu_offset;
tu_t *ps_tu = ps_codec->s_parse.ps_tu;
WORD32 cb_size = 1 << ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_log2_cb_size;
cu_pos_x = ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_pos_x << 3;
cu_pos_y = ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_pos_y << 3;
qpg_x = (cu_pos_x - (cu_pos_x & ((1 << ps_pps->i1_log2_min_cu_qp_delta_size) - 1))) >> 3;
qpg_y = (cu_pos_y - (cu_pos_y & ((1 << ps_pps->i1_log2_min_cu_qp_delta_size) - 1))) >> 3;
/*previous coded Qp*/
qp_left = ps_codec->s_parse.u4_qpg;
qp_top = ps_codec->s_parse.u4_qpg;
if(qpg_x > 0)
{
qp_left = ps_codec->s_parse.ai1_8x8_cu_qp[qpg_x - 1 + (qpg_y * 8)];
}
if(qpg_y > 0)
{
qp_top = ps_codec->s_parse.ai1_8x8_cu_qp[qpg_x + ((qpg_y - 1) * 8)];
}
qp_pred = (qp_left + qp_top + 1) >> 1;
/* Since qp_pred + ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_cu_qp_delta can be negative,
52 is added before taking modulo 52 */
qp = (qp_pred + ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_cu_qp_delta + 52) % 52;
cur_cu_offset = (cu_pos_x >> 3) + cu_pos_y;
for(i = 0; i < (cb_size >> 3); i++)
{
for(j = 0; j < (cb_size >> 3); j++)
{
ps_codec->s_parse.ai1_8x8_cu_qp[cur_cu_offset + (i * 8) + j] = qp;
}
}
ps_codec->s_parse.u4_qp = qp;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_qp = qp;
/* When change in QP is signaled, update the QP in TUs that are already parsed in the CU */
{
tu_t *ps_tu_tmp;
ps_tu_tmp = ps_tu - ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_tu_cnt;
ps_tu->b7_qp = ps_codec->s_parse.u4_qp;
while(ps_tu_tmp != ps_tu)
{
ps_tu_tmp->b7_qp = ps_codec->s_parse.u4_qp;
ps_tu_tmp++;
}
}
if(ps_codec->s_parse.s_cu.i4_cu_qp_delta)
{
WORD32 ctb_indx;
ctb_indx = ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_x + ps_sps->i2_pic_wd_in_ctb * ps_codec->s_parse.i4_ctb_y;
ps_codec->s_parse.s_bs_ctxt.pu1_pic_qp_const_in_ctb[ctb_indx >> 3] &= (~(1 << (ctb_indx & 7)));
}
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Set error skip ctbs as multiple 8x8 pus
Bug: 65123471
This is required for incomplete ctbs at the frame
boundaries
Change-Id: I7e41a3ac2f6e35a929ba4ff3ca4cfcc859a7b867
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void Chapters::Edition::ShallowCopy(Edition& rhs) const
{
rhs.m_atoms = m_atoms;
rhs.m_atoms_size = m_atoms_size;
rhs.m_atoms_count = m_atoms_count;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void vrend_clear(struct vrend_context *ctx,
unsigned buffers,
const union pipe_color_union *color,
double depth, unsigned stencil)
{
GLbitfield bits = 0;
if (ctx->in_error)
return;
if (ctx->ctx_switch_pending)
vrend_finish_context_switch(ctx);
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT, ctx->sub->fb_id);
vrend_update_frontface_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->stencil_state_dirty)
vrend_update_stencil_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->scissor_state_dirty)
vrend_update_scissor_state(ctx);
if (ctx->sub->viewport_state_dirty)
vrend_update_viewport_state(ctx);
vrend_use_program(ctx, 0);
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_COLOR) {
if (ctx->sub->nr_cbufs && ctx->sub->surf[0] && vrend_format_is_emulated_alpha(ctx->sub->surf[0]->format)) {
glClearColor(color->f[3], 0.0, 0.0, 0.0);
} else {
glClearColor(color->f[0], color->f[1], color->f[2], color->f[3]);
}
}
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_DEPTH) {
/* gallium clears don't respect depth mask */
glDepthMask(GL_TRUE);
glClearDepth(depth);
}
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_STENCIL)
glClearStencil(stencil);
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_COLOR) {
uint32_t mask = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->sub->nr_cbufs; i++) {
if (ctx->sub->surf[i])
mask |= (1 << i);
}
if (mask != (buffers >> 2)) {
mask = buffers >> 2;
while (mask) {
i = u_bit_scan(&mask);
if (util_format_is_pure_uint(ctx->sub->surf[i]->format))
glClearBufferuiv(GL_COLOR,
i, (GLuint *)color);
else if (util_format_is_pure_sint(ctx->sub->surf[i]->format))
glClearBufferiv(GL_COLOR,
i, (GLint *)color);
else
glClearBufferfv(GL_COLOR,
i, (GLfloat *)color);
}
}
else
bits |= GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT;
}
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_DEPTH)
bits |= GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT;
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_STENCIL)
bits |= GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT;
if (bits)
glClear(bits);
if (buffers & PIPE_CLEAR_DEPTH)
if (!ctx->sub->dsa_state.depth.writemask)
glDepthMask(GL_FALSE);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: GF_Err reftype_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i;
GF_TrackReferenceTypeBox *ptr = (GF_TrackReferenceTypeBox *)s;
ptr->type = ptr->reference_type;
if (!ptr->trackIDCount) return GF_OK;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
ptr->type = GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_REFT;
if (e) return e;
for (i = 0; i < ptr->trackIDCount; i++) {
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->trackIDs[i]);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int seticc(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, int ncomps, ref *ICCdict, float *range_buff)
{
int code, k;
gs_color_space * pcs;
ref * pstrmval;
stream * s = 0L;
cmm_profile_t *picc_profile = NULL;
int i, expected = 0;
ref * pnameval;
static const char *const icc_std_profile_names[] = {
GSICC_STANDARD_PROFILES
};
static const char *const icc_std_profile_keys[] = {
GSICC_STANDARD_PROFILES_KEYS
};
/* verify the DataSource entry */
if (dict_find_string(ICCdict, "DataSource", &pstrmval) <= 0)
return_error(gs_error_undefined);
check_read_file(i_ctx_p, s, pstrmval);
/* build the color space object */
code = gs_cspace_build_ICC(&pcs, NULL, gs_gstate_memory(igs));
if (code < 0)
return gs_rethrow(code, "building color space object");
/* For now, dump the profile into a buffer
and obtain handle from the buffer when we need it.
We may want to change this later.
This depends to some degree on what the CMS is capable of doing.
I don't want to get bogged down on stream I/O at this point.
Note also, if we are going to be putting these into the clist we will
want to have this buffer. */
/* Check if we have the /Name entry. This is used to associate with
specs that have enumerated types to indicate sRGB sGray etc */
if (dict_find_string(ICCdict, "Name", &pnameval) > 0){
uint size = r_size(pnameval);
char *str = (char *)gs_alloc_bytes(gs_gstate_memory(igs), size+1, "seticc");
memcpy(str, (const char *)pnameval->value.bytes, size);
str[size] = 0;
/* Compare this to the standard profile names */
for (k = 0; k < GSICC_NUMBER_STANDARD_PROFILES; k++) {
if ( strcmp( str, icc_std_profile_keys[k] ) == 0 ) {
picc_profile = gsicc_get_profile_handle_file(icc_std_profile_names[k],
strlen(icc_std_profile_names[k]), gs_gstate_memory(igs));
break;
}
}
gs_free_object(gs_gstate_memory(igs), str, "seticc");
} else {
picc_profile = gsicc_profile_new(s, gs_gstate_memory(igs), NULL, 0);
if (picc_profile == NULL)
return gs_throw(gs_error_VMerror, "Creation of ICC profile failed");
/* We have to get the profile handle due to the fact that we need to know
if it has a data space that is CIELAB */
picc_profile->profile_handle =
gsicc_get_profile_handle_buffer(picc_profile->buffer,
picc_profile->buffer_size,
gs_gstate_memory(igs));
}
if (picc_profile == NULL || picc_profile->profile_handle == NULL) {
/* Free up everything, the profile is not valid. We will end up going
ahead and using a default based upon the number of components */
rc_decrement(picc_profile,"seticc");
rc_decrement(pcs,"seticc");
return -1;
}
code = gsicc_set_gscs_profile(pcs, picc_profile, gs_gstate_memory(igs));
if (code < 0) {
rc_decrement(picc_profile,"seticc");
rc_decrement(pcs,"seticc");
return code;
}
picc_profile->num_comps = ncomps;
picc_profile->data_cs =
gscms_get_profile_data_space(picc_profile->profile_handle,
picc_profile->memory);
switch (picc_profile->data_cs) {
case gsCIEXYZ:
case gsCIELAB:
case gsRGB:
expected = 3;
break;
case gsGRAY:
expected = 1;
break;
case gsCMYK:
expected = 4;
break;
case gsNCHANNEL:
case gsNAMED: /* Silence warnings */
case gsUNDEFINED: /* Silence warnings */
break;
}
if (!expected || ncomps != expected) {
rc_decrement(picc_profile,"seticc");
rc_decrement(pcs,"seticc");
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
}
/* Lets go ahead and get the hash code and check if we match one of the default spaces */
/* Later we may want to delay this, but for now lets go ahead and do it */
gsicc_init_hash_cs(picc_profile, igs);
/* Set the range according to the data type that is associated with the
ICC input color type. Occasionally, we will run into CIELAB to CIELAB
profiles for spot colors in PDF documents. These spot colors are typically described
as separation colors with tint transforms that go from a tint value
to a linear mapping between the CIELAB white point and the CIELAB tint
color. This results in a CIELAB value that we need to use to fill. We
need to detect this to make sure we do the proper scaling of the data. For
CIELAB images in PDF, the source is always normal 8 or 16 bit encoded data
in the range from 0 to 255 or 0 to 65535. In that case, there should not
be any encoding and decoding to CIELAB. The PDF content will not include
an ICC profile but will set the color space to \Lab. In this case, we use
our seticc_lab operation to install the LAB to LAB profile, but we detect
that we did that through the use of the is_lab flag in the profile descriptor.
When then avoid the CIELAB encode and decode */
if (picc_profile->data_cs == gsCIELAB) {
/* If the input space to this profile is CIELAB, then we need to adjust the limits */
/* See ICC spec ICC.1:2004-10 Section 6.3.4.2 and 6.4. I don't believe we need to
worry about CIEXYZ profiles or any of the other odds ones. Need to check that though
at some point. */
picc_profile->Range.ranges[0].rmin = 0.0;
picc_profile->Range.ranges[0].rmax = 100.0;
picc_profile->Range.ranges[1].rmin = -128.0;
picc_profile->Range.ranges[1].rmax = 127.0;
picc_profile->Range.ranges[2].rmin = -128.0;
picc_profile->Range.ranges[2].rmax = 127.0;
picc_profile->islab = true;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < ncomps; i++) {
picc_profile->Range.ranges[i].rmin = range_buff[2 * i];
picc_profile->Range.ranges[i].rmax = range_buff[2 * i + 1];
}
}
/* Now see if we are in an overide situation. We have to wait until now
in case this is an LAB profile which we will not overide */
if (gs_currentoverrideicc(igs) && picc_profile->data_cs != gsCIELAB) {
/* Free up the profile structure */
switch( picc_profile->data_cs ) {
case gsRGB:
pcs->cmm_icc_profile_data = igs->icc_manager->default_rgb;
break;
case gsGRAY:
pcs->cmm_icc_profile_data = igs->icc_manager->default_gray;
break;
case gsCMYK:
pcs->cmm_icc_profile_data = igs->icc_manager->default_cmyk;
break;
default:
break;
}
/* Have one increment from the color space. Having these tied
together is not really correct. Need to fix that. ToDo. MJV */
rc_adjust(picc_profile, -2, "seticc");
rc_increment(pcs->cmm_icc_profile_data);
}
/* Set the color space. We are done. No joint cache here... */
code = gs_setcolorspace(igs, pcs);
/* The context has taken a reference to the colorspace. We no longer need
* ours, so drop it. */
rc_decrement_only(pcs, "seticc");
/* In this case, we already have a ref count of 2 on the icc profile
one for when it was created and one for when it was set. We really
only want one here so adjust */
rc_decrement(picc_profile,"seticc");
/* Remove the ICC dict from the stack */
pop(1);
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int cine_read_header(AVFormatContext *avctx)
{
AVIOContext *pb = avctx->pb;
AVStream *st;
unsigned int version, compression, offImageHeader, offSetup, offImageOffsets, biBitCount, length, CFA;
int vflip;
char *description;
uint64_t i;
st = avformat_new_stream(avctx, NULL);
if (!st)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
st->codecpar->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO;
st->codecpar->codec_id = AV_CODEC_ID_RAWVIDEO;
st->codecpar->codec_tag = 0;
/* CINEFILEHEADER structure */
avio_skip(pb, 4); // Type, Headersize
compression = avio_rl16(pb);
version = avio_rl16(pb);
if (version != 1) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "unknown version %i", version);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
avio_skip(pb, 12); // FirstMovieImage, TotalImageCount, FirstImageNumber
st->duration = avio_rl32(pb);
offImageHeader = avio_rl32(pb);
offSetup = avio_rl32(pb);
offImageOffsets = avio_rl32(pb);
avio_skip(pb, 8); // TriggerTime
/* BITMAPINFOHEADER structure */
avio_seek(pb, offImageHeader, SEEK_SET);
avio_skip(pb, 4); //biSize
st->codecpar->width = avio_rl32(pb);
st->codecpar->height = avio_rl32(pb);
if (avio_rl16(pb) != 1) // biPlanes
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
biBitCount = avio_rl16(pb);
if (biBitCount != 8 && biBitCount != 16 && biBitCount != 24 && biBitCount != 48) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "unsupported biBitCount %i", biBitCount);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
switch (avio_rl32(pb)) {
case BMP_RGB:
vflip = 0;
break;
case 0x100: /* BI_PACKED */
st->codecpar->codec_tag = MKTAG('B', 'I', 'T', 0);
vflip = 1;
break;
default:
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "unknown bitmap compression");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
avio_skip(pb, 4); // biSizeImage
/* parse SETUP structure */
avio_seek(pb, offSetup, SEEK_SET);
avio_skip(pb, 140); // FrameRatae16 .. descriptionOld
if (avio_rl16(pb) != 0x5453)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
length = avio_rl16(pb);
if (length < 0x163C) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "short SETUP header");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
avio_skip(pb, 616); // Binning .. bFlipH
if (!avio_rl32(pb) ^ vflip) {
st->codecpar->extradata = av_strdup("BottomUp");
st->codecpar->extradata_size = 9;
}
avio_skip(pb, 4); // Grid
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 64, 1, avio_rl32(pb));
avio_skip(pb, 20); // Shutter .. bEnableColor
set_metadata_int(&st->metadata, "camera_version", avio_rl32(pb), 0);
set_metadata_int(&st->metadata, "firmware_version", avio_rl32(pb), 0);
set_metadata_int(&st->metadata, "software_version", avio_rl32(pb), 0);
set_metadata_int(&st->metadata, "recording_timezone", avio_rl32(pb), 0);
CFA = avio_rl32(pb);
set_metadata_int(&st->metadata, "brightness", avio_rl32(pb), 1);
set_metadata_int(&st->metadata, "contrast", avio_rl32(pb), 1);
set_metadata_int(&st->metadata, "gamma", avio_rl32(pb), 1);
avio_skip(pb, 12 + 16); // Reserved1 .. AutoExpRect
set_metadata_float(&st->metadata, "wbgain[0].r", av_int2float(avio_rl32(pb)), 1);
set_metadata_float(&st->metadata, "wbgain[0].b", av_int2float(avio_rl32(pb)), 1);
avio_skip(pb, 36); // WBGain[1].. WBView
st->codecpar->bits_per_coded_sample = avio_rl32(pb);
if (compression == CC_RGB) {
if (biBitCount == 8) {
st->codecpar->format = AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY8;
} else if (biBitCount == 16) {
st->codecpar->format = AV_PIX_FMT_GRAY16LE;
} else if (biBitCount == 24) {
st->codecpar->format = AV_PIX_FMT_BGR24;
} else if (biBitCount == 48) {
st->codecpar->format = AV_PIX_FMT_BGR48LE;
} else {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "unsupported biBitCount %i", biBitCount);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
} else if (compression == CC_UNINT) {
switch (CFA & 0xFFFFFF) {
case CFA_BAYER:
if (biBitCount == 8) {
st->codecpar->format = AV_PIX_FMT_BAYER_GBRG8;
} else if (biBitCount == 16) {
st->codecpar->format = AV_PIX_FMT_BAYER_GBRG16LE;
} else {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "unsupported biBitCount %i", biBitCount);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
break;
case CFA_BAYERFLIP:
if (biBitCount == 8) {
st->codecpar->format = AV_PIX_FMT_BAYER_RGGB8;
} else if (biBitCount == 16) {
st->codecpar->format = AV_PIX_FMT_BAYER_RGGB16LE;
} else {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "unsupported biBitCount %i", biBitCount);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
break;
default:
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "unsupported Color Field Array (CFA) %i", CFA & 0xFFFFFF);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
} else { //CC_LEAD
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "unsupported compression %i", compression);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
avio_skip(pb, 668); // Conv8Min ... Sensor
set_metadata_int(&st->metadata, "shutter_ns", avio_rl32(pb), 0);
avio_skip(pb, 24); // EDRShutterNs ... ImHeightAcq
#define DESCRIPTION_SIZE 4096
description = av_malloc(DESCRIPTION_SIZE + 1);
if (!description)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
i = avio_get_str(pb, DESCRIPTION_SIZE, description, DESCRIPTION_SIZE + 1);
if (i < DESCRIPTION_SIZE)
avio_skip(pb, DESCRIPTION_SIZE - i);
if (description[0])
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "description", description, AV_DICT_DONT_STRDUP_VAL);
else
av_free(description);
avio_skip(pb, 1176); // RisingEdge ... cmUser
set_metadata_int(&st->metadata, "enable_crop", avio_rl32(pb), 1);
set_metadata_int(&st->metadata, "crop_left", avio_rl32(pb), 1);
set_metadata_int(&st->metadata, "crop_top", avio_rl32(pb), 1);
set_metadata_int(&st->metadata, "crop_right", avio_rl32(pb), 1);
set_metadata_int(&st->metadata, "crop_bottom", avio_rl32(pb), 1);
/* parse image offsets */
avio_seek(pb, offImageOffsets, SEEK_SET);
for (i = 0; i < st->duration; i++)
av_add_index_entry(st, avio_rl64(pb), i, 0, 0, AVINDEX_KEYFRAME);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/cinedec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check
Fixes: loop.cine
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-834
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: WORD32 ih264d_get_version(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
char version_string[MAXVERSION_STRLEN + 1];
UWORD32 version_string_len;
ivd_ctl_getversioninfo_ip_t *ps_ip;
ivd_ctl_getversioninfo_op_t *ps_op;
ps_ip = (ivd_ctl_getversioninfo_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_op = (ivd_ctl_getversioninfo_op_t *)pv_api_op;
UNUSED(dec_hdl);
ps_op->u4_error_code = IV_SUCCESS;
VERSION(version_string, CODEC_NAME, CODEC_RELEASE_TYPE, CODEC_RELEASE_VER,
CODEC_VENDOR);
if((WORD32)ps_ip->u4_version_buffer_size <= 0)
{
ps_op->u4_error_code = IH264D_VERS_BUF_INSUFFICIENT;
return (IV_FAIL);
}
version_string_len = strlen(version_string) + 1;
if(ps_ip->u4_version_buffer_size >= version_string_len) //(WORD32)sizeof(sizeof(version_string)))
{
memcpy(ps_ip->pv_version_buffer, version_string, version_string_len);
ps_op->u4_error_code = IV_SUCCESS;
}
else
{
ps_op->u4_error_code = IH264D_VERS_BUF_INSUFFICIENT;
return IV_FAIL;
}
return (IV_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed initialization of first_slice_in_pic
To handle some errors, first_slice_in_pic was being set to 2.
This is now cleaned up and first_slice_in_pic is set to 1 only once per pic.
This will ensure picture level initializations are done only once even in case
of error clips
Bug: 33717589
Bug: 33551775
Bug: 33716442
Bug: 33677995
Change-Id: If341436b3cbaa724017eedddd88c2e6fac36d8ba
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: tlink_rb_insert(struct rb_root *root, struct tcon_link *new_tlink)
{
struct rb_node **new = &(root->rb_node), *parent = NULL;
struct tcon_link *tlink;
while (*new) {
tlink = rb_entry(*new, struct tcon_link, tl_rbnode);
parent = *new;
if (uid_gt(tlink->tl_uid, new_tlink->tl_uid))
new = &((*new)->rb_left);
else
new = &((*new)->rb_right);
}
rb_link_node(&new_tlink->tl_rbnode, parent, new);
rb_insert_color(&new_tlink->tl_rbnode, root);
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int load_segment_descriptor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u16 selector, int seg)
{
u8 cpl = ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt);
return __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, selector, seg, cpl, false);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps
Far jmp/call/ret may fault while loading a new RIP. Currently KVM does not
handle this case, and may result in failed vm-entry once the assignment is
done. The tricky part of doing so is that loading the new CS affects the
VMCS/VMCB state, so if we fail during loading the new RIP, we are left in
unconsistent state. Therefore, this patch saves on 64-bit the old CS
descriptor and restores it if loading RIP failed.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void stop_tty(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
if (tty->stopped) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
return;
}
tty->stopped = 1;
if (tty->link && tty->link->packet) {
tty->ctrl_status &= ~TIOCPKT_START;
tty->ctrl_status |= TIOCPKT_STOP;
wake_up_interruptible_poll(&tty->link->read_wait, POLLIN);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags);
if (tty->ops->stop)
(tty->ops->stop)(tty);
}
Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Cc: Alan Cox <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: TabGroupData::TabGroupData() {
static int next_placeholder_title_number = 1;
title_ = base::ASCIIToUTF16(
"Group " + base::NumberToString(next_placeholder_title_number));
++next_placeholder_title_number;
static SkRandom rand;
stroke_color_ = rand.nextU() | 0xff000000;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: BurnLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetBurnLibrary() {
return burn_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: request_swap_ns(struct request *req, struct nameserver *ns) {
if (ns && req->ns != ns) {
EVUTIL_ASSERT(req->ns->requests_inflight > 0);
req->ns->requests_inflight--;
ns->requests_inflight++;
req->ns = ns;
}
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static inline u32 avg_delay(const struct illinois *ca)
{
u64 t = ca->sum_rtt;
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
return t - ca->base_rtt;
}
Commit Message: net: fix divide by zero in tcp algorithm illinois
Reading TCP stats when using TCP Illinois congestion control algorithm
can cause a divide by zero kernel oops.
The division by zero occur in tcp_illinois_info() at:
do_div(t, ca->cnt_rtt);
where ca->cnt_rtt can become zero (when rtt_reset is called)
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Register tcp_illinois:
# sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=illinois
2. Monitor internal TCP information via command "ss -i"
# watch -d ss -i
3. Establish new TCP conn to machine
Either it fails at the initial conn, or else it needs to wait
for a loss or a reset.
This is only related to reading stats. The function avg_delay() also
performs the same divide, but is guarded with a (ca->cnt_rtt > 0) at its
calling point in update_params(). Thus, simply fix tcp_illinois_info().
Function tcp_illinois_info() / get_info() is called without
socket lock. Thus, eliminate any race condition on ca->cnt_rtt
by using a local stack variable. Simply reuse info.tcpv_rttcnt,
as its already set to ca->cnt_rtt.
Function avg_delay() is not affected by this race condition, as
its called with the socket lock.
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: device_has_capability (NMDevice *self, NMDeviceCapabilities caps)
{
{
static guint32 devcount = 0;
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self));
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_return_if_fail (priv->path == NULL);
priv->path = g_strdup_printf ("/org/freedesktop/NetworkManager/Devices/%d", devcount++);
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "exported as %s", priv->path);
nm_dbus_manager_register_object (nm_dbus_manager_get (), priv->path, self);
}
const char *
nm_device_get_path (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->path;
}
const char *
nm_device_get_udi (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->udi;
}
const char *
nm_device_get_iface (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), 0);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->iface;
}
int
nm_device_get_ifindex (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, 0);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->ifindex;
}
gboolean
nm_device_is_software (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
return priv->is_software;
}
const char *
nm_device_get_ip_iface (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
/* If it's not set, default to iface */
return priv->ip_iface ? priv->ip_iface : priv->iface;
}
int
nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, 0);
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
/* If it's not set, default to iface */
return priv->ip_iface ? priv->ip_ifindex : priv->ifindex;
}
void
nm_device_set_ip_iface (NMDevice *self, const char *iface)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
char *old_ip_iface;
g_return_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self));
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (!g_strcmp0 (iface, priv->ip_iface))
return;
old_ip_iface = priv->ip_iface;
priv->ip_ifindex = 0;
priv->ip_iface = g_strdup (iface);
if (priv->ip_iface) {
priv->ip_ifindex = nm_platform_link_get_ifindex (priv->ip_iface);
if (priv->ip_ifindex > 0) {
if (nm_platform_check_support_user_ipv6ll ())
nm_platform_link_set_user_ipv6ll_enabled (priv->ip_ifindex, TRUE);
if (!nm_platform_link_is_up (priv->ip_ifindex))
nm_platform_link_set_up (priv->ip_ifindex);
} else {
/* Device IP interface must always be a kernel network interface */
_LOGW (LOGD_HW, "failed to look up interface index");
}
}
/* We don't care about any saved values from the old iface */
g_hash_table_remove_all (priv->ip6_saved_properties);
/* Emit change notification */
if (g_strcmp0 (old_ip_iface, priv->ip_iface))
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_IP_IFACE);
g_free (old_ip_iface);
}
static gboolean
get_ip_iface_identifier (NMDevice *self, NMUtilsIPv6IfaceId *out_iid)
{
NMLinkType link_type;
const guint8 *hwaddr = NULL;
size_t hwaddr_len = 0;
int ifindex;
gboolean success;
/* If we get here, we *must* have a kernel netdev, which implies an ifindex */
ifindex = nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self);
g_assert (ifindex);
link_type = nm_platform_link_get_type (ifindex);
g_return_val_if_fail (link_type > NM_LINK_TYPE_UNKNOWN, 0);
hwaddr = nm_platform_link_get_address (ifindex, &hwaddr_len);
if (!hwaddr_len)
return FALSE;
success = nm_utils_get_ipv6_interface_identifier (link_type,
hwaddr,
hwaddr_len,
out_iid);
if (!success) {
_LOGW (LOGD_HW, "failed to generate interface identifier "
"for link type %u hwaddr_len %zu", link_type, hwaddr_len);
}
return success;
}
static gboolean
nm_device_get_ip_iface_identifier (NMDevice *self, NMUtilsIPv6IfaceId *iid)
{
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->get_ip_iface_identifier (self, iid);
}
const char *
nm_device_get_driver (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->driver;
}
const char *
nm_device_get_driver_version (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->driver_version;
}
NMDeviceType
nm_device_get_device_type (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), NM_DEVICE_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->type;
}
/**
* nm_device_get_priority():
* @self: the #NMDevice
*
* Returns: the device's routing priority. Lower numbers means a "better"
* device, eg higher priority.
*/
int
nm_device_get_priority (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), 1000);
/* Device 'priority' is used for the default route-metric and is based on
* the device type. The settings ipv4.route-metric and ipv6.route-metric
* can overwrite this default.
*
* Currently for both IPv4 and IPv6 we use the same default values.
*
* The route-metric is used for the metric of the routes of device.
* This also applies to the default route. Therefore it affects also
* which device is the "best".
*
* For comparison, note that iproute2 by default adds IPv4 routes with
* metric 0, and IPv6 routes with metric 1024. The latter is the IPv6
* "user default" in the kernel (NM_PLATFORM_ROUTE_METRIC_DEFAULT_IP6).
* In kernel, the full uint32_t range is available for route
* metrics (except for IPv6, where 0 means 1024).
*/
switch (nm_device_get_device_type (self)) {
/* 50 is reserved for VPN (NM_VPN_ROUTE_METRIC_DEFAULT) */
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_ETHERNET:
return 100;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_INFINIBAND:
return 150;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_ADSL:
return 200;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_WIMAX:
return 250;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_BOND:
return 300;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_TEAM:
return 350;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_VLAN:
return 400;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_BRIDGE:
return 425;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_MODEM:
return 450;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_BT:
return 550;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_WIFI:
return 600;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_OLPC_MESH:
return 650;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_GENERIC:
return 950;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_UNKNOWN:
return 10000;
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_UNUSED1:
case NM_DEVICE_TYPE_UNUSED2:
/* omit default: to get compiler warning about missing switch cases */
break;
}
return 11000;
}
guint32
nm_device_get_ip4_route_metric (NMDevice *self)
{
NMConnection *connection;
gint64 route_metric = -1;
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), G_MAXUINT32);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
if (connection)
route_metric = nm_setting_ip_config_get_route_metric (nm_connection_get_setting_ip4_config (connection));
return route_metric >= 0 ? route_metric : nm_device_get_priority (self);
}
guint32
nm_device_get_ip6_route_metric (NMDevice *self)
{
NMConnection *connection;
gint64 route_metric = -1;
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), G_MAXUINT32);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
if (connection)
route_metric = nm_setting_ip_config_get_route_metric (nm_connection_get_setting_ip6_config (connection));
return route_metric >= 0 ? route_metric : nm_device_get_priority (self);
}
const NMPlatformIP4Route *
nm_device_get_ip4_default_route (NMDevice *self, gboolean *out_is_assumed)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), NULL);
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (out_is_assumed)
*out_is_assumed = priv->default_route.v4_is_assumed;
return priv->default_route.v4_has ? &priv->default_route.v4 : NULL;
}
const NMPlatformIP6Route *
nm_device_get_ip6_default_route (NMDevice *self, gboolean *out_is_assumed)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), NULL);
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (out_is_assumed)
*out_is_assumed = priv->default_route.v6_is_assumed;
return priv->default_route.v6_has ? &priv->default_route.v6 : NULL;
}
const char *
nm_device_get_type_desc (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->type_desc;
}
gboolean
nm_device_has_carrier (NMDevice *self)
{
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->carrier;
}
NMActRequest *
nm_device_get_act_request (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->act_request;
}
NMConnection *
nm_device_get_connection (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
return priv->act_request ? nm_act_request_get_connection (priv->act_request) : NULL;
}
RfKillType
nm_device_get_rfkill_type (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), FALSE);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->rfkill_type;
}
static const char *
nm_device_get_physical_port_id (NMDevice *self)
{
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->physical_port_id;
}
/***********************************************************/
static gboolean
nm_device_uses_generated_assumed_connection (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
if ( priv->act_request
&& nm_active_connection_get_assumed (NM_ACTIVE_CONNECTION (priv->act_request))) {
connection = nm_act_request_get_connection (priv->act_request);
if ( connection
&& nm_settings_connection_get_nm_generated_assumed (NM_SETTINGS_CONNECTION (connection)))
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
gboolean
nm_device_uses_assumed_connection (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if ( priv->act_request
&& nm_active_connection_get_assumed (NM_ACTIVE_CONNECTION (priv->act_request)))
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
static SlaveInfo *
find_slave_info (NMDevice *self, NMDevice *slave)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
SlaveInfo *info;
GSList *iter;
for (iter = priv->slaves; iter; iter = g_slist_next (iter)) {
info = iter->data;
if (info->slave == slave)
return info;
}
return NULL;
}
static void
free_slave_info (SlaveInfo *info)
{
g_signal_handler_disconnect (info->slave, info->watch_id);
g_clear_object (&info->slave);
memset (info, 0, sizeof (*info));
g_free (info);
}
/**
* nm_device_enslave_slave:
* @self: the master device
* @slave: the slave device to enslave
* @connection: (allow-none): the slave device's connection
*
* If @self is capable of enslaving other devices (ie it's a bridge, bond, team,
* etc) then this function enslaves @slave.
*
* Returns: %TRUE on success, %FALSE on failure or if this device cannot enslave
* other devices.
*/
static gboolean
nm_device_enslave_slave (NMDevice *self, NMDevice *slave, NMConnection *connection)
{
SlaveInfo *info;
gboolean success = FALSE;
gboolean configure;
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (slave != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->enslave_slave != NULL, FALSE);
info = find_slave_info (self, slave);
if (!info)
return FALSE;
if (info->enslaved)
success = TRUE;
else {
configure = (info->configure && connection != NULL);
if (configure)
g_return_val_if_fail (nm_device_get_state (slave) >= NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED, FALSE);
success = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->enslave_slave (self, slave, connection, configure);
info->enslaved = success;
}
nm_device_slave_notify_enslave (info->slave, success);
/* Ensure the device's hardware address is up-to-date; it often changes
* when slaves change.
*/
nm_device_update_hw_address (self);
/* Restart IP configuration if we're waiting for slaves. Do this
* after updating the hardware address as IP config may need the
* new address.
*/
if (success) {
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->ip4_state == IP_WAIT)
nm_device_activate_stage3_ip4_start (self);
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->ip6_state == IP_WAIT)
nm_device_activate_stage3_ip6_start (self);
}
return success;
}
/**
* nm_device_release_one_slave:
* @self: the master device
* @slave: the slave device to release
* @configure: whether @self needs to actually release @slave
* @reason: the state change reason for the @slave
*
* If @self is capable of enslaving other devices (ie it's a bridge, bond, team,
* etc) then this function releases the previously enslaved @slave and/or
* updates the state of @self and @slave to reflect its release.
*
* Returns: %TRUE on success, %FALSE on failure, if this device cannot enslave
* other devices, or if @slave was never enslaved.
*/
static gboolean
nm_device_release_one_slave (NMDevice *self, NMDevice *slave, gboolean configure, NMDeviceStateReason reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
SlaveInfo *info;
gboolean success = FALSE;
g_return_val_if_fail (slave != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->release_slave != NULL, FALSE);
info = find_slave_info (self, slave);
if (!info)
return FALSE;
priv->slaves = g_slist_remove (priv->slaves, info);
if (info->enslaved) {
success = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->release_slave (self, slave, configure);
/* The release_slave() implementation logs success/failure (in the
* correct device-specific log domain), so we don't have to do anything.
*/
}
if (!configure) {
g_warn_if_fail (reason == NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE || reason == NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_REMOVED);
reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE;
} else if (reason == NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE) {
g_warn_if_reached ();
reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_UNKNOWN;
}
nm_device_slave_notify_release (info->slave, reason);
free_slave_info (info);
/* Ensure the device's hardware address is up-to-date; it often changes
* when slaves change.
*/
nm_device_update_hw_address (self);
return success;
}
static gboolean
is_software_external (NMDevice *self)
{
return nm_device_is_software (self)
&& !nm_device_get_is_nm_owned (self);
}
/**
* nm_device_finish_init:
* @self: the master device
*
* Whatever needs to be done post-initialization, when the device has a DBus
* object name.
*/
void
nm_device_finish_init (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_assert (priv->initialized == FALSE);
/* Do not manage externally created software devices until they are IFF_UP */
if ( is_software_external (self)
&& !nm_platform_link_is_up (priv->ifindex)
&& priv->ifindex > 0)
nm_device_set_initial_unmanaged_flag (self, NM_UNMANAGED_EXTERNAL_DOWN, TRUE);
if (priv->master)
nm_device_enslave_slave (priv->master, self, NULL);
priv->initialized = TRUE;
}
static void
carrier_changed (NMDevice *self, gboolean carrier)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (!nm_device_get_managed (self))
return;
nm_device_recheck_available_connections (self);
/* ignore-carrier devices ignore all carrier-down events */
if (priv->ignore_carrier && !carrier)
return;
if (priv->is_master) {
/* Bridge/bond/team carrier does not affect its own activation,
* but when carrier comes on, if there are slaves waiting,
* it will restart them.
*/
if (!carrier)
return;
if (nm_device_activate_ip4_state_in_wait (self))
nm_device_activate_stage3_ip4_start (self);
if (nm_device_activate_ip6_state_in_wait (self))
nm_device_activate_stage3_ip6_start (self);
return;
} else if (nm_device_get_enslaved (self) && !carrier) {
/* Slaves don't deactivate when they lose carrier; for
* bonds/teams in particular that would be actively
* counterproductive.
*/
return;
}
if (carrier) {
g_warn_if_fail (priv->state >= NM_DEVICE_STATE_UNAVAILABLE);
if (priv->state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_UNAVAILABLE) {
nm_device_queue_state (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_CARRIER);
} else if (priv->state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED) {
/* If the device is already in DISCONNECTED state without a carrier
* (probably because it is tagged for carrier ignore) ensure that
* when the carrier appears, auto connections are rechecked for
* the device.
*/
nm_device_emit_recheck_auto_activate (self);
}
} else {
g_return_if_fail (priv->state >= NM_DEVICE_STATE_UNAVAILABLE);
if (priv->state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_UNAVAILABLE) {
if (nm_device_queued_state_peek (self) >= NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED)
nm_device_queued_state_clear (self);
} else {
nm_device_queue_state (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_UNAVAILABLE,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_CARRIER);
}
}
}
#define LINK_DISCONNECT_DELAY 4
static gboolean
link_disconnect_action_cb (gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "link disconnected (calling deferred action) (id=%u)", priv->carrier_defer_id);
priv->carrier_defer_id = 0;
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "link disconnected (calling deferred action)");
NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->carrier_changed (self, FALSE);
return FALSE;
}
static void
link_disconnect_action_cancel (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->carrier_defer_id) {
g_source_remove (priv->carrier_defer_id);
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "link disconnected (canceling deferred action) (id=%u)", priv->carrier_defer_id);
priv->carrier_defer_id = 0;
}
}
void
nm_device_set_carrier (NMDevice *self, gboolean carrier)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMDeviceClass *klass = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self);
NMDeviceState state = nm_device_get_state (self);
if (priv->carrier == carrier)
return;
priv->carrier = carrier;
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_CARRIER);
if (priv->carrier) {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "link connected");
link_disconnect_action_cancel (self);
klass->carrier_changed (self, TRUE);
if (priv->carrier_wait_id) {
g_source_remove (priv->carrier_wait_id);
priv->carrier_wait_id = 0;
nm_device_remove_pending_action (self, "carrier wait", TRUE);
_carrier_wait_check_queued_act_request (self);
}
} else if (state <= NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED) {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "link disconnected");
klass->carrier_changed (self, FALSE);
} else {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "link disconnected (deferring action for %d seconds)", LINK_DISCONNECT_DELAY);
priv->carrier_defer_id = g_timeout_add_seconds (LINK_DISCONNECT_DELAY,
link_disconnect_action_cb, self);
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "link disconnected (deferring action for %d seconds) (id=%u)",
LINK_DISCONNECT_DELAY, priv->carrier_defer_id);
}
}
static void
update_for_ip_ifname_change (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_hash_table_remove_all (priv->ip6_saved_properties);
if (priv->dhcp4_client) {
if (!nm_device_dhcp4_renew (self, FALSE)) {
nm_device_state_changed (self,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_DHCP_FAILED);
return;
}
}
if (priv->dhcp6_client) {
if (!nm_device_dhcp6_renew (self, FALSE)) {
nm_device_state_changed (self,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_DHCP_FAILED);
return;
}
}
if (priv->rdisc) {
/* FIXME: todo */
}
if (priv->dnsmasq_manager) {
/* FIXME: todo */
}
}
static void
device_set_master (NMDevice *self, int ifindex)
{
NMDevice *master;
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
master = nm_manager_get_device_by_ifindex (nm_manager_get (), ifindex);
if (master && NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (master)->enslave_slave) {
g_clear_object (&priv->master);
priv->master = g_object_ref (master);
nm_device_master_add_slave (master, self, FALSE);
} else if (master) {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "enslaved to non-master-type device %s; ignoring",
nm_device_get_iface (master));
} else {
_LOGW (LOGD_DEVICE, "enslaved to unknown device %d %s",
ifindex,
nm_platform_link_get_name (ifindex));
}
}
static void
device_link_changed (NMDevice *self, NMPlatformLink *info)
{
NMDeviceClass *klass = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMUtilsIPv6IfaceId token_iid;
gboolean ip_ifname_changed = FALSE;
if (info->udi && g_strcmp0 (info->udi, priv->udi)) {
/* Update UDI to what udev gives us */
g_free (priv->udi);
priv->udi = g_strdup (info->udi);
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_UDI);
}
/* Update MTU if it has changed. */
if (priv->mtu != info->mtu) {
priv->mtu = info->mtu;
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_MTU);
}
if (info->name[0] && strcmp (priv->iface, info->name) != 0) {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "interface index %d renamed iface from '%s' to '%s'",
priv->ifindex, priv->iface, info->name);
g_free (priv->iface);
priv->iface = g_strdup (info->name);
/* If the device has no explicit ip_iface, then changing iface changes ip_iface too. */
ip_ifname_changed = !priv->ip_iface;
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_IFACE);
if (ip_ifname_changed)
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_IP_IFACE);
/* Re-match available connections against the new interface name */
nm_device_recheck_available_connections (self);
/* Let any connections that use the new interface name have a chance
* to auto-activate on the device.
*/
nm_device_emit_recheck_auto_activate (self);
}
/* Update slave status for external changes */
if (priv->enslaved && info->master != nm_device_get_ifindex (priv->master))
nm_device_release_one_slave (priv->master, self, FALSE, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE);
if (info->master && !priv->enslaved) {
device_set_master (self, info->master);
if (priv->master)
nm_device_enslave_slave (priv->master, self, NULL);
}
if (priv->rdisc && nm_platform_link_get_ipv6_token (priv->ifindex, &token_iid)) {
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "IPv6 tokenized identifier present on device %s", priv->iface);
if (nm_rdisc_set_iid (priv->rdisc, token_iid))
nm_rdisc_start (priv->rdisc);
}
if (klass->link_changed)
klass->link_changed (self, info);
/* Update DHCP, etc, if needed */
if (ip_ifname_changed)
update_for_ip_ifname_change (self);
if (priv->up != info->up) {
priv->up = info->up;
/* Manage externally-created software interfaces only when they are IFF_UP */
g_assert (priv->ifindex > 0);
if (is_software_external (self)) {
gboolean external_down = nm_device_get_unmanaged_flag (self, NM_UNMANAGED_EXTERNAL_DOWN);
if (external_down && info->up) {
if (nm_device_get_state (self) < NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED) {
/* Ensure the assume check is queued before any queued state changes
* from the transition to UNAVAILABLE.
*/
nm_device_queue_recheck_assume (self);
/* Resetting the EXTERNAL_DOWN flag may change the device's state
* to UNAVAILABLE. To ensure that the state change doesn't touch
* the device before assumption occurs, pass
* NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_CONNECTION_ASSUMED as the reason.
*/
nm_device_set_unmanaged (self,
NM_UNMANAGED_EXTERNAL_DOWN,
FALSE,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_CONNECTION_ASSUMED);
} else {
/* Don't trigger a state change; if the device is in a
* state higher than UNAVAILABLE, it is already IFF_UP
* or an explicit activation request was received.
*/
priv->unmanaged_flags &= ~NM_UNMANAGED_EXTERNAL_DOWN;
}
} else if (!external_down && !info->up && nm_device_get_state (self) <= NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED) {
/* If the device is already disconnected and is set !IFF_UP,
* unmanage it.
*/
nm_device_set_unmanaged (self,
NM_UNMANAGED_EXTERNAL_DOWN,
TRUE,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_USER_REQUESTED);
}
}
}
}
static void
device_ip_link_changed (NMDevice *self, NMPlatformLink *info)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (info->name[0] && g_strcmp0 (priv->ip_iface, info->name)) {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "interface index %d renamed ip_iface (%d) from '%s' to '%s'",
priv->ifindex, nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self),
priv->ip_iface, info->name);
g_free (priv->ip_iface);
priv->ip_iface = g_strdup (info->name);
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_IP_IFACE);
update_for_ip_ifname_change (self);
}
}
static void
link_changed_cb (NMPlatform *platform,
int ifindex,
NMPlatformLink *info,
NMPlatformSignalChangeType change_type,
NMPlatformReason reason,
NMDevice *self)
{
if (change_type != NM_PLATFORM_SIGNAL_CHANGED)
return;
/* We don't filter by 'reason' because we are interested in *all* link
* changes. For example a call to nm_platform_link_set_up() may result
* in an internal carrier change (i.e. we ask the kernel to set IFF_UP
* and it results in also setting IFF_LOWER_UP.
*/
if (ifindex == nm_device_get_ifindex (self))
device_link_changed (self, info);
else if (ifindex == nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self))
device_ip_link_changed (self, info);
}
static void
link_changed (NMDevice *self, NMPlatformLink *info)
{
/* Update carrier from link event if applicable. */
if ( device_has_capability (self, NM_DEVICE_CAP_CARRIER_DETECT)
&& !device_has_capability (self, NM_DEVICE_CAP_NONSTANDARD_CARRIER))
nm_device_set_carrier (self, info->connected);
}
/**
* nm_device_notify_component_added():
* @self: the #NMDevice
* @component: the component being added by a plugin
*
* Called by the manager to notify the device that a new component has
* been found. The device implementation should return %TRUE if it
* wishes to claim the component, or %FALSE if it cannot.
*
* Returns: %TRUE to claim the component, %FALSE if the component cannot be
* claimed.
*/
gboolean
nm_device_notify_component_added (NMDevice *self, GObject *component)
{
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->component_added)
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->component_added (self, component);
return FALSE;
}
/**
* nm_device_owns_iface():
* @self: the #NMDevice
* @iface: an interface name
*
* Called by the manager to ask if the device or any of its components owns
* @iface. For example, a WWAN implementation would return %TRUE for an
* ethernet interface name that was owned by the WWAN device's modem component,
* because that ethernet interface is controlled by the WWAN device and cannot
* be used independently of the WWAN device.
*
* Returns: %TRUE if @self or it's components owns the interface name,
* %FALSE if not
*/
gboolean
nm_device_owns_iface (NMDevice *self, const char *iface)
{
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->owns_iface)
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->owns_iface (self, iface);
return FALSE;
}
NMConnection *
nm_device_new_default_connection (NMDevice *self)
{
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->new_default_connection)
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->new_default_connection (self);
return NULL;
}
static void
slave_state_changed (NMDevice *slave,
NMDeviceState slave_new_state,
NMDeviceState slave_old_state,
NMDeviceStateReason reason,
NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
gboolean release = FALSE;
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "slave %s state change %d (%s) -> %d (%s)",
nm_device_get_iface (slave),
slave_old_state,
state_to_string (slave_old_state),
slave_new_state,
state_to_string (slave_new_state));
/* Don't try to enslave slaves until the master is ready */
if (priv->state < NM_DEVICE_STATE_CONFIG)
return;
if (slave_new_state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_IP_CONFIG)
nm_device_enslave_slave (self, slave, nm_device_get_connection (slave));
else if (slave_new_state > NM_DEVICE_STATE_ACTIVATED)
release = TRUE;
else if ( slave_new_state <= NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED
&& slave_old_state > NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED) {
/* Catch failures due to unavailable or unmanaged */
release = TRUE;
}
if (release) {
nm_device_release_one_slave (self, slave, TRUE, reason);
/* Bridge/bond/team interfaces are left up until manually deactivated */
if (priv->slaves == NULL && priv->state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_ACTIVATED)
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "last slave removed; remaining activated");
}
}
/**
* nm_device_master_add_slave:
* @self: the master device
* @slave: the slave device to enslave
* @configure: pass %TRUE if the slave should be configured by the master, or
* %FALSE if it is already configured outside NetworkManager
*
* If @self is capable of enslaving other devices (ie it's a bridge, bond, team,
* etc) then this function adds @slave to the slave list for later enslavement.
*
* Returns: %TRUE on success, %FALSE on failure
*/
static gboolean
nm_device_master_add_slave (NMDevice *self, NMDevice *slave, gboolean configure)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
SlaveInfo *info;
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (slave != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->enslave_slave != NULL, FALSE);
if (configure)
g_return_val_if_fail (nm_device_get_state (slave) >= NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED, FALSE);
if (!find_slave_info (self, slave)) {
info = g_malloc0 (sizeof (SlaveInfo));
info->slave = g_object_ref (slave);
info->configure = configure;
info->watch_id = g_signal_connect (slave, "state-changed",
G_CALLBACK (slave_state_changed), self);
priv->slaves = g_slist_append (priv->slaves, info);
}
nm_device_queue_recheck_assume (self);
return TRUE;
}
/**
* nm_device_master_get_slaves:
* @self: the master device
*
* Returns: any slaves of which @self is the master. Caller owns returned list.
*/
GSList *
nm_device_master_get_slaves (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
GSList *slaves = NULL, *iter;
for (iter = priv->slaves; iter; iter = g_slist_next (iter))
slaves = g_slist_prepend (slaves, ((SlaveInfo *) iter->data)->slave);
return slaves;
}
/**
* nm_device_master_get_slave_by_ifindex:
* @self: the master device
* @ifindex: the slave's interface index
*
* Returns: the slave with the given @ifindex of which @self is the master,
* or %NULL if no device with @ifindex is a slave of @self.
*/
NMDevice *
nm_device_master_get_slave_by_ifindex (NMDevice *self, int ifindex)
{
GSList *iter;
for (iter = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->slaves; iter; iter = g_slist_next (iter)) {
SlaveInfo *info = iter->data;
if (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (info->slave) == ifindex)
return info->slave;
}
return NULL;
}
/**
* nm_device_master_check_slave_physical_port:
* @self: the master device
* @slave: a slave device
* @log_domain: domain to log a warning in
*
* Checks if @self already has a slave with the same #NMDevice:physical-port-id
* as @slave, and logs a warning if so.
*/
void
nm_device_master_check_slave_physical_port (NMDevice *self, NMDevice *slave,
guint64 log_domain)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
const char *slave_physical_port_id, *existing_physical_port_id;
SlaveInfo *info;
GSList *iter;
slave_physical_port_id = nm_device_get_physical_port_id (slave);
if (!slave_physical_port_id)
return;
for (iter = priv->slaves; iter; iter = iter->next) {
info = iter->data;
if (info->slave == slave)
continue;
existing_physical_port_id = nm_device_get_physical_port_id (info->slave);
if (!g_strcmp0 (slave_physical_port_id, existing_physical_port_id)) {
_LOGW (log_domain, "slave %s shares a physical port with existing slave %s",
nm_device_get_ip_iface (slave),
nm_device_get_ip_iface (info->slave));
/* Since this function will get called for every slave, we only have
* to warn about the first match we find; if there are other matches
* later in the list, we will have already warned about them matching
* @existing earlier.
*/
return;
}
}
}
/* release all slaves */
static void
nm_device_master_release_slaves (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMDeviceStateReason reason;
/* Don't release the slaves if this connection doesn't belong to NM. */
if (nm_device_uses_generated_assumed_connection (self))
return;
reason = priv->state_reason;
if (priv->state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED)
reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_DEPENDENCY_FAILED;
while (priv->slaves) {
SlaveInfo *info = priv->slaves->data;
nm_device_release_one_slave (self, info->slave, TRUE, reason);
}
}
/**
* nm_device_get_master:
* @self: the device
*
* If @self has been enslaved by another device, this returns that
* device. Otherwise it returns %NULL. (In particular, note that if
* @self is in the process of activating as a slave, but has not yet
* been enslaved by its master, this will return %NULL.)
*
* Returns: (transfer none): @self's master, or %NULL
*/
NMDevice *
nm_device_get_master (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->enslaved)
return priv->master;
else
return NULL;
}
/**
* nm_device_slave_notify_enslave:
* @self: the slave device
* @success: whether the enslaving operation succeeded
*
* Notifies a slave that either it has been enslaved, or else its master tried
* to enslave it and failed.
*/
static void
nm_device_slave_notify_enslave (NMDevice *self, gboolean success)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
gboolean activating = (priv->state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_IP_CONFIG);
g_assert (priv->master);
if (!priv->enslaved) {
if (success) {
if (activating) {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: connection '%s' enslaved, continuing activation",
nm_connection_get_id (connection));
} else
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "enslaved to %s", nm_device_get_iface (priv->master));
priv->enslaved = TRUE;
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_MASTER);
} else if (activating) {
_LOGW (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: connection '%s' could not be enslaved",
nm_connection_get_id (connection));
}
}
if (activating) {
priv->ip4_state = IP_DONE;
priv->ip6_state = IP_DONE;
nm_device_queue_state (self,
success ? NM_DEVICE_STATE_SECONDARIES : NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE);
} else
nm_device_queue_recheck_assume (self);
}
/**
* nm_device_slave_notify_release:
* @self: the slave device
* @reason: the reason associated with the state change
*
* Notifies a slave that it has been released, and why.
*/
static void
nm_device_slave_notify_release (NMDevice *self, NMDeviceStateReason reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
NMDeviceState new_state;
const char *master_status;
if ( reason != NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE
&& priv->state > NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED
&& priv->state <= NM_DEVICE_STATE_ACTIVATED) {
if (reason == NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_DEPENDENCY_FAILED) {
new_state = NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED;
master_status = "failed";
} else if (reason == NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_USER_REQUESTED) {
new_state = NM_DEVICE_STATE_DEACTIVATING;
master_status = "deactivated by user request";
} else {
new_state = NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED;
master_status = "deactivated";
}
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: connection '%s' master %s",
nm_connection_get_id (connection),
master_status);
nm_device_queue_state (self, new_state, reason);
} else if (priv->master)
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "released from master %s", nm_device_get_iface (priv->master));
else
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "released from master%s", priv->enslaved ? "" : " (was not enslaved)");
if (priv->enslaved) {
priv->enslaved = FALSE;
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_MASTER);
}
}
/**
* nm_device_get_enslaved:
* @self: the #NMDevice
*
* Returns: %TRUE if the device is enslaved to a master device (eg bridge or
* bond or team), %FALSE if not
*/
gboolean
nm_device_get_enslaved (NMDevice *self)
{
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->enslaved;
}
/**
* nm_device_removed:
* @self: the #NMDevice
*
* Called by the manager when the device was removed. Releases the device from
* the master in case it's enslaved.
*/
void
nm_device_removed (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->enslaved)
nm_device_release_one_slave (priv->master, self, FALSE, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_REMOVED);
}
static gboolean
is_available (NMDevice *self, NMDeviceCheckDevAvailableFlags flags)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->carrier || priv->ignore_carrier)
return TRUE;
if (NM_FLAGS_HAS (flags, NM_DEVICE_CHECK_DEV_AVAILABLE_IGNORE_CARRIER))
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
/**
* nm_device_is_available:
* @self: the #NMDevice
* @flags: additional flags to influence the check. Flags have the
* meaning to increase the availability of a device.
*
* Checks if @self would currently be capable of activating a
* connection. In particular, it checks that the device is ready (eg,
* is not missing firmware), that it has carrier (if necessary), and
* that any necessary external software (eg, ModemManager,
* wpa_supplicant) is available.
*
* @self can only be in a state higher than
* %NM_DEVICE_STATE_UNAVAILABLE when nm_device_is_available() returns
* %TRUE. (But note that it can still be %NM_DEVICE_STATE_UNMANAGED
* when it is available.)
*
* Returns: %TRUE or %FALSE
*/
gboolean
nm_device_is_available (NMDevice *self, NMDeviceCheckDevAvailableFlags flags)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->firmware_missing)
return FALSE;
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->is_available (self, flags);
}
gboolean
nm_device_get_enabled (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), FALSE);
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->get_enabled)
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->get_enabled (self);
return TRUE;
}
void
nm_device_set_enabled (NMDevice *self, gboolean enabled)
{
g_return_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self));
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->set_enabled)
NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->set_enabled (self, enabled);
}
/**
* nm_device_get_autoconnect:
* @self: the #NMDevice
*
* Returns: %TRUE if the device allows autoconnect connections, or %FALSE if the
* device is explicitly blocking all autoconnect connections. Does not take
* into account transient conditions like companion devices that may wish to
* block the device.
*/
gboolean
nm_device_get_autoconnect (NMDevice *self)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), FALSE);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self)->autoconnect;
}
static void
nm_device_set_autoconnect (NMDevice *self, gboolean autoconnect)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self));
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->autoconnect == autoconnect)
return;
if (autoconnect) {
/* Default-unmanaged devices never autoconnect */
if (!nm_device_get_default_unmanaged (self)) {
priv->autoconnect = TRUE;
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_AUTOCONNECT);
}
} else {
priv->autoconnect = FALSE;
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_AUTOCONNECT);
}
}
static gboolean
autoconnect_allowed_accumulator (GSignalInvocationHint *ihint,
GValue *return_accu,
const GValue *handler_return, gpointer data)
{
if (!g_value_get_boolean (handler_return))
g_value_set_boolean (return_accu, FALSE);
return TRUE;
}
/**
* nm_device_autoconnect_allowed:
* @self: the #NMDevice
*
* Returns: %TRUE if the device can be auto-connected immediately, taking
* transient conditions into account (like companion devices that may wish to
* block autoconnect for a time).
*/
gboolean
nm_device_autoconnect_allowed (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
GValue instance = G_VALUE_INIT;
GValue retval = G_VALUE_INIT;
if (priv->state < NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED || !priv->autoconnect)
return FALSE;
/* The 'autoconnect-allowed' signal is emitted on a device to allow
* other listeners to block autoconnect on the device if they wish.
* This is mainly used by the OLPC Mesh devices to block autoconnect
* on their companion WiFi device as they share radio resources and
* cannot be connected at the same time.
*/
g_value_init (&instance, G_TYPE_OBJECT);
g_value_set_object (&instance, self);
g_value_init (&retval, G_TYPE_BOOLEAN);
if (priv->autoconnect)
g_value_set_boolean (&retval, TRUE);
else
g_value_set_boolean (&retval, FALSE);
/* Use g_signal_emitv() rather than g_signal_emit() to avoid the return
* value being changed if no handlers are connected */
g_signal_emitv (&instance, signals[AUTOCONNECT_ALLOWED], 0, &retval);
g_value_unset (&instance);
return g_value_get_boolean (&retval);
}
static gboolean
can_auto_connect (NMDevice *self,
NMConnection *connection,
char **specific_object)
{
NMSettingConnection *s_con;
s_con = nm_connection_get_setting_connection (connection);
if (!nm_setting_connection_get_autoconnect (s_con))
return FALSE;
return nm_device_check_connection_available (self, connection, NM_DEVICE_CHECK_CON_AVAILABLE_NONE, NULL);
}
/**
* nm_device_can_auto_connect:
* @self: an #NMDevice
* @connection: a #NMConnection
* @specific_object: (out) (transfer full): on output, the path of an
* object associated with the returned connection, to be passed to
* nm_manager_activate_connection(), or %NULL.
*
* Checks if @connection can be auto-activated on @self right now.
* This requires, at a minimum, that the connection be compatible with
* @self, and that it have the #NMSettingConnection:autoconnect property
* set, and that the device allow auto connections. Some devices impose
* additional requirements. (Eg, a Wi-Fi connection can only be activated
* if its SSID was seen in the last scan.)
*
* Returns: %TRUE, if the @connection can be auto-activated.
**/
gboolean
nm_device_can_auto_connect (NMDevice *self,
NMConnection *connection,
char **specific_object)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_CONNECTION (connection), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (specific_object && !*specific_object, FALSE);
if (nm_device_autoconnect_allowed (self))
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->can_auto_connect (self, connection, specific_object);
return FALSE;
}
static gboolean
device_has_config (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
/* Check for IP configuration. */
if (priv->ip4_config && nm_ip4_config_get_num_addresses (priv->ip4_config))
return TRUE;
if (priv->ip6_config && nm_ip6_config_get_num_addresses (priv->ip6_config))
return TRUE;
/* The existence of a software device is good enough. */
if (nm_device_is_software (self))
return TRUE;
/* Slaves are also configured by definition */
if (nm_platform_link_get_master (priv->ifindex) > 0)
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
/**
* nm_device_master_update_slave_connection:
* @self: the master #NMDevice
* @slave: the slave #NMDevice
* @connection: the #NMConnection to update with the slave settings
* @GError: (out): error description
*
* Reads the slave configuration for @slave and updates @connection with those
* properties. This invokes a virtual function on the master device @self.
*
* Returns: %TRUE if the configuration was read and @connection updated,
* %FALSE on failure.
*/
gboolean
nm_device_master_update_slave_connection (NMDevice *self,
NMDevice *slave,
NMConnection *connection,
GError **error)
{
NMDeviceClass *klass;
gboolean success;
g_return_val_if_fail (self, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (slave, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (connection, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (!error || !*error, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (nm_connection_get_setting_connection (connection), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (nm_device_get_iface (self), FALSE);
klass = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self);
if (klass->master_update_slave_connection) {
success = klass->master_update_slave_connection (self, slave, connection, error);
g_return_val_if_fail (!error || (success && !*error) || *error, success);
return success;
}
g_set_error (error,
NM_DEVICE_ERROR,
NM_DEVICE_ERROR_FAILED,
"master device '%s' cannot update a slave connection for slave device '%s' (master type not supported?)",
nm_device_get_iface (self), nm_device_get_iface (slave));
return FALSE;
}
NMConnection *
nm_device_generate_connection (NMDevice *self, NMDevice *master)
{
NMDeviceClass *klass = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
const char *ifname = nm_device_get_iface (self);
NMConnection *connection;
NMSetting *s_con;
NMSetting *s_ip4;
NMSetting *s_ip6;
gs_free char *uuid = NULL;
const char *ip4_method, *ip6_method;
GError *error = NULL;
/* If update_connection() is not implemented, just fail. */
if (!klass->update_connection)
return NULL;
/* Return NULL if device is unconfigured. */
if (!device_has_config (self)) {
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "device has no existing configuration");
return NULL;
}
connection = nm_simple_connection_new ();
s_con = nm_setting_connection_new ();
uuid = nm_utils_uuid_generate ();
g_object_set (s_con,
NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_UUID, uuid,
NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_ID, ifname,
NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_AUTOCONNECT, FALSE,
NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_INTERFACE_NAME, ifname,
NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_TIMESTAMP, (guint64) time (NULL),
NULL);
if (klass->connection_type)
g_object_set (s_con, NM_SETTING_CONNECTION_TYPE, klass->connection_type, NULL);
nm_connection_add_setting (connection, s_con);
/* If the device is a slave, update various slave settings */
if (master) {
if (!nm_device_master_update_slave_connection (master,
self,
connection,
&error))
{
_LOGE (LOGD_DEVICE, "master device '%s' failed to update slave connection: %s",
nm_device_get_iface (master), error ? error->message : "(unknown error)");
g_error_free (error);
g_object_unref (connection);
return NULL;
}
} else {
/* Only regular and master devices get IP configuration; slaves do not */
s_ip4 = nm_ip4_config_create_setting (priv->ip4_config);
nm_connection_add_setting (connection, s_ip4);
s_ip6 = nm_ip6_config_create_setting (priv->ip6_config);
nm_connection_add_setting (connection, s_ip6);
}
klass->update_connection (self, connection);
/* Check the connection in case of update_connection() bug. */
if (!nm_connection_verify (connection, &error)) {
_LOGE (LOGD_DEVICE, "Generated connection does not verify: %s", error->message);
g_clear_error (&error);
g_object_unref (connection);
return NULL;
}
/* Ignore the connection if it has no IP configuration,
* no slave configuration, and is not a master interface.
*/
ip4_method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG);
ip6_method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG);
if ( g_strcmp0 (ip4_method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_DISABLED) == 0
&& g_strcmp0 (ip6_method, NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_IGNORE) == 0
&& !nm_setting_connection_get_master (NM_SETTING_CONNECTION (s_con))
&& !priv->slaves) {
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "ignoring generated connection (no IP and not in master-slave relationship)");
g_object_unref (connection);
connection = NULL;
}
return connection;
}
gboolean
nm_device_complete_connection (NMDevice *self,
NMConnection *connection,
const char *specific_object,
const GSList *existing_connections,
GError **error)
{
gboolean success = FALSE;
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (connection != NULL, FALSE);
if (!NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->complete_connection) {
g_set_error (error, NM_DEVICE_ERROR, NM_DEVICE_ERROR_INVALID_CONNECTION,
"Device class %s had no complete_connection method",
G_OBJECT_TYPE_NAME (self));
return FALSE;
}
success = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->complete_connection (self,
connection,
specific_object,
existing_connections,
error);
if (success)
success = nm_connection_verify (connection, error);
return success;
}
static gboolean
check_connection_compatible (NMDevice *self, NMConnection *connection)
{
NMSettingConnection *s_con;
const char *config_iface, *device_iface;
s_con = nm_connection_get_setting_connection (connection);
g_assert (s_con);
config_iface = nm_setting_connection_get_interface_name (s_con);
device_iface = nm_device_get_iface (self);
if (config_iface && strcmp (config_iface, device_iface) != 0)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
/**
* nm_device_check_connection_compatible:
* @self: an #NMDevice
* @connection: an #NMConnection
*
* Checks if @connection could potentially be activated on @self.
* This means only that @self has the proper capabilities, and that
* @connection is not locked to some other device. It does not
* necessarily mean that @connection could be activated on @self
* right now. (Eg, it might refer to a Wi-Fi network that is not
* currently available.)
*
* Returns: #TRUE if @connection could potentially be activated on
* @self.
*/
gboolean
nm_device_check_connection_compatible (NMDevice *self, NMConnection *connection)
{
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self), FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (NM_IS_CONNECTION (connection), FALSE);
return NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->check_connection_compatible (self, connection);
}
/**
* nm_device_can_assume_connections:
* @self: #NMDevice instance
*
* This is a convenience function to determine whether connection assumption
* is available for this device.
*
* Returns: %TRUE if the device is capable of assuming connections, %FALSE if not
*/
static gboolean
nm_device_can_assume_connections (NMDevice *self)
{
return !!NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->update_connection;
}
/**
* nm_device_can_assume_active_connection:
* @self: #NMDevice instance
*
* This is a convenience function to determine whether the device's active
* connection can be assumed if NetworkManager restarts. This method returns
* %TRUE if and only if the device can assume connections, and the device has
* an active connection, and that active connection can be assumed.
*
* Returns: %TRUE if the device's active connection can be assumed, or %FALSE
* if there is no active connection or the active connection cannot be
* assumed.
*/
gboolean
nm_device_can_assume_active_connection (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
const char *method;
const char *assumable_ip6_methods[] = {
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_IGNORE,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_AUTO,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_DHCP,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_LINK_LOCAL,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_MANUAL,
NULL
};
const char *assumable_ip4_methods[] = {
NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_DISABLED,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_AUTO,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_MANUAL,
NULL
};
if (!nm_device_can_assume_connections (self))
return FALSE;
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
if (!connection)
return FALSE;
/* Can't assume connections that aren't yet configured
* FIXME: what about bridges/bonds waiting for slaves?
*/
if (priv->state < NM_DEVICE_STATE_IP_CONFIG)
return FALSE;
if (priv->ip4_state != IP_DONE && priv->ip6_state != IP_DONE)
return FALSE;
method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG);
if (!_nm_utils_string_in_list (method, assumable_ip6_methods))
return FALSE;
method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG);
if (!_nm_utils_string_in_list (method, assumable_ip4_methods))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
static gboolean
nm_device_emit_recheck_assume (gpointer self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
priv->recheck_assume_id = 0;
if (!nm_device_get_act_request (self)) {
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "emit RECHECK_ASSUME signal");
g_signal_emit (self, signals[RECHECK_ASSUME], 0);
}
return G_SOURCE_REMOVE;
}
void
nm_device_queue_recheck_assume (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (nm_device_can_assume_connections (self) && !priv->recheck_assume_id)
priv->recheck_assume_id = g_idle_add (nm_device_emit_recheck_assume, self);
}
void
nm_device_emit_recheck_auto_activate (NMDevice *self)
{
g_signal_emit (self, signals[RECHECK_AUTO_ACTIVATE], 0);
}
static void
dnsmasq_state_changed_cb (NMDnsMasqManager *manager, guint32 status, gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
switch (status) {
case NM_DNSMASQ_STATUS_DEAD:
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_SHARED_START_FAILED);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
static void
activation_source_clear (NMDevice *self, gboolean remove_source, int family)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
guint *act_source_id;
gpointer *act_source_func;
if (family == AF_INET6) {
act_source_id = &priv->act_source6_id;
act_source_func = &priv->act_source6_func;
} else {
act_source_id = &priv->act_source_id;
act_source_func = &priv->act_source_func;
}
if (*act_source_id) {
if (remove_source)
g_source_remove (*act_source_id);
*act_source_id = 0;
*act_source_func = NULL;
}
}
static void
activation_source_schedule (NMDevice *self, GSourceFunc func, int family)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
guint *act_source_id;
gpointer *act_source_func;
if (family == AF_INET6) {
act_source_id = &priv->act_source6_id;
act_source_func = &priv->act_source6_func;
} else {
act_source_id = &priv->act_source_id;
act_source_func = &priv->act_source_func;
}
if (*act_source_id)
_LOGE (LOGD_DEVICE, "activation stage already scheduled");
/* Don't bother rescheduling the same function that's about to
* run anyway. Fixes issues with crappy wireless drivers sending
* streams of associate events before NM has had a chance to process
* the first one.
*/
if (!*act_source_id || (*act_source_func != func)) {
activation_source_clear (self, TRUE, family);
*act_source_id = g_idle_add (func, self);
*act_source_func = func;
}
}
static gboolean
get_ip_config_may_fail (NMDevice *self, int family)
{
NMConnection *connection;
NMSettingIPConfig *s_ip = NULL;
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, TRUE);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
g_assert (connection);
/* Fail the connection if the failed IP method is required to complete */
switch (family) {
case AF_INET:
s_ip = nm_connection_get_setting_ip4_config (connection);
break;
case AF_INET6:
s_ip = nm_connection_get_setting_ip6_config (connection);
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
return nm_setting_ip_config_get_may_fail (s_ip);
}
static void
master_ready_cb (NMActiveConnection *active,
GParamSpec *pspec,
NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMActiveConnection *master;
g_assert (priv->state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_PREPARE);
/* Notify a master device that it has a new slave */
g_assert (nm_active_connection_get_master_ready (active));
master = nm_active_connection_get_master (active);
priv->master = g_object_ref (nm_active_connection_get_device (master));
nm_device_master_add_slave (priv->master,
self,
nm_active_connection_get_assumed (active) ? FALSE : TRUE);
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "master connection ready; master device %s",
nm_device_get_iface (priv->master));
if (priv->master_ready_id) {
g_signal_handler_disconnect (active, priv->master_ready_id);
priv->master_ready_id = 0;
}
nm_device_activate_schedule_stage2_device_config (self);
}
static NMActStageReturn
act_stage1_prepare (NMDevice *self, NMDeviceStateReason *reason)
{
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS;
}
/*
* nm_device_activate_stage1_device_prepare
*
* Prepare for device activation
*
*/
static gboolean
nm_device_activate_stage1_device_prepare (gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMActStageReturn ret = NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS;
NMDeviceStateReason reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE;
NMActiveConnection *active = NM_ACTIVE_CONNECTION (priv->act_request);
/* Clear the activation source ID now that this stage has run */
activation_source_clear (self, FALSE, 0);
priv->ip4_state = priv->ip6_state = IP_NONE;
/* Notify the new ActiveConnection along with the state change */
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_ACTIVE_CONNECTION);
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: Stage 1 of 5 (Device Prepare) started...");
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_PREPARE, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE);
/* Assumed connections were already set up outside NetworkManager */
if (!nm_active_connection_get_assumed (active)) {
ret = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->act_stage1_prepare (self, &reason);
if (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_POSTPONE) {
goto out;
} else if (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE) {
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, reason);
goto out;
}
g_assert (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS);
}
if (nm_active_connection_get_master (active)) {
/* If the master connection is ready for slaves, attach ourselves */
if (nm_active_connection_get_master_ready (active))
master_ready_cb (active, NULL, self);
else {
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "waiting for master connection to become ready");
/* Attach a signal handler and wait for the master connection to begin activating */
g_assert (priv->master_ready_id == 0);
priv->master_ready_id = g_signal_connect (active,
"notify::" NM_ACTIVE_CONNECTION_INT_MASTER_READY,
(GCallback) master_ready_cb,
self);
/* Postpone */
}
} else
nm_device_activate_schedule_stage2_device_config (self);
out:
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: Stage 1 of 5 (Device Prepare) complete.");
return FALSE;
}
/*
* nm_device_activate_schedule_stage1_device_prepare
*
* Prepare a device for activation
*
*/
void
nm_device_activate_schedule_stage1_device_prepare (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self));
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_return_if_fail (priv->act_request);
activation_source_schedule (self, nm_device_activate_stage1_device_prepare, 0);
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: Stage 1 of 5 (Device Prepare) scheduled...");
}
static NMActStageReturn
act_stage2_config (NMDevice *self, NMDeviceStateReason *reason)
{
/* Nothing to do */
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS;
}
/*
* nm_device_activate_stage2_device_config
*
* Determine device parameters and set those on the device, ie
* for wireless devices, set SSID, keys, etc.
*
*/
static gboolean
nm_device_activate_stage2_device_config (gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMActStageReturn ret;
NMDeviceStateReason reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE;
gboolean no_firmware = FALSE;
NMActiveConnection *active = NM_ACTIVE_CONNECTION (priv->act_request);
GSList *iter;
/* Clear the activation source ID now that this stage has run */
activation_source_clear (self, FALSE, 0);
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: Stage 2 of 5 (Device Configure) starting...");
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_CONFIG, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE);
/* Assumed connections were already set up outside NetworkManager */
if (!nm_active_connection_get_assumed (active)) {
if (!nm_device_bring_up (self, FALSE, &no_firmware)) {
if (no_firmware)
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_FIRMWARE_MISSING);
else
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_CONFIG_FAILED);
goto out;
}
ret = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->act_stage2_config (self, &reason);
if (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_POSTPONE)
goto out;
else if (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE) {
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, reason);
goto out;
}
g_assert (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS);
}
/* If we have slaves that aren't yet enslaved, do that now */
for (iter = priv->slaves; iter; iter = g_slist_next (iter)) {
SlaveInfo *info = iter->data;
NMDeviceState slave_state = nm_device_get_state (info->slave);
if (slave_state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_IP_CONFIG)
nm_device_enslave_slave (self, info->slave, nm_device_get_connection (info->slave));
else if ( nm_device_uses_generated_assumed_connection (self)
&& slave_state <= NM_DEVICE_STATE_DISCONNECTED)
nm_device_queue_recheck_assume (info->slave);
}
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: Stage 2 of 5 (Device Configure) successful.");
nm_device_activate_schedule_stage3_ip_config_start (self);
out:
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: Stage 2 of 5 (Device Configure) complete.");
return FALSE;
}
/*
* nm_device_activate_schedule_stage2_device_config
*
* Schedule setup of the hardware device
*
*/
void
nm_device_activate_schedule_stage2_device_config (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv;
g_return_if_fail (NM_IS_DEVICE (self));
priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_return_if_fail (priv->act_request);
activation_source_schedule (self, nm_device_activate_stage2_device_config, 0);
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE, "Activation: Stage 2 of 5 (Device Configure) scheduled...");
}
/*********************************************/
/* avahi-autoipd stuff */
static void
aipd_timeout_remove (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->aipd_timeout) {
g_source_remove (priv->aipd_timeout);
priv->aipd_timeout = 0;
}
}
static void
aipd_cleanup (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->aipd_watch) {
g_source_remove (priv->aipd_watch);
priv->aipd_watch = 0;
}
if (priv->aipd_pid > 0) {
nm_utils_kill_child_sync (priv->aipd_pid, SIGKILL, LOGD_AUTOIP4, "avahi-autoipd", NULL, 0, 0);
priv->aipd_pid = -1;
}
aipd_timeout_remove (self);
}
static NMIP4Config *
aipd_get_ip4_config (NMDevice *self, guint32 lla)
{
NMIP4Config *config = NULL;
NMPlatformIP4Address address;
NMPlatformIP4Route route;
config = nm_ip4_config_new (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self));
g_assert (config);
memset (&address, 0, sizeof (address));
address.address = lla;
address.plen = 16;
address.source = NM_IP_CONFIG_SOURCE_IP4LL;
nm_ip4_config_add_address (config, &address);
/* Add a multicast route for link-local connections: destination= 224.0.0.0, netmask=240.0.0.0 */
memset (&route, 0, sizeof (route));
route.network = htonl (0xE0000000L);
route.plen = 4;
route.source = NM_IP_CONFIG_SOURCE_IP4LL;
route.metric = nm_device_get_ip4_route_metric (self);
nm_ip4_config_add_route (config, &route);
return config;
}
#define IPV4LL_NETWORK (htonl (0xA9FE0000L))
#define IPV4LL_NETMASK (htonl (0xFFFF0000L))
void
nm_device_handle_autoip4_event (NMDevice *self,
const char *event,
const char *address)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection = NULL;
const char *method;
NMDeviceStateReason reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE;
g_return_if_fail (event != NULL);
if (priv->act_request == NULL)
return;
connection = nm_act_request_get_connection (priv->act_request);
g_assert (connection);
/* Ignore if the connection isn't an AutoIP connection */
method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG);
if (g_strcmp0 (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_LINK_LOCAL) != 0)
return;
if (strcmp (event, "BIND") == 0) {
guint32 lla;
NMIP4Config *config;
if (inet_pton (AF_INET, address, &lla) <= 0) {
_LOGE (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "invalid address %s received from avahi-autoipd.", address);
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_AUTOIP_ERROR);
return;
}
if ((lla & IPV4LL_NETMASK) != IPV4LL_NETWORK) {
_LOGE (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "invalid address %s received from avahi-autoipd (not link-local).", address);
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_AUTOIP_ERROR);
return;
}
config = aipd_get_ip4_config (self, lla);
if (config == NULL) {
_LOGE (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "failed to get autoip config");
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_IP_CONFIG_UNAVAILABLE);
return;
}
if (priv->ip4_state == IP_CONF) {
aipd_timeout_remove (self);
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip4_config_result (self, config);
} else if (priv->ip4_state == IP_DONE) {
if (!ip4_config_merge_and_apply (self, config, TRUE, &reason)) {
_LOGE (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "failed to update IP4 config for autoip change.");
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, reason);
}
} else
g_assert_not_reached ();
g_object_unref (config);
} else {
_LOGW (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "autoip address %s no longer valid because '%s'.", address, event);
/* The address is gone; terminate the connection or fail activation */
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_IP_CONFIG_EXPIRED);
}
}
static void
aipd_watch_cb (GPid pid, gint status, gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMDeviceState state;
if (!priv->aipd_watch)
return;
priv->aipd_watch = 0;
if (WIFEXITED (status))
_LOGD (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "avahi-autoipd exited with error code %d", WEXITSTATUS (status));
else if (WIFSTOPPED (status))
_LOGW (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "avahi-autoipd stopped unexpectedly with signal %d", WSTOPSIG (status));
else if (WIFSIGNALED (status))
_LOGW (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "avahi-autoipd died with signal %d", WTERMSIG (status));
else
_LOGW (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "avahi-autoipd died from an unknown cause");
aipd_cleanup (self);
state = nm_device_get_state (self);
if (nm_device_is_activating (self) || (state == NM_DEVICE_STATE_ACTIVATED))
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_AUTOIP_FAILED);
}
static gboolean
aipd_timeout_cb (gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->aipd_timeout) {
_LOGI (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "avahi-autoipd timed out.");
priv->aipd_timeout = 0;
aipd_cleanup (self);
if (priv->ip4_state == IP_CONF)
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip4_config_timeout (self);
}
return FALSE;
}
/* default to installed helper, but can be modified for testing */
const char *nm_device_autoipd_helper_path = LIBEXECDIR "/nm-avahi-autoipd.action";
static NMActStageReturn
aipd_start (NMDevice *self, NMDeviceStateReason *reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
const char *argv[6];
char *cmdline;
const char *aipd_binary;
int i = 0;
GError *error = NULL;
aipd_cleanup (self);
/* Find avahi-autoipd */
aipd_binary = nm_utils_find_helper ("avahi-autoipd", NULL, NULL);
if (!aipd_binary) {
_LOGW (LOGD_DEVICE | LOGD_AUTOIP4,
"Activation: Stage 3 of 5 (IP Configure Start) failed"
" to start avahi-autoipd: not found");
*reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_AUTOIP_START_FAILED;
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE;
}
argv[i++] = aipd_binary;
argv[i++] = "--script";
argv[i++] = nm_device_autoipd_helper_path;
if (nm_logging_enabled (LOGL_DEBUG, LOGD_AUTOIP4))
argv[i++] = "--debug";
argv[i++] = nm_device_get_ip_iface (self);
argv[i++] = NULL;
cmdline = g_strjoinv (" ", (char **) argv);
_LOGD (LOGD_AUTOIP4, "running: %s", cmdline);
g_free (cmdline);
if (!g_spawn_async ("/", (char **) argv, NULL, G_SPAWN_DO_NOT_REAP_CHILD,
nm_utils_setpgid, NULL, &(priv->aipd_pid), &error)) {
_LOGW (LOGD_DEVICE | LOGD_AUTOIP4,
"Activation: Stage 3 of 5 (IP Configure Start) failed"
" to start avahi-autoipd: %s",
error && error->message ? error->message : "(unknown)");
g_clear_error (&error);
aipd_cleanup (self);
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE;
}
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE | LOGD_AUTOIP4,
"Activation: Stage 3 of 5 (IP Configure Start) started"
" avahi-autoipd...");
/* Monitor the child process so we know when it dies */
priv->aipd_watch = g_child_watch_add (priv->aipd_pid, aipd_watch_cb, self);
/* Start a timeout to bound the address attempt */
priv->aipd_timeout = g_timeout_add_seconds (20, aipd_timeout_cb, self);
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_POSTPONE;
}
/*********************************************/
static gboolean
_device_get_default_route_from_platform (NMDevice *self, int addr_family, NMPlatformIPRoute *out_route)
{
gboolean success = FALSE;
int ifindex = nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self);
GArray *routes;
if (addr_family == AF_INET)
routes = nm_platform_ip4_route_get_all (ifindex, NM_PLATFORM_GET_ROUTE_MODE_ONLY_DEFAULT);
else
routes = nm_platform_ip6_route_get_all (ifindex, NM_PLATFORM_GET_ROUTE_MODE_ONLY_DEFAULT);
if (routes) {
guint route_metric = G_MAXUINT32, m;
const NMPlatformIPRoute *route = NULL, *r;
guint i;
/* if there are several default routes, find the one with the best metric */
for (i = 0; i < routes->len; i++) {
if (addr_family == AF_INET) {
r = (const NMPlatformIPRoute *) &g_array_index (routes, NMPlatformIP4Route, i);
m = r->metric;
} else {
r = (const NMPlatformIPRoute *) &g_array_index (routes, NMPlatformIP6Route, i);
m = nm_utils_ip6_route_metric_normalize (r->metric);
}
if (!route || m < route_metric) {
route = r;
route_metric = m;
}
}
if (route) {
if (addr_family == AF_INET)
*((NMPlatformIP4Route *) out_route) = *((NMPlatformIP4Route *) route);
else
*((NMPlatformIP6Route *) out_route) = *((NMPlatformIP6Route *) route);
success = TRUE;
}
g_array_free (routes, TRUE);
}
return success;
}
/*********************************************/
static void
ensure_con_ipx_config (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
int ip_ifindex = nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self);
NMConnection *connection;
g_assert (!!priv->con_ip4_config == !!priv->con_ip6_config);
if (priv->con_ip4_config)
return;
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
if (!connection)
return;
priv->con_ip4_config = nm_ip4_config_new (ip_ifindex);
priv->con_ip6_config = nm_ip6_config_new (ip_ifindex);
nm_ip4_config_merge_setting (priv->con_ip4_config,
nm_connection_get_setting_ip4_config (connection),
nm_device_get_ip4_route_metric (self));
nm_ip6_config_merge_setting (priv->con_ip6_config,
nm_connection_get_setting_ip6_config (connection),
nm_device_get_ip6_route_metric (self));
if (nm_device_uses_assumed_connection (self)) {
/* For assumed connections ignore all addresses and routes. */
nm_ip4_config_reset_addresses (priv->con_ip4_config);
nm_ip4_config_reset_routes (priv->con_ip4_config);
nm_ip6_config_reset_addresses (priv->con_ip6_config);
nm_ip6_config_reset_routes (priv->con_ip6_config);
}
}
/*********************************************/
/* DHCPv4 stuff */
static void
dhcp4_cleanup (NMDevice *self, gboolean stop, gboolean release)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->dhcp4_client) {
/* Stop any ongoing DHCP transaction on this device */
if (priv->dhcp4_state_sigid) {
g_signal_handler_disconnect (priv->dhcp4_client, priv->dhcp4_state_sigid);
priv->dhcp4_state_sigid = 0;
}
nm_device_remove_pending_action (self, PENDING_ACTION_DHCP4, FALSE);
if (stop)
nm_dhcp_client_stop (priv->dhcp4_client, release);
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp4_client);
}
if (priv->dhcp4_config) {
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp4_config);
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_DHCP4_CONFIG);
}
}
static gboolean
ip4_config_merge_and_apply (NMDevice *self,
NMIP4Config *config,
gboolean commit,
NMDeviceStateReason *out_reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
gboolean success;
NMIP4Config *composite;
gboolean has_direct_route;
const guint32 default_route_metric = nm_device_get_ip4_route_metric (self);
guint32 gateway;
/* Merge all the configs into the composite config */
if (config) {
g_clear_object (&priv->dev_ip4_config);
priv->dev_ip4_config = g_object_ref (config);
}
composite = nm_ip4_config_new (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self));
ensure_con_ipx_config (self);
if (priv->dev_ip4_config)
nm_ip4_config_merge (composite, priv->dev_ip4_config);
if (priv->vpn4_config)
nm_ip4_config_merge (composite, priv->vpn4_config);
if (priv->ext_ip4_config)
nm_ip4_config_merge (composite, priv->ext_ip4_config);
/* Merge WWAN config *last* to ensure modem-given settings overwrite
* any external stuff set by pppd or other scripts.
*/
if (priv->wwan_ip4_config)
nm_ip4_config_merge (composite, priv->wwan_ip4_config);
/* Merge user overrides into the composite config. For assumed connection,
* con_ip4_config is empty. */
if (priv->con_ip4_config)
nm_ip4_config_merge (composite, priv->con_ip4_config);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
/* Add the default route.
*
* We keep track of the default route of a device in a private field.
* NMDevice needs to know the default route at this point, because the gateway
* might require a direct route (see below).
*
* But also, we don't want to add the default route to priv->ip4_config,
* because the default route from the setting might not be the same that
* NMDefaultRouteManager eventually configures (because the it might
* tweak the effective metric).
*/
/* unless we come to a different conclusion below, we have no default route and
* the route is assumed. */
priv->default_route.v4_has = FALSE;
priv->default_route.v4_is_assumed = TRUE;
if (!commit) {
/* during a non-commit event, we always pickup whatever is configured. */
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
}
if (nm_device_uses_assumed_connection (self))
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
/* we are about to commit (for a non-assumed connection). Enforce whatever we have
* configured. */
priv->default_route.v4_is_assumed = FALSE;
if ( !connection
|| !nm_default_route_manager_ip4_connection_has_default_route (nm_default_route_manager_get (), connection))
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
if (!nm_ip4_config_get_num_addresses (composite)) {
/* without addresses we can have no default route. */
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
}
gateway = nm_ip4_config_get_gateway (composite);
if ( !gateway
&& nm_device_get_device_type (self) != NM_DEVICE_TYPE_MODEM)
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
has_direct_route = ( gateway == 0
|| nm_ip4_config_get_subnet_for_host (composite, gateway)
|| nm_ip4_config_get_direct_route_for_host (composite, gateway));
priv->default_route.v4_has = TRUE;
memset (&priv->default_route.v4, 0, sizeof (priv->default_route.v4));
priv->default_route.v4.source = NM_IP_CONFIG_SOURCE_USER;
priv->default_route.v4.gateway = gateway;
priv->default_route.v4.metric = default_route_metric;
priv->default_route.v4.mss = nm_ip4_config_get_mss (composite);
if (!has_direct_route) {
NMPlatformIP4Route r = priv->default_route.v4;
/* add a direct route to the gateway */
r.network = gateway;
r.plen = 32;
r.gateway = 0;
nm_ip4_config_add_route (composite, &r);
}
END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE:
if (priv->default_route.v4_is_assumed) {
/* If above does not explicitly assign a default route, we always pick up the
* default route based on what is currently configured.
* That means that even managed connections with never-default, can
* get a default route (if configured externally).
*/
priv->default_route.v4_has = _device_get_default_route_from_platform (self, AF_INET, (NMPlatformIPRoute *) &priv->default_route.v4);
}
/* Allow setting MTU etc */
if (commit) {
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->ip4_config_pre_commit)
NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->ip4_config_pre_commit (self, composite);
}
success = nm_device_set_ip4_config (self, composite, default_route_metric, commit, out_reason);
g_object_unref (composite);
return success;
}
static void
dhcp4_lease_change (NMDevice *self, NMIP4Config *config)
{
NMDeviceStateReason reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE;
g_return_if_fail (config != NULL);
if (!ip4_config_merge_and_apply (self, config, TRUE, &reason)) {
_LOGW (LOGD_DHCP4, "failed to update IPv4 config for DHCP change.");
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, reason);
} else {
/* Notify dispatcher scripts of new DHCP4 config */
nm_dispatcher_call (DISPATCHER_ACTION_DHCP4_CHANGE,
nm_device_get_connection (self),
self,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL);
}
}
static void
dhcp4_fail (NMDevice *self, gboolean timeout)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
dhcp4_cleanup (self, TRUE, FALSE);
if (timeout || (priv->ip4_state == IP_CONF))
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip4_config_timeout (self);
else if (priv->ip4_state == IP_DONE)
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_IP_CONFIG_EXPIRED);
else
g_warn_if_reached ();
}
static void
dhcp4_update_config (NMDevice *self, NMDhcp4Config *config, GHashTable *options)
{
GHashTableIter iter;
const char *key, *value;
/* Update the DHCP4 config object with new DHCP options */
nm_dhcp4_config_reset (config);
g_hash_table_iter_init (&iter, options);
while (g_hash_table_iter_next (&iter, (gpointer) &key, (gpointer) &value))
nm_dhcp4_config_add_option (config, key, value);
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_DHCP4_CONFIG);
}
static void
dhcp4_state_changed (NMDhcpClient *client,
NMDhcpState state,
NMIP4Config *ip4_config,
GHashTable *options,
gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_return_if_fail (nm_dhcp_client_get_ipv6 (client) == FALSE);
g_return_if_fail (!ip4_config || NM_IS_IP4_CONFIG (ip4_config));
_LOGD (LOGD_DHCP4, "new DHCPv4 client state %d", state);
switch (state) {
case NM_DHCP_STATE_BOUND:
if (!ip4_config) {
_LOGW (LOGD_DHCP4, "failed to get IPv4 config in response to DHCP event.");
nm_device_state_changed (self,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED,
NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_IP_CONFIG_UNAVAILABLE);
break;
}
dhcp4_update_config (self, priv->dhcp4_config, options);
if (priv->ip4_state == IP_CONF)
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip4_config_result (self, ip4_config);
else if (priv->ip4_state == IP_DONE)
dhcp4_lease_change (self, ip4_config);
break;
case NM_DHCP_STATE_TIMEOUT:
dhcp4_fail (self, TRUE);
break;
case NM_DHCP_STATE_EXPIRE:
/* Ignore expiry before we even have a lease (NAK, old lease, etc) */
if (priv->ip4_state == IP_CONF)
break;
/* Fall through */
case NM_DHCP_STATE_DONE:
case NM_DHCP_STATE_FAIL:
dhcp4_fail (self, FALSE);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
static NMActStageReturn
dhcp4_start (NMDevice *self,
NMConnection *connection,
NMDeviceStateReason *reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMSettingIPConfig *s_ip4;
const guint8 *hw_addr;
size_t hw_addr_len = 0;
GByteArray *tmp = NULL;
s_ip4 = nm_connection_get_setting_ip4_config (connection);
/* Clear old exported DHCP options */
if (priv->dhcp4_config)
g_object_unref (priv->dhcp4_config);
priv->dhcp4_config = nm_dhcp4_config_new ();
hw_addr = nm_platform_link_get_address (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self), &hw_addr_len);
if (hw_addr_len) {
tmp = g_byte_array_sized_new (hw_addr_len);
g_byte_array_append (tmp, hw_addr, hw_addr_len);
}
/* Begin DHCP on the interface */
g_warn_if_fail (priv->dhcp4_client == NULL);
priv->dhcp4_client = nm_dhcp_manager_start_ip4 (nm_dhcp_manager_get (),
nm_device_get_ip_iface (self),
nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self),
tmp,
nm_connection_get_uuid (connection),
nm_device_get_ip4_route_metric (self),
nm_setting_ip_config_get_dhcp_send_hostname (s_ip4),
nm_setting_ip_config_get_dhcp_hostname (s_ip4),
nm_setting_ip4_config_get_dhcp_client_id (NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG (s_ip4)),
priv->dhcp_timeout,
priv->dhcp_anycast_address,
NULL);
if (tmp)
g_byte_array_free (tmp, TRUE);
if (!priv->dhcp4_client) {
*reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_DHCP_START_FAILED;
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE;
}
priv->dhcp4_state_sigid = g_signal_connect (priv->dhcp4_client,
NM_DHCP_CLIENT_SIGNAL_STATE_CHANGED,
G_CALLBACK (dhcp4_state_changed),
self);
nm_device_add_pending_action (self, PENDING_ACTION_DHCP4, TRUE);
/* DHCP devices will be notified by the DHCP manager when stuff happens */
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_POSTPONE;
}
gboolean
nm_device_dhcp4_renew (NMDevice *self, gboolean release)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMActStageReturn ret;
NMDeviceStateReason reason;
NMConnection *connection;
g_return_val_if_fail (priv->dhcp4_client != NULL, FALSE);
_LOGI (LOGD_DHCP4, "DHCPv4 lease renewal requested");
/* Terminate old DHCP instance and release the old lease */
dhcp4_cleanup (self, TRUE, release);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
g_assert (connection);
/* Start DHCP again on the interface */
ret = dhcp4_start (self, connection, &reason);
return (ret != NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE);
}
/*********************************************/
static GHashTable *shared_ips = NULL;
static void
release_shared_ip (gpointer data)
{
g_hash_table_remove (shared_ips, data);
}
static gboolean
reserve_shared_ip (NMDevice *self, NMSettingIPConfig *s_ip4, NMPlatformIP4Address *address)
{
if (G_UNLIKELY (shared_ips == NULL))
shared_ips = g_hash_table_new (g_direct_hash, g_direct_equal);
memset (address, 0, sizeof (*address));
if (s_ip4 && nm_setting_ip_config_get_num_addresses (s_ip4)) {
/* Use the first user-supplied address */
NMIPAddress *user = nm_setting_ip_config_get_address (s_ip4, 0);
g_assert (user);
nm_ip_address_get_address_binary (user, &address->address);
address->plen = nm_ip_address_get_prefix (user);
} else {
/* Find an unused address in the 10.42.x.x range */
guint32 start = (guint32) ntohl (0x0a2a0001); /* 10.42.0.1 */
guint32 count = 0;
while (g_hash_table_lookup (shared_ips, GUINT_TO_POINTER (start + count))) {
count += ntohl (0x100);
if (count > ntohl (0xFE00)) {
_LOGE (LOGD_SHARING, "ran out of shared IP addresses!");
return FALSE;
}
}
address->address = start + count;
address->plen = 24;
g_hash_table_insert (shared_ips,
GUINT_TO_POINTER (address->address),
GUINT_TO_POINTER (TRUE));
}
return TRUE;
}
static NMIP4Config *
shared4_new_config (NMDevice *self, NMConnection *connection, NMDeviceStateReason *reason)
{
NMIP4Config *config = NULL;
NMPlatformIP4Address address;
g_return_val_if_fail (self != NULL, NULL);
if (!reserve_shared_ip (self, nm_connection_get_setting_ip4_config (connection), &address)) {
*reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_IP_CONFIG_UNAVAILABLE;
return NULL;
}
config = nm_ip4_config_new (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self));
address.source = NM_IP_CONFIG_SOURCE_SHARED;
nm_ip4_config_add_address (config, &address);
/* Remove the address lock when the object gets disposed */
g_object_set_data_full (G_OBJECT (config), "shared-ip",
GUINT_TO_POINTER (address.address),
release_shared_ip);
return config;
}
/*********************************************/
static gboolean
connection_ip4_method_requires_carrier (NMConnection *connection,
gboolean *out_ip4_enabled)
{
const char *method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG);
static const char *ip4_carrier_methods[] = {
NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_AUTO,
NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_LINK_LOCAL,
NULL
};
if (out_ip4_enabled)
*out_ip4_enabled = !!strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_DISABLED);
return _nm_utils_string_in_list (method, ip4_carrier_methods);
}
static gboolean
connection_ip6_method_requires_carrier (NMConnection *connection,
gboolean *out_ip6_enabled)
{
const char *method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG);
static const char *ip6_carrier_methods[] = {
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_AUTO,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_DHCP,
NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_LINK_LOCAL,
NULL
};
if (out_ip6_enabled)
*out_ip6_enabled = !!strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_IGNORE);
return _nm_utils_string_in_list (method, ip6_carrier_methods);
}
static gboolean
connection_requires_carrier (NMConnection *connection)
{
NMSettingIPConfig *s_ip4, *s_ip6;
gboolean ip4_carrier_wanted, ip6_carrier_wanted;
gboolean ip4_used = FALSE, ip6_used = FALSE;
ip4_carrier_wanted = connection_ip4_method_requires_carrier (connection, &ip4_used);
if (ip4_carrier_wanted) {
/* If IPv4 wants a carrier and cannot fail, the whole connection
* requires a carrier regardless of the IPv6 method.
*/
s_ip4 = nm_connection_get_setting_ip4_config (connection);
if (s_ip4 && !nm_setting_ip_config_get_may_fail (s_ip4))
return TRUE;
}
ip6_carrier_wanted = connection_ip6_method_requires_carrier (connection, &ip6_used);
if (ip6_carrier_wanted) {
/* If IPv6 wants a carrier and cannot fail, the whole connection
* requires a carrier regardless of the IPv4 method.
*/
s_ip6 = nm_connection_get_setting_ip6_config (connection);
if (s_ip6 && !nm_setting_ip_config_get_may_fail (s_ip6))
return TRUE;
}
/* If an IP version wants a carrier and and the other IP version isn't
* used, the connection requires carrier since it will just fail without one.
*/
if (ip4_carrier_wanted && !ip6_used)
return TRUE;
if (ip6_carrier_wanted && !ip4_used)
return TRUE;
/* If both want a carrier, the whole connection wants a carrier */
return ip4_carrier_wanted && ip6_carrier_wanted;
}
static gboolean
have_any_ready_slaves (NMDevice *self, const GSList *slaves)
{
const GSList *iter;
/* Any enslaved slave is "ready" in the generic case as it's
* at least >= NM_DEVCIE_STATE_IP_CONFIG and has had Layer 2
* properties set up.
*/
for (iter = slaves; iter; iter = g_slist_next (iter)) {
if (nm_device_get_enslaved (iter->data))
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
static gboolean
ip4_requires_slaves (NMConnection *connection)
{
const char *method;
method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG);
return strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_AUTO) == 0;
}
static NMActStageReturn
act_stage3_ip4_config_start (NMDevice *self,
NMIP4Config **out_config,
NMDeviceStateReason *reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
NMActStageReturn ret = NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE;
const char *method;
GSList *slaves;
gboolean ready_slaves;
g_return_val_if_fail (reason != NULL, NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
g_assert (connection);
if ( connection_ip4_method_requires_carrier (connection, NULL)
&& priv->is_master
&& !priv->carrier) {
_LOGI (LOGD_IP4 | LOGD_DEVICE,
"IPv4 config waiting until carrier is on");
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_WAIT;
}
if (priv->is_master && ip4_requires_slaves (connection)) {
/* If the master has no ready slaves, and depends on slaves for
* a successful IPv4 attempt, then postpone IPv4 addressing.
*/
slaves = nm_device_master_get_slaves (self);
ready_slaves = NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->have_any_ready_slaves (self, slaves);
g_slist_free (slaves);
if (ready_slaves == FALSE) {
_LOGI (LOGD_DEVICE | LOGD_IP4,
"IPv4 config waiting until slaves are ready");
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_WAIT;
}
}
method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG);
/* Start IPv4 addressing based on the method requested */
if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_AUTO) == 0)
ret = dhcp4_start (self, connection, reason);
else if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_LINK_LOCAL) == 0)
ret = aipd_start (self, reason);
else if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_MANUAL) == 0) {
/* Use only IPv4 config from the connection data */
*out_config = nm_ip4_config_new (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self));
g_assert (*out_config);
ret = NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS;
} else if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_SHARED) == 0) {
*out_config = shared4_new_config (self, connection, reason);
if (*out_config) {
priv->dnsmasq_manager = nm_dnsmasq_manager_new (nm_device_get_ip_iface (self));
ret = NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS;
} else
ret = NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_FAILURE;
} else if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP4_CONFIG_METHOD_DISABLED) == 0) {
/* Nothing to do... */
ret = NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_STOP;
} else
_LOGW (LOGD_IP4, "unhandled IPv4 config method '%s'; will fail", method);
return ret;
}
/*********************************************/
/* DHCPv6 stuff */
static void
dhcp6_cleanup (NMDevice *self, gboolean stop, gboolean release)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
priv->dhcp6_mode = NM_RDISC_DHCP_LEVEL_NONE;
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp6_ip6_config);
if (priv->dhcp6_client) {
if (priv->dhcp6_state_sigid) {
g_signal_handler_disconnect (priv->dhcp6_client, priv->dhcp6_state_sigid);
priv->dhcp6_state_sigid = 0;
}
if (stop)
nm_dhcp_client_stop (priv->dhcp6_client, release);
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp6_client);
}
nm_device_remove_pending_action (self, PENDING_ACTION_DHCP6, FALSE);
if (priv->dhcp6_config) {
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp6_config);
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_DHCP6_CONFIG);
}
}
static gboolean
ip6_config_merge_and_apply (NMDevice *self,
gboolean commit,
NMDeviceStateReason *out_reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
gboolean success;
NMIP6Config *composite;
gboolean has_direct_route;
const struct in6_addr *gateway;
/* If no config was passed in, create a new one */
composite = nm_ip6_config_new (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self));
ensure_con_ipx_config (self);
g_assert (composite);
/* Merge all the IP configs into the composite config */
if (priv->ac_ip6_config)
nm_ip6_config_merge (composite, priv->ac_ip6_config);
if (priv->dhcp6_ip6_config)
nm_ip6_config_merge (composite, priv->dhcp6_ip6_config);
if (priv->vpn6_config)
nm_ip6_config_merge (composite, priv->vpn6_config);
if (priv->ext_ip6_config)
nm_ip6_config_merge (composite, priv->ext_ip6_config);
/* Merge WWAN config *last* to ensure modem-given settings overwrite
* any external stuff set by pppd or other scripts.
*/
if (priv->wwan_ip6_config)
nm_ip6_config_merge (composite, priv->wwan_ip6_config);
/* Merge user overrides into the composite config. For assumed connections,
* con_ip6_config is empty. */
if (priv->con_ip6_config)
nm_ip6_config_merge (composite, priv->con_ip6_config);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
/* Add the default route.
*
* We keep track of the default route of a device in a private field.
* NMDevice needs to know the default route at this point, because the gateway
* might require a direct route (see below).
*
* But also, we don't want to add the default route to priv->ip6_config,
* because the default route from the setting might not be the same that
* NMDefaultRouteManager eventually configures (because the it might
* tweak the effective metric).
*/
/* unless we come to a different conclusion below, we have no default route and
* the route is assumed. */
priv->default_route.v6_has = FALSE;
priv->default_route.v6_is_assumed = TRUE;
if (!commit) {
/* during a non-commit event, we always pickup whatever is configured. */
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
}
if (nm_device_uses_assumed_connection (self))
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
/* we are about to commit (for a non-assumed connection). Enforce whatever we have
* configured. */
priv->default_route.v6_is_assumed = FALSE;
if ( !connection
|| !nm_default_route_manager_ip6_connection_has_default_route (nm_default_route_manager_get (), connection))
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
if (!nm_ip6_config_get_num_addresses (composite)) {
/* without addresses we can have no default route. */
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
}
gateway = nm_ip6_config_get_gateway (composite);
if (!gateway)
goto END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE;
has_direct_route = nm_ip6_config_get_direct_route_for_host (composite, gateway) != NULL;
priv->default_route.v6_has = TRUE;
memset (&priv->default_route.v6, 0, sizeof (priv->default_route.v6));
priv->default_route.v6.source = NM_IP_CONFIG_SOURCE_USER;
priv->default_route.v6.gateway = *gateway;
priv->default_route.v6.metric = nm_device_get_ip6_route_metric (self);
priv->default_route.v6.mss = nm_ip6_config_get_mss (composite);
if (!has_direct_route) {
NMPlatformIP6Route r = priv->default_route.v6;
/* add a direct route to the gateway */
r.network = *gateway;
r.plen = 128;
r.gateway = in6addr_any;
nm_ip6_config_add_route (composite, &r);
}
END_ADD_DEFAULT_ROUTE:
if (priv->default_route.v6_is_assumed) {
/* If above does not explicitly assign a default route, we always pick up the
* default route based on what is currently configured.
* That means that even managed connections with never-default, can
* get a default route (if configured externally).
*/
priv->default_route.v6_has = _device_get_default_route_from_platform (self, AF_INET6, (NMPlatformIPRoute *) &priv->default_route.v6);
}
nm_ip6_config_addresses_sort (composite,
priv->rdisc ? priv->rdisc_use_tempaddr : NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_PRIVACY_UNKNOWN);
/* Allow setting MTU etc */
if (commit) {
if (NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->ip6_config_pre_commit)
NM_DEVICE_GET_CLASS (self)->ip6_config_pre_commit (self, composite);
}
success = nm_device_set_ip6_config (self, composite, commit, out_reason);
g_object_unref (composite);
return success;
}
static void
dhcp6_lease_change (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
NMDeviceStateReason reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_NONE;
if (priv->dhcp6_ip6_config == NULL) {
_LOGW (LOGD_DHCP6, "failed to get DHCPv6 config for rebind");
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_IP_CONFIG_EXPIRED);
return;
}
g_assert (priv->dhcp6_client); /* sanity check */
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
g_assert (connection);
/* Apply the updated config */
if (ip6_config_merge_and_apply (self, TRUE, &reason) == FALSE) {
_LOGW (LOGD_DHCP6, "failed to update IPv6 config in response to DHCP event.");
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, reason);
} else {
/* Notify dispatcher scripts of new DHCPv6 config */
nm_dispatcher_call (DISPATCHER_ACTION_DHCP6_CHANGE, connection, self, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
}
static void
dhcp6_fail (NMDevice *self, gboolean timeout)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
dhcp6_cleanup (self, TRUE, FALSE);
if (priv->dhcp6_mode == NM_RDISC_DHCP_LEVEL_MANAGED) {
if (timeout || (priv->ip6_state == IP_CONF))
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_timeout (self);
else if (priv->ip6_state == IP_DONE)
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_IP_CONFIG_EXPIRED);
else
g_warn_if_reached ();
} else {
/* not a hard failure; just live with the RA info */
if (priv->ip6_state == IP_CONF)
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_result (self);
}
}
static void
dhcp6_timeout (NMDevice *self, NMDhcpClient *client)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->dhcp6_mode == NM_RDISC_DHCP_LEVEL_MANAGED)
dhcp6_fail (self, TRUE);
else {
/* not a hard failure; just live with the RA info */
dhcp6_cleanup (self, TRUE, FALSE);
if (priv->ip6_state == IP_CONF)
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_result (self);
}
}
static void
dhcp6_update_config (NMDevice *self, NMDhcp6Config *config, GHashTable *options)
{
GHashTableIter iter;
const char *key, *value;
/* Update the DHCP6 config object with new DHCP options */
nm_dhcp6_config_reset (config);
g_hash_table_iter_init (&iter, options);
while (g_hash_table_iter_next (&iter, (gpointer) &key, (gpointer) &value))
nm_dhcp6_config_add_option (config, key, value);
g_object_notify (G_OBJECT (self), NM_DEVICE_DHCP6_CONFIG);
}
static void
dhcp6_state_changed (NMDhcpClient *client,
NMDhcpState state,
NMIP6Config *ip6_config,
GHashTable *options,
gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = NM_DEVICE (user_data);
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_return_if_fail (nm_dhcp_client_get_ipv6 (client) == TRUE);
g_return_if_fail (!ip6_config || NM_IS_IP6_CONFIG (ip6_config));
_LOGD (LOGD_DHCP6, "new DHCPv6 client state %d", state);
switch (state) {
case NM_DHCP_STATE_BOUND:
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp6_ip6_config);
if (ip6_config) {
priv->dhcp6_ip6_config = g_object_ref (ip6_config);
dhcp6_update_config (self, priv->dhcp6_config, options);
}
if (priv->ip6_state == IP_CONF) {
if (priv->dhcp6_ip6_config == NULL) {
/* FIXME: Initial DHCP failed; should we fail IPv6 entirely then? */
nm_device_state_changed (self, NM_DEVICE_STATE_FAILED, NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_DHCP_FAILED);
break;
}
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_result (self);
} else if (priv->ip6_state == IP_DONE)
dhcp6_lease_change (self);
break;
case NM_DHCP_STATE_TIMEOUT:
dhcp6_timeout (self, client);
break;
case NM_DHCP_STATE_EXPIRE:
/* Ignore expiry before we even have a lease (NAK, old lease, etc) */
if (priv->ip6_state != IP_CONF)
dhcp6_fail (self, FALSE);
break;
case NM_DHCP_STATE_DONE:
/* In IPv6 info-only mode, the client doesn't handle leases so it
* may exit right after getting a response from the server. That's
* normal. In that case we just ignore the exit.
*/
if (priv->dhcp6_mode == NM_RDISC_DHCP_LEVEL_OTHERCONF)
break;
/* Otherwise, fall through */
case NM_DHCP_STATE_FAIL:
dhcp6_fail (self, FALSE);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
static gboolean
dhcp6_start_with_link_ready (NMDevice *self, NMConnection *connection)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMSettingIPConfig *s_ip6;
GByteArray *tmp = NULL;
const guint8 *hw_addr;
size_t hw_addr_len = 0;
g_assert (connection);
s_ip6 = nm_connection_get_setting_ip6_config (connection);
g_assert (s_ip6);
hw_addr = nm_platform_link_get_address (nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self), &hw_addr_len);
if (hw_addr_len) {
tmp = g_byte_array_sized_new (hw_addr_len);
g_byte_array_append (tmp, hw_addr, hw_addr_len);
}
priv->dhcp6_client = nm_dhcp_manager_start_ip6 (nm_dhcp_manager_get (),
nm_device_get_ip_iface (self),
nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self),
tmp,
nm_connection_get_uuid (connection),
nm_device_get_ip6_route_metric (self),
nm_setting_ip_config_get_dhcp_send_hostname (s_ip6),
nm_setting_ip_config_get_dhcp_hostname (s_ip6),
priv->dhcp_timeout,
priv->dhcp_anycast_address,
(priv->dhcp6_mode == NM_RDISC_DHCP_LEVEL_OTHERCONF) ? TRUE : FALSE,
nm_setting_ip6_config_get_ip6_privacy (NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG (s_ip6)));
if (tmp)
g_byte_array_free (tmp, TRUE);
if (priv->dhcp6_client) {
priv->dhcp6_state_sigid = g_signal_connect (priv->dhcp6_client,
NM_DHCP_CLIENT_SIGNAL_STATE_CHANGED,
G_CALLBACK (dhcp6_state_changed),
self);
}
return !!priv->dhcp6_client;
}
static gboolean
dhcp6_start (NMDevice *self, gboolean wait_for_ll, NMDeviceStateReason *reason)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
NMSettingIPConfig *s_ip6;
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp6_config);
priv->dhcp6_config = nm_dhcp6_config_new ();
g_warn_if_fail (priv->dhcp6_ip6_config == NULL);
g_clear_object (&priv->dhcp6_ip6_config);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
g_assert (connection);
s_ip6 = nm_connection_get_setting_ip6_config (connection);
if (!nm_setting_ip_config_get_may_fail (s_ip6) ||
!strcmp (nm_setting_ip_config_get_method (s_ip6), NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_DHCP))
nm_device_add_pending_action (self, PENDING_ACTION_DHCP6, TRUE);
if (wait_for_ll) {
NMActStageReturn ret;
/* ensure link local is ready... */
ret = linklocal6_start (self);
if (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_POSTPONE) {
/* success; wait for the LL address to show up */
return TRUE;
}
/* success; already have the LL address; kick off DHCP */
g_assert (ret == NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS);
}
if (!dhcp6_start_with_link_ready (self, connection)) {
*reason = NM_DEVICE_STATE_REASON_DHCP_START_FAILED;
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
gboolean
nm_device_dhcp6_renew (NMDevice *self, gboolean release)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
g_return_val_if_fail (priv->dhcp6_client != NULL, FALSE);
_LOGI (LOGD_DHCP6, "DHCPv6 lease renewal requested");
/* Terminate old DHCP instance and release the old lease */
dhcp6_cleanup (self, TRUE, release);
/* Start DHCP again on the interface */
return dhcp6_start (self, FALSE, NULL);
}
/******************************************/
static gboolean
have_ip6_address (const NMIP6Config *ip6_config, gboolean linklocal)
{
guint i;
if (!ip6_config)
return FALSE;
linklocal = !!linklocal;
for (i = 0; i < nm_ip6_config_get_num_addresses (ip6_config); i++) {
const NMPlatformIP6Address *addr = nm_ip6_config_get_address (ip6_config, i);
if ((IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL (&addr->address) == linklocal) &&
!(addr->flags & IFA_F_TENTATIVE))
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
static void
linklocal6_cleanup (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
if (priv->linklocal6_timeout_id) {
g_source_remove (priv->linklocal6_timeout_id);
priv->linklocal6_timeout_id = 0;
}
}
static gboolean
linklocal6_timeout_cb (gpointer user_data)
{
NMDevice *self = user_data;
linklocal6_cleanup (self);
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "linklocal6: waiting for link-local addresses failed due to timeout");
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_timeout (self);
return G_SOURCE_REMOVE;
}
static void
linklocal6_complete (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
const char *method;
g_assert (priv->linklocal6_timeout_id);
g_assert (have_ip6_address (priv->ip6_config, TRUE));
linklocal6_cleanup (self);
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
g_assert (connection);
method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG);
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "linklocal6: waiting for link-local addresses successful, continue with method %s", method);
if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_AUTO) == 0) {
if (!addrconf6_start_with_link_ready (self)) {
/* Time out IPv6 instead of failing the entire activation */
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_timeout (self);
}
} else if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_DHCP) == 0) {
if (!dhcp6_start_with_link_ready (self, connection)) {
/* Time out IPv6 instead of failing the entire activation */
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_timeout (self);
}
} else if (strcmp (method, NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_METHOD_LINK_LOCAL) == 0)
nm_device_activate_schedule_ip6_config_result (self);
else
g_return_if_fail (FALSE);
}
static void
check_and_add_ipv6ll_addr (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
int ip_ifindex = nm_device_get_ip_ifindex (self);
NMUtilsIPv6IfaceId iid;
struct in6_addr lladdr;
guint i, n;
if (priv->nm_ipv6ll == FALSE)
return;
if (priv->ip6_config) {
n = nm_ip6_config_get_num_addresses (priv->ip6_config);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
const NMPlatformIP6Address *addr;
addr = nm_ip6_config_get_address (priv->ip6_config, i);
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL (&addr->address)) {
/* Already have an LL address, nothing to do */
return;
}
}
}
if (!nm_device_get_ip_iface_identifier (self, &iid)) {
_LOGW (LOGD_IP6, "failed to get interface identifier; IPv6 may be broken");
return;
}
memset (&lladdr, 0, sizeof (lladdr));
lladdr.s6_addr16[0] = htons (0xfe80);
nm_utils_ipv6_addr_set_interface_identfier (&lladdr, iid);
_LOGD (LOGD_IP6, "adding IPv6LL address %s", nm_utils_inet6_ntop (&lladdr, NULL));
if (!nm_platform_ip6_address_add (ip_ifindex,
lladdr,
in6addr_any,
64,
NM_PLATFORM_LIFETIME_PERMANENT,
NM_PLATFORM_LIFETIME_PERMANENT,
0)) {
_LOGW (LOGD_IP6, "failed to add IPv6 link-local address %s",
nm_utils_inet6_ntop (&lladdr, NULL));
}
}
static NMActStageReturn
linklocal6_start (NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
NMConnection *connection;
const char *method;
linklocal6_cleanup (self);
if (have_ip6_address (priv->ip6_config, TRUE))
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_SUCCESS;
connection = nm_device_get_connection (self);
g_assert (connection);
method = nm_utils_get_ip_config_method (connection, NM_TYPE_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG);
_LOGD (LOGD_DEVICE, "linklocal6: starting IPv6 with method '%s', but the device has no link-local addresses configured. Wait.", method);
check_and_add_ipv6ll_addr (self);
priv->linklocal6_timeout_id = g_timeout_add_seconds (5, linklocal6_timeout_cb, self);
return NM_ACT_STAGE_RETURN_POSTPONE;
}
/******************************************/
static void
print_support_extended_ifa_flags (NMSettingIP6ConfigPrivacy use_tempaddr)
{
static gint8 warn = 0;
static gint8 s_libnl = -1, s_kernel;
if (warn >= 2)
return;
if (s_libnl == -1) {
s_libnl = !!nm_platform_check_support_libnl_extended_ifa_flags ();
s_kernel = !!nm_platform_check_support_kernel_extended_ifa_flags ();
if (s_libnl && s_kernel) {
nm_log_dbg (LOGD_IP6, "kernel and libnl support extended IFA_FLAGS (needed by NM for IPv6 private addresses)");
warn = 2;
return;
}
}
if ( use_tempaddr != NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_PRIVACY_PREFER_TEMP_ADDR
&& use_tempaddr != NM_SETTING_IP6_CONFIG_PRIVACY_PREFER_PUBLIC_ADDR) {
if (warn == 0) {
nm_log_dbg (LOGD_IP6, "%s%s%s %s not support extended IFA_FLAGS (needed by NM for IPv6 private addresses)",
!s_kernel ? "kernel" : "",
!s_kernel && !s_libnl ? " and " : "",
!s_libnl ? "libnl" : "",
!s_kernel && !s_libnl ? "do" : "does");
warn = 1;
}
return;
}
if (!s_libnl && !s_kernel) {
nm_log_warn (LOGD_IP6, "libnl and the kernel do not support extended IFA_FLAGS needed by NM for "
"IPv6 private addresses. This feature is not available");
} else if (!s_libnl) {
nm_log_warn (LOGD_IP6, "libnl does not support extended IFA_FLAGS needed by NM for "
"IPv6 private addresses. This feature is not available");
} else if (!s_kernel) {
nm_log_warn (LOGD_IP6, "The kernel does not support extended IFA_FLAGS needed by NM for "
"IPv6 private addresses. This feature is not available");
}
warn = 2;
}
static void
rdisc_config_changed (NMRDisc *rdisc, NMRDiscConfigMap changed, NMDevice *self)
{
NMDevicePrivate *priv = NM_DEVICE_GET_PRIVATE (self);
warn = 2;
}
static void
rdisc_config_changed (NMRDisc *rdisc, NMRDiscConfigMap changed, NMDevice *self)
{
address.preferred = discovered_address->preferred;
if (address.preferred > address.lifetime)
address.preferred = address.lifetime;
address.source = NM_IP_CONFIG_SOURCE_RDISC;
address.flags = ifa_flags;
nm_ip6_config_add_address (priv->ac_ip6_config, &address);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static inline int sector_in_part(struct hd_struct *part, sector_t sector)
{
return part->start_sect <= sector &&
sector < part->start_sect + part_nr_sects_read(part);
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int omninet_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;
struct usb_serial_port *wport;
wport = serial->port[1];
tty_port_tty_set(&wport->port, tty);
return usb_serial_generic_open(tty, port);
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: omninet: fix reference leaks at open
This driver needlessly took another reference to the tty on open, a
reference which was then never released on close. This lead to not just
a leak of the tty, but also a driver reference leak that prevented the
driver from being unloaded after a port had once been opened.
Fixes: 4a90f09b20f4 ("tty: usb-serial krefs")
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 2.6.28
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-404
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: gss_wrap_iov (minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
int * conf_state;
gss_iov_buffer_desc * iov;
int iov_count;
{
/* EXPORT DELETE START */
OM_uint32 status;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
gss_mechanism mech;
status = val_wrap_iov_args(minor_status, context_handle,
conf_req_flag, qop_req,
conf_state, iov, iov_count);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
if (mech->gss_wrap_iov) {
status = mech->gss_wrap_iov(
minor_status,
ctx->internal_ctx_id,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
map_error(minor_status, mech);
} else
status = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
return(status);
}
/* EXPORT DELETE END */
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
}
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-415
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static const char * read_line_input(char * line, int maxSize, Bool showContent) {
char read;
int i = 0;
if (fflush( stderr ))
perror("Failed to flush buffer %s");
do {
line[i] = '\0';
if (i >= maxSize - 1)
return line;
read = getch();
if (read == 8 || read == 127) {
if (i > 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\b \b");
i--;
}
} else if (read > 32) {
fputc(showContent ? read : '*', stderr);
line[i++] = read;
}
fflush(stderr);
} while (read != '\n');
if (!read)
return 0;
return line;
}
Commit Message: add some boundary checks on gf_text_get_utf8_line (#1188)
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: BaseShadow::log_except(const char *msg)
{
ShadowExceptionEvent event;
bool exception_already_logged = false;
if(!msg) msg = "";
sprintf(event.message, msg);
if ( BaseShadow::myshadow_ptr ) {
BaseShadow *shadow = BaseShadow::myshadow_ptr;
event.recvd_bytes = shadow->bytesSent();
event.sent_bytes = shadow->bytesReceived();
exception_already_logged = shadow->exception_already_logged;
if (shadow->began_execution) {
event.began_execution = TRUE;
}
} else {
event.recvd_bytes = 0.0;
event.sent_bytes = 0.0;
}
if (!exception_already_logged && !uLog.writeEventNoFsync (&event,NULL))
{
::dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Unable to log ULOG_SHADOW_EXCEPTION event\n");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int bmpr_read_rle(struct iwbmprcontext *rctx)
{
int retval = 0;
if(!(rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RLE8 && rctx->bitcount==8) &&
!(rctx->compression==IWBMP_BI_RLE4 && rctx->bitcount==4))
{
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Compression type incompatible with image type");
}
if(rctx->topdown) {
iw_set_error(rctx->ctx,"Compression not allowed with top-down images");
}
rctx->img->imgtype = IW_IMGTYPE_RGBA;
rctx->img->bit_depth = 8;
rctx->img->bpr = iw_calc_bytesperrow(rctx->width,32);
rctx->img->pixels = (iw_byte*)iw_malloc_large(rctx->ctx,rctx->img->bpr,rctx->img->height);
if(!rctx->img->pixels) goto done;
if(!bmpr_read_rle_internal(rctx)) goto done;
if(!bmpr_has_transparency(rctx->img)) {
bmpr_strip_alpha(rctx->img);
}
retval = 1;
done:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void gdImageSetThickness (gdImagePtr im, int thickness)
{
im->thick = thickness;
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::couldPlayIfEnoughData() const {
return !paused() && !endedPlayback() && !stoppedDueToErrors();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
unsigned int type;
int renegotiate_seen = 0;
PACKET extensions;
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
s->servername_done = 0;
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
#endif
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
#endif
s->srtp_profile = NULL;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
goto ri_check;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
return 0;
if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
return 0;
/*
* We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
* unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
* resumption.
*/
while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
PACKET extension;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
return 0;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
PACKET_remaining(&extension),
s->tlsext_debug_arg);
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
renegotiate_seen = 1;
} else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
}
/*-
* The servername extension is treated as follows:
*
* - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
* - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
* in which case an fatal alert is generated.
* - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
* - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
* to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
* - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
* it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
* Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
* set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
* case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
* a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
* presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
* the value of the Host: field.
* - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
* if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
* session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
* extension.
* - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
*
*/
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
unsigned int servname_type;
PACKET sni, hostname;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
/* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
|| PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
return 0;
}
/*
* Although the server_name extension was intended to be
* extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
* syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
* such.
* RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
* is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
* SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
*
* Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
* i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
*/
if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
|| servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
|| !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
}
if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
s->servername_done = 1;
} else {
/*
* TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
* fall back to a full handshake.
*/
s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
&& PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
PACKET srp_I;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
return 0;
if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
return 0;
/*
* TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
* upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
*/
if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
PACKET ec_point_format_list;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &ec_point_format_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
&s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
&s->
session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
/* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list)
|| PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
|| (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
&s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
&s->
session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
!s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
PACKET_remaining(&extension),
s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
{
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
PACKET supported_sig_algs;
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
|| (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
|| PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit) {
if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
return 0;
}
}
} else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
(unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
const unsigned char *ext_data;
PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
(&extension, &responder_id_list))
return 0;
/*
* We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
* to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
*/
sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
OCSP_RESPID_free);
if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
} else {
s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
OCSP_RESPID *id;
PACKET responder_id;
const unsigned char *id_data;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
&responder_id)
|| PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
return 0;
}
id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
if (id == NULL)
return 0;
if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
return 0;
}
if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
/* Read in request_extensions */
if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
return 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
PACKET_remaining(&exts));
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
|| ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
return 0;
}
}
} else
#endif
{
/*
* We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
*/
s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
unsigned int hbtype;
if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
|| PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
switch (hbtype) {
case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
break;
case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
break;
default:
*al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
/*-
* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
* renegotiation.
*
* s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
* probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
* the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
* there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
* earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
* anything like that, but this might change).
*
* A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
* in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
* 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
* in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
* Finished message could have been computed.)
*/
s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
}
/* session ticket processed earlier */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
&& type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
return 0;
}
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
/*
* Note: extended master secret extension handled in
* tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
*/
/*
* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
* nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
* TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
* callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
* ServerHello may be later returned.
*/
else if (!s->hit) {
if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
return 0;
}
}
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
/*
* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens.
*/
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
ri_check:
/* Need RI if renegotiating */
if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
return 0;
}
/*
* This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
* If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
* The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
* then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
*/
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: virtual void TearDown() {
semaphore_free(done);
AllocationTestHarness::TearDown();
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: set_default_lang ()
{
char *v;
v = get_string_value ("LC_ALL");
set_locale_var ("LC_ALL", v);
v = get_string_value ("LANG");
set_lang ("LANG", v);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void cJSON_ReplaceItemInArray( cJSON *array, int which, cJSON *newitem )
{
cJSON *c = array->child;
while ( c && which > 0 ) {
c = c->next;
--which;
}
if ( ! c )
return;
newitem->next = c->next;
newitem->prev = c->prev;
if ( newitem->next )
newitem->next->prev = newitem;
if ( c == array->child )
array->child = newitem;
else
newitem->prev->next = newitem;
c->next = c->prev = 0;
cJSON_Delete( c );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetCrashSignalFD(
const std::string& process_type) {
if (process_type == switches::kRendererProcess)
return RendererCrashHandlerHostLinux::GetInstance()->GetDeathSignalSocket();
if (process_type == switches::kExtensionProcess) {
ExtensionCrashHandlerHostLinux* crash_handler =
ExtensionCrashHandlerHostLinux::GetInstance();
return crash_handler->GetDeathSignalSocket();
}
if (process_type == switches::kPluginProcess)
return PluginCrashHandlerHostLinux::GetInstance()->GetDeathSignalSocket();
if (process_type == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess)
return PpapiCrashHandlerHostLinux::GetInstance()->GetDeathSignalSocket();
if (process_type == switches::kGpuProcess)
return GpuCrashHandlerHostLinux::GetInstance()->GetDeathSignalSocket();
return -1;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(zip)
{
#ifdef PHP_ZIP_USE_OO
zend_class_entry ce;
memcpy(&zip_object_handlers, zend_get_std_object_handlers(), sizeof(zend_object_handlers));
zip_object_handlers.clone_obj = NULL;
zip_object_handlers.get_property_ptr_ptr = php_zip_get_property_ptr_ptr;
zip_object_handlers.get_properties = php_zip_get_properties;
zip_object_handlers.read_property = php_zip_read_property;
zip_object_handlers.has_property = php_zip_has_property;
INIT_CLASS_ENTRY(ce, "ZipArchive", zip_class_functions);
ce.create_object = php_zip_object_new;
zip_class_entry = zend_register_internal_class(&ce TSRMLS_CC);
zend_hash_init(&zip_prop_handlers, 0, NULL, NULL, 1);
php_zip_register_prop_handler(&zip_prop_handlers, "status", php_zip_status, NULL, NULL, IS_LONG TSRMLS_CC);
php_zip_register_prop_handler(&zip_prop_handlers, "statusSys", php_zip_status_sys, NULL, NULL, IS_LONG TSRMLS_CC);
php_zip_register_prop_handler(&zip_prop_handlers, "numFiles", php_zip_get_num_files, NULL, NULL, IS_LONG TSRMLS_CC);
php_zip_register_prop_handler(&zip_prop_handlers, "filename", NULL, NULL, php_zipobj_get_filename, IS_STRING TSRMLS_CC);
php_zip_register_prop_handler(&zip_prop_handlers, "comment", NULL, php_zipobj_get_zip_comment, NULL, IS_STRING TSRMLS_CC);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CREATE", ZIP_CREATE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("EXCL", ZIP_EXCL);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CHECKCONS", ZIP_CHECKCONS);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("OVERWRITE", ZIP_OVERWRITE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("FL_NOCASE", ZIP_FL_NOCASE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("FL_NODIR", ZIP_FL_NODIR);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("FL_COMPRESSED", ZIP_FL_COMPRESSED);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("FL_UNCHANGED", ZIP_FL_UNCHANGED);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_DEFAULT", ZIP_CM_DEFAULT);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_STORE", ZIP_CM_STORE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_SHRINK", ZIP_CM_SHRINK);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_REDUCE_1", ZIP_CM_REDUCE_1);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_REDUCE_2", ZIP_CM_REDUCE_2);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_REDUCE_3", ZIP_CM_REDUCE_3);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_REDUCE_4", ZIP_CM_REDUCE_4);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_IMPLODE", ZIP_CM_IMPLODE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_DEFLATE", ZIP_CM_DEFLATE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_DEFLATE64", ZIP_CM_DEFLATE64);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_PKWARE_IMPLODE", ZIP_CM_PKWARE_IMPLODE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_BZIP2", ZIP_CM_BZIP2);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_LZMA", ZIP_CM_LZMA);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_TERSE", ZIP_CM_TERSE);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_LZ77", ZIP_CM_LZ77);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_WAVPACK", ZIP_CM_WAVPACK);
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("CM_PPMD", ZIP_CM_PPMD);
/* Error code */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_OK", ZIP_ER_OK); /* N No error */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_MULTIDISK", ZIP_ER_MULTIDISK); /* N Multi-disk zip archives not supported */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_RENAME", ZIP_ER_RENAME); /* S Renaming temporary file failed */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_CLOSE", ZIP_ER_CLOSE); /* S Closing zip archive failed */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_SEEK", ZIP_ER_SEEK); /* S Seek error */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_READ", ZIP_ER_READ); /* S Read error */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_WRITE", ZIP_ER_WRITE); /* S Write error */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_CRC", ZIP_ER_CRC); /* N CRC error */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_ZIPCLOSED", ZIP_ER_ZIPCLOSED); /* N Containing zip archive was closed */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_NOENT", ZIP_ER_NOENT); /* N No such file */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_EXISTS", ZIP_ER_EXISTS); /* N File already exists */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_OPEN", ZIP_ER_OPEN); /* S Can't open file */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_TMPOPEN", ZIP_ER_TMPOPEN); /* S Failure to create temporary file */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_ZLIB", ZIP_ER_ZLIB); /* Z Zlib error */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_MEMORY", ZIP_ER_MEMORY); /* N Malloc failure */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_CHANGED", ZIP_ER_CHANGED); /* N Entry has been changed */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_COMPNOTSUPP", ZIP_ER_COMPNOTSUPP);/* N Compression method not supported */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_EOF", ZIP_ER_EOF); /* N Premature EOF */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_INVAL", ZIP_ER_INVAL); /* N Invalid argument */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_NOZIP", ZIP_ER_NOZIP); /* N Not a zip archive */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_INTERNAL", ZIP_ER_INTERNAL); /* N Internal error */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_INCONS", ZIP_ER_INCONS); /* N Zip archive inconsistent */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_REMOVE", ZIP_ER_REMOVE); /* S Can't remove file */
REGISTER_ZIP_CLASS_CONST_LONG("ER_DELETED", ZIP_ER_DELETED); /* N Entry has been deleted */
php_register_url_stream_wrapper("zip", &php_stream_zip_wrapper TSRMLS_CC);
#endif
le_zip_dir = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(php_zip_free_dir, NULL, le_zip_dir_name, module_number);
le_zip_entry = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(php_zip_free_entry, NULL, le_zip_entry_name, module_number);
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8(
"[æӕ] > ae; [þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋпԥก] > n; œ > ce;"
"[ŧтҭԏ] > t; [ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщพฟພຟ] > w;"
"[мӎ] > m; [єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f;"
"[ҫင] > c; ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടรຣຮ] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зҙӡვဒ] > 3; [บບ] > u"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Map U+10DE to 3 when checking for confusables
Georgian letter U+10DE (პ) looks similar to the number 3. This cl adds
U+10DE to the mapping to 3 when determining whether to fall back to
punycode when displaying URLs.
Bug: 895207
Change-Id: I49713d7772428f8d364f371850a42913669acc4b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1284396
Commit-Queue: Livvie Lin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600193}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: uint16_t ndp_msgra_router_lifetime(struct ndp_msgra *msgra)
{
return ntohs(msgra->ra->nd_ra_router_lifetime);
}
Commit Message: libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool AutoplayAllowed(const ToRenderFrameHost& adapter,
bool with_user_gesture) {
RenderFrameHost* rfh = adapter.render_frame_host();
const char* test_script = "attemptPlay();";
bool worked = false;
if (with_user_gesture) {
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScriptAndExtractBool(rfh, test_script, &worked));
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScriptWithoutUserGestureAndExtractBool(
rfh, test_script, &worked));
}
return worked;
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
/* Kernel starts us with all fd's closed.
* But it's dangerous:
* fprintf(stderr) can dump messages into random fds, etc.
* Ensure that if any of fd 0,1,2 is closed, we open it to /dev/null.
*/
int fd = xopen("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
while (fd < 2)
fd = xdup(fd);
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
if (argc < 8)
{
/* percent specifier: %s %c %p %u %g %t %e %h */
/* argv: [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]*/
error_msg_and_die("Usage: %s SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID UID GID TIME BINARY_NAME [HOSTNAME]", argv[0]);
}
/* Not needed on 2.6.30.
* At least 2.6.18 has a bug where
* argv[1] = "SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* argv[2] = "CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* and so on. Fixing it:
*/
if (strchr(argv[1], ' '))
{
int i;
for (i = 1; argv[i]; i++)
{
strchrnul(argv[i], ' ')[0] = '\0';
}
}
logmode = LOGMODE_JOURNAL;
/* Parse abrt.conf */
load_abrt_conf();
/* ... and plugins/CCpp.conf */
bool setting_MakeCompatCore;
bool setting_SaveBinaryImage;
{
map_string_t *settings = new_map_string();
load_abrt_plugin_conf_file("CCpp.conf", settings);
const char *value;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "MakeCompatCore");
setting_MakeCompatCore = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveBinaryImage");
setting_SaveBinaryImage = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "VerboseLog");
if (value)
g_verbose = xatoi_positive(value);
free_map_string(settings);
}
errno = 0;
const char* signal_str = argv[1];
int signal_no = xatoi_positive(signal_str);
off_t ulimit_c = strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 10);
if (ulimit_c < 0) /* unlimited? */
{
/* set to max possible >0 value */
ulimit_c = ~((off_t)1 << (sizeof(off_t)*8-1));
}
const char *pid_str = argv[3];
pid_t pid = xatoi_positive(argv[3]);
uid_t uid = xatoi_positive(argv[4]);
if (errno || pid <= 0)
{
perror_msg_and_die("PID '%s' or limit '%s' is bogus", argv[3], argv[2]);
}
{
char *s = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose(VAR_RUN"/abrt/saved_core_pattern");
/* If we have a saved pattern and it's not a "|PROG ARGS" thing... */
if (s && s[0] != '|')
core_basename = s;
else
free(s);
}
struct utsname uts;
if (!argv[8]) /* no HOSTNAME? */
{
uname(&uts);
argv[8] = uts.nodename;
}
char path[PATH_MAX];
int src_fd_binary = -1;
char *executable = get_executable(pid, setting_SaveBinaryImage ? &src_fd_binary : NULL);
if (executable && strstr(executable, "/abrt-hook-ccpp"))
{
error_msg_and_die("PID %lu is '%s', not dumping it to avoid recursion",
(long)pid, executable);
}
user_pwd = get_cwd(pid); /* may be NULL on error */
log_notice("user_pwd:'%s'", user_pwd);
sprintf(path, "/proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
proc_pid_status = xmalloc_xopen_read_close(path, /*maxsz:*/ NULL);
uid_t fsuid = uid;
uid_t tmp_fsuid = get_fsuid();
int suid_policy = dump_suid_policy();
if (tmp_fsuid != uid)
{
/* use root for suided apps unless it's explicitly set to UNSAFE */
fsuid = 0;
if (suid_policy == DUMP_SUID_UNSAFE)
{
fsuid = tmp_fsuid;
}
}
/* Open a fd to compat coredump, if requested and is possible */
if (setting_MakeCompatCore && ulimit_c != 0)
/* note: checks "user_pwd == NULL" inside; updates core_basename */
user_core_fd = open_user_core(uid, fsuid, pid, &argv[1]);
if (executable == NULL)
{
/* readlink on /proc/$PID/exe failed, don't create abrt dump dir */
error_msg("Can't read /proc/%lu/exe link", (long)pid);
goto create_user_core;
}
const char *signame = NULL;
switch (signal_no)
{
case SIGILL : signame = "ILL" ; break;
case SIGFPE : signame = "FPE" ; break;
case SIGSEGV: signame = "SEGV"; break;
case SIGBUS : signame = "BUS" ; break; //Bus error (bad memory access)
case SIGABRT: signame = "ABRT"; break; //usually when abort() was called
case SIGTRAP: signame = "TRAP"; break; //Trace/breakpoint trap
default: goto create_user_core; // not a signal we care about
}
if (!daemon_is_ok())
{
/* not an error, exit with exit code 0 */
log("abrtd is not running. If it crashed, "
"/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains a stale value, "
"consider resetting it to 'core'"
);
goto create_user_core;
}
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* If free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize... */
if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location))
goto create_user_core;
}
/* Check /var/tmp/abrt/last-ccpp marker, do not dump repeated crashes
* if they happen too often. Else, write new marker value.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/last-ccpp", g_settings_dump_location);
if (check_recent_crash_file(path, executable))
{
/* It is a repeating crash */
goto create_user_core;
}
const char *last_slash = strrchr(executable, '/');
if (last_slash && strncmp(++last_slash, "abrt", 4) == 0)
{
/* If abrtd/abrt-foo crashes, we don't want to create a _directory_,
* since that can make new copy of abrtd to process it,
* and maybe crash again...
* Unlike dirs, mere files are ignored by abrtd.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s-coredump", g_settings_dump_location, last_slash);
int abrt_core_fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
off_t core_size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (core_size < 0 || fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_eof logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
return 0;
}
unsigned path_len = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/ccpp-%s-%lu.new",
g_settings_dump_location, iso_date_string(NULL), (long)pid);
if (path_len >= (sizeof(path) - sizeof("/"FILENAME_COREDUMP)))
{
goto create_user_core;
}
/* use fsuid instead of uid, so we don't expose any sensitive
* information of suided app in /var/tmp/abrt
*/
dd = dd_create(path, fsuid, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE);
if (dd)
{
char *rootdir = get_rootdir(pid);
dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, (rootdir && strcmp(rootdir, "/") != 0) ? rootdir : NULL);
char source_filename[sizeof("/proc/%lu/somewhat_long_name") + sizeof(long)*3];
int source_base_ofs = sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/smaps", (long)pid);
source_base_ofs -= strlen("smaps");
char *dest_filename = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, "also_somewhat_longish_name");
char *dest_base = strrchr(dest_filename, '/') + 1;
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "maps");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_MAPS);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "limits");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_LIMITS);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "cgroup");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_CGROUP);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_OPEN_FDS);
dump_fd_info(dest_filename, source_filename, source_base_ofs, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid);
free(dest_filename);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ANALYZER, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TYPE, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_EXECUTABLE, executable);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PID, pid_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PROC_PID_STATUS, proc_pid_status);
if (user_pwd)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PWD, user_pwd);
if (rootdir)
{
if (strcmp(rootdir, "/") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ROOTDIR, rootdir);
}
char *reason = xasprintf("%s killed by SIG%s",
last_slash, signame ? signame : signal_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_REASON, reason);
free(reason);
char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline ? : "");
free(cmdline);
char *environ = get_environ(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ENVIRON, environ ? : "");
free(environ);
char *fips_enabled = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled");
if (fips_enabled)
{
if (strcmp(fips_enabled, "0") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, "fips_enabled", fips_enabled);
free(fips_enabled);
}
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
if (src_fd_binary > 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_BINARY);
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd_binary, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (fsync(dst_fd) != 0 || close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
dd_delete(dd);
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
close(src_fd_binary);
}
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_COREDUMP);
int abrt_core_fd = create_or_die(path);
/* We write both coredumps at once.
* We can't write user coredump first, since it might be truncated
* and thus can't be copied and used as abrt coredump;
* and if we write abrt coredump first and then copy it as user one,
* then we have a race when process exits but coredump does not exist yet:
* $ echo -e '#include<signal.h>\nmain(){raise(SIGSEGV);}' | gcc -o test -x c -
* $ rm -f core*; ulimit -c unlimited; ./test; ls -l core*
* 21631 Segmentation fault (core dumped) ./test
* ls: cannot access core*: No such file or directory <=== BAD
*/
off_t core_size = copyfd_sparse(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, user_core_fd, ulimit_c);
if (fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || close(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
unlink(path);
dd_delete(dd);
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
{
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
}
/* copyfd_sparse logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error writing '%s'", path);
}
if (user_core_fd >= 0
/* error writing user coredump? */
&& (fsync(user_core_fd) != 0 || close(user_core_fd) != 0
/* user coredump is too big? */
|| (ulimit_c == 0 /* paranoia */ || core_size > ulimit_c)
)
) {
/* nuke it (silently) */
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
}
/* Because of #1211835 and #1126850 */
#if 0
/* Save JVM crash log if it exists. (JVM's coredump per se
* is nearly useless for JVM developers)
*/
{
char *java_log = xasprintf("/tmp/jvm-%lu/hs_error.log", (long)pid);
int src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
/* If we couldn't open the error log in /tmp directory we can try to
* read the log from the current directory. It may produce AVC, it
* may produce some error log but all these are expected.
*/
if (src_fd < 0)
{
java_log = xasprintf("%s/hs_err_pid%lu.log", user_pwd, (long)pid);
src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
}
if (src_fd >= 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/hs_err.log");
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
dd_delete(dd);
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
close(src_fd);
}
}
#endif
/* We close dumpdir before we start catering for crash storm case.
* Otherwise, delete_dump_dir's from other concurrent
* CCpp's won't be able to delete our dump (their delete_dump_dir
* will wait for us), and we won't be able to delete their dumps.
* Classic deadlock.
*/
dd_close(dd);
path[path_len] = '\0'; /* path now contains only directory name */
char *newpath = xstrndup(path, path_len - (sizeof(".new")-1));
if (rename(path, newpath) == 0)
strcpy(path, newpath);
free(newpath);
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
notify_new_path(path);
/* rhbz#539551: "abrt going crazy when crashing process is respawned" */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* x1.25 and round up to 64m: go a bit up, so that usual in-daemon trimming
* kicks in first, and we don't "fight" with it:
*/
unsigned maxsize = g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize + g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize / 4;
maxsize |= 63;
trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, maxsize * (double)(1024*1024), path);
}
free(rootdir);
return 0;
}
/* We didn't create abrt dump, but may need to create compat coredump */
create_user_core:
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
{
off_t core_size = copyfd_size(STDIN_FILENO, user_core_fd, ulimit_c, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (fsync(user_core_fd) != 0 || close(user_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
/* perror first, otherwise unlink may trash errno */
perror_msg("Error writing '%s'", full_core_basename);
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
return 1;
}
if (ulimit_c == 0 || core_size > ulimit_c)
{
xchdir(user_pwd);
unlink(core_basename);
return 1;
}
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, full_core_basename, (long long)core_size);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ccpp: do not read data from root directories
Users are allowed to modify /proc/[pid]/root to any directory by running
their own MOUNT namespace.
Related: #1211835
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-59
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void GLES2Implementation::InvalidateCachedExtensions() {
cached_extension_string_ = nullptr;
cached_extensions_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int rfcomm_sock_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int *len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_rc *sa = (struct sockaddr_rc *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
BT_DBG("sock %p, sk %p", sock, sk);
sa->rc_family = AF_BLUETOOTH;
sa->rc_channel = rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel;
if (peer)
bacpy(&sa->rc_bdaddr, &bt_sk(sk)->dst);
else
bacpy(&sa->rc_bdaddr, &bt_sk(sk)->src);
*len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_rc);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the trailing padding byte of struct
sockaddr_rc added for alignment. It that for leaks one byte kernel stack
via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling
the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: long long Cluster::GetTime() const
{
const long long tc = GetTimeCode();
if (tc < 0)
return tc;
const SegmentInfo* const pInfo = m_pSegment->GetInfo();
assert(pInfo);
const long long scale = pInfo->GetTimeCodeScale();
assert(scale >= 1);
const long long t = m_timecode * scale;
return t;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoRegisterSharedIdsCHROMIUM(
GLuint namespace_id, GLsizei n, const GLuint* ids) {
IdAllocatorInterface* id_allocator = group_->GetIdAllocator(namespace_id);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
if (!id_allocator->MarkAsUsed(ids[ii])) {
for (GLsizei jj = 0; jj < ii; ++jj) {
id_allocator->FreeID(ids[jj]);
}
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_VALUE, "RegisterSharedIdsCHROMIUM",
"attempt to register id that already exists");
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int netlink_unregister_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
return atomic_notifier_chain_unregister(&netlink_chain, nb);
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Florian Weimer <[email protected]>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-287
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<File> DOMFileSystemSync::createFile(const FileEntrySync* fileEntry, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
KURL fileSystemURL = createFileSystemURL(fileEntry);
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<CreateFileHelper::CreateFileResult> result(CreateFileHelper::CreateFileResult::create());
fileSystem()->createSnapshotFileAndReadMetadata(fileSystemURL, CreateFileHelper::create(result, fileEntry->name(), fileSystemURL, type()));
if (result->m_failed) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(result->m_code, "Could not create '" + fileEntry->name() + "'.");
return nullptr;
}
return result->m_file.get();
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkey_get_details)
{
zval *key;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
BIO *out;
unsigned int pbio_len;
char *pbio;
zend_long ktype;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r", &key) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((pkey = (EVP_PKEY *)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(key), "OpenSSL key", le_key)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (!PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, pkey)) {
BIO_free(out);
php_openssl_store_errors();
RETURN_FALSE;
}
pbio_len = BIO_get_mem_data(out, &pbio);
array_init(return_value);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "bits", EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey));
add_assoc_stringl(return_value, "key", pbio, pbio_len);
/*TODO: Use the real values once the openssl constants are used
* See the enum at the top of this file
*/
switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
case EVP_PKEY_RSA2:
{
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_RSA;
if (rsa != NULL) {
zval z_rsa;
const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *p, *q, *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp;
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, &d);
RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
array_init(&z_rsa);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, n);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, e);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, d);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, q);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, dmp1);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, dmq1);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, iqmp);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "rsa", &z_rsa);
}
}
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA2:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA3:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA4:
{
DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey);
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DSA;
if (dsa != NULL) {
zval z_dsa;
const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *priv_key, *pub_key;
DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
array_init(&z_dsa);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, q);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, g);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, priv_key);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, pub_key);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "dsa", &z_dsa);
}
}
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
{
DH *dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey);
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DH;
if (dh != NULL) {
zval z_dh;
const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *priv_key, *pub_key;
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, &q, &g);
DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, &priv_key);
array_init(&z_dh);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, g);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, priv_key);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, pub_key);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "dh", &z_dh);
}
}
break;
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_EC
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_EC;
if (EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey) != NULL) {
zval ec;
const EC_GROUP *ec_group;
const EC_POINT *pub;
int nid;
char *crv_sn;
ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
char oir_buf[80];
const EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
BIGNUM *x = BN_new();
BIGNUM *y = BN_new();
const BIGNUM *d;
ec_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key);
nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(ec_group);
if (nid == NID_undef) {
break;
}
array_init(&ec);
crv_sn = (char*) OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
if (crv_sn != NULL) {
add_assoc_string(&ec, "curve_name", crv_sn);
}
obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
if (obj != NULL) {
int oir_len = OBJ_obj2txt(oir_buf, sizeof(oir_buf), obj, 1);
add_assoc_stringl(&ec, "curve_oid", (char*) oir_buf, oir_len);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
}
pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec_key);
if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(ec_group, pub, x, y, NULL)) {
OPENSSL_GET_BN(ec, x, x);
OPENSSL_GET_BN(ec, y, y);
} else {
php_openssl_store_errors();
}
if ((d = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) != NULL) {
OPENSSL_GET_BN(ec, d, d);
}
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "ec", &ec);
BN_free(x);
BN_free(y);
}
break;
#endif
default:
ktype = -1;
break;
}
add_assoc_long(return_value, "type", ktype);
BIO_free(out);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::CheckDownloadAllowed(
const content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& web_contents_getter,
const GURL& url,
const std::string& request_method,
content::CheckDownloadAllowedCallback check_download_allowed_cb) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
CanDownloadCallback cb = base::BindOnce(
&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::OnCheckDownloadAllowedComplete,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), std::move(check_download_allowed_cb));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
DownloadControllerBase::Get()->AcquireFileAccessPermission(
web_contents_getter,
base::Bind(&OnAcquireFileAccessPermissionDone, web_contents_getter, url,
request_method, base::Passed(&cb)));
#else
CheckCanDownload(web_contents_getter, url, request_method, std::move(cb));
#endif
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseChunk(off64_t *offset, int depth) {
ALOGV("entering parseChunk %lld/%d", (long long)*offset, depth);
if (*offset < 0) {
ALOGE("b/23540914");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (depth > 100) {
ALOGE("b/27456299");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
int32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size == 0) {
if (depth == 0) {
off64_t sourceSize;
if (mDataSource->getSize(&sourceSize) == OK) {
chunk_size = (sourceSize - *offset);
} else {
ALOGE("atom size is 0, and data source has no size");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else {
*offset += 4;
return OK;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
ALOGE("invalid chunk size: %" PRIu64, chunk_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("chunk: %s @ %lld, %d", chunk, (long long)*offset, depth);
if (kUseHexDump) {
static const char kWhitespace[] = " ";
const char *indent = &kWhitespace[sizeof(kWhitespace) - 1 - 2 * depth];
printf("%sfound chunk '%s' of size %" PRIu64 "\n", indent, chunk, chunk_size);
char buffer[256];
size_t n = chunk_size;
if (n > sizeof(buffer)) {
n = sizeof(buffer);
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, n)
< (ssize_t)n) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
hexdump(buffer, n);
}
PathAdder autoAdder(&mPath, chunk_type);
off64_t chunk_data_size = chunk_size - (data_offset - *offset);
if (chunk_data_size < 0) {
ALOGE("b/23540914");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't') && chunk_data_size > kMaxAtomSize) {
char errMsg[100];
sprintf(errMsg, "%s atom has size %" PRId64, chunk, chunk_data_size);
ALOGE("%s (b/28615448)", errMsg);
android_errorWriteWithInfoLog(0x534e4554, "28615448", -1, errMsg, strlen(errMsg));
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'p', 'r', 't')
&& chunk_type != FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r')
&& mPath.size() == 5 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return OK;
}
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k'):
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'i', 'a'):
case FOURCC('m', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('d', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l'):
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'e', 'x'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'):
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'f', 'r', 'a'):
case FOURCC('u', 'd', 't', 'a'):
case FOURCC('i', 'l', 's', 't'):
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'n', 'f'):
case FOURCC('s', 'c', 'h', 'i'):
case FOURCC('e', 'd', 't', 's'):
case FOURCC('w', 'a', 'v', 'e'):
{
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v') && depth != 0) {
ALOGE("moov: depth %d", depth);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f') && !mMoofFound) {
mMoofFound = true;
mMoofOffset = *offset;
}
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('s', 't', 'b', 'l')) {
ALOGV("sampleTable chunk is %" PRIu64 " bytes long.", chunk_size);
if (mDataSource->flags()
& (DataSource::kWantsPrefetching
| DataSource::kIsCachingDataSource)) {
sp<MPEG4DataSource> cachedSource =
new MPEG4DataSource(mDataSource);
if (cachedSource->setCachedRange(*offset, chunk_size) == OK) {
mDataSource = cachedSource;
}
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->sampleTable = new SampleTable(mDataSource);
}
bool isTrack = false;
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'k')) {
if (depth != 1) {
ALOGE("trak: depth %d", depth);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
isTrack = true;
Track *track = new Track;
track->next = NULL;
if (mLastTrack) {
mLastTrack->next = track;
} else {
mFirstTrack = track;
}
mLastTrack = track;
track->meta = new MetaData;
track->includes_expensive_metadata = false;
track->skipTrack = false;
track->timescale = 0;
track->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, "application/octet-stream");
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
if (isTrack) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
break;
}
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (isTrack) {
int32_t trackId;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyTrackID, &trackId)) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
}
if (mLastTrack->skipTrack) {
Track *cur = mFirstTrack;
if (cur == mLastTrack) {
delete cur;
mFirstTrack = mLastTrack = NULL;
} else {
while (cur && cur->next != mLastTrack) {
cur = cur->next;
}
if (cur) {
cur->next = NULL;
}
delete mLastTrack;
mLastTrack = cur;
}
return OK;
}
status_t err = verifyTrack(mLastTrack);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
} else if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'v')) {
mInitCheck = OK;
if (!mIsDrm) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // Return a dummy error.
} else {
return OK;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 'l', 's', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &version, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t entry_count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &entry_count)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (entry_count != 1) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list with %d entries", entry_count);
} else if (mHeaderTimescale == 0) {
ALOGW("ignoring edit list because timescale is 0");
} else {
off64_t entriesoffset = data_offset + 8;
uint64_t segment_duration;
int64_t media_time;
if (version == 1) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset, &segment_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt64(entriesoffset + 8, (uint64_t*)&media_time)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
} else if (version == 0) {
uint32_t sd;
int32_t mt;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset, &sd) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(entriesoffset + 4, (uint32_t*)&mt)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
segment_duration = sd;
media_time = mt;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t halfscale = mHeaderTimescale / 2;
segment_duration = (segment_duration * 1000000 + halfscale)/ mHeaderTimescale;
media_time = (media_time * 1000000 + halfscale) / mHeaderTimescale;
int64_t duration;
int32_t samplerate;
if (!mLastTrack) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration) &&
mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeySampleRate, &samplerate)) {
int64_t delay = (media_time * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, delay);
int64_t paddingus = duration - (int64_t)(segment_duration + media_time);
if (paddingus < 0) {
paddingus = 0;
}
int64_t paddingsamples = (paddingus * samplerate + 500000) / 1000000;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, paddingsamples);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('f', 'r', 'm', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
uint32_t original_fourcc;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset, &original_fourcc, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
original_fourcc = ntohl(original_fourcc);
ALOGV("read original format: %d", original_fourcc);
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(original_fourcc));
uint32_t num_channels = 0;
uint32_t sample_rate = 0;
if (AdjustChannelsAndRate(original_fourcc, &num_channels, &sample_rate)) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'e', 'n', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buf[4];
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, buf + 1, 3) < 3) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultAlgorithmId = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if (defaultAlgorithmId > 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memset(buf, 0, 4);
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 7, buf + 3, 1) < 1) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t defaultIVSize = ntohl(*((int32_t*)buf));
if ((defaultAlgorithmId == 0 && defaultIVSize != 0) ||
(defaultAlgorithmId != 0 && defaultIVSize == 0)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else if (defaultIVSize != 0 &&
defaultIVSize != 8 &&
defaultIVSize != 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t defaultKeyId[16];
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 8, &defaultKeyId, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoMode, defaultAlgorithmId);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyCryptoDefaultIVSize, defaultIVSize);
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyCryptoKey, 'tenc', defaultKeyId, 16);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'k', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('p', 's', 's', 'h'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
PsshInfo pssh;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4, &pssh.uuid, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t psshdatalen = 0;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 20, &psshdatalen, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
pssh.datalen = ntohl(psshdatalen);
ALOGV("pssh data size: %d", pssh.datalen);
if (chunk_size < 20 || pssh.datalen > chunk_size - 20) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
pssh.data = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[pssh.datalen];
if (pssh.data == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("allocated pssh @ %p", pssh.data);
ssize_t requested = (ssize_t) pssh.datalen;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 24, pssh.data, requested) < requested) {
delete[] pssh.data;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mPssh.push_back(pssh);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4 || mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t version;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, &version, sizeof(version))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(version)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
off64_t timescale_offset;
if (version == 1) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 16;
} else if (version == 0) {
timescale_offset = data_offset + 4 + 8;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t timescale;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset, ×cale, sizeof(timescale))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(timescale)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (!timescale) {
ALOGE("timescale should not be ZERO.");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->timescale = ntohl(timescale);
int64_t duration = 0;
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration, sizeof(duration))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration != -1) {
duration = ntoh64(duration);
}
} else {
uint32_t duration32;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
timescale_offset + 4, &duration32, sizeof(duration32))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(duration32)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (duration32 != 0xffffffff) {
duration = ntohl(duration32);
}
}
if (duration != 0 && mLastTrack->timescale != 0) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, (duration * 1000000) / mLastTrack->timescale);
}
uint8_t lang[2];
off64_t lang_offset;
if (version == 1) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 8;
} else if (version == 0) {
lang_offset = timescale_offset + 4 + 4;
} else {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(lang_offset, &lang, sizeof(lang))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(lang)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
char lang_code[4];
lang_code[0] = ((lang[0] >> 2) & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[1] = ((lang[0] & 0x3) << 3 | (lang[1] >> 5)) + 0x60;
lang_code[2] = (lang[1] & 0x1f) + 0x60;
lang_code[3] = '\0';
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(
kKeyMediaLanguage, lang_code);
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd'):
{
uint8_t buffer[8];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t entry_count = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
if (entry_count > 1) {
const char *mime;
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP) &&
strcasecmp(mime, "application/octet-stream")) {
mLastTrack->skipTrack = true;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + 8;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (buffer->data() == NULL) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
String8 mimeFormat((const char *)(buffer->data()), chunk_data_size);
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, mimeFormat.string());
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
{
if (mIsQT && chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')
&& depth >= 1 && mPath[depth - 1] == FOURCC('w', 'a', 'v', 'e')) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
uint8_t buffer[8 + 20];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index __unused = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t version = U16_AT(&buffer[8]);
uint32_t num_channels = U16_AT(&buffer[16]);
uint16_t sample_size = U16_AT(&buffer[18]);
uint32_t sample_rate = U32_AT(&buffer[24]) >> 16;
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
if (mIsQT && chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
if (version == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer, 16) < 16) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
#if 0
U32_AT(buffer); // samples per packet
U32_AT(&buffer[4]); // bytes per packet
U32_AT(&buffer[8]); // bytes per frame
U32_AT(&buffer[12]); // bytes per sample
#endif
*offset += 16;
} else if (version == 2) {
uint8_t v2buffer[36];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, v2buffer, 36) < 36) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
#if 0
U32_AT(v2buffer); // size of struct only
sample_rate = (uint32_t)U64_AT(&v2buffer[4]); // audio sample rate
num_channels = U32_AT(&v2buffer[12]); // num audio channels
U32_AT(&v2buffer[16]); // always 0x7f000000
sample_size = (uint16_t)U32_AT(&v2buffer[20]); // const bits per channel
U32_AT(&v2buffer[24]); // format specifc flags
U32_AT(&v2buffer[28]); // const bytes per audio packet
U32_AT(&v2buffer[32]); // const LPCM frames per audio packet
#endif
*offset += 36;
}
}
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'a')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
AdjustChannelsAndRate(chunk_type, &num_channels, &sample_rate);
}
ALOGV("*** coding='%s' %d channels, size %d, rate %d\n",
chunk, num_channels, sample_size, sample_rate);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyChannelCount, num_channels);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeySampleRate, sample_rate);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
case FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v'):
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', '1'):
case FOURCC('h', 'e', 'v', '1'):
{
uint8_t buffer[78];
if (chunk_data_size < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, sizeof(buffer)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint16_t data_ref_index __unused = U16_AT(&buffer[6]);
uint16_t width = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 18]);
uint16_t height = U16_AT(&buffer[6 + 20]);
if (width == 0) width = 352;
if (height == 0) height = 288;
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
if (chunk_type != FOURCC('e', 'n', 'c', 'v')) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, FourCC2MIME(chunk_type));
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyWidth, width);
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyHeight, height);
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset + sizeof(buffer);
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'c', 'o'):
case FOURCC('c', 'o', '6', '4'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setChunkOffsetParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'c'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleToChunkParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'z'):
case FOURCC('s', 't', 'z', '2'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSampleSizeParams(
chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
size_t max_size;
err = mLastTrack->sampleTable->getMaxSampleSize(&max_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (max_size != 0) {
if (max_size > SIZE_MAX - 10 * 2) {
ALOGE("max sample size too big: %zu", max_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size + 10 * 2);
} else {
uint32_t width, height;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyWidth, (int32_t*)&width) ||
!mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyHeight,(int32_t*) &height)) {
ALOGE("No width or height, assuming worst case 1080p");
width = 1920;
height = 1080;
} else {
if (width > 32768 || height > 32768) {
ALOGE("can't support %u x %u video", width, height);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC)
|| !strcmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_HEVC)) {
max_size = ((width + 15) / 16) * ((height + 15) / 16) * 192;
} else {
max_size = width * height * 3 / 2;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxInputSize, max_size);
}
const char *mime;
CHECK(mLastTrack->meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp("video/", mime, 6)) {
size_t nSamples = mLastTrack->sampleTable->countSamples();
if (nSamples == 0) {
int32_t trackId;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt32(kKeyTrackID, &trackId)) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < mTrex.size(); i++) {
Trex *t = &mTrex.editItemAt(i);
if (t->track_ID == (uint32_t) trackId) {
if (t->default_sample_duration > 0) {
int32_t frameRate =
mLastTrack->timescale / t->default_sample_duration;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
break;
}
}
}
} else {
int64_t durationUs;
if (mLastTrack->meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > 0) {
int32_t frameRate = (nSamples * 1000000LL +
(durationUs >> 1)) / durationUs;
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyFrameRate, frameRate);
}
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 't', 's'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 't', 't', 's'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 's'):
{
if ((mLastTrack == NULL) || (mLastTrack->sampleTable == NULL))
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err =
mLastTrack->sampleTable->setSyncSampleParams(
data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC(0xA9, 'x', 'y', 'z'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char buffer[18 + 8];
off64_t location_length = chunk_data_size - 5;
if (location_length >= (off64_t) sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 4, buffer, location_length) < location_length) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
buffer[location_length] = '\0';
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyLocation, buffer);
break;
}
case FOURCC('e', 's', 'd', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[256];
if (chunk_data_size > (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyESDS, kTypeESDS, &buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a')) {
status_t err = updateAudioTrackInfoFromESDS_MPEG4Audio(
&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (mPath.size() >= 2
&& mPath[mPath.size() - 2] == FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v')) {
ESDS esds(&buffer[4], chunk_data_size - 4);
uint8_t objectTypeIndication;
if (esds.getObjectTypeIndication(&objectTypeIndication) == OK) {
if (objectTypeIndication >= 0x60 && objectTypeIndication <= 0x65) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_MPEG2);
}
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('b', 't', 'r', 't'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mLastTrack == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t buffer[12];
if (chunk_data_size != sizeof(buffer)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t maxBitrate = U32_AT(&buffer[4]);
uint32_t avgBitrate = U32_AT(&buffer[8]);
if (maxBitrate > 0 && maxBitrate < INT32_MAX) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyMaxBitRate, (int32_t)maxBitrate);
}
if (avgBitrate > 0 && avgBitrate < INT32_MAX) {
mLastTrack->meta->setInt32(kKeyBitRate, (int32_t)avgBitrate);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (buffer->data() == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/28471206");
return NO_MEMORY;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyAVCC, kTypeAVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('h', 'v', 'c', 'C'):
{
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size);
if (buffer->data() == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/28471206");
return NO_MEMORY;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyHVCC, kTypeHVCC, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size);
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('d', '2', '6', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
/*
* d263 contains a fixed 7 bytes part:
* vendor - 4 bytes
* version - 1 byte
* level - 1 byte
* profile - 1 byte
* optionally, "d263" box itself may contain a 16-byte
* bit rate box (bitr)
* average bit rate - 4 bytes
* max bit rate - 4 bytes
*/
char buffer[23];
if (chunk_data_size != 7 &&
chunk_data_size != 23) {
ALOGE("Incorrect D263 box size %lld", (long long)chunk_data_size);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, chunk_data_size) < chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
mLastTrack->meta->setData(kKeyD263, kTypeD263, buffer, chunk_data_size);
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 't', 'a'):
{
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
bool isParsingMetaKeys = underQTMetaPath(mPath, 2);
if (!isParsingMetaKeys) {
uint8_t buffer[4];
if (chunk_data_size < (off64_t)sizeof(buffer)) {
*offset = stop_offset;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer, 4) < 4) {
*offset = stop_offset;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(buffer) != 0) {
*offset = stop_offset;
return OK;
}
*offset += sizeof(buffer);
}
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset, depth + 1);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (*offset != stop_offset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'a', 'n'):
case FOURCC('n', 'a', 'm', 'e'):
case FOURCC('d', 'a', 't', 'a'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mPath.size() == 6 && underMetaDataPath(mPath)) {
status_t err = parseITunesMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'v', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (depth != 1) {
ALOGE("mvhd: depth %d", depth);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (chunk_data_size < 32) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[32];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t creationTime;
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (header[0] == 1) {
creationTime = U64_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[20]);
duration = U64_AT(&header[24]);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (header[0] != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
} else {
creationTime = U32_AT(&header[4]);
mHeaderTimescale = U32_AT(&header[12]);
uint32_t d32 = U32_AT(&header[16]);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
}
if (duration != 0 && mHeaderTimescale != 0 && duration < UINT64_MAX / 1000000) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
String8 s;
if (convertTimeToDate(creationTime, &s)) {
mFileMetaData->setCString(kKeyDate, s.string());
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'e', 'h', 'd'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t flags[4];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, flags, sizeof(flags))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t duration = 0;
if (flags[0] == 1) {
if (chunk_data_size < 12) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mDataSource->getUInt64(data_offset + 4, &duration);
if (duration == 0xffffffffffffffff) {
duration = 0;
}
} else if (flags[0] == 0) {
uint32_t d32;
mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &d32);
if (d32 == 0xffffffff) {
d32 = 0;
}
duration = d32;
} else {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (duration != 0 && mHeaderTimescale != 0) {
mFileMetaData->setInt64(kKeyDuration, duration * 1000000 / mHeaderTimescale);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'):
{
ALOGV("mdat chunk, drm: %d", mIsDrm);
mMdatFound = true;
if (!mIsDrm) {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
return parseDrmSINF(offset, data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('h', 'd', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (underQTMetaPath(mPath, 3)) {
break;
}
uint32_t buffer;
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, &buffer, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint32_t type = ntohl(buffer);
if (type == FOURCC('t', 'e', 'x', 't') || type == FOURCC('s', 'b', 't', 'l')) {
if (mLastTrack != NULL) {
mLastTrack->meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_TEXT_3GPP);
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('k', 'e', 'y', 's'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (underQTMetaPath(mPath, 3)) {
status_t err = parseQTMetaKey(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'e', 'x'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 24) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
Trex trex;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 4, &trex.track_ID) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 8, &trex.default_sample_description_index) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 12, &trex.default_sample_duration) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 16, &trex.default_sample_size) ||
!mDataSource->getUInt32(data_offset + 20, &trex.default_sample_flags)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
mTrex.add(trex);
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'x', '3', 'g'):
{
if (mLastTrack == NULL)
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
uint32_t type;
const void *data;
size_t size = 0;
if (!mLastTrack->meta->findData(
kKeyTextFormatData, &type, &data, &size)) {
size = 0;
}
if ((chunk_size > SIZE_MAX) || (SIZE_MAX - chunk_size <= size)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t *buffer = new (std::nothrow) uint8_t[size + chunk_size];
if (buffer == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (size > 0) {
memcpy(buffer, data, size);
}
if ((size_t)(mDataSource->readAt(*offset, buffer + size, chunk_size))
< chunk_size) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
*offset += chunk_size;
return ERROR_IO;
}
mLastTrack->meta->setData(
kKeyTextFormatData, 0, buffer, size + chunk_size);
delete[] buffer;
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'v', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (mFileMetaData != NULL) {
ALOGV("chunk_data_size = %" PRId64 " and data_offset = %" PRId64,
chunk_data_size, data_offset);
if (chunk_data_size < 0 || static_cast<uint64_t>(chunk_data_size) >= SIZE_MAX - 1) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(chunk_data_size + 1);
if (buffer->data() == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/28471206");
return NO_MEMORY;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, buffer->data(), chunk_data_size) != (ssize_t)chunk_data_size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
const int kSkipBytesOfDataBox = 16;
if (chunk_data_size <= kSkipBytesOfDataBox) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mFileMetaData->setData(
kKeyAlbumArt, MetaData::TYPE_NONE,
buffer->data() + kSkipBytesOfDataBox, chunk_data_size - kSkipBytesOfDataBox);
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('c', 'o', 'l', 'r'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (depth >= 2 && mPath[depth - 2] == FOURCC('s', 't', 's', 'd')) {
status_t err = parseColorInfo(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'i', 't', 'l'):
case FOURCC('p', 'e', 'r', 'f'):
case FOURCC('a', 'u', 't', 'h'):
case FOURCC('g', 'n', 'r', 'e'):
case FOURCC('a', 'l', 'b', 'm'):
case FOURCC('y', 'r', 'r', 'c'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
status_t err = parse3GPPMetaData(data_offset, chunk_data_size, depth);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('I', 'D', '3', '2'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
if (chunk_data_size < 6) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
parseID3v2MetaData(data_offset + 6);
break;
}
case FOURCC('-', '-', '-', '-'):
{
mLastCommentMean.clear();
mLastCommentName.clear();
mLastCommentData.clear();
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'i', 'd', 'x'):
{
status_t err = parseSegmentIndex(data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
*offset += chunk_size;
return UNKNOWN_ERROR; // stop parsing after sidx
}
case FOURCC('a', 'c', '-', '3'):
{
*offset += chunk_size;
return parseAC3SampleEntry(data_offset);
}
case FOURCC('f', 't', 'y', 'p'):
{
if (chunk_data_size < 8 || depth != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
uint32_t numCompatibleBrands = (chunk_data_size - 8) / 4;
for (size_t i = 0; i < numCompatibleBrands + 2; ++i) {
if (i == 1) {
continue;
}
uint32_t brand;
if (mDataSource->readAt(data_offset + 4 * i, &brand, 4) < 4) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
brand = ntohl(brand);
if (brand == FOURCC('q', 't', ' ', ' ')) {
mIsQT = true;
break;
}
}
*offset = stop_offset;
break;
}
default:
{
if (underQTMetaPath(mPath, 3)) {
status_t err = parseQTMetaVal(chunk_type, data_offset, chunk_data_size);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Skip track if verification fails
Bug: 62187433
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: Ib9b0b6de88d046d8149e9ea5073d6c40ffec7b0c
(cherry picked from commit ef8c7830d838d877e6b37b75b47294b064c79397)
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: pgp_parse_and_set_pubkey_output(sc_card_t *card, u8* data, size_t data_len,
sc_cardctl_openpgp_keygen_info_t *key_info)
{
time_t ctime = 0;
u8 *in = data;
u8 *modulus = NULL;
u8 *exponent = NULL;
int r;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
/* store creation time */
r = pgp_store_creationtime(card, key_info->keytype, &ctime);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Cannot store creation time");
/* parse response. Ref: pgp_enumerate_blob() */
while (data_len > (size_t) (in - data)) {
unsigned int cla, tag, tmptag;
size_t len;
u8 *part = in;
/* parse TLV structure */
r = sc_asn1_read_tag((const u8**)&part,
data_len - (in - data),
&cla, &tag, &len);
if (part == NULL)
r = SC_ERROR_ASN1_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND;
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Unexpected end of contents.");
/* undo ASN1's split of tag & class */
for (tmptag = tag; tmptag > 0x0FF; tmptag >>= 8) {
cla <<= 8;
}
tag |= cla;
if (tag == 0x0081) {
/* set the output data */
if (key_info->modulus) {
memcpy(key_info->modulus, part, len);
}
/* always set output for modulus_len */
key_info->modulus_len = len*8;
/* remember the modulus to calculate fingerprint later */
modulus = part;
}
else if (tag == 0x0082) {
/* set the output data */
if (key_info->exponent) {
memcpy(key_info->exponent, part, len);
}
/* always set output for exponent_len */
key_info->exponent_len = len*8;
/* remember the exponent to calculate fingerprint later */
exponent = part;
}
/* go to next part to parse */
/* This will be different from pgp_enumerate_blob() a bit */
in = part + ((tag != 0x7F49) ? len : 0);
}
/* calculate and store fingerprint */
sc_log(card->ctx, "Calculate and store fingerprint");
r = pgp_calculate_and_store_fingerprint(card, ctime, modulus, exponent, key_info);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "Cannot store fingerprint.");
/* update pubkey blobs (B601,B801, A401) */
sc_log(card->ctx, "Update blobs holding pubkey info.");
r = pgp_update_pubkey_blob(card, modulus, key_info->modulus_len,
exponent, key_info->exponent_len, key_info->keytype);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int xen_netbk_tx_check_gop(struct xen_netbk *netbk,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct gnttab_copy **gopp)
{
struct gnttab_copy *gop = *gopp;
u16 pending_idx = *((u16 *)skb->data);
struct pending_tx_info *pending_tx_info = netbk->pending_tx_info;
struct xenvif *vif = pending_tx_info[pending_idx].vif;
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp;
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
int nr_frags = shinfo->nr_frags;
int i, err, start;
/* Check status of header. */
err = gop->status;
if (unlikely(err)) {
pending_ring_idx_t index;
index = pending_index(netbk->pending_prod++);
txp = &pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
make_tx_response(vif, txp, XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR);
netbk->pending_ring[index] = pending_idx;
xenvif_put(vif);
}
/* Skip first skb fragment if it is on same page as header fragment. */
start = (frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[0]) == pending_idx);
for (i = start; i < nr_frags; i++) {
int j, newerr;
pending_ring_idx_t index;
pending_idx = frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[i]);
/* Check error status: if okay then remember grant handle. */
newerr = (++gop)->status;
if (likely(!newerr)) {
/* Had a previous error? Invalidate this fragment. */
if (unlikely(err))
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx);
continue;
}
/* Error on this fragment: respond to client with an error. */
txp = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
make_tx_response(vif, txp, XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR);
index = pending_index(netbk->pending_prod++);
netbk->pending_ring[index] = pending_idx;
xenvif_put(vif);
/* Not the first error? Preceding frags already invalidated. */
if (err)
continue;
/* First error: invalidate header and preceding fragments. */
pending_idx = *((u16 *)skb->data);
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx);
for (j = start; j < i; j++) {
pending_idx = frag_get_pending_idx(&shinfo->frags[j]);
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx);
}
/* Remember the error: invalidate all subsequent fragments. */
err = newerr;
}
*gopp = gop + 1;
return err;
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: server_partial_file_request(struct httpd *env, struct client *clt, char *path,
struct stat *st, char *range_str)
{
struct server_config *srv_conf = clt->clt_srv_conf;
struct http_descriptor *resp = clt->clt_descresp;
struct http_descriptor *desc = clt->clt_descreq;
struct media_type *media, multipart_media;
struct range *range;
struct evbuffer *evb = NULL;
size_t content_length;
int code = 500, fd = -1, i, nranges, ret;
uint32_t boundary;
char content_range[64];
const char *errstr = NULL;
/* Ignore range request for methods other than GET */
if (desc->http_method != HTTP_METHOD_GET)
return server_file_request(env, clt, path, st);
if ((range = parse_range(range_str, st->st_size, &nranges)) == NULL) {
code = 416;
(void)snprintf(content_range, sizeof(content_range),
"bytes */%lld", st->st_size);
errstr = content_range;
goto abort;
}
/* Now open the file, should be readable or we have another problem */
if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
goto abort;
media = media_find_config(env, srv_conf, path);
if ((evb = evbuffer_new()) == NULL) {
errstr = "failed to allocate file buffer";
goto abort;
}
if (nranges == 1) {
(void)snprintf(content_range, sizeof(content_range),
"bytes %lld-%lld/%lld", range->start, range->end,
st->st_size);
if (kv_add(&resp->http_headers, "Content-Range",
content_range) == NULL)
goto abort;
content_length = range->end - range->start + 1;
if (buffer_add_range(fd, evb, range) == 0)
goto abort;
} else {
content_length = 0;
boundary = arc4random();
/* Generate a multipart payload of byteranges */
while (nranges--) {
if ((i = evbuffer_add_printf(evb, "\r\n--%ud\r\n",
boundary)) == -1)
goto abort;
content_length += i;
if ((i = evbuffer_add_printf(evb,
"Content-Type: %s/%s\r\n",
media->media_type, media->media_subtype)) == -1)
goto abort;
content_length += i;
if ((i = evbuffer_add_printf(evb,
"Content-Range: bytes %lld-%lld/%lld\r\n\r\n",
range->start, range->end, st->st_size)) == -1)
goto abort;
content_length += i;
if (buffer_add_range(fd, evb, range) == 0)
goto abort;
content_length += range->end - range->start + 1;
range++;
}
if ((i = evbuffer_add_printf(evb, "\r\n--%ud--\r\n",
boundary)) == -1)
goto abort;
content_length += i;
/* prepare multipart/byteranges media type */
(void)strlcpy(multipart_media.media_type, "multipart",
sizeof(multipart_media.media_type));
(void)snprintf(multipart_media.media_subtype,
sizeof(multipart_media.media_subtype),
"byteranges; boundary=%ud", boundary);
media = &multipart_media;
}
close(fd);
fd = -1;
ret = server_response_http(clt, 206, media, content_length,
MINIMUM(time(NULL), st->st_mtim.tv_sec));
switch (ret) {
case -1:
goto fail;
case 0:
/* Connection is already finished */
goto done;
default:
break;
}
if (server_bufferevent_write_buffer(clt, evb) == -1)
goto fail;
bufferevent_enable(clt->clt_bev, EV_READ|EV_WRITE);
if (clt->clt_persist)
clt->clt_toread = TOREAD_HTTP_HEADER;
else
clt->clt_toread = TOREAD_HTTP_NONE;
clt->clt_done = 0;
done:
evbuffer_free(evb);
server_reset_http(clt);
return (0);
fail:
bufferevent_disable(clt->clt_bev, EV_READ|EV_WRITE);
bufferevent_free(clt->clt_bev);
clt->clt_bev = NULL;
abort:
if (evb != NULL)
evbuffer_free(evb);
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
if (errstr == NULL)
errstr = strerror(errno);
server_abort_http(clt, code, errstr);
return (-1);
}
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
CWE ID: CWE-770
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static u64 construct_eptp(unsigned long root_hpa)
{
u64 eptp;
/* TODO write the value reading from MSR */
eptp = VMX_EPT_DEFAULT_MT |
VMX_EPT_DEFAULT_GAW << VMX_EPT_GAW_EPTP_SHIFT;
if (enable_ept_ad_bits)
eptp |= VMX_EPT_AD_ENABLE_BIT;
eptp |= (root_hpa & PAGE_MASK);
return eptp;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: std::string Backtrace::GetFunctionName(uintptr_t pc, uintptr_t* offset) {
std::string func_name = GetFunctionNameRaw(pc, offset);
if (!func_name.empty()) {
#if defined(__APPLE__)
if (func_name[0] != '_') {
return func_name;
}
#endif
char* name = __cxa_demangle(func_name.c_str(), 0, 0, 0);
if (name) {
func_name = name;
free(name);
}
}
return func_name;
}
Commit Message: Don't demangle symbol names.
Bug: http://b/27299236
Change-Id: I26ef47f80d4d6048a316ba51e83365ff65d70439
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void put_filp(struct file *file)
{
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
security_file_free(file);
file_sb_list_del(file);
file_free(file);
}
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void reds_link_free(RedLinkInfo *link)
{
reds_stream_free(link->stream);
link->stream = NULL;
free(link->link_mess);
link->link_mess = NULL;
BN_free(link->tiTicketing.bn);
link->tiTicketing.bn = NULL;
if (link->tiTicketing.rsa) {
RSA_free(link->tiTicketing.rsa);
link->tiTicketing.rsa = NULL;
}
free(link);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int fanout_add(struct sock *sk, u16 id, u16 type_flags)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_fanout *f, *match;
u8 type = type_flags & 0xff;
u8 flags = type_flags >> 8;
int err;
switch (type) {
case PACKET_FANOUT_ROLLOVER:
if (type_flags & PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_ROLLOVER)
return -EINVAL;
case PACKET_FANOUT_HASH:
case PACKET_FANOUT_LB:
case PACKET_FANOUT_CPU:
case PACKET_FANOUT_RND:
case PACKET_FANOUT_QM:
case PACKET_FANOUT_CBPF:
case PACKET_FANOUT_EBPF:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!po->running)
return -EINVAL;
if (po->fanout)
return -EALREADY;
if (type == PACKET_FANOUT_ROLLOVER ||
(type_flags & PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_ROLLOVER)) {
po->rollover = kzalloc(sizeof(*po->rollover), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!po->rollover)
return -ENOMEM;
atomic_long_set(&po->rollover->num, 0);
atomic_long_set(&po->rollover->num_huge, 0);
atomic_long_set(&po->rollover->num_failed, 0);
}
mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
match = NULL;
list_for_each_entry(f, &fanout_list, list) {
if (f->id == id &&
read_pnet(&f->net) == sock_net(sk)) {
match = f;
break;
}
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (match && match->flags != flags)
goto out;
if (!match) {
err = -ENOMEM;
match = kzalloc(sizeof(*match), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!match)
goto out;
write_pnet(&match->net, sock_net(sk));
match->id = id;
match->type = type;
match->flags = flags;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&match->list);
spin_lock_init(&match->lock);
atomic_set(&match->sk_ref, 0);
fanout_init_data(match);
match->prot_hook.type = po->prot_hook.type;
match->prot_hook.dev = po->prot_hook.dev;
match->prot_hook.func = packet_rcv_fanout;
match->prot_hook.af_packet_priv = match;
match->prot_hook.id_match = match_fanout_group;
dev_add_pack(&match->prot_hook);
list_add(&match->list, &fanout_list);
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (match->type == type &&
match->prot_hook.type == po->prot_hook.type &&
match->prot_hook.dev == po->prot_hook.dev) {
err = -ENOSPC;
if (atomic_read(&match->sk_ref) < PACKET_FANOUT_MAX) {
__dev_remove_pack(&po->prot_hook);
po->fanout = match;
atomic_inc(&match->sk_ref);
__fanout_link(sk, po);
err = 0;
}
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
if (err) {
kfree(po->rollover);
po->rollover = NULL;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix races in fanout_add()
Multiple threads can call fanout_add() at the same time.
We need to grab fanout_mutex earlier to avoid races that could
lead to one thread freeing po->rollover that was set by another thread.
Do the same in fanout_release(), for peace of mind, and to help us
finding lockdep issues earlier.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Fixes: 0648ab70afe6 ("packet: rollover prepare: per-socket state")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterXWDImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("XWD","XWD","X Windows system window dump (color)");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_X11_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadXWDImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteXWDImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsXWD;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1553
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: generate_trivial (DBusMessageDataIter *iter,
DBusString *data,
DBusValidity *expected_validity)
{
return generate_outer (iter, data, expected_validity,
generate_trivial_inner);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int i8042_controller_check(void)
{
if (i8042_flush()) {
pr_info("No controller found\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <[email protected]>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int jpc_pi_nextpcrl(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
int rlvlno;
jpc_pirlvl_t *pirlvl;
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int prchind;
int prcvind;
int *prclyrno;
int compno;
jpc_picomp_t *picomp;
int xstep;
int ystep;
uint_fast32_t trx0;
uint_fast32_t try0;
uint_fast32_t r;
uint_fast32_t rpx;
uint_fast32_t rpy;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
goto skip;
} else {
pi->xstep = 0;
pi->ystep = 0;
for (compno = 0, picomp = pi->picomps; compno < pi->numcomps;
++compno, ++picomp) {
for (rlvlno = 0, pirlvl = picomp->pirlvls; rlvlno <
picomp->numrlvls; ++rlvlno, ++pirlvl) {
xstep = picomp->hsamp * (1 <<
(pirlvl->prcwidthexpn + picomp->numrlvls -
rlvlno - 1));
ystep = picomp->vsamp * (1 <<
(pirlvl->prcheightexpn + picomp->numrlvls -
rlvlno - 1));
pi->xstep = (!pi->xstep) ? xstep :
JAS_MIN(pi->xstep, xstep);
pi->ystep = (!pi->ystep) ? ystep :
JAS_MIN(pi->ystep, ystep);
}
}
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->y = pi->ystart; pi->y < pi->yend; pi->y += pi->ystep -
(pi->y % pi->ystep)) {
for (pi->x = pi->xstart; pi->x < pi->xend; pi->x += pi->xstep -
(pi->x % pi->xstep)) {
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart, pi->picomp =
&pi->picomps[pi->compno]; pi->compno < pi->numcomps
&& pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend); ++pi->compno,
++pi->picomp) {
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart,
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
pi->rlvlno < pi->picomp->numrlvls &&
pi->rlvlno < pchg->rlvlnoend; ++pi->rlvlno,
++pi->pirlvl) {
if (pi->pirlvl->numprcs == 0) {
continue;
}
r = pi->picomp->numrlvls - 1 - pi->rlvlno;
trx0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->xstart, pi->picomp->hsamp << r);
try0 = JPC_CEILDIV(pi->ystart, pi->picomp->vsamp << r);
rpx = r + pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rpy = r + pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn;
if (((pi->x == pi->xstart && ((trx0 << r) % (1 << rpx))) ||
!(pi->x % (pi->picomp->hsamp << rpx))) &&
((pi->y == pi->ystart && ((try0 << r) % (1 << rpy))) ||
!(pi->y % (pi->picomp->vsamp << rpy)))) {
prchind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->x, pi->picomp->hsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(trx0,
pi->pirlvl->prcwidthexpn);
prcvind = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(JPC_CEILDIV(pi->y, pi->picomp->vsamp
<< r), pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn) - JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(try0,
pi->pirlvl->prcheightexpn);
pi->prcno = prcvind * pi->pirlvl->numhprcs + prchind;
assert(pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno < pi->numlyrs &&
pi->lyrno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->lyrnoend); ++pi->lyrno) {
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed numerous integer overflow problems in the code for packet iterators
in the JPC decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool SampleTable::isValid() const {
return mChunkOffsetOffset >= 0
&& mSampleToChunkOffset >= 0
&& mSampleSizeOffset >= 0
&& mHasTimeToSample;
}
Commit Message: Fix 'potential memory leak' compiler warning.
This CL fixes the following compiler warning:
frameworks/av/media/libstagefright/SampleTable.cpp:569:9: warning:
Memory allocated by 'new[]' should be deallocated by 'delete[]', not
'delete'.
Bug: 33137046
Test: Compiled with change; no warning generated.
Change-Id: I29abd90e02bf482fa840d1f7206ebbdacf7dfa37
(cherry picked from commit 158c197b668ad684f92829db6a31bee3aec794ba)
(cherry picked from commit 37c428cd521351837fccb6864f509f996820b234)
CWE ID: CWE-772
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int hmac_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct shash_instance *inst;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
struct shash_alg *salg;
int err;
int ds;
int ss;
err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SHASH);
if (err)
return err;
salg = shash_attr_alg(tb[1], 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(salg))
return PTR_ERR(salg);
err = -EINVAL;
ds = salg->digestsize;
ss = salg->statesize;
alg = &salg->base;
if (ds > alg->cra_blocksize ||
ss < alg->cra_blocksize)
goto out_put_alg;
inst = shash_alloc_instance("hmac", alg);
err = PTR_ERR(inst);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto out_put_alg;
err = crypto_init_shash_spawn(shash_instance_ctx(inst), salg,
shash_crypto_instance(inst));
if (err)
goto out_free_inst;
inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
ss = ALIGN(ss, alg->cra_alignmask + 1);
inst->alg.digestsize = ds;
inst->alg.statesize = ss;
inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct hmac_ctx) +
ALIGN(ss * 2, crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment());
inst->alg.base.cra_init = hmac_init_tfm;
inst->alg.base.cra_exit = hmac_exit_tfm;
inst->alg.init = hmac_init;
inst->alg.update = hmac_update;
inst->alg.final = hmac_final;
inst->alg.finup = hmac_finup;
inst->alg.export = hmac_export;
inst->alg.import = hmac_import;
inst->alg.setkey = hmac_setkey;
err = shash_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
if (err) {
out_free_inst:
shash_free_instance(shash_crypto_instance(inst));
}
out_put_alg:
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed
Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash
algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))"
through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC
being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being
called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow.
This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real
problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3)
because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer,
and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that,
but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent
hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything.
Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC
template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed.
Here is a reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main()
{
int algfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "hash",
.salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))",
};
char key[4096] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
}
Here was the KASAN report from syzbot:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044
CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109
shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172
crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186
hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66
crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64
shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207
crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200
hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446
alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline]
alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: GDataEntry* GDataEntry::FromDocumentEntry(
GDataDirectory* parent,
DocumentEntry* doc,
GDataDirectoryService* directory_service) {
DCHECK(doc);
if (doc->is_folder())
return GDataDirectory::FromDocumentEntry(parent, doc, directory_service);
else if (doc->is_hosted_document() || doc->is_file())
return GDataFile::FromDocumentEntry(parent, doc, directory_service);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, serialize)
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = (spl_SplObjectStorage*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element;
zval members, *pmembers, *flags;
HashPosition pos;
php_serialize_data_t var_hash;
smart_str buf = {0};
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
PHP_VAR_SERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
/* storage */
smart_str_appendl(&buf, "x:", 2);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(flags);
ZVAL_LONG(flags, zend_hash_num_elements(&intern->storage));
php_var_serialize(&buf, &flags, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor(&flags);
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(&intern->storage, &pos);
while(zend_hash_has_more_elements_ex(&intern->storage, &pos) == SUCCESS) {
if (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(&intern->storage, (void**)&element, &pos) == FAILURE) {
smart_str_free(&buf);
PHP_VAR_SERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
RETURN_NULL();
}
php_var_serialize(&buf, &element->obj, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_appendc(&buf, ',');
php_var_serialize(&buf, &element->inf, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC);
smart_str_appendc(&buf, ';');
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(&intern->storage, &pos);
}
/* members */
smart_str_appendl(&buf, "m:", 2);
INIT_PZVAL(&members);
Z_ARRVAL(members) = zend_std_get_properties(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE(members) = IS_ARRAY;
pmembers = &members;
php_var_serialize(&buf, &pmembers, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC); /* finishes the string */
/* done */
PHP_VAR_SERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
if (buf.c) {
RETURN_STRINGL(buf.c, buf.len, 0);
} else {
RETURN_NULL();
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplObjectStorage::unserialize(string serialized)
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int dv_extract_video_info(DVDemuxContext *c, uint8_t* frame)
{
const uint8_t* vsc_pack;
AVCodecContext* avctx;
int apt, is16_9;
int size = 0;
if (c->sys) {
avctx = c->vst->codec;
avpriv_set_pts_info(c->vst, 64, c->sys->time_base.num,
c->sys->time_base.den);
avctx->time_base= c->sys->time_base;
if (!avctx->width){
avctx->width = c->sys->width;
avctx->height = c->sys->height;
}
avctx->pix_fmt = c->sys->pix_fmt;
/* finding out SAR is a little bit messy */
vsc_pack = dv_extract_pack(frame, dv_video_control);
apt = frame[4] & 0x07;
is16_9 = (vsc_pack && ((vsc_pack[2] & 0x07) == 0x02 ||
(!apt && (vsc_pack[2] & 0x07) == 0x07)));
c->vst->sample_aspect_ratio = c->sys->sar[is16_9];
avctx->bit_rate = av_rescale_q(c->sys->frame_size, (AVRational){8,1},
c->sys->time_base);
size = c->sys->frame_size;
}
return size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: dissect_rpcap_packet (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *top_tree,
proto_tree *parent_tree, gint offset, proto_item *top_item)
{
proto_tree *tree;
proto_item *ti;
nstime_t ts;
tvbuff_t *new_tvb;
guint caplen, len, frame_no;
gint reported_length_remaining;
ti = proto_tree_add_item (parent_tree, hf_packet, tvb, offset, 20, ENC_NA);
tree = proto_item_add_subtree (ti, ett_packet);
ts.secs = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
ts.nsecs = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset + 4) * 1000;
proto_tree_add_time(tree, hf_timestamp, tvb, offset, 8, &ts);
offset += 8;
caplen = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
ti = proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_caplen, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
len = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_len, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
frame_no = tvb_get_ntohl (tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item (tree, hf_npkt, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
proto_item_append_text (ti, ", Frame %u", frame_no);
proto_item_append_text (top_item, " Frame %u", frame_no);
/*
* reported_length_remaining should not be -1, as offset is at
* most right past the end of the available data in the packet.
*/
reported_length_remaining = tvb_reported_length_remaining (tvb, offset);
if (caplen > (guint)reported_length_remaining) {
expert_add_info(pinfo, ti, &ei_caplen_too_big);
return;
}
new_tvb = tvb_new_subset (tvb, offset, caplen, len);
if (decode_content && linktype != WTAP_ENCAP_UNKNOWN) {
dissector_try_uint(wtap_encap_dissector_table, linktype, new_tvb, pinfo, top_tree);
if (!info_added) {
/* Only indicate when not added before */
/* Indicate RPCAP in the protocol column */
col_prepend_fence_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "R|");
/* Indicate RPCAP in the info column */
col_prepend_fence_fstr (pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Remote | ");
info_added = TRUE;
register_frame_end_routine(pinfo, rpcap_frame_end);
}
} else {
if (linktype == WTAP_ENCAP_UNKNOWN) {
proto_item_append_text (ti, ", Unknown link-layer type");
}
call_dissector (data_handle, new_tvb, pinfo, top_tree);
}
}
Commit Message: The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void WebsiteSettingsPopupView::OnWidgetDestroying(views::Widget* widget) {
is_popup_showing = false;
presenter_->OnUIClosing();
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool PermissionUtil::GetPermissionType(ContentSettingsType type,
PermissionType* out) {
if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_GEOLOCATION) {
*out = PermissionType::GEOLOCATION;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_NOTIFICATIONS) {
*out = PermissionType::NOTIFICATIONS;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PUSH_MESSAGING) {
*out = PermissionType::PUSH_MESSAGING;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MIDI_SYSEX) {
*out = PermissionType::MIDI_SYSEX;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_DURABLE_STORAGE) {
*out = PermissionType::DURABLE_STORAGE;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_CAMERA) {
*out = PermissionType::VIDEO_CAPTURE;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_MIC) {
*out = PermissionType::AUDIO_CAPTURE;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_BACKGROUND_SYNC) {
*out = PermissionType::BACKGROUND_SYNC;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PLUGINS) {
*out = PermissionType::FLASH;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PROTECTED_MEDIA_IDENTIFIER) {
*out = PermissionType::PROTECTED_MEDIA_IDENTIFIER;
#endif
} else {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: PermissionUtil::GetPermissionType needs to handle MIDI
After the recent PermissionManager's change, it calls
GetPermissionType even for CONTENT_SETTING_TYPE_MIDI.
BUG=697771
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454231}
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: long long mkvparser::UnserializeUInt(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size)
{
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
if ((size <= 0) || (size > 8))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long long result = 0;
for (long long i = 0; i < size; ++i)
{
unsigned char b;
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0)
return status;
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void WebPagePrivate::syncProxyCredential(const WebCore::Credential& credential)
{
m_client->syncProxyCredential(credential.user(), credential.password());
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void InitRenderViewHostForExtensions(RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
SiteInstance* site_instance = render_view_host->site_instance();
const GURL& site = site_instance->site();
if (!site.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme))
return;
Profile* profile = site_instance->browsing_instance()->profile();
ExtensionService* service = profile->GetExtensionService();
if (!service)
return;
ExtensionProcessManager* process_manager =
profile->GetExtensionProcessManager();
CHECK(process_manager);
const Extension* extension = service->GetExtensionByURL(site);
if (!extension)
return;
site_instance->GetProcess()->mark_is_extension_process();
process_manager->RegisterExtensionSiteInstance(site_instance->id(),
extension->id());
RenderProcessHost* process = render_view_host->process();
if (extension->is_app()) {
render_view_host->Send(
new ExtensionMsg_ActivateApplication(extension->id()));
service->SetInstalledAppForRenderer(process->id(), extension);
}
Extension::Type type = extension->GetType();
if (type == Extension::TYPE_EXTENSION ||
type == Extension::TYPE_PACKAGED_APP) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance()->GrantScheme(
process->id(), chrome::kChromeUIScheme);
}
if (type == Extension::TYPE_EXTENSION ||
type == Extension::TYPE_USER_SCRIPT ||
type == Extension::TYPE_PACKAGED_APP ||
(type == Extension::TYPE_HOSTED_APP &&
extension->location() == Extension::COMPONENT)) {
render_view_host->Send(new ExtensionMsg_ActivateExtension(extension->id()));
render_view_host->AllowBindings(BindingsPolicy::EXTENSION);
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u32 mtu;
struct iphdr *iph; /* Our header */
struct rtable *rt; /* Route we use */
struct ip_options *opt = &(IPCB(skb)->opt);
/* that should never happen */
if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_HOST)
goto drop;
if (skb_warn_if_lro(skb))
goto drop;
if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_FWD, skb))
goto drop;
if (IPCB(skb)->opt.router_alert && ip_call_ra_chain(skb))
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
skb_forward_csum(skb);
/*
* According to the RFC, we must first decrease the TTL field. If
* that reaches zero, we must reply an ICMP control message telling
* that the packet's lifetime expired.
*/
if (ip_hdr(skb)->ttl <= 1)
goto too_many_hops;
if (!xfrm4_route_forward(skb))
goto drop;
rt = skb_rtable(skb);
if (opt->is_strictroute && rt->rt_uses_gateway)
goto sr_failed;
IPCB(skb)->flags |= IPSKB_FORWARDED;
mtu = ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward(&rt->dst, true);
if (!ip_may_fragment(skb) && ip_exceeds_mtu(skb, mtu)) {
IP_INC_STATS(dev_net(rt->dst.dev), IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS);
icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED,
htonl(mtu));
goto drop;
}
/* We are about to mangle packet. Copy it! */
if (skb_cow(skb, LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev)+rt->dst.header_len))
goto drop;
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
/* Decrease ttl after skb cow done */
ip_decrease_ttl(iph);
/*
* We now generate an ICMP HOST REDIRECT giving the route
* we calculated.
*/
if (rt->rt_flags&RTCF_DOREDIRECT && !opt->srr && !skb_sec_path(skb))
ip_rt_send_redirect(skb);
skb->priority = rt_tos2priority(iph->tos);
return NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV4, NF_INET_FORWARD, skb, skb->dev,
rt->dst.dev, ip_forward_finish);
sr_failed:
/*
* Strict routing permits no gatewaying
*/
icmp_send(skb, ICMP_DEST_UNREACH, ICMP_SR_FAILED, 0);
goto drop;
too_many_hops:
/* Tell the sender its packet died... */
IP_INC_STATS_BH(dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev), IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
icmp_send(skb, ICMP_TIME_EXCEEDED, ICMP_EXC_TTL, 0);
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_DROP;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int BN_GF2m_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
const int max = BN_num_bits(p) + 1;
int *arr = NULL;
bn_check_top(a);
bn_check_top(b);
bn_check_top(p);
if ((arr = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*arr) * max)) == NULL)
goto err;
ret = BN_GF2m_poly2arr(p, arr, max);
if (!ret || ret > max) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_GF2M_MOD_MUL, BN_R_INVALID_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
ret = BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr(r, a, b, arr, ctx);
bn_check_top(r);
err:
OPENSSL_free(arr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: bn/bn_gf2m.c: avoid infinite loop wich malformed ECParamters.
CVE-2015-1788
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int ecryptfs_destroy_crypto(void)
{
struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *key_tfm, *key_tfm_tmp;
mutex_lock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
list_for_each_entry_safe(key_tfm, key_tfm_tmp, &key_tfm_list,
key_tfm_list) {
list_del(&key_tfm->key_tfm_list);
if (key_tfm->key_tfm)
crypto_free_blkcipher(key_tfm->key_tfm);
kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, key_tfm);
}
mutex_unlock(&key_tfm_list_mutex);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: explicit HeaderTestDispatcherHostDelegate(const GURL& watch_url)
: watch_url_(watch_url) {}
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int phar_check_str(const char *fname, const char *ext_str, int ext_len, int executable, int for_create TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char test[51];
const char *pos;
if (ext_len >= 50) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (executable == 1) {
/* copy "." as well */
memcpy(test, ext_str - 1, ext_len + 1);
test[ext_len + 1] = '\0';
/* executable phars must contain ".phar" as a valid extension (phar://.pharmy/oops is invalid) */
/* (phar://hi/there/.phar/oops is also invalid) */
pos = strstr(test, ".phar");
if (pos && (*(pos - 1) != '/')
&& (pos += 5) && (*pos == '\0' || *pos == '/' || *pos == '.')) {
return phar_analyze_path(fname, ext_str, ext_len, for_create TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
return FAILURE;
}
}
/* data phars need only contain a single non-"." to be valid */
if (!executable) {
pos = strstr(ext_str, ".phar");
if (!(pos && (*(pos - 1) != '/')
&& (pos += 5) && (*pos == '\0' || *pos == '/' || *pos == '.')) && *(ext_str + 1) != '.' && *(ext_str + 1) != '/' && *(ext_str + 1) != '\0') {
return phar_analyze_path(fname, ext_str, ext_len, for_create TSRMLS_CC);
}
} else {
if (*(ext_str + 1) != '.' && *(ext_str + 1) != '/' && *(ext_str + 1) != '\0') {
return phar_analyze_path(fname, ext_str, ext_len, for_create TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
return FAILURE;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: DeviceOrientationController::DeviceOrientationController(Document* document)
: DeviceSensorEventController(document)
, DOMWindowLifecycleObserver(document->domWindow())
{
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: PepperMediaDeviceManager* PepperMediaDeviceManager::GetForRenderFrame(
RenderFrame* render_frame) {
PepperMediaDeviceManager* handler =
PepperMediaDeviceManager::Get(render_frame);
if (!handler)
handler = new PepperMediaDeviceManager(render_frame);
return handler;
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void ib_uverbs_release_file(struct kref *ref)
{
struct ib_uverbs_file *file =
container_of(ref, struct ib_uverbs_file, ref);
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
int srcu_key;
srcu_key = srcu_read_lock(&file->device->disassociate_srcu);
ib_dev = srcu_dereference(file->device->ib_dev,
&file->device->disassociate_srcu);
if (ib_dev && !ib_dev->disassociate_ucontext)
module_put(ib_dev->owner);
srcu_read_unlock(&file->device->disassociate_srcu, srcu_key);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&file->device->refcount))
ib_uverbs_comp_dev(file->device);
kfree(file);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetMountLibrary(
MountLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->mount_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: std::string DataUseUserData::GetServiceNameAsString(ServiceName service_name) {
switch (service_name) {
case SUGGESTIONS:
return "Suggestions";
case NOT_TAGGED:
return "NotTagged";
case TRANSLATE:
return "Translate";
case SYNC:
return "Sync";
case OMNIBOX:
return "Omnibox";
case INVALIDATION:
return "Invalidation";
case RAPPOR:
return "Rappor";
case VARIATIONS:
return "Variations";
case UMA:
return "UMA";
case DOMAIN_RELIABILITY:
return "DomainReliability";
case PROFILE_DOWNLOADER:
return "ProfileDownloader";
case GOOGLE_URL_TRACKER:
return "GoogleURLTracker";
case AUTOFILL:
return "Autofill";
case POLICY:
return "Policy";
case SPELL_CHECKER:
return "SpellChecker";
case NTP_SNIPPETS:
return "NTPSnippets";
case SAFE_BROWSING:
return "SafeBrowsing";
case DATA_REDUCTION_PROXY:
return "DataReductionProxy";
case PRECACHE:
return "Precache";
case NTP_TILES:
return "NTPTiles";
case FEEDBACK_UPLOADER:
return "FeedbackUploader";
case TRACING_UPLOADER:
return "TracingUploader";
case DOM_DISTILLER:
return "DOMDistiller";
case CLOUD_PRINT:
return "CloudPrint";
case SEARCH_PROVIDER_LOGOS:
return "SearchProviderLogos";
case UPDATE_CLIENT:
return "UpdateClient";
case GCM_DRIVER:
return "GCMDriver";
case WEB_HISTORY_SERVICE:
return "WebHistoryService";
case NETWORK_TIME_TRACKER:
return "NetworkTimeTracker";
case SUPERVISED_USER:
return "SupervisedUser";
case IMAGE_FETCHER_UNTAGGED:
return "ImageFetcherUntagged";
case GAIA:
return "GAIA";
}
return "INVALID";
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void v4l_printk_ioctl(unsigned int cmd)
{
char *dir, *type;
switch (_IOC_TYPE(cmd)) {
case 'd':
type = "v4l2_int";
break;
case 'V':
if (_IOC_NR(cmd) >= V4L2_IOCTLS) {
type = "v4l2";
break;
}
printk("%s", v4l2_ioctls[_IOC_NR(cmd)]);
return;
default:
type = "unknown";
}
switch (_IOC_DIR(cmd)) {
case _IOC_NONE: dir = "--"; break;
case _IOC_READ: dir = "r-"; break;
case _IOC_WRITE: dir = "-w"; break;
case _IOC_READ | _IOC_WRITE: dir = "rw"; break;
default: dir = "*ERR*"; break;
}
printk("%s ioctl '%c', dir=%s, #%d (0x%08x)",
type, _IOC_TYPE(cmd), dir, _IOC_NR(cmd), cmd);
}
Commit Message: [media] v4l: Share code between video_usercopy and video_ioctl2
The two functions are mostly identical. They handle the copy_from_user
and copy_to_user operations related with V4L2 ioctls and call the real
ioctl handler.
Create a __video_usercopy function that implements the core of
video_usercopy and video_ioctl2, and call that function from both.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int rtl8150_get_settings(struct net_device *netdev, struct ethtool_cmd *ecmd)
{
rtl8150_t *dev = netdev_priv(netdev);
short lpa, bmcr;
ecmd->supported = (SUPPORTED_10baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_10baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Half |
SUPPORTED_100baseT_Full |
SUPPORTED_Autoneg |
SUPPORTED_TP | SUPPORTED_MII);
ecmd->port = PORT_TP;
ecmd->transceiver = XCVR_INTERNAL;
ecmd->phy_address = dev->phy;
get_registers(dev, BMCR, 2, &bmcr);
get_registers(dev, ANLP, 2, &lpa);
if (bmcr & BMCR_ANENABLE) {
u32 speed = ((lpa & (LPA_100HALF | LPA_100FULL)) ?
SPEED_100 : SPEED_10);
ethtool_cmd_speed_set(ecmd, speed);
ecmd->autoneg = AUTONEG_ENABLE;
if (speed == SPEED_100)
ecmd->duplex = (lpa & LPA_100FULL) ?
DUPLEX_FULL : DUPLEX_HALF;
else
ecmd->duplex = (lpa & LPA_10FULL) ?
DUPLEX_FULL : DUPLEX_HALF;
} else {
ecmd->autoneg = AUTONEG_DISABLE;
ethtool_cmd_speed_set(ecmd, ((bmcr & BMCR_SPEED100) ?
SPEED_100 : SPEED_10));
ecmd->duplex = (bmcr & BMCR_FULLDPLX) ?
DUPLEX_FULL : DUPLEX_HALF;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: rtl8150: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static uint16_t transmit_data_on(int fd, uint8_t *data, uint16_t length) {
assert(data != NULL);
assert(length > 0);
uint16_t transmitted_length = 0;
while (length > 0) {
ssize_t ret = write(fd, data + transmitted_length, length);
switch (ret) {
case -1:
LOG_ERROR("In %s, error writing to the serial port with fd %d: %s", __func__, fd, strerror(errno));
return transmitted_length;
case 0:
return transmitted_length;
default:
transmitted_length += ret;
length -= ret;
break;
}
}
return transmitted_length;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: close_ops_fd (void)
{
SetupOp *op;
for (op = ops; op != NULL; op = op->next)
{
if (op->fd != -1)
{
(void) close (op->fd);
op->fd = -1;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Don't create our own temporary mount point for pivot_root
An attacker could pre-create /tmp/.bubblewrap-$UID and make it a
non-directory, non-symlink (in which case mounting our tmpfs would fail,
causing denial of service), or make it a symlink under their control
(potentially allowing bad things if the protected_symlinks sysctl is
not enabled).
Instead, temporarily mount the tmpfs on a directory that we are sure
exists and is not attacker-controlled. /tmp (the directory itself, not
a subdirectory) will do.
Fixes: #304
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=923557
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <[email protected]>
Closes: #305
Approved by: cgwalters
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableFeatureFromString(const std::string& name,
bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetFeatureEnabledFromString(name, enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents,
int index) {
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file)
{
if (inode_permission(file_inode(file), MAY_READ) < 0)
bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP;
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void FinishLoading() {
EXPECT_TRUE(active_loader());
data_provider()->DidFinishLoading();
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: beep_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
if (l_strnstart("MSG", 4, (const char *)bp, length)) /* A REQuest */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP MSG"));
else if (l_strnstart("RPY ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP RPY"));
else if (l_strnstart("ERR ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ERR"));
else if (l_strnstart("ANS ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ANS"));
else if (l_strnstart("NUL ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP NUL"));
else if (l_strnstart("SEQ ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP SEQ"));
else if (l_strnstart("END", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP END"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP (payload or undecoded)"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13010/BEEP: Do bounds checking when comparing strings.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: make_vers_array ()
{
SHELL_VAR *vv;
ARRAY *av;
char *s, d[32], b[INT_STRLEN_BOUND(int) + 1];
unbind_variable ("BASH_VERSINFO");
vv = make_new_array_variable ("BASH_VERSINFO");
av = array_cell (vv);
strcpy (d, dist_version);
s = strchr (d, '.');
if (s)
*s++ = '\0';
array_insert (av, 0, d);
array_insert (av, 1, s);
s = inttostr (patch_level, b, sizeof (b));
array_insert (av, 2, s);
s = inttostr (build_version, b, sizeof (b));
array_insert (av, 3, s);
array_insert (av, 4, release_status);
array_insert (av, 5, MACHTYPE);
VSETATTR (vv, att_readonly);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void __svc_rdma_free(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct svcxprt_rdma *rdma =
container_of(work, struct svcxprt_rdma, sc_work);
struct svc_xprt *xprt = &rdma->sc_xprt;
dprintk("svcrdma: %s(%p)\n", __func__, rdma);
if (rdma->sc_qp && !IS_ERR(rdma->sc_qp))
ib_drain_qp(rdma->sc_qp);
/* We should only be called from kref_put */
if (kref_read(&xprt->xpt_ref) != 0)
pr_err("svcrdma: sc_xprt still in use? (%d)\n",
kref_read(&xprt->xpt_ref));
/*
* Destroy queued, but not processed read completions. Note
* that this cleanup has to be done before destroying the
* cm_id because the device ptr is needed to unmap the dma in
* svc_rdma_put_context.
*/
while (!list_empty(&rdma->sc_read_complete_q)) {
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
ctxt = list_first_entry(&rdma->sc_read_complete_q,
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt, list);
list_del(&ctxt->list);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
}
/* Destroy queued, but not processed recv completions */
while (!list_empty(&rdma->sc_rq_dto_q)) {
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
ctxt = list_first_entry(&rdma->sc_rq_dto_q,
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt, list);
list_del(&ctxt->list);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
}
/* Warn if we leaked a resource or under-referenced */
if (rdma->sc_ctxt_used != 0)
pr_err("svcrdma: ctxt still in use? (%d)\n",
rdma->sc_ctxt_used);
/* Final put of backchannel client transport */
if (xprt->xpt_bc_xprt) {
xprt_put(xprt->xpt_bc_xprt);
xprt->xpt_bc_xprt = NULL;
}
rdma_dealloc_frmr_q(rdma);
svc_rdma_destroy_ctxts(rdma);
svc_rdma_destroy_maps(rdma);
/* Destroy the QP if present (not a listener) */
if (rdma->sc_qp && !IS_ERR(rdma->sc_qp))
ib_destroy_qp(rdma->sc_qp);
if (rdma->sc_sq_cq && !IS_ERR(rdma->sc_sq_cq))
ib_free_cq(rdma->sc_sq_cq);
if (rdma->sc_rq_cq && !IS_ERR(rdma->sc_rq_cq))
ib_free_cq(rdma->sc_rq_cq);
if (rdma->sc_pd && !IS_ERR(rdma->sc_pd))
ib_dealloc_pd(rdma->sc_pd);
/* Destroy the CM ID */
rdma_destroy_id(rdma->sc_cm_id);
kfree(rdma);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void get_icu_value_src_php( char* tag_name, INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS)
{
const char* loc_name = NULL;
int loc_name_len = 0;
char* tag_value = NULL;
char* empty_result = "";
int result = 0;
char* msg = NULL;
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
intl_error_reset( NULL TSRMLS_CC );
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s",
&loc_name ,&loc_name_len ) == FAILURE) {
spprintf(&msg , 0, "locale_get_%s : unable to parse input params", tag_name );
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR, msg , 1 TSRMLS_CC );
efree(msg);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if(loc_name_len == 0) {
loc_name = intl_locale_get_default(TSRMLS_C);
}
/* Call ICU get */
tag_value = get_icu_value_internal( loc_name , tag_name , &result ,0);
/* No value found */
if( result == -1 ) {
if( tag_value){
efree( tag_value);
}
RETURN_STRING( empty_result , TRUE);
}
/* value found */
if( tag_value){
RETURN_STRING( tag_value , FALSE);
}
/* Error encountered while fetching the value */
if( result ==0) {
spprintf(&msg , 0, "locale_get_%s : unable to get locale %s", tag_name , tag_name );
intl_error_set( NULL, status, msg , 1 TSRMLS_CC );
efree(msg);
RETURN_NULL();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_verifier_state *old,
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur)
{
int i;
if (old->curframe != cur->curframe)
return false;
/* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same
* and all frame states need to be equivalent
*/
for (i = 0; i <= old->curframe; i++) {
if (old->frame[i]->callsite != cur->frame[i]->callsite)
return false;
if (!func_states_equal(old->frame[i], cur->frame[i]))
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: jbig2_decode_gray_scale_image(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment,
const byte *data, const size_t size,
bool GSMMR, uint32_t GSW, uint32_t GSH,
uint32_t GSBPP, bool GSUSESKIP, Jbig2Image *GSKIP, int GSTEMPLATE, Jbig2ArithCx *GB_stats)
{
uint8_t **GSVALS = NULL;
size_t consumed_bytes = 0;
int i, j, code, stride;
int x, y;
Jbig2Image **GSPLANES;
Jbig2GenericRegionParams rparams;
Jbig2WordStream *ws = NULL;
Jbig2ArithState *as = NULL;
/* allocate GSPLANES */
GSPLANES = jbig2_new(ctx, Jbig2Image *, GSBPP);
if (GSPLANES == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to allocate %d bytes for GSPLANES", GSBPP);
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < GSBPP; ++i) {
GSPLANES[i] = jbig2_image_new(ctx, GSW, GSH);
if (GSPLANES[i] == NULL) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_FATAL, segment->number, "failed to allocate %dx%d image for GSPLANES", GSW, GSH);
/* free already allocated */
for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; --j) {
jbig2_image_release(ctx, GSPLANES[j]);
}
jbig2_free(ctx->allocator, GSPLANES);
return NULL;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: juniper_parse_header(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, struct juniper_l2info_t *l2info)
{
const struct juniper_cookie_table_t *lp = juniper_cookie_table;
u_int idx, jnx_ext_len, jnx_header_len = 0;
uint8_t tlv_type,tlv_len;
uint32_t control_word;
int tlv_value;
const u_char *tptr;
l2info->header_len = 0;
l2info->cookie_len = 0;
l2info->proto = 0;
l2info->length = h->len;
l2info->caplen = h->caplen;
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 4);
l2info->flags = p[3];
l2info->direction = p[3]&JUNIPER_BPF_PKT_IN;
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) != JUNIPER_MGC_NUMBER) { /* magic number found ? */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no magic-number found!"));
return 0;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) /* print direction */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%3s ", tok2str(juniper_direction_values, "---", l2info->direction)));
/* magic number + flags */
jnx_header_len = 4;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tJuniper PCAP Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(jnx_flag_values, "none", l2info->flags)));
/* extensions present ? - calculate how much bytes to skip */
if ((l2info->flags & JUNIPER_BPF_EXT ) == JUNIPER_BPF_EXT ) {
tptr = p+jnx_header_len;
/* ok to read extension length ? */
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
jnx_ext_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
jnx_header_len += 2;
tptr +=2;
/* nail up the total length -
* just in case something goes wrong
* with TLV parsing */
jnx_header_len += jnx_ext_len;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", PCAP Extension(s) total length %u", jnx_ext_len));
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], jnx_ext_len);
while (jnx_ext_len > JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_OVERHEAD) {
tlv_type = *(tptr++);
tlv_len = *(tptr++);
tlv_value = 0;
/* sanity checks */
if (tlv_type == 0 || tlv_len == 0)
break;
if (tlv_len+JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_OVERHEAD > jnx_ext_len)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Extension TLV #%u, length %u, value ",
tok2str(jnx_ext_tlv_values,"Unknown",tlv_type),
tlv_type,
tlv_len));
tlv_value = juniper_read_tlv_value(tptr, tlv_type, tlv_len);
switch (tlv_type) {
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFD_NAME:
/* FIXME */
break;
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFD_MEDIATYPE:
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_TTP_IFD_MEDIATYPE:
if (tlv_value != -1) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (%u)",
tok2str(juniper_ifmt_values, "Unknown", tlv_value),
tlv_value));
}
break;
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFL_ENCAPS:
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_TTP_IFL_ENCAPS:
if (tlv_value != -1) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (%u)",
tok2str(juniper_ifle_values, "Unknown", tlv_value),
tlv_value));
}
break;
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFL_IDX: /* fall through */
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFL_UNIT:
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFD_IDX:
default:
if (tlv_value != -1) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", tlv_value));
}
break;
}
tptr+=tlv_len;
jnx_ext_len -= tlv_len+JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_OVERHEAD;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t-----original packet-----\n\t"));
}
if ((l2info->flags & JUNIPER_BPF_NO_L2 ) == JUNIPER_BPF_NO_L2 ) {
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no-L2-hdr, "));
/* there is no link-layer present -
* perform the v4/v6 heuristics
* to figure out what it is
*/
ND_TCHECK2(p[jnx_header_len + 4], 1);
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p + jnx_header_len + 4,
l2info->length - (jnx_header_len + 4)) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no IP-hdr found!"));
l2info->header_len=jnx_header_len+4;
return 0; /* stop parsing the output further */
}
l2info->header_len = jnx_header_len;
p+=l2info->header_len;
l2info->length -= l2info->header_len;
l2info->caplen -= l2info->header_len;
/* search through the cookie table and copy values matching for our PIC type */
while (lp->s != NULL) {
if (lp->pictype == l2info->pictype) {
l2info->cookie_len += lp->cookie_len;
switch (p[0]) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->cookie_type = LS_COOKIE_ID;
l2info->cookie_len += 2;
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->cookie_type = AS_COOKIE_ID;
l2info->cookie_len = 8;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
break;
}
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MFR
/* MFR child links don't carry cookies */
if (l2info->pictype == DLT_JUNIPER_MFR &&
(p[0] & MFR_BE_MASK) == MFR_BE_MASK) {
l2info->cookie_len = 0;
}
#endif
l2info->header_len += l2info->cookie_len;
l2info->length -= l2info->cookie_len;
l2info->caplen -= l2info->cookie_len;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s-PIC, cookie-len %u",
lp->s,
l2info->cookie_len));
if (l2info->cookie_len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], l2info->cookie_len);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", cookie 0x"));
for (idx = 0; idx < l2info->cookie_len; idx++) {
l2info->cookie[idx] = p[idx]; /* copy cookie data */
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", p[idx]));
}
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) ND_PRINT((ndo, ": ")); /* print demarc b/w L2/L3*/
l2info->proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(p+l2info->cookie_len);
break;
}
++lp;
}
p+=l2info->cookie_len;
/* DLT_ specific parsing */
switch(l2info->pictype) {
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MLPPP
case DLT_JUNIPER_MLPPP:
switch (l2info->cookie_type) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[1];
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = (EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info->cookie[6])>>3)&0xfff;
l2info->proto = (l2info->cookie[5])&JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MASK;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
break;
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MLFR
case DLT_JUNIPER_MLFR:
switch (l2info->cookie_type) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[1];
l2info->proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
l2info->header_len += 2;
l2info->length -= 2;
l2info->caplen -= 2;
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = (EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info->cookie[6])>>3)&0xfff;
l2info->proto = (l2info->cookie[5])&JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MASK;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
l2info->header_len += 2;
l2info->length -= 2;
l2info->caplen -= 2;
break;
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MFR
case DLT_JUNIPER_MFR:
switch (l2info->cookie_type) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[1];
l2info->proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
l2info->header_len += 2;
l2info->length -= 2;
l2info->caplen -= 2;
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = (EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info->cookie[6])>>3)&0xfff;
l2info->proto = (l2info->cookie[5])&JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MASK;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
break;
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_ATM2
case DLT_JUNIPER_ATM2:
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 4);
/* ATM cell relay control word present ? */
if (l2info->cookie[7] & ATM2_PKT_TYPE_MASK) {
control_word = EXTRACT_32BITS(p);
/* some control word heuristics */
switch(control_word) {
case 0: /* zero control word */
case 0x08000000: /* < JUNOS 7.4 control-word */
case 0x08380000: /* cntl word plus cell length (56) >= JUNOS 7.4*/
l2info->header_len += 4;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "control-word 0x%08x ", control_word));
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_GGSN
case DLT_JUNIPER_GGSN:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1
case DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_PPP
case DLT_JUNIPER_PPP:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_CHDLC
case DLT_JUNIPER_CHDLC:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_ETHER
case DLT_JUNIPER_ETHER:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_FRELAY
case DLT_JUNIPER_FRELAY:
break;
#endif
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Unknown Juniper DLT_ type %u: ", l2info->pictype));
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "hlen %u, proto 0x%04x, ", l2info->header_len, l2info->proto));
return 1; /* everything went ok so far. continue parsing */
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|juniper_hdr], length %u", h->len));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12993/Juniper: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static unsigned int packet_read_pending(const struct packet_ring_buffer *rb)
{
unsigned int refcnt = 0;
int cpu;
/* We don't use pending refcount in rx_ring. */
if (rb->pending_refcnt == NULL)
return 0;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
refcnt += *per_cpu_ptr(rb->pending_refcnt, cpu);
return refcnt;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void stopRecording()
{
ALOGV("stopRecording");
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(ICameraRecordingProxy::getInterfaceDescriptor());
remote()->transact(STOP_RECORDING, data, &reply);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void TestPlaybackRate(double playback_rate,
int buffer_size_in_frames,
int total_frames_requested) {
int initial_bytes_enqueued = bytes_enqueued_;
int initial_bytes_buffered = algorithm_.bytes_buffered();
algorithm_.SetPlaybackRate(static_cast<float>(playback_rate));
scoped_array<uint8> buffer(
new uint8[buffer_size_in_frames * algorithm_.bytes_per_frame()]);
if (playback_rate == 0.0) {
int frames_written =
algorithm_.FillBuffer(buffer.get(), buffer_size_in_frames);
EXPECT_EQ(0, frames_written);
return;
}
int frames_remaining = total_frames_requested;
while (frames_remaining > 0) {
int frames_requested = std::min(buffer_size_in_frames, frames_remaining);
int frames_written =
algorithm_.FillBuffer(buffer.get(), frames_requested);
CHECK_GT(frames_written, 0);
CheckFakeData(buffer.get(), frames_written, playback_rate);
frames_remaining -= frames_written;
}
int bytes_requested = total_frames_requested * algorithm_.bytes_per_frame();
int bytes_consumed = ComputeConsumedBytes(initial_bytes_enqueued,
initial_bytes_buffered);
if (playback_rate == 1.0) {
EXPECT_EQ(bytes_requested, bytes_consumed);
return;
}
static const double kMaxAcceptableDelta = 0.01;
double actual_playback_rate = 1.0 * bytes_consumed / bytes_requested;
double delta = std::abs(1.0 - (actual_playback_rate / playback_rate));
EXPECT_LE(delta, kMaxAcceptableDelta);
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void treatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringAttrAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::treatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringAttrAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: cdf_count_chain(const cdf_sat_t *sat, cdf_secid_t sid, size_t size)
{
size_t i, j;
cdf_secid_t maxsector = (cdf_secid_t)((sat->sat_len * size)
/ sizeof(maxsector));
DPRINTF(("Chain:"));
for (j = i = 0; sid >= 0; i++, j++) {
DPRINTF((" %d", sid));
if (j >= CDF_LOOP_LIMIT) {
DPRINTF(("Counting chain loop limit"));
errno = EFTYPE;
return (size_t)-1;
}
if (sid >= maxsector) {
DPRINTF(("Sector %d >= %d\n", sid, maxsector));
errno = EFTYPE;
return (size_t)-1;
}
sid = CDF_TOLE4((uint32_t)sat->sat_tab[sid]);
}
if (i == 0) {
DPRINTF((" none, sid: %d\n", sid));
return (size_t)-1;
}
DPRINTF(("\n"));
return i;
}
Commit Message: Add missing check offset test (Francisco Alonso, Jan Kaluza at RedHat)
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int __mkroute_input(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct fib_result *res,
struct in_device *in_dev,
__be32 daddr, __be32 saddr, u32 tos)
{
struct fib_nh_exception *fnhe;
struct rtable *rth;
int err;
struct in_device *out_dev;
unsigned int flags = 0;
bool do_cache;
u32 itag = 0;
/* get a working reference to the output device */
out_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(FIB_RES_DEV(*res));
if (out_dev == NULL) {
net_crit_ratelimited("Bug in ip_route_input_slow(). Please report.\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
err = fib_validate_source(skb, saddr, daddr, tos, FIB_RES_OIF(*res),
in_dev->dev, in_dev, &itag);
if (err < 0) {
ip_handle_martian_source(in_dev->dev, in_dev, skb, daddr,
saddr);
goto cleanup;
}
do_cache = res->fi && !itag;
if (out_dev == in_dev && err && IN_DEV_TX_REDIRECTS(out_dev) &&
(IN_DEV_SHARED_MEDIA(out_dev) ||
inet_addr_onlink(out_dev, saddr, FIB_RES_GW(*res)))) {
flags |= RTCF_DOREDIRECT;
do_cache = false;
}
if (skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
/* Not IP (i.e. ARP). Do not create route, if it is
* invalid for proxy arp. DNAT routes are always valid.
*
* Proxy arp feature have been extended to allow, ARP
* replies back to the same interface, to support
* Private VLAN switch technologies. See arp.c.
*/
if (out_dev == in_dev &&
IN_DEV_PROXY_ARP_PVLAN(in_dev) == 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
}
fnhe = find_exception(&FIB_RES_NH(*res), daddr);
if (do_cache) {
if (fnhe != NULL)
rth = rcu_dereference(fnhe->fnhe_rth_input);
else
rth = rcu_dereference(FIB_RES_NH(*res).nh_rth_input);
if (rt_cache_valid(rth)) {
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rth->dst);
goto out;
}
}
rth = rt_dst_alloc(out_dev->dev,
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(in_dev, NOPOLICY),
IN_DEV_CONF_GET(out_dev, NOXFRM), do_cache);
if (!rth) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto cleanup;
}
rth->rt_genid = rt_genid_ipv4(dev_net(rth->dst.dev));
rth->rt_flags = flags;
rth->rt_type = res->type;
rth->rt_is_input = 1;
rth->rt_iif = 0;
rth->rt_pmtu = 0;
rth->rt_gateway = 0;
rth->rt_uses_gateway = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rth->rt_uncached);
RT_CACHE_STAT_INC(in_slow_tot);
rth->dst.input = ip_forward;
rth->dst.output = ip_output;
rt_set_nexthop(rth, daddr, res, fnhe, res->fi, res->type, itag);
skb_dst_set(skb, &rth->dst);
out:
err = 0;
cleanup:
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-17
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int dev_get_valid_name(struct net *net, const char *name, char *buf,
bool fmt)
{
if (!dev_valid_name(name))
return -EINVAL;
if (fmt && strchr(name, '%'))
return __dev_alloc_name(net, name, buf);
else if (__dev_get_by_name(net, name))
return -EEXIST;
else if (buf != name)
strlcpy(buf, name, IFNAMSIZ);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int ip_cmsg_send(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, struct ipcm_cookie *ipc,
bool allow_ipv6)
{
int err, val;
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
for_each_cmsghdr(cmsg, msg) {
if (!CMSG_OK(msg, cmsg))
return -EINVAL;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
if (allow_ipv6 &&
cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_IPV6 &&
cmsg->cmsg_type == IPV6_PKTINFO) {
struct in6_pktinfo *src_info;
if (cmsg->cmsg_len < CMSG_LEN(sizeof(*src_info)))
return -EINVAL;
src_info = (struct in6_pktinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
if (!ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&src_info->ipi6_addr))
return -EINVAL;
ipc->oif = src_info->ipi6_ifindex;
ipc->addr = src_info->ipi6_addr.s6_addr32[3];
continue;
}
#endif
if (cmsg->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET) {
err = __sock_cmsg_send(sk, msg, cmsg, &ipc->sockc);
if (err)
return err;
continue;
}
if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_IP)
continue;
switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) {
case IP_RETOPTS:
err = cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr));
/* Our caller is responsible for freeing ipc->opt */
err = ip_options_get(net, &ipc->opt, CMSG_DATA(cmsg),
err < 40 ? err : 40);
if (err)
return err;
break;
case IP_PKTINFO:
{
struct in_pktinfo *info;
if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct in_pktinfo)))
return -EINVAL;
info = (struct in_pktinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
ipc->oif = info->ipi_ifindex;
ipc->addr = info->ipi_spec_dst.s_addr;
break;
}
case IP_TTL:
if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int)))
return -EINVAL;
val = *(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
if (val < 1 || val > 255)
return -EINVAL;
ipc->ttl = val;
break;
case IP_TOS:
if (cmsg->cmsg_len == CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int)))
val = *(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
else if (cmsg->cmsg_len == CMSG_LEN(sizeof(u8)))
val = *(u8 *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
else
return -EINVAL;
if (val < 0 || val > 255)
return -EINVAL;
ipc->tos = val;
ipc->priority = rt_tos2priority(ipc->tos);
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: keep skb->dst around in presence of IP options
Andrey Konovalov got crashes in __ip_options_echo() when a NULL skb->dst
is accessed.
ipv4_pktinfo_prepare() should not drop the dst if (evil) IP options
are present.
We could refine the test to the presence of ts_needtime or srr,
but IP options are not often used, so let's be conservative.
Thanks to syzkaller team for finding this bug.
Fixes: d826eb14ecef ("ipv4: PKTINFO doesnt need dst reference")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void ShellWindowFrameView::Init(views::Widget* frame) {
frame_ = frame;
ui::ResourceBundle& rb = ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
close_button_ = new views::ImageButton(this);
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_NORMAL,
rb.GetNativeImageNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR).ToImageSkia());
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_HOT,
rb.GetNativeImageNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR_H).ToImageSkia());
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_PUSHED,
rb.GetNativeImageNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR_P).ToImageSkia());
close_button_->SetAccessibleName(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_APP_ACCNAME_CLOSE));
AddChildView(close_button_);
#if defined(USE_ASH)
aura::Window* window = frame->GetNativeWindow();
int outside_bounds = ui::GetDisplayLayout() == ui::LAYOUT_TOUCH ?
kResizeOutsideBoundsSizeTouch :
kResizeOutsideBoundsSize;
window->set_hit_test_bounds_override_outer(
gfx::Insets(-outside_bounds, -outside_bounds,
-outside_bounds, -outside_bounds));
window->set_hit_test_bounds_override_inner(
gfx::Insets(kResizeInsideBoundsSize, kResizeInsideBoundsSize,
kResizeInsideBoundsSize, kResizeInsideBoundsSize));
#endif
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatR32F,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoUnmultiply,
float,
float>(const float* source,
float* destination,
unsigned pixels_per_row) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < pixels_per_row; ++i) {
float scale_factor = source[3] ? 1.0f / source[3] : 1.0f;
destination[0] = source[0] * scale_factor;
source += 4;
destination += 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: extract_header_length(uint16_t fc)
{
int len = 0;
switch ((fc >> 10) & 0x3) {
case 0x00:
if (fc & (1 << 6)) /* intra-PAN with none dest addr */
return -1;
break;
case 0x01:
return -1;
case 0x02:
len += 4;
break;
case 0x03:
len += 10;
break;
}
switch ((fc >> 14) & 0x3) {
case 0x00:
break;
case 0x01:
return -1;
case 0x02:
len += 4;
break;
case 0x03:
len += 10;
break;
}
if (fc & (1 << 6)) {
if (len < 2)
return -1;
len -= 2;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13000/IEEE 802.15.4: Add more bounds checks.
While we're at it, add a bunch of macros for the frame control field's
subfields, have the reserved frame types show the frame type value, use
the same code path for processing source and destination addresses
regardless of whether -v was specified (just leave out the addresses in
non-verbose mode), and return the header length in all cases.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static char *rfc2047_decode_word(const char *s, size_t len, enum ContentEncoding enc)
{
const char *it = s;
const char *end = s + len;
if (enc == ENCQUOTEDPRINTABLE)
{
struct Buffer buf = { 0 };
for (; it < end; ++it)
{
if (*it == '_')
{
mutt_buffer_addch(&buf, ' ');
}
else if ((*it == '=') && (!(it[1] & ~127) && hexval(it[1]) != -1) &&
(!(it[2] & ~127) && hexval(it[2]) != -1))
{
mutt_buffer_addch(&buf, (hexval(it[1]) << 4) | hexval(it[2]));
it += 2;
}
else
{
mutt_buffer_addch(&buf, *it);
}
}
mutt_buffer_addch(&buf, '\0');
return buf.data;
}
else if (enc == ENCBASE64)
{
char *out = mutt_mem_malloc(3 * len / 4 + 1);
int dlen = mutt_b64_decode(out, it);
if (dlen == -1)
{
FREE(&out);
return NULL;
}
out[dlen] = '\0';
return out;
}
assert(0); /* The enc parameter has an invalid value */
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Check outbuf length in mutt_to_base64()
The obuf can be overflowed in auth_cram.c, and possibly auth_gss.c.
Thanks to Jeriko One for the bug report.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int yr_object_set_float(
double value,
YR_OBJECT* object,
const char* field,
...)
{
YR_OBJECT* double_obj;
va_list args;
va_start(args, field);
if (field != NULL)
double_obj = _yr_object_lookup(object, OBJECT_CREATE, field, args);
else
double_obj = object;
va_end(args);
assert(double_obj != NULL);
assert(double_obj->type == OBJECT_TYPE_FLOAT);
double_obj->value.d = value;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap overflow (reported by Jurriaan Bremer)
When setting a new array item with yr_object_array_set_item() the array size is doubled if the index for the new item is larger than the already allocated ones. No further checks were made to ensure that the index fits into the array after doubling its capacity. If the array capacity was for example 64, and a new object is assigned to an index larger than 128 the overflow occurs. As yr_object_array_set_item() is usually invoked with indexes that increase monotonically by one, this bug never triggered before. But the new "dotnet" module has the potential to allow the exploitation of this bug by scanning a specially crafted .NET binary.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int sas_discover_root_expander(struct domain_device *dev)
{
int res;
struct sas_expander_device *ex = rphy_to_expander_device(dev->rphy);
res = sas_rphy_add(dev->rphy);
if (res)
goto out_err;
ex->level = dev->port->disc.max_level; /* 0 */
res = sas_discover_expander(dev);
if (res)
goto out_err2;
sas_ex_bfs_disc(dev->port);
return res;
out_err2:
sas_rphy_remove(dev->rphy);
out_err:
return res;
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: fix memory leak in sas_smp_get_phy_events()
We've got a memory leak with the following producer:
while true;
do cat /sys/class/sas_phy/phy-1:0:12/invalid_dword_count >/dev/null;
done
The buffer req is allocated and not freed after we return. Fix it.
Fixes: 2908d778ab3e ("[SCSI] aic94xx: new driver")
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: chenqilin <[email protected]>
CC: chenxiang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-772
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void Huff_offsetReceive (node_t *node, int *ch, byte *fin, int *offset) {
bloc = *offset;
while (node && node->symbol == INTERNAL_NODE) {
if (get_bit(fin)) {
node = node->right;
} else {
node = node->left;
}
}
if (!node) {
*ch = 0;
return;
}
*ch = node->symbol;
*offset = bloc;
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int getsortcriteria(char *tag, struct sortcrit **sortcrit)
{
int c;
static struct buf criteria;
int nsort, n;
int hasconv = config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_CONVERSATIONS);
*sortcrit = NULL;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '(') goto missingcrit;
c = getword(imapd_in, &criteria);
if (criteria.s[0] == '\0') goto missingcrit;
nsort = 0;
n = 0;
for (;;) {
if (n >= nsort - 1) { /* leave room for implicit criterion */
/* (Re)allocate an array for sort criteria */
nsort += SORTGROWSIZE;
*sortcrit =
(struct sortcrit *) xrealloc(*sortcrit,
nsort * sizeof(struct sortcrit));
/* Zero out the newly added sortcrit */
memset((*sortcrit)+n, 0, SORTGROWSIZE * sizeof(struct sortcrit));
}
lcase(criteria.s);
if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "reverse")) {
(*sortcrit)[n].flags |= SORT_REVERSE;
goto nextcrit;
}
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "arrival"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_ARRIVAL;
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "cc"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_CC;
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "date"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_DATE;
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "displayfrom"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_DISPLAYFROM;
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "displayto"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_DISPLAYTO;
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "from"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_FROM;
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "size"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_SIZE;
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "subject"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_SUBJECT;
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "to"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_TO;
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "annotation")) {
const char *userid = NULL;
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_ANNOTATION;
if (c != ' ') goto missingarg;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &criteria);
if (c != ' ') goto missingarg;
(*sortcrit)[n].args.annot.entry = xstrdup(criteria.s);
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &criteria);
if (c == EOF) goto missingarg;
if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "value.shared"))
userid = "";
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "value.priv"))
userid = imapd_userid;
else
goto missingarg;
(*sortcrit)[n].args.annot.userid = xstrdup(userid);
}
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "modseq"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_MODSEQ;
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "uid"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_UID;
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "hasflag")) {
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_HASFLAG;
if (c != ' ') goto missingarg;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &criteria);
if (c == EOF) goto missingarg;
(*sortcrit)[n].args.flag.name = xstrdup(criteria.s);
}
else if (hasconv && !strcmp(criteria.s, "convmodseq"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_CONVMODSEQ;
else if (hasconv && !strcmp(criteria.s, "convexists"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_CONVEXISTS;
else if (hasconv && !strcmp(criteria.s, "convsize"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_CONVSIZE;
else if (hasconv && !strcmp(criteria.s, "hasconvflag")) {
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_HASCONVFLAG;
if (c != ' ') goto missingarg;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &criteria);
if (c == EOF) goto missingarg;
(*sortcrit)[n].args.flag.name = xstrdup(criteria.s);
}
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "folder"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_FOLDER;
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "relevancy"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_RELEVANCY;
else if (!strcmp(criteria.s, "spamscore"))
(*sortcrit)[n].key = SORT_SPAMSCORE;
else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Invalid Sort criterion %s\r\n",
tag, criteria.s);
if (c != EOF) prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
return EOF;
}
n++;
nextcrit:
if (c == ' ') c = getword(imapd_in, &criteria);
else break;
}
if ((*sortcrit)[n].flags & SORT_REVERSE && !(*sortcrit)[n].key) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Missing Sort criterion to reverse\r\n", tag);
if (c != EOF) prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
return EOF;
}
if (c != ')') {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Missing close parenthesis in Sort\r\n", tag);
if (c != EOF) prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
return EOF;
}
/* Terminate the list with the implicit sort criterion */
(*sortcrit)[n++].key = SORT_SEQUENCE;
c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
return c;
missingcrit:
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Missing Sort criteria\r\n", tag);
if (c != EOF) prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
return EOF;
missingarg:
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s BAD Missing argument to Sort criterion %s\r\n",
tag, criteria.s);
if (c != EOF) prot_ungetc(c, imapd_in);
return EOF;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int rxrpc_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct crypto_blkcipher *ci;
_enter("%zu", prep->datalen);
if (prep->datalen != 8)
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(&prep->type_data, prep->data, 8);
ci = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("pcbc(des)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(ci)) {
_leave(" = %ld", PTR_ERR(ci));
return PTR_ERR(ci);
}
if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(ci, prep->data, 8) < 0)
BUG();
prep->payload[0] = ci;
_leave(" = 0");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key,
const struct key_match_data *match_data)
{
const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
const char *description = match_data->raw_data;
const char *spec = description;
const char *id;
ptrdiff_t speclen;
if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec)
return 0;
/* See if the full key description matches as is */
if (key->description && strcmp(key->description, description) == 0)
return 1;
/* All tests from here on break the criterion description into a
* specifier, a colon and then an identifier.
*/
id = strchr(spec, ':');
if (!id)
return 0;
speclen = id - spec;
id++;
if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id);
if (speclen == subtype->name_len &&
memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void perf_event_enable_on_exec(struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
struct perf_event *event;
unsigned long flags;
int enabled = 0;
int ret;
local_irq_save(flags);
if (!ctx || !ctx->nr_events)
goto out;
/*
* We must ctxsw out cgroup events to avoid conflict
* when invoking perf_task_event_sched_in() later on
* in this function. Otherwise we end up trying to
* ctxswin cgroup events which are already scheduled
* in.
*/
perf_cgroup_sched_out(current, NULL);
raw_spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
task_ctx_sched_out(ctx);
list_for_each_entry(event, &ctx->event_list, event_entry) {
ret = event_enable_on_exec(event, ctx);
if (ret)
enabled = 1;
}
/*
* Unclone this context if we enabled any event.
*/
if (enabled)
unclone_ctx(ctx);
raw_spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
/*
* Also calls ctxswin for cgroup events, if any:
*/
perf_event_context_sched_in(ctx, ctx->task);
out:
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool ScreenLayoutObserver::GetDisplayMessageForNotification(
const ScreenLayoutObserver::DisplayInfoMap& old_info,
base::string16* out_message,
base::string16* out_additional_message) {
if (old_display_mode_ != current_display_mode_) {
if (current_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::MIRRORING) {
*out_message = GetEnterMirrorModeMessage();
return true;
}
if (old_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::MIRRORING &&
GetExitMirrorModeMessage(out_message, out_additional_message)) {
return true;
}
if (current_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::UNIFIED) {
*out_message = GetEnterUnifiedModeMessage();
return true;
}
if (old_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::UNIFIED) {
*out_message = GetExitUnifiedModeMessage();
return true;
}
if (current_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::DOCKED ||
old_display_mode_ == DisplayMode::DOCKED) {
return false;
}
}
if (display_info_.size() < old_info.size()) {
for (const auto& iter : old_info) {
if (display_info_.count(iter.first))
continue;
*out_message =
GetDisplayRemovedMessage(iter.second, out_additional_message);
return true;
}
} else if (display_info_.size() > old_info.size()) {
for (const auto& iter : display_info_) {
if (old_info.count(iter.first))
continue;
*out_message = GetDisplayAddedMessage(iter.first, out_additional_message);
return true;
}
}
for (const auto& iter : display_info_) {
DisplayInfoMap::const_iterator old_iter = old_info.find(iter.first);
if (old_iter == old_info.end()) {
NOTREACHED() << "A display mode transition that should have been handled"
"earlier.";
return false;
}
if (iter.second.configured_ui_scale() !=
old_iter->second.configured_ui_scale()) {
*out_additional_message = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_RESOLUTION_CHANGED,
GetDisplayName(iter.first), GetDisplaySize(iter.first));
return true;
}
if (iter.second.GetActiveRotation() !=
old_iter->second.GetActiveRotation()) {
int rotation_text_id = 0;
switch (iter.second.GetActiveRotation()) {
case display::Display::ROTATE_0:
rotation_text_id = IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_STANDARD_ORIENTATION;
break;
case display::Display::ROTATE_90:
rotation_text_id = IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_ORIENTATION_90;
break;
case display::Display::ROTATE_180:
rotation_text_id = IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_ORIENTATION_180;
break;
case display::Display::ROTATE_270:
rotation_text_id = IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_ORIENTATION_270;
break;
}
*out_additional_message = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_ASH_STATUS_TRAY_DISPLAY_ROTATED, GetDisplayName(iter.first),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(rotation_text_id));
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Avoid Showing rotation change notification when source is accelerometer
BUG=717252
TEST=Manually rotate device with accelerometer and observe there's no notification
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2853113005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469058}
CWE ID: CWE-17
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct page *page;
struct kvm *kvm;
int r;
BUG_ON(vcpu->kvm == NULL);
kvm = vcpu->kvm;
vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt.ops = &emulate_ops;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm) || kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(vcpu))
vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
else
vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED;
page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!page) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
vcpu->arch.pio_data = page_address(page);
kvm_set_tsc_khz(vcpu, max_tsc_khz);
r = kvm_mmu_create(vcpu);
if (r < 0)
goto fail_free_pio_data;
if (irqchip_in_kernel(kvm)) {
r = kvm_create_lapic(vcpu);
if (r < 0)
goto fail_mmu_destroy;
} else
static_key_slow_inc(&kvm_no_apic_vcpu);
vcpu->arch.mce_banks = kzalloc(KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS * sizeof(u64) * 4,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vcpu->arch.mce_banks) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto fail_free_lapic;
}
vcpu->arch.mcg_cap = KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS;
if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask, GFP_KERNEL))
goto fail_free_mce_banks;
r = fx_init(vcpu);
if (r)
goto fail_free_wbinvd_dirty_mask;
vcpu->arch.ia32_tsc_adjust_msr = 0x0;
kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(vcpu);
kvm_pmu_init(vcpu);
return 0;
fail_free_wbinvd_dirty_mask:
free_cpumask_var(vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask);
fail_free_mce_banks:
kfree(vcpu->arch.mce_banks);
fail_free_lapic:
kvm_free_lapic(vcpu);
fail_mmu_destroy:
kvm_mmu_destroy(vcpu);
fail_free_pio_data:
free_page((unsigned long)vcpu->arch.pio_data);
fail:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static MagickBooleanType DecodeImage(Image *image,const ssize_t opacity,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
c;
LZWInfo
*lzw_info;
size_t
pass;
ssize_t
index,
offset,
y;
unsigned char
data_size;
/*
Allocate decoder tables.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
data_size=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (data_size > MaximumLZWBits)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
lzw_info=AcquireLZWInfo(image,data_size);
if (lzw_info == (LZWInfo *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
pass=0;
offset=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; )
{
c=ReadBlobLZWByte(lzw_info);
if (c < 0)
break;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) c,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+index,q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,index == opacity ? TransparentAlpha : OpaqueAlpha,q);
x++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
break;
if (image->interlace == NoInterlace)
offset++;
else
{
switch (pass)
{
case 0:
default:
{
offset+=8;
break;
}
case 1:
{
offset+=8;
break;
}
case 2:
{
offset+=4;
break;
}
case 3:
{
offset+=2;
break;
}
}
if ((pass == 0) && (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
pass++;
offset=4;
}
if ((pass == 1) && (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
pass++;
offset=2;
}
if ((pass == 2) && (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
pass++;
offset=1;
}
}
}
lzw_info=RelinquishLZWInfo(lzw_info);
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/592
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int ExtensionTabUtil::GetWindowIdOfTab(const WebContents* web_contents) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void vrend_renderer_context_create_internal(uint32_t handle, uint32_t nlen,
const char *debug_name)
{
struct vrend_decode_ctx *dctx;
if (handle >= VREND_MAX_CTX)
return;
dctx = malloc(sizeof(struct vrend_decode_ctx));
if (!dctx)
return;
return;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: Ins_DEBUG( INS_ARG )
{
DO_DEBUG
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: module_from_sym(mrb_state *mrb, struct RClass *klass, mrb_sym id)
{
mrb_value c = mrb_const_get(mrb, mrb_obj_value(klass), id);
mrb_check_type(mrb, c, MRB_TT_MODULE);
return mrb_class_ptr(c);
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: MagickExport MemoryInfo *AcquireVirtualMemory(const size_t count,
const size_t quantum)
{
MemoryInfo
*memory_info;
size_t
extent;
if (CheckMemoryOverflow(count,quantum) != MagickFalse)
return((MemoryInfo *) NULL);
memory_info=(MemoryInfo *) MagickAssumeAligned(AcquireAlignedMemory(1,
sizeof(*memory_info)));
if (memory_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) ResetMagickMemory(memory_info,0,sizeof(*memory_info));
extent=count*quantum;
memory_info->length=extent;
memory_info->signature=MagickSignature;
if (AcquireMagickResource(MemoryResource,extent) != MagickFalse)
{
memory_info->blob=AcquireAlignedMemory(1,extent);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
{
memory_info->type=AlignedVirtualMemory;
return(memory_info);
}
}
RelinquishMagickResource(MemoryResource,extent);
if (AcquireMagickResource(MapResource,extent) != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Heap memory failed, try anonymous memory mapping.
*/
memory_info->blob=MapBlob(-1,IOMode,0,extent);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
{
memory_info->type=MapVirtualMemory;
return(memory_info);
}
if (AcquireMagickResource(DiskResource,extent) != MagickFalse)
{
int
file;
/*
Anonymous memory mapping failed, try file-backed memory mapping.
If the MapResource request failed, there is no point in trying
file-backed memory mapping.
*/
file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(memory_info->filename);
if (file != -1)
{
MagickOffsetType
offset;
offset=(MagickOffsetType) lseek(file,extent-1,SEEK_SET);
if ((offset == (MagickOffsetType) (extent-1)) &&
(write(file,"",1) == 1))
{
memory_info->blob=MapBlob(file,IOMode,0,extent);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
{
(void) close(file);
memory_info->type=MapVirtualMemory;
return(memory_info);
}
}
/*
File-backed memory mapping failed, delete the temporary file.
*/
(void) close(file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(memory_info->filename);
*memory_info->filename='\0';
}
}
RelinquishMagickResource(DiskResource,extent);
}
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,extent);
if (memory_info->blob == NULL)
{
memory_info->blob=AcquireMagickMemory(extent);
if (memory_info->blob != NULL)
memory_info->type=UnalignedVirtualMemory;
}
if (memory_info->blob == NULL)
memory_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(memory_info);
return(memory_info);
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int fd_locked_ioctl(struct block_device *bdev, fmode_t mode, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long param)
{
int drive = (long)bdev->bd_disk->private_data;
int type = ITYPE(UDRS->fd_device);
int i;
int ret;
int size;
union inparam {
struct floppy_struct g; /* geometry */
struct format_descr f;
struct floppy_max_errors max_errors;
struct floppy_drive_params dp;
} inparam; /* parameters coming from user space */
const void *outparam; /* parameters passed back to user space */
/* convert compatibility eject ioctls into floppy eject ioctl.
* We do this in order to provide a means to eject floppy disks before
* installing the new fdutils package */
if (cmd == CDROMEJECT || /* CD-ROM eject */
cmd == 0x6470) { /* SunOS floppy eject */
DPRINT("obsolete eject ioctl\n");
DPRINT("please use floppycontrol --eject\n");
cmd = FDEJECT;
}
if (!((cmd & 0xff00) == 0x0200))
return -EINVAL;
/* convert the old style command into a new style command */
ret = normalize_ioctl(&cmd, &size);
if (ret)
return ret;
/* permission checks */
if (((cmd & 0x40) && !(mode & (FMODE_WRITE | FMODE_WRITE_IOCTL))) ||
((cmd & 0x80) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)))
return -EPERM;
if (WARN_ON(size < 0 || size > sizeof(inparam)))
return -EINVAL;
/* copyin */
memset(&inparam, 0, sizeof(inparam));
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
ret = fd_copyin((void __user *)param, &inparam, size);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
switch (cmd) {
case FDEJECT:
if (UDRS->fd_ref != 1)
/* somebody else has this drive open */
return -EBUSY;
if (lock_fdc(drive, true))
return -EINTR;
/* do the actual eject. Fails on
* non-Sparc architectures */
ret = fd_eject(UNIT(drive));
set_bit(FD_DISK_CHANGED_BIT, &UDRS->flags);
set_bit(FD_VERIFY_BIT, &UDRS->flags);
process_fd_request();
return ret;
case FDCLRPRM:
if (lock_fdc(drive, true))
return -EINTR;
current_type[drive] = NULL;
floppy_sizes[drive] = MAX_DISK_SIZE << 1;
UDRS->keep_data = 0;
return invalidate_drive(bdev);
case FDSETPRM:
case FDDEFPRM:
return set_geometry(cmd, &inparam.g, drive, type, bdev);
case FDGETPRM:
ret = get_floppy_geometry(drive, type,
(struct floppy_struct **)&outparam);
if (ret)
return ret;
break;
case FDMSGON:
UDP->flags |= FTD_MSG;
return 0;
case FDMSGOFF:
UDP->flags &= ~FTD_MSG;
return 0;
case FDFMTBEG:
if (lock_fdc(drive, true))
return -EINTR;
if (poll_drive(true, FD_RAW_NEED_DISK) == -EINTR)
return -EINTR;
ret = UDRS->flags;
process_fd_request();
if (ret & FD_VERIFY)
return -ENODEV;
if (!(ret & FD_DISK_WRITABLE))
return -EROFS;
return 0;
case FDFMTTRK:
if (UDRS->fd_ref != 1)
return -EBUSY;
return do_format(drive, &inparam.f);
case FDFMTEND:
case FDFLUSH:
if (lock_fdc(drive, true))
return -EINTR;
return invalidate_drive(bdev);
case FDSETEMSGTRESH:
UDP->max_errors.reporting = (unsigned short)(param & 0x0f);
return 0;
case FDGETMAXERRS:
outparam = &UDP->max_errors;
break;
case FDSETMAXERRS:
UDP->max_errors = inparam.max_errors;
break;
case FDGETDRVTYP:
outparam = drive_name(type, drive);
SUPBOUND(size, strlen((const char *)outparam) + 1);
break;
case FDSETDRVPRM:
*UDP = inparam.dp;
break;
case FDGETDRVPRM:
outparam = UDP;
break;
case FDPOLLDRVSTAT:
if (lock_fdc(drive, true))
return -EINTR;
if (poll_drive(true, FD_RAW_NEED_DISK) == -EINTR)
return -EINTR;
process_fd_request();
/* fall through */
case FDGETDRVSTAT:
outparam = UDRS;
break;
case FDRESET:
return user_reset_fdc(drive, (int)param, true);
case FDGETFDCSTAT:
outparam = UFDCS;
break;
case FDWERRORCLR:
memset(UDRWE, 0, sizeof(*UDRWE));
return 0;
case FDWERRORGET:
outparam = UDRWE;
break;
case FDRAWCMD:
if (type)
return -EINVAL;
if (lock_fdc(drive, true))
return -EINTR;
set_floppy(drive);
i = raw_cmd_ioctl(cmd, (void __user *)param);
if (i == -EINTR)
return -EINTR;
process_fd_request();
return i;
case FDTWADDLE:
if (lock_fdc(drive, true))
return -EINTR;
twaddle();
process_fd_request();
return 0;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
return fd_copyout((void __user *)param, outparam, size);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin(PluginView* pluginView, const Platform::TouchPoint& point)
{
NPEvent npEvent;
NPMouseEvent mouse;
switch (point.m_state) {
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchPressed:
mouse.type = MOUSE_BUTTON_DOWN;
break;
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchReleased:
mouse.type = MOUSE_BUTTON_UP;
break;
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchMoved:
mouse.type = MOUSE_MOTION;
break;
case Platform::TouchPoint::TouchStationary:
return true;
}
mouse.x = point.m_screenPos.x();
mouse.y = point.m_screenPos.y();
mouse.button = mouse.type != MOUSE_BUTTON_UP;
mouse.flags = 0;
npEvent.type = NP_MouseEvent;
npEvent.data = &mouse;
pluginView->dispatchFullScreenNPEvent(npEvent);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int process_cmd_sock(int h)
{
sock_cmd_t cmd = {-1, 0, 0, 0, 0};
int fd = ts[h].cmd_fdr;
if(recv(fd, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), MSG_WAITALL) != sizeof(cmd))
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("recv cmd errno:%d", errno);
return FALSE;
}
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("cmd.id:%d", cmd.id);
switch(cmd.id)
{
case CMD_ADD_FD:
add_poll(h, cmd.fd, cmd.type, cmd.flags, cmd.user_id);
break;
case CMD_REMOVE_FD:
for (int i = 1; i < MAX_POLL; ++i)
{
poll_slot_t *poll_slot = &ts[h].ps[i];
if (poll_slot->pfd.fd == cmd.fd)
{
remove_poll(h, poll_slot, poll_slot->flags);
break;
}
}
close(cmd.fd);
break;
case CMD_WAKEUP:
break;
case CMD_USER_PRIVATE:
asrt(ts[h].cmd_callback);
if(ts[h].cmd_callback)
ts[h].cmd_callback(fd, cmd.type, cmd.flags, cmd.user_id);
break;
case CMD_EXIT:
return FALSE;
default:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("unknown cmd: %d", cmd.id);
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: SharedMemoryHandleProvider::GetHandleForInProcessAccess() {
{
base::AutoLock lock(mapping_lock_);
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK_GE(map_ref_count_, 0);
++map_ref_count_;
#endif
if (!shared_memory_->memory()) {
CHECK(shared_memory_->Map(mapped_size_));
DVLOG(3) << __func__ << ": Mapped memory for in-process access @"
<< shared_memory_->memory() << '.';
}
}
return std::make_unique<Handle>(this);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
void *data)
{
int err;
struct super_block *sb = path->mnt->mnt_sb;
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(path->mnt);
if (!check_mnt(mnt))
return -EINVAL;
if (path->dentry != path->mnt->mnt_root)
return -EINVAL;
/* Don't allow changing of locked mnt flags.
*
* No locks need to be held here while testing the various
* MNT_LOCK flags because those flags can never be cleared
* once they are set.
*/
if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_READONLY) &&
!(mnt_flags & MNT_READONLY)) {
return -EPERM;
}
if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NODEV) &&
!(mnt_flags & MNT_NODEV)) {
/* Was the nodev implicitly added in mount? */
if ((mnt->mnt_ns->user_ns != &init_user_ns) &&
!(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_DEV_MOUNT)) {
mnt_flags |= MNT_NODEV;
} else {
return -EPERM;
}
}
if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOSUID) &&
!(mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)) {
return -EPERM;
}
if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC) &&
!(mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
return -EPERM;
}
if ((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCK_ATIME) &&
((mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK) != (mnt_flags & MNT_ATIME_MASK))) {
return -EPERM;
}
err = security_sb_remount(sb, data);
if (err)
return err;
down_write(&sb->s_umount);
if (flags & MS_BIND)
err = change_mount_flags(path->mnt, flags);
else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
err = -EPERM;
else
err = do_remount_sb(sb, flags, data, 0);
if (!err) {
lock_mount_hash();
mnt_flags |= mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & ~MNT_USER_SETTABLE_MASK;
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = mnt_flags;
touch_mnt_namespace(mnt->mnt_ns);
unlock_mount_hash();
}
up_write(&sb->s_umount);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Fail collect_mounts when applied to unmounted mounts
The only users of collect_mounts are in audit_tree.c
In audit_trim_trees and audit_add_tree_rule the path passed into
collect_mounts is generated from kern_path passed an audit_tree
pathname which is guaranteed to be an absolute path. In those cases
collect_mounts is obviously intended to work on mounted paths and
if a race results in paths that are unmounted when collect_mounts
it is reasonable to fail early.
The paths passed into audit_tag_tree don't have the absolute path
check. But are used to play with fsnotify and otherwise interact with
the audit_trees, so again operating only on mounted paths appears
reasonable.
Avoid having to worry about what happens when we try and audit
unmounted filesystems by restricting collect_mounts to mounts
that appear in the mount tree.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
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