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value | input
stringlengths 386
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Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void MemoryInstrumentation::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
RequestGlobalDumpCallback callback) {
const auto& coordinator = GetCoordinatorBindingForCurrentThread();
coordinator->GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(callback);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-269
Summary: Lack of access control checks in Instrumentation in Google Chrome prior to 65.0.3325.146 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to obtain memory metadata from privileged processes .
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059} | Medium | 6,000 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PaymentRequest::AreRequestedMethodsSupportedCallback(
bool methods_supported) {
if (methods_supported) {
if (SatisfiesSkipUIConstraints()) {
skipped_payment_request_ui_ = true;
Pay();
}
} else {
journey_logger_.SetNotShown(
JourneyLogger::NOT_SHOWN_REASON_NO_SUPPORTED_PAYMENT_METHOD);
client_->OnError(mojom::PaymentErrorReason::NOT_SUPPORTED);
if (observer_for_testing_)
observer_for_testing_->OnNotSupportedError();
OnConnectionTerminated();
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Incorrect handling of negative zero in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 72.0.3626.81 allowed a remote attacker to perform arbitrary read/write via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [Payment Request][Desktop] Prevent use after free.
Before this patch, a compromised renderer on desktop could make IPC
methods into Payment Request in an unexpected ordering and cause use
after free in the browser.
This patch will disconnect the IPC pipes if:
- Init() is called more than once.
- Any other method is called before Init().
- Show() is called more than once.
- Retry(), UpdateWith(), NoupdatedPaymentDetails(), Abort(), or
Complete() are called before Show().
This patch re-orders the IPC methods in payment_request.cc to match the
order in payment_request.h, which eases verifying correctness of their
error handling.
This patch prints more errors to the developer console, if available, to
improve debuggability by web developers, who rarely check where LOG
prints.
After this patch, unexpected ordering of calls into the Payment Request
IPC from the renderer to the browser on desktop will print an error in
the developer console and disconnect the IPC pipes. The binary might
increase slightly in size because more logs are included in the release
version instead of being stripped at compile time.
Bug: 912947
Change-Id: Iac2131181c64cd49b4e5ec99f4b4a8ae5d8df57a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1370198
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616822} | Medium | 3,975 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: omx_vdec::omx_vdec(): m_error_propogated(false),
m_state(OMX_StateInvalid),
m_app_data(NULL),
m_inp_mem_ptr(NULL),
m_out_mem_ptr(NULL),
input_flush_progress (false),
output_flush_progress (false),
input_use_buffer (false),
output_use_buffer (false),
ouput_egl_buffers(false),
m_use_output_pmem(OMX_FALSE),
m_out_mem_region_smi(OMX_FALSE),
m_out_pvt_entry_pmem(OMX_FALSE),
pending_input_buffers(0),
pending_output_buffers(0),
m_out_bm_count(0),
m_inp_bm_count(0),
m_inp_bPopulated(OMX_FALSE),
m_out_bPopulated(OMX_FALSE),
m_flags(0),
#ifdef _ANDROID_
m_heap_ptr(NULL),
#endif
m_inp_bEnabled(OMX_TRUE),
m_out_bEnabled(OMX_TRUE),
m_in_alloc_cnt(0),
m_platform_list(NULL),
m_platform_entry(NULL),
m_pmem_info(NULL),
h264_parser(NULL),
arbitrary_bytes (true),
psource_frame (NULL),
pdest_frame (NULL),
m_inp_heap_ptr (NULL),
m_phdr_pmem_ptr(NULL),
m_heap_inp_bm_count (0),
codec_type_parse ((codec_type)0),
first_frame_meta (true),
frame_count (0),
nal_count (0),
nal_length(0),
look_ahead_nal (false),
first_frame(0),
first_buffer(NULL),
first_frame_size (0),
m_device_file_ptr(NULL),
m_vc1_profile((vc1_profile_type)0),
h264_last_au_ts(LLONG_MAX),
h264_last_au_flags(0),
m_disp_hor_size(0),
m_disp_vert_size(0),
prev_ts(LLONG_MAX),
rst_prev_ts(true),
frm_int(0),
in_reconfig(false),
m_display_id(NULL),
client_extradata(0),
m_reject_avc_1080p_mp (0),
#ifdef _ANDROID_
m_enable_android_native_buffers(OMX_FALSE),
m_use_android_native_buffers(OMX_FALSE),
iDivXDrmDecrypt(NULL),
#endif
m_desc_buffer_ptr(NULL),
secure_mode(false),
m_other_extradata(NULL),
m_profile(0),
client_set_fps(false),
m_last_rendered_TS(-1),
m_queued_codec_config_count(0),
secure_scaling_to_non_secure_opb(false)
{
/* Assumption is that , to begin with , we have all the frames with decoder */
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("In %u bit OMX vdec Constructor", (unsigned int)sizeof(long) * 8);
memset(&m_debug,0,sizeof(m_debug));
#ifdef _ANDROID_
char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
property_get("vidc.debug.level", property_value, "1");
debug_level = atoi(property_value);
property_value[0] = '\0';
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("In OMX vdec Constructor");
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.perf", property_value, "0");
perf_flag = atoi(property_value);
if (perf_flag) {
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.perf is %d", perf_flag);
dec_time.start();
proc_frms = latency = 0;
}
prev_n_filled_len = 0;
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.ts", property_value, "0");
m_debug_timestamp = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.ts value is %d",m_debug_timestamp);
if (m_debug_timestamp) {
time_stamp_dts.set_timestamp_reorder_mode(true);
time_stamp_dts.enable_debug_print(true);
}
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.concealedmb", property_value, "0");
m_debug_concealedmb = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.concealedmb value is %d",m_debug_concealedmb);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.profile.check", property_value, "0");
m_reject_avc_1080p_mp = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.profile.check value is %d",m_reject_avc_1080p_mp);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.log.in", property_value, "0");
m_debug.in_buffer_log = atoi(property_value);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.log.out", property_value, "0");
m_debug.out_buffer_log = atoi(property_value);
sprintf(m_debug.log_loc, "%s", BUFFER_LOG_LOC);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.log.loc", property_value, "");
if (*property_value)
strlcpy(m_debug.log_loc, property_value, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.120fps.enabled", property_value, "0");
if(atoi(property_value)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("feature 120 FPS decode enabled");
m_last_rendered_TS = 0;
}
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.dyn.disabled", property_value, "0");
m_disable_dynamic_buf_mode = atoi(property_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.dyn.disabled value is %d",m_disable_dynamic_buf_mode);
#endif
memset(&m_cmp,0,sizeof(m_cmp));
memset(&m_cb,0,sizeof(m_cb));
memset (&drv_ctx,0,sizeof(drv_ctx));
memset (&h264_scratch,0,sizeof (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE));
memset (m_hwdevice_name,0,sizeof(m_hwdevice_name));
memset(m_demux_offsets, 0, ( sizeof(OMX_U32) * 8192) );
memset(&m_custom_buffersize, 0, sizeof(m_custom_buffersize));
m_demux_entries = 0;
msg_thread_id = 0;
async_thread_id = 0;
msg_thread_created = false;
async_thread_created = false;
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
memset(&native_buffer, 0 ,(sizeof(struct nativebuffer) * MAX_NUM_INPUT_OUTPUT_BUFFERS));
#endif
memset(&drv_ctx.extradata_info, 0, sizeof(drv_ctx.extradata_info));
/* invalidate m_frame_pack_arrangement */
memset(&m_frame_pack_arrangement, 0, sizeof(OMX_QCOM_FRAME_PACK_ARRANGEMENT));
m_frame_pack_arrangement.cancel_flag = 1;
drv_ctx.timestamp_adjust = false;
drv_ctx.video_driver_fd = -1;
m_vendor_config.pData = NULL;
pthread_mutex_init(&m_lock, NULL);
pthread_mutex_init(&c_lock, NULL);
sem_init(&m_cmd_lock,0,0);
sem_init(&m_safe_flush, 0, 0);
streaming[CAPTURE_PORT] =
streaming[OUTPUT_PORT] = false;
#ifdef _ANDROID_
char extradata_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
property_get("vidc.dec.debug.extradata", extradata_value, "0");
m_debug_extradata = atoi(extradata_value);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("vidc.dec.debug.extradata value is %d",m_debug_extradata);
#endif
m_fill_output_msg = OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_FTB;
client_buffers.set_vdec_client(this);
dynamic_buf_mode = false;
out_dynamic_list = NULL;
is_down_scalar_enabled = false;
m_smoothstreaming_mode = false;
m_smoothstreaming_width = 0;
m_smoothstreaming_height = 0;
is_q6_platform = false;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the mm-video-v4l2 vdec component in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01 allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27890802.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
| Low | 1,172 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAACEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
formatParams->eEncoding =
(formatParams->nPortIndex == 0)
? OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM : OMX_AUDIO_CodingAAC;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *aacParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AACPROFILETYPE *)params;
if (aacParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
aacParams->nBitRate = mBitRate;
aacParams->nAudioBandWidth = 0;
aacParams->nAACtools = 0;
aacParams->nAACERtools = 0;
aacParams->eAACProfile = OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectMain;
aacParams->eAACStreamFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AACStreamFormatMP4FF;
aacParams->eChannelMode = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelModeStereo;
aacParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
aacParams->nSampleRate = mSampleRate;
aacParams->nFrameLength = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
| Medium | 12,946 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: TestPaintArtifact& TestPaintArtifact::Chunk(
DisplayItemClient& client,
scoped_refptr<const TransformPaintPropertyNode> transform,
scoped_refptr<const ClipPaintPropertyNode> clip,
scoped_refptr<const EffectPaintPropertyNode> effect) {
return Chunk(client,
PropertyTreeState(transform.get(), clip.get(), effect.get()));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | Low | 28,119 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
UUT_ = GET_PARAM(2);
/* Set up guard blocks for an inner block centered in the outer block */
for (int i = 0; i < kOutputBufferSize; ++i) {
if (IsIndexInBorder(i))
output_[i] = 255;
else
output_[i] = 0;
}
::libvpx_test::ACMRandom prng;
for (int i = 0; i < kInputBufferSize; ++i)
input_[i] = prng.Rand8Extremes();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| Low | 1,958 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawArrays(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::DrawArrays& c) {
GLenum mode = static_cast<GLenum>(c.mode);
GLint first = static_cast<GLint>(c.first);
GLsizei count = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.count);
if (!validators_->draw_mode.IsValid(mode)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glDrawArrays: mode GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: count < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckFramebufferComplete("glDrawArrays")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
if (first < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: first < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count == 0) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint max_vertex_accessed = first + count - 1;
if (IsDrawValid(max_vertex_accessed)) {
bool simulated_attrib_0 = SimulateAttrib0(max_vertex_accessed);
bool simulated_fixed_attribs = false;
if (SimulateFixedAttribs(max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_fixed_attribs)) {
bool textures_set = SetBlackTextureForNonRenderableTextures();
ApplyDirtyState();
glDrawArrays(mode, first, count);
if (textures_set) {
RestoreStateForNonRenderableTextures();
}
if (simulated_fixed_attribs) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedFixedAttribs();
}
}
if (simulated_attrib_0) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedAttrib0();
}
if (WasContextLost()) {
LOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Context lost during DrawArrays.";
return error::kLostContext;
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 does not properly handle triangle arrays, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 10,651 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool NavigationController::RendererDidNavigate(
const ViewHostMsg_FrameNavigate_Params& params,
int extra_invalidate_flags,
LoadCommittedDetails* details) {
if (GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
details->previous_url = GetLastCommittedEntry()->url();
details->previous_entry_index = last_committed_entry_index();
} else {
details->previous_url = GURL();
details->previous_entry_index = -1;
}
if (pending_entry_index_ >= 0 && !pending_entry_->site_instance()) {
DCHECK(pending_entry_->restore_type() != NavigationEntry::RESTORE_NONE);
pending_entry_->set_site_instance(tab_contents_->GetSiteInstance());
pending_entry_->set_restore_type(NavigationEntry::RESTORE_NONE);
}
details->is_in_page = IsURLInPageNavigation(params.url);
details->type = ClassifyNavigation(params);
switch (details->type) {
case NavigationType::NEW_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(params, &(details->did_replace_entry));
break;
case NavigationType::EXISTING_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage(params);
break;
case NavigationType::SAME_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateToSamePage(params);
break;
case NavigationType::IN_PAGE:
RendererDidNavigateInPage(params, &(details->did_replace_entry));
break;
case NavigationType::NEW_SUBFRAME:
RendererDidNavigateNewSubframe(params);
break;
case NavigationType::AUTO_SUBFRAME:
if (!RendererDidNavigateAutoSubframe(params))
return false;
break;
case NavigationType::NAV_IGNORE:
return false;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
DCHECK(!params.content_state.empty());
NavigationEntry* active_entry = GetActiveEntry();
active_entry->set_content_state(params.content_state);
DCHECK(active_entry->site_instance() == tab_contents_->GetSiteInstance());
details->is_auto = (PageTransition::IsRedirect(params.transition) &&
!pending_entry()) ||
params.gesture == NavigationGestureAuto;
details->entry = active_entry;
details->is_main_frame = PageTransition::IsMainFrame(params.transition);
details->serialized_security_info = params.security_info;
details->http_status_code = params.http_status_code;
NotifyNavigationEntryCommitted(details, extra_invalidate_flags);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The drag-and-drop implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 on Linux does not properly enforce permissions for files, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 3,321 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: store_message(png_store *ps, png_const_structp pp, char *buffer, size_t bufsize,
size_t pos, PNG_CONST char *msg)
{
if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pread)
{
/* Reading a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "read: ");
if (ps->current != NULL)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->current->name);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
}
else if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pwrite)
{
/* Writing a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "write: ");
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->wname);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
else
{
/* Neither reading nor writing (or a memory error in struct delete) */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "pngvalid: ");
}
if (ps->test[0] != 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->test);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, msg);
return pos;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| Low | 27,259 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void jpc_undo_roi(jas_matrix_t *x, int roishift, int bgshift, int numbps)
{
int i;
int j;
int thresh;
jpc_fix_t val;
jpc_fix_t mag;
bool warn;
uint_fast32_t mask;
if (roishift == 0 && bgshift == 0) {
return;
}
thresh = 1 << roishift;
warn = false;
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(x); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(x); ++j) {
val = jas_matrix_get(x, i, j);
mag = JAS_ABS(val);
if (mag >= thresh) {
/* We are dealing with ROI data. */
mag >>= roishift;
val = (val < 0) ? (-mag) : mag;
jas_matrix_set(x, i, j, val);
} else {
/* We are dealing with non-ROI (i.e., background) data. */
mag <<= bgshift;
mask = (1 << numbps) - 1;
/* Perform a basic sanity check on the sample value. */
/* Some implementations write garbage in the unused
most-significant bit planes introduced by ROI shifting.
Here we ensure that any such bits are masked off. */
if (mag & (~mask)) {
if (!warn) {
jas_eprintf("warning: possibly corrupt code stream\n");
warn = true;
}
mag &= mask;
}
val = (val < 0) ? (-mag) : mag;
jas_matrix_set(x, i, j, val);
}
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: The jpc_tsfb_synthesize function in jpc_tsfb.c in JasPer before 1.900.9 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via vectors involving an empty sequence.
Commit Message: Fixed an integral type promotion problem by adding a JAS_CAST.
Modified the jpc_tsfb_synthesize function so that it will be a noop for
an empty sequence (in order to avoid dereferencing a null pointer). | Low | 13,439 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: SchedulerObject::hold(std::string key, std::string &reason, std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster < 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Hold: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
if (!holdJob(id.cluster,
id.proc,
reason.c_str(),
true, // Always perform this action within a transaction
true, // Always notify the shadow of the hold
false, // Do not email the user about this action
false, // Do not email admin about this action
false // This is not a system related (internal) hold
)) {
text = "Failed to hold job";
return false;
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: aviary/jobcontrol.py in Condor, as used in Red Hat Enterprise MRG 2.3, when removing a job, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (condor_schedd restart) via square brackets in the cproc option.
Commit Message: | Medium | 27,567 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static Image *ReadDPSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*client_name;
Display
*display;
float
pixels_per_point;
Image
*image;
int
sans,
status;
Pixmap
pixmap;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
register ssize_t
i;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register size_t
pixel;
Screen
*screen;
ssize_t
x,
y;
XColor
*colors;
XImage
*dps_image;
XRectangle
page,
bits_per_pixel;
XResourceInfo
resource_info;
XrmDatabase
resource_database;
XStandardColormap
*map_info;
XVisualInfo
*visual_info;
/*
Open X server connection.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
display=XOpenDisplay(image_info->server_name);
if (display == (Display *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
/*
Set our forgiving exception handler.
*/
(void) XSetErrorHandler(XError);
/*
Open image file.
*/
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Image *) NULL);
/*
Get user defaults from X resource database.
*/
client_name=GetClientName();
resource_database=XGetResourceDatabase(display,client_name);
XGetResourceInfo(image_info,resource_database,client_name,&resource_info);
/*
Allocate standard colormap.
*/
map_info=XAllocStandardColormap();
visual_info=(XVisualInfo *) NULL;
if (map_info == (XStandardColormap *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToCreateStandardColormap")
else
{
/*
Initialize visual info.
*/
(void) CloneString(&resource_info.visual_type,"default");
visual_info=XBestVisualInfo(display,map_info,&resource_info);
map_info->colormap=(Colormap) NULL;
}
if ((map_info == (XStandardColormap *) NULL) ||
(visual_info == (XVisualInfo *) NULL))
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
XFreeResources(display,visual_info,map_info,(XPixelInfo *) NULL,
(XFontStruct *) NULL,&resource_info,(XWindowInfo *) NULL);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Create a pixmap the appropriate size for the image.
*/
screen=ScreenOfDisplay(display,visual_info->screen);
pixels_per_point=XDPSPixelsPerPoint(screen);
if ((image->x_resolution != 0.0) && (image->y_resolution != 0.0))
pixels_per_point=MagickMin(image->x_resolution,image->y_resolution)/
DefaultResolution;
status=XDPSCreatePixmapForEPSF((DPSContext) NULL,screen,
GetBlobFileHandle(image),visual_info->depth,pixels_per_point,&pixmap,
&bits_per_pixel,&page);
if ((status == dps_status_failure) || (status == dps_status_no_extension))
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
XFreeResources(display,visual_info,map_info,(XPixelInfo *) NULL,
(XFontStruct *) NULL,&resource_info,(XWindowInfo *) NULL);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Rasterize the file into the pixmap.
*/
status=XDPSImageFileIntoDrawable((DPSContext) NULL,screen,pixmap,
GetBlobFileHandle(image),(int) bits_per_pixel.height,visual_info->depth,
&page,-page.x,-page.y,pixels_per_point,MagickTrue,MagickFalse,MagickTrue,
&sans);
if (status != dps_status_success)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
XFreeResources(display,visual_info,map_info,(XPixelInfo *) NULL,
(XFontStruct *) NULL,&resource_info,(XWindowInfo *) NULL);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize DPS X image.
*/
dps_image=XGetImage(display,pixmap,0,0,bits_per_pixel.width,
bits_per_pixel.height,AllPlanes,ZPixmap);
(void) XFreePixmap(display,pixmap);
if (dps_image == (XImage *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
XFreeResources(display,visual_info,map_info,(XPixelInfo *) NULL,
(XFontStruct *) NULL,&resource_info,(XWindowInfo *) NULL);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Get the colormap colors.
*/
colors=(XColor *) AcquireQuantumMemory(visual_info->colormap_size,
sizeof(*colors));
if (colors == (XColor *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
XDestroyImage(dps_image);
XFreeResources(display,visual_info,map_info,(XPixelInfo *) NULL,
(XFontStruct *) NULL,&resource_info,(XWindowInfo *) NULL);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if ((visual_info->klass != DirectColor) && (visual_info->klass != TrueColor))
for (i=0; i < visual_info->colormap_size; i++)
{
colors[i].pixel=(size_t) i;
colors[i].pad=0;
}
else
{
size_t
blue,
blue_bit,
green,
green_bit,
red,
red_bit;
/*
DirectColor or TrueColor visual.
*/
red=0;
green=0;
blue=0;
red_bit=visual_info->red_mask & (~(visual_info->red_mask)+1);
green_bit=visual_info->green_mask & (~(visual_info->green_mask)+1);
blue_bit=visual_info->blue_mask & (~(visual_info->blue_mask)+1);
for (i=0; i < visual_info->colormap_size; i++)
{
colors[i].pixel=red | green | blue;
colors[i].pad=0;
red+=red_bit;
if (red > visual_info->red_mask)
red=0;
green+=green_bit;
if (green > visual_info->green_mask)
green=0;
blue+=blue_bit;
if (blue > visual_info->blue_mask)
blue=0;
}
}
(void) XQueryColors(display,XDefaultColormap(display,visual_info->screen),
colors,visual_info->colormap_size);
/*
Convert X image to MIFF format.
*/
if ((visual_info->klass != TrueColor) && (visual_info->klass != DirectColor))
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->columns=(size_t) dps_image->width;
image->rows=(size_t) dps_image->height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
switch (image->storage_class)
{
case DirectClass:
default:
{
register size_t
color,
index;
size_t
blue_mask,
blue_shift,
green_mask,
green_shift,
red_mask,
red_shift;
/*
Determine shift and mask for red, green, and blue.
*/
red_mask=visual_info->red_mask;
red_shift=0;
while ((red_mask != 0) && ((red_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
red_mask>>=1;
red_shift++;
}
green_mask=visual_info->green_mask;
green_shift=0;
while ((green_mask != 0) && ((green_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
green_mask>>=1;
green_shift++;
}
blue_mask=visual_info->blue_mask;
blue_shift=0;
while ((blue_mask != 0) && ((blue_mask & 0x01) == 0))
{
blue_mask>>=1;
blue_shift++;
}
/*
Convert X image to DirectClass packets.
*/
if ((visual_info->colormap_size > 0) &&
(visual_info->klass == DirectColor))
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=XGetPixel(dps_image,x,y);
index=(pixel >> red_shift) & red_mask;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[index].red));
index=(pixel >> green_shift) & green_mask;
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[index].green));
index=(pixel >> blue_shift) & blue_mask;
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[index].blue));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,y,image->rows) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
else
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=XGetPixel(dps_image,x,y);
color=(pixel >> red_shift) & red_mask;
color=(color*65535L)/red_mask;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) color));
color=(pixel >> green_shift) & green_mask;
color=(color*65535L)/green_mask;
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
color));
color=(pixel >> blue_shift) & blue_mask;
color=(color*65535L)/blue_mask;
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short)
color));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,y,image->rows) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case PseudoClass:
{
/*
Create colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,(size_t) visual_info->colormap_size) == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
XDestroyImage(dps_image);
XFreeResources(display,visual_info,map_info,(XPixelInfo *) NULL,
(XFontStruct *) NULL,&resource_info,(XWindowInfo *) NULL);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[colors[i].pixel].red=ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[i].red);
image->colormap[colors[i].pixel].green=
ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[i].green);
image->colormap[colors[i].pixel].blue=
ScaleShortToQuantum(colors[i].blue);
}
/*
Convert X image to PseudoClass packets.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,(unsigned short)
XGetPixel(dps_image,x,y));
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,y,image->rows) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
colors=(XColor *) RelinquishMagickMemory(colors);
XDestroyImage(dps_image);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image);
/*
Rasterize matte image.
*/
status=XDPSCreatePixmapForEPSF((DPSContext) NULL,screen,
GetBlobFileHandle(image),1,pixels_per_point,&pixmap,&bits_per_pixel,&page);
if ((status != dps_status_failure) && (status != dps_status_no_extension))
{
status=XDPSImageFileIntoDrawable((DPSContext) NULL,screen,pixmap,
GetBlobFileHandle(image),(int) bits_per_pixel.height,1,&page,-page.x,
-page.y,pixels_per_point,MagickTrue,MagickTrue,MagickTrue,&sans);
if (status == dps_status_success)
{
XImage
*matte_image;
/*
Initialize image matte.
*/
matte_image=XGetImage(display,pixmap,0,0,bits_per_pixel.width,
bits_per_pixel.height,AllPlanes,ZPixmap);
(void) XFreePixmap(display,pixmap);
if (matte_image != (XImage *) NULL)
{
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
image->matte=MagickTrue;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
if (XGetPixel(matte_image,x,y) == 0)
SetPixelOpacity(q,TransparentOpacity);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
XDestroyImage(matte_image);
}
}
}
/*
Relinquish resources.
*/
XFreeResources(display,visual_info,map_info,(XPixelInfo *) NULL,
(XFontStruct *) NULL,&resource_info,(XWindowInfo *) NULL);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 2,121 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RenderFlexibleBox::styleDidChange(StyleDifference diff, const RenderStyle* oldStyle)
{
RenderBlock::styleDidChange(diff, oldStyle);
if (oldStyle && oldStyle->alignItems() == ItemPositionStretch && diff == StyleDifferenceLayout) {
for (RenderBox* child = firstChildBox(); child; child = child->nextSiblingBox()) {
ItemPosition previousAlignment = resolveAlignment(oldStyle, child->style());
if (previousAlignment == ItemPositionStretch && previousAlignment != resolveAlignment(style(), child->style()))
child->setChildNeedsLayout(MarkOnlyThis);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Web Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.152 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Low | 20,453 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void UpdateContentLengthPrefs(int received_content_length,
int original_content_length,
bool via_data_reduction_proxy) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK_GE(received_content_length, 0);
DCHECK_GE(original_content_length, 0);
if (!g_browser_process)
return;
PrefService* prefs = g_browser_process->local_state();
if (!prefs)
return;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
bool with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled =
g_browser_process->profile_manager()->GetDefaultProfile()->
GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kSpdyProxyAuthEnabled);
#else
bool with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled = false;
#endif
chrome_browser_net::UpdateContentLengthPrefs(
received_content_length,
original_content_length,
with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled,
via_data_reduction_proxy, prefs);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the HTML5 Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 27.0.1453.110 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 3,297 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void LauncherView::OnBoundsChanged(const gfx::Rect& previous_bounds) {
LayoutToIdealBounds();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(LauncherIconObserver, observers_,
OnLauncherIconPositionsChanged());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 26,653 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool isNodeAriaVisible(Node* node) {
if (!node)
return false;
if (!node->isElementNode())
return false;
return equalIgnoringCase(toElement(node)->getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr),
"false");
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 17,806 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper::PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper(
ppapi::host::ResourceHost* resource_host,
Delegate* delegate,
PP_DeviceType_Dev device_type,
const GURL& document_url)
: resource_host_(resource_host),
delegate_(delegate),
device_type_(device_type),
document_url_(document_url) {}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Pepper plugins in Google Chrome before 39.0.2171.65 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted Flash content that triggers an attempted PepperMediaDeviceManager access outside of the object's lifetime.
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897} | Low | 5,246 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: GDataEntry* GDataDirectory::FromDocumentEntry(
GDataDirectory* parent,
DocumentEntry* doc,
GDataDirectoryService* directory_service) {
DCHECK(doc->is_folder());
GDataDirectory* dir = new GDataDirectory(parent, directory_service);
dir->title_ = UTF16ToUTF8(doc->title());
dir->SetBaseNameFromTitle();
dir->file_info_.last_modified = doc->updated_time();
dir->file_info_.last_accessed = doc->updated_time();
dir->file_info_.creation_time = doc->published_time();
dir->resource_id_ = doc->resource_id();
dir->content_url_ = doc->content_url();
dir->deleted_ = doc->deleted();
const Link* edit_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::EDIT);
DCHECK(edit_link) << "No edit link for dir " << dir->title_;
if (edit_link)
dir->edit_url_ = edit_link->href();
const Link* parent_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::PARENT);
if (parent_link)
dir->parent_resource_id_ = ExtractResourceId(parent_link->href());
const Link* upload_link = doc->GetLinkByType(Link::RESUMABLE_CREATE_MEDIA);
if (upload_link)
dir->upload_url_ = upload_link->href();
return dir;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.56 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of fonts in CANVAS elements.
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 10,568 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void xgroupCommand(client *c) {
const char *help[] = {
"CREATE <key> <groupname> <id or $> -- Create a new consumer group.",
"SETID <key> <groupname> <id or $> -- Set the current group ID.",
"DELGROUP <key> <groupname> -- Remove the specified group.",
"DELCONSUMER <key> <groupname> <consumer> -- Remove the specified conusmer.",
"HELP -- Prints this help.",
NULL
};
stream *s = NULL;
sds grpname = NULL;
streamCG *cg = NULL;
char *opt = c->argv[1]->ptr; /* Subcommand name. */
/* Lookup the key now, this is common for all the subcommands but HELP. */
if (c->argc >= 4) {
robj *o = lookupKeyWriteOrReply(c,c->argv[2],shared.nokeyerr);
if (o == NULL) return;
s = o->ptr;
grpname = c->argv[3]->ptr;
/* Certain subcommands require the group to exist. */
if ((cg = streamLookupCG(s,grpname)) == NULL &&
(!strcasecmp(opt,"SETID") ||
!strcasecmp(opt,"DELCONSUMER")))
{
addReplyErrorFormat(c, "-NOGROUP No such consumer group '%s' "
"for key name '%s'",
(char*)grpname, (char*)c->argv[2]->ptr);
return;
}
}
/* Dispatch the different subcommands. */
if (!strcasecmp(opt,"CREATE") && c->argc == 5) {
streamID id;
if (!strcmp(c->argv[4]->ptr,"$")) {
id = s->last_id;
} else if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[4],&id,0) != C_OK) {
return;
}
streamCG *cg = streamCreateCG(s,grpname,sdslen(grpname),&id);
if (cg) {
addReply(c,shared.ok);
server.dirty++;
} else {
addReplySds(c,
sdsnew("-BUSYGROUP Consumer Group name already exists\r\n"));
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"SETID") && c->argc == 5) {
streamID id;
if (!strcmp(c->argv[4]->ptr,"$")) {
id = s->last_id;
} else if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[4],&id,0) != C_OK) {
return;
}
cg->last_id = id;
addReply(c,shared.ok);
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"DESTROY") && c->argc == 4) {
if (cg) {
raxRemove(s->cgroups,(unsigned char*)grpname,sdslen(grpname),NULL);
streamFreeCG(cg);
addReply(c,shared.cone);
} else {
addReply(c,shared.czero);
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"DELCONSUMER") && c->argc == 5) {
/* Delete the consumer and returns the number of pending messages
* that were yet associated with such a consumer. */
long long pending = streamDelConsumer(cg,c->argv[4]->ptr);
addReplyLongLong(c,pending);
server.dirty++;
} else if (!strcasecmp(opt,"HELP")) {
addReplyHelp(c, help);
} else {
addReply(c,shared.syntaxerr);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-704
Summary: Type confusion in the xgroupCommand function in t_stream.c in redis-server in Redis before 5.0 allows remote attackers to cause denial-of-service via an XGROUP command in which the key is not a stream.
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream | Low | 7,687 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ContentEncoding::GetEncryptionByIndex(unsigned long idx) const {
const ptrdiff_t count = encryption_entries_end_ - encryption_entries_;
assert(count >= 0);
if (idx >= static_cast<unsigned long>(count))
return NULL;
return encryption_entries_[idx];
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | Low | 7,937 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static __u8 *lg_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
struct lg_drv_data *drv_data = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
struct usb_device_descriptor *udesc;
__u16 bcdDevice, rev_maj, rev_min;
if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC) && *rsize >= 90 && rdesc[83] == 0x26 &&
rdesc[84] == 0x8c && rdesc[85] == 0x02) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech keyboard report descriptor\n");
rdesc[84] = rdesc[89] = 0x4d;
rdesc[85] = rdesc[90] = 0x10;
}
if ((drv_data->quirks & LG_RDESC_REL_ABS) && *rsize >= 50 &&
rdesc[32] == 0x81 && rdesc[33] == 0x06 &&
rdesc[49] == 0x81 && rdesc[50] == 0x06) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up rel/abs in Logitech report descriptor\n");
rdesc[33] = rdesc[50] = 0x02;
}
switch (hdev->product) {
/* Several wheels report as this id when operating in emulation mode. */
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_WHEEL:
udesc = &(hid_to_usb_dev(hdev)->descriptor);
if (!udesc) {
hid_err(hdev, "NULL USB device descriptor\n");
break;
}
bcdDevice = le16_to_cpu(udesc->bcdDevice);
rev_maj = bcdDevice >> 8;
rev_min = bcdDevice & 0xff;
/* Update the report descriptor for only the Driving Force wheel */
if (rev_maj == 1 && rev_min == 2 &&
*rsize == DF_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Driving Force report descriptor\n");
rdesc = df_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(df_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_MOMO_WHEEL:
if (*rsize == MOMO_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Momo Force (Red) report descriptor\n");
rdesc = momo_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(momo_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_MOMO_WHEEL2:
if (*rsize == MOMO2_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Momo Racing Force (Black) report descriptor\n");
rdesc = momo2_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(momo2_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_VIBRATION_WHEEL:
if (*rsize == FV_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Formula Vibration report descriptor\n");
rdesc = fv_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(fv_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_DFP_WHEEL:
if (*rsize == DFP_RDESC_ORIG_SIZE) {
hid_info(hdev,
"fixing up Logitech Driving Force Pro report descriptor\n");
rdesc = dfp_rdesc_fixed;
*rsize = sizeof(dfp_rdesc_fixed);
}
break;
case USB_DEVICE_ID_LOGITECH_WII_WHEEL:
if (*rsize >= 101 && rdesc[41] == 0x95 && rdesc[42] == 0x0B &&
rdesc[47] == 0x05 && rdesc[48] == 0x09) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up Logitech Speed Force Wireless report descriptor\n");
rdesc[41] = 0x05;
rdesc[42] = 0x09;
rdesc[47] = 0x95;
rdesc[48] = 0x0B;
}
break;
}
return rdesc;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The report_fixup functions in the HID subsystem in the Linux kernel before 3.16.2 might allow physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted device that provides a small report descriptor, related to (1) drivers/hid/hid-cherry.c, (2) drivers/hid/hid-kye.c, (3) drivers/hid/hid-lg.c, (4) drivers/hid/hid-monterey.c, (5) drivers/hid/hid-petalynx.c, and (6) drivers/hid/hid-sunplus.c.
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> | Medium | 27,891 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(recvfrom, int, fd, void __user *, ubuf, size_t, size,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int __user *, addr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct iovec iov;
struct msghdr msg;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err, err2;
int fput_needed;
if (size > INT_MAX)
size = INT_MAX;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
msg.msg_iov = &iov;
iov.iov_len = size;
iov.iov_base = ubuf;
msg.msg_name = (struct sockaddr *)&address;
msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(address);
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
err = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, size, flags);
if (err >= 0 && addr != NULL) {
err2 = move_addr_to_user(&address,
msg.msg_namelen, addr, addr_len);
if (err2 < 0)
err = err2;
}
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 18,897 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: doshn(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off, int num,
size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags, int mach, int strtab)
{
Elf32_Shdr sh32;
Elf64_Shdr sh64;
int stripped = 1;
void *nbuf;
off_t noff, coff, name_off;
uint64_t cap_hw1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x hardware capabilites */
uint64_t cap_sf1 = 0; /* SunOS 5.x software capabilites */
char name[50];
if (size != xsh_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted section header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/* Read offset of name section to be able to read section names later */
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off + size * strtab) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name_off = xsh_offset;
for ( ; num; num--) {
/* Read the name of this section. */
if (pread(fd, name, sizeof(name), name_off + xsh_name) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0';
if (strcmp(name, ".debug_info") == 0)
stripped = 0;
if (pread(fd, xsh_addr, xsh_sizeof, off) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
/* Things we can determine before we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_SYMTAB:
#if 0
case SHT_DYNSYM:
#endif
stripped = 0;
break;
default:
if (xsh_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
break;
}
/* Things we can determine when we seek */
switch (xsh_type) {
case SHT_NOTE:
if ((nbuf = malloc(xsh_size)) == NULL) {
file_error(ms, errno, "Cannot allocate memory"
" for note");
return -1;
}
if (pread(fd, nbuf, xsh_size, xsh_offset) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
free(nbuf);
return -1;
}
noff = 0;
for (;;) {
if (noff >= (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
noff = donote(ms, nbuf, (size_t)noff,
xsh_size, clazz, swap, 4, flags);
if (noff == 0)
break;
}
free(nbuf);
break;
case SHT_SUNW_cap:
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARCV9:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_386:
case EM_AMD64:
break;
default:
goto skip;
}
if (lseek(fd, xsh_offset, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
file_badseek(ms);
return -1;
}
coff = 0;
for (;;) {
Elf32_Cap cap32;
Elf64_Cap cap64;
char cbuf[/*CONSTCOND*/
MAX(sizeof cap32, sizeof cap64)];
if ((coff += xcap_sizeof) > (off_t)xsh_size)
break;
if (read(fd, cbuf, (size_t)xcap_sizeof) !=
(ssize_t)xcap_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
if (cbuf[0] == 'A') {
#ifdef notyet
char *p = cbuf + 1;
uint32_t len, tag;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (memcmp("gnu", p, 3) != 0) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", unknown capability %.3s", p)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
p += strlen(p) + 1;
tag = *p++;
memcpy(&len, p, sizeof(len));
p += 4;
len = getu32(swap, len);
if (tag != 1) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown gnu"
" capability tag %d", tag)
== -1)
return -1;
break;
}
#endif
break;
}
(void)memcpy(xcap_addr, cbuf, xcap_sizeof);
switch (xcap_tag) {
case CA_SUNW_NULL:
break;
case CA_SUNW_HW_1:
cap_hw1 |= xcap_val;
break;
case CA_SUNW_SF_1:
cap_sf1 |= xcap_val;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown capability "
"0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x = 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)xcap_tag,
(unsigned long long)xcap_val) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
}
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
skip:
default:
break;
}
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", %sstripped", stripped ? "" : "not ") == -1)
return -1;
if (cap_hw1) {
const cap_desc_t *cdp;
switch (mach) {
case EM_SPARC:
case EM_SPARC32PLUS:
case EM_SPARCV9:
cdp = cap_desc_sparc;
break;
case EM_386:
case EM_IA_64:
case EM_AMD64:
cdp = cap_desc_386;
break;
default:
cdp = NULL;
break;
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", uses") == -1)
return -1;
if (cdp) {
while (cdp->cd_name) {
if (cap_hw1 & cdp->cd_mask) {
if (file_printf(ms,
" %s", cdp->cd_name) == -1)
return -1;
cap_hw1 &= ~cdp->cd_mask;
}
++cdp;
}
if (cap_hw1)
if (file_printf(ms,
" unknown hardware capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
if (file_printf(ms,
" hardware capability 0x%" INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_hw1) == -1)
return -1;
}
}
if (cap_sf1) {
if (cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPUSED) {
if (file_printf(ms,
(cap_sf1 & SF1_SUNW_FPKNWN)
? ", uses frame pointer"
: ", not known to use frame pointer") == -1)
return -1;
}
cap_sf1 &= ~SF1_SUNW_MASK;
if (cap_sf1)
if (file_printf(ms,
", with unknown software capability 0x%"
INT64_T_FORMAT "x",
(unsigned long long)cap_sf1) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The ELF parser (readelf.c) in file before 5.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption or crash) via a large number of (1) program or (2) section headers or (3) invalid capabilities.
Commit Message: Stop reporting bad capabilities after the first few. | Low | 29,385 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int key_len = 0, key_size = 0;
int str_len = 0, bin_len = 0, hex_len = 0;
xmlChar *key = NULL, *str = NULL, *padkey = NULL;
xmlChar *bin = NULL, *hex = NULL;
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt = NULL;
if (nargs != 2) {
xmlXPathSetArityError (ctxt);
return;
}
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
str = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
key = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
key_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (key);
if (key_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (key);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
padkey = xmlMallocAtomic (RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
if (padkey == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate padkey\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memset(padkey, 0, RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
key_size = xmlUTF8Strsize (key, key_len);
if ((key_size > RC4_KEY_LENGTH) || (key_size < 0)) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: key size too long or key broken\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memcpy (padkey, key, key_size);
/* encrypt it */
bin_len = str_len;
bin = xmlStrdup (str);
if (bin == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate string\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
PLATFORM_RC4_ENCRYPT (ctxt, padkey, str, str_len, bin, bin_len);
/* encode it */
hex_len = str_len * 2 + 1;
hex = xmlMallocAtomic (hex_len);
if (hex == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate result\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
exsltCryptoBin2Hex (bin, str_len, hex, hex_len);
xmlXPathReturnString (ctxt, hex);
done:
if (key != NULL)
xmlFree (key);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree (str);
if (padkey != NULL)
xmlFree (padkey);
if (bin != NULL)
xmlFree (bin);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338} | High | 14,931 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
{
int ret;
ret = wait_on_bit(&key->flags, KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT,
intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
if (ret)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
smp_rmb();
return key->reject_error;
}
return key_validate(key);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The KEYS subsystem in the Linux kernel before 4.13.10 does not correctly synchronize the actions of updating versus finding a key in the *negative* state to avoid a race condition, which allows local users to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls.
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> | Low | 18,204 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: Mac_Read_POST_Resource( FT_Library library,
FT_Stream stream,
FT_Long *offsets,
FT_Long resource_cnt,
FT_Long face_index,
FT_Face *aface )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Cannot_Open_Resource;
FT_Memory memory = library->memory;
FT_Byte* pfb_data;
int i, type, flags;
FT_Long len;
FT_Long pfb_len, pfb_pos, pfb_lenpos;
FT_Long rlen, temp;
if ( face_index == -1 )
face_index = 0;
if ( face_index != 0 )
return error;
/* Find the length of all the POST resources, concatenated. Assume */
/* worst case (each resource in its own section). */
pfb_len = 0;
for ( i = 0; i < resource_cnt; ++i )
{
error = FT_Stream_Seek( stream, offsets[i] );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_READ_LONG( temp ) )
goto Exit;
pfb_len += temp + 6;
}
if ( FT_ALLOC( pfb_data, (FT_Long)pfb_len + 2 ) )
goto Exit;
pfb_data[0] = 0x80;
pfb_data[1] = 1; /* Ascii section */
pfb_data[2] = 0; /* 4-byte length, fill in later */
pfb_data[3] = 0;
pfb_data[4] = 0;
pfb_data[5] = 0;
pfb_pos = 6;
pfb_lenpos = 2;
len = 0;
type = 1;
for ( i = 0; i < resource_cnt; ++i )
{
error = FT_Stream_Seek( stream, offsets[i] );
if ( error )
goto Exit2;
if ( FT_READ_LONG( rlen ) )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_READ_USHORT( flags ) )
goto Exit;
FT_TRACE3(( "POST fragment[%d]: offsets=0x%08x, rlen=0x%08x, flags=0x%04x\n",
i, offsets[i], rlen, flags ));
/* the flags are part of the resource, so rlen >= 2. */
/* but some fonts declare rlen = 0 for empty fragment */
if ( rlen > 2 )
if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == type )
len += rlen;
else
{
if ( pfb_lenpos + 3 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos ] = (FT_Byte)( len );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 1] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 8 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 2] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 16 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 3] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 24 );
if ( ( flags >> 8 ) == 5 ) /* End of font mark */
break;
if ( pfb_pos + 6 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0x80;
type = flags >> 8;
len = rlen;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = (FT_Byte)type;
pfb_lenpos = pfb_pos;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0; /* 4-byte length, fill in later */
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0;
}
error = FT_Stream_Read( stream, (FT_Byte *)pfb_data + pfb_pos, rlen );
if ( error )
goto Exit2;
pfb_pos += rlen;
}
if ( pfb_pos + 2 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 0x80;
pfb_data[pfb_pos++] = 3;
if ( pfb_lenpos + 3 > pfb_len + 2 )
goto Exit2;
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos ] = (FT_Byte)( len );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 1] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 8 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 2] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 16 );
pfb_data[pfb_lenpos + 3] = (FT_Byte)( len >> 24 );
return open_face_from_buffer( library,
pfb_data,
pfb_pos,
face_index,
"type1",
aface );
Exit2:
FT_FREE( pfb_data );
Exit:
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Heap-based buffer overflow in the Mac_Read_POST_Resource function in base/ftobjs.c in FreeType before 2.4.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted length value in a POST fragment header in a font file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 4,112 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: R_API RConfigNode* r_config_set(RConfig *cfg, const char *name, const char *value) {
RConfigNode *node = NULL;
char *ov = NULL;
ut64 oi;
if (!cfg || STRNULL (name)) {
return NULL;
}
node = r_config_node_get (cfg, name);
if (node) {
if (node->flags & CN_RO) {
eprintf ("(error: '%s' config key is read only)\n", name);
return node;
}
oi = node->i_value;
if (node->value) {
ov = strdup (node->value);
if (!ov) {
goto beach;
}
} else {
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup ("");
}
if (node->flags & CN_BOOL) {
bool b = is_true (value);
node->i_value = (ut64) b? 1: 0;
char *value = strdup (r_str_bool (b));
if (value) {
free (node->value);
node->value = value;
}
} else {
if (!value) {
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup ("");
node->i_value = 0;
} else {
if (node->value == value) {
goto beach;
}
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup (value);
if (IS_DIGIT (*value)) {
if (strchr (value, '/')) {
node->i_value = r_num_get (cfg->num, value);
} else {
node->i_value = r_num_math (cfg->num, value);
}
} else {
node->i_value = 0;
}
node->flags |= CN_INT;
}
}
} else { // Create a new RConfigNode
oi = UT64_MAX;
if (!cfg->lock) {
node = r_config_node_new (name, value);
if (node) {
if (value && is_bool (value)) {
node->flags |= CN_BOOL;
node->i_value = is_true (value)? 1: 0;
}
if (cfg->ht) {
ht_insert (cfg->ht, node->name, node);
r_list_append (cfg->nodes, node);
cfg->n_nodes++;
}
} else {
eprintf ("r_config_set: unable to create a new RConfigNode\n");
}
} else {
eprintf ("r_config_set: variable '%s' not found\n", name);
}
}
if (node && node->setter) {
int ret = node->setter (cfg->user, node);
if (ret == false) {
if (oi != UT64_MAX) {
node->i_value = oi;
}
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup (ov? ov: "");
}
}
beach:
free (ov);
return node;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: The r_config_set function in libr/config/config.c in radare2 1.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free and application crash) via a crafted DEX file.
Commit Message: Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex | Medium | 26,883 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: my_object_error_get_type (void)
{
static GType etype = 0;
if (etype == 0)
{
static const GEnumValue values[] =
{
ENUM_ENTRY (MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO, "Foo"),
ENUM_ENTRY (MY_OBJECT_ERROR_BAR, "Bar"),
{ 0, 0, 0 }
};
etype = g_enum_register_static ("MyObjectError", values);
}
return etype;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message: | Low | 18,056 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void usb_ehci_pci_exit(PCIDevice *dev)
{
EHCIPCIState *i = PCI_EHCI(dev);
static void usb_ehci_pci_reset(DeviceState *dev)
{
PCIDevice *pci_dev = PCI_DEVICE(dev);
EHCIPCIState *i = PCI_EHCI(pci_dev);
EHCIState *s = &i->ehci;
ehci_reset(s);
}
static void usb_ehci_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *dev, uint32_t addr,
uint32_t val, int l)
{
EHCIPCIState *i = PCI_EHCI(dev);
bool busmaster;
pci_default_write_config(dev, addr, val, l);
if (!range_covers_byte(addr, l, PCI_COMMAND)) {
return;
}
busmaster = pci_get_word(dev->config + PCI_COMMAND) & PCI_COMMAND_MASTER;
i->ehci.as = busmaster ? pci_get_address_space(dev) : &address_space_memory;
}
static Property ehci_pci_properties[] = {
DEFINE_PROP_UINT32("maxframes", EHCIPCIState, ehci.maxframes, 128),
DEFINE_PROP_END_OF_LIST(),
};
static const VMStateDescription vmstate_ehci_pci = {
.name = "ehci",
.version_id = 2,
.minimum_version_id = 1,
.fields = (VMStateField[]) {
VMSTATE_PCI_DEVICE(pcidev, EHCIPCIState),
VMSTATE_STRUCT(ehci, EHCIPCIState, 2, vmstate_ehci, EHCIState),
VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST()
}
};
static void ehci_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
{
DeviceClass *dc = DEVICE_CLASS(klass);
PCIDeviceClass *k = PCI_DEVICE_CLASS(klass);
k->realize = usb_ehci_pci_realize;
k->exit = usb_ehci_pci_exit;
k->class_id = PCI_CLASS_SERIAL_USB;
k->config_write = usb_ehci_pci_write_config;
dc->vmsd = &vmstate_ehci_pci;
dc->props = ehci_pci_properties;
dc->reset = usb_ehci_pci_reset;
}
static const TypeInfo ehci_pci_type_info = {
.name = TYPE_PCI_EHCI,
.parent = TYPE_PCI_DEVICE,
.instance_size = sizeof(EHCIPCIState),
.instance_init = usb_ehci_pci_init,
.abstract = true,
.class_init = ehci_class_init,
};
static void ehci_data_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
.parent = TYPE_PCI_DEVICE,
.instance_size = sizeof(EHCIPCIState),
.instance_init = usb_ehci_pci_init,
.abstract = true,
.class_init = ehci_class_init,
};
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-772
Summary: Memory leak in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator), when built with USB EHCI Emulation support, allows local guest OS privileged users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by repeatedly hot-unplugging the device.
Commit Message: | Low | 9,415 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void svc_rdma_send_error(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt, struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
int status)
{
struct ib_send_wr err_wr;
struct page *p;
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
enum rpcrdma_errcode err;
__be32 *va;
int length;
int ret;
ret = svc_rdma_repost_recv(xprt, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret)
return;
p = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
return;
va = page_address(p);
/* XDR encode an error reply */
err = ERR_CHUNK;
if (status == -EPROTONOSUPPORT)
err = ERR_VERS;
length = svc_rdma_xdr_encode_error(xprt, rmsgp, err, va);
ctxt = svc_rdma_get_context(xprt);
ctxt->direction = DMA_TO_DEVICE;
ctxt->count = 1;
ctxt->pages[0] = p;
/* Prepare SGE for local address */
ctxt->sge[0].lkey = xprt->sc_pd->local_dma_lkey;
ctxt->sge[0].length = length;
ctxt->sge[0].addr = ib_dma_map_page(xprt->sc_cm_id->device,
p, 0, length, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
if (ib_dma_mapping_error(xprt->sc_cm_id->device, ctxt->sge[0].addr)) {
dprintk("svcrdma: Error mapping buffer for protocol error\n");
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
return;
}
svc_rdma_count_mappings(xprt, ctxt);
/* Prepare SEND WR */
memset(&err_wr, 0, sizeof(err_wr));
ctxt->cqe.done = svc_rdma_wc_send;
err_wr.wr_cqe = &ctxt->cqe;
err_wr.sg_list = ctxt->sge;
err_wr.num_sge = 1;
err_wr.opcode = IB_WR_SEND;
err_wr.send_flags = IB_SEND_SIGNALED;
/* Post It */
ret = svc_rdma_send(xprt, &err_wr);
if (ret) {
dprintk("svcrdma: Error %d posting send for protocol error\n",
ret);
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 1);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
... | Low | 7,328 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: do_decrypt (const RIJNDAEL_context *ctx, unsigned char *bx,
const unsigned char *ax)
{
#ifdef USE_AMD64_ASM
return _gcry_aes_amd64_decrypt_block(ctx->keyschdec, bx, ax, ctx->rounds,
&dec_tables);
#elif defined(USE_ARM_ASM)
return _gcry_aes_arm_decrypt_block(ctx->keyschdec, bx, ax, ctx->rounds,
&dec_tables);
#else
return do_decrypt_fn (ctx, bx, ax);
#endif /*!USE_ARM_ASM && !USE_AMD64_ASM*/
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-310
Summary: In Libgcrypt 1.8.4, the C implementation of AES is vulnerable to a flush-and-reload side-channel attack because physical addresses are available to other processes. (The C implementation is used on platforms where an assembly-language implementation is unavailable.)
Commit Message: AES: move look-up tables to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/rijndael-internal.h (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
* cipher/rijndael-tables.h (encT): Move to 'enc_tables' structure.
(enc_tables): New structure for encryption table with counters before
and after.
(encT): New macro.
(dec_tables): Add counters before and after encryption table; Move
from .rodata to .data section.
(do_encrypt): Change 'encT' to 'enc_tables.T'.
(do_decrypt): Change '&dec_tables' to 'dec_tables.T'.
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (prefetch_table): Make inline; Handle input
with length not multiple of 256.
(prefetch_enc, prefetch_dec): Modify pre- and post-table counters
to unshare look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <[email protected]> | Medium | 8,828 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int peer_recv_callback(rdpTransport* transport, wStream* s, void* extra)
{
freerdp_peer* client = (freerdp_peer*) extra;
rdpRdp* rdp = client->context->rdp;
switch (rdp->state)
{
case CONNECTION_STATE_INITIAL:
if (!rdp_server_accept_nego(rdp, s))
return -1;
if (rdp->nego->selected_protocol & PROTOCOL_NLA)
{
sspi_CopyAuthIdentity(&client->identity, &(rdp->nego->transport->credssp->identity));
IFCALLRET(client->Logon, client->authenticated, client, &client->identity, TRUE);
credssp_free(rdp->nego->transport->credssp);
}
else
{
IFCALLRET(client->Logon, client->authenticated, client, &client->identity, FALSE);
}
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_NEGO:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_connect_initial(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_CONNECT:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_erect_domain_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_ERECT_DOMAIN:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_attach_user_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_ATTACH_USER:
if (!rdp_server_accept_mcs_channel_join_request(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_MCS_CHANNEL_JOIN:
if (rdp->settings->DisableEncryption)
{
if (!rdp_server_accept_client_keys(rdp, s))
return -1;
break;
}
rdp->state = CONNECTION_STATE_ESTABLISH_KEYS;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case CONNECTION_STATE_ESTABLISH_KEYS:
if (!rdp_server_accept_client_info(rdp, s))
return -1;
IFCALL(client->Capabilities, client);
if (!rdp_send_demand_active(rdp))
return -1;
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_LICENSE:
if (!rdp_server_accept_confirm_active(rdp, s))
{
/**
* During reactivation sequence the client might sent some input or channel data
* before receiving the Deactivate All PDU. We need to process them as usual.
*/
Stream_SetPosition(s, 0);
return peer_recv_pdu(client, s);
}
break;
case CONNECTION_STATE_ACTIVE:
if (peer_recv_pdu(client, s) < 0)
return -1;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid state %d\n", rdp->state);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: FreeRDP before 1.1.0-beta+2013071101 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and application crash) by disconnecting before authentication has finished.
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished. | Low | 7,064 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void _jsvTrace(JsVar *var, int indent, JsVar *baseVar, int level) {
#ifdef SAVE_ON_FLASH
jsiConsolePrint("Trace unimplemented in this version.\n");
#else
int i;
for (i=0;i<indent;i++) jsiConsolePrint(" ");
if (!var) {
jsiConsolePrint("undefined");
return;
}
jsvTraceLockInfo(var);
int lowestLevel = _jsvTraceGetLowestLevel(baseVar, var);
if (lowestLevel < level) {
jsiConsolePrint("...\n");
return;
}
if (jsvIsName(var)) jsiConsolePrint("Name ");
char endBracket = ' ';
if (jsvIsObject(var)) { jsiConsolePrint("Object { "); endBracket = '}'; }
else if (jsvIsArray(var)) { jsiConsolePrintf("Array(%d) [ ", var->varData.integer); endBracket = ']'; }
else if (jsvIsNativeFunction(var)) { jsiConsolePrintf("NativeFunction 0x%x (%d) { ", var->varData.native.ptr, var->varData.native.argTypes); endBracket = '}'; }
else if (jsvIsFunction(var)) {
jsiConsolePrint("Function { ");
if (jsvIsFunctionReturn(var)) jsiConsolePrint("return ");
endBracket = '}';
} else if (jsvIsPin(var)) jsiConsolePrintf("Pin %d", jsvGetInteger(var));
else if (jsvIsInt(var)) jsiConsolePrintf("Integer %d", jsvGetInteger(var));
else if (jsvIsBoolean(var)) jsiConsolePrintf("Bool %s", jsvGetBool(var)?"true":"false");
else if (jsvIsFloat(var)) jsiConsolePrintf("Double %f", jsvGetFloat(var));
else if (jsvIsFunctionParameter(var)) jsiConsolePrintf("Param %q ", var);
else if (jsvIsArrayBufferName(var)) jsiConsolePrintf("ArrayBufferName[%d] ", jsvGetInteger(var));
else if (jsvIsArrayBuffer(var)) jsiConsolePrintf("%s ", jswGetBasicObjectName(var)); // way to get nice name
else if (jsvIsString(var)) {
size_t blocks = 1;
if (jsvGetLastChild(var)) {
JsVar *v = jsvLock(jsvGetLastChild(var));
blocks += jsvCountJsVarsUsed(v);
jsvUnLock(v);
}
if (jsvIsFlatString(var)) {
blocks += jsvGetFlatStringBlocks(var);
}
jsiConsolePrintf("%sString [%d blocks] %q", jsvIsFlatString(var)?"Flat":(jsvIsNativeString(var)?"Native":""), blocks, var);
} else {
jsiConsolePrintf("Unknown %d", var->flags & (JsVarFlags)~(JSV_LOCK_MASK));
}
if (jsvIsNameInt(var)) {
jsiConsolePrintf("= int %d\n", (int)jsvGetFirstChildSigned(var));
return;
} else if (jsvIsNameIntBool(var)) {
jsiConsolePrintf("= bool %s\n", jsvGetFirstChild(var)?"true":"false");
return;
}
if (jsvHasSingleChild(var)) {
JsVar *child = jsvGetFirstChild(var) ? jsvLock(jsvGetFirstChild(var)) : 0;
_jsvTrace(child, indent+2, baseVar, level+1);
jsvUnLock(child);
} else if (jsvHasChildren(var)) {
JsvIterator it;
jsvIteratorNew(&it, var, JSIF_DEFINED_ARRAY_ElEMENTS);
bool first = true;
while (jsvIteratorHasElement(&it) && !jspIsInterrupted()) {
if (first) jsiConsolePrintf("\n");
first = false;
JsVar *child = jsvIteratorGetKey(&it);
_jsvTrace(child, indent+2, baseVar, level+1);
jsvUnLock(child);
jsiConsolePrintf("\n");
jsvIteratorNext(&it);
}
jsvIteratorFree(&it);
if (!first)
for (i=0;i<indent;i++) jsiConsolePrint(" ");
}
jsiConsolePrintf("%c", endBracket);
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: Espruino before 1.98 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) with a user crafted input file via a NULL pointer dereference during syntax parsing. This was addressed by adding validation for a debug trace print statement in jsvar.c.
Commit Message: Add sanity check for debug trace print statement (fix #1420) | Medium | 10,282 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: find_file (const char *currpath, grub_fshelp_node_t currroot,
grub_fshelp_node_t *currfound,
struct grub_fshelp_find_file_closure *c)
{
#ifndef _MSC_VER
char fpath[grub_strlen (currpath) + 1];
#else
char *fpath = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (currpath) + 1);
#endif
char *name = fpath;
char *next;
enum grub_fshelp_filetype type = GRUB_FSHELP_DIR;
grub_fshelp_node_t currnode = currroot;
grub_fshelp_node_t oldnode = currroot;
c->currroot = currroot;
grub_strncpy (fpath, currpath, grub_strlen (currpath) + 1);
/* Remove all leading slashes. */
while (*name == '/')
name++;
if (! *name)
{
*currfound = currnode;
return 0;
}
for (;;)
{
int found;
struct find_file_closure cc;
/* Extract the actual part from the pathname. */
next = grub_strchr (name, '/');
if (next)
{
/* Remove all leading slashes. */
while (*next == '/')
*(next++) = '\0';
}
/* At this point it is expected that the current node is a
directory, check if this is true. */
if (type != GRUB_FSHELP_DIR)
{
free_node (currnode, c);
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "not a directory");
}
cc.name = name;
cc.type = &type;
cc.oldnode = &oldnode;
cc.currnode = &currnode;
/* Iterate over the directory. */
found = c->iterate_dir (currnode, iterate, &cc);
if (! found)
{
if (grub_errno)
return grub_errno;
break;
}
/* Read in the symlink and follow it. */
if (type == GRUB_FSHELP_SYMLINK)
{
char *symlink;
/* Test if the symlink does not loop. */
if (++(c->symlinknest) == 8)
{
free_node (currnode, c);
free_node (oldnode, c);
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_SYMLINK_LOOP,
"too deep nesting of symlinks");
}
symlink = c->read_symlink (currnode);
free_node (currnode, c);
if (!symlink)
{
free_node (oldnode, c);
return grub_errno;
}
/* The symlink is an absolute path, go back to the root inode. */
if (symlink[0] == '/')
{
free_node (oldnode, c);
oldnode = c->rootnode;
}
/* Lookup the node the symlink points to. */
find_file (symlink, oldnode, &currnode, c);
type = c->foundtype;
grub_free (symlink);
if (grub_errno)
{
free_node (oldnode, c);
return grub_errno;
}
}
free_node (oldnode, c);
/* Found the node! */
if (! next || *next == '\0')
{
*currfound = currnode;
c->foundtype = type;
return 0;
}
name = next;
}
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "file not found");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The grub_ext2_read_block function in fs/ext2.c in GNU GRUB before 2013-11-12, as used in shlr/grub/fs/ext2.c in radare2 1.5.0, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (excessive stack use and application crash) via a crafted binary file, related to use of a variable-size stack array.
Commit Message: Fix #7723 - crash in ext2 GRUB code because of variable size array in stack | Low | 18,484 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::DidFinishPrinting(PrintingResult result) {
bool store_print_pages_params = true;
if (result == FAIL_PRINT) {
DisplayPrintJobError();
if (notify_browser_of_print_failure_ && print_pages_params_.get()) {
int cookie = print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintingFailed(routing_id(), cookie));
}
} else if (result == FAIL_PREVIEW) {
DCHECK(is_preview_);
store_print_pages_params = false;
int cookie = print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie;
if (notify_browser_of_print_failure_)
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewFailed(routing_id(), cookie));
else
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewCancelled(routing_id(), cookie));
print_preview_context_.Failed(notify_browser_of_print_failure_);
}
if (print_web_view_) {
print_web_view_->close();
print_web_view_ = NULL;
}
if (store_print_pages_params) {
old_print_pages_params_.reset(print_pages_params_.release());
} else {
print_pages_params_.reset();
old_print_pages_params_.reset();
}
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 15.0.874.120 allows user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to editing.
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 9,442 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static bool access_pmu_evcntr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct sys_reg_params *p,
const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
{
u64 idx;
if (!kvm_arm_pmu_v3_ready(vcpu))
return trap_raz_wi(vcpu, p, r);
if (r->CRn == 9 && r->CRm == 13) {
if (r->Op2 == 2) {
/* PMXEVCNTR_EL0 */
if (pmu_access_event_counter_el0_disabled(vcpu))
return false;
idx = vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, PMSELR_EL0)
& ARMV8_PMU_COUNTER_MASK;
} else if (r->Op2 == 0) {
/* PMCCNTR_EL0 */
if (pmu_access_cycle_counter_el0_disabled(vcpu))
return false;
idx = ARMV8_PMU_CYCLE_IDX;
} else {
BUG();
}
} else if (r->CRn == 14 && (r->CRm & 12) == 8) {
/* PMEVCNTRn_EL0 */
if (pmu_access_event_counter_el0_disabled(vcpu))
return false;
idx = ((r->CRm & 3) << 3) | (r->Op2 & 7);
} else {
BUG();
}
if (!pmu_counter_idx_valid(vcpu, idx))
return false;
if (p->is_write) {
if (pmu_access_el0_disabled(vcpu))
return false;
kvm_pmu_set_counter_value(vcpu, idx, p->regval);
} else {
p->regval = kvm_pmu_get_counter_value(vcpu, idx);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-617
Summary: The access_pmu_evcntr function in arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c in the Linux kernel before 4.8.11 allows privileged KVM guest OS users to cause a denial of service (assertion failure and host OS crash) by accessing the Performance Monitors Cycle Count Register (PMCCNTR).
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: [email protected] # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> | Low | 11,655 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void HTMLElement::setInnerHTML(const String& html, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
RefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment = createFragmentFromSource(html, this, ec);
if (fragment)
replaceChildrenWithFragment(this, fragment.release(), ec);
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not prevent calls to functions in other frames, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions via a crafted web site, related to a *cross-frame function leak.*
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Medium | 6,744 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ProcXFixesSetCursorName(ClientPtr client)
{
CursorPtr pCursor;
char *tchar;
REQUEST(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
REQUEST(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
Atom atom;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXFixesSetCursorNameReq);
VERIFY_CURSOR(pCursor, stuff->cursor, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
tchar = (char *) &stuff[1];
atom = MakeAtom(tchar, stuff->nbytes, TRUE);
return BadAlloc;
pCursor->name = atom;
return Success;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: xorg-x11-server before 1.19.5 was missing length validation in XFIXES extension allowing malicious X client to cause X server to crash or possibly execute arbitrary code.
Commit Message: | Low | 8,156 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: WORD32 ixheaacd_real_synth_filt(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer,
WORD32 num_columns, FLOAT32 qmf_buf_real[][64],
FLOAT32 qmf_buf_imag[][64]) {
WORD32 i, j, k, l, idx;
FLOAT32 g[640];
FLOAT32 w[640];
FLOAT32 synth_out[128];
FLOAT32 accu_r;
WORD32 synth_size = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
FLOAT32 *ptr_cos_tab_trans_qmf =
(FLOAT32 *)&ixheaacd_cos_table_trans_qmf[0][0] +
ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start * 32;
FLOAT32 *buffer = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_buf;
for (idx = 0; idx < num_columns; idx++) {
FLOAT32 loc_qmf_buf[64];
FLOAT32 *synth_buf_r = loc_qmf_buf;
FLOAT32 *out_buf = ptr_hbe_txposer->ptr_input_buf +
(idx + 1) * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
FLOAT32 *synth_cos_tab = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_cos_tab;
const FLOAT32 *interp_window_coeff = ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_wind_coeff;
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start < 0) return -1;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
WORD32 ki = ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start + k;
synth_buf_r[k] = (FLOAT32)(
ptr_cos_tab_trans_qmf[(k << 1) + 0] * qmf_buf_real[idx][ki] +
ptr_cos_tab_trans_qmf[(k << 1) + 1] * qmf_buf_imag[idx][ki]);
synth_buf_r[k + ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size] = 0;
}
for (l = (20 * synth_size - 1); l >= 2 * synth_size; l--) {
buffer[l] = buffer[l - 2 * synth_size];
}
if (synth_size == 20) {
FLOAT32 *psynth_cos_tab = synth_cos_tab;
for (l = 0; l < (synth_size + 1); l++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
accu_r += synth_buf_r[k] * psynth_cos_tab[k];
}
buffer[0 + l] = accu_r;
buffer[synth_size - l] = accu_r;
psynth_cos_tab = psynth_cos_tab + synth_size;
}
for (l = (synth_size + 1); l < (2 * synth_size - synth_size / 2); l++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
accu_r += synth_buf_r[k] * psynth_cos_tab[k];
}
buffer[0 + l] = accu_r;
buffer[3 * synth_size - l] = -accu_r;
psynth_cos_tab = psynth_cos_tab + synth_size;
}
accu_r = 0.0;
for (k = 0; k < synth_size; k++) {
accu_r += synth_buf_r[k] * psynth_cos_tab[k];
}
buffer[3 * synth_size >> 1] = accu_r;
} else {
FLOAT32 tmp;
FLOAT32 *ptr_u = synth_out;
WORD32 kmax = (synth_size >> 1);
FLOAT32 *syn_buf = &buffer[kmax];
kmax += synth_size;
if (ixheaacd_real_synth_fft != NULL)
(*ixheaacd_real_synth_fft)(synth_buf_r, synth_out, synth_size * 2);
else
return -1;
for (k = 0; k < kmax; k++) {
tmp = ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
tmp -= ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
*syn_buf++ = tmp;
}
syn_buf = &buffer[0];
kmax -= synth_size;
for (k = 0; k < kmax; k++) {
tmp = ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
tmp -= ((*ptr_u++) * (*synth_cos_tab++));
*syn_buf++ = tmp;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
memcpy(&g[(2 * i + 0) * synth_size], &buffer[(4 * i + 0) * synth_size],
sizeof(FLOAT32) * synth_size);
memcpy(&g[(2 * i + 1) * synth_size], &buffer[(4 * i + 3) * synth_size],
sizeof(FLOAT32) * synth_size);
}
for (k = 0; k < 10 * synth_size; k++) {
w[k] = g[k] * interp_window_coeff[k];
}
for (i = 0; i < synth_size; i++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
accu_r = accu_r + w[synth_size * j + i];
}
out_buf[i] = (FLOAT32)accu_r;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: In ixheaacd_real_synth_fft_p3 of ixheaacd_esbr_fft.c there is a possible out of bounds write due to a missing bounds check. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. Product: Android Versions: Android-9.0 Android ID: A-110769924
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
| Medium | 6,693 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: log2vis_encoded_string (PyObject * string, const char *encoding,
FriBidiParType base_direction, int clean, int reordernsm)
{
PyObject *logical = NULL; /* logical unicode object */
PyObject *result = NULL; /* output string object */
/* Always needed for the string length */
logical = PyUnicode_Decode (PyString_AS_STRING (string),
PyString_GET_SIZE (string),
encoding, "strict");
if (logical == NULL)
return NULL;
if (strcmp (encoding, "utf-8") == 0)
/* Shortcut for utf8 strings (little faster) */
result = log2vis_utf8 (string,
PyUnicode_GET_SIZE (logical),
base_direction, clean, reordernsm);
else
{
/* Invoke log2vis_unicode and encode back to encoding */
PyObject *visual = log2vis_unicode (logical, base_direction, clean, reordernsm);
if (visual)
{
result = PyUnicode_Encode (PyUnicode_AS_UNICODE
(visual),
PyUnicode_GET_SIZE (visual),
encoding, "strict");
Py_DECREF (visual);
}
}
Py_DECREF (logical);
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode function in PyFriBidi before 0.11.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a 4-byte utf-8 sequence.
Commit Message: refactor pyfribidi.c module
pyfribidi.c is now compiled as _pyfribidi. This module only handles
unicode internally and doesn't use the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode
function (which can't handle 4 byte utf-8 sequences). This fixes the
buffer overflow in issue #2.
The code is now also much simpler: pyfribidi.c is down from 280 to 130
lines of code.
We now ship a pure python pyfribidi that handles the case when
non-unicode strings are passed in.
We now also adapt the size of the output string if clean=True is
passed. | Low | 18,446 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int ipddp_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
{
struct ipddp_route __user *rt = ifr->ifr_data;
struct ipddp_route rcp, rcp2, *rp;
if(!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if(copy_from_user(&rcp, rt, sizeof(rcp)))
return -EFAULT;
switch(cmd)
{
case SIOCADDIPDDPRT:
return ipddp_create(&rcp);
case SIOCFINDIPDDPRT:
spin_lock_bh(&ipddp_route_lock);
rp = __ipddp_find_route(&rcp);
if (rp)
memcpy(&rcp2, rp, sizeof(rcp2));
spin_unlock_bh(&ipddp_route_lock);
if (rp) {
if (copy_to_user(rt, &rcp2,
sizeof(struct ipddp_route)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
} else
return -ENOENT;
case SIOCDELIPDDPRT:
return ipddp_delete(&rcp);
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An issue was discovered in the Linux kernel before 4.18.11. The ipddp_ioctl function in drivers/net/appletalk/ipddp.c allows local users to obtain sensitive kernel address information by leveraging CAP_NET_ADMIN to read the ipddp_route dev and next fields via an SIOCFINDIPDDPRT ioctl call.
Commit Message: net/appletalk: fix minor pointer leak to userspace in SIOCFINDIPDDPRT
Fields ->dev and ->next of struct ipddp_route may be copied to
userspace on the SIOCFINDIPDDPRT ioctl. This is only accessible
to CAP_NET_ADMIN though. Let's manually copy the relevant fields
instead of using memcpy().
BugLink: http://blog.infosectcbr.com.au/2018/09/linux-kernel-infoleaks.html
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 179 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: av_cold void ff_idctdsp_init(IDCTDSPContext *c, AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
const unsigned high_bit_depth = avctx->bits_per_raw_sample > 8;
if (avctx->lowres==1) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct4_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct4_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct4;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else if (avctx->lowres==2) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct2_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct2_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct2;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else if (avctx->lowres==3) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct1_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct1_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct1;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else {
if (avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 10 || avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 9) {
/* 10-bit MPEG-4 Simple Studio Profile requires a higher precision IDCT
However, it only uses idct_put */
if (avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4 && avctx->profile == FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO)
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int32_10bit;
else {
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int16_10bit;
c->idct_add = ff_simple_idct_add_int16_10bit;
c->idct = ff_simple_idct_int16_10bit;
}
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else if (avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 12) {
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int16_12bit;
c->idct_add = ff_simple_idct_add_int16_12bit;
c->idct = ff_simple_idct_int16_12bit;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
} else {
if (avctx->idct_algo == FF_IDCT_INT) {
c->idct_put = ff_jref_idct_put;
c->idct_add = ff_jref_idct_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_LIBMPEG2;
#if CONFIG_FAANIDCT
} else if (avctx->idct_algo == FF_IDCT_FAAN) {
c->idct_put = ff_faanidct_put;
c->idct_add = ff_faanidct_add;
c->idct = ff_faanidct;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
#endif /* CONFIG_FAANIDCT */
} else { // accurate/default
/* Be sure FF_IDCT_NONE will select this one, since it uses FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE */
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_int16_8bit;
c->idct_add = ff_simple_idct_add_int16_8bit;
c->idct = ff_simple_idct_int16_8bit;
c->perm_type = FF_IDCT_PERM_NONE;
}
}
}
c->put_pixels_clamped = ff_put_pixels_clamped_c;
c->put_signed_pixels_clamped = put_signed_pixels_clamped_c;
c->add_pixels_clamped = ff_add_pixels_clamped_c;
if (CONFIG_MPEG4_DECODER && avctx->idct_algo == FF_IDCT_XVID)
ff_xvid_idct_init(c, avctx);
if (ARCH_AARCH64)
ff_idctdsp_init_aarch64(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_ALPHA)
ff_idctdsp_init_alpha(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_ARM)
ff_idctdsp_init_arm(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_PPC)
ff_idctdsp_init_ppc(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_X86)
ff_idctdsp_init_x86(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
if (ARCH_MIPS)
ff_idctdsp_init_mips(c, avctx, high_bit_depth);
ff_init_scantable_permutation(c->idct_permutation,
c->perm_type);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libavcodec in FFmpeg 4.0 may trigger a NULL pointer dereference if the studio profile is incorrectly detected while converting a crafted AVI file to MPEG4, leading to a denial of service, related to idctdsp.c and mpegvideo.c.
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <[email protected]>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | Medium | 21,171 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static MagickBooleanType SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image,DDSInfo *dds_info,
int texel_size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register ssize_t
i;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i = 1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) ((w + 3) / 4) * ((h + 3) / 4) * texel_size;
(void) SeekBlob(image, offset, SEEK_CUR);
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: coders/dds.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.0-4 Beta allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a crafted DDS file.
Commit Message: | Medium | 4,945 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnCreateSnapshotFile(
int request_id, const GURL& blob_url, const GURL& path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
FileSystemURL url(path);
base::Callback<void(const FilePath&)> register_file_callback =
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::RegisterFileAsBlob,
this, blob_url, url.path());
FileSystemOperation* operation = GetNewOperation(url, request_id);
if (!operation)
return;
operation->CreateSnapshotFile(
url,
base::Bind(&FileAPIMessageFilter::DidCreateSnapshot,
this, request_id, register_file_callback));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 does not properly maintain database metadata, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended file-access restrictions via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 21,854 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: USHORT CNB::QueryL4HeaderOffset(PVOID PacketData, ULONG IpHeaderOffset) const
{
USHORT Res;
auto ppr = ParaNdis_ReviewIPPacket(RtlOffsetToPointer(PacketData, IpHeaderOffset),
GetDataLength(), __FUNCTION__);
if (ppr.ipStatus != ppresNotIP)
{
Res = static_cast<USHORT>(IpHeaderOffset + ppr.ipHeaderSize);
}
else
{
DPrintf(0, ("[%s] ERROR: NOT an IP packet - expected troubles!\n", __FUNCTION__));
Res = 0;
}
return Res;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The NetKVM Windows Virtio driver allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (guest crash) via a crafted length value in an IP packet, as demonstrated by a value that does not account for the size of the IP options.
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]> | Low | 11,354 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: tiffcp(TIFF* in, TIFF* out)
{
uint16 bitspersample, samplesperpixel;
uint16 input_compression, input_photometric;
copyFunc cf;
uint32 width, length;
struct cpTag* p;
CopyField(TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH, width);
CopyField(TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH, length);
CopyField(TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, bitspersample);
CopyField(TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, samplesperpixel);
if (compression != (uint16)-1)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, compression);
else
CopyField(TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, compression);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, &input_compression);
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, &input_photometric);
if (input_compression == COMPRESSION_JPEG) {
/* Force conversion to RGB */
TIFFSetField(in, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB);
} else if (input_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR) {
/* Otherwise, can't handle subsampled input */
uint16 subsamplinghor,subsamplingver;
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,
&subsamplinghor, &subsamplingver);
if (subsamplinghor!=1 || subsamplingver!=1) {
fprintf(stderr, "tiffcp: %s: Can't copy/convert subsampled image.\n",
TIFFFileName(in));
return FALSE;
}
}
if (compression == COMPRESSION_JPEG) {
if (input_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB &&
jpegcolormode == JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR);
else
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, input_photometric);
}
else if (compression == COMPRESSION_SGILOG
|| compression == COMPRESSION_SGILOG24)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC,
samplesperpixel == 1 ?
PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL : PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV);
else if (input_compression == COMPRESSION_JPEG &&
samplesperpixel == 3 ) {
/* RGB conversion was forced above
hence the output will be of the same type */
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, PHOTOMETRIC_RGB);
}
else
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, 1, TIFF_SHORT);
if (fillorder != 0)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_FILLORDER, fillorder);
else
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FILLORDER, 1, TIFF_SHORT);
/*
* Will copy `Orientation' tag from input image
*/
TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(in, TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION, &orientation);
switch (orientation) {
case ORIENTATION_BOTRIGHT:
case ORIENTATION_RIGHTBOT: /* XXX */
TIFFWarning(TIFFFileName(in), "using bottom-left orientation");
orientation = ORIENTATION_BOTLEFT;
/* fall thru... */
case ORIENTATION_LEFTBOT: /* XXX */
case ORIENTATION_BOTLEFT:
break;
case ORIENTATION_TOPRIGHT:
case ORIENTATION_RIGHTTOP: /* XXX */
default:
TIFFWarning(TIFFFileName(in), "using top-left orientation");
orientation = ORIENTATION_TOPLEFT;
/* fall thru... */
case ORIENTATION_LEFTTOP: /* XXX */
case ORIENTATION_TOPLEFT:
break;
}
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION, orientation);
/*
* Choose tiles/strip for the output image according to
* the command line arguments (-tiles, -strips) and the
* structure of the input image.
*/
if (outtiled == -1)
outtiled = TIFFIsTiled(in);
if (outtiled) {
/*
* Setup output file's tile width&height. If either
* is not specified, use either the value from the
* input image or, if nothing is defined, use the
* library default.
*/
if (tilewidth == (uint32) -1)
TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tilewidth);
if (tilelength == (uint32) -1)
TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tilelength);
TIFFDefaultTileSize(out, &tilewidth, &tilelength);
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, tilewidth);
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, tilelength);
} else {
/*
* RowsPerStrip is left unspecified: use either the
* value from the input image or, if nothing is defined,
* use the library default.
*/
if (rowsperstrip == (uint32) 0) {
if (!TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,
&rowsperstrip)) {
rowsperstrip =
TIFFDefaultStripSize(out, rowsperstrip);
}
if (rowsperstrip > length && rowsperstrip != (uint32)-1)
rowsperstrip = length;
}
else if (rowsperstrip == (uint32) -1)
rowsperstrip = length;
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, rowsperstrip);
}
if (config != (uint16) -1)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, config);
else
CopyField(TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, config);
if (samplesperpixel <= 4)
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_TRANSFERFUNCTION, 4, TIFF_SHORT);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_COLORMAP, 4, TIFF_SHORT);
/* SMinSampleValue & SMaxSampleValue */
switch (compression) {
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_JPEGQUALITY, quality);
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, jpegcolormode);
break;
case COMPRESSION_JBIG:
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FAXRECVPARAMS, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FAXRECVTIME, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FAXSUBADDRESS, 1, TIFF_ASCII);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FAXDCS, 1, TIFF_ASCII);
break;
case COMPRESSION_LZW:
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE:
case COMPRESSION_DEFLATE:
case COMPRESSION_LZMA:
if (predictor != (uint16)-1)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR, predictor);
else
CopyField(TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR, predictor);
if (preset != -1) {
if (compression == COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE
|| compression == COMPRESSION_DEFLATE)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_ZIPQUALITY, preset);
else if (compression == COMPRESSION_LZMA)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_LZMAPRESET, preset);
}
break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3:
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4:
if (compression == COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3) {
if (g3opts != (uint32) -1)
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_GROUP3OPTIONS,
g3opts);
else
CopyField(TIFFTAG_GROUP3OPTIONS, g3opts);
} else
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_GROUP4OPTIONS, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_BADFAXLINES, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_CLEANFAXDATA, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_CONSECUTIVEBADFAXLINES, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FAXRECVPARAMS, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FAXRECVTIME, 1, TIFF_LONG);
CopyTag(TIFFTAG_FAXSUBADDRESS, 1, TIFF_ASCII);
break;
}
{
uint32 len32;
void** data;
if (TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_ICCPROFILE, &len32, &data))
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_ICCPROFILE, len32, data);
}
{
uint16 ninks;
const char* inknames;
if (TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS, &ninks)) {
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_NUMBEROFINKS, ninks);
if (TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_INKNAMES, &inknames)) {
int inknameslen = strlen(inknames) + 1;
const char* cp = inknames;
while (ninks > 1) {
cp = strchr(cp, '\0');
cp++;
inknameslen += (strlen(cp) + 1);
ninks--;
}
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_INKNAMES, inknameslen, inknames);
}
}
}
{
unsigned short pg0, pg1;
if (pageInSeq == 1) {
if (pageNum < 0) /* only one input file */ {
if (TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER, &pg0, &pg1))
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER, pg0, pg1);
} else
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER, pageNum++, 0);
} else {
if (TIFFGetField(in, TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER, &pg0, &pg1)) {
if (pageNum < 0) /* only one input file */
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER, pg0, pg1);
else
TIFFSetField(out, TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER, pageNum++, 0);
}
}
}
for (p = tags; p < &tags[NTAGS]; p++)
CopyTag(p->tag, p->count, p->type);
cf = pickCopyFunc(in, out, bitspersample, samplesperpixel);
return (cf ? (*cf)(in, out, length, width, samplesperpixel) : FALSE);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: tools/tiffcrop.c in libtiff 4.0.6 reads an undefined buffer in readContigStripsIntoBuffer() because of a uint16 integer overflow. Reported as MSVR 35100.
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix read of undefined variable in case of missing
required tags. Found on test case of MSVR 35100.
* tools/tiffcrop.c: fix read of undefined buffer in
readContigStripsIntoBuffer() due to uint16 overflow. Probably not a
security issue but I can be wrong. Reported as MSVR 35100 by Axel
Souchet from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team. | Low | 7,744 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool Block::IsInvisible() const
{
return bool(int(m_flags & 0x08) != 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | Low | 14,936 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: create_bits (pixman_format_code_t format,
int width,
int height,
int * rowstride_bytes,
pixman_bool_t clear)
{
int stride;
size_t buf_size;
int bpp;
/* what follows is a long-winded way, avoiding any possibility of integer
* overflows, of saying:
* stride = ((width * bpp + 0x1f) >> 5) * sizeof (uint32_t);
*/
bpp = PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP (format);
if (_pixman_multiply_overflows_int (width, bpp))
return NULL;
stride = width * bpp;
if (_pixman_addition_overflows_int (stride, 0x1f))
return NULL;
stride += 0x1f;
stride >>= 5;
stride *= sizeof (uint32_t);
if (_pixman_multiply_overflows_size (height, stride))
return NULL;
buf_size = height * stride;
if (rowstride_bytes)
*rowstride_bytes = stride;
if (clear)
return calloc (buf_size, 1);
else
return malloc (buf_size);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the create_bits function in pixman-bits-image.c in Pixman before 0.32.6 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via large height and stride values.
Commit Message: | Low | 21,896 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int ParseCaffHeaderConfig (FILE *infile, char *infilename, char *fourcc, WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackConfig *config)
{
uint32_t chan_chunk = 0, channel_layout = 0, bcount;
unsigned char *channel_identities = NULL;
unsigned char *channel_reorder = NULL;
int64_t total_samples = 0, infilesize;
CAFFileHeader caf_file_header;
CAFChunkHeader caf_chunk_header;
CAFAudioFormat caf_audio_format;
int i;
infilesize = DoGetFileSize (infile);
memcpy (&caf_file_header, fourcc, 4);
if ((!DoReadFile (infile, ((char *) &caf_file_header) + 4, sizeof (CAFFileHeader) - 4, &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (CAFFileHeader) - 4)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &caf_file_header, sizeof (CAFFileHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&caf_file_header, CAFFileHeaderFormat);
if (caf_file_header.mFileVersion != 1) {
error_line ("%s: can't handle version %d .CAF files!", infilename, caf_file_header.mFileVersion);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
while (1) {
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &caf_chunk_header, sizeof (CAFChunkHeader), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (CAFChunkHeader)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &caf_chunk_header, sizeof (CAFChunkHeader))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&caf_chunk_header, CAFChunkHeaderFormat);
if (!strncmp (caf_chunk_header.mChunkType, "desc", 4)) {
int supported = TRUE;
if (caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize != sizeof (CAFAudioFormat) ||
!DoReadFile (infile, &caf_audio_format, (uint32_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &caf_audio_format, (uint32_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (&caf_audio_format, CAFAudioFormatFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode) {
char formatstr [5];
memcpy (formatstr, caf_audio_format.mFormatID, 4);
formatstr [4] = 0;
error_line ("format = %s, flags = %x, sampling rate = %g",
formatstr, caf_audio_format.mFormatFlags, caf_audio_format.mSampleRate);
error_line ("packet = %d bytes and %d frames",
caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket, caf_audio_format.mFramesPerPacket);
error_line ("channels per frame = %d, bits per channel = %d",
caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame, caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel);
}
if (strncmp (caf_audio_format.mFormatID, "lpcm", 4) || (caf_audio_format.mFormatFlags & ~3))
supported = FALSE;
else if (caf_audio_format.mSampleRate < 1.0 || caf_audio_format.mSampleRate > 16777215.0 ||
caf_audio_format.mSampleRate != floor (caf_audio_format.mSampleRate))
supported = FALSE;
else if (!caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame || caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame > 256)
supported = FALSE;
else if (caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel < 1 || caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel > 32 ||
((caf_audio_format.mFormatFlags & CAF_FORMAT_FLOAT) && caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel != 32))
supported = FALSE;
else if (caf_audio_format.mFramesPerPacket != 1 ||
caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket / caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame < (caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel + 7) / 8 ||
caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket / caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame > 4 ||
caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket % caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame)
supported = FALSE;
if (!supported) {
error_line ("%s is an unsupported .CAF format!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
config->bytes_per_sample = caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket / caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame;
config->float_norm_exp = (caf_audio_format.mFormatFlags & CAF_FORMAT_FLOAT) ? 127 : 0;
config->bits_per_sample = caf_audio_format.mBitsPerChannel;
config->num_channels = caf_audio_format.mChannelsPerFrame;
config->sample_rate = (int) caf_audio_format.mSampleRate;
if (!(caf_audio_format.mFormatFlags & CAF_FORMAT_LITTLE_ENDIAN) && config->bytes_per_sample > 1)
config->qmode |= QMODE_BIG_ENDIAN;
if (config->bytes_per_sample == 1)
config->qmode |= QMODE_SIGNED_BYTES;
if (debug_logging_mode) {
if (config->float_norm_exp == 127)
error_line ("data format: 32-bit %s-endian floating point", (config->qmode & QMODE_BIG_ENDIAN) ? "big" : "little");
else
error_line ("data format: %d-bit %s-endian integers stored in %d byte(s)",
config->bits_per_sample, (config->qmode & QMODE_BIG_ENDIAN) ? "big" : "little", config->bytes_per_sample);
}
}
else if (!strncmp (caf_chunk_header.mChunkType, "chan", 4)) {
CAFChannelLayout *caf_channel_layout;
if (caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize < 0 || caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize > 1024 ||
caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize < sizeof (CAFChannelLayout)) {
error_line ("this .CAF file has an invalid 'chan' chunk!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("'chan' chunk is %d bytes", (int) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize);
caf_channel_layout = malloc ((size_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, caf_channel_layout, (uint32_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize, &bcount) ||
bcount != caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
free (caf_channel_layout);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, caf_channel_layout, (uint32_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (caf_channel_layout);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
WavpackBigEndianToNative (caf_channel_layout, CAFChannelLayoutFormat);
chan_chunk = 1;
if (config->channel_mask || (config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED)) {
error_line ("this CAF file already has channel order information!");
free (caf_channel_layout);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
switch (caf_channel_layout->mChannelLayoutTag) {
case kCAFChannelLayoutTag_UseChannelDescriptions:
{
CAFChannelDescription *descriptions = (CAFChannelDescription *) (caf_channel_layout + 1);
int num_descriptions = caf_channel_layout->mNumberChannelDescriptions;
int label, cindex = 0, idents = 0;
if (caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize != sizeof (CAFChannelLayout) + sizeof (CAFChannelDescription) * num_descriptions ||
num_descriptions != config->num_channels) {
error_line ("channel descriptions in 'chan' chunk are the wrong size!");
free (caf_channel_layout);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (num_descriptions >= 256) {
error_line ("%d channel descriptions is more than we can handle...ignoring!");
break;
}
channel_reorder = malloc (num_descriptions);
memset (channel_reorder, -1, num_descriptions);
channel_identities = malloc (num_descriptions+1);
for (i = 0; i < num_descriptions; ++i) {
WavpackBigEndianToNative (descriptions + i, CAFChannelDescriptionFormat);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("chan %d --> %d", i + 1, descriptions [i].mChannelLabel);
}
for (label = 1; label <= 18; ++label)
for (i = 0; i < num_descriptions; ++i)
if (descriptions [i].mChannelLabel == label) {
config->channel_mask |= 1 << (label - 1);
channel_reorder [i] = cindex++;
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_descriptions; ++i)
if (channel_reorder [i] == (unsigned char) -1) {
uint32_t clabel = descriptions [i].mChannelLabel;
if (clabel == 0 || clabel == 0xffffffff || clabel == 100)
channel_identities [idents++] = 0xff;
else if ((clabel >= 33 && clabel <= 44) || (clabel >= 200 && clabel <= 207) || (clabel >= 301 && clabel <= 305))
channel_identities [idents++] = clabel >= 301 ? clabel - 80 : clabel;
else {
error_line ("warning: unknown channel descriptions label: %d", clabel);
channel_identities [idents++] = 0xff;
}
channel_reorder [i] = cindex++;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_descriptions; ++i)
if (channel_reorder [i] != i)
break;
if (i == num_descriptions) {
free (channel_reorder); // no reordering required, so don't
channel_reorder = NULL;
}
else {
config->qmode |= QMODE_REORDERED_CHANS; // reordering required, put channel count into layout
channel_layout = num_descriptions;
}
if (!idents) { // if no non-MS channels, free the identities string
free (channel_identities);
channel_identities = NULL;
}
else
channel_identities [idents] = 0; // otherwise NULL terminate it
if (debug_logging_mode) {
error_line ("layout_tag = 0x%08x, so generated bitmap of 0x%08x from %d descriptions, %d non-MS",
caf_channel_layout->mChannelLayoutTag, config->channel_mask,
caf_channel_layout->mNumberChannelDescriptions, idents);
if (channel_reorder && num_descriptions <= 8) {
char reorder_string [] = "12345678";
for (i = 0; i < num_descriptions; ++i)
reorder_string [i] = channel_reorder [i] + '1';
reorder_string [i] = 0;
error_line ("reordering string = \"%s\"\n", reorder_string);
}
}
}
break;
case kCAFChannelLayoutTag_UseChannelBitmap:
config->channel_mask = caf_channel_layout->mChannelBitmap;
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("layout_tag = 0x%08x, so using supplied bitmap of 0x%08x",
caf_channel_layout->mChannelLayoutTag, caf_channel_layout->mChannelBitmap);
break;
default:
for (i = 0; i < NUM_LAYOUTS; ++i)
if (caf_channel_layout->mChannelLayoutTag == layouts [i].mChannelLayoutTag) {
config->channel_mask = layouts [i].mChannelBitmap;
channel_layout = layouts [i].mChannelLayoutTag;
if (layouts [i].mChannelReorder) {
channel_reorder = (unsigned char *) strdup (layouts [i].mChannelReorder);
config->qmode |= QMODE_REORDERED_CHANS;
}
if (layouts [i].mChannelIdentities)
channel_identities = (unsigned char *) strdup (layouts [i].mChannelIdentities);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("layout_tag 0x%08x found in table, bitmap = 0x%08x, reorder = %s, identities = %s",
channel_layout, config->channel_mask, channel_reorder ? "yes" : "no", channel_identities ? "yes" : "no");
break;
}
if (i == NUM_LAYOUTS && debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("layout_tag 0x%08x not found in table...all channels unassigned",
caf_channel_layout->mChannelLayoutTag);
break;
}
free (caf_channel_layout);
}
else if (!strncmp (caf_chunk_header.mChunkType, "data", 4)) { // on the data chunk, get size and exit loop
uint32_t mEditCount;
if (!DoReadFile (infile, &mEditCount, sizeof (mEditCount), &bcount) ||
bcount != sizeof (mEditCount)) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
else if (!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, &mEditCount, sizeof (mEditCount))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if ((config->qmode & QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH) || caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize == -1) {
config->qmode |= QMODE_IGNORE_LENGTH;
if (infilesize && DoGetFilePosition (infile) != -1)
total_samples = (infilesize - DoGetFilePosition (infile)) / caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket;
else
total_samples = -1;
}
else {
if (infilesize && infilesize - caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize > 16777216) {
error_line (".CAF file %s has over 16 MB of extra CAFF data, probably is corrupt!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if ((caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize - 4) % caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket) {
error_line (".CAF file %s has an invalid data chunk size, probably is corrupt!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
total_samples = (caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize - 4) / caf_audio_format.mBytesPerPacket;
if (!total_samples) {
error_line ("this .CAF file has no audio samples, probably is corrupt!");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (total_samples > MAX_WAVPACK_SAMPLES) {
error_line ("%s has too many samples for WavPack!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
}
break;
}
else { // just copy unknown chunks to output file
uint32_t bytes_to_copy = (uint32_t) caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize;
char *buff;
if (caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize < 0 || caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize > 1048576) {
error_line ("%s is not a valid .CAF file!", infilename);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
buff = malloc (bytes_to_copy);
if (debug_logging_mode)
error_line ("extra unknown chunk \"%c%c%c%c\" of %d bytes",
caf_chunk_header.mChunkType [0], caf_chunk_header.mChunkType [1], caf_chunk_header.mChunkType [2],
caf_chunk_header.mChunkType [3], caf_chunk_header.mChunkSize);
if (!DoReadFile (infile, buff, bytes_to_copy, &bcount) ||
bcount != bytes_to_copy ||
(!(config->qmode & QMODE_NO_STORE_WRAPPER) &&
!WavpackAddWrapper (wpc, buff, bytes_to_copy))) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
free (buff);
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
free (buff);
}
}
if (!chan_chunk && !config->channel_mask && config->num_channels <= 2 && !(config->qmode & QMODE_CHANS_UNASSIGNED))
config->channel_mask = 0x5 - config->num_channels;
if (!WavpackSetConfiguration64 (wpc, config, total_samples, channel_identities)) {
error_line ("%s", WavpackGetErrorMessage (wpc));
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (channel_identities)
free (channel_identities);
if (channel_layout || channel_reorder) {
if (!WavpackSetChannelLayout (wpc, channel_layout, channel_reorder)) {
error_line ("problem with setting channel layout (should not happen)");
return WAVPACK_SOFT_ERROR;
}
if (channel_reorder)
free (channel_reorder);
}
return WAVPACK_NO_ERROR;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-665
Summary: WavPack 5.1.0 and earlier is affected by: CWE-457: Use of Uninitialized Variable. The impact is: Unexpected control flow, crashes, and segfaults. The component is: ParseCaffHeaderConfig (caff.c:486). The attack vector is: Maliciously crafted .wav file. The fixed version is: After commit https://github.com/dbry/WavPack/commit/f68a9555b548306c5b1ee45199ccdc4a16a6101b.
Commit Message: issue #66: make sure CAF files have a "desc" chunk | Medium | 18,801 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host,
ContentViewCoreImpl* content_view_core)
: host_(widget_host),
is_layer_attached_(true),
content_view_core_(NULL),
ime_adapter_android_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)),
cached_background_color_(SK_ColorWHITE),
texture_id_in_layer_(0) {
if (CompositorImpl::UsesDirectGL()) {
surface_texture_transport_.reset(new SurfaceTextureTransportClient());
layer_ = surface_texture_transport_->Initialize();
} else {
texture_layer_ = cc::TextureLayer::create(0);
layer_ = texture_layer_;
}
layer_->setContentsOpaque(true);
layer_->setIsDrawable(true);
host_->SetView(this);
SetContentViewCore(content_view_core);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 551 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int LE_command(effect_handle_t self, uint32_t cmdCode, uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData, uint32_t *replySize, void *pReplyData) {
LoudnessEnhancerContext * pContext = (LoudnessEnhancerContext *)self;
int retsize;
if (pContext == NULL || pContext->mState == LOUDNESS_ENHANCER_STATE_UNINITIALIZED) {
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (cmdCode) {
case EFFECT_CMD_INIT:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *) pReplyData = LE_init(pContext);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG:
if (pCmdData == NULL || cmdSize != sizeof(effect_config_t)
|| pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *) pReplyData = LE_setConfig(pContext,
(effect_config_t *) pCmdData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG:
if (pReplyData == NULL ||
*replySize != sizeof(effect_config_t)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
LE_getConfig(pContext, (effect_config_t *)pReplyData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_RESET:
LE_reset(pContext);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pContext->mState != LOUDNESS_ENHANCER_STATE_INITIALIZED) {
return -ENOSYS;
}
pContext->mState = LOUDNESS_ENHANCER_STATE_ACTIVE;
ALOGV("EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE() OK");
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pContext->mState != LOUDNESS_ENHANCER_STATE_ACTIVE) {
return -ENOSYS;
}
pContext->mState = LOUDNESS_ENHANCER_STATE_INITIALIZED;
ALOGV("EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE() OK");
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM: {
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize != (int)(sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t)) ||
pReplyData == NULL ||
*replySize < (int)(sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t))) {
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(pReplyData, pCmdData, sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t));
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *)pReplyData;
p->status = 0;
*replySize = sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t);
if (p->psize != sizeof(uint32_t)) {
p->status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
switch (*(uint32_t *)p->data) {
case LOUDNESS_ENHANCER_PARAM_TARGET_GAIN_MB:
ALOGV("get target gain(mB) = %d", pContext->mTargetGainmB);
*((int32_t *)p->data + 1) = pContext->mTargetGainmB;
p->vsize = sizeof(int32_t);
*replySize += sizeof(int32_t);
break;
default:
p->status = -EINVAL;
}
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: {
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize != (int)(sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t)) ||
pReplyData == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int32_t)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int32_t *)pReplyData = 0;
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *)pCmdData;
if (p->psize != sizeof(uint32_t) || p->vsize != sizeof(uint32_t)) {
*(int32_t *)pReplyData = -EINVAL;
break;
}
switch (*(uint32_t *)p->data) {
case LOUDNESS_ENHANCER_PARAM_TARGET_GAIN_MB:
pContext->mTargetGainmB = *((int32_t *)p->data + 1);
ALOGV("set target gain(mB) = %d", pContext->mTargetGainmB);
LE_reset(pContext); // apply parameter update
break;
default:
*(int32_t *)pReplyData = -EINVAL;
}
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE:
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME:
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_AUDIO_MODE:
break;
default:
ALOGW("LE_command invalid command %d",cmdCode);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple heap-based buffer overflows in libeffects in the Audio Policy Service in mediaserver in Android before 5.1.1 LMY48I allow attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted application, aka internal bug 21953516.
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
| Medium | 29,971 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void vmxnet3_complete_packet(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx, uint32_t tx_ridx)
{
struct Vmxnet3_TxCompDesc txcq_descr;
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_RIPRN, "TXC", qidx, &s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
txcq_descr.txdIdx = tx_ridx;
txcq_descr.gen = vmxnet3_ring_curr_gen(&s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
/* Flush changes in TX descriptor before changing the counter value */
smp_wmb();
vmxnet3_inc_tx_completion_counter(s, qidx);
vmxnet3_trigger_interrupt(s, s->txq_descr[qidx].intr_idx);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The vmxnet3_complete_packet function in hw/net/vmxnet3.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to obtain sensitive host memory information by leveraging failure to initialize the txcq_descr object.
Commit Message: | Low | 29,516 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void v9fs_walk(void *opaque)
{
int name_idx;
V9fsFidState *newfidp = NULL;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "ddw", &fid, &newfid, &nwnames);
if (err < 0) {
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
return ;
}
V9fsFidState *newfidp = NULL;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "ddw", &fid, &newfid, &nwnames);
if (err < 0) {
for (i = 0; i < nwnames; i++) {
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "s", &wnames[i]);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
if (name_is_illegal(wnames[i].data)) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
offset += err;
}
} else if (nwnames > P9_MAXWELEM) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
v9fs_path_init(&dpath);
v9fs_path_init(&path);
/*
* Both dpath and path initially poin to fidp.
* Needed to handle request with nwnames == 0
*/
v9fs_path_copy(&dpath, &fidp->path);
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Directory traversal vulnerability in hw/9pfs/9p.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to access host files outside the export path via a .. (dot dot) in an unspecified string.
Commit Message: | Low | 9,101 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: char **XListExtensions(
register Display *dpy,
int *nextensions) /* RETURN */
{
xListExtensionsReply rep;
char **list = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (ListExtensions, req);
if (! _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nExtensions) {
list = Xmalloc (rep.nExtensions * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((!list) || (!ch)) {
Xfree(list);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + (rlen + 1);
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nExtensions; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
list[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
if (ch <= chend) {
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else {
list[i] = NULL;
}
} else
list[i] = NULL;
}
}
} else
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-682
Summary: An issue was discovered in libX11 through 1.6.5. The function XListExtensions in ListExt.c is vulnerable to an off-by-one error caused by malicious server responses, leading to DoS or possibly unspecified other impact.
Commit Message: | Low | 20,831 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: user_change_icon_file_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
User *user,
GDBusMethodInvocation *context,
gpointer data)
{
g_autofree gchar *filename = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) file = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFileInfo) info = NULL;
guint32 mode;
GFileType type;
guint64 size;
filename = g_strdup (data);
if (filename == NULL ||
*filename == '\0') {
g_autofree gchar *dest_path = NULL;
g_autoptr(GFile) dest = NULL;
g_autoptr(GError) error = NULL;
g_clear_pointer (&filename, g_free);
dest_path = g_build_filename (ICONDIR, accounts_user_get_user_name (ACCOUNTS_USER (user)), NULL);
dest = g_file_new_for_path (dest_path);
if (!g_file_delete (dest, NULL, &error) &&
!g_error_matches (error, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_FOUND)) {
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "failed to remove user icon, %s", error->message);
return;
}
goto icon_saved;
}
file = g_file_new_for_path (filename);
info = g_file_query_info (file, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_SIZE,
return;
}
Vulnerability Type: Dir. Trav.
CWE ID: CWE-22
Summary: Directory Traversal with ../ sequences occurs in AccountsService before 0.6.50 because of an insufficient path check in user_change_icon_file_authorized_cb() in user.c.
Commit Message: | Low | 22,159 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateNull( void )
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item();
if ( item )
item->type = cJSON_NULL;
return item;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]> | Low | 16,829 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void NormalPageArena::promptlyFreeObject(HeapObjectHeader* header) {
ASSERT(!getThreadState()->sweepForbidden());
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
Address address = reinterpret_cast<Address>(header);
Address payload = header->payload();
size_t size = header->size();
size_t payloadSize = header->payloadSize();
ASSERT(size > 0);
ASSERT(pageFromObject(address) == findPageFromAddress(address));
{
ThreadState::SweepForbiddenScope forbiddenScope(getThreadState());
header->finalize(payload, payloadSize);
if (address + size == m_currentAllocationPoint) {
m_currentAllocationPoint = address;
setRemainingAllocationSize(m_remainingAllocationSize + size);
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(address, size);
return;
}
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(payload, payloadSize);
header->markPromptlyFreed();
}
m_promptlyFreedSize += size;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Inline metadata in GarbageCollection in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489} | Medium | 13,557 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool Browser::CanCloseContentsAt(int index) {
if (!CanCloseTab())
return false;
if (tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->count() > 1)
return true;
return CanCloseWithInProgressDownloads();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Google Chrome before 14.0.835.163 allows user-assisted remote attackers to spoof the URL bar via vectors related to *unusual user interaction.*
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 16,398 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ntlm_write_message_fields_buffer(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (fields->Len > 0)
{
Stream_SetPosition(s, fields->BufferOffset);
Stream_Write(s, fields->Buffer, fields->Len);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains several Out-Of-Bounds Reads in the NTLM Authentication module that results in a Denial of Service (segfault).
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies. | Low | 9,729 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: status_t SampleIterator::seekTo(uint32_t sampleIndex) {
ALOGV("seekTo(%d)", sampleIndex);
if (sampleIndex >= mTable->mNumSampleSizes) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
if (mTable->mSampleToChunkOffset < 0
|| mTable->mChunkOffsetOffset < 0
|| mTable->mSampleSizeOffset < 0
|| mTable->mTimeToSampleCount == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mInitialized && mCurrentSampleIndex == sampleIndex) {
return OK;
}
if (!mInitialized || sampleIndex < mFirstChunkSampleIndex) {
reset();
}
if (sampleIndex >= mStopChunkSampleIndex) {
status_t err;
if ((err = findChunkRange(sampleIndex)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findChunkRange failed");
return err;
}
}
CHECK(sampleIndex < mStopChunkSampleIndex);
if (mSamplesPerChunk == 0) {
ALOGE("b/22802344");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t chunk =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) / mSamplesPerChunk
+ mFirstChunk;
if (!mInitialized || chunk != mCurrentChunkIndex) {
mCurrentChunkIndex = chunk;
status_t err;
if ((err = getChunkOffset(chunk, &mCurrentChunkOffset)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getChunkOffset return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.clear();
uint32_t firstChunkSampleIndex =
mFirstChunkSampleIndex
+ mSamplesPerChunk * (mCurrentChunkIndex - mFirstChunk);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSamplesPerChunk; ++i) {
size_t sampleSize;
if ((err = getSampleSizeDirect(
firstChunkSampleIndex + i, &sampleSize)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getSampleSizeDirect return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.push(sampleSize);
}
}
uint32_t chunkRelativeSampleIndex =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) % mSamplesPerChunk;
mCurrentSampleOffset = mCurrentChunkOffset;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < chunkRelativeSampleIndex; ++i) {
mCurrentSampleOffset += mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[i];
}
mCurrentSampleSize = mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[chunkRelativeSampleIndex];
if (sampleIndex < mTTSSampleIndex) {
mTimeToSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleTime = 0;
mTTSCount = 0;
mTTSDuration = 0;
}
status_t err;
if ((err = findSampleTimeAndDuration(
sampleIndex, &mCurrentSampleTime, &mCurrentSampleDuration)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findSampleTime return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentSampleIndex = sampleIndex;
mInitialized = true;
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: An information disclosure vulnerability in libstagefright in Mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-11-01, and 7.0 before 2016-11-01 could enable a local malicious application to access data outside of its permission levels. This issue is rated as Moderate because it could be used to access sensitive data without permission. Android ID: A-31091777.
Commit Message: SampleIterator: clear members on seekTo error
Bug: 31091777
Change-Id: Iddf99d0011961d0fd3d755e57db4365b6a6a1193
(cherry picked from commit 03237ce0f9584c98ccda76c2474a4ae84c763f5b)
| Medium | 95 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: yyparse (void *yyscanner, YR_COMPILER* compiler)
{
/* The lookahead symbol. */
int yychar;
/* The semantic value of the lookahead symbol. */
/* Default value used for initialization, for pacifying older GCCs
or non-GCC compilers. */
YY_INITIAL_VALUE (static YYSTYPE yyval_default;)
YYSTYPE yylval YY_INITIAL_VALUE (= yyval_default);
/* Number of syntax errors so far. */
int yynerrs;
int yystate;
/* Number of tokens to shift before error messages enabled. */
int yyerrstatus;
/* The stacks and their tools:
'yyss': related to states.
'yyvs': related to semantic values.
Refer to the stacks through separate pointers, to allow yyoverflow
to reallocate them elsewhere. */
/* The state stack. */
yytype_int16 yyssa[YYINITDEPTH];
yytype_int16 *yyss;
yytype_int16 *yyssp;
/* The semantic value stack. */
YYSTYPE yyvsa[YYINITDEPTH];
YYSTYPE *yyvs;
YYSTYPE *yyvsp;
YYSIZE_T yystacksize;
int yyn;
int yyresult;
/* Lookahead token as an internal (translated) token number. */
int yytoken = 0;
/* The variables used to return semantic value and location from the
action routines. */
YYSTYPE yyval;
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
/* Buffer for error messages, and its allocated size. */
char yymsgbuf[128];
char *yymsg = yymsgbuf;
YYSIZE_T yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
#endif
#define YYPOPSTACK(N) (yyvsp -= (N), yyssp -= (N))
/* The number of symbols on the RHS of the reduced rule.
Keep to zero when no symbol should be popped. */
int yylen = 0;
yyssp = yyss = yyssa;
yyvsp = yyvs = yyvsa;
yystacksize = YYINITDEPTH;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Starting parse\n"));
yystate = 0;
yyerrstatus = 0;
yynerrs = 0;
yychar = YYEMPTY; /* Cause a token to be read. */
goto yysetstate;
/*------------------------------------------------------------.
| yynewstate -- Push a new state, which is found in yystate. |
`------------------------------------------------------------*/
yynewstate:
/* In all cases, when you get here, the value and location stacks
have just been pushed. So pushing a state here evens the stacks. */
yyssp++;
yysetstate:
*yyssp = yystate;
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
{
/* Get the current used size of the three stacks, in elements. */
YYSIZE_T yysize = yyssp - yyss + 1;
#ifdef yyoverflow
{
/* Give user a chance to reallocate the stack. Use copies of
these so that the &'s don't force the real ones into
memory. */
YYSTYPE *yyvs1 = yyvs;
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
/* Each stack pointer address is followed by the size of the
data in use in that stack, in bytes. This used to be a
conditional around just the two extra args, but that might
be undefined if yyoverflow is a macro. */
yyoverflow (YY_("memory exhausted"),
&yyss1, yysize * sizeof (*yyssp),
&yyvs1, yysize * sizeof (*yyvsp),
&yystacksize);
yyss = yyss1;
yyvs = yyvs1;
}
#else /* no yyoverflow */
# ifndef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
goto yyexhaustedlab;
# else
/* Extend the stack our own way. */
if (YYMAXDEPTH <= yystacksize)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
yystacksize *= 2;
if (YYMAXDEPTH < yystacksize)
yystacksize = YYMAXDEPTH;
{
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
union yyalloc *yyptr =
(union yyalloc *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (YYSTACK_BYTES (yystacksize));
if (! yyptr)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyss_alloc, yyss);
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyvs_alloc, yyvs);
# undef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
if (yyss1 != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss1);
}
# endif
#endif /* no yyoverflow */
yyssp = yyss + yysize - 1;
yyvsp = yyvs + yysize - 1;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Stack size increased to %lu\n",
(unsigned long int) yystacksize));
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
YYABORT;
}
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Entering state %d\n", yystate));
if (yystate == YYFINAL)
YYACCEPT;
goto yybackup;
/*-----------.
| yybackup. |
`-----------*/
yybackup:
/* Do appropriate processing given the current state. Read a
lookahead token if we need one and don't already have one. */
/* First try to decide what to do without reference to lookahead token. */
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (yypact_value_is_default (yyn))
goto yydefault;
/* Not known => get a lookahead token if don't already have one. */
/* YYCHAR is either YYEMPTY or YYEOF or a valid lookahead symbol. */
if (yychar == YYEMPTY)
{
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Reading a token: "));
yychar = yylex (&yylval, yyscanner, compiler);
}
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
yychar = yytoken = YYEOF;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Now at end of input.\n"));
}
else
{
yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Next token is", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
}
/* If the proper action on seeing token YYTOKEN is to reduce or to
detect an error, take that action. */
yyn += yytoken;
if (yyn < 0 || YYLAST < yyn || yycheck[yyn] != yytoken)
goto yydefault;
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (yyn <= 0)
{
if (yytable_value_is_error (yyn))
goto yyerrlab;
yyn = -yyn;
goto yyreduce;
}
/* Count tokens shifted since error; after three, turn off error
status. */
if (yyerrstatus)
yyerrstatus--;
/* Shift the lookahead token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
/* Discard the shifted token. */
yychar = YYEMPTY;
yystate = yyn;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
*++yyvsp = yylval;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
goto yynewstate;
/*-----------------------------------------------------------.
| yydefault -- do the default action for the current state. |
`-----------------------------------------------------------*/
yydefault:
yyn = yydefact[yystate];
if (yyn == 0)
goto yyerrlab;
goto yyreduce;
/*-----------------------------.
| yyreduce -- Do a reduction. |
`-----------------------------*/
yyreduce:
/* yyn is the number of a rule to reduce with. */
yylen = yyr2[yyn];
/* If YYLEN is nonzero, implement the default value of the action:
'$$ = $1'.
Otherwise, the following line sets YYVAL to garbage.
This behavior is undocumented and Bison
users should not rely upon it. Assigning to YYVAL
unconditionally makes the parser a bit smaller, and it avoids a
GCC warning that YYVAL may be used uninitialized. */
yyval = yyvsp[1-yylen];
YY_REDUCE_PRINT (yyn);
switch (yyn)
{
case 8:
#line 230 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int result = yr_parser_reduce_import(yyscanner, (yyvsp[0].sized_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[0].sized_string));
ERROR_IF(result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 1661 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 9:
#line 242 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_RULE* rule = yr_parser_reduce_rule_declaration_phase_1(
yyscanner, (int32_t) (yyvsp[-2].integer), (yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(rule == NULL);
(yyval.rule) = rule;
}
#line 1674 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 10:
#line 251 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_RULE* rule = (yyvsp[-4].rule); // rule created in phase 1
rule->tags = (yyvsp[-3].c_string);
rule->metas = (yyvsp[-1].meta);
rule->strings = (yyvsp[0].string);
}
#line 1686 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 11:
#line 259 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_RULE* rule = (yyvsp[-7].rule); // rule created in phase 1
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_rule_declaration_phase_2(
yyscanner, rule);
yr_free((yyvsp[-8].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 1701 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 12:
#line 274 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.meta) = NULL;
}
#line 1709 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 13:
#line 278 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_META null_meta;
memset(&null_meta, 0xFF, sizeof(YR_META));
null_meta.type = META_TYPE_NULL;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_data(
compiler->metas_arena,
&null_meta,
sizeof(YR_META),
NULL);
(yyval.meta) = (yyvsp[0].meta);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 1736 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 14:
#line 305 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.string) = NULL;
}
#line 1744 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 15:
#line 309 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_STRING null_string;
memset(&null_string, 0xFF, sizeof(YR_STRING));
null_string.g_flags = STRING_GFLAGS_NULL;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_data(
compiler->strings_arena,
&null_string,
sizeof(YR_STRING),
NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.string) = (yyvsp[0].string);
}
#line 1771 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 17:
#line 340 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = 0; }
#line 1777 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 18:
#line 341 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = (yyvsp[-1].integer) | (yyvsp[0].integer); }
#line 1783 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 19:
#line 346 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = RULE_GFLAGS_PRIVATE; }
#line 1789 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 20:
#line 347 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = RULE_GFLAGS_GLOBAL; }
#line 1795 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 21:
#line 353 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.c_string) = NULL;
}
#line 1803 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 22:
#line 357 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_string(
yyget_extra(yyscanner)->sz_arena, "", NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.c_string) = (yyvsp[0].c_string);
}
#line 1821 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 23:
#line 375 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
char* identifier;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_string(
yyget_extra(yyscanner)->sz_arena, (yyvsp[0].c_string), &identifier);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.c_string) = identifier;
}
#line 1838 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 24:
#line 388 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
char* tag_name = (yyvsp[-1].c_string);
size_t tag_length = tag_name != NULL ? strlen(tag_name) : 0;
while (tag_length > 0)
{
if (strcmp(tag_name, (yyvsp[0].c_string)) == 0)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(compiler, tag_name);
compiler->last_result = ERROR_DUPLICATED_TAG_IDENTIFIER;
break;
}
tag_name = (char*) yr_arena_next_address(
yyget_extra(yyscanner)->sz_arena,
tag_name,
tag_length + 1);
tag_length = tag_name != NULL ? strlen(tag_name) : 0;
}
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_string(
yyget_extra(yyscanner)->sz_arena, (yyvsp[0].c_string), NULL);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.c_string) = (yyvsp[-1].c_string);
}
#line 1874 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 25:
#line 424 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.meta) = (yyvsp[0].meta); }
#line 1880 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 26:
#line 425 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.meta) = (yyvsp[-1].meta); }
#line 1886 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 27:
#line 431 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
SIZED_STRING* sized_string = (yyvsp[0].sized_string);
(yyval.meta) = yr_parser_reduce_meta_declaration(
yyscanner,
META_TYPE_STRING,
(yyvsp[-2].c_string),
sized_string->c_string,
0);
yr_free((yyvsp[-2].c_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[0].sized_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.meta) == NULL);
}
#line 1906 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 28:
#line 447 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.meta) = yr_parser_reduce_meta_declaration(
yyscanner,
META_TYPE_INTEGER,
(yyvsp[-2].c_string),
NULL,
(yyvsp[0].integer));
yr_free((yyvsp[-2].c_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.meta) == NULL);
}
#line 1923 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 29:
#line 460 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.meta) = yr_parser_reduce_meta_declaration(
yyscanner,
META_TYPE_INTEGER,
(yyvsp[-3].c_string),
NULL,
-(yyvsp[0].integer));
yr_free((yyvsp[-3].c_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.meta) == NULL);
}
#line 1940 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 30:
#line 473 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.meta) = yr_parser_reduce_meta_declaration(
yyscanner,
META_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
(yyvsp[-2].c_string),
NULL,
TRUE);
yr_free((yyvsp[-2].c_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.meta) == NULL);
}
#line 1957 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 31:
#line 486 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.meta) = yr_parser_reduce_meta_declaration(
yyscanner,
META_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
(yyvsp[-2].c_string),
NULL,
FALSE);
yr_free((yyvsp[-2].c_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.meta) == NULL);
}
#line 1974 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 32:
#line 502 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.string) = (yyvsp[0].string); }
#line 1980 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 33:
#line 503 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.string) = (yyvsp[-1].string); }
#line 1986 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 34:
#line 509 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->error_line = yyget_lineno(yyscanner);
}
#line 1994 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 35:
#line 513 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.string) = yr_parser_reduce_string_declaration(
yyscanner, (int32_t) (yyvsp[0].integer), (yyvsp[-4].c_string), (yyvsp[-1].sized_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[-4].c_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[-1].sized_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.string) == NULL);
compiler->error_line = 0;
}
#line 2009 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 36:
#line 524 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->error_line = yyget_lineno(yyscanner);
}
#line 2017 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 37:
#line 528 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.string) = yr_parser_reduce_string_declaration(
yyscanner, (int32_t) (yyvsp[0].integer) | STRING_GFLAGS_REGEXP, (yyvsp[-4].c_string), (yyvsp[-1].sized_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[-4].c_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[-1].sized_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.string) == NULL);
compiler->error_line = 0;
}
#line 2033 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 38:
#line 540 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.string) = yr_parser_reduce_string_declaration(
yyscanner, STRING_GFLAGS_HEXADECIMAL, (yyvsp[-2].c_string), (yyvsp[0].sized_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[-2].c_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[0].sized_string));
ERROR_IF((yyval.string) == NULL);
}
#line 2047 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 39:
#line 553 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = 0; }
#line 2053 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 40:
#line 554 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = (yyvsp[-1].integer) | (yyvsp[0].integer); }
#line 2059 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 41:
#line 559 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = STRING_GFLAGS_WIDE; }
#line 2065 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 42:
#line 560 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = STRING_GFLAGS_ASCII; }
#line 2071 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 43:
#line 561 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = STRING_GFLAGS_NO_CASE; }
#line 2077 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 44:
#line 562 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = STRING_GFLAGS_FULL_WORD; }
#line 2083 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 45:
#line 568 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int var_index = yr_parser_lookup_loop_variable(yyscanner, (yyvsp[0].c_string));
if (var_index >= 0)
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner,
OP_PUSH_M,
LOOP_LOCAL_VARS * var_index,
NULL,
NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
(yyval.expression).identifier = compiler->loop_identifier[var_index];
}
else
{
YR_OBJECT* object = (YR_OBJECT*) yr_hash_table_lookup(
compiler->objects_table, (yyvsp[0].c_string), NULL);
if (object == NULL)
{
char* ns = compiler->current_namespace->name;
object = (YR_OBJECT*) yr_hash_table_lookup(
compiler->objects_table, (yyvsp[0].c_string), ns);
}
if (object != NULL)
{
char* id;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_string(
compiler->sz_arena, (yyvsp[0].c_string), &id);
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_OBJ_LOAD,
id,
NULL,
NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT;
(yyval.expression).value.object = object;
(yyval.expression).identifier = object->identifier;
}
else
{
YR_RULE* rule = (YR_RULE*) yr_hash_table_lookup(
compiler->rules_table,
(yyvsp[0].c_string),
compiler->current_namespace->name);
if (rule != NULL)
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_PUSH_RULE,
rule,
NULL,
NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
(yyval.expression).identifier = rule->identifier;
}
else
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(compiler, (yyvsp[0].c_string));
compiler->last_result = ERROR_UNDEFINED_IDENTIFIER;
}
}
}
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 2172 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 46:
#line 653 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_OBJECT* field = NULL;
if ((yyvsp[-2].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT &&
(yyvsp[-2].expression).value.object->type == OBJECT_TYPE_STRUCTURE)
{
field = yr_object_lookup_field((yyvsp[-2].expression).value.object, (yyvsp[0].c_string));
if (field != NULL)
{
char* ident;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_string(
compiler->sz_arena, (yyvsp[0].c_string), &ident);
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_OBJ_FIELD,
ident,
NULL,
NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT;
(yyval.expression).value.object = field;
(yyval.expression).identifier = field->identifier;
}
else
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(compiler, (yyvsp[0].c_string));
compiler->last_result = ERROR_INVALID_FIELD_NAME;
}
}
else
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, (yyvsp[-2].expression).identifier);
compiler->last_result = ERROR_NOT_A_STRUCTURE;
}
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 2222 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 47:
#line 699 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_OBJECT_ARRAY* array;
YR_OBJECT_DICTIONARY* dict;
if ((yyvsp[-3].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT &&
(yyvsp[-3].expression).value.object->type == OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY)
{
if ((yyvsp[-1].expression).type != EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, "array indexes must be of integer type");
compiler->last_result = ERROR_WRONG_TYPE;
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, OP_INDEX_ARRAY, NULL);
array = (YR_OBJECT_ARRAY*) (yyvsp[-3].expression).value.object;
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT;
(yyval.expression).value.object = array->prototype_item;
(yyval.expression).identifier = array->identifier;
}
else if ((yyvsp[-3].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT &&
(yyvsp[-3].expression).value.object->type == OBJECT_TYPE_DICTIONARY)
{
if ((yyvsp[-1].expression).type != EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, "dictionary keys must be of string type");
compiler->last_result = ERROR_WRONG_TYPE;
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, OP_LOOKUP_DICT, NULL);
dict = (YR_OBJECT_DICTIONARY*) (yyvsp[-3].expression).value.object;
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT;
(yyval.expression).value.object = dict->prototype_item;
(yyval.expression).identifier = dict->identifier;
}
else
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, (yyvsp[-3].expression).identifier);
compiler->last_result = ERROR_NOT_INDEXABLE;
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 2283 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 48:
#line 757 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION* function;
char* args_fmt;
if ((yyvsp[-3].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT &&
(yyvsp[-3].expression).value.object->type == OBJECT_TYPE_FUNCTION)
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_check_types(
compiler, (YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION*) (yyvsp[-3].expression).value.object, (yyvsp[-1].c_string));
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_string(
compiler->sz_arena, (yyvsp[-1].c_string), &args_fmt);
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_CALL,
args_fmt,
NULL,
NULL);
function = (YR_OBJECT_FUNCTION*) (yyvsp[-3].expression).value.object;
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT;
(yyval.expression).value.object = function->return_obj;
(yyval.expression).identifier = function->identifier;
}
else
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, (yyvsp[-3].expression).identifier);
compiler->last_result = ERROR_NOT_A_FUNCTION;
}
yr_free((yyvsp[-1].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 2328 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 49:
#line 801 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.c_string) = yr_strdup(""); }
#line 2334 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 50:
#line 802 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.c_string) = (yyvsp[0].c_string); }
#line 2340 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 51:
#line 807 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.c_string) = (char*) yr_malloc(MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS + 1);
switch((yyvsp[0].expression).type)
{
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER:
strlcpy((yyval.c_string), "i", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT:
strlcpy((yyval.c_string), "f", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
strlcpy((yyval.c_string), "b", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING:
strlcpy((yyval.c_string), "s", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_REGEXP:
strlcpy((yyval.c_string), "r", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
}
ERROR_IF((yyval.c_string) == NULL);
}
#line 2369 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 52:
#line 832 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if (strlen((yyvsp[-2].c_string)) == MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
compiler->last_result = ERROR_TOO_MANY_ARGUMENTS;
}
else
{
switch((yyvsp[0].expression).type)
{
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER:
strlcat((yyvsp[-2].c_string), "i", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT:
strlcat((yyvsp[-2].c_string), "f", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
strlcat((yyvsp[-2].c_string), "b", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING:
strlcat((yyvsp[-2].c_string), "s", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
case EXPRESSION_TYPE_REGEXP:
strlcat((yyvsp[-2].c_string), "r", MAX_FUNCTION_ARGS);
break;
}
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.c_string) = (yyvsp[-2].c_string);
}
#line 2405 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 53:
#line 868 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
SIZED_STRING* sized_string = (yyvsp[0].sized_string);
RE* re;
RE_ERROR error;
int re_flags = 0;
if (sized_string->flags & SIZED_STRING_FLAGS_NO_CASE)
re_flags |= RE_FLAGS_NO_CASE;
if (sized_string->flags & SIZED_STRING_FLAGS_DOT_ALL)
re_flags |= RE_FLAGS_DOT_ALL;
compiler->last_result = yr_re_compile(
sized_string->c_string,
re_flags,
compiler->re_code_arena,
&re,
&error);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].sized_string));
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_INVALID_REGULAR_EXPRESSION)
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(compiler, error.message);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_PUSH,
re->root_node->forward_code,
NULL,
NULL);
yr_re_destroy(re);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_REGEXP;
}
#line 2451 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 54:
#line 914 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING)
{
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).value.sized_string != NULL)
{
yywarning(yyscanner,
"Using literal string \"%s\" in a boolean operation.",
(yyvsp[0].expression).value.sized_string->c_string);
}
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, OP_STR_TO_BOOL, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2474 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 55:
#line 936 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH, 1, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2487 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 56:
#line 945 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH, 0, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2500 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 57:
#line 954 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING, "matches");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_REGEXP, "matches");
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner,
OP_MATCHES,
NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2519 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 58:
#line 969 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING, "contains");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING, "contains");
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, OP_CONTAINS, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2535 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 59:
#line 981 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner,
(yyvsp[0].c_string),
OP_FOUND,
UNDEFINED);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2553 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 60:
#line 995 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "at");
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[-2].c_string), OP_FOUND_AT, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
yr_free((yyvsp[-2].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2570 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 61:
#line 1008 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[-2].c_string), OP_FOUND_IN, UNDEFINED);
yr_free((yyvsp[-2].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result!= ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2585 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 62:
#line 1019 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if (compiler->loop_depth > 0)
{
compiler->loop_depth--;
compiler->loop_identifier[compiler->loop_depth] = NULL;
}
}
#line 2597 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 63:
#line 1027 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int var_index;
if (compiler->loop_depth == MAX_LOOP_NESTING)
compiler->last_result = \
ERROR_LOOP_NESTING_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
var_index = yr_parser_lookup_loop_variable(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[-1].c_string));
if (var_index >= 0)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, (yyvsp[-1].c_string));
compiler->last_result = \
ERROR_DUPLICATED_LOOP_IDENTIFIER;
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH, UNDEFINED, NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 2631 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 64:
#line 1057 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int mem_offset = LOOP_LOCAL_VARS * compiler->loop_depth;
uint8_t* addr;
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_CLEAR_M, mem_offset + 1, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_CLEAR_M, mem_offset + 2, NULL, NULL);
if ((yyvsp[-1].integer) == INTEGER_SET_ENUMERATION)
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_POP_M, mem_offset, &addr, NULL);
}
else // INTEGER_SET_RANGE
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_POP_M, mem_offset + 3, &addr, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_POP_M, mem_offset, NULL, NULL);
}
compiler->loop_address[compiler->loop_depth] = addr;
compiler->loop_identifier[compiler->loop_depth] = (yyvsp[-4].c_string);
compiler->loop_depth++;
}
#line 2670 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 65:
#line 1092 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int mem_offset;
compiler->loop_depth--;
mem_offset = LOOP_LOCAL_VARS * compiler->loop_depth;
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_ADD_M, mem_offset + 1, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_INCR_M, mem_offset + 2, NULL, NULL);
if ((yyvsp[-5].integer) == INTEGER_SET_ENUMERATION)
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_JNUNDEF,
compiler->loop_address[compiler->loop_depth],
NULL,
NULL);
}
else // INTEGER_SET_RANGE
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_INCR_M, mem_offset, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH_M, mem_offset, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH_M, mem_offset + 3, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_JLE,
compiler->loop_address[compiler->loop_depth],
NULL,
NULL);
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_POP, NULL);
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_POP, NULL);
}
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_POP, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_SWAPUNDEF, mem_offset + 2, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH_M, mem_offset + 1, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_INT_LE, NULL);
compiler->loop_identifier[compiler->loop_depth] = NULL;
yr_free((yyvsp[-8].c_string));
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2753 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 66:
#line 1171 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int mem_offset = LOOP_LOCAL_VARS * compiler->loop_depth;
uint8_t* addr;
if (compiler->loop_depth == MAX_LOOP_NESTING)
compiler->last_result = \
ERROR_LOOP_NESTING_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
if (compiler->loop_for_of_mem_offset != -1)
compiler->last_result = \
ERROR_NESTED_FOR_OF_LOOP;
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_CLEAR_M, mem_offset + 1, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_CLEAR_M, mem_offset + 2, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_POP_M, mem_offset, &addr, NULL);
compiler->loop_for_of_mem_offset = mem_offset;
compiler->loop_address[compiler->loop_depth] = addr;
compiler->loop_identifier[compiler->loop_depth] = NULL;
compiler->loop_depth++;
}
#line 2787 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 67:
#line 1201 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
int mem_offset;
compiler->loop_depth--;
compiler->loop_for_of_mem_offset = -1;
mem_offset = LOOP_LOCAL_VARS * compiler->loop_depth;
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_ADD_M, mem_offset + 1, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_INCR_M, mem_offset + 2, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_JNUNDEF,
compiler->loop_address[compiler->loop_depth],
NULL,
NULL);
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_POP, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_SWAPUNDEF, mem_offset + 2, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH_M, mem_offset + 1, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_INT_LE, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2840 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 68:
#line 1250 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_OF, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2850 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 69:
#line 1256 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_NOT, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2860 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 70:
#line 1262 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_FIXUP* fixup;
void* jmp_destination_addr;
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_JFALSE,
0, // still don't know the jump destination
NULL,
&jmp_destination_addr);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
fixup = (YR_FIXUP*) yr_malloc(sizeof(YR_FIXUP));
if (fixup == NULL)
compiler->last_error = ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
fixup->address = jmp_destination_addr;
fixup->next = compiler->fixup_stack_head;
compiler->fixup_stack_head = fixup;
}
#line 2890 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 71:
#line 1288 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_FIXUP* fixup;
uint8_t* and_addr;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_reserve_memory(
compiler->code_arena, 2);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_AND, &and_addr);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
fixup = compiler->fixup_stack_head;
*(void**)(fixup->address) = (void*)(and_addr + 1);
compiler->fixup_stack_head = fixup->next;
yr_free(fixup);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2930 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 72:
#line 1324 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_FIXUP* fixup;
void* jmp_destination_addr;
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_JTRUE,
0, // still don't know the jump destination
NULL,
&jmp_destination_addr);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
fixup = (YR_FIXUP*) yr_malloc(sizeof(YR_FIXUP));
if (fixup == NULL)
compiler->last_error = ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
fixup->address = jmp_destination_addr;
fixup->next = compiler->fixup_stack_head;
compiler->fixup_stack_head = fixup;
}
#line 2959 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 73:
#line 1349 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
YR_FIXUP* fixup;
uint8_t* or_addr;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_reserve_memory(
compiler->code_arena, 2);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_OR, &or_addr);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
fixup = compiler->fixup_stack_head;
*(void**)(fixup->address) = (void*)(or_addr + 1);
compiler->fixup_stack_head = fixup->next;
yr_free(fixup);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 2999 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 74:
#line 1385 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "<", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 3012 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 75:
#line 1394 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, ">", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 3025 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 76:
#line 1403 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "<=", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 3038 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 77:
#line 1412 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, ">=", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 3051 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 78:
#line 1421 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "==", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 3064 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 79:
#line 1430 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "!=", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
}
#line 3077 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 80:
#line 1439 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.expression) = (yyvsp[0].expression);
}
#line 3085 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 81:
#line 1443 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.expression) = (yyvsp[-1].expression);
}
#line 3093 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 82:
#line 1450 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = INTEGER_SET_ENUMERATION; }
#line 3099 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 83:
#line 1451 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{ (yyval.integer) = INTEGER_SET_RANGE; }
#line 3105 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 84:
#line 1457 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if ((yyvsp[-3].expression).type != EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, "wrong type for range's lower bound");
compiler->last_result = ERROR_WRONG_TYPE;
}
if ((yyvsp[-1].expression).type != EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, "wrong type for range's upper bound");
compiler->last_result = ERROR_WRONG_TYPE;
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3127 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 85:
#line 1479 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type != EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, "wrong type for enumeration item");
compiler->last_result = ERROR_WRONG_TYPE;
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3143 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 86:
#line 1491 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type != EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info(
compiler, "wrong type for enumeration item");
compiler->last_result = ERROR_WRONG_TYPE;
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3158 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 87:
#line 1506 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(yyscanner, OP_PUSH, UNDEFINED, NULL, NULL);
}
#line 3167 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 89:
#line 1512 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(yyscanner, OP_PUSH, UNDEFINED, NULL, NULL);
yr_parser_emit_pushes_for_strings(yyscanner, "$*");
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3178 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 92:
#line 1529 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit_pushes_for_strings(yyscanner, (yyvsp[0].c_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3189 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 93:
#line 1536 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit_pushes_for_strings(yyscanner, (yyvsp[0].c_string));
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3200 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 95:
#line 1548 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(yyscanner, OP_PUSH, UNDEFINED, NULL, NULL);
}
#line 3208 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 96:
#line 1552 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yr_parser_emit_with_arg(yyscanner, OP_PUSH, 1, NULL, NULL);
}
#line 3216 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 97:
#line 1560 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.expression) = (yyvsp[-1].expression);
}
#line 3224 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 98:
#line 1564 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, OP_FILESIZE, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3238 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 99:
#line 1574 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
yywarning(yyscanner,
"Using deprecated \"entrypoint\" keyword. Use the \"entry_point\" "
"function from PE module instead.");
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, OP_ENTRYPOINT, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3256 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 100:
#line 1588 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-1].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "intXXXX or uintXXXX");
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, (uint8_t) (OP_READ_INT + (yyvsp[-3].integer)), NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3276 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 101:
#line 1604 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH, (yyvsp[0].integer), NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = (yyvsp[0].integer);
}
#line 3290 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 102:
#line 1614 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_double(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH, (yyvsp[0].double_), NULL, NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT;
}
#line 3303 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 103:
#line 1623 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
SIZED_STRING* sized_string;
compiler->last_result = yr_arena_write_data(
compiler->sz_arena,
(yyvsp[0].sized_string),
(yyvsp[0].sized_string)->length + sizeof(SIZED_STRING),
(void**) &sized_string);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].sized_string));
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg_reloc(
yyscanner,
OP_PUSH,
sized_string,
NULL,
NULL);
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING;
(yyval.expression).value.sized_string = sized_string;
}
#line 3332 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 104:
#line 1648 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[0].c_string), OP_COUNT, UNDEFINED);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3348 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 105:
#line 1660 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[-3].c_string), OP_OFFSET, UNDEFINED);
yr_free((yyvsp[-3].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3364 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 106:
#line 1672 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH, 1, NULL, NULL);
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[0].c_string), OP_OFFSET, UNDEFINED);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3384 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 107:
#line 1688 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[-3].c_string), OP_LENGTH, UNDEFINED);
yr_free((yyvsp[-3].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3400 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 108:
#line 1700 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit_with_arg(
yyscanner, OP_PUSH, 1, NULL, NULL);
if (compiler->last_result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_string_identifier(
yyscanner, (yyvsp[0].c_string), OP_LENGTH, UNDEFINED);
yr_free((yyvsp[0].c_string));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
#line 3420 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 109:
#line 1716 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER) // loop identifier
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
else if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN) // rule identifier
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_BOOLEAN;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
}
else if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_OBJECT)
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(
yyscanner, OP_OBJ_VALUE, NULL);
switch((yyvsp[0].expression).value.object->type)
{
case OBJECT_TYPE_INTEGER:
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = UNDEFINED;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_FLOAT:
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT;
break;
case OBJECT_TYPE_STRING:
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_STRING;
(yyval.expression).value.sized_string = NULL;
break;
default:
yr_compiler_set_error_extra_info_fmt(
compiler,
"wrong usage of identifier \"%s\"",
(yyvsp[0].expression).identifier);
compiler->last_result = ERROR_WRONG_TYPE;
}
}
else
{
assert(FALSE);
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3469 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 110:
#line 1761 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER | EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT, "-");
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = ((yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer == UNDEFINED) ?
UNDEFINED : -((yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_INT_MINUS, NULL);
}
else if ((yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT)
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT;
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_DBL_MINUS, NULL);
}
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
#line 3492 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 111:
#line 1780 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "+", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
if ((yyvsp[-2].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER &&
(yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(+, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
}
else
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT;
}
}
#line 3514 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 112:
#line 1798 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "-", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
if ((yyvsp[-2].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER &&
(yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(-, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
}
else
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT;
}
}
#line 3536 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 113:
#line 1816 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "*", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
if ((yyvsp[-2].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER &&
(yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(*, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
}
else
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT;
}
}
#line 3558 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 114:
#line 1834 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
compiler->last_result = yr_parser_reduce_operation(
yyscanner, "\\", (yyvsp[-2].expression), (yyvsp[0].expression));
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
if ((yyvsp[-2].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER &&
(yyvsp[0].expression).type == EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER)
{
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer != 0)
{
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(/, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
}
else
{
compiler->last_result = ERROR_DIVISION_BY_ZERO;
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
}
else
{
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_FLOAT;
}
}
#line 3588 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 115:
#line 1860 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "%");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "%");
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_MOD, NULL);
if ((yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer != 0)
{
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(%, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
}
else
{
compiler->last_result = ERROR_DIVISION_BY_ZERO;
ERROR_IF(compiler->last_result != ERROR_SUCCESS);
}
}
#line 3610 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 116:
#line 1878 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "^");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "^");
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_BITWISE_XOR, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(^, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
}
#line 3624 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 117:
#line 1888 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "^");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "^");
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_BITWISE_AND, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(&, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
}
#line 3638 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 118:
#line 1898 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "|");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "|");
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_BITWISE_OR, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(|, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
}
#line 3652 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 119:
#line 1908 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "~");
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_BITWISE_NOT, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = ((yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer == UNDEFINED) ?
UNDEFINED : ~((yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
}
#line 3666 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 120:
#line 1918 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "<<");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, "<<");
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_SHL, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(<<, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
}
#line 3680 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 121:
#line 1928 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[-2].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, ">>");
CHECK_TYPE((yyvsp[0].expression), EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER, ">>");
yr_parser_emit(yyscanner, OP_SHR, NULL);
(yyval.expression).type = EXPRESSION_TYPE_INTEGER;
(yyval.expression).value.integer = OPERATION(>>, (yyvsp[-2].expression).value.integer, (yyvsp[0].expression).value.integer);
}
#line 3694 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
case 122:
#line 1938 "grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1646 */
{
(yyval.expression) = (yyvsp[0].expression);
}
#line 3702 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
break;
#line 3706 "grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1646 */
default: break;
}
/* User semantic actions sometimes alter yychar, and that requires
that yytoken be updated with the new translation. We take the
approach of translating immediately before every use of yytoken.
One alternative is translating here after every semantic action,
but that translation would be missed if the semantic action invokes
YYABORT, YYACCEPT, or YYERROR immediately after altering yychar or
if it invokes YYBACKUP. In the case of YYABORT or YYACCEPT, an
incorrect destructor might then be invoked immediately. In the
case of YYERROR or YYBACKUP, subsequent parser actions might lead
to an incorrect destructor call or verbose syntax error message
before the lookahead is translated. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("-> $$ =", yyr1[yyn], &yyval, &yyloc);
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
*++yyvsp = yyval;
/* Now 'shift' the result of the reduction. Determine what state
that goes to, based on the state we popped back to and the rule
number reduced by. */
yyn = yyr1[yyn];
yystate = yypgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS] + *yyssp;
if (0 <= yystate && yystate <= YYLAST && yycheck[yystate] == *yyssp)
yystate = yytable[yystate];
else
yystate = yydefgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS];
goto yynewstate;
/*--------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab -- here on detecting error. |
`--------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab:
/* Make sure we have latest lookahead translation. See comments at
user semantic actions for why this is necessary. */
yytoken = yychar == YYEMPTY ? YYEMPTY : YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
/* If not already recovering from an error, report this error. */
if (!yyerrstatus)
{
++yynerrs;
#if ! YYERROR_VERBOSE
yyerror (yyscanner, compiler, YY_("syntax error"));
#else
# define YYSYNTAX_ERROR yysyntax_error (&yymsg_alloc, &yymsg, \
yyssp, yytoken)
{
char const *yymsgp = YY_("syntax error");
int yysyntax_error_status;
yysyntax_error_status = YYSYNTAX_ERROR;
if (yysyntax_error_status == 0)
yymsgp = yymsg;
else if (yysyntax_error_status == 1)
{
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
yymsg = (char *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (yymsg_alloc);
if (!yymsg)
{
yymsg = yymsgbuf;
yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
yysyntax_error_status = 2;
}
else
{
yysyntax_error_status = YYSYNTAX_ERROR;
yymsgp = yymsg;
}
}
yyerror (yyscanner, compiler, yymsgp);
if (yysyntax_error_status == 2)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
}
# undef YYSYNTAX_ERROR
#endif
}
if (yyerrstatus == 3)
{
/* If just tried and failed to reuse lookahead token after an
error, discard it. */
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
/* Return failure if at end of input. */
if (yychar == YYEOF)
YYABORT;
}
else
{
yydestruct ("Error: discarding",
yytoken, &yylval, yyscanner, compiler);
yychar = YYEMPTY;
}
}
/* Else will try to reuse lookahead token after shifting the error
token. */
goto yyerrlab1;
/*---------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrorlab -- error raised explicitly by YYERROR. |
`---------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrorlab:
/* Pacify compilers like GCC when the user code never invokes
YYERROR and the label yyerrorlab therefore never appears in user
code. */
if (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0)
goto yyerrorlab;
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule whose action triggered
this YYERROR. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
yystate = *yyssp;
goto yyerrlab1;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab1 -- common code for both syntax error and YYERROR. |
`-------------------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab1:
yyerrstatus = 3; /* Each real token shifted decrements this. */
for (;;)
{
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (!yypact_value_is_default (yyn))
{
yyn += YYTERROR;
if (0 <= yyn && yyn <= YYLAST && yycheck[yyn] == YYTERROR)
{
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (0 < yyn)
break;
}
}
/* Pop the current state because it cannot handle the error token. */
if (yyssp == yyss)
YYABORT;
yydestruct ("Error: popping",
yystos[yystate], yyvsp, yyscanner, compiler);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
yystate = *yyssp;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
}
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
*++yyvsp = yylval;
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_END
/* Shift the error token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yystos[yyn], yyvsp, yylsp);
yystate = yyn;
goto yynewstate;
/*-------------------------------------.
| yyacceptlab -- YYACCEPT comes here. |
`-------------------------------------*/
yyacceptlab:
yyresult = 0;
goto yyreturn;
/*-----------------------------------.
| yyabortlab -- YYABORT comes here. |
`-----------------------------------*/
yyabortlab:
yyresult = 1;
goto yyreturn;
#if !defined yyoverflow || YYERROR_VERBOSE
/*-------------------------------------------------.
| yyexhaustedlab -- memory exhaustion comes here. |
`-------------------------------------------------*/
yyexhaustedlab:
yyerror (yyscanner, compiler, YY_("memory exhausted"));
yyresult = 2;
/* Fall through. */
#endif
yyreturn:
if (yychar != YYEMPTY)
{
/* Make sure we have latest lookahead translation. See comments at
user semantic actions for why this is necessary. */
yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
yydestruct ("Cleanup: discarding lookahead",
yytoken, &yylval, yyscanner, compiler);
}
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule whose action triggered
this YYABORT or YYACCEPT. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
while (yyssp != yyss)
{
yydestruct ("Cleanup: popping",
yystos[*yyssp], yyvsp, yyscanner, compiler);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
}
#ifndef yyoverflow
if (yyss != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss);
#endif
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
#endif
return yyresult;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: libyara/grammar.y in YARA 3.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (heap-based out-of-bounds read and application crash) via a crafted rule that is mishandled in the yara_yyparse function.
Commit Message: Fix issue #597 | Low | 17,215 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::texSubImage2D(GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLintptr offset) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateTexture2DBinding("texSubImage2D", target))
return;
if (!bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "texSubImage2D",
"no bound PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER");
return;
}
if (!ValidateTexFunc("texSubImage2D", kTexSubImage, kSourceUnpackBuffer,
target, level, 0, width, height, 1, 0, format, type,
xoffset, yoffset, 0))
return;
if (!ValidateValueFitNonNegInt32("texSubImage2D", "offset", offset))
return;
ContextGL()->TexSubImage2D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, height,
format, type,
reinterpret_cast<const void*>(offset));
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Heap buffer overflow in WebGL in Google Chrome prior to 64.0.3282.119 allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003} | Medium | 23,926 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: raptor_turtle_writer_set_option(raptor_turtle_writer *turtle_writer,
raptor_option option, int value)
{
if(value < 0 ||
!raptor_option_is_valid_for_area(option, RAPTOR_OPTION_AREA_TURTLE_WRITER))
return 1;
switch(option) {
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_AUTO_INDENT:
if(value)
turtle_writer->flags |= TURTLE_WRITER_AUTO_INDENT;
else
turtle_writer->flags &= ~TURTLE_WRITER_AUTO_INDENT;
break;
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_INDENT_WIDTH:
turtle_writer->indent = value;
break;
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_AUTO_EMPTY:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_XML_VERSION:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITER_XML_DECLARATION:
break;
/* parser options */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_SCANNING:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_ALLOW_NON_NS_ATTRIBUTES:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_ALLOW_OTHER_PARSETYPES:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_ALLOW_BAGID:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_ALLOW_RDF_TYPE_RDF_LIST:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_NORMALIZE_LANGUAGE:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_NON_NFC_FATAL:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WARN_OTHER_PARSETYPES:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_CHECK_RDF_ID:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_HTML_TAG_SOUP:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_MICROFORMATS:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_HTML_LINK:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_TIMEOUT:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_STRICT:
/* Shared */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_NET:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_NO_FILE:
/* XML writer options */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_RELATIVE_URIS:
/* DOT serializer options */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_RESOURCE_BORDER:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_LITERAL_BORDER:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_BNODE_BORDER:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_RESOURCE_FILL:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_LITERAL_FILL:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_BNODE_FILL:
/* JSON serializer options */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_JSON_CALLBACK:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_JSON_EXTRA_DATA:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_RSS_TRIPLES:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_ATOM_ENTRY_URI:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_PREFIX_ELEMENTS:
/* Turtle serializer option */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WRITE_BASE_URI:
/* WWW option */
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_HTTP_CACHE_CONTROL:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_HTTP_USER_AGENT:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_CERT_FILENAME:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_CERT_TYPE:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_CERT_PASSPHRASE:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_SSL_VERIFY_PEER:
case RAPTOR_OPTION_WWW_SSL_VERIFY_HOST:
default:
return -1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: Redland Raptor (aka libraptor) before 2.0.7, as used by OpenOffice 3.3 and 3.4 Beta, LibreOffice before 3.4.6 and 3.5.x before 3.5.1, and other products, allows user-assisted remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a crafted XML external entity (XXE) declaration and reference in an RDF document.
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa. | Medium | 19,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::StopWorker() {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (launch_success_timer_->IsRunning()) {
launch_success_timer_->Stop();
launch_backoff_.InformOfRequest(false);
}
self_ = this;
ipc_enabled_ = false;
if (process_watcher_.GetWatchedObject() != NULL) {
launcher_delegate_->KillProcess(CONTROL_C_EXIT);
return;
}
DCHECK(process_watcher_.GetWatchedObject() == NULL);
ipc_error_timer_->Stop();
process_exit_event_.Close();
if (stopping_) {
ipc_error_timer_.reset();
launch_timer_.reset();
self_ = NULL;
return;
}
self_ = NULL;
DWORD exit_code = launcher_delegate_->GetExitCode();
if (kMinPermanentErrorExitCode <= exit_code &&
exit_code <= kMaxPermanentErrorExitCode) {
worker_delegate_->OnPermanentError();
return;
}
launch_timer_->Start(FROM_HERE, launch_backoff_.GetTimeUntilRelease(),
this, &Core::LaunchWorker);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving PDF fields.
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 3,185 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: NavigationPolicy EffectiveNavigationPolicy(NavigationPolicy policy,
const WebInputEvent* current_event,
const WebWindowFeatures& features) {
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyIgnore)
return GetNavigationPolicy(current_event, features);
if (policy == kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
GetNavigationPolicy(current_event, features) !=
kNavigationPolicyNewBackgroundTab &&
!UIEventWithKeyState::NewTabModifierSetFromIsolatedWorld()) {
return kNavigationPolicyNewForegroundTab;
}
return policy;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: A missing check for JS-simulated input events in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to download arbitrary files with no user input via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Only allow downloading in response to real keyboard modifiers
BUG=848531
Change-Id: I97554c8d312243b55647f1376945aee32dbd95bf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1082216
Reviewed-by: Mike West <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564051} | ??? | 24,094 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: RenderFrameHostManager::GetSiteInstanceForNavigationRequest(
const NavigationRequest& request) {
SiteInstance* current_site_instance = render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance();
bool no_renderer_swap_allowed = false;
bool was_server_redirect = request.navigation_handle() &&
request.navigation_handle()->WasServerRedirect();
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
bool can_renderer_initiate_transfer =
(request.state() == NavigationRequest::FAILED &&
SiteIsolationPolicy::IsErrorPageIsolationEnabled(
true /* in_main_frame */)) ||
(render_frame_host_->IsRenderFrameLive() &&
IsURLHandledByNetworkStack(request.common_params().url) &&
IsRendererTransferNeededForNavigation(render_frame_host_.get(),
request.common_params().url));
no_renderer_swap_allowed |=
request.from_begin_navigation() && !can_renderer_initiate_transfer;
} else {
no_renderer_swap_allowed |= !CanSubframeSwapProcess(
request.common_params().url, request.source_site_instance(),
request.dest_site_instance(), was_server_redirect);
}
if (no_renderer_swap_allowed)
return scoped_refptr<SiteInstance>(current_site_instance);
SiteInstance* candidate_site_instance =
speculative_render_frame_host_
? speculative_render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance()
: nullptr;
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> dest_site_instance = GetSiteInstanceForNavigation(
request.common_params().url, request.source_site_instance(),
request.dest_site_instance(), candidate_site_instance,
request.common_params().transition,
request.state() == NavigationRequest::FAILED,
request.restore_type() != RestoreType::NONE, request.is_view_source(),
was_server_redirect);
return dest_site_instance;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-285
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in site isolation in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to bypass site isolation via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023} | Medium | 29,795 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: scoped_refptr<EffectPaintPropertyNode> CreateSampleEffectNodeWithElementId() {
EffectPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.local_transform_space = TransformPaintPropertyNode::Root();
state.output_clip = ClipPaintPropertyNode::Root();
state.opacity = 2.0 / 255.0;
state.direct_compositing_reasons = CompositingReason::kActiveOpacityAnimation;
state.compositor_element_id = CompositorElementId(2);
return EffectPaintPropertyNode::Create(EffectPaintPropertyNode::Root(),
std::move(state));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <[email protected]>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> [email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930} | Low | 26,657 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: aspath_put (struct stream *s, struct aspath *as, int use32bit )
{
struct assegment *seg = as->segments;
size_t bytes = 0;
if (!seg || seg->length == 0)
return 0;
if (seg)
{
/*
* Hey, what do we do when we have > STREAM_WRITABLE(s) here?
* At the moment, we would write out a partial aspath, and our peer
* will complain and drop the session :-/
*
* The general assumption here is that many things tested will
* never happen. And, in real live, up to now, they have not.
*/
while (seg && (ASSEGMENT_LEN(seg, use32bit) <= STREAM_WRITEABLE(s)))
{
struct assegment *next = seg->next;
int written = 0;
int asns_packed = 0;
size_t lenp;
/* Overlength segments have to be split up */
while ( (seg->length - written) > AS_SEGMENT_MAX)
{
assegment_header_put (s, seg->type, AS_SEGMENT_MAX);
assegment_data_put (s, seg->as, AS_SEGMENT_MAX, use32bit);
written += AS_SEGMENT_MAX;
bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (written, use32bit);
}
/* write the final segment, probably is also the first */
lenp = assegment_header_put (s, seg->type, seg->length - written);
assegment_data_put (s, (seg->as + written), seg->length - written,
use32bit);
/* Sequence-type segments can be 'packed' together
* Case of a segment which was overlength and split up
* will be missed here, but that doesn't matter.
*/
while (next && ASSEGMENTS_PACKABLE (seg, next))
{
/* NB: We should never normally get here given we
* normalise aspath data when parse them. However, better
* safe than sorry. We potentially could call
* assegment_normalise here instead, but it's cheaper and
* easier to do it on the fly here rather than go through
* the segment list twice every time we write out
* aspath's.
*/
/* Next segment's data can fit in this one */
assegment_data_put (s, next->as, next->length, use32bit);
/* update the length of the segment header */
stream_putc_at (s, lenp, seg->length - written + next->length);
asns_packed += next->length;
next = next->next;
}
bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (seg->length - written + asns_packed,
use32bit);
seg = next;
}
}
return bytes;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The aspath_put function in bgpd/bgp_aspath.c in Quagga before 1.2.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (session drop) via BGP UPDATE messages, because AS_PATH size calculation for long paths counts certain bytes twice and consequently constructs an invalid message.
Commit Message: | Low | 17,750 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void BrowserPpapiHostImpl::AddInstance(
PP_Instance instance,
const PepperRendererInstanceData& renderer_instance_data) {
DCHECK(instance_map_.find(instance) == instance_map_.end());
instance_map_[instance] =
base::MakeUnique<InstanceData>(renderer_instance_data);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in PPAPI Plugins in Google Chrome prior to 60.0.3112.78 for Windows allowed a remote attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696} | Medium | 24,598 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: long SimpleBlock::Parse()
{
return m_block.Parse(m_pCluster);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039 | Low | 15,861 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static int skcipher_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
{
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx;
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx) + crypto_skcipher_reqsize(private);
ctx = sock_kmalloc(sk, len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
ctx->iv = sock_kmalloc(sk, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(private),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx->iv) {
sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset(ctx->iv, 0, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(private));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->tsgl);
ctx->len = len;
ctx->used = 0;
ctx->more = 0;
ctx->merge = 0;
ctx->enc = 0;
atomic_set(&ctx->inflight, 0);
af_alg_init_completion(&ctx->completion);
ask->private = ctx;
skcipher_request_set_tfm(&ctx->req, private);
skcipher_request_set_callback(&ctx->req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
af_alg_complete, &ctx->completion);
sk->sk_destruct = skcipher_sock_destruct;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: crypto/algif_skcipher.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.2 does not verify that a setkey operation has been performed on an AF_ALG socket before an accept system call is processed, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a crafted application that does not supply a key, related to the lrw_crypt function in crypto/lrw.c.
Commit Message: crypto: algif_skcipher - Require setkey before accept(2)
Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them
without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that
the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been
done on the socket yet.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]> | Low | 4,650 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RunInvTxfm(const int16_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
inv_txfm_(out, dst, stride);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
| Low | 7,099 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int sr_do_ioctl(Scsi_CD *cd, struct packet_command *cgc)
{
struct scsi_device *SDev;
struct scsi_sense_hdr sshdr;
int result, err = 0, retries = 0;
SDev = cd->device;
retry:
if (!scsi_block_when_processing_errors(SDev)) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
result = scsi_execute(SDev, cgc->cmd, cgc->data_direction,
cgc->buffer, cgc->buflen,
(unsigned char *)cgc->sense, &sshdr,
cgc->timeout, IOCTL_RETRIES, 0, 0, NULL);
/* Minimal error checking. Ignore cases we know about, and report the rest. */
if (driver_byte(result) != 0) {
switch (sshdr.sense_key) {
case UNIT_ATTENTION:
SDev->changed = 1;
if (!cgc->quiet)
sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd,
"disc change detected.\n");
if (retries++ < 10)
goto retry;
err = -ENOMEDIUM;
break;
case NOT_READY: /* This happens if there is no disc in drive */
if (sshdr.asc == 0x04 &&
sshdr.ascq == 0x01) {
/* sense: Logical unit is in process of becoming ready */
if (!cgc->quiet)
sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd,
"CDROM not ready yet.\n");
if (retries++ < 10) {
/* sleep 2 sec and try again */
ssleep(2);
goto retry;
} else {
/* 20 secs are enough? */
err = -ENOMEDIUM;
break;
}
}
if (!cgc->quiet)
sr_printk(KERN_INFO, cd,
"CDROM not ready. Make sure there "
"is a disc in the drive.\n");
err = -ENOMEDIUM;
break;
case ILLEGAL_REQUEST:
err = -EIO;
if (sshdr.asc == 0x20 &&
sshdr.ascq == 0x00)
/* sense: Invalid command operation code */
err = -EDRIVE_CANT_DO_THIS;
break;
default:
err = -EIO;
}
}
/* Wake up a process waiting for device */
out:
cgc->stat = err;
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The sr_do_ioctl function in drivers/scsi/sr_ioctl.c in the Linux kernel through 4.16.12 allows local users to cause a denial of service (stack-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact because sense buffers have different sizes at the CDROM layer and the SCSI layer, as demonstrated by a CDROMREADMODE2 ioctl call.
Commit Message: sr: pass down correctly sized SCSI sense buffer
We're casting the CDROM layer request_sense to the SCSI sense
buffer, but the former is 64 bytes and the latter is 96 bytes.
As we generally allocate these on the stack, we end up blowing
up the stack.
Fix this by wrapping the scsi_execute() call with a properly
sized sense buffer, and copying back the bits for the CDROM
layer.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Piotr Gabriel Kosinski <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Daniel Shapira <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Fixes: 82ed4db499b8 ("block: split scsi_request out of struct request")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> | Low | 21,539 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: CompileKeymap(XkbFile *file, struct xkb_keymap *keymap, enum merge_mode merge)
{
bool ok;
XkbFile *files[LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE + 1] = { NULL };
enum xkb_file_type type;
struct xkb_context *ctx = keymap->ctx;
/* Collect section files and check for duplicates. */
for (file = (XkbFile *) file->defs; file;
file = (XkbFile *) file->common.next) {
if (file->file_type < FIRST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE ||
file->file_type > LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE) {
log_err(ctx, "Cannot define %s in a keymap file\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(file->file_type));
continue;
}
if (files[file->file_type]) {
log_err(ctx,
"More than one %s section in keymap file; "
"All sections after the first ignored\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(file->file_type));
continue;
}
files[file->file_type] = file;
}
/*
* Check that all required section were provided.
* Report everything before failing.
*/
ok = true;
for (type = FIRST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type <= LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type++) {
if (files[type] == NULL) {
log_err(ctx, "Required section %s missing from keymap\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(type));
ok = false;
}
}
if (!ok)
return false;
/* Compile sections. */
for (type = FIRST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type <= LAST_KEYMAP_FILE_TYPE;
type++) {
log_dbg(ctx, "Compiling %s \"%s\"\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(type), files[type]->name);
ok = compile_file_fns[type](files[type], keymap, merge);
if (!ok) {
log_err(ctx, "Failed to compile %s\n",
xkb_file_type_to_string(type));
return false;
}
}
return UpdateDerivedKeymapFields(keymap);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: Unchecked NULL pointer usage in xkbcommon before 0.8.1 could be used by local attackers to crash (NULL pointer dereference) the xkbcommon parser by supplying a crafted keymap file, because the XkbFile for an xkb_geometry section was mishandled.
Commit Message: xkbcomp: fix crash when parsing an xkb_geometry section
xkb_geometry sections are ignored; previously the had done so by
returning NULL for the section's XkbFile, however some sections of the
code do not expect this. Instead, create an XkbFile for it, it will
never be processes and discarded later.
Caught with the afl fuzzer.
Signed-off-by: Ran Benita <[email protected]> | Low | 5,751 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RenderBlockFlow::styleDidChange(StyleDifference diff, const RenderStyle* oldStyle)
{
RenderBlock::styleDidChange(diff, oldStyle);
bool canPropagateFloatIntoSibling = !isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned() && !avoidsFloats();
if (diff == StyleDifferenceLayout && s_canPropagateFloatIntoSibling && !canPropagateFloatIntoSibling && hasOverhangingFloats()) {
RenderBlockFlow* parentBlockFlow = this;
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
FloatingObjectSetIterator end = floatingObjectSet.end();
for (RenderObject* curr = parent(); curr && !curr->isRenderView(); curr = curr->parent()) {
if (curr->isRenderBlockFlow()) {
RenderBlockFlow* currBlock = toRenderBlockFlow(curr);
if (currBlock->hasOverhangingFloats()) {
for (FloatingObjectSetIterator it = floatingObjectSet.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
RenderBox* renderer = (*it)->renderer();
if (currBlock->hasOverhangingFloat(renderer)) {
parentBlockFlow = currBlock;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
parentBlockFlow->markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout();
parentBlockFlow->markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout();
}
if (diff == StyleDifferenceLayout || !oldStyle)
createOrDestroyMultiColumnFlowThreadIfNeeded();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Web Audio implementation in Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.152 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538 | Low | 6,548 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: foreach_nfs_shareopt(const char *shareopts,
nfs_shareopt_callback_t callback, void *cookie)
{
char *shareopts_dup, *opt, *cur, *value;
int was_nul, rc;
if (shareopts == NULL)
return (SA_OK);
shareopts_dup = strdup(shareopts);
if (shareopts_dup == NULL)
return (SA_NO_MEMORY);
opt = shareopts_dup;
was_nul = 0;
while (1) {
cur = opt;
while (*cur != ',' && *cur != '\0')
cur++;
if (*cur == '\0')
was_nul = 1;
*cur = '\0';
if (cur > opt) {
value = strchr(opt, '=');
if (value != NULL) {
*value = '\0';
value++;
}
rc = callback(opt, value, cookie);
if (rc != SA_OK) {
free(shareopts_dup);
return (rc);
}
}
opt = cur + 1;
if (was_nul)
break;
}
free(shareopts_dup);
return (0);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: sharenfs 0.6.4, when built with commits bcdd594 and 7d08880 from the zfs repository, provides world readable access to the shared zfs file system, which might allow remote authenticated users to obtain sensitive information by reading shared files.
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare. | Medium | 17,664 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: xmlParseDocument(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar start[4];
xmlCharEncoding enc;
xmlInitParser();
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->input == NULL))
return(-1);
GROW;
/*
* SAX: detecting the level.
*/
xmlDetectSAX2(ctxt);
/*
* SAX: beginning of the document processing.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator))
ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator(ctxt->userData, &xmlDefaultSAXLocator);
if ((ctxt->encoding == (const xmlChar *)XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) &&
((ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur) >= 4)) {
/*
* Get the 4 first bytes and decode the charset
* if enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE
* plug some encoding conversion routines.
*/
start[0] = RAW;
start[1] = NXT(1);
start[2] = NXT(2);
start[3] = NXT(3);
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding(&start[0], 4);
if (enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) {
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
}
}
if (CUR == 0) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY, NULL);
}
/*
* Check for the XMLDecl in the Prolog.
* do not GROW here to avoid the detected encoder to decode more
* than just the first line, unless the amount of data is really
* too small to hold "<?xml version="1.0" encoding="foo"
*/
if ((ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur) < 35) {
GROW;
}
if ((CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) && (IS_BLANK_CH(NXT(5)))) {
/*
* Note that we will switch encoding on the fly.
*/
xmlParseXMLDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right here
*/
return(-1);
}
ctxt->standalone = ctxt->input->standalone;
SKIP_BLANKS;
} else {
ctxt->version = xmlCharStrdup(XML_DEFAULT_VERSION);
}
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->startDocument) && (!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->startDocument(ctxt->userData);
/*
* The Misc part of the Prolog
*/
GROW;
xmlParseMisc(ctxt);
/*
* Then possibly doc type declaration(s) and more Misc
* (doctypedecl Misc*)?
*/
GROW;
if (CMP9(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', 'D', 'O', 'C', 'T', 'Y', 'P', 'E')) {
ctxt->inSubset = 1;
xmlParseDocTypeDecl(ctxt);
if (RAW == '[') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
xmlParseInternalSubset(ctxt);
}
/*
* Create and update the external subset.
*/
ctxt->inSubset = 2;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (ctxt->sax->externalSubset != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->externalSubset(ctxt->userData, ctxt->intSubName,
ctxt->extSubSystem, ctxt->extSubURI);
ctxt->inSubset = 0;
xmlCleanSpecialAttr(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PROLOG;
xmlParseMisc(ctxt);
}
/*
* Time to start parsing the tree itself
*/
GROW;
if (RAW != '<') {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY,
"Start tag expected, '<' not found\n");
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
xmlParseElement(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
/*
* The Misc part at the end
*/
xmlParseMisc(ctxt);
if (RAW != 0) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_END, NULL);
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
}
/*
* SAX: end of the document processing.
*/
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
/*
* Remove locally kept entity definitions if the tree was not built
*/
if ((ctxt->myDoc != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(ctxt->myDoc->version, SAX_COMPAT_MODE))) {
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
}
if ((ctxt->wellFormed) && (ctxt->myDoc != NULL)) {
ctxt->myDoc->properties |= XML_DOC_WELLFORMED;
if (ctxt->valid)
ctxt->myDoc->properties |= XML_DOC_DTDVALID;
if (ctxt->nsWellFormed)
ctxt->myDoc->properties |= XML_DOC_NSVALID;
if (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLD10)
ctxt->myDoc->properties |= XML_DOC_OLD10;
}
if (! ctxt->wellFormed) {
ctxt->valid = 0;
return(-1);
}
return(0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 19,623 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void DataReductionProxyConfig::InitializeOnIOThread(
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> url_loader_factory,
WarmupURLFetcher::CreateCustomProxyConfigCallback
create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
NetworkPropertiesManager* manager,
const std::string& user_agent) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
network_properties_manager_ = manager;
network_properties_manager_->ResetWarmupURLFetchMetrics();
secure_proxy_checker_.reset(new SecureProxyChecker(url_loader_factory));
warmup_url_fetcher_.reset(new WarmupURLFetcher(
create_custom_proxy_config_callback,
base::BindRepeating(
&DataReductionProxyConfig::HandleWarmupFetcherResponse,
base::Unretained(this)),
base::BindRepeating(&DataReductionProxyConfig::GetHttpRttEstimate,
base::Unretained(this)),
ui_task_runner_, user_agent));
AddDefaultProxyBypassRules();
network_connection_tracker_->AddNetworkConnectionObserver(this);
network_connection_tracker_->GetConnectionType(
&connection_type_,
base::BindOnce(&DataReductionProxyConfig::OnConnectionChanged,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: A use after free in PDFium in Google Chrome prior to 57.0.2987.98 for Mac, Windows, and Linux and 57.0.2987.108 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted PDF file.
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649} | Medium | 20,196 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void __sock_recv_timestamp(struct msghdr *msg, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int need_software_tstamp = sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP);
struct scm_timestamping tss;
int empty = 1;
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *shhwtstamps =
skb_hwtstamps(skb);
/* Race occurred between timestamp enabling and packet
receiving. Fill in the current time for now. */
if (need_software_tstamp && skb->tstamp == 0)
__net_timestamp(skb);
if (need_software_tstamp) {
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS)) {
struct timeval tv;
skb_get_timestamp(skb, &tv);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMP,
sizeof(tv), &tv);
} else {
struct timespec ts;
skb_get_timestampns(skb, &ts);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMPNS,
sizeof(ts), &ts);
}
}
memset(&tss, 0, sizeof(tss));
if ((sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_SOFTWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(skb->tstamp, tss.ts + 0))
empty = 0;
if (shhwtstamps &&
(sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(shhwtstamps->hwtstamp, tss.ts + 2))
empty = 0;
if (!empty) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET,
SCM_TIMESTAMPING, sizeof(tss), &tss);
if (skb->len && (sk->sk_tsflags & SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS))
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS,
skb->len, skb->data);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Info
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The TCP stack in the Linux kernel through 4.10.6 mishandles the SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS feature, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from the kernel's internal socket data structures or cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via crafted system calls, related to net/core/skbuff.c and net/socket.c.
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 13,932 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ProxyChannelDelegate::ProxyChannelDelegate()
: shutdown_event_(true, false) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors involving SVG text references.
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 6,622 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> PrivateScriptRunner::runDOMAttributeGetter(ScriptState* scriptState, ScriptState* scriptStateInUserScript, const char* className, const char* attributeName, v8::Local<v8::Value> holder)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = scriptState->isolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> classObject = classObjectOfPrivateScript(scriptState, className);
v8::Local<v8::Value> descriptor;
if (!classObject->GetOwnPropertyDescriptor(scriptState->context(), v8String(isolate, attributeName)).ToLocal(&descriptor) || !descriptor->IsObject()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: Target DOM attribute getter was not found. (Class name = %s, Attribute name = %s)\n", className, attributeName);
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> getter;
if (!v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(descriptor)->Get(scriptState->context(), v8String(isolate, "get")).ToLocal(&getter) || !getter->IsFunction()) {
fprintf(stderr, "Private script error: Target DOM attribute getter was not found. (Class name = %s, Attribute name = %s)\n", className, attributeName);
RELEASE_NOTREACHED();
}
initializeHolderIfNeeded(scriptState, classObject, holder);
v8::TryCatch block(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> result;
if (!V8ScriptRunner::callFunction(v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(getter), scriptState->getExecutionContext(), holder, 0, 0, isolate).ToLocal(&result)) {
rethrowExceptionInPrivateScript(isolate, block, scriptStateInUserScript, ExceptionState::GetterContext, attributeName, className);
block.ReThrow();
return v8::Local<v8::Value>();
}
return result;
}
Vulnerability Type: XSS
CWE ID: CWE-79
Summary: Blink in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.59 for Windows, Mac, and Linux; 54.0.2840.85 for Android permitted execution of v8 microtasks while the DOM was in an inconsistent state, which allowed a remote attacker to inject arbitrary scripts or HTML (UXSS) via crafted HTML pages.
Commit Message: Blink-in-JS should not run micro tasks
If Blink-in-JS runs micro tasks, there's a risk of causing a UXSS bug
(see 645211 for concrete steps).
This CL makes Blink-in-JS use callInternalFunction (instead of callFunction)
to avoid running micro tasks after Blink-in-JS' callbacks.
BUG=645211
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2330843002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#417874} | Medium | 24,405 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnUpdatePrintSettings(
int document_cookie,
const base::DictionaryValue& job_settings,
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params* params) {
std::string dummy_string;
int margins_type = 0;
if (!job_settings.GetBoolean(printing::kSettingLandscape, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetBoolean(printing::kSettingCollate, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingColor, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetBoolean(printing::kSettingPrintToPDF, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetBoolean(printing::kIsFirstRequest, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetString(printing::kSettingDeviceName, &dummy_string) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingDuplexMode, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingCopies, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetString(printing::kPreviewUIAddr, &dummy_string) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kPreviewRequestID, NULL) ||
!job_settings.GetInteger(printing::kSettingMarginsType, &margins_type)) {
return;
}
if (printer_.get()) {
const ListValue* page_range_array;
printing::PageRanges new_ranges;
if (job_settings.GetList(printing::kSettingPageRange, &page_range_array)) {
for (size_t index = 0; index < page_range_array->GetSize(); ++index) {
const base::DictionaryValue* dict;
if (!page_range_array->GetDictionary(index, &dict))
continue;
printing::PageRange range;
if (!dict->GetInteger(printing::kSettingPageRangeFrom, &range.from) ||
!dict->GetInteger(printing::kSettingPageRangeTo, &range.to)) {
continue;
}
range.from--;
range.to--;
new_ranges.push_back(range);
}
}
std::vector<int> pages(printing::PageRange::GetPages(new_ranges));
printer_->UpdateSettings(document_cookie, params, pages, margins_type);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 18,349 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: dwarf_elf_object_access_load_section(void* obj_in,
Dwarf_Half section_index,
Dwarf_Small** section_data,
int* error)
{
dwarf_elf_object_access_internals_t*obj =
(dwarf_elf_object_access_internals_t*)obj_in;
if (section_index == 0) {
return DW_DLV_NO_ENTRY;
}
{
Elf_Scn *scn = 0;
Elf_Data *data = 0;
scn = elf_getscn(obj->elf, section_index);
if (scn == NULL) {
*error = DW_DLE_MDE;
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
}
/* When using libelf as a producer, section data may be stored
in multiple buffers. In libdwarf however, we only use libelf
as a consumer (there is a dwarf producer API, but it doesn't
use libelf). Because of this, this single call to elf_getdata
will retrieve the entire section in a single contiguous
buffer. */
data = elf_getdata(scn, NULL);
if (data == NULL) {
*error = DW_DLE_MDE;
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
}
*section_data = data->d_buf;
}
return DW_DLV_OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: libdwarf 20151114 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) via a debug_abbrev section marked NOBITS in an ELF file.
Commit Message: A DWARF related section marked SHT_NOBITS (elf section type)
is an error in the elf object. Now detected.
dwarf_elf_access.c | Medium | 20,668 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetSurfaceNotInUseByCompositor(ui::Compositor*) {
if (current_surface_ || !host_->is_hidden())
return;
current_surface_in_use_by_compositor_ = false;
AdjustSurfaceProtection();
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 25.0.1364.99 on Mac OS X does not properly implement signal handling for Native Client (aka NaCl) code, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 3,152 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void MaybeCreateIBus() {
if (ibus_) {
return;
}
ibus_init();
ibus_ = ibus_bus_new();
if (!ibus_) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ibus_bus_new() failed";
return;
}
ConnectIBusSignals();
ibus_bus_set_watch_dbus_signal(ibus_, TRUE);
ibus_bus_set_watch_ibus_signal(ibus_, TRUE);
if (ibus_bus_is_connected(ibus_)) {
LOG(INFO) << "IBus connection is ready.";
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 22,282 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: bool SendAutomationJSONRequest(AutomationMessageSender* sender,
const DictionaryValue& request_dict,
DictionaryValue* reply_dict,
std::string* error_msg) {
std::string request, reply;
base::JSONWriter::Write(&request_dict, false, &request);
bool success = false;
int timeout_ms = TestTimeouts::action_max_timeout_ms();
base::Time before_sending = base::Time::Now();
if (!SendAutomationJSONRequest(
sender, request, timeout_ms, &reply, &success)) {
int64 elapsed_ms = (base::Time::Now() - before_sending).InMilliseconds();
std::string command;
request_dict.GetString("command", &command);
if (elapsed_ms >= timeout_ms) {
*error_msg = base::StringPrintf(
"Chrome did not respond to '%s'. Request may have timed out. "
"Elapsed time was %" PRId64 " ms. Request timeout was %d ms. "
"Request details: (%s).",
command.c_str(),
elapsed_ms,
timeout_ms,
request.c_str());
} else {
*error_msg = base::StringPrintf(
"Chrome did not respond to '%s'. Elapsed time was %" PRId64 " ms. "
"Request details: (%s).",
command.c_str(),
elapsed_ms,
request.c_str());
}
return false;
}
scoped_ptr<Value> value(base::JSONReader::Read(reply, true));
if (!value.get() || !value->IsType(Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY)) {
std::string command;
request_dict.GetString("command", &command);
LOG(ERROR) << "JSON request did not return dict: " << command << "\n";
return false;
}
DictionaryValue* dict = static_cast<DictionaryValue*>(value.get());
if (!success) {
std::string command, error;
request_dict.GetString("command", &command);
dict->GetString("error", &error);
*error_msg = base::StringPrintf(
"Internal Chrome error during '%s': (%s). Request details: (%s).",
command.c_str(),
error.c_str(),
request.c_str());
LOG(ERROR) << "JSON request failed: " << command << "\n"
<< " with error: " << error;
return false;
}
reply_dict->MergeDictionary(dict);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google V8, as used in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107, does not properly perform const lookups, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Medium | 21,773 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static double pcerr(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* Percentage error permitted in the linear values. Note that the specified
* value is a percentage but this routine returns a simple number.
*/
if (pm->assume_16_bit_calculations ||
(pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
return pm->maxpc16 * .01;
else
return pm->maxpc8 * .01;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| Low | 2,777 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, current)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
} else if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object_create_type(0, intern, SPL_FS_INFO, NULL, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
RETURN_ZVAL(getThis(), 1, 0);
/*RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);*/
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int | Low | 15,281 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnDidGetPrintedPagesCount(
int cookie, int number_pages) {
if (printer_.get())
printer_->SetPrintedPagesCount(cookie, number_pages);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The IPC implementation in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows attackers to obtain potentially sensitive information about memory addresses via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 19,388 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(const BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai)
{
ASN1_INTEGER *ret;
int len, j;
if (ai == NULL)
ret = M_ASN1_INTEGER_new();
else
ret = ai;
if (ret == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_negative(bn))
ret->type = V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER;
else
ret->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
if (ret->length < len + 4) {
unsigned char *new_data = OPENSSL_realloc(ret->data, len + 4);
if (!new_data) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ret->data = new_data;
}
ret->length = BN_bn2bin(bn, ret->data);
/* Correct zero case */
if (!ret->length) {
ret->data[0] = 0;
ret->length = 1;
}
return (ret);
err:
if (ret != ai)
M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(ret);
return (NULL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ASN.1 implementation in OpenSSL before 1.0.1o and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2c allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (buffer underflow and memory corruption) via an ANY field in crafted serialized data, aka the "negative zero" issue.
Commit Message: | Low | 28,460 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: char *M_fs_path_tmpdir(M_fs_system_t sys_type)
{
char *d = NULL;
char *out = NULL;
M_fs_error_t res;
#ifdef _WIN32
size_t len = M_fs_path_get_path_max(M_FS_SYSTEM_WINDOWS)+1;
d = M_malloc_zero(len);
/* Return is length without NULL. */
if (GetTempPath((DWORD)len, d) >= len) {
M_free(d);
d = NULL;
}
#elif defined(__APPLE__)
d = M_fs_path_mac_tmpdir();
#else
const char *const_temp;
/* Try Unix env var. */
# ifdef HAVE_SECURE_GETENV
const_temp = secure_getenv("TMPDIR");
# else
const_temp = getenv("TMPDIR");
# endif
if (!M_str_isempty(const_temp) && M_fs_perms_can_access(const_temp, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
d = M_strdup(const_temp);
}
/* Fallback to some "standard" system paths. */
if (d == NULL) {
const_temp = "/tmp";
if (!M_str_isempty(const_temp) && M_fs_perms_can_access(const_temp, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
d = M_strdup(const_temp);
}
}
if (d == NULL) {
const_temp = "/var/tmp";
if (!M_str_isempty(const_temp) && M_fs_perms_can_access(const_temp, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
d = M_strdup(const_temp);
}
}
#endif
if (d != NULL) {
res = M_fs_path_norm(&out, d, M_FS_PATH_NORM_ABSOLUTE, sys_type);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
out = NULL;
}
}
M_free(d);
return out;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-732
Summary: mstdlib (aka the M Standard Library for C) 1.2.0 has incorrect file access control in situations where M_fs_perms_can_access attempts to delete an existing file (that lacks public read/write access) during a copy operation, related to fs/m_fs.c and fs/m_fs_path.c. An attacker could create the file and then would have access to the data.
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data. | Low | 28,592 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
{
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
pipe = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_inode_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (pipe) {
pipe->bufs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_buffer) * PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS, GFP_KERNEL);
if (pipe->bufs) {
init_waitqueue_head(&pipe->wait);
pipe->r_counter = pipe->w_counter = 1;
pipe->buffers = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
mutex_init(&pipe->mutex);
return pipe;
}
kfree(pipe);
}
return NULL;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: fs/pipe.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 does not limit the amount of unread data in pipes, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by creating many pipes with non-default sizes.
Commit Message: pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.
This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.
The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> | Low | 2,084 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: void AudioRendererHost::OnCreateStream(
int stream_id, const media::AudioParameters& params, int input_channels) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(LookupById(stream_id) == NULL);
media::AudioParameters audio_params(params);
uint32 buffer_size = media::AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(audio_params);
DCHECK_GT(buffer_size, 0U);
DCHECK_LE(buffer_size,
static_cast<uint32>(media::limits::kMaxPacketSizeInBytes));
DCHECK_GE(input_channels, 0);
DCHECK_LT(input_channels, media::limits::kMaxChannels);
int output_memory_size = AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(audio_params);
DCHECK_GT(output_memory_size, 0);
int frames = audio_params.frames_per_buffer();
int input_memory_size =
AudioBus::CalculateMemorySize(input_channels, frames);
DCHECK_GE(input_memory_size, 0);
scoped_ptr<AudioEntry> entry(new AudioEntry());
uint32 io_buffer_size = output_memory_size + input_memory_size;
uint32 shared_memory_size =
media::TotalSharedMemorySizeInBytes(io_buffer_size);
if (!entry->shared_memory.CreateAndMapAnonymous(shared_memory_size)) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<AudioSyncReader> reader(
new AudioSyncReader(&entry->shared_memory, params, input_channels));
if (!reader->Init()) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->reader.reset(reader.release());
entry->controller = media::AudioOutputController::Create(
audio_manager_, this, audio_params, entry->reader.get());
if (!entry->controller) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
entry->stream_id = stream_id;
audio_entries_.insert(std::make_pair(stream_id, entry.release()));
if (media_observer_)
media_observer_->OnSetAudioStreamStatus(this, stream_id, "created");
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the audio IPC layer in Google Chrome before 24.0.1312.52 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98 | Low | 135 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: sp<VBRISeeker> VBRISeeker::CreateFromSource(
const sp<DataSource> &source, off64_t post_id3_pos) {
off64_t pos = post_id3_pos;
uint8_t header[4];
ssize_t n = source->readAt(pos, header, sizeof(header));
if (n < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return NULL;
}
uint32_t tmp = U32_AT(&header[0]);
size_t frameSize;
int sampleRate;
if (!GetMPEGAudioFrameSize(tmp, &frameSize, &sampleRate)) {
return NULL;
}
pos += sizeof(header) + 32;
uint8_t vbriHeader[26];
n = source->readAt(pos, vbriHeader, sizeof(vbriHeader));
if (n < (ssize_t)sizeof(vbriHeader)) {
return NULL;
}
if (memcmp(vbriHeader, "VBRI", 4)) {
return NULL;
}
size_t numFrames = U32_AT(&vbriHeader[14]);
int64_t durationUs =
numFrames * 1000000ll * (sampleRate >= 32000 ? 1152 : 576) / sampleRate;
ALOGV("duration = %.2f secs", durationUs / 1E6);
size_t numEntries = U16_AT(&vbriHeader[18]);
size_t entrySize = U16_AT(&vbriHeader[22]);
size_t scale = U16_AT(&vbriHeader[20]);
ALOGV("%zu entries, scale=%zu, size_per_entry=%zu",
numEntries,
scale,
entrySize);
size_t totalEntrySize = numEntries * entrySize;
uint8_t *buffer = new uint8_t[totalEntrySize];
n = source->readAt(pos + sizeof(vbriHeader), buffer, totalEntrySize);
if (n < (ssize_t)totalEntrySize) {
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
return NULL;
}
sp<VBRISeeker> seeker = new VBRISeeker;
seeker->mBasePos = post_id3_pos + frameSize;
if (durationUs) {
seeker->mDurationUs = durationUs;
}
off64_t offset = post_id3_pos;
for (size_t i = 0; i < numEntries; ++i) {
uint32_t numBytes;
switch (entrySize) {
case 1: numBytes = buffer[i]; break;
case 2: numBytes = U16_AT(buffer + 2 * i); break;
case 3: numBytes = U24_AT(buffer + 3 * i); break;
default:
{
CHECK_EQ(entrySize, 4u);
numBytes = U32_AT(buffer + 4 * i); break;
}
}
numBytes *= scale;
seeker->mSegments.push(numBytes);
ALOGV("entry #%zu: %u offset %#016llx", i, numBytes, (long long)offset);
offset += numBytes;
}
delete[] buffer;
buffer = NULL;
ALOGI("Found VBRI header.");
return seeker;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: A denial of service vulnerability in VBRISeeker.cpp in libstagefright in Mediaserver could enable a remote attacker to use a specially crafted file to cause a device hang or reboot. This issue is rated as High due to the possibility of remote denial of service. Product: Android. Versions: 4.4.4, 5.0.2, 5.1.1, 6.0, 6.0.1, 7.0, 7.1. Android ID: A-32577290.
Commit Message: Make VBRISeeker more robust
Bug: 32577290
Change-Id: I9bcc9422ae7dd3ae4a38df330c9dcd7ac4941ec8
(cherry picked from commit 7fdd36418e945cf6a500018632dfb0ed8cb1a343)
| Medium | 27,444 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int propagate_mnt(struct mount *dest_mnt, struct mountpoint *dest_mp,
struct mount *source_mnt, struct hlist_head *tree_list)
{
struct mount *m, *n;
int ret = 0;
/*
* we don't want to bother passing tons of arguments to
* propagate_one(); everything is serialized by namespace_sem,
* so globals will do just fine.
*/
user_ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->user_ns;
last_dest = dest_mnt;
last_source = source_mnt;
mp = dest_mp;
list = tree_list;
dest_master = dest_mnt->mnt_master;
/* all peers of dest_mnt, except dest_mnt itself */
for (n = next_peer(dest_mnt); n != dest_mnt; n = next_peer(n)) {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
/* all slave groups */
for (m = next_group(dest_mnt, dest_mnt); m;
m = next_group(m, dest_mnt)) {
/* everything in that slave group */
n = m;
do {
ret = propagate_one(n);
if (ret)
goto out;
n = next_peer(n);
} while (n != m);
}
out:
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry(n, tree_list, mnt_hash) {
m = n->mnt_parent;
if (m->mnt_master != dest_mnt->mnt_master)
CLEAR_MNT_MARK(m->mnt_master);
}
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: fs/pnode.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5.4 does not properly traverse a mount propagation tree in a certain case involving a slave mount, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and OOPS) via a crafted series of mount system calls.
Commit Message: propogate_mnt: Handle the first propogated copy being a slave
When the first propgated copy was a slave the following oops would result:
> BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
> IP: [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> PGD bacd4067 PUD bac66067 PMD 0
> Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 1 PID: 824 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.6.0-rc5userns+ #1523
> Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2007
> task: ffff8800bb0a8000 ti: ffff8800bac3c000 task.ti: ffff8800bac3c000
> RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811fba4e>] [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> RSP: 0018:ffff8800bac3fd38 EFLAGS: 00010283
> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8800bb77ec00 RCX: 0000000000000010
> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8800bb58c000 RDI: ffff8800bb58c480
> RBP: ffff8800bac3fd48 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000000001ca1 R11: 0000000000001c9d R12: 0000000000000000
> R13: ffff8800ba713800 R14: ffff8800bac3fda0 R15: ffff8800bb77ec00
> FS: 00007f3c0cd9b7e0(0000) GS:ffff8800bfb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 00000000bb79d000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
> Stack:
> ffff8800bb77ec00 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fd88 ffffffff811fbf85
> ffff8800bac3fd98 ffff8800bb77f080 ffff8800ba713800 ffff8800bb262b40
> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8800bac3fdd8 ffffffff811f1da0
> Call Trace:
> [<ffffffff811fbf85>] propagate_mnt+0x105/0x140
> [<ffffffff811f1da0>] attach_recursive_mnt+0x120/0x1e0
> [<ffffffff811f1ec3>] graft_tree+0x63/0x70
> [<ffffffff811f1f6b>] do_add_mount+0x9b/0x100
> [<ffffffff811f2c1a>] do_mount+0x2aa/0xdf0
> [<ffffffff8117efbe>] ? strndup_user+0x4e/0x70
> [<ffffffff811f3a45>] SyS_mount+0x75/0xc0
> [<ffffffff8100242b>] do_syscall_64+0x4b/0xa0
> [<ffffffff81988f3c>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
> Code: 00 00 75 ec 48 89 0d 02 22 22 01 8b 89 10 01 00 00 48 89 05 fd 21 22 01 39 8e 10 01 00 00 0f 84 e0 00 00 00 48 8b 80 d8 00 00 00 <48> 8b 50 10 48 89 05 df 21 22 01 48 89 15 d0 21 22 01 8b 53 30
> RIP [<ffffffff811fba4e>] propagate_one+0xbe/0x1c0
> RSP <ffff8800bac3fd38>
> CR2: 0000000000000010
> ---[ end trace 2725ecd95164f217 ]---
This oops happens with the namespace_sem held and can be triggered by
non-root users. An all around not pleasant experience.
To avoid this scenario when finding the appropriate source mount to
copy stop the walk up the mnt_master chain when the first source mount
is encountered.
Further rewrite the walk up the last_source mnt_master chain so that
it is clear what is going on.
The reason why the first source mount is special is that it it's
mnt_parent is not a mount in the dest_mnt propagation tree, and as
such termination conditions based up on the dest_mnt mount propgation
tree do not make sense.
To avoid other kinds of confusion last_dest is not changed when
computing last_source. last_dest is only used once in propagate_one
and that is above the point of the code being modified, so changing
the global variable is meaningless and confusing.
Cc: [email protected]
fixes: f2ebb3a921c1ca1e2ddd9242e95a1989a50c4c68 ("smarter propagate_mnt()")
Reported-by: Tycho Andersen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Seth Forshee <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]> | Low | 29,649 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: AriaCurrentState AXNodeObject::ariaCurrentState() const {
const AtomicString& attributeValue =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kCurrent);
if (attributeValue.isNull())
return AriaCurrentStateUndefined;
if (attributeValue.isEmpty() || equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "false"))
return AriaCurrentStateFalse;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "true"))
return AriaCurrentStateTrue;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "page"))
return AriaCurrentStatePage;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "step"))
return AriaCurrentStateStep;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "location"))
return AriaCurrentStateLocation;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "date"))
return AriaCurrentStateDate;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "time"))
return AriaCurrentStateTime;
if (!attributeValue.isEmpty())
return AriaCurrentStateTrue;
return AXObject::ariaCurrentState();
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858} | Medium | 10,633 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: emit_string(const char *str, FILE *out)
/* Print a string with spaces replaced by '_' and non-printing characters by
* an octal escape.
*/
{
for (; *str; ++str)
if (isgraph(UCHAR_MAX & *str))
putc(*str, out);
else if (isspace(UCHAR_MAX & *str))
putc('_', out);
else
fprintf(out, "\\%.3o", *str);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
| Low | 26,062 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: static void __update_open_stateid(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *open_stateid, const nfs4_stateid *deleg_stateid, int open_flags)
{
/*
* Protect the call to nfs4_state_set_mode_locked and
* serialise the stateid update
*/
write_seqlock(&state->seqlock);
if (deleg_stateid != NULL) {
memcpy(state->stateid.data, deleg_stateid->data, sizeof(state->stateid.data));
set_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags);
}
if (open_stateid != NULL)
nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(state, open_stateid, open_flags);
write_sequnlock(&state->seqlock);
spin_lock(&state->owner->so_lock);
update_open_stateflags(state, open_flags);
spin_unlock(&state->owner->so_lock);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The encode_share_access function in fs/nfs/nfs4xdr.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.29 allows local users to cause a denial of service (BUG and system crash) by using the mknod system call with a pathname on an NFSv4 filesystem.
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> | Low | 13,645 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int fpm_stdio_init_child(struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp) /* {{{ */
{
#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H
if (fpm_globals.error_log_fd == ZLOG_SYSLOG) {
closelog(); /* ensure to close syslog not to interrupt with PHP syslog code */
} else
#endif
/* Notice: child cannot use master error_log
* because not aware when being reopen
* else, should use if (!fpm_use_error_log())
*/
if (fpm_globals.error_log_fd > 0) {
close(fpm_globals.error_log_fd);
}
fpm_globals.error_log_fd = -1;
zlog_set_fd(-1);
if (wp->listening_socket != STDIN_FILENO) {
if (0 > dup2(wp->listening_socket, STDIN_FILENO)) {
zlog(ZLOG_SYSERROR, "failed to init child stdio: dup2()");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-400
Summary: An issue was discovered in PHP 7.3.x before 7.3.0alpha3, 7.2.x before 7.2.8, and before 7.1.20. The php-fpm master process restarts a child process in an endless loop when using program execution functions (e.g., passthru, exec, shell_exec, or system) with a non-blocking STDIN stream, causing this master process to consume 100% of the CPU, and consume disk space with a large volume of error logs, as demonstrated by an attack by a customer of a shared-hosting facility.
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that. | Low | 23,399 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only. | Code: int rds_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t size, int msg_flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct rds_sock *rs = rds_sk_to_rs(sk);
long timeo;
int ret = 0, nonblock = msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sockaddr_in *sin;
struct rds_incoming *inc = NULL;
/* udp_recvmsg()->sock_recvtimeo() gets away without locking too.. */
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
rdsdebug("size %zu flags 0x%x timeo %ld\n", size, msg_flags, timeo);
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
if (msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
while (1) {
/* If there are pending notifications, do those - and nothing else */
if (!list_empty(&rs->rs_notify_queue)) {
ret = rds_notify_queue_get(rs, msg);
break;
}
if (rs->rs_cong_notify) {
ret = rds_notify_cong(rs, msg);
break;
}
if (!rds_next_incoming(rs, &inc)) {
if (nonblock) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
timeo = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(*sk_sleep(sk),
(!list_empty(&rs->rs_notify_queue) ||
rs->rs_cong_notify ||
rds_next_incoming(rs, &inc)), timeo);
rdsdebug("recvmsg woke inc %p timeo %ld\n", inc,
timeo);
if (timeo > 0 || timeo == MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT)
continue;
ret = timeo;
if (ret == 0)
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
break;
}
rdsdebug("copying inc %p from %pI4:%u to user\n", inc,
&inc->i_conn->c_faddr,
ntohs(inc->i_hdr.h_sport));
ret = inc->i_conn->c_trans->inc_copy_to_user(inc, msg->msg_iov,
size);
if (ret < 0)
break;
/*
* if the message we just copied isn't at the head of the
* recv queue then someone else raced us to return it, try
* to get the next message.
*/
if (!rds_still_queued(rs, inc, !(msg_flags & MSG_PEEK))) {
rds_inc_put(inc);
inc = NULL;
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_deliver_raced);
continue;
}
if (ret < be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len)) {
if (msg_flags & MSG_TRUNC)
ret = be32_to_cpu(inc->i_hdr.h_len);
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
if (rds_cmsg_recv(inc, msg)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
rds_stats_inc(s_recv_delivered);
sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
if (sin) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = inc->i_hdr.h_sport;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = inc->i_saddr;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
msg->msg_namelen = sizeof(*sin);
}
break;
}
if (inc)
rds_inc_put(inc);
out:
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The x25_recvmsg function in net/x25/af_x25.c in the Linux kernel before 3.12.4 updates a certain length value without ensuring that an associated data structure has been initialized, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory via a (1) recvfrom, (2) recvmmsg, or (3) recvmsg system call.
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | Low | 10,378 |
Subsets and Splits