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Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: another_hunk (enum diff difftype, bool rev)
{
char *s;
lin context = 0;
size_t chars_read;
char numbuf0[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
char numbuf2[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
char numbuf3[LINENUM_LENGTH_BOUND + 1];
while (p_end >= 0) {
if (p_end == p_efake)
p_end = p_bfake; /* don't free twice */
free(p_line[p_end]);
p_end--;
}
assert(p_end == -1);
p_efake = -1;
if (p_c_function)
{
free (p_c_function);
p_c_function = NULL;
}
p_max = hunkmax; /* gets reduced when --- found */
if (difftype == CONTEXT_DIFF || difftype == NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF) {
file_offset line_beginning = file_tell (pfp);
/* file pos of the current line */
lin repl_beginning = 0; /* index of --- line */
lin fillcnt = 0; /* #lines of missing ptrn or repl */
lin fillsrc; /* index of first line to copy */
lin filldst; /* index of first missing line */
bool ptrn_spaces_eaten = false; /* ptrn was slightly misformed */
bool some_context = false; /* (perhaps internal) context seen */
bool repl_could_be_missing = true;
bool ptrn_missing = false; /* The pattern was missing. */
bool repl_missing = false; /* Likewise for replacement. */
file_offset repl_backtrack_position = 0;
/* file pos of first repl line */
lin repl_patch_line; /* input line number for same */
lin repl_context; /* context for same */
lin ptrn_prefix_context = -1; /* lines in pattern prefix context */
lin ptrn_suffix_context = -1; /* lines in pattern suffix context */
lin repl_prefix_context = -1; /* lines in replac. prefix context */
lin ptrn_copiable = 0; /* # of copiable lines in ptrn */
lin repl_copiable = 0; /* Likewise for replacement. */
/* Pacify 'gcc -Wall'. */
fillsrc = filldst = repl_patch_line = repl_context = 0;
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1
|| chars_read <= 8
|| strncmp (buf, "********", 8) != 0) {
next_intuit_at(line_beginning,p_input_line);
return chars_read == (size_t) -1 ? -1 : 0;
}
s = buf;
while (*s == '*')
s++;
if (*s == ' ')
{
p_c_function = s;
while (*s != '\n')
s++;
*s = '\0';
p_c_function = savestr (p_c_function);
if (! p_c_function)
return -1;
}
p_hunk_beg = p_input_line + 1;
while (p_end < p_max) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
return -1;
if (!chars_read) {
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
if (p_max - p_end < 4) {
strcpy (buf, " \n"); /* assume blank lines got chopped */
chars_read = 3;
} else {
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch");
}
}
p_end++;
if (p_end == hunkmax)
fatal ("unterminated hunk starting at line %s; giving up at line %s: %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, pch_hunk_beg ()),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_input_line), buf);
assert(p_end < hunkmax);
p_Char[p_end] = *buf;
p_len[p_end] = 0;
p_line[p_end] = 0;
switch (*buf) {
case '*':
if (strnEQ(buf, "********", 8)) {
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
else
fatal ("unexpected end of hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
}
if (p_end != 0) {
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
fatal ("unexpected '***' at line %s: %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line), buf);
}
context = 0;
p_len[p_end] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[p_end] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
for (s = buf; *s && !ISDIGIT (*s); s++)
/* do nothing */ ;
if (strnEQ(s,"0,0",3))
remove_prefix (s, 2);
s = scan_linenum (s, &p_first);
if (*s == ',') {
while (*s && !ISDIGIT (*s))
s++;
scan_linenum (s, &p_ptrn_lines);
p_ptrn_lines += 1 - p_first;
if (p_ptrn_lines < 0)
malformed ();
}
else if (p_first)
p_ptrn_lines = 1;
else {
p_ptrn_lines = 0;
p_first = 1;
}
if (p_first >= LINENUM_MAX - p_ptrn_lines ||
p_ptrn_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - 6)
malformed ();
p_max = p_ptrn_lines + 6; /* we need this much at least */
while (p_max + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
return -1;
p_max = hunkmax;
break;
case '-':
if (buf[1] != '-')
goto change_line;
if (ptrn_prefix_context == -1)
ptrn_prefix_context = context;
ptrn_suffix_context = context;
if (repl_beginning
|| (p_end
!= p_ptrn_lines + 1 + (p_Char[p_end - 1] == '\n')))
{
if (p_end == 1)
{
/* 'Old' lines were omitted. Set up to fill
them in from 'new' context lines. */
ptrn_missing = true;
p_end = p_ptrn_lines + 1;
ptrn_prefix_context = ptrn_suffix_context = -1;
fillsrc = p_end + 1;
filldst = 1;
fillcnt = p_ptrn_lines;
}
else if (! repl_beginning)
fatal ("%s '---' at line %s; check line numbers at line %s",
(p_end <= p_ptrn_lines
? "Premature"
: "Overdue"),
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_hunk_beg));
else if (! repl_could_be_missing)
fatal ("duplicate '---' at line %s; check line numbers at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line),
format_linenum (numbuf1,
p_hunk_beg + repl_beginning));
else
{
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
}
repl_beginning = p_end;
repl_backtrack_position = file_tell (pfp);
repl_patch_line = p_input_line;
repl_context = context;
p_len[p_end] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[p_end] = savestr (buf)))
{
p_end--;
return -1;
}
p_Char[p_end] = '=';
for (s = buf; *s && ! ISDIGIT (*s); s++)
/* do nothing */ ;
s = scan_linenum (s, &p_newfirst);
if (*s == ',')
{
do
{
if (!*++s)
malformed ();
}
while (! ISDIGIT (*s));
scan_linenum (s, &p_repl_lines);
p_repl_lines += 1 - p_newfirst;
if (p_repl_lines < 0)
malformed ();
}
else if (p_newfirst)
p_repl_lines = 1;
else
{
p_repl_lines = 0;
p_newfirst = 1;
}
if (p_newfirst >= LINENUM_MAX - p_repl_lines ||
p_repl_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - p_end)
malformed ();
p_max = p_repl_lines + p_end;
while (p_max + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
return -1;
if (p_repl_lines != ptrn_copiable
&& (p_prefix_context != 0
|| context != 0
|| p_repl_lines != 1))
repl_could_be_missing = false;
context = 0;
break;
case '+': case '!':
repl_could_be_missing = false;
change_line:
s = buf + 1;
chars_read--;
if (*s == '\n' && canonicalize) {
strcpy (s, " \n");
chars_read = 2;
}
if (*s == ' ' || *s == '\t') {
s++;
chars_read--;
} else if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
if (! repl_beginning)
{
if (ptrn_prefix_context == -1)
ptrn_prefix_context = context;
}
else
{
if (repl_prefix_context == -1)
repl_prefix_context = context;
}
chars_read -=
(1 < chars_read
&& p_end == (repl_beginning ? p_max : p_ptrn_lines)
&& incomplete_line ());
p_len[p_end] = chars_read;
p_line[p_end] = savebuf (s, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[p_end]) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
context = 0;
break;
case '\t': case '\n': /* assume spaces got eaten */
s = buf;
if (*buf == '\t') {
s++;
chars_read--;
}
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing &&
(!ptrn_spaces_eaten || difftype == NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF) ) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
chars_read -=
(1 < chars_read
&& p_end == (repl_beginning ? p_max : p_ptrn_lines)
&& incomplete_line ());
p_len[p_end] = chars_read;
p_line[p_end] = savebuf (buf, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[p_end]) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
if (p_end != p_ptrn_lines + 1) {
ptrn_spaces_eaten |= (repl_beginning != 0);
some_context = true;
context++;
if (repl_beginning)
repl_copiable++;
else
ptrn_copiable++;
p_Char[p_end] = ' ';
}
break;
case ' ':
s = buf + 1;
chars_read--;
if (*s == '\n' && canonicalize) {
strcpy (s, "\n");
chars_read = 2;
}
if (*s == ' ' || *s == '\t') {
s++;
chars_read--;
} else if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
some_context = true;
context++;
if (repl_beginning)
repl_copiable++;
else
ptrn_copiable++;
chars_read -=
(1 < chars_read
&& p_end == (repl_beginning ? p_max : p_ptrn_lines)
&& incomplete_line ());
p_len[p_end] = chars_read;
p_line[p_end] = savebuf (s, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[p_end]) {
p_end--;
return -1;
}
break;
default:
if (repl_beginning && repl_could_be_missing) {
repl_missing = true;
goto hunk_done;
}
malformed ();
}
}
hunk_done:
if (p_end >=0 && !repl_beginning)
fatal ("no '---' found in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, pch_hunk_beg ()));
if (repl_missing) {
/* reset state back to just after --- */
p_input_line = repl_patch_line;
context = repl_context;
for (p_end--; p_end > repl_beginning; p_end--)
free(p_line[p_end]);
Fseek (pfp, repl_backtrack_position, SEEK_SET);
/* redundant 'new' context lines were omitted - set */
/* up to fill them in from the old file context */
fillsrc = 1;
filldst = repl_beginning+1;
fillcnt = p_repl_lines;
p_end = p_max;
}
else if (! ptrn_missing && ptrn_copiable != repl_copiable)
fatal ("context mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
else if (!some_context && fillcnt == 1) {
/* the first hunk was a null hunk with no context */
/* and we were expecting one line -- fix it up. */
while (filldst < p_end) {
p_line[filldst] = p_line[filldst+1];
p_Char[filldst] = p_Char[filldst+1];
p_len[filldst] = p_len[filldst+1];
filldst++;
}
#if 0
repl_beginning--; /* this doesn't need to be fixed */
#endif
p_end--;
p_first++; /* do append rather than insert */
fillcnt = 0;
p_ptrn_lines = 0;
}
p_prefix_context = ((repl_prefix_context == -1
|| (ptrn_prefix_context != -1
&& ptrn_prefix_context < repl_prefix_context))
? ptrn_prefix_context : repl_prefix_context);
p_suffix_context = ((ptrn_suffix_context != -1
&& ptrn_suffix_context < context)
? ptrn_suffix_context : context);
if (p_prefix_context == -1 || p_suffix_context == -1)
fatal ("replacement text or line numbers mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
if (difftype == CONTEXT_DIFF
&& (fillcnt
|| (p_first > 1
&& p_prefix_context + p_suffix_context < ptrn_copiable))) {
if (verbosity == VERBOSE)
say ("%s\n%s\n%s\n",
"(Fascinating -- this is really a new-style context diff but without",
"the telltale extra asterisks on the *** line that usually indicate",
"the new style...)");
diff_type = difftype = NEW_CONTEXT_DIFF;
}
/* if there were omitted context lines, fill them in now */
if (fillcnt) {
p_bfake = filldst; /* remember where not to free() */
p_efake = filldst + fillcnt - 1;
while (fillcnt-- > 0) {
while (fillsrc <= p_end && fillsrc != repl_beginning
&& p_Char[fillsrc] != ' ')
fillsrc++;
if (p_end < fillsrc || fillsrc == repl_beginning)
{
fatal ("replacement text or line numbers mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
}
p_line[filldst] = p_line[fillsrc];
p_Char[filldst] = p_Char[fillsrc];
p_len[filldst] = p_len[fillsrc];
fillsrc++; filldst++;
}
while (fillsrc <= p_end && fillsrc != repl_beginning)
{
if (p_Char[fillsrc] == ' ')
fatal ("replacement text or line numbers mangled in hunk at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_hunk_beg));
fillsrc++;
}
if (debug & 64)
printf ("fillsrc %s, filldst %s, rb %s, e+1 %s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, fillsrc),
format_linenum (numbuf1, filldst),
format_linenum (numbuf2, repl_beginning),
format_linenum (numbuf3, p_end + 1));
assert(fillsrc==p_end+1 || fillsrc==repl_beginning);
assert(filldst==p_end+1 || filldst==repl_beginning);
}
}
else if (difftype == UNI_DIFF) {
file_offset line_beginning = file_tell (pfp); /* file pos of the current line */
lin fillsrc; /* index of old lines */
lin filldst; /* index of new lines */
char ch = '\0';
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1
|| chars_read <= 4
|| strncmp (buf, "@@ -", 4) != 0) {
next_intuit_at(line_beginning,p_input_line);
return chars_read == (size_t) -1 ? -1 : 0;
}
s = scan_linenum (buf + 4, &p_first);
if (*s == ',')
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_ptrn_lines);
else
p_ptrn_lines = 1;
if (p_first >= LINENUM_MAX - p_ptrn_lines)
malformed ();
if (*s == ' ') s++;
if (*s != '+')
malformed ();
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_newfirst);
if (*s == ',')
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_repl_lines);
else
p_repl_lines = 1;
if (p_newfirst >= LINENUM_MAX - p_repl_lines)
malformed ();
if (*s == ' ') s++;
if (*s++ != '@')
malformed ();
if (*s++ == '@' && *s == ' ')
{
p_c_function = s;
while (*s != '\n')
s++;
*s = '\0';
p_c_function = savestr (p_c_function);
if (! p_c_function)
return -1;
}
if (!p_ptrn_lines)
p_first++; /* do append rather than insert */
if (!p_repl_lines)
p_newfirst++;
if (p_ptrn_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - (p_repl_lines + 1))
malformed ();
p_max = p_ptrn_lines + p_repl_lines + 1;
while (p_max + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
return -1;
fillsrc = 1;
filldst = fillsrc + p_ptrn_lines;
p_end = filldst + p_repl_lines;
sprintf (buf, "*** %s,%s ****\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_first),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_first + p_ptrn_lines - 1));
p_len[0] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[0] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = -1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[0] = '*';
sprintf (buf, "--- %s,%s ----\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_newfirst),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_newfirst + p_repl_lines - 1));
p_len[filldst] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[filldst] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = 0;
return -1;
}
p_Char[filldst++] = '=';
p_prefix_context = -1;
p_hunk_beg = p_input_line + 1;
while (fillsrc <= p_ptrn_lines || filldst <= p_end) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (!chars_read) {
if (p_max - filldst < 3) {
strcpy (buf, " \n"); /* assume blank lines got chopped */
chars_read = 2;
} else {
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch");
}
}
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
s = 0;
else if (*buf == '\t' || *buf == '\n') {
ch = ' '; /* assume the space got eaten */
s = savebuf (buf, chars_read);
}
else {
ch = *buf;
s = savebuf (buf+1, --chars_read);
}
if (chars_read && ! s)
{
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
return -1;
}
switch (ch) {
case '-':
if (fillsrc > p_ptrn_lines) {
free(s);
p_end = filldst-1;
malformed ();
}
chars_read -= fillsrc == p_ptrn_lines && incomplete_line ();
p_Char[fillsrc] = ch;
p_line[fillsrc] = s;
p_len[fillsrc++] = chars_read;
break;
case '=':
ch = ' ';
/* FALL THROUGH */
case ' ':
if (fillsrc > p_ptrn_lines) {
free(s);
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
malformed ();
}
context++;
chars_read -= fillsrc == p_ptrn_lines && incomplete_line ();
p_Char[fillsrc] = ch;
p_line[fillsrc] = s;
p_len[fillsrc++] = chars_read;
s = savebuf (s, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! s) {
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
return -1;
}
/* FALL THROUGH */
case '+':
if (filldst > p_end) {
free(s);
while (--filldst > p_ptrn_lines)
free(p_line[filldst]);
p_end = fillsrc-1;
malformed ();
}
chars_read -= filldst == p_end && incomplete_line ();
p_Char[filldst] = ch;
p_line[filldst] = s;
p_len[filldst++] = chars_read;
break;
default:
p_end = filldst;
malformed ();
}
if (ch != ' ') {
if (p_prefix_context == -1)
p_prefix_context = context;
context = 0;
}
}/* while */
if (p_prefix_context == -1)
malformed ();
p_suffix_context = context;
}
else { /* normal diff--fake it up */
char hunk_type;
int i;
lin min, max;
file_offset line_beginning = file_tell (pfp);
p_prefix_context = p_suffix_context = 0;
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1 || !chars_read || !ISDIGIT (*buf)) {
next_intuit_at(line_beginning,p_input_line);
return chars_read == (size_t) -1 ? -1 : 0;
}
s = scan_linenum (buf, &p_first);
if (*s == ',') {
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &p_ptrn_lines);
p_ptrn_lines += 1 - p_first;
}
else
p_ptrn_lines = (*s != 'a');
if (p_first >= LINENUM_MAX - p_ptrn_lines)
malformed ();
hunk_type = *s;
if (hunk_type == 'a')
p_first++; /* do append rather than insert */
s = scan_linenum (s + 1, &min);
if (*s == ',')
scan_linenum (s + 1, &max);
else
max = min;
if (min > max || max - min == LINENUM_MAX)
malformed ();
if (hunk_type == 'd')
min++;
p_newfirst = min;
p_repl_lines = max - min + 1;
if (p_newfirst >= LINENUM_MAX - p_repl_lines)
malformed ();
if (p_ptrn_lines >= LINENUM_MAX - (p_repl_lines + 1))
malformed ();
p_end = p_ptrn_lines + p_repl_lines + 1;
while (p_end + 1 >= hunkmax)
if (! grow_hunkmax ())
{
p_end = -1;
return -1;
}
sprintf (buf, "*** %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_first),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_first + p_ptrn_lines - 1));
p_len[0] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[0] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = -1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[0] = '*';
for (i=1; i<=p_ptrn_lines; i++) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
{
p_end = i - 1;
return -1;
}
if (!chars_read)
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
if (buf[0] != '<' || (buf[1] != ' ' && buf[1] != '\t'))
fatal ("'<' expected at line %s of patch",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
chars_read -= 2 + (i == p_ptrn_lines && incomplete_line ());
p_len[i] = chars_read;
p_line[i] = savebuf (buf + 2, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[i]) {
p_end = i-1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[i] = '-';
}
if (hunk_type == 'c') {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
{
p_end = i - 1;
return -1;
}
if (! chars_read)
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
if (*buf != '-')
fatal ("'---' expected at line %s of patch",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
}
sprintf (buf, "--- %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, min),
format_linenum (numbuf1, max));
p_len[i] = strlen (buf);
if (! (p_line[i] = savestr (buf))) {
p_end = i-1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[i] = '=';
for (i++; i<=p_end; i++) {
chars_read = get_line ();
if (chars_read == (size_t) -1)
{
p_end = i - 1;
return -1;
}
if (!chars_read)
fatal ("unexpected end of file in patch at line %s",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
if (buf[0] != '>' || (buf[1] != ' ' && buf[1] != '\t'))
fatal ("'>' expected at line %s of patch",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_input_line));
chars_read -= 2 + (i == p_end && incomplete_line ());
p_len[i] = chars_read;
p_line[i] = savebuf (buf + 2, chars_read);
if (chars_read && ! p_line[i]) {
p_end = i-1;
return -1;
}
p_Char[i] = '+';
}
}
if (rev) /* backwards patch? */
if (!pch_swap())
say ("Not enough memory to swap next hunk!\n");
assert (p_end + 1 < hunkmax);
p_Char[p_end + 1] = '^'; /* add a stopper for apply_hunk */
if (debug & 2) {
lin i;
for (i = 0; i <= p_end + 1; i++) {
fprintf (stderr, "%s %c",
format_linenum (numbuf0, i),
p_Char[i]);
if (p_Char[i] == '*')
fprintf (stderr, " %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_first),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_ptrn_lines));
else if (p_Char[i] == '=')
fprintf (stderr, " %s,%s\n",
format_linenum (numbuf0, p_newfirst),
format_linenum (numbuf1, p_repl_lines));
else if (p_Char[i] != '^')
{
fputs(" |", stderr);
pch_write_line (i, stderr);
}
else
fputc('\n', stderr);
}
fflush (stderr);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int __init l2tp_eth_init(void)
{
int err = 0;
err = l2tp_nl_register_ops(L2TP_PWTYPE_ETH, &l2tp_eth_nl_cmd_ops);
if (err)
goto out;
err = register_pernet_device(&l2tp_eth_net_ops);
if (err)
goto out_unreg;
printk(KERN_INFO "L2TP ethernet pseudowire support (L2TPv3)\n");
return 0;
out_unreg:
l2tp_nl_unregister_ops(L2TP_PWTYPE_ETH);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: scoped_ptr<base::Value> LayerTreeHost::AsValue() const {
scoped_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> state(new base::DictionaryValue());
state->Set("proxy", proxy_->AsValue().release());
return state.PassAs<base::Value>();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ftrace_regex_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
{
loff_t ret;
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
ret = seq_lseek(file, offset, whence);
else
file->f_pos = ret = 1;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void _gdImageFillTiled(gdImagePtr im, int x, int y, int nc)
{
int i, l, x1, x2, dy;
int oc; /* old pixel value */
int wx2,wy2;
/* stack of filled segments */
struct seg *stack;
struct seg *sp;
char **pts;
if (!im->tile) {
return;
}
wx2=im->sx;wy2=im->sy;
nc = gdImageTileGet(im,x,y);
pts = (char **) ecalloc(im->sy + 1, sizeof(char *));
for (i = 0; i < im->sy + 1; i++) {
pts[i] = (char *) ecalloc(im->sx + 1, sizeof(char));
}
stack = (struct seg *)safe_emalloc(sizeof(struct seg), ((int)(im->sy*im->sx)/4), 1);
sp = stack;
oc = gdImageGetPixel(im, x, y);
/* required! */
FILL_PUSH(y,x,x,1);
/* seed segment (popped 1st) */
FILL_PUSH(y+1, x, x, -1);
while (sp>stack) {
FILL_POP(y, x1, x2, dy);
for (x=x1; x>=0 && (!pts[y][x] && gdImageGetPixel(im,x,y)==oc); x--) {
nc = gdImageTileGet(im,x,y);
pts[y][x] = 1;
gdImageSetPixel(im,x, y, nc);
}
if (x>=x1) {
goto skip;
}
l = x+1;
/* leak on left? */
if (l<x1) {
FILL_PUSH(y, l, x1-1, -dy);
}
x = x1+1;
do {
for(; x<wx2 && (!pts[y][x] && gdImageGetPixel(im,x, y)==oc); x++) {
nc = gdImageTileGet(im,x,y);
pts[y][x] = 1;
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y, nc);
}
FILL_PUSH(y, l, x-1, dy);
/* leak on right? */
if (x>x2+1) {
FILL_PUSH(y, x2+1, x-1, -dy);
}
skip: for(x++; x<=x2 && (pts[y][x] || gdImageGetPixel(im,x, y)!=oc); x++);
l = x;
} while (x<=x2);
}
for(i = 0; i < im->sy + 1; i++) {
efree(pts[i]);
}
efree(pts);
efree(stack);
}
Commit Message: Fix #72696: imagefilltoborder stackoverflow on truecolor images
We must not allow negative color values be passed to
gdImageFillToBorder(), because that can lead to infinite recursion
since the recursion termination condition will not necessarily be met.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::PassesCORSAccessCheck() {
DCHECK(MediaElement());
return (MediaElement()->GetWebMediaPlayer() &&
MediaElement()->GetWebMediaPlayer()->DidPassCORSAccessCheck()) ||
passes_current_src_cors_access_check_;
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void HTMLInputElement::HandleFocusEvent(Element* old_focused_element,
WebFocusType type) {
input_type_->EnableSecureTextInput();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::LoadErrorPage(int reason) {
WebURLError error(reason, frame_->GetDocument().Url());
std::string error_html;
GetContentClient()->renderer()->PrepareErrorPage(
this, frame_->GetDocumentLoader()->GetRequest(), error, &error_html,
nullptr);
frame_->LoadData(error_html, WebString::FromUTF8("text/html"),
WebString::FromUTF8("UTF-8"), GURL(kUnreachableWebDataURL),
error.url(), true, blink::WebFrameLoadType::kStandard,
blink::WebHistoryItem(),
blink::kWebHistoryDifferentDocumentLoad, true);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
int err;
if (opcode == BPF_END || opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (opcode == BPF_NEG) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != 0 ||
insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 ||
insn->off != 0 || insn->imm != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_NEG uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
(insn->imm != 16 && insn->imm != 32 && insn->imm != 64) ||
BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
verbose(env, "BPF_END uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->dst_reg)) {
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic prohibited\n",
insn->dst_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else if (opcode == BPF_MOV) {
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_MOV uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64) {
/* case: R1 = R2
* copy register state to dest reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg] = regs[insn->src_reg];
regs[insn->dst_reg].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
} else {
/* R1 = (u32) R2 */
if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
verbose(env,
"R%d partial copy of pointer\n",
insn->src_reg);
return -EACCES;
}
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
/* high 32 bits are known zero. */
regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off = tnum_cast(
regs[insn->dst_reg].var_off, 4);
__update_reg_bounds(®s[insn->dst_reg]);
}
} else {
/* case: R = imm
* remember the value we stored into this reg
*/
regs[insn->dst_reg].type = SCALAR_VALUE;
__mark_reg_known(regs + insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
}
} else if (opcode > BPF_END) {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_ALU opcode %x\n", opcode);
return -EINVAL;
} else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
verbose(env, "div by zero\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
if (err)
return err;
return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in check_alu_op()
Distinguish between
BPF_ALU64|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, sign-extended to 64-bit)
and BPF_ALU|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, zero-padded to 64-bit);
only perform sign extension in the first case.
Starting with v4.14, this is exploitable by unprivileged users as long as
the unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl isn't set.
Debian assigned CVE-2017-16995 for this issue.
v3:
- add CVE number (Ben Hutchings)
Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: SampleTable::SampleTable(const sp<DataSource> &source)
: mDataSource(source),
mChunkOffsetOffset(-1),
mChunkOffsetType(0),
mNumChunkOffsets(0),
mSampleToChunkOffset(-1),
mNumSampleToChunkOffsets(0),
mSampleSizeOffset(-1),
mSampleSizeFieldSize(0),
mDefaultSampleSize(0),
mNumSampleSizes(0),
mTimeToSampleCount(0),
mTimeToSample(NULL),
mSampleTimeEntries(NULL),
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries(NULL),
mNumCompositionTimeDeltaEntries(0),
mCompositionDeltaLookup(new CompositionDeltaLookup),
mSyncSampleOffset(-1),
mNumSyncSamples(0),
mSyncSamples(NULL),
mLastSyncSampleIndex(0),
mSampleToChunkEntries(NULL) {
mSampleIterator = new SampleIterator(this);
}
Commit Message: Resolve merge conflict when cp'ing ag/931301 to mnc-mr1-release
Change-Id: I079d1db2d30d126f8aed348bd62451acf741037d
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void set_numabalancing_state(bool enabled)
{
numabalancing_enabled = enabled;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <[email protected]>
Cc: Juri Lelli <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: uint32_t DefragTrackerSpareQueueGetSize(void)
{
return DefragTrackerQueueLen(&defragtracker_spare_q);
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: DECLAREcpFunc(cpContig2SeparateByRow)
{
tsize_t scanlinesizein = TIFFScanlineSize(in);
tsize_t scanlinesizeout = TIFFScanlineSize(out);
tdata_t inbuf;
tdata_t outbuf;
register uint8 *inp, *outp;
register uint32 n;
uint32 row;
tsample_t s;
inbuf = _TIFFmalloc(scanlinesizein);
outbuf = _TIFFmalloc(scanlinesizeout);
if (!inbuf || !outbuf)
goto bad;
_TIFFmemset(inbuf, 0, scanlinesizein);
_TIFFmemset(outbuf, 0, scanlinesizeout);
/* unpack channels */
for (s = 0; s < spp; s++) {
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row++) {
if (TIFFReadScanline(in, inbuf, row, 0) < 0
&& !ignore) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't read scanline %lu",
(unsigned long) row);
goto bad;
}
inp = ((uint8*)inbuf) + s;
outp = (uint8*)outbuf;
for (n = imagewidth; n-- > 0;) {
*outp++ = *inp;
inp += spp;
}
if (TIFFWriteScanline(out, outbuf, row, s) < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, can't write scanline %lu",
(unsigned long) row);
goto bad;
}
}
}
if (inbuf) _TIFFfree(inbuf);
if (outbuf) _TIFFfree(outbuf);
return 1;
bad:
if (inbuf) _TIFFfree(inbuf);
if (outbuf) _TIFFfree(outbuf);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: error out cleanly in cpContig2SeparateByRow and
cpSeparate2ContigByRow if BitsPerSample != 8 to avoid heap based overflow.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2656 and
http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2657
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void tcp_rtt_estimator(struct sock *sk, const __u32 mrtt)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
long m = mrtt; /* RTT */
/* The following amusing code comes from Jacobson's
* article in SIGCOMM '88. Note that rtt and mdev
* are scaled versions of rtt and mean deviation.
* This is designed to be as fast as possible
* m stands for "measurement".
*
* On a 1990 paper the rto value is changed to:
* RTO = rtt + 4 * mdev
*
* Funny. This algorithm seems to be very broken.
* These formulae increase RTO, when it should be decreased, increase
* too slowly, when it should be increased quickly, decrease too quickly
* etc. I guess in BSD RTO takes ONE value, so that it is absolutely
* does not matter how to _calculate_ it. Seems, it was trap
* that VJ failed to avoid. 8)
*/
if (m == 0)
m = 1;
if (tp->srtt != 0) {
m -= (tp->srtt >> 3); /* m is now error in rtt est */
tp->srtt += m; /* rtt = 7/8 rtt + 1/8 new */
if (m < 0) {
m = -m; /* m is now abs(error) */
m -= (tp->mdev >> 2); /* similar update on mdev */
/* This is similar to one of Eifel findings.
* Eifel blocks mdev updates when rtt decreases.
* This solution is a bit different: we use finer gain
* for mdev in this case (alpha*beta).
* Like Eifel it also prevents growth of rto,
* but also it limits too fast rto decreases,
* happening in pure Eifel.
*/
if (m > 0)
m >>= 3;
} else {
m -= (tp->mdev >> 2); /* similar update on mdev */
}
tp->mdev += m; /* mdev = 3/4 mdev + 1/4 new */
if (tp->mdev > tp->mdev_max) {
tp->mdev_max = tp->mdev;
if (tp->mdev_max > tp->rttvar)
tp->rttvar = tp->mdev_max;
}
if (after(tp->snd_una, tp->rtt_seq)) {
if (tp->mdev_max < tp->rttvar)
tp->rttvar -= (tp->rttvar - tp->mdev_max) >> 2;
tp->rtt_seq = tp->snd_nxt;
tp->mdev_max = tcp_rto_min(sk);
}
} else {
/* no previous measure. */
tp->srtt = m << 3; /* take the measured time to be rtt */
tp->mdev = m << 1; /* make sure rto = 3*rtt */
tp->mdev_max = tp->rttvar = max(tp->mdev, tcp_rto_min(sk));
tp->rtt_seq = tp->snd_nxt;
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int create_flush_cmd_control(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
dev_t dev = sbi->sb->s_bdev->bd_dev;
struct flush_cmd_control *fcc;
int err = 0;
if (SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info) {
fcc = SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info;
goto init_thread;
}
fcc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct flush_cmd_control), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fcc)
return -ENOMEM;
atomic_set(&fcc->issued_flush, 0);
atomic_set(&fcc->issing_flush, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&fcc->flush_wait_queue);
init_llist_head(&fcc->issue_list);
SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info = fcc;
init_thread:
fcc->f2fs_issue_flush = kthread_run(issue_flush_thread, sbi,
"f2fs_flush-%u:%u", MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev));
if (IS_ERR(fcc->f2fs_issue_flush)) {
err = PTR_ERR(fcc->f2fs_issue_flush);
kfree(fcc);
SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info = NULL;
return err;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
sctp_disposition_t retval;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sctp_association *new_asoc;
int error = 0;
char action;
struct sctp_chunk *err_chk_p;
/* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length from the protocol
* perspective. In this case check to make sure we have at least
* enough for the chunk header. Cookie length verification is
* done later.
*/
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
/* "Decode" the chunk. We have no optional parameters so we
* are in good shape.
*/
chunk->subh.cookie_hdr = (struct sctp_signed_cookie *)chunk->skb->data;
if (!pskb_pull(chunk->skb, ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length) -
sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
goto nomem;
/* In RFC 2960 5.2.4 3, if both Verification Tags in the State Cookie
* of a duplicate COOKIE ECHO match the Verification Tags of the
* current association, consider the State Cookie valid even if
* the lifespan is exceeded.
*/
new_asoc = sctp_unpack_cookie(ep, asoc, chunk, GFP_ATOMIC, &error,
&err_chk_p);
/* FIXME:
* If the re-build failed, what is the proper error path
* from here?
*
* [We should abort the association. --piggy]
*/
if (!new_asoc) {
/* FIXME: Several errors are possible. A bad cookie should
* be silently discarded, but think about logging it too.
*/
switch (error) {
case -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM:
goto nomem;
case -SCTP_IERROR_STALE_COOKIE:
sctp_send_stale_cookie_err(net, ep, asoc, chunk, commands,
err_chk_p);
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
case -SCTP_IERROR_BAD_SIG:
default:
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
}
/* Compare the tie_tag in cookie with the verification tag of
* current association.
*/
action = sctp_tietags_compare(new_asoc, asoc);
switch (action) {
case 'A': /* Association restart. */
retval = sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a(net, ep, asoc, chunk, commands,
new_asoc);
break;
case 'B': /* Collision case B. */
retval = sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b(net, ep, asoc, chunk, commands,
new_asoc);
break;
case 'C': /* Collision case C. */
retval = sctp_sf_do_dupcook_c(net, ep, asoc, chunk, commands,
new_asoc);
break;
case 'D': /* Collision case D. */
retval = sctp_sf_do_dupcook_d(net, ep, asoc, chunk, commands,
new_asoc);
break;
default: /* Discard packet for all others. */
retval = sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
break;
}
/* Delete the tempory new association. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC, SCTP_ASOC(new_asoc));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_DELETE_TCB, SCTP_NULL());
/* Restore association pointer to provide SCTP command interpeter
* with a valid context in case it needs to manipulate
* the queues */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC,
SCTP_ASOC((struct sctp_association *)asoc));
return retval;
nomem:
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <[email protected]>
CC: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int inet_compat_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
if (sk->sk_prot->compat_ioctl)
err = sk->sk_prot->compat_ioctl(sk, cmd, arg);
return err;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: htmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
int len = 0, l;
int c;
int count = 0;
const xmlChar *base = ctxt->input->base;
/*
* Handler for more complex cases
*/
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if ((c == ' ') || (c == '>') || (c == '/') || /* accelerators */
(!IS_LETTER(c) && (c != '_') &&
(c != ':'))) {
return(NULL);
}
while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* test bigname.xml */
((IS_LETTER(c)) || (IS_DIGIT(c)) ||
(c == '.') || (c == '-') ||
(c == '_') || (c == ':') ||
(IS_COMBINING(c)) ||
(IS_EXTENDER(c)))) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
len += l;
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (ctxt->input->base != base) {
/*
* We changed encoding from an unknown encoding
* Input buffer changed location, so we better start again
*/
return(htmlParseNameComplex(ctxt));
}
}
if (ctxt->input->base > ctxt->input->cur - len)
return(NULL);
return(xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, ctxt->input->cur - len, len));
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: long Cluster::Load(long long& pos, long& len) const {
assert(m_pSegment);
assert(m_pos >= m_element_start);
if (m_timecode >= 0) // at least partially loaded
return 0;
assert(m_pos == m_element_start);
assert(m_element_size < 0);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long total, avail;
const int status = pReader->Length(&total, &avail);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
assert((total < 0) || (avail <= total));
assert((total < 0) || (m_pos <= total)); // TODO: verify this
pos = m_pos;
long long cluster_size = -1;
{
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error or underflow
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // underflow (weird)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id_ = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id_ < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id_);
if (id_ != 0x0F43B675) // Cluster ID
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume id
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(cluster_size);
if (size == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID; // TODO: verify this
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size != unknown_size)
cluster_size = size;
}
#if 0
len = static_cast<long>(size_);
if (cluster_stop > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
#endif
long long timecode = -1;
long long new_pos = -1;
bool bBlock = false;
long long cluster_stop = (cluster_size < 0) ? -1 : pos + cluster_size;
for (;;) {
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos >= cluster_stop))
break;
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long long result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(id);
if (id == 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x0F43B675) // Cluster ID
break;
if (id == 0x0C53BB6B) // Cues ID
break;
pos += len; // consume ID field
if ((pos + 1) > avail) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result = GetUIntLength(pReader, pos, len);
if (result < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(result);
if (result > 0) // weird
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + len) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if ((pos + len) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(size);
const long long unknown_size = (1LL << (7 * len)) - 1;
if (size == unknown_size)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume size field
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && (pos > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if ((cluster_stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > cluster_stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (id == 0x67) { // TimeCode ID
len = static_cast<long>(size);
if ((pos + size) > avail)
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
timecode = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (timecode < 0) // error (or underflow)
return static_cast<long>(timecode);
new_pos = pos + size;
if (bBlock)
break;
} else if (id == 0x20) { // BlockGroup ID
bBlock = true;
break;
} else if (id == 0x23) { // SimpleBlock ID
bBlock = true;
break;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
}
assert((cluster_stop < 0) || (pos <= cluster_stop));
if (timecode < 0) // no timecode found
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
if (!bBlock)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
m_pos = new_pos; // designates position just beyond timecode payload
m_timecode = timecode; // m_timecode >= 0 means we're partially loaded
if (cluster_size >= 0)
m_element_size = cluster_stop - m_element_start;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void ConnectToChannel(const IPC::ChannelHandle& handle, bool is_ppapi) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (!is_removing_)
return;
DCHECK(!channel_.get());
channel_ = IPC::Channel::CreateClient(handle, this);
if (!channel_->Connect()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Couldn't connect to plugin";
SignalDone();
return;
}
uint64 max_age = begin_time_.is_null() ?
std::numeric_limits<uint64>::max() :
(base::Time::Now() - begin_time_).InSeconds();
IPC::Message* msg;
if (is_ppapi) {
msg = CreatePpapiClearSiteDataMsg(max_age);
} else {
msg = new PluginProcessMsg_ClearSiteData(
std::string(), kClearAllData, max_age);
}
if (!channel_->Send(msg)) {
NOTREACHED() << "Couldn't send ClearSiteData message";
SignalDone();
return;
}
}
Commit Message: Do not attempt to open a channel to a plugin in Plugin Data Remover if there are no plugins available.
BUG=485886
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1144353003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#331168}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ScriptValue ScriptController::executeScriptInMainWorld(const ScriptSourceCode& sourceCode, AccessControlStatus corsStatus)
{
String sourceURL = sourceCode.url();
const String* savedSourceURL = m_sourceURL;
m_sourceURL = &sourceURL;
v8::HandleScope handleScope;
v8::Handle<v8::Context> v8Context = ScriptController::mainWorldContext(m_frame);
if (v8Context.IsEmpty())
return ScriptValue();
v8::Context::Scope scope(v8Context);
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame);
v8::Local<v8::Value> object = compileAndRunScript(sourceCode, corsStatus);
m_sourceURL = savedSourceURL;
if (object.IsEmpty())
return ScriptValue();
return ScriptValue(object);
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void swizzleImageData(unsigned char* srcAddr,
size_t height,
size_t bytesPerRow,
bool flipY) {
if (flipY) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < height / 2; i++) {
size_t topRowStartPosition = i * bytesPerRow;
size_t bottomRowStartPosition = (height - 1 - i) * bytesPerRow;
if (kN32_SkColorType == kBGRA_8888_SkColorType) { // needs to swizzle
for (size_t j = 0; j < bytesPerRow; j += 4) {
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j + 2]);
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j + 1],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j + 1]);
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j + 2],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j]);
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j + 3],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j + 3]);
}
} else {
std::swap_ranges(srcAddr + topRowStartPosition,
srcAddr + topRowStartPosition + bytesPerRow,
srcAddr + bottomRowStartPosition);
}
}
} else {
if (kN32_SkColorType == kBGRA_8888_SkColorType) // needs to swizzle
for (size_t i = 0; i < height * bytesPerRow; i += 4)
std::swap(srcAddr[i], srcAddr[i + 2]);
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void atl2_down(struct atl2_adapter *adapter)
{
struct net_device *netdev = adapter->netdev;
/* signal that we're down so the interrupt handler does not
* reschedule our watchdog timer */
set_bit(__ATL2_DOWN, &adapter->flags);
netif_tx_disable(netdev);
/* reset MAC to disable all RX/TX */
atl2_reset_hw(&adapter->hw);
msleep(1);
atl2_irq_disable(adapter);
del_timer_sync(&adapter->watchdog_timer);
del_timer_sync(&adapter->phy_config_timer);
clear_bit(0, &adapter->cfg_phy);
netif_carrier_off(netdev);
adapter->link_speed = SPEED_0;
adapter->link_duplex = -1;
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: RenderLayer* RenderLayerScrollableArea::layer() const
{
return &m_layer;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void spl_filesystem_dir_it_move_forward(zend_object_iterator *iter TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_object *object = spl_filesystem_iterator_to_object((spl_filesystem_iterator *)iter);
object->u.dir.index++;
spl_filesystem_dir_read(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (object->file_name) {
efree(object->file_name);
object->file_name = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: GF_Err kind_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_KindBox *ptr = (GF_KindBox *)s;
ptr->size += strlen(ptr->schemeURI) + 1;
if (ptr->value) {
ptr->size += strlen(ptr->value) + 1;
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bgp_capabilities_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *opt, int caps_len)
{
int cap_type, cap_len, tcap_len, cap_offset;
int i = 0;
while (i < caps_len) {
ND_TCHECK2(opt[i], BGP_CAP_HEADER_SIZE);
cap_type=opt[i];
cap_len=opt[i+1];
tcap_len=cap_len;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_capcode_values, "Unknown",
cap_type),
cap_type,
cap_len));
ND_TCHECK2(opt[i+2], cap_len);
switch (cap_type) {
case BGP_CAPCODE_MP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAFI %s (%u), SAFI %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+2)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+2),
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown",
opt[i+5]),
opt[i+5]));
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_RESTART:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tRestart Flags: [%s], Restart Time %us",
((opt[i+2])&0x80) ? "R" : "none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+2)&0xfff));
tcap_len-=2;
cap_offset=4;
while(tcap_len>=4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t AFI %s (%u), SAFI %s (%u), Forwarding state preserved: %s",
tok2str(af_values,"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset),
tok2str(bgp_safi_values,"Unknown",
opt[i+cap_offset+2]),
opt[i+cap_offset+2],
((opt[i+cap_offset+3])&0x80) ? "yes" : "no" ));
tcap_len-=4;
cap_offset+=4;
}
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_RR:
case BGP_CAPCODE_RR_CISCO:
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_AS_NEW:
/*
* Extract the 4 byte AS number encoded.
*/
if (cap_len == 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t 4 Byte AS %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(opt + i + 2))));
}
break;
case BGP_CAPCODE_ADD_PATH:
cap_offset=2;
if (tcap_len == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (bogus)")); /* length */
break;
}
while (tcap_len > 0) {
if (tcap_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t(invalid)"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tAFI %s (%u), SAFI %s (%u), Send/Receive: %s",
tok2str(af_values,"Unknown",EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(opt+i+cap_offset),
tok2str(bgp_safi_values,"Unknown",opt[i+cap_offset+2]),
opt[i+cap_offset+2],
tok2str(bgp_add_path_recvsend,"Bogus (0x%02x)",opt[i+cap_offset+3])
));
tcap_len-=4;
cap_offset+=4;
}
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\tno decoder for Capability %u",
cap_type));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, &opt[i+2], "\n\t\t", cap_len);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 && cap_len > 0) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, &opt[i+2], "\n\t\t", cap_len);
}
i += BGP_CAP_HEADER_SIZE + cap_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|BGP]"));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14881/BGP: Fix BGP_CAPCODE_RESTART.
Add a bounds check and a comment to bgp_capabilities_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void NetworkHandler::SetCookie(const std::string& name,
const std::string& value,
Maybe<std::string> url,
Maybe<std::string> domain,
Maybe<std::string> path,
Maybe<bool> secure,
Maybe<bool> http_only,
Maybe<std::string> same_site,
Maybe<double> expires,
std::unique_ptr<SetCookieCallback> callback) {
if (!process_) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
return;
}
if (!url.isJust() && !domain.isJust()) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::InvalidParams(
"At least one of the url and domain needs to be specified"));
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&SetCookieOnIO,
base::Unretained(
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetURLRequestContext()),
name, value, url.fromMaybe(""), domain.fromMaybe(""),
path.fromMaybe(""), secure.fromMaybe(false),
http_only.fromMaybe(false), same_site.fromMaybe(""),
expires.fromMaybe(-1),
base::BindOnce(&CookieSetOnIO, std::move(callback))));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int flashputbuf(struct airo_info *ai){
int nwords;
/* Write stuff */
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags))
memcpy_toio(ai->pciaux + 0x8000, ai->flash, FLASHSIZE);
else {
OUT4500(ai,AUXPAGE,0x100);
OUT4500(ai,AUXOFF,0);
for(nwords=0;nwords != FLASHSIZE / 2;nwords++){
OUT4500(ai,AUXDATA,ai->flash[nwords] & 0xffff);
}
}
OUT4500(ai,SWS0,0x8000);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static const char *parse_number( cJSON *item, const char *num )
{
int64_t i = 0;
double f = 0;
int isint = 1;
int sign = 1, scale = 0, subscale = 0, signsubscale = 1;
/* Could use sscanf for this? */
if ( *num == '-' ) {
/* Has sign. */
sign = -1;
++num;
}
if ( *num == '0' )
/* Is zero. */
++num;
if ( *num >= '1' && *num<='9' ) {
/* Number. */
do {
i = ( i * 10 ) + ( *num - '0' );
f = ( f * 10.0 ) + ( *num - '0' );
++num;
} while ( *num >= '0' && *num <= '9' );
}
if ( *num == '.' && num[1] >= '0' && num[1] <= '9' ) {
/* Fractional part. */
isint = 0;
++num;
do {
f = ( f * 10.0 ) + ( *num++ - '0' );
scale--;
} while ( *num >= '0' && *num <= '9' );
}
if ( *num == 'e' || *num == 'E' ) {
/* Exponent. */
isint = 0;
++num;
if ( *num == '+' )
++num;
else if ( *num == '-' ) {
/* With sign. */
signsubscale = -1;
++num;
}
while ( *num >= '0' && *num <= '9' )
subscale = ( subscale * 10 ) + ( *num++ - '0' );
}
/* Put it together. */
if ( isint ) {
/* Int: number = +/- number */
i = sign * i;
item->valueint = i;
item->valuefloat = i;
} else {
/* Float: number = +/- number.fraction * 10^+/- exponent */
f = sign * f * ipow( 10.0, scale + subscale * signsubscale );
item->valueint = f;
item->valuefloat = f;
}
item->type = cJSON_Number;
return num;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder2::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.aac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if ((formatParams->nPortIndex == 0
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM)
|| (formatParams->nPortIndex == 1
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitRate = aacParams->nBitRate;
mNumChannels = aacParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = aacParams->nSampleRate;
if (aacParams->eAACProfile != OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectNull) {
mAACProfile = aacParams->eAACProfile;
}
if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 0;
mSBRRatio = 0;
} else if ((aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& !(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 1;
} else if (!(aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidSSBR)
&& (aacParams->nAACtools & OMX_AUDIO_AACToolAndroidDSBR)) {
mSBRMode = 1;
mSBRRatio = 2;
} else {
mSBRMode = -1; // codec default sbr mode
mSBRRatio = 0;
}
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mNumChannels = pcmParams->nChannels;
mSampleRate = pcmParams->nSamplingRate;
if (setAudioParams() != OK) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static ssize_t ap_poll_thread_store(struct bus_type *bus,
const char *buf, size_t count)
{
int flag, rc;
if (sscanf(buf, "%d\n", &flag) != 1)
return -EINVAL;
if (flag) {
rc = ap_poll_thread_start();
if (rc)
return rc;
}
else
ap_poll_thread_stop();
return count;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void Document::UpdateFocusAppearanceLater() {
if (!update_focus_appearance_timer_.IsActive())
update_focus_appearance_timer_.StartOneShot(0, BLINK_FROM_HERE);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: XFixesFetchRegionAndBounds (Display *dpy,
XserverRegion region,
int *nrectanglesRet,
XRectangle *bounds)
{
XFixesExtDisplayInfo *info = XFixesFindDisplay (dpy);
xXFixesFetchRegionReq *req;
xXFixesFetchRegionReply rep;
XRectangle *rects;
int nrects;
long nbytes;
long nread;
XFixesCheckExtension (dpy, info, NULL);
LockDisplay (dpy);
GetReq (XFixesFetchRegion, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->xfixesReqType = X_XFixesFetchRegion;
req->region = region;
*nrectanglesRet = 0;
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse))
{
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
}
bounds->x = rep.x;
bounds->y = rep.y;
bounds->y = rep.y;
bounds->width = rep.width;
bounds->height = rep.height;
nbytes = (long) rep.length << 2;
nrects = rep.length >> 1;
rects = Xmalloc (nrects * sizeof (XRectangle));
if (!rects)
{
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
_XEatData (dpy, (unsigned long) (nbytes - nread));
}
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle();
*nrectanglesRet = nrects;
return rects;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int addstring(JF, const char *value)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < F->strlen; ++i)
if (!strcmp(F->strtab[i], value))
return i;
if (F->strlen >= F->strcap) {
F->strcap = F->strcap ? F->strcap * 2 : 16;
F->strtab = js_realloc(J, F->strtab, F->strcap * sizeof *F->strtab);
}
F->strtab[F->strlen] = value;
return F->strlen++;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: long long Block::GetTime(const Cluster* pCluster) const
{
assert(pCluster);
const long long tc = GetTimeCode(pCluster);
const Segment* const pSegment = pCluster->m_pSegment;
const SegmentInfo* const pInfo = pSegment->GetInfo();
assert(pInfo);
const long long scale = pInfo->GetTimeCodeScale();
assert(scale >= 1);
const long long ns = tc * scale;
return ns;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: pkinit_eku_authorize(krb5_context context, krb5_certauth_moddata moddata,
const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_len,
krb5_const_principal princ, const void *opts,
const struct _krb5_db_entry_new *db_entry,
char ***authinds_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
int valid_eku;
const struct certauth_req_opts *req_opts = opts;
*authinds_out = NULL;
/* Verify the client EKU. */
ret = verify_client_eku(context, req_opts->plgctx, req_opts->reqctx,
&valid_eku);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!valid_eku) {
TRACE_PKINIT_SERVER_EKU_REJECT(context);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix certauth built-in module returns
The PKINIT certauth eku module should never authoritatively authorize
a certificate, because an extended key usage does not establish a
relationship between the certificate and any specific user; it only
establishes that the certificate was created for PKINIT client
authentication. Therefore, pkinit_eku_authorize() should return
KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE on success, not 0.
The certauth san module should pass if it does not find any SANs of
the types it can match against; the presence of other types of SANs
should not cause it to explicitly deny a certificate. Check for an
empty result from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() in verify_client_san(),
instead of returning ENOENT from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() when
there are no SANs at all.
ticket: 8561
CWE ID: CWE-287
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int modbus_read_bits(modbus_t *ctx, int addr, int nb, uint8_t *dest)
{
int rc;
if (ctx == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
if (nb > MODBUS_MAX_READ_BITS) {
if (ctx->debug) {
fprintf(stderr,
"ERROR Too many bits requested (%d > %d)\n",
nb, MODBUS_MAX_READ_BITS);
}
errno = EMBMDATA;
return -1;
}
rc = read_io_status(ctx, MODBUS_FC_READ_COILS, addr, nb, dest);
if (rc == -1)
return -1;
else
return nb;
}
Commit Message: Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct wireless_dev *wdev,
struct cfg80211_mgmt_tx_params *params, u64 *cookie)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy);
struct ieee80211_channel *chan = params->chan;
const u8 *buf = params->buf;
size_t len = params->len;
const struct ieee80211_mgmt *mgmt;
struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif *vif;
s32 err = 0;
s32 ie_offset;
s32 ie_len;
struct brcmf_fil_action_frame_le *action_frame;
struct brcmf_fil_af_params_le *af_params;
bool ack;
s32 chan_nr;
u32 freq;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
*cookie = 0;
mgmt = (const struct ieee80211_mgmt *)buf;
if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(mgmt->frame_control)) {
brcmf_err("Driver only allows MGMT packet type\n");
return -EPERM;
}
vif = container_of(wdev, struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif, wdev);
if (ieee80211_is_probe_resp(mgmt->frame_control)) {
/* Right now the only reason to get a probe response */
/* is for p2p listen response or for p2p GO from */
/* wpa_supplicant. Unfortunately the probe is send */
/* on primary ndev, while dongle wants it on the p2p */
/* vif. Since this is only reason for a probe */
/* response to be sent, the vif is taken from cfg. */
/* If ever desired to send proberesp for non p2p */
/* response then data should be checked for */
/* "DIRECT-". Note in future supplicant will take */
/* dedicated p2p wdev to do this and then this 'hack'*/
/* is not needed anymore. */
ie_offset = DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN +
DOT11_BCN_PRB_FIXED_LEN;
ie_len = len - ie_offset;
if (vif == cfg->p2p.bss_idx[P2PAPI_BSSCFG_PRIMARY].vif)
vif = cfg->p2p.bss_idx[P2PAPI_BSSCFG_DEVICE].vif;
err = brcmf_vif_set_mgmt_ie(vif,
BRCMF_VNDR_IE_PRBRSP_FLAG,
&buf[ie_offset],
ie_len);
cfg80211_mgmt_tx_status(wdev, *cookie, buf, len, true,
GFP_KERNEL);
} else if (ieee80211_is_action(mgmt->frame_control)) {
af_params = kzalloc(sizeof(*af_params), GFP_KERNEL);
if (af_params == NULL) {
brcmf_err("unable to allocate frame\n");
err = -ENOMEM;
goto exit;
}
action_frame = &af_params->action_frame;
/* Add the packet Id */
action_frame->packet_id = cpu_to_le32(*cookie);
/* Add BSSID */
memcpy(&action_frame->da[0], &mgmt->da[0], ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(&af_params->bssid[0], &mgmt->bssid[0], ETH_ALEN);
/* Add the length exepted for 802.11 header */
action_frame->len = cpu_to_le16(len - DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN);
/* Add the channel. Use the one specified as parameter if any or
* the current one (got from the firmware) otherwise
*/
if (chan)
freq = chan->center_freq;
else
brcmf_fil_cmd_int_get(vif->ifp, BRCMF_C_GET_CHANNEL,
&freq);
chan_nr = ieee80211_frequency_to_channel(freq);
af_params->channel = cpu_to_le32(chan_nr);
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Action frame, cookie=%lld, len=%d, freq=%d\n",
*cookie, le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len), freq);
ack = brcmf_p2p_send_action_frame(cfg, cfg_to_ndev(cfg),
af_params);
cfg80211_mgmt_tx_status(wdev, *cookie, buf, len, ack,
GFP_KERNEL);
kfree(af_params);
} else {
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Unhandled, fc=%04x!!\n", mgmt->frame_control);
brcmf_dbg_hex_dump(true, buf, len, "payload, len=%zu\n", len);
}
exit:
return err;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()
The lower level nl80211 code in cfg80211 ensures that "len" is between
25 and NL80211_ATTR_FRAME (2304). We subtract DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN (24) from
"len" so thats's max of 2280. However, the action_frame->data[] buffer is
only BRCMF_FIL_ACTION_FRAME_SIZE (1800) bytes long so this memcpy() can
overflow.
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
Cc: [email protected] # 3.9.x
Fixes: 18e2f61db3b70 ("brcmfmac: P2P action frame tx.")
Reported-by: "freenerguo(郭大兴)" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static struct mnt_namespace *dup_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns,
struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct fs_struct *fs)
{
struct mnt_namespace *new_ns;
struct vfsmount *rootmnt = NULL, *pwdmnt = NULL;
struct mount *p, *q;
struct mount *old = mnt_ns->root;
struct mount *new;
int copy_flags;
new_ns = alloc_mnt_ns(user_ns);
if (IS_ERR(new_ns))
return new_ns;
down_write(&namespace_sem);
/* First pass: copy the tree topology */
copy_flags = CL_COPY_ALL | CL_EXPIRE;
if (user_ns != mnt_ns->user_ns)
copy_flags |= CL_SHARED_TO_SLAVE;
new = copy_tree(old, old->mnt.mnt_root, copy_flags);
if (IS_ERR(new)) {
up_write(&namespace_sem);
free_mnt_ns(new_ns);
return ERR_CAST(new);
}
new_ns->root = new;
br_write_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
list_add_tail(&new_ns->list, &new->mnt_list);
br_write_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
/*
* Second pass: switch the tsk->fs->* elements and mark new vfsmounts
* as belonging to new namespace. We have already acquired a private
* fs_struct, so tsk->fs->lock is not needed.
*/
p = old;
q = new;
while (p) {
q->mnt_ns = new_ns;
if (fs) {
if (&p->mnt == fs->root.mnt) {
fs->root.mnt = mntget(&q->mnt);
rootmnt = &p->mnt;
}
if (&p->mnt == fs->pwd.mnt) {
fs->pwd.mnt = mntget(&q->mnt);
pwdmnt = &p->mnt;
}
}
p = next_mnt(p, old);
q = next_mnt(q, new);
}
up_write(&namespace_sem);
if (rootmnt)
mntput(rootmnt);
if (pwdmnt)
mntput(pwdmnt);
return new_ns;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: dissect_fach_channel_info(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
int offset, struct fp_info *p_fp_info, void *data)
{
gboolean is_control_frame;
guint16 header_crc = 0;
proto_item * header_crc_pi = NULL;
guint header_length = 0;
/* Header CRC */
header_crc = tvb_get_bits8(tvb, 0, 7);
header_crc_pi = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_header_crc, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
/* Frame Type */
is_control_frame = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) & 0x01;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_ft, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
col_append_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, is_control_frame ? " [Control] " : " [Data] ");
if (is_control_frame) {
dissect_common_control(tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, p_fp_info);
/* For control frame the header CRC is actually frame CRC covering all
* bytes except the first */
if (preferences_header_checksum) {
verify_control_frame_crc(tvb, pinfo, header_crc_pi, header_crc);
}
}
else {
guint8 cfn;
/* DATA */
/* CFN */
cfn = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_cfn, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "CFN=%03u ", cfn);
/* TFI */
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_fach_tfi, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
/* Transmit power level */
proto_tree_add_float(tree, hf_fp_transmit_power_level, tvb, offset, 1,
(float)(int)(tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset)) / 10);
offset++;
header_length = offset;
/* TB data */
offset = dissect_tb_data(tvb, pinfo, tree, offset, p_fp_info, &mac_fdd_fach_handle, data);
/* New IE flags (if it looks as though they are present) */
if ((p_fp_info->release == 7) &&
(tvb_reported_length_remaining(tvb, offset) > 2)) {
guint8 flags = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
guint8 aoa_present = flags & 0x01;
offset++;
if (aoa_present) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_angle_of_arrival, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
}
}
if (preferences_header_checksum) {
verify_header_crc(tvb, pinfo, header_crc_pi, header_crc, header_length);
}
/* Spare Extension and Payload CRC */
dissect_spare_extension_and_crc(tvb, pinfo, tree, 1, offset, header_length);
}
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::FrameNavigationHelper::FrameDeleted(
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
if (render_frame_host->GetFrameTreeNodeId() != frame_tree_node_id_)
return;
filter_->ResumeAttachOrDestroy(element_instance_id_,
MSG_ROUTING_NONE /* no plugin frame */);
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void DiscardTest(DiscardReason reason) {
const base::TimeTicks kDummyLastActiveTime =
base::TimeTicks() + kShortDelay;
LifecycleUnit* background_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* foreground_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &background_lifecycle_unit,
&foreground_lifecycle_unit);
content::WebContents* initial_web_contents =
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0);
content::WebContentsTester::For(initial_web_contents)
->SetLastActiveTime(kDummyLastActiveTime);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, true));
background_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_NE(initial_web_contents, tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0));
EXPECT_FALSE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
EXPECT_EQ(kDummyLastActiveTime,
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetLastActiveTime());
source_->SetFocusedTabStripModelForTesting(nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int aead_null_givencrypt(struct aead_givcrypt_request *req)
{
return crypto_aead_encrypt(&req->areq);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ikev2_sub_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
struct isakmp *base,
u_char np, const struct isakmp_gen *ext, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase, uint32_t doi, uint32_t proto, int depth)
{
const u_char *cp;
int i;
struct isakmp_gen e;
cp = (const u_char *)ext;
while (np) {
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_TCHECK2(*ext, ntohs(e.len));
depth++;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"\n"));
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"("));
cp = ikev2_sub0_print(ndo, base, np,
ext, ep, phase, doi, proto, depth);
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
depth--;
if (cp == NULL) {
/* Zero-length subitem */
return NULL;
}
np = e.np;
ext = (const struct isakmp_gen *)cp;
}
return cp;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(np)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: gs_heap_alloc_bytes(gs_memory_t * mem, uint size, client_name_t cname)
{
gs_malloc_memory_t *mmem = (gs_malloc_memory_t *) mem;
byte *ptr = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
const char *msg;
static const char *const ok_msg = "OK";
# define set_msg(str) (msg = (str))
#else
# define set_msg(str) DO_NOTHING
#endif
/* Exclusive acces so our decisions and changes are 'atomic' */
if (mmem->monitor)
gx_monitor_enter(mmem->monitor);
if (size > mmem->limit - sizeof(gs_malloc_block_t)) {
/* Definitely too large to allocate; also avoids overflow. */
set_msg("exceeded limit");
} else {
uint added = size + sizeof(gs_malloc_block_t);
if (mmem->limit - added < mmem->used)
set_msg("exceeded limit");
else if ((ptr = (byte *) Memento_label(malloc(added), cname)) == 0)
set_msg("failed");
else {
gs_malloc_block_t *bp = (gs_malloc_block_t *) ptr;
/*
* We would like to check that malloc aligns blocks at least as
* strictly as the compiler (as defined by ARCH_ALIGN_MEMORY_MOD).
* However, Microsoft VC 6 does not satisfy this requirement.
* See gsmemory.h for more explanation.
*/
set_msg(ok_msg);
if (mmem->allocated)
mmem->allocated->prev = bp;
bp->next = mmem->allocated;
bp->prev = 0;
bp->size = size;
bp->type = &st_bytes;
bp->cname = cname;
mmem->allocated = bp;
ptr = (byte *) (bp + 1);
mmem->used += size + sizeof(gs_malloc_block_t);
if (mmem->used > mmem->max_used)
mmem->max_used = mmem->used;
}
}
if (mmem->monitor)
gx_monitor_leave(mmem->monitor); /* Done with exclusive access */
/* We don't want to 'fill' under mutex to keep the window smaller */
if (ptr)
gs_alloc_fill(ptr, gs_alloc_fill_alloc, size);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (gs_debug_c('a') || msg != ok_msg)
dmlprintf6(mem, "[a+]gs_malloc(%s)(%u) = 0x%lx: %s, used=%ld, max=%ld\n",
client_name_string(cname), size, (ulong) ptr, msg, mmem->used, mmem->max_used);
#endif
return ptr;
#undef set_msg
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: ensure_database (PolkitBackendSessionMonitor *monitor,
GError **error)
{
gboolean ret = FALSE;
if (monitor->database != NULL)
{
struct stat statbuf;
if (stat (CKDB_PATH, &statbuf) != 0)
{
g_set_error (error,
G_IO_ERROR,
g_io_error_from_errno (errno),
"Error statting file " CKDB_PATH " to check timestamp: %s",
strerror (errno));
goto out;
}
if (statbuf.st_mtime == monitor->database_mtime)
{
ret = TRUE;
goto out;
}
}
ret = reload_database (monitor, error);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: float MSG_ReadAngle16( msg_t *msg ) {
return SHORT2ANGLE(MSG_ReadShort(msg));
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int Track::Info::CopyStr(char* Info::*str, Info& dst_) const {
if (str == static_cast<char * Info::*>(NULL))
return -1;
char*& dst = dst_.*str;
if (dst) // should be NULL already
return -1;
const char* const src = this->*str;
if (src == NULL)
return 0;
const size_t len = strlen(src);
dst = new (std::nothrow) char[len + 1];
if (dst == NULL)
return -1;
strcpy(dst, src);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void CLASS parse_cine()
{
unsigned off_head, off_setup, off_image, i;
order = 0x4949;
fseek (ifp, 4, SEEK_SET);
is_raw = get2() == 2;
fseek (ifp, 14, SEEK_CUR);
is_raw *= get4();
off_head = get4();
off_setup = get4();
off_image = get4();
timestamp = get4();
if ((i = get4())) timestamp = i;
fseek (ifp, off_head+4, SEEK_SET);
raw_width = get4();
raw_height = get4();
switch (get2(),get2()) {
case 8: load_raw = &CLASS eight_bit_load_raw; break;
case 16: load_raw = &CLASS unpacked_load_raw;
}
fseek (ifp, off_setup+792, SEEK_SET);
strcpy (make, "CINE");
sprintf (model, "%d", get4());
fseek (ifp, 12, SEEK_CUR);
switch ((i=get4()) & 0xffffff) {
case 3: filters = 0x94949494; break;
case 4: filters = 0x49494949; break;
default: is_raw = 0;
}
fseek (ifp, 72, SEEK_CUR);
switch ((get4()+3600) % 360) {
case 270: flip = 4; break;
case 180: flip = 1; break;
case 90: flip = 7; break;
case 0: flip = 2;
}
cam_mul[0] = getreal(11);
cam_mul[2] = getreal(11);
maximum = ~(-1 << get4());
fseek (ifp, 668, SEEK_CUR);
shutter = get4()/1000000000.0;
fseek (ifp, off_image, SEEK_SET);
if (shot_select < is_raw)
fseek (ifp, shot_select*8, SEEK_CUR);
data_offset = (INT64) get4() + 8;
data_offset += (INT64) get4() << 32;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int Chapters::Atom::GetDisplayCount() const
{
return m_displays_count;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: Cluster::GetEntry(
const CuePoint& cp,
const CuePoint::TrackPosition& tp) const
{
assert(m_pSegment);
#if 0
LoadBlockEntries();
if (m_entries == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long count = m_entries_count;
if (count <= 0)
return NULL;
const long long tc = cp.GetTimeCode();
if ((tp.m_block > 0) && (tp.m_block <= count))
{
const size_t block = static_cast<size_t>(tp.m_block);
const size_t index = block - 1;
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if ((pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == tp.m_track) &&
(pBlock->GetTimeCode(this) == tc))
{
return pEntry;
}
}
const BlockEntry* const* i = m_entries;
const BlockEntry* const* const j = i + count;
while (i != j)
{
#ifdef _DEBUG
const ptrdiff_t idx = i - m_entries;
idx;
#endif
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = *i++;
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != tp.m_track)
continue;
const long long tc_ = pBlock->GetTimeCode(this);
assert(tc_ >= 0);
if (tc_ < tc)
continue;
if (tc_ > tc)
return NULL;
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(tp.m_track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long type = pTrack->GetType();
if (type == 2) //audio
return pEntry;
if (type != 1) //not video
return NULL;
if (!pBlock->IsKey())
return NULL;
return pEntry;
}
return NULL;
#else
const long long tc = cp.GetTimeCode();
if (tp.m_block > 0)
{
const long block = static_cast<long>(tp.m_block);
const long index = block - 1;
while (index >= m_entries_count)
{
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //TODO: can this happen?
return NULL;
if (status > 0) //nothing remains to be parsed
return NULL;
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if ((pBlock->GetTrackNumber() == tp.m_track) &&
(pBlock->GetTimeCode(this) == tc))
{
return pEntry;
}
}
long index = 0;
for (;;)
{
if (index >= m_entries_count)
{
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //TODO: can this happen?
return NULL;
if (status > 0) //nothing remains to be parsed
return NULL;
assert(m_entries);
assert(index < m_entries_count);
}
const BlockEntry* const pEntry = m_entries[index];
assert(pEntry);
assert(!pEntry->EOS());
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
if (pBlock->GetTrackNumber() != tp.m_track)
{
++index;
continue;
}
const long long tc_ = pBlock->GetTimeCode(this);
if (tc_ < tc)
{
++index;
continue;
}
if (tc_ > tc)
return NULL;
const Tracks* const pTracks = m_pSegment->GetTracks();
assert(pTracks);
const long tn = static_cast<long>(tp.m_track);
const Track* const pTrack = pTracks->GetTrackByNumber(tn);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return NULL;
const long long type = pTrack->GetType();
if (type == 2) //audio
return pEntry;
if (type != 1) //not video
return NULL;
if (!pBlock->IsKey())
return NULL;
return pEntry;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: char *path_kill_slashes(char *path) {
char *f, *t;
bool slash = false;
/* Removes redundant inner and trailing slashes. Modifies the
* passed string in-place.
*
* ///foo///bar/ becomes /foo/bar
*/
for (f = path, t = path; *f; f++) {
if (*f == '/') {
slash = true;
continue;
}
if (slash) {
slash = false;
*(t++) = '/';
}
*(t++) = *f;
}
/* Special rule, if we are talking of the root directory, a
trailing slash is good */
if (t == path && slash)
*(t++) = '/';
*t = 0;
return path;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int __glXDisp_WaitGL(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
xGLXWaitGLReq *req = (xGLXWaitGLReq *)pc;
GLXContextTag tag = req->contextTag;
__GLXcontext *glxc = NULL;
int error;
if (tag) {
glxc = __glXLookupContextByTag(cl, tag);
if (!glxc)
return __glXError(GLXBadContextTag);
if (!__glXForceCurrent(cl, req->contextTag, &error))
return error;
CALL_Finish( GET_DISPATCH(), () );
}
if (glxc && glxc->drawPriv->waitGL)
(*glxc->drawPriv->waitGL)(glxc->drawPriv);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_enc_is_block_algorithm)
{
MCRYPT_GET_TD_ARG
if (mcrypt_enc_is_block_algorithm(pm->td) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE
} else {
RETURN_FALSE
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: mrb_obj_public_methods(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
mrb_bool recur = TRUE;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "|b", &recur);
return mrb_obj_methods(mrb, recur, self, NOEX_PUBLIC); /* public attribute not define */
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: set_store_for_read(png_store *ps, png_infopp ppi, png_uint_32 id,
PNG_CONST char *name)
{
/* Set the name for png_error */
safecat(ps->test, sizeof ps->test, 0, name);
if (ps->pread != NULL)
png_error(ps->pread, "read store already in use");
store_read_reset(ps);
/* Both the create APIs can return NULL if used in their default mode
* (because there is no other way of handling an error because the jmp_buf
* by default is stored in png_struct and that has not been allocated!)
* However, given that store_error works correctly in these circumstances
* we don't ever expect NULL in this program.
*/
# ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
if (!ps->speed)
ps->pread = png_create_read_struct_2(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, ps,
store_error, store_warning, &ps->read_memory_pool, store_malloc,
store_free);
else
# endif
ps->pread = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, ps, store_error,
store_warning);
if (ps->pread == NULL)
{
struct exception_context *the_exception_context = &ps->exception_context;
store_log(ps, NULL, "png_create_read_struct returned NULL (unexpected)",
1 /*error*/);
Throw ps;
}
# ifdef PNG_SET_OPTION_SUPPORTED
{
int opt;
for (opt=0; opt<ps->noptions; ++opt)
if (png_set_option(ps->pread, ps->options[opt].option,
ps->options[opt].setting) == PNG_OPTION_INVALID)
png_error(ps->pread, "png option invalid");
}
# endif
store_read_set(ps, id);
if (ppi != NULL)
*ppi = ps->piread = png_create_info_struct(ps->pread);
return ps->pread;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static char *pool_strdup(const char *s)
{
char *r = pool_alloc(strlen(s) + 1);
strcpy(r, s);
return r;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int rxrpc_get_server_data_key(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
const void *session_key,
time_t expiry,
u32 kvno)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct key *key;
int ret;
struct {
u32 kver;
struct rxrpc_key_data_v1 v1;
} data;
_enter("");
key = key_alloc(&key_type_rxrpc, "x",
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, cred, 0,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
_leave(" = -ENOMEM [alloc %ld]", PTR_ERR(key));
return -ENOMEM;
}
_debug("key %d", key_serial(key));
data.kver = 1;
data.v1.security_index = RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD;
data.v1.ticket_length = 0;
data.v1.expiry = expiry;
data.v1.kvno = 0;
memcpy(&data.v1.session_key, session_key, sizeof(data.v1.session_key));
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(key, &data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
conn->key = key;
_leave(" = 0 [%d]", key_serial(key));
return 0;
error:
key_revoke(key);
key_put(key);
_leave(" = -ENOMEM [ins %d]", ret);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int copy_to_user_auth(struct xfrm_algo_auth *auth, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct xfrm_algo *algo;
struct nlattr *nla;
nla = nla_reserve(skb, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH,
sizeof(*algo) + (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
if (!nla)
return -EMSGSIZE;
algo = nla_data(nla);
strcpy(algo->alg_name, auth->alg_name);
memcpy(algo->alg_key, auth->alg_key, (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
algo->alg_key_len = auth->alg_key_len;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_auth()
copy_to_user_auth() fails to initialize the remainder of alg_name and
therefore discloses up to 54 bytes of heap memory via netlink to
userland.
Use strncpy() instead of strcpy() to fill the trailing bytes of alg_name
with null bytes.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
{
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
/*
* If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
* then nothing to do.
*/
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
(cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
return;
switch (cmd) {
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
return;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
goto retpoline_auto;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
goto retpoline_amd;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
goto retpoline_generic;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
goto retpoline_auto;
break;
}
pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
return;
retpoline_auto:
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
retpoline_amd:
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
goto retpoline_generic;
}
mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
} else {
retpoline_generic:
mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC :
SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
}
spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
/*
* If neither SMEP nor PTI are available, there is a risk of
* hitting userspace addresses in the RSB after a context switch
* from a shallow call stack to a deeper one. To prevent this fill
* the entire RSB, even when using IBRS.
*
* Skylake era CPUs have a separate issue with *underflow* of the
* RSB, when they will predict 'ret' targets from the generic BTB.
* The proper mitigation for this is IBRS. If IBRS is not supported
* or deactivated in favour of retpolines the RSB fill on context
* switch is required.
*/
if ((!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) &&
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMEP)) || is_skylake_era()) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
}
/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
}
/*
* Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
* branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that.
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
}
Commit Message: x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB
The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack
Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attacks,
making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to
BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+).
Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on
context switch when the generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled.
[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bson_iter_document (const bson_iter_t *iter, /* IN */
uint32_t *document_len, /* OUT */
const uint8_t **document) /* OUT */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
BSON_ASSERT (document_len);
BSON_ASSERT (document);
*document = NULL;
*document_len = 0;
if (ITER_TYPE (iter) == BSON_TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
memcpy (document_len, (iter->raw + iter->d1), sizeof (*document_len));
*document_len = BSON_UINT32_FROM_LE (*document_len);
*document = (iter->raw + iter->d1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void MediaStreamManager::CancelAllRequests(int render_process_id,
int render_frame_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
auto request_it = requests_.begin();
while (request_it != requests_.end()) {
if (request_it->second->requesting_process_id != render_process_id ||
request_it->second->requesting_frame_id != render_frame_id) {
++request_it;
continue;
}
const std::string label = request_it->first;
++request_it;
CancelRequest(label);
}
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip(TIFF* tif)
{
register TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
uint64 bytecount;
uint64 offset;
uint32 rowblock;
uint64 rowblockbytes;
uint64 stripbytes;
uint32 strip;
uint64 nstrips64;
uint32 nstrips32;
uint32 rowsperstrip;
uint64* newcounts;
uint64* newoffsets;
bytecount = td->td_stripbytecount[0];
offset = td->td_stripoffset[0];
assert(td->td_planarconfig == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG);
if ((td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR)&&
(!isUpSampled(tif)))
rowblock = td->td_ycbcrsubsampling[1];
else
rowblock = 1;
rowblockbytes = TIFFVTileSize64(tif, rowblock);
/*
* Make the rows hold at least one scanline, but fill specified amount
* of data if possible.
*/
if (rowblockbytes > STRIP_SIZE_DEFAULT) {
stripbytes = rowblockbytes;
rowsperstrip = rowblock;
} else if (rowblockbytes > 0 ) {
uint32 rowblocksperstrip;
rowblocksperstrip = (uint32) (STRIP_SIZE_DEFAULT / rowblockbytes);
rowsperstrip = rowblocksperstrip * rowblock;
stripbytes = rowblocksperstrip * rowblockbytes;
}
else
return;
/*
* never increase the number of strips in an image
*/
if (rowsperstrip >= td->td_rowsperstrip)
return;
nstrips64 = TIFFhowmany_64(bytecount, stripbytes);
if ((nstrips64==0)||(nstrips64>0xFFFFFFFF)) /* something is wonky, do nothing. */
return;
nstrips32 = (uint32)nstrips64;
newcounts = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips32, sizeof (uint64),
"for chopped \"StripByteCounts\" array");
newoffsets = (uint64*) _TIFFCheckMalloc(tif, nstrips32, sizeof (uint64),
"for chopped \"StripOffsets\" array");
if (newcounts == NULL || newoffsets == NULL) {
/*
* Unable to allocate new strip information, give up and use
* the original one strip information.
*/
if (newcounts != NULL)
_TIFFfree(newcounts);
if (newoffsets != NULL)
_TIFFfree(newoffsets);
return;
}
/*
* Fill the strip information arrays with new bytecounts and offsets
* that reflect the broken-up format.
*/
for (strip = 0; strip < nstrips32; strip++) {
if (stripbytes > bytecount)
stripbytes = bytecount;
newcounts[strip] = stripbytes;
newoffsets[strip] = offset;
offset += stripbytes;
bytecount -= stripbytes;
}
/*
* Replace old single strip info with multi-strip info.
*/
td->td_stripsperimage = td->td_nstrips = nstrips32;
TIFFSetField(tif, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, rowsperstrip);
_TIFFfree(td->td_stripbytecount);
_TIFFfree(td->td_stripoffset);
td->td_stripbytecount = newcounts;
td->td_stripoffset = newoffsets;
td->td_stripbytecountsorted = 1;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(rt_sigpending, compat_sigset_t __user *, uset,
compat_size_t, sigsetsize)
{
#ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN
sigset_t set;
int err = do_sigpending(&set, sigsetsize);
if (!err) {
compat_sigset_t set32;
sigset_to_compat(&set32, &set);
/* we can get here only if sigsetsize <= sizeof(set) */
if (copy_to_user(uset, &set32, sigsetsize))
err = -EFAULT;
}
return err;
#else
return sys_rt_sigpending((sigset_t __user *)uset, sigsetsize);
#endif
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::configureVideoTunnelMode(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL tunneled, OMX_U32 audioHwSync,
native_handle_t **sidebandHandle) {
Mutex::Autolock autolock(mLock);
CLOG_CONFIG(configureVideoTunnelMode, "%s:%u tun=%d sync=%u",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, tunneled, audioHwSync);
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.configureVideoTunnelMode");
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR_IF(tunneled, getExtensionIndex, err, "%s", name);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
ConfigureVideoTunnelModeParams tunnelParams;
InitOMXParams(&tunnelParams);
tunnelParams.nPortIndex = portIndex;
tunnelParams.bTunneled = tunneled;
tunnelParams.nAudioHwSync = audioHwSync;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, &tunnelParams);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u tun=%d sync=%u", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, tunneled, audioHwSync);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
err = OMX_GetParameter(mHandle, index, &tunnelParams);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(getParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u tun=%d sync=%u", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, tunneled, audioHwSync);
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
if (sidebandHandle) {
*sidebandHandle = (native_handle_t*)tunnelParams.pSidebandWindow;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static enum entity_charset determine_charset(char *charset_hint TSRMLS_DC)
{
int i;
enum entity_charset charset = cs_utf_8;
int len = 0;
const zend_encoding *zenc;
/* Default is now UTF-8 */
if (charset_hint == NULL)
return cs_utf_8;
if ((len = strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
zenc = zend_multibyte_get_internal_encoding(TSRMLS_C);
if (zenc != NULL) {
charset_hint = (char *)zend_multibyte_get_encoding_name(zenc);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
if ((len == 4) /* sizeof (none|auto|pass) */ &&
(!memcmp("pass", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4))) {
charset_hint = NULL;
len = 0;
} else {
goto det_charset;
}
}
}
charset_hint = SG(default_charset);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
/* try to detect the charset for the locale */
#if HAVE_NL_LANGINFO && HAVE_LOCALE_H && defined(CODESET)
charset_hint = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
#endif
#if HAVE_LOCALE_H
/* try to figure out the charset from the locale */
{
char *localename;
char *dot, *at;
/* lang[_territory][.codeset][@modifier] */
localename = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, NULL);
dot = strchr(localename, '.');
if (dot) {
dot++;
/* locale specifies a codeset */
at = strchr(dot, '@');
if (at)
len = at - dot;
else
len = strlen(dot);
charset_hint = dot;
} else {
/* no explicit name; see if the name itself
* is the charset */
charset_hint = localename;
len = strlen(charset_hint);
}
}
#endif
det_charset:
if (charset_hint) {
int found = 0;
/* now walk the charset map and look for the codeset */
for (i = 0; charset_map[i].codeset; i++) {
if (len == strlen(charset_map[i].codeset) && strncasecmp(charset_hint, charset_map[i].codeset, len) == 0) {
charset = charset_map[i].charset;
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "charset `%s' not supported, assuming utf-8",
charset_hint);
}
}
return charset;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: NTPResourceCache::NTPResourceCache(Profile* profile)
: profile_(profile), is_swipe_tracking_from_scroll_events_enabled_(false),
should_show_apps_page_(NewTabUI::ShouldShowApps()),
should_show_most_visited_page_(true),
should_show_other_devices_menu_(true),
should_show_recently_closed_menu_(true) {
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_THEME_CHANGED,
content::Source<ThemeService>(
ThemeServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile)));
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_PROMO_RESOURCE_STATE_CHANGED,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
base::Closure callback = base::Bind(&NTPResourceCache::OnPreferenceChanged,
base::Unretained(this));
profile_pref_change_registrar_.Init(profile_->GetPrefs());
profile_pref_change_registrar_.Add(prefs::kShowBookmarkBar, callback);
profile_pref_change_registrar_.Add(prefs::kNtpShownPage, callback);
profile_pref_change_registrar_.Add(prefs::kSignInPromoShowNTPBubble,
callback);
profile_pref_change_registrar_.Add(prefs::kHideWebStoreIcon, callback);
#if defined(ENABLE_APP_LIST)
if (g_browser_process->local_state()) {
local_state_pref_change_registrar_.Init(g_browser_process->local_state());
local_state_pref_change_registrar_.Add(prefs::kShowAppLauncherPromo,
callback);
local_state_pref_change_registrar_.Add(
prefs::kAppLauncherHasBeenEnabled, callback);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int Instance::GetScaled(int x) const {
return static_cast<int>(x * device_scale_);
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: jpc_ms_t *jpc_getms(jas_stream_t *in, jpc_cstate_t *cstate)
{
jpc_ms_t *ms;
jpc_mstabent_t *mstabent;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
if (!(ms = jpc_ms_create(0))) {
return 0;
}
/* Get the marker type. */
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &ms->id) || ms->id < JPC_MS_MIN ||
ms->id > JPC_MS_MAX) {
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
return 0;
}
mstabent = jpc_mstab_lookup(ms->id);
ms->ops = &mstabent->ops;
/* Get the marker segment length and parameters if present. */
/* Note: It is tacitly assumed that a marker segment cannot have
parameters unless it has a length field. That is, there cannot
be a parameters field without a length field and vice versa. */
if (JPC_MS_HASPARMS(ms->id)) {
/* Get the length of the marker segment. */
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &ms->len) || ms->len < 3) {
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
return 0;
}
/* Calculate the length of the marker segment parameters. */
ms->len -= 2;
/* Create and prepare a temporary memory stream from which to
read the marker segment parameters. */
/* Note: This approach provides a simple way of ensuring that
we never read beyond the end of the marker segment (even if
the marker segment length is errantly set too small). */
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
return 0;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, ms->len) ||
jas_stream_seek(tmpstream, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
return 0;
}
/* Get the marker segment parameters. */
if ((*ms->ops->getparms)(ms, cstate, tmpstream)) {
ms->ops = 0;
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
return 0;
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() > 0) {
jpc_ms_dump(ms, stderr);
}
if (JAS_CAST(ulong, jas_stream_tell(tmpstream)) != ms->len) {
jas_eprintf(
"warning: trailing garbage in marker segment (%ld bytes)\n",
ms->len - jas_stream_tell(tmpstream));
}
/* Close the temporary stream. */
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
} else {
/* There are no marker segment parameters. */
ms->len = 0;
if (jas_getdbglevel() > 0) {
jpc_ms_dump(ms, stderr);
}
}
/* Update the code stream state information based on the type of
marker segment read. */
/* Note: This is a bit of a hack, but I'm not going to define another
type of virtual function for this one special case. */
if (ms->id == JPC_MS_SIZ) {
cstate->numcomps = ms->parms.siz.numcomps;
}
return ms;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagetruecolortopalette)
{
zval *IM;
zend_bool dither;
long ncolors;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rbl", &IM, &dither, &ncolors) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (ncolors <= 0 || ncolors > INT_MAX) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number of colors has to be greater than zero and no more than %d", INT_MAX);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
gdImageTrueColorToPalette(im, dither, (int)ncolors);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72730 - imagegammacorrect allows arbitrary write access
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: read_png(struct control *control)
/* Read a PNG, return 0 on success else an error (status) code; a bit mask as
* defined for file::status_code as above.
*/
{
png_structp png_ptr;
png_infop info_ptr = NULL;
volatile png_bytep row = NULL, display = NULL;
volatile int rc;
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, control,
error_handler, warning_handler);
if (png_ptr == NULL)
{
/* This is not really expected. */
log_error(&control->file, LIBPNG_ERROR_CODE, "OOM allocating png_struct");
control->file.status_code |= INTERNAL_ERROR;
return LIBPNG_ERROR_CODE;
}
rc = setjmp(control->file.jmpbuf);
if (rc == 0)
{
png_set_read_fn(png_ptr, control, read_callback);
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (info_ptr == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating info structure");
if (control->file.global->verbose)
fprintf(stderr, " INFO\n");
png_read_info(png_ptr, info_ptr);
{
png_size_t rowbytes = png_get_rowbytes(png_ptr, info_ptr);
row = png_voidcast(png_byte*, malloc(rowbytes));
display = png_voidcast(png_byte*, malloc(rowbytes));
if (row == NULL || display == NULL)
png_error(png_ptr, "OOM allocating row buffers");
{
png_uint_32 height = png_get_image_height(png_ptr, info_ptr);
int passes = png_set_interlace_handling(png_ptr);
int pass;
png_start_read_image(png_ptr);
for (pass = 0; pass < passes; ++pass)
{
png_uint_32 y = height;
/* NOTE: this trashes the row each time; interlace handling won't
* work, but this avoids memory thrashing for speed testing.
*/
while (y-- > 0)
png_read_row(png_ptr, row, display);
}
}
}
if (control->file.global->verbose)
fprintf(stderr, " END\n");
/* Make sure to read to the end of the file: */
png_read_end(png_ptr, info_ptr);
}
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
if (row != NULL) free(row);
if (display != NULL) free(display);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int digi_startup(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct digi_serial *serial_priv;
int ret;
serial_priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*serial_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!serial_priv)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num = serial->type->num_ports;
serial_priv->ds_oob_port = serial->port[serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num];
ret = digi_port_init(serial_priv->ds_oob_port,
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num);
if (ret) {
kfree(serial_priv);
return ret;
}
usb_set_serial_data(serial, serial_priv);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: digi_acceleport: do sanity checking for the number of ports
The driver can be crashed with devices that expose crafted descriptors
with too few endpoints.
See: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/61
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
[johan: fix OOB endpoint check and add error messages ]
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: std::string RenderThreadImpl::GetLocale() {
const base::CommandLine& parsed_command_line =
*base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
const std::string& lang =
parsed_command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kLang);
DCHECK(!lang.empty());
return lang;
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: GLES2Implementation::GLES2Implementation(
GLES2CmdHelper* helper,
scoped_refptr<ShareGroup> share_group,
TransferBufferInterface* transfer_buffer,
bool bind_generates_resource,
bool lose_context_when_out_of_memory,
bool support_client_side_arrays,
GpuControl* gpu_control)
: ImplementationBase(helper, transfer_buffer, gpu_control),
helper_(helper),
chromium_framebuffer_multisample_(kUnknownExtensionStatus),
pack_alignment_(4),
pack_row_length_(0),
pack_skip_pixels_(0),
pack_skip_rows_(0),
unpack_alignment_(4),
unpack_row_length_(0),
unpack_image_height_(0),
unpack_skip_rows_(0),
unpack_skip_pixels_(0),
unpack_skip_images_(0),
active_texture_unit_(0),
bound_framebuffer_(0),
bound_read_framebuffer_(0),
bound_renderbuffer_(0),
current_program_(0),
bound_array_buffer_(0),
bound_atomic_counter_buffer_(0),
bound_copy_read_buffer_(0),
bound_copy_write_buffer_(0),
bound_pixel_pack_buffer_(0),
bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_(0),
bound_shader_storage_buffer_(0),
bound_transform_feedback_buffer_(0),
bound_uniform_buffer_(0),
bound_pixel_pack_transfer_buffer_id_(0),
bound_pixel_unpack_transfer_buffer_id_(0),
error_bits_(0),
lose_context_when_out_of_memory_(lose_context_when_out_of_memory),
support_client_side_arrays_(support_client_side_arrays),
use_count_(0),
flush_id_(0),
max_extra_transfer_buffer_size_(0),
current_trace_stack_(0),
aggressively_free_resources_(false),
cached_extension_string_(nullptr),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(helper);
std::stringstream ss;
ss << std::hex << this;
this_in_hex_ = ss.str();
share_group_ =
(share_group ? std::move(share_group)
: new ShareGroup(
bind_generates_resource,
gpu_control_->GetCommandBufferID().GetUnsafeValue()));
DCHECK(share_group_->bind_generates_resource() == bind_generates_resource);
memset(&reserved_ids_, 0, sizeof(reserved_ids_));
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: smb_fdata(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *buf, const char *fmt, const u_char *maxbuf,
int unicodestr)
{
static int depth = 0;
char s[128];
char *p;
while (*fmt) {
switch (*fmt) {
case '*':
fmt++;
while (buf < maxbuf) {
const u_char *buf2;
depth++;
buf2 = smb_fdata(ndo, buf, fmt, maxbuf, unicodestr);
depth--;
if (buf2 == NULL)
return(NULL);
if (buf2 == buf)
return(buf);
buf = buf2;
}
return(buf);
case '|':
fmt++;
if (buf >= maxbuf)
return(buf);
break;
case '%':
fmt++;
buf = maxbuf;
break;
case '#':
fmt++;
return(buf);
break;
case '[':
fmt++;
if (buf >= maxbuf)
return(buf);
memset(s, 0, sizeof(s));
p = strchr(fmt, ']');
if ((size_t)(p - fmt + 1) > sizeof(s)) {
/* overrun */
return(buf);
}
strncpy(s, fmt, p - fmt);
s[p - fmt] = '\0';
fmt = p + 1;
buf = smb_fdata1(ndo, buf, s, maxbuf, unicodestr);
if (buf == NULL)
return(NULL);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", *fmt));
fmt++;
break;
}
}
if (!depth && buf < maxbuf) {
size_t len = PTR_DIFF(maxbuf, buf);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Data: (%lu bytes)\n", (unsigned long)len));
smb_print_data(ndo, buf, len);
return(buf + len);
}
return(buf);
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16452/SMB: prevent stack exhaustion
Enforce a limit on how many times smb_fdata() can recurse.
This fixes a stack exhaustion discovered by Include Security working
under the Mozilla SOS program in 2018 by means of code audit.
CWE ID: CWE-674
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: file_close(ref * pfile)
{
stream *s;
if (file_is_valid(s, pfile)) { /* closing a closed file is a no-op */
if (sclose(s))
return_error(gs_error_ioerror);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void SavePackage::Cancel(bool user_action) {
if (!canceled()) {
if (user_action)
user_canceled_ = true;
else
disk_error_occurred_ = true;
Stop();
}
RecordSavePackageEvent(SAVE_PACKAGE_CANCELLED);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash with mismatched vector sizes.
BUG=169295
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11817050
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176252 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePNMImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
buffer[MagickPathExtent],
format,
magick[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*value;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
Quantum
index;
QuantumAny
pixel;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
extent,
imageListLength,
packet_size;
ssize_t
count,
y;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
scene=0;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
QuantumAny
max_value;
/*
Write PNM file header.
*/
packet_size=3;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
(void) CopyMagickString(magick,image_info->magick,MagickPathExtent);
max_value=GetQuantumRange(image->depth);
switch (magick[1])
{
case 'A':
case 'a':
{
format='7';
break;
}
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
format='4';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='1';
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
format='F';
if (SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
format='f';
break;
}
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
format='5';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='2';
break;
}
case 'N':
case 'n':
{
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse))
{
format='5';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='2';
if (SetImageMonochrome(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
{
format='4';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='1';
}
break;
}
}
default:
{
format='6';
if (image_info->compression == NoCompression)
format='3';
break;
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"P%c\n",format);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
value=GetImageProperty(image,"comment",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
register const char
*p;
/*
Write comments to file.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'#');
for (p=value; *p != '\0'; p++)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) *p);
if ((*p == '\n') || (*p == '\r'))
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'#');
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
}
if (format != '7')
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g %.20g\n",
(double) image->columns,(double) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
else
{
char
type[MagickPathExtent];
/*
PAM header.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"WIDTH %.20g\nHEIGHT %.20g\n",(double) image->columns,(double)
image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_type=GetQuantumType(image,exception);
switch (quantum_type)
{
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
packet_size=4;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"CMYK",MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
packet_size=1;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"GRAYSCALE",MagickPathExtent);
if (IdentifyImageMonochrome(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"BLACKANDWHITE",MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
default:
{
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
packet_size=3;
(void) CopyMagickString(type,"RGB",MagickPathExtent);
break;
}
}
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
packet_size++;
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"_ALPHA",MagickPathExtent);
}
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"DEPTH %.20g\nMAXVAL %.20g\n",(double) packet_size,(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"TUPLTYPE %s\nENDHDR\n",type);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
/*
Convert runextent encoded to PNM raster pixels.
*/
switch (format)
{
case '1':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PBM image.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType,exception);
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (GetPixelLuma(image,p) >= (QuantumRange/2.0) ?
'0' : '1');
*q++=' ';
if ((q-pixels+1) >= (ssize_t) sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '2':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PGM image.
*/
if (image->depth <= 8)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"255\n");
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"65535\n");
else
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"4294967295\n");
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,p));
if (image->depth <= 8)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%u ",
ScaleQuantumToChar(index));
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%u ",ScaleQuantumToShort(index));
else
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%u ",ScaleQuantumToLong(index));
extent=(size_t) count;
(void) strncpy((char *) q,buffer,extent);
q+=extent;
if ((q-pixels+extent+1) >= sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '3':
{
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Convert image to a PNM image.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
if (image->depth <= 8)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"255\n");
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"65535\n");
else
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"4294967295\n");
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,p)));
else
if (image->depth <= 16)
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelGreen(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelBlue(image,p)));
else
count=(ssize_t) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%u %u %u ",ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelRed(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelGreen(image,p)),
ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelBlue(image,p)));
extent=(size_t) count;
(void) strncpy((char *) q,buffer,extent);
q+=extent;
if ((q-pixels+extent+1) >= sizeof(pixels))
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case '4':
{
register unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Convert image to a PBM image.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType,exception);
image->depth=1;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GrayQuantum,pixels,exception);
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '5':
{
register unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Convert image to a PGM image.
*/
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,GrayQuantum);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
GrayQuantum,pixels,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsPixelGray(image,p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(
image,p)),max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 8)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),
max_value);
}
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsPixelGray(image,p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,
p)),max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 16)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToShort(GetPixelRed(image,p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),
max_value);
}
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsPixelGray(image,p) == MagickFalse)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,p)),
max_value);
else
{
if (image->depth == 16)
pixel=ScaleQuantumToLong(GetPixelRed(image,p));
else
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
}
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '6':
{
register unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Convert image to a PNM image.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
extent=GetQuantumExtent(image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case '7':
{
register unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Convert image to a PAM.
*/
if (image->depth > 32)
image->depth=32;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetQuantumEndian(image,quantum_info,MSBEndian);
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
switch (image->depth)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
{
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
break;
}
default:
{
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayQuantum:
case GrayAlphaQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(
image,p)),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelAlpha(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(
image,p)),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelAlpha(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,
p)),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=(unsigned char) ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelAlpha(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case CMYKQuantum:
case CMYKAQuantum:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlack(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlack(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlack(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->depth <= 8)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopCharPixel((unsigned char) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
if (image->depth <= 16)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopShortPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned short) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelRed(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelGreen(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelBlue(image,p),max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
pixel=ScaleQuantumToAny(GetPixelAlpha(image,p),
max_value);
q=PopLongPixel(MSBEndian,(unsigned int) pixel,q);
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
}
extent=(size_t) (q-pixels);
break;
}
}
count=WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) extent)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
register unsigned char
*pixels;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,image->endian == LSBEndian ? "-1.0\n" :
"1.0\n");
image->depth=32;
quantum_type=format == 'f' ? GrayQuantum : RGBQuantum;
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=(ssize_t) image->rows-1; y >= 0; y--)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
extent=ExportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
(void) WriteBlob(image,extent,pixels);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
}
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1612
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: decode_NXAST_RAW_REG_MOVE(const struct nx_action_reg_move *narm,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map,
uint64_t *tlv_bitmap, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts)
{
struct ofpact_reg_move *move = ofpact_put_REG_MOVE(ofpacts);
enum ofperr error;
move->ofpact.raw = NXAST_RAW_REG_MOVE;
move->src.ofs = ntohs(narm->src_ofs);
move->src.n_bits = ntohs(narm->n_bits);
move->dst.ofs = ntohs(narm->dst_ofs);
move->dst.n_bits = ntohs(narm->n_bits);
struct ofpbuf b = ofpbuf_const_initializer(narm, ntohs(narm->len));
ofpbuf_pull(&b, sizeof *narm);
error = mf_vl_mff_nx_pull_header(&b, vl_mff_map, &move->src.field, NULL,
tlv_bitmap);
if (error) {
return error;
}
error = mf_vl_mff_nx_pull_header(&b, vl_mff_map, &move->dst.field, NULL,
tlv_bitmap);
if (error) {
return error;
}
if (!is_all_zeros(b.data, b.size)) {
return OFPERR_NXBRC_MUST_BE_ZERO;
}
return nxm_reg_move_check(move, NULL);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2];
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned char *param,*p;
int al,j,ok;
long i,param_len,n,alg_k,alg_a;
EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh=NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
int curve_nid = 0;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
#endif
/* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */
n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
-1,
s->max_cert_list,
&ok);
if (!ok) return((int)n);
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be
omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set
session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems
later.*/
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
}
#endif
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
return(1);
}
param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
{
RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp)
{
DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp)
{
EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL;
}
#endif
}
else
{
s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new();
}
/* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
param_len=0;
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
{
char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
/* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used
* in ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the
* maximum length of a PSK identity hint can be as
* long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. */
if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
/* If received PSK identity hint contains NULL
* characters, the hint is truncated from the first
* NULL. p may not be ending with NULL, so create a
* NULL-terminated string. */
memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
memset(tmp_id_hint+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
{
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.N=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (1 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 1;
i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
p++;
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.s=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(s->srp_ctx.B=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
/* We must check if there is a certificate */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#else
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
}
else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
{
if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
/* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
else
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa;
rsa=NULL;
}
#else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
{
if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
param_len = 2;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
if (2 > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += 2;
n2s(p,i);
if (i > n - param_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += i;
if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
p+=i;
n-=param_len;
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh))
{
al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#else
if (0)
;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh;
dh=NULL;
}
else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd))
{
al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
{
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the
* server's ephemeral ECDH public key.
* Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
* param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
*/
/* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves
* and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We
* also need one byte for the length of the encoded point
*/
param_len=4;
if (param_len > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
/* Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has
* sent an invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
*/
if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
goto f_err;
}
if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
if (ngroup == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
(EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
{
al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
p+=3;
/* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
p+=1;
if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
(EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
goto f_err;
}
param_len += encoded_pt_len;
n-=param_len;
p+=encoded_pt_len;
/* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention
* the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server
* key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA.
*/
if (0) ;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
#endif
/* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh;
ecdh=NULL;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
}
else if (alg_k)
{
al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if (pkey != NULL)
{
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
int rv;
if (2 > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
if (rv == -1)
goto err;
else if (rv == 0)
{
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
p += 2;
n -= 2;
}
else
md = EVP_sha1();
if (2 > n)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
n2s(p,i);
n-=2;
j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
/* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty */
if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
{
/* wrong packet length */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
int num;
unsigned int size;
j=0;
q=md_buf;
for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
{
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,&size);
q+=size;
j+=size;
}
i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
else
#endif
{
EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len);
if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0)
{
/* bad signature */
al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
else
{
/* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
{
/* Might be wrong key type, check it */
if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
/* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* still data left over */
if (n != 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (dh != NULL)
DH_free(dh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
if (ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return(-1);
}
Commit Message: ECDH downgrade bug fix.
Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-310
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void CtcpHandler::handleVersion(CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m) {
Q_UNUSED(target)
if(ctcptype == CtcpQuery) {
if(_ignoreListManager->ctcpMatch(prefix, network()->networkName(), "VERSION"))
return;
reply(nickFromMask(prefix), "VERSION", QString("Quassel IRC %1 (built on %2) -- http://www.quassel-irc.org")
.arg(Quassel::buildInfo().plainVersionString)
.arg(Quassel::buildInfo().buildDate));
emit displayMsg(Message::Server, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", tr("Received CTCP VERSION request by %1").arg(prefix));
} else {
str.append(tr(" with arguments: %1").arg(param));
emit displayMsg(Message::Error, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", str);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: const char* TaskTypeToString(TaskType task_type) {
switch (task_type) {
case TaskType::kDOMManipulation:
return "DOMManipultion";
case TaskType::kUserInteraction:
return "UserInteraction";
case TaskType::kNetworking:
return "Networking";
case TaskType::kNetworkingControl:
return "NetworkingControl";
case TaskType::kHistoryTraversal:
return "HistoryTraversal";
case TaskType::kEmbed:
return "Embed";
case TaskType::kMediaElementEvent:
return "MediaElementEvent";
case TaskType::kCanvasBlobSerialization:
return "CanvasBlobSerialization";
case TaskType::kMicrotask:
return "Microtask";
case TaskType::kJavascriptTimer:
return "JavascriptTimer";
case TaskType::kRemoteEvent:
return "RemoteEvent";
case TaskType::kWebSocket:
return "WebSocket";
case TaskType::kPostedMessage:
return "PostedMessage";
case TaskType::kUnshippedPortMessage:
return "UnshipedPortMessage";
case TaskType::kFileReading:
return "FileReading";
case TaskType::kDatabaseAccess:
return "DatabaseAccess";
case TaskType::kPresentation:
return "Presentation";
case TaskType::kSensor:
return "Sensor";
case TaskType::kPerformanceTimeline:
return "PerformanceTimeline";
case TaskType::kWebGL:
return "WebGL";
case TaskType::kIdleTask:
return "IdleTask";
case TaskType::kMiscPlatformAPI:
return "MiscPlatformAPI";
case TaskType::kUnspecedTimer:
return "UnspecedTimer";
case TaskType::kUnspecedLoading:
return "UnspecedLoading";
case TaskType::kUnthrottled:
return "Unthrottled";
case TaskType::kInternalTest:
return "InternalTest";
case TaskType::kInternalWebCrypto:
return "InternalWebCrypto";
case TaskType::kInternalIndexedDB:
return "InternalIndexedDB";
case TaskType::kInternalMedia:
return "InternalMedia";
case TaskType::kCount:
return "Count";
}
NOTREACHED();
return "";
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
[email protected]
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
{
char arg[20];
int ret, i;
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
else {
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
if (ret < 0)
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
continue;
cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd;
break;
}
if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
}
if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD ||
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
if (mitigation_options[i].secure)
spec2_print_if_secure(mitigation_options[i].option);
else
spec2_print_if_insecure(mitigation_options[i].option);
return cmd;
}
Commit Message: x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB
The article "Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using the Return Stack
Buffer" [1] describes two new (sub-)variants of spectrev2-like attacks,
making use solely of the RSB contents even on CPUs that don't fallback to
BTB on RSB underflow (Skylake+).
Mitigate userspace-userspace attacks by always unconditionally filling RSB on
context switch when the generic spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled.
[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.07940.pdf
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: crm_recv_remote_msg(void *session, gboolean encrypted)
{
char *reply = NULL;
xmlNode *xml = NULL;
if (encrypted) {
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
reply = cib_recv_tls(session);
#else
CRM_ASSERT(encrypted == FALSE);
#endif
} else {
reply = cib_recv_plaintext(GPOINTER_TO_INT(session));
}
if (reply == NULL || strlen(reply) == 0) {
crm_trace("Empty reply");
} else {
xml = string2xml(reply);
if (xml == NULL) {
crm_err("Couldn't parse: '%.120s'", reply);
}
}
free(reply);
return xml;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int pcm_chmap_ctl_tlv(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, int op_flag,
unsigned int size, unsigned int __user *tlv)
{
struct snd_pcm_chmap *info = snd_kcontrol_chip(kcontrol);
const struct snd_pcm_chmap_elem *map;
unsigned int __user *dst;
int c, count = 0;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!info->chmap))
return -EINVAL;
if (size < 8)
return -ENOMEM;
if (put_user(SNDRV_CTL_TLVT_CONTAINER, tlv))
return -EFAULT;
size -= 8;
dst = tlv + 2;
for (map = info->chmap; map->channels; map++) {
int chs_bytes = map->channels * 4;
if (!valid_chmap_channels(info, map->channels))
continue;
if (size < 8)
return -ENOMEM;
if (put_user(SNDRV_CTL_TLVT_CHMAP_FIXED, dst) ||
put_user(chs_bytes, dst + 1))
return -EFAULT;
dst += 2;
size -= 8;
count += 8;
if (size < chs_bytes)
return -ENOMEM;
size -= chs_bytes;
count += chs_bytes;
for (c = 0; c < map->channels; c++) {
if (put_user(map->map[c], dst))
return -EFAULT;
dst++;
}
}
if (put_user(count, tlv + 1))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
{
if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
return(SSLv3_server_method());
else
return(NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static Image *ReadPDBImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
unsigned char
attributes,
tag[3];
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
index;
MagickBooleanType
status;
PDBImage
pdb_image;
PDBInfo
pdb_info;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bits_per_pixel,
num_pad_bytes,
one,
packets;
ssize_t
count,
img_offset,
comment_offset = 0,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Determine if this a PDB image file.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,32,(unsigned char *) pdb_info.name);
pdb_info.attributes=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_info.version=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_info.create_time=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.modify_time=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.archive_time=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.modify_number=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.application_info=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.sort_info=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) pdb_info.type);
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) pdb_info.id);
if ((count == 0) || (memcmp(pdb_info.type,"vIMG",4) != 0) ||
(memcmp(pdb_info.id,"View",4) != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
pdb_info.seed=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.next_record=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_info.number_records=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (pdb_info.next_record != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"MultipleRecordListNotSupported");
/*
Read record header.
*/
img_offset=(ssize_t) ((int) ReadBlobMSBLong(image));
attributes=(unsigned char) ((int) ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) attributes;
count=ReadBlob(image,3,(unsigned char *) tag);
if (count != 3 || memcmp(tag,"\x6f\x80\x00",3) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
if (pdb_info.number_records > 1)
{
comment_offset=(ssize_t) ((int) ReadBlobMSBLong(image));
attributes=(unsigned char) ((int) ReadBlobByte(image));
count=ReadBlob(image,3,(unsigned char *) tag);
if (count != 3 || memcmp(tag,"\x6f\x80\x01",3) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
num_pad_bytes = (size_t) (img_offset - TellBlob( image ));
while (num_pad_bytes--) ReadBlobByte( image );
/*
Read image header.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,32,(unsigned char *) pdb_image.name);
pdb_image.version=ReadBlobByte(image);
pdb_image.type=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
pdb_image.reserved_1=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_image.note=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_image.x_last=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_image.y_last=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_image.reserved_2=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
pdb_image.x_anchor=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_image.y_anchor=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_image.width=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
pdb_image.height=(short) ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) pdb_image.width;
image->rows=(size_t) pdb_image.height;
image->depth=8;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
bits_per_pixel=pdb_image.type == 0 ? 2UL : pdb_image.type == 2 ? 4UL : 1UL;
one=1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,one << bits_per_pixel) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
packets=(bits_per_pixel*image->columns+7)/8;
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(packets+256UL,image->rows*
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
switch (pdb_image.version & 0x07)
{
case 0:
{
image->compression=NoCompression;
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image, packets * image -> rows, pixels);
break;
}
case 1:
{
image->compression=RLECompression;
if (!DecodeImage(image, pixels, packets * image -> rows))
ThrowReaderException( CorruptImageError, "RLEDecoderError" );
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"UnrecognizedImageCompressionType" );
}
p=pixels;
switch (bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
int
bit;
/*
Read 1-bit PDB image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=(IndexPacket) (*p & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 2:
{
/*
Read 2-bit PDB image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x+=4)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,3UL-((*p >> 6) & 0x03));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,3UL-((*p >> 4) & 0x03));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,3UL-((*p >> 2) & 0x03));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+2,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,3UL-((*p) & 0x03));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+3,index);
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
case 4:
{
/*
Read 4-bit PDB image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,15UL-((*p >> 4) & 0x0f));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,15UL-((*p) & 0x0f));
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
if (pdb_info.number_records > 1)
{
char
*comment;
int
c;
register char
*p;
size_t
length;
num_pad_bytes = (size_t) (comment_offset - TellBlob( image ));
while (num_pad_bytes--) ReadBlobByte( image );
/*
Read comment.
*/
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
length=MaxTextExtent;
comment=AcquireString((char *) NULL);
for (p=comment; c != EOF; p++)
{
if ((size_t) (p-comment+MaxTextExtent) >= length)
{
*p='\0';
length<<=1;
length+=MaxTextExtent;
comment=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(comment,length+MaxTextExtent,
sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=comment+strlen(comment);
}
*p=c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
}
*p='\0';
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::UpgradeInsecureRequests() {
insecure_request_policy_ |= kUpgradeInsecureRequests;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static pdf_creator_t *new_creator(int *n_elements)
{
pdf_creator_t *daddy;
static const pdf_creator_t creator_template[] =
{
{"Title", ""},
{"Author", ""},
{"Subject", ""},
{"Keywords", ""},
{"Creator", ""},
{"Producer", ""},
{"CreationDate", ""},
{"ModDate", ""},
{"Trapped", ""},
};
daddy = malloc(sizeof(creator_template));
memcpy(daddy, creator_template, sizeof(creator_template));
if (n_elements)
*n_elements = sizeof(creator_template) / sizeof(creator_template[0]);
return daddy;
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: PassRefPtr<DrawingBuffer> DrawingBuffer::Create(
std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider,
Client* client,
const IntSize& size,
bool premultiplied_alpha,
bool want_alpha_channel,
bool want_depth_buffer,
bool want_stencil_buffer,
bool want_antialiasing,
PreserveDrawingBuffer preserve,
WebGLVersion web_gl_version,
ChromiumImageUsage chromium_image_usage,
const CanvasColorParams& color_params) {
DCHECK(context_provider);
if (g_should_fail_drawing_buffer_creation_for_testing) {
g_should_fail_drawing_buffer_creation_for_testing = false;
return nullptr;
}
std::unique_ptr<Extensions3DUtil> extensions_util =
Extensions3DUtil::Create(context_provider->ContextGL());
if (!extensions_util->IsValid()) {
return nullptr;
}
DCHECK(extensions_util->SupportsExtension("GL_OES_packed_depth_stencil"));
extensions_util->EnsureExtensionEnabled("GL_OES_packed_depth_stencil");
bool multisample_supported =
want_antialiasing &&
(extensions_util->SupportsExtension(
"GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_multisample") ||
extensions_util->SupportsExtension(
"GL_EXT_multisampled_render_to_texture")) &&
extensions_util->SupportsExtension("GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8");
if (multisample_supported) {
extensions_util->EnsureExtensionEnabled("GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8");
if (extensions_util->SupportsExtension(
"GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_multisample"))
extensions_util->EnsureExtensionEnabled(
"GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_multisample");
else
extensions_util->EnsureExtensionEnabled(
"GL_EXT_multisampled_render_to_texture");
}
bool discard_framebuffer_supported =
extensions_util->SupportsExtension("GL_EXT_discard_framebuffer");
if (discard_framebuffer_supported)
extensions_util->EnsureExtensionEnabled("GL_EXT_discard_framebuffer");
RefPtr<DrawingBuffer> drawing_buffer = AdoptRef(new DrawingBuffer(
std::move(context_provider), std::move(extensions_util), client,
discard_framebuffer_supported, want_alpha_channel, premultiplied_alpha,
preserve, web_gl_version, want_depth_buffer, want_stencil_buffer,
chromium_image_usage, color_params));
if (!drawing_buffer->Initialize(size, multisample_supported)) {
drawing_buffer->BeginDestruction();
return PassRefPtr<DrawingBuffer>();
}
return drawing_buffer;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: print_smb(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *buf, const u_char *maxbuf)
{
uint16_t flags2;
int nterrcodes;
int command;
uint32_t nterror;
const u_char *words, *maxwords, *data;
const struct smbfns *fn;
const char *fmt_smbheader =
"[P4]SMB Command = [B]\nError class = [BP1]\nError code = [d]\nFlags1 = [B]\nFlags2 = [B][P13]\nTree ID = [d]\nProc ID = [d]\nUID = [d]\nMID = [d]\nWord Count = [b]\n";
int smboffset;
ND_TCHECK(buf[9]);
request = (buf[9] & 0x80) ? 0 : 1;
startbuf = buf;
command = buf[4];
fn = smbfind(command, smb_fns);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "SMB PACKET: %s (%s)\n", fn->name, request ? "REQUEST" : "REPLY"));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 2)
return;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&buf[10]);
flags2 = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(&buf[10]);
unicodestr = flags2 & 0x8000;
nterrcodes = flags2 & 0x4000;
/* print out the header */
smb_fdata(ndo, buf, fmt_smbheader, buf + 33, unicodestr);
if (nterrcodes) {
nterror = EXTRACT_LE_32BITS(&buf[5]);
if (nterror)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NTError = %s\n", nt_errstr(nterror)));
} else {
if (buf[5])
ND_PRINT((ndo, "SMBError = %s\n", smb_errstr(buf[5], EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(&buf[7]))));
}
smboffset = 32;
for (;;) {
const char *f1, *f2;
int wct;
u_int bcc;
int newsmboffset;
words = buf + smboffset;
ND_TCHECK(words[0]);
wct = words[0];
data = words + 1 + wct * 2;
maxwords = min(data, maxbuf);
if (request) {
f1 = fn->descript.req_f1;
f2 = fn->descript.req_f2;
} else {
f1 = fn->descript.rep_f1;
f2 = fn->descript.rep_f2;
}
if (fn->descript.fn)
(*fn->descript.fn)(ndo, words, data, buf, maxbuf);
else {
if (wct) {
if (f1)
smb_fdata(ndo, words + 1, f1, words + 1 + wct * 2, unicodestr);
else {
int i;
int v;
for (i = 0; &words[1 + 2 * i] < maxwords; i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(words[1 + 2 * i], 2);
v = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(words + 1 + 2 * i);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "smb_vwv[%d]=%d (0x%X)\n", i, v, v));
}
}
}
ND_TCHECK2(*data, 2);
bcc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(data);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "smb_bcc=%u\n", bcc));
if (f2) {
if (bcc > 0)
smb_fdata(ndo, data + 2, f2, data + 2 + bcc, unicodestr);
} else {
if (bcc > 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "smb_buf[]=\n"));
smb_print_data(ndo, data + 2, min(bcc, PTR_DIFF(maxbuf, data + 2)));
}
}
}
if ((fn->flags & FLG_CHAIN) == 0)
break;
if (wct == 0)
break;
ND_TCHECK(words[1]);
command = words[1];
if (command == 0xFF)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(words[3], 2);
newsmboffset = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(words + 3);
fn = smbfind(command, smb_fns);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\nSMB PACKET: %s (%s) (CHAINED)\n",
fn->name, request ? "REQUEST" : "REPLY"));
if (newsmboffset <= smboffset) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Bad andX offset: %u <= %u\n", newsmboffset, smboffset));
break;
}
smboffset = newsmboffset;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n"));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) SMB: Add two missing bounds checks
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int write_boot_mem(struct edgeport_serial *serial,
int start_address, int length, __u8 *buffer)
{
int status = 0;
int i;
u8 *temp;
/* Must do a read before write */
if (!serial->TiReadI2C) {
temp = kmalloc(1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!temp) {
dev_err(&serial->serial->dev->dev,
"%s - out of memory\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
status = read_boot_mem(serial, 0, 1, temp);
kfree(temp);
if (status)
return status;
}
for (i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
status = ti_vsend_sync(serial->serial->dev,
UMPC_MEMORY_WRITE, buffer[i],
(__u16)(i + start_address), NULL, 0);
if (status)
return status;
}
dev_dbg(&serial->serial->dev->dev, "%s - start_sddr = %x, length = %d\n", __func__, start_address, length);
usb_serial_debug_data(&serial->serial->dev->dev, __func__, length, buffer);
return status;
}
Commit Message: USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void *) gdImageWebpPtrEx (gdImagePtr im, int *size, int quality)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx(2048, NULL);
if (out == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
gdImageWebpCtx(im, out, quality);
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
out->gd_free(out);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to [email protected].
CVE-2016-6912
CWE ID: CWE-415
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: BlobStorageContextTest() {}
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int RenderProcessHostImpl::GetID() const {
return id_;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: aiptek_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
struct aiptek *aiptek;
struct input_dev *inputdev;
int i;
int speeds[] = { 0,
AIPTEK_PROGRAMMABLE_DELAY_50,
AIPTEK_PROGRAMMABLE_DELAY_400,
AIPTEK_PROGRAMMABLE_DELAY_25,
AIPTEK_PROGRAMMABLE_DELAY_100,
AIPTEK_PROGRAMMABLE_DELAY_200,
AIPTEK_PROGRAMMABLE_DELAY_300
};
int err = -ENOMEM;
/* programmableDelay is where the command-line specified
* delay is kept. We make it the first element of speeds[],
* so therefore, your override speed is tried first, then the
* remainder. Note that the default value of 400ms will be tried
* if you do not specify any command line parameter.
*/
speeds[0] = programmableDelay;
aiptek = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aiptek), GFP_KERNEL);
inputdev = input_allocate_device();
if (!aiptek || !inputdev) {
dev_warn(&intf->dev,
"cannot allocate memory or input device\n");
goto fail1;
}
aiptek->data = usb_alloc_coherent(usbdev, AIPTEK_PACKET_LENGTH,
GFP_ATOMIC, &aiptek->data_dma);
if (!aiptek->data) {
dev_warn(&intf->dev, "cannot allocate usb buffer\n");
goto fail1;
}
aiptek->urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!aiptek->urb) {
dev_warn(&intf->dev, "cannot allocate urb\n");
goto fail2;
}
aiptek->inputdev = inputdev;
aiptek->usbdev = usbdev;
aiptek->intf = intf;
aiptek->ifnum = intf->altsetting[0].desc.bInterfaceNumber;
aiptek->inDelay = 0;
aiptek->endDelay = 0;
aiptek->previousJitterable = 0;
aiptek->lastMacro = -1;
/* Set up the curSettings struct. Said struct contains the current
* programmable parameters. The newSetting struct contains changes
* the user makes to the settings via the sysfs interface. Those
* changes are not "committed" to curSettings until the user
* writes to the sysfs/.../execute file.
*/
aiptek->curSetting.pointerMode = AIPTEK_POINTER_EITHER_MODE;
aiptek->curSetting.coordinateMode = AIPTEK_COORDINATE_ABSOLUTE_MODE;
aiptek->curSetting.toolMode = AIPTEK_TOOL_BUTTON_PEN_MODE;
aiptek->curSetting.xTilt = AIPTEK_TILT_DISABLE;
aiptek->curSetting.yTilt = AIPTEK_TILT_DISABLE;
aiptek->curSetting.mouseButtonLeft = AIPTEK_MOUSE_LEFT_BUTTON;
aiptek->curSetting.mouseButtonMiddle = AIPTEK_MOUSE_MIDDLE_BUTTON;
aiptek->curSetting.mouseButtonRight = AIPTEK_MOUSE_RIGHT_BUTTON;
aiptek->curSetting.stylusButtonUpper = AIPTEK_STYLUS_UPPER_BUTTON;
aiptek->curSetting.stylusButtonLower = AIPTEK_STYLUS_LOWER_BUTTON;
aiptek->curSetting.jitterDelay = jitterDelay;
aiptek->curSetting.programmableDelay = programmableDelay;
/* Both structs should have equivalent settings
*/
aiptek->newSetting = aiptek->curSetting;
/* Determine the usb devices' physical path.
* Asketh not why we always pretend we're using "../input0",
* but I suspect this will have to be refactored one
* day if a single USB device can be a keyboard & a mouse
* & a tablet, and the inputX number actually will tell
* us something...
*/
usb_make_path(usbdev, aiptek->features.usbPath,
sizeof(aiptek->features.usbPath));
strlcat(aiptek->features.usbPath, "/input0",
sizeof(aiptek->features.usbPath));
/* Set up client data, pointers to open and close routines
* for the input device.
*/
inputdev->name = "Aiptek";
inputdev->phys = aiptek->features.usbPath;
usb_to_input_id(usbdev, &inputdev->id);
inputdev->dev.parent = &intf->dev;
input_set_drvdata(inputdev, aiptek);
inputdev->open = aiptek_open;
inputdev->close = aiptek_close;
/* Now program the capacities of the tablet, in terms of being
* an input device.
*/
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(eventTypes); ++i)
__set_bit(eventTypes[i], inputdev->evbit);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(absEvents); ++i)
__set_bit(absEvents[i], inputdev->absbit);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(relEvents); ++i)
__set_bit(relEvents[i], inputdev->relbit);
__set_bit(MSC_SERIAL, inputdev->mscbit);
/* Set up key and button codes */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(buttonEvents); ++i)
__set_bit(buttonEvents[i], inputdev->keybit);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(macroKeyEvents); ++i)
__set_bit(macroKeyEvents[i], inputdev->keybit);
/*
* Program the input device coordinate capacities. We do not yet
* know what maximum X, Y, and Z values are, so we're putting fake
* values in. Later, we'll ask the tablet to put in the correct
* values.
*/
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_X, 0, 2999, 0, 0);
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_Y, 0, 2249, 0, 0);
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_PRESSURE, 0, 511, 0, 0);
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_TILT_X, AIPTEK_TILT_MIN, AIPTEK_TILT_MAX, 0, 0);
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_TILT_Y, AIPTEK_TILT_MIN, AIPTEK_TILT_MAX, 0, 0);
input_set_abs_params(inputdev, ABS_WHEEL, AIPTEK_WHEEL_MIN, AIPTEK_WHEEL_MAX - 1, 0, 0);
endpoint = &intf->altsetting[0].endpoint[0].desc;
/* Go set up our URB, which is called when the tablet receives
* input.
*/
usb_fill_int_urb(aiptek->urb,
aiptek->usbdev,
usb_rcvintpipe(aiptek->usbdev,
endpoint->bEndpointAddress),
aiptek->data, 8, aiptek_irq, aiptek,
endpoint->bInterval);
aiptek->urb->transfer_dma = aiptek->data_dma;
aiptek->urb->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
/* Program the tablet. This sets the tablet up in the mode
* specified in newSetting, and also queries the tablet's
* physical capacities.
*
* Sanity check: if a tablet doesn't like the slow programmatic
* delay, we often get sizes of 0x0. Let's use that as an indicator
* to try faster delays, up to 25 ms. If that logic fails, well, you'll
* have to explain to us how your tablet thinks it's 0x0, and yet that's
* not an error :-)
*/
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(speeds); ++i) {
aiptek->curSetting.programmableDelay = speeds[i];
(void)aiptek_program_tablet(aiptek);
if (input_abs_get_max(aiptek->inputdev, ABS_X) > 0) {
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"Aiptek using %d ms programming speed\n",
aiptek->curSetting.programmableDelay);
break;
}
}
/* Murphy says that some day someone will have a tablet that fails the
above test. That's you, Frederic Rodrigo */
if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(speeds)) {
dev_info(&intf->dev,
"Aiptek tried all speeds, no sane response\n");
goto fail3;
}
/* Associate this driver's struct with the usb interface.
*/
usb_set_intfdata(intf, aiptek);
/* Set up the sysfs files
*/
err = sysfs_create_group(&intf->dev.kobj, &aiptek_attribute_group);
if (err) {
dev_warn(&intf->dev, "cannot create sysfs group err: %d\n",
err);
goto fail3;
}
/* Register the tablet as an Input Device
*/
err = input_register_device(aiptek->inputdev);
if (err) {
dev_warn(&intf->dev,
"input_register_device returned err: %d\n", err);
goto fail4;
}
return 0;
fail4: sysfs_remove_group(&intf->dev.kobj, &aiptek_attribute_group);
fail3: usb_free_urb(aiptek->urb);
fail2: usb_free_coherent(usbdev, AIPTEK_PACKET_LENGTH, aiptek->data,
aiptek->data_dma);
fail1: usb_set_intfdata(intf, NULL);
input_free_device(inputdev);
kfree(aiptek);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int BN_GF2m_arr2poly(const int p[], BIGNUM *a)
{
int i;
bn_check_top(a);
BN_zero(a);
for (i = 0; p[i] != -1; i++) {
if (BN_set_bit(a, p[i]) == 0)
return 0;
}
bn_check_top(a);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: bn/bn_gf2m.c: avoid infinite loop wich malformed ECParamters.
CVE-2015-1788
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::FindEntry(int64_t cache_id,
const GURL& url,
EntryRecord* record) {
DCHECK(record);
if (!LazyOpen(kDontCreate))
return false;
static const char kSql[] =
"SELECT cache_id, url, flags, response_id, response_size FROM Entries"
" WHERE cache_id = ? AND url = ?";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, cache_id);
statement.BindString(1, url.spec());
if (!statement.Step())
return false;
ReadEntryRecord(statement, record);
DCHECK(record->cache_id == cache_id);
DCHECK(record->url == url);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static inline void sem_getref_and_unlock(struct sem_array *sma)
{
ipc_rcu_getref(sma);
ipc_unlock(&(sma)->sem_perm);
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[[email protected]: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[[email protected]: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Low <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void hugetlb_unregister_node(struct node *node)
{
struct hstate *h;
struct node_hstate *nhs = &node_hstates[node->dev.id];
if (!nhs->hugepages_kobj)
return; /* no hstate attributes */
for_each_hstate(h) {
int idx = hstate_index(h);
if (nhs->hstate_kobjs[idx]) {
kobject_put(nhs->hstate_kobjs[idx]);
nhs->hstate_kobjs[idx] = NULL;
}
}
kobject_put(nhs->hugepages_kobj);
nhs->hugepages_kobj = NULL;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: GF_Err sbgp_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i;
GF_SampleGroupBox *ptr = (GF_SampleGroupBox*) a;
if (!a) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "SampleGroupBox", trace);
if (ptr->grouping_type)
fprintf(trace, "grouping_type=\"%s\"", gf_4cc_to_str(ptr->grouping_type) );
if (ptr->version==1) {
if (isalnum(ptr->grouping_type_parameter&0xFF)) {
fprintf(trace, " grouping_type_parameter=\"%s\"", gf_4cc_to_str(ptr->grouping_type_parameter) );
} else {
fprintf(trace, " grouping_type_parameter=\"%d\"", ptr->grouping_type_parameter);
}
}
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
for (i=0; i<ptr->entry_count; i++) {
fprintf(trace, "<SampleGroupBoxEntry sample_count=\"%d\" group_description_index=\"%d\"/>\n", ptr->sample_entries[i].sample_count, ptr->sample_entries[i].group_description_index );
}
if (!ptr->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<SampleGroupBoxEntry sample_count=\"\" group_description_index=\"\"/>\n");
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("SampleGroupBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int g2m_init_buffers(G2MContext *c)
{
int aligned_height;
if (!c->framebuf || c->old_width < c->width || c->old_height < c->height) {
c->framebuf_stride = FFALIGN(c->width * 3, 16);
aligned_height = FFALIGN(c->height, 16);
av_free(c->framebuf);
c->framebuf = av_mallocz(c->framebuf_stride * aligned_height);
if (!c->framebuf)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
if (!c->synth_tile || !c->jpeg_tile ||
c->old_tile_w < c->tile_width ||
c->old_tile_h < c->tile_height) {
c->tile_stride = FFALIGN(c->tile_width, 16) * 3;
aligned_height = FFALIGN(c->tile_height, 16);
av_free(c->synth_tile);
av_free(c->jpeg_tile);
av_free(c->kempf_buf);
av_free(c->kempf_flags);
c->synth_tile = av_mallocz(c->tile_stride * aligned_height);
c->jpeg_tile = av_mallocz(c->tile_stride * aligned_height);
c->kempf_buf = av_mallocz((c->tile_width + 1) * aligned_height
+ FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
c->kempf_flags = av_mallocz( c->tile_width * aligned_height);
if (!c->synth_tile || !c->jpeg_tile ||
!c->kempf_buf || !c->kempf_flags)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/g2meet: Fix framebuf size
Currently the code can in some cases draw tiles that hang outside the
allocated buffer. This patch increases the buffer size to avoid out
of array accesses. An alternative would be to fail if such tiles are
encountered.
I do not know if any valid files use such hanging tiles.
Fixes Ticket2971
Found-by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void print_version(FILE *out)
{
fprintf(out, "%s from %s (libblkid %s, %s)\n",
program_invocation_short_name, PACKAGE_STRING,
LIBBLKID_VERSION, LIBBLKID_DATE);
}
Commit Message: libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-77
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: xsltDocumentFunctionLoadDocument(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, xmlChar* URI)
{
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt;
xmlURIPtr uri;
xmlChar *fragment;
xsltDocumentPtr idoc; /* document info */
xmlDocPtr doc;
xmlXPathContextPtr xptrctxt = NULL;
xmlXPathObjectPtr resObj = NULL;
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
if (tctxt == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"document() : internal error tctxt == NULL\n");
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewNodeSet(NULL));
return;
}
uri = xmlParseURI((const char *) URI);
if (uri == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, NULL,
"document() : failed to parse URI\n");
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewNodeSet(NULL));
return;
}
/*
* check for and remove fragment identifier
*/
fragment = (xmlChar *)uri->fragment;
if (fragment != NULL) {
xmlChar *newURI;
uri->fragment = NULL;
newURI = xmlSaveUri(uri);
idoc = xsltLoadDocument(tctxt, newURI);
xmlFree(newURI);
} else
idoc = xsltLoadDocument(tctxt, URI);
xmlFreeURI(uri);
if (idoc == NULL) {
if ((URI == NULL) ||
(URI[0] == '#') ||
((tctxt->style->doc != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(tctxt->style->doc->URL, URI))))
{
/*
* This selects the stylesheet's doc itself.
*/
doc = tctxt->style->doc;
} else {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewNodeSet(NULL));
if (fragment != NULL)
xmlFree(fragment);
return;
}
} else
doc = idoc->doc;
if (fragment == NULL) {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewNodeSet((xmlNodePtr) doc));
return;
}
/* use XPointer of HTML location for fragment ID */
#ifdef LIBXML_XPTR_ENABLED
xptrctxt = xmlXPtrNewContext(doc, NULL, NULL);
if (xptrctxt == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, NULL,
"document() : internal error xptrctxt == NULL\n");
goto out_fragment;
}
resObj = xmlXPtrEval(fragment, xptrctxt);
xmlXPathFreeContext(xptrctxt);
#endif
xmlFree(fragment);
if (resObj == NULL)
goto out_fragment;
switch (resObj->type) {
case XPATH_NODESET:
break;
case XPATH_UNDEFINED:
case XPATH_BOOLEAN:
case XPATH_NUMBER:
case XPATH_STRING:
case XPATH_POINT:
case XPATH_USERS:
case XPATH_XSLT_TREE:
case XPATH_RANGE:
case XPATH_LOCATIONSET:
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, NULL,
"document() : XPointer does not select a node set: #%s\n",
fragment);
goto out_object;
}
valuePush(ctxt, resObj);
return;
out_object:
xmlXPathFreeObject(resObj);
out_fragment:
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewNodeSet(NULL));
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void SendHandwritingStroke(const HandwritingStroke& stroke) {
if (stroke.size() < 2) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Empty stroke data or a single dot is passed.";
return;
}
IBusInputContext* context = GetInputContext(input_context_path_, ibus_);
if (!context) {
return;
}
const size_t raw_stroke_size = stroke.size() * 2;
scoped_array<double> raw_stroke(new double[raw_stroke_size]);
for (size_t n = 0; n < stroke.size(); ++n) {
raw_stroke[n * 2] = stroke[n].first; // x
raw_stroke[n * 2 + 1] = stroke[n].second; // y
}
ibus_input_context_process_hand_writing_event(
context, raw_stroke.get(), raw_stroke_size);
g_object_unref(context);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int mov_parse_stsd_data(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb,
AVStream *st, MOVStreamContext *sc,
int64_t size)
{
int ret;
if (st->codecpar->codec_tag == MKTAG('t','m','c','d')) {
if ((int)size != size)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
ret = ff_get_extradata(c->fc, st->codecpar, pb, size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (size > 16) {
MOVStreamContext *tmcd_ctx = st->priv_data;
int val;
val = AV_RB32(st->codecpar->extradata + 4);
tmcd_ctx->tmcd_flags = val;
st->avg_frame_rate.num = st->codecpar->extradata[16]; /* number of frame */
st->avg_frame_rate.den = 1;
#if FF_API_LAVF_AVCTX
FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
st->codec->time_base = av_inv_q(st->avg_frame_rate);
FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
#endif
/* adjust for per frame dur in counter mode */
if (tmcd_ctx->tmcd_flags & 0x0008) {
int timescale = AV_RB32(st->codecpar->extradata + 8);
int framedur = AV_RB32(st->codecpar->extradata + 12);
st->avg_frame_rate.num *= timescale;
st->avg_frame_rate.den *= framedur;
#if FF_API_LAVF_AVCTX
FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
st->codec->time_base.den *= timescale;
st->codec->time_base.num *= framedur;
FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
#endif
}
if (size > 30) {
uint32_t len = AV_RB32(st->codecpar->extradata + 18); /* name atom length */
uint32_t format = AV_RB32(st->codecpar->extradata + 22);
if (format == AV_RB32("name") && (int64_t)size >= (int64_t)len + 18) {
uint16_t str_size = AV_RB16(st->codecpar->extradata + 26); /* string length */
if (str_size > 0 && size >= (int)str_size + 26) {
char *reel_name = av_malloc(str_size + 1);
if (!reel_name)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
memcpy(reel_name, st->codecpar->extradata + 30, str_size);
reel_name[str_size] = 0; /* Add null terminator */
/* don't add reel_name if emtpy string */
if (*reel_name == 0) {
av_free(reel_name);
} else {
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "reel_name", reel_name, AV_DICT_DONT_STRDUP_VAL);
}
}
}
}
}
} else {
/* other codec type, just skip (rtp, mp4s ...) */
avio_skip(pb, size);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-834
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(ptrace, long, request, long, pid, unsigned long, addr,
unsigned long, data)
{
struct task_struct *child;
long ret;
if (request == PTRACE_TRACEME) {
ret = ptrace_traceme();
if (!ret)
arch_ptrace_attach(current);
goto out;
}
child = ptrace_get_task_struct(pid);
if (IS_ERR(child)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(child);
goto out;
}
if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH || request == PTRACE_SEIZE) {
ret = ptrace_attach(child, request, addr, data);
/*
* Some architectures need to do book-keeping after
* a ptrace attach.
*/
if (!ret)
arch_ptrace_attach(child);
goto out_put_task_struct;
}
ret = ptrace_check_attach(child, request == PTRACE_KILL ||
request == PTRACE_INTERRUPT);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_put_task_struct;
ret = arch_ptrace(child, request, addr, data);
out_put_task_struct:
put_task_struct(child);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: CompositorFrameMetadata LayerTreeHostImpl::MakeCompositorFrameMetadata() const {
CompositorFrameMetadata metadata;
metadata.device_scale_factor = active_tree_->painted_device_scale_factor() *
active_tree_->device_scale_factor();
metadata.page_scale_factor = active_tree_->current_page_scale_factor();
metadata.scrollable_viewport_size = active_tree_->ScrollableViewportSize();
metadata.root_layer_size = active_tree_->ScrollableSize();
metadata.min_page_scale_factor = active_tree_->min_page_scale_factor();
metadata.max_page_scale_factor = active_tree_->max_page_scale_factor();
metadata.top_controls_height =
browser_controls_offset_manager_->TopControlsHeight();
metadata.top_controls_shown_ratio =
browser_controls_offset_manager_->TopControlsShownRatio();
metadata.bottom_controls_height =
browser_controls_offset_manager_->BottomControlsHeight();
metadata.bottom_controls_shown_ratio =
browser_controls_offset_manager_->BottomControlsShownRatio();
metadata.root_background_color = active_tree_->background_color();
active_tree_->GetViewportSelection(&metadata.selection);
if (OuterViewportScrollLayer()) {
metadata.root_overflow_x_hidden =
!OuterViewportScrollLayer()->user_scrollable_horizontal();
metadata.root_overflow_y_hidden =
!OuterViewportScrollLayer()->user_scrollable_vertical();
}
if (GetDrawMode() == DRAW_MODE_RESOURCELESS_SOFTWARE) {
metadata.is_resourceless_software_draw_with_scroll_or_animation =
IsActivelyScrolling() || mutator_host_->NeedsTickAnimations();
}
for (LayerImpl* surface_layer : active_tree_->SurfaceLayers()) {
SurfaceLayerImpl* surface_layer_impl =
static_cast<SurfaceLayerImpl*>(surface_layer);
metadata.referenced_surfaces.push_back(
surface_layer_impl->primary_surface_info().id());
if (surface_layer_impl->fallback_surface_info().is_valid()) {
metadata.referenced_surfaces.push_back(
surface_layer_impl->fallback_surface_info().id());
}
}
if (!InnerViewportScrollLayer())
return metadata;
metadata.root_overflow_x_hidden |=
!InnerViewportScrollLayer()->user_scrollable_horizontal();
metadata.root_overflow_y_hidden |=
!InnerViewportScrollLayer()->user_scrollable_vertical();
metadata.root_scroll_offset =
gfx::ScrollOffsetToVector2dF(active_tree_->TotalScrollOffset());
return metadata;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool IsZipArchiverPackerEnabled() {
return !base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
kDisableZipArchiverPacker);
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: set_store_for_write(png_store *ps, png_infopp ppi,
PNG_CONST char * volatile name)
{
anon_context(ps);
Try
{
if (ps->pwrite != NULL)
png_error(ps->pwrite, "write store already in use");
store_write_reset(ps);
safecat(ps->wname, sizeof ps->wname, 0, name);
/* Don't do the slow memory checks if doing a speed test, also if user
* memory is not supported we can't do it anyway.
*/
# ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
if (!ps->speed)
ps->pwrite = png_create_write_struct_2(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,
ps, store_error, store_warning, &ps->write_memory_pool,
store_malloc, store_free);
else
# endif
ps->pwrite = png_create_write_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,
ps, store_error, store_warning);
png_set_write_fn(ps->pwrite, ps, store_write, store_flush);
# ifdef PNG_SET_OPTION_SUPPORTED
{
int opt;
for (opt=0; opt<ps->noptions; ++opt)
if (png_set_option(ps->pwrite, ps->options[opt].option,
ps->options[opt].setting) == PNG_OPTION_INVALID)
png_error(ps->pwrite, "png option invalid");
}
# endif
if (ppi != NULL)
*ppi = ps->piwrite = png_create_info_struct(ps->pwrite);
}
Catch_anonymous
return NULL;
return ps->pwrite;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> V8InjectedScriptHost::create(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, V8InspectorImpl* inspector)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = inspector->isolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> injectedScriptHost = v8::Object::New(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::External> debuggerExternal = v8::External::New(isolate, inspector);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "internalConstructorName", V8InjectedScriptHost::internalConstructorNameCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "formatAccessorsAsProperties", V8InjectedScriptHost::formatAccessorsAsProperties, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "subtype", V8InjectedScriptHost::subtypeCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "getInternalProperties", V8InjectedScriptHost::getInternalPropertiesCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "objectHasOwnProperty", V8InjectedScriptHost::objectHasOwnPropertyCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "bind", V8InjectedScriptHost::bindCallback, debuggerExternal);
setFunctionProperty(context, injectedScriptHost, "proxyTargetValue", V8InjectedScriptHost::proxyTargetValueCallback, debuggerExternal);
return injectedScriptHost;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool WebPage::isWebInspectorEnabled()
{
return d->m_page->settings()->developerExtrasEnabled();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::Core(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> main_task_runner,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> io_task_runner,
const FilePath& binary_path,
bool launch_elevated,
const std::string& channel_security)
: main_task_runner_(main_task_runner),
io_task_runner_(io_task_runner),
binary_path_(binary_path),
channel_security_(channel_security),
launch_elevated_(launch_elevated),
stopping_(false) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagesetstyle)
{
zval *IM, *styles;
gdImagePtr im;
int * stylearr;
int index;
HashPosition pos;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ra", &IM, &styles) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
/* copy the style values in the stylearr */
stylearr = safe_emalloc(sizeof(int), zend_hash_num_elements(HASH_OF(styles)), 0);
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(HASH_OF(styles), &pos);
for (index = 0;; zend_hash_move_forward_ex(HASH_OF(styles), &pos)) {
zval ** item;
if (zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(HASH_OF(styles), (void **) &item, &pos) == FAILURE) {
break;
}
convert_to_long_ex(item);
stylearr[index++] = Z_LVAL_PP(item);
}
gdImageSetStyle(im, stylearr, index);
efree(stylearr);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #66356 (Heap Overflow Vulnerability in imagecrop())
And also fixed the bug: arguments are altered after some calls
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static struct page *kvm_pfn_to_page(kvm_pfn_t pfn)
{
if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn))
return KVM_ERR_PTR_BAD_PAGE;
if (kvm_is_reserved_pfn(pfn)) {
WARN_ON(1);
return KVM_ERR_PTR_BAD_PAGE;
}
return pfn_to_page(pfn);
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: gdImagePtr gdImageCreate (int sx, int sy)
{
int i;
gdImagePtr im;
if (overflow2(sx, sy)) {
return NULL;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof(unsigned char *), sy)) {
return NULL;
}
im = (gdImage *) gdCalloc(1, sizeof(gdImage));
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels = (unsigned char **) gdMalloc(sizeof(unsigned char *) * sy);
im->AA_opacity = (unsigned char **) gdMalloc(sizeof(unsigned char *) * sy);
im->polyInts = 0;
im->polyAllocated = 0;
im->brush = 0;
im->tile = 0;
im->style = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sy; i++) {
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels[i] = (unsigned char *) gdCalloc(sx, sizeof(unsigned char));
im->AA_opacity[i] = (unsigned char *) gdCalloc(sx, sizeof(unsigned char));
}
im->sx = sx;
im->sy = sy;
im->colorsTotal = 0;
im->transparent = (-1);
im->interlace = 0;
im->thick = 1;
im->AA = 0;
im->AA_polygon = 0;
for (i = 0; i < gdMaxColors; i++) {
im->open[i] = 1;
im->red[i] = 0;
im->green[i] = 0;
im->blue[i] = 0;
}
im->trueColor = 0;
im->tpixels = 0;
im->cx1 = 0;
im->cy1 = 0;
im->cx2 = im->sx - 1;
im->cy2 = im->sy - 1;
im->interpolation = NULL;
im->interpolation_id = GD_BILINEAR_FIXED;
return im;
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void __exit pcd_exit(void)
{
struct pcd_unit *cd;
int unit;
for (unit = 0, cd = pcd; unit < PCD_UNITS; unit++, cd++) {
if (cd->present) {
del_gendisk(cd->disk);
pi_release(cd->pi);
unregister_cdrom(&cd->info);
}
blk_cleanup_queue(cd->disk->queue);
blk_mq_free_tag_set(&cd->tag_set);
put_disk(cd->disk);
}
unregister_blkdev(major, name);
pi_unregister_driver(par_drv);
}
Commit Message: paride/pcd: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference and mem leak
Syzkaller report this:
pcd: pcd version 1.07, major 46, nice 0
pcd0: Autoprobe failed
pcd: No CD-ROM drive found
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 4525 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pcd_init+0x95c/0x1000 [pcd]
Code: c4 ab f7 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 56 a3 da f7 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 39 a3 da f7 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 cc b2
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e84df880 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc155a088 RCX: ffffffffc1508935
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffc900014f0000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee658b8 R09: ffffed103ee658b8
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee658b7 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc155a778 R14: ffffffffc155a4a8 R15: 0000000000000003
FS: 00007fe71bee3700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055a7334441a8 CR3: 00000001e9674003 CR4: 00000000007606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1508000
? 0xffffffffc1508000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe71bee2c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fe71bee2c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe71bee36bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pcd(+) paride solos_pci atm ts_fsm rtc_mt6397 mac80211 nhc_mobility nhc_udp nhc_ipv6 nhc_hop nhc_dest nhc_fragment nhc_routing 6lowpan rtc_cros_ec memconsole intel_xhci_usb_role_switch roles rtc_wm8350 usbcore industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio asc7621 dm_era dm_persistent_data dm_bufio dm_mod tpm gnss_ubx gnss_serial serdev gnss max2165 cpufreq_dt hid_penmount hid menf21bmc_wdt rc_core n_tracesink ide_gd_mod cdns_csi2tx v4l2_fwnode videodev media pinctrl_lewisburg pinctrl_intel iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun joydev mousedev ppdev kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd
ide_pci_generic piix input_leds cryptd glue_helper psmouse ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt ata_generic i2c_piix4 agpgart pata_acpi parport_pc parport floppy rtc_cmos sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: bmc150_magn]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace d873691c3cd69f56 ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pcd_init_units, cd->disk will be
NULL, however in pcd_detect and pcd_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 81b74ac68c28 ("paride/pcd: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void __init early_platform_add_devices(struct platform_device **devs, int num)
{
struct device *dev;
int i;
/* simply add the devices to list */
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
dev = &devs[i]->dev;
if (!dev->devres_head.next) {
pm_runtime_early_init(dev);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->devres_head);
list_add_tail(&dev->devres_head,
&early_platform_device_list);
}
}
}
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: gnutls_session_get_data (gnutls_session_t session,
void *session_data, size_t * session_data_size)
{
gnutls_datum_t psession;
int ret;
if (session->internals.resumable == RESUME_FALSE)
return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION;
psession.data = session_data;
ret = _gnutls_session_pack (session, &psession);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
if (psession.size > *session_data_size)
{
ret = GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER;
goto error;
}
if (session_data != NULL)
memcpy (session_data, psession.data, psession.size);
ret = 0;
error:
_gnutls_free_datum (&psession);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: MagickExport unsigned char *DetachBlob(BlobInfo *blob_info)
{
unsigned char
*data;
assert(blob_info != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
if (blob_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
if (blob_info->mapped != MagickFalse)
{
(void) UnmapBlob(blob_info->data,blob_info->length);
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,blob_info->length);
}
blob_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
blob_info->length=0;
blob_info->offset=0;
blob_info->eof=MagickFalse;
blob_info->error=0;
blob_info->exempt=MagickFalse;
blob_info->type=UndefinedStream;
blob_info->file_info.file=(FILE *) NULL;
data=blob_info->data;
blob_info->data=(unsigned char *) NULL;
blob_info->stream=(StreamHandler) NULL;
return(data);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void HTMLDocument::removeNamedItem(const AtomicString& name)
{
removeItemFromMap(m_namedItemCounts, name);
}
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void LocationAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueFast(info, WTF::GetPtr(impl->location()), impl);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static inline int ip6_ufo_append_data(struct sock *sk,
int getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len,
int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int hh_len, int fragheaderlen,
int transhdrlen, int mtu,unsigned int flags,
struct rt6_info *rt)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
/* There is support for UDP large send offload by network
* device, so create one single skb packet containing complete
* udp datagram
*/
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
hh_len + fragheaderlen + transhdrlen + 20,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
if (skb == NULL)
return err;
/* reserve space for Hardware header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len);
/* create space for UDP/IP header */
skb_put(skb,fragheaderlen + transhdrlen);
/* initialize network header pointer */
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
/* initialize protocol header pointer */
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + fragheaderlen;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
skb->csum = 0;
}
err = skb_append_datato_frags(sk,skb, getfrag, from,
(length - transhdrlen));
if (!err) {
struct frag_hdr fhdr;
/* Specify the length of each IPv6 datagram fragment.
* It has to be a multiple of 8.
*/
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = (mtu - fragheaderlen -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr)) & ~7;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_UDP;
ipv6_select_ident(&fhdr, rt);
skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id = fhdr.identification;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
return 0;
}
/* There is not enough support do UPD LSO,
* so follow normal path
*/
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO
In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the already queued up gso-skb via
plain ip6_append_data. This causes random memory corruptions.
In ip6_ufo_append_data we also have to be careful to not queue up the
same skb multiple times. So setup the gso frame only when no first skb
is available.
This also fixes a shortcoming where we add the current packet's length to
cork->length but return early because of a packet > mtu with dontfrag set
(instead of sutracting it again).
Found with trinity.
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: tt_name_entry_ascii_from_utf16( TT_NameEntry entry,
FT_Memory memory )
{
FT_String* string = NULL;
FT_UInt len, code, n;
FT_Byte* read = (FT_Byte*)entry->string;
FT_Error error;
len = (FT_UInt)entry->stringLength / 2;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( string, len + 1 ) )
return NULL;
for ( n = 0; n < len; n++ )
{
code = FT_NEXT_USHORT( read );
if ( code == 0 )
break;
if ( code < 32 || code > 127 )
code = '?';
string[n] = (char)code;
}
string[n] = 0;
return string;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::InitializeCompositorThread() {
base::Thread::Options options;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
options.priority = base::ThreadPriority::DISPLAY;
#endif
compositor_thread_ =
blink::scheduler::WebThreadBase::CreateCompositorThread(options);
blink_platform_impl_->SetCompositorThread(compositor_thread_.get());
compositor_task_runner_ = compositor_thread_->GetTaskRunner();
compositor_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(base::IgnoreResult(&ThreadRestrictions::SetIOAllowed),
false));
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
ChildThreadImpl::current()->SetThreadPriority(compositor_thread_->ThreadId(),
base::ThreadPriority::DISPLAY);
#endif
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kMojoInputMessages)) {
SynchronousInputHandlerProxyClient* synchronous_input_handler_proxy_client =
nullptr;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (GetContentClient()->UsingSynchronousCompositing()) {
sync_compositor_message_filter_ =
new SynchronousCompositorFilter(compositor_task_runner_);
AddFilter(sync_compositor_message_filter_.get());
synchronous_input_handler_proxy_client =
sync_compositor_message_filter_.get();
}
#endif
scoped_refptr<InputEventFilter> compositor_input_event_filter(
new InputEventFilter(main_input_callback_.callback(),
main_thread_compositor_task_runner_,
compositor_task_runner_));
InputHandlerManagerClient* input_handler_manager_client =
compositor_input_event_filter.get();
input_event_filter_ = compositor_input_event_filter;
input_handler_manager_.reset(new InputHandlerManager(
compositor_task_runner_, input_handler_manager_client,
synchronous_input_handler_proxy_client, renderer_scheduler_.get()));
} else {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
DCHECK(!GetContentClient()->UsingSynchronousCompositing());
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
{
if (user_pwd == NULL)
return;
BN_free(user_pwd->s);
BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void stroke_add_conn(private_stroke_socket_t *this, stroke_msg_t *msg)
{
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_conn.name);
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "received stroke: add connection '%s'", msg->add_conn.name);
DBG2(DBG_CFG, "conn %s", msg->add_conn.name);
pop_end(msg, "left", &msg->add_conn.me);
pop_end(msg, "right", &msg->add_conn.other);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_conn.eap_identity);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_conn.aaa_identity);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_conn.xauth_identity);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_conn.algorithms.ike);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_conn.algorithms.esp);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_conn.algorithms.ah);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_conn.ikeme.mediated_by);
pop_string(msg, &msg->add_conn.ikeme.peerid);
DBG_OPT(" eap_identity=%s", msg->add_conn.eap_identity);
DBG_OPT(" aaa_identity=%s", msg->add_conn.aaa_identity);
DBG_OPT(" xauth_identity=%s", msg->add_conn.xauth_identity);
DBG_OPT(" ike=%s", msg->add_conn.algorithms.ike);
DBG_OPT(" esp=%s", msg->add_conn.algorithms.esp);
DBG_OPT(" ah=%s", msg->add_conn.algorithms.ah);
DBG_OPT(" dpddelay=%d", msg->add_conn.dpd.delay);
DBG_OPT(" dpdtimeout=%d", msg->add_conn.dpd.timeout);
DBG_OPT(" dpdaction=%d", msg->add_conn.dpd.action);
DBG_OPT(" closeaction=%d", msg->add_conn.close_action);
DBG_OPT(" sha256_96=%s", msg->add_conn.sha256_96 ? "yes" : "no");
DBG_OPT(" mediation=%s", msg->add_conn.ikeme.mediation ? "yes" : "no");
DBG_OPT(" mediated_by=%s", msg->add_conn.ikeme.mediated_by);
DBG_OPT(" me_peerid=%s", msg->add_conn.ikeme.peerid);
DBG_OPT(" keyexchange=ikev%u", msg->add_conn.version);
this->config->add(this->config, msg);
this->attribute->add_dns(this->attribute, msg);
this->handler->add_attributes(this->handler, msg);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebpCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quality)
{
uint8_t *argb;
int x, y;
uint8_t *p;
uint8_t *out;
size_t out_size;
if (im == NULL) {
return;
}
if (!gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
gd_error("Paletter image not supported by webp");
return;
}
if (quality == -1) {
quality = 80;
}
argb = (uint8_t *)gdMalloc(gdImageSX(im) * 4 * gdImageSY(im));
if (!argb) {
return;
}
p = argb;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
register int c;
register char a;
c = im->tpixels[y][x];
a = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c);
if (a == 127) {
a = 0;
} else {
a = 255 - ((a << 1) + (a >> 6));
}
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetRed(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetGreen(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetBlue(c);
*(p++) = a;
}
}
out_size = WebPEncodeRGBA(argb, gdImageSX(im), gdImageSY(im), gdImageSX(im) * 4, quality, &out);
if (out_size == 0) {
gd_error("gd-webp encoding failed");
goto freeargb;
}
gdPutBuf(out, out_size, outfile);
free(out);
freeargb:
gdFree(argb);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'pull-request/296'
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagegammacorrect)
{
zval *IM;
gdImagePtr im;
int i;
double input, output;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rdd", &IM, &input, &output) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
int x, y, c;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
c = gdImageGetPixel(im, x, y);
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y,
gdTrueColorAlpha(
(int) ((pow((pow((gdTrueColorGetRed(c) / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5),
(int) ((pow((pow((gdTrueColorGetGreen(c) / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5),
(int) ((pow((pow((gdTrueColorGetBlue(c) / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5),
gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c)
)
);
}
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
for (i = 0; i < gdImageColorsTotal(im); i++) {
im->red[i] = (int)((pow((pow((im->red[i] / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5);
im->green[i] = (int)((pow((pow((im->green[i] / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5);
im->blue[i] = (int)((pow((pow((im->blue[i] / 255.0), input)), 1.0 / output) * 255) + .5);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72730 - imagegammacorrect allows arbitrary write access
CWE ID: CWE-787
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RunLoop::Run() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
if (!BeforeRun())
return;
DETACH_FROM_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
tracked_objects::TaskStopwatch stopwatch;
stopwatch.Start();
delegate_->Run();
stopwatch.Stop();
DETACH_FROM_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
AfterRun();
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
[email protected]
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: danakj <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void send_sigtrap(struct task_struct *tsk, struct pt_regs *regs,
int error_code, int si_code)
{
struct siginfo info;
fill_sigtrap_info(tsk, regs, error_code, si_code, &info);
/* Send us the fake SIGTRAP */
force_sig_info(SIGTRAP, &info, tsk);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: mprint(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m)
{
uint64_t v;
float vf;
double vd;
int64_t t = 0;
char buf[128], tbuf[26];
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BYTE:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, (uint64_t)p->b);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d",
(unsigned char)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%d"),
(unsigned char) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(char);
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, (uint64_t)p->h);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u",
(unsigned short)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%u"),
(unsigned short) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(short);
break;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_MELONG:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, (uint64_t)p->l);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", (uint32_t) v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%u"), (uint32_t) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_LEQUAD:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, p->q);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u",
(unsigned long long)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%" INT64_T_FORMAT "u"),
(unsigned long long) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(int64_t);
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16:
if (m->reln == '=' || m->reln == '!') {
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), m->value.s) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + m->vallen;
}
else {
char *str = p->s;
/* compute t before we mangle the string? */
t = ms->offset + strlen(str);
if (*m->value.s == '\0')
str[strcspn(str, "\n")] = '\0';
if (m->str_flags & STRING_TRIM) {
char *last;
while (isspace((unsigned char)*str))
str++;
last = str;
while (*last)
last++;
--last;
while (isspace((unsigned char)*last))
last--;
*++last = '\0';
}
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), str) == -1)
return -1;
if (m->type == FILE_PSTRING)
t += file_pstring_length_size(m);
}
break;
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_MEDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->l, FILE_T_LOCAL, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case FILE_LDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->l, 0, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->q, FILE_T_LOCAL, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->q, 0, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case FILE_QWDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->q, FILE_T_WINDOWS, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case FILE_FLOAT:
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
vf = p->f;
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%g", vf);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%g"), vf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(float);
break;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
vd = p->d;
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%g", vd);
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%g"), vd) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(double);
break;
case FILE_REGEX: {
char *cp;
int rval;
cp = strndup((const char *)ms->search.s, ms->search.rm_len);
if (cp == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, ms->search.rm_len);
return -1;
}
rval = file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), cp);
free(cp);
if (rval == -1)
return -1;
if ((m->str_flags & REGEX_OFFSET_START))
t = ms->search.offset;
else
t = ms->search.offset + ms->search.rm_len;
break;
}
case FILE_SEARCH:
if (file_printf(ms, F(ms, m, "%s"), m->value.s) == -1)
return -1;
if ((m->str_flags & REGEX_OFFSET_START))
t = ms->search.offset;
else
t = ms->search.offset + m->vallen;
break;
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", m->desc) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset;
break;
case FILE_INDIRECT:
case FILE_USE:
case FILE_NAME:
t = ms->offset;
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid m->type (%d) in mprint()", m->type);
return -1;
}
return (int32_t)t;
}
Commit Message: * Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible.
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: record_crypto_stats(
sockaddr_u *addr,
const char *text /* text message */
)
{
l_fp now;
u_long day;
if (!stats_control)
return;
get_systime(&now);
filegen_setup(&cryptostats, now.l_ui);
day = now.l_ui / 86400 + MJD_1900;
now.l_ui %= 86400;
if (cryptostats.fp != NULL) {
if (addr == NULL)
fprintf(cryptostats.fp, "%lu %s 0.0.0.0 %s\n",
day, ulfptoa(&now, 3), text);
else
fprintf(cryptostats.fp, "%lu %s %s %s\n",
day, ulfptoa(&now, 3), stoa(addr), text);
fflush(cryptostats.fp);
}
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int megasas_mgmt_compat_ioctl_fw(struct file *file, unsigned long arg)
{
struct compat_megasas_iocpacket __user *cioc =
(struct compat_megasas_iocpacket __user *)arg;
struct megasas_iocpacket __user *ioc =
compat_alloc_user_space(sizeof(struct megasas_iocpacket));
int i;
int error = 0;
compat_uptr_t ptr;
u32 local_sense_off;
u32 local_sense_len;
u32 user_sense_off;
if (clear_user(ioc, sizeof(*ioc)))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_in_user(&ioc->host_no, &cioc->host_no, sizeof(u16)) ||
copy_in_user(&ioc->sgl_off, &cioc->sgl_off, sizeof(u32)) ||
copy_in_user(&ioc->sense_off, &cioc->sense_off, sizeof(u32)) ||
copy_in_user(&ioc->sense_len, &cioc->sense_len, sizeof(u32)) ||
copy_in_user(ioc->frame.raw, cioc->frame.raw, 128) ||
copy_in_user(&ioc->sge_count, &cioc->sge_count, sizeof(u32)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* The sense_ptr is used in megasas_mgmt_fw_ioctl only when
* sense_len is not null, so prepare the 64bit value under
* the same condition.
*/
if (get_user(local_sense_off, &ioc->sense_off) ||
get_user(local_sense_len, &ioc->sense_len) ||
get_user(user_sense_off, &cioc->sense_off))
return -EFAULT;
if (local_sense_off != user_sense_off)
return -EINVAL;
if (local_sense_len) {
void __user **sense_ioc_ptr =
(void __user **)((u8 *)((unsigned long)&ioc->frame.raw) + local_sense_off);
compat_uptr_t *sense_cioc_ptr =
(compat_uptr_t *)(((unsigned long)&cioc->frame.raw) + user_sense_off);
if (get_user(ptr, sense_cioc_ptr) ||
put_user(compat_ptr(ptr), sense_ioc_ptr))
return -EFAULT;
}
for (i = 0; i < MAX_IOCTL_SGE; i++) {
if (get_user(ptr, &cioc->sgl[i].iov_base) ||
put_user(compat_ptr(ptr), &ioc->sgl[i].iov_base) ||
copy_in_user(&ioc->sgl[i].iov_len,
&cioc->sgl[i].iov_len, sizeof(compat_size_t)))
return -EFAULT;
}
error = megasas_mgmt_ioctl_fw(file, (unsigned long)ioc);
if (copy_in_user(&cioc->frame.hdr.cmd_status,
&ioc->frame.hdr.cmd_status, sizeof(u8))) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "megasas: error copy_in_user cmd_status\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: PanelSettingsMenuModel::PanelSettingsMenuModel(Panel* panel)
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(ui::SimpleMenuModel(this)),
panel_(panel) {
const Extension* extension = panel_->GetExtension();
DCHECK(extension);
AddItem(COMMAND_NAME, UTF8ToUTF16(extension->name()));
AddSeparator();
AddItem(COMMAND_CONFIGURE, l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_OPTIONS));
AddItem(COMMAND_DISABLE, l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_DISABLE));
AddItem(COMMAND_UNINSTALL,
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_SHORT_PRODUCT_NAME)));
AddSeparator();
AddItem(COMMAND_MANAGE, l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_MANAGE_EXTENSIONS));
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool SetCollectStatsInSample(bool in_sample) {
std::wstring registry_path = GetRegistryPath();
HANDLE key_handle = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
if (!nt::CreateRegKey(nt::HKCU, registry_path.c_str(),
KEY_SET_VALUE | KEY_WOW64_32KEY, &key_handle)) {
return false;
}
bool success = nt::SetRegValueDWORD(key_handle, kRegValueChromeStatsSample,
in_sample ? 1 : 0);
nt::CloseRegKey(key_handle);
return success;
}
Commit Message: Ignore switches following "--" when parsing a command line.
BUG=933004
[email protected]
Change-Id: I911be4cbfc38a4d41dec85d85f7fe0f50ddca392
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481210
Auto-Submit: Greg Thompson <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634604}
CWE ID: CWE-77
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: INST_HANDLER (lac) { // LAC Z, Rd
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4);
__generic_ld_st (op, "ram", 'z', 1, 0, 0, 0); // 0: Read (RAMPZ:Z)
ESIL_A ("r%d,0xff,^,&,", d); // 0: (Z) & ~Rd
ESIL_A ("DUP,r%d,=,", d); // Rd = [0]
__generic_ld_st (op, "ram", 'z', 1, 0, 0, 1); // Store in RAM
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: WORD32 ih264d_start_of_pic(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
WORD32 i4_poc,
pocstruct_t *ps_temp_poc,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num,
dec_pic_params_t *ps_pps)
{
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc = ps_temp_poc;
pic_buffer_t *pic_buf;
ivd_video_decode_op_t * ps_dec_output =
(ivd_video_decode_op_t *)ps_dec->pv_dec_out;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
dec_seq_params_t *ps_seq = ps_pps->ps_sps;
UWORD8 u1_bottom_field_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
/* high profile related declarations */
high_profile_tools_t s_high_profile;
WORD32 ret;
H264_MUTEX_LOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0];
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1];
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_bottom_field_flag;
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst;
ps_prev_poc->u2_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->i1_prev_mb_qp_delta = 0;
ps_dec->i1_next_ctxt_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 0;
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores == 1)
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 1;
if(ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag == 1)
{
ps_dec->u4_nmb_deblk = 0;
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores > 2)
ps_dec->u4_num_cores = 2;
}
ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy = 0;
if (ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag == 0)
{
ps_dec->u4_use_intrapred_line_copy = 1;
}
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 0;
/* If degrade is enabled, set the degrade flags appropriately */
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type && ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics)
{
WORD32 degrade_pic;
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt++;
degrade_pic = 0;
/* If degrade is to be done in all frames, then do not check further */
switch(ps_dec->i4_degrade_pics)
{
case 4:
{
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 3:
{
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type != I_SLICE)
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 2:
{
/* If pic count hits non-degrade interval or it is an islice, then do not degrade */
if((ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type != I_SLICE)
&& (ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt
!= ps_dec->i4_nondegrade_interval))
degrade_pic = 1;
break;
}
case 1:
{
/* Check if the current picture is non-ref */
if(0 == ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
degrade_pic = 1;
}
break;
}
}
if(degrade_pic)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x2)
ps_dec->u4_app_disable_deblk_frm = 1;
/* MC degrading is done only for non-ref pictures */
if(0 == ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x4)
ps_dec->i4_mv_frac_mask = 0;
if(ps_dec->i4_degrade_type & 0x8)
ps_dec->i4_mv_frac_mask = 0;
}
}
else
ps_dec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt = 0;
}
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_dec->u1_sl_typ_5_9
&& ((ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type == I_SLICE)
|| (ps_cur_slice->u1_slice_type
== SI_SLICE)))
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_I;
else
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
if(ps_err->u1_pic_aud_i == PIC_TYPE_I)
{
ps_err->u1_cur_pic_type = PIC_TYPE_I;
ps_err->u1_pic_aud_i = PIC_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_unit_type == IDR_SLICE_NAL)
{
if(ps_err->u1_err_flag)
ih264d_reset_ref_bufs(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr);
ps_err->u1_err_flag = ACCEPT_ALL_PICS;
}
}
if(ps_dec->u1_init_dec_flag && ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending)
{
/* Reset the decoder picture buffers */
WORD32 j;
for(j = 0; j < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; j++)
{
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[j],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
/* reset the decoder structure parameters related to buffer handling */
ps_dec->u1_second_field = 0;
ps_dec->i4_cur_display_seq = 0;
/********************************************************************/
/* indicate in the decoder output i4_status that some frames are being */
/* dropped, so that it resets timestamp and wait for a new sequence */
/********************************************************************/
ps_dec->s_prev_seq_params.u1_eoseq_pending = 0;
}
ret = ih264d_init_pic(ps_dec, u2_frame_num, i4_poc, ps_pps);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->pv_parse_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_pic_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->pv_proc_tu_coeff_data = ps_dec->pv_pic_tu_coeff_data;
ps_dec->ps_nmb_info = ps_dec->ps_frm_mb_info;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
UWORD16 pic_wd = ps_dec->u4_width_at_init;
UWORD16 pic_ht = ps_dec->u4_height_at_init;
UWORD32 num_mbs;
if((NULL != ps_dec->ps_cur_sps) && (1 == (ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_is_valid)))
{
pic_wd = ps_dec->u2_pic_wd;
pic_ht = ps_dec->u2_pic_ht;
}
num_mbs = (pic_wd * pic_ht) >> 8;
if(ps_dec->pu1_dec_mb_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu1_dec_mb_map, 0, num_mbs);
}
if(ps_dec->pu1_recon_mb_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu1_recon_mb_map, 0, num_mbs);
}
if(ps_dec->pu2_slice_num_map)
{
memset((void *)ps_dec->pu2_slice_num_map, 0,
(num_mbs * sizeof(UWORD16)));
}
}
ps_dec->ps_parse_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->ps_decode_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->ps_computebs_cur_slice = &(ps_dec->ps_dec_slice_buf[0]);
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num = 0;
/* Initialize all the HP toolsets to zero */
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_scaling_present = 0;
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_transform8x8_present = 0;
/* Get Next Free Picture */
if(1 == ps_dec->u4_share_disp_buf)
{
UWORD32 i;
/* Free any buffer that is in the queue to be freed */
for(i = 0; i < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; i++)
{
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i])
continue;
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr, i,
BUF_MGR_IO);
ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_to_be_freed[i] = 0;
ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[i] = 0;
}
}
if(!(u1_field_pic_flag && 0 != ps_dec->u1_top_bottom_decoded)) //ps_dec->u1_second_field))
{
pic_buffer_t *ps_cur_pic;
WORD32 cur_pic_buf_id, cur_mv_buf_id;
col_mv_buf_t *ps_col_mv;
while(1)
{
ps_cur_pic = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
&cur_pic_buf_id);
if(ps_cur_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
}
if(0 == ps_dec->u4_disp_buf_mapping[cur_pic_buf_id])
{
break;
}
}
ps_col_mv = (col_mv_buf_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
&cur_mv_buf_id);
if(ps_col_mv == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_cur_pic;
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id = cur_pic_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_ts;
ps_cur_pic->u1_mv_buf_id = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->pu1_col_zero_flag = (UWORD8 *)ps_col_mv->pv_col_zero_flag;
ps_cur_pic->ps_mv = (mv_pred_t *)ps_col_mv->pv_mv;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[cur_pic_buf_id] = 0;
if(ps_dec->u1_first_slice_in_stream)
{
/*make first entry of list0 point to cur pic,so that if first Islice is in error, ref pic struct will have valid entries*/
ps_dec->ps_ref_pic_buf_lx[0] = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0];
*(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][0]) = *ps_cur_pic;
/* Initialize for field reference as well */
*(ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[0][MAX_REF_BUFS]) = *ps_cur_pic;
}
if(!ps_dec->ps_cur_pic)
{
WORD32 j;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("------- Display Buffers Reset --------\n");
for(j = 0; j < MAX_DISP_BUFS_NEW; j++)
{
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[j],
BUF_MGR_REF);
ih264_buf_mgr_release((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
j,
BUF_MGR_IO);
}
ps_dec->i4_cur_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->i4_prev_max_display_seq = 0;
ps_dec->i4_max_poc = 0;
ps_cur_pic = (pic_buffer_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free(
(buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_pic_buf_mgr,
&cur_pic_buf_id);
if(ps_cur_pic == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_PICBUF_T;
}
ps_col_mv = (col_mv_buf_t *)ih264_buf_mgr_get_next_free((buf_mgr_t *)ps_dec->pv_mv_buf_mgr,
&cur_mv_buf_id);
if(ps_col_mv == NULL)
{
ps_dec->i4_error_code = ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
return ERROR_UNAVAIL_MVBUF_T;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic = ps_cur_pic;
ps_dec->u1_pic_buf_id = cur_pic_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->u4_ts = ps_dec->u4_ts;
ps_dec->apv_buf_id_pic_buf_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = (void *)ps_cur_pic;
ps_cur_pic->u1_mv_buf_id = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_id_mv_buf_id_map[cur_pic_buf_id] = cur_mv_buf_id;
ps_cur_pic->pu1_col_zero_flag = (UWORD8 *)ps_col_mv->pv_col_zero_flag;
ps_cur_pic->ps_mv = (mv_pred_t *)ps_col_mv->pv_mv;
ps_dec->au1_pic_buf_ref_flag[cur_pic_buf_id] = 0;
}
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype = u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_pack_slc_typ = SKIP_NONE;
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("got a buffer\n");
}
else
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("did not get a buffer\n");
}
ps_dec->u4_pic_buf_got = 1;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_poc = i4_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_frame_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_pic_num = u2_frame_num;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt = ps_pps->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt =
ps_pps->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = ps_pps->i4_avg_poc;
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u4_time_stamp = ps_dec->u4_pts;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic = *(ps_dec->ps_cur_pic);
if(u1_field_pic_flag && u1_bottom_field_flag)
{
WORD32 i4_temp_poc;
WORD32 i4_top_field_order_poc, i4_bot_field_order_poc;
/* Point to odd lines, since it's bottom field */
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_y;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3 += ps_dec->s_cur_pic.u2_frm_wd_uv;
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv +=
((ps_dec->u2_pic_ht * ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 5);
ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_col_zero_flag += ((ps_dec->u2_pic_ht
* ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 5);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype |= BOT_FLD;
i4_top_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_top_field_order_cnt;
i4_bot_field_order_poc = ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_bottom_field_order_cnt;
i4_temp_poc = MIN(i4_top_field_order_poc,
i4_bot_field_order_poc);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->i4_avg_poc = i4_temp_poc;
}
ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag = ps_seq->u1_mb_aff_flag
&& (!u1_field_pic_flag);
ps_dec->ps_cur_pic->u1_picturetype |= (ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag
<< 2);
ps_dec->ps_cur_mb_row = ps_dec->ps_nbr_mb_row; //[0];
ps_dec->ps_cur_mb_row++; //Increment by 1 ,so that left mb will always be valid
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row =
ps_dec->ps_nbr_mb_row
+ ((ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs + 1)
<< (1
- ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_frame_mbs_only_flag));
ps_dec->ps_top_mb_row++; //Increment by 1 ,so that left mb will always be valid
ps_dec->pu1_y = ps_dec->pu1_y_scratch[0];
ps_dec->pu1_u = ps_dec->pu1_u_scratch[0];
ps_dec->pu1_v = ps_dec->pu1_v_scratch[0];
ps_dec->u1_yuv_scratch_idx = 0;
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->ps_mv_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->ps_mv_top = ps_dec->ps_mv_top_p[0];
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->u1_mv_top_p = 0;
ps_dec->u1_mb_idx = 0;
/* CHANGED CODE */
ps_dec->ps_mv_left = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->pu1_yleft = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_uleft = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_vleft = 0;
ps_dec->u1_not_wait_rec = 2;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
ps_dec->i4_submb_ofst = -(SUB_BLK_SIZE);
ps_dec->u4_pred_info_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_pred_info_pkd_idx = 0;
ps_dec->u4_dma_buf_idx = 0;
ps_dec->ps_mv = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->ps_mv_bank_cur = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.ps_mv;
ps_dec->pu1_col_zero_flag = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_col_zero_flag;
ps_dec->ps_part = ps_dec->ps_parse_part_params;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mbx = -1;
ps_dec->i2_prev_slice_mby = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[0] = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[1] = 0;
ps_dec->u1_last_pic_not_decoded = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num_dec_thread = 0;
ps_dec->u2_cur_slice_num_bs = 0;
ps_dec->u4_intra_pred_line_ofst = 0;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_y_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_u_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_v_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_y_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_u_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_cur_v_intra_pred_line_base = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line;
ps_dec->pu1_prev_y_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_y_intra_pred_line
+ (ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * MB_SIZE);
ps_dec->pu1_prev_u_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_u_intra_pred_line
+ ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * BLK8x8SIZE * YUV420SP_FACTOR;
ps_dec->pu1_prev_v_intra_pred_line = ps_dec->pu1_v_intra_pred_line
+ ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs * BLK8x8SIZE;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn_curr = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn;
ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn_prev = ps_dec->ps_deblk_mbn + ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp;
/* Initialize The Function Pointer Depending Upon the Entropy and MbAff Flag */
{
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs = ih264d_compute_bs_mbaff;
ps_dec->pf_mvpred = ih264d_mvpred_mbaff;
}
else
{
ps_dec->pf_compute_bs = ih264d_compute_bs_non_mbaff;
ps_dec->u1_cur_mb_fld_dec_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
}
}
/* Set up the Parameter for DMA transfer */
{
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
UWORD8 u1_mbaff = ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag;
UWORD8 uc_lastmbs = (((ps_dec->u2_pic_wd) >> 4)
% (ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp >> u1_mbaff));
UWORD16 ui16_lastmbs_widthY =
(uc_lastmbs ? (uc_lastmbs << 4) : ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) << 4));
UWORD16 ui16_lastmbs_widthUV =
uc_lastmbs ? (uc_lastmbs << 3) : ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) << 3);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_y = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf1;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_u = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf2;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.pu1_dest_v = ps_dec->s_cur_pic.pu1_buf3;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_y = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y
<< u1_field_pic_flag;
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_uv = ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv
<< u1_field_pic_flag;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
ui16_lastmbs_widthY += ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_y;
ui16_lastmbs_widthUV += ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_uv;
}
/* Normal Increment of Pointer */
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_y[0] = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp << 4)
>> u1_mbaff);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_uv[0] = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp << 4)
>> u1_mbaff);
/* End of Row Increment */
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_y[1] = (ui16_lastmbs_widthY
+ (PAD_LEN_Y_H << 1)
+ ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_y
* ((15 << u1_mbaff) + u1_mbaff));
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u4_inc_uv[1] = (ui16_lastmbs_widthUV
+ (PAD_LEN_UV_H << 2)
+ ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_frm_wd_uv
* ((15 << u1_mbaff) + u1_mbaff));
/* Assign picture numbers to each frame/field */
/* only once per picture. */
ih264d_assign_pic_num(ps_dec);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_mv_top_left_inc = (ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
<< 2) - 1 - (u1_mbaff << 2);
ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon.u2_mv_left_inc = ((ps_dec->u1_recon_mb_grp
>> u1_mbaff) - 1) << (4 + u1_mbaff);
}
/**********************************************************************/
/* High profile related initialization at pictrue level */
/**********************************************************************/
if(ps_seq->u1_profile_idc == HIGH_PROFILE_IDC)
{
if((ps_seq->i4_seq_scaling_matrix_present_flag)
|| (ps_pps->i4_pic_scaling_matrix_present_flag))
{
ih264d_form_scaling_matrix_picture(ps_seq, ps_pps, ps_dec);
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_scaling_present = 1;
}
else
{
ih264d_form_default_scaling_matrix(ps_dec);
}
if(ps_pps->i4_transform_8x8_mode_flag)
{
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_transform8x8_present = 1;
}
}
else
{
ih264d_form_default_scaling_matrix(ps_dec);
}
/* required while reading the transform_size_8x8 u4_flag */
ps_dec->s_high_profile.u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag =
ps_seq->u1_direct_8x8_inference_flag;
ps_dec->s_high_profile.s_cavlc_ctxt = ps_dec->s_cavlc_ctxt;
ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag = 1;
ps_dec->ps_frame_buf_ip_recon = &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon;
if(ps_dec->u1_separate_parse)
{
memcpy(&ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon_parse, &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon,
sizeof(tfr_ctxt_t));
if(ps_dec->u4_num_cores >= 3 && ps_dec->i1_recon_in_thread3_flag)
{
memcpy(&ps_dec->s_tran_iprecon, &ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon,
sizeof(tfr_ctxt_t));
ps_dec->ps_frame_buf_ip_recon = &ps_dec->s_tran_iprecon;
}
}
ih264d_init_deblk_tfr_ctxt(ps_dec,&(ps_dec->s_pad_mgr), &(ps_dec->s_tran_addrecon),
ps_dec->u2_frm_wd_in_mbs, 0);
ps_dec->ps_cur_deblk_mb = ps_dec->ps_deblk_pic;
ps_dec->u4_cur_deblk_mb_num = 0;
ps_dec->u4_deblk_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u4_deblk_mb_y = 0;
ps_dec->pu4_wt_ofsts = ps_dec->pu4_wts_ofsts_mat;
H264_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Initialize default reference buffers for all pictures
Reference buffer is now initialized to default value for
each pic before decoding the first slice in the pic
Bug: 34097866
Change-Id: Id64b123af2188217ce833f11db0e6c0681d41dfd
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE5(get_mempolicy, int __user *, policy,
unsigned long __user *, nmask, unsigned long, maxnode,
unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, flags)
{
int err;
int uninitialized_var(pval);
nodemask_t nodes;
if (nmask != NULL && maxnode < MAX_NUMNODES)
return -EINVAL;
err = do_get_mempolicy(&pval, &nodes, addr, flags);
if (err)
return err;
if (policy && put_user(pval, policy))
return -EFAULT;
if (nmask)
err = copy_nodes_to_user(nmask, maxnode, &nodes);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int test(char *URL)
{
int errors = 0;
(void)URL; /* not used */
errors += test_weird_arguments();
errors += test_unsigned_short_formatting();
errors += test_signed_short_formatting();
errors += test_unsigned_int_formatting();
errors += test_signed_int_formatting();
errors += test_unsigned_long_formatting();
errors += test_signed_long_formatting();
errors += test_curl_off_t_formatting();
errors += test_string_formatting();
if(errors)
return TEST_ERR_MAJOR_BAD;
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: printf: fix floating point buffer overflow issues
... and add a bunch of floating point printf tests
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: freeimage(Image *image)
{
freebuffer(image);
png_image_free(&image->image);
if (image->input_file != NULL)
{
fclose(image->input_file);
image->input_file = NULL;
}
if (image->input_memory != NULL)
{
free(image->input_memory);
image->input_memory = NULL;
image->input_memory_size = 0;
}
if (image->tmpfile_name[0] != 0 && (image->opts & KEEP_TMPFILES) == 0)
{
remove(image->tmpfile_name);
image->tmpfile_name[0] = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: PHP_METHOD(snmp, close)
{
php_snmp_object *snmp_object;
zval *object = getThis();
snmp_object = Z_SNMP_P(object);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
netsnmp_session_free(&(snmp_object->session));
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int generic_access_phys(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
void *buf, int len, int write)
{
resource_size_t phys_addr;
unsigned long prot = 0;
void __iomem *maddr;
int offset = addr & (PAGE_SIZE-1);
if (follow_phys(vma, addr, write, &prot, &phys_addr))
return -EINVAL;
maddr = ioremap_prot(phys_addr, PAGE_ALIGN(len + offset), prot);
if (write)
memcpy_toio(maddr + offset, buf, len);
else
memcpy_fromio(buf, maddr + offset, len);
iounmap(maddr);
return len;
}
Commit Message: mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: image_transform_mod_end(PNG_CONST image_transform *this, image_pixel *that,
png_const_structp pp, PNG_CONST transform_display *display)
{
PNG_CONST unsigned int scale = (1U<<that->sample_depth)-1;
UNUSED(this)
UNUSED(pp)
UNUSED(display)
/* At the end recalculate the digitized red green and blue values according
* to the current sample_depth of the pixel.
*
* The sample value is simply scaled to the maximum, checking for over
* and underflow (which can both happen for some image transforms,
* including simple size scaling, though libpng doesn't do that at present.
*/
that->red = sample_scale(that->redf, scale);
/* The error value is increased, at the end, according to the lowest sBIT
* value seen. Common sense tells us that the intermediate integer
* representations are no more accurate than +/- 0.5 in the integral values,
* the sBIT allows the implementation to be worse than this. In addition the
* PNG specification actually permits any error within the range (-1..+1),
* but that is ignored here. Instead the final digitized value is compared,
* below to the digitized value of the error limits - this has the net effect
* of allowing (almost) +/-1 in the output value. It's difficult to see how
* any algorithm that digitizes intermediate results can be more accurate.
*/
that->rede += 1./(2*((1U<<that->red_sBIT)-1));
if (that->colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR)
{
that->green = sample_scale(that->greenf, scale);
that->blue = sample_scale(that->bluef, scale);
that->greene += 1./(2*((1U<<that->green_sBIT)-1));
that->bluee += 1./(2*((1U<<that->blue_sBIT)-1));
}
else
{
that->blue = that->green = that->red;
that->bluef = that->greenf = that->redf;
that->bluee = that->greene = that->rede;
}
if ((that->colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) ||
that->colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
that->alpha = sample_scale(that->alphaf, scale);
that->alphae += 1./(2*((1U<<that->alpha_sBIT)-1));
}
else
{
that->alpha = scale; /* opaque */
that->alpha = 1; /* Override this. */
that->alphae = 0; /* It's exact ;-) */
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static inline void cm_deref_id(struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&cm_id_priv->refcount))
complete(&cm_id_priv->comp);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void SVGStyleElement::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument() {
if (StyleElement::ProcessStyleSheet(GetDocument(), *this) ==
StyleElement::kProcessingFatalError)
NotifyLoadedSheetAndAllCriticalSubresources(
kErrorOccurredLoadingSubresource);
}
Commit Message: Do not crash while reentrantly appending to style element.
When a node is inserted into a container, it is notified via
::InsertedInto. However, a node may request a second notification via
DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, which occurs after all the children
have been notified as well. *StyleElement is currently using this
second notification.
This causes a problem, because *ScriptElement is using the same mechanism,
which in turn means that scripts can execute before the state of
*StyleElements are properly updated.
This patch avoids ::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument, and instead
processes the stylesheet in ::InsertedInto. The original reason for using
::DidNotifySubtreeInsertionsToDocument in the first place appears to be
invalid now, as the test case is still passing.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 853709, 847570
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel
Change-Id: Ic0b5fa611044c78c5745cf26870a747f88920a14
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1104347
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568368}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: tPacketIndicationType ParaNdis_PrepareReceivedPacket(
PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext,
pRxNetDescriptor pBuffersDesc,
PUINT pnCoalescedSegmentsCount)
{
PMDL pMDL = pBuffersDesc->Holder;
PNET_BUFFER_LIST pNBL = NULL;
*pnCoalescedSegmentsCount = 1;
if (pMDL)
{
ULONG nBytesStripped = 0;
PNET_PACKET_INFO pPacketInfo = &pBuffersDesc->PacketInfo;
if (pContext->ulPriorityVlanSetting && pPacketInfo->hasVlanHeader)
{
nBytesStripped = ParaNdis_StripVlanHeaderMoveHead(pPacketInfo);
}
ParaNdis_PadPacketToMinimalLength(pPacketInfo);
ParaNdis_AdjustRxBufferHolderLength(pBuffersDesc, nBytesStripped);
pNBL = NdisAllocateNetBufferAndNetBufferList(pContext->BufferListsPool, 0, 0, pMDL, nBytesStripped, pPacketInfo->dataLength);
if (pNBL)
{
virtio_net_hdr_basic *pHeader = (virtio_net_hdr_basic *) pBuffersDesc->PhysicalPages[0].Virtual;
tChecksumCheckResult csRes;
pNBL->SourceHandle = pContext->MiniportHandle;
NBLSetRSSInfo(pContext, pNBL, pPacketInfo);
NBLSet8021QInfo(pContext, pNBL, pPacketInfo);
pNBL->MiniportReserved[0] = pBuffersDesc;
#if PARANDIS_SUPPORT_RSC
if(pHeader->gso_type != VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE)
{
*pnCoalescedSegmentsCount = PktGetTCPCoalescedSegmentsCount(pPacketInfo, pContext->MaxPacketSize.nMaxDataSize);
NBLSetRSCInfo(pContext, pNBL, pPacketInfo, *pnCoalescedSegmentsCount);
}
else
#endif
{
csRes = ParaNdis_CheckRxChecksum(
pContext,
pHeader->flags,
&pBuffersDesc->PhysicalPages[PARANDIS_FIRST_RX_DATA_PAGE],
pPacketInfo->dataLength,
nBytesStripped);
if (csRes.value)
{
NDIS_TCP_IP_CHECKSUM_NET_BUFFER_LIST_INFO qCSInfo;
qCSInfo.Value = NULL;
qCSInfo.Receive.IpChecksumFailed = csRes.flags.IpFailed;
qCSInfo.Receive.IpChecksumSucceeded = csRes.flags.IpOK;
qCSInfo.Receive.TcpChecksumFailed = csRes.flags.TcpFailed;
qCSInfo.Receive.TcpChecksumSucceeded = csRes.flags.TcpOK;
qCSInfo.Receive.UdpChecksumFailed = csRes.flags.UdpFailed;
qCSInfo.Receive.UdpChecksumSucceeded = csRes.flags.UdpOK;
NET_BUFFER_LIST_INFO(pNBL, TcpIpChecksumNetBufferListInfo) = qCSInfo.Value;
DPrintf(1, ("Reporting CS %X->%X\n", csRes.value, (ULONG)(ULONG_PTR)qCSInfo.Value));
}
}
pNBL->Status = NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
#if defined(ENABLE_HISTORY_LOG)
{
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult packetReview = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(
RtlOffsetToPointer(pPacketInfo->headersBuffer, ETH_HEADER_SIZE),
pPacketInfo->dataLength,
pcrIpChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrUdpChecksum,
__FUNCTION__
);
ParaNdis_DebugHistory(pContext, hopPacketReceived, pNBL, pPacketInfo->dataLength, (ULONG)(ULONG_PTR)qInfo.Value, packetReview.value);
}
#endif
}
}
return pNBL;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: evutil_fast_socket_closeonexec(evutil_socket_t fd)
{
#if !defined(_WIN32) && defined(EVENT__HAVE_SETFD)
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) {
event_warn("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", fd);
return -1;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: IntRect FrameView::convertToRenderer(const RenderObject& renderer, const IntRect& viewRect) const
{
IntRect rect = viewRect;
rect.moveBy(scrollPosition());
rect.setLocation(roundedIntPoint(renderer.absoluteToLocal(rect.location(), UseTransforms)));
return rect;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int add_push_report_sideband_pkt(git_push *push, git_pkt_data *data_pkt, git_buf *data_pkt_buf)
{
git_pkt *pkt;
const char *line, *line_end;
size_t line_len;
int error;
int reading_from_buf = data_pkt_buf->size > 0;
if (reading_from_buf) {
/* We had an existing partial packet, so add the new
* packet to the buffer and parse the whole thing */
git_buf_put(data_pkt_buf, data_pkt->data, data_pkt->len);
line = data_pkt_buf->ptr;
line_len = data_pkt_buf->size;
}
else {
line = data_pkt->data;
line_len = data_pkt->len;
}
while (line_len > 0) {
error = git_pkt_parse_line(&pkt, line, &line_end, line_len);
if (error == GIT_EBUFS) {
/* Buffer the data when the inner packet is split
* across multiple sideband packets */
if (!reading_from_buf)
git_buf_put(data_pkt_buf, line, line_len);
error = 0;
goto done;
}
else if (error < 0)
goto done;
/* Advance in the buffer */
line_len -= (line_end - line);
line = line_end;
/* When a valid packet with no content has been
* read, git_pkt_parse_line does not report an
* error, but the pkt pointer has not been set.
* Handle this by skipping over empty packets.
*/
if (pkt == NULL)
continue;
error = add_push_report_pkt(push, pkt);
git_pkt_free(pkt);
if (error < 0 && error != GIT_ITEROVER)
goto done;
}
error = 0;
done:
if (reading_from_buf)
git_buf_consume(data_pkt_buf, line_end);
return error;
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int loop_set_dio(struct loop_device *lo, unsigned long arg)
{
int error = -ENXIO;
if (lo->lo_state != Lo_bound)
goto out;
__loop_update_dio(lo, !!arg);
if (lo->use_dio == !!arg)
return 0;
error = -EINVAL;
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void HTMLFrameOwnerElement::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(content_frame_);
visitor->Trace(embedded_content_view_);
HTMLElement::Trace(visitor);
FrameOwner::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
CWE ID: CWE-601
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static void CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(
const TransportDIB::Handle& handle_in,
TransportDIB::Handle* handle_out) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if ((handle_out->fd = HANDLE_EINTR(dup(handle_in.fd))) < 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "dup()";
return;
}
handle_out->auto_close = true;
#else
*handle_out = handle_in;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static inline void svm_inject_irq(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int irq)
{
struct vmcb_control_area *control;
control = &svm->vmcb->control;
control->int_vector = irq;
control->int_ctl &= ~V_INTR_PRIO_MASK;
control->int_ctl |= V_IRQ_MASK |
((/*control->int_vector >> 4*/ 0xf) << V_INTR_PRIO_SHIFT);
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTR);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void webkit_web_view_update_settings(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
WebKitWebViewPrivate* priv = webView->priv;
WebKitWebSettings* webSettings = priv->webSettings.get();
Settings* settings = core(webView)->settings();
gchar* defaultEncoding, *cursiveFontFamily, *defaultFontFamily, *fantasyFontFamily, *monospaceFontFamily, *sansSerifFontFamily, *serifFontFamily, *userStylesheetUri, *defaultSpellCheckingLanguages;
gboolean autoLoadImages, autoShrinkImages, printBackgrounds,
enableScripts, enablePlugins, enableDeveloperExtras, resizableTextAreas,
enablePrivateBrowsing, enableCaretBrowsing, enableHTML5Database, enableHTML5LocalStorage,
enableXSSAuditor, enableSpatialNavigation, enableFrameFlattening, javascriptCanOpenWindows,
javaScriptCanAccessClipboard, enableOfflineWebAppCache,
enableUniversalAccessFromFileURI, enableFileAccessFromFileURI,
enableDOMPaste, tabKeyCyclesThroughElements, enableWebGL,
enableSiteSpecificQuirks, usePageCache, enableJavaApplet,
enableHyperlinkAuditing, enableFullscreen, enableDNSPrefetching;
WebKitEditingBehavior editingBehavior;
g_object_get(webSettings,
"default-encoding", &defaultEncoding,
"cursive-font-family", &cursiveFontFamily,
"default-font-family", &defaultFontFamily,
"fantasy-font-family", &fantasyFontFamily,
"monospace-font-family", &monospaceFontFamily,
"sans-serif-font-family", &sansSerifFontFamily,
"serif-font-family", &serifFontFamily,
"auto-load-images", &autoLoadImages,
"auto-shrink-images", &autoShrinkImages,
"print-backgrounds", &printBackgrounds,
"enable-scripts", &enableScripts,
"enable-plugins", &enablePlugins,
"resizable-text-areas", &resizableTextAreas,
"user-stylesheet-uri", &userStylesheetUri,
"enable-developer-extras", &enableDeveloperExtras,
"enable-private-browsing", &enablePrivateBrowsing,
"enable-caret-browsing", &enableCaretBrowsing,
"enable-html5-database", &enableHTML5Database,
"enable-html5-local-storage", &enableHTML5LocalStorage,
"enable-xss-auditor", &enableXSSAuditor,
"enable-spatial-navigation", &enableSpatialNavigation,
"enable-frame-flattening", &enableFrameFlattening,
"javascript-can-open-windows-automatically", &javascriptCanOpenWindows,
"javascript-can-access-clipboard", &javaScriptCanAccessClipboard,
"enable-offline-web-application-cache", &enableOfflineWebAppCache,
"editing-behavior", &editingBehavior,
"enable-universal-access-from-file-uris", &enableUniversalAccessFromFileURI,
"enable-file-access-from-file-uris", &enableFileAccessFromFileURI,
"enable-dom-paste", &enableDOMPaste,
"tab-key-cycles-through-elements", &tabKeyCyclesThroughElements,
"enable-site-specific-quirks", &enableSiteSpecificQuirks,
"enable-page-cache", &usePageCache,
"enable-java-applet", &enableJavaApplet,
"enable-hyperlink-auditing", &enableHyperlinkAuditing,
"spell-checking-languages", &defaultSpellCheckingLanguages,
"enable-fullscreen", &enableFullscreen,
"enable-dns-prefetching", &enableDNSPrefetching,
"enable-webgl", &enableWebGL,
NULL);
settings->setDefaultTextEncodingName(defaultEncoding);
settings->setCursiveFontFamily(cursiveFontFamily);
settings->setStandardFontFamily(defaultFontFamily);
settings->setFantasyFontFamily(fantasyFontFamily);
settings->setFixedFontFamily(monospaceFontFamily);
settings->setSansSerifFontFamily(sansSerifFontFamily);
settings->setSerifFontFamily(serifFontFamily);
settings->setLoadsImagesAutomatically(autoLoadImages);
settings->setShrinksStandaloneImagesToFit(autoShrinkImages);
settings->setShouldPrintBackgrounds(printBackgrounds);
settings->setJavaScriptEnabled(enableScripts);
settings->setPluginsEnabled(enablePlugins);
settings->setTextAreasAreResizable(resizableTextAreas);
settings->setUserStyleSheetLocation(KURL(KURL(), userStylesheetUri));
settings->setDeveloperExtrasEnabled(enableDeveloperExtras);
settings->setPrivateBrowsingEnabled(enablePrivateBrowsing);
settings->setCaretBrowsingEnabled(enableCaretBrowsing);
#if ENABLE(DATABASE)
AbstractDatabase::setIsAvailable(enableHTML5Database);
#endif
settings->setLocalStorageEnabled(enableHTML5LocalStorage);
settings->setXSSAuditorEnabled(enableXSSAuditor);
settings->setSpatialNavigationEnabled(enableSpatialNavigation);
settings->setFrameFlatteningEnabled(enableFrameFlattening);
settings->setJavaScriptCanOpenWindowsAutomatically(javascriptCanOpenWindows);
settings->setJavaScriptCanAccessClipboard(javaScriptCanAccessClipboard);
settings->setOfflineWebApplicationCacheEnabled(enableOfflineWebAppCache);
settings->setEditingBehaviorType(static_cast<WebCore::EditingBehaviorType>(editingBehavior));
settings->setAllowUniversalAccessFromFileURLs(enableUniversalAccessFromFileURI);
settings->setAllowFileAccessFromFileURLs(enableFileAccessFromFileURI);
settings->setDOMPasteAllowed(enableDOMPaste);
settings->setNeedsSiteSpecificQuirks(enableSiteSpecificQuirks);
settings->setUsesPageCache(usePageCache);
settings->setJavaEnabled(enableJavaApplet);
settings->setHyperlinkAuditingEnabled(enableHyperlinkAuditing);
settings->setDNSPrefetchingEnabled(enableDNSPrefetching);
#if ENABLE(FULLSCREEN_API)
settings->setFullScreenEnabled(enableFullscreen);
#endif
#if ENABLE(SPELLCHECK)
WebKit::EditorClient* client = static_cast<WebKit::EditorClient*>(core(webView)->editorClient());
static_cast<WebKit::TextCheckerClientEnchant*>(client->textChecker())->updateSpellCheckingLanguage(defaultSpellCheckingLanguages);
#endif
#if ENABLE(WEBGL)
settings->setWebGLEnabled(enableWebGL);
#endif
Page* page = core(webView);
if (page)
page->setTabKeyCyclesThroughElements(tabKeyCyclesThroughElements);
g_free(defaultEncoding);
g_free(cursiveFontFamily);
g_free(defaultFontFamily);
g_free(fantasyFontFamily);
g_free(monospaceFontFamily);
g_free(sansSerifFontFamily);
g_free(serifFontFamily);
g_free(userStylesheetUri);
webkit_web_view_screen_changed(GTK_WIDGET(webView), NULL);
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: gimp_write_and_read_file (Gimp *gimp,
gboolean with_unusual_stuff,
gboolean compat_paths,
gboolean use_gimp_2_8_features)
{
GimpImage *image;
GimpImage *loaded_image;
GimpPlugInProcedure *proc;
gchar *filename;
GFile *file;
/* Create the image */
image = gimp_create_mainimage (gimp,
with_unusual_stuff,
compat_paths,
use_gimp_2_8_features);
/* Assert valid state */
gimp_assert_mainimage (image,
with_unusual_stuff,
compat_paths,
use_gimp_2_8_features);
/* Write to file */
filename = g_build_filename (g_get_tmp_dir (), "gimp-test.xcf", NULL);
file = g_file_new_for_path (filename);
g_free (filename);
proc = gimp_plug_in_manager_file_procedure_find (image->gimp->plug_in_manager,
GIMP_FILE_PROCEDURE_GROUP_SAVE,
file,
NULL /*error*/);
file_save (gimp,
image,
NULL /*progress*/,
file,
proc,
GIMP_RUN_NONINTERACTIVE,
FALSE /*change_saved_state*/,
FALSE /*export_backward*/,
FALSE /*export_forward*/,
NULL /*error*/);
/* Load from file */
loaded_image = gimp_test_load_image (image->gimp, file);
/* Assert on the loaded file. If success, it means that there is no
* significant information loss when we wrote the image to a file
* and loaded it again
*/
gimp_assert_mainimage (loaded_image,
with_unusual_stuff,
compat_paths,
use_gimp_2_8_features);
g_file_delete (file, NULL, NULL);
g_object_unref (file);
}
Commit Message: Issue #1689: create unique temporary file with g_file_open_tmp().
Not sure this is really solving the issue reported, which is that
`g_get_tmp_dir()` uses environment variables (yet as g_file_open_tmp()
uses g_get_tmp_dir()…). But at least g_file_open_tmp() should create
unique temporary files, which prevents overriding existing files (which
is most likely the only real attack possible here, or at least the only
one I can think of unless some weird vulnerabilities exist in glib).
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void BackRenderbuffer::Destroy() {
if (id_ != 0) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor("BackRenderbuffer::Destroy",
state_->GetErrorState());
glDeleteRenderbuffersEXT(1, &id_);
id_ = 0;
}
memory_tracker_.TrackMemFree(bytes_allocated_);
bytes_allocated_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: TestOpenCallback()
: callback_(
base::Bind(&TestOpenCallback::SetResult, base::Unretained(this))) {}
Commit Message: Update helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest for OnceCallback
Helper classes in usb_device_handle_unittest.cc don't fit to OnceCallback
migration, as they are copied and passed to others.
This CL updates them to pass new callbacks for each use to avoid the
copy of callbacks.
Bug: 714018
Change-Id: Ifb70901439ae92b6b049b84534283c39ebc40ee0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/527549
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478549}
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAAC2::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch ((int)index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.aac",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (aacParams->eAACStreamFormat == OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF) {
mIsADTS = false;
} else if (aacParams->eAACStreamFormat
== OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4ADTS) {
mIsADTS = true;
} else {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidAacPresentation:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_AACPRESENTATIONTYPE *aacPresParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_AACPRESENTATIONTYPE *)params;
if (aacPresParams->nMaxOutputChannels >= 0) {
int max;
if (aacPresParams->nMaxOutputChannels >= 8) { max = 8; }
else if (aacPresParams->nMaxOutputChannels >= 6) { max = 6; }
else if (aacPresParams->nMaxOutputChannels >= 2) { max = 2; }
else {
max = aacPresParams->nMaxOutputChannels;
}
ALOGV("set nMaxOutputChannels=%d", max);
aacDecoder_SetParam(mAACDecoder, AAC_PCM_MAX_OUTPUT_CHANNELS, max);
}
bool updateDrcWrapper = false;
if (aacPresParams->nDrcBoost >= 0) {
ALOGV("set nDrcBoost=%d", aacPresParams->nDrcBoost);
mDrcWrap.setParam(DRC_PRES_MODE_WRAP_DESIRED_BOOST_FACTOR,
aacPresParams->nDrcBoost);
updateDrcWrapper = true;
}
if (aacPresParams->nDrcCut >= 0) {
ALOGV("set nDrcCut=%d", aacPresParams->nDrcCut);
mDrcWrap.setParam(DRC_PRES_MODE_WRAP_DESIRED_ATT_FACTOR, aacPresParams->nDrcCut);
updateDrcWrapper = true;
}
if (aacPresParams->nHeavyCompression >= 0) {
ALOGV("set nHeavyCompression=%d", aacPresParams->nHeavyCompression);
mDrcWrap.setParam(DRC_PRES_MODE_WRAP_DESIRED_HEAVY,
aacPresParams->nHeavyCompression);
updateDrcWrapper = true;
}
if (aacPresParams->nTargetReferenceLevel >= 0) {
ALOGV("set nTargetReferenceLevel=%d", aacPresParams->nTargetReferenceLevel);
mDrcWrap.setParam(DRC_PRES_MODE_WRAP_DESIRED_TARGET,
aacPresParams->nTargetReferenceLevel);
updateDrcWrapper = true;
}
if (aacPresParams->nEncodedTargetLevel >= 0) {
ALOGV("set nEncodedTargetLevel=%d", aacPresParams->nEncodedTargetLevel);
mDrcWrap.setParam(DRC_PRES_MODE_WRAP_ENCODER_TARGET,
aacPresParams->nEncodedTargetLevel);
updateDrcWrapper = true;
}
if (aacPresParams->nPCMLimiterEnable >= 0) {
aacDecoder_SetParam(mAACDecoder, AAC_PCM_LIMITER_ENABLE,
(aacPresParams->nPCMLimiterEnable != 0));
}
if (updateDrcWrapper) {
mDrcWrap.update();
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int airspy_g_frequency(struct file *file, void *priv,
struct v4l2_frequency *f)
{
struct airspy *s = video_drvdata(file);
int ret;
if (f->tuner == 0) {
f->type = V4L2_TUNER_ADC;
f->frequency = s->f_adc;
dev_dbg(s->dev, "ADC frequency=%u Hz\n", s->f_adc);
ret = 0;
} else if (f->tuner == 1) {
f->type = V4L2_TUNER_RF;
f->frequency = s->f_rf;
dev_dbg(s->dev, "RF frequency=%u Hz\n", s->f_rf);
ret = 0;
} else {
ret = -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: media: fix airspy usb probe error path
Fix a memory leak on probe error of the airspy usb device driver.
The problem is triggered when more than 64 usb devices register with
v4l2 of type VFL_TYPE_SDR or VFL_TYPE_SUBDEV.
The memory leak is caused by the probe function of the airspy driver
mishandeling errors and not freeing the corresponding control structures
when an error occours registering the device to v4l2 core.
A badusb device can emulate 64 of these devices, and then through
continual emulated connect/disconnect of the 65th device, cause the
kernel to run out of RAM and crash the kernel, thus causing a local DOS
vulnerability.
Fixes CVE-2016-5400
Signed-off-by: James Patrick-Evans <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] # 3.17+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestEventTarget::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestEventTarget* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestEventTarget*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestEventTarget::s_info);
TestEventTarget* impl = static_cast<TestEventTarget*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 2)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
JSValue listener = exec->argument(1);
if (!listener.isObject())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->removeEventListener(ustringToAtomicString(exec->argument(0).toString(exec)->value(exec)), JSEventListener::create(asObject(listener), castedThis, false, currentWorld(exec)).get(), exec->argument(2).toBoolean(exec));
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void SoftVPXEncoder::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mCodecContext == NULL) {
if (OK != initEncoder()) {
ALOGE("Failed to initialize encoder");
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
return;
}
}
vpx_codec_err_t codec_return;
List<BufferInfo *> &inputBufferInfoQueue = getPortQueue(kInputPortIndex);
List<BufferInfo *> &outputBufferInfoQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
while (!inputBufferInfoQueue.empty() && !outputBufferInfoQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inputBufferInfo = *inputBufferInfoQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inputBufferHeader = inputBufferInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outputBufferInfo = *outputBufferInfoQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outputBufferHeader = outputBufferInfo->mHeader;
if ((inputBufferHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) &&
inputBufferHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
inputBufferInfoQueue.erase(inputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
inputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inputBufferHeader);
outputBufferHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outputBufferHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outputBufferInfoQueue.erase(outputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
outputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outputBufferHeader);
return;
}
const uint8_t *source =
inputBufferHeader->pBuffer + inputBufferHeader->nOffset;
if (mInputDataIsMeta) {
source = extractGraphicBuffer(
mConversionBuffer, mWidth * mHeight * 3 / 2,
source, inputBufferHeader->nFilledLen,
mWidth, mHeight);
if (source == NULL) {
ALOGE("Unable to extract gralloc buffer in metadata mode");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, 0);
return;
}
} else if (mColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar) {
ConvertYUV420SemiPlanarToYUV420Planar(
source, mConversionBuffer, mWidth, mHeight);
source = mConversionBuffer;
}
vpx_image_t raw_frame;
vpx_img_wrap(&raw_frame, VPX_IMG_FMT_I420, mWidth, mHeight,
kInputBufferAlignment, (uint8_t *)source);
vpx_enc_frame_flags_t flags = 0;
if (mTemporalPatternLength > 0) {
flags = getEncodeFlags();
}
if (mKeyFrameRequested) {
flags |= VPX_EFLAG_FORCE_KF;
mKeyFrameRequested = false;
}
if (mBitrateUpdated) {
mCodecConfiguration->rc_target_bitrate = mBitrate/1000;
vpx_codec_err_t res = vpx_codec_enc_config_set(mCodecContext,
mCodecConfiguration);
if (res != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
ALOGE("vp8 encoder failed to update bitrate: %s",
vpx_codec_err_to_string(res));
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
}
mBitrateUpdated = false;
}
uint32_t frameDuration;
if (inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp > mLastTimestamp) {
frameDuration = (uint32_t)(inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp - mLastTimestamp);
} else {
frameDuration = (uint32_t)(((uint64_t)1000000 << 16) / mFramerate);
}
mLastTimestamp = inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp;
codec_return = vpx_codec_encode(
mCodecContext,
&raw_frame,
inputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp, // in timebase units
frameDuration, // frame duration in timebase units
flags, // frame flags
VPX_DL_REALTIME); // encoding deadline
if (codec_return != VPX_CODEC_OK) {
ALOGE("vpx encoder failed to encode frame");
notify(OMX_EventError,
OMX_ErrorUndefined,
0, // Extra notification data
NULL); // Notification data pointer
return;
}
vpx_codec_iter_t encoded_packet_iterator = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t* encoded_packet;
while ((encoded_packet = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(
mCodecContext, &encoded_packet_iterator))) {
if (encoded_packet->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
outputBufferHeader->nTimeStamp = encoded_packet->data.frame.pts;
outputBufferHeader->nFlags = 0;
if (encoded_packet->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY)
outputBufferHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_SYNCFRAME;
outputBufferHeader->nOffset = 0;
outputBufferHeader->nFilledLen = encoded_packet->data.frame.sz;
memcpy(outputBufferHeader->pBuffer,
encoded_packet->data.frame.buf,
encoded_packet->data.frame.sz);
outputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outputBufferInfoQueue.erase(outputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
if (inputBufferHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
outputBufferHeader->nFlags |= OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
}
notifyFillBufferDone(outputBufferHeader);
}
}
inputBufferInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inputBufferInfoQueue.erase(inputBufferInfoQueue.begin());
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inputBufferHeader);
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in VP8 encoder.
Bug: 27569635
Change-Id: I469573f40e21dc9f4c200749d4f220e3a2d31761
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int nft_flush(struct nft_ctx *ctx, int family)
{
struct nft_af_info *afi;
struct nft_table *table, *nt;
const struct nlattr * const *nla = ctx->nla;
int err = 0;
list_for_each_entry(afi, &ctx->net->nft.af_info, list) {
if (family != AF_UNSPEC && afi->family != family)
continue;
ctx->afi = afi;
list_for_each_entry_safe(table, nt, &afi->tables, list) {
if (nla[NFTA_TABLE_NAME] &&
nla_strcmp(nla[NFTA_TABLE_NAME], table->name) != 0)
continue;
ctx->table = table;
err = nft_flush_table(ctx);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
}
}
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: WebGLRenderingContextBase::getAttachedShaders(WebGLProgram* program) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateWebGLObject("getAttachedShaders", program))
return nullptr;
HeapVector<Member<WebGLShader>> shader_objects;
const GLenum kShaderType[] = {GL_VERTEX_SHADER, GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER};
for (unsigned i = 0; i < sizeof(kShaderType) / sizeof(GLenum); ++i) {
WebGLShader* shader = program->GetAttachedShader(kShaderType[i]);
if (shader)
shader_objects.push_back(shader);
}
return shader_objects;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool Document::SetFocusedElement(Element* new_focused_element,
const FocusParams& params) {
DCHECK(!lifecycle_.InDetach());
clear_focused_element_timer_.Stop();
if (new_focused_element && (new_focused_element->GetDocument() != this))
return true;
if (NodeChildRemovalTracker::IsBeingRemoved(new_focused_element))
return true;
if (focused_element_ == new_focused_element)
return true;
bool focus_change_blocked = false;
Element* old_focused_element = focused_element_;
focused_element_ = nullptr;
UpdateDistributionForFlatTreeTraversal();
Node* ancestor = (old_focused_element && old_focused_element->isConnected() &&
new_focused_element)
? FlatTreeTraversal::CommonAncestor(*old_focused_element,
*new_focused_element)
: nullptr;
if (old_focused_element) {
old_focused_element->SetFocused(false, params.type);
old_focused_element->SetHasFocusWithinUpToAncestor(false, ancestor);
if (GetPage() && (GetPage()->GetFocusController().IsFocused())) {
old_focused_element->DispatchBlurEvent(new_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
new_focused_element = nullptr;
}
old_focused_element->DispatchFocusOutEvent(event_type_names::kFocusout,
new_focused_element,
params.source_capabilities);
old_focused_element->DispatchFocusOutEvent(event_type_names::kDOMFocusOut,
new_focused_element,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
new_focused_element = nullptr;
}
}
}
if (new_focused_element)
UpdateStyleAndLayoutTreeForNode(new_focused_element);
if (new_focused_element && new_focused_element->IsFocusable()) {
if (IsRootEditableElement(*new_focused_element) &&
!AcceptsEditingFocus(*new_focused_element)) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
focused_element_ = new_focused_element;
SetSequentialFocusNavigationStartingPoint(focused_element_.Get());
if (params.type != kWebFocusTypeNone)
last_focus_type_ = params.type;
focused_element_->SetFocused(true, params.type);
focused_element_->SetHasFocusWithinUpToAncestor(true, ancestor);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
CancelFocusAppearanceUpdate();
EnsurePaintLocationDataValidForNode(focused_element_);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
focused_element_->UpdateFocusAppearanceWithOptions(
params.selection_behavior, params.options);
if (GetPage() && (GetPage()->GetFocusController().IsFocused())) {
focused_element_->DispatchFocusEvent(old_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
focused_element_->DispatchFocusInEvent(event_type_names::kFocusin,
old_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
focused_element_->DispatchFocusInEvent(event_type_names::kDOMFocusIn,
old_focused_element, params.type,
params.source_capabilities);
if (focused_element_ != new_focused_element) {
focus_change_blocked = true;
goto SetFocusedElementDone;
}
}
}
if (!focus_change_blocked && focused_element_) {
if (AXObjectCache* cache = ExistingAXObjectCache()) {
cache->HandleFocusedUIElementChanged(old_focused_element,
new_focused_element);
}
}
if (!focus_change_blocked && GetPage()) {
GetPage()->GetChromeClient().FocusedNodeChanged(old_focused_element,
focused_element_.Get());
}
SetFocusedElementDone:
UpdateStyleAndLayoutTree();
if (LocalFrame* frame = GetFrame())
frame->Selection().DidChangeFocus();
return !focus_change_blocked;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::Show() {
WasShown();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: DownloadPersistentStoreInfo DownloadItemImpl::GetPersistentStoreInfo() const {
return DownloadPersistentStoreInfo(GetFullPath(),
GetURL(),
GetReferrerUrl(),
GetStartTime(),
GetEndTime(),
GetReceivedBytes(),
GetTotalBytes(),
GetState(),
GetDbHandle(),
GetOpened());
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void AudioRendererHost::OnCreateStream(
int stream_id, const media::AudioParameters& params, int input_channels) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(LookupById(stream_id) == NULL);
media::AudioParameters audio_params(params);
uint32 buffer_size = media::AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(audio_params);
DCHECK_GT(buffer_size, 0U);
DCHECK_LE(buffer_size,
static_cast<uint32>(media::limits::kMaxPacketSizeInBytes));
DCHECK_GE(input_channels, 0);
DCHECK_LT(input_channels, media::limits::kMaxChannels);
int output_memory_size = AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(audio_params);
DCHECK_GT(output_memory_size, 0);
int frames = audio_params.frames_per_buffer();
int input_memory_size =
AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(input_channels, frames);
DCHECK_GE(input_memory_size, 0);
scoped_ptr<AudioEntry> entry(new AudioEntry());
uint32 io_buffer_size = output_memory_size + input_memory_size;
uint32 shared_memory_size =
media::TotalSharedMemorySizeInBytes(io_buffer_size);
if (!entry->shared_memory.CreateAndMapAnonymous(shared_memory_size)) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<AudioSyncReader> reader(
new AudioSyncReader(&entry->shared_memory, params, input_channels));
if (!reader->Init()) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->reader.reset(reader.release());
entry->controller = media::AudioOutputController::Create(
audio_manager_, this, audio_params, entry->reader.get());
if (!entry->controller) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->stream_id = stream_id;
audio_entries_.insert(std::make_pair(stream_id, entry.release()));
if (media_observer_)
media_observer_->OnSetAudioStreamStatus(this, stream_id, "created");
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleCompressedTexImage2D(
uint32_t immediate_data_size, const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::CompressedTexImage2D& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::CompressedTexImage2D*>(cmd_data);
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLenum internal_format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.internalformat);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLint border = static_cast<GLint>(c.border);
GLsizei image_size = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.imageSize);
uint32_t data_shm_id = c.data_shm_id;
uint32_t data_shm_offset = c.data_shm_offset;
const void* data;
if (state_.bound_pixel_unpack_buffer.get()) {
if (data_shm_id) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
data = reinterpret_cast<const void*>(data_shm_offset);
} else {
if (!data_shm_id && data_shm_offset) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
data = GetSharedMemoryAs<const void*>(
data_shm_id, data_shm_offset, image_size);
}
return DoCompressedTexImage(target, level, internal_format, width, height, 1,
border, image_size, data, ContextState::k2D);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandler::GetStats(
std::unique_ptr<blink::WebRTCStatsReportCallback> callback,
blink::RTCStatsFilter filter) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
signaling_thread()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&GetRTCStatsOnSignalingThread, task_runner_,
native_peer_connection_, std::move(callback), filter));
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void CanOnlyDiscardOnceTest(DiscardReason reason) {
LifecycleUnit* background_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* foreground_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &background_lifecycle_unit,
&foreground_lifecycle_unit);
content::WebContents* initial_web_contents =
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0);
ExpectCanDiscardTrueAllReasons(background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, true));
background_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_NE(initial_web_contents, tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0));
EXPECT_FALSE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, false));
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)->GetController().Reload(
content::ReloadType::NORMAL, false);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_TRUE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivial(background_lifecycle_unit,
DiscardReason::kExternal);
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivial(background_lifecycle_unit,
DiscardReason::kProactive);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ExpectCanDiscardTrue(background_lifecycle_unit, DiscardReason::kUrgent);
#else
ExpectCanDiscardFalseTrivial(background_lifecycle_unit,
DiscardReason::kUrgent);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static __forceinline uint32 crc32_update(uint32 crc, uint8 byte)
{
return (crc << 8) ^ crc_table[byte ^ (crc >> 24)];
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: CopyKeyAliasesToKeymap(struct xkb_keymap *keymap, KeyNamesInfo *info)
{
AliasInfo *alias;
unsigned i, num_key_aliases;
struct xkb_key_alias *key_aliases;
/*
* Do some sanity checking on the aliases. We can't do it before
* because keys and their aliases may be added out-of-order.
*/
num_key_aliases = 0;
darray_foreach(alias, info->aliases) {
/* Check that ->real is a key. */
if (!XkbKeyByName(keymap, alias->real, false)) {
log_vrb(info->ctx, 5,
"Attempt to alias %s to non-existent key %s; Ignored\n",
KeyNameText(info->ctx, alias->alias),
KeyNameText(info->ctx, alias->real));
alias->real = XKB_ATOM_NONE;
continue;
}
/* Check that ->alias is not a key. */
if (XkbKeyByName(keymap, alias->alias, false)) {
log_vrb(info->ctx, 5,
"Attempt to create alias with the name of a real key; "
"Alias \"%s = %s\" ignored\n",
KeyNameText(info->ctx, alias->alias),
KeyNameText(info->ctx, alias->real));
alias->real = XKB_ATOM_NONE;
continue;
}
num_key_aliases++;
}
/* Copy key aliases. */
key_aliases = NULL;
if (num_key_aliases > 0) {
key_aliases = calloc(num_key_aliases, sizeof(*key_aliases));
if (!key_aliases)
return false;
}
i = 0;
darray_foreach(alias, info->aliases) {
if (alias->real != XKB_ATOM_NONE) {
key_aliases[i].alias = alias->alias;
key_aliases[i].real = alias->real;
i++;
}
}
keymap->num_key_aliases = num_key_aliases;
keymap->key_aliases = key_aliases;
return true;
}
Commit Message: keycodes: don't try to copy zero key aliases
Move the aliases copy to within the (num_key_aliases > 0) block.
Passing info->aliases into this fuction with invalid aliases will
cause log messages but num_key_aliases stays on 0. The key_aliases array
is never allocated and remains NULL. We then loop through the aliases, causing
a null-pointer dereference.
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: long Cluster::CreateBlock(long long id,
long long pos, // absolute pos of payload
long long size, long long discard_padding) {
assert((id == 0x20) || (id == 0x23)); // BlockGroup or SimpleBlock
if (m_entries_count < 0) { // haven't parsed anything yet
assert(m_entries == NULL);
assert(m_entries_size == 0);
m_entries_size = 1024;
m_entries = new BlockEntry* [m_entries_size];
m_entries_count = 0;
} else {
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count <= m_entries_size);
if (m_entries_count >= m_entries_size) {
const long entries_size = 2 * m_entries_size;
BlockEntry** const entries = new BlockEntry* [entries_size];
assert(entries);
BlockEntry** src = m_entries;
BlockEntry** const src_end = src + m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** dst = entries;
while (src != src_end)
*dst++ = *src++;
delete[] m_entries;
m_entries = entries;
m_entries_size = entries_size;
}
}
if (id == 0x20) // BlockGroup ID
return CreateBlockGroup(pos, size, discard_padding);
else // SimpleBlock ID
return CreateSimpleBlock(pos, size);
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::~ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost() {
ServiceWorkerDevToolsManager::GetInstance()->AgentHostDestroyed(this);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: DWORD WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::GetExitCode() {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DWORD exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
if (worker_process_.IsValid()) {
if (!::GetExitCodeProcess(worker_process_, &exit_code)) {
LOG_GETLASTERROR(INFO)
<< "Failed to query the exit code of the worker process";
exit_code = CONTROL_C_EXIT;
}
}
return exit_code;
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int rose_parse_national(unsigned char *p, struct rose_facilities_struct *facilities, int len)
{
unsigned char *pt;
unsigned char l, lg, n = 0;
int fac_national_digis_received = 0;
do {
switch (*p & 0xC0) {
case 0x00:
p += 2;
n += 2;
len -= 2;
break;
case 0x40:
if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_RAND)
facilities->rand = ((p[1] << 8) & 0xFF00) + ((p[2] << 0) & 0x00FF);
p += 3;
n += 3;
len -= 3;
break;
case 0x80:
p += 4;
n += 4;
len -= 4;
break;
case 0xC0:
l = p[1];
if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DEST_DIGI) {
if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
facilities->source_ndigis = 1;
}
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_SRC_DIGI) {
if (!fac_national_digis_received) {
memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[0], p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
facilities->dest_ndigis = 1;
}
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_CALL) {
memcpy(&facilities->fail_call, p + 2, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_FAIL_ADD) {
memcpy(&facilities->fail_addr, p + 3, ROSE_ADDR_LEN);
}
else if (*p == FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS) {
fac_national_digis_received = 1;
facilities->source_ndigis = 0;
facilities->dest_ndigis = 0;
for (pt = p + 2, lg = 0 ; lg < l ; pt += AX25_ADDR_LEN, lg += AX25_ADDR_LEN) {
if (pt[6] & AX25_HBIT)
memcpy(&facilities->dest_digis[facilities->dest_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
else
memcpy(&facilities->source_digis[facilities->source_ndigis++], pt, AX25_ADDR_LEN);
}
}
p += l + 2;
n += l + 2;
len -= l + 2;
break;
}
} while (*p != 0x00 && len > 0);
return n;
}
Commit Message: ROSE: prevent heap corruption with bad facilities
When parsing the FAC_NATIONAL_DIGIS facilities field, it's possible for
a remote host to provide more digipeaters than expected, resulting in
heap corruption. Check against ROSE_MAX_DIGIS to prevent overflows, and
abort facilities parsing on failure.
Additionally, when parsing the FAC_CCITT_DEST_NSAP and
FAC_CCITT_SRC_NSAP facilities fields, a remote host can provide a length
of less than 10, resulting in an underflow in a memcpy size, causing a
kernel panic due to massive heap corruption. A length of greater than
20 results in a stack overflow of the callsign array. Abort facilities
parsing on these invalid length values.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RenderBuffer::Invalidate() {
id_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void Document::suspendScheduledTasks()
{
ExecutionContext::suspendScheduledTasks();
m_taskRunner->suspend();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: tt_cmap12_validate( FT_Byte* table,
FT_Validator valid )
{
FT_Byte* p;
FT_ULong length;
FT_ULong num_groups;
if ( table + 16 > valid->limit )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
p = table + 4;
length = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
p = table + 12;
p = table + 12;
num_groups = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( table + length > valid->limit || length < 16 + 12 * num_groups )
FT_INVALID_TOO_SHORT;
/* check groups, they must be in increasing order */
for ( n = 0; n < num_groups; n++ )
{
start = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
end = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
start_id = TT_NEXT_ULONG( p );
if ( start > end )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( n > 0 && start <= last )
FT_INVALID_DATA;
if ( valid->level >= FT_VALIDATE_TIGHT )
{
if ( start_id + end - start >= TT_VALID_GLYPH_COUNT( valid ) )
FT_INVALID_GLYPH_ID;
}
last = end;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void ConvertRequestLEScanOptions(
const BluetoothLEScanOptions* options,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothRequestLEScanOptionsPtr& result,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (!(options->hasFilters() ^ options->acceptAllAdvertisements())) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(
"Either 'filters' should be present or 'acceptAllAdvertisements' "
"should be true, but not both.");
return;
}
result->accept_all_advertisements = options->acceptAllAdvertisements();
result->keep_repeated_devices = options->keepRepeatedDevices();
if (options->hasFilters()) {
if (options->filters().IsEmpty()) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(
"'filters' member must be non-empty to find any devices.");
return;
}
result->filters.emplace();
for (const BluetoothLEScanFilterInit* filter : options->filters()) {
auto canonicalized_filter = mojom::blink::WebBluetoothLeScanFilter::New();
CanonicalizeFilter(filter, canonicalized_filter, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
result->filters->push_back(std::move(canonicalized_filter));
}
}
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::enableLayerSquashing(bool enable)
{
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::setLayerSquashingEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove SpeechSynthesis runtime flag (status=stable)
BUG=402536
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/482273005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180763 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-94
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: kg_seal_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
int toktype)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *)context_handle;
if (!ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
}
if (conf_req_flag && kg_integ_only_iov(iov, iov_count)) {
/* may be more sensible to return an error here */
conf_req_flag = FALSE;
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto) {
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1_iov(context, ctx, conf_req_flag,
conf_state, iov, iov_count, toktype);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3_iov(context, ctx, conf_req_flag,
conf_state, iov, iov_count, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
break;
}
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int fpm_stdio_init_main() /* {{{ */
{
int fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
if (0 > fd) {
zlog(ZLOG_SYSERROR, "failed to init stdio: open(\"/dev/null\")");
return -1;
}
if (0 > dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO) || 0 > dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO)) {
zlog(ZLOG_SYSERROR, "failed to init stdio: dup2()");
close(fd);
return -1;
}
close(fd);
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that.
CWE ID: CWE-400
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::Abandon() {
texture_holder_->Abandon();
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( hash != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( sig != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( slen != NULL );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &s );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
(void) f_rng;
(void) p_rng;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, md_alg, rs_ctx ) );
#else
(void) md_alg;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#else
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free( &r );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &s );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void V8TestObject::LimitedWithMissingDefaultAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_limitedWithMissingDefaultAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::LimitedWithMissingDefaultAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void arcmsr_hbaC_postqueue_isr(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
struct MessageUnit_C __iomem *phbcmu;
struct ARCMSR_CDB *arcmsr_cdb;
struct CommandControlBlock *ccb;
uint32_t flag_ccb, ccb_cdb_phy, throttling = 0;
int error;
phbcmu = acb->pmuC;
/* areca cdb command done */
/* Use correct offset and size for syncing */
while ((flag_ccb = readl(&phbcmu->outbound_queueport_low)) !=
0xFFFFFFFF) {
ccb_cdb_phy = (flag_ccb & 0xFFFFFFF0);
arcmsr_cdb = (struct ARCMSR_CDB *)(acb->vir2phy_offset
+ ccb_cdb_phy);
ccb = container_of(arcmsr_cdb, struct CommandControlBlock,
arcmsr_cdb);
error = (flag_ccb & ARCMSR_CCBREPLY_FLAG_ERROR_MODE1)
? true : false;
/* check if command done with no error */
arcmsr_drain_donequeue(acb, ccb, error);
throttling++;
if (throttling == ARCMSR_HBC_ISR_THROTTLING_LEVEL) {
writel(ARCMSR_HBCMU_DRV2IOP_POSTQUEUE_THROTTLING,
&phbcmu->inbound_doorbell);
throttling = 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: BOOL transport_accept_nla(rdpTransport* transport)
{
freerdp* instance;
rdpSettings* settings;
if (transport->TlsIn == NULL)
transport->TlsIn = tls_new(transport->settings);
if (transport->TlsOut == NULL)
transport->TlsOut = transport->TlsIn;
transport->layer = TRANSPORT_LAYER_TLS;
transport->TlsIn->sockfd = transport->TcpIn->sockfd;
if (tls_accept(transport->TlsIn, transport->settings->CertificateFile, transport->settings->PrivateKeyFile) != TRUE)
return FALSE;
/* Network Level Authentication */
if (transport->settings->Authentication != TRUE)
return TRUE;
settings = transport->settings;
instance = (freerdp*) settings->instance;
if (transport->credssp == NULL)
transport->credssp = credssp_new(instance, transport, settings);
if (credssp_authenticate(transport->credssp) < 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "client authentication failure\n");
credssp_free(transport->credssp);
return FALSE;
}
/* don't free credssp module yet, we need to copy the credentials from it first */
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void JSTestActiveDOMObject::destroy(JSC::JSCell* cell)
{
JSTestActiveDOMObject* thisObject = jsCast<JSTestActiveDOMObject*>(cell);
thisObject->JSTestActiveDOMObject::~JSTestActiveDOMObject();
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void ChildThread::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
channel_connected_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
}
Commit Message: [FileAPI] Clean up WebFileSystemImpl before Blink shutdown
WebFileSystemImpl should not outlive V8 instance, since it may have references to V8.
This CL ensures it deleted before Blink shutdown.
BUG=369525
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/270633009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269345 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: virtual void Predict(MB_PREDICTION_MODE mode) {
mbptr_->mode_info_context->mbmi.mode = mode;
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(pred_fn_(mbptr_,
data_ptr_[0] - kStride,
data_ptr_[0] - 1, kStride,
data_ptr_[0], kStride));
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: AcpiNsBuildInternalName (
ACPI_NAMESTRING_INFO *Info)
{
UINT32 NumSegments = Info->NumSegments;
char *InternalName = Info->InternalName;
const char *ExternalName = Info->NextExternalChar;
char *Result = NULL;
UINT32 i;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE (NsBuildInternalName);
/* Setup the correct prefixes, counts, and pointers */
if (Info->FullyQualified)
{
InternalName[0] = AML_ROOT_PREFIX;
if (NumSegments <= 1)
{
Result = &InternalName[1];
}
else if (NumSegments == 2)
{
InternalName[1] = AML_DUAL_NAME_PREFIX;
Result = &InternalName[2];
}
else
{
InternalName[1] = AML_MULTI_NAME_PREFIX_OP;
InternalName[2] = (char) NumSegments;
Result = &InternalName[3];
}
}
else
{
/*
* Not fully qualified.
* Handle Carats first, then append the name segments
*/
i = 0;
if (Info->NumCarats)
{
for (i = 0; i < Info->NumCarats; i++)
{
InternalName[i] = AML_PARENT_PREFIX;
}
}
if (NumSegments <= 1)
{
Result = &InternalName[i];
}
else if (NumSegments == 2)
{
InternalName[i] = AML_DUAL_NAME_PREFIX;
Result = &InternalName[(ACPI_SIZE) i+1];
}
else
{
InternalName[i] = AML_MULTI_NAME_PREFIX_OP;
InternalName[(ACPI_SIZE) i+1] = (char) NumSegments;
Result = &InternalName[(ACPI_SIZE) i+2];
}
}
/* Build the name (minus path separators) */
for (; NumSegments; NumSegments--)
{
for (i = 0; i < ACPI_NAME_SIZE; i++)
{
if (ACPI_IS_PATH_SEPARATOR (*ExternalName) ||
(*ExternalName == 0))
{
/* Pad the segment with underscore(s) if segment is short */
Result[i] = '_';
}
else
{
/* Convert the character to uppercase and save it */
Result[i] = (char) toupper ((int) *ExternalName);
ExternalName++;
}
}
/* Now we must have a path separator, or the pathname is bad */
if (!ACPI_IS_PATH_SEPARATOR (*ExternalName) &&
(*ExternalName != 0))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_BAD_PATHNAME);
}
/* Move on the next segment */
ExternalName++;
Result += ACPI_NAME_SIZE;
}
/* Terminate the string */
*Result = 0;
if (Info->FullyQualified)
{
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_EXEC, "Returning [%p] (abs) \"\\%s\"\n",
InternalName, InternalName));
}
else
{
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_EXEC, "Returning [%p] (rel) \"%s\"\n",
InternalName, InternalName));
}
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Namespace: fix operand cache leak
I found some ACPI operand cache leaks in ACPI early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.174332] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.175504] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.176010] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.177032] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.178284] ACPI: SCI (IRQ16705) allocation failed
>[ 0.179352] ACPI Exception: AE_NOT_ACQUIRED, Unable to install
System Control Interrupt handler (20160930/evevent-131)
>[ 0.180008] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.181125] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler
(20160930/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.184068] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has
objects
>[ 0.185358] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3 #2
>[ 0.186820] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.188000] Call Trace:
>[ 0.188000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x7d
>[ 0.188000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x224/0x230
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x22/0x22
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0xd
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_terminate+0x5/0xf
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_init+0x288/0x32e
>[ 0.188000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? video_setup+0x7a/0x7a
>[ 0.188000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1b0
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x194/0x21a
>[ 0.188000] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.188000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling AcpiTerminate() function. The function calls
AcpiNsTerminate() function to delete namespace data and ACPI operand cache
(AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList).
But the deletion code in AcpiNsTerminate() function is wrapped in
ACPI_EXEC_APP definition, therefore the code is only executed when the
definition exists. If the define doesn't exist, ACPI operand cache
(AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList) is leaked, and stack dump is shown in kernel log.
This causes a security threat because the old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory
locations of kernel functions in stack dump, therefore kernel ASLR can be
neutralized.
To fix ACPI operand leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which
removes the ACPI_EXEC_APP define in AcpiNsTerminate() function for
executing the deletion code unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-755
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: atmarp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length, u_int caplen)
{
const struct atmarp_pkthdr *ap;
u_short pro, hrd, op;
ap = (const struct atmarp_pkthdr *)bp;
ND_TCHECK(*ap);
hrd = ATMHRD(ap);
pro = ATMPRO(ap);
op = ATMOP(ap);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*aar_tpa(ap), ATMTPROTO_LEN(ap))) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, length);
return;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ARP, "));
}
if ((pro != ETHERTYPE_IP && pro != ETHERTYPE_TRAIL) ||
ATMSPROTO_LEN(ap) != 4 ||
ATMTPROTO_LEN(ap) != 4 ||
ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s, %s (len %u/%u)",
tok2str(arphrd_values, "Unknown Hardware (%u)", hrd),
tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)", pro),
ATMSPROTO_LEN(ap),
ATMTPROTO_LEN(ap)));
/* don't know know about the address formats */
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
goto out;
}
}
/* print operation */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s ",
ndo->ndo_vflag ? ", " : "",
tok2str(arpop_values, "Unknown (%u)", op)));
switch (op) {
case ARPOP_REQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-has %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMTPA(ap))));
if (ATMTHRD_LEN(ap) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ("));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMTHA(ap), ATMTHRD_LEN(ap),
ATMTSA(ap), ATMTSLN(ap));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "tell %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_REPLY:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s is-at ", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMSHA(ap), ATMSHRD_LEN(ap), ATMSSA(ap),
ATMSSLN(ap));
break;
case ARPOP_INVREQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-is "));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMTHA(ap), ATMTHRD_LEN(ap), ATMTSA(ap),
ATMTSLN(ap));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tell "));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMSHA(ap), ATMSHRD_LEN(ap), ATMSSA(ap),
ATMSSLN(ap));
break;
case ARPOP_INVREPLY:
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMSHA(ap), ATMSHRD_LEN(ap), ATMSSA(ap),
ATMSSLN(ap));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "at %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_NAK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "for %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
break;
default:
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, caplen);
return;
}
out:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13013/ARP: Fix printing of ARP protocol addresses.
If the protocol type isn't ETHERTYPE_IP or ETHERTYPE_TRAIL, or if the
protocol address length isn't 4, don't print the address as an IPv4 address.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update another test file's tcpdump output to reflect this change.
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool ResourcePrefetchPredictor::PredictPreconnectOrigins(
const GURL& url,
PreconnectPrediction* prediction) const {
DCHECK(!prediction || prediction->requests.empty());
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (initialization_state_ != INITIALIZED)
return false;
url::Origin url_origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
url::Origin redirect_origin;
bool has_any_prediction = GetRedirectEndpointsForPreconnect(
url_origin, *host_redirect_data_, prediction);
if (!GetRedirectOrigin(url_origin, *host_redirect_data_, &redirect_origin)) {
return has_any_prediction;
}
OriginData data;
if (!origin_data_->TryGetData(redirect_origin.host(), &data)) {
return has_any_prediction;
}
if (prediction) {
prediction->host = redirect_origin.host();
prediction->is_redirected = (redirect_origin != url_origin);
}
net::NetworkIsolationKey network_isolation_key(redirect_origin,
redirect_origin);
for (const OriginStat& origin : data.origins()) {
float confidence = static_cast<float>(origin.number_of_hits()) /
(origin.number_of_hits() + origin.number_of_misses());
if (confidence < kMinOriginConfidenceToTriggerPreresolve)
continue;
has_any_prediction = true;
if (prediction) {
if (confidence > kMinOriginConfidenceToTriggerPreconnect) {
prediction->requests.emplace_back(GURL(origin.origin()), 1,
network_isolation_key);
} else {
prediction->requests.emplace_back(GURL(origin.origin()), 0,
network_isolation_key);
}
}
}
return has_any_prediction;
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void OmniboxViewViews::OnMouseReleased(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
views::Textfield::OnMouseReleased(event);
if ((event.IsOnlyLeftMouseButton() || event.IsOnlyRightMouseButton()) &&
select_all_on_mouse_release_) {
SelectAll(true);
}
select_all_on_mouse_release_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Strip JavaScript schemas on Linux text drop
When dropping text onto the Omnibox, any leading JavaScript schemes
should be stripped to avoid a "self-XSS" attack. This stripping already
occurs in all cases except when plaintext is dropped on Linux. This CL
corrects that oversight.
Bug: 768910
Change-Id: I43af24ace4a13cf61d15a32eb9382dcdd498a062
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/685638
Reviewed-by: Justin Donnelly <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504695}
CWE ID: CWE-79
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: SWFShape_hideLine(SWFShape shape)
{
ShapeRecord record;
if ( shape->isEnded )
return;
if ( shape->isMorph )
return;
record = addStyleRecord(shape);
record.record.stateChange->line = 0;
record.record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_LINESTYLEFLAG;
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void PluginInfoMessageFilter::Context::GrantAccess(
const ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status& status,
const FilePath& path) const {
if (status.value == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kAllowed ||
status.value == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kClickToPlay) {
ChromePluginServiceFilter::GetInstance()->AuthorizePlugin(
render_process_id_, path);
}
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnRequestDesktopNotificationPermission(
const GURL& source_origin, int callback_context) {
GetContentClient()->browser()->RequestDesktopNotificationPermission(
source_origin, callback_context, GetProcess()->GetID(), GetRoutingID());
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: WebString WebPageSerializer::generateBaseTagDeclaration(const WebString& baseTarget)
{
if (baseTarget.isEmpty())
return String("<base href=\".\">");
String baseString = "<base href=\".\" target=\"" + static_cast<const String&>(baseTarget) + "\">";
return baseString;
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: xmlPushInput(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserInputPtr input) {
int ret;
if (input == NULL) return(-1);
if (xmlParserDebugEntities) {
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) && (ctxt->input->filename))
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"%s(%d): ", ctxt->input->filename,
ctxt->input->line);
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"Pushing input %d : %.30s\n", ctxt->inputNr+1, input->cur);
}
ret = inputPush(ctxt, input);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(-1);
GROW;
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: alt_merge_mml(MinMax* to, MinMax* from)
{
if (to->min > from->min) to->min = from->min;
if (to->max < from->max) to->max = from->max;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static char *ps_files_path_create(char *buf, size_t buflen, ps_files *data, const char *key)
{
{
size_t len;
const char *p;
char c;
int ret = 1;
for (p = key; (c = *p); p++) {
/* valid characters are a..z,A..Z,0..9 */
if (!((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
|| (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
|| (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
|| c == ','
|| c == '-')) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
len = p - key;
/* Somewhat arbitrary length limit here, but should be way more than
anyone needs and avoids file-level warnings later on if we exceed MAX_PATH */
if (len == 0 || len > 128) {
ret = 0;
}
return ret;
}
static char *ps_files_path_create(char *buf, size_t buflen, ps_files *data, const char *key)
{
size_t key_len;
const char *p;
int i;
int n;
key_len = strlen(key);
if (key_len <= data->dirdepth ||
buflen < (strlen(data->basedir) + 2 * data->dirdepth + key_len + 5 + sizeof(FILE_PREFIX))) {
return NULL;
}
p = key;
memcpy(buf, data->basedir, data->basedir_len);
n = data->basedir_len;
buf[n++] = PHP_DIR_SEPARATOR;
for (i = 0; i < (int)data->dirdepth; i++) {
buf[n++] = *p++;
buf[n++] = PHP_DIR_SEPARATOR;
}
memcpy(buf + n, FILE_PREFIX, sizeof(FILE_PREFIX) - 1);
n += sizeof(FILE_PREFIX) - 1;
memcpy(buf + n, key, key_len);
n += key_len;
ps_files_close(data);
if (!ps_files_valid_key(key)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The session id is too long or contains illegal characters, valid characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9 and '-,'");
PS(invalid_session_id) = 1;
return;
}
if (!ps_files_path_create(buf, sizeof(buf), data, key)) {
return;
}
if (data->fd != -1) {
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
/* On Win32 locked files that are closed without being explicitly unlocked
will be unlocked only when "system resources become available". */
flock(data->fd, LOCK_UN);
#endif
close(data->fd);
data->fd = -1;
}
}
static void ps_files_open(ps_files *data, const char *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
if (data->fd < 0 || !data->lastkey || strcmp(key, data->lastkey)) {
if (data->lastkey) {
efree(data->lastkey);
data->lastkey = NULL;
}
ps_files_close(data);
if (!ps_files_valid_key(key)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The session id is too long or contains illegal characters, valid characters are a-z, A-Z, 0-9 and '-,'");
PS(invalid_session_id) = 1;
return;
}
if (!ps_files_path_create(buf, sizeof(buf), data, key)) {
return;
}
data->lastkey = estrdup(key);
data->fd = VCWD_OPEN_MODE(buf, O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_BINARY, data->filemode);
if (data->fd != -1) {
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
/* check to make sure that the opened file is not a symlink, linking to data outside of allowable dirs */
if (PG(open_basedir)) {
struct stat sbuf;
if (fstat(data->fd, &sbuf)) {
close(data->fd);
return;
}
if (S_ISLNK(sbuf.st_mode) && php_check_open_basedir(buf TSRMLS_CC)) {
close(data->fd);
return;
}
}
#endif
flock(data->fd, LOCK_EX);
#ifdef F_SETFD
# ifndef FD_CLOEXEC
# define FD_CLOEXEC 1
# endif
if (fcntl(data->fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "fcntl(%d, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) failed: %s (%d)", data->fd, strerror(errno), errno);
}
#endif
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "open(%s, O_RDWR) failed: %s (%d)", buf, strerror(errno), errno);
}
}
}
static int ps_files_cleanup_dir(const char *dirname, int maxlifetime TSRMLS_DC)
{
DIR *dir;
char dentry[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN];
struct dirent *entry = (struct dirent *) &dentry;
struct stat sbuf;
char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
time_t now;
int nrdels = 0;
size_t dirname_len;
dir = opendir(dirname);
if (!dir) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "ps_files_cleanup_dir: opendir(%s) failed: %s (%d)", dirname, strerror(errno), errno);
return (0);
}
time(&now);
return (nrdels);
}
#define PS_FILES_DATA ps_files *data = PS_GET_MOD_DATA()
PS_OPEN_FUNC(files)
(now - sbuf.st_mtime) > maxlifetime) {
VCWD_UNLINK(buf);
nrdels++;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void rfc_process_mx_message(tRFC_MCB* p_mcb, BT_HDR* p_buf) {
uint8_t* p_data = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
MX_FRAME* p_rx_frame = &rfc_cb.rfc.rx_frame;
uint16_t length = p_buf->len;
uint8_t ea, cr, mx_len;
bool is_command;
p_rx_frame->ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
p_rx_frame->cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->type = *p_data++ & ~(RFCOMM_CR_MASK | RFCOMM_EA_MASK);
if (!p_rx_frame->ea || !length) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__
<< ": Invalid MX frame ea=" << std::to_string(p_rx_frame->ea)
<< ", len=" << length << ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
osi_free(p_buf);
return;
}
length--;
is_command = p_rx_frame->cr;
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
mx_len = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_LENGTH1;
length--;
if (!ea) {
mx_len += *p_data++ << RFCOMM_SHIFT_LENGTH2;
length--;
}
if (mx_len != length) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Bad MX frame, p_mcb=" << p_mcb
<< ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
osi_free(p_buf);
return;
}
RFCOMM_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: type=%d, p_mcb=%p", __func__, p_rx_frame->type,
p_mcb);
switch (p_rx_frame->type) {
case RFCOMM_MX_PN:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_PN_LEN) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Invalid PN length, p_mcb=" << p_mcb
<< ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
break;
}
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_DLCI_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.frame_type = *p_data & RFCOMM_PN_FRAME_TYPE_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.conv_layer = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_CONV_LAYER_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.priority = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_PRIORITY_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.t1 = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.mtu = *p_data + (*(p_data + 1) << 8);
p_data += 2;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.n2 = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.pn.k = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_PN_K_MASK;
if (!p_rx_frame->dlci || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci) ||
(p_rx_frame->u.pn.mtu < RFCOMM_MIN_MTU) ||
(p_rx_frame->u.pn.mtu > RFCOMM_MAX_MTU)) {
LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ": Bad PN frame, p_mcb=" << p_mcb
<< ", bd_addr=" << p_mcb->bd_addr;
break;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_pn(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_TEST:
if (!length) break;
p_rx_frame->u.test.p_data = p_data;
p_rx_frame->u.test.data_len = length;
p_buf->offset += 2;
p_buf->len -= 2;
if (is_command)
rfc_send_test(p_mcb, false, p_buf);
else
rfc_process_test_rsp(p_mcb, p_buf);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_FCON:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_FCON_LEN) break;
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_fcon(p_mcb, is_command);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_FCOFF:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_FCOFF_LEN) break;
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_fcoff(p_mcb, is_command);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_MSC:
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
if (!ea || !cr || !p_rx_frame->dlci ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad MSC frame");
break;
}
p_rx_frame->u.msc.signals = *p_data++;
if (mx_len == RFCOMM_MX_MSC_LEN_WITH_BREAK) {
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_present =
*p_data & RFCOMM_MSC_BREAK_PRESENT_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_duration =
(*p_data & RFCOMM_MSC_BREAK_MASK) >> RFCOMM_MSC_SHIFT_BREAK;
} else {
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_present = false;
p_rx_frame->u.msc.break_duration = 0;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_msc(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_NSC:
if ((length != RFCOMM_MX_NSC_LEN) || !is_command) break;
p_rx_frame->u.nsc.ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
p_rx_frame->u.nsc.cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->u.nsc.type = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_nsc(p_mcb, p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_RPN:
if ((length != RFCOMM_MX_RPN_REQ_LEN) && (length != RFCOMM_MX_RPN_LEN))
break;
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
if (!ea || !cr || !p_rx_frame->dlci ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad RPN frame");
break;
}
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.is_request = (length == RFCOMM_MX_RPN_REQ_LEN);
if (!p_rx_frame->u.rpn.is_request) {
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.baud_rate = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.byte_size =
(*p_data >> RFCOMM_RPN_BITS_SHIFT) & RFCOMM_RPN_BITS_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.stop_bits =
(*p_data >> RFCOMM_RPN_STOP_BITS_SHIFT) & RFCOMM_RPN_STOP_BITS_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.parity =
(*p_data >> RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_SHIFT) & RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.parity_type =
(*p_data++ >> RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_TYPE_SHIFT) &
RFCOMM_RPN_PARITY_TYPE_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.fc_type = *p_data++ & RFCOMM_FC_MASK;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.xon_char = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.xoff_char = *p_data++;
p_rx_frame->u.rpn.param_mask =
(*p_data + (*(p_data + 1) << 8)) & RFCOMM_RPN_PM_MASK;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_rpn(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame->u.rpn.is_request,
p_rx_frame);
return;
case RFCOMM_MX_RLS:
if (length != RFCOMM_MX_RLS_LEN) break;
ea = *p_data & RFCOMM_EA;
cr = (*p_data & RFCOMM_CR_MASK) >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_CR;
p_rx_frame->dlci = *p_data++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_DLCI;
p_rx_frame->u.rls.line_status = (*p_data & ~0x01);
if (!ea || !cr || !p_rx_frame->dlci ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_rx_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad RPN frame");
break;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
rfc_process_rls(p_mcb, is_command, p_rx_frame);
return;
}
osi_free(p_buf);
if (is_command) rfc_send_nsc(p_mcb);
}
Commit Message: Check remaining frame length in rfc_process_mx_message
Bug: 111936792
Bug: 80432928
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ie2c09f3d598fb230ce060c9043f5a88c241cdd79
(cherry picked from commit 0471355c8b035aaa2ce07a33eecad60ad49c5ad0)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void StreamTcpSetSessionNoReassemblyFlag (TcpSession *ssn, char direction)
{
ssn->flags |= STREAMTCP_FLAG_APP_LAYER_DISABLED;
if (direction) {
ssn->server.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_NEW_RAW_DISABLED;
} else {
ssn->client.flags |= STREAMTCP_STREAM_FLAG_NEW_RAW_DISABLED;
}
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int hns_gmac_get_sset_count(int stringset)
{
if (stringset == ETH_SS_STATS)
return ARRAY_SIZE(g_gmac_stats_string);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void WebPluginProxy::SetWindowlessPumpEvent(HANDLE pump_messages_event) {
HANDLE pump_messages_event_for_renderer = NULL;
DuplicateHandle(GetCurrentProcess(), pump_messages_event,
channel_->renderer_handle(),
&pump_messages_event_for_renderer,
0, FALSE, DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS);
DCHECK(pump_messages_event_for_renderer != NULL);
Send(new PluginHostMsg_SetWindowlessPumpEvent(
route_id_, pump_messages_event_for_renderer));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace::getGray(GfxColor *color, GfxGray *gray) {
*gray = clip01(color->c[0]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: AppResult::AppResult(Profile* profile,
const std::string& app_id,
AppListControllerDelegate* controller,
bool is_recommendation)
: profile_(profile),
app_id_(app_id),
controller_(controller),
extension_registry_(NULL) {
set_id(extensions::Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(app_id_).spec());
if (app_list::switches::IsExperimentalAppListEnabled())
set_display_type(is_recommendation ? DISPLAY_RECOMMENDATION : DISPLAY_TILE);
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_service()
->GetInstalledExtension(app_id_);
DCHECK(extension);
is_platform_app_ = extension->is_platform_app();
icon_.reset(
new extensions::IconImage(profile_,
extension,
extensions::IconsInfo::GetIcons(extension),
GetPreferredIconDimension(),
extensions::util::GetDefaultAppIcon(),
this));
UpdateIcon();
StartObservingExtensionRegistry();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CopyFromCompositingSurface(
const gfx::Rect& src_subrect,
const gfx::Size& dst_size,
const base::Callback<void(bool)>& callback,
skia::PlatformBitmap* output) {
base::ScopedClosureRunner scoped_callback_runner(base::Bind(callback, false));
std::map<uint64, scoped_refptr<ui::Texture> >::iterator it =
image_transport_clients_.find(current_surface_);
if (it == image_transport_clients_.end())
return;
ui::Texture* container = it->second;
DCHECK(container);
gfx::Size dst_size_in_pixel = ConvertSizeToPixel(this, dst_size);
if (!output->Allocate(
dst_size_in_pixel.width(), dst_size_in_pixel.height(), true))
return;
ImageTransportFactory* factory = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance();
GLHelper* gl_helper = factory->GetGLHelper();
if (!gl_helper)
return;
unsigned char* addr = static_cast<unsigned char*>(
output->GetBitmap().getPixels());
scoped_callback_runner.Release();
base::Callback<void(bool)> wrapper_callback = base::Bind(
&RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CopyFromCompositingSurfaceFinished,
AsWeakPtr(),
callback);
++pending_thumbnail_tasks_;
gfx::Rect src_subrect_in_gl = src_subrect;
src_subrect_in_gl.set_y(GetViewBounds().height() - src_subrect.bottom());
gfx::Rect src_subrect_in_pixel = ConvertRectToPixel(this, src_subrect_in_gl);
gl_helper->CropScaleReadbackAndCleanTexture(container->PrepareTexture(),
container->size(),
src_subrect_in_pixel,
dst_size_in_pixel,
addr,
wrapper_callback);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ip6t_entry *s, const struct ip6t_entry *e,
const char *hookname, const char **chainname,
const char **comment, unsigned int *rulenum)
{
const struct xt_standard_target *t = (void *)ip6t_get_target_c(s);
if (strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0) {
/* Head of user chain: ERROR target with chainname */
*chainname = t->target.data;
(*rulenum) = 0;
} else if (s == e) {
(*rulenum)++;
if (unconditional(s) &&
strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
t->verdict < 0) {
/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
*comment = *chainname == hookname
? comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
: comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_RETURN];
}
return 1;
} else
(*rulenum)++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: virtual scoped_refptr<ui::Texture> CreateTransportClient(
const gfx::Size& size,
float device_scale_factor,
uint64 transport_handle) {
if (!shared_context_.get())
return NULL;
scoped_refptr<ImageTransportClientTexture> image(
new ImageTransportClientTexture(shared_context_.get(),
size, device_scale_factor,
transport_handle));
return image;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int udf_read_inode(struct inode *inode, bool hidden_inode)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
struct fileEntry *fe;
struct extendedFileEntry *efe;
uint16_t ident;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct kernel_lb_addr *iloc = &iinfo->i_location;
unsigned int link_count;
unsigned int indirections = 0;
int ret = -EIO;
reread:
if (iloc->logicalBlockNum >=
sbi->s_partmaps[iloc->partitionReferenceNum].s_partition_len) {
udf_debug("block=%d, partition=%d out of range\n",
iloc->logicalBlockNum, iloc->partitionReferenceNum);
return -EIO;
}
/*
* Set defaults, but the inode is still incomplete!
* Note: get_new_inode() sets the following on a new inode:
* i_sb = sb
* i_no = ino
* i_flags = sb->s_flags
* i_state = 0
* clean_inode(): zero fills and sets
* i_count = 1
* i_nlink = 1
* i_op = NULL;
*/
bh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, iloc, 0, &ident);
if (!bh) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed !bh\n", inode->i_ino);
return -EIO;
}
if (ident != TAG_IDENT_FE && ident != TAG_IDENT_EFE &&
ident != TAG_IDENT_USE) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed ident=%d\n",
inode->i_ino, ident);
goto out;
}
fe = (struct fileEntry *)bh->b_data;
efe = (struct extendedFileEntry *)bh->b_data;
if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4096)) {
struct buffer_head *ibh;
ibh = udf_read_ptagged(inode->i_sb, iloc, 1, &ident);
if (ident == TAG_IDENT_IE && ibh) {
struct kernel_lb_addr loc;
struct indirectEntry *ie;
ie = (struct indirectEntry *)ibh->b_data;
loc = lelb_to_cpu(ie->indirectICB.extLocation);
if (ie->indirectICB.extLength) {
brelse(ibh);
memcpy(&iinfo->i_location, &loc,
sizeof(struct kernel_lb_addr));
if (++indirections > UDF_MAX_ICB_NESTING) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb,
"too many ICBs in ICB hierarchy"
" (max %d supported)\n",
UDF_MAX_ICB_NESTING);
goto out;
}
brelse(bh);
goto reread;
}
}
brelse(ibh);
} else if (fe->icbTag.strategyType != cpu_to_le16(4)) {
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "unsupported strategy type: %d\n",
le16_to_cpu(fe->icbTag.strategyType));
goto out;
}
if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4))
iinfo->i_strat4096 = 0;
else /* if (fe->icbTag.strategyType == cpu_to_le16(4096)) */
iinfo->i_strat4096 = 1;
iinfo->i_alloc_type = le16_to_cpu(fe->icbTag.flags) &
ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_MASK;
iinfo->i_unique = 0;
iinfo->i_lenEAttr = 0;
iinfo->i_lenExtents = 0;
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = 0;
iinfo->i_next_alloc_block = 0;
iinfo->i_next_alloc_goal = 0;
if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_EFE)) {
iinfo->i_efe = 1;
iinfo->i_use = 0;
ret = udf_alloc_i_data(inode, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry));
if (ret)
goto out;
memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data,
bh->b_data + sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry),
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct extendedFileEntry));
} else if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_FE)) {
iinfo->i_efe = 0;
iinfo->i_use = 0;
ret = udf_alloc_i_data(inode, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct fileEntry));
if (ret)
goto out;
memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data,
bh->b_data + sizeof(struct fileEntry),
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - sizeof(struct fileEntry));
} else if (fe->descTag.tagIdent == cpu_to_le16(TAG_IDENT_USE)) {
iinfo->i_efe = 0;
iinfo->i_use = 1;
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(
((struct unallocSpaceEntry *)bh->b_data)->
lengthAllocDescs);
ret = udf_alloc_i_data(inode, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry));
if (ret)
goto out;
memcpy(iinfo->i_ext.i_data,
bh->b_data + sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry),
inode->i_sb->s_blocksize -
sizeof(struct unallocSpaceEntry));
return 0;
}
ret = -EIO;
read_lock(&sbi->s_cred_lock);
i_uid_write(inode, le32_to_cpu(fe->uid));
if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UID_IGNORE) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_UID_SET))
inode->i_uid = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_uid;
i_gid_write(inode, le32_to_cpu(fe->gid));
if (!gid_valid(inode->i_gid) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_GID_IGNORE) ||
UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_GID_SET))
inode->i_gid = UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_gid;
if (fe->icbTag.fileType != ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY &&
sbi->s_fmode != UDF_INVALID_MODE)
inode->i_mode = sbi->s_fmode;
else if (fe->icbTag.fileType == ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY &&
sbi->s_dmode != UDF_INVALID_MODE)
inode->i_mode = sbi->s_dmode;
else
inode->i_mode = udf_convert_permissions(fe);
inode->i_mode &= ~sbi->s_umask;
read_unlock(&sbi->s_cred_lock);
link_count = le16_to_cpu(fe->fileLinkCount);
if (!link_count) {
if (!hidden_inode) {
ret = -ESTALE;
goto out;
}
link_count = 1;
}
set_nlink(inode, link_count);
inode->i_size = le64_to_cpu(fe->informationLength);
iinfo->i_lenExtents = inode->i_size;
if (iinfo->i_efe == 0) {
inode->i_blocks = le64_to_cpu(fe->logicalBlocksRecorded) <<
(inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9);
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_atime, fe->accessTime))
inode->i_atime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_mtime,
fe->modificationTime))
inode->i_mtime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_ctime, fe->attrTime))
inode->i_ctime = sbi->s_record_time;
iinfo->i_unique = le64_to_cpu(fe->uniqueID);
iinfo->i_lenEAttr = le32_to_cpu(fe->lengthExtendedAttr);
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(fe->lengthAllocDescs);
iinfo->i_checkpoint = le32_to_cpu(fe->checkpoint);
} else {
inode->i_blocks = le64_to_cpu(efe->logicalBlocksRecorded) <<
(inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits - 9);
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_atime, efe->accessTime))
inode->i_atime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_mtime,
efe->modificationTime))
inode->i_mtime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&iinfo->i_crtime, efe->createTime))
iinfo->i_crtime = sbi->s_record_time;
if (!udf_disk_stamp_to_time(&inode->i_ctime, efe->attrTime))
inode->i_ctime = sbi->s_record_time;
iinfo->i_unique = le64_to_cpu(efe->uniqueID);
iinfo->i_lenEAttr = le32_to_cpu(efe->lengthExtendedAttr);
iinfo->i_lenAlloc = le32_to_cpu(efe->lengthAllocDescs);
iinfo->i_checkpoint = le32_to_cpu(efe->checkpoint);
}
inode->i_generation = iinfo->i_unique;
switch (fe->icbTag.fileType) {
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY:
inode->i_op = &udf_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &udf_dir_operations;
inode->i_mode |= S_IFDIR;
inc_nlink(inode);
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_REALTIME:
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_REGULAR:
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_UNDEF:
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_VAT20:
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type == ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB)
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_adinicb_aops;
else
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_aops;
inode->i_op = &udf_file_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &udf_file_operations;
inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_BLOCK:
inode->i_mode |= S_IFBLK;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_CHAR:
inode->i_mode |= S_IFCHR;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_FIFO:
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode | S_IFIFO, 0);
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_SOCKET:
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode | S_IFSOCK, 0);
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_SYMLINK:
inode->i_data.a_ops = &udf_symlink_aops;
inode->i_op = &udf_symlink_inode_operations;
inode->i_mode = S_IFLNK | S_IRWXUGO;
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_MAIN:
udf_debug("METADATA FILE-----\n");
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_MIRROR:
udf_debug("METADATA MIRROR FILE-----\n");
break;
case ICBTAG_FILE_TYPE_BITMAP:
udf_debug("METADATA BITMAP FILE-----\n");
break;
default:
udf_err(inode->i_sb, "(ino %ld) failed unknown file type=%d\n",
inode->i_ino, fe->icbTag.fileType);
goto out;
}
if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) {
struct deviceSpec *dsea =
(struct deviceSpec *)udf_get_extendedattr(inode, 12, 1);
if (dsea) {
init_special_inode(inode, inode->i_mode,
MKDEV(le32_to_cpu(dsea->majorDeviceIdent),
le32_to_cpu(dsea->minorDeviceIdent)));
/* Developer ID ??? */
} else
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
out:
brelse(bh);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: udf: Verify i_size when loading inode
Verify that inode size is sane when loading inode with data stored in
ICB. Otherwise we may get confused later when working with the inode and
inode size is too big.
CC: [email protected]
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void vmx_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr,
bool has_error_code, u32 error_code,
bool reinject)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u32 intr_info = nr | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
if (!reinject && is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
nested_vmx_check_exception(vcpu, nr))
return;
if (has_error_code) {
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE, error_code);
intr_info |= INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
}
if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
int inc_eip = 0;
if (kvm_exception_is_soft(nr))
inc_eip = vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
if (kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, nr, inc_eip) != EMULATE_DONE)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT, vcpu);
return;
}
if (kvm_exception_is_soft(nr)) {
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len);
intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION;
} else
intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION;
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr_info);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: jbig2_decode_mmr_init(Jbig2MmrCtx *mmr, int width, int height, const byte *data, size_t size)
{
int i;
uint32_t word = 0;
mmr->width = width;
mmr->size = size;
mmr->data_index = 0;
mmr->bit_index = 0;
for (i = 0; i < size && i < 4; i++)
word |= (data[i] << ((3 - i) << 3));
mmr->word = word;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int PDFiumEngine::GetMostVisiblePage() {
if (in_flight_visible_page_)
return *in_flight_visible_page_;
CalculateVisiblePages();
return most_visible_page_;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: FcCacheInsert (FcCache *cache, struct stat *cache_stat)
{
FcCacheSkip **update[FC_CACHE_MAX_LEVEL];
FcCacheSkip *s, **next;
int i, level;
lock_cache ();
/*
* Find links along each chain
*/
next = fcCacheChains;
for (i = fcCacheMaxLevel; --i >= 0; )
{
for (; (s = next[i]); next = s->next)
if (s->cache > cache)
break;
update[i] = &next[i];
}
/*
* Create new list element
*/
level = random_level ();
if (level > fcCacheMaxLevel)
{
level = fcCacheMaxLevel + 1;
update[fcCacheMaxLevel] = &fcCacheChains[fcCacheMaxLevel];
fcCacheMaxLevel = level;
}
s = malloc (sizeof (FcCacheSkip) + (level - 1) * sizeof (FcCacheSkip *));
if (!s)
return FcFalse;
s->cache = cache;
s->size = cache->size;
FcRefInit (&s->ref, 1);
if (cache_stat)
{
s->cache_dev = cache_stat->st_dev;
s->cache_ino = cache_stat->st_ino;
s->cache_mtime = cache_stat->st_mtime;
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM
s->cache_mtime_nano = cache_stat->st_mtim.tv_nsec;
#else
s->cache_mtime_nano = 0;
#endif
}
else
{
s->cache_dev = 0;
s->cache_ino = 0;
s->cache_mtime = 0;
s->cache_mtime_nano = 0;
}
/*
* Insert into all fcCacheChains
*/
for (i = 0; i < level; i++)
{
s->next[i] = *update[i];
*update[i] = s;
}
unlock_cache ();
return FcTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-415
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: ContentUtilityClient* ShellMainDelegate::CreateContentUtilityClient() {
utility_client_.reset(new ShellContentUtilityClient);
return utility_client_.get();
}
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011}
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: xfs_attr3_leaf_clearflag(
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote *name_rmt;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
int error;
#ifdef DEBUG
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
xfs_attr_leaf_name_local_t *name_loc;
int namelen;
char *name;
#endif /* DEBUG */
trace_xfs_attr_leaf_clearflag(args);
/*
* Set up the operation.
*/
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_read(args->trans, args->dp, args->blkno, -1, &bp);
if (error)
return(error);
leaf = bp->b_addr;
entry = &xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf)[args->index];
ASSERT(entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE);
#ifdef DEBUG
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(&ichdr, leaf);
ASSERT(args->index < ichdr.count);
ASSERT(args->index >= 0);
if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) {
name_loc = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_local(leaf, args->index);
namelen = name_loc->namelen;
name = (char *)name_loc->nameval;
} else {
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, args->index);
namelen = name_rmt->namelen;
name = (char *)name_rmt->name;
}
ASSERT(be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) == args->hashval);
ASSERT(namelen == args->namelen);
ASSERT(memcmp(name, args->name, namelen) == 0);
#endif /* DEBUG */
entry->flags &= ~XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE;
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf, entry, sizeof(*entry)));
if (args->rmtblkno) {
ASSERT((entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) == 0);
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, args->index);
name_rmt->valueblk = cpu_to_be32(args->rmtblkno);
name_rmt->valuelen = cpu_to_be32(args->valuelen);
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf, name_rmt, sizeof(*name_rmt)));
}
/*
* Commit the flag value change and start the next trans in series.
*/
return xfs_trans_roll(&args->trans, args->dp);
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: gfx::Point TreeView::GetKeyboardContextMenuLocation() {
int y = height() / 2;
if (GetSelectedNode()) {
RECT bounds;
RECT client_rect;
if (TreeView_GetItemRect(tree_view_,
GetNodeDetails(GetSelectedNode())->tree_item,
&bounds, TRUE) &&
GetClientRect(tree_view_, &client_rect) &&
bounds.bottom >= 0 && bounds.bottom < client_rect.bottom) {
y = bounds.bottom;
}
}
gfx::Point screen_loc(0, y);
if (base::i18n::IsRTL())
screen_loc.set_x(width());
ConvertPointToScreen(this, &screen_loc);
return screen_loc;
}
Commit Message: Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: rs_filter_graph(RSFilter *filter)
{
g_return_if_fail(RS_IS_FILTER(filter));
GString *str = g_string_new("digraph G {\n");
rs_filter_graph_helper(str, filter);
g_string_append_printf(str, "}\n");
g_file_set_contents("/tmp/rs-filter-graph", str->str, str->len, NULL);
if (0 != system("dot -Tpng >/tmp/rs-filter-graph.png </tmp/rs-filter-graph"))
g_warning("Calling dot failed");
if (0 != system("gnome-open /tmp/rs-filter-graph.png"))
g_warning("Calling gnome-open failed.");
g_string_free(str, TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Fixes insecure use of temporary file (CVE-2014-4978).
CWE ID: CWE-59
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int hugepage_madvise(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long *vm_flags, int advice)
{
switch (advice) {
case MADV_HUGEPAGE:
/*
* Be somewhat over-protective like KSM for now!
*/
if (*vm_flags & (VM_HUGEPAGE |
VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE |
VM_PFNMAP | VM_IO | VM_DONTEXPAND |
VM_RESERVED | VM_HUGETLB | VM_INSERTPAGE |
VM_MIXEDMAP | VM_SAO))
return -EINVAL;
*vm_flags &= ~VM_NOHUGEPAGE;
*vm_flags |= VM_HUGEPAGE;
/*
* If the vma become good for khugepaged to scan,
* register it here without waiting a page fault that
* may not happen any time soon.
*/
if (unlikely(khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(vma)))
return -ENOMEM;
break;
case MADV_NOHUGEPAGE:
/*
* Be somewhat over-protective like KSM for now!
*/
if (*vm_flags & (VM_NOHUGEPAGE |
VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE |
VM_PFNMAP | VM_IO | VM_DONTEXPAND |
VM_RESERVED | VM_HUGETLB | VM_INSERTPAGE |
VM_MIXEDMAP | VM_SAO))
return -EINVAL;
*vm_flags &= ~VM_HUGEPAGE;
*vm_flags |= VM_NOHUGEPAGE;
/*
* Setting VM_NOHUGEPAGE will prevent khugepaged from scanning
* this vma even if we leave the mm registered in khugepaged if
* it got registered before VM_NOHUGEPAGE was set.
*/
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: get_secret_flags (NMSetting *setting,
const char *secret_name,
gboolean verify_secret,
NMSettingSecretFlags *out_flags,
GError **error)
{
NMSettingVPNPrivate *priv = NM_SETTING_VPN_GET_PRIVATE (setting);
gboolean success = FALSE;
char *flags_key;
gpointer val;
unsigned long tmp;
flags_key = g_strdup_printf ("%s-flags", secret_name);
if (g_hash_table_lookup_extended (priv->data, flags_key, NULL, &val)) {
errno = 0;
tmp = strtoul ((const char *) val, NULL, 10);
if ((errno == 0) && (tmp <= NM_SETTING_SECRET_FLAGS_ALL)) {
if (out_flags)
*out_flags = (guint32) tmp;
success = TRUE;
} else {
g_set_error (error,
NM_SETTING_ERROR,
NM_SETTING_ERROR_PROPERTY_TYPE_MISMATCH,
"Failed to convert '%s' value '%s' to uint",
flags_key, (const char *) val);
}
} else {
g_set_error (error,
NM_SETTING_ERROR,
NM_SETTING_ERROR_PROPERTY_NOT_FOUND,
"Secret flags property '%s' not found", flags_key);
}
g_free (flags_key);
return success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void CardUnmaskPromptViews::DisableAndWaitForVerification() {
SetInputsEnabled(false);
progress_overlay_->SetOpacity(0.0);
progress_overlay_->SetVisible(true);
progress_throbber_->Start();
overlay_animation_.Show();
GetDialogClientView()->UpdateDialogButtons();
Layout();
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: DOMArrayBuffer* FileReaderLoader::ArrayBufferResult() {
DCHECK_EQ(read_type_, kReadAsArrayBuffer);
if (array_buffer_result_)
return array_buffer_result_;
if (!raw_data_ || error_code_ != FileErrorCode::kOK)
return nullptr;
DOMArrayBuffer* result = DOMArrayBuffer::Create(raw_data_->ToArrayBuffer());
if (finished_loading_) {
array_buffer_result_ = result;
AdjustReportedMemoryUsageToV8(
-1 * static_cast<int64_t>(raw_data_->ByteLength()));
raw_data_.reset();
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: FileReader: Make a copy of the ArrayBuffer when returning partial results.
This is to avoid accidentally ending up with multiple references to the
same underlying ArrayBuffer. The extra performance overhead of this is
minimal as usage of partial results is very rare anyway (as can be seen
on https://www.chromestatus.com/metrics/feature/timeline/popularity/2158).
Bug: 936448
Change-Id: Icd1081adc1c889829fe7fa4af9cf4440097e8854
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1492873
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Adam Klein <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#636251}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: bool V8TestMediaQueryListListener::HasInstance(v8::Handle<v8::Value> value)
{
return GetRawTemplate()->HasInstance(value);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: __do_block_io_op(struct xen_blkif *blkif)
{
union blkif_back_rings *blk_rings = &blkif->blk_rings;
struct blkif_request req;
struct pending_req *pending_req;
RING_IDX rc, rp;
int more_to_do = 0;
rc = blk_rings->common.req_cons;
rp = blk_rings->common.sring->req_prod;
rmb(); /* Ensure we see queued requests up to 'rp'. */
while (rc != rp) {
if (RING_REQUEST_CONS_OVERFLOW(&blk_rings->common, rc))
break;
if (kthread_should_stop()) {
more_to_do = 1;
break;
}
pending_req = alloc_req(blkif);
if (NULL == pending_req) {
blkif->st_oo_req++;
more_to_do = 1;
break;
}
switch (blkif->blk_protocol) {
case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_NATIVE:
memcpy(&req, RING_GET_REQUEST(&blk_rings->native, rc), sizeof(req));
break;
case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_X86_32:
blkif_get_x86_32_req(&req, RING_GET_REQUEST(&blk_rings->x86_32, rc));
break;
case BLKIF_PROTOCOL_X86_64:
blkif_get_x86_64_req(&req, RING_GET_REQUEST(&blk_rings->x86_64, rc));
break;
default:
BUG();
}
blk_rings->common.req_cons = ++rc; /* before make_response() */
/* Apply all sanity checks to /private copy/ of request. */
barrier();
switch (req.operation) {
case BLKIF_OP_READ:
case BLKIF_OP_WRITE:
case BLKIF_OP_WRITE_BARRIER:
case BLKIF_OP_FLUSH_DISKCACHE:
case BLKIF_OP_INDIRECT:
if (dispatch_rw_block_io(blkif, &req, pending_req))
goto done;
break;
case BLKIF_OP_DISCARD:
free_req(blkif, pending_req);
if (dispatch_discard_io(blkif, &req))
goto done;
break;
default:
if (dispatch_other_io(blkif, &req, pending_req))
goto done;
break;
}
/* Yield point for this unbounded loop. */
cond_resched();
}
done:
return more_to_do;
}
Commit Message: xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <[email protected]>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static uint64_t pci_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned int size)
{
AcpiPciHpState *s = opaque;
uint32_t val = 0;
int bsel = s->hotplug_select;
if (bsel < 0 || bsel > ACPI_PCIHP_MAX_HOTPLUG_BUS) {
return 0;
}
switch (addr) {
case PCI_UP_BASE:
val = s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].up;
if (!s->legacy_piix) {
s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].up = 0;
}
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_up_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_DOWN_BASE:
val = s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].down;
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_down_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_EJ_BASE:
/* No feature defined yet */
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_features_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_RMV_BASE:
val = s->acpi_pcihp_pci_status[bsel].hotplug_enable;
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_rmv_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
break;
case PCI_SEL_BASE:
val = s->hotplug_select;
ACPI_PCIHP_DPRINTF("pci_sel_read %" PRIu32 "\n", val);
default:
break;
}
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: SProcXvSelectVideoNotify(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xvSelectVideoNotifyReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvSelectVideoNotifyReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->drawable);
return XvProcVector[xv_SelectVideoNotify] (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void php_wddx_pop_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name)
{
st_entry *ent1, *ent2;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
HashTable *target_hash;
zend_class_entry **pce;
zval *obj;
zval *tmp;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
if (stack->top == 0) {
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING) || !strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN) || !strcmp(name, EL_NULL) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY) || !strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET) || !strcmp(name, EL_BINARY) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent1);
if (!ent1->data) {
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
int new_len=0;
unsigned char *new_str;
new_str = php_base64_decode(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data), &new_len);
STR_FREE(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data));
Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data) = new_str;
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) = new_len;
}
/* Call __wakeup() method on the object. */
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zval *fname, *retval = NULL;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__wakeup", 1);
call_user_function_ex(NULL, &ent1->data, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent2);
/* if non-existent field */
if (ent2->type == ST_FIELD && ent2->data == NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY || Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
target_hash = HASH_OF(ent2->data);
if (ent1->varname) {
if (!strcmp(ent1->varname, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR) &&
Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) &&
ent2->type == ST_STRUCT && Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_bool incomplete_class = 0;
zend_str_tolower(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
if (zend_hash_find(EG(class_table), Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data),
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data)+1, (void **) &pce)==FAILURE) {
incomplete_class = 1;
pce = &PHP_IC_ENTRY;
}
/* Initialize target object */
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(obj);
object_init_ex(obj, *pce);
/* Merge current hashtable with object's default properties */
zend_hash_merge(Z_OBJPROP_P(obj),
Z_ARRVAL_P(ent2->data),
(void (*)(void *)) zval_add_ref,
(void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), 0);
if (incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(obj, Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
}
/* Clean up old array entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
/* Set stack entry to point to the newly created object */
ent2->data = obj;
/* Clean up class name var entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_class_entry *old_scope = EG(scope);
EG(scope) = Z_OBJCE_P(ent2->data);
Z_DELREF_P(ent1->data);
add_property_zval(ent2->data, ent1->varname, ent1->data);
EG(scope) = old_scope;
} else {
zend_symtable_update(target_hash, ent1->varname, strlen(ent1->varname)+1, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
efree(ent1->varname);
} else {
zend_hash_next_index_insert(target_hash, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
}
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR) && stack->varname) {
efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = NULL;
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void **)&ent);
efree(ent);
stack->top--;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72750: wddx_deserialize null dereference
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_venc::component_deinit(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp)
{
(void) hComp;
OMX_U32 i = 0;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("omx_venc(): Inside component_deinit()");
if (OMX_StateLoaded != m_state) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("WARNING:Rxd DeInit,OMX not in LOADED state %d",\
m_state);
}
if (m_out_mem_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing the Output Memory");
for (i=0; i< m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++ ) {
free_output_buffer (&m_out_mem_ptr[i]);
}
free(m_out_mem_ptr);
m_out_mem_ptr = NULL;
}
/*Check if the input buffers have to be cleaned up*/
if (m_inp_mem_ptr
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
&& !meta_mode_enable
#endif
) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Freeing the Input Memory");
for (i=0; i<m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++ ) {
free_input_buffer (&m_inp_mem_ptr[i]);
}
free(m_inp_mem_ptr);
m_inp_mem_ptr = NULL;
}
m_ftb_q.m_size=0;
m_cmd_q.m_size=0;
m_etb_q.m_size=0;
m_ftb_q.m_read = m_ftb_q.m_write =0;
m_cmd_q.m_read = m_cmd_q.m_write =0;
m_etb_q.m_read = m_etb_q.m_write =0;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Calling m_heap_ptr.clear()");
m_heap_ptr.clear();
#endif // _ANDROID_
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Calling venc_close()");
if (handle) {
handle->venc_close();
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Deleting HANDLE[%p]", handle);
delete (handle);
handle = NULL;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_INFO("Component Deinit");
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Heap Overflow and Possible Local Privilege Escalation in
MediaServer (libOmxVenc problem)
Bug: 27532497
Change-Id: I31e576ef9dc542df73aa6b0ea113d72724b50fc6
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: SCTP_STATIC int sctp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
int retval = 0;
int len;
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("sctp_getsockopt(sk: %p... optname: %d)\n",
sk, optname);
/* I can hardly begin to describe how wrong this is. This is
* so broken as to be worse than useless. The API draft
* REALLY is NOT helpful here... I am not convinced that the
* semantics of getsockopt() with a level OTHER THAN SOL_SCTP
* are at all well-founded.
*/
if (level != SOL_SCTP) {
struct sctp_af *af = sctp_sk(sk)->pf->af;
retval = af->getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
return retval;
}
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
sctp_lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case SCTP_STATUS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_sctp_status(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_DISABLE_FRAGMENTS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_disable_fragments(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_EVENTS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_events(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTOCLOSE:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_autoclose(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_peeloff(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PEER_ADDR_PARAMS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_peer_addr_params(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_DELAYED_ACK_TIME:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_delayed_ack_time(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_INITMSG:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_initmsg(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDRS_NUM_OLD:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_peer_addrs_num_old(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_GET_LOCAL_ADDRS_NUM_OLD:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_local_addrs_num_old(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDRS_OLD:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_peer_addrs_old(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_GET_LOCAL_ADDRS_OLD:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_local_addrs_old(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDRS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_peer_addrs(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_GET_LOCAL_ADDRS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_local_addrs(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_DEFAULT_SEND_PARAM:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_default_send_param(sk, len,
optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_primary_addr(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_NODELAY:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_nodelay(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_RTOINFO:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_rtoinfo(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_ASSOCINFO:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_associnfo(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_I_WANT_MAPPED_V4_ADDR:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_mappedv4(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_MAXSEG:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_maxseg(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDR_INFO:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_peer_addr_info(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_ADAPTATION_LAYER:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_adaptation_layer(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_CONTEXT:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_context(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
default:
retval = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
};
sctp_release_sock(sk);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: get_linux_shareopts(const char *shareopts, char **plinux_opts)
{
int rc;
assert(plinux_opts != NULL);
*plinux_opts = NULL;
/* default options for Solaris shares */
(void) add_linux_shareopt(plinux_opts, "no_subtree_check", NULL);
(void) add_linux_shareopt(plinux_opts, "no_root_squash", NULL);
(void) add_linux_shareopt(plinux_opts, "mountpoint", NULL);
rc = foreach_nfs_shareopt(shareopts, get_linux_shareopts_cb,
plinux_opts);
if (rc != SA_OK) {
free(*plinux_opts);
*plinux_opts = NULL;
}
return (rc);
}
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare.
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int spl_filesystem_file_read(spl_filesystem_object *intern, int silent TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
char *buf;
size_t line_len = 0;
long line_add = (intern->u.file.current_line || intern->u.file.current_zval) ? 1 : 0;
spl_filesystem_file_free_line(intern TSRMLS_CC);
if (php_stream_eof(intern->u.file.stream)) {
if (!silent) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot read from file %s", intern->file_name);
}
return FAILURE;
}
if (intern->u.file.max_line_len > 0) {
buf = safe_emalloc((intern->u.file.max_line_len + 1), sizeof(char), 0);
if (php_stream_get_line(intern->u.file.stream, buf, intern->u.file.max_line_len + 1, &line_len) == NULL) {
efree(buf);
buf = NULL;
} else {
buf[line_len] = '\0';
}
} else {
buf = php_stream_get_line(intern->u.file.stream, NULL, 0, &line_len);
}
if (!buf) {
intern->u.file.current_line = estrdup("");
intern->u.file.current_line_len = 0;
} else {
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_DROP_NEW_LINE)) {
line_len = strcspn(buf, "\r\n");
buf[line_len] = '\0';
}
intern->u.file.current_line = buf;
intern->u.file.current_line_len = line_len;
}
intern->u.file.current_line_num += line_add;
return SUCCESS;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static MagickBooleanType WritePSDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
char
layer_name[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*property;
const StringInfo
*icc_profile,
*info;
Image
*base_image,
*next_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
*layer_size_offsets,
size_offset;
PSDInfo
psd_info;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
layer_count,
layer_index,
length,
name_length,
num_channels,
packet_size,
rounded_size,
size;
StringInfo
*bim_profile;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
packet_size=(size_t) (image->depth > 8 ? 6 : 3);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
packet_size+=image->depth > 8 ? 2 : 1;
psd_info.version=1;
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PSB") == 0) ||
(image->columns > 30000) || (image->rows > 30000))
psd_info.version=2;
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(const unsigned char *) "8BPS");
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,psd_info.version); /* version */
for (i=1; i <= 6; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image, 0); /* 6 bytes of reserved */
/* When the image has a color profile it won't be converted to gray scale */
if ((GetImageProfile(image,"icc") == (StringInfo *) NULL) &&
(SetImageGray(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse))
num_channels=(image->matte != MagickFalse ? 2UL : 1UL);
else
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) && (image_info->type !=
TrueColorMatteType) && (image->storage_class == PseudoClass))
num_channels=(image->matte != MagickFalse ? 2UL : 1UL);
else
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass);
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
num_channels=(image->matte != MagickFalse ? 4UL : 3UL);
else
num_channels=(image->matte != MagickFalse ? 5UL : 4UL);
}
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) num_channels);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) image->columns);
if (IsGrayImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse)
{
MagickBooleanType
monochrome;
/*
Write depth & mode.
*/
monochrome=IsMonochromeImage(image,&image->exception) &&
(image->depth == 1) ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(monochrome != MagickFalse ? 1 : image->depth > 8 ? 16 : 8));
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(monochrome != MagickFalse ? BitmapMode : GrayscaleMode));
}
else
{
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) (image->storage_class ==
PseudoClass ? 8 : image->depth > 8 ? 16 : 8));
if (((image_info->colorspace != UndefinedColorspace) ||
(image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)) &&
(image_info->colorspace != CMYKColorspace))
{
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short)
(image->storage_class == PseudoClass ? IndexedMode : RGBMode));
}
else
{
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,CMYKMode);
}
}
if ((IsGrayImage(image,&image->exception) != MagickFalse) ||
(image->storage_class == DirectClass) || (image->colors > 256))
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0);
else
{
/*
Write PSD raster colormap.
*/
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,768);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].red));
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(
image->colormap[i].green));
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(image->colormap[i].blue));
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
}
/*
Image resource block.
*/
length=28; /* 0x03EB */
bim_profile=(StringInfo *) GetImageProfile(image,"8bim");
icc_profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if (bim_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
bim_profile=CloneStringInfo(bim_profile);
if (icc_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
RemoveICCProfileFromResourceBlock(bim_profile);
RemoveResolutionFromResourceBlock(bim_profile);
length+=PSDQuantum(GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile));
}
if (icc_profile != (const StringInfo *) NULL)
length+=PSDQuantum(GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile))+12;
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) length);
WriteResolutionResourceBlock(image);
if (bim_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile));
bim_profile=DestroyStringInfo(bim_profile);
}
if (icc_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(const unsigned char *) "8BIM");
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0x0000040F);
(void) WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0);
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) GetStringInfoLength(
icc_profile));
(void) WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile),
GetStringInfoDatum(icc_profile));
if ((MagickOffsetType) GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile) !=
PSDQuantum(GetStringInfoLength(icc_profile)))
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,0);
}
base_image=GetNextImageInList(image);
if (base_image == (Image *)NULL)
base_image=image;
size=0;
size_offset=TellBlob(image);
SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,0);
SetPSDSize(&psd_info,image,0);
layer_count=0;
for (next_image=base_image; next_image != NULL; )
{
layer_count++;
next_image=GetNextImageInList(next_image);
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
size+=WriteBlobMSBShort(image,-(unsigned short) layer_count);
else
size+=WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) layer_count);
layer_size_offsets=(MagickOffsetType *) AcquireQuantumMemory(
(size_t) layer_count,sizeof(MagickOffsetType));
if (layer_size_offsets == (MagickOffsetType *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
layer_index=0;
for (next_image=base_image; next_image != NULL; )
{
Image
*mask;
unsigned char
default_color;
unsigned short
channels,
total_channels;
mask=(Image *) NULL;
property=GetImageArtifact(next_image,"psd:opacity-mask");
default_color=0;
if (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
mask=(Image *) GetImageRegistry(ImageRegistryType,property,
&image->exception);
default_color=strlen(property) == 9 ? 255 : 0;
}
size+=WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) next_image->page.y);
size+=WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) next_image->page.x);
size+=WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) (next_image->page.y+
next_image->rows));
size+=WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) (next_image->page.x+
next_image->columns));
channels=1U;
if ((next_image->storage_class != PseudoClass) &&
(IsGrayImage(next_image,&next_image->exception) == MagickFalse))
channels=next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace ? 4U : 3U;
total_channels=channels;
if (next_image->matte != MagickFalse)
total_channels++;
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
total_channels++;
size+=WriteBlobMSBShort(image,total_channels);
layer_size_offsets[layer_index++]=TellBlob(image);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) channels; i++)
size+=WriteChannelSize(&psd_info,image,(signed short) i);
if (next_image->matte != MagickFalse)
size+=WriteChannelSize(&psd_info,image,-1);
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
size+=WriteChannelSize(&psd_info,image,-2);
size+=WriteBlob(image,4,(const unsigned char *) "8BIM");
size+=WriteBlob(image,4,(const unsigned char *)
CompositeOperatorToPSDBlendMode(next_image->compose));
property=GetImageArtifact(next_image,"psd:layer.opacity");
if (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
Quantum
opacity;
opacity=(Quantum) StringToInteger(property);
size+=WriteBlobByte(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(opacity));
(void) ApplyPSDLayerOpacity(next_image,opacity,MagickTrue,
&image->exception);
}
else
size+=WriteBlobByte(image,255);
size+=WriteBlobByte(image,0);
size+=WriteBlobByte(image,next_image->compose==NoCompositeOp ?
1 << 0x02 : 1); /* layer properties - visible, etc. */
size+=WriteBlobByte(image,0);
info=GetAdditionalInformation(image_info,next_image);
property=(const char *) GetImageProperty(next_image,"label");
if (property == (const char *) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(layer_name,MaxTextExtent,"L%.20g",
(double) layer_index);
property=layer_name;
}
name_length=strlen(property)+1;
if ((name_length % 4) != 0)
name_length+=(4-(name_length % 4));
if (info != (const StringInfo *) NULL)
name_length+=GetStringInfoLength(info);
name_length+=8;
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
name_length+=20;
size+=WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) name_length);
if (mask == (Image *) NULL)
size+=WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0);
else
{
if (mask->compose != NoCompositeOp)
(void) ApplyPSDOpacityMask(next_image,mask,ScaleCharToQuantum(
default_color),MagickTrue,&image->exception);
mask->page.y+=image->page.y;
mask->page.x+=image->page.x;
size+=WriteBlobMSBLong(image,20);
size+=WriteBlobMSBSignedLong(image,mask->page.y);
size+=WriteBlobMSBSignedLong(image,mask->page.x);
size+=WriteBlobMSBSignedLong(image,(const signed int) mask->rows+
mask->page.y);
size+=WriteBlobMSBSignedLong(image,(const signed int) mask->columns+
mask->page.x);
size+=WriteBlobByte(image,default_color);
size+=WriteBlobByte(image,mask->compose == NoCompositeOp ? 2 : 0);
size+=WriteBlobMSBShort(image,0);
}
size+=WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0);
size+=WritePascalString(image,property,4);
if (info != (const StringInfo *) NULL)
size+=WriteBlob(image,GetStringInfoLength(info),
GetStringInfoDatum(info));
next_image=GetNextImageInList(next_image);
}
/*
Now the image data!
*/
next_image=base_image;
layer_index=0;
while (next_image != NULL)
{
length=WritePSDChannels(&psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
layer_size_offsets[layer_index++],MagickTrue);
if (length == 0)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
size+=length;
next_image=GetNextImageInList(next_image);
}
(void) WriteBlobMSBLong(image,0); /* user mask data */
/*
Remove the opacity mask from the registry
*/
next_image=base_image;
while (next_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
property=GetImageArtifact(next_image,"psd:opacity-mask");
if (property != (const char *) NULL)
DeleteImageRegistry(property);
next_image=GetNextImageInList(next_image);
}
/*
Write the total size
*/
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(&psd_info,image,size+
(psd_info.version == 1 ? 8 : 16),size_offset);
if ((size/2) != ((size+1)/2))
rounded_size=size+1;
else
rounded_size=size;
(void) WritePSDSize(&psd_info,image,rounded_size,size_offset);
layer_size_offsets=(MagickOffsetType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
layer_size_offsets);
/*
Write composite image.
*/
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
CompressionType
compression;
compression=image->compression;
if (image->compression == ZipCompression)
image->compression=RLECompression;
if (WritePSDChannels(&psd_info,image_info,image,image,0,
MagickFalse) == 0)
status=MagickFalse;
image->compression=compression;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: fgetwln(FILE *stream, size_t *lenp)
{
struct filewbuf *fb;
wint_t wc;
size_t wused = 0;
/* Try to diminish the possibility of several fgetwln() calls being
* used on different streams, by using a pool of buffers per file. */
fb = &fb_pool[fb_pool_cur];
if (fb->fp != stream && fb->fp != NULL) {
fb_pool_cur++;
fb_pool_cur %= FILEWBUF_POOL_ITEMS;
fb = &fb_pool[fb_pool_cur];
}
fb->fp = stream;
while ((wc = fgetwc(stream)) != WEOF) {
if (!fb->len || wused > fb->len) {
wchar_t *wp;
if (fb->len)
fb->len *= 2;
else
fb->len = FILEWBUF_INIT_LEN;
wp = reallocarray(fb->wbuf, fb->len, sizeof(wchar_t));
if (wp == NULL) {
wused = 0;
break;
}
fb->wbuf = wp;
}
fb->wbuf[wused++] = wc;
if (wc == L'\n')
break;
}
*lenp = wused;
return wused ? fb->wbuf : NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void btm_sec_pin_code_request (UINT8 *p_bda)
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec;
tBTM_CB *p_cb = &btm_cb;
#ifdef PORCHE_PAIRING_CONFLICT
UINT8 default_pin_code_len = 4;
PIN_CODE default_pin_code = {0x30, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30};
#endif
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_pin_code_request() State: %s, BDA:%04x%08x",
btm_pair_state_descr(btm_cb.pairing_state),
(p_bda[0]<<8)+p_bda[1], (p_bda[2]<<24)+(p_bda[3]<<16)+(p_bda[4]<<8)+p_bda[5] );
if (btm_cb.pairing_state != BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE)
{
if ( (memcmp (p_bda, btm_cb.pairing_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN) == 0) &&
(btm_cb.pairing_state == BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE) )
{
/* fake this out - porshe carkit issue - */
if(! btm_cb.pin_code_len_saved)
{
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_neg_reply (p_bda);
return;
}
else
{
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_req_reply (p_bda, btm_cb.pin_code_len_saved, p_cb->pin_code);
return;
}
}
else if ((btm_cb.pairing_state != BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_PIN_REQ)
|| memcmp (p_bda, btm_cb.pairing_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN) != 0)
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING ("btm_sec_pin_code_request() rejected - state: %s",
btm_pair_state_descr(btm_cb.pairing_state));
#ifdef PORCHE_PAIRING_CONFLICT
/* reply pin code again due to counter in_rand when local initiates pairing */
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_pin_code_request from remote dev. for local initiated pairing");
if(! btm_cb.pin_code_len_saved)
{
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE);
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_req_reply (p_bda, default_pin_code_len, default_pin_code);
}
else
{
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE);
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_req_reply (p_bda, btm_cb.pin_code_len_saved, p_cb->pin_code);
}
#else
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_neg_reply (p_bda);
#endif
return;
}
}
p_dev_rec = btm_find_or_alloc_dev (p_bda);
/* received PIN code request. must be non-sm4 */
p_dev_rec->sm4 = BTM_SM4_KNOWN;
if (btm_cb.pairing_state == BTM_PAIR_STATE_IDLE)
{
memcpy (btm_cb.pairing_bda, p_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN);
btm_cb.pairing_flags = BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_PEER_STARTED_DD;
/* Make sure we reset the trusted mask to help against attacks */
BTM_SEC_CLR_TRUSTED_DEVICE(p_dev_rec->trusted_mask);
}
if (!p_cb->pairing_disabled && (p_cb->cfg.pin_type == HCI_PIN_TYPE_FIXED))
{
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_pin_code_request fixed pin replying");
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE);
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_req_reply (p_bda, p_cb->cfg.pin_code_len, p_cb->cfg.pin_code);
return;
}
/* Use the connecting device's CoD for the connection */
if ( (!memcmp (p_bda, p_cb->connecting_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN))
&& (p_cb->connecting_dc[0] || p_cb->connecting_dc[1] || p_cb->connecting_dc[2]) )
memcpy (p_dev_rec->dev_class, p_cb->connecting_dc, DEV_CLASS_LEN);
/* We could have started connection after asking user for the PIN code */
if (btm_cb.pin_code_len != 0)
{
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_pin_code_request bonding sending reply");
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_req_reply (p_bda, btm_cb.pin_code_len, p_cb->pin_code);
#ifdef PORCHE_PAIRING_CONFLICT
btm_cb.pin_code_len_saved = btm_cb.pin_code_len;
#endif
/* Mark that we forwarded received from the user PIN code */
btm_cb.pin_code_len = 0;
/* We can change mode back right away, that other connection being established */
/* is not forced to be secure - found a FW issue, so we can not do this
btm_restore_mode(); */
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_AUTH_COMPLETE);
}
/* If pairing disabled OR (no PIN callback and not bonding) */
/* OR we could not allocate entry in the database reject pairing request */
else if (p_cb->pairing_disabled
|| (p_cb->api.p_pin_callback == NULL)
/* OR Microsoft keyboard can for some reason try to establish connection */
/* the only thing we can do here is to shut it up. Normally we will be originator */
/* for keyboard bonding */
|| (!p_dev_rec->is_originator
&& ((p_dev_rec->dev_class[1] & BTM_COD_MAJOR_CLASS_MASK) == BTM_COD_MAJOR_PERIPHERAL)
&& (p_dev_rec->dev_class[2] & BTM_COD_MINOR_KEYBOARD)) )
{
BTM_TRACE_WARNING("btm_sec_pin_code_request(): Pairing disabled:%d; PIN callback:%x, Dev Rec:%x!",
p_cb->pairing_disabled, p_cb->api.p_pin_callback, p_dev_rec);
btsnd_hcic_pin_code_neg_reply (p_bda);
}
/* Notify upper layer of PIN request and start expiration timer */
else
{
btm_cb.pin_code_len_saved = 0;
btm_sec_change_pairing_state (BTM_PAIR_STATE_WAIT_LOCAL_PIN);
/* Pin code request can not come at the same time as connection request */
memcpy (p_cb->connecting_bda, p_bda, BD_ADDR_LEN);
memcpy (p_cb->connecting_dc, p_dev_rec->dev_class, DEV_CLASS_LEN);
/* Check if the name is known */
/* Even if name is not known we might not be able to get one */
/* this is the case when we are already getting something from the */
/* device, so HCI level is flow controlled */
/* Also cannot send remote name request while paging, i.e. connection is not completed */
if (p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_NAME_KNOWN)
{
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_pin_code_request going for callback");
btm_cb.pairing_flags |= BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_PIN_REQD;
if (p_cb->api.p_pin_callback)
(*p_cb->api.p_pin_callback) (p_bda, p_dev_rec->dev_class, p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name);
}
else
{
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("btm_sec_pin_code_request going for remote name");
/* We received PIN code request for the device with unknown name */
/* it is not user friendly just to ask for the PIN without name */
/* try to get name at first */
if (!btsnd_hcic_rmt_name_req (p_dev_rec->bd_addr,
HCI_PAGE_SCAN_REP_MODE_R1,
HCI_MANDATARY_PAGE_SCAN_MODE, 0))
{
p_dev_rec->sec_flags |= BTM_SEC_NAME_KNOWN;
p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name[0] = 'f';
p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name[1] = '0';
BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("can not send rmt_name_req?? fake a name and call callback");
btm_cb.pairing_flags |= BTM_PAIR_FLAGS_PIN_REQD;
if (p_cb->api.p_pin_callback)
(*p_cb->api.p_pin_callback) (p_bda, p_dev_rec->dev_class, p_dev_rec->sec_bd_name);
}
}
}
return;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void SetLengthImpl(Isolate* isolate, Handle<JSArray> array,
uint32_t length,
Handle<FixedArrayBase> backing_store) {
DCHECK(!array->SetLengthWouldNormalize(length));
DCHECK(IsFastElementsKind(array->GetElementsKind()));
uint32_t old_length = 0;
CHECK(array->length()->ToArrayIndex(&old_length));
if (old_length < length) {
ElementsKind kind = array->GetElementsKind();
if (!IsFastHoleyElementsKind(kind)) {
kind = GetHoleyElementsKind(kind);
JSObject::TransitionElementsKind(array, kind);
}
}
uint32_t capacity = backing_store->length();
old_length = Min(old_length, capacity);
if (length == 0) {
array->initialize_elements();
} else if (length <= capacity) {
if (IsFastSmiOrObjectElementsKind(kind())) {
JSObject::EnsureWritableFastElements(array);
if (array->elements() != *backing_store) {
backing_store = handle(array->elements(), isolate);
}
}
if (2 * length <= capacity) {
isolate->heap()->RightTrimFixedArray(*backing_store, capacity - length);
} else {
BackingStore::cast(*backing_store)->FillWithHoles(length, old_length);
}
} else {
capacity = Max(length, JSObject::NewElementsCapacity(capacity));
Subclass::GrowCapacityAndConvertImpl(array, capacity);
}
array->set_length(Smi::FromInt(length));
JSObject::ValidateElements(array);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void AXObjectCacheImpl::inlineTextBoxesUpdated(LineLayoutItem lineLayoutItem) {
if (!inlineTextBoxAccessibilityEnabled())
return;
LayoutObject* layoutObject =
LineLayoutAPIShim::layoutObjectFrom(lineLayoutItem);
if (AXObject* obj = get(layoutObject)) {
if (!obj->needsToUpdateChildren()) {
obj->setNeedsToUpdateChildren();
postNotification(layoutObject, AXChildrenChanged);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: long SegmentInfo::Parse()
{
assert(m_pMuxingAppAsUTF8 == NULL);
assert(m_pWritingAppAsUTF8 == NULL);
assert(m_pTitleAsUTF8 == NULL);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
m_timecodeScale = 1000000;
m_duration = -1;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x0AD7B1) //Timecode Scale
{
m_timecodeScale = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_timecodeScale <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x0489) //Segment duration
{
const long status = UnserializeFloat(
pReader,
pos,
size,
m_duration);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (m_duration < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x0D80) //MuxingApp
{
const long status = UnserializeString(
pReader,
pos,
size,
m_pMuxingAppAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x1741) //WritingApp
{
const long status = UnserializeString(
pReader,
pos,
size,
m_pWritingAppAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
}
else if (id == 0x3BA9) //Title
{
const long status = UnserializeString(
pReader,
pos,
size,
m_pTitleAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void ext4_ext_truncate(struct inode *inode)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_lblk_t last_block;
handle_t *handle;
int err = 0;
/*
* finish any pending end_io work so we won't run the risk of
* converting any truncated blocks to initialized later
*/
ext4_flush_completed_IO(inode);
/*
* probably first extent we're gonna free will be last in block
*/
err = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, err);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return;
if (inode->i_size & (sb->s_blocksize - 1))
ext4_block_truncate_page(handle, mapping, inode->i_size);
if (ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode))
goto out_stop;
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_ext_invalidate_cache(inode);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
/*
* TODO: optimization is possible here.
* Probably we need not scan at all,
* because page truncation is enough.
*/
/* we have to know where to truncate from in crash case */
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = inode->i_size;
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
last_block = (inode->i_size + sb->s_blocksize - 1)
>> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
err = ext4_ext_remove_space(inode, last_block);
/* In a multi-transaction truncate, we only make the final
* transaction synchronous.
*/
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
out_stop:
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
/*
* If this was a simple ftruncate() and the file will remain alive,
* then we need to clear up the orphan record which we created above.
* However, if this was a real unlink then we were called by
* ext4_delete_inode(), and we allow that function to clean up the
* orphan info for us.
*/
if (inode->i_nlink)
ext4_orphan_del(handle, inode);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void CairoOutputDev::setTextPage(TextPage *text)
{
if (this->text)
this->text->decRefCnt();
if (actualText)
delete actualText;
if (text) {
this->text = text;
this->text->incRefCnt();
actualText = new ActualText(text);
} else {
this->text = NULL;
actualText = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, count)
{
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(zend_hash_num_elements(&phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int opinc(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
if (op->operands[1].type) {
eprintf ("Error: Invalid operands\n");
return -1;
}
int l = 0;
int size = op->operands[0].type & ALL_SIZE;
if (op->operands[0].explicit_size) {
size = op->operands[0].dest_size;
}
if (size & OT_WORD) {
data[l++] = 0x66;
}
int rex = 1 << 6;
bool use_rex = false;
if (size & OT_QWORD) { //W field
use_rex = true;
rex |= 1 << 3;
}
if (op->operands[0].extended) { //B field
use_rex = true;
rex |= 1;
}
int opcode;
if (size & OT_BYTE) {
opcode = 0xfe;
} else {
opcode = 0xff;
}
if (!(op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY)) {
if (use_rex) {
data[l++] = rex;
}
if (a->bits > 32 || size & OT_BYTE) {
data[l++] = opcode;
}
if (a->bits == 32 && size & (OT_DWORD | OT_WORD)) {
data[l++] = 0x40 | op->operands[0].reg;
} else {
data[l++] = 0xc0 | op->operands[0].reg;
}
return l;
}
bool rip_rel = op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_RIP;
int offset = op->operands[0].offset * op->operands[0].offset_sign;
int modrm = 0;
int mod;
int reg = 0;
int rm;
bool use_sib = false;
int sib;
if (offset == 0) {
mod = 0;
} else if (offset < 128 && offset > -129) {
mod = 1;
} else {
mod = 2;
}
if (op->operands[0].regs[0] & OT_WORD) {
if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_BX && op->operands[0].regs[1] == X86R_SI) {
rm = B0000;
} else if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_BX && op->operands[0].regs[1] == X86R_DI) {
rm = B0001;
} else if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_BP && op->operands[0].regs[1] == X86R_SI) {
rm = B0010;
} else if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_BP && op->operands[0].regs[1] == X86R_DI) {
rm = B0011;
} else if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_SI && op->operands[0].regs[1] == -1) {
rm = B0100;
} else if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_DI && op->operands[0].regs[1] == -1) {
rm = B0101;
} else if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_BX && op->operands[0].regs[1] == -1) {
rm = B0111;
} else {
return -1;
}
modrm = (mod << 6) | (reg << 3) | rm;
} else {
if (op->operands[0].extended) {
rm = op->operands[0].reg;
} else {
rm = op->operands[0].regs[0];
}
if (rm == 5 && mod == 0) {
mod = 1;
}
int index = op->operands[0].regs[1];
int scale = getsib(op->operands[0].scale[1]);
if (index != -1) {
use_sib = true;
sib = (scale << 6) | (index << 3) | rm;
} else if (rm == 4) {
use_sib = true;
sib = 0x24;
}
if (use_sib) {
rm = B0100;
}
if (rip_rel) {
modrm = (B0000 << 6) | (reg << 3) | B0101;
sib = (scale << 6) | (B0100 << 3) | B0101;
} else {
modrm = (mod << 6) | (reg << 3) | rm;
}
}
if (use_rex) {
data[l++] = rex;
}
data[l++] = opcode;
data[l++] = modrm;
if (use_sib) {
data[l++] = sib;
}
if (mod == 1) {
data[l++] = offset;
} else if (op->operands[0].regs[0] & OT_WORD && mod == 2) {
data[l++] = offset;
data[l++] = offset >> 8;
} else if (mod == 2 || rip_rel) {
data[l++] = offset;
data[l++] = offset >> 8;
data[l++] = offset >> 16;
data[l++] = offset >> 24;
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12242 - Crash in x86.nz assembler (#12266)
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetImageProfile(Image *image,const char *name,
const StringInfo *profile)
{
return(SetImageProfileInternal(image,name,profile,MagickFalse));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/354
CWE ID: CWE-415
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: PHP_FUNCTION( locale_get_region )
{
get_icu_value_src_php( LOC_REGION_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: System(char *command)
{
int pid, p;
void (*csig)(int);
int status;
if (!command)
return 1;
csig = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
if (csig == SIG_ERR) {
perror("signal");
return -1;
}
DebugF("System: `%s'\n", command);
switch (pid = fork()) {
case -1: /* error */
p = -1;
case 0: /* child */
if (setgid(getgid()) == -1)
_exit(127);
if (setuid(getuid()) == -1)
_exit(127);
execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", command, (char *)NULL);
_exit(127);
default: /* parent */
do {
p = waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
} while (p == -1 && errno == EINTR);
}
if (signal(SIGCHLD, csig) == SIG_ERR) {
perror("signal");
return -1;
}
return p == -1 ? -1 : status;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
#ifdef sgi
char tmpline[80];
#endif
char *p;
int rc, alen, flen;
int error = 0;
int have_bg = FALSE;
double LUT_exponent; /* just the lookup table */
double CRT_exponent = 2.2; /* just the monitor */
double default_display_exponent; /* whole display system */
XEvent e;
KeySym k;
displayname = (char *)NULL;
filename = (char *)NULL;
/* First set the default value for our display-system exponent, i.e.,
* the product of the CRT exponent and the exponent corresponding to
* the frame-buffer's lookup table (LUT), if any. This is not an
* exhaustive list of LUT values (e.g., OpenStep has a lot of weird
* ones), but it should cover 99% of the current possibilities. */
#if defined(NeXT)
LUT_exponent = 1.0 / 2.2;
/*
if (some_next_function_that_returns_gamma(&next_gamma))
LUT_exponent = 1.0 / next_gamma;
*/
#elif defined(sgi)
LUT_exponent = 1.0 / 1.7;
/* there doesn't seem to be any documented function to get the
* "gamma" value, so we do it the hard way */
infile = fopen("/etc/config/system.glGammaVal", "r");
if (infile) {
double sgi_gamma;
fgets(tmpline, 80, infile);
fclose(infile);
sgi_gamma = atof(tmpline);
if (sgi_gamma > 0.0)
LUT_exponent = 1.0 / sgi_gamma;
}
#elif defined(Macintosh)
LUT_exponent = 1.8 / 2.61;
/*
if (some_mac_function_that_returns_gamma(&mac_gamma))
LUT_exponent = mac_gamma / 2.61;
*/
#else
LUT_exponent = 1.0; /* assume no LUT: most PCs */
#endif
/* the defaults above give 1.0, 1.3, 1.5 and 2.2, respectively: */
default_display_exponent = LUT_exponent * CRT_exponent;
/* If the user has set the SCREEN_GAMMA environment variable as suggested
* (somewhat imprecisely) in the libpng documentation, use that; otherwise
* use the default value we just calculated. Either way, the user may
* override this via a command-line option. */
if ((p = getenv("SCREEN_GAMMA")) != NULL)
display_exponent = atof(p);
else
display_exponent = default_display_exponent;
/* Now parse the command line for options and the PNG filename. */
while (*++argv && !error) {
if (!strncmp(*argv, "-display", 2)) {
if (!*++argv)
++error;
else
displayname = *argv;
} else if (!strncmp(*argv, "-gamma", 2)) {
if (!*++argv)
++error;
else {
display_exponent = atof(*argv);
if (display_exponent <= 0.0)
++error;
}
} else if (!strncmp(*argv, "-bgcolor", 2)) {
if (!*++argv)
++error;
else {
bgstr = *argv;
if (strlen(bgstr) != 7 || bgstr[0] != '#')
++error;
else
have_bg = TRUE;
}
} else {
if (**argv != '-') {
filename = *argv;
if (argv[1]) /* shouldn't be any more args after filename */
++error;
} else
++error; /* not expecting any other options */
}
}
if (!filename)
++error;
/* print usage screen if any errors up to this point */
if (error) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n%s %s: %s\n", PROGNAME, VERSION, appname);
readpng_version_info();
fprintf(stderr, "\n"
"Usage: %s [-display xdpy] [-gamma exp] [-bgcolor bg] file.png\n"
" xdpy\tname of the target X display (e.g., ``hostname:0'')\n"
" exp \ttransfer-function exponent (``gamma'') of the display\n"
"\t\t system in floating-point format (e.g., ``%.1f''); equal\n"
"\t\t to the product of the lookup-table exponent (varies)\n"
"\t\t and the CRT exponent (usually 2.2); must be positive\n"
" bg \tdesired background color in 7-character hex RGB format\n"
"\t\t (e.g., ``#ff7700'' for orange: same as HTML colors);\n"
"\t\t used with transparent images\n"
"\nPress Q, Esc or mouse button 1 (within image window, after image\n"
"is displayed) to quit.\n"
"\n", PROGNAME, default_display_exponent);
exit(1);
}
if (!(infile = fopen(filename, "rb"))) {
fprintf(stderr, PROGNAME ": can't open PNG file [%s]\n", filename);
++error;
} else {
if ((rc = readpng_init(infile, &image_width, &image_height)) != 0) {
switch (rc) {
case 1:
fprintf(stderr, PROGNAME
": [%s] is not a PNG file: incorrect signature\n",
filename);
break;
case 2:
fprintf(stderr, PROGNAME
": [%s] has bad IHDR (libpng longjmp)\n", filename);
break;
case 4:
fprintf(stderr, PROGNAME ": insufficient memory\n");
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, PROGNAME
": unknown readpng_init() error\n");
break;
}
++error;
} else {
display = XOpenDisplay(displayname);
if (!display) {
readpng_cleanup(TRUE);
fprintf(stderr, PROGNAME ": can't open X display [%s]\n",
displayname? displayname : "default");
++error;
}
}
if (error)
fclose(infile);
}
if (error) {
fprintf(stderr, PROGNAME ": aborting.\n");
exit(2);
}
/* set the title-bar string, but make sure buffer doesn't overflow */
alen = strlen(appname);
flen = strlen(filename);
if (alen + flen + 3 > 1023)
sprintf(titlebar, "%s: ...%s", appname, filename+(alen+flen+6-1023));
else
sprintf(titlebar, "%s: %s", appname, filename);
/* if the user didn't specify a background color on the command line,
* check for one in the PNG file--if not, the initialized values of 0
* (black) will be used */
if (have_bg) {
unsigned r, g, b; /* this approach quiets compiler warnings */
sscanf(bgstr+1, "%2x%2x%2x", &r, &g, &b);
bg_red = (uch)r;
bg_green = (uch)g;
bg_blue = (uch)b;
} else if (readpng_get_bgcolor(&bg_red, &bg_green, &bg_blue) > 1) {
readpng_cleanup(TRUE);
fprintf(stderr, PROGNAME
": libpng error while checking for background color\n");
exit(2);
}
/* do the basic X initialization stuff, make the window and fill it
* with the background color */
if (rpng_x_create_window())
exit(2);
/* decode the image, all at once */
Trace((stderr, "calling readpng_get_image()\n"))
image_data = readpng_get_image(display_exponent, &image_channels,
&image_rowbytes);
Trace((stderr, "done with readpng_get_image()\n"))
/* done with PNG file, so clean up to minimize memory usage (but do NOT
* nuke image_data!) */
readpng_cleanup(FALSE);
fclose(infile);
if (!image_data) {
fprintf(stderr, PROGNAME ": unable to decode PNG image\n");
exit(3);
}
/* display image (composite with background if requested) */
Trace((stderr, "calling rpng_x_display_image()\n"))
if (rpng_x_display_image()) {
free(image_data);
exit(4);
}
Trace((stderr, "done with rpng_x_display_image()\n"))
/* wait for the user to tell us when to quit */
printf(
"Done. Press Q, Esc or mouse button 1 (within image window) to quit.\n");
fflush(stdout);
do
XNextEvent(display, &e);
while (!(e.type == ButtonPress && e.xbutton.button == Button1) &&
!(e.type == KeyPress && /* v--- or 1 for shifted keys */
((k = XLookupKeysym(&e.xkey, 0)) == XK_q || k == XK_Escape) ));
/* OK, we're done: clean up all image and X resources and go away */
rpng_x_cleanup();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void *Sys_LoadDll(const char *name, qboolean useSystemLib)
{
void *dllhandle;
if(useSystemLib)
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\"...\n", name);
if(!useSystemLib || !(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(name)))
{
const char *topDir;
char libPath[MAX_OSPATH];
topDir = Sys_BinaryPath();
if(!*topDir)
topDir = ".";
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, topDir);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", topDir, PATH_SEP, name);
if(!(dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath)))
{
const char *basePath = Cvar_VariableString("fs_basepath");
if(!basePath || !*basePath)
basePath = ".";
if(FS_FilenameCompare(topDir, basePath))
{
Com_Printf("Trying to load \"%s\" from \"%s\"...\n", name, basePath);
Com_sprintf(libPath, sizeof(libPath), "%s%c%s", basePath, PATH_SEP, name);
dllhandle = Sys_LoadLibrary(libPath);
}
if(!dllhandle)
Com_Printf("Loading \"%s\" failed\n", name);
}
}
return dllhandle;
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: TakeLastCommitParams() {
return std::move(last_commit_params_);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd_in, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *p = (void __user *)arg;
int __user *ip = p;
int result, val, read_only;
Sg_device *sdp;
Sg_fd *sfp;
Sg_request *srp;
unsigned long iflags;
if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp)))
return -ENXIO;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
"sg_ioctl: cmd=0x%x\n", (int) cmd_in));
read_only = (O_RDWR != (filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE));
switch (cmd_in) {
case SG_IO:
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
if (!scsi_block_when_processing_errors(sdp->device))
return -ENXIO;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, p, SZ_SG_IO_HDR))
return -EFAULT;
result = sg_new_write(sfp, filp, p, SZ_SG_IO_HDR,
1, read_only, 1, &srp);
if (result < 0)
return result;
result = wait_event_interruptible(sfp->read_wait,
(srp_done(sfp, srp) || atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)));
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
write_lock_irq(&sfp->rq_list_lock);
if (srp->done) {
srp->done = 2;
write_unlock_irq(&sfp->rq_list_lock);
result = sg_new_read(sfp, p, SZ_SG_IO_HDR, srp);
return (result < 0) ? result : 0;
}
srp->orphan = 1;
write_unlock_irq(&sfp->rq_list_lock);
return result; /* -ERESTARTSYS because signal hit process */
case SG_SET_TIMEOUT:
result = get_user(val, ip);
if (result)
return result;
if (val < 0)
return -EIO;
if (val >= mult_frac((s64)INT_MAX, USER_HZ, HZ))
val = min_t(s64, mult_frac((s64)INT_MAX, USER_HZ, HZ),
INT_MAX);
sfp->timeout_user = val;
sfp->timeout = mult_frac(val, HZ, USER_HZ);
return 0;
case SG_GET_TIMEOUT: /* N.B. User receives timeout as return value */
/* strange ..., for backward compatibility */
return sfp->timeout_user;
case SG_SET_FORCE_LOW_DMA:
/*
* N.B. This ioctl never worked properly, but failed to
* return an error value. So returning '0' to keep compability
* with legacy applications.
*/
return 0;
case SG_GET_LOW_DMA:
return put_user((int) sdp->device->host->unchecked_isa_dma, ip);
case SG_GET_SCSI_ID:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, p, sizeof (sg_scsi_id_t)))
return -EFAULT;
else {
sg_scsi_id_t __user *sg_idp = p;
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
__put_user((int) sdp->device->host->host_no,
&sg_idp->host_no);
__put_user((int) sdp->device->channel,
&sg_idp->channel);
__put_user((int) sdp->device->id, &sg_idp->scsi_id);
__put_user((int) sdp->device->lun, &sg_idp->lun);
__put_user((int) sdp->device->type, &sg_idp->scsi_type);
__put_user((short) sdp->device->host->cmd_per_lun,
&sg_idp->h_cmd_per_lun);
__put_user((short) sdp->device->queue_depth,
&sg_idp->d_queue_depth);
__put_user(0, &sg_idp->unused[0]);
__put_user(0, &sg_idp->unused[1]);
return 0;
}
case SG_SET_FORCE_PACK_ID:
result = get_user(val, ip);
if (result)
return result;
sfp->force_packid = val ? 1 : 0;
return 0;
case SG_GET_PACK_ID:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ip, sizeof (int)))
return -EFAULT;
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
if ((1 == srp->done) && (!srp->sg_io_owned)) {
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock,
iflags);
__put_user(srp->header.pack_id, ip);
return 0;
}
}
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
__put_user(-1, ip);
return 0;
case SG_GET_NUM_WAITING:
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
val = 0;
list_for_each_entry(srp, &sfp->rq_list, entry) {
if ((1 == srp->done) && (!srp->sg_io_owned))
++val;
}
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
return put_user(val, ip);
case SG_GET_SG_TABLESIZE:
return put_user(sdp->sg_tablesize, ip);
case SG_SET_RESERVED_SIZE:
result = get_user(val, ip);
if (result)
return result;
if (val < 0)
return -EINVAL;
val = min_t(int, val,
max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue));
mutex_lock(&sfp->f_mutex);
if (val != sfp->reserve.bufflen) {
if (sfp->mmap_called ||
sfp->res_in_use) {
mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex);
return -EBUSY;
}
sg_remove_scat(sfp, &sfp->reserve);
sg_build_reserve(sfp, val);
}
mutex_unlock(&sfp->f_mutex);
return 0;
case SG_GET_RESERVED_SIZE:
val = min_t(int, sfp->reserve.bufflen,
max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue));
return put_user(val, ip);
case SG_SET_COMMAND_Q:
result = get_user(val, ip);
if (result)
return result;
sfp->cmd_q = val ? 1 : 0;
return 0;
case SG_GET_COMMAND_Q:
return put_user((int) sfp->cmd_q, ip);
case SG_SET_KEEP_ORPHAN:
result = get_user(val, ip);
if (result)
return result;
sfp->keep_orphan = val;
return 0;
case SG_GET_KEEP_ORPHAN:
return put_user((int) sfp->keep_orphan, ip);
case SG_NEXT_CMD_LEN:
result = get_user(val, ip);
if (result)
return result;
if (val > SG_MAX_CDB_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
sfp->next_cmd_len = (val > 0) ? val : 0;
return 0;
case SG_GET_VERSION_NUM:
return put_user(sg_version_num, ip);
case SG_GET_ACCESS_COUNT:
/* faked - we don't have a real access count anymore */
val = (sdp->device ? 1 : 0);
return put_user(val, ip);
case SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE:
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, p, SZ_SG_REQ_INFO * SG_MAX_QUEUE))
return -EFAULT;
else {
sg_req_info_t *rinfo;
rinfo = kmalloc(SZ_SG_REQ_INFO * SG_MAX_QUEUE,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
sg_fill_request_table(sfp, rinfo);
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, iflags);
result = __copy_to_user(p, rinfo,
SZ_SG_REQ_INFO * SG_MAX_QUEUE);
result = result ? -EFAULT : 0;
kfree(rinfo);
return result;
}
case SG_EMULATED_HOST:
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
return put_user(sdp->device->host->hostt->emulated, ip);
case SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND:
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
if (read_only) {
unsigned char opcode = WRITE_6;
Scsi_Ioctl_Command __user *siocp = p;
if (copy_from_user(&opcode, siocp->data, 1))
return -EFAULT;
if (sg_allow_access(filp, &opcode))
return -EPERM;
}
return sg_scsi_ioctl(sdp->device->request_queue, NULL, filp->f_mode, p);
case SG_SET_DEBUG:
result = get_user(val, ip);
if (result)
return result;
sdp->sgdebug = (char) val;
return 0;
case BLKSECTGET:
return put_user(max_sectors_bytes(sdp->device->request_queue),
ip);
case BLKTRACESETUP:
return blk_trace_setup(sdp->device->request_queue,
sdp->disk->disk_name,
MKDEV(SCSI_GENERIC_MAJOR, sdp->index),
NULL, p);
case BLKTRACESTART:
return blk_trace_startstop(sdp->device->request_queue, 1);
case BLKTRACESTOP:
return blk_trace_startstop(sdp->device->request_queue, 0);
case BLKTRACETEARDOWN:
return blk_trace_remove(sdp->device->request_queue);
case SCSI_IOCTL_GET_IDLUN:
case SCSI_IOCTL_GET_BUS_NUMBER:
case SCSI_IOCTL_PROBE_HOST:
case SG_GET_TRANSFORM:
case SG_SCSI_RESET:
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
return -ENODEV;
break;
default:
if (read_only)
return -EPERM; /* don't know so take safe approach */
break;
}
result = scsi_ioctl_block_when_processing_errors(sdp->device,
cmd_in, filp->f_flags & O_NDELAY);
if (result)
return result;
return scsi_ioctl(sdp->device, cmd_in, p);
}
Commit Message: scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE
When calling SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE ioctl only a half-filled table is
returned; the remaining part will then contain stale kernel memory
information. This patch zeroes out the entire table to avoid this
issue.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: log2vis_utf8 (PyObject * string, int unicode_length,
FriBidiParType base_direction, int clean, int reordernsm)
{
FriBidiChar *logical = NULL; /* input fribidi unicode buffer */
FriBidiChar *visual = NULL; /* output fribidi unicode buffer */
char *visual_utf8 = NULL; /* output fribidi UTF-8 buffer */
FriBidiStrIndex new_len = 0; /* length of the UTF-8 buffer */
PyObject *result = NULL; /* failure */
/* Allocate fribidi unicode buffers */
logical = PyMem_New (FriBidiChar, unicode_length + 1);
if (logical == NULL)
{
PyErr_SetString (PyExc_MemoryError,
"failed to allocate unicode buffer");
goto cleanup;
}
visual = PyMem_New (FriBidiChar, unicode_length + 1);
if (visual == NULL)
{
PyErr_SetString (PyExc_MemoryError,
"failed to allocate unicode buffer");
goto cleanup;
}
/* Convert to unicode and order visually */
fribidi_set_reorder_nsm(reordernsm);
fribidi_utf8_to_unicode (PyString_AS_STRING (string),
PyString_GET_SIZE (string), logical);
if (!fribidi_log2vis (logical, unicode_length, &base_direction, visual,
NULL, NULL, NULL))
{
PyErr_SetString (PyExc_RuntimeError,
"fribidi failed to order string");
goto cleanup;
}
/* Cleanup the string if requested */
if (clean)
fribidi_remove_bidi_marks (visual, unicode_length, NULL, NULL, NULL);
/* Allocate fribidi UTF-8 buffer */
visual_utf8 = PyMem_New(char, (unicode_length * 4)+1);
if (visual_utf8 == NULL)
{
PyErr_SetString (PyExc_MemoryError,
"failed to allocate UTF-8 buffer");
goto cleanup;
}
/* Encode the reordered string and create result string */
new_len = fribidi_unicode_to_utf8 (visual, unicode_length, visual_utf8);
result = PyString_FromStringAndSize (visual_utf8, new_len);
if (result == NULL)
/* XXX does it raise any error? */
goto cleanup;
cleanup:
/* Delete unicode buffers */
PyMem_Del (logical);
PyMem_Del (visual);
PyMem_Del (visual_utf8);
return result;
}
Commit Message: refactor pyfribidi.c module
pyfribidi.c is now compiled as _pyfribidi. This module only handles
unicode internally and doesn't use the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode
function (which can't handle 4 byte utf-8 sequences). This fixes the
buffer overflow in issue #2.
The code is now also much simpler: pyfribidi.c is down from 280 to 130
lines of code.
We now ship a pure python pyfribidi that handles the case when
non-unicode strings are passed in.
We now also adapt the size of the output string if clean=True is
passed.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int aes_cfb_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
{
EVP_AES_KEY *dat = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_AES_KEY,ctx);
int num = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_num(ctx);
CRYPTO_cfb128_encrypt(in, out, len, &dat->ks,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), &num,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx), dat->block);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_num(ctx, num);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: const AtomicString& XMLHttpRequest::interfaceName() const
{
return eventNames().interfaceForXMLHttpRequest;
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: findoprnd(ITEM *ptr, int32 *pos)
{
#ifdef BS_DEBUG
elog(DEBUG3, (ptr[*pos].type == OPR) ?
"%d %c" : "%d %d", *pos, ptr[*pos].val);
#endif
if (ptr[*pos].type == VAL)
{
ptr[*pos].left = 0;
(*pos)--;
}
else if (ptr[*pos].val == (int32) '!')
{
ptr[*pos].left = -1;
(*pos)--;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
}
else
{
ITEM *curitem = &ptr[*pos];
int32 tmp = *pos;
(*pos)--;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
curitem->left = *pos - tmp;
findoprnd(ptr, pos);
}
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static future_t *shut_down(void) {
btif_config_flush();
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static ssize_t ib_uverbs_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *pos)
{
struct ib_uverbs_file *file = filp->private_data;
struct ib_device *ib_dev;
struct ib_uverbs_cmd_hdr hdr;
__u32 command;
__u32 flags;
int srcu_key;
ssize_t ret;
if (count < sizeof hdr)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&hdr, buf, sizeof hdr))
return -EFAULT;
srcu_key = srcu_read_lock(&file->device->disassociate_srcu);
ib_dev = srcu_dereference(file->device->ib_dev,
&file->device->disassociate_srcu);
if (!ib_dev) {
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if (hdr.command & ~(__u32)(IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_FLAGS_MASK |
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_COMMAND_MASK)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
command = hdr.command & IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_COMMAND_MASK;
if (verify_command_mask(ib_dev, command)) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
if (!file->ucontext &&
command != IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_GET_CONTEXT) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
flags = (hdr.command &
IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_FLAGS_MASK) >> IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_FLAGS_SHIFT;
if (!flags) {
if (command >= ARRAY_SIZE(uverbs_cmd_table) ||
!uverbs_cmd_table[command]) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (hdr.in_words * 4 != count) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ret = uverbs_cmd_table[command](file, ib_dev,
buf + sizeof(hdr),
hdr.in_words * 4,
hdr.out_words * 4);
} else if (flags == IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_FLAG_EXTENDED) {
struct ib_uverbs_ex_cmd_hdr ex_hdr;
struct ib_udata ucore;
struct ib_udata uhw;
size_t written_count = count;
if (command >= ARRAY_SIZE(uverbs_ex_cmd_table) ||
!uverbs_ex_cmd_table[command]) {
ret = -ENOSYS;
goto out;
}
if (!file->ucontext) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (count < (sizeof(hdr) + sizeof(ex_hdr))) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (copy_from_user(&ex_hdr, buf + sizeof(hdr), sizeof(ex_hdr))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
count -= sizeof(hdr) + sizeof(ex_hdr);
buf += sizeof(hdr) + sizeof(ex_hdr);
if ((hdr.in_words + ex_hdr.provider_in_words) * 8 != count) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (ex_hdr.cmd_hdr_reserved) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (ex_hdr.response) {
if (!hdr.out_words && !ex_hdr.provider_out_words) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE,
(void __user *) (unsigned long) ex_hdr.response,
(hdr.out_words + ex_hdr.provider_out_words) * 8)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
} else {
if (hdr.out_words || ex_hdr.provider_out_words) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
INIT_UDATA_BUF_OR_NULL(&ucore, buf, (unsigned long) ex_hdr.response,
hdr.in_words * 8, hdr.out_words * 8);
INIT_UDATA_BUF_OR_NULL(&uhw,
buf + ucore.inlen,
(unsigned long) ex_hdr.response + ucore.outlen,
ex_hdr.provider_in_words * 8,
ex_hdr.provider_out_words * 8);
ret = uverbs_ex_cmd_table[command](file,
ib_dev,
&ucore,
&uhw);
if (!ret)
ret = written_count;
} else {
ret = -ENOSYS;
}
out:
srcu_read_unlock(&file->device->disassociate_srcu, srcu_key);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static Image *ReadTIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
float
*chromaticity,
x_position,
y_position,
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
Image
*image;
int
tiff_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
pad;
ssize_t
y;
TIFF
*tiff;
TIFFMethodType
method;
uint16
compress_tag,
bits_per_sample,
endian,
extra_samples,
interlace,
max_sample_value,
min_sample_value,
orientation,
pages,
photometric,
*sample_info,
sample_format,
samples_per_pixel,
units,
value;
uint32
height,
rows_per_strip,
width;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) SetMagickThreadValue(tiff_exception,exception);
tiff=TIFFClientOpen(image->filename,"rb",(thandle_t) image,TIFFReadBlob,
TIFFWriteBlob,TIFFSeekBlob,TIFFCloseBlob,TIFFGetBlobSize,TIFFMapBlob,
TIFFUnmapBlob);
if (tiff == (TIFF *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
/*
Generate blank images for subimage specification (e.g. image.tif[4].
We need to check the number of directores because it is possible that
the subimage(s) are stored in the photoshop profile.
*/
if (image_info->scene < (size_t) TIFFNumberOfDirectories(tiff))
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image_info->scene; i++)
{
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
}
}
do
{
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0 && (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse))
TIFFPrintDirectory(tiff,stdout,MagickFalse);
RestoreMSCWarning
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,&width) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,&height) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION,&compress_tag) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_FILLORDER,&endian) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG,&interlace) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,&samples_per_pixel) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,&bits_per_sample) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,&sample_format) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MINSAMPLEVALUE,&min_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAXSAMPLEVALUE,&max_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC,&photometric) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"quantum:format","floating-point",
exception);
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-black",
exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-white",
exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","palette",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_RGB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","RGB",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIELAB",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIE Log2(L)",
exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","LOGLUV",exception);
break;
}
#if defined(PHOTOMETRIC_MASK)
case PHOTOMETRIC_MASK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","MASK",exception);
break;
}
#endif
case PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","separated",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","YCBCR",exception);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","unknown",exception);
break;
}
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Geometry: %ux%u",
(unsigned int) width,(unsigned int) height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Interlace: %u",
interlace);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Bits per sample: %u",bits_per_sample);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Min sample value: %u",min_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Max sample value: %u",max_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Photometric "
"interpretation: %s",GetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric",
exception));
}
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=(size_t) bits_per_sample;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Image depth: %.20g",
(double) image->depth);
image->endian=MSBEndian;
if (endian == FILLORDER_LSB2MSB)
image->endian=LSBEndian;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISBIGENDIAN)
if (TIFFIsBigEndian(tiff) == 0)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","lsb",exception);
image->endian=LSBEndian;
}
else
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","msb",exception);
image->endian=MSBEndian;
}
#endif
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED)
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace,exception);
TIFFGetProfiles(tiff,image,image_info->ping,exception);
TIFFGetProperties(tiff,image,exception);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:exif-properties");
if (IsStringFalse(option) == MagickFalse) /* enabled by default */
TIFFGetEXIFProperties(tiff,image,exception);
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,
&samples_per_pixel);
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XRESOLUTION,&x_resolution) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YRESOLUTION,&y_resolution) == 1))
{
image->resolution.x=x_resolution;
image->resolution.y=y_resolution;
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_RESOLUTIONUNIT,&units) == 1)
{
if (units == RESUNIT_INCH)
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
if (units == RESUNIT_CENTIMETER)
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
}
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XPOSITION,&x_position) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YPOSITION,&y_position) == 1))
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) ceil(x_position*image->resolution.x-0.5);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) ceil(y_position*image->resolution.y-0.5);
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION,&orientation) == 1)
image->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_WHITEPOINT,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=chromaticity[1];
}
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PRIMARYCHROMATICITIES,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=chromaticity[1];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=chromaticity[2];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=chromaticity[3];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=chromaticity[4];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=chromaticity[5];
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISCODECCONFIGURED) || (TIFFLIB_VERSION > 20040919)
if ((compress_tag != COMPRESSION_NONE) &&
(TIFFIsCODECConfigured(compress_tag) == 0))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"CompressNotSupported");
}
#endif
switch (compress_tag)
{
case COMPRESSION_NONE: image->compression=NoCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3: image->compression=FaxCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4: image->compression=Group4Compression; break;
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
{
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT)
{
char
sampling_factor[MagickPathExtent];
int
tiff_status;
uint16
horizontal,
vertical;
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,
&horizontal,&vertical);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(sampling_factor,MagickPathExtent,
"%dx%d",horizontal,vertical);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:sampling-factor",
sampling_factor,exception);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Sampling Factors: %s",sampling_factor);
}
}
#endif
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_OJPEG: image->compression=JPEGCompression; break;
#if defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case COMPRESSION_LZMA: image->compression=LZMACompression; break;
#endif
case COMPRESSION_LZW: image->compression=LZWCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
default: image->compression=RLECompression; break;
}
/*
Allocate memory for the image and pixel buffer.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,UnsignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_INT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,SignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
status=MagickTrue;
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_EXTRASAMPLES,&extra_samples,
&sample_info);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unspecified",exception);
if (extra_samples == 0)
{
if ((samples_per_pixel == 4) && (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB))
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
}
else
for (i=0; i < extra_samples; i++)
{
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_ASSOCALPHA)
{
SetQuantumAlphaType(quantum_info,DisassociatedQuantumAlpha);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","associated",
exception);
}
else
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_UNASSALPHA)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unassociated",
exception);
}
}
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE) &&
(pow(2.0,1.0*bits_per_sample) <= MaxColormapSize))
{
size_t
colors;
colors=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(bits_per_sample)+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
value=(unsigned short) image->scene;
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER,&value,&pages) == 1)
image->scene=value;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
int
tiff_status;
size_t
range;
uint16
*blue_colormap,
*green_colormap,
*red_colormap;
/*
Initialize colormap.
*/
tiff_status=TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COLORMAP,&red_colormap,
&green_colormap,&blue_colormap);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
if ((red_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(green_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(blue_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL))
{
range=255; /* might be old style 8-bit colormap */
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if ((red_colormap[i] >= 256) || (green_colormap[i] >= 256) ||
(blue_colormap[i] >= 256))
{
range=65535;
break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*red_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].green=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*green_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].blue=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*blue_colormap[i])/range);
}
}
}
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
image->depth=GetImageDepth(image,exception);
}
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
goto next_tiff_frame;
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,&rows_per_strip) == 1)
{
char
value[MagickPathExtent];
method=ReadStripMethod;
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%u",
(unsigned int) rows_per_strip);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:rows-per-strip",value,exception);
}
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 2) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG))
method=ReadRGBAMethod;
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 2) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE))
method=ReadCMYKAMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED) &&
(interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) && (bits_per_sample < 64))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->compression == JPEGCompression)
method=GetJPEGMethod(image,tiff,photometric,bits_per_sample,
samples_per_pixel);
if (compress_tag == COMPRESSION_JBIG)
method=ReadStripMethod;
if (TIFFIsTiled(tiff) != MagickFalse)
method=ReadTileMethod;
quantum_info->endian=LSBEndian;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
switch (method)
{
case ReadSingleSampleMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to PseudoClass MIFF image.
*/
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=samples_per_pixel == 1 ? AlphaQuantum :
GrayAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
else
{
quantum_type=IndexAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*pow(2,ceil(log(
bits_per_sample)/log(2))));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadRGBAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-3,0);
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-5,0);
}
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*((bits_per_sample+7) >> 3));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadCMYKAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
int
status;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,(tsample_t) i,y,(char *)
pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=RedQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=GreenQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=BlueQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
else
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=CyanQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=MagentaQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=YellowQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=BlackQuantum; break;
case 4: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadYCCKMethod:
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned char
*p;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
p=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelCyan(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.402*(double) *(p+2))-179.456)),q);
SetPixelMagenta(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p-
(0.34414*(double) *(p+1))-(0.71414*(double ) *(p+2))+
135.45984)),q);
SetPixelYellow(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.772*(double) *(p+1))-226.816)),q);
SetPixelBlack(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) *(p+3)),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p+=4;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadStripMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
/*
Convert stripped TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
i=0;
p=(uint32 *) NULL;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (i == 0)
{
if (TIFFReadRGBAStrip(tiff,(tstrip_t) y,(uint32 *) pixels) == 0)
break;
i=(ssize_t) MagickMin((ssize_t) rows_per_strip,(ssize_t)
image->rows-y);
}
i--;
p=((uint32 *) pixels)+image->columns*i;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetR(*p))),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetG(*p))),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetB(*p))),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetA(*p))),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadTileMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*tile_pixels,
columns,
rows;
/*
Convert tiled TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH,&columns) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH,&rows) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageIsNotTiled");
}
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) columns*rows;
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(rows,sizeof(*tile_pixels)) != MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(columns,rows*
sizeof(*tile_pixels));
if (tile_pixels == (uint32 *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=rows)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q,
*magick_restrict tile;
size_t
columns_remaining,
rows_remaining;
rows_remaining=image->rows-y;
if ((ssize_t) (y+rows) < (ssize_t) image->rows)
rows_remaining=rows;
tile=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,rows_remaining,
exception);
if (tile == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x+=columns)
{
size_t
column,
row;
if (TIFFReadRGBATile(tiff,(uint32) x,(uint32) y,tile_pixels) == 0)
break;
columns_remaining=image->columns-x;
if ((ssize_t) (x+columns) < (ssize_t) image->columns)
columns_remaining=columns;
p=tile_pixels+(rows-rows_remaining)*columns;
q=tile+GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns*(rows_remaining-1)+
x);
for (row=rows_remaining; row > 0; row--)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetA(*p)),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p+=columns-columns_remaining;
q-=GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+columns_remaining);
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(tile_pixels);
break;
}
case ReadGenericMethod:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*pixels;
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(image->rows,sizeof(*pixels)) != MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*
sizeof(uint32));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(uint32 *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
(void) TIFFReadRGBAImage(tiff,(uint32) image->columns,(uint32)
image->rows,(uint32 *) pixels,0);
/*
Convert image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels+number_pixels-1;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns-1);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetA(*p)),q);
p--;
q-=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
break;
}
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
next_tiff_frame:
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
DecodeLabImage(image,exception);
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
{
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (bits_per_sample == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,image->scene-1,
image->scene);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (status != MagickFalse);
TIFFClose(tiff);
TIFFReadPhotoshopLayers(image,image_info,exception);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
if (image_info->scene >= GetImageListLength(image))
{
/* Subimage was not found in the Photoshop layer */
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *)NULL);
}
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/268
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void TabClosedNotificationObserver::ObserveTab(
NavigationController* controller) {
if (!automation_)
return;
if (use_json_interface_) {
AutomationJSONReply(automation_,
reply_message_.release()).SendSuccess(NULL);
} else {
if (for_browser_command_) {
AutomationMsg_WindowExecuteCommand::WriteReplyParams(reply_message_.get(),
true);
} else {
AutomationMsg_CloseTab::WriteReplyParams(reply_message_.get(), true);
}
automation_->Send(reply_message_.release());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void sdp_copy_raw_data(tCONN_CB* p_ccb, bool offset) {
unsigned int cpy_len, rem_len;
uint32_t list_len;
uint8_t* p;
uint8_t type;
#if (SDP_DEBUG_RAW == TRUE)
uint8_t num_array[SDP_MAX_LIST_BYTE_COUNT];
uint32_t i;
for (i = 0; i < p_ccb->list_len; i++) {
snprintf((char*)&num_array[i * 2], sizeof(num_array) - i * 2, "%02X",
(uint8_t)(p_ccb->rsp_list[i]));
}
SDP_TRACE_WARNING("result :%s", num_array);
#endif
if (p_ccb->p_db->raw_data) {
cpy_len = p_ccb->p_db->raw_size - p_ccb->p_db->raw_used;
list_len = p_ccb->list_len;
p = &p_ccb->rsp_list[0];
if (offset) {
type = *p++;
p = sdpu_get_len_from_type(p, type, &list_len);
}
if (list_len < cpy_len) {
cpy_len = list_len;
}
rem_len = SDP_MAX_LIST_BYTE_COUNT - (unsigned int)(p - &p_ccb->rsp_list[0]);
if (cpy_len > rem_len) {
SDP_TRACE_WARNING("rem_len :%d less than cpy_len:%d", rem_len, cpy_len);
cpy_len = rem_len;
}
SDP_TRACE_WARNING(
"%s: list_len:%d cpy_len:%d p:%p p_ccb:%p p_db:%p raw_size:%d "
"raw_used:%d raw_data:%p",
__func__, list_len, cpy_len, p, p_ccb, p_ccb->p_db,
p_ccb->p_db->raw_size, p_ccb->p_db->raw_used, p_ccb->p_db->raw_data);
memcpy(&p_ccb->p_db->raw_data[p_ccb->p_db->raw_used], p, cpy_len);
p_ccb->p_db->raw_used += cpy_len;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix copy length calculation in sdp_copy_raw_data
Test: compilation
Bug: 110216176
Change-Id: Ic4a19c9f0fe8cd592bc6c25dcec7b1da49ff7459
(cherry picked from commit 23aa15743397b345f3d948289fe90efa2a2e2b3e)
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::DisplayPasskey(
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device,
int passkey,
int entered) {
}
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: WebPageProxy* WebInspectorProxy::platformCreateInspectorPage()
{
ASSERT(m_page);
ASSERT(!m_inspectorView);
m_inspectorView = GTK_WIDGET(webkitWebViewBaseCreate(page()->process()->context(), inspectorPageGroup()));
g_object_add_weak_pointer(G_OBJECT(m_inspectorView), reinterpret_cast<void**>(&m_inspectorView));
return webkitWebViewBaseGetPage(WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_BASE(m_inspectorView));
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: AP_DECLARE(apr_uint32_t) ap_random_pick(apr_uint32_t min, apr_uint32_t max)
{
apr_uint32_t number;
#if (!__GNUC__ || __GNUC__ >= 5 || (__GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 8) || \
!__sparc__ || APR_SIZEOF_VOIDP != 8)
/* This triggers a gcc bug on sparc/64bit with gcc < 4.8, PR 52900 */
if (max < 16384) {
apr_uint16_t num16;
ap_random_insecure_bytes(&num16, sizeof(num16));
RAND_RANGE(num16, min, max, APR_UINT16_MAX);
number = num16;
}
else
#endif
{
ap_random_insecure_bytes(&number, sizeof(number));
RAND_RANGE(number, min, max, APR_UINT32_MAX);
}
return number;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: int compat_get_timex(struct timex *txc, const struct compat_timex __user *utp)
{
struct compat_timex tx32;
if (copy_from_user(&tx32, utp, sizeof(struct compat_timex)))
return -EFAULT;
txc->modes = tx32.modes;
txc->offset = tx32.offset;
txc->freq = tx32.freq;
txc->maxerror = tx32.maxerror;
txc->esterror = tx32.esterror;
txc->status = tx32.status;
txc->constant = tx32.constant;
txc->precision = tx32.precision;
txc->tolerance = tx32.tolerance;
txc->time.tv_sec = tx32.time.tv_sec;
txc->time.tv_usec = tx32.time.tv_usec;
txc->tick = tx32.tick;
txc->ppsfreq = tx32.ppsfreq;
txc->jitter = tx32.jitter;
txc->shift = tx32.shift;
txc->stabil = tx32.stabil;
txc->jitcnt = tx32.jitcnt;
txc->calcnt = tx32.calcnt;
txc->errcnt = tx32.errcnt;
txc->stbcnt = tx32.stbcnt;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: compat: fix 4-byte infoleak via uninitialized struct field
Commit 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to
native counterparts") removed the memset() in compat_get_timex(). Since
then, the compat adjtimex syscall can invoke do_adjtimex() with an
uninitialized ->tai.
If do_adjtimex() doesn't write to ->tai (e.g. because the arguments are
invalid), compat_put_timex() then copies the uninitialized ->tai field
to userspace.
Fix it by adding the memset() back.
Fixes: 3a4d44b61625 ("ntp: Move adjtimex related compat syscalls to native counterparts")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void send_panic_events(struct ipmi_smi *intf, char *str)
{
struct kernel_ipmi_msg msg;
unsigned char data[16];
struct ipmi_system_interface_addr *si;
struct ipmi_addr addr;
char *p = str;
struct ipmi_ipmb_addr *ipmb;
int j;
if (ipmi_send_panic_event == IPMI_SEND_PANIC_EVENT_NONE)
return;
si = (struct ipmi_system_interface_addr *) &addr;
si->addr_type = IPMI_SYSTEM_INTERFACE_ADDR_TYPE;
si->channel = IPMI_BMC_CHANNEL;
si->lun = 0;
/* Fill in an event telling that we have failed. */
msg.netfn = 0x04; /* Sensor or Event. */
msg.cmd = 2; /* Platform event command. */
msg.data = data;
msg.data_len = 8;
data[0] = 0x41; /* Kernel generator ID, IPMI table 5-4 */
data[1] = 0x03; /* This is for IPMI 1.0. */
data[2] = 0x20; /* OS Critical Stop, IPMI table 36-3 */
data[4] = 0x6f; /* Sensor specific, IPMI table 36-1 */
data[5] = 0xa1; /* Runtime stop OEM bytes 2 & 3. */
/*
* Put a few breadcrumbs in. Hopefully later we can add more things
* to make the panic events more useful.
*/
if (str) {
data[3] = str[0];
data[6] = str[1];
data[7] = str[2];
}
/* Send the event announcing the panic. */
ipmi_panic_request_and_wait(intf, &addr, &msg);
/*
* On every interface, dump a bunch of OEM event holding the
* string.
*/
if (ipmi_send_panic_event != IPMI_SEND_PANIC_EVENT_STRING || !str)
return;
/*
* intf_num is used as an marker to tell if the
* interface is valid. Thus we need a read barrier to
* make sure data fetched before checking intf_num
* won't be used.
*/
smp_rmb();
/*
* First job here is to figure out where to send the
* OEM events. There's no way in IPMI to send OEM
* events using an event send command, so we have to
* find the SEL to put them in and stick them in
* there.
*/
/* Get capabilities from the get device id. */
intf->local_sel_device = 0;
intf->local_event_generator = 0;
intf->event_receiver = 0;
/* Request the device info from the local MC. */
msg.netfn = IPMI_NETFN_APP_REQUEST;
msg.cmd = IPMI_GET_DEVICE_ID_CMD;
msg.data = NULL;
msg.data_len = 0;
intf->null_user_handler = device_id_fetcher;
ipmi_panic_request_and_wait(intf, &addr, &msg);
if (intf->local_event_generator) {
/* Request the event receiver from the local MC. */
msg.netfn = IPMI_NETFN_SENSOR_EVENT_REQUEST;
msg.cmd = IPMI_GET_EVENT_RECEIVER_CMD;
msg.data = NULL;
msg.data_len = 0;
intf->null_user_handler = event_receiver_fetcher;
ipmi_panic_request_and_wait(intf, &addr, &msg);
}
intf->null_user_handler = NULL;
/*
* Validate the event receiver. The low bit must not
* be 1 (it must be a valid IPMB address), it cannot
* be zero, and it must not be my address.
*/
if (((intf->event_receiver & 1) == 0)
&& (intf->event_receiver != 0)
&& (intf->event_receiver != intf->addrinfo[0].address)) {
/*
* The event receiver is valid, send an IPMB
* message.
*/
ipmb = (struct ipmi_ipmb_addr *) &addr;
ipmb->addr_type = IPMI_IPMB_ADDR_TYPE;
ipmb->channel = 0; /* FIXME - is this right? */
ipmb->lun = intf->event_receiver_lun;
ipmb->slave_addr = intf->event_receiver;
} else if (intf->local_sel_device) {
/*
* The event receiver was not valid (or was
* me), but I am an SEL device, just dump it
* in my SEL.
*/
si = (struct ipmi_system_interface_addr *) &addr;
si->addr_type = IPMI_SYSTEM_INTERFACE_ADDR_TYPE;
si->channel = IPMI_BMC_CHANNEL;
si->lun = 0;
} else
return; /* No where to send the event. */
msg.netfn = IPMI_NETFN_STORAGE_REQUEST; /* Storage. */
msg.cmd = IPMI_ADD_SEL_ENTRY_CMD;
msg.data = data;
msg.data_len = 16;
j = 0;
while (*p) {
int size = strlen(p);
if (size > 11)
size = 11;
data[0] = 0;
data[1] = 0;
data[2] = 0xf0; /* OEM event without timestamp. */
data[3] = intf->addrinfo[0].address;
data[4] = j++; /* sequence # */
/*
* Always give 11 bytes, so strncpy will fill
* it with zeroes for me.
*/
strncpy(data+5, p, 11);
p += size;
ipmi_panic_request_and_wait(intf, &addr, &msg);
}
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: [email protected] # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int megasas_wait_for_outstanding(struct megasas_instance *instance)
{
int i, sl, outstanding;
u32 reset_index;
u32 wait_time = MEGASAS_RESET_WAIT_TIME;
unsigned long flags;
struct list_head clist_local;
struct megasas_cmd *reset_cmd;
u32 fw_state;
if (atomic_read(&instance->adprecovery) == MEGASAS_HW_CRITICAL_ERROR) {
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev, "%s:%d HBA is killed.\n",
__func__, __LINE__);
return FAILED;
}
if (atomic_read(&instance->adprecovery) != MEGASAS_HBA_OPERATIONAL) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&clist_local);
spin_lock_irqsave(&instance->hba_lock, flags);
list_splice_init(&instance->internal_reset_pending_q,
&clist_local);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&instance->hba_lock, flags);
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "HBA reset wait ...\n");
for (i = 0; i < wait_time; i++) {
msleep(1000);
if (atomic_read(&instance->adprecovery) == MEGASAS_HBA_OPERATIONAL)
break;
}
if (atomic_read(&instance->adprecovery) != MEGASAS_HBA_OPERATIONAL) {
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "reset: Stopping HBA.\n");
atomic_set(&instance->adprecovery, MEGASAS_HW_CRITICAL_ERROR);
return FAILED;
}
reset_index = 0;
while (!list_empty(&clist_local)) {
reset_cmd = list_entry((&clist_local)->next,
struct megasas_cmd, list);
list_del_init(&reset_cmd->list);
if (reset_cmd->scmd) {
reset_cmd->scmd->result = DID_REQUEUE << 16;
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "%d:%p reset [%02x]\n",
reset_index, reset_cmd,
reset_cmd->scmd->cmnd[0]);
reset_cmd->scmd->scsi_done(reset_cmd->scmd);
megasas_return_cmd(instance, reset_cmd);
} else if (reset_cmd->sync_cmd) {
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "%p synch cmds"
"reset queue\n",
reset_cmd);
reset_cmd->cmd_status_drv = MFI_STAT_INVALID_STATUS;
instance->instancet->fire_cmd(instance,
reset_cmd->frame_phys_addr,
0, instance->reg_set);
} else {
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "%p unexpected"
"cmds lst\n",
reset_cmd);
}
reset_index++;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
for (i = 0; i < resetwaittime; i++) {
outstanding = atomic_read(&instance->fw_outstanding);
if (!outstanding)
break;
if (!(i % MEGASAS_RESET_NOTICE_INTERVAL)) {
dev_notice(&instance->pdev->dev, "[%2d]waiting for %d "
"commands to complete\n",i,outstanding);
/*
* Call cmd completion routine. Cmd to be
* be completed directly without depending on isr.
*/
megasas_complete_cmd_dpc((unsigned long)instance);
}
msleep(1000);
}
i = 0;
outstanding = atomic_read(&instance->fw_outstanding);
fw_state = instance->instancet->read_fw_status_reg(instance) & MFI_STATE_MASK;
if ((!outstanding && (fw_state == MFI_STATE_OPERATIONAL)))
goto no_outstanding;
if (instance->disableOnlineCtrlReset)
goto kill_hba_and_failed;
do {
if ((fw_state == MFI_STATE_FAULT) || atomic_read(&instance->fw_outstanding)) {
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev,
"%s:%d waiting_for_outstanding: before issue OCR. FW state = 0x%x, oustanding 0x%x\n",
__func__, __LINE__, fw_state, atomic_read(&instance->fw_outstanding));
if (i == 3)
goto kill_hba_and_failed;
megasas_do_ocr(instance);
if (atomic_read(&instance->adprecovery) == MEGASAS_HW_CRITICAL_ERROR) {
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev, "%s:%d OCR failed and HBA is killed.\n",
__func__, __LINE__);
return FAILED;
}
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev, "%s:%d waiting_for_outstanding: after issue OCR.\n",
__func__, __LINE__);
for (sl = 0; sl < 10; sl++)
msleep(500);
outstanding = atomic_read(&instance->fw_outstanding);
fw_state = instance->instancet->read_fw_status_reg(instance) & MFI_STATE_MASK;
if ((!outstanding && (fw_state == MFI_STATE_OPERATIONAL)))
goto no_outstanding;
}
i++;
} while (i <= 3);
no_outstanding:
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev, "%s:%d no more pending commands remain after reset handling.\n",
__func__, __LINE__);
return SUCCESS;
kill_hba_and_failed:
/* Reset not supported, kill adapter */
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev, "%s:%d killing adapter scsi%d"
" disableOnlineCtrlReset %d fw_outstanding %d \n",
__func__, __LINE__, instance->host->host_no, instance->disableOnlineCtrlReset,
atomic_read(&instance->fw_outstanding));
megasas_dump_pending_frames(instance);
megaraid_sas_kill_hba(instance);
return FAILED;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-476
Output: | 0 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: nfsd4_encode_getdeviceinfo(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
struct nfsd4_getdeviceinfo *gdev)
{
struct xdr_stream *xdr = &resp->xdr;
const struct nfsd4_layout_ops *ops =
nfsd4_layout_ops[gdev->gd_layout_type];
u32 starting_len = xdr->buf->len, needed_len;
__be32 *p;
dprintk("%s: err %d\n", __func__, be32_to_cpu(nfserr));
if (nfserr)
goto out;
nfserr = nfserr_resource;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(gdev->gd_layout_type);
/* If maxcount is 0 then just update notifications */
if (gdev->gd_maxcount != 0) {
nfserr = ops->encode_getdeviceinfo(xdr, gdev);
if (nfserr) {
/*
* We don't bother to burden the layout drivers with
* enforcing gd_maxcount, just tell the client to
* come back with a bigger buffer if it's not enough.
*/
if (xdr->buf->len + 4 > gdev->gd_maxcount)
goto toosmall;
goto out;
}
}
nfserr = nfserr_resource;
if (gdev->gd_notify_types) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4 + 4);
if (!p)
goto out;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1); /* bitmap length */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(gdev->gd_notify_types);
} else {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
goto out;
*p++ = 0;
}
nfserr = 0;
out:
kfree(gdev->gd_device);
dprintk("%s: done: %d\n", __func__, be32_to_cpu(nfserr));
return nfserr;
toosmall:
dprintk("%s: maxcount too small\n", __func__);
needed_len = xdr->buf->len + 4 /* notifications */;
xdr_truncate_encode(xdr, starting_len);
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p) {
nfserr = nfserr_resource;
} else {
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(needed_len);
nfserr = nfserr_toosmall;
}
goto out;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static int show_numa_map(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
struct numa_maps_private *numa_priv = m->private;
struct proc_maps_private *proc_priv = &numa_priv->proc_maps;
struct vm_area_struct *vma = v;
struct numa_maps *md = &numa_priv->md;
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct mm_walk walk = {};
struct mempolicy *pol;
int n;
char buffer[50];
if (!mm)
return 0;
/* Ensure we start with an empty set of numa_maps statistics. */
memset(md, 0, sizeof(*md));
md->vma = vma;
walk.hugetlb_entry = gather_hugetbl_stats;
walk.pmd_entry = gather_pte_stats;
walk.private = md;
walk.mm = mm;
pol = get_vma_policy(proc_priv->task, vma, vma->vm_start);
mpol_to_str(buffer, sizeof(buffer), pol, 0);
mpol_cond_put(pol);
seq_printf(m, "%08lx %s", vma->vm_start, buffer);
if (file) {
seq_printf(m, " file=");
seq_path(m, &file->f_path, "\n\t= ");
} else if (vma->vm_start <= mm->brk && vma->vm_end >= mm->start_brk) {
seq_printf(m, " heap");
} else if (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack &&
vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack) {
seq_printf(m, " stack");
}
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
seq_printf(m, " huge");
walk_page_range(vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, &walk);
if (!md->pages)
goto out;
if (md->anon)
seq_printf(m, " anon=%lu", md->anon);
if (md->dirty)
seq_printf(m, " dirty=%lu", md->dirty);
if (md->pages != md->anon && md->pages != md->dirty)
seq_printf(m, " mapped=%lu", md->pages);
if (md->mapcount_max > 1)
seq_printf(m, " mapmax=%lu", md->mapcount_max);
if (md->swapcache)
seq_printf(m, " swapcache=%lu", md->swapcache);
if (md->active < md->pages && !is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
seq_printf(m, " active=%lu", md->active);
if (md->writeback)
seq_printf(m, " writeback=%lu", md->writeback);
for_each_node_state(n, N_HIGH_MEMORY)
if (md->node[n])
seq_printf(m, " N%d=%lu", n, md->node[n]);
out:
seq_putc(m, '\n');
if (m->count < m->size)
m->version = (vma != proc_priv->tail_vma) ? vma->vm_start : 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static netdev_tx_t veth_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct net_device *rcv = NULL;
struct veth_priv *priv, *rcv_priv;
struct veth_net_stats *stats, *rcv_stats;
int length;
priv = netdev_priv(dev);
rcv = priv->peer;
rcv_priv = netdev_priv(rcv);
stats = this_cpu_ptr(priv->stats);
rcv_stats = this_cpu_ptr(rcv_priv->stats);
if (!(rcv->flags & IFF_UP))
goto tx_drop;
if (dev->features & NETIF_F_NO_CSUM)
skb->ip_summed = rcv_priv->ip_summed;
length = skb->len + ETH_HLEN;
if (dev_forward_skb(rcv, skb) != NET_RX_SUCCESS)
goto rx_drop;
stats->tx_bytes += length;
stats->tx_packets++;
rcv_stats->rx_bytes += length;
rcv_stats->rx_packets++;
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
tx_drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
stats->tx_dropped++;
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
rx_drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
rcv_stats->rx_dropped++;
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static struct sock * tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct inet6_request_sock *treq;
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp, *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct tcp6_sock *newtcp6sk;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct tcp_sock *newtp;
struct sock *newsk;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
struct tcp_md5sig_key *key;
#endif
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
/*
* v6 mapped
*/
newsk = tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst);
if (newsk == NULL)
return NULL;
newtcp6sk = (struct tcp6_sock *)newsk;
inet_sk(newsk)->pinet6 = &newtcp6sk->inet6;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(newinet->inet_daddr, &newnp->daddr);
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(newinet->inet_saddr, &newnp->saddr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->rcv_saddr, &newnp->saddr);
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_af_ops = &ipv6_mapped;
newsk->sk_backlog_rcv = tcp_v4_do_rcv;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
newtp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_mapped_specific;
#endif
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks count
* here, tcp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the comment in
* that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
/* It is tricky place. Until this moment IPv4 tcp
worked with IPv6 icsk.icsk_af_ops.
Sync it now.
*/
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
return newsk;
}
treq = inet6_rsk(req);
opt = np->opt;
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto out_overflow;
if (!dst) {
dst = inet6_csk_route_req(sk, req);
if (!dst)
goto out;
}
newsk = tcp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (newsk == NULL)
goto out_nonewsk;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks
* count here, tcp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the
* comment in that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
newsk->sk_gso_type = SKB_GSO_TCPV6;
__ip6_dst_store(newsk, dst, NULL, NULL);
newtcp6sk = (struct tcp6_sock *)newsk;
inet_sk(newsk)->pinet6 = &newtcp6sk->inet6;
newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->daddr, &treq->rmt_addr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->saddr, &treq->loc_addr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&newnp->rcv_saddr, &treq->loc_addr);
newsk->sk_bound_dev_if = treq->iif;
/* Now IPv6 options...
First: no IPv4 options.
*/
newinet->opt = NULL;
newnp->ipv6_fl_list = NULL;
/* Clone RX bits */
newnp->rxopt.all = np->rxopt.all;
/* Clone pktoptions received with SYN */
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
if (treq->pktopts != NULL) {
newnp->pktoptions = skb_clone(treq->pktopts, GFP_ATOMIC);
kfree_skb(treq->pktopts);
treq->pktopts = NULL;
if (newnp->pktoptions)
skb_set_owner_r(newnp->pktoptions, newsk);
}
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
/* Clone native IPv6 options from listening socket (if any)
Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever,
but we make one more one thing there: reattach optmem
to newsk.
*/
if (opt) {
newnp->opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
if (opt != np->opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
}
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (newnp->opt)
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = (newnp->opt->opt_nflen +
newnp->opt->opt_flen);
tcp_mtup_init(newsk);
tcp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
newtp->advmss = dst_metric_advmss(dst);
tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(newsk);
newinet->inet_daddr = newinet->inet_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
/* Copy over the MD5 key from the original socket */
if ((key = tcp_v6_md5_do_lookup(sk, &newnp->daddr)) != NULL) {
/* We're using one, so create a matching key
* on the newsk structure. If we fail to get
* memory, then we end up not copying the key
* across. Shucks.
*/
char *newkey = kmemdup(key->key, key->keylen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (newkey != NULL)
tcp_v6_md5_do_add(newsk, &newnp->daddr,
newkey, key->keylen);
}
#endif
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
sock_put(newsk);
goto out;
}
__inet6_hash(newsk, NULL);
return newsk;
out_overflow:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
out_nonewsk:
if (opt && opt != np->opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
dst_release(dst);
out:
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static inline int cache_free_alien(struct kmem_cache *cachep, void *objp)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>
Cc: David Rientjes <[email protected]>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void SocketStream::CheckPrivacyMode() {
if (context_.get() && context_->network_delegate()) {
bool enable = context_->network_delegate()->CanEnablePrivacyMode(url_,
url_);
privacy_mode_ = enable ? kPrivacyModeEnabled : kPrivacyModeDisabled;
if (enable)
server_ssl_config_.channel_id_enabled = false;
}
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: parse_encoding( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Byte* cur;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->root.limit;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
cur = parser->root.cursor;
if ( cur >= limit )
{
FT_ERROR(( "parse_encoding: out of bounds\n" ));
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
/* if we have a number or `[', the encoding is an array, */
/* and we must load it now */
if ( ft_isdigit( *cur ) || *cur == '[' )
{
T1_Encoding encode = &face->type1.encoding;
FT_Int count, n;
PS_Table char_table = &loader->encoding_table;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
FT_Bool only_immediates = 0;
/* read the number of entries in the encoding; should be 256 */
if ( *cur == '[' )
{
count = 256;
only_immediates = 1;
parser->root.cursor++;
}
else
count = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser );
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
return;
/* we use a T1_Table to store our charnames */
loader->num_chars = encode->num_chars = count;
if ( FT_NEW_ARRAY( encode->char_index, count ) ||
FT_NEW_ARRAY( encode->char_name, count ) ||
FT_SET_ERROR( psaux->ps_table_funcs->init(
char_table, count, memory ) ) )
{
parser->root.error = error;
return;
}
/* We need to `zero' out encoding_table.elements */
for ( n = 0; n < count; n++ )
{
char* notdef = (char *)".notdef";
T1_Add_Table( char_table, n, notdef, 8 );
}
/* Now we need to read records of the form */
/* */
/* ... charcode /charname ... */
/* */
/* for each entry in our table. */
/* */
/* We simply look for a number followed by an immediate */
/* name. Note that this ignores correctly the sequence */
/* that is often seen in type1 fonts: */
/* */
/* 0 1 255 { 1 index exch /.notdef put } for dup */
/* */
/* used to clean the encoding array before anything else. */
/* */
/* Alternatively, if the array is directly given as */
/* */
/* /Encoding [ ... ] */
/* */
/* we only read immediates. */
n = 0;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
while ( parser->root.cursor < limit )
{
cur = parser->root.cursor;
/* we stop when we encounter a `def' or `]' */
if ( *cur == 'd' && cur + 3 < limit )
{
if ( cur[1] == 'e' &&
cur[2] == 'f' &&
IS_PS_DELIM( cur[3] ) )
{
FT_TRACE6(( "encoding end\n" ));
cur += 3;
break;
}
}
if ( *cur == ']' )
{
FT_TRACE6(( "encoding end\n" ));
cur++;
break;
}
/* check whether we've found an entry */
if ( ft_isdigit( *cur ) || only_immediates )
{
FT_Int charcode;
if ( only_immediates )
charcode = n;
else
{
charcode = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser );
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
}
cur = parser->root.cursor;
parser->root.cursor = cur;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= limit )
return;
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
len = parser->root.cursor - cur;
parser->root.error = T1_Add_Table( char_table, charcode,
cur, len + 1 );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
char_table->elements[charcode][len] = '\0';
n++;
}
else if ( only_immediates )
{
/* Since the current position is not updated for */
/* immediates-only mode we would get an infinite loop if */
/* we don't do anything here. */
/* */
/* This encoding array is not valid according to the type1 */
/* specification (it might be an encoding for a CID type1 */
/* font, however), so we conclude that this font is NOT a */
/* type1 font. */
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Unknown_File_Format );
return;
}
}
else
{
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
}
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
}
face->type1.encoding_type = T1_ENCODING_TYPE_ARRAY;
parser->root.cursor = cur;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static inline void ModulateHWB(const double percent_hue,
const double percent_whiteness,const double percent_blackness,double *red,
double *green,double *blue)
{
double
blackness,
hue,
whiteness;
/*
Increase or decrease color blackness, whiteness, or hue.
*/
ConvertRGBToHWB(*red,*green,*blue,&hue,&whiteness,&blackness);
hue+=fmod((percent_hue-100.0),200.0)/200.0;
blackness*=0.01*percent_blackness;
whiteness*=0.01*percent_whiteness;
ConvertHWBToRGB(hue,whiteness,blackness,red,green,blue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/663
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/655
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void DevToolsAgentHostImpl::ForceDetachAllClients() {
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHostImpl> protect(this);
while (!session_by_client_.empty()) {
DevToolsAgentHostClient* client = session_by_client_.begin()->first;
InnerDetachClient(client);
client->AgentHostClosed(this);
}
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
unsigned int h;
int err;
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset
< sizeof(struct arpt_entry) + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_entry(e);
if (err)
return err;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
continue;
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
if (!check_underflow(e)) {
pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
"use the STANDARD target with "
"ACCEPT/DROP\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
e->counters = ((struct xt_counters) { 0, 0 });
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: Document* ContentSecurityPolicy::GetDocument() const {
return DynamicTo<Document>(execution_context_.Get());
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
{
struct task_struct *tsk = current;
int group_dead;
profile_task_exit(tsk);
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->fs_excl));
if (unlikely(in_interrupt()))
panic("Aiee, killing interrupt handler!");
if (unlikely(!tsk->pid))
panic("Attempted to kill the idle task!");
tracehook_report_exit(&code);
/*
* We're taking recursive faults here in do_exit. Safest is to just
* leave this task alone and wait for reboot.
*/
if (unlikely(tsk->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
printk(KERN_ALERT
"Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed!\n");
/*
* We can do this unlocked here. The futex code uses
* this flag just to verify whether the pi state
* cleanup has been done or not. In the worst case it
* loops once more. We pretend that the cleanup was
* done as there is no way to return. Either the
* OWNER_DIED bit is set by now or we push the blocked
* task into the wait for ever nirwana as well.
*/
tsk->flags |= PF_EXITPIDONE;
if (tsk->io_context)
exit_io_context();
set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
schedule();
}
exit_signals(tsk); /* sets PF_EXITING */
/*
* tsk->flags are checked in the futex code to protect against
* an exiting task cleaning up the robust pi futexes.
*/
smp_mb();
spin_unlock_wait(&tsk->pi_lock);
if (unlikely(in_atomic()))
printk(KERN_INFO "note: %s[%d] exited with preempt_count %d\n",
current->comm, task_pid_nr(current),
preempt_count());
acct_update_integrals(tsk);
if (tsk->mm) {
update_hiwater_rss(tsk->mm);
update_hiwater_vm(tsk->mm);
}
group_dead = atomic_dec_and_test(&tsk->signal->live);
if (group_dead) {
hrtimer_cancel(&tsk->signal->real_timer);
exit_itimers(tsk->signal);
}
acct_collect(code, group_dead);
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
if (unlikely(tsk->robust_list))
exit_robust_list(tsk);
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list))
compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
#endif
#endif
if (group_dead)
tty_audit_exit();
if (unlikely(tsk->audit_context))
audit_free(tsk);
tsk->exit_code = code;
taskstats_exit(tsk, group_dead);
exit_mm(tsk);
if (group_dead)
acct_process();
trace_sched_process_exit(tsk);
exit_sem(tsk);
exit_files(tsk);
exit_fs(tsk);
check_stack_usage();
exit_thread();
cgroup_exit(tsk, 1);
exit_keys(tsk);
if (group_dead && tsk->signal->leader)
disassociate_ctty(1);
module_put(task_thread_info(tsk)->exec_domain->module);
if (tsk->binfmt)
module_put(tsk->binfmt->module);
proc_exit_connector(tsk);
exit_notify(tsk, group_dead);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
mpol_put(tsk->mempolicy);
tsk->mempolicy = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
/*
* This must happen late, after the PID is not
* hashed anymore:
*/
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&tsk->pi_state_list)))
exit_pi_state_list(tsk);
if (unlikely(current->pi_state_cache))
kfree(current->pi_state_cache);
#endif
/*
* Make sure we are holding no locks:
*/
debug_check_no_locks_held(tsk);
/*
* We can do this unlocked here. The futex code uses this flag
* just to verify whether the pi state cleanup has been done
* or not. In the worst case it loops once more.
*/
tsk->flags |= PF_EXITPIDONE;
if (tsk->io_context)
exit_io_context();
if (tsk->splice_pipe)
__free_pipe_info(tsk->splice_pipe);
preempt_disable();
/* causes final put_task_struct in finish_task_switch(). */
tsk->state = TASK_DEAD;
schedule();
BUG();
/* Avoid "noreturn function does return". */
for (;;)
cpu_relax(); /* For when BUG is null */
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Nick Piggin <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Efros <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: MagickExport size_t GetQuantumExtent(const Image *image,
const QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const QuantumType quantum_type)
{
size_t
extent,
packet_size;
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
packet_size=1;
switch (quantum_type)
{
case GrayAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case IndexAlphaQuantum: packet_size=2; break;
case RGBQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case BGRQuantum: packet_size=3; break;
case RGBAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case RGBOQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case BGRAQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKQuantum: packet_size=4; break;
case CMYKAQuantum: packet_size=5; break;
default: break;
}
extent=MagickMax(image->columns,image->rows);
if (quantum_info->pack == MagickFalse)
return((size_t) (packet_size*extent*((quantum_info->depth+7)/8)));
return((size_t) ((packet_size*extent*quantum_info->depth+7)/8));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/126
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: xsltFormatNumberFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs)
{
xmlXPathObjectPtr numberObj = NULL;
xmlXPathObjectPtr formatObj = NULL;
xmlXPathObjectPtr decimalObj = NULL;
xsltStylesheetPtr sheet;
xsltDecimalFormatPtr formatValues;
xmlChar *result;
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt;
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
if (tctxt == NULL)
return;
sheet = tctxt->style;
if (sheet == NULL)
return;
formatValues = sheet->decimalFormat;
switch (nargs) {
case 3:
CAST_TO_STRING;
decimalObj = valuePop(ctxt);
formatValues = xsltDecimalFormatGetByName(sheet, decimalObj->stringval);
if (formatValues == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, NULL,
"format-number() : undeclared decimal format '%s'\n",
decimalObj->stringval);
}
/* Intentional fall-through */
case 2:
CAST_TO_STRING;
formatObj = valuePop(ctxt);
CAST_TO_NUMBER;
numberObj = valuePop(ctxt);
break;
default:
XP_ERROR(XPATH_INVALID_ARITY);
}
if (formatValues != NULL) {
if (xsltFormatNumberConversion(formatValues,
formatObj->stringval,
numberObj->floatval,
&result) == XPATH_EXPRESSION_OK) {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(result));
xmlFree(result);
}
}
xmlXPathFreeObject(numberObj);
xmlXPathFreeObject(formatObj);
xmlXPathFreeObject(decimalObj);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static double abserr(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* Absolute error permitted in linear values - affected by the bit depth of
* the calculations.
*/
if (pm->assume_16_bit_calculations ||
(pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
return pm->maxabs16;
else
return pm->maxabs8;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static size_t exif_convert_any_to_int(void *value, int format, int motorola_intel TSRMLS_DC)
{
int s_den;
unsigned u_den;
switch(format) {
case TAG_FMT_SBYTE: return *(signed char *)value;
case TAG_FMT_BYTE: return *(uchar *)value;
case TAG_FMT_USHORT: return php_ifd_get16u(value, motorola_intel);
case TAG_FMT_ULONG: return php_ifd_get32u(value, motorola_intel);
case TAG_FMT_URATIONAL:
u_den = php_ifd_get32u(4+(char *)value, motorola_intel);
if (u_den == 0) {
return 0;
} else {
return php_ifd_get32u(value, motorola_intel) / u_den;
}
case TAG_FMT_SRATIONAL:
s_den = php_ifd_get32s(4+(char *)value, motorola_intel);
if (s_den == 0) {
return 0;
} else {
return php_ifd_get32s(value, motorola_intel) / s_den;
}
case TAG_FMT_SSHORT: return php_ifd_get16u(value, motorola_intel);
case TAG_FMT_SLONG: return php_ifd_get32s(value, motorola_intel);
/* Not sure if this is correct (never seen float used in Exif format) */
case TAG_FMT_SINGLE:
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Found value of type single");
#endif
return (size_t)*(float *)value;
case TAG_FMT_DOUBLE:
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Found value of type double");
#endif
return (size_t)*(double *)value;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73737 FPE when parsing a tag format
CWE ID: CWE-189
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void absFunc(sqlite3_context *context, int argc, sqlite3_value **argv){
assert( argc==1 );
UNUSED_PARAMETER(argc);
switch( sqlite3_value_type(argv[0]) ){
case SQLITE_INTEGER: {
i64 iVal = sqlite3_value_int64(argv[0]);
if( iVal<0 ){
if( iVal==SMALLEST_INT64 ){
/* IMP: R-31676-45509 If X is the integer -9223372036854775808
** then abs(X) throws an integer overflow error since there is no
** equivalent positive 64-bit two complement value. */
sqlite3_result_error(context, "integer overflow", -1);
return;
}
iVal = -iVal;
}
sqlite3_result_int64(context, iVal);
break;
}
case SQLITE_NULL: {
/* IMP: R-37434-19929 Abs(X) returns NULL if X is NULL. */
sqlite3_result_null(context);
break;
}
default: {
/* Because sqlite3_value_double() returns 0.0 if the argument is not
** something that can be converted into a number, we have:
** IMP: R-01992-00519 Abs(X) returns 0.0 if X is a string or blob
** that cannot be converted to a numeric value.
*/
double rVal = sqlite3_value_double(argv[0]);
if( rVal<0 ) rVal = -rVal;
sqlite3_result_double(context, rVal);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: uint8_t* output() const {
return output_ + BorderTop() * kOuterBlockSize + BorderLeft();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: ubik_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp)
{
int ubik_op;
int32_t temp;
/*
* Print out the afs call we're invoking. The table used here was
* gleaned from ubik/ubik_int.xg
*/
ubik_op = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp + sizeof(struct rx_header));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ubik call %s", tok2str(ubik_req, "op#%d", ubik_op)));
/*
* Decode some of the arguments to the Ubik calls
*/
bp += sizeof(struct rx_header) + 4;
switch (ubik_op) {
case 10000: /* Beacon */
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
temp = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " syncsite %s", temp ? "yes" : "no"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " votestart"));
DATEOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " dbversion"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
break;
case 10003: /* Get sync site */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " site"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 20000: /* Begin */
case 20001: /* Commit */
case 20007: /* Abort */
case 20008: /* Release locks */
case 20010: /* Writev */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
break;
case 20002: /* Lock */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " file"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pos"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length"));
INTOUT();
temp = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
tok2str(ubik_lock_types, "type %d", temp);
break;
case 20003: /* Write */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " file"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pos"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 20005: /* Get file */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " file"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 20006: /* Send file */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " file"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " dbversion"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
break;
case 20009: /* Truncate */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " file"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length"));
INTOUT();
break;
case 20012: /* Set version */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tid"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " oldversion"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " newversion"));
UBIK_VERSIONOUT();
break;
default:
;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|ubik]"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13049/Rx: add a missing bounds check for Ubik
One of the case blocks in ubik_print() didn't check bounds before
fetching 32 bits of packet data and could overread past the captured
packet data by that amount.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: ext4_ext_binsearch_idx(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path, ext4_lblk_t block)
{
struct ext4_extent_header *eh = path->p_hdr;
struct ext4_extent_idx *r, *l, *m;
ext_debug("binsearch for %u(idx): ", block);
l = EXT_FIRST_INDEX(eh) + 1;
r = EXT_LAST_INDEX(eh);
while (l <= r) {
m = l + (r - l) / 2;
if (block < le32_to_cpu(m->ei_block))
r = m - 1;
else
l = m + 1;
ext_debug("%p(%u):%p(%u):%p(%u) ", l, le32_to_cpu(l->ei_block),
m, le32_to_cpu(m->ei_block),
r, le32_to_cpu(r->ei_block));
}
path->p_idx = l - 1;
ext_debug(" -> %d->%lld ", le32_to_cpu(path->p_idx->ei_block),
ext4_idx_pblock(path->p_idx));
#ifdef CHECK_BINSEARCH
{
struct ext4_extent_idx *chix, *ix;
int k;
chix = ix = EXT_FIRST_INDEX(eh);
for (k = 0; k < le16_to_cpu(eh->eh_entries); k++, ix++) {
if (k != 0 &&
le32_to_cpu(ix->ei_block) <= le32_to_cpu(ix[-1].ei_block)) {
printk(KERN_DEBUG "k=%d, ix=0x%p, "
"first=0x%p\n", k,
ix, EXT_FIRST_INDEX(eh));
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%u <= %u\n",
le32_to_cpu(ix->ei_block),
le32_to_cpu(ix[-1].ei_block));
}
BUG_ON(k && le32_to_cpu(ix->ei_block)
<= le32_to_cpu(ix[-1].ei_block));
if (block < le32_to_cpu(ix->ei_block))
break;
chix = ix;
}
BUG_ON(chix != path->p_idx);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <[email protected]>
CWE ID:
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileInfo, getFilename)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
int path_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_filesystem_object_get_path(intern, &path_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (path_len && path_len < intern->file_name_len) {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name + path_len + 1, intern->file_name_len - (path_len + 1), 1);
} else {
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: bool VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiVP9Accelerator::SubmitDecode(
const scoped_refptr<VP9Picture>& pic,
const Vp9SegmentationParams& seg,
const Vp9LoopFilterParams& lf,
const std::vector<scoped_refptr<VP9Picture>>& ref_pictures,
const base::Closure& done_cb) {
DCHECK(done_cb.is_null());
VADecPictureParameterBufferVP9 pic_param;
memset(&pic_param, 0, sizeof(pic_param));
const Vp9FrameHeader* frame_hdr = pic->frame_hdr.get();
DCHECK(frame_hdr);
pic_param.frame_width = base::checked_cast<uint16_t>(frame_hdr->frame_width);
pic_param.frame_height =
base::checked_cast<uint16_t>(frame_hdr->frame_height);
CHECK_EQ(ref_pictures.size(), arraysize(pic_param.reference_frames));
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(pic_param.reference_frames); ++i) {
VASurfaceID va_surface_id;
if (ref_pictures[i]) {
scoped_refptr<VaapiDecodeSurface> surface =
VP9PictureToVaapiDecodeSurface(ref_pictures[i]);
va_surface_id = surface->va_surface()->id();
} else {
va_surface_id = VA_INVALID_SURFACE;
}
pic_param.reference_frames[i] = va_surface_id;
}
#define FHDR_TO_PP_PF1(a) pic_param.pic_fields.bits.a = frame_hdr->a
#define FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(a, b) pic_param.pic_fields.bits.a = b
FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(subsampling_x, frame_hdr->subsampling_x == 1);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(subsampling_y, frame_hdr->subsampling_y == 1);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(frame_type, frame_hdr->IsKeyframe() ? 0 : 1);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF1(show_frame);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF1(error_resilient_mode);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF1(intra_only);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF1(allow_high_precision_mv);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(mcomp_filter_type, frame_hdr->interpolation_filter);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF1(frame_parallel_decoding_mode);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF1(reset_frame_context);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF1(refresh_frame_context);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(frame_context_idx, frame_hdr->frame_context_idx_to_save_probs);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(segmentation_enabled, seg.enabled);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(segmentation_temporal_update, seg.temporal_update);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(segmentation_update_map, seg.update_map);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(last_ref_frame, frame_hdr->ref_frame_idx[0]);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(last_ref_frame_sign_bias,
frame_hdr->ref_frame_sign_bias[Vp9RefType::VP9_FRAME_LAST]);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(golden_ref_frame, frame_hdr->ref_frame_idx[1]);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(golden_ref_frame_sign_bias,
frame_hdr->ref_frame_sign_bias[Vp9RefType::VP9_FRAME_GOLDEN]);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(alt_ref_frame, frame_hdr->ref_frame_idx[2]);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(alt_ref_frame_sign_bias,
frame_hdr->ref_frame_sign_bias[Vp9RefType::VP9_FRAME_ALTREF]);
FHDR_TO_PP_PF2(lossless_flag, frame_hdr->quant_params.IsLossless());
#undef FHDR_TO_PP_PF2
#undef FHDR_TO_PP_PF1
pic_param.filter_level = lf.level;
pic_param.sharpness_level = lf.sharpness;
pic_param.log2_tile_rows = frame_hdr->tile_rows_log2;
pic_param.log2_tile_columns = frame_hdr->tile_cols_log2;
pic_param.frame_header_length_in_bytes = frame_hdr->uncompressed_header_size;
pic_param.first_partition_size = frame_hdr->header_size_in_bytes;
ARRAY_MEMCPY_CHECKED(pic_param.mb_segment_tree_probs, seg.tree_probs);
ARRAY_MEMCPY_CHECKED(pic_param.segment_pred_probs, seg.pred_probs);
pic_param.profile = frame_hdr->profile;
pic_param.bit_depth = frame_hdr->bit_depth;
DCHECK((pic_param.profile == 0 && pic_param.bit_depth == 8) ||
(pic_param.profile == 2 && pic_param.bit_depth == 10));
if (!vaapi_wrapper_->SubmitBuffer(VAPictureParameterBufferType,
sizeof(pic_param), &pic_param))
return false;
VASliceParameterBufferVP9 slice_param;
memset(&slice_param, 0, sizeof(slice_param));
slice_param.slice_data_size = frame_hdr->frame_size;
slice_param.slice_data_offset = 0;
slice_param.slice_data_flag = VA_SLICE_DATA_FLAG_ALL;
static_assert(arraysize(Vp9SegmentationParams::feature_enabled) ==
arraysize(slice_param.seg_param),
"seg_param array of incorrect size");
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(slice_param.seg_param); ++i) {
VASegmentParameterVP9& seg_param = slice_param.seg_param[i];
#define SEG_TO_SP_SF(a, b) seg_param.segment_flags.fields.a = b
SEG_TO_SP_SF(
segment_reference_enabled,
seg.FeatureEnabled(i, Vp9SegmentationParams::SEG_LVL_REF_FRAME));
SEG_TO_SP_SF(segment_reference,
seg.FeatureData(i, Vp9SegmentationParams::SEG_LVL_REF_FRAME));
SEG_TO_SP_SF(segment_reference_skipped,
seg.FeatureEnabled(i, Vp9SegmentationParams::SEG_LVL_SKIP));
#undef SEG_TO_SP_SF
ARRAY_MEMCPY_CHECKED(seg_param.filter_level, lf.lvl[i]);
seg_param.luma_dc_quant_scale = seg.y_dequant[i][0];
seg_param.luma_ac_quant_scale = seg.y_dequant[i][1];
seg_param.chroma_dc_quant_scale = seg.uv_dequant[i][0];
seg_param.chroma_ac_quant_scale = seg.uv_dequant[i][1];
}
if (!vaapi_wrapper_->SubmitBuffer(VASliceParameterBufferType,
sizeof(slice_param), &slice_param))
return false;
void* non_const_ptr = const_cast<uint8_t*>(frame_hdr->data);
if (!vaapi_wrapper_->SubmitBuffer(VASliceDataBufferType,
frame_hdr->frame_size, non_const_ptr))
return false;
scoped_refptr<VaapiDecodeSurface> dec_surface =
VP9PictureToVaapiDecodeSurface(pic);
return vaapi_dec_->DecodeSurface(dec_surface);
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: fst_process_rx_status(int rx_status, char *name)
{
switch (rx_status) {
case NET_RX_SUCCESS:
{
/*
* Nothing to do here
*/
break;
}
case NET_RX_DROP:
{
dbg(DBG_ASS, "%s: Received packet dropped\n", name);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: int wasm_dis(WasmOp *op, const unsigned char *buf, int buf_len) {
op->len = 1;
op->op = buf[0];
if (op->op > 0xbf) return 1;
WasmOpDef *opdef = &opcodes[op->op];
switch (op->op) {
case WASM_OP_TRAP:
case WASM_OP_NOP:
case WASM_OP_ELSE:
case WASM_OP_RETURN:
case WASM_OP_DROP:
case WASM_OP_SELECT:
case WASM_OP_I32EQZ:
case WASM_OP_I32EQ:
case WASM_OP_I32NE:
case WASM_OP_I32LTS:
case WASM_OP_I32LTU:
case WASM_OP_I32GTS:
case WASM_OP_I32GTU:
case WASM_OP_I32LES:
case WASM_OP_I32LEU:
case WASM_OP_I32GES:
case WASM_OP_I32GEU:
case WASM_OP_I64EQZ:
case WASM_OP_I64EQ:
case WASM_OP_I64NE:
case WASM_OP_I64LTS:
case WASM_OP_I64LTU:
case WASM_OP_I64GTS:
case WASM_OP_I64GTU:
case WASM_OP_I64LES:
case WASM_OP_I64LEU:
case WASM_OP_I64GES:
case WASM_OP_I64GEU:
case WASM_OP_F32EQ:
case WASM_OP_F32NE:
case WASM_OP_F32LT:
case WASM_OP_F32GT:
case WASM_OP_F32LE:
case WASM_OP_F32GE:
case WASM_OP_F64EQ:
case WASM_OP_F64NE:
case WASM_OP_F64LT:
case WASM_OP_F64GT:
case WASM_OP_F64LE:
case WASM_OP_F64GE:
case WASM_OP_I32CLZ:
case WASM_OP_I32CTZ:
case WASM_OP_I32POPCNT:
case WASM_OP_I32ADD:
case WASM_OP_I32SUB:
case WASM_OP_I32MUL:
case WASM_OP_I32DIVS:
case WASM_OP_I32DIVU:
case WASM_OP_I32REMS:
case WASM_OP_I32REMU:
case WASM_OP_I32AND:
case WASM_OP_I32OR:
case WASM_OP_I32XOR:
case WASM_OP_I32SHL:
case WASM_OP_I32SHRS:
case WASM_OP_I32SHRU:
case WASM_OP_I32ROTL:
case WASM_OP_I32ROTR:
case WASM_OP_I64CLZ:
case WASM_OP_I64CTZ:
case WASM_OP_I64POPCNT:
case WASM_OP_I64ADD:
case WASM_OP_I64SUB:
case WASM_OP_I64MUL:
case WASM_OP_I64DIVS:
case WASM_OP_I64DIVU:
case WASM_OP_I64REMS:
case WASM_OP_I64REMU:
case WASM_OP_I64AND:
case WASM_OP_I64OR:
case WASM_OP_I64XOR:
case WASM_OP_I64SHL:
case WASM_OP_I64SHRS:
case WASM_OP_I64SHRU:
case WASM_OP_I64ROTL:
case WASM_OP_I64ROTR:
case WASM_OP_F32ABS:
case WASM_OP_F32NEG:
case WASM_OP_F32CEIL:
case WASM_OP_F32FLOOR:
case WASM_OP_F32TRUNC:
case WASM_OP_F32NEAREST:
case WASM_OP_F32SQRT:
case WASM_OP_F32ADD:
case WASM_OP_F32SUB:
case WASM_OP_F32MUL:
case WASM_OP_F32DIV:
case WASM_OP_F32MIN:
case WASM_OP_F32MAX:
case WASM_OP_F32COPYSIGN:
case WASM_OP_F64ABS:
case WASM_OP_F64NEG:
case WASM_OP_F64CEIL:
case WASM_OP_F64FLOOR:
case WASM_OP_F64TRUNC:
case WASM_OP_F64NEAREST:
case WASM_OP_F64SQRT:
case WASM_OP_F64ADD:
case WASM_OP_F64SUB:
case WASM_OP_F64MUL:
case WASM_OP_F64DIV:
case WASM_OP_F64MIN:
case WASM_OP_F64MAX:
case WASM_OP_F64COPYSIGN:
case WASM_OP_I32WRAPI64:
case WASM_OP_I32TRUNCSF32:
case WASM_OP_I32TRUNCUF32:
case WASM_OP_I32TRUNCSF64:
case WASM_OP_I32TRUNCUF64:
case WASM_OP_I64EXTENDSI32:
case WASM_OP_I64EXTENDUI32:
case WASM_OP_I64TRUNCSF32:
case WASM_OP_I64TRUNCUF32:
case WASM_OP_I64TRUNCSF64:
case WASM_OP_I64TRUNCUF64:
case WASM_OP_F32CONVERTSI32:
case WASM_OP_F32CONVERTUI32:
case WASM_OP_F32CONVERTSI64:
case WASM_OP_F32CONVERTUI64:
case WASM_OP_F32DEMOTEF64:
case WASM_OP_F64CONVERTSI32:
case WASM_OP_F64CONVERTUI32:
case WASM_OP_F64CONVERTSI64:
case WASM_OP_F64CONVERTUI64:
case WASM_OP_F64PROMOTEF32:
case WASM_OP_I32REINTERPRETF32:
case WASM_OP_I64REINTERPRETF64:
case WASM_OP_F32REINTERPRETI32:
case WASM_OP_F64REINTERPRETI64:
case WASM_OP_END:
{
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s", opdef->txt);
}
break;
case WASM_OP_BLOCK:
case WASM_OP_LOOP:
case WASM_OP_IF:
{
st32 val = 0;
size_t n = read_i32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
switch (0x80 - val) {
case R_BIN_WASM_VALUETYPE_EMPTY:
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s", opdef->txt);
break;
case R_BIN_WASM_VALUETYPE_i32:
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s (result i32)", opdef->txt);
break;
case R_BIN_WASM_VALUETYPE_i64:
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s (result i64)", opdef->txt);
break;
case R_BIN_WASM_VALUETYPE_f32:
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s (result f32)", opdef->txt);
break;
case R_BIN_WASM_VALUETYPE_f64:
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s (result f64)", opdef->txt);
break;
default:
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s (result ?)", opdef->txt);
break;
}
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_BR:
case WASM_OP_BRIF:
case WASM_OP_CALL:
{
ut32 val = 0;
size_t n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %d", opdef->txt, val);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_BRTABLE:
{
ut32 count = 0, *table = NULL, def = 0;
size_t n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &count);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
if (!(table = calloc (count, sizeof (ut32)))) goto err;
int i = 0;
op->len += n;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + op->len, buf + buf_len, &table[i]);
if (!(op->len + n <= buf_len)) goto beach;
op->len += n;
}
n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + op->len, buf + buf_len, &def);
if (!(n > 0 && n + op->len < buf_len)) goto beach;
op->len += n;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %d ", opdef->txt, count);
for (i = 0; i < count && strlen (op->txt) < R_ASM_BUFSIZE; i++) {
snprintf (op->txt + strlen (op->txt), R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%d ", table[i]);
}
snprintf (op->txt + strlen (op->txt), R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%d", def);
free (table);
break;
beach:
free (table);
goto err;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_CALLINDIRECT:
{
ut32 val = 0, reserved = 0;
size_t n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
op->len += n;
n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + op->len, buf + buf_len, &reserved);
if (!(n == 1 && op->len + n <= buf_len)) goto err;
reserved &= 0x1;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %d %d", opdef->txt, val, reserved);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_GETLOCAL:
case WASM_OP_SETLOCAL:
case WASM_OP_TEELOCAL:
case WASM_OP_GETGLOBAL:
case WASM_OP_SETGLOBAL:
{
ut32 val = 0;
size_t n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %d", opdef->txt, val);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_I32LOAD:
case WASM_OP_I64LOAD:
case WASM_OP_F32LOAD:
case WASM_OP_F64LOAD:
case WASM_OP_I32LOAD8S:
case WASM_OP_I32LOAD8U:
case WASM_OP_I32LOAD16S:
case WASM_OP_I32LOAD16U:
case WASM_OP_I64LOAD8S:
case WASM_OP_I64LOAD8U:
case WASM_OP_I64LOAD16S:
case WASM_OP_I64LOAD16U:
case WASM_OP_I64LOAD32S:
case WASM_OP_I64LOAD32U:
case WASM_OP_I32STORE:
case WASM_OP_I64STORE:
case WASM_OP_F32STORE:
case WASM_OP_F64STORE:
case WASM_OP_I32STORE8:
case WASM_OP_I32STORE16:
case WASM_OP_I64STORE8:
case WASM_OP_I64STORE16:
case WASM_OP_I64STORE32:
{
ut32 flag = 0, offset = 0;
size_t n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &flag);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
op->len += n;
n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + op->len, buf + buf_len, &offset);
if (!(n > 0 && op->len + n <= buf_len)) goto err;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %d %d", opdef->txt, flag, offset);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_CURRENTMEMORY:
case WASM_OP_GROWMEMORY:
{
ut32 reserved = 0;
size_t n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &reserved);
if (!(n == 1 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
reserved &= 0x1;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %d", opdef->txt, reserved);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_I32CONST:
{
st32 val = 0;
size_t n = read_i32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %" PFMT32d, opdef->txt, val);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_I64CONST:
{
st64 val = 0;
size_t n = read_i64_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %" PFMT64d, opdef->txt, val);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_F32CONST:
{
ut32 val = 0;
size_t n = read_u32_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
long double d = (long double)val;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %" LDBLFMT, opdef->txt, d);
op->len += n;
}
break;
case WASM_OP_F64CONST:
{
ut64 val = 0;
size_t n = read_u64_leb128 (buf + 1, buf + buf_len, &val);
if (!(n > 0 && n < buf_len)) goto err;
long double d = (long double)val;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "%s %" LDBLFMT, opdef->txt, d);
op->len += n;
}
break;
default:
goto err;
}
return op->len;
err:
op->len = 1;
snprintf (op->txt, R_ASM_BUFSIZE, "invalid");
return op->len;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
CWE ID: CWE-125
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: static int do_ipv6_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned int flags)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
int len;
int val;
if (ip6_mroute_opt(optname))
return ip6_mroute_getsockopt(sk, optname, optval, optlen);
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_ADDRFORM:
if (sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP &&
sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDPLITE &&
sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_TCP)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -ENOTCONN;
val = sk->sk_family;
break;
case MCAST_MSFILTER:
{
struct group_filter gsf;
int err;
if (len < GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(0))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&gsf, optval, GROUP_FILTER_SIZE(0)))
return -EFAULT;
if (gsf.gf_group.ss_family != AF_INET6)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
lock_sock(sk);
err = ip6_mc_msfget(sk, &gsf,
(struct group_filter __user *)optval, optlen);
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
case IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS:
{
struct msghdr msg;
struct sk_buff *skb;
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
msg.msg_control = optval;
msg.msg_controllen = len;
msg.msg_flags = flags;
lock_sock(sk);
skb = np->pktoptions;
if (skb)
ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, &msg, skb);
release_sock(sk);
if (!skb) {
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxinfo) {
struct in6_pktinfo src_info;
src_info.ipi6_ifindex = np->mcast_oif ? np->mcast_oif :
np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex;
src_info.ipi6_addr = np->mcast_oif ? sk->sk_v6_daddr : np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_addr;
put_cmsg(&msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_PKTINFO, sizeof(src_info), &src_info);
}
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxhlim) {
int hlim = np->mcast_hops;
put_cmsg(&msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_HOPLIMIT, sizeof(hlim), &hlim);
}
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxtclass) {
int tclass = (int)ip6_tclass(np->rcv_flowinfo);
put_cmsg(&msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, sizeof(tclass), &tclass);
}
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxoinfo) {
struct in6_pktinfo src_info;
src_info.ipi6_ifindex = np->mcast_oif ? np->mcast_oif :
np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_ifindex;
src_info.ipi6_addr = np->mcast_oif ? sk->sk_v6_daddr :
np->sticky_pktinfo.ipi6_addr;
put_cmsg(&msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292PKTINFO, sizeof(src_info), &src_info);
}
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxohlim) {
int hlim = np->mcast_hops;
put_cmsg(&msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292HOPLIMIT, sizeof(hlim), &hlim);
}
if (np->rxopt.bits.rxflow) {
__be32 flowinfo = np->rcv_flowinfo;
put_cmsg(&msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_FLOWINFO, sizeof(flowinfo), &flowinfo);
}
}
len -= msg.msg_controllen;
return put_user(len, optlen);
}
case IPV6_MTU:
{
struct dst_entry *dst;
val = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
if (dst)
val = dst_mtu(dst);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!val)
return -ENOTCONN;
break;
}
case IPV6_V6ONLY:
val = sk->sk_ipv6only;
break;
case IPV6_RECVPKTINFO:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxinfo;
break;
case IPV6_2292PKTINFO:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxoinfo;
break;
case IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxhlim;
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPLIMIT:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxohlim;
break;
case IPV6_RECVRTHDR:
val = np->rxopt.bits.srcrt;
break;
case IPV6_2292RTHDR:
val = np->rxopt.bits.osrcrt;
break;
case IPV6_HOPOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDR:
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
{
lock_sock(sk);
len = ipv6_getsockopt_sticky(sk, np->opt,
optname, optval, len);
release_sock(sk);
/* check if ipv6_getsockopt_sticky() returns err code */
if (len < 0)
return len;
return put_user(len, optlen);
}
case IPV6_RECVHOPOPTS:
val = np->rxopt.bits.hopopts;
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPOPTS:
val = np->rxopt.bits.ohopopts;
break;
case IPV6_RECVDSTOPTS:
val = np->rxopt.bits.dstopts;
break;
case IPV6_2292DSTOPTS:
val = np->rxopt.bits.odstopts;
break;
case IPV6_TCLASS:
val = np->tclass;
break;
case IPV6_RECVTCLASS:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxtclass;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWINFO:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxflow;
break;
case IPV6_RECVPATHMTU:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu;
break;
case IPV6_PATHMTU:
{
struct dst_entry *dst;
struct ip6_mtuinfo mtuinfo;
if (len < sizeof(mtuinfo))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(mtuinfo);
memset(&mtuinfo, 0, sizeof(mtuinfo));
rcu_read_lock();
dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
if (dst)
mtuinfo.ip6m_mtu = dst_mtu(dst);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!mtuinfo.ip6m_mtu)
return -ENOTCONN;
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &mtuinfo, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
case IPV6_TRANSPARENT:
val = inet_sk(sk)->transparent;
break;
case IPV6_RECVORIGDSTADDR:
val = np->rxopt.bits.rxorigdstaddr;
break;
case IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS:
case IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS:
{
struct dst_entry *dst;
if (optname == IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS)
val = np->hop_limit;
else
val = np->mcast_hops;
if (val < 0) {
rcu_read_lock();
dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
if (dst)
val = ip6_dst_hoplimit(dst);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
if (val < 0)
val = sock_net(sk)->ipv6.devconf_all->hop_limit;
break;
}
case IPV6_MULTICAST_LOOP:
val = np->mc_loop;
break;
case IPV6_MULTICAST_IF:
val = np->mcast_oif;
break;
case IPV6_UNICAST_IF:
val = (__force int)htonl((__u32) np->ucast_oif);
break;
case IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER:
val = np->pmtudisc;
break;
case IPV6_RECVERR:
val = np->recverr;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWINFO_SEND:
val = np->sndflow;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR:
{
struct in6_flowlabel_req freq;
int flags;
if (len < sizeof(freq))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&freq, optval, sizeof(freq)))
return -EFAULT;
if (freq.flr_action != IPV6_FL_A_GET)
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(freq);
flags = freq.flr_flags;
memset(&freq, 0, sizeof(freq));
val = ipv6_flowlabel_opt_get(sk, &freq, flags);
if (val < 0)
return val;
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &freq, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
case IPV6_ADDR_PREFERENCES:
val = 0;
if (np->srcprefs & IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP)
val |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_TMP;
else if (np->srcprefs & IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC)
val |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBLIC;
else {
/* XXX: should we return system default? */
val |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_PUBTMP_DEFAULT;
}
if (np->srcprefs & IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA)
val |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_COA;
else
val |= IPV6_PREFER_SRC_HOME;
break;
case IPV6_MINHOPCOUNT:
val = np->min_hopcount;
break;
case IPV6_DONTFRAG:
val = np->dontfrag;
break;
case IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL:
val = np->autoflowlabel;
break;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(int), len);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: int ip6_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb, *tmp_skb;
struct sk_buff **tail_skb;
struct in6_addr final_dst_buf, *final_dst = &final_dst_buf;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct ipv6hdr *hdr;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = np->cork.opt;
struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *)inet->cork.base.dst;
struct flowi6 *fl6 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip6;
unsigned char proto = fl6->flowi6_proto;
int err = 0;
if ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL)
goto out;
tail_skb = &(skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list);
/* move skb->data to ip header from ext header */
if (skb->data < skb_network_header(skb))
__skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(skb));
while ((tmp_skb = __skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_write_queue)) != NULL) {
__skb_pull(tmp_skb, skb_network_header_len(skb));
*tail_skb = tmp_skb;
tail_skb = &(tmp_skb->next);
skb->len += tmp_skb->len;
skb->data_len += tmp_skb->len;
skb->truesize += tmp_skb->truesize;
tmp_skb->destructor = NULL;
tmp_skb->sk = NULL;
}
/* Allow local fragmentation. */
if (np->pmtudisc < IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO)
skb->local_df = 1;
*final_dst = fl6->daddr;
__skb_pull(skb, skb_network_header_len(skb));
if (opt && opt->opt_flen)
ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, &proto);
if (opt && opt->opt_nflen)
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts(skb, opt, &proto, &final_dst);
skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
hdr = ipv6_hdr(skb);
ip6_flow_hdr(hdr, np->cork.tclass, fl6->flowlabel);
hdr->hop_limit = np->cork.hop_limit;
hdr->nexthdr = proto;
hdr->saddr = fl6->saddr;
hdr->daddr = *final_dst;
skb->priority = sk->sk_priority;
skb->mark = sk->sk_mark;
skb_dst_set(skb, dst_clone(&rt->dst));
IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(net, rt->rt6i_idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUT, skb->len);
if (proto == IPPROTO_ICMPV6) {
struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb));
ICMP6MSGOUT_INC_STATS_BH(net, idev, icmp6_hdr(skb)->icmp6_type);
ICMP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, idev, ICMP6_MIB_OUTMSGS);
}
err = ip6_local_out(skb);
if (err) {
if (err > 0)
err = net_xmit_errno(err);
if (err)
goto error;
}
out:
ip6_cork_release(inet, np);
return err;
error:
IP6_INC_STATS(net, rt->rt6i_idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO
In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the already queued up gso-skb via
plain ip6_append_data. This causes random memory corruptions.
In ip6_ufo_append_data we also have to be careful to not queue up the
same skb multiple times. So setup the gso frame only when no first skb
is available.
This also fixes a shortcoming where we add the current packet's length to
cork->length but return early because of a packet > mtu with dontfrag set
(instead of sutracting it again).
Found with trinity.
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: void check_request_for_cacheability(struct stream *s, struct channel *chn)
{
struct http_txn *txn = s->txn;
char *p1, *p2;
char *cur_ptr, *cur_end, *cur_next;
int pragma_found;
int cc_found;
int cur_idx;
if ((txn->flags & (TX_CACHEABLE|TX_CACHE_IGNORE)) == TX_CACHE_IGNORE)
return; /* nothing more to do here */
cur_idx = 0;
pragma_found = cc_found = 0;
cur_next = chn->buf->p + hdr_idx_first_pos(&txn->hdr_idx);
while ((cur_idx = txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx].next)) {
struct hdr_idx_elem *cur_hdr;
int val;
cur_hdr = &txn->hdr_idx.v[cur_idx];
cur_ptr = cur_next;
cur_end = cur_ptr + cur_hdr->len;
cur_next = cur_end + cur_hdr->cr + 1;
/* We have one full header between cur_ptr and cur_end, and the
* next header starts at cur_next.
*/
val = http_header_match2(cur_ptr, cur_end, "Pragma", 6);
if (val) {
if ((cur_end - (cur_ptr + val) >= 8) &&
strncasecmp(cur_ptr + val, "no-cache", 8) == 0) {
pragma_found = 1;
continue;
}
}
val = http_header_match2(cur_ptr, cur_end, "Cache-control", 13);
if (!val)
continue;
p2 = p1;
while (p2 < cur_end && *p2 != '=' && *p2 != ',' && !isspace((unsigned char)*p2))
p2++;
/* we have a complete value between p1 and p2. We don't check the
* values after max-age, max-stale nor min-fresh, we simply don't
* use the cache when they're specified.
*/
if (((p2 - p1 == 7) && strncasecmp(p1, "max-age", 7) == 0) ||
((p2 - p1 == 8) && strncasecmp(p1, "no-cache", 8) == 0) ||
((p2 - p1 == 9) && strncasecmp(p1, "max-stale", 9) == 0) ||
((p2 - p1 == 9) && strncasecmp(p1, "min-fresh", 9) == 0)) {
txn->flags |= TX_CACHE_IGNORE;
continue;
}
if ((p2 - p1 == 8) && strncasecmp(p1, "no-store", 8) == 0) {
txn->flags &= ~TX_CACHEABLE & ~TX_CACHE_COOK;
continue;
}
}
/* RFC7234#5.4:
* When the Cache-Control header field is also present and
* understood in a request, Pragma is ignored.
* When the Cache-Control header field is not present in a
* request, caches MUST consider the no-cache request
* pragma-directive as having the same effect as if
* "Cache-Control: no-cache" were present.
*/
if (!cc_found && pragma_found)
txn->flags |= TX_CACHE_IGNORE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void Com_WriteConfig_f( void ) {
char filename[MAX_QPATH];
if ( Cmd_Argc() != 2 ) {
Com_Printf( "Usage: writeconfig <filename>\n" );
return;
}
Q_strncpyz( filename, Cmd_Argv( 1 ), sizeof( filename ) );
COM_DefaultExtension( filename, sizeof( filename ), ".cfg" );
Com_Printf( "Writing %s.\n", filename );
Com_WriteConfigToFile( filename );
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: static void methodWithNullableCallbackInterfaceArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("methodWithNullableCallbackInterfaceArg", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
if (info.Length() <= 0 || !(info[0]->IsFunction() || info[0]->IsNull())) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("methodWithNullableCallbackInterfaceArg", "TestObject", "The callback provided as parameter 1 is not a function."), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
OwnPtr<TestCallbackInterface> callbackInterface = info[0]->IsNull() ? nullptr : V8TestCallbackInterface::create(v8::Handle<v8::Function>::Cast(info[0]), currentExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate()));
imp->methodWithNullableCallbackInterfaceArg(callbackInterface.release());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static void _php_image_convert(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, int image_type )
{
char *f_org, *f_dest;
int f_org_len, f_dest_len;
long height, width, threshold;
gdImagePtr im_org, im_dest, im_tmp;
char *fn_org = NULL;
char *fn_dest = NULL;
FILE *org, *dest;
int dest_height = -1;
int dest_width = -1;
int org_height, org_width;
int white, black;
int color, color_org, median;
int int_threshold;
int x, y;
float x_ratio, y_ratio;
long ignore_warning;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "pplll", &f_org, &f_org_len, &f_dest, &f_dest_len, &height, &width, &threshold) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
fn_org = f_org;
fn_dest = f_dest;
dest_height = height;
dest_width = width;
int_threshold = threshold;
/* Check threshold value */
if (int_threshold < 0 || int_threshold > 8) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid threshold value '%d'", int_threshold);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Check origin file */
PHP_GD_CHECK_OPEN_BASEDIR(fn_org, "Invalid origin filename");
/* Check destination file */
PHP_GD_CHECK_OPEN_BASEDIR(fn_dest, "Invalid destination filename");
/* Open origin file */
org = VCWD_FOPEN(fn_org, "rb");
if (!org) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to open '%s' for reading", fn_org);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Open destination file */
dest = VCWD_FOPEN(fn_dest, "wb");
if (!dest) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to open '%s' for writing", fn_dest);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
switch (image_type) {
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GIF:
im_org = gdImageCreateFromGif(org);
if (im_org == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to open '%s' Not a valid GIF file", fn_dest);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
#ifdef HAVE_GD_JPG
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_JPG:
ignore_warning = INI_INT("gd.jpeg_ignore_warning");
im_org = gdImageCreateFromJpegEx(org, ignore_warning);
if (im_org == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to open '%s' Not a valid JPEG file", fn_dest);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
#endif /* HAVE_GD_JPG */
#ifdef HAVE_GD_PNG
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_PNG:
im_org = gdImageCreateFromPng(org);
if (im_org == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to open '%s' Not a valid PNG file", fn_dest);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
#endif /* HAVE_GD_PNG */
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Format not supported");
RETURN_FALSE;
break;
}
org_width = gdImageSX (im_org);
org_height = gdImageSY (im_org);
x_ratio = (float) org_width / (float) dest_width;
y_ratio = (float) org_height / (float) dest_height;
if (x_ratio > 1 && y_ratio > 1) {
if (y_ratio > x_ratio) {
x_ratio = y_ratio;
} else {
y_ratio = x_ratio;
}
dest_width = (int) (org_width / x_ratio);
dest_height = (int) (org_height / y_ratio);
} else {
x_ratio = (float) dest_width / (float) org_width;
y_ratio = (float) dest_height / (float) org_height;
if (y_ratio < x_ratio) {
x_ratio = y_ratio;
} else {
y_ratio = x_ratio;
}
dest_width = (int) (org_width * x_ratio);
dest_height = (int) (org_height * y_ratio);
}
im_tmp = gdImageCreate (dest_width, dest_height);
if (im_tmp == NULL ) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to allocate temporary buffer");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
gdImageCopyResized (im_tmp, im_org, 0, 0, 0, 0, dest_width, dest_height, org_width, org_height);
gdImageDestroy(im_org);
fclose(org);
im_dest = gdImageCreate(dest_width, dest_height);
if (im_dest == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to allocate destination buffer");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
white = gdImageColorAllocate(im_dest, 255, 255, 255);
if (white == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to allocate the colors for the destination buffer");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
black = gdImageColorAllocate(im_dest, 0, 0, 0);
if (black == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to allocate the colors for the destination buffer");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
int_threshold = int_threshold * 32;
for (y = 0; y < dest_height; y++) {
for (x = 0; x < dest_width; x++) {
color_org = gdImageGetPixel (im_tmp, x, y);
median = (im_tmp->red[color_org] + im_tmp->green[color_org] + im_tmp->blue[color_org]) / 3;
if (median < int_threshold) {
color = black;
} else {
color = white;
}
gdImageSetPixel (im_dest, x, y, color);
}
}
gdImageDestroy (im_tmp );
gdImageWBMP(im_dest, black , dest);
fflush(dest);
fclose(dest);
gdImageDestroy(im_dest);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug#72697 - select_colors write out-of-bounds
CWE ID: CWE-787
Output: | 1 |
Here are some example code snippets. Analyze the following code, commit message, CWE ID and the target value where 1 indicates the code has vulnerability and 0 indicates non-vulnerable code.
Example 1:
Code: void Dispatcher::RegisterNativeHandlers(ModuleSystem* module_system,
ScriptContext* context,
Dispatcher* dispatcher,
RequestSender* request_sender,
V8SchemaRegistry* v8_schema_registry) {
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"chrome", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new ChromeNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"lazy_background_page",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"logging", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new LoggingNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler("schema_registry",
v8_schema_registry->AsNativeHandler());
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"print", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new PrintNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"test_features",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new TestFeaturesNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"test_native_handler",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new TestNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"user_gestures",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new UserGesturesNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"utils", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new UtilsNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"v8_context",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new V8ContextNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"event_natives", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new EventBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"messaging_natives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(MessagingBindings::Get(dispatcher, context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"apiDefinitions",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new ApiDefinitionsNatives(dispatcher, context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"sendRequest",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new SendRequestNatives(request_sender, context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"setIcon",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new SetIconNatives(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"activityLogger",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new APIActivityLogger(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"renderFrameObserverNatives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new RenderFrameObserverNatives(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"file_system_natives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new FileSystemNatives(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"app_window_natives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new AppWindowCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"blob_natives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new BlobNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"context_menus",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new ContextMenusCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"css_natives", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new CssNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"document_natives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new DocumentCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"guest_view_internal",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new GuestViewInternalCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"i18n", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new I18NCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"id_generator",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new IdGeneratorCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"runtime", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new RuntimeCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"display_source",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new DisplaySourceCustomBindings(context)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
Target: 1
Example 2:
Code: void RunTasksForPeriod(double delay_ms) {
TimeAdvance();
scheduler::GetSingleThreadTaskRunnerForTesting()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(
&ScrollbarsTestWithVirtualTimer::StopVirtualTimeAndExitRunLoop,
WTF::Unretained(this)),
TimeDelta::FromMillisecondsD(delay_ms));
testing::EnterRunLoop();
}
Commit Message: Reset virtual time state in scrollbar tests
This prevents ScrollbarTestWithVirtualTimer from polluting global state
for tests following it.
Bug: 791742
Change-Id: Iae3440451833408a6a5bd24b3319b307cd6d3547
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/969582
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Clarke <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544691}
CWE ID: CWE-200
Target: 0
Now analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0'. Do Not respond with explanation.
Code: static int get_dotl_openflags(V9fsState *s, int oflags)
{
int flags;
/*
* Filter the client open flags
*/
flags = dotl_to_open_flags(oflags);
flags &= ~(O_NOCTTY | O_ASYNC | O_CREAT);
/*
* Ignore direct disk access hint until the server supports it.
*/
flags &= ~O_DIRECT;
return flags;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Output: | 0 |
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