instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 90
9.34k
| output
stringlengths 16
15.4k
| __index_level_0__
int64 165k
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XvQueryAdaptors(
Display *dpy,
Window window,
unsigned int *p_nAdaptors,
XvAdaptorInfo **p_pAdaptors)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = xv_find_display(dpy);
xvQueryAdaptorsReq *req;
xvQueryAdaptorsReply rep;
size_t size;
unsigned int ii, jj;
char *name;
XvAdaptorInfo *pas = NULL, *pa;
XvFormat *pfs, *pf;
char *buffer = NULL;
char *buffer;
char *string;
xvAdaptorInfo *pa;
xvFormat *pf;
} u;
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | XvQueryAdaptors(
Display *dpy,
Window window,
unsigned int *p_nAdaptors,
XvAdaptorInfo **p_pAdaptors)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = xv_find_display(dpy);
xvQueryAdaptorsReq *req;
xvQueryAdaptorsReply rep;
size_t size;
unsigned int ii, jj;
char *name;
char *end;
XvAdaptorInfo *pas = NULL, *pa;
XvFormat *pfs, *pf;
char *buffer = NULL;
char *buffer;
char *string;
xvAdaptorInfo *pa;
xvFormat *pf;
} u;
| 165,009 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(osf_getdomainname, char __user *, name, int, namelen)
{
unsigned len;
int i;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, namelen))
return -EFAULT;
len = namelen;
if (namelen > 32)
len = 32;
down_read(&uts_sem);
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
__put_user(utsname()->domainname[i], name + i);
if (utsname()->domainname[i] == '\0')
break;
}
up_read(&uts_sem);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>
Cc: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <[email protected]>
Cc: Matt Turner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | SYSCALL_DEFINE2(osf_getdomainname, char __user *, name, int, namelen)
{
unsigned len;
int i;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, name, namelen))
return -EFAULT;
len = namelen;
if (len > 32)
len = 32;
down_read(&uts_sem);
for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
__put_user(utsname()->domainname[i], name + i);
if (utsname()->domainname[i] == '\0')
break;
}
up_read(&uts_sem);
return 0;
}
| 165,867 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: find_insert(png_const_charp what, png_charp param)
{
png_uint_32 chunk = 0;
png_charp parameter_list[1024];
int i, nparams;
/* Assemble the chunk name */
for (i=0; i<4; ++i)
{
char ch = what[i];
if ((ch >= 65 && ch <= 90) || (ch >= 97 && ch <= 122))
chunk = (chunk << 8) + what[i];
else
break;
}
if (i < 4 || what[4] != 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "makepng --insert \"%s\": invalid chunk name\n", what);
exit(1);
}
/* Assemble the parameter list. */
nparams = find_parameters(what, param, parameter_list, 1024);
# define CHUNK(a,b,c,d) (((a)<<24)+((b)<<16)+((c)<<8)+(d))
switch (chunk)
{
case CHUNK(105,67,67,80): /* iCCP */
if (nparams == 2)
return make_insert(what, insert_iCCP, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(116,69,88,116): /* tEXt */
if (nparams == 2)
return make_insert(what, insert_tEXt, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(122,84,88,116): /* zTXt */
if (nparams == 2)
return make_insert(what, insert_zTXt, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(105,84,88,116): /* iTXt */
if (nparams == 4)
return make_insert(what, insert_iTXt, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(104,73,83,84): /* hIST */
if (nparams <= 256)
return make_insert(what, insert_hIST, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
#if 0
case CHUNK(115,80,76,84): /* sPLT */
return make_insert(what, insert_sPLT, nparams, parameter_list);
#endif
default:
fprintf(stderr, "makepng --insert \"%s\": unrecognized chunk name\n",
what);
exit(1);
}
bad_parameter_count(what, nparams);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | find_insert(png_const_charp what, png_charp param)
{
png_uint_32 chunk = 0;
png_charp parameter_list[1024];
int i, nparams;
/* Assemble the chunk name */
for (i=0; i<4; ++i)
{
char ch = what[i];
if ((ch >= 65 && ch <= 90) || (ch >= 97 && ch <= 122))
chunk = (chunk << 8) + what[i];
else
break;
}
if (i < 4 || what[4] != 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "makepng --insert \"%s\": invalid chunk name\n", what);
exit(1);
}
/* Assemble the parameter list. */
nparams = find_parameters(what, param, parameter_list, 1024);
# define CHUNK(a,b,c,d) (((a)<<24)+((b)<<16)+((c)<<8)+(d))
switch (chunk)
{
case CHUNK(105,67,67,80): /* iCCP */
if (nparams == 2)
return make_insert(what, insert_iCCP, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(116,69,88,116): /* tEXt */
if (nparams == 2)
return make_insert(what, insert_tEXt, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(122,84,88,116): /* zTXt */
if (nparams == 2)
return make_insert(what, insert_zTXt, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(105,84,88,116): /* iTXt */
if (nparams == 4)
return make_insert(what, insert_iTXt, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(104,73,83,84): /* hIST */
if (nparams <= 256)
return make_insert(what, insert_hIST, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
case CHUNK(115,66,73,84): /* sBIT */
if (nparams <= 4)
return make_insert(what, insert_sBIT, nparams, parameter_list);
break;
#if 0
case CHUNK(115,80,76,84): /* sPLT */
return make_insert(what, insert_sPLT, nparams, parameter_list);
#endif
default:
fprintf(stderr, "makepng --insert \"%s\": unrecognized chunk name\n",
what);
exit(1);
}
bad_parameter_count(what, nparams);
return NULL;
}
| 173,578 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ImageFetched(const ContentSuggestion::ID& id,
const GURL& url,
const base::string16& title,
const base::string16& text,
base::Time timeout_at,
const gfx::Image& image) {
if (!ShouldNotifyInState(app_status_listener_.GetState())) {
return; // Became foreground while we were fetching the image; forget it.
}
DVLOG(1) << "Fetched " << image.Size().width() << "x"
<< image.Size().height() << " image for " << url.spec();
if (ContentSuggestionsNotificationHelper::SendNotification(
id, url, title, text, CropSquare(image), timeout_at)) {
RecordContentSuggestionsNotificationImpression(
id.category().IsKnownCategory(KnownCategories::ARTICLES)
? CONTENT_SUGGESTIONS_ARTICLE
: CONTENT_SUGGESTIONS_NONARTICLE);
}
}
Commit Message: NTP: cap number of notifications/day
1 by default; Finch-configurable.
BUG=689465
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2691023002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450389}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void ImageFetched(const ContentSuggestion::ID& id,
const GURL& url,
const base::string16& title,
const base::string16& text,
base::Time timeout_at,
const gfx::Image& image) {
if (!ShouldNotifyInState(app_status_listener_.GetState())) {
return; // Became foreground while we were fetching the image; forget it.
}
DVLOG(1) << "Fetched " << image.Size().width() << "x"
<< image.Size().height() << " image for " << url.spec();
ConsumeQuota(profile_->GetPrefs());
if (ContentSuggestionsNotificationHelper::SendNotification(
id, url, title, text, CropSquare(image), timeout_at)) {
RecordContentSuggestionsNotificationImpression(
id.category().IsKnownCategory(KnownCategories::ARTICLES)
? CONTENT_SUGGESTIONS_ARTICLE
: CONTENT_SUGGESTIONS_NONARTICLE);
}
}
| 172,037 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfsd4_encode_layoutget(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
struct nfsd4_layoutget *lgp)
{
struct xdr_stream *xdr = &resp->xdr;
const struct nfsd4_layout_ops *ops =
nfsd4_layout_ops[lgp->lg_layout_type];
__be32 *p;
dprintk("%s: err %d\n", __func__, nfserr);
if (nfserr)
goto out;
nfserr = nfserr_resource;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 36 + sizeof(stateid_opaque_t));
if (!p)
goto out;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1); /* we always set return-on-close */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lgp->lg_sid.si_generation);
p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, &lgp->lg_sid.si_opaque,
sizeof(stateid_opaque_t));
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1); /* we always return a single layout */
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, lgp->lg_seg.offset);
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, lgp->lg_seg.length);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lgp->lg_seg.iomode);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lgp->lg_layout_type);
nfserr = ops->encode_layoutget(xdr, lgp);
out:
kfree(lgp->lg_content);
return nfserr;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | nfsd4_encode_layoutget(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
struct nfsd4_layoutget *lgp)
{
struct xdr_stream *xdr = &resp->xdr;
const struct nfsd4_layout_ops *ops;
__be32 *p;
dprintk("%s: err %d\n", __func__, nfserr);
if (nfserr)
goto out;
nfserr = nfserr_resource;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 36 + sizeof(stateid_opaque_t));
if (!p)
goto out;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1); /* we always set return-on-close */
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lgp->lg_sid.si_generation);
p = xdr_encode_opaque_fixed(p, &lgp->lg_sid.si_opaque,
sizeof(stateid_opaque_t));
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(1); /* we always return a single layout */
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, lgp->lg_seg.offset);
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, lgp->lg_seg.length);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lgp->lg_seg.iomode);
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lgp->lg_layout_type);
ops = nfsd4_layout_ops[lgp->lg_layout_type];
nfserr = ops->encode_layoutget(xdr, lgp);
out:
kfree(lgp->lg_content);
return nfserr;
}
| 168,149 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cdrom_ioctl_drive_status(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
unsigned long arg)
{
cd_dbg(CD_DO_IOCTL, "entering CDROM_DRIVE_STATUS\n");
if (!(cdi->ops->capability & CDC_DRIVE_STATUS))
return -ENOSYS;
if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_SELECT_DISC) ||
(arg == CDSL_CURRENT || arg == CDSL_NONE))
return cdi->ops->drive_status(cdi, CDSL_CURRENT);
if (((int)arg >= cdi->capacity))
return -EINVAL;
return cdrom_slot_status(cdi, arg);
}
Commit Message: cdrom: Fix info leak/OOB read in cdrom_ioctl_drive_status
Like d88b6d04: "cdrom: information leak in cdrom_ioctl_media_changed()"
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int cdrom_ioctl_drive_status(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
unsigned long arg)
{
cd_dbg(CD_DO_IOCTL, "entering CDROM_DRIVE_STATUS\n");
if (!(cdi->ops->capability & CDC_DRIVE_STATUS))
return -ENOSYS;
if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_SELECT_DISC) ||
(arg == CDSL_CURRENT || arg == CDSL_NONE))
return cdi->ops->drive_status(cdi, CDSL_CURRENT);
if (arg >= cdi->capacity)
return -EINVAL;
return cdrom_slot_status(cdi, arg);
}
| 169,035 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XSLStyleSheet::XSLStyleSheet(XSLImportRule* parentRule, const String& originalURL, const KURL& finalURL)
: m_ownerNode(0)
, m_originalURL(originalURL)
, m_finalURL(finalURL)
, m_isDisabled(false)
, m_embedded(false)
, m_processed(false) // Child sheets get marked as processed when the libxslt engine has finally seen them.
, m_stylesheetDoc(0)
, m_stylesheetDocTaken(false)
, m_parentStyleSheet(parentRule ? parentRule->parentStyleSheet() : 0)
{
}
Commit Message: Avoid reparsing an XSLT stylesheet after the first failure.
Certain libxslt versions appear to leave the doc in an invalid state when parsing fails. We should cache this result and avoid re-parsing.
(The test cannot be converted to text-only due to its invalid stylesheet).
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
BUG=271939
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23103007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@156248 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | XSLStyleSheet::XSLStyleSheet(XSLImportRule* parentRule, const String& originalURL, const KURL& finalURL)
: m_ownerNode(0)
, m_originalURL(originalURL)
, m_finalURL(finalURL)
, m_isDisabled(false)
, m_embedded(false)
, m_processed(false) // Child sheets get marked as processed when the libxslt engine has finally seen them.
, m_stylesheetDoc(0)
, m_stylesheetDocTaken(false)
, m_compilationFailed(false)
, m_parentStyleSheet(parentRule ? parentRule->parentStyleSheet() : 0)
{
}
| 171,183 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
int off, i, slot, spi;
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
register_is_null(regs[regno]))
return 0;
verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
return -EACCES;
}
/* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
if (!tnum_is_const(regs[regno].var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off);
verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
regno, tn_buf);
}
off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value;
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
regno, off, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
meta->access_size = access_size;
meta->regno = regno;
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
slot = -(off + i) - 1;
spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (state->allocated_stack <= slot ||
state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
STACK_MISC) {
verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix missing error return in check_stack_boundary()
Prevent indirect stack accesses at non-constant addresses, which would
permit reading and corrupting spilled pointers.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
int off, i, slot, spi;
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
register_is_null(regs[regno]))
return 0;
verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
return -EACCES;
}
/* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
if (!tnum_is_const(regs[regno].var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off);
verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
regno, tn_buf);
return -EACCES;
}
off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value;
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
regno, off, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
meta->access_size = access_size;
meta->regno = regno;
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
slot = -(off + i) - 1;
spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (state->allocated_stack <= slot ||
state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
STACK_MISC) {
verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 167,640 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: explicit MountState(DriveFsHost* host)
: host_(host),
mojo_connection_delegate_(
host_->delegate_->CreateMojoConnectionDelegate()),
pending_token_(base::UnguessableToken::Create()),
binding_(this) {
source_path_ = base::StrCat({kMountScheme, pending_token_.ToString()});
std::string datadir_option = base::StrCat(
{"datadir=",
host_->profile_path_.Append(kDataPath)
.Append(host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetAccountIdKey())
.value()});
chromeos::disks::DiskMountManager::GetInstance()->MountPath(
source_path_, "",
base::StrCat(
{"drivefs-", host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetAccountIdKey()}),
{datadir_option}, chromeos::MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE,
chromeos::MOUNT_ACCESS_MODE_READ_WRITE);
auto bootstrap =
mojo::MakeProxy(mojo_connection_delegate_->InitializeMojoConnection());
mojom::DriveFsDelegatePtr delegate;
binding_.Bind(mojo::MakeRequest(&delegate));
bootstrap->Init(
{base::in_place, host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetUserEmail()},
mojo::MakeRequest(&drivefs_), std::move(delegate));
PendingConnectionManager::Get().ExpectOpenIpcChannel(
pending_token_,
base::BindOnce(&DriveFsHost::MountState::AcceptMojoConnection,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | explicit MountState(DriveFsHost* host)
: host_(host),
mojo_connection_delegate_(
host_->delegate_->CreateMojoConnectionDelegate()),
pending_token_(base::UnguessableToken::Create()),
binding_(this) {
source_path_ = base::StrCat({kMountScheme, pending_token_.ToString()});
std::string datadir_option = base::StrCat(
{"datadir=",
host_->profile_path_.Append(kDataPath)
.Append(host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetAccountIdKey())
.value()});
auto bootstrap =
mojo::MakeProxy(mojo_connection_delegate_->InitializeMojoConnection());
mojom::DriveFsDelegatePtr delegate;
binding_.Bind(mojo::MakeRequest(&delegate));
bootstrap->Init(
{base::in_place, host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetUserEmail()},
mojo::MakeRequest(&drivefs_), std::move(delegate));
PendingConnectionManager::Get().ExpectOpenIpcChannel(
pending_token_,
base::BindOnce(&DriveFsHost::MountState::AcceptMojoConnection,
base::Unretained(this)));
chromeos::disks::DiskMountManager::GetInstance()->MountPath(
source_path_, "",
base::StrCat(
{"drivefs-", host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetAccountIdKey()}),
{datadir_option}, chromeos::MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE,
chromeos::MOUNT_ACCESS_MODE_READ_WRITE);
}
| 171,729 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
{
struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
/* clear the quota */
key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
if (key_is_instantiated(key) &&
(size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
vfs_truncate(path, 0);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
{
struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
/* clear the quota */
key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
if (key_is_positive(key) &&
(size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
vfs_truncate(path, 0);
}
| 167,693 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void php_wddx_pop_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name)
{
st_entry *ent1, *ent2;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
HashTable *target_hash;
zend_class_entry **pce;
zval *obj;
zval *tmp;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
if (stack->top == 0) {
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING) || !strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN) || !strcmp(name, EL_NULL) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY) || !strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET) || !strcmp(name, EL_BINARY) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent1);
if (!ent1->data) {
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
int new_len=0;
unsigned char *new_str;
new_str = php_base64_decode(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data), &new_len);
STR_FREE(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data));
if (new_str) {
Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data) = new_str;
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) = new_len;
} else {
ZVAL_EMPTY_STRING(ent1->data);
}
}
/* Call __wakeup() method on the object. */
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zval *fname, *retval = NULL;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__wakeup", 1);
call_user_function_ex(NULL, &ent1->data, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent2);
/* if non-existent field */
if (ent2->type == ST_FIELD && ent2->data == NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY || Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
target_hash = HASH_OF(ent2->data);
if (ent1->varname) {
if (!strcmp(ent1->varname, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR) &&
Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) &&
ent2->type == ST_STRUCT && Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_bool incomplete_class = 0;
zend_str_tolower(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
if (zend_hash_find(EG(class_table), Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data),
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data)+1, (void **) &pce)==FAILURE) {
incomplete_class = 1;
pce = &PHP_IC_ENTRY;
}
/* Initialize target object */
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(obj);
object_init_ex(obj, *pce);
/* Merge current hashtable with object's default properties */
zend_hash_merge(Z_OBJPROP_P(obj),
Z_ARRVAL_P(ent2->data),
(void (*)(void *)) zval_add_ref,
(void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), 0);
if (incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(obj, Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
}
/* Clean up old array entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
/* Set stack entry to point to the newly created object */
ent2->data = obj;
/* Clean up class name var entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_class_entry *old_scope = EG(scope);
EG(scope) = Z_OBJCE_P(ent2->data);
Z_DELREF_P(ent1->data);
add_property_zval(ent2->data, ent1->varname, ent1->data);
EG(scope) = old_scope;
} else {
zend_symtable_update(target_hash, ent1->varname, strlen(ent1->varname)+1, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
efree(ent1->varname);
} else {
zend_hash_next_index_insert(target_hash, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
}
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR) && stack->varname) {
efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = NULL;
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void **)&ent);
efree(ent);
stack->top--;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for bug #72790 and bug #72799
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static void php_wddx_pop_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name)
{
st_entry *ent1, *ent2;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
HashTable *target_hash;
zend_class_entry **pce;
zval *obj;
zval *tmp;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
if (stack->top == 0) {
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING) || !strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN) || !strcmp(name, EL_NULL) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY) || !strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET) || !strcmp(name, EL_BINARY) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent1);
if (!ent1->data) {
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
int new_len=0;
unsigned char *new_str;
new_str = php_base64_decode(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data), &new_len);
STR_FREE(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data));
if (new_str) {
Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data) = new_str;
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) = new_len;
} else {
ZVAL_EMPTY_STRING(ent1->data);
}
}
/* Call __wakeup() method on the object. */
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zval *fname, *retval = NULL;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__wakeup", 1);
call_user_function_ex(NULL, &ent1->data, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent2);
/* if non-existent field */
if (ent2->data == NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY || Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
target_hash = HASH_OF(ent2->data);
if (ent1->varname) {
if (!strcmp(ent1->varname, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR) &&
Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) &&
ent2->type == ST_STRUCT && Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_bool incomplete_class = 0;
zend_str_tolower(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
if (zend_hash_find(EG(class_table), Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data),
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data)+1, (void **) &pce)==FAILURE) {
incomplete_class = 1;
pce = &PHP_IC_ENTRY;
}
/* Initialize target object */
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(obj);
object_init_ex(obj, *pce);
/* Merge current hashtable with object's default properties */
zend_hash_merge(Z_OBJPROP_P(obj),
Z_ARRVAL_P(ent2->data),
(void (*)(void *)) zval_add_ref,
(void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), 0);
if (incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(obj, Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
}
/* Clean up old array entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
/* Set stack entry to point to the newly created object */
ent2->data = obj;
/* Clean up class name var entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_class_entry *old_scope = EG(scope);
EG(scope) = Z_OBJCE_P(ent2->data);
Z_DELREF_P(ent1->data);
add_property_zval(ent2->data, ent1->varname, ent1->data);
EG(scope) = old_scope;
} else {
zend_symtable_update(target_hash, ent1->varname, strlen(ent1->varname)+1, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
efree(ent1->varname);
} else {
zend_hash_next_index_insert(target_hash, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
}
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR) && stack->varname) {
efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = NULL;
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void **)&ent);
efree(ent);
stack->top--;
}
}
| 166,949 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_sei_message(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
dec_bit_stream_t *ps_bitstrm)
{
UWORD32 ui4_payload_type, ui4_payload_size;
UWORD32 u4_bits;
WORD32 i4_status = 0;
do
{
ui4_payload_type = 0;
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
while(0xff == u4_bits)
{
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
ui4_payload_type += 255;
}
ui4_payload_type += u4_bits;
ui4_payload_size = 0;
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
while(0xff == u4_bits)
{
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
ui4_payload_size += 255;
}
ui4_payload_size += u4_bits;
i4_status = ih264d_parse_sei_payload(ps_bitstrm, ui4_payload_type,
ui4_payload_size, ps_dec);
if(i4_status == -1)
{
i4_status = 0;
break;
}
if(i4_status != OK)
return i4_status;
if(ih264d_check_byte_aligned(ps_bitstrm) == 0)
{
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
if(0 == u4_bits)
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("\nError in parsing SEI message");
}
while(0 == ih264d_check_byte_aligned(ps_bitstrm))
{
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
if(u4_bits)
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("\nError in parsing SEI message");
}
}
}
}
while(ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst < ps_bitstrm->u4_max_ofst);
return (i4_status);
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Increased allocation and added checks in sei parsing.
This prevents heap overflow while parsing sei_message.
Bug: 63122634
Test: ran PoC on unpatched/patched
Change-Id: I61c1ff4ac053a060be8c24da4671db985cac628c
(cherry picked from commit f2b70d353768af8d4ead7f32497be05f197925ef)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | WORD32 ih264d_parse_sei_message(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
dec_bit_stream_t *ps_bitstrm)
{
UWORD32 ui4_payload_type, ui4_payload_size;
UWORD32 u4_bits;
WORD32 i4_status = 0;
do
{
ui4_payload_type = 0;
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
while(0xff == u4_bits && !EXCEED_OFFSET(ps_bitstrm))
{
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
ui4_payload_type += 255;
}
ui4_payload_type += u4_bits;
ui4_payload_size = 0;
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
while(0xff == u4_bits && !EXCEED_OFFSET(ps_bitstrm))
{
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bits_h264(ps_bitstrm, 8);
ui4_payload_size += 255;
}
ui4_payload_size += u4_bits;
i4_status = ih264d_parse_sei_payload(ps_bitstrm, ui4_payload_type,
ui4_payload_size, ps_dec);
if(i4_status == -1)
{
i4_status = 0;
break;
}
if(i4_status != OK)
return i4_status;
if(ih264d_check_byte_aligned(ps_bitstrm) == 0)
{
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
if(0 == u4_bits)
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("\nError in parsing SEI message");
}
while(0 == ih264d_check_byte_aligned(ps_bitstrm)
&& !EXCEED_OFFSET(ps_bitstrm))
{
u4_bits = ih264d_get_bit_h264(ps_bitstrm);
if(u4_bits)
{
H264_DEC_DEBUG_PRINT("\nError in parsing SEI message");
}
}
}
}
while(ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst < ps_bitstrm->u4_max_ofst);
return (i4_status);
}
| 174,107 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl;
int instance = 0;
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
char *rem_addr = NULL;
char *community = "public";
char Opts[256];
int arg;
char *command;
int i;
/* Get options at the command line (overide default values) */
strcpy(Opts, "i:d:h-");
while ((arg = getopt(argc, argv, Opts)) != EOF) {
switch (arg) {
case 'h':
case '-':
usage(argv[0]);
return(0);
case 'i':
instance = atol(optarg);
break;
case 'd':
rem_addr = optarg;
break;
default:
usage(argv[0]);
return(-1);
}
}
if(optind >= argc){
fprintf(stderr, "Command required\n");
usage(argv[0]);
return -1;
}
command = argv[optind++];
printf("Connecting to %s FM instance %d\n", (rem_addr==NULL) ? "LOCAL":rem_addr, instance);
if((res = fm_mgr_config_init(&hdl,instance, rem_addr, community)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to initialize the client handle: %d\n", res);
goto die_clean;
}
if((res = fm_mgr_config_connect(hdl)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to connect: (%d) %s\n",res,fm_mgr_get_error_str(res));
goto die_clean;
}
for(i=0;i<commandListLen;i++){
if(strcmp(command,commandList[i].name) == 0){
return commandList[i].cmdPtr(hdl, commandList[i].mgr, (argc - optind), &argv[optind]);
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "Command (%s) is not valid\n",command);
usage(argv[0]);
res = -1;
die_clean:
if (hdl) free(hdl);
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362 | int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl = NULL;
int instance = 0;
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
char *rem_addr = NULL;
char *community = "public";
char Opts[256];
int arg;
char *command;
int i;
/* Get options at the command line (overide default values) */
strcpy(Opts, "i:d:h-");
while ((arg = getopt(argc, argv, Opts)) != EOF) {
switch (arg) {
case 'h':
case '-':
usage(argv[0]);
return(0);
case 'i':
instance = atol(optarg);
break;
case 'd':
rem_addr = optarg;
break;
default:
usage(argv[0]);
return(-1);
}
}
if(optind >= argc){
fprintf(stderr, "Command required\n");
usage(argv[0]);
return -1;
}
command = argv[optind++];
printf("Connecting to %s FM instance %d\n", (rem_addr==NULL) ? "LOCAL":rem_addr, instance);
if((res = fm_mgr_config_init(&hdl,instance, rem_addr, community)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to initialize the client handle: %d\n", res);
goto cleanup;
}
if((res = fm_mgr_config_connect(hdl)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to connect: (%d) %s\n",res,fm_mgr_get_error_str(res));
goto cleanup;
}
for(i=0;i<commandListLen;i++){
if(strcmp(command,commandList[i].name) == 0){
res = commandList[i].cmdPtr(hdl, commandList[i].mgr, (argc - optind), &argv[optind]);
goto cleanup;
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "Command (%s) is not valid\n",command);
usage(argv[0]);
res = -1;
cleanup:
if (hdl)
{
if (hdl->sm_hdl)
{
if (hdl->sm_hdl->c_path[0])
unlink(hdl->sm_hdl->c_path);
}
if (hdl->pm_hdl)
{
if (hdl->pm_hdl->c_path[0])
unlink(hdl->pm_hdl->c_path);
}
if (hdl->fe_hdl)
{
if (hdl->fe_hdl->c_path[0])
unlink(hdl->fe_hdl->c_path);
}
free(hdl);
}
return res;
}
| 170,127 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void unmarshallAudioAttributes(const Parcel& parcel, audio_attributes_t *attributes)
{
attributes->usage = (audio_usage_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->content_type = (audio_content_type_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->source = (audio_source_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->flags = (audio_flags_mask_t) parcel.readInt32();
const bool hasFlattenedTag = (parcel.readInt32() == kAudioAttributesMarshallTagFlattenTags);
if (hasFlattenedTag) {
String16 tags = parcel.readString16();
ssize_t realTagSize = utf16_to_utf8_length(tags.string(), tags.size());
if (realTagSize <= 0) {
strcpy(attributes->tags, "");
} else {
size_t tagSize = realTagSize > AUDIO_ATTRIBUTES_TAGS_MAX_SIZE - 1 ?
AUDIO_ATTRIBUTES_TAGS_MAX_SIZE - 1 : realTagSize;
utf16_to_utf8(tags.string(), tagSize, attributes->tags);
}
} else {
ALOGE("unmarshallAudioAttributes() received unflattened tags, ignoring tag values");
strcpy(attributes->tags, "");
}
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I3518416e89ed901021970958fb6005fd69129f7c
(cherry picked from commit 1d3f4278b2666d1a145af2f54782c993aa07d1d9)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void unmarshallAudioAttributes(const Parcel& parcel, audio_attributes_t *attributes)
{
attributes->usage = (audio_usage_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->content_type = (audio_content_type_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->source = (audio_source_t) parcel.readInt32();
attributes->flags = (audio_flags_mask_t) parcel.readInt32();
const bool hasFlattenedTag = (parcel.readInt32() == kAudioAttributesMarshallTagFlattenTags);
if (hasFlattenedTag) {
String16 tags = parcel.readString16();
ssize_t realTagSize = utf16_to_utf8_length(tags.string(), tags.size());
if (realTagSize <= 0) {
strcpy(attributes->tags, "");
} else {
size_t tagSize = realTagSize > AUDIO_ATTRIBUTES_TAGS_MAX_SIZE - 1 ?
AUDIO_ATTRIBUTES_TAGS_MAX_SIZE - 1 : realTagSize;
utf16_to_utf8(tags.string(), tagSize, attributes->tags,
sizeof(attributes->tags) / sizeof(attributes->tags[0]));
}
} else {
ALOGE("unmarshallAudioAttributes() received unflattened tags, ignoring tag values");
strcpy(attributes->tags, "");
}
}
| 174,159 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void handle_pxe_menu(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, struct pxe_menu *cfg)
{
void *choice;
struct menu *m;
int err;
#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_BMP
/* display BMP if available */
if (cfg->bmp) {
if (get_relfile(cmdtp, cfg->bmp, image_load_addr)) {
run_command("cls", 0);
bmp_display(image_load_addr,
BMP_ALIGN_CENTER, BMP_ALIGN_CENTER);
} else {
printf("Skipping background bmp %s for failure\n",
cfg->bmp);
}
}
#endif
m = pxe_menu_to_menu(cfg);
if (!m)
return;
err = menu_get_choice(m, &choice);
menu_destroy(m);
/*
* err == 1 means we got a choice back from menu_get_choice.
*
* err == -ENOENT if the menu was setup to select the default but no
* default was set. in that case, we should continue trying to boot
* labels that haven't been attempted yet.
*
* otherwise, the user interrupted or there was some other error and
* we give up.
*/
if (err == 1) {
err = label_boot(cmdtp, choice);
if (!err)
return;
} else if (err != -ENOENT) {
return;
}
boot_unattempted_labels(cmdtp, cfg);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | void handle_pxe_menu(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, struct pxe_menu *cfg)
{
void *choice;
struct menu *m;
int err;
#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_BMP
/* display BMP if available */
if (cfg->bmp) {
if (get_relfile(cmdtp, cfg->bmp, image_load_addr)) {
if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(CMD_CLS))
run_command("cls", 0);
bmp_display(image_load_addr,
BMP_ALIGN_CENTER, BMP_ALIGN_CENTER);
} else {
printf("Skipping background bmp %s for failure\n",
cfg->bmp);
}
}
#endif
m = pxe_menu_to_menu(cfg);
if (!m)
return;
err = menu_get_choice(m, &choice);
menu_destroy(m);
/*
* err == 1 means we got a choice back from menu_get_choice.
*
* err == -ENOENT if the menu was setup to select the default but no
* default was set. in that case, we should continue trying to boot
* labels that haven't been attempted yet.
*
* otherwise, the user interrupted or there was some other error and
* we give up.
*/
if (err == 1) {
err = label_boot(cmdtp, choice);
if (!err)
return;
} else if (err != -ENOENT) {
return;
}
boot_unattempted_labels(cmdtp, cfg);
}
| 169,637 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DocumentLoader::CommitNavigation(const AtomicString& mime_type,
const KURL& overriding_url) {
if (state_ != kProvisional)
return;
if (!GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->CreatingInitialEmptyDocument()) {
SetHistoryItemStateForCommit(
GetFrameLoader().GetDocumentLoader()->GetHistoryItem(), load_type_,
HistoryNavigationType::kDifferentDocument);
}
DCHECK_EQ(state_, kProvisional);
GetFrameLoader().CommitProvisionalLoad();
if (!frame_)
return;
const AtomicString& encoding = GetResponse().TextEncodingName();
Document* owner_document = nullptr;
if (Document::ShouldInheritSecurityOriginFromOwner(Url())) {
Frame* owner_frame = frame_->Tree().Parent();
if (!owner_frame)
owner_frame = frame_->Loader().Opener();
if (owner_frame && owner_frame->IsLocalFrame())
owner_document = ToLocalFrame(owner_frame)->GetDocument();
}
DCHECK(frame_->GetPage());
ParserSynchronizationPolicy parsing_policy = kAllowAsynchronousParsing;
if (!Document::ThreadedParsingEnabledForTesting())
parsing_policy = kForceSynchronousParsing;
InstallNewDocument(Url(), owner_document,
frame_->ShouldReuseDefaultView(Url())
? WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting
: WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kCreateNew,
mime_type, encoding, InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation,
parsing_policy, overriding_url);
parser_->SetDocumentWasLoadedAsPartOfNavigation();
if (request_.WasDiscarded())
frame_->GetDocument()->SetWasDiscarded(true);
frame_->GetDocument()->MaybeHandleHttpRefresh(
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Refresh),
Document::kHttpRefreshFromHeader);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | void DocumentLoader::CommitNavigation(const AtomicString& mime_type,
const KURL& overriding_url) {
if (state_ != kProvisional)
return;
if (!GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->CreatingInitialEmptyDocument()) {
SetHistoryItemStateForCommit(
GetFrameLoader().GetDocumentLoader()->GetHistoryItem(), load_type_,
HistoryNavigationType::kDifferentDocument);
}
DCHECK_EQ(state_, kProvisional);
GetFrameLoader().CommitProvisionalLoad();
if (!frame_)
return;
const AtomicString& encoding = GetResponse().TextEncodingName();
Document* owner_document = nullptr;
if (Document::ShouldInheritSecurityOriginFromOwner(Url())) {
Frame* owner_frame = frame_->Tree().Parent();
if (!owner_frame)
owner_frame = frame_->Loader().Opener();
if (owner_frame && owner_frame->IsLocalFrame())
owner_document = ToLocalFrame(owner_frame)->GetDocument();
}
DCHECK(frame_->GetPage());
ParserSynchronizationPolicy parsing_policy = kAllowAsynchronousParsing;
if (!Document::ThreadedParsingEnabledForTesting())
parsing_policy = kForceSynchronousParsing;
InstallNewDocument(
Url(), owner_document,
frame_->ShouldReuseDefaultView(Url(), GetContentSecurityPolicy())
? WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting
: WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kCreateNew,
mime_type, encoding, InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation,
parsing_policy, overriding_url);
parser_->SetDocumentWasLoadedAsPartOfNavigation();
if (request_.WasDiscarded())
frame_->GetDocument()->SetWasDiscarded(true);
frame_->GetDocument()->MaybeHandleHttpRefresh(
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Refresh),
Document::kHttpRefreshFromHeader);
}
| 173,197 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int DefragMfIpv6Test(void)
{
int retval = 0;
int ip_id = 9;
Packet *p = NULL;
DefragInit();
Packet *p1 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(ip_id, 2, 1, 'C', 8);
Packet *p2 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(ip_id, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
Packet *p3 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(ip_id, 1, 0, 'B', 8);
if (p1 == NULL || p2 == NULL || p3 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL);
if (p != NULL) {
goto end;
}
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL);
if (p != NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* This should return a packet as MF=0. */
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p3, NULL);
if (p == NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* For IPv6 the expected length is just the length of the payload
* of 2 fragments, so 16. */
if (IPV6_GET_PLEN(p) != 16) {
goto end;
}
retval = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL) {
SCFree(p1);
}
if (p2 != NULL) {
SCFree(p2);
}
if (p3 != NULL) {
SCFree(p3);
}
if (p != NULL) {
SCFree(p);
}
DefragDestroy();
return retval;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | static int DefragMfIpv6Test(void)
{
int retval = 0;
int ip_id = 9;
Packet *p = NULL;
DefragInit();
Packet *p1 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMPV6, ip_id, 2, 1, 'C', 8);
Packet *p2 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMPV6, ip_id, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
Packet *p3 = IPV6BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMPV6, ip_id, 1, 0, 'B', 8);
if (p1 == NULL || p2 == NULL || p3 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL);
if (p != NULL) {
goto end;
}
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL);
if (p != NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* This should return a packet as MF=0. */
p = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p3, NULL);
if (p == NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* For IPv6 the expected length is just the length of the payload
* of 2 fragments, so 16. */
if (IPV6_GET_PLEN(p) != 16) {
goto end;
}
retval = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL) {
SCFree(p1);
}
if (p2 != NULL) {
SCFree(p2);
}
if (p3 != NULL) {
SCFree(p3);
}
if (p != NULL) {
SCFree(p);
}
DefragDestroy();
return retval;
}
| 168,300 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xfs_attr3_leaf_getvalue(
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_local *name_loc;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote *name_rmt;
int valuelen;
leaf = bp->b_addr;
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(&ichdr, leaf);
ASSERT(ichdr.count < XFS_LBSIZE(args->dp->i_mount) / 8);
ASSERT(args->index < ichdr.count);
entry = &xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf)[args->index];
if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) {
name_loc = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_local(leaf, args->index);
ASSERT(name_loc->namelen == args->namelen);
ASSERT(memcmp(args->name, name_loc->nameval, args->namelen) == 0);
valuelen = be16_to_cpu(name_loc->valuelen);
if (args->flags & ATTR_KERNOVAL) {
args->valuelen = valuelen;
return 0;
}
if (args->valuelen < valuelen) {
args->valuelen = valuelen;
return XFS_ERROR(ERANGE);
}
args->valuelen = valuelen;
memcpy(args->value, &name_loc->nameval[args->namelen], valuelen);
} else {
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, args->index);
ASSERT(name_rmt->namelen == args->namelen);
ASSERT(memcmp(args->name, name_rmt->name, args->namelen) == 0);
valuelen = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valuelen);
args->rmtblkno = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valueblk);
args->rmtblkcnt = xfs_attr3_rmt_blocks(args->dp->i_mount,
valuelen);
if (args->flags & ATTR_KERNOVAL) {
args->valuelen = valuelen;
return 0;
}
if (args->valuelen < valuelen) {
args->valuelen = valuelen;
return XFS_ERROR(ERANGE);
}
args->valuelen = valuelen;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | xfs_attr3_leaf_getvalue(
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_da_args *args)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr ichdr;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_local *name_loc;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote *name_rmt;
int valuelen;
leaf = bp->b_addr;
xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_from_disk(&ichdr, leaf);
ASSERT(ichdr.count < XFS_LBSIZE(args->dp->i_mount) / 8);
ASSERT(args->index < ichdr.count);
entry = &xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf)[args->index];
if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) {
name_loc = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_local(leaf, args->index);
ASSERT(name_loc->namelen == args->namelen);
ASSERT(memcmp(args->name, name_loc->nameval, args->namelen) == 0);
valuelen = be16_to_cpu(name_loc->valuelen);
if (args->flags & ATTR_KERNOVAL) {
args->valuelen = valuelen;
return 0;
}
if (args->valuelen < valuelen) {
args->valuelen = valuelen;
return XFS_ERROR(ERANGE);
}
args->valuelen = valuelen;
memcpy(args->value, &name_loc->nameval[args->namelen], valuelen);
} else {
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, args->index);
ASSERT(name_rmt->namelen == args->namelen);
ASSERT(memcmp(args->name, name_rmt->name, args->namelen) == 0);
args->rmtvaluelen = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valuelen);
args->rmtblkno = be32_to_cpu(name_rmt->valueblk);
args->rmtblkcnt = xfs_attr3_rmt_blocks(args->dp->i_mount,
args->rmtvaluelen);
if (args->flags & ATTR_KERNOVAL) {
args->valuelen = args->rmtvaluelen;
return 0;
}
if (args->valuelen < args->rmtvaluelen) {
args->valuelen = args->rmtvaluelen;
return XFS_ERROR(ERANGE);
}
args->valuelen = args->rmtvaluelen;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,736 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool FrameSelection::SetSelectionDeprecated(
const SelectionInDOMTree& passed_selection,
const SetSelectionData& options) {
DCHECK(IsAvailable());
passed_selection.AssertValidFor(GetDocument());
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder builder(passed_selection);
if (ShouldAlwaysUseDirectionalSelection(frame_))
builder.SetIsDirectional(true);
SelectionInDOMTree new_selection = builder.Build();
if (granularity_strategy_ && !options.DoNotClearStrategy())
granularity_strategy_->Clear();
granularity_ = options.Granularity();
if (options.ShouldCloseTyping())
TypingCommand::CloseTyping(frame_);
if (options.ShouldClearTypingStyle())
frame_->GetEditor().ClearTypingStyle();
const SelectionInDOMTree old_selection_in_dom_tree =
selection_editor_->GetSelectionInDOMTree();
if (old_selection_in_dom_tree == new_selection)
return false;
selection_editor_->SetSelection(new_selection);
ScheduleVisualUpdateForPaintInvalidationIfNeeded();
const Document& current_document = GetDocument();
frame_->GetEditor().RespondToChangedSelection(
old_selection_in_dom_tree.ComputeStartPosition(),
options.ShouldCloseTyping() ? TypingContinuation::kEnd
: TypingContinuation::kContinue);
DCHECK_EQ(current_document, GetDocument());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool FrameSelection::SetSelectionDeprecated(
const SelectionInDOMTree& passed_selection,
const SetSelectionData& options) {
DCHECK(IsAvailable());
passed_selection.AssertValidFor(GetDocument());
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder builder(passed_selection);
if (ShouldAlwaysUseDirectionalSelection(frame_))
builder.SetIsDirectional(true);
SelectionInDOMTree new_selection = builder.Build();
if (granularity_strategy_ && !options.DoNotClearStrategy())
granularity_strategy_->Clear();
granularity_ = options.Granularity();
if (options.ShouldCloseTyping())
TypingCommand::CloseTyping(frame_);
if (options.ShouldClearTypingStyle())
frame_->GetEditor().ClearTypingStyle();
const SelectionInDOMTree old_selection_in_dom_tree =
selection_editor_->GetSelectionInDOMTree();
const bool is_changed = old_selection_in_dom_tree != new_selection;
const bool should_show_handle = options.ShouldShowHandle();
if (!is_changed && is_handle_visible_ == should_show_handle)
return false;
if (is_changed)
selection_editor_->SetSelection(new_selection);
is_handle_visible_ = should_show_handle;
ScheduleVisualUpdateForPaintInvalidationIfNeeded();
const Document& current_document = GetDocument();
frame_->GetEditor().RespondToChangedSelection(
old_selection_in_dom_tree.ComputeStartPosition(),
options.ShouldCloseTyping() ? TypingContinuation::kEnd
: TypingContinuation::kContinue);
DCHECK_EQ(current_document, GetDocument());
return true;
}
| 171,760 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SoftAVC::drainOneOutputBuffer(int32_t picId, uint8_t* data) {
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = mPicToHeaderMap.valueFor(picId);
outHeader->nTimeStamp = header->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nFlags = header->nFlags;
outHeader->nFilledLen = mWidth * mHeight * 3 / 2;
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset;
const uint8_t *srcY = data;
const uint8_t *srcU = srcY + mWidth * mHeight;
const uint8_t *srcV = srcU + mWidth * mHeight / 4;
size_t srcYStride = mWidth;
size_t srcUStride = mWidth / 2;
size_t srcVStride = srcUStride;
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
mPicToHeaderMap.removeItem(picId);
delete header;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (h263|h264)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: I0fd599b3da431425d89236ffdd9df423c11947c0
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void SoftAVC::drainOneOutputBuffer(int32_t picId, uint8_t* data) {
bool SoftAVC::drainOneOutputBuffer(int32_t picId, uint8_t* data) {
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(kOutputPortIndex);
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
OMX_U32 frameSize = mWidth * mHeight * 3 / 2;
if (outHeader->nAllocLen - outHeader->nOffset < frameSize) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27833616");
return false;
}
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = mPicToHeaderMap.valueFor(picId);
outHeader->nTimeStamp = header->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nFlags = header->nFlags;
outHeader->nFilledLen = frameSize;
uint8_t *dst = outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset;
const uint8_t *srcY = data;
const uint8_t *srcU = srcY + mWidth * mHeight;
const uint8_t *srcV = srcU + mWidth * mHeight / 4;
size_t srcYStride = mWidth;
size_t srcUStride = mWidth / 2;
size_t srcVStride = srcUStride;
copyYV12FrameToOutputBuffer(dst, srcY, srcU, srcV, srcYStride, srcUStride, srcVStride);
mPicToHeaderMap.removeItem(picId);
delete header;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return true;
}
| 174,177 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DevToolsWindow::InspectedContentsClosing() {
web_contents_->GetRenderViewHost()->ClosePage();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void DevToolsWindow::InspectedContentsClosing() {
intercepted_page_beforeunload_ = false;
web_contents_->GetRenderViewHost()->ClosePage();
}
| 171,267 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageHelperHTMLVideoElement(
const SecurityOrigin* security_origin,
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
HTMLVideoElement* video,
const IntRect& source_image_rect,
GLsizei depth,
GLint unpack_image_height,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
const char* func_name = GetTexImageFunctionName(function_id);
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateHTMLVideoElement(security_origin, func_name, video,
exception_state))
return;
WebGLTexture* texture =
ValidateTexImageBinding(func_name, function_id, target);
if (!texture)
return;
TexImageFunctionType function_type;
if (function_id == kTexImage2D || function_id == kTexImage3D)
function_type = kTexImage;
else
function_type = kTexSubImage;
if (!ValidateTexFunc(func_name, function_type, kSourceHTMLVideoElement,
target, level, internalformat, video->videoWidth(),
video->videoHeight(), 1, 0, format, type, xoffset,
yoffset, zoffset))
return;
WebMediaPlayer::VideoFrameUploadMetadata frame_metadata = {};
int already_uploaded_id = -1;
WebMediaPlayer::VideoFrameUploadMetadata* frame_metadata_ptr = nullptr;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::ExperimentalCanvasFeaturesEnabled()) {
already_uploaded_id = texture->GetLastUploadedVideoFrameId();
frame_metadata_ptr = &frame_metadata;
}
bool source_image_rect_is_default =
source_image_rect == SentinelEmptyRect() ||
source_image_rect ==
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight());
const bool use_copyTextureCHROMIUM = function_id == kTexImage2D &&
source_image_rect_is_default &&
depth == 1 && GL_TEXTURE_2D == target &&
CanUseTexImageByGPU(format, type);
if (use_copyTextureCHROMIUM) {
DCHECK_EQ(xoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(yoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(zoffset, 0);
if (video->CopyVideoTextureToPlatformTexture(
ContextGL(), target, texture->Object(), internalformat, format,
type, level, unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_,
already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr)) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
return;
}
}
if (source_image_rect_is_default) {
ScopedUnpackParametersResetRestore(
this, unpack_flip_y_ || unpack_premultiply_alpha_);
if (video->TexImageImpl(
static_cast<WebMediaPlayer::TexImageFunctionID>(function_id),
target, ContextGL(), texture->Object(), level,
ConvertTexInternalFormat(internalformat, type), format, type,
xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_ &&
unpack_colorspace_conversion_ == GL_NONE)) {
texture->ClearLastUploadedFrame();
return;
}
}
if (use_copyTextureCHROMIUM) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageBufferSurface> surface =
WTF::WrapUnique(new AcceleratedImageBufferSurface(
IntSize(video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight())));
if (surface->IsValid()) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageBuffer> image_buffer(
ImageBuffer::Create(std::move(surface)));
if (image_buffer) {
video->PaintCurrentFrame(
image_buffer->Canvas(),
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight()), nullptr,
already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr);
TexImage2DBase(target, level, internalformat, video->videoWidth(),
video->videoHeight(), 0, format, type, nullptr);
if (image_buffer->CopyToPlatformTexture(
FunctionIDToSnapshotReason(function_id), ContextGL(), target,
texture->Object(), unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_,
IntPoint(0, 0),
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight()))) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
return;
}
}
}
}
scoped_refptr<Image> image =
VideoFrameToImage(video, already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr);
if (!image)
return;
TexImageImpl(function_id, target, level, internalformat, xoffset, yoffset,
zoffset, format, type, image.get(),
WebGLImageConversion::kHtmlDomVideo, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_, source_image_rect, depth,
unpack_image_height);
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
}
Commit Message: Tighten about IntRect use in WebGL with overflow detection
BUG=784183
TEST=test case in the bug in ASAN build
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie25ca328af99de7828e28e6a6e3d775f1bebc43f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811826
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522213}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageHelperHTMLVideoElement(
const SecurityOrigin* security_origin,
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
HTMLVideoElement* video,
const IntRect& source_image_rect,
GLsizei depth,
GLint unpack_image_height,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
const char* func_name = GetTexImageFunctionName(function_id);
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateHTMLVideoElement(security_origin, func_name, video,
exception_state))
return;
WebGLTexture* texture =
ValidateTexImageBinding(func_name, function_id, target);
if (!texture)
return;
TexImageFunctionType function_type;
if (function_id == kTexImage2D || function_id == kTexImage3D)
function_type = kTexImage;
else
function_type = kTexSubImage;
if (!ValidateTexFunc(func_name, function_type, kSourceHTMLVideoElement,
target, level, internalformat, video->videoWidth(),
video->videoHeight(), 1, 0, format, type, xoffset,
yoffset, zoffset))
return;
WebMediaPlayer::VideoFrameUploadMetadata frame_metadata = {};
int already_uploaded_id = -1;
WebMediaPlayer::VideoFrameUploadMetadata* frame_metadata_ptr = nullptr;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::ExperimentalCanvasFeaturesEnabled()) {
already_uploaded_id = texture->GetLastUploadedVideoFrameId();
frame_metadata_ptr = &frame_metadata;
}
if (!source_image_rect.IsValid()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"source sub-rectangle specified via pixel unpack "
"parameters is invalid");
return;
}
bool source_image_rect_is_default =
source_image_rect == SentinelEmptyRect() ||
source_image_rect ==
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight());
const bool use_copyTextureCHROMIUM = function_id == kTexImage2D &&
source_image_rect_is_default &&
depth == 1 && GL_TEXTURE_2D == target &&
CanUseTexImageByGPU(format, type);
if (use_copyTextureCHROMIUM) {
DCHECK_EQ(xoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(yoffset, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(zoffset, 0);
if (video->CopyVideoTextureToPlatformTexture(
ContextGL(), target, texture->Object(), internalformat, format,
type, level, unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_,
already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr)) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
return;
}
}
if (source_image_rect_is_default) {
ScopedUnpackParametersResetRestore(
this, unpack_flip_y_ || unpack_premultiply_alpha_);
if (video->TexImageImpl(
static_cast<WebMediaPlayer::TexImageFunctionID>(function_id),
target, ContextGL(), texture->Object(), level,
ConvertTexInternalFormat(internalformat, type), format, type,
xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_ &&
unpack_colorspace_conversion_ == GL_NONE)) {
texture->ClearLastUploadedFrame();
return;
}
}
if (use_copyTextureCHROMIUM) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageBufferSurface> surface =
WTF::WrapUnique(new AcceleratedImageBufferSurface(
IntSize(video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight())));
if (surface->IsValid()) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageBuffer> image_buffer(
ImageBuffer::Create(std::move(surface)));
if (image_buffer) {
video->PaintCurrentFrame(
image_buffer->Canvas(),
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight()), nullptr,
already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr);
TexImage2DBase(target, level, internalformat, video->videoWidth(),
video->videoHeight(), 0, format, type, nullptr);
if (image_buffer->CopyToPlatformTexture(
FunctionIDToSnapshotReason(function_id), ContextGL(), target,
texture->Object(), unpack_premultiply_alpha_, unpack_flip_y_,
IntPoint(0, 0),
IntRect(0, 0, video->videoWidth(), video->videoHeight()))) {
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
return;
}
}
}
}
scoped_refptr<Image> image =
VideoFrameToImage(video, already_uploaded_id, frame_metadata_ptr);
if (!image)
return;
TexImageImpl(function_id, target, level, internalformat, xoffset, yoffset,
zoffset, format, type, image.get(),
WebGLImageConversion::kHtmlDomVideo, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_, source_image_rect, depth,
unpack_image_height);
texture->UpdateLastUploadedFrame(frame_metadata);
}
| 172,667 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserEventRouter::TabPinnedStateChanged(WebContents* contents,
int index) {
TabStripModel* tab_strip = NULL;
int tab_index;
if (ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabStripModel(contents, &tab_strip, &tab_index)) {
DictionaryValue* changed_properties = new DictionaryValue();
changed_properties->SetBoolean(tab_keys::kPinnedKey,
tab_strip->IsTabPinned(tab_index));
DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(contents, changed_properties);
}
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void BrowserEventRouter::TabPinnedStateChanged(WebContents* contents,
int index) {
TabStripModel* tab_strip = NULL;
int tab_index;
if (ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabStripModel(contents, &tab_strip, &tab_index)) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> changed_properties(new DictionaryValue());
changed_properties->SetBoolean(tab_keys::kPinnedKey,
tab_strip->IsTabPinned(tab_index));
DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(contents, changed_properties.Pass());
}
}
| 171,451 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void snd_timer_user_tinterrupt(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri,
unsigned long resolution,
unsigned long ticks)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu = timeri->callback_data;
struct snd_timer_tread *r, r1;
struct timespec tstamp;
int prev, append = 0;
memset(&tstamp, 0, sizeof(tstamp));
spin_lock(&tu->qlock);
if ((tu->filter & ((1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION) |
(1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK))) == 0) {
spin_unlock(&tu->qlock);
return;
}
if (tu->last_resolution != resolution || ticks > 0) {
if (timer_tstamp_monotonic)
ktime_get_ts(&tstamp);
else
getnstimeofday(&tstamp);
}
if ((tu->filter & (1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)) &&
tu->last_resolution != resolution) {
r1.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION;
r1.tstamp = tstamp;
r1.val = resolution;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
tu->last_resolution = resolution;
append++;
}
if ((tu->filter & (1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK)) == 0)
goto __wake;
if (ticks == 0)
goto __wake;
if (tu->qused > 0) {
prev = tu->qtail == 0 ? tu->queue_size - 1 : tu->qtail - 1;
r = &tu->tqueue[prev];
if (r->event == SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK) {
r->tstamp = tstamp;
r->val += ticks;
append++;
goto __wake;
}
}
r1.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK;
r1.tstamp = tstamp;
r1.val = ticks;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
append++;
__wake:
spin_unlock(&tu->qlock);
if (append == 0)
return;
kill_fasync(&tu->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
wake_up(&tu->qchange_sleep);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void snd_timer_user_tinterrupt(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri,
unsigned long resolution,
unsigned long ticks)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu = timeri->callback_data;
struct snd_timer_tread *r, r1;
struct timespec tstamp;
int prev, append = 0;
memset(&tstamp, 0, sizeof(tstamp));
spin_lock(&tu->qlock);
if ((tu->filter & ((1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION) |
(1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK))) == 0) {
spin_unlock(&tu->qlock);
return;
}
if (tu->last_resolution != resolution || ticks > 0) {
if (timer_tstamp_monotonic)
ktime_get_ts(&tstamp);
else
getnstimeofday(&tstamp);
}
if ((tu->filter & (1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)) &&
tu->last_resolution != resolution) {
memset(&r1, 0, sizeof(r1));
r1.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION;
r1.tstamp = tstamp;
r1.val = resolution;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
tu->last_resolution = resolution;
append++;
}
if ((tu->filter & (1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK)) == 0)
goto __wake;
if (ticks == 0)
goto __wake;
if (tu->qused > 0) {
prev = tu->qtail == 0 ? tu->queue_size - 1 : tu->qtail - 1;
r = &tu->tqueue[prev];
if (r->event == SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK) {
r->tstamp = tstamp;
r->val += ticks;
append++;
goto __wake;
}
}
r1.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK;
r1.tstamp = tstamp;
r1.val = ticks;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
append++;
__wake:
spin_unlock(&tu->qlock);
if (append == 0)
return;
kill_fasync(&tu->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
wake_up(&tu->qchange_sleep);
}
| 167,236 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int try_read_command(conn *c) {
assert(c != NULL);
assert(c->rcurr <= (c->rbuf + c->rsize));
assert(c->rbytes > 0);
if (c->protocol == negotiating_prot || c->transport == udp_transport) {
if ((unsigned char)c->rbuf[0] == (unsigned char)PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ) {
c->protocol = binary_prot;
} else {
c->protocol = ascii_prot;
}
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Client using the %s protocol\n", c->sfd,
prot_text(c->protocol));
}
}
if (c->protocol == binary_prot) {
/* Do we have the complete packet header? */
if (c->rbytes < sizeof(c->binary_header)) {
/* need more data! */
return 0;
} else {
#ifdef NEED_ALIGN
if (((long)(c->rcurr)) % 8 != 0) {
/* must realign input buffer */
memmove(c->rbuf, c->rcurr, c->rbytes);
c->rcurr = c->rbuf;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Realign input buffer\n", c->sfd);
}
}
#endif
protocol_binary_request_header* req;
req = (protocol_binary_request_header*)c->rcurr;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
/* Dump the packet before we convert it to host order */
int ii;
fprintf(stderr, "<%d Read binary protocol data:", c->sfd);
for (ii = 0; ii < sizeof(req->bytes); ++ii) {
if (ii % 4 == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n<%d ", c->sfd);
}
fprintf(stderr, " 0x%02x", req->bytes[ii]);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
c->binary_header = *req;
c->binary_header.request.keylen = ntohs(req->request.keylen);
c->binary_header.request.bodylen = ntohl(req->request.bodylen);
c->binary_header.request.cas = ntohll(req->request.cas);
if (c->binary_header.request.magic != PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ) {
if (settings.verbose) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid magic: %x\n",
c->binary_header.request.magic);
}
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
return -1;
}
c->msgcurr = 0;
c->msgused = 0;
c->iovused = 0;
if (add_msghdr(c) != 0) {
out_string(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory");
return 0;
}
c->cmd = c->binary_header.request.opcode;
c->keylen = c->binary_header.request.keylen;
c->opaque = c->binary_header.request.opaque;
/* clear the returned cas value */
c->cas = 0;
dispatch_bin_command(c);
c->rbytes -= sizeof(c->binary_header);
c->rcurr += sizeof(c->binary_header);
}
} else {
char *el, *cont;
if (c->rbytes == 0)
return 0;
el = memchr(c->rcurr, '\n', c->rbytes);
if (!el)
return 0;
cont = el + 1;
if ((el - c->rcurr) > 1 && *(el - 1) == '\r') {
el--;
}
*el = '\0';
assert(cont <= (c->rcurr + c->rbytes));
process_command(c, c->rcurr);
c->rbytes -= (cont - c->rcurr);
c->rcurr = cont;
assert(c->rcurr <= (c->rbuf + c->rsize));
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int try_read_command(conn *c) {
assert(c != NULL);
assert(c->rcurr <= (c->rbuf + c->rsize));
assert(c->rbytes > 0);
if (c->protocol == negotiating_prot || c->transport == udp_transport) {
if ((unsigned char)c->rbuf[0] == (unsigned char)PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ) {
c->protocol = binary_prot;
} else {
c->protocol = ascii_prot;
}
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Client using the %s protocol\n", c->sfd,
prot_text(c->protocol));
}
}
if (c->protocol == binary_prot) {
/* Do we have the complete packet header? */
if (c->rbytes < sizeof(c->binary_header)) {
/* need more data! */
return 0;
} else {
#ifdef NEED_ALIGN
if (((long)(c->rcurr)) % 8 != 0) {
/* must realign input buffer */
memmove(c->rbuf, c->rcurr, c->rbytes);
c->rcurr = c->rbuf;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d: Realign input buffer\n", c->sfd);
}
}
#endif
protocol_binary_request_header* req;
req = (protocol_binary_request_header*)c->rcurr;
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
/* Dump the packet before we convert it to host order */
int ii;
fprintf(stderr, "<%d Read binary protocol data:", c->sfd);
for (ii = 0; ii < sizeof(req->bytes); ++ii) {
if (ii % 4 == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n<%d ", c->sfd);
}
fprintf(stderr, " 0x%02x", req->bytes[ii]);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
c->binary_header = *req;
c->binary_header.request.keylen = ntohs(req->request.keylen);
c->binary_header.request.bodylen = ntohl(req->request.bodylen);
c->binary_header.request.cas = ntohll(req->request.cas);
if (c->binary_header.request.magic != PROTOCOL_BINARY_REQ) {
if (settings.verbose) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid magic: %x\n",
c->binary_header.request.magic);
}
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
return -1;
}
c->msgcurr = 0;
c->msgused = 0;
c->iovused = 0;
if (add_msghdr(c) != 0) {
out_string(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory");
return 0;
}
c->cmd = c->binary_header.request.opcode;
c->keylen = c->binary_header.request.keylen;
c->opaque = c->binary_header.request.opaque;
/* clear the returned cas value */
c->cas = 0;
dispatch_bin_command(c);
c->rbytes -= sizeof(c->binary_header);
c->rcurr += sizeof(c->binary_header);
}
} else {
char *el, *cont;
if (c->rbytes == 0)
return 0;
el = memchr(c->rcurr, '\n', c->rbytes);
if (!el) {
if (c->rbytes > 1024) {
/*
* We didn't have a '\n' in the first k. This _has_ to be a
* large multiget, if not we should just nuke the connection.
*/
char *ptr = c->rcurr;
while (*ptr == ' ') { /* ignore leading whitespaces */
++ptr;
}
if (strcmp(ptr, "get ") && strcmp(ptr, "gets ")) {
conn_set_state(c, conn_closing);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
cont = el + 1;
if ((el - c->rcurr) > 1 && *(el - 1) == '\r') {
el--;
}
*el = '\0';
assert(cont <= (c->rcurr + c->rbytes));
process_command(c, c->rcurr);
c->rbytes -= (cont - c->rcurr);
c->rcurr = cont;
assert(c->rcurr <= (c->rbuf + c->rsize));
}
return 1;
}
| 169,875 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int tap_if_down(const char *devname)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
int sk;
sk = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (sk < 0)
return -1;
memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, devname, IF_NAMESIZE - 1);
ifr.ifr_flags &= ~IFF_UP;
ioctl(sk, SIOCSIFFLAGS, (caddr_t) &ifr);
close(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static int tap_if_down(const char *devname)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
int sk;
sk = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
if (sk < 0)
return -1;
memset(&ifr, 0, sizeof(ifr));
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, devname, IF_NAMESIZE - 1);
ifr.ifr_flags &= ~IFF_UP;
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(ioctl(sk, SIOCSIFFLAGS, (caddr_t) &ifr));
close(sk);
return 0;
}
| 173,448 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SpeechSynthesisLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetSpeechSynthesisLibrary() {
return speech_synthesis_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | SpeechSynthesisLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetSpeechSynthesisLibrary() {
| 170,630 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FrameSelection::MoveCaretSelection(const IntPoint& point) {
DCHECK(!GetDocument().NeedsLayoutTreeUpdate());
Element* const editable =
ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().RootEditableElement();
if (!editable)
return;
const VisiblePosition position =
VisiblePositionForContentsPoint(point, GetFrame());
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder builder;
builder.SetIsDirectional(GetSelectionInDOMTree().IsDirectional());
builder.SetIsHandleVisible(true);
if (position.IsNotNull())
builder.Collapse(position.ToPositionWithAffinity());
SetSelection(builder.Build(), SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.SetSetSelectionBy(SetSelectionBy::kUser)
.Build());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void FrameSelection::MoveCaretSelection(const IntPoint& point) {
DCHECK(!GetDocument().NeedsLayoutTreeUpdate());
Element* const editable =
ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree().RootEditableElement();
if (!editable)
return;
const VisiblePosition position =
VisiblePositionForContentsPoint(point, GetFrame());
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder builder;
builder.SetIsDirectional(GetSelectionInDOMTree().IsDirectional());
if (position.IsNotNull())
builder.Collapse(position.ToPositionWithAffinity());
SetSelection(builder.Build(), SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.SetSetSelectionBy(SetSelectionBy::kUser)
.SetShouldShowHandle(true)
.Build());
}
| 171,756 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: px_crypt_des(const char *key, const char *setting)
{
int i;
uint32 count,
salt,
l,
r0,
r1,
keybuf[2];
char *p;
uint8 *q;
static char output[21];
if (!des_initialised)
des_init();
/*
* Copy the key, shifting each character up by one bit and padding with
* zeros.
*/
q = (uint8 *) keybuf;
while (q - (uint8 *) keybuf - 8)
{
if ((*q++ = *key << 1))
key++;
}
if (des_setkey((char *) keybuf))
#ifndef DISABLE_XDES
if (*setting == _PASSWORD_EFMT1)
{
/*
* "new"-style: setting - underscore, 4 bytes of count, 4 bytes of
* salt key - unlimited characters
*/
for (i = 1, count = 0L; i < 5; i++)
count |= ascii_to_bin(setting[i]) << (i - 1) * 6;
for (i = 5, salt = 0L; i < 9; i++)
salt |= ascii_to_bin(setting[i]) << (i - 5) * 6;
while (*key)
{
/*
* Encrypt the key with itself.
*/
if (des_cipher((char *) keybuf, (char *) keybuf, 0L, 1))
return (NULL);
/*
* And XOR with the next 8 characters of the key.
*/
q = (uint8 *) keybuf;
while (q - (uint8 *) keybuf - 8 && *key)
*q++ ^= *key++ << 1;
if (des_setkey((char *) keybuf))
return (NULL);
}
strncpy(output, setting, 9);
/*
* Double check that we weren't given a short setting. If we were, the
* above code will probably have created weird values for count and
* salt, but we don't really care. Just make sure the output string
* doesn't have an extra NUL in it.
*/
output[9] = '\0';
p = output + strlen(output);
}
else
#endif /* !DISABLE_XDES */
{
/*
* "old"-style: setting - 2 bytes of salt key - up to 8 characters
*/
count = 25;
salt = (ascii_to_bin(setting[1]) << 6)
| ascii_to_bin(setting[0]);
output[0] = setting[0];
/*
* If the encrypted password that the salt was extracted from is only
* 1 character long, the salt will be corrupted. We need to ensure
* that the output string doesn't have an extra NUL in it!
*/
output[1] = setting[1] ? setting[1] : output[0];
p = output + 2;
}
setup_salt(salt);
/*
* Do it.
*/
if (do_des(0L, 0L, &r0, &r1, count))
return (NULL);
/*
* Now encode the result...
*/
l = (r0 >> 8);
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 18) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 12) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 6) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[l & 0x3f];
l = (r0 << 16) | ((r1 >> 16) & 0xffff);
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 18) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 12) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 6) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[l & 0x3f];
l = r1 << 2;
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 12) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 6) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[l & 0x3f];
*p = 0;
return (output);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | px_crypt_des(const char *key, const char *setting)
{
int i;
uint32 count,
salt,
l,
r0,
r1,
keybuf[2];
char *p;
uint8 *q;
static char output[21];
if (!des_initialised)
des_init();
/*
* Copy the key, shifting each character up by one bit and padding with
* zeros.
*/
q = (uint8 *) keybuf;
while (q - (uint8 *) keybuf - 8)
{
*q++ = *key << 1;
if (*key != '\0')
key++;
}
if (des_setkey((char *) keybuf))
#ifndef DISABLE_XDES
if (*setting == _PASSWORD_EFMT1)
{
/*
* "new"-style: setting - underscore, 4 bytes of count, 4 bytes of
* salt key - unlimited characters
*/
for (i = 1, count = 0L; i < 5; i++)
count |= ascii_to_bin(setting[i]) << (i - 1) * 6;
for (i = 5, salt = 0L; i < 9; i++)
salt |= ascii_to_bin(setting[i]) << (i - 5) * 6;
while (*key)
{
/*
* Encrypt the key with itself.
*/
if (des_cipher((char *) keybuf, (char *) keybuf, 0L, 1))
return (NULL);
/*
* And XOR with the next 8 characters of the key.
*/
q = (uint8 *) keybuf;
while (q - (uint8 *) keybuf - 8 && *key)
*q++ ^= *key++ << 1;
if (des_setkey((char *) keybuf))
return (NULL);
}
strncpy(output, setting, 9);
/*
* Double check that we weren't given a short setting. If we were, the
* above code will probably have created weird values for count and
* salt, but we don't really care. Just make sure the output string
* doesn't have an extra NUL in it.
*/
output[9] = '\0';
p = output + strlen(output);
}
else
#endif /* !DISABLE_XDES */
{
/*
* "old"-style: setting - 2 bytes of salt key - up to 8 characters
*/
count = 25;
salt = (ascii_to_bin(setting[1]) << 6)
| ascii_to_bin(setting[0]);
output[0] = setting[0];
/*
* If the encrypted password that the salt was extracted from is only
* 1 character long, the salt will be corrupted. We need to ensure
* that the output string doesn't have an extra NUL in it!
*/
output[1] = setting[1] ? setting[1] : output[0];
p = output + 2;
}
setup_salt(salt);
/*
* Do it.
*/
if (do_des(0L, 0L, &r0, &r1, count))
return (NULL);
/*
* Now encode the result...
*/
l = (r0 >> 8);
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 18) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 12) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 6) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[l & 0x3f];
l = (r0 << 16) | ((r1 >> 16) & 0xffff);
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 18) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 12) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 6) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[l & 0x3f];
l = r1 << 2;
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 12) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 6) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _crypt_a64[l & 0x3f];
*p = 0;
return (output);
}
| 165,027 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int readpng2_init(mainprog_info *mainprog_ptr)
{
png_structp png_ptr; /* note: temporary variables! */
png_infop info_ptr;
/* could also replace libpng warning-handler (final NULL), but no need: */
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, mainprog_ptr,
readpng2_error_handler, readpng2_warning_handler);
if (!png_ptr)
return 4; /* out of memory */
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
return 4; /* out of memory */
}
/* we could create a second info struct here (end_info), but it's only
* useful if we want to keep pre- and post-IDAT chunk info separated
* (mainly for PNG-aware image editors and converters) */
/* setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a PNG-reading
* libpng function, unless an alternate error handler was installed--
* but compatible error handlers must either use longjmp() themselves
* (as in this program) or exit immediately, so here we are: */
if (setjmp(mainprog_ptr->jmpbuf)) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return 2;
}
#ifdef PNG_HANDLE_AS_UNKNOWN_SUPPORTED
/* prepare the reader to ignore all recognized chunks whose data won't be
* used, i.e., all chunks recognized by libpng except for IHDR, PLTE, IDAT,
* IEND, tRNS, bKGD, gAMA, and sRGB (small performance improvement) */
{
/* These byte strings were copied from png.h. If a future version
* of readpng2.c recognizes more chunks, add them to this list.
*/
static PNG_CONST png_byte chunks_to_process[] = {
98, 75, 71, 68, '\0', /* bKGD */
103, 65, 77, 65, '\0', /* gAMA */
115, 82, 71, 66, '\0', /* sRGB */
};
/* Ignore all chunks except for IHDR, PLTE, tRNS, IDAT, and IEND */
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_ptr, -1 /* PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_NEVER */,
NULL, -1);
/* But do not ignore chunks in the "chunks_to_process" list */
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_ptr,
0 /* PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_AS_DEFAULT */, chunks_to_process,
sizeof(chunks_to_process)/5);
}
#endif /* PNG_HANDLE_AS_UNKNOWN_SUPPORTED */
/* instead of doing png_init_io() here, now we set up our callback
* functions for progressive decoding */
png_set_progressive_read_fn(png_ptr, mainprog_ptr,
readpng2_info_callback, readpng2_row_callback, readpng2_end_callback);
/* make sure we save our pointers for use in readpng2_decode_data() */
mainprog_ptr->png_ptr = png_ptr;
mainprog_ptr->info_ptr = info_ptr;
/* and that's all there is to initialization */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | int readpng2_init(mainprog_info *mainprog_ptr)
{
png_structp png_ptr; /* note: temporary variables! */
png_infop info_ptr;
/* could also replace libpng warning-handler (final NULL), but no need: */
png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(png_get_libpng_ver(NULL), mainprog_ptr,
readpng2_error_handler, readpng2_warning_handler);
if (!png_ptr)
return 4; /* out of memory */
info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(png_ptr);
if (!info_ptr) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
return 4; /* out of memory */
}
/* we could create a second info struct here (end_info), but it's only
* useful if we want to keep pre- and post-IDAT chunk info separated
* (mainly for PNG-aware image editors and converters) */
/* setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a PNG-reading
* libpng function, unless an alternate error handler was installed--
* but compatible error handlers must either use longjmp() themselves
* (as in this program) or exit immediately, so here we are: */
if (setjmp(mainprog_ptr->jmpbuf)) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
return 2;
}
#ifdef PNG_HANDLE_AS_UNKNOWN_SUPPORTED
/* prepare the reader to ignore all recognized chunks whose data won't be
* used, i.e., all chunks recognized by libpng except for IHDR, PLTE, IDAT,
* IEND, tRNS, bKGD, gAMA, and sRGB (small performance improvement) */
{
/* These byte strings were copied from png.h. If a future version
* of readpng2.c recognizes more chunks, add them to this list.
*/
static PNG_CONST png_byte chunks_to_process[] = {
98, 75, 71, 68, '\0', /* bKGD */
103, 65, 77, 65, '\0', /* gAMA */
115, 82, 71, 66, '\0', /* sRGB */
};
/* Ignore all chunks except for IHDR, PLTE, tRNS, IDAT, and IEND */
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_ptr, -1 /* PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_NEVER */,
NULL, -1);
/* But do not ignore chunks in the "chunks_to_process" list */
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_ptr,
0 /* PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_AS_DEFAULT */, chunks_to_process,
sizeof(chunks_to_process)/5);
}
#endif /* PNG_HANDLE_AS_UNKNOWN_SUPPORTED */
/* instead of doing png_init_io() here, now we set up our callback
* functions for progressive decoding */
png_set_progressive_read_fn(png_ptr, mainprog_ptr,
readpng2_info_callback, readpng2_row_callback, readpng2_end_callback);
/* make sure we save our pointers for use in readpng2_decode_data() */
mainprog_ptr->png_ptr = png_ptr;
mainprog_ptr->info_ptr = info_ptr;
/* and that's all there is to initialization */
return 0;
}
| 173,570 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ext4_end_io_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
ext4_io_end_t *io = container_of(work, ext4_io_end_t, work);
struct inode *inode = io->inode;
int ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
ret = ext4_end_io_nolock(io);
if (ret >= 0) {
if (!list_empty(&io->list))
list_del_init(&io->list);
ext4_free_io_end(io);
}
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
CWE ID: | static void ext4_end_io_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
ext4_io_end_t *io = container_of(work, ext4_io_end_t, work);
struct inode *inode = io->inode;
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
ret = ext4_end_io_nolock(io);
if (ret < 0) {
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&ei->i_completed_io_lock, flags);
if (!list_empty(&io->list))
list_del_init(&io->list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ei->i_completed_io_lock, flags);
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
ext4_free_io_end(io);
}
| 167,542 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t Camera3Device::createDefaultRequest(int templateId,
CameraMetadata *request) {
ATRACE_CALL();
ALOGV("%s: for template %d", __FUNCTION__, templateId);
Mutex::Autolock il(mInterfaceLock);
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
switch (mStatus) {
case STATUS_ERROR:
CLOGE("Device has encountered a serious error");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
case STATUS_UNINITIALIZED:
CLOGE("Device is not initialized!");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
case STATUS_UNCONFIGURED:
case STATUS_CONFIGURED:
case STATUS_ACTIVE:
break;
default:
SET_ERR_L("Unexpected status: %d", mStatus);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (!mRequestTemplateCache[templateId].isEmpty()) {
*request = mRequestTemplateCache[templateId];
return OK;
}
const camera_metadata_t *rawRequest;
ATRACE_BEGIN("camera3->construct_default_request_settings");
rawRequest = mHal3Device->ops->construct_default_request_settings(
mHal3Device, templateId);
ATRACE_END();
if (rawRequest == NULL) {
ALOGI("%s: template %d is not supported on this camera device",
__FUNCTION__, templateId);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
*request = rawRequest;
mRequestTemplateCache[templateId] = rawRequest;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264 | status_t Camera3Device::createDefaultRequest(int templateId,
CameraMetadata *request) {
ATRACE_CALL();
ALOGV("%s: for template %d", __FUNCTION__, templateId);
if (templateId <= 0 || templateId >= CAMERA3_TEMPLATE_COUNT) {
android_errorWriteWithInfoLog(CameraService::SN_EVENT_LOG_ID, "26866110",
IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingUid(), NULL, 0);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock il(mInterfaceLock);
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
switch (mStatus) {
case STATUS_ERROR:
CLOGE("Device has encountered a serious error");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
case STATUS_UNINITIALIZED:
CLOGE("Device is not initialized!");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
case STATUS_UNCONFIGURED:
case STATUS_CONFIGURED:
case STATUS_ACTIVE:
break;
default:
SET_ERR_L("Unexpected status: %d", mStatus);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (!mRequestTemplateCache[templateId].isEmpty()) {
*request = mRequestTemplateCache[templateId];
return OK;
}
const camera_metadata_t *rawRequest;
ATRACE_BEGIN("camera3->construct_default_request_settings");
rawRequest = mHal3Device->ops->construct_default_request_settings(
mHal3Device, templateId);
ATRACE_END();
if (rawRequest == NULL) {
ALOGI("%s: template %d is not supported on this camera device",
__FUNCTION__, templateId);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
*request = rawRequest;
mRequestTemplateCache[templateId] = rawRequest;
return OK;
}
| 173,883 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dophn_exec(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off,
int num, size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags, int sh_num)
{
Elf32_Phdr ph32;
Elf64_Phdr ph64;
const char *linking_style = "statically";
const char *interp = "";
unsigned char nbuf[BUFSIZ];
char ibuf[BUFSIZ];
ssize_t bufsize;
size_t offset, align, len;
if (size != xph_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted program header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
for ( ; num; num--) {
if (pread(fd, xph_addr, xph_sizeof, off) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
bufsize = 0;
align = 4;
/* Things we can determine before we seek */
switch (xph_type) {
case PT_DYNAMIC:
linking_style = "dynamically";
break;
case PT_NOTE:
if (sh_num) /* Did this through section headers */
continue;
if (((align = xph_align) & 0x80000000UL) != 0 ||
align < 4) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", invalid note alignment 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)align) == -1)
return -1;
align = 4;
}
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case PT_INTERP:
len = xph_filesz < sizeof(nbuf) ? xph_filesz
: sizeof(nbuf);
bufsize = pread(fd, nbuf, len, xph_offset);
if (bufsize == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
break;
default:
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xph_offset > fsize) {
/* Maybe warn here? */
continue;
}
break;
}
/* Things we can determine when we seek */
switch (xph_type) {
case PT_INTERP:
if (bufsize && nbuf[0]) {
nbuf[bufsize - 1] = '\0';
interp = (const char *)nbuf;
} else
interp = "*empty*";
break;
case PT_NOTE:
/*
* This is a PT_NOTE section; loop through all the notes
* in the section.
*/
offset = 0;
for (;;) {
if (offset >= (size_t)bufsize)
break;
offset = donote(ms, nbuf, offset,
(size_t)bufsize, clazz, swap, align,
flags);
if (offset == 0)
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s linked", linking_style)
== -1)
return -1;
if (interp[0])
if (file_printf(ms, ", interpreter %s",
file_printable(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf), interp)) == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bail out on partial reads, from Alexander Cherepanov
CWE ID: CWE-20 | dophn_exec(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off,
int num, size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags, int sh_num)
{
Elf32_Phdr ph32;
Elf64_Phdr ph64;
const char *linking_style = "statically";
const char *interp = "";
unsigned char nbuf[BUFSIZ];
char ibuf[BUFSIZ];
ssize_t bufsize;
size_t offset, align, len;
if (size != xph_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted program header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
for ( ; num; num--) {
if (pread(fd, xph_addr, xph_sizeof, off) < (ssize_t)xph_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
bufsize = 0;
align = 4;
/* Things we can determine before we seek */
switch (xph_type) {
case PT_DYNAMIC:
linking_style = "dynamically";
break;
case PT_NOTE:
if (sh_num) /* Did this through section headers */
continue;
if (((align = xph_align) & 0x80000000UL) != 0 ||
align < 4) {
if (file_printf(ms,
", invalid note alignment 0x%lx",
(unsigned long)align) == -1)
return -1;
align = 4;
}
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case PT_INTERP:
len = xph_filesz < sizeof(nbuf) ? xph_filesz
: sizeof(nbuf);
bufsize = pread(fd, nbuf, len, xph_offset);
if (bufsize == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
break;
default:
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xph_offset > fsize) {
/* Maybe warn here? */
continue;
}
break;
}
/* Things we can determine when we seek */
switch (xph_type) {
case PT_INTERP:
if (bufsize && nbuf[0]) {
nbuf[bufsize - 1] = '\0';
interp = (const char *)nbuf;
} else
interp = "*empty*";
break;
case PT_NOTE:
/*
* This is a PT_NOTE section; loop through all the notes
* in the section.
*/
offset = 0;
for (;;) {
if (offset >= (size_t)bufsize)
break;
offset = donote(ms, nbuf, offset,
(size_t)bufsize, clazz, swap, align,
flags);
if (offset == 0)
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s linked", linking_style)
== -1)
return -1;
if (interp[0])
if (file_printf(ms, ", interpreter %s",
file_printable(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf), interp)) == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
| 166,768 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: fix_transited_encoding(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
krb5_boolean check_policy,
const TransitedEncoding *tr,
EncTicketPart *et,
const char *client_realm,
const char *server_realm,
const char *tgt_realm)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
char **realms, **tmp;
unsigned int num_realms;
size_t i;
switch (tr->tr_type) {
case DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS:
break;
case 0:
/*
* Allow empty content of type 0 because that is was Microsoft
* generates in their TGT.
*/
if (tr->contents.length == 0)
break;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Transited type 0 with non empty content");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
default:
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Unknown transited type: %u", tr->tr_type);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
}
ret = krb5_domain_x500_decode(context,
tr->contents,
&realms,
&num_realms,
client_realm,
server_realm);
if(ret){
krb5_warn(context, ret,
"Decoding transited encoding");
return ret;
}
if(strcmp(client_realm, tgt_realm) && strcmp(server_realm, tgt_realm)) {
/* not us, so add the previous realm to transited set */
if (num_realms + 1 > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*realms)) {
ret = ERANGE;
goto free_realms;
}
tmp = realloc(realms, (num_realms + 1) * sizeof(*realms));
if(tmp == NULL){
ret = ENOMEM;
goto free_realms;
}
realms = tmp;
realms[num_realms] = strdup(tgt_realm);
if(realms[num_realms] == NULL){
ret = ENOMEM;
goto free_realms;
}
num_realms++;
}
if(num_realms == 0) {
if(strcmp(client_realm, server_realm))
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"cross-realm %s -> %s", client_realm, server_realm);
} else {
size_t l = 0;
char *rs;
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
l += strlen(realms[i]) + 2;
rs = malloc(l);
if(rs != NULL) {
*rs = '\0';
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) {
if(i > 0)
strlcat(rs, ", ", l);
strlcat(rs, realms[i], l);
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"cross-realm %s -> %s via [%s]",
client_realm, server_realm, rs);
free(rs);
}
}
if(check_policy) {
ret = krb5_check_transited(context, client_realm,
server_realm,
realms, num_realms, NULL);
if(ret) {
krb5_warn(context, ret, "cross-realm %s -> %s",
client_realm, server_realm);
goto free_realms;
}
et->flags.transited_policy_checked = 1;
}
et->transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
ret = krb5_domain_x500_encode(realms, num_realms, &et->transited.contents);
if(ret)
krb5_warn(context, ret, "Encoding transited encoding");
free_realms:
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
free(realms[i]);
free(realms);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix transit path validation CVE-2017-6594
Commit f469fc6 (2010-10-02) inadvertently caused the previous hop realm
to not be added to the transit path of issued tickets. This may, in
some cases, enable bypass of capath policy in Heimdal versions 1.5
through 7.2.
Note, this may break sites that rely on the bug. With the bug some
incomplete [capaths] worked, that should not have. These may now break
authentication in some cross-realm configurations.
CWE ID: CWE-295 | fix_transited_encoding(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
krb5_boolean check_policy,
const TransitedEncoding *tr,
EncTicketPart *et,
const char *client_realm,
const char *server_realm,
const char *tgt_realm)
{
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
char **realms, **tmp;
unsigned int num_realms;
size_t i;
switch (tr->tr_type) {
case DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS:
break;
case 0:
/*
* Allow empty content of type 0 because that is was Microsoft
* generates in their TGT.
*/
if (tr->contents.length == 0)
break;
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Transited type 0 with non empty content");
return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
default:
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"Unknown transited type: %u", tr->tr_type);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_TRTYPE_NOSUPP;
}
ret = krb5_domain_x500_decode(context,
tr->contents,
&realms,
&num_realms,
client_realm,
server_realm);
if(ret){
krb5_warn(context, ret,
"Decoding transited encoding");
return ret;
}
/*
* If the realm of the presented tgt is neither the client nor the server
* realm, it is a transit realm and must be added to transited set.
*/
if(strcmp(client_realm, tgt_realm) && strcmp(server_realm, tgt_realm)) {
if (num_realms + 1 > UINT_MAX/sizeof(*realms)) {
ret = ERANGE;
goto free_realms;
}
tmp = realloc(realms, (num_realms + 1) * sizeof(*realms));
if(tmp == NULL){
ret = ENOMEM;
goto free_realms;
}
realms = tmp;
realms[num_realms] = strdup(tgt_realm);
if(realms[num_realms] == NULL){
ret = ENOMEM;
goto free_realms;
}
num_realms++;
}
if(num_realms == 0) {
if(strcmp(client_realm, server_realm))
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"cross-realm %s -> %s", client_realm, server_realm);
} else {
size_t l = 0;
char *rs;
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
l += strlen(realms[i]) + 2;
rs = malloc(l);
if(rs != NULL) {
*rs = '\0';
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++) {
if(i > 0)
strlcat(rs, ", ", l);
strlcat(rs, realms[i], l);
}
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
"cross-realm %s -> %s via [%s]",
client_realm, server_realm, rs);
free(rs);
}
}
if(check_policy) {
ret = krb5_check_transited(context, client_realm,
server_realm,
realms, num_realms, NULL);
if(ret) {
krb5_warn(context, ret, "cross-realm %s -> %s",
client_realm, server_realm);
goto free_realms;
}
et->flags.transited_policy_checked = 1;
}
et->transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
ret = krb5_domain_x500_encode(realms, num_realms, &et->transited.contents);
if(ret)
krb5_warn(context, ret, "Encoding transited encoding");
free_realms:
for(i = 0; i < num_realms; i++)
free(realms[i]);
free(realms);
return ret;
}
| 168,325 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const SeekHead::Entry* SeekHead::GetEntry(int idx) const
{
if (idx < 0)
return 0;
if (idx >= m_entry_count)
return 0;
return m_entries + idx;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const SeekHead::Entry* SeekHead::GetEntry(int idx) const
| 174,317 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ip_options_echo(struct ip_options * dopt, struct sk_buff * skb)
{
struct ip_options *sopt;
unsigned char *sptr, *dptr;
int soffset, doffset;
int optlen;
__be32 daddr;
memset(dopt, 0, sizeof(struct ip_options));
sopt = &(IPCB(skb)->opt);
if (sopt->optlen == 0) {
dopt->optlen = 0;
return 0;
}
sptr = skb_network_header(skb);
dptr = dopt->__data;
daddr = skb_rtable(skb)->rt_spec_dst;
if (sopt->rr) {
optlen = sptr[sopt->rr+1];
soffset = sptr[sopt->rr+2];
dopt->rr = dopt->optlen + sizeof(struct iphdr);
memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->rr, optlen);
if (sopt->rr_needaddr && soffset <= optlen) {
if (soffset + 3 > optlen)
return -EINVAL;
dptr[2] = soffset + 4;
dopt->rr_needaddr = 1;
}
dptr += optlen;
dopt->optlen += optlen;
}
if (sopt->ts) {
optlen = sptr[sopt->ts+1];
soffset = sptr[sopt->ts+2];
dopt->ts = dopt->optlen + sizeof(struct iphdr);
memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->ts, optlen);
if (soffset <= optlen) {
if (sopt->ts_needaddr) {
if (soffset + 3 > optlen)
return -EINVAL;
dopt->ts_needaddr = 1;
soffset += 4;
}
if (sopt->ts_needtime) {
if (soffset + 3 > optlen)
return -EINVAL;
if ((dptr[3]&0xF) != IPOPT_TS_PRESPEC) {
dopt->ts_needtime = 1;
soffset += 4;
} else {
dopt->ts_needtime = 0;
if (soffset + 7 <= optlen) {
__be32 addr;
memcpy(&addr, dptr+soffset-1, 4);
if (inet_addr_type(dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev), addr) != RTN_UNICAST) {
dopt->ts_needtime = 1;
soffset += 8;
}
}
}
}
dptr[2] = soffset;
}
dptr += optlen;
dopt->optlen += optlen;
}
if (sopt->srr) {
unsigned char * start = sptr+sopt->srr;
__be32 faddr;
optlen = start[1];
soffset = start[2];
doffset = 0;
if (soffset > optlen)
soffset = optlen + 1;
soffset -= 4;
if (soffset > 3) {
memcpy(&faddr, &start[soffset-1], 4);
for (soffset-=4, doffset=4; soffset > 3; soffset-=4, doffset+=4)
memcpy(&dptr[doffset-1], &start[soffset-1], 4);
/*
* RFC1812 requires to fix illegal source routes.
*/
if (memcmp(&ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&start[soffset + 3], 4) == 0)
doffset -= 4;
}
if (doffset > 3) {
memcpy(&start[doffset-1], &daddr, 4);
dopt->faddr = faddr;
dptr[0] = start[0];
dptr[1] = doffset+3;
dptr[2] = 4;
dptr += doffset+3;
dopt->srr = dopt->optlen + sizeof(struct iphdr);
dopt->optlen += doffset+3;
dopt->is_strictroute = sopt->is_strictroute;
}
}
if (sopt->cipso) {
optlen = sptr[sopt->cipso+1];
dopt->cipso = dopt->optlen+sizeof(struct iphdr);
memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->cipso, optlen);
dptr += optlen;
dopt->optlen += optlen;
}
while (dopt->optlen & 3) {
*dptr++ = IPOPT_END;
dopt->optlen++;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | int ip_options_echo(struct ip_options * dopt, struct sk_buff * skb)
int ip_options_echo(struct ip_options *dopt, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct ip_options *sopt;
unsigned char *sptr, *dptr;
int soffset, doffset;
int optlen;
__be32 daddr;
memset(dopt, 0, sizeof(struct ip_options));
sopt = &(IPCB(skb)->opt);
if (sopt->optlen == 0)
return 0;
sptr = skb_network_header(skb);
dptr = dopt->__data;
daddr = skb_rtable(skb)->rt_spec_dst;
if (sopt->rr) {
optlen = sptr[sopt->rr+1];
soffset = sptr[sopt->rr+2];
dopt->rr = dopt->optlen + sizeof(struct iphdr);
memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->rr, optlen);
if (sopt->rr_needaddr && soffset <= optlen) {
if (soffset + 3 > optlen)
return -EINVAL;
dptr[2] = soffset + 4;
dopt->rr_needaddr = 1;
}
dptr += optlen;
dopt->optlen += optlen;
}
if (sopt->ts) {
optlen = sptr[sopt->ts+1];
soffset = sptr[sopt->ts+2];
dopt->ts = dopt->optlen + sizeof(struct iphdr);
memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->ts, optlen);
if (soffset <= optlen) {
if (sopt->ts_needaddr) {
if (soffset + 3 > optlen)
return -EINVAL;
dopt->ts_needaddr = 1;
soffset += 4;
}
if (sopt->ts_needtime) {
if (soffset + 3 > optlen)
return -EINVAL;
if ((dptr[3]&0xF) != IPOPT_TS_PRESPEC) {
dopt->ts_needtime = 1;
soffset += 4;
} else {
dopt->ts_needtime = 0;
if (soffset + 7 <= optlen) {
__be32 addr;
memcpy(&addr, dptr+soffset-1, 4);
if (inet_addr_type(dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev), addr) != RTN_UNICAST) {
dopt->ts_needtime = 1;
soffset += 8;
}
}
}
}
dptr[2] = soffset;
}
dptr += optlen;
dopt->optlen += optlen;
}
if (sopt->srr) {
unsigned char *start = sptr+sopt->srr;
__be32 faddr;
optlen = start[1];
soffset = start[2];
doffset = 0;
if (soffset > optlen)
soffset = optlen + 1;
soffset -= 4;
if (soffset > 3) {
memcpy(&faddr, &start[soffset-1], 4);
for (soffset-=4, doffset=4; soffset > 3; soffset-=4, doffset+=4)
memcpy(&dptr[doffset-1], &start[soffset-1], 4);
/*
* RFC1812 requires to fix illegal source routes.
*/
if (memcmp(&ip_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&start[soffset + 3], 4) == 0)
doffset -= 4;
}
if (doffset > 3) {
memcpy(&start[doffset-1], &daddr, 4);
dopt->faddr = faddr;
dptr[0] = start[0];
dptr[1] = doffset+3;
dptr[2] = 4;
dptr += doffset+3;
dopt->srr = dopt->optlen + sizeof(struct iphdr);
dopt->optlen += doffset+3;
dopt->is_strictroute = sopt->is_strictroute;
}
}
if (sopt->cipso) {
optlen = sptr[sopt->cipso+1];
dopt->cipso = dopt->optlen+sizeof(struct iphdr);
memcpy(dptr, sptr+sopt->cipso, optlen);
dptr += optlen;
dopt->optlen += optlen;
}
while (dopt->optlen & 3) {
*dptr++ = IPOPT_END;
dopt->optlen++;
}
return 0;
}
| 165,557 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Segment::AppendCluster(Cluster* pCluster)
{
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index >= 0);
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
long& size = m_clusterSize;
assert(size >= count);
const long idx = pCluster->m_index;
assert(idx == m_clusterCount);
if (count >= size)
{
const long n = (size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2*size;
Cluster** const qq = new Cluster*[n];
Cluster** q = qq;
Cluster** p = m_clusters;
Cluster** const pp = p + count;
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_clusters;
m_clusters = qq;
size = n;
}
if (m_clusterPreloadCount > 0)
{
assert(m_clusters);
Cluster** const p = m_clusters + m_clusterCount;
assert(*p);
assert((*p)->m_index < 0);
Cluster** q = p + m_clusterPreloadCount;
assert(q < (m_clusters + size));
for (;;)
{
Cluster** const qq = q - 1;
assert((*qq)->m_index < 0);
*q = *qq;
q = qq;
if (q == p)
break;
}
}
m_clusters[idx] = pCluster;
++m_clusterCount;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Segment::AppendCluster(Cluster* pCluster)
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
long& size = m_clusterSize;
assert(size >= count);
const long idx = pCluster->m_index;
assert(idx == m_clusterCount);
if (count >= size) {
const long n = (size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2 * size;
Cluster** const qq = new Cluster* [n];
Cluster** q = qq;
Cluster** p = m_clusters;
Cluster** const pp = p + count;
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_clusters;
m_clusters = qq;
size = n;
}
| 174,237 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(kvm_rip_read(vcpu), exit_reason,
vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION),
vmx->idt_vectoring_info,
intr_info,
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
KVM_ISA_VMX);
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
return false;
if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
pr_info_ratelimited("%s failed vm entry %x\n", __func__,
vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
return true;
}
switch (exit_reason) {
case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
if (!is_exception(intr_info))
return false;
else if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
return enable_ept;
else if (is_no_device(intr_info) &&
!(vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_TS))
return false;
else if (is_debug(intr_info) &&
vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
return false;
else if (is_breakpoint(intr_info) &&
vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
return false;
return vmcs12->exception_bitmap &
(1u << (intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK));
case EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT:
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_PENDING_INTERRUPT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
if (kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX) == 0xa)
return false;
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_INVD:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_INVLPG:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDPMC:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDTSC: case EXIT_REASON_RDTSCP:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_VMCALL: case EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR:
case EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH: case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST: case EXIT_REASON_VMREAD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME: case EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_VMOFF: case EXIT_REASON_VMON:
case EXIT_REASON_INVEPT: case EXIT_REASON_INVVPID:
/*
* VMX instructions trap unconditionally. This allows L1 to
* emulate them for its L2 guest, i.e., allows 3-level nesting!
*/
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_CR_ACCESS:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_DR_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_GDTR_IDTR: case EXIT_REASON_LDTR_TR:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ:
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(vcpu, vmcs12, exit_reason);
case EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_MWAIT_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG);
case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_PAUSE_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING) ||
nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY:
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW);
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES);
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED:
/* apic_write and eoi_induced should exit unconditionally. */
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
/*
* L0 always deals with the EPT violation. If nested EPT is
* used, and the nested mmu code discovers that the address is
* missing in the guest EPT table (EPT12), the EPT violation
* will be injected with nested_ept_inject_page_fault()
*/
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG:
/*
* L2 never uses directly L1's EPT, but rather L0's own EPT
* table (shadow on EPT) or a merged EPT table that L0 built
* (EPT on EPT). So any problems with the structure of the
* table is L0's fault.
*/
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_WBINVD:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_XSETBV:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_XSAVES: case EXIT_REASON_XRSTORS:
/*
* This should never happen, since it is not possible to
* set XSS to a non-zero value---neither in L1 nor in L2.
* If if it were, XSS would have to be checked against
* the XSS exit bitmap in vmcs12.
*/
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES);
case EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER:
return false;
default:
return true;
}
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
trace_kvm_nested_vmexit(kvm_rip_read(vcpu), exit_reason,
vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION),
vmx->idt_vectoring_info,
intr_info,
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
KVM_ISA_VMX);
if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending)
return false;
if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
pr_info_ratelimited("%s failed vm entry %x\n", __func__,
vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
return true;
}
switch (exit_reason) {
case EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI:
if (is_nmi(intr_info))
return false;
else if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
return enable_ept;
else if (is_no_device(intr_info) &&
!(vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_TS))
return false;
else if (is_debug(intr_info) &&
vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
return false;
else if (is_breakpoint(intr_info) &&
vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
return false;
return vmcs12->exception_bitmap &
(1u << (intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK));
case EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT:
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_PENDING_INTERRUPT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_INTR_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING);
case EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
if (kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX) == 0xa)
return false;
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_INVD:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_INVLPG:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDPMC:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_RDTSC: case EXIT_REASON_RDTSCP:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_RDTSC_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_VMCALL: case EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR:
case EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH: case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST: case EXIT_REASON_VMREAD:
case EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME: case EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_VMOFF: case EXIT_REASON_VMON:
case EXIT_REASON_INVEPT: case EXIT_REASON_INVVPID:
/*
* VMX instructions trap unconditionally. This allows L1 to
* emulate them for its L2 guest, i.e., allows 3-level nesting!
*/
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_CR_ACCESS:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_DR_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(vcpu, vmcs12);
case EXIT_REASON_GDTR_IDTR: case EXIT_REASON_LDTR_TR:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ:
case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
return nested_vmx_exit_handled_msr(vcpu, vmcs12, exit_reason);
case EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_MWAIT_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG);
case EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_PAUSE_INSTRUCTION:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_PAUSE_EXITING) ||
nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY:
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD:
return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW);
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES);
case EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE:
case EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED:
/* apic_write and eoi_induced should exit unconditionally. */
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
/*
* L0 always deals with the EPT violation. If nested EPT is
* used, and the nested mmu code discovers that the address is
* missing in the guest EPT table (EPT12), the EPT violation
* will be injected with nested_ept_inject_page_fault()
*/
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG:
/*
* L2 never uses directly L1's EPT, but rather L0's own EPT
* table (shadow on EPT) or a merged EPT table that L0 built
* (EPT on EPT). So any problems with the structure of the
* table is L0's fault.
*/
return false;
case EXIT_REASON_WBINVD:
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING);
case EXIT_REASON_XSETBV:
return true;
case EXIT_REASON_XSAVES: case EXIT_REASON_XRSTORS:
/*
* This should never happen, since it is not possible to
* set XSS to a non-zero value---neither in L1 nor in L2.
* If if it were, XSS would have to be checked against
* the XSS exit bitmap in vmcs12.
*/
return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES);
case EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER:
return false;
default:
return true;
}
}
| 166,856 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int mem_check_range(struct rxe_mem *mem, u64 iova, size_t length)
{
switch (mem->type) {
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_DMA:
return 0;
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_MR:
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_FMR:
return ((iova < mem->iova) ||
((iova + length) > (mem->iova + mem->length))) ?
-EFAULT : 0;
default:
return -EFAULT;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/rxe: Fix mem_check_range integer overflow
Update the range check to avoid integer-overflow in edge case.
Resolves CVE 2016-8636.
Signed-off-by: Eyal Itkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | int mem_check_range(struct rxe_mem *mem, u64 iova, size_t length)
{
switch (mem->type) {
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_DMA:
return 0;
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_MR:
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_FMR:
if (iova < mem->iova ||
length > mem->length ||
iova > mem->iova + mem->length - length)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
default:
return -EFAULT;
}
}
| 168,773 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void parse_content_range(URLContext *h, const char *p)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
const char *slash;
if (!strncmp(p, "bytes ", 6)) {
p += 6;
s->off = strtoll(p, NULL, 10);
if ((slash = strchr(p, '/')) && strlen(slash) > 0)
s->filesize = strtoll(slash + 1, NULL, 10);
}
if (s->seekable == -1 && (!s->is_akamai || s->filesize != 2147483647))
h->is_streamed = 0; /* we _can_ in fact seek */
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <[email protected]>.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void parse_content_range(URLContext *h, const char *p)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
const char *slash;
if (!strncmp(p, "bytes ", 6)) {
p += 6;
s->off = strtoull(p, NULL, 10);
if ((slash = strchr(p, '/')) && strlen(slash) > 0)
s->filesize = strtoull(slash + 1, NULL, 10);
}
if (s->seekable == -1 && (!s->is_akamai || s->filesize != 2147483647))
h->is_streamed = 0; /* we _can_ in fact seek */
}
| 168,503 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int read_data(void *opaque, uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
struct playlist *v = opaque;
HLSContext *c = v->parent->priv_data;
int ret, i;
int just_opened = 0;
restart:
if (!v->needed)
return AVERROR_EOF;
if (!v->input) {
int64_t reload_interval;
struct segment *seg;
/* Check that the playlist is still needed before opening a new
* segment. */
if (v->ctx && v->ctx->nb_streams) {
v->needed = 0;
for (i = 0; i < v->n_main_streams; i++) {
if (v->main_streams[i]->discard < AVDISCARD_ALL) {
v->needed = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!v->needed) {
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_INFO, "No longer receiving playlist %d\n",
v->index);
return AVERROR_EOF;
}
/* If this is a live stream and the reload interval has elapsed since
* the last playlist reload, reload the playlists now. */
reload_interval = default_reload_interval(v);
reload:
if (!v->finished &&
av_gettime_relative() - v->last_load_time >= reload_interval) {
if ((ret = parse_playlist(c, v->url, v, NULL)) < 0) {
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Failed to reload playlist %d\n",
v->index);
return ret;
}
/* If we need to reload the playlist again below (if
* there's still no more segments), switch to a reload
* interval of half the target duration. */
reload_interval = v->target_duration / 2;
}
if (v->cur_seq_no < v->start_seq_no) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"skipping %d segments ahead, expired from playlists\n",
v->start_seq_no - v->cur_seq_no);
v->cur_seq_no = v->start_seq_no;
}
if (v->cur_seq_no >= v->start_seq_no + v->n_segments) {
if (v->finished)
return AVERROR_EOF;
while (av_gettime_relative() - v->last_load_time < reload_interval) {
if (ff_check_interrupt(c->interrupt_callback))
return AVERROR_EXIT;
av_usleep(100*1000);
}
/* Enough time has elapsed since the last reload */
goto reload;
}
seg = current_segment(v);
/* load/update Media Initialization Section, if any */
ret = update_init_section(v, seg);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = open_input(c, v, seg);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ff_check_interrupt(c->interrupt_callback))
return AVERROR_EXIT;
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Failed to open segment of playlist %d\n",
v->index);
v->cur_seq_no += 1;
goto reload;
}
just_opened = 1;
}
if (v->init_sec_buf_read_offset < v->init_sec_data_len) {
/* Push init section out first before first actual segment */
int copy_size = FFMIN(v->init_sec_data_len - v->init_sec_buf_read_offset, buf_size);
memcpy(buf, v->init_sec_buf, copy_size);
v->init_sec_buf_read_offset += copy_size;
return copy_size;
}
ret = read_from_url(v, current_segment(v), buf, buf_size, READ_NORMAL);
if (ret > 0) {
if (just_opened && v->is_id3_timestamped != 0) {
/* Intercept ID3 tags here, elementary audio streams are required
* to convey timestamps using them in the beginning of each segment. */
intercept_id3(v, buf, buf_size, &ret);
}
return ret;
}
ff_format_io_close(v->parent, &v->input);
v->cur_seq_no++;
c->cur_seq_no = v->cur_seq_no;
goto restart;
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | static int read_data(void *opaque, uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
struct playlist *v = opaque;
HLSContext *c = v->parent->priv_data;
int ret, i;
int just_opened = 0;
int reload_count = 0;
restart:
if (!v->needed)
return AVERROR_EOF;
if (!v->input) {
int64_t reload_interval;
struct segment *seg;
/* Check that the playlist is still needed before opening a new
* segment. */
if (v->ctx && v->ctx->nb_streams) {
v->needed = 0;
for (i = 0; i < v->n_main_streams; i++) {
if (v->main_streams[i]->discard < AVDISCARD_ALL) {
v->needed = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!v->needed) {
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_INFO, "No longer receiving playlist %d\n",
v->index);
return AVERROR_EOF;
}
/* If this is a live stream and the reload interval has elapsed since
* the last playlist reload, reload the playlists now. */
reload_interval = default_reload_interval(v);
reload:
reload_count++;
if (reload_count > c->max_reload)
return AVERROR_EOF;
if (!v->finished &&
av_gettime_relative() - v->last_load_time >= reload_interval) {
if ((ret = parse_playlist(c, v->url, v, NULL)) < 0) {
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Failed to reload playlist %d\n",
v->index);
return ret;
}
/* If we need to reload the playlist again below (if
* there's still no more segments), switch to a reload
* interval of half the target duration. */
reload_interval = v->target_duration / 2;
}
if (v->cur_seq_no < v->start_seq_no) {
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"skipping %d segments ahead, expired from playlists\n",
v->start_seq_no - v->cur_seq_no);
v->cur_seq_no = v->start_seq_no;
}
if (v->cur_seq_no >= v->start_seq_no + v->n_segments) {
if (v->finished)
return AVERROR_EOF;
while (av_gettime_relative() - v->last_load_time < reload_interval) {
if (ff_check_interrupt(c->interrupt_callback))
return AVERROR_EXIT;
av_usleep(100*1000);
}
/* Enough time has elapsed since the last reload */
goto reload;
}
seg = current_segment(v);
/* load/update Media Initialization Section, if any */
ret = update_init_section(v, seg);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = open_input(c, v, seg);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ff_check_interrupt(c->interrupt_callback))
return AVERROR_EXIT;
av_log(v->parent, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Failed to open segment of playlist %d\n",
v->index);
v->cur_seq_no += 1;
goto reload;
}
just_opened = 1;
}
if (v->init_sec_buf_read_offset < v->init_sec_data_len) {
/* Push init section out first before first actual segment */
int copy_size = FFMIN(v->init_sec_data_len - v->init_sec_buf_read_offset, buf_size);
memcpy(buf, v->init_sec_buf, copy_size);
v->init_sec_buf_read_offset += copy_size;
return copy_size;
}
ret = read_from_url(v, current_segment(v), buf, buf_size, READ_NORMAL);
if (ret > 0) {
if (just_opened && v->is_id3_timestamped != 0) {
/* Intercept ID3 tags here, elementary audio streams are required
* to convey timestamps using them in the beginning of each segment. */
intercept_id3(v, buf, buf_size, &ret);
}
return ret;
}
ff_format_io_close(v->parent, &v->input);
v->cur_seq_no++;
c->cur_seq_no = v->cur_seq_no;
goto restart;
}
| 167,774 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport void *AcquireAlignedMemory(const size_t count,const size_t quantum)
{
#define AlignedExtent(size,alignment) \
(((size)+((alignment)-1)) & ~((alignment)-1))
size_t
alignment,
extent,
size;
void
*memory;
if (CheckMemoryOverflow(count,quantum) != MagickFalse)
return((void *) NULL);
memory=NULL;
alignment=CACHE_LINE_SIZE;
size=count*quantum;
extent=AlignedExtent(size,alignment);
if ((size == 0) || (alignment < sizeof(void *)) || (extent < size))
return((void *) NULL);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_POSIX_MEMALIGN)
if (posix_memalign(&memory,alignment,extent) != 0)
memory=NULL;
#elif defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE__ALIGNED_MALLOC)
memory=_aligned_malloc(extent,alignment);
#else
{
void
*p;
extent=(size+alignment-1)+sizeof(void *);
if (extent > size)
{
p=malloc(extent);
if (p != NULL)
{
memory=(void *) AlignedExtent((size_t) p+sizeof(void *),alignment);
*((void **) memory-1)=p;
}
}
}
#endif
return(memory);
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119 | MagickExport void *AcquireAlignedMemory(const size_t count,const size_t quantum)
{
#define AlignedExtent(size,alignment) \
(((size)+((alignment)-1)) & ~((alignment)-1))
size_t
alignment,
extent,
size;
void
*memory;
if (HeapOverflowSanityCheck(count,quantum) != MagickFalse)
return((void *) NULL);
memory=NULL;
alignment=CACHE_LINE_SIZE;
size=count*quantum;
extent=AlignedExtent(size,alignment);
if ((size == 0) || (alignment < sizeof(void *)) || (extent < size))
return((void *) NULL);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_POSIX_MEMALIGN)
if (posix_memalign(&memory,alignment,extent) != 0)
memory=NULL;
#elif defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE__ALIGNED_MALLOC)
memory=_aligned_malloc(extent,alignment);
#else
{
void
*p;
extent=(size+alignment-1)+sizeof(void *);
if (extent > size)
{
p=malloc(extent);
if (p != NULL)
{
memory=(void *) AlignedExtent((size_t) p+sizeof(void *),alignment);
*((void **) memory-1)=p;
}
}
}
#endif
return(memory);
}
| 168,542 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool TokenExitsSVG(const CompactHTMLToken& token) {
return DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(token.Data(),
SVGNames::foreignObjectTag.LocalName());
}
Commit Message: HTML parser: Fix "HTML integration point" implementation in HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator.
HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator assumed only <foreignObject> as an HTML
integration point. This CL adds <annotation-xml>, <desc>, and SVG
<title>.
Bug: 805924
Change-Id: I6793d9163d4c6bc8bf0790415baedddaac7a1fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964038
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543634}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | static bool TokenExitsSVG(const CompactHTMLToken& token) {
| 173,255 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void IBusBusConnectedCallback(IBusBus* bus, gpointer user_data) {
LOG(WARNING) << "IBus connection is recovered.";
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->MaybeRestoreConnections();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void IBusBusConnectedCallback(IBusBus* bus, gpointer user_data) {
void IBusBusConnected(IBusBus* bus) {
LOG(WARNING) << "IBus connection is recovered.";
MaybeRestoreConnections();
}
| 170,536 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void copy_xauthority(void) {
char *src = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE ;
char *dest;
if (asprintf(&dest, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
if (is_link(dest)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s is a symbolic link\n", dest);
exit(1);
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .Xauthority in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
if (chown(dest, getuid(), getgid()) < 0)
errExit("chown");
if (chmod(dest, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) < 0)
errExit("chmod");
unlink(src);
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | static void copy_xauthority(void) {
char *src = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE ;
char *dest;
if (asprintf(&dest, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
if (is_link(dest)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s is a symbolic link\n", dest);
exit(1);
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); // regular user
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
unlink(src);
}
| 170,097 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Array> V8Debugger::internalProperties(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Value> value)
{
v8::Local<v8::Array> properties;
if (!v8::Debug::GetInternalProperties(m_isolate, value).ToLocal(&properties))
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Array>();
if (value->IsFunction()) {
v8::Local<v8::Function> function = value.As<v8::Function>();
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = functionLocation(context, function);
if (location->IsObject()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[FunctionLocation]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), location);
}
if (function->IsGeneratorFunction()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[IsGenerator]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), v8::True(m_isolate));
}
}
if (!enabled())
return properties;
if (value->IsMap() || value->IsWeakMap() || value->IsSet() || value->IsWeakSet() || value->IsSetIterator() || value->IsMapIterator()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> entries = collectionEntries(context, v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value));
if (entries->IsArray()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[Entries]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), entries);
}
}
if (value->IsGeneratorObject()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = generatorObjectLocation(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value));
if (location->IsObject()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[GeneratorLocation]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), location);
}
}
if (value->IsFunction()) {
v8::Local<v8::Function> function = value.As<v8::Function>();
v8::Local<v8::Value> boundFunction = function->GetBoundFunction();
v8::Local<v8::Value> scopes;
if (boundFunction->IsUndefined() && functionScopes(function).ToLocal(&scopes)) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[Scopes]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), scopes);
}
}
return properties;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Array> V8Debugger::internalProperties(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Value> value)
{
v8::Local<v8::Array> properties;
if (!v8::Debug::GetInternalProperties(m_isolate, value).ToLocal(&properties))
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Array>();
if (value->IsFunction()) {
v8::Local<v8::Function> function = value.As<v8::Function>();
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = functionLocation(context, function);
if (location->IsObject()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[FunctionLocation]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), location);
}
if (function->IsGeneratorFunction()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[IsGenerator]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), v8::True(m_isolate));
}
}
if (!enabled())
return properties;
if (value->IsMap() || value->IsWeakMap() || value->IsSet() || value->IsWeakSet() || value->IsSetIterator() || value->IsMapIterator()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> entries = collectionEntries(context, v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value));
if (entries->IsArray()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[Entries]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), entries);
}
}
if (value->IsGeneratorObject()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> location = generatorObjectLocation(context, v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value));
if (location->IsObject()) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[GeneratorLocation]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), location);
}
}
if (value->IsFunction()) {
v8::Local<v8::Function> function = value.As<v8::Function>();
v8::Local<v8::Value> boundFunction = function->GetBoundFunction();
v8::Local<v8::Value> scopes;
if (boundFunction->IsUndefined() && functionScopes(context, function).ToLocal(&scopes)) {
properties->Set(properties->Length(), toV8StringInternalized(m_isolate, "[[Scopes]]"));
properties->Set(properties->Length(), scopes);
}
}
return properties;
}
| 172,068 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: l2tp_q931_cc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
print_16bits_val(ndo, (const uint16_t *)dat);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %02x", dat[2]));
if (length > 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
print_string(ndo, dat+3, length-3);
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | l2tp_q931_cc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
if (length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
print_16bits_val(ndo, (const uint16_t *)dat);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %02x", dat[2]));
dat += 3;
length -= 3;
if (length != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
print_string(ndo, dat, length);
}
}
| 167,901 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetEntryURL(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK(args.Length() == 1);
CHECK(args[0]->IsObject());
const blink::WebURL& url =
blink::WebDOMFileSystem::createFileSystemURL(args[0]);
args.GetReturnValue().Set(v8_helpers::ToV8StringUnsafe(
args.GetIsolate(), url.string().utf8().c_str()));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | void FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetEntryURL(
void FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetExternalFileEntryCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
GetExternalFileEntry(args, context());
}
| 173,272 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::getConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexConfigCommonOutputCrop:
{
OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE *rectParams = (OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE *)params;
if (rectParams->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
rectParams->nLeft = mCropLeft;
rectParams->nTop = mCropTop;
rectParams->nWidth = mCropWidth;
rectParams->nHeight = mCropHeight;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::getConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexConfigCommonOutputCrop:
{
OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE *rectParams = (OMX_CONFIG_RECTTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(rectParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (rectParams->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
rectParams->nLeft = mCropLeft;
rectParams->nTop = mCropTop;
rectParams->nWidth = mCropWidth;
rectParams->nHeight = mCropHeight;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
| 174,224 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const Block* BlockGroup::GetBlock() const
{
return &m_block;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const Block* BlockGroup::GetBlock() const
| 174,286 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ProcessHeap::Init() {
total_allocated_space_ = 0;
total_allocated_object_size_ = 0;
total_marked_object_size_ = 0;
GCInfoTable::Init();
base::SamplingHeapProfiler::SetHooksInstallCallback([]() {
HeapAllocHooks::SetAllocationHook(&BlinkGCAllocHook);
HeapAllocHooks::SetFreeHook(&BlinkGCFreeHook);
});
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void ProcessHeap::Init() {
total_allocated_space_ = 0;
total_allocated_object_size_ = 0;
total_marked_object_size_ = 0;
base::SamplingHeapProfiler::SetHooksInstallCallback([]() {
HeapAllocHooks::SetAllocationHook(&BlinkGCAllocHook);
HeapAllocHooks::SetFreeHook(&BlinkGCFreeHook);
});
}
| 173,142 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t SampleIterator::seekTo(uint32_t sampleIndex) {
ALOGV("seekTo(%d)", sampleIndex);
if (sampleIndex >= mTable->mNumSampleSizes) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
if (mTable->mSampleToChunkOffset < 0
|| mTable->mChunkOffsetOffset < 0
|| mTable->mSampleSizeOffset < 0
|| mTable->mTimeToSampleCount == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mInitialized && mCurrentSampleIndex == sampleIndex) {
return OK;
}
if (!mInitialized || sampleIndex < mFirstChunkSampleIndex) {
reset();
}
if (sampleIndex >= mStopChunkSampleIndex) {
status_t err;
if ((err = findChunkRange(sampleIndex)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findChunkRange failed");
return err;
}
}
CHECK(sampleIndex < mStopChunkSampleIndex);
if (mSamplesPerChunk == 0) {
ALOGE("b/22802344");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t chunk =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) / mSamplesPerChunk
+ mFirstChunk;
if (!mInitialized || chunk != mCurrentChunkIndex) {
mCurrentChunkIndex = chunk;
status_t err;
if ((err = getChunkOffset(chunk, &mCurrentChunkOffset)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getChunkOffset return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.clear();
uint32_t firstChunkSampleIndex =
mFirstChunkSampleIndex
+ mSamplesPerChunk * (mCurrentChunkIndex - mFirstChunk);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSamplesPerChunk; ++i) {
size_t sampleSize;
if ((err = getSampleSizeDirect(
firstChunkSampleIndex + i, &sampleSize)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getSampleSizeDirect return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.push(sampleSize);
}
}
uint32_t chunkRelativeSampleIndex =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) % mSamplesPerChunk;
mCurrentSampleOffset = mCurrentChunkOffset;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < chunkRelativeSampleIndex; ++i) {
mCurrentSampleOffset += mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[i];
}
mCurrentSampleSize = mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[chunkRelativeSampleIndex];
if (sampleIndex < mTTSSampleIndex) {
mTimeToSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleTime = 0;
mTTSCount = 0;
mTTSDuration = 0;
}
status_t err;
if ((err = findSampleTimeAndDuration(
sampleIndex, &mCurrentSampleTime, &mCurrentSampleDuration)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findSampleTime return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentSampleIndex = sampleIndex;
mInitialized = true;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: SampleIterator: clear members on seekTo error
Bug: 31091777
Change-Id: Iddf99d0011961d0fd3d755e57db4365b6a6a1193
(cherry picked from commit 03237ce0f9584c98ccda76c2474a4ae84c763f5b)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t SampleIterator::seekTo(uint32_t sampleIndex) {
ALOGV("seekTo(%d)", sampleIndex);
if (sampleIndex >= mTable->mNumSampleSizes) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
if (mTable->mSampleToChunkOffset < 0
|| mTable->mChunkOffsetOffset < 0
|| mTable->mSampleSizeOffset < 0
|| mTable->mTimeToSampleCount == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mInitialized && mCurrentSampleIndex == sampleIndex) {
return OK;
}
if (!mInitialized || sampleIndex < mFirstChunkSampleIndex) {
reset();
}
if (sampleIndex >= mStopChunkSampleIndex) {
status_t err;
if ((err = findChunkRange(sampleIndex)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findChunkRange failed");
return err;
}
}
CHECK(sampleIndex < mStopChunkSampleIndex);
if (mSamplesPerChunk == 0) {
ALOGE("b/22802344");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t chunk =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) / mSamplesPerChunk
+ mFirstChunk;
if (!mInitialized || chunk != mCurrentChunkIndex) {
status_t err;
if ((err = getChunkOffset(chunk, &mCurrentChunkOffset)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getChunkOffset return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.clear();
uint32_t firstChunkSampleIndex =
mFirstChunkSampleIndex
+ mSamplesPerChunk * (chunk - mFirstChunk);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSamplesPerChunk; ++i) {
size_t sampleSize;
if ((err = getSampleSizeDirect(
firstChunkSampleIndex + i, &sampleSize)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getSampleSizeDirect return error");
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.clear();
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.push(sampleSize);
}
mCurrentChunkIndex = chunk;
}
uint32_t chunkRelativeSampleIndex =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) % mSamplesPerChunk;
mCurrentSampleOffset = mCurrentChunkOffset;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < chunkRelativeSampleIndex; ++i) {
mCurrentSampleOffset += mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[i];
}
mCurrentSampleSize = mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[chunkRelativeSampleIndex];
if (sampleIndex < mTTSSampleIndex) {
mTimeToSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleTime = 0;
mTTSCount = 0;
mTTSDuration = 0;
}
status_t err;
if ((err = findSampleTimeAndDuration(
sampleIndex, &mCurrentSampleTime, &mCurrentSampleDuration)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findSampleTime return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentSampleIndex = sampleIndex;
mInitialized = true;
return OK;
}
| 173,378 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: M_bool M_fs_path_ishidden(const char *path, M_fs_info_t *info)
{
M_list_str_t *path_parts;
size_t len;
M_bool ret = M_FALSE;
(void)info;
if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
return M_FALSE;
}
/* Hidden. Check if the first character of the last part of the path. Either the file or directory name itself
* starts with a '.'. */
path_parts = M_fs_path_componentize_path(path, M_FS_SYSTEM_UNIX);
len = M_list_str_len(path_parts);
if (len > 0) {
if (*M_list_str_at(path_parts, len-1) == '.') {
ret = M_TRUE;
}
}
M_list_str_destroy(path_parts);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732 | M_bool M_fs_path_ishidden(const char *path, M_fs_info_t *info)
{
M_list_str_t *path_parts;
size_t len;
M_bool ret = M_FALSE;
(void)info;
if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
return M_FALSE;
}
/* Hidden. Check if the first character of the last part of the path. Either the file or directory name itself
* starts with a '.'. */
path_parts = M_fs_path_componentize_path(path, M_FS_SYSTEM_UNIX);
len = M_list_str_len(path_parts);
if (len > 0) {
if (*M_list_str_at(path_parts, len-1) == '.') {
ret = M_TRUE;
}
}
M_list_str_destroy(path_parts);
return ret;
}
| 169,145 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void xen_netbk_fill_frags(struct xen_netbk *netbk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
int nr_frags = shinfo->nr_frags;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_frags; i++) {
skb_frag_t *frag = shinfo->frags + i;
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp;
struct page *page;
u16 pending_idx;
pending_idx = frag_get_pending_idx(frag);
txp = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
page = virt_to_page(idx_to_kaddr(netbk, pending_idx));
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, txp->offset, txp->size);
skb->len += txp->size;
skb->data_len += txp->size;
skb->truesize += txp->size;
/* Take an extra reference to offset xen_netbk_idx_release */
get_page(netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx]);
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx);
}
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void xen_netbk_fill_frags(struct xen_netbk *netbk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
int nr_frags = shinfo->nr_frags;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_frags; i++) {
skb_frag_t *frag = shinfo->frags + i;
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp;
struct page *page;
u16 pending_idx;
pending_idx = frag_get_pending_idx(frag);
txp = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
page = virt_to_page(idx_to_kaddr(netbk, pending_idx));
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, txp->offset, txp->size);
skb->len += txp->size;
skb->data_len += txp->size;
skb->truesize += txp->size;
/* Take an extra reference to offset xen_netbk_idx_release */
get_page(netbk->mmap_pages[pending_idx]);
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx, XEN_NETIF_RSP_OKAY);
}
}
| 166,167 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xps_true_callback_glyph_name(gs_font *pfont, gs_glyph glyph, gs_const_string *pstr)
{
/* This function is copied verbatim from plfont.c */
int table_length;
int table_offset;
ulong format;
uint numGlyphs;
uint glyph_name_index;
const byte *postp; /* post table pointer */
/* guess if the font type is not truetype */
if ( pfont->FontType != ft_TrueType )
{
pstr->size = strlen((char*)pstr->data);
return 0;
}
else
{
return gs_throw1(-1, "glyph index %lu out of range", (ulong)glyph);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xps_true_callback_glyph_name(gs_font *pfont, gs_glyph glyph, gs_const_string *pstr)
{
/* This function is copied verbatim from plfont.c */
int table_length;
int table_offset;
ulong format;
int numGlyphs;
uint glyph_name_index;
const byte *postp; /* post table pointer */
if (glyph >= GS_MIN_GLYPH_INDEX) {
glyph -= GS_MIN_GLYPH_INDEX;
}
/* guess if the font type is not truetype */
if ( pfont->FontType != ft_TrueType )
{
pstr->size = strlen((char*)pstr->data);
return 0;
}
else
{
return gs_throw1(-1, "glyph index %lu out of range", (ulong)glyph);
}
}
| 164,784 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> PersistentHistogramAllocator::CreateHistogram(
PersistentHistogramData* histogram_data_ptr) {
if (!histogram_data_ptr) {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_INVALID_METADATA_POINTER);
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
if (histogram_data_ptr->histogram_type == SPARSE_HISTOGRAM) {
std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> histogram =
SparseHistogram::PersistentCreate(this, histogram_data_ptr->name,
&histogram_data_ptr->samples_metadata,
&histogram_data_ptr->logged_metadata);
DCHECK(histogram);
histogram->SetFlags(histogram_data_ptr->flags);
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_SUCCESS);
return histogram;
}
int32_t histogram_type = histogram_data_ptr->histogram_type;
int32_t histogram_flags = histogram_data_ptr->flags;
int32_t histogram_minimum = histogram_data_ptr->minimum;
int32_t histogram_maximum = histogram_data_ptr->maximum;
uint32_t histogram_bucket_count = histogram_data_ptr->bucket_count;
uint32_t histogram_ranges_ref = histogram_data_ptr->ranges_ref;
uint32_t histogram_ranges_checksum = histogram_data_ptr->ranges_checksum;
HistogramBase::Sample* ranges_data =
memory_allocator_->GetAsArray<HistogramBase::Sample>(
histogram_ranges_ref, kTypeIdRangesArray,
PersistentMemoryAllocator::kSizeAny);
const uint32_t max_buckets =
std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max() / sizeof(HistogramBase::Sample);
size_t required_bytes =
(histogram_bucket_count + 1) * sizeof(HistogramBase::Sample);
size_t allocated_bytes =
memory_allocator_->GetAllocSize(histogram_ranges_ref);
if (!ranges_data || histogram_bucket_count < 2 ||
histogram_bucket_count >= max_buckets ||
allocated_bytes < required_bytes) {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_INVALID_RANGES_ARRAY);
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
std::unique_ptr<const BucketRanges> created_ranges = CreateRangesFromData(
ranges_data, histogram_ranges_checksum, histogram_bucket_count + 1);
if (!created_ranges) {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_INVALID_RANGES_ARRAY);
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
const BucketRanges* ranges =
StatisticsRecorder::RegisterOrDeleteDuplicateRanges(
created_ranges.release());
size_t counts_bytes = CalculateRequiredCountsBytes(histogram_bucket_count);
PersistentMemoryAllocator::Reference counts_ref =
subtle::Acquire_Load(&histogram_data_ptr->counts_ref);
if (counts_bytes == 0 ||
(counts_ref != 0 &&
memory_allocator_->GetAllocSize(counts_ref) < counts_bytes)) {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_INVALID_COUNTS_ARRAY);
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
DelayedPersistentAllocation counts_data(memory_allocator_.get(),
&histogram_data_ptr->counts_ref,
kTypeIdCountsArray, counts_bytes, 0);
DelayedPersistentAllocation logged_data(
memory_allocator_.get(), &histogram_data_ptr->counts_ref,
kTypeIdCountsArray, counts_bytes, counts_bytes / 2,
/*make_iterable=*/false);
const char* name = histogram_data_ptr->name;
std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> histogram;
switch (histogram_type) {
case HISTOGRAM:
histogram = Histogram::PersistentCreate(
name, histogram_minimum, histogram_maximum, ranges, counts_data,
logged_data, &histogram_data_ptr->samples_metadata,
&histogram_data_ptr->logged_metadata);
DCHECK(histogram);
break;
case LINEAR_HISTOGRAM:
histogram = LinearHistogram::PersistentCreate(
name, histogram_minimum, histogram_maximum, ranges, counts_data,
logged_data, &histogram_data_ptr->samples_metadata,
&histogram_data_ptr->logged_metadata);
DCHECK(histogram);
break;
case BOOLEAN_HISTOGRAM:
histogram = BooleanHistogram::PersistentCreate(
name, ranges, counts_data, logged_data,
&histogram_data_ptr->samples_metadata,
&histogram_data_ptr->logged_metadata);
DCHECK(histogram);
break;
case CUSTOM_HISTOGRAM:
histogram = CustomHistogram::PersistentCreate(
name, ranges, counts_data, logged_data,
&histogram_data_ptr->samples_metadata,
&histogram_data_ptr->logged_metadata);
DCHECK(histogram);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
if (histogram) {
DCHECK_EQ(histogram_type, histogram->GetHistogramType());
histogram->SetFlags(histogram_flags);
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_SUCCESS);
} else {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_UNKNOWN_TYPE);
}
return histogram;
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> PersistentHistogramAllocator::CreateHistogram(
PersistentHistogramData* histogram_data_ptr) {
if (!histogram_data_ptr) {
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
if (histogram_data_ptr->histogram_type == SPARSE_HISTOGRAM) {
std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> histogram =
SparseHistogram::PersistentCreate(this, histogram_data_ptr->name,
&histogram_data_ptr->samples_metadata,
&histogram_data_ptr->logged_metadata);
DCHECK(histogram);
histogram->SetFlags(histogram_data_ptr->flags);
return histogram;
}
int32_t histogram_type = histogram_data_ptr->histogram_type;
int32_t histogram_flags = histogram_data_ptr->flags;
int32_t histogram_minimum = histogram_data_ptr->minimum;
int32_t histogram_maximum = histogram_data_ptr->maximum;
uint32_t histogram_bucket_count = histogram_data_ptr->bucket_count;
uint32_t histogram_ranges_ref = histogram_data_ptr->ranges_ref;
uint32_t histogram_ranges_checksum = histogram_data_ptr->ranges_checksum;
HistogramBase::Sample* ranges_data =
memory_allocator_->GetAsArray<HistogramBase::Sample>(
histogram_ranges_ref, kTypeIdRangesArray,
PersistentMemoryAllocator::kSizeAny);
const uint32_t max_buckets =
std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max() / sizeof(HistogramBase::Sample);
size_t required_bytes =
(histogram_bucket_count + 1) * sizeof(HistogramBase::Sample);
size_t allocated_bytes =
memory_allocator_->GetAllocSize(histogram_ranges_ref);
if (!ranges_data || histogram_bucket_count < 2 ||
histogram_bucket_count >= max_buckets ||
allocated_bytes < required_bytes) {
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
std::unique_ptr<const BucketRanges> created_ranges = CreateRangesFromData(
ranges_data, histogram_ranges_checksum, histogram_bucket_count + 1);
if (!created_ranges) {
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
const BucketRanges* ranges =
StatisticsRecorder::RegisterOrDeleteDuplicateRanges(
created_ranges.release());
size_t counts_bytes = CalculateRequiredCountsBytes(histogram_bucket_count);
PersistentMemoryAllocator::Reference counts_ref =
subtle::Acquire_Load(&histogram_data_ptr->counts_ref);
if (counts_bytes == 0 ||
(counts_ref != 0 &&
memory_allocator_->GetAllocSize(counts_ref) < counts_bytes)) {
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
DelayedPersistentAllocation counts_data(memory_allocator_.get(),
&histogram_data_ptr->counts_ref,
kTypeIdCountsArray, counts_bytes, 0);
DelayedPersistentAllocation logged_data(
memory_allocator_.get(), &histogram_data_ptr->counts_ref,
kTypeIdCountsArray, counts_bytes, counts_bytes / 2,
/*make_iterable=*/false);
const char* name = histogram_data_ptr->name;
std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> histogram;
switch (histogram_type) {
case HISTOGRAM:
histogram = Histogram::PersistentCreate(
name, histogram_minimum, histogram_maximum, ranges, counts_data,
logged_data, &histogram_data_ptr->samples_metadata,
&histogram_data_ptr->logged_metadata);
DCHECK(histogram);
break;
case LINEAR_HISTOGRAM:
histogram = LinearHistogram::PersistentCreate(
name, histogram_minimum, histogram_maximum, ranges, counts_data,
logged_data, &histogram_data_ptr->samples_metadata,
&histogram_data_ptr->logged_metadata);
DCHECK(histogram);
break;
case BOOLEAN_HISTOGRAM:
histogram = BooleanHistogram::PersistentCreate(
name, ranges, counts_data, logged_data,
&histogram_data_ptr->samples_metadata,
&histogram_data_ptr->logged_metadata);
DCHECK(histogram);
break;
case CUSTOM_HISTOGRAM:
histogram = CustomHistogram::PersistentCreate(
name, ranges, counts_data, logged_data,
&histogram_data_ptr->samples_metadata,
&histogram_data_ptr->logged_metadata);
DCHECK(histogram);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
if (histogram) {
DCHECK_EQ(histogram_type, histogram->GetHistogramType());
histogram->SetFlags(histogram_flags);
}
return histogram;
}
| 172,132 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnPreviewDataIsAvailable(int expected_pages_count,
int preview_request_id) {
VLOG(1) << "Print preview request finished with "
<< expected_pages_count << " pages";
if (!initial_preview_start_time_.is_null()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("PrintPreview.InitialDisplayTime",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - initial_preview_start_time_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("PrintPreview.PageCount.Initial",
expected_pages_count);
initial_preview_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks();
}
base::StringValue ui_identifier(preview_ui_addr_str_);
base::FundamentalValue ui_preview_request_id(preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("updatePrintPreview", ui_identifier,
ui_preview_request_id);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void PrintPreviewUI::OnPreviewDataIsAvailable(int expected_pages_count,
int preview_request_id) {
VLOG(1) << "Print preview request finished with "
<< expected_pages_count << " pages";
if (!initial_preview_start_time_.is_null()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("PrintPreview.InitialDisplayTime",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - initial_preview_start_time_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("PrintPreview.PageCount.Initial",
expected_pages_count);
initial_preview_start_time_ = base::TimeTicks();
}
base::FundamentalValue ui_identifier(id_);
base::FundamentalValue ui_preview_request_id(preview_request_id);
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("updatePrintPreview", ui_identifier,
ui_preview_request_id);
}
| 170,838 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng = &rng_ctx;
unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_mpi h;
if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
ECDSA_RS_ENTER( det );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
{
/* redirect to our context */
p_rng = &rs_ctx->det->rng_ctx;
/* jump to current step */
if( rs_ctx->det->state == ecdsa_det_sign )
goto sign;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
rs_ctx->det->state = ecdsa_det_sign;
sign:
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng );
#else
ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, rs_ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
cleanup:
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );
ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( det );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng_blind,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng = &rng_ctx;
unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
mbedtls_mpi h;
if( ( md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
ECDSA_RS_ENTER( det );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
{
/* redirect to our context */
p_rng = &rs_ctx->det->rng_ctx;
/* jump to current step */
if( rs_ctx->det->state == ecdsa_det_sign )
goto sign;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
rs_ctx->det->state = ecdsa_det_sign;
sign:
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng );
#else
if( f_rng_blind != NULL )
ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx );
else
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng_blind_det;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* To avoid reusing rng_ctx and risking incorrect behavior we seed a
* second HMAC-DRBG with the same seed. We also apply a label to avoid
* reusing the bits of the ephemeral key for blinding and eliminate the
* risk that they leak this way.
*/
const char* blind_label = "BLINDING CONTEXT";
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx_blind;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx_blind );
p_rng_blind_det = &rng_ctx_blind;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng_blind_det, md_info,
data, 2 * grp_len );
ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret( p_rng_blind_det,
(const unsigned char*) blind_label,
strlen( blind_label ) );
if( ret != 0 )
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
goto cleanup;
}
#else
/*
* In the case of restartable computations we would either need to store
* the second RNG in the restart context too or set it up at every
* restart. The first option would penalize the correct application of
* the function and the second would defeat the purpose of the
* restartable feature.
*
* Therefore in this case we reuse the original RNG. This comes with the
* price that the resulting signature might not be a valid deterministic
* ECDSA signature with a very low probability (same magnitude as
* successfully guessing the private key). However even then it is still
* a valid ECDSA signature.
*/
p_rng_blind_det = p_rng;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/*
* Since the output of the RNGs is always the same for the same key and
* message, this limits the efficiency of blinding and leaks information
* through side channels. After mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det() is removed NULL
* won't be a valid value for f_rng_blind anymore. Therefore it should
* be checked by the caller and this branch and check can be removed.
*/
ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng_blind_det,
rs_ctx );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx_blind );
#endif
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
cleanup:
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );
ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( det );
return( ret );
}
| 169,505 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void uwbd_start(struct uwb_rc *rc)
{
rc->uwbd.task = kthread_run(uwbd, rc, "uwbd");
if (rc->uwbd.task == NULL)
printk(KERN_ERR "UWB: Cannot start management daemon; "
"UWB won't work\n");
else
rc->uwbd.pid = rc->uwbd.task->pid;
}
Commit Message: uwb: properly check kthread_run return value
uwbd_start() calls kthread_run() and checks that the return value is
not NULL. But the return value is not NULL in case kthread_run() fails,
it takes the form of ERR_PTR(-EINTR).
Use IS_ERR() instead.
Also add a check to uwbd_stop().
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void uwbd_start(struct uwb_rc *rc)
{
struct task_struct *task = kthread_run(uwbd, rc, "uwbd");
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
rc->uwbd.task = NULL;
printk(KERN_ERR "UWB: Cannot start management daemon; "
"UWB won't work\n");
} else {
rc->uwbd.task = task;
rc->uwbd.pid = rc->uwbd.task->pid;
}
}
| 167,685 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (state_ == WORKER_READY) {
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SetDevToolsAttachedOnIO,
context_weak_, version_id_, true));
}
session->SetRenderer(worker_process_id_, nullptr);
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
}
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
bool ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (state_ == WORKER_READY) {
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SetDevToolsAttachedOnIO,
context_weak_, version_id_, true));
}
session->SetRenderer(worker_process_id_, nullptr);
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
}
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
return true;
}
| 173,251 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int Downmix_Reset(downmix_object_t *pDownmixer, bool init) {
return 0;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int Downmix_Reset(downmix_object_t *pDownmixer, bool init) {
int Downmix_Reset(downmix_object_t *pDownmixer __unused, bool init __unused) {
return 0;
}
| 173,345 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: FileEntrySync* DirectoryEntrySync::getFile(const String& path, const Dictionary& options, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
FileSystemFlags flags(options);
RefPtr<EntrySyncCallbackHelper> helper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->getFile(this, path, flags, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return static_cast<FileEntrySync*>(helper->getResult(exceptionState));
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | FileEntrySync* DirectoryEntrySync::getFile(const String& path, const Dictionary& options, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
FileSystemFlags flags(options);
EntrySyncCallbackHelper* helper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->getFile(this, path, flags, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return static_cast<FileEntrySync*>(helper->getResult(exceptionState));
}
| 171,418 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: rdp_in_unistr(STREAM s, int in_len, char **string, uint32 * str_size)
{
static iconv_t icv_utf16_to_local;
size_t ibl, obl;
char *pin, *pout;
if (!icv_utf16_to_local)
{
icv_utf16_to_local = iconv_open(g_codepage, WINDOWS_CODEPAGE);
if (icv_utf16_to_local == (iconv_t) - 1)
{
logger(Protocol, Error, "rdp_in_unistr(), iconv_open[%s -> %s] fail %p",
WINDOWS_CODEPAGE, g_codepage, icv_utf16_to_local);
abort();
}
}
/* Dynamic allocate of destination string if not provided */
if (*string == NULL)
{
*string = xmalloc(in_len * 2);
*str_size = in_len * 2;
}
ibl = in_len;
obl = *str_size - 1;
pin = (char *) s->p;
pout = *string;
if (iconv(icv_utf16_to_local, (char **) &pin, &ibl, &pout, &obl) == (size_t) - 1)
{
if (errno == E2BIG)
{
logger(Protocol, Warning,
"rdp_in_unistr(), server sent an unexpectedly long string, truncating");
}
else
{
logger(Protocol, Warning, "rdp_in_unistr(), iconv fail, errno %d", errno);
free(*string);
*string = NULL;
*str_size = 0;
}
abort();
}
/* we must update the location of the current STREAM for future reads of s->p */
s->p += in_len;
*pout = 0;
if (*string)
*str_size = pout - *string;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | rdp_in_unistr(STREAM s, int in_len, char **string, uint32 * str_size)
{
static iconv_t icv_utf16_to_local;
size_t ibl, obl;
char *pin, *pout;
struct stream packet = *s;
if ((in_len < 0) || ((uint32)in_len >= (RD_UINT32_MAX / 2)))
{
logger(Protocol, Error, "rdp_in_unistr(), length of unicode data is out of bounds.");
abort();
}
if (!s_check_rem(s, in_len))
{
rdp_protocol_error("rdp_in_unistr(), consume of unicode data from stream would overrun", &packet);
}
if (!icv_utf16_to_local)
{
icv_utf16_to_local = iconv_open(g_codepage, WINDOWS_CODEPAGE);
if (icv_utf16_to_local == (iconv_t) - 1)
{
logger(Protocol, Error, "rdp_in_unistr(), iconv_open[%s -> %s] fail %p",
WINDOWS_CODEPAGE, g_codepage, icv_utf16_to_local);
abort();
}
}
/* Dynamic allocate of destination string if not provided */
if (*string == NULL)
{
*string = xmalloc(in_len * 2);
*str_size = in_len * 2;
}
ibl = in_len;
obl = *str_size - 1;
pin = (char *) s->p;
pout = *string;
if (iconv(icv_utf16_to_local, (char **) &pin, &ibl, &pout, &obl) == (size_t) - 1)
{
if (errno == E2BIG)
{
logger(Protocol, Warning,
"rdp_in_unistr(), server sent an unexpectedly long string, truncating");
}
else
{
logger(Protocol, Warning, "rdp_in_unistr(), iconv fail, errno %d", errno);
free(*string);
*string = NULL;
*str_size = 0;
}
abort();
}
/* we must update the location of the current STREAM for future reads of s->p */
s->p += in_len;
*pout = 0;
if (*string)
*str_size = pout - *string;
}
| 169,804 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long mkvparser::UnserializeString(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size_, char*& str) {
delete[] str;
str = NULL;
if (size_ >= LONG_MAX) // we need (size+1) chars
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const long size = static_cast<long>(size_);
str = new (std::nothrow) char[size + 1];
if (str == NULL)
return -1;
unsigned char* const buf = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(str);
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, size, buf);
if (status) {
delete[] str;
str = NULL;
return status;
}
str[size] = '\0';
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long mkvparser::UnserializeString(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long UnserializeString(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long long size,
char*& str) {
delete[] str;
str = NULL;
if (size >= LONG_MAX || size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
// +1 for '\0' terminator
const long required_size = static_cast<long>(size) + 1;
str = SafeArrayAlloc<char>(1, required_size);
if (str == NULL)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char* const buf = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(str);
const long status = pReader->Read(pos, size, buf);
if (status) {
delete[] str;
str = NULL;
return status;
}
str[required_size - 1] = '\0';
return 0;
}
| 173,867 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void local_socket_close_locked(asocket* s) {
D("entered local_socket_close_locked. LS(%d) fd=%d", s->id, s->fd);
if (s->peer) {
D("LS(%d): closing peer. peer->id=%d peer->fd=%d", s->id, s->peer->id, s->peer->fd);
/* Note: it's important to call shutdown before disconnecting from
* the peer, this ensures that remote sockets can still get the id
* of the local socket they're connected to, to send a CLOSE()
* protocol event. */
if (s->peer->shutdown) {
s->peer->shutdown(s->peer);
}
s->peer->peer = 0;
if (s->peer->close == local_socket_close) {
local_socket_close_locked(s->peer);
} else {
s->peer->close(s->peer);
}
s->peer = 0;
}
/* If we are already closing, or if there are no
** pending packets, destroy immediately
*/
if (s->closing || s->has_write_error || s->pkt_first == NULL) {
int id = s->id;
local_socket_destroy(s);
D("LS(%d): closed", id);
return;
}
/* otherwise, put on the closing list
*/
D("LS(%d): closing", s->id);
s->closing = 1;
fdevent_del(&s->fde, FDE_READ);
remove_socket(s);
D("LS(%d): put on socket_closing_list fd=%d", s->id, s->fd);
insert_local_socket(s, &local_socket_closing_list);
CHECK_EQ(FDE_WRITE, s->fde.state & FDE_WRITE);
}
Commit Message: adb: switch the socket list mutex to a recursive_mutex.
sockets.cpp was branching on whether a socket close function was
local_socket_close in order to avoid a potential deadlock if the socket
list lock was held while closing a peer socket.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I5e56f17fa54275284787f0f1dc150d1960256ab3
(cherry picked from commit 9b587dec6d0a57c8fe1083c1c543fbeb163d65fa)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void local_socket_close_locked(asocket* s) {
static void local_socket_close(asocket* s) {
D("entered local_socket_close. LS(%d) fd=%d", s->id, s->fd);
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> lock(local_socket_list_lock);
if (s->peer) {
D("LS(%d): closing peer. peer->id=%d peer->fd=%d", s->id, s->peer->id, s->peer->fd);
/* Note: it's important to call shutdown before disconnecting from
* the peer, this ensures that remote sockets can still get the id
* of the local socket they're connected to, to send a CLOSE()
* protocol event. */
if (s->peer->shutdown) {
s->peer->shutdown(s->peer);
}
s->peer->peer = nullptr;
s->peer->close(s->peer);
s->peer = nullptr;
}
/* If we are already closing, or if there are no
** pending packets, destroy immediately
*/
if (s->closing || s->has_write_error || s->pkt_first == NULL) {
int id = s->id;
local_socket_destroy(s);
D("LS(%d): closed", id);
return;
}
/* otherwise, put on the closing list
*/
D("LS(%d): closing", s->id);
s->closing = 1;
fdevent_del(&s->fde, FDE_READ);
remove_socket(s);
D("LS(%d): put on socket_closing_list fd=%d", s->id, s->fd);
insert_local_socket(s, &local_socket_closing_list);
CHECK_EQ(FDE_WRITE, s->fde.state & FDE_WRITE);
}
| 174,154 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long BlockEntry::GetIndex() const
{
return m_index;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long BlockEntry::GetIndex() const
| 174,329 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetExternalFileEntry",
base::Bind(&FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetExternalFileEntry,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetEntryURL",
base::Bind(&FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetEntryURL,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetExternalFileEntry", "fileBrowserHandler",
base::Bind(
&FileBrowserHandlerCustomBindings::GetExternalFileEntryCallback,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 173,271 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cib_tls_close(cib_t * cib)
{
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
shutdown(private->command.socket, SHUT_RDWR); /* no more receptions */
shutdown(private->callback.socket, SHUT_RDWR); /* no more receptions */
close(private->command.socket);
close(private->callback.socket);
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
if (private->command.encrypted) {
gnutls_bye(*(private->command.session), GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR);
gnutls_deinit(*(private->command.session));
gnutls_free(private->command.session);
gnutls_bye(*(private->callback.session), GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR);
gnutls_deinit(*(private->callback.session));
gnutls_free(private->callback.session);
gnutls_anon_free_client_credentials(anon_cred_c);
gnutls_global_deinit();
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | cib_tls_close(cib_t * cib)
{
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
if (private->command.encrypted) {
if (private->command.session) {
gnutls_bye(*(private->command.session), GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR);
gnutls_deinit(*(private->command.session));
gnutls_free(private->command.session);
}
if (private->callback.session) {
gnutls_bye(*(private->callback.session), GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR);
gnutls_deinit(*(private->callback.session));
gnutls_free(private->callback.session);
}
private->command.session = NULL;
private->callback.session = NULL;
if (remote_gnutls_credentials_init) {
gnutls_anon_free_client_credentials(anon_cred_c);
gnutls_global_deinit();
remote_gnutls_credentials_init = FALSE;
}
}
#endif
if (private->command.socket) {
shutdown(private->command.socket, SHUT_RDWR); /* no more receptions */
close(private->command.socket);
}
if (private->callback.socket) {
shutdown(private->callback.socket, SHUT_RDWR); /* no more receptions */
close(private->callback.socket);
}
private->command.socket = 0;
private->callback.socket = 0;
free(private->command.recv_buf);
free(private->callback.recv_buf);
private->command.recv_buf = NULL;
private->callback.recv_buf = NULL;
return 0;
}
| 166,155 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int32_t scsi_send_command(SCSIRequest *req, uint8_t *buf)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, req->dev);
int32_t len;
uint8_t command;
uint8_t *outbuf;
int rc;
command = buf[0];
outbuf = (uint8_t *)r->iov.iov_base;
DPRINTF("Command: lun=%d tag=0x%x data=0x%02x", req->lun, req->tag, buf[0]);
#ifdef DEBUG_SCSI
{
int i;
for (i = 1; i < r->req.cmd.len; i++) {
printf(" 0x%02x", buf[i]);
}
printf("\n");
}
#endif
switch (command) {
case TEST_UNIT_READY:
case INQUIRY:
case MODE_SENSE:
case MODE_SENSE_10:
case RESERVE:
case RESERVE_10:
case RELEASE:
case RELEASE_10:
case START_STOP:
case ALLOW_MEDIUM_REMOVAL:
case READ_CAPACITY_10:
case READ_TOC:
case GET_CONFIGURATION:
case SERVICE_ACTION_IN_16:
case VERIFY_10:
rc = scsi_disk_emulate_command(r, outbuf);
if (rc < 0) {
return 0;
}
r->iov.iov_len = rc;
break;
case SYNCHRONIZE_CACHE:
bdrv_acct_start(s->bs, &r->acct, 0, BDRV_ACCT_FLUSH);
r->req.aiocb = bdrv_aio_flush(s->bs, scsi_flush_complete, r);
if (r->req.aiocb == NULL) {
scsi_flush_complete(r, -EIO);
}
return 0;
case READ_6:
case READ_10:
case READ_12:
case READ_16:
len = r->req.cmd.xfer / s->qdev.blocksize;
DPRINTF("Read (sector %" PRId64 ", count %d)\n", r->req.cmd.lba, len);
if (r->req.cmd.lba > s->max_lba)
goto illegal_lba;
r->sector = r->req.cmd.lba * s->cluster_size;
r->sector_count = len * s->cluster_size;
break;
case WRITE_6:
case WRITE_10:
case WRITE_12:
case WRITE_16:
case WRITE_VERIFY_10:
case WRITE_VERIFY_12:
case WRITE_VERIFY_16:
len = r->req.cmd.xfer / s->qdev.blocksize;
DPRINTF("Write %s(sector %" PRId64 ", count %d)\n",
(command & 0xe) == 0xe ? "And Verify " : "",
r->req.cmd.lba, len);
if (r->req.cmd.lba > s->max_lba)
goto illegal_lba;
r->sector = r->req.cmd.lba * s->cluster_size;
r->sector_count = len * s->cluster_size;
break;
case MODE_SELECT:
DPRINTF("Mode Select(6) (len %lu)\n", (long)r->req.cmd.xfer);
/* We don't support mode parameter changes.
Allow the mode parameter header + block descriptors only. */
if (r->req.cmd.xfer > 12) {
goto fail;
}
break;
case MODE_SELECT_10:
DPRINTF("Mode Select(10) (len %lu)\n", (long)r->req.cmd.xfer);
/* We don't support mode parameter changes.
Allow the mode parameter header + block descriptors only. */
if (r->req.cmd.xfer > 16) {
goto fail;
}
break;
case SEEK_6:
case SEEK_10:
DPRINTF("Seek(%d) (sector %" PRId64 ")\n", command == SEEK_6 ? 6 : 10,
r->req.cmd.lba);
if (r->req.cmd.lba > s->max_lba) {
goto illegal_lba;
}
break;
case WRITE_SAME_16:
len = r->req.cmd.xfer / s->qdev.blocksize;
DPRINTF("WRITE SAME(16) (sector %" PRId64 ", count %d)\n",
r->req.cmd.lba, len);
if (r->req.cmd.lba > s->max_lba) {
goto illegal_lba;
}
/*
* We only support WRITE SAME with the unmap bit set for now.
*/
if (!(buf[1] & 0x8)) {
goto fail;
}
rc = bdrv_discard(s->bs, r->req.cmd.lba * s->cluster_size,
len * s->cluster_size);
if (rc < 0) {
/* XXX: better error code ?*/
goto fail;
}
break;
case REQUEST_SENSE:
abort();
default:
DPRINTF("Unknown SCSI command (%2.2x)\n", buf[0]);
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_OPCODE));
return 0;
fail:
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_FIELD));
return 0;
illegal_lba:
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(LBA_OUT_OF_RANGE));
return 0;
}
if (r->sector_count == 0 && r->iov.iov_len == 0) {
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
}
len = r->sector_count * 512 + r->iov.iov_len;
if (r->req.cmd.mode == SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
return -len;
} else {
if (!r->sector_count)
r->sector_count = -1;
return len;
}
}
Commit Message: scsi-disk: lazily allocate bounce buffer
It will not be needed for reads and writes if the HBA provides a sglist.
In addition, this lets scsi-disk refuse commands with an excessive
allocation length, as well as limit memory on usual well-behaved guests.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int32_t scsi_send_command(SCSIRequest *req, uint8_t *buf)
{
SCSIDiskReq *r = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskReq, req, req);
SCSIDiskState *s = DO_UPCAST(SCSIDiskState, qdev, req->dev);
int32_t len;
uint8_t command;
int rc;
command = buf[0];
DPRINTF("Command: lun=%d tag=0x%x data=0x%02x", req->lun, req->tag, buf[0]);
#ifdef DEBUG_SCSI
{
int i;
for (i = 1; i < r->req.cmd.len; i++) {
printf(" 0x%02x", buf[i]);
}
printf("\n");
}
#endif
switch (command) {
case TEST_UNIT_READY:
case INQUIRY:
case MODE_SENSE:
case MODE_SENSE_10:
case RESERVE:
case RESERVE_10:
case RELEASE:
case RELEASE_10:
case START_STOP:
case ALLOW_MEDIUM_REMOVAL:
case READ_CAPACITY_10:
case READ_TOC:
case GET_CONFIGURATION:
case SERVICE_ACTION_IN_16:
case VERIFY_10:
rc = scsi_disk_emulate_command(r);
if (rc < 0) {
return 0;
}
r->iov.iov_len = rc;
break;
case SYNCHRONIZE_CACHE:
bdrv_acct_start(s->bs, &r->acct, 0, BDRV_ACCT_FLUSH);
r->req.aiocb = bdrv_aio_flush(s->bs, scsi_flush_complete, r);
if (r->req.aiocb == NULL) {
scsi_flush_complete(r, -EIO);
}
return 0;
case READ_6:
case READ_10:
case READ_12:
case READ_16:
len = r->req.cmd.xfer / s->qdev.blocksize;
DPRINTF("Read (sector %" PRId64 ", count %d)\n", r->req.cmd.lba, len);
if (r->req.cmd.lba > s->max_lba)
goto illegal_lba;
r->sector = r->req.cmd.lba * s->cluster_size;
r->sector_count = len * s->cluster_size;
break;
case WRITE_6:
case WRITE_10:
case WRITE_12:
case WRITE_16:
case WRITE_VERIFY_10:
case WRITE_VERIFY_12:
case WRITE_VERIFY_16:
len = r->req.cmd.xfer / s->qdev.blocksize;
DPRINTF("Write %s(sector %" PRId64 ", count %d)\n",
(command & 0xe) == 0xe ? "And Verify " : "",
r->req.cmd.lba, len);
if (r->req.cmd.lba > s->max_lba)
goto illegal_lba;
r->sector = r->req.cmd.lba * s->cluster_size;
r->sector_count = len * s->cluster_size;
break;
case MODE_SELECT:
DPRINTF("Mode Select(6) (len %lu)\n", (long)r->req.cmd.xfer);
/* We don't support mode parameter changes.
Allow the mode parameter header + block descriptors only. */
if (r->req.cmd.xfer > 12) {
goto fail;
}
break;
case MODE_SELECT_10:
DPRINTF("Mode Select(10) (len %lu)\n", (long)r->req.cmd.xfer);
/* We don't support mode parameter changes.
Allow the mode parameter header + block descriptors only. */
if (r->req.cmd.xfer > 16) {
goto fail;
}
break;
case SEEK_6:
case SEEK_10:
DPRINTF("Seek(%d) (sector %" PRId64 ")\n", command == SEEK_6 ? 6 : 10,
r->req.cmd.lba);
if (r->req.cmd.lba > s->max_lba) {
goto illegal_lba;
}
break;
case WRITE_SAME_16:
len = r->req.cmd.xfer / s->qdev.blocksize;
DPRINTF("WRITE SAME(16) (sector %" PRId64 ", count %d)\n",
r->req.cmd.lba, len);
if (r->req.cmd.lba > s->max_lba) {
goto illegal_lba;
}
/*
* We only support WRITE SAME with the unmap bit set for now.
*/
if (!(buf[1] & 0x8)) {
goto fail;
}
rc = bdrv_discard(s->bs, r->req.cmd.lba * s->cluster_size,
len * s->cluster_size);
if (rc < 0) {
/* XXX: better error code ?*/
goto fail;
}
break;
case REQUEST_SENSE:
abort();
default:
DPRINTF("Unknown SCSI command (%2.2x)\n", buf[0]);
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_OPCODE));
return 0;
fail:
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(INVALID_FIELD));
return 0;
illegal_lba:
scsi_check_condition(r, SENSE_CODE(LBA_OUT_OF_RANGE));
return 0;
}
if (r->sector_count == 0 && r->iov.iov_len == 0) {
scsi_req_complete(&r->req, GOOD);
}
len = r->sector_count * 512 + r->iov.iov_len;
if (r->req.cmd.mode == SCSI_XFER_TO_DEV) {
return -len;
} else {
if (!r->sector_count)
r->sector_count = -1;
return len;
}
}
| 166,556 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: sf_open_fd (int fd, int mode, SF_INFO *sfinfo, int close_desc)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
if ((SF_CONTAINER (sfinfo->format)) == SF_FORMAT_SD2)
{ sf_errno = SFE_SD2_FD_DISALLOWED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
if ((psf = calloc (1, sizeof (SF_PRIVATE))) == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
psf_init_files (psf) ;
copy_filename (psf, "") ;
psf->file.mode = mode ;
psf_set_file (psf, fd) ;
psf->is_pipe = psf_is_pipe (psf) ;
psf->fileoffset = psf_ftell (psf) ;
if (! close_desc)
psf->file.do_not_close_descriptor = SF_TRUE ;
return psf_open_file (psf, sfinfo) ;
} /* sf_open_fd */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | sf_open_fd (int fd, int mode, SF_INFO *sfinfo, int close_desc)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
if ((SF_CONTAINER (sfinfo->format)) == SF_FORMAT_SD2)
{ sf_errno = SFE_SD2_FD_DISALLOWED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
if ((psf = psf_allocate ()) == NULL)
{ sf_errno = SFE_MALLOC_FAILED ;
return NULL ;
} ;
psf_init_files (psf) ;
copy_filename (psf, "") ;
psf->file.mode = mode ;
psf_set_file (psf, fd) ;
psf->is_pipe = psf_is_pipe (psf) ;
psf->fileoffset = psf_ftell (psf) ;
if (! close_desc)
psf->file.do_not_close_descriptor = SF_TRUE ;
return psf_open_file (psf, sfinfo) ;
} /* sf_open_fd */
| 170,068 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
session->AddHandler(std::make_unique<protocol::InspectorHandler>());
session->AddHandler(std::make_unique<protocol::NetworkHandler>(GetId()));
session->AddHandler(std::make_unique<protocol::SchemaHandler>());
session->SetRenderer(worker_host_ ? worker_host_->process_id() : -1, nullptr);
if (state_ == WORKER_READY)
session->AttachToAgent(EnsureAgent());
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
bool SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
session->AddHandler(std::make_unique<protocol::InspectorHandler>());
session->AddHandler(std::make_unique<protocol::NetworkHandler>(GetId()));
session->AddHandler(std::make_unique<protocol::SchemaHandler>());
session->SetRenderer(worker_host_ ? worker_host_->process_id() : -1, nullptr);
if (state_ == WORKER_READY)
session->AttachToAgent(EnsureAgent());
return true;
}
| 173,252 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xid_map_enter(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct sunrpc_msg *rp, const u_char *bp)
{
const struct ip *ip = NULL;
const struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL;
struct xid_map_entry *xmep;
if (!ND_TTEST(rp->rm_call.cb_vers))
return (0);
switch (IP_V((const struct ip *)bp)) {
case 4:
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
break;
case 6:
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp;
break;
default:
return (1);
}
xmep = &xid_map[xid_map_next];
if (++xid_map_next >= XIDMAPSIZE)
xid_map_next = 0;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->xid, &rp->rm_xid, sizeof(xmep->xid));
if (ip) {
xmep->ipver = 4;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(ip->ip_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(ip->ip_dst));
}
else if (ip6) {
xmep->ipver = 6;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip6->ip6_src, sizeof(ip6->ip6_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip6->ip6_dst, sizeof(ip6->ip6_dst));
}
xmep->proc = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_proc);
xmep->vers = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_vers);
return (1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13005/NFS: Add two bounds checks before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | xid_map_enter(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct sunrpc_msg *rp, const u_char *bp)
{
const struct ip *ip = NULL;
const struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL;
struct xid_map_entry *xmep;
if (!ND_TTEST(rp->rm_call.cb_vers))
return (0);
switch (IP_V((const struct ip *)bp)) {
case 4:
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
break;
case 6:
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp;
break;
default:
return (1);
}
xmep = &xid_map[xid_map_next];
if (++xid_map_next >= XIDMAPSIZE)
xid_map_next = 0;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->xid, &rp->rm_xid, sizeof(xmep->xid));
if (ip) {
xmep->ipver = 4;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip->ip_src, sizeof(ip->ip_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip->ip_dst, sizeof(ip->ip_dst));
}
else if (ip6) {
xmep->ipver = 6;
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->client, &ip6->ip6_src, sizeof(ip6->ip6_src));
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&xmep->server, &ip6->ip6_dst, sizeof(ip6->ip6_dst));
}
if (!ND_TTEST(rp->rm_call.cb_proc))
return (0);
xmep->proc = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_proc);
if (!ND_TTEST(rp->rm_call.cb_vers))
return (0);
xmep->vers = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_vers);
return (1);
}
| 167,903 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline void VectorClamp3(DDSVector3 *value)
{
value->x = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->x));
value->y = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->y));
value->z = MinF(1.0f,MaxF(0.0f,value->z));
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static inline void VectorClamp3(DDSVector3 *value)
{
value->x = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->x));
value->y = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->y));
value->z = MagickMin(1.0f,MagickMax(0.0f,value->z));
}
| 168,907 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltGenerateIdFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs){
static char base_address;
xmlNodePtr cur = NULL;
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj = NULL;
long val;
xmlChar str[30];
xmlDocPtr doc;
if (nargs == 0) {
cur = ctxt->context->node;
} else if (nargs == 1) {
xmlNodeSetPtr nodelist;
int i, ret;
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) || (ctxt->value->type != XPATH_NODESET)) {
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_TYPE;
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid arg expecting a node-set\n");
return;
}
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
nodelist = obj->nodesetval;
if ((nodelist == NULL) || (nodelist->nodeNr <= 0)) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewCString(""));
return;
}
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[0];
for (i = 1;i < nodelist->nodeNr;i++) {
ret = xmlXPathCmpNodes(cur, nodelist->nodeTab[i]);
if (ret == -1)
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[i];
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid number of args %d\n", nargs);
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_ARITY;
return;
}
/*
* Okay this is ugly but should work, use the NodePtr address
* to forge the ID
*/
if (cur->type != XML_NAMESPACE_DECL)
doc = cur->doc;
else {
xmlNsPtr ns = (xmlNsPtr) cur;
if (ns->context != NULL)
doc = ns->context;
else
doc = ctxt->context->doc;
}
if (obj)
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
val = (long)((char *)cur - (char *)&base_address);
if (val >= 0) {
sprintf((char *)str, "idp%ld", val);
} else {
sprintf((char *)str, "idm%ld", -val);
}
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(str));
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xsltGenerateIdFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs){
static char base_address;
xmlNodePtr cur = NULL;
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj = NULL;
long val;
xmlChar str[30];
if (nargs == 0) {
cur = ctxt->context->node;
} else if (nargs == 1) {
xmlNodeSetPtr nodelist;
int i, ret;
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) || (ctxt->value->type != XPATH_NODESET)) {
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_TYPE;
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid arg expecting a node-set\n");
return;
}
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
nodelist = obj->nodesetval;
if ((nodelist == NULL) || (nodelist->nodeNr <= 0)) {
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewCString(""));
return;
}
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[0];
for (i = 1;i < nodelist->nodeNr;i++) {
ret = xmlXPathCmpNodes(cur, nodelist->nodeTab[i]);
if (ret == -1)
cur = nodelist->nodeTab[i];
}
} else {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"generate-id() : invalid number of args %d\n", nargs);
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_ARITY;
return;
}
if (obj)
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
val = (long)((char *)cur - (char *)&base_address);
if (val >= 0) {
snprintf((char *)str, sizeof(str), "idp%ld", val);
} else {
snprintf((char *)str, sizeof(str), "idm%ld", -val);
}
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewString(str));
}
| 173,302 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: sp<ABuffer> decodeBase64(const AString &s) {
size_t n = s.size();
if ((n % 4) != 0) {
return NULL;
}
size_t padding = 0;
if (n >= 1 && s.c_str()[n - 1] == '=') {
padding = 1;
if (n >= 2 && s.c_str()[n - 2] == '=') {
padding = 2;
if (n >= 3 && s.c_str()[n - 3] == '=') {
padding = 3;
}
}
}
size_t outLen = (n / 4) * 3 - padding;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(outLen);
uint8_t *out = buffer->data();
if (out == NULL || buffer->size() < outLen) {
return NULL;
}
size_t j = 0;
uint32_t accum = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
char c = s.c_str()[i];
unsigned value;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') {
value = c - 'A';
} else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') {
value = 26 + c - 'a';
} else if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
value = 52 + c - '0';
} else if (c == '+') {
value = 62;
} else if (c == '/') {
value = 63;
} else if (c != '=') {
return NULL;
} else {
if (i < n - padding) {
return NULL;
}
value = 0;
}
accum = (accum << 6) | value;
if (((i + 1) % 4) == 0) {
out[j++] = (accum >> 16);
if (j < outLen) { out[j++] = (accum >> 8) & 0xff; }
if (j < outLen) { out[j++] = accum & 0xff; }
accum = 0;
}
}
return buffer;
}
Commit Message: stagefright: avoid buffer overflow in base64 decoder
Bug: 62673128
Change-Id: Id5f04b772aaca3184879bd5bca453ad9e82c7f94
(cherry picked from commit 5e96386ab7a5391185f6b3ed9ea06f3e23ed253b)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | sp<ABuffer> decodeBase64(const AString &s) {
size_t n = s.size();
if ((n % 4) != 0) {
return NULL;
}
size_t padding = 0;
if (n >= 1 && s.c_str()[n - 1] == '=') {
padding = 1;
if (n >= 2 && s.c_str()[n - 2] == '=') {
padding = 2;
if (n >= 3 && s.c_str()[n - 3] == '=') {
padding = 3;
}
}
}
size_t outLen = (n / 4) * 3 - padding;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(outLen);
uint8_t *out = buffer->data();
if (out == NULL || buffer->size() < outLen) {
return NULL;
}
size_t j = 0;
uint32_t accum = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
char c = s.c_str()[i];
unsigned value;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') {
value = c - 'A';
} else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') {
value = 26 + c - 'a';
} else if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
value = 52 + c - '0';
} else if (c == '+') {
value = 62;
} else if (c == '/') {
value = 63;
} else if (c != '=') {
return NULL;
} else {
if (i < n - padding) {
return NULL;
}
value = 0;
}
accum = (accum << 6) | value;
if (((i + 1) % 4) == 0) {
if (j < outLen) { out[j++] = (accum >> 16); }
if (j < outLen) { out[j++] = (accum >> 8) & 0xff; }
if (j < outLen) { out[j++] = accum & 0xff; }
accum = 0;
}
}
return buffer;
}
| 173,996 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void *btif_hh_poll_event_thread(void *arg)
{
btif_hh_device_t *p_dev = arg;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Thread created fd = %d", __FUNCTION__, p_dev->fd);
struct pollfd pfds[1];
int ret;
pfds[0].fd = p_dev->fd;
pfds[0].events = POLLIN;
uhid_set_non_blocking(p_dev->fd);
while(p_dev->hh_keep_polling){
ret = poll(pfds, 1, 50);
if (ret < 0) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Cannot poll for fds: %s\n", __FUNCTION__, strerror(errno));
break;
}
if (pfds[0].revents & POLLIN) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hh_poll_event_thread: POLLIN");
ret = uhid_event(p_dev);
if (ret){
break;
}
}
}
p_dev->hh_poll_thread_id = -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void *btif_hh_poll_event_thread(void *arg)
{
btif_hh_device_t *p_dev = arg;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Thread created fd = %d", __FUNCTION__, p_dev->fd);
struct pollfd pfds[1];
int ret;
pfds[0].fd = p_dev->fd;
pfds[0].events = POLLIN;
uhid_set_non_blocking(p_dev->fd);
while(p_dev->hh_keep_polling){
ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(poll(pfds, 1, 50));
if (ret < 0) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Cannot poll for fds: %s\n", __FUNCTION__, strerror(errno));
break;
}
if (pfds[0].revents & POLLIN) {
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hh_poll_event_thread: POLLIN");
ret = uhid_event(p_dev);
if (ret){
break;
}
}
}
p_dev->hh_poll_thread_id = -1;
return 0;
}
| 173,431 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CoordinatorImpl::PerformNextQueuedGlobalMemoryDump() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
QueuedRequest* request = GetCurrentRequest();
if (request == nullptr)
return;
std::vector<QueuedRequestDispatcher::ClientInfo> clients;
for (const auto& kv : clients_) {
auto client_identity = kv.second->identity;
const base::ProcessId pid = GetProcessIdForClientIdentity(client_identity);
if (pid == base::kNullProcessId) {
VLOG(1) << "Couldn't find a PID for client \"" << client_identity.name()
<< "." << client_identity.instance() << "\"";
continue;
}
clients.emplace_back(kv.second->client.get(), pid, kv.second->process_type);
}
auto chrome_callback = base::Bind(
&CoordinatorImpl::OnChromeMemoryDumpResponse, base::Unretained(this));
auto os_callback = base::Bind(&CoordinatorImpl::OnOSMemoryDumpResponse,
base::Unretained(this), request->dump_guid);
QueuedRequestDispatcher::SetUpAndDispatch(request, clients, chrome_callback,
os_callback);
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CoordinatorImpl::OnQueuedRequestTimedOut,
base::Unretained(this), request->dump_guid),
client_process_timeout_);
if (request->args.add_to_trace && heap_profiler_) {
request->heap_dump_in_progress = true;
bool strip_path_from_mapped_files =
base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance()
->GetCurrentTraceConfig()
.IsArgumentFilterEnabled();
heap_profiler_->DumpProcessesForTracing(
strip_path_from_mapped_files,
base::BindRepeating(&CoordinatorImpl::OnDumpProcessesForTracing,
base::Unretained(this), request->dump_guid));
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CoordinatorImpl::OnHeapDumpTimeOut,
base::Unretained(this), request->dump_guid),
kHeapDumpTimeout);
}
FinalizeGlobalMemoryDumpIfAllManagersReplied();
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void CoordinatorImpl::PerformNextQueuedGlobalMemoryDump() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
QueuedRequest* request = GetCurrentRequest();
if (request == nullptr)
return;
std::vector<QueuedRequestDispatcher::ClientInfo> clients;
for (const auto& kv : clients_) {
auto client_identity = kv.second->identity;
const base::ProcessId pid = GetProcessIdForClientIdentity(client_identity);
if (pid == base::kNullProcessId) {
VLOG(1) << "Couldn't find a PID for client \"" << client_identity.name()
<< "." << client_identity.instance() << "\"";
continue;
}
clients.emplace_back(kv.second->client.get(), pid, kv.second->process_type);
}
auto chrome_callback =
base::Bind(&CoordinatorImpl::OnChromeMemoryDumpResponse,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
auto os_callback =
base::Bind(&CoordinatorImpl::OnOSMemoryDumpResponse,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), request->dump_guid);
QueuedRequestDispatcher::SetUpAndDispatch(request, clients, chrome_callback,
os_callback);
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CoordinatorImpl::OnQueuedRequestTimedOut,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), request->dump_guid),
client_process_timeout_);
if (request->args.add_to_trace && heap_profiler_) {
request->heap_dump_in_progress = true;
bool strip_path_from_mapped_files =
base::trace_event::TraceLog::GetInstance()
->GetCurrentTraceConfig()
.IsArgumentFilterEnabled();
heap_profiler_->DumpProcessesForTracing(
strip_path_from_mapped_files,
base::BindRepeating(&CoordinatorImpl::OnDumpProcessesForTracing,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
request->dump_guid));
base::SequencedTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CoordinatorImpl::OnHeapDumpTimeOut,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), request->dump_guid),
kHeapDumpTimeout);
}
FinalizeGlobalMemoryDumpIfAllManagersReplied();
}
| 173,214 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"IncrementKeepaliveCount",
base::Bind(&LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::IncrementKeepaliveCount,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction(
"DecrementKeepaliveCount",
base::Bind(&LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::DecrementKeepaliveCount,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"IncrementKeepaliveCount", "tts",
base::Bind(&LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::IncrementKeepaliveCount,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction(
"DecrementKeepaliveCount", "tts",
base::Bind(&LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler::DecrementKeepaliveCount,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,250 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ElementsUploadDataStreamTest::FileChangedHelper(
const base::FilePath& file_path,
const base::Time& time,
bool error_expected) {
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<UploadElementReader>> element_readers;
element_readers.push_back(base::MakeUnique<UploadFileElementReader>(
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get().get(), file_path, 1, 2, time));
TestCompletionCallback init_callback;
std::unique_ptr<UploadDataStream> stream(
new ElementsUploadDataStream(std::move(element_readers), 0));
ASSERT_THAT(stream->Init(init_callback.callback(), NetLogWithSource()),
IsError(ERR_IO_PENDING));
int error_code = init_callback.WaitForResult();
if (error_expected)
ASSERT_THAT(error_code, IsError(ERR_UPLOAD_FILE_CHANGED));
else
ASSERT_THAT(error_code, IsOk());
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | void ElementsUploadDataStreamTest::FileChangedHelper(
const base::FilePath& file_path,
const base::Time& time,
bool error_expected) {
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<UploadElementReader>> element_readers;
element_readers.push_back(std::make_unique<UploadFileElementReader>(
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get().get(), file_path, 1, 2, time));
TestCompletionCallback init_callback;
std::unique_ptr<UploadDataStream> stream(
new ElementsUploadDataStream(std::move(element_readers), 0));
ASSERT_THAT(stream->Init(init_callback.callback(), NetLogWithSource()),
IsError(ERR_IO_PENDING));
int error_code = init_callback.WaitForResult();
if (error_expected)
ASSERT_THAT(error_code, IsError(ERR_UPLOAD_FILE_CHANGED));
else
ASSERT_THAT(error_code, IsOk());
}
| 173,261 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfsd_dispatch(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *statp)
{
struct svc_procedure *proc;
kxdrproc_t xdr;
__be32 nfserr;
__be32 *nfserrp;
dprintk("nfsd_dispatch: vers %d proc %d\n",
rqstp->rq_vers, rqstp->rq_proc);
proc = rqstp->rq_procinfo;
/*
* Give the xdr decoder a chance to change this if it wants
* (necessary in the NFSv4.0 compound case)
*/
rqstp->rq_cachetype = proc->pc_cachetype;
/* Decode arguments */
xdr = proc->pc_decode;
if (xdr && !xdr(rqstp, (__be32*)rqstp->rq_arg.head[0].iov_base,
rqstp->rq_argp)) {
dprintk("nfsd: failed to decode arguments!\n");
*statp = rpc_garbage_args;
return 1;
}
/* Check whether we have this call in the cache. */
switch (nfsd_cache_lookup(rqstp)) {
case RC_DROPIT:
return 0;
case RC_REPLY:
return 1;
case RC_DOIT:;
/* do it */
}
/* need to grab the location to store the status, as
* nfsv4 does some encoding while processing
*/
nfserrp = rqstp->rq_res.head[0].iov_base
+ rqstp->rq_res.head[0].iov_len;
rqstp->rq_res.head[0].iov_len += sizeof(__be32);
/* Now call the procedure handler, and encode NFS status. */
nfserr = proc->pc_func(rqstp, rqstp->rq_argp, rqstp->rq_resp);
nfserr = map_new_errors(rqstp->rq_vers, nfserr);
if (nfserr == nfserr_dropit || test_bit(RQ_DROPME, &rqstp->rq_flags)) {
dprintk("nfsd: Dropping request; may be revisited later\n");
nfsd_cache_update(rqstp, RC_NOCACHE, NULL);
return 0;
}
if (rqstp->rq_proc != 0)
*nfserrp++ = nfserr;
/* Encode result.
* For NFSv2, additional info is never returned in case of an error.
*/
if (!(nfserr && rqstp->rq_vers == 2)) {
xdr = proc->pc_encode;
if (xdr && !xdr(rqstp, nfserrp,
rqstp->rq_resp)) {
/* Failed to encode result. Release cache entry */
dprintk("nfsd: failed to encode result!\n");
nfsd_cache_update(rqstp, RC_NOCACHE, NULL);
*statp = rpc_system_err;
return 1;
}
}
/* Store reply in cache. */
nfsd_cache_update(rqstp, rqstp->rq_cachetype, statp + 1);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check for oversized NFSv2/v3 arguments
A client can append random data to the end of an NFSv2 or NFSv3 RPC call
without our complaining; we'll just stop parsing at the end of the
expected data and ignore the rest.
Encoded arguments and replies are stored together in an array of pages,
and if a call is too large it could leave inadequate space for the
reply. This is normally OK because NFS RPC's typically have either
short arguments and long replies (like READ) or long arguments and short
replies (like WRITE). But a client that sends an incorrectly long reply
can violate those assumptions. This was observed to cause crashes.
Also, several operations increment rq_next_page in the decode routine
before checking the argument size, which can leave rq_next_page pointing
well past the end of the page array, causing trouble later in
svc_free_pages.
So, following a suggestion from Neil Brown, add a central check to
enforce our expectation that no NFSv2/v3 call has both a large call and
a large reply.
As followup we may also want to rewrite the encoding routines to check
more carefully that they aren't running off the end of the page array.
We may also consider rejecting calls that have any extra garbage
appended. That would be safer, and within our rights by spec, but given
the age of our server and the NFS protocol, and the fact that we've
never enforced this before, we may need to balance that against the
possibility of breaking some oddball client.
Reported-by: Tuomas Haanpää <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Ari Kauppi <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | nfsd_dispatch(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *statp)
{
struct svc_procedure *proc;
kxdrproc_t xdr;
__be32 nfserr;
__be32 *nfserrp;
dprintk("nfsd_dispatch: vers %d proc %d\n",
rqstp->rq_vers, rqstp->rq_proc);
proc = rqstp->rq_procinfo;
if (nfs_request_too_big(rqstp, proc)) {
dprintk("nfsd: NFSv%d argument too large\n", rqstp->rq_vers);
*statp = rpc_garbage_args;
return 1;
}
/*
* Give the xdr decoder a chance to change this if it wants
* (necessary in the NFSv4.0 compound case)
*/
rqstp->rq_cachetype = proc->pc_cachetype;
/* Decode arguments */
xdr = proc->pc_decode;
if (xdr && !xdr(rqstp, (__be32*)rqstp->rq_arg.head[0].iov_base,
rqstp->rq_argp)) {
dprintk("nfsd: failed to decode arguments!\n");
*statp = rpc_garbage_args;
return 1;
}
/* Check whether we have this call in the cache. */
switch (nfsd_cache_lookup(rqstp)) {
case RC_DROPIT:
return 0;
case RC_REPLY:
return 1;
case RC_DOIT:;
/* do it */
}
/* need to grab the location to store the status, as
* nfsv4 does some encoding while processing
*/
nfserrp = rqstp->rq_res.head[0].iov_base
+ rqstp->rq_res.head[0].iov_len;
rqstp->rq_res.head[0].iov_len += sizeof(__be32);
/* Now call the procedure handler, and encode NFS status. */
nfserr = proc->pc_func(rqstp, rqstp->rq_argp, rqstp->rq_resp);
nfserr = map_new_errors(rqstp->rq_vers, nfserr);
if (nfserr == nfserr_dropit || test_bit(RQ_DROPME, &rqstp->rq_flags)) {
dprintk("nfsd: Dropping request; may be revisited later\n");
nfsd_cache_update(rqstp, RC_NOCACHE, NULL);
return 0;
}
if (rqstp->rq_proc != 0)
*nfserrp++ = nfserr;
/* Encode result.
* For NFSv2, additional info is never returned in case of an error.
*/
if (!(nfserr && rqstp->rq_vers == 2)) {
xdr = proc->pc_encode;
if (xdr && !xdr(rqstp, nfserrp,
rqstp->rq_resp)) {
/* Failed to encode result. Release cache entry */
dprintk("nfsd: failed to encode result!\n");
nfsd_cache_update(rqstp, RC_NOCACHE, NULL);
*statp = rpc_system_err;
return 1;
}
}
/* Store reply in cache. */
nfsd_cache_update(rqstp, rqstp->rq_cachetype, statp + 1);
return 1;
}
| 168,256 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XSLStyleSheet::XSLStyleSheet(Node* parentNode, const String& originalURL, const KURL& finalURL, bool embedded)
: m_ownerNode(parentNode)
, m_originalURL(originalURL)
, m_finalURL(finalURL)
, m_isDisabled(false)
, m_embedded(embedded)
, m_processed(true) // The root sheet starts off processed.
, m_stylesheetDoc(0)
, m_stylesheetDocTaken(false)
, m_parentStyleSheet(0)
{
}
Commit Message: Avoid reparsing an XSLT stylesheet after the first failure.
Certain libxslt versions appear to leave the doc in an invalid state when parsing fails. We should cache this result and avoid re-parsing.
(The test cannot be converted to text-only due to its invalid stylesheet).
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
BUG=271939
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23103007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@156248 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | XSLStyleSheet::XSLStyleSheet(Node* parentNode, const String& originalURL, const KURL& finalURL, bool embedded)
: m_ownerNode(parentNode)
, m_originalURL(originalURL)
, m_finalURL(finalURL)
, m_isDisabled(false)
, m_embedded(embedded)
, m_processed(true) // The root sheet starts off processed.
, m_stylesheetDoc(0)
, m_stylesheetDocTaken(false)
, m_compilationFailed(false)
, m_parentStyleSheet(0)
{
}
| 171,184 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateFloatArray( double *numbers, int count )
{
int i;
cJSON *n = 0, *p = 0, *a = cJSON_CreateArray();
for ( i = 0; a && i < count; ++i ) {
n = cJSON_CreateFloat( numbers[i] );
if ( ! i )
a->child = n;
else
suffix_object( p, n );
p = n;
}
return a;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cJSON *cJSON_CreateFloatArray( double *numbers, int count )
| 167,273 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int read_tfra(MOVContext *mov, AVIOContext *f)
{
MOVFragmentIndex* index = NULL;
int version, fieldlength, i, j;
int64_t pos = avio_tell(f);
uint32_t size = avio_rb32(f);
void *tmp;
if (avio_rb32(f) != MKBETAG('t', 'f', 'r', 'a')) {
return 1;
}
av_log(mov->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "found tfra\n");
index = av_mallocz(sizeof(MOVFragmentIndex));
if (!index) {
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
tmp = av_realloc_array(mov->fragment_index_data,
mov->fragment_index_count + 1,
sizeof(MOVFragmentIndex*));
if (!tmp) {
av_freep(&index);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
mov->fragment_index_data = tmp;
mov->fragment_index_data[mov->fragment_index_count++] = index;
version = avio_r8(f);
avio_rb24(f);
index->track_id = avio_rb32(f);
fieldlength = avio_rb32(f);
index->item_count = avio_rb32(f);
index->items = av_mallocz_array(
index->item_count, sizeof(MOVFragmentIndexItem));
if (!index->items) {
index->item_count = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = 0; i < index->item_count; i++) {
int64_t time, offset;
if (version == 1) {
time = avio_rb64(f);
offset = avio_rb64(f);
} else {
time = avio_rb32(f);
offset = avio_rb32(f);
}
index->items[i].time = time;
index->items[i].moof_offset = offset;
for (j = 0; j < ((fieldlength >> 4) & 3) + 1; j++)
avio_r8(f);
for (j = 0; j < ((fieldlength >> 2) & 3) + 1; j++)
avio_r8(f);
for (j = 0; j < ((fieldlength >> 0) & 3) + 1; j++)
avio_r8(f);
}
avio_seek(f, pos + size, SEEK_SET);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | static int read_tfra(MOVContext *mov, AVIOContext *f)
{
MOVFragmentIndex* index = NULL;
int version, fieldlength, i, j;
int64_t pos = avio_tell(f);
uint32_t size = avio_rb32(f);
void *tmp;
if (avio_rb32(f) != MKBETAG('t', 'f', 'r', 'a')) {
return 1;
}
av_log(mov->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "found tfra\n");
index = av_mallocz(sizeof(MOVFragmentIndex));
if (!index) {
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
tmp = av_realloc_array(mov->fragment_index_data,
mov->fragment_index_count + 1,
sizeof(MOVFragmentIndex*));
if (!tmp) {
av_freep(&index);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
mov->fragment_index_data = tmp;
mov->fragment_index_data[mov->fragment_index_count++] = index;
version = avio_r8(f);
avio_rb24(f);
index->track_id = avio_rb32(f);
fieldlength = avio_rb32(f);
index->item_count = avio_rb32(f);
index->items = av_mallocz_array(
index->item_count, sizeof(MOVFragmentIndexItem));
if (!index->items) {
index->item_count = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
for (i = 0; i < index->item_count; i++) {
int64_t time, offset;
if (avio_feof(f)) {
index->item_count = 0;
av_freep(&index->items);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (version == 1) {
time = avio_rb64(f);
offset = avio_rb64(f);
} else {
time = avio_rb32(f);
offset = avio_rb32(f);
}
index->items[i].time = time;
index->items[i].moof_offset = offset;
for (j = 0; j < ((fieldlength >> 4) & 3) + 1; j++)
avio_r8(f);
for (j = 0; j < ((fieldlength >> 2) & 3) + 1; j++)
avio_r8(f);
for (j = 0; j < ((fieldlength >> 0) & 3) + 1; j++)
avio_r8(f);
}
avio_seek(f, pos + size, SEEK_SET);
return 0;
}
| 167,759 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t BnGraphicBufferConsumer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case ACQUIRE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
BufferItem item;
int64_t presentWhen = data.readInt64();
uint64_t maxFrameNumber = data.readUint64();
status_t result = acquireBuffer(&item, presentWhen, maxFrameNumber);
status_t err = reply->write(item);
if (err) return err;
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DETACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int slot = data.readInt32();
int result = detachBuffer(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ATTACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*buffer.get());
int slot = -1;
int result = attachBuffer(&slot, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case RELEASE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
uint64_t frameNumber = static_cast<uint64_t>(data.readInt64());
sp<Fence> releaseFence = new Fence();
status_t err = data.read(*releaseFence);
if (err) return err;
status_t result = releaseBuffer(buf, frameNumber,
EGL_NO_DISPLAY, EGL_NO_SYNC_KHR, releaseFence);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONSUMER_CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<IConsumerListener> consumer = IConsumerListener::asInterface( data.readStrongBinder() );
bool controlledByApp = data.readInt32();
status_t result = consumerConnect(consumer, controlledByApp);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONSUMER_DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
status_t result = consumerDisconnect();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_RELEASED_BUFFERS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint64_t slotMask;
status_t result = getReleasedBuffers(&slotMask);
reply->writeInt64(static_cast<int64_t>(slotMask));
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t width = data.readUint32();
uint32_t height = data.readUint32();
status_t result = setDefaultBufferSize(width, height);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_MAX_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int bufferCount = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setDefaultMaxBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DISABLE_ASYNC_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
status_t result = disableAsyncBuffer();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_MAX_ACQUIRED_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int maxAcquiredBuffers = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setMaxAcquiredBufferCount(maxAcquiredBuffers);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_CONSUMER_NAME: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
setConsumerName( data.readString8() );
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_FORMAT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
PixelFormat defaultFormat = static_cast<PixelFormat>(data.readInt32());
status_t result = setDefaultBufferFormat(defaultFormat);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_DATA_SPACE: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
android_dataspace defaultDataSpace =
static_cast<android_dataspace>(data.readInt32());
status_t result = setDefaultBufferDataSpace(defaultDataSpace);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_CONSUMER_USAGE_BITS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t usage = data.readUint32();
status_t result = setConsumerUsageBits(usage);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_TRANSFORM_HINT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t hint = data.readUint32();
status_t result = setTransformHint(hint);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_SIDEBAND_STREAM: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<NativeHandle> stream = getSidebandStream();
reply->writeInt32(static_cast<int32_t>(stream != NULL));
if (stream != NULL) {
reply->writeNativeHandle(stream->handle());
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DUMP: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
String8 result = data.readString8();
String8 prefix = data.readString8();
static_cast<IGraphicBufferConsumer*>(this)->dump(result, prefix);
reply->writeString8(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t BnGraphicBufferConsumer::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case ACQUIRE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
BufferItem item;
int64_t presentWhen = data.readInt64();
uint64_t maxFrameNumber = data.readUint64();
status_t result = acquireBuffer(&item, presentWhen, maxFrameNumber);
status_t err = reply->write(item);
if (err) return err;
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DETACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int slot = data.readInt32();
int result = detachBuffer(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ATTACH_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<GraphicBuffer> buffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*buffer.get());
int slot = -1;
int result = attachBuffer(&slot, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(slot);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case RELEASE_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int buf = data.readInt32();
uint64_t frameNumber = static_cast<uint64_t>(data.readInt64());
sp<Fence> releaseFence = new Fence();
status_t err = data.read(*releaseFence);
if (err) return err;
status_t result = releaseBuffer(buf, frameNumber,
EGL_NO_DISPLAY, EGL_NO_SYNC_KHR, releaseFence);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONSUMER_CONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<IConsumerListener> consumer = IConsumerListener::asInterface( data.readStrongBinder() );
bool controlledByApp = data.readInt32();
status_t result = consumerConnect(consumer, controlledByApp);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONSUMER_DISCONNECT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
status_t result = consumerDisconnect();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_RELEASED_BUFFERS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint64_t slotMask = 0;
status_t result = getReleasedBuffers(&slotMask);
reply->writeInt64(static_cast<int64_t>(slotMask));
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t width = data.readUint32();
uint32_t height = data.readUint32();
status_t result = setDefaultBufferSize(width, height);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_MAX_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int bufferCount = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setDefaultMaxBufferCount(bufferCount);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DISABLE_ASYNC_BUFFER: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
status_t result = disableAsyncBuffer();
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_MAX_ACQUIRED_BUFFER_COUNT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
int maxAcquiredBuffers = data.readInt32();
status_t result = setMaxAcquiredBufferCount(maxAcquiredBuffers);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_CONSUMER_NAME: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
setConsumerName( data.readString8() );
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_FORMAT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
PixelFormat defaultFormat = static_cast<PixelFormat>(data.readInt32());
status_t result = setDefaultBufferFormat(defaultFormat);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_DEFAULT_BUFFER_DATA_SPACE: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
android_dataspace defaultDataSpace =
static_cast<android_dataspace>(data.readInt32());
status_t result = setDefaultBufferDataSpace(defaultDataSpace);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_CONSUMER_USAGE_BITS: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t usage = data.readUint32();
status_t result = setConsumerUsageBits(usage);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SET_TRANSFORM_HINT: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
uint32_t hint = data.readUint32();
status_t result = setTransformHint(hint);
reply->writeInt32(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_SIDEBAND_STREAM: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
sp<NativeHandle> stream = getSidebandStream();
reply->writeInt32(static_cast<int32_t>(stream != NULL));
if (stream != NULL) {
reply->writeNativeHandle(stream->handle());
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case DUMP: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(IGraphicBufferConsumer, data, reply);
String8 result = data.readString8();
String8 prefix = data.readString8();
static_cast<IGraphicBufferConsumer*>(this)->dump(result, prefix);
reply->writeString8(result);
return NO_ERROR;
}
}
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
| 173,877 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: name_len(netdissect_options *ndo,
const unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *maxbuf)
{
const unsigned char *s0 = s;
unsigned char c;
if (s >= maxbuf)
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1);
c = *s;
if ((c & 0xC0) == 0xC0)
return(2);
while (*s) {
if (s >= maxbuf)
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1);
s += (*s) + 1;
}
return(PTR_DIFF(s, s0) + 1);
trunc:
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12893/SMB/CIFS: Add a bounds check in name_len().
After we advance the pointer by the length value in the buffer, make
sure it points to something in the captured data.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | name_len(netdissect_options *ndo,
const unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *maxbuf)
{
const unsigned char *s0 = s;
unsigned char c;
if (s >= maxbuf)
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1);
c = *s;
if ((c & 0xC0) == 0xC0)
return(2);
while (*s) {
if (s >= maxbuf)
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1);
s += (*s) + 1;
ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1);
}
return(PTR_DIFF(s, s0) + 1);
trunc:
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
}
| 167,961 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ffs_user_copy_worker(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct ffs_io_data *io_data = container_of(work, struct ffs_io_data,
work);
int ret = io_data->req->status ? io_data->req->status :
io_data->req->actual;
if (io_data->read && ret > 0) {
use_mm(io_data->mm);
ret = copy_to_iter(io_data->buf, ret, &io_data->data);
if (iov_iter_count(&io_data->data))
ret = -EFAULT;
unuse_mm(io_data->mm);
}
io_data->kiocb->ki_complete(io_data->kiocb, ret, ret);
if (io_data->ffs->ffs_eventfd &&
!(io_data->kiocb->ki_flags & IOCB_EVENTFD))
eventfd_signal(io_data->ffs->ffs_eventfd, 1);
usb_ep_free_request(io_data->ep, io_data->req);
io_data->kiocb->private = NULL;
if (io_data->read)
kfree(io_data->to_free);
kfree(io_data->buf);
kfree(io_data);
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static void ffs_user_copy_worker(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct ffs_io_data *io_data = container_of(work, struct ffs_io_data,
work);
int ret = io_data->req->status ? io_data->req->status :
io_data->req->actual;
bool kiocb_has_eventfd = io_data->kiocb->ki_flags & IOCB_EVENTFD;
if (io_data->read && ret > 0) {
use_mm(io_data->mm);
ret = copy_to_iter(io_data->buf, ret, &io_data->data);
if (iov_iter_count(&io_data->data))
ret = -EFAULT;
unuse_mm(io_data->mm);
}
io_data->kiocb->ki_complete(io_data->kiocb, ret, ret);
if (io_data->ffs->ffs_eventfd && !kiocb_has_eventfd)
eventfd_signal(io_data->ffs->ffs_eventfd, 1);
usb_ep_free_request(io_data->ep, io_data->req);
if (io_data->read)
kfree(io_data->to_free);
kfree(io_data->buf);
kfree(io_data);
}
| 166,924 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppCache::AddEntry(const GURL& url, const AppCacheEntry& entry) {
DCHECK(entries_.find(url) == entries_.end());
entries_.insert(EntryMap::value_type(url, entry));
cache_size_ += entry.response_size();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void AppCache::AddEntry(const GURL& url, const AppCacheEntry& entry) {
DCHECK(entries_.find(url) == entries_.end());
entries_.insert(EntryMap::value_type(url, entry));
cache_size_ += entry.response_size();
padding_size_ += entry.padding_size();
}
| 172,967 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gfx::Vector2d LayerTreeHost::DistributeScrollOffsetToViewports(
const gfx::Vector2d offset,
Layer* layer) {
DCHECK(layer);
if (layer != outer_viewport_scroll_layer_.get())
return offset;
gfx::Vector2d inner_viewport_offset =
inner_viewport_scroll_layer_->scroll_offset();
gfx::Vector2d outer_viewport_offset =
outer_viewport_scroll_layer_->scroll_offset();
if (offset == inner_viewport_offset + outer_viewport_offset) {
return outer_viewport_offset;
}
gfx::Vector2d max_outer_viewport_scroll_offset =
outer_viewport_scroll_layer_->MaxScrollOffset();
gfx::Vector2d max_inner_viewport_scroll_offset =
inner_viewport_scroll_layer_->MaxScrollOffset();
outer_viewport_offset = offset - inner_viewport_offset;
outer_viewport_offset.SetToMin(max_outer_viewport_scroll_offset);
outer_viewport_offset.SetToMax(gfx::Vector2d());
inner_viewport_offset = offset - outer_viewport_offset;
inner_viewport_offset.SetToMin(max_inner_viewport_scroll_offset);
inner_viewport_offset.SetToMax(gfx::Vector2d());
inner_viewport_scroll_layer_->SetScrollOffset(inner_viewport_offset);
return outer_viewport_offset;
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | gfx::Vector2d LayerTreeHost::DistributeScrollOffsetToViewports(
| 171,199 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::use_input_buffer(
OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_INOUT OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE** bufferHdr,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 bytes,
OMX_IN OMX_U8* buffer)
{
(void) hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned i = 0;
unsigned char *buf_addr = NULL;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("use_input_buffer: port = %u appData = %p bytes = %u buffer = %p",(unsigned int)port,appData,(unsigned int)bytes,buffer);
if (bytes != m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: use_input_buffer: Size Mismatch!! "
"bytes[%u] != Port.nBufferSize[%u]", (unsigned int)bytes, (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (!m_inp_mem_ptr) {
input_use_buffer = true;
m_inp_mem_ptr = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE*) \
calloc( (sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE)), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_inp_mem_ptr == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_inp_mem_ptr");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Successfully allocated m_inp_mem_ptr = %p", m_inp_mem_ptr);
m_pInput_pmem = (struct pmem *) calloc(sizeof (struct pmem), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pInput_pmem == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pInput_pmem");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pInput_ion = (struct venc_ion *) calloc(sizeof (struct venc_ion), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pInput_ion == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pInput_ion");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
for (i=0; i< m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = -1;
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd =-1;
m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd =-1;
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data.handle = 0;
#endif
}
}
for (i=0; i< m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++) {
if (BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_inp_bm_count,i)) {
break;
}
}
if (i < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
*bufferHdr = (m_inp_mem_ptr + i);
BITMASK_SET(&m_inp_bm_count,i);
(*bufferHdr)->pBuffer = (OMX_U8 *)buffer;
(*bufferHdr)->nSize = sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
(*bufferHdr)->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
(*bufferHdr)->nAllocLen = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
(*bufferHdr)->pAppPrivate = appData;
(*bufferHdr)->nInputPortIndex = PORT_INDEX_IN;
if (!m_use_input_pmem) {
#ifdef USE_ION
#ifdef _MSM8974_
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
&m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,0);
#else
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
&m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,ION_FLAG_CACHED);
#endif
if (m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ION device open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd;
#else
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
if (m_pInput_pmem[i].fd == 0) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
}
if (m_pInput_pmem[i] .fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: /dev/pmem_adsp open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
m_pInput_pmem[i].size = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
m_pInput_pmem[i].offset = 0;
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = (OMX_U8 *)SECURE_BUFPTR;
if(!secure_session) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)mmap(
NULL,m_pInput_pmem[i].size,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,m_pInput_pmem[i].fd,0);
if (m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer == MAP_FAILED) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: mmap() Failed");
close(m_pInput_pmem[i].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pInput_ion[i]);
#endif
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
}
} else {
OMX_QCOM_PLATFORM_PRIVATE_PMEM_INFO *pParam = reinterpret_cast<OMX_QCOM_PLATFORM_PRIVATE_PMEM_INFO *>((*bufferHdr)->pAppPrivate);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Inside qcom_ext with luma:(fd:%lu,offset:0x%x)", pParam->pmem_fd, (unsigned)pParam->offset);
if (pParam) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = pParam->pmem_fd;
m_pInput_pmem[i].offset = pParam->offset;
m_pInput_pmem[i].size = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)buffer;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("DBG:: pParam->pmem_fd = %u, pParam->offset = %u",
(unsigned int)pParam->pmem_fd, (unsigned int)pParam->offset);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid AppData given for PMEM i/p UseBuffer case");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("use_inp:: bufhdr = %p, pBuffer = %p, m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = %p",
(*bufferHdr), (*bufferHdr)->pBuffer, m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer);
if ( dev_use_buf(&m_pInput_pmem[i],PORT_INDEX_IN,i) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_use_buf() Failed for i/p buf");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: All buffers are already used, invalid use_buf call for "
"index = %u", i);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
return eRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::use_input_buffer(
OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_INOUT OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE** bufferHdr,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 bytes,
OMX_IN OMX_U8* buffer)
{
(void) hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
unsigned i = 0;
unsigned char *buf_addr = NULL;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("use_input_buffer: port = %u appData = %p bytes = %u buffer = %p",(unsigned int)port,appData,(unsigned int)bytes,buffer);
if (bytes != m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: use_input_buffer: Size Mismatch!! "
"bytes[%u] != Port.nBufferSize[%u]", (unsigned int)bytes, (unsigned int)m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize);
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (!m_inp_mem_ptr) {
input_use_buffer = true;
m_inp_mem_ptr = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE*) \
calloc( (sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE)), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_inp_mem_ptr == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_inp_mem_ptr");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Successfully allocated m_inp_mem_ptr = %p", m_inp_mem_ptr);
m_pInput_pmem = (struct pmem *) calloc(sizeof (struct pmem), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pInput_pmem == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pInput_pmem");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pInput_ion = (struct venc_ion *) calloc(sizeof (struct venc_ion), m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pInput_ion == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pInput_ion");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
for (i=0; i< m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = -1;
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd =-1;
m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd =-1;
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data.handle = 0;
#endif
}
}
for (i=0; i< m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++) {
if (BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_inp_bm_count,i)) {
break;
}
}
if (i < m_sInPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
*bufferHdr = (m_inp_mem_ptr + i);
BITMASK_SET(&m_inp_bm_count,i);
(*bufferHdr)->pBuffer = (OMX_U8 *)buffer;
(*bufferHdr)->nSize = sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
(*bufferHdr)->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
(*bufferHdr)->nAllocLen = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
(*bufferHdr)->pAppPrivate = appData;
(*bufferHdr)->nInputPortIndex = PORT_INDEX_IN;
if (!m_use_input_pmem) {
#ifdef USE_ION
#ifdef _MSM8974_
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
&m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,0);
#else
m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize,
&m_pInput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,ION_FLAG_CACHED);
#endif
if (m_pInput_ion[i].ion_device_fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ION device open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = m_pInput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd;
#else
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
if (m_pInput_pmem[i].fd == 0) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
}
if (m_pInput_pmem[i] .fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: /dev/pmem_adsp open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
m_pInput_pmem[i].size = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
m_pInput_pmem[i].offset = 0;
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = NULL;
if(!secure_session) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)mmap(
NULL,m_pInput_pmem[i].size,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,m_pInput_pmem[i].fd,0);
if (m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer == MAP_FAILED) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: mmap() Failed");
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = NULL;
close(m_pInput_pmem[i].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pInput_ion[i]);
#endif
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
}
} else {
OMX_QCOM_PLATFORM_PRIVATE_PMEM_INFO *pParam = reinterpret_cast<OMX_QCOM_PLATFORM_PRIVATE_PMEM_INFO *>((*bufferHdr)->pAppPrivate);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Inside qcom_ext with luma:(fd:%lu,offset:0x%x)", pParam->pmem_fd, (unsigned)pParam->offset);
if (pParam) {
m_pInput_pmem[i].fd = pParam->pmem_fd;
m_pInput_pmem[i].offset = pParam->offset;
m_pInput_pmem[i].size = m_sInPortDef.nBufferSize;
m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)buffer;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("DBG:: pParam->pmem_fd = %u, pParam->offset = %u",
(unsigned int)pParam->pmem_fd, (unsigned int)pParam->offset);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid AppData given for PMEM i/p UseBuffer case");
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("use_inp:: bufhdr = %p, pBuffer = %p, m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer = %p",
(*bufferHdr), (*bufferHdr)->pBuffer, m_pInput_pmem[i].buffer);
if ( dev_use_buf(&m_pInput_pmem[i],PORT_INDEX_IN,i) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_use_buf() Failed for i/p buf");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: All buffers are already used, invalid use_buf call for "
"index = %u", i);
eRet = OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
return eRet;
}
| 173,503 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_size_of_type(int color_type, int bit_depth, unsigned int *colors)
{
if (*colors)
return 16;
else
{
int pixel_depth = pixel_depth_of_type(color_type, bit_depth);
if (pixel_depth < 8)
return 64;
else if (pixel_depth > 16)
return 1024;
else
return 256;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_size_of_type(int color_type, int bit_depth, unsigned int *colors)
image_size_of_type(int color_type, int bit_depth, unsigned int *colors,
int small)
{
if (*colors)
return 16;
else
{
int pixel_depth = pixel_depth_of_type(color_type, bit_depth);
if (small)
{
if (pixel_depth <= 8) /* there will be one row */
return 1 << pixel_depth;
else
return 256;
}
else if (pixel_depth < 8)
return 64;
else if (pixel_depth > 16)
return 1024;
else
return 256;
}
}
| 173,581 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::DownloadUrl(
std::unique_ptr<download::DownloadUrlParameters> params,
std::unique_ptr<storage::BlobDataHandle> blob_data_handle,
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> blob_url_loader_factory) {
if (params->post_id() >= 0) {
DCHECK(params->prefer_cache());
DCHECK_EQ("POST", params->method());
}
download::RecordDownloadCountWithSource(
download::DownloadCountTypes::DOWNLOAD_TRIGGERED_COUNT,
params->download_source());
auto* rfh = RenderFrameHost::FromID(params->render_process_host_id(),
params->render_frame_host_routing_id());
BeginDownloadInternal(std::move(params), std::move(blob_data_handle),
std::move(blob_url_loader_factory), true,
rfh ? rfh->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL() : GURL());
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <[email protected]>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void DownloadManagerImpl::DownloadUrl(
std::unique_ptr<download::DownloadUrlParameters> params,
std::unique_ptr<storage::BlobDataHandle> blob_data_handle,
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> blob_url_loader_factory) {
if (params->post_id() >= 0) {
DCHECK(params->prefer_cache());
DCHECK_EQ("POST", params->method());
}
download::RecordDownloadCountWithSource(
download::DownloadCountTypes::DOWNLOAD_TRIGGERED_COUNT,
params->download_source());
auto* rfh = RenderFrameHost::FromID(params->render_process_host_id(),
params->render_frame_host_routing_id());
if (rfh)
params->set_frame_tree_node_id(rfh->GetFrameTreeNodeId());
BeginDownloadInternal(std::move(params), std::move(blob_data_handle),
std::move(blob_url_loader_factory), true,
rfh ? rfh->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL() : GURL());
}
| 173,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
int32 route_id, int gpu_host_id, bool presented, uint32 sync_point) {
GpuProcessHostUIShim* ui_shim = GpuProcessHostUIShim::FromID(gpu_host_id);
if (ui_shim)
ui_shim->Send(new AcceleratedSurfaceMsg_BufferPresented(route_id,
presented,
sync_point));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(
int32 route_id, int gpu_host_id, uint64 surface_handle, uint32 sync_point) {
GpuProcessHostUIShim* ui_shim = GpuProcessHostUIShim::FromID(gpu_host_id);
if (ui_shim)
ui_shim->Send(new AcceleratedSurfaceMsg_BufferPresented(route_id,
surface_handle,
sync_point));
}
| 171,366 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(linkinfo)
{
char *link;
size_t link_len;
zend_stat_t sb;
int ret;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p", &link, &link_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ret = VCWD_STAT(link, &sb);
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
RETURN_LONG(Z_L(-1));
}
RETURN_LONG((zend_long) sb.st_dev);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #76459 windows linkinfo lacks openbasedir check
CWE ID: CWE-200 | PHP_FUNCTION(linkinfo)
{
char *link;
char *dirname;
size_t link_len;
zend_stat_t sb;
int ret;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p", &link, &link_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
dirname = estrndup(link, link_len);
php_dirname(dirname, link_len);
if (php_check_open_basedir(dirname)) {
efree(dirname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ret = VCWD_STAT(link, &sb);
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
efree(dirname);
RETURN_LONG(Z_L(-1));
}
efree(dirname);
RETURN_LONG((zend_long) sb.st_dev);
}
| 169,107 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int SocketStream::DoBeforeConnect() {
next_state_ = STATE_BEFORE_CONNECT_COMPLETE;
if (!context_.get() || !context_->network_delegate()) {
return OK;
}
int result = context_->network_delegate()->NotifyBeforeSocketStreamConnect(
this, io_callback_);
if (result != OK && result != ERR_IO_PENDING)
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | int SocketStream::DoBeforeConnect() {
next_state_ = STATE_BEFORE_CONNECT_COMPLETE;
if (!context_ || !context_->network_delegate())
return OK;
int result = context_->network_delegate()->NotifyBeforeSocketStreamConnect(
this, io_callback_);
if (result != OK && result != ERR_IO_PENDING)
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return result;
}
| 171,253 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int handle_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
u32 intr_info, ex_no, error_code;
unsigned long cr2, rip, dr6;
u32 vect_info;
enum emulation_result er;
vect_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
intr_info = vmx->exit_intr_info;
if (is_machine_check(intr_info))
return handle_machine_check(vcpu);
if ((intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) == INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR)
return 1; /* already handled by vmx_vcpu_run() */
if (is_no_device(intr_info)) {
vmx_fpu_activate(vcpu);
return 1;
}
if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info)) {
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
er = emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD);
if (er != EMULATE_DONE)
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
error_code = 0;
if (intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
/*
* The #PF with PFEC.RSVD = 1 indicates the guest is accessing
* MMIO, it is better to report an internal error.
* See the comments in vmx_handle_exit.
*/
if ((vect_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
!(is_page_fault(intr_info) && !(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK))) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_SIMUL_EX;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 3;
vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vect_info;
vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = intr_info;
vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = error_code;
return 0;
}
if (is_page_fault(intr_info)) {
/* EPT won't cause page fault directly */
BUG_ON(enable_ept);
cr2 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
trace_kvm_page_fault(cr2, error_code);
if (kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu))
kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt(vcpu, cr2);
return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, cr2, error_code, NULL, 0);
}
ex_no = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no))
return handle_rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no, error_code);
switch (ex_no) {
case DB_VECTOR:
dr6 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
if (!(vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))) {
vcpu->arch.dr6 &= ~15;
vcpu->arch.dr6 |= dr6 | DR6_RTM;
if (!(dr6 & ~DR6_RESERVED)) /* icebp */
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
kvm_run->debug.arch.dr6 = dr6 | DR6_FIXED_1;
kvm_run->debug.arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
/* fall through */
case BP_VECTOR:
/*
* Update instruction length as we may reinject #BP from
* user space while in guest debugging mode. Reading it for
* #DB as well causes no harm, it is not used in that case.
*/
vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CS_BASE) + rip;
kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = ex_no;
break;
default:
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION;
kvm_run->ex.exception = ex_no;
kvm_run->ex.error_code = error_code;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static int handle_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
u32 intr_info, ex_no, error_code;
unsigned long cr2, rip, dr6;
u32 vect_info;
enum emulation_result er;
vect_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
intr_info = vmx->exit_intr_info;
if (is_machine_check(intr_info))
return handle_machine_check(vcpu);
if ((intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) == INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR)
return 1; /* already handled by vmx_vcpu_run() */
if (is_no_device(intr_info)) {
vmx_fpu_activate(vcpu);
return 1;
}
if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info)) {
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
er = emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD);
if (er != EMULATE_DONE)
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
error_code = 0;
if (intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
/*
* The #PF with PFEC.RSVD = 1 indicates the guest is accessing
* MMIO, it is better to report an internal error.
* See the comments in vmx_handle_exit.
*/
if ((vect_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
!(is_page_fault(intr_info) && !(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK))) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_SIMUL_EX;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 3;
vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vect_info;
vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = intr_info;
vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = error_code;
return 0;
}
if (is_page_fault(intr_info)) {
/* EPT won't cause page fault directly */
BUG_ON(enable_ept);
cr2 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
trace_kvm_page_fault(cr2, error_code);
if (kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu))
kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt(vcpu, cr2);
return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, cr2, error_code, NULL, 0);
}
ex_no = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no))
return handle_rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no, error_code);
switch (ex_no) {
case AC_VECTOR:
kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, error_code);
return 1;
case DB_VECTOR:
dr6 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
if (!(vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))) {
vcpu->arch.dr6 &= ~15;
vcpu->arch.dr6 |= dr6 | DR6_RTM;
if (!(dr6 & ~DR6_RESERVED)) /* icebp */
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
kvm_run->debug.arch.dr6 = dr6 | DR6_FIXED_1;
kvm_run->debug.arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
/* fall through */
case BP_VECTOR:
/*
* Update instruction length as we may reinject #BP from
* user space while in guest debugging mode. Reading it for
* #DB as well causes no harm, it is not used in that case.
*/
vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CS_BASE) + rip;
kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = ex_no;
break;
default:
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION;
kvm_run->ex.exception = ex_no;
kvm_run->ex.error_code = error_code;
break;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,599 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static enum try_read_result try_read_network(conn *c) {
enum try_read_result gotdata = READ_NO_DATA_RECEIVED;
int res;
assert(c != NULL);
if (c->rcurr != c->rbuf) {
if (c->rbytes != 0) /* otherwise there's nothing to copy */
memmove(c->rbuf, c->rcurr, c->rbytes);
c->rcurr = c->rbuf;
}
while (1) {
if (c->rbytes >= c->rsize) {
char *new_rbuf = realloc(c->rbuf, c->rsize * 2);
if (!new_rbuf) {
if (settings.verbose > 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't realloc input buffer\n");
c->rbytes = 0; /* ignore what we read */
out_string(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory reading request");
c->write_and_go = conn_closing;
return READ_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
c->rcurr = c->rbuf = new_rbuf;
c->rsize *= 2;
}
int avail = c->rsize - c->rbytes;
res = read(c->sfd, c->rbuf + c->rbytes, avail);
if (res > 0) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.bytes_read += res;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
gotdata = READ_DATA_RECEIVED;
c->rbytes += res;
if (res == avail) {
continue;
} else {
break;
}
}
if (res == 0) {
return READ_ERROR;
}
if (res == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
break;
}
return READ_ERROR;
}
}
return gotdata;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static enum try_read_result try_read_network(conn *c) {
enum try_read_result gotdata = READ_NO_DATA_RECEIVED;
int res;
int num_allocs = 0;
assert(c != NULL);
if (c->rcurr != c->rbuf) {
if (c->rbytes != 0) /* otherwise there's nothing to copy */
memmove(c->rbuf, c->rcurr, c->rbytes);
c->rcurr = c->rbuf;
}
while (1) {
if (c->rbytes >= c->rsize) {
if (num_allocs == 4) {
return gotdata;
}
++num_allocs;
char *new_rbuf = realloc(c->rbuf, c->rsize * 2);
if (!new_rbuf) {
if (settings.verbose > 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't realloc input buffer\n");
c->rbytes = 0; /* ignore what we read */
out_string(c, "SERVER_ERROR out of memory reading request");
c->write_and_go = conn_closing;
return READ_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
c->rcurr = c->rbuf = new_rbuf;
c->rsize *= 2;
}
int avail = c->rsize - c->rbytes;
res = read(c->sfd, c->rbuf + c->rbytes, avail);
if (res > 0) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.bytes_read += res;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
gotdata = READ_DATA_RECEIVED;
c->rbytes += res;
if (res == avail) {
continue;
} else {
break;
}
}
if (res == 0) {
return READ_ERROR;
}
if (res == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
break;
}
return READ_ERROR;
}
}
return gotdata;
}
| 169,876 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::setBuffers(
bool audio, Vector<MediaBuffer *> &buffers) {
if (mIsSecure && !audio) {
return mVideoTrack.mSource->setBuffers(buffers);
}
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::setBuffers(
bool audio, Vector<MediaBuffer *> &buffers) {
if (mIsWidevine && !audio && mVideoTrack.mSource != NULL) {
return mVideoTrack.mSource->setBuffers(buffers);
}
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
| 173,763 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pixel_copy(png_bytep toBuffer, png_uint_32 toIndex,
png_const_bytep fromBuffer, png_uint_32 fromIndex, unsigned int pixelSize)
{
/* Assume we can multiply by 'size' without overflow because we are
* just working in a single buffer.
*/
toIndex *= pixelSize;
fromIndex *= pixelSize;
if (pixelSize < 8) /* Sub-byte */
{
/* Mask to select the location of the copied pixel: */
unsigned int destMask = ((1U<<pixelSize)-1) << (8-pixelSize-(toIndex&7));
/* The following read the entire pixels and clears the extra: */
unsigned int destByte = toBuffer[toIndex >> 3] & ~destMask;
unsigned int sourceByte = fromBuffer[fromIndex >> 3];
/* Don't rely on << or >> supporting '0' here, just in case: */
fromIndex &= 7;
if (fromIndex > 0) sourceByte <<= fromIndex;
if ((toIndex & 7) > 0) sourceByte >>= toIndex & 7;
toBuffer[toIndex >> 3] = (png_byte)(destByte | (sourceByte & destMask));
}
else /* One or more bytes */
memmove(toBuffer+(toIndex>>3), fromBuffer+(fromIndex>>3), pixelSize>>3);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | pixel_copy(png_bytep toBuffer, png_uint_32 toIndex,
png_const_bytep fromBuffer, png_uint_32 fromIndex, unsigned int pixelSize,
int littleendian)
{
/* Assume we can multiply by 'size' without overflow because we are
* just working in a single buffer.
*/
toIndex *= pixelSize;
fromIndex *= pixelSize;
if (pixelSize < 8) /* Sub-byte */
{
/* Mask to select the location of the copied pixel: */
unsigned int destMask = ((1U<<pixelSize)-1) <<
(littleendian ? toIndex&7 : 8-pixelSize-(toIndex&7));
/* The following read the entire pixels and clears the extra: */
unsigned int destByte = toBuffer[toIndex >> 3] & ~destMask;
unsigned int sourceByte = fromBuffer[fromIndex >> 3];
/* Don't rely on << or >> supporting '0' here, just in case: */
fromIndex &= 7;
if (littleendian)
{
if (fromIndex > 0) sourceByte >>= fromIndex;
if ((toIndex & 7) > 0) sourceByte <<= toIndex & 7;
}
else
{
if (fromIndex > 0) sourceByte <<= fromIndex;
if ((toIndex & 7) > 0) sourceByte >>= toIndex & 7;
}
toBuffer[toIndex >> 3] = (png_byte)(destByte | (sourceByte & destMask));
}
else /* One or more bytes */
memmove(toBuffer+(toIndex>>3), fromBuffer+(fromIndex>>3), pixelSize>>3);
}
| 173,685 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(inotify_init1, int, flags)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group;
struct user_struct *user;
int ret;
/* Check the IN_* constants for consistency. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(IN_CLOEXEC != O_CLOEXEC);
BUILD_BUG_ON(IN_NONBLOCK != O_NONBLOCK);
if (flags & ~(IN_CLOEXEC | IN_NONBLOCK))
return -EINVAL;
user = get_current_user();
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&user->inotify_devs) >=
inotify_max_user_instances)) {
ret = -EMFILE;
goto out_free_uid;
}
/* fsnotify_obtain_group took a reference to group, we put this when we kill the file in the end */
group = inotify_new_group(user, inotify_max_queued_events);
if (IS_ERR(group)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(group);
goto out_free_uid;
}
atomic_inc(&user->inotify_devs);
ret = anon_inode_getfd("inotify", &inotify_fops, group,
O_RDONLY | flags);
if (ret >= 0)
return ret;
fsnotify_put_group(group);
atomic_dec(&user->inotify_devs);
out_free_uid:
free_uid(user);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: inotify: fix double free/corruption of stuct user
On an error path in inotify_init1 a normal user can trigger a double
free of struct user. This is a regression introduced by a2ae4cc9a16e
("inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure").
We fix this by making sure that if a group exists the user reference is
dropped when the group is cleaned up. We should not explictly drop the
reference on error and also drop the reference when the group is cleaned
up.
The new lifetime rules are that an inotify group lives from
inotify_new_group to the last fsnotify_put_group. Since the struct user
and inotify_devs are directly tied to this lifetime they are only
changed/updated in those two locations. We get rid of all special
casing of struct user or user->inotify_devs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] (2.6.37 and up)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | SYSCALL_DEFINE1(inotify_init1, int, flags)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group;
int ret;
/* Check the IN_* constants for consistency. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(IN_CLOEXEC != O_CLOEXEC);
BUILD_BUG_ON(IN_NONBLOCK != O_NONBLOCK);
if (flags & ~(IN_CLOEXEC | IN_NONBLOCK))
return -EINVAL;
/* fsnotify_obtain_group took a reference to group, we put this when we kill the file in the end */
group = inotify_new_group(inotify_max_queued_events);
if (IS_ERR(group))
return PTR_ERR(group);
ret = anon_inode_getfd("inotify", &inotify_fops, group,
O_RDONLY | flags);
if (ret < 0)
fsnotify_put_group(group);
return ret;
}
| 165,887 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void test_base64_decode(void)
{
char buffer[16];
int len = mutt_b64_decode(buffer, encoded);
if (!TEST_CHECK(len == sizeof(clear) - 1))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %zu", sizeof(clear) - 1);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %zu", len);
}
buffer[len] = '\0';
if (!TEST_CHECK(strcmp(buffer, clear) == 0))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %s", clear);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %s", buffer);
}
}
Commit Message: Check outbuf length in mutt_to_base64()
The obuf can be overflowed in auth_cram.c, and possibly auth_gss.c.
Thanks to Jeriko One for the bug report.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void test_base64_decode(void)
{
char buffer[16];
int len = mutt_b64_decode(buffer, encoded, sizeof(buffer));
if (!TEST_CHECK(len == sizeof(clear) - 1))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %zu", sizeof(clear) - 1);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %zu", len);
}
buffer[len] = '\0';
if (!TEST_CHECK(strcmp(buffer, clear) == 0))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %s", clear);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %s", buffer);
}
}
| 169,130 |
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