instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 386
112k
| output
stringclasses 3
values | __index_level_0__
int64 15
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void __ip_select_ident(struct net *net, struct iphdr *iph, int segs)
{
static u32 ip_idents_hashrnd __read_mostly;
u32 hash, id;
net_get_random_once(&ip_idents_hashrnd, sizeof(ip_idents_hashrnd));
hash = jhash_3words((__force u32)iph->daddr,
(__force u32)iph->saddr,
iph->protocol ^ net_hash_mix(net),
ip_idents_hashrnd);
id = ip_idents_reserve(hash, segs);
iph->id = htons(id);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: In the Linux kernel before 5.1.7, a device can be tracked by an attacker using the IP ID values the kernel produces for connection-less protocols (e.g., UDP and ICMP). When such traffic is sent to multiple destination IP addresses, it is possible to obtain hash collisions (of indices to the counter array) and thereby obtain the hashing key (via enumeration). An attack may be conducted by hosting a crafted web page that uses WebRTC or gQUIC to force UDP traffic to attacker-controlled IP addresses.
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 17,367 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: vmnc_handle_wmvi_rectangle (GstVMncDec * dec, struct RfbRectangle *rect,
const guint8 * data, int len, gboolean decode)
{
GstVideoFormat format;
gint bpp, tc;
guint32 redmask, greenmask, bluemask;
guint32 endianness, dataendianness;
GstVideoCodecState *state;
/* A WMVi rectangle has a 16byte payload */
if (len < 16) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Bad WMVi rect: too short");
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA;
}
/* We only compare 13 bytes; ignoring the 3 padding bytes at the end */
if (dec->have_format && memcmp (data, dec->format.descriptor, 13) == 0) {
/* Nothing changed, so just exit */
return 16;
}
/* Store the whole block for simple comparison later */
memcpy (dec->format.descriptor, data, 16);
if (rect->x != 0 || rect->y != 0) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Bad WMVi rect: wrong coordinates");
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
bpp = data[0];
dec->format.depth = data[1];
dec->format.big_endian = data[2];
dataendianness = data[2] ? G_BIG_ENDIAN : G_LITTLE_ENDIAN;
tc = data[3];
if (bpp != 8 && bpp != 16 && bpp != 32) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Bad bpp value: %d", bpp);
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
if (!tc) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Paletted video not supported");
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
dec->format.bytes_per_pixel = bpp / 8;
dec->format.width = rect->width;
dec->format.height = rect->height;
redmask = (guint32) (RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 4)) << data[10];
greenmask = (guint32) (RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 6)) << data[11];
bluemask = (guint32) (RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 8)) << data[12];
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Red: mask %d, shift %d",
RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 4), data[10]);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Green: mask %d, shift %d",
RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 6), data[11]);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Blue: mask %d, shift %d",
RFB_GET_UINT16 (data + 8), data[12]);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "BPP: %d. endianness: %s", bpp,
data[2] ? "big" : "little");
/* GStreamer's RGB caps are a bit weird. */
if (bpp == 8) {
endianness = G_BYTE_ORDER; /* Doesn't matter */
} else if (bpp == 16) {
/* We require host-endian. */
endianness = G_BYTE_ORDER;
} else { /* bpp == 32 */
/* We require big endian */
endianness = G_BIG_ENDIAN;
if (endianness != dataendianness) {
redmask = GUINT32_SWAP_LE_BE (redmask);
greenmask = GUINT32_SWAP_LE_BE (greenmask);
bluemask = GUINT32_SWAP_LE_BE (bluemask);
}
}
format = gst_video_format_from_masks (dec->format.depth, bpp, endianness,
redmask, greenmask, bluemask, 0);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "From depth: %d bpp: %u endianess: %s redmask: %X "
"greenmask: %X bluemask: %X got format %s",
dec->format.depth, bpp, endianness == G_BIG_ENDIAN ? "BE" : "LE",
GUINT32_FROM_BE (redmask), GUINT32_FROM_BE (greenmask),
GUINT32_FROM_BE (bluemask),
format == GST_VIDEO_FORMAT_UNKNOWN ? "UNKOWN" :
gst_video_format_to_string (format));
if (format == GST_VIDEO_FORMAT_UNKNOWN) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Video format unknown to GStreamer");
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
dec->have_format = TRUE;
if (!decode) {
GST_LOG_OBJECT (dec, "Parsing, not setting caps");
return 16;
}
state = gst_video_decoder_set_output_state (GST_VIDEO_DECODER (dec), format,
rect->width, rect->height, dec->input_state);
gst_video_codec_state_unref (state);
g_free (dec->imagedata);
dec->imagedata = g_malloc (dec->format.width * dec->format.height *
dec->format.bytes_per_pixel);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (dec, "Allocated image data at %p", dec->imagedata);
dec->format.stride = dec->format.width * dec->format.bytes_per_pixel;
return 16;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The vmnc decoder in the gstreamer does not initialize the render canvas, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information as demonstrated by thumbnailing a simple 1 frame vmnc movie that does not draw to the allocated render canvas.
Commit Message: | Medium | 18,302 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: seamless_process(STREAM s)
{
unsigned int pkglen;
char *buf;
pkglen = s->end - s->p;
/* str_handle_lines requires null terminated strings */
buf = xmalloc(pkglen + 1);
STRNCPY(buf, (char *) s->p, pkglen + 1);
str_handle_lines(buf, &seamless_rest, seamless_line_handler, NULL);
xfree(buf);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: rdesktop versions up to and including v1.8.3 contain a Buffer Overflow over the global variables in the function seamless_process_line() that results in memory corruption and probably even a remote code execution.
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182 | High | 16,026 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void BrowserTabStripController::TabDetachedAt(TabContents* contents,
int model_index) {
hover_tab_selector_.CancelTabTransition();
tabstrip_->RemoveTabAt(model_index);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The hyphenation functionality in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly validate file names, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 28,040 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: RenderFrameHostManager::GetSiteInstanceForNavigationRequest(
const NavigationRequest& request) {
SiteInstance* current_site_instance = render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance();
bool no_renderer_swap_allowed = false;
bool was_server_redirect = request.navigation_handle() &&
request.navigation_handle()->WasServerRedirect();
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
bool can_renderer_initiate_transfer =
(request.state() == NavigationRequest::FAILED &&
SiteIsolationPolicy::IsErrorPageIsolationEnabled(
true /* in_main_frame */)) ||
(render_frame_host_->IsRenderFrameLive() &&
IsURLHandledByNetworkStack(request.common_params().url) &&
IsRendererTransferNeededForNavigation(render_frame_host_.get(),
request.common_params().url));
no_renderer_swap_allowed |=
request.from_begin_navigation() && !can_renderer_initiate_transfer;
} else {
no_renderer_swap_allowed |= !CanSubframeSwapProcess(
request.common_params().url, request.source_site_instance(),
request.dest_site_instance(), was_server_redirect);
}
if (no_renderer_swap_allowed)
return scoped_refptr<SiteInstance>(current_site_instance);
SiteInstance* candidate_site_instance =
speculative_render_frame_host_
? speculative_render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance()
: nullptr;
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> dest_site_instance = GetSiteInstanceForNavigation(
request.common_params().url, request.source_site_instance(),
request.dest_site_instance(), candidate_site_instance,
request.common_params().transition,
request.state() == NavigationRequest::FAILED,
request.restore_type() != RestoreType::NONE, request.is_view_source(),
was_server_redirect);
return dest_site_instance;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-285
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in site isolation in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023} | Medium | 29,795 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int parse_rock_ridge_inode(struct iso_directory_record *de, struct inode *inode)
{
int result = parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(de, inode, 0);
/*
* if rockridge flag was reset and we didn't look for attributes
* behind eventual XA attributes, have a look there
*/
if ((ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock_offset == -1)
&& (ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock == 2)) {
result = parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(de, inode, 14);
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal function in fs/isofs/rock.c in the Linux kernel through 3.16.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (unkillable mount process) via a crafted iso9660 image with a self-referential CL entry.
Commit Message: isofs: Fix unbounded recursion when processing relocated directories
We did not check relocated directory in any way when processing Rock
Ridge 'CL' tag. Thus a corrupted isofs image can possibly have a CL
entry pointing to another CL entry leading to possibly unbounded
recursion in kernel code and thus stack overflow or deadlocks (if there
is a loop created from CL entries).
Fix the problem by not allowing CL entry to point to a directory entry
with CL entry (such use makes no good sense anyway) and by checking
whether CL entry doesn't point to itself.
CC: [email protected]
Reported-by: Chris Evans <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> | Medium | 24,353 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ChildProcessTerminationInfo ChildProcessLauncherHelper::GetTerminationInfo(
const ChildProcessLauncherHelper::Process& process,
bool known_dead) {
ChildProcessTerminationInfo info;
if (!java_peer_avaiable_on_client_thread_)
return info;
Java_ChildProcessLauncherHelperImpl_getTerminationInfo(
AttachCurrentThread(), java_peer_, reinterpret_cast<intptr_t>(&info));
base::android::ApplicationState app_state =
base::android::ApplicationStatusListener::GetState();
bool app_foreground =
app_state == base::android::APPLICATION_STATE_HAS_RUNNING_ACTIVITIES ||
app_state == base::android::APPLICATION_STATE_HAS_PAUSED_ACTIVITIES;
if (app_foreground &&
(info.binding_state == base::android::ChildBindingState::MODERATE ||
info.binding_state == base::android::ChildBindingState::STRONG)) {
info.status = base::TERMINATION_STATUS_OOM_PROTECTED;
} else {
info.status = base::TERMINATION_STATUS_NORMAL_TERMINATION;
}
return info;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-664
Summary: Process lifetime issue in Chrome in Google Chrome on Android prior to 74.0.3729.108 allowed a remote attacker to potentially persist an exploited process via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: android: Stop child process in GetTerminationInfo
Android currently abuses TerminationStatus to pass whether process is
"oom protected" rather than whether it has died or not. This confuses
cross-platform code about the state process.
Only TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING is treated as still running, which
android never passes. Also it appears to be ok to kill the process in
getTerminationInfo as it's only called when the child process is dead or
dying. Also posix kills the process on some calls.
Bug: 940245
Change-Id: Id165711848c279bbe77ef8a784c8cf0b14051877
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1516284
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: ssid <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Bo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#639639} | Medium | 27,906 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: MediaStreamDispatcherHost::~MediaStreamDispatcherHost() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
bindings_.CloseAllBindings();
CancelAllRequests();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347} | Medium | 27,168 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: get_linux_shareopts(const char *shareopts, char **plinux_opts)
{
int rc;
assert(plinux_opts != NULL);
*plinux_opts = NULL;
/* default options for Solaris shares */
(void) add_linux_shareopt(plinux_opts, "no_subtree_check", NULL);
(void) add_linux_shareopt(plinux_opts, "no_root_squash", NULL);
(void) add_linux_shareopt(plinux_opts, "mountpoint", NULL);
rc = foreach_nfs_shareopt(shareopts, get_linux_shareopts_cb,
plinux_opts);
if (rc != SA_OK) {
free(*plinux_opts);
*plinux_opts = NULL;
}
return (rc);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: sharenfs 0.6.4, when built with commits bcdd594 and 7d08880 from the zfs repository, provides world readable access to the shared zfs file system, which might allow remote authenticated users to obtain sensitive information by reading shared files.
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare. | Low | 9,983 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PageHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
if (host_ == frame_host)
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host =
host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Remove(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
host_ = frame_host;
widget_host = host_ ? host_->GetRenderWidgetHost() : nullptr;
if (widget_host) {
registrar_.Add(
this,
content::NOTIFICATION_RENDER_WIDGET_VISIBILITY_CHANGED,
content::Source<RenderWidgetHost>(widget_host));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157} | Medium | 26,667 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void btsnoop_net_write(const void *data, size_t length) {
#if (!defined(BT_NET_DEBUG) || (BT_NET_DEBUG != TRUE))
return; // Disable using network sockets for security reasons
#endif
pthread_mutex_lock(&client_socket_lock_);
if (client_socket_ != -1) {
if (send(client_socket_, data, length, 0) == -1 && errno == ECONNRESET) {
safe_close_(&client_socket_);
}
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&client_socket_lock_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 3,378 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator(
media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::Client* client,
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process)
: client_(client),
egl_config_(NULL),
state_(kUninitialized),
pictures_requested_(false),
renderer_process_(renderer_process),
last_input_buffer_id_(-1),
inputs_before_decode_(0) {
memset(&input_stream_info_, 0, sizeof(input_stream_info_));
memset(&output_stream_info_, 0, sizeof(output_stream_info_));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 12,591 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static enum entity_charset determine_charset(char *charset_hint TSRMLS_DC)
{
int i;
enum entity_charset charset = cs_utf_8;
int len = 0;
const zend_encoding *zenc;
/* Default is now UTF-8 */
if (charset_hint == NULL)
return cs_utf_8;
if ((len = strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
zenc = zend_multibyte_get_internal_encoding(TSRMLS_C);
if (zenc != NULL) {
charset_hint = (char *)zend_multibyte_get_encoding_name(zenc);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
if ((len == 4) /* sizeof (none|auto|pass) */ &&
(!memcmp("pass", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4))) {
charset_hint = NULL;
len = 0;
} else {
goto det_charset;
}
}
}
charset_hint = SG(default_charset);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
/* try to detect the charset for the locale */
#if HAVE_NL_LANGINFO && HAVE_LOCALE_H && defined(CODESET)
charset_hint = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
#endif
#if HAVE_LOCALE_H
/* try to figure out the charset from the locale */
{
char *localename;
char *dot, *at;
/* lang[_territory][.codeset][@modifier] */
localename = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, NULL);
dot = strchr(localename, '.');
if (dot) {
dot++;
/* locale specifies a codeset */
at = strchr(dot, '@');
if (at)
len = at - dot;
else
len = strlen(dot);
charset_hint = dot;
} else {
/* no explicit name; see if the name itself
* is the charset */
charset_hint = localename;
len = strlen(charset_hint);
}
}
#endif
det_charset:
if (charset_hint) {
int found = 0;
/* now walk the charset map and look for the codeset */
for (i = 0; charset_map[i].codeset; i++) {
if (len == strlen(charset_map[i].codeset) && strncasecmp(charset_hint, charset_map[i].codeset, len) == 0) {
charset = charset_map[i].charset;
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "charset `%s' not supported, assuming utf-8",
charset_hint);
}
}
return charset;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the php_html_entities function in ext/standard/html.c in PHP before 5.5.36 and 5.6.x before 5.6.22 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering a large output string from the htmlspecialchars function.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range | High | 5,549 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: const Block* SimpleBlock::GetBlock() const
{
return &m_block;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 6,575 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint(const BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint& point)
: m_id(point.m_id)
, m_screenPos(point.m_screenPos)
, m_pos(point.m_pos)
{
switch (point.m_state) {
case BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchReleased:
m_state = TouchReleased;
break;
case BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchMoved:
m_state = TouchMoved;
break;
case BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchPressed:
m_state = TouchPressed;
break;
case BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint::TouchStationary:
m_state = TouchStationary;
break;
default:
m_state = TouchStationary; // make sure m_state is initialized
BLACKBERRY_ASSERT(false);
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 1,431 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xmlDocPtr soap_xmlParseMemory(const void *buf, size_t buf_size)
{
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = NULL;
xmlDocPtr ret;
/*
xmlInitParser();
*/
ctxt = xmlCreateMemoryParserCtxt(buf, buf_size);
if (ctxt) {
ctxt->options -= XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD;
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = soap_ignorableWhitespace;
ctxt->sax->comment = soap_Comment;
ctxt->sax->warning = NULL;
ctxt->sax->error = NULL;
/*ctxt->sax->fatalError = NULL;*/
#if LIBXML_VERSION >= 20703
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_HUGE;
#endif
xmlParseDocument(ctxt);
if (ctxt->wellFormed) {
ret = ctxt->myDoc;
if (ret->URL == NULL && ctxt->directory != NULL) {
ret->URL = xmlCharStrdup(ctxt->directory);
}
} else {
ret = NULL;
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
} else {
ret = NULL;
}
/*
xmlCleanupParser();
*/
/*
if (ret) {
cleanup_xml_node((xmlNodePtr)ret);
}
*/
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The SOAP parser in PHP before 5.3.22 and 5.4.x before 5.4.12 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a SOAP WSDL file containing an XML external entity declaration in conjunction with an entity reference, related to an XML External Entity (XXE) issue in the soap_xmlParseFile and soap_xmlParseMemory functions.
Commit Message: | Medium | 13,261 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void AppLauncherHandler::FillAppDictionary(base::DictionaryValue* dictionary) {
base::AutoReset<bool> auto_reset(&ignore_changes_, true);
base::ListValue* list = new base::ListValue();
Profile* profile = Profile::FromWebUI(web_ui());
PrefService* prefs = profile->GetPrefs();
for (std::set<std::string>::iterator it = visible_apps_.begin();
it != visible_apps_.end(); ++it) {
const Extension* extension = extension_service_->GetInstalledExtension(*it);
if (extension && extensions::ui_util::ShouldDisplayInNewTabPage(
extension, profile)) {
base::DictionaryValue* app_info = GetAppInfo(extension);
list->Append(app_info);
}
}
dictionary->Set("apps", list);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableAppWindowLaunch", true);
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableCreateAppShortcut", true);
#endif
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
dictionary->SetBoolean("disableCreateAppShortcut", true);
#endif
const base::ListValue* app_page_names =
prefs->GetList(prefs::kNtpAppPageNames);
if (!app_page_names || !app_page_names->GetSize()) {
ListPrefUpdate update(prefs, prefs::kNtpAppPageNames);
base::ListValue* list = update.Get();
list->Set(0, new base::StringValue(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_APP_DEFAULT_PAGE_NAME)));
dictionary->Set("appPageNames",
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(list->DeepCopy()));
} else {
dictionary->Set("appPageNames",
static_cast<base::ListValue*>(app_page_names->DeepCopy()));
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTMLMediaElement::didMoveToNewDocument function in core/html/HTMLMediaElement.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 31.0.1650.48, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving the movement of a media element between documents.
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 25,684 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: WandExport MagickBooleanType MogrifyImageList(ImageInfo *image_info,
const int argc,const char **argv,Image **images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
ChannelType
channel;
const char
*option;
ImageInfo
*mogrify_info;
MagickStatusType
status;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
index;
/*
Apply options to the image list.
*/
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(images != (Image **) NULL);
assert((*images)->previous == (Image *) NULL);
assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
(*images)->filename);
if ((argc <= 0) || (*argv == (char *) NULL))
return(MagickTrue);
mogrify_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(mogrify_info);
channel=mogrify_info->channel;
status=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) argc; i++)
{
if (*images == (Image *) NULL)
break;
option=argv[i];
if (IsCommandOption(option) == MagickFalse)
continue;
count=ParseCommandOption(MagickCommandOptions,MagickFalse,option);
count=MagickMax(count,0L);
if ((i+count) >= (ssize_t) argc)
break;
status=MogrifyImageInfo(mogrify_info,(int) count+1,argv+i,exception);
switch (*(option+1))
{
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare("affinity",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("append",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*append_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
append_image=AppendImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,exception);
if (append_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=append_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("average",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*average_image;
/*
Average an image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
average_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MeanEvaluateOperator,
exception);
if (average_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=average_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channel",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
{
channel=DefaultChannels;
break;
}
channel=(ChannelType) ParseChannelOption(argv[i+1]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*clut_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
clut_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (clut_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) ClutImageChannel(image,channel,clut_image);
clut_image=DestroyImage(clut_image);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("coalesce",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*coalesce_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
coalesce_image=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (coalesce_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=coalesce_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("combine",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*combine_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
combine_image=CombineImages(*images,channel,exception);
if (combine_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=combine_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("compare",option+1) == 0)
{
const char
*option;
double
distortion;
Image
*difference_image,
*image,
*reconstruct_image;
MetricType
metric;
/*
Mathematically and visually annotate the difference between an
image and its reconstruction.
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
reconstruct_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (reconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
metric=UndefinedMetric;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"metric");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
metric=(MetricType) ParseCommandOption(MagickMetricOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
difference_image=CompareImageChannels(image,reconstruct_image,
channel,metric,&distortion,exception);
if (difference_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=difference_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("complex",option+1) == 0)
{
ComplexOperator
op;
Image
*complex_images;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
op=(ComplexOperator) ParseCommandOption(MagickComplexOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
complex_images=ComplexImages(*images,op,exception);
if (complex_images == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=complex_images;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("composite",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*mask_image,
*composite_image,
*image;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
composite_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (composite_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) TransformImage(&composite_image,(char *) NULL,
composite_image->geometry);
SetGeometry(composite_image,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(composite_image->geometry,&geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(image->columns,image->rows,image->gravity,
&geometry);
mask_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (mask_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
if ((image->compose == DisplaceCompositeOp) ||
(image->compose == DistortCompositeOp))
{
/*
Merge Y displacement into X displacement image.
*/
(void) CompositeImage(composite_image,CopyGreenCompositeOp,
mask_image,0,0);
mask_image=DestroyImage(mask_image);
}
else
{
/*
Set a blending mask for the composition.
*/
if (image->mask != (Image *) NULL)
image->mask=DestroyImage(image->mask);
image->mask=mask_image;
(void) NegateImage(image->mask,MagickFalse);
}
}
(void) CompositeImageChannel(image,channel,image->compose,
composite_image,geometry.x,geometry.y);
if (mask_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
image->mask=DestroyImage(image->mask);
mask_image=image->mask;
}
composite_image=DestroyImage(composite_image);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("copy",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*source_image;
OffsetInfo
offset;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Copy image pixels.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
(void) ParsePageGeometry(*images,argv[i+2],&geometry,exception);
offset.x=geometry.x;
offset.y=geometry.y;
source_image=(*images);
if (source_image->next != (Image *) NULL)
source_image=source_image->next;
(void) ParsePageGeometry(source_image,argv[i+1],&geometry,
exception);
status=CopyImagePixels(*images,source_image,&geometry,&offset,
exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("deconstruct",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*deconstruct_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
deconstruct_image=DeconstructImages(*images,exception);
if (deconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=deconstruct_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("delete",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
DeleteImages(images,"-1",exception);
else
DeleteImages(images,argv[i+1],exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("dither",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
{
quantize_info->dither=MagickFalse;
break;
}
quantize_info->dither=MagickTrue;
quantize_info->dither_method=(DitherMethod) ParseCommandOption(
MagickDitherOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("duplicate",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*duplicate_images;
if (*option == '+')
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,1,"-1",exception);
else
{
const char
*p;
size_t
number_duplicates;
number_duplicates=(size_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=strchr(argv[i+1],',');
if (p == (const char *) NULL)
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,
"-1",exception);
else
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,p,
exception);
}
AppendImageToList(images, duplicate_images);
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare("evaluate-sequence",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*evaluate_image;
MagickEvaluateOperator
op;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
op=(MagickEvaluateOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickEvaluateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
evaluate_image=EvaluateImages(*images,op,exception);
if (evaluate_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=evaluate_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare("fft",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image;
/*
Implements the discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
fourier_image=ForwardFourierTransformImage(*images,*option == '-' ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("flatten",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*flatten_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
flatten_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,FlattenLayer,exception);
if (flatten_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=flatten_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("fx",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fx_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
fx_image=FxImageChannel(*images,channel,argv[i+1],exception);
if (fx_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fx_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("hald-clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*hald_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
hald_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (hald_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) HaldClutImageChannel(image,channel,hald_image);
hald_image=DestroyImage(hald_image);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("ift",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image,
*magnitude_image,
*phase_image;
/*
Implements the inverse fourier discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
magnitude_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
phase_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (phase_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
fourier_image=InverseFourierTransformImage(magnitude_image,
phase_image,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("insert",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q;
index=0;
if (*option != '+')
index=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=RemoveLastImageFromList(images);
if (p == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
q=p;
if (index == 0)
PrependImageToList(images,q);
else
if (index == (ssize_t) GetImageListLength(*images))
AppendImageToList(images,q);
else
{
q=GetImageFromList(*images,index-1);
if (q == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InsertImageInList(&q,p);
}
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("layers",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*layers;
ImageLayerMethod
method;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
layers=(Image *) NULL;
method=(ImageLayerMethod) ParseCommandOption(MagickLayerOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
switch (method)
{
case CoalesceLayer:
{
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case CompareAnyLayer:
case CompareClearLayer:
case CompareOverlayLayer:
default:
{
layers=CompareImageLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case MergeLayer:
case FlattenLayer:
case MosaicLayer:
case TrimBoundsLayer:
{
layers=MergeImageLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case DisposeLayer:
{
layers=DisposeImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeImageLayer:
{
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizePlusLayer:
{
layers=OptimizePlusImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeTransLayer:
{
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveDupsLayer:
{
RemoveDuplicateLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveZeroLayer:
{
RemoveZeroDelayLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeLayer:
{
/*
General Purpose, GIF Animation Optimizer.
*/
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InheritException(exception,&layers->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InheritException(exception,&layers->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=(Image *) NULL;
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL);
break;
}
case CompositeLayer:
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
Image
*source;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Split image sequence at the first 'NULL:' image.
*/
source=(*images);
while (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
source=GetNextImageInList(source);
if ((source != (Image *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(source->magick,"NULL") == 0))
break;
}
if (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
if ((GetPreviousImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL) ||
(GetNextImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL))
source=(Image *) NULL;
else
{
/*
Separate the two lists, junk the null: image.
*/
source=SplitImageList(source->previous);
DeleteImageFromList(&source);
}
}
if (source == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"MissingNullSeparator","layers Composite");
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
/*
Adjust offset with gravity and virtual canvas.
*/
SetGeometry(*images,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry((*images)->geometry,&geometry);
geometry.width=source->page.width != 0 ?
source->page.width : source->columns;
geometry.height=source->page.height != 0 ?
source->page.height : source->rows;
GravityAdjustGeometry((*images)->page.width != 0 ?
(*images)->page.width : (*images)->columns,
(*images)->page.height != 0 ? (*images)->page.height :
(*images)->rows,(*images)->gravity,&geometry);
compose=OverCompositeOp;
option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,option);
CompositeLayers(*images,compose,source,geometry.x,geometry.y,
exception);
source=DestroyImageList(source);
break;
}
}
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
break;
InheritException(exception,&layers->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare("map",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("maximum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*maximum_image;
/*
Maximum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
maximum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MaxEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (maximum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=maximum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("minimum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*minimum_image;
/*
Minimum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
minimum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MinEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (minimum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=minimum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("morph",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*morph_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
morph_image=MorphImages(*images,StringToUnsignedLong(argv[i+1]),
exception);
if (morph_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=morph_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("mosaic",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*mosaic_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
mosaic_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,MosaicLayer,exception);
if (mosaic_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=mosaic_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("poly",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*args,
token[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*p;
double
*arguments;
Image
*polynomial_image;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
number_arguments;
/*
Polynomial image.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
args=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1]);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
if (args == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; *p != '\0'; x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
}
number_arguments=(size_t) x;
arguments=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_arguments,
sizeof(*arguments));
if (arguments == (double *) NULL)
ThrowWandFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed",(*images)->filename);
(void) memset(arguments,0,number_arguments*
sizeof(*arguments));
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; (x < (ssize_t) number_arguments) && (*p != '\0'); x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
arguments[x]=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
}
args=DestroyString(args);
polynomial_image=PolynomialImageChannel(*images,channel,
number_arguments >> 1,arguments,exception);
arguments=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
if (polynomial_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=polynomial_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("print",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*string;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
string=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1]);
if (string == (char *) NULL)
break;
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%s",string);
string=DestroyString(string);
}
if (LocaleCompare("process",option+1) == 0)
{
char
**arguments;
int
j,
number_arguments;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
arguments=StringToArgv(argv[i+1],&number_arguments);
if (arguments == (char **) NULL)
break;
if ((argc > 1) && (strchr(arguments[1],'=') != (char *) NULL))
{
char
breaker,
quote,
*token;
const char
*arguments;
int
next,
status;
size_t
length;
TokenInfo
*token_info;
/*
Support old style syntax, filter="-option arg".
*/
length=strlen(argv[i+1]);
token=(char *) NULL;
if (~length >= (MaxTextExtent-1))
token=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MaxTextExtent,
sizeof(*token));
if (token == (char *) NULL)
break;
next=0;
arguments=argv[i+1];
token_info=AcquireTokenInfo();
status=Tokenizer(token_info,0,token,length,arguments,"","=",
"\"",'\0',&breaker,&next,"e);
token_info=DestroyTokenInfo(token_info);
if (status == 0)
{
const char
*argv;
argv=(&(arguments[next]));
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(token,&(*images),1,&argv,
exception);
}
token=DestroyString(token);
break;
}
(void) SubstituteString(&arguments[1],"-","");
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(arguments[1],&(*images),
number_arguments-2,(const char **) arguments+2,exception);
for (j=0; j < number_arguments; j++)
arguments[j]=DestroyString(arguments[j]);
arguments=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("reverse",option+1) == 0)
{
ReverseImageList(images);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare("smush",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*smush_image;
ssize_t
offset;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
offset=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
smush_image=SmushImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,offset,exception);
if (smush_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=smush_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("swap",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q,
*u,
*v;
ssize_t
swap_index;
index=(-1);
swap_index=(-2);
if (*option != '+')
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
swap_index=(-1);
flags=ParseGeometry(argv[i+1],&geometry_info);
index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
swap_index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.sigma;
}
p=GetImageFromList(*images,index);
q=GetImageFromList(*images,swap_index);
if ((p == (Image *) NULL) || (q == (Image *) NULL))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",(*images)->filename);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (p == q)
break;
u=CloneImage(p,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (u == (Image *) NULL)
break;
v=CloneImage(q,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (v == (Image *) NULL)
{
u=DestroyImage(u);
break;
}
ReplaceImageInList(&p,v);
ReplaceImageInList(&q,u);
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare("write",option+1) == 0)
{
char
key[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*write_images;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MaxTextExtent,"cache:%s",argv[i+1]);
(void) DeleteImageRegistry(key);
write_images=(*images);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=CloneImageList(*images,exception);
write_info=CloneImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=WriteImages(write_info,write_images,argv[i+1],exception);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=DestroyImageList(write_images);
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
i+=count;
}
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
mogrify_info=DestroyImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=MogrifyImageInfo(image_info,argc,argv,exception);
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick 7.0.8-50 Q16 has memory leaks at AcquireMagickMemory because of an error in MagickWand/mogrify.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1616 | Medium | 13,493 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ConnectPanelServiceSignals() {
if (!ibus_) {
return;
}
IBusPanelService* ibus_panel_service = IBUS_PANEL_SERVICE(
g_object_get_data(G_OBJECT(ibus_), kPanelObjectKey));
if (!ibus_panel_service) {
LOG(ERROR) << "IBusPanelService is NOT available.";
return;
}
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"focus-in",
G_CALLBACK(FocusInCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"register-properties",
G_CALLBACK(RegisterPropertiesCallback),
this);
g_signal_connect(ibus_panel_service,
"update-property",
G_CALLBACK(UpdatePropertyCallback),
this);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 20,263 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static Image *ReadXWDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define CheckOverflowException(length,width,height) \
(((height) != 0) && ((length)/((size_t) height) != ((size_t) width)))
char
*comment;
Image
*image;
int
x_status;
MagickBooleanType
authentic_colormap;
MagickStatusType
status;
Quantum
index;
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i;
register size_t
pixel;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned long
lsb_first;
XColor
*colors;
XImage
*ximage;
XWDFileHeader
header;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read in header information.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,sz_XWDheader,(unsigned char *) &header);
if (count != sz_XWDheader)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageHeader");
/*
Ensure the header byte-order is most-significant byte first.
*/
lsb_first=1;
if ((int) (*(char *) &lsb_first) != 0)
MSBOrderLong((unsigned char *) &header,sz_XWDheader);
/*
Check to see if the dump file is in the proper format.
*/
if (header.file_version != XWD_FILE_VERSION)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"FileFormatVersionMismatch");
if (header.header_size < sz_XWDheader)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
switch (header.visual_class)
{
case StaticGray:
case GrayScale:
{
if (header.bits_per_pixel != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
}
case StaticColor:
case PseudoColor:
{
if ((header.bits_per_pixel < 1) || (header.bits_per_pixel > 15) ||
(header.ncolors == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
}
case TrueColor:
case DirectColor:
{
if ((header.bits_per_pixel != 16) && (header.bits_per_pixel != 24) &&
(header.bits_per_pixel != 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (header.pixmap_format)
{
case XYBitmap:
{
if (header.pixmap_depth != 1)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
break;
}
case XYPixmap:
case ZPixmap:
{
if ((header.pixmap_depth < 1) || (header.pixmap_depth > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
switch (header.bitmap_pad)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (header.bitmap_unit)
{
case 8:
case 16:
case 32:
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (header.byte_order)
{
case LSBFirst:
case MSBFirst:
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
switch (header.bitmap_bit_order)
{
case LSBFirst:
case MSBFirst:
break;
default:
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (header.ncolors > 65535)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (((header.bitmap_pad % 8) != 0) || (header.bitmap_pad > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
length=(size_t) (header.header_size-sz_XWDheader);
comment=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,sizeof(*comment));
if (comment == (char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,length,(unsigned char *) comment);
comment[length]='\0';
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",comment,exception);
comment=DestroyString(comment);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
/*
Initialize the X image.
*/
ximage=(XImage *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*ximage));
if (ximage == (XImage *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
ximage->depth=(int) header.pixmap_depth;
ximage->format=(int) header.pixmap_format;
ximage->xoffset=(int) header.xoffset;
ximage->data=(char *) NULL;
ximage->width=(int) header.pixmap_width;
ximage->height=(int) header.pixmap_height;
ximage->bitmap_pad=(int) header.bitmap_pad;
ximage->bytes_per_line=(int) header.bytes_per_line;
ximage->byte_order=(int) header.byte_order;
ximage->bitmap_unit=(int) header.bitmap_unit;
ximage->bitmap_bit_order=(int) header.bitmap_bit_order;
ximage->bits_per_pixel=(int) header.bits_per_pixel;
ximage->red_mask=header.red_mask;
ximage->green_mask=header.green_mask;
ximage->blue_mask=header.blue_mask;
if ((ximage->width < 0) || (ximage->height < 0) || (ximage->depth < 0) ||
(ximage->format < 0) || (ximage->byte_order < 0) ||
(ximage->bitmap_bit_order < 0) || (ximage->bitmap_pad < 0) ||
(ximage->bytes_per_line < 0))
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if ((ximage->width > 65535) || (ximage->height > 65535))
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if ((ximage->bits_per_pixel > 32) || (ximage->bitmap_unit > 32))
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
x_status=XInitImage(ximage);
if (x_status == 0)
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
/*
Read colormap.
*/
authentic_colormap=MagickFalse;
colors=(XColor *) NULL;
if (header.ncolors != 0)
{
XWDColor
color;
colors=(XColor *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) header.ncolors,
sizeof(*colors));
if (colors == (XColor *) NULL)
{
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) header.ncolors; i++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,sz_XWDColor,(unsigned char *) &color);
if (count != sz_XWDColor)
{
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
colors[i].pixel=color.pixel;
colors[i].red=color.red;
colors[i].green=color.green;
colors[i].blue=color.blue;
colors[i].flags=(char) color.flags;
if (color.flags != 0)
authentic_colormap=MagickTrue;
}
/*
Ensure the header byte-order is most-significant byte first.
*/
lsb_first=1;
if ((int) (*(char *) &lsb_first) != 0)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) header.ncolors; i++)
{
MSBOrderLong((unsigned char *) &colors[i].pixel,
sizeof(colors[i].pixel));
MSBOrderShort((unsigned char *) &colors[i].red,3*
sizeof(colors[i].red));
}
}
/*
Allocate the pixel buffer.
*/
length=(size_t) ximage->bytes_per_line*ximage->height;
if (CheckOverflowException(length,ximage->bytes_per_line,ximage->height))
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (ximage->format != ZPixmap)
{
size_t
extent;
extent=length;
length*=ximage->depth;
if (CheckOverflowException(length,extent,ximage->depth))
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
ximage->data=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*ximage->data));
if (ximage->data == (char *) NULL)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,(unsigned char *) ximage->data);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
}
/*
Convert image to MIFF format.
*/
image->columns=(size_t) ximage->width;
image->rows=(size_t) ximage->height;
image->depth=8;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if ((header.ncolors == 0U) || (ximage->red_mask != 0) ||
(ximage->green_mask != 0) || (ximage->blue_mask != 0))
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
else
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=header.ncolors;
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
switch (image->storage_class)
{
case DirectClass:
default:
{
register size_t
color;
size_t
blue_mask,
blue_shift,
green_mask,
green_shift,
red_mask,
red_shift;
/*
Determine shift and mask for red, green, and blue.
*/
red_mask=ximage->red_mask;
red_shift=0;
while ((red_mask != 0) && ((red_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
red_mask>>=1;
red_shift++;
}
green_mask=ximage->green_mask;
green_shift=0;
while ((green_mask != 0) && ((green_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
green_mask>>=1;
green_shift++;
}
blue_mask=ximage->blue_mask;
blue_shift=0;
while ((blue_mask != 0) && ((blue_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
blue_mask>>=1;
blue_shift++;
}
/*
Convert X image to DirectClass packets.
*/
if ((image->colors != 0) && (authentic_colormap != MagickFalse))
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=XGetPixel(ximage,(int) x,(int) y);
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) (pixel >>
red_shift) & red_mask,exception);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
colors[(ssize_t) index].red),q);
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) (pixel >>
green_shift) & green_mask,exception);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
colors[(ssize_t) index].green),q);
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t) (pixel >>
blue_shift) & blue_mask,exception);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
colors[(ssize_t) index].blue),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
else
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=XGetPixel(ximage,(int) x,(int) y);
color=(pixel >> red_shift) & red_mask;
if (red_mask != 0)
color=(color*65535UL)/red_mask;
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color),q);
color=(pixel >> green_shift) & green_mask;
if (green_mask != 0)
color=(color*65535UL)/green_mask;
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color),
q);
color=(pixel >> blue_shift) & blue_mask;
if (blue_mask != 0)
color=(color*65535UL)/blue_mask;
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case PseudoClass:
{
/*
Convert X image to PseudoClass packets.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(
colors[i].red);
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(
colors[i].green);
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleShortToQuantum(
colors[i].blue);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(ssize_t)
XGetPixel(ximage,(int) x,(int) y),exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
/*
Free image and colormap.
*/
if (header.ncolors != 0)
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
ximage->data=DestroyString(ximage->data);
ximage=(XImage *) RelinquishMagickMemory(ximage);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The XWD image (X Window System window dumping file) parsing component in ImageMagick 7.0.8-41 Q16 allows attackers to cause a denial-of-service (application crash resulting from an out-of-bounds Read) in ReadXWDImage in coders/xwd.c by crafting a corrupted XWD image file, a different vulnerability than CVE-2019-11472.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1553 | Medium | 8,623 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int _snd_timer_stop(struct snd_timer_instance * timeri,
int keep_flag, int event)
{
struct snd_timer *timer;
unsigned long flags;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!timeri))
return -ENXIO;
if (timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_SLAVE) {
if (!keep_flag) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&slave_active_lock, flags);
timeri->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&slave_active_lock, flags);
}
goto __end;
}
timer = timeri->timer;
if (!timer)
return -EINVAL;
spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
list_del_init(&timeri->ack_list);
list_del_init(&timeri->active_list);
if ((timeri->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING) &&
!(--timer->running)) {
timer->hw.stop(timer);
if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED) {
timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_RESCHED;
snd_timer_reschedule(timer, 0);
if (timer->flags & SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE) {
timer->flags &= ~SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_CHANGE;
timer->hw.start(timer);
}
}
}
if (!keep_flag)
timeri->flags &=
~(SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_RUNNING | SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_START);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&timer->lock, flags);
__end:
if (event != SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)
snd_timer_notify1(timeri, event);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: sound/core/timer.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 retains certain linked lists after a close or stop action, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) via a crafted ioctl call, related to the (1) snd_timer_close and (2) _snd_timer_stop functions.
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Harden slave timer list handling
A slave timer instance might be still accessible in a racy way while
operating the master instance as it lacks of locking. Since the
master operation is mostly protected with timer->lock, we should cope
with it while changing the slave instance, too. Also, some linked
lists (active_list and ack_list) of slave instances aren't unlinked
immediately at stopping or closing, and this may lead to unexpected
accesses.
This patch tries to address these issues. It adds spin lock of
timer->lock (either from master or slave, which is equivalent) in a
few places. For avoiding a deadlock, we ensure that the global
slave_active_lock is always locked at first before each timer lock.
Also, ack and active_list of slave instances are properly unlinked at
snd_timer_stop() and snd_timer_close().
Last but not least, remove the superfluous call of _snd_timer_stop()
at removing slave links. This is a noop, and calling it may confuse
readers wrt locking. Further cleanup will follow in a later patch.
Actually we've got reports of use-after-free by syzkaller fuzzer, and
this hopefully fixes these issues.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> | Medium | 26,819 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int get_int32_le(QEMUFile *f, void *pv, size_t size)
{
int32_t loaded;
int32_t loaded;
qemu_get_sbe32s(f, &loaded);
if (loaded <= *cur) {
*cur = loaded;
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in target-arm/machine.c in QEMU before 1.7.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary code via a negative value in cpreg_vmstate_array_len in a savevm image.
Commit Message: | High | 6,489 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: pipe_iov_copy_from_user(void *to, struct iovec *iov, unsigned long len,
int atomic)
{
unsigned long copy;
while (len > 0) {
while (!iov->iov_len)
iov++;
copy = min_t(unsigned long, len, iov->iov_len);
if (atomic) {
if (__copy_from_user_inatomic(to, iov->iov_base, copy))
return -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_from_user(to, iov->iov_base, copy))
return -EFAULT;
}
to += copy;
len -= copy;
iov->iov_base += copy;
iov->iov_len -= copy;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-17
Summary: The (1) pipe_read and (2) pipe_write implementations in fs/pipe.c in the Linux kernel before 3.16 do not properly consider the side effects of failed __copy_to_user_inatomic and __copy_from_user_inatomic calls, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly gain privileges via a crafted application, aka an *I/O vector array overrun.*
Commit Message: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | High | 19,705 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static const ut8 *r_bin_dwarf_parse_comp_unit(Sdb *s, const ut8 *obuf,
RBinDwarfCompUnit *cu, const RBinDwarfDebugAbbrev *da,
size_t offset, const ut8 *debug_str, size_t debug_str_len) {
const ut8 *buf = obuf, *buf_end = obuf + (cu->hdr.length - 7);
ut64 abbr_code;
size_t i;
if (cu->hdr.length > debug_str_len) {
return NULL;
}
while (buf && buf < buf_end && buf >= obuf) {
if (cu->length && cu->capacity == cu->length) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_cu (cu);
}
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, buf_end - buf, &abbr_code);
if (abbr_code > da->length || !buf) {
return NULL;
}
r_bin_dwarf_init_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
if (!abbr_code) {
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = 0;
cu->length++;
buf++;
continue;
}
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = abbr_code;
cu->dies[cu->length].tag = da->decls[abbr_code - 1].tag;
abbr_code += offset;
if (da->capacity < abbr_code) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < da->decls[abbr_code - 1].length; i++) {
if (cu->dies[cu->length].length == cu->dies[cu->length].capacity) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
}
if (i >= cu->dies[cu->length].capacity || i >= da->decls[abbr_code - 1].capacity) {
eprintf ("Warning: malformed dwarf attribute capacity doesn't match length\n");
break;
}
memset (&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i], 0, sizeof
(cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i]));
buf = r_bin_dwarf_parse_attr_value (buf, buf_end - buf,
&da->decls[abbr_code - 1].specs[i],
&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i],
&cu->hdr, debug_str, debug_str_len);
if (cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].name == DW_AT_comp_dir) {
const char *name = cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].encoding.str_struct.string;
sdb_set (s, "DW_AT_comp_dir", name, 0);
}
cu->dies[cu->length].length++;
}
cu->length++;
}
return buf;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In radare2 2.0.1, libr/bin/dwarf.c allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (invalid read and application crash) via a crafted ELF file, related to r_bin_dwarf_parse_comp_unit in dwarf.c and sdb_set_internal in shlr/sdb/src/sdb.c.
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser | Medium | 29,683 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintPreview(const base::DictionaryValue& settings) {
print_preview_context_.OnPrintPreview();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("PrintPreview.PreviewEvent",
PREVIEW_EVENT_REQUESTED, PREVIEW_EVENT_MAX);
if (!print_preview_context_.source_frame()) {
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(print_preview_context_.source_frame(),
print_preview_context_.source_node(), settings)) {
if (print_preview_context_.last_error() != PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING) {
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewInvalidPrinterSettings(
routing_id(), print_pages_params_
? print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie
: 0));
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false; // Already sent.
}
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (print_pages_params_->params.is_first_request &&
!print_preview_context_.IsModifiable()) {
PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument_Params options;
if (SetOptionsFromPdfDocument(&options))
Send(new PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument(routing_id(), options));
}
is_print_ready_metafile_sent_ = false;
print_pages_params_->params.supports_alpha_blend = true;
bool generate_draft_pages = false;
if (!settings.GetBoolean(kSettingGenerateDraftData, &generate_draft_pages)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
print_preview_context_.set_generate_draft_pages(generate_draft_pages);
PrepareFrameForPreviewDocument();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple use-after-free vulnerabilities in the PrintWebViewHelper class in components/printing/renderer/print_web_view_helper.cc in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85 allow user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering nested IPC messages during preparation for printing, as demonstrated by messages associated with PDF documents in conjunction with messages about printer capabilities.
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100} | High | 5,235 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static char *print_number( cJSON *item )
{
char *str;
double f, f2;
int64_t i;
str = (char*) cJSON_malloc( 64 );
if ( str ) {
f = item->valuefloat;
i = f;
f2 = i;
if ( f2 == f && item->valueint >= LLONG_MIN && item->valueint <= LLONG_MAX )
sprintf( str, "%lld", (long long) item->valueint );
else
sprintf( str, "%g", item->valuefloat );
}
return str;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | High | 14,189 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: jiffies_to_compat_timeval(unsigned long jiffies, struct compat_timeval *value)
{
/*
* Convert jiffies to nanoseconds and separate with
* one divide.
*/
u64 nsec = (u64)jiffies * TICK_NSEC;
long rem;
value->tv_sec = div_long_long_rem(nsec, NSEC_PER_SEC, &rem);
value->tv_usec = rem / NSEC_PER_USEC;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The div_long_long_rem implementation in include/asm-x86/div64.h in the Linux kernel before 2.6.26 on the x86 platform allows local users to cause a denial of service (Divide Error Fault and panic) via a clock_gettime system call.
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 14,569 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool GDataRootDirectory::ParseFromString(const std::string& serialized_proto) {
scoped_ptr<GDataRootDirectoryProto> proto(
new GDataRootDirectoryProto());
bool ok = proto->ParseFromString(serialized_proto);
if (ok) {
const std::string& title = proto->gdata_directory().gdata_entry().title();
if (title != "drive") {
LOG(ERROR) << "Incompatible proto detected: " << title;
return false;
}
FromProto(*proto.get());
set_origin(FROM_CACHE);
set_refresh_time(base::Time::Now());
}
return ok;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in the PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allow remote attackers to have an unknown impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 28,492 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
InitializeConfig();
SetMode(GET_PARAM(1));
set_cpu_used_ = GET_PARAM(2);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 13,305 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: decnet_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *ap, register u_int length,
register u_int caplen)
{
register const union routehdr *rhp;
register int mflags;
int dst, src, hops;
u_int nsplen, pktlen;
const u_char *nspp;
if (length < sizeof(struct shorthdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*ap, sizeof(short));
pktlen = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(ap);
if (pktlen < sizeof(struct shorthdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
if (pktlen > length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
length = pktlen;
rhp = (const union routehdr *)&(ap[sizeof(short)]);
ND_TCHECK(rhp->rh_short.sh_flags);
mflags = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_flags);
if (mflags & RMF_PAD) {
/* pad bytes of some sort in front of message */
u_int padlen = mflags & RMF_PADMASK;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[pad:%d] ", padlen));
if (length < padlen + 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(ap[sizeof(short)], padlen);
ap += padlen;
length -= padlen;
caplen -= padlen;
rhp = (const union routehdr *)&(ap[sizeof(short)]);
mflags = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_flags);
}
if (mflags & RMF_FVER) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "future-version-decnet"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(ap, min(length, caplen));
return;
}
/* is it a control message? */
if (mflags & RMF_CTLMSG) {
if (!print_decnet_ctlmsg(ndo, rhp, length, caplen))
goto trunc;
return;
}
switch (mflags & RMF_MASK) {
case RMF_LONG:
if (length < sizeof(struct longhdr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(rhp->rh_long);
dst =
EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_long.lg_dst.dne_remote.dne_nodeaddr);
src =
EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_long.lg_src.dne_remote.dne_nodeaddr);
hops = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_long.lg_visits);
nspp = &(ap[sizeof(short) + sizeof(struct longhdr)]);
nsplen = length - sizeof(struct longhdr);
break;
case RMF_SHORT:
ND_TCHECK(rhp->rh_short);
dst = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_dst);
src = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_src);
hops = (EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(rhp->rh_short.sh_visits) & VIS_MASK)+1;
nspp = &(ap[sizeof(short) + sizeof(struct shorthdr)]);
nsplen = length - sizeof(struct shorthdr);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown message flags under mask"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, min(length, caplen));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s %d ",
dnaddr_string(ndo, src), dnaddr_string(ndo, dst), pktlen));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
if (mflags & RMF_RQR)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RQR "));
if (mflags & RMF_RTS)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RTS "));
if (mflags & RMF_IE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IE "));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%d hops ", hops));
}
if (!print_nsp(ndo, nspp, nsplen))
goto trunc;
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The DECnet parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-decnet.c:decnet_print().
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12899/DECnet: Fix bounds checking.
If we're skipping over padding before the *real* flags, check whether
the real flags are in the captured data before fetching it. This fixes
a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Note one place where we don't need to do bounds checking as it's already
been done.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | High | 21,546 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int validate_camera_metadata_structure(const camera_metadata_t *metadata,
const size_t *expected_size) {
if (metadata == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: metadata is null!", __FUNCTION__);
return ERROR;
}
{
static const struct {
const char *name;
size_t alignment;
} alignments[] = {
{
.name = "camera_metadata",
.alignment = METADATA_ALIGNMENT
},
{
.name = "camera_metadata_buffer_entry",
.alignment = ENTRY_ALIGNMENT
},
{
.name = "camera_metadata_data",
.alignment = DATA_ALIGNMENT
},
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(alignments)/sizeof(alignments[0]); ++i) {
uintptr_t aligned_ptr = ALIGN_TO(metadata, alignments[i].alignment);
if ((uintptr_t)metadata != aligned_ptr) {
ALOGE("%s: Metadata pointer is not aligned (actual %p, "
"expected %p) to type %s",
__FUNCTION__, metadata,
(void*)aligned_ptr, alignments[i].name);
return ERROR;
}
}
}
/**
* Check that the metadata contents are correct
*/
if (expected_size != NULL && metadata->size > *expected_size) {
ALOGE("%s: Metadata size (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= expected size (%zu)",
__FUNCTION__, metadata->size, *expected_size);
return ERROR;
}
if (metadata->entry_count > metadata->entry_capacity) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry count (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= entry capacity "
"(%" PRIu32 ")",
__FUNCTION__, metadata->entry_count, metadata->entry_capacity);
return ERROR;
}
const metadata_uptrdiff_t entries_end =
metadata->entries_start + metadata->entry_capacity;
if (entries_end < metadata->entries_start || // overflow check
entries_end > metadata->data_start) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry start + capacity (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= data start "
"(%" PRIu32 ")",
__FUNCTION__,
(metadata->entries_start + metadata->entry_capacity),
metadata->data_start);
return ERROR;
}
const metadata_uptrdiff_t data_end =
metadata->data_start + metadata->data_capacity;
if (data_end < metadata->data_start || // overflow check
data_end > metadata->size) {
ALOGE("%s: Data start + capacity (%" PRIu32 ") should be <= total size "
"(%" PRIu32 ")",
__FUNCTION__,
(metadata->data_start + metadata->data_capacity),
metadata->size);
return ERROR;
}
const metadata_size_t entry_count = metadata->entry_count;
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t *entries = get_entries(metadata);
for (size_t i = 0; i < entry_count; ++i) {
if ((uintptr_t)&entries[i] != ALIGN_TO(&entries[i], ENTRY_ALIGNMENT)) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had bad alignment (address %p),"
" expected alignment %zu",
__FUNCTION__, i, &entries[i], ENTRY_ALIGNMENT);
return ERROR;
}
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t entry = entries[i];
if (entry.type >= NUM_TYPES) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had a bad type %d",
__FUNCTION__, i, entry.type);
return ERROR;
}
uint32_t tag_section = entry.tag >> 16;
int tag_type = get_camera_metadata_tag_type(entry.tag);
if (tag_type != (int)entry.type && tag_section < VENDOR_SECTION) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had tag type %d, but the type was %d",
__FUNCTION__, i, tag_type, entry.type);
return ERROR;
}
size_t data_size;
if (validate_and_calculate_camera_metadata_entry_data_size(&data_size, entry.type,
entry.count) != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry data size is invalid. type: %u count: %u", __FUNCTION__, entry.type,
entry.count);
return ERROR;
}
if (data_size != 0) {
camera_metadata_data_t *data =
(camera_metadata_data_t*) (get_data(metadata) +
entry.data.offset);
if ((uintptr_t)data != ALIGN_TO(data, DATA_ALIGNMENT)) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had bad data alignment (address %p),"
" expected align %zu, (tag name %s, data size %zu)",
__FUNCTION__, i, data, DATA_ALIGNMENT,
get_camera_metadata_tag_name(entry.tag) ?: "unknown",
data_size);
return ERROR;
}
size_t data_entry_end = entry.data.offset + data_size;
if (data_entry_end < entry.data.offset || // overflow check
data_entry_end > metadata->data_capacity) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu data ends (%zu) beyond the capacity "
"%" PRIu32, __FUNCTION__, i, data_entry_end,
metadata->data_capacity);
return ERROR;
}
} else if (entry.count == 0) {
if (entry.data.offset != 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Entry index %zu had 0 items, but offset was non-0 "
"(%" PRIu32 "), tag name: %s", __FUNCTION__, i, entry.data.offset,
get_camera_metadata_tag_name(entry.tag) ?: "unknown");
return ERROR;
}
} // else data stored inline, so we look at value which can be anything.
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: camera/src/camera_metadata.c in the Camera service in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-10-01, and 7.0 before 2016-10-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka internal bug 30591838.
Commit Message: Camera metadata: Check for inconsistent data count
Resolve merge conflict for nyc-release
Also check for overflow of data/entry count on append.
Bug: 30591838
Change-Id: Ibf4c3c6e236cdb28234f3125055d95ef0a2416a2
| High | 6,023 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int jp2_cdef_getdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_cdef_t *cdef = &box->data.cdef;
jp2_cdefchan_t *chan;
unsigned int channo;
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &cdef->numchans)) {
return -1;
}
if (!(cdef->ents = jas_alloc2(cdef->numchans, sizeof(jp2_cdefchan_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (channo = 0; channo < cdef->numchans; ++channo) {
chan = &cdef->ents[channo];
if (jp2_getuint16(in, &chan->channo) || jp2_getuint16(in, &chan->type) ||
jp2_getuint16(in, &chan->assoc)) {
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jp2_cdef_destroy function in jp2_cod.c in JasPer before 2.0.13 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted image.
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems. | Medium | 20,355 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xmalloc (size_t size)
{
void *ptr = malloc (size);
if (!ptr
&& (size != 0)) /* some libc don't like size == 0 */
{
perror ("xmalloc: Memory allocation failure");
abort();
}
return ptr;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: An issue was discovered in tnef before 1.4.13. Several Integer Overflows, which can lead to Heap Overflows, have been identified in the functions that wrap memory allocation.
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows and harden memory allocator. | Medium | 12,729 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawArrays(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::DrawArrays& c) {
GLenum mode = static_cast<GLenum>(c.mode);
GLint first = static_cast<GLint>(c.first);
GLsizei count = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.count);
if (!validators_->draw_mode.IsValid(mode)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glDrawArrays: mode GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: count < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckFramebufferComplete("glDrawArrays")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
if (first < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: first < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count == 0) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint max_vertex_accessed = first + count - 1;
if (IsDrawValid(max_vertex_accessed)) {
bool simulated_attrib_0 = SimulateAttrib0(max_vertex_accessed);
bool simulated_fixed_attribs = false;
if (SimulateFixedAttribs(max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_fixed_attribs)) {
bool textures_set = SetBlackTextureForNonRenderableTextures();
ApplyDirtyState();
glDrawArrays(mode, first, count);
if (textures_set) {
RestoreStateForNonRenderableTextures();
}
if (simulated_fixed_attribs) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedFixedAttribs();
}
}
if (simulated_attrib_0) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedAttrib0();
}
if (WasContextLost()) {
LOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Context lost during DrawArrays.";
return error::kLostContext;
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle triangle arrays, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 10,651 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int TS_OBJ_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
{
char obj_txt[128];
int len = OBJ_obj2txt(obj_txt, sizeof(obj_txt), obj, 0);
BIO_write(bio, obj_txt, len);
BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The TS_OBJ_print_bio function in crypto/ts/ts_lib.c in the X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP) implementation in OpenSSL through 1.0.2h allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted time-stamp file that is mishandled by the *openssl ts* command.
Commit Message: Fix OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio().
TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_txt2obj: it should print the result
as a null terminated buffer. The length value returned is the total
length the complete text reprsentation would need not the amount of
data written.
CVE-2016-2180
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> | Medium | 12,955 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *frame)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FieldOrderContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
int h, plane, line_step, line_size, line;
uint8_t *data;
if (!frame->interlaced_frame ||
frame->top_field_first == s->dst_tff)
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, frame);
av_dlog(ctx,
"picture will move %s one line\n",
s->dst_tff ? "up" : "down");
h = frame->height;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane]; plane++) {
line_step = frame->linesize[plane];
line_size = s->line_size[plane];
data = frame->data[plane];
if (s->dst_tff) {
/** Move every line up one line, working from
* the top to the bottom of the frame.
* The original top line is lost.
* The new last line is created as a copy of the
* penultimate line from that field. */
for (line = 0; line < h; line++) {
if (1 + line < frame->height) {
memcpy(data, data + line_step, line_size);
} else {
memcpy(data, data - line_step - line_step, line_size);
}
data += line_step;
}
} else {
/** Move every line down one line, working from
* the bottom to the top of the frame.
* The original bottom line is lost.
* The new first line is created as a copy of the
* second line from that field. */
data += (h - 1) * line_step;
for (line = h - 1; line >= 0 ; line--) {
if (line > 0) {
memcpy(data, data - line_step, line_size);
} else {
memcpy(data, data + line_step + line_step, line_size);
}
data -= line_step;
}
}
}
frame->top_field_first = s->dst_tff;
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, frame);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libavfilter in FFmpeg before 2.0.1 has unspecified impact and remote vectors related to a crafted *plane,* which triggers an out-of-bounds heap write.
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | High | 1,553 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnCreateSnapshotFile(
int request_id, const GURL& blob_url, const GURL& path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
FileSystemURL url(path);
base::Callback<void(const FilePath&)> register_file_callback =
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::RegisterFileAsBlob,
this, blob_url, url.path());
FileSystemOperation* operation = GetNewOperation(url, request_id);
if (!operation)
return;
operation->CreateSnapshotFile(
url,
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidCreateSnapshot,
this, request_id, register_file_callback));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly maintain database metadata, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended file-access restrictions via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 8,468 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ntlm_write_message_fields_buffer(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (fields->Len > 0)
{
Stream_SetPosition(s, fields->BufferOffset);
Stream_Write(s, fields->Buffer, fields->Len);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains several Out-Of-Bounds Reads in the NTLM Authentication module that results in a Denial of Service (segfault).
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies. | Medium | 9,729 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: Track::~Track()
{
Info& info = const_cast<Info&>(m_info);
info.Clear();
ContentEncoding** i = content_encoding_entries_;
ContentEncoding** const j = content_encoding_entries_end_;
while (i != j) {
ContentEncoding* const encoding = *i++;
delete encoding;
}
delete [] content_encoding_entries_;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 2,055 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool ResourceTracker::UnrefResource(PP_Resource res) {
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(res, PP_ID_TYPE_RESOURCE))
<< res << " is not a PP_Resource.";
ResourceMap::iterator i = live_resources_.find(res);
if (i != live_resources_.end()) {
if (!--i->second.second) {
Resource* to_release = i->second.first;
PP_Instance instance = to_release->instance()->pp_instance();
to_release->LastPluginRefWasDeleted(false);
instance_map_[instance]->resources.erase(res);
live_resources_.erase(i);
}
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to instantiation of the Pepper plug-in.
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 19,946 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static inline int btif_hl_select_close_connected(void){
char sig_on = btif_hl_signal_select_close_connected;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_close_connected");
return send(signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
| Medium | 3,466 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ProcessMSLScript(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image **image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
message[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*msl_image;
int
status;
ssize_t
n;
MSLInfo
msl_info;
xmlSAXHandler
sax_modules;
xmlSAXHandlerPtr
sax_handler;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(image != (Image **) NULL);
msl_image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,msl_image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile",
msl_image->filename);
msl_image=DestroyImageList(msl_image);
return(MagickFalse);
}
msl_image->columns=1;
msl_image->rows=1;
/*
Parse MSL file.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&msl_info,0,sizeof(msl_info));
msl_info.exception=exception;
msl_info.image_info=(ImageInfo **) AcquireMagickMemory(
sizeof(*msl_info.image_info));
msl_info.draw_info=(DrawInfo **) AcquireMagickMemory(
sizeof(*msl_info.draw_info));
/* top of the stack is the MSL file itself */
msl_info.image=(Image **) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*msl_info.image));
msl_info.attributes=(Image **) AcquireMagickMemory(
sizeof(*msl_info.attributes));
msl_info.group_info=(MSLGroupInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(
sizeof(*msl_info.group_info));
if ((msl_info.image_info == (ImageInfo **) NULL) ||
(msl_info.image == (Image **) NULL) ||
(msl_info.attributes == (Image **) NULL) ||
(msl_info.group_info == (MSLGroupInfo *) NULL))
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"UnableToInterpretMSLImage");
*msl_info.image_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
*msl_info.draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(image_info,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
*msl_info.attributes=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
msl_info.group_info[0].numImages=0;
/* the first slot is used to point to the MSL file image */
*msl_info.image=msl_image;
if (*image != (Image *) NULL)
MSLPushImage(&msl_info,*image);
(void) xmlSubstituteEntitiesDefault(1);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sax_modules,0,sizeof(sax_modules));
sax_modules.internalSubset=MSLInternalSubset;
sax_modules.isStandalone=MSLIsStandalone;
sax_modules.hasInternalSubset=MSLHasInternalSubset;
sax_modules.hasExternalSubset=MSLHasExternalSubset;
sax_modules.resolveEntity=MSLResolveEntity;
sax_modules.getEntity=MSLGetEntity;
sax_modules.entityDecl=MSLEntityDeclaration;
sax_modules.notationDecl=MSLNotationDeclaration;
sax_modules.attributeDecl=MSLAttributeDeclaration;
sax_modules.elementDecl=MSLElementDeclaration;
sax_modules.unparsedEntityDecl=MSLUnparsedEntityDeclaration;
sax_modules.setDocumentLocator=MSLSetDocumentLocator;
sax_modules.startDocument=MSLStartDocument;
sax_modules.endDocument=MSLEndDocument;
sax_modules.startElement=MSLStartElement;
sax_modules.endElement=MSLEndElement;
sax_modules.reference=MSLReference;
sax_modules.characters=MSLCharacters;
sax_modules.ignorableWhitespace=MSLIgnorableWhitespace;
sax_modules.processingInstruction=MSLProcessingInstructions;
sax_modules.comment=MSLComment;
sax_modules.warning=MSLWarning;
sax_modules.error=MSLError;
sax_modules.fatalError=MSLError;
sax_modules.getParameterEntity=MSLGetParameterEntity;
sax_modules.cdataBlock=MSLCDataBlock;
sax_modules.externalSubset=MSLExternalSubset;
sax_handler=(&sax_modules);
msl_info.parser=xmlCreatePushParserCtxt(sax_handler,&msl_info,(char *) NULL,0,
msl_image->filename);
while (ReadBlobString(msl_image,message) != (char *) NULL)
{
n=(ssize_t) strlen(message);
if (n == 0)
continue;
status=xmlParseChunk(msl_info.parser,message,(int) n,MagickFalse);
if (status != 0)
break;
(void) xmlParseChunk(msl_info.parser," ",1,MagickFalse);
if (msl_info.exception->severity >= ErrorException)
break;
}
if (msl_info.exception->severity == UndefinedException)
(void) xmlParseChunk(msl_info.parser," ",1,MagickTrue);
xmlFreeParserCtxt(msl_info.parser);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"end SAX");
msl_info.group_info=(MSLGroupInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
msl_info.group_info);
if (*image == (Image *) NULL)
*image=(*msl_info.image);
if (msl_info.exception->severity != UndefinedException)
return(MagickFalse);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: The ProcessMSLScript function in coders/msl.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.9-5 and 7.x before 7.0.6-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory leak) via a crafted file, related to the WriteMSLImage function.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/636 | Medium | 17,963 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int cypress_generic_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;
struct cypress_private *priv;
priv = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cypress_private), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!priv)
return -ENOMEM;
priv->comm_is_ok = !0;
spin_lock_init(&priv->lock);
if (kfifo_alloc(&priv->write_fifo, CYPRESS_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL)) {
kfree(priv);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Skip reset for FRWD device. It is a workaound:
device hangs if it receives SET_CONFIGURE in Configured
state. */
if (!is_frwd(serial->dev))
usb_reset_configuration(serial->dev);
priv->cmd_ctrl = 0;
priv->line_control = 0;
priv->termios_initialized = 0;
priv->rx_flags = 0;
/* Default packet format setting is determined by packet size.
Anything with a size larger then 9 must have a separate
count field since the 3 bit count field is otherwise too
small. Otherwise we can use the slightly more compact
format. This is in accordance with the cypress_m8 serial
converter app note. */
if (port->interrupt_out_size > 9)
priv->pkt_fmt = packet_format_1;
else
priv->pkt_fmt = packet_format_2;
if (interval > 0) {
priv->write_urb_interval = interval;
priv->read_urb_interval = interval;
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - read & write intervals forced to %d\n",
__func__, interval);
} else {
priv->write_urb_interval = port->interrupt_out_urb->interval;
priv->read_urb_interval = port->interrupt_in_urb->interval;
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - intervals: read=%d write=%d\n",
__func__, priv->read_urb_interval,
priv->write_urb_interval);
}
usb_set_serial_port_data(port, priv);
port->port.drain_delay = 256;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: drivers/usb/serial/cypress_m8.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.1 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a USB device without both an interrupt-in and an interrupt-out endpoint descriptor, related to the cypress_generic_port_probe and cypress_open functions.
Commit Message: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
An attack using missing endpoints exists.
CVE-2016-3137
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
CC: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 8,415 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PPB_URLLoader_Impl::FinishLoading(int32_t done_status) {
done_status_ = done_status;
if (TrackedCallback::IsPending(pending_callback_))
RunCallback(done_status_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 21.0.1180.89 does not properly load URLs, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger a *stale buffer.*
Commit Message: Remove possibility of stale user_buffer_ member in PPB_URLLoader_Impl when FinishedLoading() is called.
BUG=137778
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10797037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@147914 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 10,161 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static __init int seqgen_init(void)
{
rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The (1) IPv4 and (2) IPv6 implementations in the Linux kernel before 3.1 use a modified MD4 algorithm to generate sequence numbers and Fragment Identification values, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (disrupted networking) or hijack network sessions by predicting these values and sending crafted packets.
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Medium | 10,793 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: raptor_turtle_writer_set_option(raptor_turtle_writer *turtle_writer,
raptor_option option, int value)
{
if(value < 0 ||
!raptor_option_is_valid_for_area(option, RAPTOR_OPTION_AREA_TURTLE_WRITER))
return 1;
switch(option) {
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_AUTO_INDENT:
if(value)
turtle_writer->flags |= TURTLE_WRITER_AUTO_INDENT;
else
turtle_writer->flags &= ~TURTLE_WRITER_AUTO_INDENT;
break;
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_INDENT_WIDTH:
turtle_writer->indent = value;
break;
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_AUTO_EMPTY:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_XML_VERSION:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_XML_DECLARATION:
break;
/* parser options */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_SCANNING:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_ALLOW_NON_NS_ATTRIBUTES:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_ALLOW_OTHER_PARSETYPES:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_ALLOW_BAGID:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_ALLOW_RDF_TYPE_RDF_LIST:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_NORMALIZE_LANGUAGE:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_NON_NFC_FATAL:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WARN_OTHER_PARSETYPES:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_CHECK_RDF_ID:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_HTML_TAG_SOUP:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_MICROFORMATS:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_HTML_LINK:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_TIMEOUT:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_STRICT:
/* Shared */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_NET:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_FILE:
/* XML writer options */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_RELATIVE_URIS:
/* DOT serializer options */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_RESOURCE_BORDER:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_LITERAL_BORDER:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_BNODE_BORDER:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_RESOURCE_FILL:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_LITERAL_FILL:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_BNODE_FILL:
/* JSON serializer options */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_JSON_CALLBACK:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_JSON_EXTRA_DATA:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_RSS_TRIPLES:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_ATOM_ENTRY_URI:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_PREFIX_ELEMENTS:
/* Turtle serializer option */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITE_BASE_URI:
/* WWW option */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_HTTP_CACHE_CONTROL:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_HTTP_USER_AGENT:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_CERT_FILENAME:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_CERT_TYPE:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_CERT_PASSPHRASE:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_SSL_VERIFY_PEER:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_SSL_VERIFY_HOST:
default:
return -1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Redland Raptor (aka libraptor) before 2.0.7, as used by OpenOffice 3.3 and 3.4 Beta, LibreOffice before 3.4.6 and 3.5.x before 3.5.1, and other products, allows user-assisted remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a crafted XML external entity (XXE) declaration and reference in an RDF document.
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa. | Medium | 19,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: USHORT CNB::QueryL4HeaderOffset(PVOID PacketData, ULONG IpHeaderOffset) const
{
USHORT Res;
auto ppr = ParaNdis_ReviewIPPacket(RtlOffsetToPointer(PacketData, IpHeaderOffset),
GetDataLength(), __FUNCTION__);
if (ppr.ipStatus != ppresNotIP)
{
Res = static_cast<USHORT>(IpHeaderOffset + ppr.ipHeaderSize);
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] ERROR: NOT an IP packet - expected troubles!\n", __FUNCTION__));
Res = 0;
}
return Res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]> | Medium | 11,354 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texImage2D(GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLint border,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLintptr offset) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateTexture2DBinding("texImage2D", target))
return;
if (!bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texImage2D",
"no bound PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER");
return;
}
if (!ValidateTexFunc("texImage2D", kTexImage, kSourceUnpackBuffer, target,
level, internalformat, width, height, 1, border, format,
type, 0, 0, 0))
return;
if (!ValidateValueFitNonNegInt32("texImage2D", "offset", offset))
return;
ContextGL()->TexImage2D(
target, level, ConvertTexInternalFormat(internalformat, type), width,
height, border, format, type, reinterpret_cast<const void*>(offset));
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003} | Medium | 1,286 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (!ShouldAllowSession(session))
return false;
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(
GetId(),
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->devtools_frame_token()
: base::UnguessableToken(),
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(
session->client()->MayAttachToBrowser()
? protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kRegular
: protocol::TargetHandler::AccessMode::kAutoAttachOnly,
GetId(), GetRendererChannel(), session->GetRootSession())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(
emulation_handler, session->client()->MayAffectLocalFiles())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (!frame_tree_node_ || !frame_tree_node_->parent()) {
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(
new protocol::TracingHandler(frame_tree_node_, GetIOContext())));
}
if (sessions().empty()) {
bool use_video_capture_api = true;
#ifdef OS_ANDROID
if (!CompositorImpl::IsInitialized())
use_video_capture_api = false;
#endif
if (!use_video_capture_api)
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: DevTools API not correctly gating on extension capability in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed an attacker who convinced a user to install a malicious extension to read local files via a crafted Chrome Extension.
Commit Message: [DevTools] Guard DOM.setFileInputFiles under MayAffectLocalFiles
Bug: 805557
Change-Id: Ib6f37ec6e1d091ee54621cc0c5c44f1a6beab10f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1334847
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607902} | Medium | 12,575 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego(struct smb_request *req)
{
const uint8 *p;
DATA_BLOB blob1;
size_t bufrem;
char *tmp;
const char *native_os;
const char *native_lanman;
const char *primary_domain;
const char *p2;
uint16 data_blob_len = SVAL(req->vwv+7, 0);
enum remote_arch_types ra_type = get_remote_arch();
int vuid = req->vuid;
user_struct *vuser = NULL;
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK;
uint16 smbpid = req->smbpid;
struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = smbd_server_conn;
DEBUG(3,("Doing spnego session setup\n"));
if (global_client_caps == 0) {
global_client_caps = IVAL(req->vwv+10, 0);
if (!(global_client_caps & CAP_STATUS32)) {
remove_from_common_flags2(FLAGS2_32_BIT_ERROR_CODES);
}
}
p = req->buf;
if (data_blob_len == 0) {
/* an invalid request */
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
return;
}
bufrem = smbreq_bufrem(req, p);
/* pull the spnego blob */
blob1 = data_blob(p, MIN(bufrem, data_blob_len));
#if 0
file_save("negotiate.dat", blob1.data, blob1.length);
#endif
p2 = (char *)req->buf + data_blob_len;
p2 += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p2,
STR_TERMINATE);
native_os = tmp ? tmp : "";
p2 += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p2,
STR_TERMINATE);
native_lanman = tmp ? tmp : "";
p2 += srvstr_pull_req_talloc(talloc_tos(), req, &tmp, p2,
STR_TERMINATE);
primary_domain = tmp ? tmp : "";
DEBUG(3,("NativeOS=[%s] NativeLanMan=[%s] PrimaryDomain=[%s]\n",
native_os, native_lanman, primary_domain));
if ( ra_type == RA_WIN2K ) {
/* Vista sets neither the OS or lanman strings */
if ( !strlen(native_os) && !strlen(native_lanman) )
set_remote_arch(RA_VISTA);
/* Windows 2003 doesn't set the native lanman string,
but does set primary domain which is a bug I think */
if ( !strlen(native_lanman) ) {
ra_lanman_string( primary_domain );
} else {
ra_lanman_string( native_lanman );
}
}
/* Did we get a valid vuid ? */
if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(sconn, vuid)) {
/* No, then try and see if this is an intermediate sessionsetup
* for a large SPNEGO packet. */
struct pending_auth_data *pad;
pad = get_pending_auth_data(sconn, smbpid);
if (pad) {
DEBUG(10,("reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego: found "
"pending vuid %u\n",
(unsigned int)pad->vuid ));
vuid = pad->vuid;
}
}
/* Do we have a valid vuid now ? */
if (!is_partial_auth_vuid(sconn, vuid)) {
/* No, start a new authentication setup. */
vuid = register_initial_vuid(sconn);
if (vuid == UID_FIELD_INVALID) {
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(
NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER));
return;
}
}
vuser = get_partial_auth_user_struct(sconn, vuid);
/* This MUST be valid. */
if (!vuser) {
smb_panic("reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego: invalid vuid.");
}
/* Large (greater than 4k) SPNEGO blobs are split into multiple
* sessionsetup requests as the Windows limit on the security blob
* field is 4k. Bug #4400. JRA.
*/
status = check_spnego_blob_complete(sconn, smbpid, vuid, &blob1);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,
NT_STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED)) {
/* Real error - kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
}
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_APPLICATION(0)) {
/* its a negTokenTarg packet */
reply_spnego_negotiate(req, vuid, blob1,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
return;
}
if (blob1.data[0] == ASN1_CONTEXT(1)) {
/* its a auth packet */
reply_spnego_auth(req, vuid, blob1,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
return;
}
if (strncmp((char *)(blob1.data), "NTLMSSP", 7) == 0) {
DATA_BLOB chal;
if (!vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state) {
status = auth_ntlmssp_start(&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
/* Kill the intermediate vuid */
invalidate_vuid(sconn, vuid);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(status));
return;
}
}
status = auth_ntlmssp_update(vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
blob1, &chal);
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_spnego_ntlmssp(req, vuid,
&vuser->auth_ntlmssp_state,
&chal, status, OID_NTLMSSP, false);
data_blob_free(&chal);
return;
}
/* what sort of packet is this? */
DEBUG(1,("Unknown packet in reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego\n"));
data_blob_free(&blob1);
reply_nterror(req, nt_status_squash(NT_STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The reply_sesssetup_and_X_spnego function in sesssetup.c in smbd in Samba before 3.4.8 and 3.5.x before 3.5.2 allows remote attackers to trigger an out-of-bounds read, and cause a denial of service (process crash), via a \xff\xff security blob length in a Session Setup AndX request.
Commit Message: | Medium | 6,488 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: processInternalEntity(XML_Parser parser, ENTITY *entity, XML_Bool betweenDecl) {
const char *textStart, *textEnd;
const char *next;
enum XML_Error result;
OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *openEntity;
if (parser->m_freeInternalEntities) {
openEntity = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
} else {
openEntity
= (OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(OPEN_INTERNAL_ENTITY));
if (! openEntity)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
entity->open = XML_TRUE;
entity->processed = 0;
openEntity->next = parser->m_openInternalEntities;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity;
openEntity->entity = entity;
openEntity->startTagLevel = parser->m_tagLevel;
openEntity->betweenDecl = betweenDecl;
openEntity->internalEventPtr = NULL;
openEntity->internalEventEndPtr = NULL;
textStart = (char *)entity->textPtr;
textEnd = (char *)(entity->textPtr + entity->textLen);
/* Set a safe default value in case 'next' does not get set */
next = textStart;
#ifdef XML_DTD
if (entity->is_param) {
int tok
= XmlPrologTok(parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd, &next);
result = doProlog(parser, parser->m_internalEncoding, textStart, textEnd,
tok, next, &next, XML_FALSE);
} else
#endif /* XML_DTD */
result = doContent(parser, parser->m_tagLevel, parser->m_internalEncoding,
textStart, textEnd, &next, XML_FALSE);
if (result == XML_ERROR_NONE) {
if (textEnd != next && parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED) {
entity->processed = (int)(next - textStart);
parser->m_processor = internalEntityProcessor;
} else {
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
parser->m_openInternalEntities = openEntity->next;
/* put openEntity back in list of free instances */
openEntity->next = parser->m_freeInternalEntities;
parser->m_freeInternalEntities = openEntity;
}
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-611
Summary: In libexpat before 2.2.8, crafted XML input could fool the parser into changing from DTD parsing to document parsing too early; a consecutive call to XML_GetCurrentLineNumber (or XML_GetCurrentColumnNumber) then resulted in a heap-based buffer over-read.
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype | Medium | 19,044 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: std::string GetUploadData(const std::string& brand) {
DCHECK(!brand.empty());
std::string data(kPostXml);
const std::string placeholder("__BRANDCODE_PLACEHOLDER__");
size_t placeholder_pos = data.find(placeholder);
DCHECK(placeholder_pos != std::string::npos);
data.replace(placeholder_pos, placeholder.size(), brand);
return data;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the ModuleSystem::RequireForJsInner function in extensions/renderer/module_system.cc in the Extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.75 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via a crafted web site, aka *Universal XSS (UXSS).*
Commit Message: Use install_static::GetAppGuid instead of the hardcoded string in BrandcodeConfigFetcher.
Bug: 769756
Change-Id: Ifdcb0a5145ffad1d563562e2b2ea2390ff074cdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1213178
Reviewed-by: Dominic Battré <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Vasilii Sukhanov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#590275} | Medium | 19,313 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void cliRefreshPrompt(void) {
int len;
if (config.eval_ldb) return;
if (config.hostsocket != NULL)
len = snprintf(config.prompt,sizeof(config.prompt),"redis %s",
config.hostsocket);
else
len = anetFormatAddr(config.prompt, sizeof(config.prompt),
config.hostip, config.hostport);
/* Add [dbnum] if needed */
if (config.dbnum != 0)
len += snprintf(config.prompt+len,sizeof(config.prompt)-len,"[%d]",
config.dbnum);
snprintf(config.prompt+len,sizeof(config.prompt)-len,"> ");
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in redis-cli of Redis before 4.0.10 and 5.x before 5.0 RC3 allows an attacker to achieve code execution and escalate to higher privileges via a crafted command line. NOTE: It is unclear whether there are any common situations in which redis-cli is used with, for example, a -h (aka hostname) argument from an untrusted source.
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end. | Medium | 22,449 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int TS_OBJ_print_bio(BIO *bio, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
{
char obj_txt[128];
int len = OBJ_obj2txt(obj_txt, sizeof(obj_txt), obj, 0);
BIO_write(bio, obj_txt, len);
BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1);
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The TS_OBJ_print_bio function in crypto/ts/ts_lib.c in the X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP) implementation in OpenSSL through 1.0.2h allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted time-stamp file that is mishandled by the *openssl ts* command.
Commit Message: Fix OOB read in TS_OBJ_print_bio().
TS_OBJ_print_bio() misuses OBJ_txt2obj: it should print the result
as a null terminated buffer. The length value returned is the total
length the complete text reprsentation would need not the amount of
data written.
CVE-2016-2180
Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> | Medium | 11,718 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
{
if (user_pwd == NULL)
return;
BN_free(user_pwd->s);
BN_clear_free(user_pwd->v);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->id);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd->info);
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Memory leak in the SRP_VBASE_get_by_user implementation in OpenSSL 1.0.1 before 1.0.1s and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2g allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by providing an invalid username in a connection attempt, related to apps/s_server.c and crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c.
Commit Message: | High | 21,440 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: swabHorAcc32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
uint32* wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 4;
TIFFSwabArrayOfLong(wp, wc);
horAcc32(tif, cp0, cc);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: tif_predict.h and tif_predict.c in libtiff 4.0.6 have assertions that can lead to assertion failures in debug mode, or buffer overflows in release mode, when dealing with unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105, aka *Predictor heap-buffer-overflow.*
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team. | High | 16,147 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int read_request_line(request_rec *r, apr_bucket_brigade *bb)
{
const char *ll;
const char *uri;
const char *pro;
unsigned int major = 1, minor = 0; /* Assume HTTP/1.0 if non-"HTTP" protocol */
char http[5];
apr_size_t len;
int num_blank_lines = 0;
int max_blank_lines = r->server->limit_req_fields;
core_server_config *conf = ap_get_core_module_config(r->server->module_config);
int strict = conf->http_conformance & AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_STRICT;
int enforce_strict = !(conf->http_conformance & AP_HTTP_CONFORMANCE_LOGONLY);
if (max_blank_lines <= 0) {
max_blank_lines = DEFAULT_LIMIT_REQUEST_FIELDS;
}
/* Read past empty lines until we get a real request line,
* a read error, the connection closes (EOF), or we timeout.
*
* We skip empty lines because browsers have to tack a CRLF on to the end
* of POSTs to support old CERN webservers. But note that we may not
* have flushed any previous response completely to the client yet.
* We delay the flush as long as possible so that we can improve
* performance for clients that are pipelining requests. If a request
* is pipelined then we won't block during the (implicit) read() below.
* If the requests aren't pipelined, then the client is still waiting
* for the final buffer flush from us, and we will block in the implicit
* read(). B_SAFEREAD ensures that the BUFF layer flushes if it will
* have to block during a read.
*/
do {
apr_status_t rv;
/* ensure ap_rgetline allocates memory each time thru the loop
* if there are empty lines
*/
r->the_request = NULL;
rv = ap_rgetline(&(r->the_request), (apr_size_t)(r->server->limit_req_line + 2),
&len, r, 0, bb);
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
r->request_time = apr_time_now();
/* ap_rgetline returns APR_ENOSPC if it fills up the
* buffer before finding the end-of-line. This is only going to
* happen if it exceeds the configured limit for a request-line.
*/
if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rv)) {
r->status = HTTP_REQUEST_URI_TOO_LARGE;
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(1,0);
r->protocol = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, "HTTP/1.0");
}
else if (APR_STATUS_IS_TIMEUP(rv)) {
r->status = HTTP_REQUEST_TIME_OUT;
}
else if (APR_STATUS_IS_EINVAL(rv)) {
r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
return 0;
}
} while ((len <= 0) && (++num_blank_lines < max_blank_lines));
if (APLOGrtrace5(r)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE5, 0, r,
"Request received from client: %s",
ap_escape_logitem(r->pool, r->the_request));
}
r->request_time = apr_time_now();
ll = r->the_request;
r->method = ap_getword_white(r->pool, &ll);
uri = ap_getword_white(r->pool, &ll);
/* Provide quick information about the request method as soon as known */
r->method_number = ap_method_number_of(r->method);
if (r->method_number == M_GET && r->method[0] == 'H') {
r->header_only = 1;
}
ap_parse_uri(r, uri);
if (ll[0]) {
r->assbackwards = 0;
pro = ll;
len = strlen(ll);
} else {
r->assbackwards = 1;
pro = "HTTP/0.9";
len = 8;
if (conf->http09_enable == AP_HTTP09_DISABLE) {
r->status = HTTP_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
r->protocol = apr_pstrmemdup(r->pool, pro, len);
/* If we deny 0.9, send error message with 1.x */
r->assbackwards = 0;
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(0, 9);
r->connection->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE;
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02401)
"HTTP/0.9 denied by server configuration");
return 0;
}
}
r->protocol = apr_pstrmemdup(r->pool, pro, len);
/* Avoid sscanf in the common case */
if (len == 8
&& pro[0] == 'H' && pro[1] == 'T' && pro[2] == 'T' && pro[3] == 'P'
&& pro[4] == '/' && apr_isdigit(pro[5]) && pro[6] == '.'
&& apr_isdigit(pro[7])) {
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(pro[5] - '0', pro[7] - '0');
}
else {
if (strict) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02418)
"Invalid protocol '%s'", r->protocol);
if (enforce_strict) {
r->status = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
return 0;
}
}
if (3 == sscanf(r->protocol, "%4s/%u.%u", http, &major, &minor)
&& (strcasecmp("http", http) == 0)
&& (minor < HTTP_VERSION(1, 0)) ) { /* don't allow HTTP/0.1000 */
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(major, minor);
}
else {
r->proto_num = HTTP_VERSION(1, 0);
}
}
if (strict) {
int err = 0;
if (ap_has_cntrl(r->the_request)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02420)
"Request line must not contain control characters");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
if (r->parsed_uri.fragment) {
/* RFC3986 3.5: no fragment */
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02421)
"URI must not contain a fragment");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
else if (r->parsed_uri.user || r->parsed_uri.password) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02422)
"URI must not contain a username/password");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
else if (r->method_number == M_INVALID) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02423)
"Invalid HTTP method string: %s", r->method);
err = HTTP_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
else if (r->assbackwards == 0 && r->proto_num < HTTP_VERSION(1, 0)) {
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02424)
"HTTP/0.x does not take a protocol");
err = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
}
if (err && enforce_strict) {
r->status = err;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The read_request_line function in server/protocol.c in the Apache HTTP Server 2.4.12 does not initialize the protocol structure member, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and process crash) by sending a request that lacks a method to an installation that enables the INCLUDES filter and has an ErrorDocument 400 directive specifying a local URI.
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 | Medium | 12,172 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: sp<VBRISeeker> VBRISeeker::CreateFromSource(
const sp<DataSource> &source, off64_t post_id3_pos) {
off64_t pos = post_id3_pos;
uint8_t header[4];
ssize_t n = source->readAt(pos, header, sizeof(header));
if (n < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return NULL;
}
uint32_t tmp = U32_AT(&header[0]);
size_t frameSize;
int sampleRate;
if (!GetMPEGAudioFrameSize(tmp, &frameSize, &sampleRate)) {
return NULL;
}
pos += sizeof(header) + 32;
uint8_t vbriHeader[26];
n = source->readAt(pos, vbriHeader, sizeof(vbriHeader));
if (n < (ssize_t)sizeof(vbriHeader)) {
return NULL;
}
if (memcmp(vbriHeader, "VBRI", 4)) {
return NULL;
}
size_t numFrames = U32_AT(&vbriHeader[14]);
int64_t durationUs =
numFrames * 1000000ll * (sampleRate >= 32000 ? 1152 : 576) / sampleRate;
ALOGV("duration = %.2f secs", durationUs / 1E6);
size_t numEntries = U16_AT(&vbriHeader[18]);
size_t entrySize = U16_AT(&vbriHeader[22]);
size_t scale = U16_AT(&vbriHeader[20]);
ALOGV("%zu entries, scale=%zu, size_per_entry=%zu",
numEntries,
scale,
entrySize);
size_t totalEntrySize = numEntries * entrySize;
uint8_t *buffer = new uint8_t[totalEntrySize];
n = source->readAt(pos + sizeof(vbriHeader), buffer, totalEntrySize);
if (n < (ssize_t)totalEntrySize) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return NULL;
}
sp<VBRISeeker> seeker = new VBRISeeker;
seeker->mBasePos = post_id3_pos + frameSize;
if (durationUs) {
seeker->mDurationUs = durationUs;
}
off64_t offset = post_id3_pos;
for (size_t i = 0; i < numEntries; ++i) {
uint32_t numBytes;
switch (entrySize) {
case 1: numBytes = buffer[i]; break;
case 2: numBytes = U16_AT(buffer + 2 * i); break;
case 3: numBytes = U24_AT(buffer + 3 * i); break;
default:
{
CHECK_EQ(entrySize, 4u);
numBytes = U32_AT(buffer + 4 * i); break;
}
}
numBytes *= scale;
seeker->mSegments.push(numBytes);
ALOGV("entry #%zu: %u offset %#016llx", i, numBytes, (long long)offset);
offset += numBytes;
}
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
ALOGI("Found VBRI header.");
return seeker;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: A denial of service vulnerability in VBRISeeker.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable a remote attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-32577290.
Commit Message: Make VBRISeeker more robust
Bug: 32577290
Change-Id: I9bcc9422ae7dd3ae4a38df330c9dcd7ac4941ec8
(cherry picked from commit 7fdd36418e945cf6a500018632dfb0ed8cb1a343)
| High | 27,444 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int mem_resize(jas_stream_memobj_t *m, int bufsize)
{
unsigned char *buf;
assert(m->buf_);
assert(bufsize >= 0);
if (!(buf = jas_realloc2(m->buf_, bufsize, sizeof(unsigned char)))) {
return -1;
}
m->buf_ = buf;
m->bufsize_ = bufsize;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-415
Summary: Double free vulnerability in the mem_close function in jas_stream.c in JasPer before 1.900.10 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted BMP image to the imginfo command.
Commit Message: The memory stream interface allows for a buffer size of zero.
The case of a zero-sized buffer was not handled correctly, as it could
lead to a double free.
This problem has now been fixed (hopefully).
One might ask whether a zero-sized buffer should be allowed at all,
but this is a question for another day. | Medium | 10,255 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void FrameFetchContext::DispatchWillSendRequest(
unsigned long identifier,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
if (IsDetached())
return;
if (redirect_response.IsNull()) {
GetFrame()->Loader().Progress().WillStartLoading(identifier,
request.Priority());
}
probe::willSendRequest(GetFrame()->GetDocument(), identifier,
MasterDocumentLoader(), request, redirect_response,
initiator_info);
if (IdlenessDetector* idleness_detector = GetFrame()->GetIdlenessDetector())
idleness_detector->OnWillSendRequest();
if (GetFrame()->FrameScheduler())
GetFrame()->FrameScheduler()->DidStartLoading(identifier);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 56.0.2924.76 for Linux, Windows and Mac, and 56.0.2924.87 for Android, failed to perform proper bounds checking, which allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936} | Medium | 25,069 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
{
int ret;
unsigned char arg[MAX_ARG_LEN];
struct ip_vs_service_user *usvc_compat;
struct ip_vs_service_user_kern usvc;
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
struct ip_vs_dest_user *udest_compat;
struct ip_vs_dest_user_kern udest;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (len != set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]) {
pr_err("set_ctl: len %u != %u\n",
len, set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (copy_from_user(arg, user, len) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
/* increase the module use count */
ip_vs_use_count_inc();
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&__ip_vs_mutex)) {
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto out_dec;
}
if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_FLUSH) {
/* Flush the virtual service */
ret = ip_vs_flush();
goto out_unlock;
} else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_TIMEOUT) {
/* Set timeout values for (tcp tcpfin udp) */
ret = ip_vs_set_timeout((struct ip_vs_timeout_user *)arg);
goto out_unlock;
} else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_STARTDAEMON) {
struct ip_vs_daemon_user *dm = (struct ip_vs_daemon_user *)arg;
ret = start_sync_thread(dm->state, dm->mcast_ifn, dm->syncid);
goto out_unlock;
} else if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_STOPDAEMON) {
struct ip_vs_daemon_user *dm = (struct ip_vs_daemon_user *)arg;
ret = stop_sync_thread(dm->state);
goto out_unlock;
}
usvc_compat = (struct ip_vs_service_user *)arg;
udest_compat = (struct ip_vs_dest_user *)(usvc_compat + 1);
/* We only use the new structs internally, so copy userspace compat
* structs to extended internal versions */
ip_vs_copy_usvc_compat(&usvc, usvc_compat);
ip_vs_copy_udest_compat(&udest, udest_compat);
if (cmd == IP_VS_SO_SET_ZERO) {
/* if no service address is set, zero counters in all */
if (!usvc.fwmark && !usvc.addr.ip && !usvc.port) {
ret = ip_vs_zero_all();
goto out_unlock;
}
}
/* Check for valid protocol: TCP or UDP, even for fwmark!=0 */
if (usvc.protocol != IPPROTO_TCP && usvc.protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) {
pr_err("set_ctl: invalid protocol: %d %pI4:%d %s\n",
usvc.protocol, &usvc.addr.ip,
ntohs(usvc.port), usvc.sched_name);
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Lookup the exact service by <protocol, addr, port> or fwmark */
if (usvc.fwmark == 0)
svc = __ip_vs_service_get(usvc.af, usvc.protocol,
&usvc.addr, usvc.port);
else
svc = __ip_vs_svc_fwm_get(usvc.af, usvc.fwmark);
if (cmd != IP_VS_SO_SET_ADD
&& (svc == NULL || svc->protocol != usvc.protocol)) {
ret = -ESRCH;
goto out_unlock;
}
switch (cmd) {
case IP_VS_SO_SET_ADD:
if (svc != NULL)
ret = -EEXIST;
else
ret = ip_vs_add_service(&usvc, &svc);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_EDIT:
ret = ip_vs_edit_service(svc, &usvc);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_DEL:
ret = ip_vs_del_service(svc);
if (!ret)
goto out_unlock;
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_ZERO:
ret = ip_vs_zero_service(svc);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_ADDDEST:
ret = ip_vs_add_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_EDITDEST:
ret = ip_vs_edit_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
case IP_VS_SO_SET_DELDEST:
ret = ip_vs_del_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
if (svc)
ip_vs_service_put(svc);
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
out_dec:
/* decrease the module use count */
ip_vs_use_count_dec();
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.33, when CONFIG_IP_VS is used, allow local users to gain privileges by leveraging the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability for (1) a getsockopt system call, related to the do_ip_vs_get_ctl function, or (2) a setsockopt system call, related to the do_ip_vs_set_ctl function.
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ [email protected]: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]> | Medium | 18,331 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
return (value.type == ImeConfigValue::kValueTypeStringList &&
value.string_list_value.size() == 1 &&
chromeos::input_method::IsKeyboardLayout(
value.string_list_value[0]));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 11,866 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long Track::GetNumber() const
{
return m_info.number;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 343 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int dex_loadcode(RBinFile *arch, RBinDexObj *bin) {
struct r_bin_t *rbin = arch->rbin;
int i;
int *methods = NULL;
int sym_count = 0;
if (!bin || bin->methods_list) {
return false;
}
bin->code_from = UT64_MAX;
bin->code_to = 0;
bin->methods_list = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free);
if (!bin->methods_list) {
return false;
}
bin->imports_list = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free);
if (!bin->imports_list) {
r_list_free (bin->methods_list);
return false;
}
bin->classes_list = r_list_newf ((RListFree)__r_bin_class_free);
if (!bin->classes_list) {
r_list_free (bin->methods_list);
r_list_free (bin->imports_list);
return false;
}
if (bin->header.method_size>bin->size) {
bin->header.method_size = 0;
return false;
}
/* WrapDown the header sizes to avoid huge allocations */
bin->header.method_size = R_MIN (bin->header.method_size, bin->size);
bin->header.class_size = R_MIN (bin->header.class_size, bin->size);
bin->header.strings_size = R_MIN (bin->header.strings_size, bin->size);
if (bin->header.strings_size > bin->size) {
eprintf ("Invalid strings size\n");
return false;
}
if (bin->classes) {
ut64 amount = sizeof (int) * bin->header.method_size;
if (amount > UT32_MAX || amount < bin->header.method_size) {
return false;
}
methods = calloc (1, amount + 1);
for (i = 0; i < bin->header.class_size; i++) {
char *super_name, *class_name;
struct dex_class_t *c = &bin->classes[i];
class_name = dex_class_name (bin, c);
super_name = dex_class_super_name (bin, c);
if (dexdump) {
rbin->cb_printf ("Class #%d -\n", i);
}
parse_class (arch, bin, c, i, methods, &sym_count);
free (class_name);
free (super_name);
}
}
if (methods) {
int import_count = 0;
int sym_count = bin->methods_list->length;
for (i = 0; i < bin->header.method_size; i++) {
int len = 0;
if (methods[i]) {
continue;
}
if (bin->methods[i].class_id > bin->header.types_size - 1) {
continue;
}
if (is_class_idx_in_code_classes(bin, bin->methods[i].class_id)) {
continue;
}
char *class_name = getstr (
bin, bin->types[bin->methods[i].class_id]
.descriptor_id);
if (!class_name) {
free (class_name);
continue;
}
len = strlen (class_name);
if (len < 1) {
continue;
}
class_name[len - 1] = 0; // remove last char ";"
char *method_name = dex_method_name (bin, i);
char *signature = dex_method_signature (bin, i);
if (method_name && *method_name) {
RBinImport *imp = R_NEW0 (RBinImport);
imp->name = r_str_newf ("%s.method.%s%s", class_name, method_name, signature);
imp->type = r_str_const ("FUNC");
imp->bind = r_str_const ("NONE");
imp->ordinal = import_count++;
r_list_append (bin->imports_list, imp);
RBinSymbol *sym = R_NEW0 (RBinSymbol);
sym->name = r_str_newf ("imp.%s", imp->name);
sym->type = r_str_const ("FUNC");
sym->bind = r_str_const ("NONE");
sym->paddr = sym->vaddr = bin->b->base + bin->header.method_offset + (sizeof (struct dex_method_t) * i) ;
sym->ordinal = sym_count++;
r_list_append (bin->methods_list, sym);
sdb_num_set (mdb, sdb_fmt (0, "method.%d", i), sym->paddr, 0);
}
free (method_name);
free (signature);
free (class_name);
}
free (methods);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The dex_loadcode function in libr/bin/p/bin_dex.c in radare2 1.2.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted DEX file.
Commit Message: fix #6857 | Medium | 216 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiH264Accelerator::FillVARefFramesFromDPB(
const H264DPB& dpb,
VAPictureH264* va_pics,
int num_pics) {
H264Picture::Vector::const_reverse_iterator rit;
int i;
for (rit = dpb.rbegin(), i = 0; rit != dpb.rend() && i < num_pics; ++rit) {
if ((*rit)->ref)
FillVAPicture(&va_pics[i++], *rit);
}
return i;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: A race in the handling of SharedArrayBuffers in WebAssembly in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372} | Medium | 6,004 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: struct task_struct * __cpuinit fork_idle(int cpu)
{
struct task_struct *task;
struct pt_regs regs;
task = copy_process(CLONE_VM, 0, idle_regs(®s), 0, NULL,
&init_struct_pid, 0);
if (!IS_ERR(task))
init_idle(task, cpu);
return task;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: include/linux/init_task.h in the Linux kernel before 2.6.35 does not prevent signals with a process group ID of zero from reaching the swapper process, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging access to this process group.
Commit Message: pids: fix fork_idle() to setup ->pids correctly
copy_process(pid => &init_struct_pid) doesn't do attach_pid/etc.
It shouldn't, but this means that the idle threads run with the wrong
pids copied from the caller's task_struct. In x86 case the caller is
either kernel_init() thread or keventd.
In particular, this means that after the series of cpu_up/cpu_down an
idle thread (which never exits) can run with .pid pointing to nowhere.
Change fork_idle() to initialize idle->pids[] correctly. We only set
.pid = &init_struct_pid but do not add .node to list, INIT_TASK() does
the same for the boot-cpu idle thread (swapper).
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Cedric Le Goater <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Biederman <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Poetzl <[email protected]>
Cc: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | Medium | 28,169 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RunInvTxfm(const int16_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
inv_txfm_(out, dst, stride, tx_type_);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 15,949 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RunExtremalCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
int max_error = 0;
int total_error = 0;
const int count_test_block = 100000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_input_block, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, test_temp_block, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, dst, 64);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, uint8_t, src, 64);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
src[j] = rnd.Rand8() % 2 ? 255 : 0;
dst[j] = src[j] > 0 ? 0 : 255;
test_input_block[j] = src[j] - dst[j];
}
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunFwdTxfm(test_input_block, test_temp_block, pitch_));
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(
RunInvTxfm(test_temp_block, dst, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
const int diff = dst[j] - src[j];
const int error = diff * diff;
if (max_error < error)
max_error = error;
total_error += error;
}
EXPECT_GE(1, max_error)
<< "Error: Extremal 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has"
<< "an individual roundtrip error > 1";
EXPECT_GE(count_test_block/5, total_error)
<< "Error: Extremal 8x8 FDCT/IDCT or FHT/IHT has average"
<< " roundtrip error > 1/5 per block";
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| High | 7,447 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_UINT32 x, y;
OPJ_UINT8 *pix;
const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond;
beyond = pData + stride * height;
pix = pData;
x = y = 0U;
while (y < height) {
int c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
break;
}
if (c) { /* encoded mode */
int j;
OPJ_UINT8 c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
*pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
}
} else { /* absolute mode */
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
break;
}
if (c == 0x00) { /* EOL */
x = 0;
y++;
pix = pData + y * stride;
} else if (c == 0x01) { /* EOP */
break;
} else if (c == 0x02) { /* MOVE by dxdy */
c = getc(IN);
x += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
c = getc(IN);
y += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
pix = pData + y * stride + x;
} else { /* 03 .. 255 : absolute mode */
int j;
OPJ_UINT8 c1 = 0U;
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
if ((j & 1) == 0) {
c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
}
*pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
}
if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */
getc(IN);
}
}
}
} /* while(y < height) */
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: In OpenJPEG 2.3.1, there is excessive iteration in the opj_t1_encode_cblks function of openjp2/t1.c. Remote attackers could leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service via a crafted bmp file. This issue is similar to CVE-2018-6616.
Commit Message: convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early
width/length dimensions read from bmp headers are not necessarily
valid. For instance they may have been maliciously set to very large
values with the intention to cause DoS (large memory allocation, stack
overflow). In these cases we want to detect the invalid size as early
as possible.
This commit introduces a counter which verifies that the number of
written bytes corresponds to the advertized width/length.
See commit 8ee335227bbc for details.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <[email protected]> | Medium | 3,236 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int snd_compress_check_input(struct snd_compr_params *params)
{
/* first let's check the buffer parameter's */
if (params->buffer.fragment_size == 0 ||
params->buffer.fragments > SIZE_MAX / params->buffer.fragment_size)
return -EINVAL;
/* now codec parameters */
if (params->codec.id == 0 || params->codec.id > SND_AUDIOCODEC_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if (params->codec.ch_in == 0 || params->codec.ch_out == 0)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID:
Summary: The snd_compress_check_input function in sound/core/compress_offload.c in the ALSA subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.17 does not properly check for an integer overflow, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (insufficient memory allocation) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted SNDRV_COMPRESS_SET_PARAMS ioctl call.
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> | High | 9,732 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: spnego_gss_import_sec_context(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_buffer_t interprocess_token,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_import_sec_context(minor_status,
interprocess_token,
context_handle);
return (ret);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/spnego/spnego_mech.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted SPNEGO packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[[email protected]: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup | High | 12,737 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void MemoryInstrumentation::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
RequestGlobalDumpCallback callback) {
const auto& coordinator = GetCoordinatorBindingForCurrentThread();
coordinator->GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(callback);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Lack of access control checks in Instrumentation in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to obtain memory metadata from privileged processes .
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059} | Medium | 29,028 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: http_DissectRequest(struct sess *sp)
{
struct http_conn *htc;
struct http *hp;
uint16_t retval;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(sp, SESS_MAGIC);
htc = sp->htc;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(htc, HTTP_CONN_MAGIC);
hp = sp->http;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(hp, HTTP_MAGIC);
hp->logtag = HTTP_Rx;
retval = http_splitline(sp->wrk, sp->fd, hp, htc,
HTTP_HDR_REQ, HTTP_HDR_URL, HTTP_HDR_PROTO);
if (retval != 0) {
WSPR(sp, SLT_HttpGarbage, htc->rxbuf);
return (retval);
}
http_ProtoVer(hp);
retval = htc_request_check_host_hdr(hp);
if (retval != 0) {
WSP(sp, SLT_Error, "Duplicated Host header");
return (retval);
}
return (retval);
}
Vulnerability Type: Http R.Spl.
CWE ID:
Summary: Varnish 3.x before 3.0.7, when used in certain stacked installations, allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers and conduct HTTP response splitting attacks via a header line terminated by a r (carriage return) character in conjunction with multiple Content-Length headers in an HTTP request.
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that. | Medium | 90 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: status_t Camera2Client::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& args) {
String8 result;
result.appendFormat("Client2[%d] (%p) Client: %s PID: %d, dump:\n",
mCameraId,
getRemoteCallback()->asBinder().get(),
String8(mClientPackageName).string(),
mClientPid);
result.append(" State: ");
#define CASE_APPEND_ENUM(x) case x: result.append(#x "\n"); break;
const Parameters& p = mParameters.unsafeAccess();
result.append(Parameters::getStateName(p.state));
result.append("\n Current parameters:\n");
result.appendFormat(" Preview size: %d x %d\n",
p.previewWidth, p.previewHeight);
result.appendFormat(" Preview FPS range: %d - %d\n",
p.previewFpsRange[0], p.previewFpsRange[1]);
result.appendFormat(" Preview HAL pixel format: 0x%x\n",
p.previewFormat);
result.appendFormat(" Preview transform: %x\n",
p.previewTransform);
result.appendFormat(" Picture size: %d x %d\n",
p.pictureWidth, p.pictureHeight);
result.appendFormat(" Jpeg thumbnail size: %d x %d\n",
p.jpegThumbSize[0], p.jpegThumbSize[1]);
result.appendFormat(" Jpeg quality: %d, thumbnail quality: %d\n",
p.jpegQuality, p.jpegThumbQuality);
result.appendFormat(" Jpeg rotation: %d\n", p.jpegRotation);
result.appendFormat(" GPS tags %s\n",
p.gpsEnabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
if (p.gpsEnabled) {
result.appendFormat(" GPS lat x long x alt: %f x %f x %f\n",
p.gpsCoordinates[0], p.gpsCoordinates[1],
p.gpsCoordinates[2]);
result.appendFormat(" GPS timestamp: %lld\n",
p.gpsTimestamp);
result.appendFormat(" GPS processing method: %s\n",
p.gpsProcessingMethod.string());
}
result.append(" White balance mode: ");
switch (p.wbMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_INCANDESCENT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_FLUORESCENT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_WARM_FLUORESCENT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_DAYLIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_CLOUDY_DAYLIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_TWILIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AWB_MODE_SHADE)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Effect mode: ");
switch (p.effectMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_OFF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_MONO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_NEGATIVE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_SOLARIZE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_SEPIA)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_POSTERIZE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_WHITEBOARD)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_BLACKBOARD)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_EFFECT_MODE_AQUA)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Antibanding mode: ");
switch (p.antibandingMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_OFF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_50HZ)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AE_ANTIBANDING_MODE_60HZ)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Scene mode: ");
switch (p.sceneMode) {
case ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_UNSUPPORTED:
result.append("AUTO\n"); break;
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_ACTION)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_PORTRAIT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_LANDSCAPE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_NIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_NIGHT_PORTRAIT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_THEATRE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_BEACH)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_SNOW)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_SUNSET)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_STEADYPHOTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_FIREWORKS)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_SPORTS)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_PARTY)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_CANDLELIGHT)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_SCENE_MODE_BARCODE)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Flash mode: ");
switch (p.flashMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_OFF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_ON)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_TORCH)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_RED_EYE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FLASH_MODE_INVALID)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Focus mode: ");
switch (p.focusMode) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_AUTO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_MACRO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_CONTINUOUS_VIDEO)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_CONTINUOUS_PICTURE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_EDOF)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_INFINITY)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_FIXED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(Parameters::FOCUS_MODE_INVALID)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Focus state: ");
switch (p.focusState) {
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_INACTIVE)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_PASSIVE_SCAN)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_PASSIVE_FOCUSED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_PASSIVE_UNFOCUSED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_ACTIVE_SCAN)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_FOCUSED_LOCKED)
CASE_APPEND_ENUM(ANDROID_CONTROL_AF_STATE_NOT_FOCUSED_LOCKED)
default: result.append("UNKNOWN\n");
}
result.append(" Focusing areas:\n");
for (size_t i = 0; i < p.focusingAreas.size(); i++) {
result.appendFormat(" [ (%d, %d, %d, %d), weight %d ]\n",
p.focusingAreas[i].left,
p.focusingAreas[i].top,
p.focusingAreas[i].right,
p.focusingAreas[i].bottom,
p.focusingAreas[i].weight);
}
result.appendFormat(" Exposure compensation index: %d\n",
p.exposureCompensation);
result.appendFormat(" AE lock %s, AWB lock %s\n",
p.autoExposureLock ? "enabled" : "disabled",
p.autoWhiteBalanceLock ? "enabled" : "disabled" );
result.appendFormat(" Metering areas:\n");
for (size_t i = 0; i < p.meteringAreas.size(); i++) {
result.appendFormat(" [ (%d, %d, %d, %d), weight %d ]\n",
p.meteringAreas[i].left,
p.meteringAreas[i].top,
p.meteringAreas[i].right,
p.meteringAreas[i].bottom,
p.meteringAreas[i].weight);
}
result.appendFormat(" Zoom index: %d\n", p.zoom);
result.appendFormat(" Video size: %d x %d\n", p.videoWidth,
p.videoHeight);
result.appendFormat(" Recording hint is %s\n",
p.recordingHint ? "set" : "not set");
result.appendFormat(" Video stabilization is %s\n",
p.videoStabilization ? "enabled" : "disabled");
result.appendFormat(" Selected still capture FPS range: %d - %d\n",
p.fastInfo.bestStillCaptureFpsRange[0],
p.fastInfo.bestStillCaptureFpsRange[1]);
result.append(" Current streams:\n");
result.appendFormat(" Preview stream ID: %d\n",
getPreviewStreamId());
result.appendFormat(" Capture stream ID: %d\n",
getCaptureStreamId());
result.appendFormat(" Recording stream ID: %d\n",
getRecordingStreamId());
result.append(" Quirks for this camera:\n");
bool haveQuirk = false;
if (p.quirks.triggerAfWithAuto) {
result.appendFormat(" triggerAfWithAuto\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (p.quirks.useZslFormat) {
result.appendFormat(" useZslFormat\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (p.quirks.meteringCropRegion) {
result.appendFormat(" meteringCropRegion\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (p.quirks.partialResults) {
result.appendFormat(" usePartialResult\n");
haveQuirk = true;
}
if (!haveQuirk) {
result.appendFormat(" none\n");
}
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
mStreamingProcessor->dump(fd, args);
mCaptureSequencer->dump(fd, args);
mFrameProcessor->dump(fd, args);
mZslProcessor->dump(fd, args);
return dumpDevice(fd, args);
#undef CASE_APPEND_ENUM
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: libcameraservice in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.x before 2016-03-01 does not require use of the ICameraService::dump method for a camera service dump, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application that directly dumps, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 26265403.
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
| High | 14,130 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: TouchpadLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetTouchpadLibrary() {
return touchpad_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 17,461 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool InputWindowInfo::frameContainsPoint(int32_t x, int32_t y) const {
return x >= frameLeft && x <= frameRight
&& y >= frameTop && y <= frameBottom;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The Framework UI permission-dialog implementation in Android 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows attackers to conduct tapjacking attacks and access arbitrary private-storage files by creating a partially overlapping window, aka internal bug 26677796.
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
| High | 9,842 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: const Cluster* Segment::GetNext(const Cluster* pCurr) {
assert(pCurr);
assert(pCurr != &m_eos);
assert(m_clusters);
long idx = pCurr->m_index;
if (idx >= 0) {
assert(m_clusterCount > 0);
assert(idx < m_clusterCount);
assert(pCurr == m_clusters[idx]);
++idx;
if (idx >= m_clusterCount)
return &m_eos; // caller will LoadCluster as desired
Cluster* const pNext = m_clusters[idx];
assert(pNext);
assert(pNext->m_index >= 0);
assert(pNext->m_index == idx);
return pNext;
}
assert(m_clusterPreloadCount > 0);
long long pos = pCurr->m_element_start;
assert(m_size >= 0); // TODO
const long long stop = m_start + m_size; // end of segment
{
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop); // TODO
if (result != 0)
return NULL;
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(id == 0x0F43B675); // Cluster ID
if (id != 0x0F43B675)
return NULL;
pos += len; // consume ID
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop); // TODO
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(size > 0); // TODO
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
assert((pos + size) <= stop); // TODO
pos += size; // consume payload
}
long long off_next = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
long long result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop); // TODO
if (result != 0)
return NULL;
const long long idpos = pos; // pos of next (potential) cluster
const long long id = ReadUInt(m_pReader, idpos, len);
assert(id > 0); // TODO
pos += len; // consume ID
result = GetUIntLength(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(result == 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop); // TODO
const long long size = ReadUInt(m_pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0); // TODO
pos += len; // consume length of size of element
assert((pos + size) <= stop); // TODO
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x0F43B675) { // Cluster ID
const long long off_next_ = idpos - m_start;
long long pos_;
long len_;
const long status = Cluster::HasBlockEntries(this, off_next_, pos_, len_);
assert(status >= 0);
if (status > 0) {
off_next = off_next_;
break;
}
}
pos += size; // consume payload
}
if (off_next <= 0)
return 0;
Cluster** const ii = m_clusters + m_clusterCount;
Cluster** i = ii;
Cluster** const jj = ii + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** j = jj;
while (i < j) {
Cluster** const k = i + (j - i) / 2;
assert(k < jj);
Cluster* const pNext = *k;
assert(pNext);
assert(pNext->m_index < 0);
pos = pNext->GetPosition();
if (pos < off_next)
i = k + 1;
else if (pos > off_next)
j = k;
else
return pNext;
}
assert(i == j);
Cluster* const pNext = Cluster::Create(this, -1, off_next);
assert(pNext);
const ptrdiff_t idx_next = i - m_clusters; // insertion position
PreloadCluster(pNext, idx_next);
assert(m_clusters);
assert(idx_next < m_clusterSize);
assert(m_clusters[idx_next] == pNext);
return pNext;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: libvpx in libwebm in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted mkv file, aka internal bug 23167726.
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
| High | 6,792 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: qedi_dbg_notice(struct qedi_dbg_ctx *qedi, const char *func, u32 line,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list va;
struct va_format vaf;
char nfunc[32];
memset(nfunc, 0, sizeof(nfunc));
memcpy(nfunc, func, sizeof(nfunc) - 1);
va_start(va, fmt);
vaf.fmt = fmt;
vaf.va = &va;
if (!(qedi_dbg_log & QEDI_LOG_NOTICE))
goto ret;
if (likely(qedi) && likely(qedi->pdev))
pr_notice("[%s]:[%s:%d]:%d: %pV",
dev_name(&qedi->pdev->dev), nfunc, line,
qedi->host_no, &vaf);
else
pr_notice("[0000:00:00.0]:[%s:%d]: %pV", nfunc, line, &vaf);
ret:
va_end(va);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: An issue was discovered in drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_dbg.c in the Linux kernel before 5.1.12. In the qedi_dbg_* family of functions, there is an out-of-bounds read.
Commit Message: scsi: qedi: remove memset/memcpy to nfunc and use func instead
KASAN reports this:
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in qedi_dbg_err+0xda/0x330 [qedi]
Read of size 31 at addr ffffffffc12b0ae0 by task syz-executor.0/2429
CPU: 0 PID: 2429 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x1c4/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
qedi_dbg_err+0xda/0x330 [qedi]
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
qedi_init+0x118/0x1000 [qedi]
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
? 0xffffffffc12d0000
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f2d57e55c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bfa0 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200003c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f2d57e55c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f2d57e566bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
The buggy address belongs to the variable:
__func__.67584+0x0/0xffffffffffffd520 [qedi]
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffffffc12b0980: fa fa fa fa 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 05 fa
ffffffffc12b0a00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa 00 05 fa fa
> ffffffffc12b0a80: fa fa fa fa 00 06 fa fa fa fa fa fa 00 02 fa fa
^
ffffffffc12b0b00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 03 fa
ffffffffc12b0b80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 02 fa fa fa fa fa 00 00 04 fa
Currently the qedi_dbg_* family of functions can overrun the end of the
source string if it is less than the destination buffer length because of
the use of a fixed sized memcpy. Remove the memset/memcpy calls to nfunc
and just use func instead as it is always a null terminated string.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: ace7f46ba5fd ("scsi: qedi: Add QLogic FastLinQ offload iSCSI driver framework.")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> | Medium | 17,966 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnDidPreviewPage(int page_number,
int preview_request_id) {
DCHECK_GE(page_number, 0);
base::FundamentalValue number(page_number);
StringValue ui_identifier(preview_ui_addr_str_);
base::FundamentalValue request_id(preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction(
"onDidPreviewPage", number, ui_identifier, request_id);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 26,354 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: fbPictureInit (ScreenPtr pScreen, PictFormatPtr formats, int nformats)
{
srcRepeat = FALSE;
if (maskTransform)
maskRepeat = FALSE;
if (!miComputeCompositeRegion (®ion, pSrc, pMask, pDst, xSrc, ySrc,
xMask, yMask, xDst, yDst, width, height))
return;
n = REGION_NUM_RECTS (®ion);
pbox = REGION_RECTS (®ion);
while (n--)
{
h = pbox->y2 - pbox->y1;
y_src = pbox->y1 - yDst + ySrc;
y_msk = pbox->y1 - yDst + yMask;
y_dst = pbox->y1;
while (h)
{
h_this = h;
w = pbox->x2 - pbox->x1;
x_src = pbox->x1 - xDst + xSrc;
x_msk = pbox->x1 - xDst + xMask;
x_dst = pbox->x1;
if (maskRepeat)
{
y_msk = mod (y_msk - pMask->pDrawable->y, pMask->pDrawable->height);
if (h_this > pMask->pDrawable->height - y_msk)
h_this = pMask->pDrawable->height - y_msk;
y_msk += pMask->pDrawable->y;
}
if (srcRepeat)
{
y_src = mod (y_src - pSrc->pDrawable->y, pSrc->pDrawable->height);
if (h_this > pSrc->pDrawable->height - y_src)
h_this = pSrc->pDrawable->height - y_src;
y_src += pSrc->pDrawable->y;
}
while (w)
{
w_this = w;
if (maskRepeat)
{
x_msk = mod (x_msk - pMask->pDrawable->x, pMask->pDrawable->width);
if (w_this > pMask->pDrawable->width - x_msk)
w_this = pMask->pDrawable->width - x_msk;
x_msk += pMask->pDrawable->x;
}
if (srcRepeat)
{
x_src = mod (x_src - pSrc->pDrawable->x, pSrc->pDrawable->width);
if (w_this > pSrc->pDrawable->width - x_src)
w_this = pSrc->pDrawable->width - x_src;
x_src += pSrc->pDrawable->x;
}
(*func) (op, pSrc, pMask, pDst,
x_src, y_src, x_msk, y_msk, x_dst, y_dst,
w_this, h_this);
w -= w_this;
x_src += w_this;
x_msk += w_this;
x_dst += w_this;
}
h -= h_this;
y_src += h_this;
y_msk += h_this;
y_dst += h_this;
}
pbox++;
}
REGION_UNINIT (pDst->pDrawable->pScreen, ®ion);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The fbComposite function in fbpict.c in the Render extension in the X server in X.Org X11R7.1 allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption and daemon crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted request, related to an incorrect macro definition.
Commit Message: | High | 18,947 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int ext4_page_mkwrite(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct page *page = vmf->page;
loff_t size;
unsigned long len;
int ret;
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
handle_t *handle;
get_block_t *get_block;
int retries = 0;
sb_start_pagefault(inode->i_sb);
file_update_time(vma->vm_file);
/* Delalloc case is easy... */
if (test_opt(inode->i_sb, DELALLOC) &&
!ext4_should_journal_data(inode) &&
!ext4_nonda_switch(inode->i_sb)) {
do {
ret = block_page_mkwrite(vma, vmf,
ext4_da_get_block_prep);
} while (ret == -ENOSPC &&
ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries));
goto out_ret;
}
lock_page(page);
size = i_size_read(inode);
/* Page got truncated from under us? */
if (page->mapping != mapping || page_offset(page) > size) {
unlock_page(page);
ret = VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
goto out;
}
if (page->index == size >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT)
len = size & ~PAGE_CACHE_MASK;
else
len = PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
/*
* Return if we have all the buffers mapped. This avoids the need to do
* journal_start/journal_stop which can block and take a long time
*/
if (page_has_buffers(page)) {
if (!ext4_walk_page_buffers(NULL, page_buffers(page),
0, len, NULL,
ext4_bh_unmapped)) {
/* Wait so that we don't change page under IO */
wait_for_stable_page(page);
ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
goto out;
}
}
unlock_page(page);
/* OK, we need to fill the hole... */
if (ext4_should_dioread_nolock(inode))
get_block = ext4_get_block_write;
else
get_block = ext4_get_block;
retry_alloc:
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_WRITE_PAGE,
ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode));
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
goto out;
}
ret = block_page_mkwrite(vma, vmf, get_block);
if (!ret && ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
if (ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, page_buffers(page), 0,
PAGE_CACHE_SIZE, NULL, do_journal_get_write_access)) {
unlock_page(page);
ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
goto out;
}
ext4_set_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_JDATA);
}
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (ret == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries))
goto retry_alloc;
out_ret:
ret = block_page_mkwrite_return(ret);
out:
sb_end_pagefault(inode->i_sb);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-362
Summary: Multiple race conditions in the ext4 filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allow local users to cause a denial of service (disk corruption) by writing to a page that is associated with a different user's file after unsynchronized hole punching and page-fault handling.
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> | Low | 10,005 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: OMXNodeInstance::OMXNodeInstance(
OMX *owner, const sp<IOMXObserver> &observer, const char *name)
: mOwner(owner),
mNodeID(0),
mHandle(NULL),
mObserver(observer),
mDying(false),
mBufferIDCount(0)
{
mName = ADebug::GetDebugName(name);
DEBUG = ADebug::GetDebugLevelFromProperty(name, "debug.stagefright.omx-debug");
ALOGV("debug level for %s is %d", name, DEBUG);
DEBUG_BUMP = DEBUG;
mNumPortBuffers[0] = 0;
mNumPortBuffers[1] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[0] = 0;
mDebugLevelBumpPendingBuffers[1] = 0;
mMetadataType[0] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mMetadataType[1] = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
mSecureBufferType[0] = kSecureBufferTypeUnknown;
mSecureBufferType[1] = kSecureBufferTypeUnknown;
mIsSecure = AString(name).endsWith(".secure");
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-29422020.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
| Medium | 5,209 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int FindStartOffsetOfFileInZipFile(const char* zip_file, const char* filename) {
FileDescriptor fd;
if (!fd.OpenReadOnly(zip_file)) {
LOG_ERRNO("%s: open failed trying to open zip file %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
struct stat stat_buf;
if (stat(zip_file, &stat_buf) == -1) {
LOG_ERRNO("%s: stat failed trying to stat zip file %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
if (stat_buf.st_size > kMaxZipFileLength) {
LOG("%s: The size %ld of %s is too large to map\n",
__FUNCTION__, stat_buf.st_size, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
void* mem = fd.Map(NULL, stat_buf.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, 0);
if (mem == MAP_FAILED) {
LOG_ERRNO("%s: mmap failed trying to mmap zip file %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
ScopedMMap scoped_mmap(mem, stat_buf.st_size);
uint8_t* mem_bytes = static_cast<uint8_t*>(mem);
int off;
for (off = stat_buf.st_size - sizeof(kEndOfCentralDirectoryMarker);
off >= 0; --off) {
if (ReadUInt32(mem_bytes, off) == kEndOfCentralDirectoryMarker) {
break;
}
}
if (off == -1) {
LOG("%s: Failed to find end of central directory in %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
uint32_t length_of_central_dir = ReadUInt32(
mem_bytes, off + kOffsetOfCentralDirLengthInEndOfCentralDirectory);
uint32_t start_of_central_dir = ReadUInt32(
mem_bytes, off + kOffsetOfStartOfCentralDirInEndOfCentralDirectory);
if (start_of_central_dir > off) {
LOG("%s: Found out of range offset %u for start of directory in %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, start_of_central_dir, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
uint32_t end_of_central_dir = start_of_central_dir + length_of_central_dir;
if (end_of_central_dir > off) {
LOG("%s: Found out of range offset %u for end of directory in %s\n",
__FUNCTION__, end_of_central_dir, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
uint32_t num_entries = ReadUInt16(
mem_bytes, off + kOffsetNumOfEntriesInEndOfCentralDirectory);
off = start_of_central_dir;
const int target_len = strlen(filename);
int n = 0;
for (; n < num_entries && off < end_of_central_dir; ++n) {
uint32_t marker = ReadUInt32(mem_bytes, off);
if (marker != kCentralDirHeaderMarker) {
LOG("%s: Failed to find central directory header marker in %s. "
"Found 0x%x but expected 0x%x\n", __FUNCTION__,
zip_file, marker, kCentralDirHeaderMarker);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
uint32_t file_name_length =
ReadUInt16(mem_bytes, off + kOffsetFilenameLengthInCentralDirectory);
uint32_t extra_field_length =
ReadUInt16(mem_bytes, off + kOffsetExtraFieldLengthInCentralDirectory);
uint32_t comment_field_length =
ReadUInt16(mem_bytes, off + kOffsetCommentLengthInCentralDirectory);
uint32_t header_length = kOffsetFilenameInCentralDirectory +
file_name_length + extra_field_length + comment_field_length;
uint32_t local_header_offset =
ReadUInt32(mem_bytes, off + kOffsetLocalHeaderOffsetInCentralDirectory);
uint8_t* filename_bytes =
mem_bytes + off + kOffsetFilenameInCentralDirectory;
if (file_name_length == target_len &&
memcmp(filename_bytes, filename, target_len) == 0) {
uint32_t marker = ReadUInt32(mem_bytes, local_header_offset);
if (marker != kLocalHeaderMarker) {
LOG("%s: Failed to find local file header marker in %s. "
"Found 0x%x but expected 0x%x\n", __FUNCTION__,
zip_file, marker, kLocalHeaderMarker);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
uint32_t compression_method =
ReadUInt16(
mem_bytes,
local_header_offset + kOffsetCompressionMethodInLocalHeader);
if (compression_method != kCompressionMethodStored) {
LOG("%s: %s is compressed within %s. "
"Found compression method %u but expected %u\n", __FUNCTION__,
filename, zip_file, compression_method, kCompressionMethodStored);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
uint32_t file_name_length =
ReadUInt16(
mem_bytes,
local_header_offset + kOffsetFilenameLengthInLocalHeader);
uint32_t extra_field_length =
ReadUInt16(
mem_bytes,
local_header_offset + kOffsetExtraFieldLengthInLocalHeader);
uint32_t header_length =
kOffsetFilenameInLocalHeader + file_name_length + extra_field_length;
return local_header_offset + header_length;
}
off += header_length;
}
if (n < num_entries) {
LOG("%s: Did not find all the expected entries in the central directory. "
"Found %d but expected %d\n", __FUNCTION__, n, num_entries);
}
if (off < end_of_central_dir) {
LOG("%s: There are %d extra bytes at the end of the central directory.\n",
__FUNCTION__, end_of_central_dir - off);
}
LOG("%s: Did not find %s in %s\n", __FUNCTION__, filename, zip_file);
return CRAZY_OFFSET_FAILED;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The FindStartOffsetOfFileInZipFile function in crazy_linker_zip.cpp in crazy_linker (aka Crazy Linker) in Android 5.x and 6.x, as used in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73, improperly searches for an EOCD record, which allows attackers to bypass a signature-validation requirement via a crafted ZIP archive.
Commit Message: crazy linker: Alter search for zip EOCD start
When loading directly from APK, begin searching backwards
for the zip EOCD record signature at size of EOCD record
bytes before the end of the file.
BUG=537205
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1390553002 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352577} | Medium | 22,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::setBuffers(
bool audio, Vector<MediaBuffer *> &buffers) {
if (mIsWidevine && !audio && mVideoTrack.mSource != NULL) {
return mVideoTrack.mSource->setBuffers(buffers);
}
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: media/libmediaplayerservice/nuplayer/GenericSource.cpp in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 does not validate certain track data, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 28799341.
Commit Message: Resolve a merge issue between lmp and lmp-mr1+
Change-Id: I336cb003fb7f50fd7d95c30ca47e45530a7ad503
(cherry picked from commit 33f6da1092834f1e4be199cfa3b6310d66b521c0)
(cherry picked from commit bb3a0338b58fafb01ac5b34efc450b80747e71e4)
| High | 24,694 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: get_uncompressed_data(struct archive_read *a, const void **buff, size_t size,
size_t minimum)
{
struct _7zip *zip = (struct _7zip *)a->format->data;
ssize_t bytes_avail;
if (zip->codec == _7Z_COPY && zip->codec2 == (unsigned long)-1) {
/* Copy mode. */
/*
* Note: '1' here is a performance optimization.
* Recall that the decompression layer returns a count of
* available bytes; asking for more than that forces the
* decompressor to combine reads by copying data.
*/
*buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1, &bytes_avail);
if (bytes_avail <= 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated 7-Zip file data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if ((size_t)bytes_avail >
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining)
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining;
if ((size_t)bytes_avail > size)
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)size;
zip->pack_stream_bytes_unconsumed = bytes_avail;
} else if (zip->uncompressed_buffer_pointer == NULL) {
/* Decompression has failed. */
archive_set_error(&(a->archive),
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC, "Damaged 7-Zip archive");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
} else {
/* Packed mode. */
if (minimum > zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining) {
/*
* If remaining uncompressed data size is less than
* the minimum size, fill the buffer up to the
* minimum size.
*/
if (extract_pack_stream(a, minimum) < 0)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (size > zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining)
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining;
else
bytes_avail = (ssize_t)size;
*buff = zip->uncompressed_buffer_pointer;
zip->uncompressed_buffer_pointer += bytes_avail;
}
zip->uncompressed_buffer_bytes_remaining -= bytes_avail;
return (bytes_avail);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: libarchive version commit bf9aec176c6748f0ee7a678c5f9f9555b9a757c1 onwards (release v3.0.2 onwards) contains a CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read vulnerability in 7zip decompression, archive_read_support_format_7zip.c, header_bytes() that can result in a crash (denial of service). This attack appears to be exploitable via the victim opening a specially crafted 7zip file.
Commit Message: 7zip: fix crash when parsing certain archives
Fuzzing with CRCs disabled revealed that a call to get_uncompressed_data()
would sometimes fail to return at least 'minimum' bytes. This can cause
the crc32() invocation in header_bytes to read off into invalid memory.
A specially crafted archive can use this to cause a crash.
An ASAN trace is below, but ASAN is not required - an uninstrumented
binary will also crash.
==7719==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x631000040000 (pc 0x7fbdb3b3ec1d bp 0x7ffe77a51310 sp 0x7ffe77a51150 T0)
==7719==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
#0 0x7fbdb3b3ec1c in crc32_z (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libz.so.1+0x2c1c)
#1 0x84f5eb in header_bytes (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84f5eb)
#2 0x856156 in read_Header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x856156)
#3 0x84e134 in slurp_central_directory (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x84e134)
#4 0x849690 in archive_read_format_7zip_read_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x849690)
#5 0x5713b7 in _archive_read_next_header2 (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5713b7)
#6 0x570e63 in _archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x570e63)
#7 0x6f08bd in archive_read_next_header (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x6f08bd)
#8 0x52373f in read_archive (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x52373f)
#9 0x5257be in tar_mode_x (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x5257be)
#10 0x51daeb in main (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x51daeb)
#11 0x7fbdb27cab96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310
#12 0x41dd09 in _start (/tmp/libarchive/bsdtar+0x41dd09)
This was primarly done with afl and FairFuzz. Some early corpus entries
may have been generated by qsym. | Medium | 1,298 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int mxf_read_primer_pack(void *arg, AVIOContext *pb, int tag, int size, UID uid, int64_t klv_offset)
{
MXFContext *mxf = arg;
int item_num = avio_rb32(pb);
int item_len = avio_rb32(pb);
if (item_len != 18) {
avpriv_request_sample(pb, "Primer pack item length %d", item_len);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (item_num > 65536) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "item_num %d is too large\n", item_num);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (mxf->local_tags)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Multiple primer packs\n");
av_free(mxf->local_tags);
mxf->local_tags_count = 0;
mxf->local_tags = av_calloc(item_num, item_len);
if (!mxf->local_tags)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
mxf->local_tags_count = item_num;
avio_read(pb, mxf->local_tags, item_num*item_len);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: In the mxf_read_primer_pack function in libavformat/mxfdec.c in FFmpeg 3.3.3, an integer signedness error might occur when a crafted file, which claims a large *item_num* field such as 0xffffffff, is provided. As a result, the variable *item_num* turns negative, bypassing the check for a large value.
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix Sign error in mxf_read_primer_pack()
Fixes: 20170829B.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <[email protected]>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 26,316 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::CanCommitURL(int child_id,
const GURL& url) {
if (!url.is_valid())
return false; // Can't commit invalid URLs.
const std::string& scheme = url.scheme();
if (IsPseudoScheme(scheme))
return url == url::kAboutBlankURL || url == kAboutSrcDocURL;
if (url.SchemeIsBlob() || url.SchemeIsFileSystem()) {
if (IsMalformedBlobUrl(url))
return false;
url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(url);
return origin.unique() || CanCommitURL(child_id, GURL(origin.Serialize()));
}
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (base::ContainsKey(schemes_okay_to_commit_in_any_process_, scheme))
return true;
SecurityStateMap::iterator state = security_state_.find(child_id);
if (state == security_state_.end())
return false;
return state->second->CanCommitURL(url);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Incorrect handling of blob URLS in Site Isolation in Google Chrome prior to 71.0.3578.80 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to bypass site isolation protections via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914} | Medium | 6,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: off_t HFSForkReadStream::Seek(off_t offset, int whence) {
DCHECK_EQ(SEEK_SET, whence);
DCHECK_GE(offset, 0);
DCHECK_LT(static_cast<uint64_t>(offset), fork_.logicalSize);
size_t target_block = offset / hfs_->block_size();
size_t block_count = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(fork_.extents); ++i) {
const HFSPlusExtentDescriptor* extent = &fork_.extents[i];
if (extent->startBlock == 0 && extent->blockCount == 0)
break;
base::CheckedNumeric<size_t> new_block_count(block_count);
new_block_count += extent->blockCount;
if (!new_block_count.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Seek offset block count overflows";
return false;
}
if (target_block < new_block_count.ValueOrDie()) {
if (current_extent_ != i) {
read_current_extent_ = false;
current_extent_ = i;
}
auto iterator_block_offset =
base::CheckedNumeric<size_t>(block_count) * hfs_->block_size();
if (!iterator_block_offset.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Seek block offset overflows";
return false;
}
fork_logical_offset_ = offset;
return offset;
}
block_count = new_block_count.ValueOrDie();
}
return -1;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 33.0.1750.117 allow attackers to bypass the sandbox protection mechanism after obtaining renderer access, or have other impact, via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876} | High | 16,698 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: image_transform_png_set_gray_to_rgb_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_gray_to_rgb(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 5,781 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
volatile int summary = 1; /* Print the error summary at the end */
volatile int memstats = 0; /* Print memory statistics at the end */
/* Create the given output file on success: */
PNG_CONST char *volatile touch = NULL;
/* This is an array of standard gamma values (believe it or not I've seen
* every one of these mentioned somewhere.)
*
* In the following list the most useful values are first!
*/
static double
gammas[]={2.2, 1.0, 2.2/1.45, 1.8, 1.5, 2.4, 2.5, 2.62, 2.9};
/* This records the command and arguments: */
size_t cp = 0;
char command[1024];
anon_context(&pm.this);
/* Add appropriate signal handlers, just the ANSI specified ones: */
signal(SIGABRT, signal_handler);
signal(SIGFPE, signal_handler);
signal(SIGILL, signal_handler);
signal(SIGINT, signal_handler);
signal(SIGSEGV, signal_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler);
#ifdef HAVE_FEENABLEEXCEPT
/* Only required to enable FP exceptions on platforms where they start off
* disabled; this is not necessary but if it is not done pngvalid will likely
* end up ignoring FP conditions that other platforms fault.
*/
feenableexcept(FE_DIVBYZERO | FE_INVALID | FE_OVERFLOW);
#endif
modifier_init(&pm);
/* Preallocate the image buffer, because we know how big it needs to be,
* note that, for testing purposes, it is deliberately mis-aligned by tag
* bytes either side. All rows have an additional five bytes of padding for
* overwrite checking.
*/
store_ensure_image(&pm.this, NULL, 2, TRANSFORM_ROWMAX, TRANSFORM_HEIGHTMAX);
/* Don't give argv[0], it's normally some horrible libtool string: */
cp = safecat(command, sizeof command, cp, "pngvalid");
/* Default to error on warning: */
pm.this.treat_warnings_as_errors = 1;
/* Default assume_16_bit_calculations appropriately; this tells the checking
* code that 16-bit arithmetic is used for 8-bit samples when it would make a
* difference.
*/
pm.assume_16_bit_calculations = PNG_LIBPNG_VER >= 10700;
/* Currently 16 bit expansion happens at the end of the pipeline, so the
* calculations are done in the input bit depth not the output.
*
* TODO: fix this
*/
pm.calculations_use_input_precision = 1U;
/* Store the test gammas */
pm.gammas = gammas;
pm.ngammas = (sizeof gammas) / (sizeof gammas[0]);
pm.ngamma_tests = 0; /* default to off */
/* And the test encodings */
pm.encodings = test_encodings;
pm.nencodings = (sizeof test_encodings) / (sizeof test_encodings[0]);
pm.sbitlow = 8U; /* because libpng doesn't do sBIT below 8! */
/* The following allows results to pass if they correspond to anything in the
* transformed range [input-.5,input+.5]; this is is required because of the
* way libpng treates the 16_TO_8 flag when building the gamma tables in
* releases up to 1.6.0.
*
* TODO: review this
*/
pm.use_input_precision_16to8 = 1U;
pm.use_input_precision_sbit = 1U; /* because libpng now rounds sBIT */
/* Some default values (set the behavior for 'make check' here).
* These values simply control the maximum error permitted in the gamma
* transformations. The practial limits for human perception are described
* below (the setting for maxpc16), however for 8 bit encodings it isn't
* possible to meet the accepted capabilities of human vision - i.e. 8 bit
* images can never be good enough, regardless of encoding.
*/
pm.maxout8 = .1; /* Arithmetic error in *encoded* value */
pm.maxabs8 = .00005; /* 1/20000 */
pm.maxcalc8 = 1./255; /* +/-1 in 8 bits for compose errors */
pm.maxpc8 = .499; /* I.e., .499% fractional error */
pm.maxout16 = .499; /* Error in *encoded* value */
pm.maxabs16 = .00005;/* 1/20000 */
pm.maxcalc16 =1./65535;/* +/-1 in 16 bits for compose errors */
pm.maxcalcG = 1./((1<<PNG_MAX_GAMMA_8)-1);
/* NOTE: this is a reasonable perceptual limit. We assume that humans can
* perceive light level differences of 1% over a 100:1 range, so we need to
* maintain 1 in 10000 accuracy (in linear light space), which is what the
* following guarantees. It also allows significantly higher errors at
* higher 16 bit values, which is important for performance. The actual
* maximum 16 bit error is about +/-1.9 in the fixed point implementation but
* this is only allowed for values >38149 by the following:
*/
pm.maxpc16 = .005; /* I.e., 1/200% - 1/20000 */
/* Now parse the command line options. */
while (--argc >= 1)
{
int catmore = 0; /* Set if the argument has an argument. */
/* Record each argument for posterity: */
cp = safecat(command, sizeof command, cp, " ");
cp = safecat(command, sizeof command, cp, *++argv);
if (strcmp(*argv, "-v") == 0)
pm.this.verbose = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-l") == 0)
pm.log = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-q") == 0)
summary = pm.this.verbose = pm.log = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "-w") == 0)
pm.this.treat_warnings_as_errors = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--speed") == 0)
pm.this.speed = 1, pm.ngamma_tests = pm.ngammas, pm.test_standard = 0,
summary = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--memory") == 0)
memstats = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--size") == 0)
pm.test_size = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nosize") == 0)
pm.test_size = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--standard") == 0)
pm.test_standard = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nostandard") == 0)
pm.test_standard = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--transform") == 0)
pm.test_transform = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--notransform") == 0)
pm.test_transform = 0;
#ifdef PNG_READ_TRANSFORMS_SUPPORTED
else if (strncmp(*argv, "--transform-disable=",
sizeof "--transform-disable") == 0)
{
pm.test_transform = 1;
transform_disable(*argv + sizeof "--transform-disable");
}
else if (strncmp(*argv, "--transform-enable=",
sizeof "--transform-enable") == 0)
{
pm.test_transform = 1;
transform_enable(*argv + sizeof "--transform-enable");
}
#endif /* PNG_READ_TRANSFORMS_SUPPORTED */
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--gamma") == 0)
{
/* Just do two gamma tests here (2.2 and linear) for speed: */
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U;
pm.test_gamma_threshold = 1;
pm.test_gamma_transform = 1;
pm.test_gamma_sbit = 1;
pm.test_gamma_scale16 = 1;
pm.test_gamma_background = 1;
pm.test_gamma_alpha_mode = 1;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nogamma") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--gamma-threshold") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U, pm.test_gamma_threshold = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nogamma-threshold") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_threshold = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--gamma-transform") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U, pm.test_gamma_transform = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nogamma-transform") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_transform = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--gamma-sbit") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U, pm.test_gamma_sbit = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nogamma-sbit") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_sbit = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--gamma-16-to-8") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U, pm.test_gamma_scale16 = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nogamma-16-to-8") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_scale16 = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--gamma-background") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U, pm.test_gamma_background = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nogamma-background") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_background = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--gamma-alpha-mode") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U, pm.test_gamma_alpha_mode = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--nogamma-alpha-mode") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_alpha_mode = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--expand16") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_expand16 = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--noexpand16") == 0)
pm.test_gamma_expand16 = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--more-gammas") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = 3U;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--all-gammas") == 0)
pm.ngamma_tests = pm.ngammas;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--progressive-read") == 0)
pm.this.progressive = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--use-update-info") == 0)
++pm.use_update_info; /* Can call multiple times */
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--interlace") == 0)
{
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
pm.interlace_type = PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7;
# else
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: no write interlace support\n");
return SKIP;
# endif
}
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--use-input-precision") == 0)
pm.use_input_precision = 1U;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--use-calculation-precision") == 0)
pm.use_input_precision = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--calculations-use-input-precision") == 0)
pm.calculations_use_input_precision = 1U;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--assume-16-bit-calculations") == 0)
pm.assume_16_bit_calculations = 1U;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--calculations-follow-bit-depth") == 0)
pm.calculations_use_input_precision =
pm.assume_16_bit_calculations = 0;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--exhaustive") == 0)
pm.test_exhaustive = 1;
else if (argc > 1 && strcmp(*argv, "--sbitlow") == 0)
--argc, pm.sbitlow = (png_byte)atoi(*++argv), catmore = 1;
else if (argc > 1 && strcmp(*argv, "--touch") == 0)
--argc, touch = *++argv, catmore = 1;
else if (argc > 1 && strncmp(*argv, "--max", 5) == 0)
{
--argc;
if (strcmp(5+*argv, "abs8") == 0)
pm.maxabs8 = atof(*++argv);
else if (strcmp(5+*argv, "abs16") == 0)
pm.maxabs16 = atof(*++argv);
else if (strcmp(5+*argv, "calc8") == 0)
pm.maxcalc8 = atof(*++argv);
else if (strcmp(5+*argv, "calc16") == 0)
pm.maxcalc16 = atof(*++argv);
else if (strcmp(5+*argv, "out8") == 0)
pm.maxout8 = atof(*++argv);
else if (strcmp(5+*argv, "out16") == 0)
pm.maxout16 = atof(*++argv);
else if (strcmp(5+*argv, "pc8") == 0)
pm.maxpc8 = atof(*++argv);
else if (strcmp(5+*argv, "pc16") == 0)
pm.maxpc16 = atof(*++argv);
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: %s: unknown 'max' option\n", *argv);
exit(99);
}
catmore = 1;
}
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--log8") == 0)
--argc, pm.log8 = atof(*++argv), catmore = 1;
else if (strcmp(*argv, "--log16") == 0)
--argc, pm.log16 = atof(*++argv), catmore = 1;
#ifdef PNG_SET_OPTION_SUPPORTED
else if (strncmp(*argv, "--option=", 9) == 0)
{
/* Syntax of the argument is <option>:{on|off} */
const char *arg = 9+*argv;
unsigned char option=0, setting=0;
#ifdef PNG_ARM_NEON_API_SUPPORTED
if (strncmp(arg, "arm-neon:", 9) == 0)
option = PNG_ARM_NEON, arg += 9;
else
#endif
#ifdef PNG_MAXIMUM_INFLATE_WINDOW
if (strncmp(arg, "max-inflate-window:", 19) == 0)
option = PNG_MAXIMUM_INFLATE_WINDOW, arg += 19;
else
#endif
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: %s: %s: unknown option\n", *argv, arg);
exit(99);
}
if (strcmp(arg, "off") == 0)
setting = PNG_OPTION_OFF;
else if (strcmp(arg, "on") == 0)
setting = PNG_OPTION_ON;
else
{
fprintf(stderr,
"pngvalid: %s: %s: unknown setting (use 'on' or 'off')\n",
*argv, arg);
exit(99);
}
pm.this.options[pm.this.noptions].option = option;
pm.this.options[pm.this.noptions++].setting = setting;
}
#endif /* PNG_SET_OPTION_SUPPORTED */
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: %s: unknown argument\n", *argv);
exit(99);
}
if (catmore) /* consumed an extra *argv */
{
cp = safecat(command, sizeof command, cp, " ");
cp = safecat(command, sizeof command, cp, *argv);
}
}
/* If pngvalid is run with no arguments default to a reasonable set of the
* tests.
*/
if (pm.test_standard == 0 && pm.test_size == 0 && pm.test_transform == 0 &&
pm.ngamma_tests == 0)
{
/* Make this do all the tests done in the test shell scripts with the same
* parameters, where possible. The limitation is that all the progressive
* read and interlace stuff has to be done in separate runs, so only the
* basic 'standard' and 'size' tests are done.
*/
pm.test_standard = 1;
pm.test_size = 1;
pm.test_transform = 1;
pm.ngamma_tests = 2U;
}
if (pm.ngamma_tests > 0 &&
pm.test_gamma_threshold == 0 && pm.test_gamma_transform == 0 &&
pm.test_gamma_sbit == 0 && pm.test_gamma_scale16 == 0 &&
pm.test_gamma_background == 0 && pm.test_gamma_alpha_mode == 0)
{
pm.test_gamma_threshold = 1;
pm.test_gamma_transform = 1;
pm.test_gamma_sbit = 1;
pm.test_gamma_scale16 = 1;
pm.test_gamma_background = 1;
pm.test_gamma_alpha_mode = 1;
}
else if (pm.ngamma_tests == 0)
{
/* Nothing to test so turn everything off: */
pm.test_gamma_threshold = 0;
pm.test_gamma_transform = 0;
pm.test_gamma_sbit = 0;
pm.test_gamma_scale16 = 0;
pm.test_gamma_background = 0;
pm.test_gamma_alpha_mode = 0;
}
Try
{
/* Make useful base images */
make_transform_images(&pm.this);
/* Perform the standard and gamma tests. */
if (pm.test_standard)
{
perform_interlace_macro_validation();
perform_formatting_test(&pm.this);
# ifdef PNG_READ_SUPPORTED
perform_standard_test(&pm);
# endif
perform_error_test(&pm);
}
/* Various oddly sized images: */
if (pm.test_size)
{
make_size_images(&pm.this);
# ifdef PNG_READ_SUPPORTED
perform_size_test(&pm);
# endif
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_TRANSFORMS_SUPPORTED
/* Combinatorial transforms: */
if (pm.test_transform)
perform_transform_test(&pm);
#endif /* PNG_READ_TRANSFORMS_SUPPORTED */
#ifdef PNG_READ_GAMMA_SUPPORTED
if (pm.ngamma_tests > 0)
perform_gamma_test(&pm, summary);
#endif
}
Catch_anonymous
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: test aborted (probably failed in cleanup)\n");
if (!pm.this.verbose)
{
if (pm.this.error[0] != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: first error: %s\n", pm.this.error);
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: run with -v to see what happened\n");
}
exit(1);
}
if (summary)
{
printf("%s: %s (%s point arithmetic)\n",
(pm.this.nerrors || (pm.this.treat_warnings_as_errors &&
pm.this.nwarnings)) ? "FAIL" : "PASS",
command,
#if defined(PNG_FLOATING_ARITHMETIC_SUPPORTED) || PNG_LIBPNG_VER < 10500
"floating"
#else
"fixed"
#endif
);
}
if (memstats)
{
printf("Allocated memory statistics (in bytes):\n"
"\tread %lu maximum single, %lu peak, %lu total\n"
"\twrite %lu maximum single, %lu peak, %lu total\n",
(unsigned long)pm.this.read_memory_pool.max_max,
(unsigned long)pm.this.read_memory_pool.max_limit,
(unsigned long)pm.this.read_memory_pool.max_total,
(unsigned long)pm.this.write_memory_pool.max_max,
(unsigned long)pm.this.write_memory_pool.max_limit,
(unsigned long)pm.this.write_memory_pool.max_total);
}
/* Do this here to provoke memory corruption errors in memory not directly
* allocated by libpng - not a complete test, but better than nothing.
*/
store_delete(&pm.this);
/* Error exit if there are any errors, and maybe if there are any
* warnings.
*/
if (pm.this.nerrors || (pm.this.treat_warnings_as_errors &&
pm.this.nwarnings))
{
if (!pm.this.verbose)
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: %s\n", pm.this.error);
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: %d errors, %d warnings\n", pm.this.nerrors,
pm.this.nwarnings);
exit(1);
}
/* Success case. */
if (touch != NULL)
{
FILE *fsuccess = fopen(touch, "wt");
if (fsuccess != NULL)
{
int error = 0;
fprintf(fsuccess, "PNG validation succeeded\n");
fflush(fsuccess);
error = ferror(fsuccess);
if (fclose(fsuccess) || error)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: write failed\n", touch);
exit(1);
}
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: open failed\n", touch);
exit(1);
}
}
/* This is required because some very minimal configurations do not use it:
*/
UNUSED(fail)
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| High | 14,572 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: Track::Track(
Segment* pSegment,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
content_encoding_entries_(NULL),
content_encoding_entries_end_(NULL)
{
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | High | 9,954 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static u_char *php_parserr(u_char *cp, querybuf *answer, int type_to_fetch, int store, int raw, zval **subarray)
{
u_short type, class, dlen;
u_long ttl;
long n, i;
u_short s;
u_char *tp, *p;
char name[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
int have_v6_break = 0, in_v6_break = 0;
*subarray = NULL;
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, sizeof(name) - 2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
GETSHORT(type, cp);
GETSHORT(class, cp);
GETLONG(ttl, cp);
GETSHORT(dlen, cp);
if (type_to_fetch != T_ANY && type != type_to_fetch) {
cp += dlen;
return cp;
}
if (!store) {
cp += dlen;
return cp;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(*subarray);
array_init(*subarray);
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "host", name, 1);
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "class", "IN", 1);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "ttl", ttl);
if (raw) {
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "type", type);
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "data", (char*) cp, (uint) dlen, 1);
cp += dlen;
return cp;
}
switch (type) {
case DNS_T_A:
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "A", 1);
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%d.%d.%d.%d", cp[0], cp[1], cp[2], cp[3]);
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "ip", name, 1);
cp += dlen;
break;
case DNS_T_MX:
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "MX", 1);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "pri", n);
/* no break; */
case DNS_T_CNAME:
if (type == DNS_T_CNAME) {
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "CNAME", 1);
}
/* no break; */
case DNS_T_NS:
if (type == DNS_T_NS) {
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "NS", 1);
}
/* no break; */
case DNS_T_PTR:
if (type == DNS_T_PTR) {
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "PTR", 1);
}
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) - 2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "target", name, 1);
break;
case DNS_T_HINFO:
/* See RFC 1010 for values */
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "HINFO", 1);
n = *cp & 0xFF;
cp++;
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "cpu", (char*)cp, n, 1);
cp += n;
n = *cp & 0xFF;
cp++;
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "os", (char*)cp, n, 1);
cp += n;
break;
case DNS_T_TXT:
{
int ll = 0;
zval *entries = NULL;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "TXT", 1);
tp = emalloc(dlen + 1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(entries);
array_init(entries);
while (ll < dlen) {
n = cp[ll];
if ((ll + n) >= dlen) {
n = dlen - (ll + 1);
}
memcpy(tp + ll , cp + ll + 1, n);
add_next_index_stringl(entries, cp + ll + 1, n, 1);
ll = ll + n + 1;
}
tp[dlen] = '\0';
cp += dlen;
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "txt", tp, (dlen>0)?dlen - 1:0, 0);
add_assoc_zval(*subarray, "entries", entries);
}
break;
case DNS_T_SOA:
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "SOA", 1);
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) -2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "mname", name, 1);
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) -2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "rname", name, 1);
GETLONG(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "serial", n);
GETLONG(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "refresh", n);
GETLONG(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "retry", n);
GETLONG(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "expire", n);
GETLONG(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "minimum-ttl", n);
break;
case DNS_T_AAAA:
tp = (u_char*)name;
for(i=0; i < 8; i++) {
GETSHORT(s, cp);
if (s != 0) {
if (tp > (u_char *)name) {
in_v6_break = 0;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
tp += sprintf((char*)tp,"%x",s);
} else {
if (!have_v6_break) {
have_v6_break = 1;
in_v6_break = 1;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
} else if (!in_v6_break) {
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
tp[0] = '0';
tp++;
}
}
}
if (have_v6_break && in_v6_break) {
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
tp[0] = '\0';
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "AAAA", 1);
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "ipv6", name, 1);
break;
case DNS_T_A6:
p = cp;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "A6", 1);
n = ((int)cp[0]) & 0xFF;
cp++;
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "masklen", n);
tp = (u_char*)name;
if (n > 15) {
have_v6_break = 1;
in_v6_break = 1;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
if (n % 16 > 8) {
/* Partial short */
if (cp[0] != 0) {
if (tp > (u_char *)name) {
in_v6_break = 0;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
sprintf((char*)tp, "%x", cp[0] & 0xFF);
} else {
if (!have_v6_break) {
have_v6_break = 1;
in_v6_break = 1;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
} else if (!in_v6_break) {
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
tp[0] = '0';
tp++;
}
}
cp++;
}
for (i = (n + 8) / 16; i < 8; i++) {
GETSHORT(s, cp);
if (s != 0) {
if (tp > (u_char *)name) {
in_v6_break = 0;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
tp += sprintf((char*)tp,"%x",s);
} else {
if (!have_v6_break) {
have_v6_break = 1;
in_v6_break = 1;
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
} else if (!in_v6_break) {
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
tp[0] = '0';
tp++;
}
}
}
if (have_v6_break && in_v6_break) {
tp[0] = ':';
tp++;
}
tp[0] = '\0';
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "ipv6", name, 1);
if (cp < p + dlen) {
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) - 2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "chain", name, 1);
}
break;
case DNS_T_SRV:
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "SRV", 1);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "pri", n);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "weight", n);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "port", n);
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) - 2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "target", name, 1);
break;
case DNS_T_NAPTR:
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "type", "NAPTR", 1);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "order", n);
GETSHORT(n, cp);
add_assoc_long(*subarray, "pref", n);
n = (cp[0] & 0xFF);
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "flags", (char*)++cp, n, 1);
cp += n;
n = (cp[0] & 0xFF);
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "services", (char*)++cp, n, 1);
cp += n;
n = (cp[0] & 0xFF);
add_assoc_stringl(*subarray, "regex", (char*)++cp, n, 1);
cp += n;
n = dn_expand(answer->qb2, answer->qb2+65536, cp, name, (sizeof name) - 2);
if (n < 0) {
return NULL;
}
cp += n;
add_assoc_string(*subarray, "replacement", name, 1);
break;
default:
zval_ptr_dtor(subarray);
*subarray = NULL;
cp += dlen;
break;
}
return cp;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the php_parserr function in ext/standard/dns.c in PHP before 5.4.32 and 5.5.x before 5.5.16 allow remote DNS servers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted DNS record, related to the dns_get_record function and the dn_expand function. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2014-4049.
Commit Message: Fixed Sec Bug #67717 segfault in dns_get_record CVE-2014-3597
Incomplete fix for CVE-2014-4049
Check possible buffer overflow
- pass real buffer end to dn_expand calls
- check buffer len before each read | Medium | 4,393 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: create_bits (pixman_format_code_t format,
int width,
int height,
int * rowstride_bytes,
pixman_bool_t clear)
{
int stride;
size_t buf_size;
int bpp;
/* what follows is a long-winded way, avoiding any possibility of integer
* overflows, of saying:
* stride = ((width * bpp + 0x1f) >> 5) * sizeof (uint32_t);
*/
bpp = PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP (format);
if (_pixman_multiply_overflows_int (width, bpp))
return NULL;
stride = width * bpp;
if (_pixman_addition_overflows_int (stride, 0x1f))
return NULL;
stride += 0x1f;
stride >>= 5;
stride *= sizeof (uint32_t);
if (_pixman_multiply_overflows_size (height, stride))
return NULL;
buf_size = height * stride;
if (rowstride_bytes)
*rowstride_bytes = stride;
if (clear)
return calloc (buf_size, 1);
else
return malloc (buf_size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the create_bits function in pixman-bits-image.c in Pixman before 0.32.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via large height and stride values.
Commit Message: | High | 21,896 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: std::string ExtensionTtsController::GetMatchingExtensionId(
Utterance* utterance) {
ExtensionService* service = utterance->profile()->GetExtensionService();
DCHECK(service);
ExtensionEventRouter* event_router =
utterance->profile()->GetExtensionEventRouter();
DCHECK(event_router);
const ExtensionList* extensions = service->extensions();
ExtensionList::const_iterator iter;
for (iter = extensions->begin(); iter != extensions->end(); ++iter) {
const Extension* extension = *iter;
if (!event_router->ExtensionHasEventListener(
extension->id(), events::kOnSpeak) ||
!event_router->ExtensionHasEventListener(
extension->id(), events::kOnStop)) {
continue;
}
const std::vector<Extension::TtsVoice>& tts_voices =
extension->tts_voices();
for (size_t i = 0; i < tts_voices.size(); ++i) {
const Extension::TtsVoice& voice = tts_voices[i];
if (!voice.voice_name.empty() &&
!utterance->voice_name().empty() &&
voice.voice_name != utterance->voice_name()) {
continue;
}
if (!voice.locale.empty() &&
!utterance->locale().empty() &&
voice.locale != utterance->locale()) {
continue;
}
if (!voice.gender.empty() &&
!utterance->gender().empty() &&
voice.gender != utterance->gender()) {
continue;
}
return extension->id();
}
}
return std::string();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 15,076 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int utf8s_to_utf16s(const u8 *s, int len, wchar_t *pwcs)
{
u16 *op;
int size;
unicode_t u;
op = pwcs;
while (*s && len > 0) {
if (*s & 0x80) {
size = utf8_to_utf32(s, len, &u);
if (size < 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (u >= PLANE_SIZE) {
u -= PLANE_SIZE;
*op++ = (wchar_t) (SURROGATE_PAIR |
((u >> 10) & SURROGATE_BITS));
*op++ = (wchar_t) (SURROGATE_PAIR |
SURROGATE_LOW |
(u & SURROGATE_BITS));
} else {
*op++ = (wchar_t) u;
}
s += size;
len -= size;
} else {
*op++ = *s++;
len--;
}
}
return op - pwcs;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the VFAT filesystem implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.3 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (system crash) via a VFAT write operation on a filesystem with the utf8 mount option, which is not properly handled during UTF-8 to UTF-16 conversion.
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> | Medium | 16,355 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML(const String& where, const String& markup, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
RefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment = document()->createDocumentFragment();
Element* contextElement = contextElementForInsertion(where, this, ec);
if (!contextElement)
return;
if (document()->isHTMLDocument())
fragment->parseHTML(markup, contextElement);
else {
if (!fragment->parseXML(markup, contextElement))
return;
}
insertAdjacent(where, fragment.get(), ec);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not prevent calls to functions in other frames, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site, related to a *cross-frame function leak.*
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 19,663 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void perf_bp_event(struct perf_event *bp, void *data)
{
struct perf_sample_data sample;
struct pt_regs *regs = data;
perf_sample_data_init(&sample, bp->attr.bp_addr);
if (!bp->hw.state && !perf_exclude_event(bp, regs))
perf_swevent_event(bp, 1, 1, &sample, regs);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.1 does not properly handle event overflows associated with PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK events, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system hang) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> | Medium | 16,001 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: dissect_u3v(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, void* data)
{
gint offset = 0;
proto_tree *u3v_tree = NULL, *ccd_tree_flag, *u3v_telegram_tree = NULL, *ccd_tree = NULL;
gint data_length = 0;
gint req_id = 0;
gint command_id = -1;
gint status = 0;
guint prefix = 0;
proto_item *ti = NULL;
proto_item *item = NULL;
const char *command_string;
usb_conv_info_t *usb_conv_info;
gint stream_detected = FALSE;
gint control_detected = FALSE;
u3v_conv_info_t *u3v_conv_info = NULL;
gencp_transaction_t *gencp_trans = NULL;
usb_conv_info = (usb_conv_info_t *)data;
/* decide if this packet belongs to U3V protocol */
u3v_conv_info = (u3v_conv_info_t *)usb_conv_info->class_data;
if (!u3v_conv_info) {
u3v_conv_info = wmem_new0(wmem_file_scope(), u3v_conv_info_t);
usb_conv_info->class_data = u3v_conv_info;
}
prefix = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, 0);
if ((tvb_reported_length(tvb) >= 4) && ( ( U3V_CONTROL_PREFIX == prefix ) || ( U3V_EVENT_PREFIX == prefix ) ) ) {
control_detected = TRUE;
}
if (((tvb_reported_length(tvb) >= 4) && (( U3V_STREAM_LEADER_PREFIX == prefix ) || ( U3V_STREAM_TRAILER_PREFIX == prefix )))
|| (usb_conv_info->endpoint == u3v_conv_info->ep_stream)) {
stream_detected = TRUE;
}
/* initialize interface class/subclass in case no descriptors have been dissected yet */
if ( control_detected || stream_detected){
if ( usb_conv_info->interfaceClass == IF_CLASS_UNKNOWN &&
usb_conv_info->interfaceSubclass == IF_SUBCLASS_UNKNOWN){
usb_conv_info->interfaceClass = IF_CLASS_MISCELLANEOUS;
usb_conv_info->interfaceSubclass = IF_SUBCLASS_MISC_U3V;
}
}
if ( control_detected ) {
/* Set the protocol column */
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "U3V");
/* Clear out stuff in the info column */
col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);
/* Adds "USB3Vision" heading to protocol tree */
/* We will add fields to this using the u3v_tree pointer */
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_u3v, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
u3v_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_u3v);
prefix = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
command_id = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset+6);
/* decode CCD ( DCI/DCE command data layout) */
if ((prefix == U3V_CONTROL_PREFIX || prefix == U3V_EVENT_PREFIX) && ((command_id % 2) == 0)) {
command_string = val_to_str(command_id,command_names,"Unknown Command (0x%x)");
item = proto_tree_add_item(u3v_tree, hf_u3v_ccd_cmd, tvb, offset, 8, ENC_NA);
proto_item_append_text(item, ": %s", command_string);
ccd_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_u3v_cmd);
/* Add the prefix code: */
proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree, hf_u3v_gencp_prefix, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* Add the flags */
item = proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree, hf_u3v_flag, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ccd_tree_flag = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_u3v_flags);
proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree_flag, hf_u3v_acknowledge_required_flag, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "> %s ", command_string);
} else if (prefix == U3V_CONTROL_PREFIX && ((command_id % 2) == 1)) {
command_string = val_to_str(command_id,command_names,"Unknown Acknowledge (0x%x)");
item = proto_tree_add_item(u3v_tree, hf_u3v_ccd_ack, tvb, offset, 8, ENC_NA);
proto_item_append_text(item, ": %s", command_string);
ccd_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(item, ett_u3v_ack);
/* Add the prefix code: */
proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree, hf_u3v_gencp_prefix, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
/* Add the status: */
proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree, hf_u3v_status, tvb, offset, 2,ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
status = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
offset += 2;
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "< %s %s",
command_string,
val_to_str(status, status_names_short, "Unknown status (0x%04X)"));
} else {
return 0;
}
/* Add the command id*/
proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree, hf_u3v_command_id, tvb, offset, 2,ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
/* Parse the second part of both the command and the acknowledge header:
0 15 16 31
-------- -------- -------- --------
| status | acknowledge |
-------- -------- -------- --------
| length | req_id |
-------- -------- -------- --------
Add the data length
Number of valid data bytes in this message, not including this header. This
represents the number of bytes of payload appended after this header */
proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree, hf_u3v_length, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
data_length = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
offset += 2;
/* Add the request ID */
proto_tree_add_item(ccd_tree, hf_u3v_request_id, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
req_id = tvb_get_letohs(tvb, offset);
offset += 2;
/* Add telegram subtree */
u3v_telegram_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(u3v_tree, ett_u3v);
if (!PINFO_FD_VISITED(pinfo)) {
if ((command_id % 2) == 0) {
/* This is a command */
gencp_trans = wmem_new(wmem_file_scope(), gencp_transaction_t);
gencp_trans->cmd_frame = pinfo->fd->num;
gencp_trans->ack_frame = 0;
gencp_trans->cmd_time = pinfo->fd->abs_ts;
/* add reference to current packet */
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_u3v, req_id, gencp_trans);
/* add reference to current */
u3v_conv_info->trans_info = gencp_trans;
} else {
gencp_trans = u3v_conv_info->trans_info;
if (gencp_trans) {
gencp_trans->ack_frame = pinfo->fd->num;
/* add reference to current packet */
p_add_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(), pinfo, proto_u3v, req_id, gencp_trans);
}
}
} else {
gencp_trans = (gencp_transaction_t*)p_get_proto_data(wmem_file_scope(),pinfo, proto_u3v, req_id);
}
if (!gencp_trans) {
/* create a "fake" gencp_trans structure */
gencp_trans = wmem_new(wmem_packet_scope(), gencp_transaction_t);
gencp_trans->cmd_frame = 0;
gencp_trans->ack_frame = 0;
gencp_trans->cmd_time = pinfo->fd->abs_ts;
}
/* dissect depending on command? */
switch (command_id) {
case U3V_READMEM_CMD:
dissect_u3v_read_mem_cmd(u3v_telegram_tree, tvb, pinfo, offset, data_length,u3v_conv_info,gencp_trans);
break;
case U3V_WRITEMEM_CMD:
dissect_u3v_write_mem_cmd(u3v_telegram_tree, tvb, pinfo, offset, data_length,u3v_conv_info,gencp_trans);
break;
case U3V_EVENT_CMD:
dissect_u3v_event_cmd(u3v_telegram_tree, tvb, pinfo, offset, data_length);
break;
case U3V_READMEM_ACK:
if ( U3V_STATUS_GENCP_SUCCESS == status ) {
dissect_u3v_read_mem_ack(u3v_telegram_tree, tvb, pinfo, offset, data_length,u3v_conv_info,gencp_trans);
}
break;
case U3V_WRITEMEM_ACK:
dissect_u3v_write_mem_ack(u3v_telegram_tree, tvb, pinfo, offset, data_length, u3v_conv_info,gencp_trans);
break;
case U3V_PENDING_ACK:
dissect_u3v_pending_ack(u3v_telegram_tree, tvb, pinfo, offset, data_length, u3v_conv_info,gencp_trans);
break;
default:
proto_tree_add_item(u3v_telegram_tree, hf_u3v_payloaddata, tvb, offset, data_length, ENC_NA);
break;
}
return data_length + 12;
} else if ( stream_detected ) {
/* this is streaming data */
/* init this stream configuration */
u3v_conv_info = (u3v_conv_info_t *)usb_conv_info->class_data;
u3v_conv_info->ep_stream = usb_conv_info->endpoint;
/* Set the protocol column */
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "U3V");
/* Clear out stuff in the info column */
col_clear(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO);
/* Adds "USB3Vision" heading to protocol tree */
/* We will add fields to this using the u3v_tree pointer */
ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_u3v, tvb, offset, -1, ENC_NA);
u3v_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(ti, ett_u3v);
if(tvb_captured_length(tvb) >=4) {
prefix = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
switch (prefix) {
case U3V_STREAM_LEADER_PREFIX:
dissect_u3v_stream_leader(u3v_tree, tvb, pinfo, usb_conv_info);
break;
case U3V_STREAM_TRAILER_PREFIX:
dissect_u3v_stream_trailer(u3v_tree, tvb, pinfo, usb_conv_info);
break;
default:
dissect_u3v_stream_payload(u3v_tree, tvb, pinfo, usb_conv_info);
break;
}
}
return tvb_captured_length(tvb);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The USB subsystem in Wireshark 1.12.x before 1.12.12 and 2.x before 2.0.4 mishandles class types, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted packet.
Commit Message: Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]> | Medium | 16,389 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: GahpServer::Reaper(Service *,int pid,int status)
{
/* This should be much better.... for now, if our Gahp Server
goes away for any reason, we EXCEPT. */
GahpServer *dead_server = NULL;
GahpServer *next_server = NULL;
GahpServersById.startIterations();
while ( GahpServersById.iterate( next_server ) != 0 ) {
if ( pid == next_server->m_gahp_pid ) {
dead_server = next_server;
break;
}
}
std::string buf;
sprintf( buf, "Gahp Server (pid=%d) ", pid );
if( WIFSIGNALED(status) ) {
sprintf_cat( buf, "died due to %s",
daemonCore->GetExceptionString(status) );
} else {
sprintf_cat( buf, "exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status) );
}
if ( dead_server ) {
sprintf_cat( buf, " unexpectedly" );
EXCEPT( buf.c_str() );
} else {
sprintf_cat( buf, "\n" );
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, buf.c_str() );
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-134
Summary: Multiple format string vulnerabilities in Condor 7.2.0 through 7.6.4, and possibly certain 7.7.x versions, as used in Red Hat MRG Grid and possibly other products, allow local users to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd daemon and failure to launch jobs) and possibly execute arbitrary code via format string specifiers in (1) the reason for a hold for a job that uses an XML user log, (2) the filename of a file to be transferred, and possibly other unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: | Medium | 20,347 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the severity score category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void MessageService::OpenChannelToNativeApp(
int source_process_id,
int source_routing_id,
int receiver_port_id,
const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& native_app_name,
const std::string& channel_name,
const std::string& connect_message) {
content::RenderProcessHost* source =
content::RenderProcessHost::FromID(source_process_id);
if (!source)
return;
WebContents* source_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
source_process_id, source_routing_id);
std::string tab_json = "null";
if (source_contents) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> tab_value(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
source_contents, ExtensionTabUtil::INCLUDE_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS));
base::JSONWriter::Write(tab_value.get(), &tab_json);
}
scoped_ptr<MessageChannel> channel(new MessageChannel());
channel->opener.reset(new ExtensionMessagePort(source, MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL,
source_extension_id));
NativeMessageProcessHost::MessageType type =
channel_name == "chrome.runtime.sendNativeMessage" ?
NativeMessageProcessHost::TYPE_SEND_MESSAGE_REQUEST :
NativeMessageProcessHost::TYPE_CONNECT;
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(
content::BrowserThread::FILE,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&NativeMessageProcessHost::Create,
base::WeakPtr<NativeMessageProcessHost::Client>(
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
native_app_name, connect_message, receiver_port_id,
type,
base::Bind(&MessageService::FinalizeOpenChannelToNativeApp,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
receiver_port_id,
channel_name,
base::Passed(&channel),
tab_json)));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 26.0.1410.43 does not ensure that an extension has the tabs (aka APIPermission::kTab) permission before providing a URL to this extension, which has unspecified impact and remote attack vectors.
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | High | 26,396 |
Subsets and Splits